JRCMLAW ARCHIVES August 7, 2017
WEEK 6 All these requisites must concur in order to create a tenancy relationship
LAND TENURE IMPROVEMENT
It is the improvement of the tenurial and socio-economic status of the
farmers short of transferring full ownership of the land
A) IMPROVEMENT OF THE LEASEHOLD RELATIONSHIP (PP. 160)
Determination of Lease Rentals
Section 12. Determination of Lease Rentals. In order to protect and
improve the tenurial and economic status of the farmers in tenanted
lands under the retention limit and lands not yet acquired under this Act,
the DAR is mandated to determine and fix immediately the lease rentals
thereof in accordance with Section 34 of
Republic Act No. 3844, as amended: provided, that the DAR shall
immediately and periodically review and adjust the rental structure for
different crops, including rice and corn, or different regions in order to
improve progressively the conditions of the farmer, tenant or lessee
WHAT CONSTITUTE A LEASEHOLD RELATIONSHIP?
Cabals vs. DAR, GR No. 78214, December 5, 1988
(168 SCRA 247)
Facts:
The landholding subject of the controversy is consists of 60 sqm was
acquired by spouses Arturo and Yolanda Caballes by virute of a Deed of
Sale executed by Andrea Alicaba Millenes, this land is situated in Lawaan
Talisay, Cebu. Before the sale of the property to Caballes, Bienvenido
Abajon constructed his house on a protion of the land, paying monthly
rental to Andrea Millenes. Abjon was likewise allowed to plant thereon,
and they have agreed that the produce thereon would be shred by them
50-50.
When the property was sold, Caballes told Abajon that they will put up a
poultry on the land and they intended to build it close to Abajon's house
and they pursuaded Abajon to transfer his dwelling to the opposite
portion of the land. Abajon offered to pay renta; to the new owners, but
they refuse and later demanded for Abajon to vacate. Abajon refused to
leave.
DAR concluded that Abajon was a tenant of the former owner, Andrea.
Issue: Whether Abajon is a tenant under the new owners.
Ruling:
Abajon is not a tenant for it only occupied a miniscule portion of the land
which cannot be interpreted as economic-family size farm under the
definition of RA 3844.
The essential requisites of a tenancy relationship are:
1. The parties are the landowner and the tenant;
2. The subject is agricultural land;
3. There is consent;
4. The purpose is agricultural production;
5. There is personal cultivation; and
6. There is sharing of harvests.
NOTES IN AGRARIAN REFORM LAW
between the parties. The absence of one does not make an occupant of a
parcel of land, or a cultivator thereof, or a planter thereon, a de jure
tenant. This is so because unless a person has established his status as a
de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure nor is he covered by
the Land Reform Program of the Government under existing tenancy
laws.
Therefore, the fact of sharing alone is not sufficient to establish a tenancy
relationship. Certainly, it is not unusual for a landowner to accept some of
the produce of his land from someone who plants certain crops thereon.
This is a typical and laudable provinciano trait of sharing or patikim, a
native way of expressing gratitude for favor received. This, however, does
not automatically make the tiller-sharer a tenant thereof especially when
the area tilled is only 60, or even 500, square meters and located in an
urban area and in. the heart of an industrial or commercial zone at that.
Tenancy status arises only if an occupant of a parcel of land has been
given its possession for the primary purpose of agricultural production.
The circumstances of this case indicate that the private respondent's
status is more of a caretaker who was allowed by the owner out of
benevolence or compassion to live in the premises and to have a garden
of some sort at its south western side rather than a tenant of the said
portion.
Anent the second assignment of error, the petitioner argues that since
Abajon, is not an agricultural tenant, the criminal case for malicious
mischief filed against him should be declared as proper for trial so that
proceedings in the lower court can resume.
Gelos vs. Court of Appeals
(208 SCRA 608, 1992)
Facts:
The Private Respondent owned the subject land of 25,000 square meters
in Laguna. The Landowner then entered in to a contract with the
petitioner and employed him to be laborer on the land with the wage of
5.00 peso a day. The Petitioner first went the Court of Agrarian Relation
and then went to Ministry of Agrarian reform and asked the court to fix
the agricultural lease rental of the land and his request was granted.
The private respondent then filed a complaint of illegal detainer against
the petitioner that was that was dismissed by the Ministry of Agrarian
reform for the existence of Tenancy relations between the parties. The
Private respondents appealed to the office of the President alleging that
there was no tenancy relation between the parties. The RTC rendered
dismissed the complaint and assailed that there was a tenancy relation
between the parties. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the
RTC
Issue: Is there a Tenancy relation between the parties?
Held:
No, it was clear that the petitioner were not intended to be tenant but a
mere employee of the private respondent as showed in the contract. The
petitioner was paid for specific kind of work. The court stressed many
cases that:
"tenancy is not a purely factual relationship dependent on what the
alleged tenant does upon the land. It is also a legal relationship. The
1

intent of the parties, the understanding when the farmer is installed, and
as in this case, their written agreements, provided these are complied
with and are not contrary to law, are even more important."
It should also be considered that a tenant is defined under Section 5(a)
R.A 1199 as a person who himself and with the aid available from within
his immediate farm household cultivates the land belonging to or
possessed by another, with the latter's consent, for purposes of
production, sharing the produce with the landholder under the share
tenancy system, or paying to the landholder a price-certain or
ascertainable in produce or in money or both, under the leasehold
tenancy system.
Therefore the court laid down the requisites for the tenancy relationship
to exist:
1) The parties are the landowner and the tenant;
2) The subject is agricultural land;
3) There is consent;
4) The purpose is agricultural production;
5) There is personal cultivation; and
6) There is sharing of harvest or payment of rental.
Absence of this clearly does not qualify someone to be a tenant. It is clear
that it is not a tenancy relationship that exists between the parties, what
they have is employee-employer relationship.
Gabriel vs. Pangilinan
(58 SCRA 590, 1974)
Facts:
Gabriel filed a complaint against Pangilinan claiming she is the owner of a
169,507 sqm fishpond in barrio Sta. Ursula, Pampanga. An oral contract
of lease with a yearly rental was entered between them. Defendant was
notified that the contract would be terminated, but upon request was
extended for another year.
Defendant moved for the dismissal of the complaint claiming that the
trial court had no jurisdiction. It should properly pertain to the Court of
Agrarian Relations, there being an agricultural leasehold tenancy
relationship between the parties. Upon opposition by plaintiff, the motion
was denied. The defendant filed his answer that the land was originally
verbally leased to him by the plaintiff's father, Potenciano for as long as
the defendant wanted, subject to the condition that he would convert the
major portion into a fishpond and that which was already a fishpond be
improved at his expense, which would be reimbursed by Potenciano
Gabriel or his heirs at the termination of the lease. Plaintiff also assured
him that he could continue leasing as long as he wanted since she was not
in a position to attend to it personally.
Parties were ordered to adduce evidence for the purpose of determining
which Court shall take cognizance of the case.
It appears that the defendant ceased to work on planting fingerlings,
repairing dikes and such, personally with the aid of helpers since he
became ill and incapacitated. His daughter, Pilar Pangilinan, took over
who said that she helps her father in administering the leased property,
conveying his instructions to the workers. Excepting Pilar who is residing
near the fishpond, defendants other children are all professionals; a
lawyer, an engineer, and a priest all residing in Manila. None of these has
been seen working on the fishpond.
NOTES IN AGRARIAN REFORM LAW
JRCMLAW ARCHIVES August 7, 2017
Defendant: relationship between the parties is an agricultural leasehold
tenancy governed by Republic Act No. 1199, as amended, pursuant to
section 35 of Republic Act No. 3844, and the present case is within the
original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations.
Plaintiff: defendant ceased to work the fishpond personally or with the
aid of the members of his immediate farm household (Section 4, Republic
Act No. 1199) the tenancy relationship between the parties has been
extinguished (Section 9, id.) and become of civil lease and therefore the
trial court properly assumed jurisdiction over the case.
Trial Court: The lease contract is a civil lease governed by the New Civil
Code. No tenancy relationship exists between the plaintiff and the
defendant as defined by Republic Act No. 1199. Court is vested with
jurisdiction to try and decide this case.
Reconsideration by the defendant was denied. He appealed to this Court.
ISSUES:
1. Lower court erred in considering the relationship of appellee and
appellant as that of a civil lease and not a leasehold tenancy under Rep.
Act No. 1199 as amended.
2. The lower court erred in not holding that the Court of First Instance is
without jurisdiction, the cue being that of an agrarian relation in nature
pursuant to Rep Act. No. 1199.
HELD:
Important differences between a leasehold tenancy and a civil law lease.
The leasehold tenancy is limited to agricultural land; that of civil law
lease may be either rural or urban property. As to attention and
cultivation, the law requires the leasehold tenant to personally attend to,
and cultivate the agricultural land, whereas the civil law lessee need not
personally cultivate or work the thing leased. As to purpose, the
landholding in leasehold tenancy is devoted to agriculture, whereas in
civil law lease, the purpose may be for any other lawful pursuits. As to the
law that governs, the civil law lease is governed by the Civil Code,
whereas leasehold tenancy is governed by special laws.
The requisites for leasehold tenancy under the Agricultural Tenancy Act
to exist:
1. land worked by the tenant is an agricultural land;
2. land is susceptible of cultivation by a single person together with
members of his immediate farm household;
3. must be cultivated by the tenant either personally or with the aid of
labor available from members of his immediate farm household;
4. land belongs to another; and
5. use of the land by the tenant is for a consideration of a fixed amount in
money or in produce or in both
There is no doubt that the land is agricultural land. It is a fishpond and
the Agricultural Tenancy Act, which refers to "agricultural land",
specifically mentions fishponds and prescribes the consideration for the
use thereof. The mere fact that a person works an agricultural land does
not necessarily make him a leasehold tenant within the purview of Sec 4
of Republic Act No. 1199. He may still be a civil law lessee unless the
other requisites as above enumerated are complied with.
The court doesnt want to decide on the second requisite since it wasnt
raised. For the third requisite, the tenancy agreement was severed in
1956 when he ceased to work the fishpond personally because he became
2

ill and incapacitated. Not even did the members of appellant's immediate
farm household work the land. Only the members of the family of the
tenant and such other persons, whether related to the tenant or not, who
are dependent upon him for support and who usually help him to operate
the farm enterprise are included in the term "immediate farm
household".
Republic Act No. 1199 is explicit in requiring the tenant and his
immediate family to work the land. A person, in order to be considered a
tenant, must himself and with the aid available from his immediate farm
household cultivate the land. Persons, therefore, who do not actually
work the land cannot be considered tenants; and he who hires others
whom he pays for doing the cultivation of the land, ceases to hold, and is
considered as having abandoned the land as tenant within the meaning of
sections 5 and 8 of Republic Act. No. 1199, and ceases to enjoy the status,
rights, and privileges of one.
We are, therefore, constrained to agree with the court a quo that the
relationship between the appellee Trinidad Gabriel and appellant Eusebio
Pangilinan was not a leasehold tenancy under Republic Act No. 1199.
Hence, this case was not within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of
the Court of Agrarian Relations.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the Court of First Instance
of Pampanga in its Civil Case No. 1823, appealed from, is affirmed, with
costs against the appellants.
Reference: Administrative Order No. 2, s, 2006, Revised Rules and
Procedures Governing Leasehold Implementation in Tenanted Agricultural
Lands
b) Production Sharing (Sec 32)
Section 32. Production-Sharing. Pending final land transfer, individuals
or entities owning, or operating under lease or management contract,
agricultural lands are hereby mandated to execute a production-sharing
plan with their farm workers or farmworkers' reorganization, if any,
whereby three percent (3%) of the gross sales from the production of
such lands are distributed within sixty (60) days of the end of the fiscal
year as compensation to regular and other farmworkers in such lands
over and above the compensation they currently receive: provided, that
these individuals or entities realize gross sales in excess of five million
pesos per annum unless the DAR, upon proper application, determines a
lower ceiling.
In the event that the individual or entity realizes a profit, an additional
ten percent (10%) of the net profit after tax shall be distributed to said
regular and other farmworkers within ninety (90) days of the end of the
fiscal year.
To forestall any disruption in the normal operation of lands to be turned
over to the farmworker-beneficiaries mentioned above, a transitory
period, the length of which shall be determined by the DAR, shall be
established.
During this transitory period, at least one percent (1%) of the gross sales
of the entity shall be distributed to the managerial, supervisory and
technical group in place at the time of the effectivity of this Act, as
compensation for such transitory managerial and technical functions as it
will perform, pursuant to an agreement that the farmworker-
NOTES IN AGRARIAN REFORM LAW
JRCMLAW ARCHIVES August 7, 2017
beneficiaries and the managerial, supervisory and technical group may
conclude, subject to the approval of the DAR.
c) Alternative Business Arrangements (Joint Economic Enterprises
in a Post Distribution Scenario: Making Landowner-Farmer
Partnership Work (DAR Adm. Order No. 9, s. 2006)
WEEK 7
CONVERSION OF AGRICULTURAL LANDS
CONVERSION is the actual change of the land use from agricultural, to
residential, industrial or commercial, of lands which could have
potentially been covered under the CARP.
SEC 65, RA 6657
Section 65. Conversion of Lands. After the lapse of five (5) years from
its award, when the land ceases to be economically feasible and sound for
agricultural purposes, or the locality has become urbanized and the land
will have a greater economic value for residential, commercial or
industrial purposes, the DAR, upon application of the beneficiary or the
landowner, with due notice to the affected parties, and subject to existing
laws, may authorize the reclassification or conversion of the land and its
disposition: provided, that the beneficiary shall have fully paid his
obligation.
Conversion of Agricultural Lands: What is the difference between
exemption, conversion and reclassification?
CONVERSION
It is the act of specifying how agricultural lands shall be utilized for non-
agricultural uses such as residential, etc. It is also the act of changing the
current use of a piece of agricultural land into some other use, to wit:
a. For residential, commercial, industrial and other non-agricultural
purposes;
b. For another type of agricultural activity such as livestock and fishpond
the effect of which is to exempt the land from CARP Coverage;
c. For non-agricultural use other than that previously authorized. (e.i.
change of crops to commercial crops or high value crops is considered as
a conversion in the use of the land.
RECLASSIFICATION
It is the act of changing the current use of a piece of agricultural land into
some other use as approved by the DAR.
TN: A mere reclassification of an agricultural land does not automatically
allow the landowner to change its use. He has to undergo the process of
conversion before he is permitted to use the agricultural land for other
purposes.
Jose Luis Ros, et. al. Petitioners, vs. Department Of Agrarian Reform
Respondents.
[G.R. No. 132477. August 31, 2005.]
CONVERSION; DISTINGUISHED FROM RECLASSIFICATION; AUTHORITY
OF DAR TO APPROVE CONVERSION OF AGRICULTURAL LANDS
COVERED BY REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6657 TO NON-AGRICULTURAL USES
HAS NOT BEEN PIERCED BY THE PASSAGE OF THE LOCAL
GOVERNMENT CODE
3

Facts:
The case stems from a denial of the application for conversion before the
Regional Office of DAR Region 7 disallowing the application for
conversion filed by petitioners, owners/developers of several parcels of
land located in Arpili, Balamban, Cebu. The application was based on
Municipal Ordinance No. 101 passed by the Mun. Council of Balamban,
Cebu which reclassified such lands as industrial lands. Said ordinance was
approved by the Provincial Board of Cebu on April 3, 1995. Because of
such disapproval, Petitioners filed with the RTC of Toledo City a
complaint for Injunction with application of TRO and a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction. RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction ruling that it is DAR which has jurisdiction citing Section 20
of the Local Government Code.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, the Trial Court denied the
same. Hence, Petitioners filed before the Supreme Court a Petition for
Certiorari with application for Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of
Preliminary Injunction. The Supreme Court referred the petition to the
Court of Appeals thru a Resolution dated 11 November 1996. Petitioners
moved for a reconsideration of the said Resolution but the same was
denied thru Resolution dated 27 January 1997.
The Court of Appeals ordered the Public Respondents to file their
comments on the Petition. Two sets of comments from Public
respondents, one from DAR Provincial Office and another from the Office
of the Solicitor General, were submitted, to which petitioners filed their
Consolidated Reply. Court of Appeals rendered a decision affirming the
Order of Dismissal issued by the RTC. Petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated 30 January 1998.
Petitioners claim that local grants have the power to reclassify portions of
their agricultural lands, subject to the conditions set forth in Section 20 of
the Local Government Code that if agricultural lands sought to be
reclassified by the local government is one which has already been
brought under the coverage of the CARL and/or which has been
distributed to ARBs, then such reclassification must be confirmed by the
DAR pursuant to its authority under Section 65 of the CARL, in order for
the reclassification to become effective, that if the land sought to be
reclassified is not covered by CARL and not distributed to ARBs, then no
confirmation from DAR is necessary.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the reclassification of the subject lands to industrial
use by the Municipality of Balamban, Cebu pursuant to its authority
under Section 20 (a) of Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local
Government Code of 1991 (the "LGC") has the effect of taking such
lands out of coverage of the CARL and beyond the jurisdiction of the
DAR?
2. Whether or not the Complaint for Injunction may be dismissed
under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction?
3. Whether or not the Complaint for Injunction is an appropriate
remedy against the order of the DAR enjoining development works
on the subject lands?
4. Whether or not the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City had authority
to issue a writ of injunction against the DAR?
Held:
The petition lacks merit.
NOTES IN AGRARIAN REFORM LAW
JRCMLAW ARCHIVES August 7, 2017
On the first issue: NO
After the passage of R.A. No. 6657, agricultural lands, through
reclassification, have to go through the process of conversion, jurisdiction
over which is vested in the DAR. However, agricultural lands already
reclassified before the effectivity of R.A. No. 6657 are exempted from
conversion.
Reclassification of lands does not suffice. In Alarcon vs. CA (405 SCRA
440) it was ruled that conversion is different from reclassification.
Conversion is the act of changing the current use of a piece of agricultural
land into some other use as approved by DAR. Reclassification is the act
of specifying how agricultural lands shall be utilized, for non-agricultural
uses such as residential, industrial, commercial, as embodied in the land
use plan, subject to the requirements and procedure for land use
conversion.
R.A. No. 6657 took effect on 15 June 1988 and Municipal Ordinance No.
101, which reclassified the subject land, was passed on 25 March 1992,
and the Provincial Ordinance No. 95-8 of the Provincial Board of Cebu,
which adopted Municipal Ordinance No. 101 was passed on 03 April
1995, long after R.A. No. 6657 has taken effect. To further clarify any
doubt on its authority, DAR issued Administrative Order No. 12 dated
October 1994 which provides for the consolidated and revised rules and
procedures governing conversion of agricultural lands to non-agricultural
uses.
The authority of DAR to approve conversions of agricultural lands
covered by Republic Act No. 6657 to non-agricultural uses has not been
pierced by the passage of the Local Government Code. The code explicitly
provides that nothing in this section shall be construed as repealing or
modifying in any manner the provisions of Republic Act No. 6657.
On the Second Issue: YES
It being settled that jurisdiction over conversion of land is vested in the
DAR, the complaint for injunction was correctly dismissed by the trial and
appellate courts under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. This Court, in
Bautista v. Mag-isa vda. de Villena, found occasion to reiterate the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction precludes the courts from resolving a
controversy over which jurisdiction has initially been lodged with an
administrative body of special competence. For agrarian reform case,
jurisdiction is vested in the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR); more
specifically, in the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB).
On the Third Issue and Fourth Issue: No
Injunction is not the appropriate remedy against the order of the DAR
enjoining petitions in developing the subject land. Moreover, the RTC has
no authority to issue an injunction agains DAR. Section 68 of R.A. No.
6657 provides:
"Section 68. Immunity of Government Agencies from Undue Interference.
No injunction, restraining order, prohibition or mandamus shall be
issued by the lower courts against the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR), the Department of Agriculture (DAR), the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), and the Department of
Justice (DOJ) in their implementation of the program."
4

CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE AND BUILDERS ASSOCIATIONS, INC.
(CREBA), petitioner, vs. THE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN
REFORM, respondent.
[G.R. No. 183409. June 18, 2010.] Sec 20 of RA 7160 (Local Govt.
Code)
FACTS:
This case is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition (with application for
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction)
under Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, filed by
herein petitioner Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations, Inc.
(CREBA) seeking to nullify and prohibit the enforcement of Department
of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Administrative Order (AO) No. 01-02, as
amended by DAR AO No. 05-07, and DAR Memorandum No. 88, for having
been issued by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as some provisions
of the aforesaid administrative issuances are illegal and unconstitutional.
The Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued DAR AO No. 07-97, entitled
Omnibus Rules and Procedures Governing Conversion of Agricultural
Lands to Non-Agricultural Uses, which consolidated all existing
implementing guidelines related to land use conversion. The aforesaid
rules embraced all private agricultural lands regardless of tenurial
arrangement and commodity produced, and all untitled agricultural lands
and agricultural lands reclassified by Local Government Units (LGUs) into
non-agricultural uses after 15 June 1988. Subsequently, DAR AO No. 01-
99, entitled Revised Rules and Regulations on the Conversion of
Agricultural Lands to Non-agricultural Uses, was also issued amending
and updating the previous rules on land use conversion. Its coverage
includes the following agricultural lands, among others, (1) those to be
converted to residential, commercial, industrial, institutional and other
non-agricultural purposes.
The Secretary issued another Administrative Order, i.e., DAR AO No. 01-
02, entitled 2002 Comprehensive Rules on Land Use Conversion, which
further amended DAR AO No. 07-97 and DAR AO No. 01-99, and repealed
all issuances inconsistent therewith. The aforesaid DAR AO No. 01-02
covers all applications for conversion from agricultural to non-
agricultural uses or to another agricultural use. Thereafter the Secretary
of Agrarian Reform amended certain provisions of DAR AO No. 01-02 by
formulating DAR AO No. 05-07, particularly addressing land conversion
in time of exigencies and calamities.
To address the unabated conversion of prime agricultural lands for real
estate development, the Secretary further issued Memorandum No. 88 on
15 April 2008, which temporarily suspended the processing and approval
of all land use conversion applications. By reason thereof, petitioner
claims that there is an actual slow down of housing projects, which, in
turn, aggravated the housing shortage, unemployment and illegal
squatting problems to the substantial prejudice not only of the petitioner
and its members but more so of the whole nation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the DAR Secretary has jurisdiction over lands that have
been reclassified as residential, commercial, industrial, or for other non-
agricultural uses.
HELD:
Primarily, although this Court, the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial
Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari,
NOTES IN AGRARIAN REFORM LAW
JRCMLAW ARCHIVES August 7, 2017
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction,
such concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of
choice of court forum. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That
hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and also serves as a
general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the
extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most
certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs
against first level (inferior) courts should be filed with the Regional
Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals.
A direct invocation of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction to issue
these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important
reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is
[an] established policy. It is a policy necessary to prevent inordinate
demands upon the Courts time and attention which are better devoted to
those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further
over-crowding of the Courts docket. In the case at bench, petitioner failed
to specifically and sufficiently set forth special and important reasons to
justify direct recourse to this Court and why this Court should give due
course to this petition in the first instance. The present petition should
have been initially filed in the Court of Appeals in strict observance of the
doctrine on the hierarchy of courts. Failure to do so is sufficient cause for
the dismissal of this petition.
Executive Order No. 129-A vested upon the DAR the responsibility of
implementing the CARP. Pursuant to the said mandate and to ensure the
successful implementation of the CARP, Section 5(c) of the said executive
order authorized the DAR to establish and promulgate operational
policies, rules and regulations and priorities for agrarian reform
implementation. Section 4(k) thereof authorized the DAR to approve or
disapprove the conversion, restructuring or readjustment of agricultural
lands into non-agricultural uses. Similarly, Section 5(l) of the same
executive order has given the DAR the exclusive authority to approve or
disapprove conversion of agricultural lands for residential, commercial,
industrial, and other land uses as may be provided for by law. Section 7
of the aforesaid executive order clearly provides that the authority and
responsibility for the exercise of the mandate of the [DAR] and the
discharge of its powers and functions shall be vested in the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform x x x.
Under DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, lands not reclassified as
residential, commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural uses before
15 June 1988 have been included in the definition of agricultural lands.
In so doing, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform merely acted within the
scope of his authority stated in the aforesaid sections of Executive Order
No. 129-A, which is to promulgate rules and regulations for agrarian
reform implementation and that includes the authority to define
agricultural lands for purposes of land use conversion. Further, the
definition of agricultural lands under DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended,
merely refers to the category of agricultural lands that may be the subject
for conversion to non-agricultural uses and is not in any way confined to
agricultural lands in the context of land redistribution as provided for
under Republic Act No. 6657.
Any reclassification of agricultural lands to residential, commercial,
industrial or other non-agricultural uses either by the LGUs or by way of
Presidential Proclamations enacted on or after 15 June 1988 must
undergo the process of conversion, despite having undergone
reclassification, before agricultural lands may be used for other purposes.
5

It is different, however, when through Presidential Proclamations public
agricultural lands have been reserved in whole or in part for public use or
purpose, i.e., public school, etc., because in such a case, conversion is no
longer necessary.
Clearly from the foregoing, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform did not act
without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in (1) including
lands not reclassified as residential, commercial, industrial or other non-
agricultural uses before 15 June 1988 in the definition of agricultural
lands under DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, and; (2) issuing and
enforcing DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, subjecting to DARs jurisdiction
for conversion lands which had already been reclassified as residential,
commercial, industrial or for other non-agricultural uses on or after 15
June 1988. Similarly, DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, providing that the
reclassification of agricultural lands by LGUs shall be subject to the
requirements of land use conversion procedure or that DARs approval or
clearance must be secured to effect reclassification, did not violate the
autonomy of the LGUs.
It bears emphasis that said Memorandum No. 88 was issued upon the
instruction of the President in order to address the unabated conversion
of prime agricultural lands for real estate development because of the
worsening rice shortage in the country at that time. Such measure was
made in order to ensure that there are enough agricultural lands in which
rice cultivation and production may be carried into. The issuance of said
Memorandum No. 88 was made pursuant to the general welfare of the
public, thus, it cannot be argued that it was made without any basis.
Memo Circular No. 54 s. 1993, Office of the President (Prescribing
the Guidelines governing Sec. 20 of RA 7160 Authorizing Cities And
Municipalities to Reclassify Agricultural Lands to Non-Agricultural
Uses.)
Reference: DAR Administrative Orders No. 1, s. 2002 2002 Rules
and Regulations on the Conversion of Agricultural Lands to Non-
Agricultural Uses
The Hon. Carlos Fortich et. al. vs. The Hon. Renato Corona GR. No.
131457, April 24, 1998
The Office of the President modified its decision which had already
become final and executory.
FACTS:
On November 7, 1997, the Office of the President (OP) issued a win-win
Resolution which reopened case O.P. Case No. 96-C-6424. The said
Resolution substantially modified its March 29, 1996 Decision. The OP
had long declared the said Decision final & executory after the DARs
Motion for Reconsideration was denied for having been filed beyond the
15-day reglementary period.
The SC then struck down as void the OPs act, it being in gross disregard
of the rules & basic legal precept that accord finality to administrative
determinations.
The respondents contended in their instant motion that the win-win
Resolution of November 7, 1997 is not void since it seeks to correct an
NOTES IN AGRARIAN REFORM LAW
JRCMLAW ARCHIVES August 7, 2017
erroneous ruling, hence, the March 29, 1996 decisioncould not as yet
become final and executory as to be beyond modification. They further
explained that the DARs failure to file their Motion for Reconsideration
on time was excusable.
ISSUE:
Was the OPs modification of the Decision void or a valid exercise of its
powers and prerogatives?
1. Whether the DARs late filing of the Motion for Reconsideration is
excusable.
2. Whether the respondents have shown a justifiable reason for the
relaxation of rules.
3. Whether the issue is a question of technicality.
HELD:
ON THE FIRST ISSUE: NO.
Sec.7 of Administrative Order No. 18, dated February 12, 1987, mandates
that decisions/resolutions/orders of the Office of the President
shallbecome final after the lapse of 15 days from receipt of a copy therof
xxx unless a Motion for Reconsideration thereof is filed within such
period.
The respondents explanation that the DARs office procedure made it
impossibleto file its Motion for Reconsideration on time since the said
decision had to be referred to its different departments cannot be
considered a valid justification. While there is nothing wrong with such
referral, the DAR must not disregard the reglementary period fixed by
law, rule or regulation.
The rules relating to reglementary period should not be made
subservient to the internal office procedure of an administrative body.
ON THE SECOND ISSUE: NO
The final & executory character of the OP Decision can no longer be
disturbed or substantially modified. Res judicata has set in and the
adjudicated affair should forever be put to rest.
Procedural rules should be treated with utmost respect and due regard
since they are designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases to remedy
the worsening problem of delay in the resolution of rival claims and in the
administration of justice. The Constitution guarantees that all persons
shall have a right to the speedy disposition of their cases before all
judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative bodies.
While a litigation is not a game of technicalities, every case must be
prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to ensure an
orderly & speedy administration of justice. The flexibility in the
relaxation of rules was never intended to forge a bastion for erring
litigants to violate the rules with impunity.
A liberal interpretation & application of the rules of procedure can only
be resorted to in proper cases and under justifiable causes and
circumstances.
ON THE THIRD ISSUE: NO
It is a question of substance & merit.
A decision/resolution/order of an administrative body, court or tribunal
which is declared void on the ground that the same was rendered
Without or in Excess of Jurisdiction, or with Grave Abuse of Discretion, is
a mere technicality of law or procedure. Jurisdiction is an essential and
6
 JRCMLAW ARCHIVES August 7, 2017

mandatory requirement before a case or controversy can be acted on.

Moreover, an act is still invalid if done in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion.

In the instant case, several fatal violations of law were committed. These
grave breaches of law, rules & settled jurisprudence are clearly
substantial, not of technical nature.

Note:
When the March 29, 1996 OP Decision was declared final and executory,
vested rights were acquired by the petitioners, and all others who should
be benefited by the said Decision.

In the words of the learned Justice Artemio V. Panganiban in Videogram

Regulatory Board vs CA, et al., just as a losing party has the right to file
an appeal within the prescribed period, the winning party also has the
correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of his/her case.

Decision of the Office of the President on the Sumilao Case (on the
Revocation of the Conversion Order)

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Office of the

President, through Executive Secretary Ruben Torres, dated March 29,
1996, is hereby MODIFIED as follows:

1. NQSRMDC's application for conversion is APPROVED only with

respect to the approximately forty-four (44) hectare portion of the land
adjacent to the highway, as recommended by the Department of
Agriculture.

2. The remaining approximately one hundred (100) hectares

traversed by an irrigation canal and found to be suitable for agriculture
shall be distributed to qualified farmer-beneficiaries in accordance with
RA 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law with a right of way
to said portion from the highway provided in the portion fronting the
highway. For this purpose, the DAR and other concerned government
agencies are directed to immediately conduct the segregation survey of
the area, valuation of the property and generation of titles in the name of
the identified farmer-beneficiaries.

3. The Department of Agrarian Reform is hereby directed to

carefully and meticulously determine who among the claimants are
qualified farmer-beneficiaries.

4. The Department of Agrarian Reform is hereby further directed

to expedite payment of just compensation to NQSRMDC for the portion of
the land to be covered by the CARP, including other lands previously
surrendered by NQSRMDC for CARP coverage.

5. The Philippine National Police is hereby directed to render full

assistance to the Department of Agrarian Reform in the implementation
of this Order.

We take note of the Memorandum in Intervention filed by 113 farmers on

October 10, 1997 without ruling on the propriety or merits thereof since
it is unnecessary to pass upon it at this time.

SO ORDERED.

NOTES IN AGRARIAN REFORM LAW 7