THE SAFE OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE OF

PULVERISED FUEL PLANT

1.0 INTRODUCTION :

The ignition of finely divided combustible material in suspension in air can

lead to a significant explosion and emission of flame. All such dusts,
whether hot or cold, shall be considered dangerous. This combustible
material can be present throughout the boiler, from the milling plant to the
precipitator hoppers. The design of certain types of plant makes them
subject to shock waves in the event of an explosion and damage and
danger to plant and personnel can be greater than expected.

It is essential, therefore, that personnel;

i) Are made aware of the risk of explosions and fires emanating from
pulverized fuel (P.F.) and hot fly ash.

ii) Are provided with the necessary understanding as to how they can
arise.

iii) Are trained in the best manner in avoiding them.

This Directive provides background information and defines acceptable

standards of practice which will enable the O&M persons responsible to
establish P.F. operating Instructions appropriate to his location.

2.0 SCOPE :

This Directive describes the operation and maintenance practices

necessary to give an adequate awareness and understanding in order to
minimize the possibility of explosion and fires occurring in and adjacent to
P.F. plant.

3.0 The Possible Sites of Pulverized Fuel Explosions :

This Directive mainly considers explosions initiated in suspensions of P.F.

in air, although brief reference is made to coal gas explosions. These
suspensions are an essential part of the processes inside P.F. mill
systems and boiler furnaces. However they can also arise as a result of
the following :

i) Leakage of P.F. from the plant.

ii) Careless cleaning up of deposits of P.F. outside the plant.
 iii) The disturbance of deposits of P.F. outside the plant, by other
circumstances, including P.F. explosions.
iv) The release to atmosphere of hot P.F. fly ash containing a high
concentration of unburnt carbon, such as can occur at precipitator
hoppers.

Although no specific reference is made to explosions resulting from

ignition of oil, it is nevertheless an important area of potential risk which
could result in damage being sustained to the P.F. plant and should,
therefore, be considered when formulating operational procedures.

4.0 Factors that Cause an Explosion :

Two factors, brought together can cause either a P.F. or coal gas
explosion, namely :

i) A concentration of combustible in suspension in air, falling within

the explosive concentration limits.
ii) A source of ignition of adequate energy.

5.0 Plant which may be affected by P.F. Explosions :

In discussing the development of an explosive mixture, it is necessary to

give consideration to all those plant items than can affect, or are affected
by, an explosion.

Pulverized Fuel Plant is defined as that bounded by, and including :

i) The top of the coal bunker.

ii) The P.F. burners fed by the mill.

iii) In the case of mills which each have an associated primary air fan;
the discharge of the primary air fan.

iv) For all other mills, the points at which the hot air and tempering air
ducts leave their respective main supply ducts.

The mill system is that part of the P.F. plant bounded by the bunker
outlet(s) and (ii), (iii) or (ii) and (iv) above.

In addition the plant areas encompassing the furnace, the gas passes and
precipitator sections also need to be considered.

Whilst this Directive deals primarily with mills and P.F. pipe work system, it
is important to remember that conditions in the coal bunker and the
 primary air ducting can influence the development of an explosion in the
mill and, conversely, the bunker and the primary air ducting may be
affected as a result of a mill explosion.

6.0 THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN EXPLOSIVE MIXTURE:

6.1 In a Milling System :

At mill startup and shutdown, the development of an explosive mixture of

P.F. and air is an unavoidable event. In mill bodies and classifiers the
air/fuel ratio at start-up is dependent on the shutdown condition and on
any subsequent work carried out which may have affected the quantity of
coal in the system. In P.F. pipe work systems and mills, particularly the
vertical spindle type, the air/fuel ratio must change from very weak to
normal, as the mill is brought into service. The air/fuel ratios normally
found in milling systems lie between 1.5/1 and 3.5/1. However,
experience within the industry shows that explosions can not be sustained
in mixtures where the air to fuel ratio is weaker than 5/1.

An explosive mixture can also result during operation. Caused by :

i) Loss of coal feed.

ii) Air ingress on suction mills.
iii) Faulty control or indication systems.
iv) Weak mixtures arising from manual control of air and/or fuel supply.

It is also possible for accumulations of static coal to ignite, producing coal

gas which, in the presence of air and an ignition source, may explode.
This is a rare event and most likely to happen in the coal bunker
outlet/feeder area. It requires a larger accumulation of coal than that
normally occurring inside the mill.

6.2 In the Boiler Furnace :

The accumulation of an explosive mixture in the furnace is an abnormal
event. It follows the failure to ignite an accumulating cloud of fuel, or loss
of ignition during operation. There is time for an explosion to be avoided if
the operator is made aware of the situation and takes prompt and
effectively planned action. Complete loss of ignition is a rare event that is
usually preceded by a period of deteriorating combustion conditions.
Partial loss of ignition can also occur, with potentially damaging
consequences when re-ignition occurs. Unstable combustion conditions
are frequently associated with fuel quality changes.
7.0 SOURCES OF IGNITION :

(A) Fires due to Spontaneous Combustion in a Mill System :

Pulverized fuel in suspension can not be ignited by the primary air. Any
credible primary air temperature is inadequate to do so. However,
mechanical considerations limit the mill outlet temperature within the P.F.
pipe work system.

If any un-cooled deposited of coal are allowed to stand in a mill system

they are likely to catch fire eventually, even when air is at room
temperatures. This is due to the spontaneous combustion, which has a
greater probability as the fuel, and surrounding air temperature increases.
Classifier rejects returned to mill inlets may be particularly susceptible.
Any coal, or other combustible material, lodging in this area presents a fire
risk. Similar considerations apply to dry coal deposits in feeder bodies,
particularly on pressurized mill systems. Running of clean out conveyor is
to be ensured for avoiding accumulation of coal in feeder.

Deposition in large pipework system is common place. Deposits are

generally cleared if the mill is purged, but the constantly being reformed
and replaced as the air to fuel ratios change during normal operation.
Whilst deposition should be minimized, a safety hazard only exists in the
event of a blockage or following a mill trip which leaves a deposit. This
deposit will be prone to spontaneous combustion.

A minimum transport velocity of 27 28 m/sec will minimize deposition of

P.F. in a typical pipe work arrangement. However, the minimum figure for
a particular system may be different from this, depending on the
aerodynamic characteristics of the pipe work and the air/fuel ratio in use.
On systems with long (> 10m) sections of horizontal pipe work, deposition
should be expected. In situations where depositions are known to occur,
particular attention must be paid to mill and P.F. pipe work purging
procedures.

In the vertical spindle mills the blockage of mill rejects passage will cause
accumulation of rejects in the chamber and the friction between pyrites
scraper and accumulated rejects, in the presence of primary air, presents
a fire risk.

More clearance than specified between Scrapper and mill bottom plate
also will lead to accumulation of rejects in scraper chamber which is prone
to fire risk. Trimming of mills shall be done regularly, ensuring specified
clearance to minimize coal rejects.
 Any passing of pyrites hopper valves or leakages at pyrites hopper flanges
will be prone to spontaneous combustion in rejects hopper.
Excessive temperature of pulverized fuel in the mill shall be avoided, and
should not be allowed to exceed a temperature of 95 degree C.

Coal deposit in feeder body takes place due to failure of clean out
conveyor which in turn lead to spontaneous combustion particularly in
summer. Continuous operation of clean out conveyor is to be ensured.

(B) Ignition from the Furnace :

Furnace over pressurisation can result in ignition sources being introduced

into milling systems in the case of correctly operating mills, the temporary
reduction of P.F. transport velocity will be sufficient to enable significant
reverse flow to occur but, with-standing, un isolated mill systems reverse
flow can occur in the absence, or non-operation of, the non-return valves.

The most likely causes of ignition from the furnace into a running or
incoming mill and P.F. pipe work system are :
i) A pressure disturbance in the furnace that reverses the forward flow
of air / fuel, so that a flame may be propagated, or carried from the
furnace into the P.F. pipe work.

ii) Failure of the primary air supply to the mill, with the mill open to the
furnace and continuing to pulverize coal.

iii) Failure to ensure that the hot and cold air supplies to running mills
are not unduly disturbed by incoming mills.

iv) Failure to ensure, when bringing additional suction mills into service
that the exhausters are running before the mill outlet dampers are
opened.

v) Operating at too low a load.

It should be noted that correctly operating non-return valves in the P.F.

lines from a running mill give total protection against furnace ignition
sources only when the forward flow of air/fuel is halted or reversed and not
while it is merely slowed down.

6.2 Ignition in the Boiler furnace other than the Normal Flame :

Other sources of ignition in the furnace are hot refractory, ash and slag
deposits.

6.4 Ignition outside the Boiler :

 Such sources e.g. from welding and burning operations, are dangerous if
P.F. is escaping from plant, or if cleaning operations involve the risk of
creating clouds of dust containing significant quantities of P.F. in their
vicinity. These shall be eliminated, as far as is reasonably practicable,
while the risk exists. There is also a danger that a source of ignition may
emerge from the boiler.

7.0 INSTRUCTIONS AND TRAINING OF P.F. PLANT OPERATIONS AND

MAINTENANCE STAFF :

7.1 Fires and explosions can be avoided by maintaining high standards of

operation and maintenance. This objective requires adequate instruction,
training and supervision.

7.2 At each site a glossary of standard terms related to the Plant shall be
compiled and included in the station P.F. operating instructions.

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7.3 Each person concerned with the operation or maintenance of P.F. Plant
shall be trained to a competent level and the continuing competence of
operations staff shall be reviewed annually. Personnel who might be
promoted temporarily into a post where they will be directly concerned
with the operation of P.F. Plant shall also be instructed and trained
accordingly. Records of training shall be maintained.

8.0 PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN THE SAFE OPERATION OF P.F.PLANT :

8.1 The basis of safe firing of P.F. rests upon the availability and reliability of
oil burners. Without oil burners, P.F. firing would not be possible and it is,
therefore, essential that the oil installation is fully understood by all staff
operating P.F. Plant.

8.2 Milling systems shall not be put into service if a fire is suspected in any
part including the coal feeder or bunker.

8.3 P.F., fuel oil and gas shall not be allowed to accumulate as a consequence
of leakage.

8.4 The velocities in the P.F. pipes on a running mill shall be sufficient to
minimize deposition of fuel ( 27 28 m/sec. based on Dirty Air Flow Test).
8.5 The minimum number of personnel shall be allowed in the vicinity of P.F.
plant and only then under controlled conditions when unstable operating
conditions are suspected.

8.6 Operations shall be instructed on how partial or complete loss of ignition,

mill fires and coal flow failure are indicated and how to proceed in such
circumstances.

8.7 A clear line of command and communication shall be established to

ensure that any abnormalities are urgently brought to the attention of the
appropriate staff.

8.8 All P.F. Stations must have evacuation procedure, adequate for the risk
category of the particular plant. The evacuation zone and procedure shall
be detailed in the Location P.F. Operating Instructions.

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8.9 Following any indication of over pressurization in a P.F. systems, including

the operation of pressure relief vents, the milling system shall be treated
as containing an ignition source.

8.10 On a standing mill, keep the mill body temperature as low as is

practicable.

8.11 On a running mill, the maximum working mill outlet temperature permitted
in normal operation will depend on the nature of the coal and the design of
the milling system. Establish an acceptable maximum mill outlet
temperature for each individual installation. The alarm temperature shall
be set 5 degree C higher than this maximum temperature.

9.0 PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN THE SAFE MAINTENANCE OF P.F.PLANT

9.1 Maintain the design features, e.g. mill fire detectors, that protect against
fires and explosions. Management shall define these features, specify
the inspection frequencies, record inspection results and any remedial
action taken and the action to be taken in the event of defects arising.

9.2 All practicable steps shall be taken to eliminate sites in the mill system
where P.F. and raw coal may lodge.
9.3 All leaks of P.F. fuel oil and gas shall be dealt with promptly.

9.4 Air leaks on suction system may render the air / fuel mixture explosive and
must be rectified.

9.5 All modification to plant shall be dealt with in accordance with the
procedure laid down in the operation Directive OD/GEN/006. Plant
Modifications and LMI derived from the above Directive.

10.0 OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES :

10.1 Fires in Milling systems :

10.1.1 Do not start or shut down a mill without checking for evidence of a
fire in the system.

There is a need to clarify the different indications given when there

is a fire in a mill and when there has been a loss of coal to a mill.
Contd.on Page 9
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In general, a fire in a mill system is indicated by :

i) Rapidly rising and uncontrollable mill outlet temperature with

no change in power consumption.
ii) Severe pressure fluctuations.
iii) Lifting of relief vents on the mill or feeder (if lifted).
iv) Visible signs of overheating, smoke emission or sparks.
v) Increased response from any mill fire detection system.

A loss of coal feed, however, is indicated by :

i) Increase in mill outlet temperature system.
ii) Decrease in mill current.
iii) Decrease in mill load.

10.1.2 Care shall be taken not to confuse the high mill outlet temperature
caused by a fire with that caused by loss of coal feed. If an
operator receives indication from the pulverized fuel plant
instrumentation, especially during a transient situation which either:
i) Appears to be misleading or inconsistent
ii) Which may lead to an emergency situation.

He shall :
i) Evacuate restricted areas to minimum staffing levels.
 ii) If the emergency has not been pre-determined, consider,
together with his supervisor, the appropriate course of
action.
Within the Location P.F. operating Instructions, an appropriate
course of action shall be defined for pre-determined emergency
situations.

10.1.3 If a fire is suspected in a mill system :

i) Evacuate restricted areas to minimum staffing levels.
ii) Do not open up any part of the mill system to atmosphere,
e.g. by opening up coal feeder doors.
iii) If the mill is shut-down when the fire is detected, check that
all isolation features are tightly closed.
iv) If the mill is off-load DO NOT attempt to put it on-load.
v) If the mill is on-load DO NOT attempt to take it off-load until a
fire is confirmed.
vi) If there is fire in feeder, stop P.A. Fan, close seal air valve,
keep running the mill and apply water to feeder after
carefully opening the door. Contdon Page 10
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10.2 Actions to be taken in a Mill System containing a Fire :

10.2.1 When a fire is detected in the mill body or classifier and does not
appear to be in mechanical danger, increase coal feed to the
maximum practicable with the coal feeder on manual control.
Increase cold air flow to the maximum practicable and evacuate the
personnel in the vicinity of the affected mill system. Run like this for
a period specified in the P.F. Operating Instructions, and then
reduce coal feed to normal.

10.2.2 If the fire persists, or the mill is in mechanical danger, or the coal
feed is lost, withdraw personnel from the area and prepare to
shutdown the mill system.

In shutting down a mill system that contains a fire, the primary

objective is to minimize the risk of an explosion occurring, whether
from flash back or from ignition of the air / fuel mixture by the fire as
the air / fuel ratio traverses the explosive range.

The following methods are for dealing with confirmed fires in the
mill systems.
a) Stop the air flow through the system by closing the isolating
damper / valves.
 b) Trip the primary air fan or exhauster, mill, coal feeder, seal
air fan and classifier.
c) After the fire has been positively extinguished and the mill
has cooled off, purge the mill system thoroughly. If advice
on the length of the necessary purge time is required, the
operation services, Boiler Group will assist.
d) In cases where fire fighting equipment is installed, the P.F.
Operating Instructions shall give guidance on the
circumstances and methods of use.
e) Water should not be admitted to mill having fire to avoid
cracking of mill internals.
f) To quench the fire, admit inert gas or steam to the mill.

No fire fighting system is installed for mills at Vindhyachal Stage # I

Units and there is no permanent inerting system provided for mills.

10.3 Putting a Mill System into Service :

10.3.1 Do not start up a mill system if there is evidence of fire in that
system.
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10.3.2 On tube ball mills, establish grinding first by starting the mill motor
before opening the hot air damper and output control damper.

10.3.3 On medium and high speed mills, it is necessary to establish the air
flow before coal is admitted and, therefore, for these types of mill,
the mill outlet isolating valves have to be opened first in the start-up
sequence. At this point, carry out a check on the mill fire detection
instrumentation, where this equipment is fitted, to ensure that there
is no indication of a fire in the mill.

10.3.4 When the mills are in service, maintain air / fuel mixture velocities in
the P.F. lines above the minimum transport velocity for the
installation, determined as follows:
i) Where no estimate has been made of the velocity to
minimize deposition, the minimum transport velocity shall be
taken as in case of Vindhyachal Station.
ii) Where an estimate of the minimum velocity to minimize
deposition has been made, then that estimate shall be
regarded as the minimum transport velocity. In our Stage # I
Units this velocity is 27 28 m/sec.
10.3.5 Very high primary air flow (Too much high air fuel velocity) will lift
the Coarse particle from mill and due to this, deposition will take
place in fuel piping. Hence maximum velocity in fuel piping is also
to be limited by limiting air/fuel ratio near to 1.8:1, so that coal
velocities in PF pipes remain around 27 to 28 m/sec.

10.4 Taking a Mill System out of Service :

10.4.1 Do not shut-down a mill system if there is evidence of fire in the

system.

10.4.2 As far as practicable, when taking a mill system off-load under

normal circumstances, maintain the minimum transport velocity
and :

i) Firstly, stop the coal feed increase the proportion of cold air in the
primary air-flow, if necessary, to control the rise in mill outlet
temperature. On medium and high speed mills, run the mill to
remove as much coal as possible. On tube ball mills, run the mill
until the remaining coal is at or above the minimum level.
Contdon Page 12
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ii) In the case of medium and high speed mills increase the air flow
through the mill as the mill empties, adjusting the mill air inlet
temperature to control the outlet temperature within the specified
limit. When the mill is judged to be empty, stop the mill motor and
trip the primary air fan, exhauster or inlet dampers.

iii) In the case of tube ball mills, stop the mill and isolate the mill body.
Purge the P.F. lines at as high a velocity as practicable for atleast 2
mins.

iv) Mills should be cooled to as low a temperature as practicable both

immediately before and during shutdown. This is particularly
relevant in the case of tube ball mills which contain an appreciable
amount of fine coal. With such mills, the mill outlet temperature at
shutdown should be as near 50 degree C as is practicable.
Medium and high speed mill contain much coarser coal when shut
down and some relaxation of the recommended mill outlet
temperature at shut down is possible. A target temperature of < 80
degree C is recommended and in the case of medium and high
speed mill experience shows that this can be achieved within a time
scale of between 2 4 mins.
 v) Complete the mill system shut down and check that it is isolated
from the boiler.

vi) Ensure that any non-return valves in the P.F. lines have closed.

10.5 Coal Flow Failure :

In the event of suspected or indicated interruption of coal flow to a mill, the

procedure to be adopted shall be as follows :

i) Establish appropriate oil burners for the mills in service.

ii) Do not open up any part of the milling system to atmosphere e.g. coal
feeder doors.
iii) Put mill controls on to manual, reduce primary air flow towards minimum
value and adjust coal feeder output as necessary.
iv) Open cold air damper to control mill outlet temperature.
v) Attempt to stimulate coal flow by whatever approved methods as
applicable at individual locations.
vi) If coal flow can not be readily restored, shut down the mill as though it
contained a fire. Contd.on Page 11
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10.6 Furnace Precautions :

10.6.1 Before lighting up a boiler, purge the furnace and all appropriate
boiler passes with an air flow at least 30% of full load for 5 mins. Or
as recommended by the original equipment manufacturer and
accepted by NTPC.

10.6.2 Before first admitting pulverized fuel to the furnace, commission the
associated lighting up burners and check for efficient operation.
Ignition of pulverized fuel from any main burner shall be effected
only by the lighting-up burner associated with it.

10.6.3 If unstable conditions are expected or are developing in the

furnace, commission the lighting-up system as necessary and
initiate appropriate evacuation procedures. On no account shall
the lighting-up burners be commissioned if ignition is already
lost on the main burners concerned and fuel is being delivered
from them.

10.6.4 The lighting-up burners shall be maintained in operation until stable

combustion is assured.
10.6.5 Ignition is lost on more than one burner in a group supplied by the
same mill and not re-established within 20 seconds, stop the mill
involved immediately and purge the mill system.

10.6.6 If ignition of an incoming burner is not established within a period of

20 seconds, treat it as if ignition has been lost on that burner.
Prove the efficient operation of the lighting-up burner making
another attempt to obtain ignition on the main burner.

10.6.7 If ignition is lost completely in the furnace :

i) Trip all mill groups, and shut off all other fuel supplies to the
furnace.
ii) Do not insert lighting-up burners.
iii) Maintain an air flow at least 30% of full load for at least 5
mins. Or the time as recommended by manufacturer of
Boiler.

Contd.on Page 12

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10.6.8 When shutting down, purge the furnace and boiler passes with an
air flow at least 30% of full load for a minimum of 5 mins. Or the
time as recommended by Boiler manufacturer after cessation of
firing.

10.6.9 If a mill system trips out whilst containing coal it shall, if possible, be
purged into the furnace with the appropriate oil burners in service
after checking for fire in that mill system.

10.6.10 Intermittent flashing of mills shall be kept to the absolute minimum,

and must be only carried out when ignition is assured by the
specified number of oil burners.

10.7.0 Burner Management System (BMS) / Furnace Supervisory

and Safe Guard System (FSSS) :

A Burner Manager System (BMS) or Furnace Supervisory and

Safeguard System (FSSS) is provided to each of the Boiler
equipment. However, it should be ensured that failure or improper
functioning of any part or components of these systems or loss of
power to the system or loss of motive power to the field equipment
 controlled by these systems is not leading to any unsafe process
conditions without reliance on the skill of the operators.

Availability of Audio Visual annunciation to alert operator in case of

failure of any part or whole of these systems should be ensured
and their functioning is checked and recorded by the maintenance
personnel during overhauls of the Unit.

The operator should promptly notify the defects to the maintenance

personnel and the later should attend and put back the defective
portion of the system into service expeditiously.
All the Stations should prepare appropriate LMIs indicating the
details of checks to be carried out to confirm the integrity of the
system and the records to be maintained thereof.

11.0 BUNKERS :
11.1 Fires in bunkers are caused by the spontaneous combustion of
stagnant regions of coal. Bunkers associated with mills that are out
of service are always in danger of spontaneous combustion and
shall be emptied if the plant is be off-load to an extended period.
Contd.on Page 13

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On pressure mill systems, a small primary air flow is always present from
the mill to the feeder whenever the mill is in service. This flow increases if
the coal level in the bunker is low and can dry out coal in the bunker outlet
area. Depending on the nature and effectiveness of the isolation, similar
conditions can exist with the mill group out of service.

On an operating bunker, coal can stagnate against the walls due to bad
flow characteristics of the bunker, or by partially open bunker gates or
rods. This can be minimised by ensuring the satisfactory operation of
bunker outlet closing devices.

11.2 The method of regularly communicating mill status and bunker level shall
be clearly established in the location P.F. Operating Instructions.

11.3 If it is suspected that there is a fire in a coal bunker, the primary aim shall
be to empty the contents of the bunker directly into lorries for disposal.
Depending on the way in which the bunker is emptied, consideration
should be given to the use of protective clothing and spraying the coal with
water as it emerges. Any hot spots on the bunker or feeder wall shall
be cooled by spraying with water.
 If this is not practicable, the coal must be passed through a running mill.
This operation shall be subject to a well defined procedure to be
established in the Location P.F. Operating Instructions. This procedure
shall specify that :-

i) The mill group(s) must be continuously maintained in service.

ii) The coal in the bunker shall be maintained at a safe level.
iii) Non-essential personnel shall be withdrawn from the mill
evacuation zone. Those remaining within the zone shall wear
protective clothing. They shall be warned to retire immediately if
coal feed is lost or the mill is to be shut down.

If the mill has to be shut down, with a known bunker fire, even if
there are no indications of ignition sources within the mill, the mill
shall be shut down as though there were a fire in it.

If in the process of emptying the bunker, it is necessary to enter it,

then actions shall follow the requirements as detailed in section 36
of Indian factories Act 1948 & provision of Section SREM-26 of
NTPC Safety Rule Hand Book Electrical & Mechanical (Code of
practices). Contdon Page 14
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12.0 BOILER ASH AND DUST HOPPERS :

12.1 Evacuation procedures shall be used to warn personnel engaged on ash

removal duties of impending or suspected unstable operating conditions.

12.2 On-load ash removal from boilers, through open doors, shall only be
carried out by personnel wearing appropriate protective clothing.

12.3 If bad combustion conditions are likely to have resulted in unburnt

pulverized fuel being caught in ash or dust hoppers in significant
quantities, the hoppers shall be cleared immediately. Otherwise, under
such conditions, it is inevitable that the unburnt fuel will continue to burn in
the hopper, due to its initial high temperature and the ingress of air at the
hopper mouth. This can lead to very high temperatures in the hoppers
and the formation of large incandescent clinkers. These can damage
plant and cause serious dust removal difficulties and, more seriously if the
dust in this condition is spilled from the hopper into the open air, a major
fire and explosion can result. The combustible material can be deposited
in layers.
12.4 There is an increased risk of collecting combustible material in all boiler
and precipitator hoppers during lighting up operations from cold,
particularly during the test firing of mills, and of safety valve testing
operations, than under normal operating conditions.

12.5 The removal of unburnt fuel immediately after its deposition is particularly
important. When temporary equipment has to be used for extracting
unburnt fuel from the hoppers, the temporary method to be used must
have been the subject of a study to ensure that it is safe. Indiscriminate
removal of dust from hoppers shall be banned. The prime aim of any
abnormal method of handling dust containing, or suspected of containing,
unburnt fuel shall be to prevent its release into the open air unless it is
fully wetted and cooled. The system to be used will be subject of a safety
study carried out by a person nominated by the Station General Manager.

This study shall assume that blockage will occur during the temporary
process and that the prime requirements must not be infringed in dealing
with it. The use of air lances to overcome blocking during such
procedures shall be banned.

Contd.on Page 15

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12.6 Dry dust shall only be emptied out of a Boiler or precipitator hopper into
the open air after a person nominated by the Station General Manager
has confirmed and recorded that there is negligible risk of a fire or an
explosion resulting, taking into account the environmental and safety
considerations associated with this practice.

*****