People v.
Zaragosa, VIII on Crimes Against Persons is clearly not included among any of the
SB-17-CRM-0652
24 August 2017
FACTS:
The following information was filed before the Sandiganbayan against the
accused:
That on 5 July 2012, or sometime prior or subsequent
thereto, in Davao City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, accused Col. Cristobal Nocillado
Zaragoza, a high ranking public officer, being then a member
of the Philippine Army, Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP), holding the rank of Colonel, committing the offense in
relation to his office in that it was committed while in his
actual performance of his official duties as a superior military
officer, in the guise of instilling military discipline to a
subordinate officer, taking advantage of his position and in
grave abuse thereof, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault and use personal violence
upon the person of Edwin M. Piodos, also a member of the
AFP, by punching, the latter's stomach several times, thereby
inflicting upon him physical injury (soft issue contusion,
epigastric area) with probable healing time of three to five
days. (underscoring by Sandiganbayan)
A Motion to Quash Information Ex Abudanti Ad Cautela was filed by the
accused on the following grounds:
(1) lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged based on Section 3(b),
Rule 117 of the Rules of Court;
(2) prescription of the offense under Section 3(g) of the same Rule; and
(3) inordinate delay in the disposition of his case before the Office of
the Ombudsman.
ARGUMENT OF THE ACCUSED:
Anent the first ground, the accused-movant contended that the
crime of slight physical injuries as cited in the Revised Penal Code under Title
offenses covered by Section 2 of Republic Act (RA) No. 10660 amending
Section 4 of Presidential Decree (PO) No. 1606. He pointed out that he was
then the Assistant Chief of the United Command Staff for Intelligence (U2) of
Eastern Mindanao Command. His office and duty were related to the
intelligence function of the command. On the other hand, the complainant,
although assigned in Eastern Mindanao Command, was not involved with his
office inasmuch as the latter was then a staff (driver) of the United
Command's Adjutant which was separate and distinct from the office of the
accused-movant. While the complainant and the accused-movant may be in
the same vicinity and command, the duties of the latter in the discharge of
his functions are not related to the complainant's official functions.
Regarding the second ground on prescription of the offense, the
accused-movant pointed out that it took the Office of the Ombudsman
almost four (4) years before issuing its Joint Resolution from the time he
submitted his Counter-Affidavit on October 15, 2012. According to him, the
alleged incident took place on July 5, 2012 and the complainant filed his
affidavit-complaint on July 18, 2012. However, the Joint Resolution of the
Office of the Ombudsman was issued only on June 21, 2016. The offense
charged being a light offense, the same prescribes in two (2) months as
provided under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Corollarily, on the
third ground, accused-movant posited that his constitutional right to speedy
disposition of his case has been violated due to the inordinate delay which
the same office took in resolving the complaint against him.
ARGUMENT OF THE PROSECUTION:
The prosecution countered that the offense charged was committed
in relation to the office of the accused-movant who, based on his own
admission in his position paper submitted to the Office of the Ombudsman,
had the right and duty to instill military discipline among the personnel within
his jurisdiction. What determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is the
specific factual allegation in the information that would indicate close
intimacy between the discharge of the accused-movant's official duties and
the commission of the offense charged.
As regards the issues of prescription and inordinate delay, the
prosecution cited the case of Mendoza-Ong v. Sandiganbayan, wherein the
Supreme Court took judicial notice of the fact that the nature of the Office of
the Ombudsman encourages individuals who clamor for efficient government
service to lodge freely their complaints against alleged wrongdoing of
government personnel as a result of which a steady stream of cases inevitably
results. Naturally, said the high court, disposition of those cases would take
some time. Besides, pursuant to the case of People v. Del Roserid',
prescription was interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information,
and shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without
the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for
any reason not imputable to him.
In addition, the prosecution pointed out that the instant motion,
though filed in the guise of a motion to quash, is actually a motion to dismiss
the complaint which is a prohibited pleading under the Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure that governs the instant case.
ISSUE:
Are the grounds for the motion to quash valid?
RULING OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN:
ONLY THE THIRD GROUND IS VALID.
On the first ground The slight physical injuries committed is in relation to
the office:
From a reading of the above-quoted information for the offense of slight
physical injuries that sufficient allegations have been set out in order to
establish that the crime was purportedly committed by the accused-movant
in relation to his office. Hence, the said ground for the instant motion to
quash is bereft of any valid basis.
On the second ground The prescriptive period stopped running when the
charge was filed:
The affidavit-complaint was filed with the Office of the Ombudsman on July
18, 2012, or thirteen (13) days after the alleged incident on July 5, 2012. The
filing thereof effectively tolled the running of the prescriptive period of the
offense. The prescriptive period remained suspended after the filing of the
complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman.
On the third ground The complaint is too simple for the delay:
The Supreme Court applied the "balancing test" where four (4) factors are
used as guidelines in the determination of whether the constitutional right to
speedy disposition of cases is violated, namely:
(1) the length of delay;
(2) the reason for the delay;
(3) the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and
(4) the prejudice caused by the delay.
To justify its procedural lag, the Office of the Ombudsman could only
invoke jurisprudence where it was apparently acknowledged that its office is
saddled with a "steady stream of cases" occasioned by the filing of complaints
relative to alleged wrongdoing of government personnel. However, such a
pronouncement by the high court cannot be used as an unbridled license as
if it is a protective shield to justify every protracted investigation; but should
be on a case-to-case or an ad hoc basis taking into consideration the
attendant facts therein.
The offense charged herein is slight physical injuries which does not
entail complex issues to be resolved nor voluminous documents to be pored
over before the preliminary investigation can be concluded. In fact, the
record reveals that the graft investigation officer had to contend with a mere
two (2)-page complaint-affidavit with a single-page medical certificate and a
police blotter as Annexes "A" and "8", together with the six (6)-page counter-
affidavit of the therein respondent devoid of any attachment, in his
investigation. Verily, four (4) years is too long a time for the Office of the
Ombudsman just to finally come out with its resolution finding probable
cause against the accused.
THE MOTION TO QUASH WAS GRANTED.