JOSE JINGGOY E. ESTRADA, petitioner, vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), sub-paragraphs (b), (c) & (d) because he is indicted as a principal and as co-
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, respondents.
In November 2000, as an offshoot of the impeachment proceedings against Joseph
Ejercito Estrada, then President of the Republic of the Philippines, five criminal
complaints against the former President and members of his family, his associates,
friends and conspirators were filed with the respondent Office of the Ombudsman.
On April 4, 2001, the respondent Ombudsman issued a Joint Resolutioni[1] finding
probable cause warranting the filing with the Sandiganbayan of several criminal
Informations against the former President and the other respondents therein. One
of the Informations was for the crime of plunder under Republic Act No. 7080 and
among the respondents was herein petitioner Jose Jinggoy Estrada, then mayor of
San Juan, Metro Manila.
On April 30, 2001, petitioner filed a Very Urgent Omnibus Motionii[2] alleging that:
(1) no probable cause exists to put him on trial and hold him liable for plunder, it
appearing that he was only allegedly involved in illegal gambling and not in a series
or combination of overt or criminal acts as required in R.A. No. 7080; and (2) he is
entitled to bail as a matter of right. Petitioner prayed that he be excluded from the
Amended Information and be discharged from custody. In the alternative,
petitioner also prayed that he be allowed to post bail in an amount to be fixed by
respondent court.iii[3]
Petitioner claims that respondent Sandiganbayan acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in:
3) sustaining the charge against petitioner for alleged offenses, and with alleged
conspirators, with which and with whom he is not even remotely connected -
contrary to the dictum that criminal liability is personal, not vicarious - results in the
denial of substantive due process;
Petitioner also faults the respondent Sandiganbayan for sustaining the charge
against petitioner for alleged offenses and with alleged conspirators, with which
and with whom he is not even remotely connected contrary to the dictum that
criminal liability is personal, not vicarious results in the denial of substantive due
process.iv[18]
The Solicitor General argues, on the other hand, that petitioner is charged not only
with the predicate act in sub-paragraph (a) but also with the other predicate acts in
conspirator of the former President. This is purportedly clear from the first and
second paragraphs of the Amended Information.v[19]
For better focus, there is a need to examine again the allegations of the Amended
Information vis--vis the provisions of R.A. No. 7080.
The Amended Information, in its first two paragraphs, charges petitioner and his
other co-accused with the crime of plunder. The first paragraph names all the
accused, while the second paragraph describes in general how plunder was
committed and lays down most of the elements of the crime itself. Sub-paragraphs
(a) to (d) describe in detail the predicate acts that constitute the crime and name
in particular the co-conspirators of former President Estrada in each predicate act.
The predicate acts alleged in the said four sub-paragraphs correspond to the items
enumerated in Section 1 (d) of R.A. No. 7080. Sub-paragraph (a) alleged the
predicate act of receiving, on several instances, money from illegal gambling, in
consideration of toleration or protection of illegal gambling, and expressly names
petitioner as one of those who conspired with former President Estrada in
committing the offense. This predicate act corresponds with the offense described
in item [2] of the enumeration in Section 1 (d) of R.A. No. 7080. Sub-paragraph (b)
alleged the predicate act of diverting, receiving or misappropriating a portion of the
tobacco excise tax share allocated for the province of Ilocos Sur, which act is the
offense described in item [1] in the enumeration in Section 1 (d) of the law. This
sub-paragraph does not mention petitioner but instead names other conspirators of
the former President. Sub-paragraph (c) alleged two predicate acts - that of
ordering the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) and the Social Security
System (SSS) to purchase shares of stock of Belle Corporation, and collecting or
receiving commissions from such purchase from the Belle Corporation which
became part of the deposit in the Jose Velarde account at the Equitable-PCI Bank.
These two predicate acts fall under items [2] and [3] in the enumeration of R.A. No.
7080, and was allegedly committed by the former President in connivance with
John Does and Jane Does. Finally, sub-paragraph (d) alleged the predicate act that
the former President unjustly enriched himself from commissions, gifts, kickbacks,
in connivance with John Does and Jane Does, and deposited the same under his
account name Jose Velarde at the Equitable-PCI Bank. This act corresponds to the
offense under item [6] in the enumeration of Section 1 (d) of R.A. No. 7080.
From the foregoing allegations of the Amended Information, it is clear that all the
accused named in sub-paragraphs (a) to (d), thru their individual acts, conspired
with former President Estrada to enable the latter to amass, accumulate or acquire
ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount of P4,097,804,173.17
We hasten to add, however, that the respondent Ombudsman cannot be faulted 2) That Dan Dangpal, neighbor of the deceased, at about 8:00 PM that evening, heard
for including the predicate acts alleged in sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) of the Amended successive gunshots and saw the deceaseds house burning.
Information in one, and not in four, separate Informations 3) That prior the incident, Barangay Captain Potado Ballang saw the appellant a few
meters away from the house of the deceased.
. In the crime of plunder, therefore, different parties may be united by a common 4) That earlier that day, Dominga Salvador, common-law wife of Manuel Salvador and
purpose. In the case at bar, the different accused and their different criminal acts mother of Analyn Salvador, went to the house of the appellant to inquire about her
have a commonalityto help the former President amass, accumulate or acquire ill- husbands share in the construction of the barangay hall. Dominga also related that
gotten wealth. Sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) in the Amended Information alleged the had earlier filed a complaint against the appellant and his brother for slaughtering
different participation of each accused in the conspiracy her pig.

In the American jurisdiction, the presence of several accused in multiple conspiracies In his appeal, the appellant argued that the court failed to rule and resolve whether
commonly involves two structures: (1) the so-called wheel or circle conspiracy, in or not conspiracy existed, despite the fact that there was no proof as to what overt
which there is a single person or group (the hub) dealing individually with two or acts he committed which would constitute the crime of murder.
more other persons or groups (the spokes); and (2) the chain conspiracy, usually
involving the distribution of narcotics or other contraband, in which there is ISSUE:
successive communication and cooperation in much the same way as with legitimate 1) Whether or not there was conspiracy.
business operations between manufacturer and wholesaler, then wholesaler and 2) Whether or not accused-appellant should be held liable for two (2) separate counts
retailer, and then retailer and consumer.ii[23] of murder or for the complex crime of double murder.

From a reading of the Amended Information, the case at bar appears similar to a HELD:
wheel conspiracy. The hub is former President Estrada while the spokes are all the 1) Conspiracy, in this case, is not essential. The rule is that in the absence of evidence
accused, and the rim that encloses the spokes is the common goal in the overall showing the direct participation of the accused in the commission of the crime,
conspiracy, i.e., the amassing, accumulation and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth. conspiracy must be established by clear and convincing evidence in order to convict
the accused. In the case at bar, however, direct participation of accused-appellant in
People vs. Gaffud the killing of the victims was established beyond doubt by the evidence of the
G.R. No. 168050. September 19, 2008 prosecution. Thus, a finding of conspiracy is no longer essential for the conviction of
accused-appellant.
Plaintiff-appellee: People of the Philippines
Accused-appellant: Bernardino Gaffud 2) No. The Court ruled that in a complex crime, although two or more crimes are
Ponente: C.J. Puno actually committed, they constitute only one crime in the eyes of the law as well as
in the conscience of the offender. The burning the house of Manuel Salvador, with
the main objective of killing the latter and his daughter, resulting in their deaths
FACTS:
resulted in the complex crime of double murder. Hence, there is only one penalty
imposed for the commission of a complex crime.
Accused-appellant Bernardino Gaffud, Jr. was found guilty of two (2) counts of
murder for killing Manuel Salvador and Analyn Salvador by means of fire. Evidence
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
for the prosecution presented the following:
vs.
BALTAZAR LACAO, SR., PATRIA LACAO and TRINIDAD LACAO MANSILLA
1) That on the night of May 10, 1994, Orly Salvador, while on his way to the house of
his uncle Manuel Salvador, heard two gunshots and thereafter saw the house of his
uncle burning. He saw three persons within the vicinity of the burning house, one of FACTS; : At about 10:00 o'clock in the evening of September 28, 1985, prosecution
whom he identified as appellant Gaffud, Jr. witness Mila Parto was at her house in Barangay Manibad attending to persons who
came to the wake of her aunt, Nemesia Lacao. Mila Parto is the sister-in-law of the

deceased police Cpl. Jose G. Inocencio, Jr. While she was so engaged, she heard and
witnessed a commotion at the first floor of the two-storey house and the events that
took place thereafter. The commotion arose from a card game where one Mansueto
Rivera was losing and accused Baltazar Lacao II, who was playing with him, was
furiously arguing with the former. Baltazar Lacao II then unsheathed his knife and
threatened Mansueto Rivera by pointing the knife at the latter's neck. Wilma Rivera,
the sister-in-law of Mansueto, intervened and Baltazar Lacao II released the latter.
Baltazar Lacao II then went inside the house wielding his knife and causing the other
guests to panic.
It was then that Cpl. Jose G. Inocencio, Jr. went down to inquire into the matter and
to pacify the people. When he saw Baltazar Lacao II with a knife, he held the latter's
hand holding that knife. Baltazar Lacao II then said: "Nyor, release me." As Cpl.
Inocencio did not release him, the latter's mother, Patria Lacao, then said: "Nyor,
release my son." When Cpl. Inocencio released Baltazar Lacao II, the latter suddenly
stabbed Inocencio on his right side. Baltazar Lacao, Sr. and his other son, Baltazar
Lacao III, together with his wife, Patria Lacao, and his sister, Trinidad Lacao Mansilla,
rushed inside the house and surrounded the victim.
The men then stabbed Cpl. Inocencio several times while the women hit him with
stools. As the attack continued, the victim was pushed toward the door of the kitchen
and he later slumped on the floor facing downward. Baltazar Lacao, Sr. then sat
astride him and continued stabbing the latter as he was thus lying prostrate.
Thereafter, this appellant asked: "Nyor, Nyor, are you still alive?" Appellant Patria
Lacao interjected: "What are you waiting for, it is already finished, we have to go."
Baltazar Lacao III then got the gun of Cpl. Inocencio and all the accused went away.
ISSSUE:
1. Whether the accused can invoke self-defense
Appellant Baltazar Lacao, Sr., by pleading self-defense necessarily admits
that he killed the victim and he is thus duty bound to prove the essential
requisites for this justifying circumstance.11 This circumstance he has to
prove by clear and convincing evidence,12 the onus probandi having shifted
to him.
Now, this appellant admitted stabbing the victim more than five (5) times.
As seen from the medico-legal report, the victim actually suffered fifteen
(15) stab wounds, that the cause of death was hemorrhage and multiple
stab wounds,13 and that most of the injuries inflicted were indeed fatal. It
cannot now be denied that, even indulging said appellant in his theory, he
definitely exceeded the limits of what is necessary to suppress an alleged
unlawful aggression directed to him by the victim. In fact, from the
eyewitness accounts, he even continued stabbing the victim who was
already slumped prone and helpless.
The first requisite of self-defense is indispensable. There can be no self-
defense unless it is proven that there has been unlawful aggression on the
part of the person injured or killed by the accused. If there is no unlawful
aggression, there is nothing to prevent or to repel. The second requisite of
self-defense will have no basis.
2. Whether there exist a conspiracy between the accused
The Court, however, is not favorably impressed with the prosecution's theory that
the assailants acted pursuant to a conspiracy just because they apparently acted in
unison in attacking the victim. True, conspiracy is always predominantly mental in
composition because it consists primary of the meeting of minds and, generally,
complicity may be inferred from circumstantial evidence, i.e., the community of
purpose and the unity of design in the contemporaneous or simultaneous
performance of the act of assaulting the deceased.20 However, conspiracy must be
proved with as much certainty as the crime itself.21 The same degree of proof
required to establish the crime is required to support a finding of conspiracy,22 that
is, proof beyond reasonable doubt.
The rapidity in the succession of such consecutive acts of the assailants, with the last
four coming instinctively, as it were, to the aid of the original assailant, cannot but
produce the conclusion that their actuations were activated without prior or
apparent deliberation
The spontaneity of their respective reactions, albeit resulting in an attack where they
all participated, rules out the existence of a conspiracy.
As a consequence, therefore, the respective liabilities of appellants shall be
determined by the nature of their individual participations in the felonious act.
3. whether or not treachery was properly appreciated as a qualifying
circumstance
we agree with the holding of the court below since this was sufficiently proven by the
evidence. It is elementary hornbook knowledge that there is treachery when the
offender commits any of the crimes against persons employing means, methods, or
forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party
might make.25

In the present case, the deceased was stabbed without warning the moment he
unsuspectingly released the hand of Baltazar Lacao II. So sudden and unanticipated
was the attack that the victim was given no chance to defend himself. Then herein
appellants, although apparently acting without prior agreement, also instantly and
all together attacked him. Even if their aforesaid acts were independently performed
on their individual initiatives, such concerted action ensured the commission of the
crime without risk to them arising from any defense or retaliation that the victim
might have resorted to. Treachery was thus correctly appreciated against all
appellants, the use of superior strength being absorbed as an integral part of the
treacherous mode of commission.
Appellant Baltazar Lacao, Sr. admitted during the trial that he was once convicted of
the crime of homicide but he was granted an absolute pardon therefor.26 The lower
court properly considered recidivism since a pardon for a preceding offense does not
obliterate the fact that the accused is a recidivist upon his conviction of a second
offense embraced in the same title of the Code.27 This aggravating circumstance of
recidivism accordingly offsets the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender by
Baltazar Lacao, Sr.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, VS. MARLON ALBERT DE LEON
FACTS: around 2 o'clock of January 7, 2000, Eduardo Zulueta and Fortunato
Lacambra III, both gasoline boys; Julieta Amistoso, cashier; and Edralin Macahis,
security guard; all employees of Energex Gasoline Station, located at Barangay
Guinayan, San Mateo, Rizal, were on duty when a mint green-colored Tamaraw FX
arrived for service at the said gasoline station.v[3]
Eduardo Zulueta was the one who attended to the said vehicle. He went to
the drivers side in order to take the key of the vehicle from the driver so that he could
open the gas tank. He saw through the lowered window shield that there were about
six to seven persons aboard the vehicle. He proceeded to fill up P50.00 worth of
diesel in the gas tank. After doing this, he returned the key to the driver. While
returning the key, the driver told him that the engine of the vehicle would not
start.v[4] Eduardo Zulueta offered to give the vehicle a push. While Eduardo Zulueta
and fellow gasoline boy Fortunato Lacambra III were positioned at the back of the
vehicle, ready to push the same, the six male passengers of the same vehicle, except
the driver, alighted and announced a hold-up. They were armed with a shotgun and
.38 caliber pistol.v[5]
Fortunato Lacambra III was ordered to lie down,v[6] while Eduardo Zulueta
was directed to go near the Car Wash Section.v[7] At that instance, guns were poked
at them.v[8]
Appellant, who guarded Eduardo Zulueta, poked a gun at the latter and
took the latter's wallet containing a pawnshop ticket and P50.00, while the
companion of the former, hit the latter on his nape with a gun.v[9]
Meanwhile, four members of the group went to the cashier's office and
took the money worth P3,000.00.v[10] Those four robbers were also the ones who
shot Edralin Macahis in the stomach.v[11] Thereafter, the same robbers took Edralin
Macahis' service firearm.v[12]
After he heard successive gunshots, Eduardo Zulueta saw appellant and his
companions immediately leave the place.v[13] The robbers boarded the same
vehicle and proceeded toward San Mateo, Rizal.v[14] When the robbers left, Eduardo
Zulueta stood up and found Julieta Amistoso, who told him that the robbers took her
bag and jewelry. He also saw that Edralin Macahis had a gunshot wound in the
stomach. He immediately hailed a vehicle which transported the injured Edralin
Macahis to the hospital.v[15] Later on, Edralin Macahis died at the hospital due to
the gunshot wound.

crime of Robbery with Homicide, having acted in conspiracy with other
malefactors, the use of an unlicensed firearm in the commission of the crime as an
aggravating circumstance
issue: whether there was conspiracy in the commission of the crime
ruling: If it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards
the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their
combined acts, though apparently independent, were in fact connected and
cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of
sentiment, a conspiracy may be inferred though no actual meeting among them to
concert means is proved. That would be termed an implied conspiracy.v[45] The
prosecution was able to prove the presence of an implied conspiracy. The witnesses
were able to narrate in a convincing manner, the circumstances surrounding the
commission of the robbery and positively identified appellant as one of the robbers.
Witness Eduardo Zulueta testified that appellant was one of the robbers who poked
a gun at him. it can be inferred from the role appellant played in the commission of
the robbery, that a conspiracy existed and he was part of it. To be a conspirator, one
need not participate in every detail of the execution; he need not even take part in
every act or need not even know the exact part to be performed by the others in the
execution of the conspiracy. Each conspirator may be assigned separate and different
tasks which may appear unrelated to one another but, in fact, constitute a whole
collective effort to achieve their common criminal objective.v[48] Once conspiracy is
shown, the act of one is the act of all the conspirators. The precise extent or modality
of participation of each of them becomes secondary,v[49] since all the conspirators
are principals.
the CA was correct in ruling that appellant was guilty only of one count of robbery
with homicide.
A continued (continuous or continuing) crime is defined as a single crime, consisting
of a series of acts but all arising from one criminal resolution.v[54] Although there is
a series of acts, there is only one crime committed; hence, only one penalty shall be
imposed
ERNESTINO P. DUNLAO, SR., vs. COURT OF APPEALS
Facts: On October 25, 1986 at about 2:30 p.m. Fortunato Mariquit and Carlito Catog,
both employees of Lourdes Farms, were instructed by its proprietor, Mrs. Lourdes
Du, to go to petitioners premises together with police officers Pfc. Epifanio Sesaldo
and Pat. Alfredo Ancajas to verify information received that some farrowing crates
and G.I. pipes stolen from Lourdes Farms were to be found thereat.
Upon arrival at petitioners compound, the group saw the farrowing crates and pipes
inside the compound. They also found assorted lengths of G.I. pipes inside a cabinet
in petitioners shop and another pile outside the shop but within the compound.
After he was informed by the police operatives that said pipes were owned by
Lourdes Farms and had been stolen from it, petitioner voluntarily surrendered the
items. These were then taken to the police station. THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT, A
DULY LICENSED SCRAP METAL BUSINESSMAN FOR MORE THAN FIFTEEN (15) YEARS,
HAD ACTED IN GOOD FAITH AND WITHOUT ANY CRIMINAL INTENT IN POSSESSING
AS TEMPORARY CUSTODIAN OF SAID GI-PIPES BY BRINGING THEM INSIDE HIS
BUSINESS ESTABLISHMENT.
Issue:; whether the accused is liable for fencing
fencing is the act of any person who, with intent to gain for himself or for another,
shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy
and sell, or in any other manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value
which he knows, or should be known to him, to have been derived from the
proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft.
There is no question that the farrowing crates and assorted lengths of G.I. pipes were
found in the premises of petitioner. The positive identification by Fortunato Mariquit,
an employee of Lourdes Farms, Inc., that these items were previously owned by it
gave rise to a presumption of fencing under the law:
Sec. 5. Presumption of Fencing. Mere possession of any good, article, item, object, or
anything of value which has been the subject of robbery or thievery shall be prima
facie evidence of fencing. intent to gain need not be proved in crimes punishable by
a special law such as P.D. 1612.

The law has long divided crimes into acts wrong in themselves called acts mala in se,
and acts which would not be wrong but for the fact that positive law forbids them,
called acts mala prohibita.v[6] This distinction is important with reference to the
intent with which a wrongful act is done. The rule on the subject is that in acts mala
in se, the intent governs, but in acts mala prohibita, the only inquiry is, has the law
been violated?v[7] When an act is illegal, the intent of the offender is
immaterial.v[8]
intent to gain need not be proved in crimes punishable by a special law such as P.D.
1612.
The law has long divided crimes into acts wrong in themselves called acts mala in se,
and acts which would not be wrong but for the fact that positive law forbids them,
called acts mala prohibita.v[6] This distinction is important with reference to the
intent with which a wrongful act is done. The rule on the subject is that in acts mala
in se, the intent governs, but in acts mala prohibita, the only inquiry is, has the law
been violated?v[7] When an act is illegal, the intent of the offender is
immaterial.v[8]
ALFREDO DE GUZMAN, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
Facts: [O]n December 24, 1997, at aboutten oclock in the evening, Alexander Flojo
(hereafter "Alexander") was fetching water below his rented house at 443 Aglipay
Street, Old Zaniga St., Mandaluyong City when suddenly Alfredo De Guzman
(hereafter "Alfredo"), the brother of his land lady, Lucila Bautista (hereafter "Lucila"),
hit him on the nape. Alexander informed Lucila about what Alfredo did to him. Lucila
apologized to Alexander by saying, "Pasensya ka na Mang Alex" and told the latter to
just go up. Alexander obliged and went upstairs. He took a rest for about two hours.
Thereafter, at around 12:00 to 12:15 A.M., Alexander went down and continued to
fetch water. While pouring water into a container, Alfredo suddenly appeared in
front of Alexander and stabbed him on his left face and chest.
Cirilino Bantaya, a son-in-law of Alexander, saw the latter bleeding on the left portion
of his body and begging for help. Alexander then told Cirilino that Alfredo stabbed
him. Cirilino immediately loaded Alexander into his motorcycle (backride) and
brought him to the Mandaluyong City Medical Center. Upon arrival at the hospital,
the doctors immediately rendered medical assistance to Alexander. Alexander stayed
in the emergency room of said hospital for about 30 to 40 minutes. Then, he was
brought to the second floor of the said hospital where he was confined for two days.
Thereafter, Alexander was transferred to the Polymedic General Hospital where he
was subjected for (sic) further medical examination.
Alexander sustained two stabbed (sic) wounds. According to Dr. Francisco Obmerga,
the physician who treated the victim at the Mandaluyong City Medical Center, the
second wound was fatal and could have caused Alexanders death without timely
medical intervention. He claims that the heightened emotions during the fistfight
naturally emboldened both of them, but he maintains that he only inflicted minor
abrasions on Alexander, not the stab wounds that he appeared to have sustained.
Hence, he should be held liable only for serious physical injuries because the intent
to kill, the necessary element to characterize the crime as homicide, was not
sufficiently established
Issue: Was the petitioner properly found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
frustrated homicide
The elements of frustrated homicide are: (1) the accused intended to kill his victim,
as manifested by his use of a deadly weapon in his assault; (2) the victim sustained
fatal or mortal wound but did not die because of timely medical assistance; and (3)
noneof the qualifying circumstances for murder under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, is present.7 Inasmuch as the trial and appellate courts
found none of the qualifying circumstances in murder under Article 248 to be
present, we immediately proceed to ascertain the presence of the two other
elements.
The essential element in frustrated or attempted homicide is the intent of the
offender to kill the victim immediately before or simultaneously with the infliction
of injuries. Intent to kill is a specific intent that the State must allege in the
information, and then prove by either direct or circumstantial evidence, as
differentiated from a general criminal intent, which is presumed from the
commission of a felony by dolo.8 Intent to kill, being a state of mind, is discerned
by the courts only through external manifestations, i.e., the acts and conduct of the
accused at the time of the assault and immediately thereafter
The petitioner wielded and used a knife in his assault on Alexander. The medical
records indicate, indeed, that Alexander sustained two stab wounds, specifically,
one on his upper left chest and the other on the left side of his face. The petitioners
attack was unprovoked with the knife used therein causing such wounds, thereby
belying his submission, and firmly proving the presence of intent to kill. There is
also to beno doubt about the wound on Alexanders chest being sufficient to result
into his death were it not for the timely medical intervention.
Ortega
G.R. No. 116736 July 24, 1997
Lessons Applicable: Indeterminate Sentence Law

Laws Applicable: Art. 4 RPC
FACTS:
October 15, 1992 5:30 pm: Andre Mar Masangkay (courting Raquel Ortega),
Ariel Caranto, Romeo Ortega, Roberto San Andres, Searfin, Boyet and Diosdado
Quitlong were having a drinking spree with gin and finger foods.
October 15, 1992 11:00 pm: Benjamin Ortega, Jr. and Manuel Garcia who were
already drank joined them.
October 16, 1992 midnight: Andre answering a call of nature went to the back
portion of the house and Benjamin followed him. Suddenly, they heard a shout
from Andre Dont, help me! (Huwag, tulungan ninyo ako!) incurred by any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act
Diosdado and Ariel ran and saw Benjamin on top of Andre who was lying down
being stabbed. Ariel got Benjamin Ortega, Sr., Benjamins father while Diosdado
called Romeo to pacify his brother. Romeo, Benjamin and Manuel lifted Andre from
the canal and dropped him in the well. They dropped stones to Andres body to
weigh the body down. Romeo warned Diosdado not to tell anybody what he
saw. He agreed so he was allowed to go home. But, his conscience bothered him
so he told his mother, reported it to the police and accompanied them to the crime
scene.
NBI Medico Legal Officer Dr. Ludivico J. Lagat:
o cause of death is drowning with multiple stab wounds, contributory
o 13 stab wounds
o stab wound on the upper left shoulder, near the upper left armpit and left chest
wall- front
o stab wound on the back left side of the body and the stab wound on the back
right portion of the body back
Manuel Garcia alibi
o He was asked to go home by his wife to fetched his mother-in-law who
performed a ritual called tawas on his sick daughter and stayed home after
Benjamin Ortega, Jr. story
o After Masangkay left, he left to urinate and he saw Andre peeking through the
room of his sister Raquel. Then, Andre approached him to ask where his sister
was. When he answered he didnt know, Andre punched him so he bled and fell to
the ground. Andre drew a knife and stabbed him, hitting him on the left arm,
thereby immobilizing him. Andre then gripped his neck with his left arm and
threatened to kill him. Unable to move, Ortega shouted for help. Quitlong came,
seized the knife and stabbed Andre 10 times with it. Andre then ran towards the
direction of the well. Then, he tended his wound in the lips and armpit and slept.
RTC: Benjamin and Manuel through conspiracy and the taking advantage of
superior strength committed murder
ISSUE: W/N Benjamin and Manuel should be liable for murder.
HELD: NO. PARTLY GRANTED. Benjamin is guilty only of homicide. Manuel deserves
acquittal
If Ortegas version of the assault was true, he should have immediately reported
the matter to the police authorities. If Ortegas version of the assault was true, he
should have immediately reported the matter to the police authorities. It is
incredible that Diosdado would stab Andre 10 times successively, completely
ignoring Benjamin who was grappling with Masangkay and that Andre was choking
him while being stabbed.
Abuse of superior strength requires deliberate intent on the part of the accused
to take advantage of such superiority none shown
o Andre was a 6-footer, whereas Ortega, Jr. was only 54
Article 4, par. 1, of the Revised Penal Code states that criminal liability shall be
done be different from that which he intended.
o The essential requisites
1. the intended act is felonious assisting Benjamin by carrying the body to the
well
2. the resulting act is likewise a felony - concealing the body of the crime to
prevent its discovery
3. the unintended albeit graver wrong was primarily caused by the actors
wrongful acts (praeter intentionem) still alive and was drowned to death
a person may be convicted of homicide although he had no original intent to kill
Garcia is a brother-in-law of Benjamin
o Exempt by Article 20 of RPC
ART. 20. Accessories who are exempt from criminal liability. -- The penalties
prescribed for accessories shall not be imposed upon those who are such with
respect to their spouses, ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural, and adopted
brothers and sisters, or relatives by affinity within the same degrees with the single
exception of accessories falling within the provisions of paragraph 1 of the next
preceding article.
The penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal under Article 249 of the Revised
Penal Code, which is imposable in its medium period, absent any aggravating or
mitigating circumstance, as in the case of Appellant Ortega. Because he is entitled
to the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum term shall be one
degree lower, that is, prision mayor.
PEOPLE V ILAGAN GR NO. 75369 NOVEMBER 26, 1190
PETITONERS/PROSECUTORS:
People of the Philippines
RESPONDENTS/DEFENDANTS:
Fernando Ilagan y Jamito, Edmundo Asis y Ilagan, and Juan Macandog
TOPIC:
Wrongful done be different from what was intended

TERMS:
Proximate legal cause
that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other
events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each
having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in
the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the
cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for
the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have
reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to
some person
might probably result therefrom.
LAWS/PROVISIONS: Article 4, Par. 1 of the RPC:
Criminal liability shall be incurred:
By any person committing a felony although the wrongful act done be different
from that which he intended
FACTS:
August 4, 1980 After a barrio fiesta in Vinzons, Camarines Norte, Edmundo
pushed aside the group of Esmeraldo Quinones, Jr., Zaldi Asis, and Felix Lukban, and
even prompted Zaldi to box. Fernando brought out his bolo when he saw Edmundo
on the ground, hacked Zaldi but missed. The group of Quinones was then pursued
by the three accused.
RULING:
1sti s s u e : Denied. Based on the d o c t r i n e : el que es causa de la causa es
causa del mal causado (hewho is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil
caused), the essential requisites of Article 4 are: (a) that an i n t e n t i o n a l
felony has been committed, and (b) that the wrong done to the aggrieved party be
the d i r e c t , n a t u r a l a n d l o g i c a l c o n s e q u e n c e of the felony
committed by the offender. These requisites are present in this case. The
intentional felony was the hacking by Fernando.
The second requisite was also met. Given that the incident happened on a national
highway where vehicles are expected to pass, Fernando s hacking of Quinoness
head was the proximate, might not be direct, cause of the latter s death. The
sequence of events from Fernandos assault to the time Quinones was run over by a
vehicle is one unbroken chain of events. With that said, it did not really matter if he
directly caused Quinoness death or if he actually meant it. Having triggered such
events, Iligan cannot escape liability even though the autopsy indicated that the
death was caused by a vehicular accident.
Since treachery and evident premeditation were not established, the lower courts
charge for Fernando was modified from murder to homicide.
However, it was not clearly established that Edmundo took any direct part in the
hacking incident since mere knowledge/approval of the act without cooperation is
not enough to charge him a co-principal. Therefore, he deserved exoneration

Upon seeing they were no longer being chased, Quinones invited the other two to
his house so that he could change to his working clothes as a bus conductor.

While the trio were walking along a national highway towards the victims house,
the three accused suddenly emerged on the road side. That was the time when
Fernando hacked Quinones, Jr. on his face, causing fatal injuries on the latters face
which resulted in his death.

The accused denied having perpetrated the crime and stated that they were on
their respective houses when the crime occurred.

The lower court found that Iligans group conspired to kill anyone or all members of
the group of the victim to vindicate the boxing on the face of Edmundo. Fernando
and Edmundo were then charged with the crime of murder with aggravating
circumstances of evident premeditation and treachery.
ISSUES:
WON Fernando could be absolved of his criminal liability given that the victim was
subsequently run over by a vehicle