CRUZ, JR. V. PEOPLE, G.R. No.

110436 June 27, 1994

The purpose of a preliminary investigation is for the investigating prosecutor to

determine if a crime has been committed. A review of the evidence is thus
necessary to establish probable cause and if the evidence so warrants, the
investigating prosecutor is duty bound to file the corresponding information.

It was established by the complainant that petitioner issued a check which was
dishonored because the account had been closed (Rollo, p. 50). The evidence
satisfies the finding of probable cause. It must be borne in mind that the
preliminary investigation is not the proper forum for an exhaustive production
of evidence.

NEW RULES ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, RULE 112, SECTION

3(D); CF. RODRIGUEZ V. SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. No. L-61355
February 18, 1983

Moreover, we see no irregularity in the ex-parte conduct of the proceedings. We

had occasion to rule that preliminary investigations can be conducted ex-
parte if the respondent cannot be subpoenaed or does not appear after due
notice.

RODIS, SR. V. SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. Nos. 71404-09 October

26, 1988

The New Rules on Criminal Procedure "does not require as a condition sine
qua non to the validity of the proceedings [in the preliminary investigation] the
presence of the accused for as long as efforts to reach him were made, and an
opportunity to controvert the evidence of the complainant is accorded him. The
obvious purpose of the rule is to block attempts of unscrupulous respondents
to thwart the prosecution of offenses by hiding themselves or by employing
dilatory tactics."

VICENTE P. LADLAD vs. HON. THELMA BUNYI-MEDINA, G.R.

No. 19000

Preliminary Investigation

A preliminary investigation is "not a casual affair. It is conducted to protect the

innocent from the embarrassment, expense and anxiety of a public trial. While
the right to have a preliminary investigation before trial is statutory rather than
constitutional, it is a substantive right and a component of due process in the
administration of criminal justice.

In the context of a preliminary investigation, the right to due process of law

entails the opportunity to be heard. It serves to accord an opportunity for the
presentation of the respondents side with regard to the accusation. Afterwards,
the investigating officer shall decide whether the allegations and defenses lead
to a reasonable belief that a crime has been committed, and that it was the
respondent who committed it. Otherwise, the investigating officer is bound to
dismiss the complaint.

"The essence of due process is reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit

evidence in support of one's defense. What is proscribed is lack of opportunity
to be heard. Thus, one who has been afforded a chance to present ones own
side of the story cannot claim denial of due process.

Section 3(d), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, allows Prosecutor Vivero to resolve
the complaint based on the evidence before him if a respondent could not be
subpoenaed. As long as efforts to reach a respondent were made, and he was
given an opportunity to present countervailing evidence, the preliminary
investigation remains valid. The rule was put in place in order to foil
underhanded attempts of a respondent to delay the prosecution of offenses.

In this case, the Resolution stated that efforts were undertaken to serve
subpoenas on the named respondents at their last known addresses. This is
sufficient for due process. It was only because a majority of them could no
longer be found at their last known addresses that they were not served copies
of the complaint and the attached documents or evidence.

FACTS Ladlad Case: (Para lang mas malinaw anu nangyari sa case)

Petitioners Echanis and Baylosis allege that they did not receive a copy of the complaint and the attached
documents or evidence. Petitioner Ladlad claims that he was not served a subpoena due to the false
address indicated in the 12 undated letters of P C/Insp. Almaden and Army Captain Tiu to Prosecutor
Vivero. Furthermore, even though his counsels filed their formal entry of appearance before the Office of
the Prosecutor, petitioner Ladlad was still not sent a subpoena through his counsels addresses. Thus,
they were deprived of the right to file counter-affidavits.

Petitioner Ocampo claims that Prosecutor Vivero, in collusion with P C/Insp. Almaden and Army Captain
Tiu, surreptitiously inserted the Supplemental Affidavit of Zacarias Piedad in the records of the case
without furnishing petitioner Ocampo a copy. The original affidavit of Zacarias Piedad dated 14
September 2006 stated that a meeting presided by petitioner Ocampo was held in 1984, when the
launching of Operation VD was agreed upon. Petitioner Ocampo refuted this claim in his Counter-affidavit
dated 22 December 2006 stating that he was in military custody from October 1976 until his escape in
May 1985. Thereafter, the Supplemental Affidavit of Zacarias Piedad dated 12 January 2007 admitted
that he made a mistake in his original affidavit, and that the meeting actually took place in June 1985.
Petitioner Ocampo argues that he was denied the opportunity to reply to the Supplemental Affidavit by not
being furnished a copy thereof.

Petitioner Ocampo also claims that he was denied the right to file a motion for reconsideration or to
appeal the Resolution of Prosecutor Vivero, because the latter deliberately delayed the service of the
Resolution by 19 days, effectively denying petitioner Ocampo his right to due process.

As to the claim of petitioners Echanis and Baylosis, we quote the pertinent portion of Prosecutor Viveros
Resolution, which states:

In connection with the foregoing and pursuant to the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure[,] the
respondents were issued and served with Subpoena at their last known address for them to submit their
counter-affidavits and that of their witnesses.

Majority of the respondents did not submit their counter-affidavits because they could no longer be found
in their last known address, per return of the subpoenas. On the other hand, Saturnino Ocampo @ Satur,
Fides Lim, Maureen Palejaro and Ruben Manatad submitted their Counter-Affidavits. However, Vicente
Ladlad and Jasmin Jerusalem failed to submit the required Counter Affidavits in spite entry of appearance
by their respective counsels.99

Petitioner Ladlad claims that his subpoena was sent to the nonexistent address "53 Sct. Rallos St., QC,"
which had never been his address at any time. In connection with this claim, we take note of the fact that
the subpoena to Fides Lim, petitioner Ladlads wife, was sent to the same address, and that she was
among those mentioned in the Resolution as having timely submitted their counter-affidavits.

Despite supposedly never receiving a subpoena, petitioner Ladlads counsel filed a formal entry of
appearance on 8 December 2006. Prosecutor Vivero had a reason to believe that petitioner Ladlad had
received the subpoena and accordingly instructed his counsel to prepare his defense.
Petitioner Ladlad, through his counsel, had every opportunity to secure copies of the complaint after his
counsels formal entry of appearance and, thereafter, to participate fully in the preliminary investigation.
Instead, he refused to participate.

COJUANGCO, JR. VS. PCGG, ET AL. G.R. Nos. 92319-20

October 2, 1990

It must be undertaken in accordance with the procedure provided in Section 3,

Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. This procedure is to be
observed in order to assure that a person undergoing such preliminary
investigation will be afforded due process.

As correctly pointed out by petitioner, an indispensable requisite of due process

is that the person who presides and decides over a proceeding, including a
preliminary investigation, must possess the cold neutrality of an impartial
judge.

Although such a preliminary investigation is not a trial and is not intended to

usurp the function of the trial court, it is not a casual affair. The officer
conducting the same investigates or inquires into the facts concerning the
commission of the crime with the end in view of determining whether or not an
information may be prepared against the accused. Indeed, a preliminary
investigation is in effect a realistic judicial appraisal of the merits of the case.
Sufficient proof of the guilt of the accused must be adduced so that when the
case is tried, the trial court may not be bound as a matter of law to order an
acquittal. A preliminary investigation has then been called a judicial inquiry. It
is a judicial proceeding. An act becomes judicial when there is opportunity to
be heard and for the production and weighing of evidence, and a decision is
rendered thereon.

The authority of a prosecutor or investigating officer duly empowered to preside

or to conduct a preliminary investigation is no less than that of a municipal
judge or even a regional trial court judge. While the investigating officer, strictly
speaking is not a "judge," by the nature of his functions he is and must be
considered to be a quasi-judicial officer.

BAUTISTA V. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 143375 July 6,

2001

The prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not determine the guilt or

innocence of the accused. He does not exercise adjudication nor rule-making
functions. Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and is often the
only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a
crime and to enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint or information. It is not
a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of determining
whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to
believe that the accused is guilty thereof. While the fiscal makes that
determination, he cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court, for it is the
courts, ultimately, that pass judgment on the accused, not the fiscal.

There may be some decisions of the Court that have characterized the public
prosecutor's power to conduct a preliminary investigation as quasi-judicial in
nature. Still, this characterization is true only to the extent that the public
prosecutor, like a quasi-judicial body, is an officer of the executive department
exercising powers akin to those of a court of law.
BUSTOS VS. LUCERO, G.R. No. L-49155 May 13, 1981

The rule is that in a preliminary investigation conducted by the provincial or

city fiscal, or state attorney, it is sufficient if the accused was given a chance to
be heard (Sec. 14, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court). In this case, Arkoncel was
afforded an opportunity to appear at the preliminary investigation. He waived
his appearance. A "preliminary investigation may be done away with entirely
without infringing the constitutional right of an accused under the due process
clause to a fair trial"