G.R. No.

107282 March 16, 1994

THE MANILA REMNANT CO., INC., petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, AND SPS. OSCAR C. VENTANILLA AND CARMEN GLORIA DIAZ, respondents.

Tabalingcos & Associates Law Office for petitioner.

Oscar C. Ventanilla, Jr. and Augusto Garmaitan for private respondents.

CRUZ, J.:

The present petition is an offshoot of our decision in Manila Remnant Co., Inc., (MRCI) v. Court of Appeals, promulgated on November 22, 1990.

That case involved parcels of land in Quezon City which were owned by petitioner MRCI and became the subject of its agreement with A.U. Valencia and
Co., Inc., (AUVCI) by virtue of which the latter was to act as the petitioner's agent in the development and sale of the property. For a stipulated fee, AUVCI
was to convert the lands into a subdivision, manage the sale of the lots, execute contracts and issue official receipts to the lot buyers. At the time of the
agreement, the president of both MRCI and AUVCI was Artemio U. Valencia.

Pursuant to the above agreement, AUVCI executed two contracts to sell dated March 3, 1970, covering Lots 1 and 2, Block 17, in favor of spouses Oscar
C. Ventanilla and Carmen Gloria Diaz for the combined contract price of P66,571.00, payable monthly in ten years. After ten days and without the
knowledge of the Ventanilla couple, Valencia, as president of MRCI, resold the same parcels to Carlos Crisostomo, one of his sales agents, without any
consideration. Upon orders of Valencia, the monthly payments of the Ventanillas were remitted to the MRCI as payments of Crisostomo, for which receipts
were issued in his name. The receipts were kept by Valencia without the knowledge of the Ventanillas and Crisostomo. The Ventanillas continued paying
their monthly installments.

On May 30, 1973, MRCI informed AUVCI that it was terminating their agreement because of discrepancies discovered in the latter's collections and
remittances. On June 6, 1973, Valencia was removed by the board of directors of MRCI as its president.

On November 21, 1978, the Ventanilla spouses, having learned of the supposed sale of their lots to Crisostomo, commenced an action for specific
performance, annulment of deeds, and damages against Manila Remnant Co., Inc., A.U. Valencia and Co., Inc., and Carlos Crisostomo. It was docketed
as Civil Case No. 26411 in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, Branch
7-B.

On November 17, 1980, the trial court rendered a decision declaring the contracts to sell in favor of the Ventanillas valid and subsisting, and annulling the
contract to sell in favor of Crisostomo. It ordered the MRCI to execute an absolute deed of sale in favor of the Ventanillas, free from all liens and
encumbrances. Damages and attorney's fees in the total amount of P210,000.00 were also awarded to the Ventanillas for which the MRCI, AUVCI, and
Crisostomo were held solidarily liable.

The lower court ruled further that if for any reason the transfer of the lots could not be effected, the defendants would be solidarily liable to the Ventanillas
for reimbursement of the sum of P73,122.35, representing the amount paid for the two lots, and legal interest thereon from March 1970, plus the decreed
damages and attorney's fees. Valencia was also held liable to MRCI for moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.

From this decision, separate appeals were filed by Valencia and MRCI. The appellate court, however, sustained the trial court in toto.

MRCI then filed before this Court a petition for certiorari to review the portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals upholding the solidary liability of MRCI,
AUVCI and Carlos Crisostomo for the payment of moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees to the Ventanillas.

On November 22, 1990, this Court affirmed the decision by the Court of Appeals and declared the judgment of the trial court immediately executory.

The Present Case

On January 25, 1991, the spouses Ventanilla filed with the trial court a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution in Civil Case No. 26411. The writ was
issued on May 3, 1991, and served upon MRCI on May 9, 1991.

In a manifestation and motion filed by MRCI with the trial court on May 24, 1991, the petitioner alleged that the subject properties could not be delivered to
the Ventanillas because they had already been sold to Samuel Marquez on February 7, 1990, while their petition was pending in this Court. Nevertheless,
MRCI offered to reimburse the amount paid by the respondents, including legal interest plus the aforestated damages. MRCI also prayed that its tender of
payment be accepted and all garnishments on their accounts lifted.

The Ventanillas accepted the amount of P210,000.00 as damages and attorney's fees but opposed the reimbursement offered by MRCI in lieu of the
execution of the absolute deed of sale. They contended that the alleged sale to Samuel Marquez was void, fraudulent, and in contempt of court and that no
claim of ownership over the properties in question had ever been made by Marquez.

On July 19, 1991, Judge Elsie Ligot-Telan issued the following order:

To ensure that there is enough amount to cover the value of the lots involved if transfer thereof to plaintiff may no longer be effected, pending litigation of
said issue, the garnishment made by the Sheriff upon the bank account of Manila Remnant may be lifted only upon the deposit to the Court of the amount
of P500,000.00 in cash.

MRCI then filed a manifestation and motion for reconsideration praying that it be ordered to reimburse the Ventanillas in the amount of P263,074.10 and
that the garnishment of its bank deposit be lifted. This motion was denied by the trial court in its order dated September 30, 1991. A second manifestation
and motion filed by MRCI was denied on December 18, 1991. The trial court also required MRCI to show cause why it should not be cited for contempt for
disobedience of its judgment.
These orders were questioned by MRCI in a petition for certiorari before the respondent court on the ground that they were issued with grave abuse of
discretion.

The Court of Appeals ruled that the contract to sell in favor of Marquez did not constitute a legal impediment to the immediate execution of the judgment.
Furthermore, the cash bond fixed by the trial court for the lifting of the garnishment was fair and reasonable because the value of the lot in question had
increased considerably. The appellate court also set aside the show-cause order and held that the trial court should have proceeded under Section 10,
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court and not Section 9 thereof.1

In the petition now before us, it is submitted that the trial court and the Court of Appeals committed certain reversible errors to the prejudice of MRCI.

The petitioner contends that the trial court may not enforce it garnishment order after the monetary judgment for damages had already been satisfied and
the amount for reimbursement had already been deposited with the sheriff. Garnishment as a remedy is intended to secure the payment of a judgment
debt when a well-founded belief exists that the erring party will abscond or deliberately render the execution of the judgment nugatory. As there is no such
situation in this case, there is no need for a garnishment order.

It is also averred that the trial court gravely abused its discretion when it arbitrarily fixed the amount of the cash bond for the lifting of the garnishment order
at P500,000.00.

MRCI further maintains that the sale to Samuel Marquez was valid and constitutes a legal impediment to the execution of the absolute deed of sale to the
Ventanillas. At the time of the sale to Marquez, the issue of the validity of the sale to the Ventanillas had not yet been resolved. Furthermore, there was no
specific injunction against the petitioner re-selling the property.

Lastly, the petitioner insists that Marquez was a buyer in good faith and had a right to rely on the recitals in the certificate of title. The subject matter of the
controversy having passed to an innocent purchaser for value, the respondent court erred in ordering the execution of the absolute deed of sale in favor of
the Ventanillas.

For their part, the respondents argue that the validity of the sale to them had already been established even while the previous petition was still pending
resolution. That petition only questioned the solidary liability of MRCI to the Ventanillas. The portion of the decision ordering the MRCI to execute an
absolute deed of sale in favor of the Ventanillas became final and executory when the petitioner failed to appeal it to the Supreme Court. There was no
need then for an order enjoining the petitioner from re-selling the property in litigation.

They also point to the unusual lack of interest of Marquez in protecting and asserting his right to the disputed property, a clear indication that the alleged
sale to him was merely a ploy of the petitioner to evade the execution of the absolute deed of sale in their favor.

The petition must fail.

The validity of the contract to sell in favor of the Ventanilla spouses is not disputed by the parties. Even in the previous petition, the recognition of that
contract was not assigned as error of either the trial court or appellate court. The fact that the MRCI did not question the legality of the award for damages
to the Ventanillas also shows that it even then already acknowledged the validity of the contract to sell in favor of the private respondents.

On top of all this, there are other circumstances that cast suspicion on the validity, not to say the very existence, of the contract with Marquez.

First, the contract to sell in favor of Marquez was entered into after the lapse of almost ten years from the rendition of the judgment of the trial court
upholding the sale to the Ventanillas.

Second, the petitioner did not invoke the contract with Marquez during the hearing on the motion for the issuance of the writ of execution filed by the private
respondents. It disclosed the contract only after the writ of execution had been served upon it.

Third, in its manifestation and motion dated December 21, 1990, the petitioner said it was ready to deliver the titles to the Ventanillas provided that their
counterclaims against private respondents were paid or offset first. There was no mention of the contract to sell with Marquez on February 7, 1990.

Fourth, Marquez has not intervened in any of these proceedings to assert and protect his rights to the subject property as an alleged purchaser in good
faith.

At any rate, even if it be assumed that the contract to sell in favor of Marquez is valid, it cannot prevail over the final and executory judgment ordering
MRCI to execute an absolute deed of sale in favor of the Ventanillas. No less importantly, the records do not show that Marquez has already paid the
supposed balance amounting to P616,000.00 of the original price of over P800,000.00.2

The Court notes that the petitioner stands to benefit more from the supposed contract with Marquez than from the contract with the Ventanillas with the
agreed price of only P66,571.00. Even if it paid the P210,000.00 damages to the private respondents as decreed by the trial court, the petitioner would still
earn more profit if the Marquez contract were to be sustained.

We come now to the order of the trial court requiring the posting of the sum of P500,000.00 for the lifting of its garnishment order.

While the petitioners have readily complied with the order of the trial court for the payment of damages to the Ventanillas, they have, however, refused to
execute the absolute deed of sale. It was for the purpose of ensuring their compliance with this portion of the judgment that the trial court issued the
garnishment order which by its term could be lifted only upon the filling of a cash bond of P500,000.00.

The petitioner questions the propriety of this order on the ground that it has already partially complied with the judgment and that it has always expressed
its willingness to reimburse the amount paid by the respondents. It says that there is no need for a garnishment order because it is willing to reimburse the
Ventanillas in lieu of execution of the absolute deed of sale.

The alternative judgment of reimbursement is applicable only if the conveyance of the lots is not possible, but it has not been shown that there is an
obstacle to such conveyance. As the main obligation of the petitioner is to execute the absolute deed of sale in favor of the Ventanillas, its unjustified
refusal to do so warranted the issuance of the garnishment order.
Garnishment is a species of attachment for reaching credits belonging to the judgment debtor and owing to him from a stranger to the litigation.3 It is an
attachment by means of which the plaintiff seeks to subject to his claim property of the defendant in the hands of a third person or money owed by such
third person or garnishee to the defendant.4The rules on attachment also apply to garnishment proceedings.

A garnishment order shall be lifted if it established that:

(a) the party whose accounts have been garnished has posted a counterbond or has made the requisite cash deposit;5

(b) the order was improperly or irregularly issued6 as where there is no ground for garnishment7 or the affidavit and/or bond filed therefor are defective or
insufficient;8

(c) the property attached is exempt from execution, hence exempt from preliminary attachment 9 or

(d) the judgment is rendered against the attaching or garnishing creditor. 10

Partial execution of the judgment is not included in the above enumeration of the legal grounds for the discharge of a garnishment order. Neither does the
petitioner's willingness to reimburse render the garnishment order unnecessary. As for the counterbond, the lower court did not err when it fixed the same
at P500,000.00. As correctly pointed out by the respondent court, that amount corresponds to the current fair market value of the property in litigation and
was a reasonable basis for determining the amount of the counterbond.

Regarding the refusal of the petitioner to execute the absolute deed of sale, Section 10 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court reads as follows:

Sec. 10. Judgment for specific act; vesting title If a judgment directs a party to execute a conveyance of land, or to deliver deeds or other documents, or
to perform any other specific act, and the party fails to comply within the time specified, the court may direct the act to be done at the cost of the
disobedient party by some other person appointed by the court and the act when so done shall have like effect as if done by the party. If real or personal
property is within the Philippines, the court in lieu of directing a conveyance thereof may enter judgment divesting the title of any party and vesting it in
others and such judgment shall have the force and effect of a conveyance executed in due form of law.

Against the unjustified refusal of the petitioner to accept payment of the balance of the contract price, the remedy of the respondents is consignation,
conformably to the following provisions of the Civil Code:

Art. 1256. If the creditor to whom tender of payment has been made refuses without just cause to accept it, the debtor shall be released from responsibility
by the consignation of the thing or sum due. . .

Art. 1258. Consignation shall be made by depositing the things due at the disposal of the judicial authority, before whom the tender of payment shall be
proved, in a proper case, and the announcement of the consignation in other cases.

The consignation having been made, the interested parties shall also be notified thereof.

Art. 1260. Once the consignation has been duly made, the debtor may ask the judge to order the cancellation of the obligation.

Accordingly, upon consignation by the Ventanillas of the sum due, the trial court may enter judgment canceling the title of the petitioner over the property
and transferring the same to the respondents. This judgment shall have the same force and effect as conveyance duly executed in accordance with the
requirements of the law.

In sum, we find that:

1. No legal impediment exists to the execution, either by the petitioner or the trial court, of an absolute deed of sale of the subject property in favor of the
respondent Ventanillas; and

2. The lower court did not abuse its discretion when it required the posting of a P500,000.00 cash bond for the lifting of the garnishment order.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against the petitioner. It is so
ordered.

G.R. No. L-4350 January 11, 1909

MONICA CASON, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
F.W. RICKARDS and SMITH, BELL & CO., defendants-appellants.

W.H. Lawrence, for appellants.

Kincaid and Hurd, for appellee.

TRACEY, J.:

In 1906 this action was before this court on an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila holding the defendant Smith, Bell and Co.
liable to the plaintiff in the sum of P2,000, with interest, but exonerating them from a second claim of P4,200, with interest. (5 Phil. Rep., 611). The P2,000
had been received from the plaintiff by the defendant Rickards as a deposit while he was acting as agent for Smith, Bell and Co. in Dagupan, and the
P4,200 was the amount of certain Spanish Government warrants delivered to him by the plaintiff and collected by him through the Hongkong Bank at
Manila. It appeared that the P2,000 had been returned over to Smith, Bell and Co. with notice of its ownership and on this ground their liability was placed,
without respect to the terms from his testimony on the first trial that the firm had also had the benefit of the collection of the government warrants. The court
in its decision said:

The question in this case in this: Can the positive testimony of Rickards, which has been set forth above, be overcome by the testimony of the
agent of the bank in view of the fact that Smith, Bell and Co. had it in their power to demonstrate the falsity of the testimony of Rickards by
producing their books? No reasons appears in the case why the books were not produced. The trial was had in Manila, where is located the main
office of Smith, Bell and Co. Rickards gave his testimony at the opening of the trial. If it were false its falsity could have been easily proved by the
introduction of these books, and their production was more imperatively demanded considering the statement of Rickards that he had seen them,
and that they did contain the entries in regard to this amount of P4,200 pesos.

xxx4350 xxx4350 xxx

In the present case we think that the ends of justice require that there should be a new trial as to the P4,200 pesos.

xxx4350 xxx4350 xxx

The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the court below for a new trial only of the issue relating to the P4,200 pesos. After the
new trial judgment will, as a matter of course, be entered for the plaintiff against Smith, Bell and Co. in reference to the 2,000 pesos, and for or
against them in respect to the 4,200 pesos, as the results of the new trial may require. . . .

On the second trial it appeared that the only book kept at Dagupan relating to these transactions was a small account book in the handwritting of Rickard's
clerk, transcribed by him from pencil memoranda made by Rickards himself, which does not bear the name of Smith, Bell and Co., which appears to be a
memorandum books and includes other transactions of his with which that firm had nothing to do, and which is evidently his personal account and not that
of his principals. The books of the firm showing his transactions in Dagupan were kept by D. M. Clark, the manager of the mills at Bayambang, to whom
Rickards reported and with whom he monthly exchanged accounts.

In none of these accounts did these governments warrants appear nor any entry of the monies received therefrom.

Upon the first trial it was proved by H.D.C. Jones, of the Hongkong Bank, that from the proceeds of these notes a personal debt of Rickards to that bank,
amounting to P1,854, growing out of an old transaction of his as agent for Warner, Barnes and Co., had been satisfied. It also was shown that he had
turned over to one Rafael Sison P1,192 and he also swore that he had paid the firm either P600 or P900 on a private debt. His cash book produced at the
second trial confirms Mr. Jones' testimony and also shows the payment of Sison, as well as some other items, so that it is established that, with the
exception of a few hundred pesos, no part of the proceeds of the P4,200 can have received by Smith, Bell and Co. as the immediate proceeds of these
warrants.

Clive Kingcome, one of the managers of the firm, who at the time of the first trial was not a witness on account of absence from the country, testified on the
second trial in detail as to the books of the firm, the manner of conducting its business in Dagupan and Bayambang, and the transactions with Rickards. He
said that, had the dealings been such as Rickards narrated, the entries thereof would have appeared in the Bayambang books and that, moreover, he had
no recollection whatever of receiving either P600 or P900 in settlement of any account of Rickards, and that no trace thereof or of any such payment could
be found in the books.

The agency of Rickards was supposedly for the purpose of buying rice and sacks. It existed for the period of one year only and he admitted that, prior
thereto and since the year 1882, he had been conducting a similar business at Dagupan, but not for Smith, Bell and Co. He showed by his book and by his
declaration that during this year he received from persons at Dagupan large sums in cash for remittance to Manila, which he effected by notifying Smith,
Bell and Co. of the amounts and using the actual cash received in the local purchase of rice and bags on their accoulnt, thus effecting a saving to both
parties of a considerable railway charge for carrying the money to and from, and that these operations were known to his principals and approved by them.
However this course of business might affect the 2,000-peso claim or any other deposit of money received by him, it has no bearing upon the transaction in
these certificates which were not cash deposited with him but, on the contrary, were handed to him by the plaintiff in order to be converted into cash, which
he was to collect and repay her. It appears that he wrote to the firm at Manila asking their advise in respect to the warrants and was by them referred to the
Hongkong Bank, which undertook to effect their collection, a thing at that precise period, at the outbreak of the revolution, of some difficulty on account of
reluctance of the Spanish Government to send into the provinces money which might serve to supply funds to the revolutionary forces. It is not shown that
Smith, Bell and Co. had ever adopted any similar course of business in regard to the collection of similar warrants or of any drafts, or that they had
intervened in this instance otherwise than as a matter of favor to their correspondent, or that they had received the proceeds of the collection, of had made
entries thereof in their own books, or in any manner recognized it.

The receipt given for the warrants read:

I have received from Da. Monica Cason three Treasury warrants of the value of 4,200 pesos, with the interest thereon, to collect in Manila; said
amount of $4,200, when collected from the treasury, I promise to deliver to said Da. Monica Cason, in cash, to her order. Calasiao, October 8,
1896, F.W. Rickards.

The firm did not sign this receipt and is not referred to therein.

Articles 286 and 287 of the Code of Commerce, cited by the defendant to establish the liability of the firm, apply to contracts made by factors, but in this
case the relation of factor has not been established. This rather appears to be an instance of an agent, if he was one, dealing in his own and on his own
responsibility and not that of his principal. (Code of Commerce, arts. 245, 246, and 247; Castle Bros., Wolf and Sons vs. Go-Juno, 7 Phil. Rep., 144.) The
mere custom of a local agent receiving monies on deposit for which his principal, the firm, might, perhaps, on general principles of the law of agency, have
made itself liable whether the money had been actually received by it or not, does not suffice to charge them with liability for the essentially different
operation of the isolated collection of a draft for his clients, such collection not creating any appearance of a general banking business upon which third
persons had a right to rely. Neither in fact nor in appearance was any agency for this purpose authorized or permitted by Smith, Bell and Co., and the
transaction as to these warrants was one for which Rickards alone is responsible to the plaintiff.

On the second trial the court directed judgment against Smith, Bell and Co. for the equivalent of 4,200 Mexican dollars at the rate stipulted by the parties,
less 5 per cent collected by the firm as commissions, amounting to P4,269 together with interest thereon from March 30, 1897, amounting to P2,689,
making a total of P6,958. The allowance of interest from the date of the first demand by the plaintiff was correct, but the computation should have been
upon the 4,200 Mexican dollars, without the deduction of the percentage, resulting in P4,494, for which judgment in favor of the plaintiff should be entered
against the defendant Ricakrds, with interest from March 30, 1897. The trial court committed no error in following the statute and computing the value of
the 2,000 Mexican pesos as of the date of the entry of the second judgment, rather than as of the date of the first judgment, and such is the correct
interpretation of the former decision in this case. Judgment is accordingly directed affirming the judgment of the Court of First Instance on the second trial
in respect to the P2,000 and interest against Smith, Bell and Co., and reversing it as to the judgment of P4,200 in respect of which, with interest thereon
from March 30, 1897, judgment is directed to be entered in favor of the plaintiff and againt the defendant, F.W. Rickards, but without costs to any of the
parties in this instance. So ordered.

[G.R. No. 153743. March 18, 2005]

NORMA B. DOMINGO, petitioner, vs. YOLANDA ROBLES; and MICHAEL MALABANAN ROBLES, MARICON MALABANAN ROBLES,
MICHELLE MALABANAN ROBLES, All Minors Represented by Their Mother, YOLANDA ROBLES, respondents.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Forgery must be proven by the party alleging it; it cannot be presumed. To prevent a forged transfer from being registered, the Torrens Act requires,
as a prerequisite to registration, the production of the owners certificate of title and the instrument of conveyance. A registered owner who places in the
hands of another an executed document of transfer of registered land effectively represents to a third party that the holder of such document is authorized
to deal with the property.[1]

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, challenging the May 27, 2002 Decision[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
[2]

GR CV No. 53842. The decretal portion of the assailed Decision reads:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, [there being] no reversible error in the challenged decision, the same is hereby AFFIRMED, in toto, and the instant appeal
ordered DISMISSED. Costs against the [petitioner].[4]

On the other hand, the affirmed Decision[5] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 272 of Marikina, disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the complaint subject of this decision is hereby DISMISSED.[6]

The Facts

The facts are narrated by the CA as follows:

The historical backdrop shows that [petitioner] and her husband, Valentino Domingo, were the registered owners of Lot 19, Block 1, subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-15706
located at Cristina Subdivision, Concepcion, Marikina and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 53412. On this lot, [Petitioner] Norma B. Domingo discontinued
the construction of her house allegedly for failure of her husband to send the necessary financial support. So, she decided to dispose of the property.

A friend, Flor Bacani, volunteered to act as [petitioners] agent in selling the lot. Trusting Bacani, [petitioner] delivered their owners copy of Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 53412 to him (Bacani). Later, the title was said to have been lost. In the petition for its reconstitution, [petitioner] gave Bacani all her receipts of payment for real
estate taxes. At the same time, Bacani asked [petitioner] to sign what she recalled was a record of exhibits. Thereafter, [petitioner] waited patiently but Bacani did not
show up any more.

On November 1, 1994, [Petitioner] Norma Domingo visited the lot and was surprised to see the [respondents] (Robles, for short) starting to build a house on the subject
lot. A verification with the Register of Deeds revealed that the reconstituted Transfer Certificate of Title No. 53412 had already been cancelled with the registration of a
Deed of Absolute Sale dated May 9, 1991 signed by Norma B. Domingo and her husband Valentino Domingo, as sellers, and [Respondent] Yolanda Robles, for herself
and representing the other minor [respondents], as buyers. As a consequence, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 201730 was issued on June 10, 1991 in the name of
[Respondent] Robles.

Claiming not to have met any of the [respondents] nor having signed any sale over the property in favor of anybody (her husband being abroad at the time), [petitioner]
assumed that the Deed of Absolute Sale dated May 9, 1991 is a forgery and, therefore, could not validly transfer ownership of the lot to the [respondents]. Hence, the case
for the nullity thereof and its reconveyance.

[Respondents] Robles responded alleging to be buyers in good faith and for value. They narrate that the subject lot was offered to them by Flor Bacani, as the agent of the
owners; that after some time when they were already prepared to buy the lot, Bacani introduced to them the supposed owners and agreed on the sale; then, on May 9, 1991,
Bacani and the introduced seller presented a Deed of Absolute Sale already signed by Valentino and Norma Domingo needing only her (Robles) signature. Presented
likewise at that meeting, where she paid full purchase price, was the original of the owners duplicate of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 53412.

Then sometime later, [Respondents] Robles contracted to sell the lot in issue in favor of spouses Danilo and Herminigilda Deza for P250,000.00. [Respondent] Yolanda
Robles even had to secure a guardianship authority over the persons and properties of her minor children from the Regional Trial Court of Pasig in JDRC No. 2614. When
only P20,000.00 remained unpaid of the total purchase price under the contract to sell, payment was stopped because of the letter received by Yolanda Robles that
[petitioner] intends to sue her.

After due proceedings, the [Regional Trial Court] rendered its Decision dated May 13, 1996, dismissing the complaint. [7]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

 The CA held that respondents were purchasers in good faith and for value. According to its findings, (a) the sale was admittedly made through
petitioners agent; (b) as Domingos agent, Bacani brought with him the original of the owners duplicate Certificate of Title of the property and some receipts;
(c) the reconstituted title presented to the buyers was free from any liens, encumbrances or adverse interests of other persons; and (d) the land was
unoccupied. Petitioner was not able to present, against these established facts, any evidence to prove that respondents had prior knowledge of any other
persons right to or interest over the property in question.

Hence, this Petition.[8]

Issue

Petitioner submits this sole issue for our consideration:

To determine whether or not the petitioner is entitled to her claims, the issue worthy of consideration by the Honorable Court in the instant case is WHO IS A
PURCHASER IN GOOD FAITH?[9]

The Courts Ruling

The Petition has no merit.

Sole Issue:
Acquisition of Valid Title

It is a well-established principle that factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding on this Court.[10] Petitioner
has given this Court no cogent reason to deviate from this rule; on the contrary, the findings of the courts a quo are amply supported by the evidence on
record.

Petitioner claims that her signature and that of her husband were forged in the Deed of Absolute Sale transferring the property from the Domingo
spouses to respondent. Relying on the general rule that a forged deed is void and conveys no title, [11] she assails the validity of the sale.

It is a well-settled rule, however, that a notarized instrument enjoys a prima facie presumption of authenticity and due execution. [12] Clear and
convincing evidence must be presented to overcome such legal presumption. Forgery cannot be presumed; hence, it was incumbent upon petitioner to
prove it.[13] This, she failed to do. On this point, the CA observed:

x x x. What surprises the Court is that a comparison of the signature of appellant Norma Domingo in the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of the appellees and the signature
in the verification of the complaint manifest a striking similarity to the point that without any contrary proof, it would be safe to conclude that said signatures were written
by one and the same person. Sadly, appellant left that matter that way without introducing counteracting evidence. x x x[14]

Petitioner also failed to convince the trial court that the person with whom Respondent Yolanda Robles transacted was in fact not Valentino
Domingo. Except for her insistence that her husband was out of the country, petitioner failed to present any other clear and convincing evidence that
Valentino was not present at the time of the sale. Bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof. [15]

Petitioner now stresses the issue of good faith on the part of respondents. In the absence of a finding of fraud and a consequent finding of
authenticity and due execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale, a discussion of whether respondents were purchasers in good faith is wholly unnecessary.
Without a clear and persuasive substantiation of bad faith, a presumption of good faith in their favor stands. [16]

The sale was admittedly made with the aid of Bacani, petitioners agent, who had with him the original of the owners duplicate Certificate of Title to
the property, free from any liens or encumbrances. The signatures of Spouses Domingo, the registered owners, appear on the Deed of Absolute Sale.
Petitioners husband met with Respondent Yolanda Robles and received payment for the property. The Torrens Act requires, as a prerequisite to
registration, the production of the owners certificate of title and the instrument of conveyance. The registered owner who places in the hands of another an
executed document of transfer of registered land effectively represents to a third party that the holder of such document is authorized to deal with the
property.[17]

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 88539 October 26, 1993

KUE CUISON, doing business under the firm name and style"KUE CUISON PAPER SUPPLY," petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, VALIANT INVESTMENT ASSOCIATES, respondents.

Leighton R. Siazon for petitioner.

Melanio L. Zoreta for private respondent.

BIDIN, J.:

This petition for review assails the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals ordering petitioner to pay private respondent, among others, the sum of
P297,482.30 with interest. Said decision reversed the appealed decision of the trial court rendered in favor of petitioner.

The case involves an action for a sum of money filed by respondent against petitioner anchored on the following antecedent facts:

Petitioner Kue Cuison is a sole proprietorship engaged in the purchase and sale of newsprint, bond paper and scrap, with places of business at Baesa,
Quezon City, and Sto. Cristo, Binondo, Manila. Private respondent Valiant Investment Associates, on the other hand, is a partnership duly organized and
existing under the laws of the Philippines with business address at Kalookan City.
From December 4, 1979 to February 15, 1980, private respondent delivered various kinds of paper products amounting to P297,487.30 to a certain Lilian
Tan of LT Trading. The deliveries were made by respondent pursuant to orders allegedly placed by Tiu Huy Tiac who was then employed in the Binondo
office of petitioner. It was likewise pursuant to Tiac's instructions that the merchandise was delivered to Lilian Tan. Upon delivery, Lilian Tan paid for the
merchandise by issuing several checks payable to cash at the specific request of Tiu Huy Tiac. In turn, Tiac issued nine (9) postdated checks to private
respondent as payment for the paper products. Unfortunately, sad checks were later dishonored by the drawee bank.

Thereafter, private respondent made several demands upon petitioner to pay for the merchandise in question, claiming that Tiu Huy Tiac was duly
authorized by petitioner as the manager of his Binondo office, to enter into the questioned transactions with private respondent and Lilian Tan. Petitioner
denied any involvement in the transaction entered into by Tiu Huy Tiac and refused to pay private respondent the amount corresponding to the selling price
of the subject merchandise.

Left with no recourse, private respondent filed an action against petitioner for the collection of P297,487.30 representing the price of the merchandise. After
due hearing, the trial court dismissed the complaint against petitioner for lack of merit. On appeal, however, the decision of the trial court was modified, but
was in effect reversed by the Court of Appeals, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is MODIFIED in that defendant-appellant Kue Cuison is hereby ordered to pay plaintiff-appellant Valiant
Investment Associates the sum of P297,487.30 with 12% interest from the filing of the complaint until the amount is fully paid, plus the sum of 7% of the
total amount due as attorney's fees, and to pay the costs. In all other respects, the decision appealed from is affirmed. (Rollo, p. 55)

In this petition, petitioner contends that:

THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN FINDING TIU HUY TIAC AGENT OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT CONTRARY TO THE
UNDISPUTED/ESTABLISHED FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES.

THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN FINDING DEFENDANT-APPELLANT LIABLE FOR AN OBLIGATION UNDISPUTEDLY BELONGING TO TIU HUY
TIAC.

THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN REVERSING THE WELL-FOUNDED DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT, (Rollo, p, 19)

The issue here is really quite simple whether or not Tiu Huy Tiac possessed the required authority from petitioner sufficient to hold the latter liable for the
disputed transaction.

This petition ought to have been denied outright, forin the final analysis, it raises a factual issue. It is elementary that in petitions for review under Rule 45,
this Court only passes upon questions of law. An exception thereto occurs where the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are at variance with the trial
court, in which case the Court reviews the evidence in order to arrive at the correct findings based on the records.

As to the merits of the case, it is a well-established rule that one who clothes another with apparent authority as his agent and holds him out to the public
as such cannot be permitted to deny the authority of such person to act as his agent, to the prejudice of innocent third parties dealing with such person in
good faith and in the honest belief that he is what he appears to be (Macke, et al, v. Camps, 7 Phil. 553 (1907]; Philippine National Bank. v Court of
Appeals, 94 SCRA 357 [1979]). From the facts and the evidence on record, there is no doubt that this rule obtains. The petition must therefore fail.

It is evident from the records that by his own acts and admission, petitioner held out Tiu Huy Tiac to the public as the manager of his store in Sto. Cristo,
Binondo, Manila. More particularly, petitioner explicitly introduced Tiu Huy Tiac to Bernardino Villanueva, respondent's manager, as his (petitioner's) branch
manager as testified to by Bernardino Villanueva. Secondly, Lilian Tan, who has been doing business with petitioner for quite a while, also testified that she
knew Tiu Huy Tiac to be the manager of petitioner's Sto. Cristo, Binondo branch. This general perception of Tiu Huy Tiac as the manager of petitioner's
Sto. Cristo store is even made manifest by the fact that Tiu Huy Tiac is known in the community to be the "kinakapatid" (godbrother) of petitioner. In fact,
even petitioner admitted his close relationship with Tiu Huy Tiac when he said that they are "like brothers" (Rollo, p. 54). There was thus no reason for
anybody especially those transacting business with petitioner to even doubt the authority of Tiu Huy Tiac as his manager in the Sto. Cristo Binondo branch.

In a futile attempt to discredit Villanueva, petitioner alleges that the former's testimony is clearly self-serving inasmuch as Villanueva worked for private
respondent as its manager.

We disagree, The argument that Villanueva's testimony is self-serving and therefore inadmissible on the lame excuse of his employment with private
respondent utterly misconstrues the nature of "'self-serving evidence" and the specific ground for its exclusion. As pointed out by this Court in Co v. Court
of Appeals et, al., (99 SCRA 321 [1980]):

Self-serving evidence is evidence made by a party out of court at one time; it does not include a party's testimony as a witness in court. It is excluded on
the same ground as any hearsay evidence, that is the lack of opportunity for cross-examination by the adverse party, and on the consideration that its
admission would open the door to fraud and to fabrication of testimony. On theother hand, a party's testimony in court is sworn and affords the other party
the opportunity for cross-examination (emphasis supplied)

Petitioner cites Villanueva's failure, despite his commitment to do so on cross-examination, to produce the very first invoice of the transaction between
petitioner and private respondent as another ground to discredit Villanueva's testimony. Such failure, proves that Villanueva was not only bluffing when he
pretended that he can produce the invoice, but that Villanueva was likewise prevaricating when he insisted that such prior transactions actually took place.
Petitioner is mistaken. In fact, it was petitioner's counsel himself who withdrew the reservation to have Villanueva produce the document in court. As aptly
observed by the Court of Appeals in its decision:

. . . However, during the hearing on March 3, 1981, Villanueva failed to present the document adverted to because defendant-appellant's counsel withdrew
his reservation to have the former (Villanueva) produce the document or invoice, thus prompting plaintiff-appellant to rest its case that same day (t.s.n., pp.
39-40, Sess. of March 3, 1981). Now, defendant-appellant assails the credibility of Villanueva for having allegedly failed to produce even one single
document to show that plaintiff-appellant have had transactions before, when in fact said failure of Villanueva to produce said document is a direct off-shoot
of the action of defendant-appellant's counsel who withdrew his reservation for the production of the document or invoice and which led plaintiff-appellant to
rest its case that very day. (Rollo, p.52)

In the same manner, petitioner assails the credibility of Lilian Tan by alleging that Tan was part of an intricate plot to defraud him. However, petitioner failed
to substantiate or prove that the subject transaction was designed to defraud him. Ironically, it was even the testimony of petitioner's daughter and assistant
manager Imelda Kue Cuison which confirmed the credibility of Tan as a witness. On the witness stand, Imelda testified that she knew for a fact that prior to
the transaction in question, Tan regularly transacted business with her father (petitioner herein), thereby corroborating Tan's testimony to the same effect.
As correctly found by the respondent court, there was no logical explanation for Tan to impute liability upon petitioner. Rather, the testimony of Imelda Kue
Cuison only served to add credence to Tan's testimony as regards the transaction, the liability for which petitioner wishes to be absolved.

But of even greater weight than any of these testimonies, is petitioner's categorical admission on the witness stand that Tiu Huy Tiac was the manager of
his store in Sto. Cristo, Binondo, to wit:

Court:

xxx xxx xxx

Q And who was managing the store in Sto. Cristo?

A At first it was Mr. Ang, then later Mr. Tiu Huy Tiac but I cannot remember the exact year.

Q So, Mr. Tiu Huy Tiac took over the management,.

A Not that was because every afternoon, I was there, sir.

Q But in the morning, who takes charge?

A Tiu Huy Tiac takes charge of management and if there (sic) orders for newsprint or bond papers they are always referred to the compound in Baesa, sir.
(t.s.n., p. 16, Session of January 20, 1981, CA decision, Rollo, p. 50, emphasis supplied).

Such admission, spontaneous no doubt, and standing alone, is sufficient to negate all the denials made by petitioner regarding the capacity of Tiu Huy Tiac
to enter into the transaction in question. Furthermore, consistent with and as an obvious indication of the fact that Tiu Huy Tiac was the manager of the Sto.
Cristo branch, three (3) months after Tiu Huy Tiac left petitioner's employ, petitioner even sent, communications to its customers notifying them that Tiu
Huy Tiac is no longer connected with petitioner's business. Such undertaking spoke unmistakenly of Tiu Huy Tiac's valuable position as petitioner's
manager than any uttered disclaimer. More than anything else, this act taken together with the declaration of petitioner in open court amount to admissions
under Rule 130 Section 22 of the Rules of Court, to wit : "The act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against
him." For well-settled is the rule that "a man's acts, conduct, and declaration, wherever made, if voluntary, are admissible against him, for the reason that it
is fair to presume that they correspond with the truth, and it is his fault if they do not. If a man's extrajudicial admissions are admissible against him, there
seems to be no reason why his admissions made in open court, under oath, should not be accepted against him." (U.S. vs. Ching Po, 23 Phil. 578, 583
[1912];).

Moreover, petitioner's unexplained delay in disowning the transactions entered into by Tiu Huy Tiac despite several attempts made by respondent to collect
the amount from him, proved all the more that petitioner was aware of the questioned commission was tantamount to an admission by silence under Rule
130 Section 23 of the Rules of Court, thus: "Any act or declaration made in the presence of and within the observation of a party who does or says nothing
when the act or declaration is such as naturally to call for action or comment if not true, may be given in evidence against him."

All of these point to the fact that at the time of the transaction Tiu Huy Tiac was admittedly the manager of petitioner's store in Sto. Cristo, Binondo.
Consequently, the transaction in question as well as the concomitant obligation is valid and binding upon petitioner.

By his representations, petitioner is now estopped from disclaiming liability for the transaction entered by Tiu Huy Tiac on his behalf. It matters not whether
the representations are intentional or merely negligent so long as innocent, third persons relied upon such representations in good faith and for value As
held in the case of Manila Remnant Co. Inc. v. Court of Appeals, (191 SCRA 622 [1990]):

More in point, we find that by the principle of estoppel, Manila Remnant is deemed to have allowed its agent to act as though it had plenary powers. Article
1911 of the Civil Code provides:

"Even when the agent has exceeded his authority, the principal issolidarily liable with the agent if the former allowed the latter to act as though he had full
powers." (Emphasis supplied).

The above-quoted article is new. It is intended to protect the rights of innocent persons. In such a situation, both the principal and the agent may be
considered as joint tortfeasors whose liability is joint and solidary.

Authority by estoppel has arisen in the instant case because by its negligence, the principal, Manila Remnant, has permitted its agent, A.U. Valencia and
Co., to exercise powers not granted to it. That the principal might not have had actual knowledge of theagent's misdeed is of no moment.

Tiu Huy Tiac, therefore, by petitioner's own representations and manifestations, became an agent of petitioner by estoppel, an admission or representation
is rendered conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon (Article 1431, Civil Code of the
Philippines). A party cannot be allowed to go back on his own acts and representations to the prejudice of the other party who, in good faith, relied upon
them (Philippine National Bank v. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., 189 SCRA 680 [1990]).

Taken in this light,. petitioner is liable for the transaction entered into by Tiu Huy Tiac on his behalf. Thus, even when the agent has exceeded his authority,
the principal is solidarily liable with the agent if the former allowed the latter to fact as though he had full powers (Article 1911 Civil Code), as in the case at
bar.

Finally, although it may appear that Tiu Huy Tiac defrauded his principal (petitioner) in not turning over the proceeds of the transaction to the latter, such
fact cannot in any way relieve nor exonerate petitioner of his liability to private respondent. For it is an equitable maxim that as between two innocent
parties, the one who made it possible for the wrong to be done should be the one to bear the resulting loss (Francisco vs. Government Service Insurance
System, 7 SCRA 577 [1963]).

Inasmuch as the fundamental issue of the capacity or incapacity of the purported agent Tiu Huy Tiac, has already been resolved, the Court deems it
unnecessary to resolve the other peripheral issues raised by petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition in hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 137686 February 8, 2000

RURAL BANK OF MILAOR (CAMARINES SUR), petitioner,

vs.
FRANCISCA OCFEMIA, ROWENA BARROGO, MARIFE O. NIO, FELICISIMO OCFEMIA, RENATO OCFEMIA JR, and WINSTON
OCFEMIA, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

When a bank, by its acts and failure to act, has clearly clothed its manager with apparent authority to sell an acquired asset in the normal course of
business, it is legally obliged to confirm the transaction by issuing a board resolution to enable the buyers to register the property in their names. It has a
duty to perform necessary and lawful acts to enable the other parties to enjoy all benefits of the contract which it had authorized.

The Case

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari challenging the December 18, 1998 Decision of the Court of Appeals 1 (CA) in CA-GR SP No.
46246, which affirmed the May 20, 1997 Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naga City (Branch 28). The CA disposed as follows:

Wherefore, premises considered, the Judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the respondent-appellant. 3

The dispositive portion of the judgment affirmed by the CA ruled in this wise:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing findings, decision is hereby rendered whereby the [petitioner] Rural Bank of Milaor (Camarines Sur), Inc.
through its Board of Directors is hereby ordered to immediately issue a Board Resolution confirming the Deed of Sale it executed in favor of Renato
Ocfemia marked Exhibits C, C-1 and C-2); to pay [respondents] the sum of FIVE HUNDRED (P500.00) PESOS as actual damages; TEN THOUSAND
(P10,000.00) PESOS as attorney's fees; THIRTY THOUSAND (P30,000.00) PESOS as moral damages; THIRTY THOUSAND (P30,000.00) PESOS as
exemplary damages; and to pay the costs. 4

Also assailed is the February 26, 1999 CA Resolution 5 which denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.

The Facts

The trial court's summary of the undisputed facts was reproduced in the CA Decision as follows:

This is an action for mandamus with damages. On April 10, 1996, [herein petitioner] was declared in default on motion of the [respondents] for failure to file
an answer within the reglementary-period after it was duly served with summons. On April 26, 1996, [herein petitioner] filed a motion to set aside the order
of default with objection thereto filed by [herein respondents].

On June 17, 1996, an order was issued denying [petitioner's] motion to set aside the order of default. On July 10, 1996, the defendant filed a motion for
reconsideration of the order of June 17, 1996 with objection thereto by [respondents]. On July 12, 1996, an order was issued denying [petitioner's] motion
for reconsideration. On July 31, 1996, [respondents] filed a motion to set case for hearing. A copy thereof was duly furnished the [petitioner] but the latter
did not file any opposition and so [respondents] were allowed to present their evidence ex-parte. A certiorari case was filed by the [petitioner] with the Court
of Appeals docketed as CA GR No. 41497-SP but the petition was denied in a decision rendered on March 31, 1997 and the same is now final.

The evidence presented by the [respondents] through the testimony of Marife O. Nio, one of the [respondents] in this case, show[s] that she is the
daughter of Francisca Ocfemia, a co-[respondent] in this case, and the late Renato Ocfemia who died on July 23, 1994. The parents of her father, Renato
Ocfemia, were Juanita Arellano Ocfemia and Felicisimo Ocfemia. Her other co-[respondents] Rowena O. Barrogo, Felicisimo Ocfemia, Renato Ocfemia, Jr.
and Winston Ocfemia are her brothers and sisters.1wphi1.nt

Marife O. Nio knows the five (5) parcels of land described in paragraph 6 of the petition which are located in Bombon, Camarines Sur and that they are
the ones possessing them which [were] originally owned by her grandparents, Juanita Arellano Ocfemia and Felicisimo Ocfemia. During the lifetime of her
grandparents, [respondents] mortgaged the said five (5) parcels of land and two (2) others to the [petitioner] Rural Bank of Milaor as shown by the Deed of
Real Estate Mortgage (Exhs. A and A-1) and the Promissory Note (Exh. B).

The spouses Felicisimo Ocfemia and Juanita Arellano Ocfemia were not able to redeem the mortgaged properties consisting of seven (7) parcels of land
and so the mortgage was foreclosed and thereafter ownership thereof was transferred to the [petitioner] bank. Out of the seven (7) parcels that were
foreclosed, five (5) of them are in the possession of the [respondents] because these five (5) parcels of land described in paragraph 6 of the petition were
sold by the [petitioner] bank to the parents of Marife O. Nio as evidenced by a Deed of Sale executed in January 1988 (Exhs. C, C-1 and C-2).

The aforementioned five (5) parcels of land subject of the deed of sale (Exh. C), have not been, however transferred in the name of the parents of Merife
O. Nio after they were sold to her parents by the [petitioner] bank because according to the Assessor's Office the five (5) parcels of land, subject of the
sale, cannot be transferred in the name of the buyers as there is a need to have the document of sale registered with the Register of Deeds of Camarines
Sur.

In view of the foregoing, Marife O. Nio went to the Register of Deeds of Camarines Sur with the Deed of Sale (Exh. C) in order to have the same
registered. The Register of Deeds, however, informed her that the document of sale cannot be registered without a board resolution of the [petitioner]
Bank. Marife Nio then went to the bank, showed to if the Deed of Sale (Exh. C), the tax declaration and receipt of tax payments and requested the
[petitioner] for a board resolution so that the property can be transferred to the name of Renato Ocfemia the husband of petitioner Francisca Ocfemia and
the father of the other [respondents] having died already.

The [petitioner] bank refused her request for a board resolution and made many alibi[s]. She was told that the [petitioner] bank ha[d] a new manager and it
had no record of the sale. She was asked and she complied with the request of the [petitioner] for a copy of the deed of sale and receipt of payment. The
president of the [petitioner] bank told her to get an authority from her parents and other [respondents] and receipts evidencing payment of the consideration
appearing in the deed of sale. She complied with said requirements and after she gave all these documents, Marife O. Nio was again told to wait for two
(2) weeks because the [petitioner] bank would still study the matter.

After two (2) weeks, Marife O. Nio returned to the [petitioner] bank and she was told that the resolution of the board would not be released because the
[petitioner] bank ha[d] no records from the old manager. Because of this, Marife O. Nio brought the matter to her lawyer and the latter wrote a letter on
December 22, 1995 to the [petitioner] bank inquiring why no action was taken by the board of the request for the issuance of the resolution considering that
the bank was already fully paid [for] the consideration of the sale since January 1988 as shown by the deed of sale itself (Exh. D and D-1 ).

On January 15, 1996 the [petitioner] bank answered [respondents'] lawyer's letter (Exh. D and D-1) informing the latter that the request for board resolution
ha[d] already been referred to the board of directors of the [petitioner] bank with another request that the latter should be furnished with a certified machine
copy of the receipt of payment covering the sale between the [respondents] and the [petitioner] (Exh. E). This request of the [petitioner] bank was already
complied [with] by Marife O. Nio even before she brought the matter to her lawyer.

On January 23, 1996 [respondents'] lawyer wrote back the branch manager of the [petitioner] bank informing the latter that they were already furnished the
receipts the bank was asking [for] and that the [respondents] want[ed] already to know the stand of the bank whether the board [would] issue the required
board resolution as the deed of sale itself already show[ed] that the [respondents were] clearly entitled to the land subject of the sale (Exh. F). The
manager of the [petitioner] bank received the letter which was served personally to him and the latter told Marife O. Nio that since he was the one himself
who received the letter he would not sign anymore a copy showing him as having already received said letter (Exh. F).

After several days from receipt of the letter (Exh. F) when Marife O. Nio went to the [petitioner] again and reiterated her request, the manager of the
[petitioner] bank told her that they could not issue the required board resolution as the [petitioner] bank ha[d] no records of the sale. Because of this Merife
O. Nio already went to their lawyer and ha[d] this petition filed.

The [respondents] are interested in having the property described in paragraph 6 of the petition transferred to their names because their mother and co-
petitioner, Francisca Ocfemia, is very sickly and they want to mortgage the property for the medical expenses of Francisca Ocfemia. The illness of
Francisca Ocfemia beg[a]n after her husband died and her suffering from arthritis and pulmonary disease already became serious before December 1995.

Marife O. Nio declared that her mother is now in serious condition and they could not have her hospitalized for treatment as they do not have any money
and this is causing the family sleepless nights and mental anguish, thinking that their mother may die because they could not submit her for medication as
they do not have money. 6

The trial court granted the Petition. As noted earlier, the CA affirmed the RTC Decision.

Hence, this recourse. 7 In a Resolution dated June 23, 1999, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order directing the trial court "to refrain and desist
from executing [pending appeal] the decision dated May 20, 1997 in Civil Case No. RTC-96-3513, effective immediately until further orders from this
Court." 8

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The CA held that herein respondents were "able to prove their present cause of action" against petitioner. It ruled that the RTC had jurisdiction over the
case, because (1) the Petition involved a matter incapable of pecuniary estimation; (2) mandamus fell within the jurisdiction of RTC; and (3) assuming that
the action was for specific performance as argued by the petitioner, it was still cognizable by the said court.

Issues

In its Memorandum, 9 the bank posed the following questions:

1. Question of Jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. Has a Regional Trial Court original jurisdiction over an action involving title to real property with a
total assessed value of less than P20,000.00?

2. Question of Law. May the board of directors of a rural banking corporation be compelled to confirm a deed of absolute sale of real property owned by
the corporation which deed of sale was executed by the bank manager without prior authority of the board of directors of the rural banking corporation? 10

This Court's Ruling

The present Petition has no merit.

First Issue:
Jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court

Petitioner submits that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case. Disputing the ruling of the appellate court that the present action was incapable of
pecuniary estimation, petitioner argues that the matter in fact involved title to real property worth less than P20,000. Thus, under RA 7691, the case should
have been filed before a metropolitan trial court, a municipal trial court or a municipal circuit trial court.

We disagree. The well-settled rule is that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations of the complaint. 11 In the present case, the Petition for Mandamus
filed by respondents before the trial court prayed that petitioner-bank be compelled to issue a board resolution confirming the Deed of Sale covering five
parcels of unregistered land, which the bank manager had executed in their favor. The RTC has jurisdiction over such action pursuant to Section 21 of BP
129, which provides:
Sec. 21. Original jurisdiction in other cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise original jurisdiction;

(1) in the issuance of writ of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction which may be enforced in any part of their
respective regions; and

(2) In actions affecting ambassadors and other public ministers and consuls.

A perusal of the Petition shows that the respondents did not raise any question involving the title to the property, but merely asked that petitioner's board of
directors be directed to issue the subject resolution. Moreover, the bank did not controvert the allegations in the said Petition. To repeat, the issue therein
was not the title to the property; it was respondents' right to compel the bank to issue a board resolution confirming the Deed of Sale.

Second Issue:
Authority of the Bank Manager

Respondents initiated the present proceedings, so that they could transfer to their names the subject five parcels of land; and subsequently, to mortgage
said lots and to use the loan proceeds for the medical expenses of their ailing mother. For the property to be transferred in their names, however, the
register of deeds required the submission of a board resolution from the bank confirming both the Deed of Sale and the authority of the bank manager, Fe
S. Tena, to enter into such transaction. Petitioner refused. After being given the runaround by the bank, respondents sued in exasperation.

Allegations in the Petition for Mandamus Deemed Admitted

Respondents based their action before the trial court on the Deed of Sale, the substance of which was alleged in and a copy thereof was attached to the
Petition for Mandamus. The Deed named Fe S. Tena as the representative of the bank. Petitioner, however, failed to specifically deny under oath the
allegations in that contract. In fact, it filed no answer at all, for which reason it was declared in default. Pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court read:

Sec. 7. Action or defense based on document. Whenever an action or defense is based upon a written instrument or document, the substance of such
instrument or document shall be set forth in the pleading, and the original or a copy thereof shall be attached to the pleading as an exhibit, which shall be
deemed to be a part of the pleading, or said copy may with like effect be set forth in the pleading.

Sec. 8. How to contest genuineness of such documents. When an action or defense is founded upon a written instrument, copied in or attached to the
corresponding pleading as provided in the preceding section, the genuineness and due execution of the instrument shall be deemed admitted unless the
adverse party, under oath, specifically denies them, and sets forth what he claims to be the facts; but this provision does not apply when the adverse party
does not appear to be a party to the instrument or when compliance with an order for an inspection of the original instrument is refused. 12

In failing to file its answer specifically denying under oath the Deed of Sale, the bank admitted the due execution of the said contract. Such admission
means that it acknowledged that Tena was authorized to sign the Deed of Sale on its behalf. 13 Thus, defenses that are inconsistent with the due execution
and the genuineness of the written instrument are cut off by an admission implied from a failure to make a verified specific denial.

Other Acts of the Bank

In any event, the bank acknowledged, by its own acts or failure to act, the authority of Fe S. Tena to enter into binding contracts. After the execution of the
Deed of Sale, respondents occupied the properties in dispute and paid the real estate taxes due thereon. If the bank management believed that it had title
to the property, it should have taken some measures to prevent the infringement or invasion of its title thereto and possession thereof.

Likewise, Tena had previously transacted business on behalf of the bank, and the latter had acknowledged her authority. A bank is liable to innocent third
persons where representation is made in the course of its normal business by an agent like Manager Tena, even though such agent is abusing her
authority. 14 Clearly, persons dealing with her could not be blamed for believing that she was authorized to transact business for and on behalf of the bank.
Thus, this Court has ruled in Board of Liquidators v. Kalaw: 15

Settled jurisprudence has it that where similar acts have been approved by the directors as a matter of general practice, custom, and policy, the general
manager may bind the company without formal authorization of the board of directors. In varying language, existence of such authority is established, by
proof of the course of business, the usages and practices of the company and by the knowledge which the board of directors has, or must be presumed to
have, of acts and doings of its subordinates in and about the affairs of the corporation. So also,

. . . authority to act for and bind a corporation may be presumed from acts of recognition in other instances where the power was in fact exercised.

. . . Thus, when, in the usual course of business of a corporation, an officer has been allowed in his official capacity to manage its affairs, his authority to
represent the corporation may be implied from the manner in which he has been permitted by the directors to manage its business.

Notwithstanding the putative authority of the manager to bind the bank in the Deed of Sale, petitioner has failed to file an answer to the Petition below
within the reglementary period, let alone present evidence controverting such authority. Indeed, when one of herein respondents, Marife S. Nino, went to
the bank to ask for the board resolution, she was merely told to bring the receipts. The bank failed to categorically declare that Tena had no authority. This
Court stresses the following:

. . . Corporate transactions would speedily come to a standstill were every person dealing with a corporation held duty-bound to disbelieve every act of its
responsible officers, no matter how regular they should appear on their face. This Court has observed in Ramirez vs. Orientalist Co., 38 Phil. 634, 654-655,
that

In passing upon the liability of a corporation in cases of this kind it is always well to keep in mind the situation as it presents itself to the third party with
whom the contract is made. Naturally he can have little or no information as to what occurs in corporate meetings; and he must necessarily rely upon the
external manifestation of corporate consent. The integrity of commercial transactions can only be maintained by holding the corporation strictly to the
liability fixed upon it by its agents in accordance with law; and we would be sorry to announce a doctrine which would permit the property of man in the city
of Paris to be whisked out of his hands and carried into a remote quarter of the earth without recourse against the corporation whose name and authority
had been used in the manner disclosed in this case. As already observed, it is familiar doctrine that if a corporation knowingly permits one of its officers, or
any other agent, to do acts within the scope of an apparent authority, and thus holds him out to the public as possessing power to do those acts, the
corporation will, as against any one who has in good faith dealt with the corporation through such agent, be estopped from denying his authority; and
where it is said "if the corporation permits this means the same as "if the thing is permitted by the directing power of the corporation." 16

In this light, the bank is estopped from questioning the authority of the bank manager to enter into the contract of sale. If a corporation knowingly permits
one of its officers or any other agent to act within the scope of an apparent authority, it holds the agent out to the public as possessing the power to do
those acts; thus, the corporation will, as against anyone who has in good faith dealt with it through such agent, be estopped from denying the agent's
authority. 17

Unquestionably, petitioner has authorized Tena to enter into the Deed of Sale. Accordingly, it has a clear legal duty to issue the board resolution sought by
respondent's. Having authorized her to sell the property, it behooves the bank to confirm the Deed of Sale so that the buyers may enjoy its full use.

The board resolution is, in fact, mere paper work. Nonetheless, it is paper work necessary in the orderly operations of the register of deeds and the full
enjoyment of respondents' rights. Petitioner-bank persistently and unjustifiably refused to perform its legal duty. Worse, it was less than candid in dealing
with respondents regarding this matter. In this light, the Court finds it proper to assess the bank treble costs, in addition to the award of damages.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision and Resolution AFFIRMED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued by this
Court is hereby LIFTED. Treble costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 160346 August 25, 2009

PURITA PAHUD, SOLEDAD PAHUD, and IAN LEE CASTILLA (represented by Mother and Attorney-in-Fact VIRGINIA CASTILLA), Petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES ISAGANI BELARMINO and LETICIA OCAMPO, EUFEMIA SAN AGUSTIN-MAGSINO, ZENAIDA SAN AGUSTIN-
McCRAE, MILAGROS SAN AGUSTIN-FORTMAN, MINERVA SAN AGUSTIN-ATKINSON, FERDINAND SAN AGUSTIN, RAUL SAN AGUSTIN,
ISABELITA SAN AGUSTIN-LUSTENBERGER and VIRGILIO SAN AGUSTIN, Respondents.

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

For our resolution is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the April 23, 2003 Decision 1 and October 8, 2003 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CV No. 59426. The appellate court, in the said decision and resolution, reversed and set aside the January 14, 1998 Decision3 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), which ruled in favor of petitioners.

The dispute stemmed from the following facts.

During their lifetime, spouses Pedro San Agustin and Agatona Genil were able to acquire a 246-square meter parcel of land situated in Barangay Anos,
Los Baos, Laguna and covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. O-(1655) 0-15.4 Agatona Genil died on September 13, 1990 while Pedro San
Agustin died on September 14, 1991. Both died intestate, survived by their eight (8) children: respondents Eufemia, Raul, Ferdinand, Zenaida, Milagros,
Minerva, Isabelita and Virgilio.

Sometime in 1992, Eufemia, Ferdinand and Raul executed a Deed of Absolute Sale of Undivided Shares 5conveying in favor of petitioners (the Pahuds, for
brevity) their respective shares from the lot they inherited from their deceased parents for 525,000.00. 6 Eufemia also signed the deed on behalf of her four
(4) other co-heirs, namely: Isabelita on the basis of a special power of attorney executed on September 28, 1991, 7 and also for Milagros, Minerva, and
Zenaida but without their apparent written authority.8 The deed of sale was also not notarized.9

On July 21, 1992, the Pahuds paid 35,792.31 to the Los Baos Rural Bank where the subject property was mortgaged.10 The bank issued a release of
mortgage and turned over the owners copy of the OCT to the Pahuds. 11 Over the following months, the Pahuds made more payments to Eufemia and her
siblings totaling to 350,000.00.12 They agreed to use the remaining 87,500.0013 to defray the payment for taxes and the expenses in transferring the title
of the property.14 When Eufemia and her co-heirs drafted an extra-judicial settlement of estate to facilitate the transfer of the title to the Pahuds, Virgilio
refused to sign it.15

On July 8, 1993, Virgilios co-heirs filed a complaint16 for judicial partition of the subject property before the RTC of Calamba, Laguna. On November 28,
1994, in the course of the proceedings for judicial partition, a Compromise Agreement 17 was signed with seven (7) of the co-heirs agreeing to sell their
undivided shares to Virgilio for 700,000.00. The compromise agreement was, however, not approved by the trial court because Atty. Dimetrio Hilbero,
lawyer for Eufemia and her six (6) co-heirs, refused to sign the agreement because he knew of the previous sale made to the Pahuds. 18lawphil.net

On December 1, 1994, Eufemia acknowledged having received 700,000.00 from Virgilio.19 Virgilio then sold the entire property to spouses Isagani
Belarmino and Leticia Ocampo (Belarminos) sometime in 1994. The Belarminos immediately constructed a building on the subject property.

Alarmed and bewildered by the ongoing construction on the lot they purchased, the Pahuds immediately confronted Eufemia who confirmed to them that
Virgilio had sold the property to the Belarminos.20 Aggrieved, the Pahuds filed a complaint in intervention21 in the pending case for judicial partition.1avvphil

After trial, the RTC upheld the validity of the sale to petitioners. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the Court orders:

1. the sale of the 7/8 portion of the property covered by OCT No. O (1655) O-15 by the plaintiffs as heirs of deceased Sps. Pedro San Agustin and Agatona
Genil in favor of the Intervenors-Third Party plaintiffs as valid and enforceable, but obligating the Intervenors-Third Party plaintiffs to complete the payment
of the purchase price of 437,500.00 by paying the balance of 87,500.00 to defendant Fe (sic) San Agustin Magsino. Upon receipt of the balance, the
plaintiff shall formalize the sale of the 7/8 portion in favor of the Intervenor[s]-Third Party plaintiffs;
2. declaring the document entitled "Salaysay sa Pagsang-ayon sa Bilihan" (Exh. "2-a") signed by plaintiff Eufemia San Agustin attached to the unapproved
Compromise Agreement (Exh. "2") as not a valid sale in favor of defendant Virgilio San Agustin;

3. declaring the sale (Exh. "4") made by defendant Virgilio San Agustin of the property covered by OCT No. O (1655)-O-15 registered in the names of
Spouses Pedro San Agustin and Agatona Genil in favor of Third-party defendant Spouses Isagani and Leticia Belarmino as not a valid sale and as
inexistent;

4. declaring the defendant Virgilio San Agustin and the Third-Party defendants spouses Isagani and Leticia Belarmino as in bad faith in buying the portion
of the property already sold by the plaintiffs in favor of the Intervenors-Third Party Plaintiffs and the Third-Party Defendant Sps. Isagani and Leticia
Belarmino in constructing the two-[storey] building in (sic) the property subject of this case; and

5. declaring the parties as not entitled to any damages, with the parties shouldering their respective responsibilities regarding the payment of attorney[]s
fees to their respective lawyers.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.22

Not satisfied, respondents appealed the decision to the CA arguing, in the main, that the sale made by Eufemia for and on behalf of her other co-heirs to
the Pahuds should have been declared void and inexistent for want of a written authority from her co-heirs. The CA yielded and set aside the findings of
the trial court. In disposing the issue, the CA ruled:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision dated January 14, 1998, rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, Branch 92 in Civil
Case No. 2011-93-C for Judicial Partition is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new one entered, as follows:

(1) The case for partition among the plaintiffs-appellees and appellant Virgilio is now considered closed and terminated;

(2) Ordering plaintiffs-appellees to return to intervenors-appellees the total amount they received from the latter, plus an interest of 12% per annum from
the time the complaint [in] intervention was filed on April 12, 1995 until actual payment of the same;

(3) Declaring the sale of appellant Virgilio San Agustin to appellants spouses, Isagani and Leticia Belarmino[,] as valid and binding;

(4) Declaring appellants-spouses as buyers in good faith and for value and are the owners of the subject property.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.23

Petitioners now come to this Court raising the following arguments:

I. The Court of Appeals committed grave and reversible error when it did not apply the second paragraph of Article 1317 of the New Civil Code insofar as
ratification is concerned to the sale of the 4/8 portion of the subject property executed by respondents San Agustin in favor of petitioners;

II. The Court of Appeals committed grave and reversible error in holding that respondents spouses Belarminos are in good faith when they bought the
subject property from respondent Virgilio San Agustin despite the findings of fact by the court a quo that they were in bad faith which clearly contravenes
the presence of long line of case laws upholding the task of giving utmost weight and value to the factual findings of the trial court during appeals; [and]

III. The Court of Appeals committed grave and reversible error in holding that respondents spouses Belarminos have superior rights over the property in
question than petitioners despite the fact that the latter were prior in possession thereby misapplying the provisions of Article 1544 of the New Civil Code.24

The focal issue to be resolved is the status of the sale of the subject property by Eufemia and her co-heirs to the Pahuds. We find the transaction to be
valid and enforceable.

Article 1874 of the Civil Code plainly provides:

Art. 1874. When a sale of a piece of land or any interest therein is through an agent, the authority of the latter shall be in writing; otherwise, the sale shall
be void.

Also, under Article 1878,25 a special power of attorney is necessary for an agent to enter into a contract by which the ownership of an immovable property
is transmitted or acquired, either gratuitously or for a valuable consideration. Such stringent statutory requirement has been explained in Cosmic Lumber
Corporation v. Court of Appeals:26

[T]he authority of an agent to execute a contract [of] sale of real estate must be conferred in writing and must give him specific authority, either to conduct
the general business of the principal or to execute a binding contract containing terms and conditions which are in the contract he did execute. A special
power of attorney is necessary to enter into any contract by which the ownership of an immovable is transmitted or acquired either gratuitously or for a
valuable consideration. The express mandate required by law to enable an appointee of an agency (couched) in general terms to sell must be one that
expressly mentions a sale or that includes a sale as a necessary ingredient of the act mentioned. For the principal to confer the right upon an agent to sell
real estate, a power of attorney must so express the powers of the agent in clear and unmistakable language. When there is any reasonable doubt that the
language so used conveys such power, no such construction shall be given the document.27

In several cases, we have repeatedly held that the absence of a written authority to sell a piece of land is, ipso jure, void,28 precisely to protect the interest
of an unsuspecting owner from being prejudiced by the unwarranted act of another.
Based on the foregoing, it is not difficult to conclude, in principle, that the sale made by Eufemia, Isabelita and her two brothers to the Pahuds sometime in
1992 should be valid only with respect to the 4/8 portion of the subject property. The sale with respect to the 3/8 portion, representing the shares of
Zenaida, Milagros, and Minerva, is void because Eufemia could not dispose of the interest of her co-heirs in the said lot absent any written authority from
the latter, as explicitly required by law. This was, in fact, the ruling of the CA.

Still, in their petition, the Pahuds argue that the sale with respect to the 3/8 portion of the land should have been deemed ratified when the three co-heirs,
namely: Milagros, Minerva, and Zenaida, executed their respective special power of attorneys 29 authorizing Eufemia to represent them in the sale of their
shares in the subject property.30

While the sale with respect to the 3/8 portion is void by express provision of law and not susceptible to ratification, 31we nevertheless uphold its validity on
the basis of the common law principle of estoppel.

Article 1431 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 1431. Through estoppel an admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as
against the person relying thereon.

True, at the time of the sale to the Pahuds, Eufemia was not armed with the requisite special power of attorney to dispose of the 3/8 portion of the property.
Initially, in their answer to the complaint in intervention,32 Eufemia and her other co-heirs denied having sold their shares to the Pahuds. During the pre-trial
conference, however, they admitted that they had indeed sold 7/8 of the property to the Pahuds sometime in 1992.33 Thus, the previous denial was
superseded, if not accordingly amended, by their subsequent admission.34 Moreover, in their Comment,35 the said co-heirs again admitted the sale made to
petitioners.36

Interestingly, in no instance did the three (3) heirs concerned assail the validity of the transaction made by Eufemia to the Pahuds on the basis of want of
written authority to sell. They could have easily filed a case for annulment of the sale of their respective shares against Eufemia and the Pahuds. Instead,
they opted to remain silent and left the task of raising the validity of the sale as an issue to their co-heir, Virgilio, who is not privy to the said transaction.
They cannot be allowed to rely on Eufemia, their attorney-in-fact, to impugn the validity of the first transaction because to allow them to do so would be
tantamount to giving premium to their sisters dishonest and fraudulent deed. Undeniably, therefore, the silence and passivity of the three co-heirs on the
issue bar them from making a contrary claim.

It is a basic rule in the law of agency that a principal is subject to liability for loss caused to another by the latters reliance upon a deceitful representation
by an agent in the course of his employment (1) if the representation is authorized; (2) if it is within the implied authority of the agent to make for the
principal; or (3) if it is apparently authorized, regardless of whether the agent was authorized by him or not to make the representation.37

By their continued silence, Zenaida, Milagros and Minerva have caused the Pahuds to believe that they have indeed clothed Eufemia with the authority to
transact on their behalf. Clearly, the three co-heirs are now estopped from impugning the validity of the sale from assailing the authority of Eufemia to enter
into such transaction.

Accordingly, the subsequent sale made by the seven co-heirs to Virgilio was void because they no longer had any interest over the subject property which
they could alienate at the time of the second transaction.38 Nemo dat quod non habet. Virgilio, however, could still alienate his 1/8 undivided share to the
Belarminos.

The Belarminos, for their part, cannot argue that they purchased the property from Virgilio in good faith. As a general rule, a purchaser of a real property is
not required to make any further inquiry beyond what the certificate of title indicates on its face. 39 But the rule excludes those who purchase with knowledge
of the defect in the title of the vendor or of facts sufficient to induce a reasonable and prudent person to inquire into the status of the property.40Such
purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man on guard, and later claim that he acted in good faith on the belief that there
was no defect in the title of the vendor. His mere refusal to believe that such defect exists, or his obvious neglect by closing his eyes to the possibility of the
existence of a defect in the vendors title, will not make him an innocent purchaser for value, if afterwards it turns out that the title was, in fact, defective. In
such a case, he is deemed to have bought the property at his own risk, and any injury or prejudice occasioned by such transaction must be borne by him.41

In the case at bar, the Belarminos were fully aware that the property was registered not in the name of the immediate transferor, Virgilio, but remained in
the name of Pedro San Agustin and Agatona Genil.42 This fact alone is sufficient impetus to make further inquiry and, thus, negate their claim that they are
purchasers for value in good faith.43 They knew that the property was still subject of partition proceedings before the trial court, and that the compromise
agreement signed by the heirs was not approved by the RTC following the opposition of the counsel for Eufemia and her six other co-heirs.44 The
Belarminos, being transferees pendente lite, are deemed buyers in mala fide, and they stand exactly in the shoes of the transferor and are bound by any
judgment or decree which may be rendered for or against the transferor. 45 Furthermore, had they verified the status of the property by asking the
neighboring residents, they would have been able to talk to the Pahuds who occupy an adjoining business establishment 46 and would have known that a
portion of the property had already been sold. All these existing and readily verifiable facts are sufficient to suggest that the Belarminos knew that they
were buying the property at their own risk.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the April 23, 2003 Decision of the Court of Appeals as well as its October 8, 2003 Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No.
59426, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the January 14, 1998 Decision of Branch 92 of the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna is
REINSTATED with the MODIFICATION that the sale made by respondent Virgilio San Agustin to respondent spouses Isagani Belarmino and Leticia
Ocampo is valid only with respect to the 1/8 portion of the subject property. The trial court is ordered to proceed with the partition of the property with
dispatch.

SO ORDERED.