TITLE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RODOLFO A. SCHNECKENBURGER ET AL.

GR NUMBER GR No. 48183

PROMULG. Nov 10, 1941

DATE

DIVISION

PONENTE Moran, J.

NATURE - Action for Bigamy and Concubinage; Plea of Double Jeopardy

ACTION

FACTS The parties were married on March 16, 1926. After seven years of marriage, they agreed, for
reason of alleged incompatibility of character, to live separately from each other. They ratified the
same in a written document which also expressed each others freedom of action in any act and in
all concepts.

On June 15, 1935, the accused, without leaving the country, secured a divorce decree from the civil
court of Juarez, Bravos District, Chihuahua, Mexico. Almost a year later, he contracted another
marriage with Julia Medel in the justice of the peace court of Malabon, Rizal, and since then lived
together as husband and wife in Manila.

With the obtained divorce decree being void, complainant instituted two actions against the
accused--one for bigamy and the other for concubinage.

The accused already served out the sentence for the first offense. On the trial for second crime,
accused interposed the plea of double jeopardy. Initially, the case was dismissed; however, upon
appeal by the fiscal, this Court held the dismissal before trial to be premature and without deciding
the question of double jeopardy, remanded the case to the trial court for trial on the merits. Therein,
accused was convicted of concubinage through reckless imprudence.

ISSUE(S) W/N the accused should be acquitted of concubinage on account of consent expressed in their
separation agreement

RULING(S) YES. We believe and so hold that the accused should be acquitted of the crime of concubinage.
The document executed by and between the accused and the complainant in which they agreed to
be " In complete freedom of action in any act and in all concepts," (Translated from Spanish) while
illegal for the purpose for which it was executed, constitutes nevertheless a valid consent to the act
of concubinage within the meaning of section 344 of the Revised Penal Code. There can be no
doubt that by such agreement, each party clearly intended to forego the illicit acts of the other.

We said before (People vs. Guinucod, 58 Phil., 621) that the consent which bars the offended party
from instituting a criminal prosecution in cases of adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction,
rape and acts of lasciviousness is that which has been given expressly or impliedly after the crime
has been committed. We are now convinced that this is a narrow view in no way warranted by the
language, as well as the manifest policy, of the law. The second paragraph of article 344 of the
 Revised Penal Code provides:

"The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution without including both the guilty parties,
if they are both alive, nor, in any case, if he shall have consented or pardoned the offenders."

As the term "pardon" unquestionably refers to the offense after its commission, "consent" must
have been intended, agreeably with its ordinary usage, to refer to the offense prior to its
commission. No logical difference can indeed be perceived between prior and subsequent consent,
for in both instances as the offended party has chosen to compromise with his/her dishonor, he/she
becomes unworthy to come to court and invoke its aid in the vindication of the wrong. For
instance, a husband who delivers his wife to another man for adultery, is as unworthy, if not more,
as where, upon acquiring knowledge of the adultery after its commission, he says or does nothing.
We, therefore, hold that prior consent is as effective as subsequent consent to bar the offended
party from prosecuting the offense.

Judgment is reversed and the accused is hereby acquitted, without costs.

TITLE FELICIDAD MUNOZ v. JOSE DEL BARRIO

CITATION 51 OG 5247

PROMULG. April 15, 1955

DATE
DIVISION

PONENTE Felix, J.

NATURE - Appeal from a Judgment; Action for Legal Separation

ACTION

FACTS The accused and complainant were married civilly on September 24, 1942 and again canonically
on October 24 of that year. Since their marriage, the couple lived together as husband and wife for
the ensuing six months in the house of the husbands father at Rizal Avenue, Manila, and then
moved their residence to the municipality of Meycawayan, Bulacan. The union bore two children.

During their marriage, the couple had frequent quarrels, on which occasions the husband
maltreated his wife by deed. In 1947, they unceremoniously separated, for the latter was unable to
bear such punishment. The wife stayed in Meycawayan, while the husband in Manila.

Notwithstanding this separation of dwellings they met each other in Manila, wherein wife claimed
that in December, 1950 or January 1951, and September 1951, she was again maltreated by her
husband which moved her to institute action on October 26, 1951. The filed petition, with
assertions that Jose made several attempts on her life, prayed that a decree of legal separation be
granted, pursuant to Art. 97 of the Civil Code.

On November 12, 1951, respondent answered to the petition denying the averments and prayed
that the petition be denied and dismissed. After the issues were joined, the court, in compliance
with the provisions of Article 98 of the NCC, took every feasible step towards the reconciliation of
the spouses, but to no avail by reason of the determined refusal of the wife. Hence, the case
proceeded, but was later dismissed for lack of merits.

Not satisfied with the outcome, Muoz appealed from said judgment and presented testimonies by
a tenant, patrolman and her counsel. The maltreatment referred to by the tenant consisted of
merely fist blows by the respondent on the face of appellant. Meanwhile, the patrolman did not
witness the maltreatment on which he testified, for he was just called to intervene in the quarrel
between the spouses when it was already over, and only saw that she was crying and that there
were scratches on her brow and cheeks and on blackened (ecchymosis) points on her neck. About
the quarrel spoken of by her counsel, respondent was said to boxed his wife on the abdomen,
pulled her hair and had also twisted her neck when the counsel of the complainant, with two other
men, separated petitioner and respondent.

ISSUE(S) W/N the maltreatments that appellant suffered at the hands of the respondent after their separation
of dwelling, which allegedly occurred in December, 1950, or January, 1951, and September of the
latter year, furnish ground for the legal separation applied for under paragraph 2 of Article 97 of
the Civil Code.

RULING(S) NO. An attempt on the life of a person implies that the actor in the attempt is moved by an
intention to kill the person against whom the attempt is made, and after a careful examination of
the evidence produced by appellant we cannot make up our mind to declare that the alleged
maltreatments of respondent to his wife were moved by such intent to kill. On the contrary, we
share the opinion of the trial judge who declared that said maltreatments cannot constitute attempts
on the life of appellant as provided in Article 97, No.2, of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

From the second edition of the Revised Penal Code by Dean Vicente J. Francisco Book II, part 1,
pp. 671-672 we copy the following:
 [] It is absolutely necessary that the homicidal intent be evidenced by adequate acts which at
the time of their execution were unmistakably calculated to produce the death of the victim, since
the crime of frustrated or attempted homicide is one in which, more than in any other case, the
penal law is based upon the material results produced by the criminal act. It is not proper or just to
attribute to the delinquent a specific intent to commit the higher crime in the absence of proof to
justify such a conclusion (U.S. vs. Taguibao, 1 Phil., 16). []

In the case of U.S. vs. Reyes et al., 30 Phil., 551, the Highest Tribunal of the land said the
following:
Homicide; Criminal intent. When the case affords no good reason for holding that the assailants
positively intended to kill the injured party in spite of the persistent and repeated beatings they
gave him, however much they plainly demonstrated their intention of doing him injury, by striking
him in an inhuman manner on various parts of his body, it is improper to classify the crime as
either frustrated or attempted homicide. A personal assault must be punished according to its
consequences and the harm done to the victim, for the penal law in this class of crimes is only
concerned with the material results produced by the transgression, unless the perverse intention of
taking the victims life be clearly manifested.

In the maltreatments complained of in this case, the respondent only used at most his bare fists or
hands and desisted from giving further chastisement after the first blows were given at the spur of
the impulse. It is argued, however, that this is a civil case and that appellant is only bound to prove
her right of action by preponderance of evidence and not by evidence beyond reasonable doubt
upon which a conviction for attempted paricide would rest, and though we may, to a certain extent,
agree with counsel for appellant on this point, yet we cannot help but declare that in so far as the
intent to kill is concerned, it must be established with clear and convincing evidence, and that in
the case at bar said intent has not been proved by such evidence. [..]

Wherefore, the decision appealed from, being in conformity with the law and the evidence of
record, is hereby affirmed without pronouncement as to costs.

TITLE SPOUSES ATTY. ERLANDO ABRENICA AND JOENA ABRENICA v. LAW FIRM OF
ABRENICA, TUNGOL AND TIBAYAN

GR NUMBER GR No. 180572

PROMULG. June 18, 2012

DATE

DIVISION Second Division

PONENTE Sereno, J.

NATURE - Petition for review on certiorari of the resolutions of the Court of Appeals
ACTION

FACTS Petitioner Atty. Erlando A. Abrenica was a partner of individual respondents, Attys. Danilo N.
Tungol and Abelardo M. Tibayan, in the Law Firm of Abrenica, Tungol and Tibayan.
 In 1998, Respondents filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) two cases
against Petitioner regarding an alleged refusal of Petitioner to return and transfer partnership
funds representing profits from the sale of a parcel of land in Lemery, Batangas, and that they
sought to recover from Petitioner the retainer fees that he received from two clients of the firm
and the balance of the cash advance he obtained in 1997.

The SEC initially heard the cases but they were later transferred to the RTC of Quezon City
pursuant to Republic Act No. 8799, which transferred jurisdiction over intra-corporate
controversies from the SEC to the courts.

On September 13, 2007, Petitioner Erlando filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion, alleging that the
sheriff had levied on properties belonging to his children and Petitioner Joena. In addition,
Erlando alleged that the trial court still had to determine the manner of distribution of the firms
assets and the value of the levied properties.

On the same day, Joena filed an Affidavit of Third Party Claim alleging that she and her
stepchildren owned a number of the personal properties sought to be levied. She also insisted
that she owned half of the two (2) motor vehicles as well as the house and lot which formed part
of the absolute community of property.

In present petition, they assert that petitioner Joenas right to due process was also violated
when she was not made a party-in-interest to the proceedings in the lower courts, even if her
half of the absolute community of property was included in the execution of the judgment
rendered by RTC.

Petitioners elevated this case to SC, because they were allegedly denied due process when the
CA rejected their second attempt at the annulment of the Decision of the RTC and their Humble
Motion for Reconsideration.

Erlando had been previously married to another woman but their marriage was already
dissolved. He was first married to a certain Ma. Aline Lovejoy Padua on October 13, 1983.
They had three children. After the dissolution of the first marriage of Erlando, he and Joena got
married on May 28, 1998. In her Affidavit, Joena alleged that she represented her stepchildren;
that the levied personal properties in particular, a piano with a chair, computer equipment and
a computer table were owned by the latter.

ISSUE(S) W/N Joena has rights on the concerned properties forming part of the absolute community, with
her claims that her stepchildren and herself are owners of such

RULING(S) NO. We note that two of these stepchildren were already of legal age when Joena filed her
Affidavit. As to Patrik Randel, parental authority over him belongs to his parents. Absent any
special power of attorney authorizing Joena to represent Erlandos children, her claim cannot be
sustained.

Petitioner Joena also asserted that the two (2) motor vehicles purchased in 1992 and 1997, as
well as the house and lot covered by TCT No. 216818 formed part of the absolute community
regime. However, Art. 92, par. (3) of the Family Code excludes from the community property
the property acquired before the marriage of a spouse who has legitimate descendants by a
former marriage; and the fruits and the income, if any, of that property. Neither these two
vehicles nor the house and lot belong to the second marriage.
TITLE JUAN YSASI v. HON. JOSE F. FERNANDEZ, ET. AL.

GR NUMBER GR No. L-28593

PROMULG. June 25,1968

DATE

DIVISION En Banc

PONENTE Sanchez, J.

NATURE - Petition for Certiorari

ACTION

FACTS Juan Ysasi, petitioner, and Maria Aldecoa de Ysasi, one of the respondents, are husband and
wife. Petitioner concedes for present purposes that Hacienda Manucao-A, in Negros Occidental,
is conjugal property of said spouses. Since 1948, the spouses have been commuting between the
Philippines and Spain where they also own real properties. But the husband shuttled more
frequently, on account of the management of the hacienda.
 Said hacienda had been managed by Valentin Bilbao, from 1952 to 1965. Juan Ysasi, however,
maintained overall supervision. Then in 1965, Jon, a son of the spouses, took over.

In 1966, Juan instructed their younger son, Jose Mari, to assist Jon Ysasi in the management,
but Jon did not allow him to participate; not even as a cashier. Dissension between the two
developed, which prompted the wife to go to the Philippines and sort out their differences.

Consequently, Jon resigned from his position through a letter. The resignation was accepted by
Juan, and assigned Bilbao to take sons place. Despite the arrival of Bilbao due to the
designation, Jon refused to turn over the hacienda to Bilbao upon the claim that his mother
already took possession and administration of the hacienda since his resignation.

Subsequently, the wife filed a verified petition where she sought the administration of the
conjugal partnership properties, or, in the alternative, a separation of property with ex parte
petition that she be appointed receiver pendente lite, due to husbands inability to manage
property directly and personally owing to his old age of 77 and his blind left eye; and that he
abandoned petitioner and their conjugal properties without just cause. Petition was granted on
same day.

Forthwith, the husband, through counsel, moved to set aside the order appointing his wife
receiver pendente lite. Furthermore, Juan, traversed the averments in his wife's petition, and
sued out a third-party complaint against Jon. At the same time, Juan Ysasi moved for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory and preventive injunction to compel his wife and
son to turn over to Bilbao Hacienda and to make them desist from interfering with Bilbao's
administration of the hacienda. The issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory and preventive
injunction was opposed by wife and son, and was later on denied. Hence this petition for
certiorari

ISSUE(S) W/N the wife is entitled to the administration of the conjugal property

RULING(S) NO. The husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership. This is a right clearly granted
to him by law. More, the husband is the sole administrator. The wife is not entitled as of
right to joint administration. The husband may even enforce right of possession against the
wife who has taken cover the administration without his consent. And, the wife may be
punished for contempt for her refusal to deliver to him the conjugal assets. She may be required
to render full and complete accounting of such properties.
TITLE LUIS LIM v. ISABEL GARCIA

GR NUMBER GR No. 2904

PROMULG. January 11, 1907

DATE

DIVISION

PONENTE Carson, J.

NATURE - Appeal from a Judgment of the Court of First Instance (Distribution of Estate)
ACTION

FACTS Hilario Lim died intestate in the year 1903, leaving wife Isabel and nine children an interest in an
estate valued at some 50,000 pesos.

Entire estate as shown in the inventory prepared by Luis Lim, administrator, was conjugal
property, except a house and lot on Calle Magallanes, Zamboanga, and the sum of 10,000 pesos
which, it was admitted, had been brought to the marriage by Hilario Lim, and except, furthermore,
700 pesos, the purchase price paid by said Lim for a certain lot which it was also admitted had
been brought by him to his marriage, and which was sold in the course of the administration of his
estate, together with the improvements made thereon during the period of coverture.

Counsel for the administrator, and for the surviving children, contends that none of the said
property should be a property of the conjugal partnership, because, as they allege, the deceased
Hilario Lim, brought to the marriage property worth more than double the amount of the intestate
 estate, and the defendant, his widow, brought nothing to the conjugal partnership, either at the time
of the marriage or at any time thereafter.

The foregoing disposes of all the errors assigned by counsel for the appellant, except the alleged
error of the trial court in ref using to order the inclusion in the inventory of the estate of the
deceased of three parcels of land, held in the name of the appellee and claimed as her separate
estate. It is further contended by the plaintiff-appellant that these parcels of land were conveyed to
the appellee during the coverture by Hilario either as a gift or for valuable consideration, and that
in either event such conveyance was void under the provisions of articles 1334 and 1458 of the
Civil Code.

ISSUE(S) W/N said parcels of land were conveyed to the wife by husband and thus, are not considered
separate estate of the wife

RULING(S) NO. It appears from the evidence, however, that these parcels of land were not acquired by the
appellee by conveyance from her husband, and that they were in fact conveyed to her by third
parties by way of exchange for certain property inherited by her from her father's estate during the
coverture, and they are, therefore, her separate property under the provisions of paragraph 3 of
article 1396, which provides that property acquired by exchange for other property belonging
separately to one of the married couple is the separate property of the owner of the property for
which it is exchanged.

The trial court speaks of this property as dowry of the appellee, but there is nothing in the record
which tends to prove that it was acquired as a part of her dowry, and indeed the evidence strongly
supports the presumption that it was and continued to be a part of her separate estate
(paraphernalia) which never acquired the "dotal" character. For the purpose of this decision,
however, it is not necessary to determine the precise character of the estate of the appellee in this
property because there can be no doubt that it was her separate estate, and whether dowry or
paraphernalia, the trial court properly excluded it from the inventory of the property of the
deceased which was to be distributed among his legitimate heirs.
TITLE JOSE MODEQUILLO v. AUGUSTO BREVA

GR NUMBER GR No. 8655

PROMULG. May 31, 1990

DATE

DIVISION First Division

PONENTE Gancayco, J.

NATURE - Petition to Review the decision of the Court of Appeals

ACTION

FACTS On 29 January 1988, a judgment was rendered by the CA entitled Francisco Salinas et al. vs.
Modequillo, rendering a judgment in favor of petitioners and directing therein respondents to
jointly and severally pay its liabilities.

As the said judgment became final, a writ of execution was issued by the RTC of Davao to satisfy
judgment on the goods and chattels of the respondents Modequillo and Malubay.

On 07 July 1988, the sheriff levied on a parcel of residential land registered in the name of now
herein petitioner Modequillo. The latter filed a motion to quash and/or set aside levy of execution
alleging therein that the residential land is where the family home is built in 1969 and that such is
exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment, provided in Articles 152 and 153 of the Family
Code except for liabilities mentioned in Article 155 thereof; and that the judgment debt sought to
be enforced against the family home of defendant is not one of those enumerated under Article 155
of the Family Code.

However, in 1988, the RTC denied the motion. A Motion for Reconsideration was filed thereof but
was again denied.
ISSUE(S) W/N said residential property is constituted as a family home and is exempt from payment of
obligation

RULING(S) NO. Under the Family Code, a family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the
time it is occupied as a family residence. There is no need to constitute the same judicially or
extrajudicially as required in the Civil Code. If the family actually resides in the premises, it is,
therefore, a family home as contemplated by law. Thus, the creditors should take the necessary
precautions to protect their interest before extending credit to the spouses or head of the family
who owns the home.

In the present case, the residential house and lot of petitioner was not constituted as a family home
whether judicially or extrajudicially under the Civil Code. It became a family home by operation
of law only under Article 153 of the Family Code. It is deemed constituted as a family home upon
the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 not August 4, one year after its publication in
the Manila Chronicle on August 4, 1987 (1988 being a leap year).

The contention of petitioner that it should be considered a family home from the time it was
occupied by petitioner and his family in 1969 is not well-taken. Under Article 162 of the Family
Code, it is provided that the provisions of this Chapter shall also govern existing family
residences insofar as said provisions are applicable. It does not mean that Articles 152 and 153 of
said Code have a retroactive effect such that all existing family residences are deemed to have
been constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code and are exempt from execution
for the payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Family Code. Article 162
simply means that all existing family residences at the time of the effectivity of the Family Code,
are considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family
home under the Family Code. Article 162 does not state that the provisions of Chapter 2, Title V
have a retroactive effect.

Is the family home of petitioner exempt from execution of the money judgment aforecited? No.
The debt or liability which was the basis of the judgment arose or was incurred at the time of the
vehicular accident on March 16, 1976 and the money judgment arising therefrom was rendered by
the appellate court on January 29, 1988. Both preceded the effectivity of the Family Code on
August 3, 1988. This case does not fall under the exemptions from execution provided in the
Family Code.
TITLE OFELIA GOMEZ v. JOAQUIN LIPANA

GR NUMBER GR No. L-23214

PROMULG. June 30, 1970

DATE

DIVISION En Banc

PONENTE Makalintal, J.

NATURE - Appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance

ACTION

FACTS The defendant-appellant, Joaquin P. Lipana, contracted two marriages: the first with Maria Loreto
Ancino in 1980 and the second with Isidra Gomez y Aquino in 1935. At the time of the second
marriage the first was still subsisting, which fact, however, Lipana concealed from the second
wife.

On December 17, 1943 the spouses of the second marriage purchased a piece of land in Cubao,
Quezon City, for P3,000.00. The Torrens title for the property was issued on February 1,1944, in
the name of "Joaquin Lipana married to Isidra Gomez."

On July 20, 1958 Isidra Gomez died intestate and childless, and survived only by her sisters as the
nearest relatives. On August 7, 1961 Ofelia Gomez, judicial administratrix of her estate,
commenced the present suit, praying for the forfeiture of the husband's share in the Cubao property
in favor of the said estate. Reliance is placed on Article 1417 of the old Civil Code.

The trial court, ruling that the second marriage was void ab initio and that the husband was the one
who gave cause for its nullity, applied the aforequoted provision and declared his interest in the
disputed property forfeited in favor of the estate of the deceased second wife.

ISSUE(S) W/N Article 1417 of the Spanish Civil Code can be invoked for the declaration of forfeiture of the
share of the husband in the conjugal partnership for having given cause for the nullity of the
second marriage

RULING(S) NO. We believe, however, that it is not necessary to resolve that question here inasmuch as the
facts do not call for the application of Article 1417. The first paragraph of this Article states two
causes for the termination of the conjugal partnership: (1) dissolution of the marriage and (2)
declaration of nullity. Under the second paragraph of the same Article it is upon the termination of
the partnership by either of said causes that the forfeiture of the guilty spouse takes place. Now
then, when did the conjugal partnership formed by virtue of the marriage of the defendant to the
deceased Isidra Gomez terminate? Obviously when the marriage was dissolved by the latter's
death in 1958. By that time Article 1417 was no longer fn force, having been eliminated in the new
Civil Code, which took effect in 1950. The legal situation arising from these facts is that while
insofar as the second wife was concerned, she having acted in good faith, her marriage produced
civil effects and gave rise, just the same, to the formation of a conjugal partnership wherein she
was entitled to an equal share upon dissolution, no action lies under Article 1417 for the forfeiture
of the husband's share in her favor, much less in favor of her estate, with respect to which there are
after all no children, but only collateral relatives, who are entitled to succeed.

It may thus be seen that if the nullity, or annulment, of the marriage is the basis for the application
of Article 1417, there Is need for a judicial declaration thereof, which of course contemplates an
action for that purpose. In the instant case, however, the conjugal partnership formed by the
second marriage was dissolved by the death of the second wife; and there has been no judicial
declaration of nullity except possibly in this very action, filed after dissolution by death had taken
place and when Article 1417 of the Spanish Civil Code was no longer in force.

There is, to be sure, a statement of Manresa that in case of nullity it is presumed, with respect to
the spouse who acted in bad faith, that neither the marriage nor the conjugal partnership ever
existed, and hence such spouse has no right to a share in the conjugal properties; but this legal
effect of such presumption derives from the premise that Article 1417 is still in force, and in any
event is of doubtful application if it would be in derogation of and to the prejudice of the right of
the other spouse of the first marriage in the conjugal partnership formed thereby, which includes
properties acquired by the husband during its existence.

The only just and equitable solution in this case would be to recognize the right of the second wife
to her husband, and consider the other half as pertaining to the conjugal partnership of the first
marriage.
TITLE EFREN MENDOZA, ET AL. v. PONCIANO REYES AND THE COURT OF APPEALS

GR NUMBER GR No. L-31618

PROMULG. August 17, 1983

DATE

DIVISION First Division

PONENTE Gutierrez, Jr., J.

NATURE - Petitions for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals
ACTION

FACTS Ponciano Reyes and Julia de Reyes were married in 1915. The properties in questionconsisting
of Lots 5 and 6. Block No. 132, situated at Retire Street, Quezon Cityplus the buildings erected
thereon, were bought from J. M. Tuason & Co., represented by Gregorio Araneta, Inc., February,
1947 on installment basis.

The spouses were always in arrears in the payment of the installments to Araneta due to lack of
money so they had to borrow money from the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation. Thus, they
jointly obtained loans from the RFC.

In the deed of sale, the vendee named is Julia de Reyes. Her signatures appear over the caption
vendee and those of Ponciano under the phrase: with my marital consent.
As a result of these sales, Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 8550 (Exh. F) and 19998 were
issued for Lots 5 and 6, respectively, by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, in the name of
JULIA REYES married to PONCIANO REYES.

As promised to the RFC, the spouses built a house and later a camarin on the two lots. The
camarin was leased as a school building to the Quezon City Elementary School of La Loma. When
the school was transferred to another place, the camarin was leased on December 10, 1952 to Mr.
and Mrs. Mendoza, appellees, for ten years. The contract of lease was signed by Julia as lessor,
with the marital consent of Ponciano. The camarin was converted into a movie house and used as
such by the lessees.

In spite of the good rentals they had been receiving for the building, the spouses failed to pay
seasonably their obligations to the RFC, so they sought for an extension

On March 3, 1961, while Ponciano was absent attending his farm in Arayat, Pampanga, Julia sold
absolutely the lots in question, together with their improvements to appellees Mendozas for the
sum of P80,000.00 without the knowledge and consent of Ponciano. At the same time the spouses
were living separately and were not in speaking terms. By virtue of such sale, Transfer Certificates
of Title Nos. 56110 and 56111 were subsequently issued in the name of the Mendozas.
ISSUE(S) W/N the sold property constitutes a conjugal property of spouses Reyes

RULING(S) YES. The applicable provision of law is Article 153 of the Civil Code which provides:
ART. 153. The following are conjugal partnership property:
(1) That which is acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the common
fund, whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of the spouses;
x x x x x x x x x

The presumption found in Article 160 of the Civil Code must also be overcome by one who
contends that the disputed property is paraphernal. Article 160 provides:
ART. 160. All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless
it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.

The presumption is a strong one. As stated in Camia de Reyes v. Reyes de llano (63 Phil. 629,
639), it is sufficient to prove that the property was acquired during the marriage in order that the
same may be deemed conjugal property. And in Laluan v. Malpaya (65 SCRA 494, 504) we
stated, proof of acquisition of the property in dispute during the marriage suffices to render the
statutory presumption operative.

There is no question that the disputed property was acquired by onerous title during the marriage.
But were the funds used to buy the lot and build the improvements at the expense of the common
fund?

The records show that the funds came from loans obtained by the spouses from the Rehabilitation
Finance Corporation. Under Article 161 of the Civil Code, all debts and obligations contracted by
the husband and the wife for the benefit of the conjugal partnership are liabilities of the
partnership.

[...] If the fact that property acquired during marriage was registered in the name of the husband
alone does not affect its conjugal nature, neither does registration in the name of the wife. Any
person who buys land registered in the married name of the wife is put on notice about its conjugal
nature.
TITLE THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, v. PROCESO ARAGON,
defendant-appellant

GR NUMBER GR No. L-10016

PROMULG. February 28, 1957

DATE

DIVISION En Banc

PONENTE Labrador, J.

NATURE - Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance

ACTION

FACTS On September 28, 1925, the accused, under the name of Proceso Rosima, contracted marriage with
a certain Maria Gorrea in the Philippine Independent Church in Cebu . While his marriage with
Maria Gorrea was subsisting, the accused, under the name of Proceso Aragon, contracted a
canonical marriage with Maria Faicol on August 27, 1934, in the Santa Teresita Church in Iloilo
City.

After the said marriage, the accused and Maria Faicol established residence in Iloilo. As the
accused was then a traveling salesman, he commuted between Iloilo where he maintained Maria
Faicol, and Cebu where he maintained his first wife, Maria Gorrea. Maria Gorrea died in Cebu
City on August 5, 1939. After Maria Gorreas death, the accused brought Maria Faicol to Cebu
City in 1940, where she worked as a teacher nurse.

In 1949 and 1950, Maria Faicol suffered injuries to her eyes because of physical maltreatment in
the hands of the accused. On January 22, 1953, the accused sent Maria Faicol to Iloilo, allegedly
for the purpose of undergoing treatment of her eyesight. During her absence, the accused
contracted a third marriage with a certain Jesusa C. Maglasang on October 3, 1953, in Sibonga,
Cebu.

ISSUE(S) W/N the third marriage is void on the grounds of bigamy

RULING(S) NO. It is to be noted that the action was instituted upon complaint of the second wife, whose
marriage with the appellant was not renewed after the death of the first wife and before the third
marriage was entered into. Hence, the last marriage was a valid one and appellants prosecution for
contracting this marriage can not prosper.
TITLE DIANA BARCELONA, petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS AND TADEO BENGZON,
respondents

GR NUMBER GR No. 130087

PROMULG. September 24, 2003

DATE

DIVISION First Division

PONENTE Carpio, J.

NATURE - Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals; Petition for Annulment of
ACTION Marriage

FACTS Petitioner Diana and private respondent Tadeo were legally married. The couple established their
residence in Quezon City. The union begot five children.

On 29 March 1995, private respondent filed a Petition for Annulment of Marriage against
petitioner. On 9 May 1995, Tadeo filed a Motion to Withdraw Petition which the trial court
granted. But on 21 July 1995, respondent Tadeo filed anew a Petition for Annulment of Marriage
on the grounds of psychological incapacity.

During their marriage, they had frequent quarrels due to their varied upbringing. Diana, coming
from a rich family, was a disorganized housekeeper and was frequently out of the house. She
would go to her sisters house or would play tennis the whole day.

When the family had crisis due to several miscarriages suffered by Diana and the sickness of a
child, respondent withdrew to herself and eventually refused to speak to her husband.

On November 1977, Diana, who was five months pregnant and on the pretext of re-evaluating her
feelings with Tadeo, requested the latter to temporarily leave their conjugal dwelling. She further
insisted that she wanted to feel a little freedom from his marital authority and influences. Tadeo
argued that he could occupy another room in their conjugal dwelling to accommodate her desire,
but no amount of plea and explanation could dissuade her from demanding that he leave their
conjugal dwelling.

In his desire to keep peace in the family and to safeguard her pregnancy, he was compelled to
leave their conjugal dwelling and reside in a condominium.

The separation in fact between the two still subsisted to the time of the petition. Tadeo contended
that Diana, at the time of the celebration of their marriage, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential obligation of marriage and such incapacity subsisted up to and until the
present time petition was filed. It was conclusively found in the psychological examination
conducted on the relationship between the petitioner and the respondent.

Diana filed a Motion to Dismiss the second petition assailing that it failed to state a cause of
action, falling short of the guidelines set forth in the Santos and Molina case.

ISSUE(S) W/N the second petition has sufficiently provided a cause of action, which is psychological
incapacity, for the annulment of marriage
RULING(S) We find the second petition sufficiently alleges a cause of action. [...]

The second petition states the ultimate facts on which respondent bases his claim in accordance
with Section 1, Rule 8 of the old Rules of Court. Ultimate facts refer to the principal,
determinative, constitutive facts upon the existence of which the cause of action rests. The term
does not refer to details of probative matter or particulars of evidence which establish the material
elements.

Subsequent to Santos and Molina, the Court adopted the new Rules on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (new Rules).
Specifically, Section 2, paragraph (d) of the new Rules provides:
SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages
x x x.
(d) What to allege.A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall specifically allege the
complete facts showing that either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated from
complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage at the time of the celebration of
marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its celebration.

The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of
psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need not
be alleged.(Emphasis supplied)

[...]The obvious effect of the new Rules providing that expert opinion need not be alleged in the
petition is that there is also no need to allege the root cause of the psychological incapacity. Only
experts in the fields of neurological and behavioral sciences are competent to determine the root
cause of psychological incapacity. Since the new Rules do not require the petition to allege expert
opinion on the psychological incapacity, it follows that there is also no need to allege in the
petition the root cause of the psychological incapacity.

[...]The root causes of many psychological disorders are still unknown to science even as their
outward, physical manifestations are evident. Hence, what the new Rules require the petition to
allege are the physical manifestations indicative of psychological incapacity. Respondent Tadeos
second petition complies with this requirement.

Petitioner Diana filed a Motion to Dismiss the second petition with one of the grounds which is failure to state a
cause of action. Bengzon opposed the Motion to which petitioner Diana filed Additional Arguments in Support of
the Motion.

An Order was issued on 18 September 1996, deferring resolution of the Motion until the parties ventilate their
arguments in a hearing. Petitioner Diana filed a motion for reconsideration, but was denied. In denying the motion
for reconsideration, Judge Pison explained that when the ground for dismissal is the complaints failure to state a
cause of action, the trial court determines such fact solely from the petition itself. The judge held that contrary to
petitioners claim, a perusal of the allegations in the petition shows that petitioner has violated respondent Tadeos
right, thus giving rise to a cause of action.

Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus before the Court of Appeals assailing the trial
courts first order deferring action on the Motion and the second order denying the motion for reconsideration. The
Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and denied the motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition.
TITLE SALLY GO - BANGAYAN, petitioner, v. BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR., respondent

GR NUMBER GR No. 201061

PROMULG. July 3, 2013

DATE

DIVISION Second Division

PONENTE Carpio, J.

NATURE - Petition for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals; Petition for
ACTION Declaration of a Non-existent and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage

FACTS On 15 March 2004, Benjamin Bangayan, Jr. filed a petition for declaration of a non-existent
marriage and/or declaration of nullity of marriage before the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 43 (trial court). He alleged that on 10 September 1973, he married Azucena Alegre
(Azucena) in Caloocan City. They had three children.

In 1979, Benjamin developed a romantic relationship with Sally Go-Bangayan who was a
customer in the auto parts and supplies business owned by Benjamins family. In December 1981,
Azucena left for the United States of America. In February 1982, Benjamin and Sally lived
together as husband and wife. Sallys father was against the relationship

On 7 March 1982, in order to appease her father, Sally brought Benjamin to an office in Santolan,
Pasig City where they signed a purported marriage contract. Sally, knowing Benjamins marital
status, assured him that the marriage contract would not be registered.

Benjamin and Sallys cohabitation produced two children. During the period of their cohabitation,
they also acquired real properties.

The relationship of Benjamin and Sally ended in 1994 when Sally left for Canada, bringing their
common children with her. She then filed criminal actions against Benjamin, using their simulated
marriage contract as evidence. Benjamin, in turn, filed a petition for declaration of a non-existent
marriage and/or declaration of nullity of marriage before the trial court on one of the grounds that
his marriage to Sally was lacking of formal requisites to a valid marriage.

ISSUE(S) W/N the marriage of Sally and Benjamin is existent by meeting the requirements for valid
remarriage

RULING(S) NO. First, Benjamins marriage to Azucena on 10 September 1973 was duly established before the
trial court, evidenced by a certified true copy of their marriage contract. At the time Benjamin and
Sally entered into a purported marriage on 7 March 1982, the marriage between Benjamin and
Azucena was valid and subsisting.

On the purported marriage of Benjamin and Sally, Teresita Oliveros (Oliveros), Registration
Officer II of the Local Civil Registrar of Pasig City, testified that there was no valid marriage
license issued to Benjamin and Sally. [...] Oliveros further testified that the local civil registrar of
Pasig City did not issue Marriage License No. N-07568 to Benjamin and Sally. The certification
from the local civil registrar is adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license and absent
any suspicious circumstance, the certification enjoys probative value, being issued by the officer
charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
Clearly, if indeed Benjamin and Sally entered into a marriage contract, the marriage was void from
the beginning for lack of a marriage license.

It was also established before the trial court that the purported marriage between Benjamin and
Sally was not recorded with the local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office. [...] The
documentary and testimonial evidence proved that there was no marriage between Benjamin and
Sally. As pointed out by the trial court, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was made only
in jest and a simulated marriage, at the instance of [Sally], intended to cover her up from
expected social humiliation coming from relatives, friends and the society especially from her
parents seen as Chinese conservatives. In short, it was a fictitious marriage.