Technological Forecasting & Social Change 101 (2015) 6282

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Technological Forecasting & Social Change

Exploring the cognitive value of technology foresight: The case

of the Cisco Technology Radar
Siri Boe-Lillegraven a,c,, Stephan Monterde b
a
Aarhus University, School of Business and Social Sciences, Department of Business Administration, Bartholins All 10, 8000 Aarhus C, Denmark
b
Cisco Systems, Inc., Corporate Development, Business Development, Avenue des Uttins 5, 1180 Rolle, Switzerland
c
The Sino-Danish Center for Education and Research, Beijing, China

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: There is much literature on how corporate foresight should be practiced, but fewer explanations of
Received 1 July 2013 through which mechanisms it creates value. We seek to deepen this understanding by applying a
Received in revised form 27 March 2014 cognitive lens. We mainly explore how and why foresight can influence ways of processing
Accepted 29 July 2014 information, first conceptually and then empirically through the case of the Cisco Technology
Available online 13 October 2014
Radar. Through consulting multiple individuals, opposed to focusing solely on statements from
top managers or observable outputs on the firm level, we uncover a broad set of hidden values
Keywords: from this technology foresight initiative. We conclude that a critical mechanism of a system such
Organizational future orientation as the radar is its probing of analytical thinking, as well as its way of making people connect and
Technology foresight
exchange views across functions and departments. We also observe that deeper and more frequent
Technology radar
involvement corresponds with greater perceived value of the system. Our findings have implications
Cognition
Decision-making for research seeking to further understand through which mechanisms foresight creates value, and
Dual process theory for the practice of designing, implementing and motivating for participation in technology foresight.
Mental models 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).

1. Introduction Where was the profitable innovation that would never

By the end of 2012 the Cisco Technology Radar a foresight
system for identification, selection and verification of emerging
technologies (Rohrbeck et al., 2006) was widely considered a
success. This was not only due to the several hundred scouted
technologies. More importantly, the technology reports were
increasingly spotted on the tables of key decision-makers
within the company. The radar scouting process also arose
considerable interest from external clients. Still, as one of the
authors can personally testify, people kept asking for the
ultimate proof that the radar created value. So what, they
asked. Where was the story of the technology that thanks to the
foresight system had been turned into a successful business?
Corresponding author at: Bartholins all 10, 8000 rhus C, Denmark. Tel.:
+ 45 24247457 (cell), + 45 84165028 (office).
E-mail addresses: Siri@badm.au.dk (S. Boe-Lillegraven),
smonterd@cisco.com (S. Monterde).
have happened had the radar project not existed? Exactly
how or why did the technology foresight system make a
difference?
Generally, foresight is known to bring value through different
roles; exploring new business fields (strategist role), increasing
the number of innovation concepts and ideas (initiator role) and
increasing the quality of the output of innovation projects
(opponent role) (Rohrbeck and Gemnden, 2011). Research
within the scenario foresight literature also specifies the
usefulness of foresight for changing mindsets and decision-
making styles, which is important for enabling managers to
realize the need for change and take action. However, direct links
between the role of foresight and specific outcomes can be hard
to establish. This was also the situation with regard to the Cisco
Technology Radar. True, some of the technologies that have been
sourced by Cisco could be tracked back to the scouted technology
reports. Proving that it was the radar initiative that made the
difference was still hard. In a large multi-national company there

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2014.07.014
0040-1625 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
 S. Boe-Lillegraven, S. Monterde / Technological Forecasting & Social Change 101 (2015) 6282
are thousands of internal and external factors impacting the
organization. Even if all those variables could be controlled for,
the effort required to measure the impact of the radar would be
too demanding and costly.
In Cisco, the people responsible for the radar were more
distracted than truly disturbed by the So what? question.
They considered other factors as proof enough that the
foresight system was creating corporate value for example
that more and more people asked to be involved and that
certain departments requested tailored versions of the process.
It was still hard to describe this kind of value more accurately.
They really like it! is hardly a satisfactory answer to the So
what?-question. Or is it?
In the broader literature on strategic management there has
been a growing interest in the role of cognition or managerial
mindsets for enabling change. In this paper we make an effort
to further specify how and why the technology radar makes a
difference by looking into cognitive aspects of foresight. Instead
of searching for examples of technologies, products or services
that were sourced and developed thanks to the foresight
initiative, we are in this paper focusing on the potential role of
technology foresight for changing mindsets and ultimately, how
this relates to value creation. We do this theoretically in
Section 2 and empirically in Section 3 by asking the following
guiding research question:
How and why can engagement in foresight impact ways of
thinking and processing information?
In other words, we contribute to the understanding of value
creation from foresight by highlighting benefits not likely to be
directly measureable through looking at products or other end
results, but rather by keeping an eye on the process. This makes it
necessary to look deeper than the corporate level descriptions
of value stemming from foresight, and consider also how
individuals might perceive the benefits from participating.
Through our framework and analysis we show how systematic
probing for analytic thinking through foresight can be a key
catalyst for changing mindsets, which will ultimately influence
strategy as well as decision-making. We also highlight how the
organizational context and the design of the foresight process
can catalyze mental model updates.
The paper is structured as follows: First, we establish a
theoretical framework from which to approach the case
(Section 2). To help us specify our focus we derive in total 8
propositions 5 regarding individual and 3 regarding
collective aspects of the cognitive role of foresight. After
summarizing the propositions (Section 2.5) we present our
case (Section 3), more specifically the setting and methods
(Section 3.1), the background of the Cisco Technology Radar
(Section 3.2) and our results (Section 3.3). Finally, we discuss
our results (Section 4), highlight key implications and limita-
tions as well as suggest several avenues for further research
before we conclude (Section 4.3).
2. Literature
In the following we theoretically consider not only the final
outcomes of foresight, but also its potential for affecting habits
and mindsets of individuals and thus creating value by enabling
organizational renewal and change. We find that there is a
63
research gap particularly with regard to three aspects. I) Most
current research considering the value of foresight does it on the
organizational level meaning that deeper parts of the
foresight process concerning the value perceived by individual
stakeholders are less accounted for, particularly from a cognitive
perspective. II) It is somewhat open whether the link between
foresight and mental model change can be established also for
activities that do not include scenarios, for instance technology
foresight. III) While there are some arguments for why foresight
can change mindsets, such as due to the memorability of
scenarios, there is lack of a solid theoretical foundation from
which to explore the cognitive value of foresight. A better
understanding of the collective cognitive process of foresight
what happens when individuals come together as participants in
a foresight system is also needed.
Whetten (1989) refers to theory-development authorities
such as Dubin (1978) when listing four essential elements a
complete theory must contain; what, how, why and who/
where/when (see Fig. 1). Our aim, in addition to exploring the
how, is to contribute with further developments especially
for the why related to the cognitive dimensions of foresight.
We are attempting first to build and then to verify the
theoretical framework.
In our efforts to identify literature describing the value
creation of foresight, and more specifically cognitive factors, we
have encountered a problem described by Rohrbeck and Bade
(2012) in a recent review: The literature explores similar
phenomena, but uses different terminologies. We identified
papers describing the value creation of corporate foresight, of
strategic foresight, of technology foresight and of specific tools
and methods such as scenario planning and horizon scanning.
Our empirical study is focusing on a specific case of technology
foresight, but we are concerned with processes and mecha-
nisms that can also be found in other approaches to foresight.
We therefore felt it would do more harm than good only to
consider literature on specific technology foresight tools.
Instead, we have chosen to consider a broader literature on
value creation from foresight, as long as the foresight dealt with
in the papers involves systematic efforts to interpret and look
out for the future. We follow the example of Rohrbeck and Bade
and consider the larger field we position ourselves within as
organizational future orientation. While our empirical study
certainly makes our results more relevant for other radar
projects or technology foresight initiatives on a more general
level, we would argue that our theoretical framework can also
serve as input for future research on any organizational
foresight effort that takes the form of a widely implemented
process, close to the best practices described in the literature
(Rohrbeck and Gemnden, 2008).
2.1. Current understanding of foresight and cognition
Literature on the value creation of foresight is often
concerned with its role for managing uncertainty. For example,
foresight systems have been highlighted as a means for
identifying drivers of change to handle the effect and response
uncertainty through betting on discontinuities, or more often
creation of strategic options (Vecchiato and Roveda, 2010).
Corporate foresight is also seen as valuable for perceiving,
interpreting and responding to change as well as influencing
other actors and enabling learning (Rohrbeck and Schwarz,
64 S. Boe-Lillegraven, S. Monterde / Technological Forecasting & Social Change 101 (2015) 6282
Fig. 1. The focus of this paper. We aim to answer how and why engagement in foresight can impact cognition, thus contributing mostly to the how and why
elements of foresight theory.
Source: Own design, solely based on Whetten (1989).
2013). Related more to the future studies literature, it has been
proposed that a key value of foresight is to enable organizations
to learn the future faster, from problem exploration to problem
resolution and action (Burt and van der Heijden, 2008; Burt,
2010). These roles can be linked to quantifiable value
contributions such as the number of new products and services,
the number of reported trends and technologies or the number
of decisions made using foresight. But should they only be
reduced to such measures?
Particularly in the literature on scenario foresight, there is
emphasis on the value for changing decision-making styles and
mindsets of managers (Chermack and Nimon, 2008; Chermack,
2004; Glick et al., 2012; Meissner and Wulf, 2012), which by
the strategic management literature has been identified as
crucial for change and long-term survival (Huff et al., 1992;
Reger and Palmer, 1996; Gavetti and Rivkin, 2007). A well-
known example is Polaroid that, due to a prevailing mental
model, failed to adapt to the growth of digital imaging (Tripsas
and Gavetti, 2000). In a critical survey on strategic foresight and
organizational learning, arguments for the cognitive value of
foresight in a wider context than scenarios are put forward by
Bootz (2010). He talks about the cognitive virtues of the
foresight attitude which facilitate the questioning of individual
representations (p 1591) and suggests that beyond the
traditional role of decision-making support, some foresight
studies () could be regarded as knowledge management and
tools to drive change (p 1593). Literature on horizon scanning
(Miles and Saritas, 2012; Palomino et al., 2012; Brown et al.,
2005) also emphasizes the role of this foresight approach for
directly assisting and improving decision-making through its
structured process of identifying emerging trends and techno-
logical developments. Particularly with reference to public
sector foresight programs, there have still been calls and
attempts for a closer assessment of the impact of foresight for
policy- and decision-making (Calof and Smith, 2012). Experts
have concluded that while design of the foresight process as
 S. Boe-Lillegraven, S. Monterde / Technological Forecasting & Social Change 101 (2015) 6282
well as organizational design is important for foresight to have
impact, the attitudes and commitment of participants also play
a key role (Calof et al., 2012). However, the underlying
mechanisms through which foresight gains impact could still
be further elaborated on.
Bootz et al. (Bootz, 2010; Bootz and Monti, 2008; Bootz
et al., 2009) also provided a matrix typology which helps clarify
that there are both direct and indirect strategic implications of
foresight. Strategic orientation and change drive have most
direct implication for strategy, while decision-making support
and mobilization have more indirect strategic impact. There are
however still many unanswered questions with regard to the
specific cognitive role, such as how the ability of foresight to
change mindsets can be explained.
2.2. Specifying the role of mental models
Literature describing the cognitive aspects of foresight, and
more widely the cognitive aspects of organizational and strategic
management, frequently refers to mental models. Mental
models are a comprehension of a specific domain in the mind
of an individual and are therefore important for organizations
and management to understand in order to enhance learning
(Miller, 2003; Senge, 2006; Starkey et al., 2004). Within the
scenario literature, Chermack (2004) describes mental models as
the lenses through which we see the world (p 301), including
our beliefs, values and biases. Shared mental models that can
be achieved by strategic conversation are also mentioned, in line
with van der Heijden (1997). Burt and Chermack (2008) refer to
the aha experience that moment when new insights have
been gleaned and a mental model has shifted (p 290). Rook
(2013) proposes a synthesized and specific definition of a
concentrated, personally constructed, internal conception, of
external phenomena (historical, existing or projected), or
experience, that affects how a person acts. We build on this
definition, and thus view mental models as individually held.
Exactly what happens when mental models are shifted with
foresight? Memorability is a central argument for why
scenarios can help alter mental models (Chermack, 2004;
Bood and Postma, 1997). In a review, Bood and Postma (1997)
specifically indicated that foresight in the form of scenarios can
hinder bottlenecks to strategic decision-making because they
a) decrease managers' inherent cognitive-inertia (the tendency
to stick with world views based on outdated information even
when new information is available), b) shorten the feedback
lag between strategic decisions and the results and c) solve
inefficiency and bias due to either too much or too little
disagreement between members of a management team.
However, from a cognitive perspective, deeper explanation of
how foresight contributes to update mental models is needed.
One might also speculate that other foresight processes such as
scouting, scanning and assessment of technologies bring expe-
riences that are less compelling and less likely to stick. Does
this mean that they are also less likely to update mental models?
2.3. The dual view of doing and thinking
By drawing on literature on the main ways in which we
process information, additional arguments for how and why
foresight contributes to updating mental models can be put
forward. Within cognitive and social psychology, dual process
65
theories have been around for 30 years or more (Evans, 2008)
and have sustained their ground despite a paradigm shift in the
psychology of reasoning (Elqayam and Over, 2012). Following
the dual process account of Evans (2006), most activities
involving conscious thinking outside the scope of everyday
routines seem to contribute to updating mental models of
individuals. According to this account, humans consider one
hypothesis of the future, or mental model, at a time. Central for
generating and considering these models are two main kinds of
reasoning processes heuristic and analytical that alternate
in controlling behavior. These processes are most popularly
known as System 1 and System 2, as used for instance by
Kahneman (2011) in his best-selling book on reasoning and
decision biases, Thinking, Fast and Slow.1
It will be outside the scope of this paper to consider the
ongoing debate concerning the details of different dual process
accounts. We will focus on the main aspects of the heuristic
analytic theory of reasoning (Evans, 2008; Evans, 2006; Evans
and Over, 1996) and how it relates to updating mental models
and affecting decision-making of individuals participating in
foresight. The theory allows for an assumption that System 1 is
more dominant in activities involving routines, while System 2
is more dominant in explorative activities. Dominance of
System 2 can be seen as critically important for acquiring new
knowledge outside of the box and the success of foresight.
2.3.1. Mental exploration and exploitation
When we talk about innovation, especially on the company
level, March's (1991) terminology of exploration and exploita-
tion in organizations is widely used. The ways to design dual
structures for innovation (Duncan, 1976) by balancing explo-
ration and exploitation in firms are discussed in the large and
still expanding research on ambidexterity. Foresight has been
linked to organizational ambidexterity through its identifica-
tion of discontinuous change and development of radical
innovations (Rohrbeck, 2010a) clearly related to exploration.
One should be careful of drawing direct links between the
frameworks, but we find it useful to refer to exploration and
exploitation when using dual process theory to investigate the
cognitive role of foresight. We link System 1 processes to
exploitation and System 2 processes to exploration.
As with exploration and exploitation on the individual or
firm level, System 1 and System 2 are seen to represent two
distinctive kinds of activities, in this case not in terms of
observable actions, but rather processes in the brain. Most
authors agree on differentiating between processes that are
unconscious, rapid and automatic, and those that are conscious,
slow, and deliberative (Evans, 2008). System 1 is generally
perceived as fast and automatic, while System 2 is slow and
controlled. Other words associated with the systems are
heuristic, intuitive, holistic, and impulsive (System 1) and
analytic, reflective, rational, and systematic (System 2) (Evans,
2008). As with exploitation activities in organizations, the
System 1 processes are associated with routines. To save
capacity, the brain applies routines to our reasoning, operated
by System 1. This system generates mental models for
consideration of the analytic system, by default to represent
the most probable states of affairs given the current
1
Kahneman specied that the system labels should be interpreted as
ctitious characters.
66 S. Boe-Lillegraven, S. Monterde / Technological Forecasting & Social Change 101 (2015) 6282
understanding. However, like in organizations, too many
routines or too much System 1 thinking can result in a blind
spot for taking into account important changes in the environ-
ment. This is because the heuristic system contextualizes
problems with reference to prior knowledge, the so-called
relevance principle (Evans, 2008). Related to the example of
Polaroid, it is likely that decision-makers rarely analytically
questioned the very basis for their business model and to a large
extent continued exploitation via existing routines mentally as
well as practically.
With intervention from System 2, implying more analytic
processing and hypothetical thinking, the likelihood of
updating the current understanding increases. However,
these analytical processes are also prone to biases, due to our
tendency to satisfice; to hold on to representations of reality
that are good enough and thus save effort (Evans, 2006). In
addition to cognitive capacity, factors such as personal
motivation and task instructions are central for determining
how much we will let the analytic processes intervene in
decision-making. Time is also a key factor. Due to the capacity
demands for System 2 processing, the analytic mode is less
likely to dominate if decisions are made under time pressure.
One important clarification is needed. We are probably not
talking about two completely different physical systems in the
brain (Evans, 2008), rather two main types of processes (Evans,
2006). As with activities of exploration and exploitation, one
way of processing does not directly rule out the other. For
application to foresight it is sufficient to assume that before a
decision or judgment is made and thus action takes place, both
types of processes will have been activated in the brain of an
individual. The relevant question is which process is the more
dominating; to which degree the analytic processes intervene
and thus to which degree the mental model is updated.
2.3.2. Implications for foresight
Fig. 2 summarizes the revised heuristicanalytic theory of
reasoning as proposed by Evans in his 2006 extension (Evans,
2006) applied to foresight. In sum, the theory provides a
good explanation for how employees and managers judge,
decide and act, for instance related to perceived future business
opportunities: They consider one hypothesis about the future
at a time (singularity principle) and confine themselves to it
until they find good reason to give it up (satisficing principle).
More active intervention of analytic processing may result in
modification or replacement of the mental model about the
future. Cognitive ability (general intelligence), task instructions
(for example strongly probing for deductive reasoning),
personal motivation (for example that the problem seems
personally relevant for the solver), personality or cultural
context (resulting in a tendency to employ analytical thinking
more often) and time are key factors that determine the degree
of intervention.
Evans extension largely builds on an idea proposed by Evans
and Over (1996) that the analytic system is (more) involved
when hypothetical thinking imagining possibilities that go
beyond the factual knowledge of the world is required. A
deeper explanation for why foresight is useful for updating
mental models is thereby offered: When decision-makers
engage in thinking about possible scenarios or trend outcomes
for the future, analytic processing is employed to a larger extent.
In a situation with no foresight process to stimulate analytic
processing, the heuristic system is more likely to bias actors to
expect things in line with past experiences and not consider
things outside the box. Thus, the possibility for updating the
current mental model would be present every time a person
engages in hypothetical thinking about the future. Even if the
analytic processing would fail to intervene at some final
decision-making-point, the likelihood that some updating has
happened before will be increased compared to a situation with
no prior engagement in foresight all other things being equal.
We can therefore propose that
1a) The revision of current mental models is helped by
engagement in foresight
When putting forward such a proposition, it also becomes
relevant to discuss the role of the frequency of engagement.
Intuitively, it is tempting to infer that more foresight engagement
would, if proposition 1a holds, be better than less engagement.
Considering the heuristicanalytic theory of reasoning, such a
view can also be backed up by referring to mental processes. Due
to the satisficing principle, there is a risk that individuals
participating in foresight might still be biased to settle for
good enough and therefore sometimes fail to take important
information into account. To overcome the satisficing principle
and maximize the update of mental models, it would thus help to
increase both the delivery of content for analytic processing
provided by the heuristic system, and the analytical consider-
ation of the hypothesis. All this is likely to be helped by regular
participation in foresight, since this will bring more hypotheses
about the future up for consideration as well as probe for more
frequent analytical thinking, than only occasional engagement
all other things equal. We therefore propose that
1b) Regular engagement in foresight increases the individual
cognitive payoff from foresight, compared to only occa-
sional engagement
Critically examining the latter proposition, however, we are
led to question what is meant by regular engagement. To really
get to the bottom of the cognitive mechanisms, we should also
specify what kind of engagement we are referring to. For
instance, participants in a scenario workshop are subject to
other instructions and perform different actions than the
readers and viewers of the final results from that workshop.
Since both task instructions and personal motivation are
relevant for determining the intervention of analytic process-
ing, it is likely that individuals who are actively participating
will update their understanding to a larger extent than passive
readers, because they are probed more through task instruc-
tions and in greater need of mobilizing motivation to act
accordingly. We therefore propose that
1c) Participative (active) engagement in foresight increases
the individual cognitive payoff compared to engagement
only as a reader of end results (passive)
However, as suggested also in the foresight literature (Peck,
2009; Bezold, 2010), there may be personality differences
when it comes to motivation for engagement in foresight,
where motivation and perceived payoff are likely to be
contingent on a match with personal preferences in thinking
and doing. Such claims are in line with the heuristicanalytic
theory of reasoning, which also suggests that individual
differences may make certain individuals engage in analytical
 S. Boe-Lillegraven, S. Monterde / Technological Forecasting & Social Change 101 (2015) 6282 67

Fig. 2. Dual processing and foresight. The top line conceptualizes how a business problem is tackled in a situation without engagement in foresight (driven by heuristic
processing, no attention to potential disruptions). The bottom line conceptualizes how participation in foresight stimulates modification of current beliefs through
generation of scenarios that foster analytic thinking.
Source: Own development, building on the dual process account of J.S.B.T. Evans; The heuristicanalytic theory of reasoning: extension and evaluation, Psy-chon. Bull.
Rev. 13 (2006) 378395.

thinking more often and more naturally than others. The
literature on scenario planning has already found evidence for
links between scenario planning and an increased reliance on
intuitive decision-making style (Chermack and Nimon, 2008).
Technology foresight is however rather different from scenario
planning, in that it relies more on fixed processes and
systematic analysis, likely to be more related to analytic
thinking. We therefore propose that
1d) Individuals with a high preference for analytic thinking are
more likely to see larger cognitive benefits from technol-
ogy foresight than individuals with a lower preference.
Moreover, due to the capacity demands of analytic
processing, it is less likely that individuals will be able to
update mental models under time pressure, where heuristics
are more employed. Updating the mental models in due time
before a critical decision-making-point is therefore likely to be
important to make an informed high quality decision under
time pressure. We thus propose that
1e) Preparation through foresight activities before a critical
decision-making-point will I) shorten the time needed to
take an informed decision at a critical decision-making
point and II) increase the quality of a decision taken under
time pressure compared to a situation with no preparation
through foresight.
2.4. Collective aspects
Thus far we have concentrated on how cognition is relevant
for foresight mainly on the individual level. However, collective
aspects must also be explored in order to determine the final
impact of such mechanisms on the value and success of
foresight. Since foresight systems and processes often involve
many individuals; what is the role of cognitive aspects for the
value creation of foresight when individuals come together?
Knowledge about value outcomes on the collective level has
often been fueled by searches for best practices in how to
organize foresight activities. For instance, Rohrbeck and
68 S. Boe-Lillegraven, S. Monterde / Technological Forecasting & Social Change 101 (2015) 6282
Gemnden (2008) offer a framework for benchmarking fore-
sight, built from case studies. They point out the dimensions
information usage, method sophistication, people and
networks and organization and culture as central for
determining the value of foresight and further subdivide
them into 19 characteristics. Battistella (2014) also provides an
organizing framework based on case studies, and specifies the
different effects of structure, coordination, decision processes
and control systems on the efficiency (related to return on
investment) and effectiveness (related to goal achievement and
satisfaction) of foresight. A third recent paper provides a complex
framework to judge the contribution of foresight towards more
participatory knowledge societies (Amanatidou, 2014), and
sees foresight as a system of elements and interactions that are
both affecting and being affected by internal as well as and
external factors.
These examples show that a) numerous aspects play a role
in determining the value of foresight when analyzing it on the
collective level, and b) there has been a need for systematizing
these aspects and sorting them into smaller categories in order
to make the frameworks relevant for practice and much
progress has been made by recent contributions. There is
however still room for more clarification on how collective
aspects influence the value of foresight related to cognition. In
the following, we make an effort to explain how and why
individual engagement in foresight, stimulated by analytic
processing, can be transformed into a collective payoff in the
first place. We also use insights from social cognition to specify
how shared and conflicting mindsets matter for the value of
foresight, and how control mechanisms govern cognitive
payoffs through influencing motivations.
2.4.1. Collaboration and cognitive bonus
Based on the recent contributions to the foresight literature
(Rohrbeck and Gemnden, 2008; Battistella, 2014; Amanatidou,
2014), it can be summarized that there are certain general ways
of organizing for foresight that will yield better payoffs than
others, and that several factors influence these payoffs. The direct
relations with cognitive processes are still to be further
specified. Still, the insights regarding best practices can be
built on to understand the relation between individual
cognitive payoffs and how such payoffs can be enforced
through interaction.
Firstly, using the terminology of Rohrbeck and Gemnden,
people and networks will likely moderate how much informa-
tion is brought in and cued for consideration by analytic
processes. Secondly, organizational aspects such as time
available and perceived risks and rewards will likely moderate
engagements in foresight thinking, thus also affect the amount
of new perspectives considered. Thirdly, the general openness
and willingness to share different views will mediate the effects
of the former two points. If debating the status quo is very
common and accepted in the organization, individual mental
models can be updated and/or further enhanced by exchange
with other updated individuals. If there is not a culture for
challenging current points of views, the mental models of a
foresighted minority may be negatively affected through
pressure from a larger group of lagging individuals who are
rejecting input.
We can therefore assume, rooted in the literature on how
foresight ideally should be established and organized, that
collective processes can both moderate and mediate the
outcomes of foresight, from a cognitive perspective. As such,
we suggest that
2a) When foresight is at its best practice, individuals (and
the firm) receive a collective cognitive bonus from
participation.
The explanation for this bonus can again be found in the
basic understanding of how the mind works, and is related to
capacity constraints. Each individual only has a certain capacity
for analytic processing. However, when exchanging views or
mental models with other individuals engaging in similar
hypothetical thinking about the future, they are offered a
shortcut compared to processing everything themselves from
scratch. It follows from this that there are potential efficiency
gains from involving many rather than few people in foresight
activities at least if ambitions for engaging in hypothetical
thinking are high. Outsourcing some parts of the analytic
processes to other individuals and receiving back more
finished mental models for heuristic cuing saves time and
effort, for both the individual and for the group. This latter
explanation is in line with the idea that assumptions of mental
representations at the individual level should not be lifted to
understand organizational level outcomes without taking
interaction into account (Allard-Poesi, 1998).
2.4.2. Culture, coincident meanings and control mechanisms
When a foresight system is introduced into an organization,
it is normally not done from a blank sheet perspective.
Therefore, it is unsurprising that achieving a fit between the
organizational culture and foresight is emphasized. Organiza-
tional culture can already be directly linked to cognitive
aspects, in that it is defined as a pattern of beliefs and
expectations shared by the organization's members (Schwartz
and Davis, 1981). A related view for instance, is of culture as
normative order, with the implication that culture can act as a
social control system by shaping the behaviors of individuals
and groups. Norms can vary in two dimensions: the degree of
consensus regarding the norm, and the intensity of the
approval/disapproval. Only when there is both intensity and
consensus can a strong culture exist (O'Reilly, 1989). The
individual perspective the dual process perspective also
suggests that culture influences individuals' tendency to
engage in analytical thinking (Evans, 2006).
However, there are good arguments for questioning a) if
"culture" is the right label to use when considering organiza-
tional aspects of foresight, and b) the sometimes seemingly
implicit assumption that shared mindsets are what create
strong value outcomes from foresight. For instance, based on
the view of culture as normative order, we are at first glance
dealing with somewhat of a contradiction in regards to the
cognitive value of foresight. For foresight to be effective,
mindsets should constantly be opened up, updated and
negotiated across functions and departments, indicating the
importance of conflicting beliefs. However, some kind of
consensus or shared mindset must also be present, with
regard to the perceived importance and usefulness of
foresight, for people to actually participate in foresight
activities.
To resolve how the mental states of alignment and
complementarity can coexist, it must first be acknowledged
 S. Boe-Lillegraven, S. Monterde / Technological Forecasting & Social Change 101 (2015) 6282
that representations at the collective level are something beyond
simple aggregations of the mental models of individuals. Second,
that such representations are not stable. The view of culture as
normative order hints at this by explicating how norms can vary
in both intensity and degree of consensus. However, by drawing
further on the perspective of Gray et al. (1985), and their
metaphors of construction and destruction of coincident
meanings in organizations, we get closer to understanding the
underlying mechanisms in play. Based on their account, we can
assume that at any-given time, some organizational meanings
will be coincident and others will not. Moreover, it is similar
valuing that fuels organizational members' meanings and
indicate the highest degrees of coincidence. Such values are
often not expressed in daily conversation, but remain tacit
influences on choices and behavior. For instance, full coincidence
of meaning is possible if all members of an academic
department perceive the new department head will work for
each of their interests (p 87). If individuals have different
perceptions of how their personal welfare is influenced by
certain experiences, the coincidence will be lower.
Applied to foresight, this first of all explains how shared
representations (regarding the usefulness of foresight, perhaps
due to an understanding that it will ultimately lead to personal
gains for the participant) and disparate views (with regard to
the interpretation and relevance of the issues put under focus
by foresight activities) are not contradictory. It also provides
the insight that, in order for individuals willingly to engage in
foresight, they do not necessarily need to share the same views
on why such an engagement would be useful, as long as they all
share the understanding that it is somehow a good idea to take
part. It is however suggested by Gray et al. that greater
coincidence among the tacit value systems produces more
socially binding meanings.
A foresight system that responds to a broad set of values
reflecting many individual interests could possibly still be more
effective than a system that is geared towards one main rationale
for participation. The reason for this is that the balance between
seeking to control the behavior of individuals (in effect, secure
their motivated participation) and avoiding a streamlining of
meanings (which can be harmful to the quality of the foresight
process) will be easier to manage. This idea represents an
important difference from the assumption that a good fit
between foresight and the organizational culture means that
individual foresight mindsets must necessarily be similar in all
aspects and, consequently, actively controlled by management.
Nevertheless, social cognition theory tells us that the need for
socially shared cognition to believe that one's ideas correspond
to the ideas of the group is a fundamental influence on the
processing that occurs in the human brain, and is related to an
overall need to belong. Put simply, people do not do well unless
they are motivated to get along with at least a few other people
(p 4849) (Fiske and Taylor, 2013). However, this functions as
yet another reminder that "shared" does not necessarily mean
identical, and that motivations do indeed play a role in
influencing the cognitive modes of individuals.
What can this tell us about value creation from foresight
at a collective level, related to cognition? Most of all, it
nuances the prescriptions regarding how to organize for
foresight. While the culture-as-normative-order-view would
be likely to suggest managerial focus on cultural control
mechanisms in order to secure increased approval for foresight
69
through creation of strong norms, the constructiondecon-
struction rather inspires governing for diverse beliefs and
values. In line with these two approaches to understanding the
creation of meaning and change in organizations, we will in the
following put forward two further propositions. First, when it
comes to control mechanisms, four basic mechanisms have
been linked to creating shared views: I) systems that provide
for participation; II) clear and visible actions from management
that support the cultural values; III) consistent messages from
coworkers regarding how to behave and interpret key events;
and IV) comprehensive reward systems that focus on recogni-
tion and approval rather than (just) money. Based on this line
of thought, we propose that
2b) Cultural control mechanisms will be important for
influencing motivations to engage in foresight and thus
enforce the participation in, and value creation from
organization-wide foresight systems.
However, taking into account the insights from the
constructiondeconstruction view, and remembering that too
much consensus could influence analytical thinking negatively,
we also propose that
2c) A foresight system that corresponds to a broad set of
values reflecting many individual interests rather than
one main shared rationale for participation is important
for securing maximum motivation to participate in
foresight, while at the same time avoiding limitation of
diversity in thinking within the foresight activities.
A useful perspective to help understand the link between
propositions 2b and 2c is to take into account a more nuanced
view of organizational culture. The competing values frame-
work (Cameron and Quinn, 1999) acknowledges that multiple
values are present in most organizations, but distinguishes
between four main organizational culture types. Central in the
competing values analysis is the organizational glue, which
unites people within a culture. The clan culture organization is
held together by loyalty or tradition, while the adhocracy
culture is held together by commitment to experimentation
and innovation. For the market culture, the glue is an emphasis
on winning, while formal rules and policies hold the hierarchy
culture together (Cameron and Quinn, 1999). This framework
can be seen as a useful practical approach to balancing the
implications of propositions 2b and 2c. An important driver for
utilizing the cognitive value of foresight could still be to
implement some control mechanisms, but at the same time
making sure that the system set-up can function as glue for
the different culture types. Ensuring people unite and talk
across organizational cultures, even though they do not
necessarily value participation in the same way, could be
particularly important in the early stages of introducing the
system. This is because, at this point it would be more difficult
to deconstruct existing meanings and rationales in the
organization, so foresight efforts would have a larger need for
fit with the existing culture(s) in order for individuals to
grasp and buy into its purpose. However, in the longer run, the
foresight system could potentially also contribute to change
culture through influencing ways of thinking and constructing
new meanings. This is more likely to happen after a critical
mass of users have joined and seen the benefits. As reflected in
the propositions above, the challenge for managers would then
70 S. Boe-Lillegraven, S. Monterde / Technological Forecasting & Social Change 101 (2015) 6282
be to manage the deconstruction and construction of meanings
in relation to foresight, without negatively influencing the
cognitive diversity among the individual foresighters.
2.5. Summary of the propositions
Guided by our overall research question we have reviewed
relevant literature and suggested how revision of mental
models is helped by engagement in foresight (proposition 1a)
and how frequent and active engagement increases cognitive
payoffs (proposition 1b and 1c) compared to passive and less
frequent participation. Furthermore, we have proposed that
technology foresight might be particularly beneficial for
analytic thinkers (proposition 1d), and that foresight can
shorten the time needed to take an informed decision at a
critical point in time as well as increase decision quality
(proposition 1e). We have also proposed that there is a
potential cognitive bonus when foresight is at its best practice
(proposition 2a) and that cultural control mechanisms are
important for motivating for foresight thinking (proposition
2b). However, a foresight system that corresponds to a broader
set of values reflecting many individual interests rather than
one main shared rationale for participation is also important for
avoiding limitation of diversity in thinking within the foresight
activities (proposition 2c). After the introduction of our
methods (Section 3.1) and case (Section 3.2), we will, in the
next chapter, present our empirical findings (Section 3.3), and
discuss how they validate the propositions and our overall
research questions (Section 4).
3. Case
In the following we retain the cognitive lens and apply it to
studying the case of the Cisco Technology Radar. A case study
was considered useful in order to extract deep knowledge,
since it is an ideal methodology for a holistic, in-depth
investigation (Feagin et al., 1991). The single case approach
allowed for exploring the phenomenon in its context without
sacrificing the richness of the studied incident and its context
(Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007), meaning that we acquired
useful business-relevant insights deep enough to also inform
our specific theoretical propositions. While it is correct that
statistical generalization from a case is not possible, analytic
generalization can still be made when previously developed
theory is used as a template against which to compare the
empirical results of the case study (Yin, 1984). In the
terminology of Stake (1995), this can thus be seen as an
instrumental case study, meaning that the case is used to
understand more than what is obvious to the observer. The unit
of analysis is the case organization, with use of data also from
the community within the organization that has been, or is,
engaged in foresight. The setting and methods of the case study
will be described below, followed by an initial description of
the company and the relevant events and stakeholders. The
results of the study will then be presented and discussed based
on the key dimensions of our theoretical framework.
3.1. Setting and methods
Cisco Systems (Nasdaq CSCO) is a multi-national technology
giant founded in 1984. Evolving from a sole focus on routers and
switches, Cisco has greatly shaped the infrastructure underlying
the Internet and eventually transformed itself into an end-to-end
network provider. Our interest in the company is related to the
Cisco Technology Radar project. One of the authors has been
involved with this project throughout its existence, while the
other author has been familiar with it since autumn 2012, when
the case study began.
Even though this paper is specifically concerned with the
aspects of foresight related to cognition, we chose to include
broader spanning questions in the first part of our investigation
to secure a good basic understanding and avoid missing any
important perspectives. We capitalized on the outsider point of
view of one of the authors by conducting a general report of the
case, citing 35 sources, most of them open-access, as a first step.
These insights were then validated and complemented through
personal interviews with the second author, who should be
considered an internal expert, as well as studies of internal
documents. The insights provided by the expert author were
further validated through talks with key members of the
organization at different levels. We also greatly benefited from
one of the authors many experiences as an observer in radar
process meetings and as a facilitator of scouting activities.
We were, however, aware that even though the insider
perspective was an advantage in terms of having good access to
details and in-depth knowledge about the case, it could also
lead to bias if this knowledge was not challenged and old
truths were taken for granted. We therefore consistently
engaged in critical discussions, challenging one another's
assumptions. We also applied relevant frameworks, such as
the best practice dimensions of Rohrbeck and Gemnden
(2008) and the OCAI framework of Cameron and Quinn (1999)
in order to achieve a solid theoretical basis for discussing the
case. Each author scored the Cisco foresight system using the
frameworks, before having a joint discussion to reach the final
scores. Finally, we chose to gather additional data using
approaches where the data analysis was less dependent on
our interpretations.
Central to the more qualitative analysis, were 25 written
testimonials from different stakeholders. These were originally
collected as part of the preparation for an internal innovation
competition at Cisco, where the stakeholders were asked to
provide their opinion about the radar. To analyze the statements
we chose the method known as cognitive mapping, or more
accurately in our case; causal mapping, as it can enable a more
detailed examination of subjective beliefs and at the same time
offers a meaningful way to portray the data (Swan, 1997). In
order to locate the central beliefs regarding why the radar was
perceived to be valuable, statements were coded and
reorganized, and maps representing relations between smaller
statements were combined into a larger map, along with
recommendations from the literature (Huff, 1990). Specifically,
we looked for the underlying rationales of the endorsements,
often following key words such as because, and, or it is. The
main advantage of this method was that underlying beliefs and
rationales could be identified; tacit information such as this can
be harder to get hold of through more direct questions in
interviews and questionnaires, since it is not always in the
conscious mind of the respondent. Through the analysis of
statements that had been freely formulated by the informants,
we were able to map out data-rooted rationales less vulnerable
to our own phrasing and language.
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However, we later triangulated the causal mapping results
through informal talks with key stakeholders within Cisco, as
well as an anonymous online questionnaire. The choice of the
questionnaire was based on the rationale of complementing
the insights that one of the authors in particular gained through
deep involvement in the radar programme, with a measure-
ment providing harder and more specific data. The question-
naire was built to further check the relation between (degree
of) engagement in foresight, thinking styles and perceived
value outcomes, necessary to more accurately answer some of
the propositions. We used a standard Likert-scale to measure
the degree of agreement to pre-defined statements. The
statements were developed based on themes identified
through the document studies and the mapping of the 25
testimonials. For instance, we asked participants to indicate to
what degree they agreed with statements such as: The radar
helps save time, or the radar slows down the decision-
making process. The respondents were reminded that there
were no right or wrong answers, and that their honesty was
important. We also collected information on the respondents'
degree of involvement in the foresight project and measured
their decision-making style. The latter was achieved through
use of the General Decision-Making Style (GDMS) question-
naire of Scott and Bruce (1994), a validated measure also
previously used in foresight research (Chermack and Nimon,
2008). We built in questions to be able control for degree of
familiarity with the radar and to check for differences between
different roles (such as scout, reader, panelist) and positions
(such as director, manager, VP). In order to not bias the
respondents by making them reflect on their decision-making
style before answering the other questions, we chose to ask the
decision-making style questions towards the end of the
questionnaire. These questions were followed only by a
question re-inviting them to rate the value of the radar as a
decision-making tool after having become more aware of their
own decision-making habits, and an open comment-box
inviting any additional comments.
The questionnaire was distributed via a link sent through e-
mail, targeting some 200 key stakeholders active in the
technology radar. This yielded around 60 replies, among
which were 39 fully completed questionnaires mainly from
manager- and director level decision-makers. Although the
sample is small, the questionnaire was seen as valuable
particularly because the responses were anonymous. More-
over, it was an efficient way of getting in touch with
respondents that otherwise could have proved difficult to
reach, given the size of the company and the challenge of
coordinating with many people at different locations. For
selected measures the questionnaire data were also found to
be acceptable for simple statistical analysis. However, it is our
belief that the more robust insights from the case are the ones
that do not rely solely on the questionnaire, but rather are
based on a mix of our qualitative and quantitative data.
3.2. Background and description of the Cisco Technology Radar
The formal history of the Cisco Technology Radar started in
2011, when one of the authors secured the early funding for the
project after some intensive months of planning and prepara-
tion. Cisco, despite its roughly 66,000 employees in 2011, still
had a somewhat entrepreneurial culture. This meant that there
71
was no structured and consistent way of identifying, selecting,
assessing and disseminating company-wide technology intel-
ligence. The idea was to establish a network of technology
scouts to provide early identification of novel technologies and
trends, to enable informed strategic decision-making and to
help stimulate innovation. After assessment the key trends
would be visualized along a so-called technology radar, a
format greatly inspired by research publications regarding
similar projects (Rohrbeck, 2010b; Rohrbeck et al., 2006). The
radar reports would serve as input for strategic decision-
making as well as to stimulate innovation in Cisco through
dissemination of knowledge and best practices. The recruit-
ment of scouts, assessment panelists and other key stake-
holders would span across many departments, functions and
geographies.
During its first year the radar was successfully expanded
from its first test version involving only employees working in
corporate development, to become a company-wide technol-
ogy foresight system. For example, the 9th volume of the radar
published in June 2012 was based on 233 novel technologies
submitted by 64 technology scouts from multiple organizations
across North and South America, Europe, Japan and Australia.
The technologies had been selected and assessed by technical
and business leaders including Fellows, Distinguished Engi-
neers, Directors and VPs. The Cisco Technology Radar website
served more than 250 unique visitors, and had more than 1,900
page views per month. Moreover, printed copies of the
Technology Radar were distributed quarterly to key decision-
makers, including Cisco Fellows, the Operating Committee and
selected executives.
The Cisco radar can be described as both an outcome and a
process. Regarding its outcome, selected technologies are
summarized in a figure resembling that of a radar screen. The
plotted technologies are displayed horizontally along the radar
according to their relation to different technology fields or
organizational units. They are also organized vertically based
on their maturity level, and plotted using symbols indicating
their relevance for the company (see a visual example of the
radar in Fig. 3). The idea of the condensed format is to provide
easy access to a quick summary of which technologies Cisco
should be keeping a particular eye on, with the possibility of
reading into the details in supplementing documents. The
visual radar, is in other words the main element and is regularly
disseminated to key decision-makers and experts within the
company. However, much of its value is also believed to be
created during the process leading up to the visual plot, as well
as what happens when the technology plot is once again
taken up for discussion and re-prioritized in the process leading
up to the next quarterly radar report.
Effort has therefore been put into optimizing the radar
process, which in addition to the dissemination phase consists of
technology identification, selection and assessment (see Fig. 3 for
overview). In the first phase, the focus is on bringing in
information. In principle, everyone in Cisco can assist with this
by becoming a technology scout a person engaged in
identifying new and relevant technologies for Cisco. An interac-
tive website has been set up where employees can both view and
contribute to the radar by submitting scouting reports. However,
in line with recommendations from other radar projects, a
community of more specialized and regularly engaged scouts
secures a satisfactory level of expertise and continuity in the
72 S. Boe-Lillegraven, S. Monterde / Technological Forecasting & Social Change 101 (2015) 6282
Fig. 3. Overview of technology radar process graphs and description: CISCO 2013.
scouting process. These scouts are recruited through numerous
channels, for instance through the HR department or by
consulting internal information brokers people who possess
detailed information on who would fulfill the scouting criteria of
being both highly knowledgeable within a field and having a
vivid social network. Efforts are also increasingly made to recruit
Identification: An internaonal network of technology
scouts submits novel technologies. All Cisco employees
can become technology scouts. Inputs are also
increasingly being gathered through joint eorts with
academia, venture capitalists, customers and partners.
Selection: The radar team and a panel of senior technical
experts review all technologies on a quarterly basis. The
selecon criteria are built upon the concepts of
Technology, Impact and Novelty.
Assessment: The selected technologies undergo a deeper
analysis led by the scout. A one-page technology prole is
wrien for an execuve audience, pung the technology
in a business context and liming the content to unbiased
facts and ndings. Senior technical and business leaders
assess the relevance of each selected technology for the
company. The assessment criteria are based on two axes:
market opportunity and implementaon risk.
Dissemination: The Cisco Technology Radar is published
every quarter. The radar screen displays all technologies
along with their maturity, their posion in the IT/Telecom
value chain, and their relevance as rated by the
assessment panel. The Technology Radar is distributed
throughout Cisco using a website, a PDF version and a
newsleer.
Graphs and descriptions: Cisco 2013
external scouts from academia and other collaboration partners.
While the scouts work mainly individually preparing initial
reports about emerging technologies, there is much more
interaction in the next phases of selection and assessment.
Every quarter, a panel of editors agrees on a maximum of 20
technologies to be presented to a panel of engineer experts, often
 S. Boe-Lillegraven, S. Monterde / Technological Forecasting & Social Change 101 (2015) 6282
by the scouts themselves. The experts discuss the relevance of
the technologies according to criteria such as novelty, changes in
complementary technologies and degree of awareness about the
technology and its application. After the panel has agreed on
which technologies they see as the most relevant, scouts can be
asked to prepare more detailed reports. Finally, the selected
technologies go through a reality check where they are rated
by an assessment committee, who discuss their market impact
and realization potential. The members of this committee are
typically technical leaders and directors, ensuring that key
stakeholders within Cisco take part in the radar process and
feel ownership with regard to the results. Finally, based on the
ratings of the assessment committee, the technologies go into
the visual radar screen, which is disseminated to the wider
organization.
It is natural to question about the difference between the
radar process and other common foresight methods, such as
scenario planning and technology forecasting. Similar to
scenario planning, there can be said to be an emphasis on
generating images about the future, particularly in that scouts
are asked to think about which technologies will be relevant for
Cisco from a long-term perspective. However, the explicit focus
can be said to be more on identifying and assessing all relevant
technologies to look out for, rather than using them to
construct more or less likely scenarios describing what can or
will actually happen. The most visual outcome of the radar
process is the radar illustration, which has the potential for
diving deeper into quite technical descriptions of the different
technologies, depending on the interest of the reader. In this
way, the idea of the radar is perhaps more about having a
constant working tool, to synchronize efforts across functions
and departments, and to secure alignment with the company's
strategy through the processes of expert selection and
assessment. Similar to other technology forecasting methods,
however, there is also an emphasis on rational and explicit
methodology, with the aim of improving decision-making. For
instance, it was learned through trial and error how critical it
was to separate scouting (information input) from the
discussion of the technologies (information prioritizing/rat-
ing). Anonymous voting is practised to minimize for instance,
social biases in the decision-making when the technologies are
selected and assessed. The criteria that the selection is based on
are also designed to minimize what could otherwise be quite
emotional influences on the rating, due to the fact that deeply
engaged experts from different business areas within Cisco are
put in a setting where they need to converge.
Another foresight method that can be said to have some
similarities with the radar process is horizon scanning, which is
being increasingly used to support governments and private
organizations in their policy- and decision-making (Palomino
et al., 2012), perhaps particularly in the medical and health
industry (Miles and Saritas, 2012; Brown et al., 2005). Horizon
scanning, sometimes described as a subset of environmental
scanning, according to most definitions involves a systematic
approach to bringing and assessing information about future
trends. The technology radar can certainly be included in such a
broad definition, however compared to typical horizon scan-
ning methodologies, the information gathering phase in the
radar must be said to be less based on systematic research and
literature reviews. Also, the assessment information gathered
could be said to be more dependent on people interacting and
73
discussing, rather than a more document processing based
assessment. Finally, as has also been called for with regard to
horizon scanning (Miles and Saritas, 2012), there is perhaps
more emphasis on the format for dissemination of the scanning
results in the radar process. Still, for those very familiar with
the horizon scanning approaches, it might make sense to
describe the radar as a deep and technology focused form of
network based long-term horizon scanning, where assessment
of technologies by key decision-makers is built into the process
before the final report and results are more widely
disseminated.
A key element of the Cisco Technology Radar initiative has
also been the structured approach to implementation and roll-
out. Collaboration with the HR-department was set up at an
early stage to improve the motivation and recruitment of
scouts. Scouting was for instance incorporated in the courses
offered for internal training, and completion of scouting made
the participant eligible for points that could be used to buy
other rewards. E-mail signature badges for bronze, silver and
gold scouts were also developed as part of a more intrinsic
reward system. The bar for offering tailored versions of the
radar for different departments was, at the same time, held low,
in order to maximize use and buy-in. The service department,
who liked the approach but felt they needed a version adjusted
to their focus on products and services rather than technolo-
gies, were among the first to make use of a custom-made
version. To secure early funding and further buy-in from key
decision-makers, a stakeholder management framework was
actively used by the radar implementation group.
Despite having gained substantial momentum during the
first couple of years, the So what?"-question kept re-appearing
from time to time, asking for ultimate evidence of a scouted
technology leading to a major business opportunity for Cisco.
Still, engaged participants both inside Cisco and increased
interest from various external partners, kept assuring the core
radar team that they were creating value. In late 2013, Cisco
sent out a media alert saying that they would host a public
technology radar webcast, broadcasting an expert panel
discussion on which technology trends would define the next
year and beyond. In February 2014, press reports about the
details of Cisco's first public Technology Radar Study began to
emerge. As for the original, internal radar project, it was as per
early 2014 still under continuous development.
3.3. Results
In the theoretical part of this paper we focused on how
the literature could inform our main research question about
how and why engagement in foresight can impact ways of
thinking and processing information. The question guided
our selection and discussion of literature, from which we
generated 8 propositions. However, in order to identify
potential value contributions related to cognition, we
started by broadly mapping out the perceived values of the
Cisco Technology Radar. In the following we will first
present the general findings and then move on to discuss
specific cognitive aspects. In the discussion (Section 4) the
findings will be linked more directly to the overall research
question we started out with, followed by a discussion of
implications, limitations and conclusion.
74 S. Boe-Lillegraven, S. Monterde / Technological Forecasting & Social Change 101 (2015) 6282

Fig. 4. Rationales for endorsing the technology radar. Grouping of different reasons given for endorsing the technology radar. Collected from 25 written testimonials.
Rationales in bold frames represent the 5 main groups. Supplementary explanations (if any) are shown in the connected frames. Illustration made using the knowledge
modeling program CmapTools.

3.3.1. Findings related to the value contribution of the radar
Through our studies of corporate documents we clarified
that the main goals of the radar are described in the following
way by Cisco: I) Early identification of novel technologies and
trends, II) enabling of informed strategic decision-making and
III) stimulation of innovation. Cisco's emphasis on these roles of
foresight can be explained through looking at the company's
history as well as recent developments. Historically, Cisco has
been renowned for its acquisition strategy. Taking over smaller,
innovative firms has been the preferred way of getting access to
expertise and technology, making expensive and perhaps
unproductive internal research less called for. Cisco iPrize, the
company's global innovation contest, and its iZone internal
employee ideation site are however examples of Cisco's
commitment to fostering open and crowd-sourced innovation
in the later years. Thus, the Technology Radar initiative in Cisco
can be seen as part of this movement towards internally
fostered innovation as well as innovation in collaboration with
key partners and customers:
Novel technologies are at the core of product and service
innovation. They provide new routes to differentiation, cost
reduction, and lead to new business opportunities. By
disseminating information about novel technologies devel-
oped both inside and outside of Cisco, and by accelerating
external engagements with our ecosystem through the
sharing of best practices and the development of joint
technology visions, the Cisco Technology Radar paves the
way for open innovation. reads a recent introduction
document presenting the radar project.
Acquisitions are however still an important part of the
growth strategy in Cisco. Because the radar locates, assesses and
filters information about threats or opportunities impacting
Cisco's future business, it is also seen as valuable for assisting
decision-making about acquisitions. Additionally, values related
to the efficiency of the radar are highlighted in corporate
documents and presentations. Implicitly, decision-makers have
limited time for details, but the radar consolidates information
 S. Boe-Lillegraven, S. Monterde / Technological Forecasting & Social Change 101 (2015) 6282
and provides them with the intelligence needed to stay on top of
the technology landscape.
Individual stakeholders within Cisco, however, value slight-
ly different aspects and use different wording than in the more
formal corporate descriptions of the radar. The main rationales
for key stakeholders' endorsements are summarized in Fig. 4
and can be grouped in five main themes: Stakeholders appraise
the radar because they genuinely like the process, they believe
it is good for business, it brings new perspectives, helps them
carry out their tasks and helps communication.
As visible from the figure, some highlighted features
particularly relate to their own personal benefit, for instance
that they are given contact time with the top management level
through participation in the radar process. Others relate it more
directly to corporate goals, or to outcomes such as better
communication and collaboration. Some also say it helps them
carry out foresight related tasks, perhaps indicating that some
of the radar activities are among their formal responsibilities.
Many, however, simply highlight that they really like the radar
process, be it because of the structured way of working,
because they are impressed with the team behind it, or that the
radar as a tool simply is the best.
In the anonymous survey we had the opportunity to ask
respondents to further rate the values. Here, we saw that
stakeholders familiar with the radar, rated values related to
collaboration and communication higher than some of the
values initially expressed at the organizational level. The radar
helps understand what other peers are doing, the radar helps
people communicate and the radar helps people connect and
socialize were agreed more upon than corporate language
statements such as the radar is a key input into strategic
activities and the radar is a key pillar of Cisco's Innovation
Engine. Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics from the
survey.
In summary, the value contribution of the technology radar
in Cisco seems to vary more than corporate documents
describing its' purpose would initially indicate. Even though
individuals agree that the radar is valuable, the underlying
rationales for why they believe so differ between 5 main
hidden values some overlapping with and some compli-
mentary to the values as communicated on the corporate level.
3.3.2. Findings related to the radars inuence on individual
cognition
3.3.2.1. Proposition 1a. The radar as an outcome is reported to be
a tool for decision-makers. Moreover, the radar process itself
seems to foster analytical thinking, in line with our expecta-
tions (proposition 1a). For instance, technologies that have
been on the radar for more than one year are systematically
reviewed to decrease the threat of aged information or
outdated mental models. Moreover, in the selection and
assessment process participants are forced to analytically
process and reconsider their current understandings through
considering mandatory questions and decision criteria. During
the selection of technologies, engineers are helped to realize
how the scouted technology has relevance to Cisco's strategy,
as one participant put it when endorsing the radar. In the
selection panel the panelists first discuss and then anony-
mously vote on which technologies to select, meaning that
points of views are converted and stakeholders upgrade their
75
understanding of relevant technologies during these meetings.
In the assessment panel there is, however, more focus on
extraction of mental models of the panelists, rather than
revision. This is because they rate the technologies based on
their current understandings, and there is less debate. Still,
through being exposed to the technologies that have already
gone through the selection phase, assessment panelists' views
on the technology landscape are revised.
As for the scouts, they also seem to experience revision of
current knowledge after having submitted their initial reports.
One engineer stated that the radar helped him connect with
leaders and business units he would not otherwise interface
with. Through this, I learn their business requirements and
their technical objections, and adjust the proposal to accom-
modate those requirements and objections or engage with
the business unit leader to explain how we can leapfrog
competition with the new technology he wrote as part of his
endorsement of the radar. One statement from a key Cisco
customer also shows that participation in the radar yielded
some "Aha" experiences or update of current mental models:
The ideas that we discussed have some significant legs to take
us some places we would have not previously thought of but
seem obvious now, he wrote.
In the questionnaire (see Table 1 for details) we further
tested the perceived relevance of the radar for influencing
analytical thinking and changing mindsets. Most of the
respondents familiar with the radar (N = 32) agreed
somewhat or strongly that the radar helps provide an overview
of the most important technologies (81%), that it helps assess
technologies (78%) and that it allows for faster (72%) and better
(75%) information processing. The statement that the radar
changes mindsets received more ambivalent answers, however
with most answers still on the agree-side (47% somewhat or
strongly agree, 38% uncertain, 15% somewhat or strongly
disagree). Most respondents (75%) agreed or strongly agreed
that the Radar improves my current understanding, indicat-
ing revision of mental models through engagement in the
foresight process.
3.3.2.2. Proposition 1b. We expected to find that people who
engaged more regularly in radar activities would report greater
benefits (proposition 1b). From the questionnaire data we saw
a consistent tendency that respondents who reported high
familiarity and frequent exposure to the radar assessed it more
positively. For example, all respondents exposed to the radar
on a monthly or weekly basis (N = 16) agreed or somewhat
agreed that the radar allows for better information processing,
while people who were quarterly or even more rarely exposed
(N = 23) disagreed or were uncertain to a larger extent. The
same tendency was observed for all questions regarding the
cognitive payoff from the radar, with the largest differences
regarding the statements the radar helps save time, the
radar facilitates decision-making and the radar changes
mindsets. For the last one we found a strong positive
relationship with level of exposure through statistical testing
(Pearson's r of 0.42, p = b0.01). Moderate positive relation-
ships between self-reported familiarity and the total assess-
ment scores of the radar and between the self-reported
exposure to the radar and the total assessment scores
(Pearson's r of 0.3 for both) were also found. The p-values
were however slightly above the acceptable level (p = 0.06)
76 S. Boe-Lillegraven, S. Monterde / Technological Forecasting & Social Change 101 (2015) 6282

Table 1
Answers from key radar community members. Answers from anonymous online questionnaire developed to further check the relation between engagement in
foresight, thinking styles and perceived value outcomes. Decision-making styles were measured based on the measure of Scott and Bruce (1994).

Itema Nb Mean Std Dev Min Max

Exposure to radar 39 2.36 0.93 1 4

Familiarity with radar 39 3.74 1.43 1 5
The radar helps provide an overview of the most important techn. 32 4.09 0.86 2 5
The radar helps assess technologies 32 4.06 1.01 2 5
The radar allows for faster information processing 32 3.97 0.97 2 5
The radar allows for better information processing 32 3.91 0.89 2 5
The radar helps understand what other peers are doing 32 3.88 0.83 2 5
The radar helps people communicate 32 3.56 0.84 2 5
The radar helps save time 32 3.56 0.80 2 5
The radar helps people connect and socialize 32 3.41 0.76 2 5
The radar is a key input into strategic activities 32 3.41 1.13 1 5
The radar facilitates decision-making 32 3.41 0.98 2 5
The radar helps inuence decision-makers 32 3.38 0.87 1 5
The radar changes mindsets 32 3.34 1.00 1 5
The radar increases the quality of work 32 3.22 0.83 1 5
The radar helps make more objective and less biased decisions 32 3.22 0.87 2 5
The radar helps people do what they should have done anyway 32 3.19 0.69 2 5
The radar helps save money 32 3.19 0.64 2 5
The radar helps work faster 32 3.13 0.79 1 5
The radar is a key pillar of Cisco's Innovation Engine 32 3.09 1.12 1 5
The radar doesn't impact the quality of discussions 32 3.03 1.00 1 5
The radar helps people carry out their daily tasks 32 2.78 0.87 1 5
The radar changes the organizational culture 32 2.69 0.90 1 5
The radar is irrelevant for business 32 2.47 1.22 1 5
The radar slows down the decision-making process 32 2.25 0.84 1 4
Sum radar assessment 32 63.91 13.53 30 91
The radar improves my current understanding 32 4.0625 1.0453 2 5
The radar helps me process information faster 32 3.6875 1.0298 1 5
The radar helps me be more objective and less biased 32 3.5625 1.1341 1 5
The radar helps me reduce riskiness of decisions 32 3.4063 0.9456 1 5
The radar helps me convince others of decisions 32 3.375 0.907 1 5
Sum decision assessment 32 18.094 4.4603 8 24
Rational decision-making style 39 4.3654 0.4793 3.5 5
Intuitive decision-making style 39 3.559 0.5215 2.4 5
Dependent decision-making style 39 3.5692 0.6736 1.8 5
Avoidant decision-making style 39 1.841 0.9075 1 5
Spontaneous decision-making style 39 2.3179 0.8344 1 5
a
A Likert scale ranging (strongly disagree, somewhat disagree, uncertain, somewhat agree, strongly agree) was used for all items, except for exposure (daily,
weekly, monthly, quarterly, other) and familiarity (very unfamiliar, somewhat unfamiliar, somewhat familiar, familiar, very familiar). Answers were coded by assigning
scores 15. For the assessment questions, means above 3 represent more agreement than disagreement.
b
Respondents that answered they were somewhat unfamiliar and very unfamiliar with the radar were excluded from some comparisons, as they were found to lack
the basic knowledge required to make a qualied assessment.

and the sample size (N = 39) indicate that these results should
be interpreted with great care.
3.3.2.3. Proposition 1c. We also expected that individuals who
were more actively and deeply engaged in radar activities
would report higher cognitively related benefits (proposition
1c). Using the questionnaire data, we checked this by
comparing the total assessment scores of readers, occasional
scouts, regular scouts, selection panelists and assessment
panelists. If one respondent reported belonging to more than
one category, the category indicating most frequent involve-
ment was selected. The categories of assessment panelist and
selection panelist were grouped together, as many double-
categorized these roles. Judging from the mean total assess-
ment scores of the different groups familiar with the radar,
selection and assessment panelists rated the payoff from the
radar much higher (69.5) than readers (61.5), occasional scouts
(61.33) and regular scouts (60.66). When accepting double-
categorization, Spearman's correlation tests returned a signif-
icant moderate positive relationship (0.38, p = 0.03) between
assessment score and being a selection panelist, indicating that
this finding was likely not by happenstance. The other
categories had non-significant very weak relationships, mean-
ing that these results could easily be due to happenstance.
The finding that selection panelists perceive the value of the
radar as higher, fits with observations that selection panelists
negotiate mental models and convert more than other
groups. It is likely that they have a higher cognitive payoff
than scouts who to a larger degree feed in expert knowledge
and assessors that feed out their ratings of the technologies.
3.3.2.4. Proposition 1d. Based on the theory, we also expected
that analytic thinkers would see larger cognitive benefits from
the radar than individuals with lower preferences for analytical
thinking (proposition 1d). From talks with key stakeholders
and analysis of the rationales for endorsing the radar, we have
already observed that a key perceived value of the radar was its
structured process. Unfortunately, we do not have information
about the relation of these value assessments to individual
preferences of ways of thinking. Based on the questionnaire
data we could however examine the relationship between
scores given to the radar's value for decision-making and the
 S. Boe-Lillegraven, S. Monterde / Technological Forecasting & Social Change 101 (2015) 6282
scores returned particularly for the rational decision-making
style from the GDMS questionnaire (refer to Table 1 for
descriptive statistics). First of all, we found that the rational
decision-making style (preference for logical evaluation of
alternatives, thorough search) was the dominant one for near
all respondents. This made it less relevant to group the
respondents into sub-groups based on their dominant
decision-making style. Instead we checked if a higher score
on rational style (mean 4.4) had a relation to giving a high
assessment score of the radar. We found positive relationships
between high rational decision-making scores and agreement
that the radar helps make more objective and less biased
decisions. In an attempt to find counter-evidence we also
checked the relationship between high scores on intuition and
the agreement that the radar decreases bias, but this was
negative. The same was the case for the assessment of the
radar's ability to reduce the riskiness of decisions; high scores
on rational decision-making style were positively related to
high scores when assessing this statement, while high scores
on intuitive decision-making were not or weakly negatively
related. It should be stressed that these results were not
statistically significant and more data would be needed to draw
conclusions solely based on these findings. There are however
indications that the radar foresight system is simply more
natural for rational decision-makers. Individuals that scored
high on rational decision-making style to a larger degree saw
the radar process as a natural part of daily work, evident by a
strong positive relationship with the statements the radar
helps people do what they should have done anyway and the
radar helps people carry out their daily tasks. Here, statistical
testing indicated that the results represent a clear tendency and
are likely not due to happenstance (Spearman's rho correla-
tions of 0.43 and 0.39, and p-values of 0.013 and 0.026,
respectively).
3.3.2.5. Proposition 1e. Our final expectation related to individ-
ual cognitive payoffs from foresight, was to find evidence that
the radar had shortened the time needed to take an informed
decision at a critical point in time, and had increased the quality
of decisions in Cisco (related to proposition 1e). While the
value for decision-making was spelled out in several corporate
documents describing the purpose of the radar, relatively few
stakeholders highlighted the value for decision-making directly
when they freely assessed it as evident from Fig. 4. Still, many
did so indirectly by indicating that the radar helped them in
their daily tasks (which involved decision-making) and that
the radar opened up new perspectives. The brief and consistent
format was highlighted in the endorsements, as well as the
rigorous process for selecting and assessing trends. As one
internal user reported: This high octane result is a tremen-
dous time saver and mind opener for executives who must stay
on top of the technology landscape with an eye to (the) impact
on their business. Without the Technology Radar, the alterna-
tives of either being oblivious to the less immediate technology
scene or wading through dozens of industry publications with
scattered or irrelevant information content, are either foolish or
prohibitively time-consuming, respectively.
Through the open for comments-box in the questionnaire
one respondent requested that the radar should be even more
of an integral part of decision-making. In my organization
there is a huge desire to increase the use of technology
77
intelligence and the radar in strategic decision-making, he
wrote. However, another wrote that very few executives
mention Technology Radar as having any influence on their
decision-making process and asked for proof of the radar's
effect on business decisions, if such existed. Still, we saw that
respondents familiar with the radar (N = 32) rather agreed
than disagreed with statements that the radar facilitates
decision-making, that it helps influence decision-makers and
that it helps make more objective and less biased decisions (see
Table 1 for descriptive statistics). The same was the case for
statements that the radar leads to better and faster information
processing and that it helps save time.
Through the more qualitative data collection we also became
aware of one actual event where the decision-making time
was likely reduced due to the foresight system. The example in
mind is the decision to acquire the company Intucell, a
provider of advanced self-optimizing network (SON) software,
in early 2013. This technology had been spotted, selected,
assessed and put into the radar ahead of the acquisition. It had
therefore already been presented to and processed by several
key decision-makers in due time before the possibility to
acquire Intucell arose. However, acquiring a company is about
much more than just assessing its technology, and it is not
possible to know whether Intucell would have been acquired
anyway if the technology had not been rst put on the radar.
Still, it would likely have been difcult to shortcut the
technology assessment necessary for the acquisition without
the systematic foresight process. Since time to make the
decision to acquire Intucell was limited, a lower quality
decision could have been the outcome if no foresight had
taken place, since less information about the technology would
have been processed.
3.3.3. Findings related to collective aspects inuencing cognitive
value
3.3.3.1. Proposition 2a. In order to understand how collective
aspects influence the value creation from the radar in Cisco, we
first needed a good understanding of the corporate environ-
ment and how advanced the Cisco radar initiative was
compared to foresight best practices. Based on the framework
of Rohrbeck and Gemnden (2008) we judged the radar as
close to best practice or as best practice in most respects, with
some notable weaknesses (for instance limited scope with
regard to information usage, limited external networks).
Especially, the deliberate openness for anyone to participate
in scouting still gave reason to expect results indicating a so-
called collective bonus from foresight participation (proposi-
tion 2a).
One of the stakeholders assessing the radar indeed stated
that the radar was especially effective as a productivity tool for
Cisco's CTOs as it gives them a broader view of the technology
landscape () without having to invest additional resources to
pursue individual topics indicating an efficiency gain for
CTOs when they with low cognitive effort take over
information that has been more systematically processed by
other individuals. We also already observed that participants in
the selection panel negotiated hypothetical futures through
discussing the technologies before voting anonymously on
their importance for Cisco. In other words, they profited from
78 S. Boe-Lillegraven, S. Monterde / Technological Forecasting & Social Change 101 (2015) 6282
other individuals who engaged in similar hypothetical
thinking.
Several others stress in their endorsements that the radar is
a tremendous time saver, saves time thanks to a well-
structured process and that it works in the direction of
improved productivity at operational and executive level.
Although these statements were given in a situation where
there was a bias towards positive assessments, the anonymous
answers in the questionnaire confirm the trend of valuing the
radar for its time-saving abilities, potentially indicating a
cognitive bonus (see Table 1 for overview of answers).
3.3.3.2. Proposition 2b. We also expected to find that the
organizational context influenced the motivation for, and
therefore also the degree, of foresight thinking. Through our
more qualitative data collection we looked into which control
mechanisms had been at play when setting up and managing
the radar (related to proposition 2b). Evident from internal
project reports, the radar initiative in Cisco was deliberately not
kept to a small corporate elite, but was from early on made
open for anyone through the scouting website and through
adjusting the process to fit wishes from different departments.
The mainly intrinsic reward system put together in cooperation
with the HR department can also be seen as a mechanism for
controlling participation, along with substantial efforts to
communicate the value of the radar internally as well as
externally. However, through our investigations we noted that
collaboration opportunities and visibility to other departments
were mentioned much more frequently than monetary
rewards or recognition (through, for instance badges), as
reasons for participating in the radar process. The high
agreement in the questionnaire that the radar helps under-
stand what other peers are doing, and that it helps communi-
cation (see Table 1 for details), supports an interpretation that
social rewards may have been most important in the case of
the radar. However, at the beginning of the implementation, e-
mail badges and recognition from the boss might still have
been important for recruiting scouts, since the social benefits of
the radar were yet to be proved.
However, in one of the early meetings to secure funding for
the radar, one piece of feedback from a senior engineer was
along the lines of Is this not what we are already meant to be
doing?. One way of interpreting this statement is that many of
the mechanisms for stimulating peoples' motivation for
participating in the radar were already in place at the point of
implementation. The extra incentives and communication
efforts put into place when rolling out the radar might have
strengthened the intensity of agreement that foresight thinking
was important, but the organizational context could already
have been foresight friendly.
3.3.3.3. Proposition 2c. As reflected in the findings about the
different rationales for endorsing the radar, individuals in Cisco
do not necessarily see exactly the same value in the radar tool
and process. In line with proposition 2c, we, in fact, expected to
find that the radars' ability to correspond to a broad rather than
narrow set of interests would be crucial for the quality of the
radar outcomes. Indeed, the 25 testimonials we analyzed show
that people highlight quite different advantages of the radar
although they agree that it is overall valuable (see Fig. 4 for
details), indicating different tacit value systems. We applied the
competing values framework (Cameron and Quinn, 1999) to
further bring light to the key motivational drivers in Cisco, from
a collective point of view. The results indicate that we can
hardly talk about one unified foresight mindset or foresight
culture within Cisco, as a traditional approach to managing
organizational culture would perhaps prescribe. True, the
culture in Cisco has been described as entrepreneurial, but
after closer assessment we considered there to be a blend of
different cultures, depending on the business unit. For instance,
the organization can be said to be held together by its
commitment to innovation, which might be strongly related
to foresight thinking. However, more operationally related
drivers such as achievement and goal accomplishment are also
present. Success can be defined by winning in the marketplace,
but also by efficiency and increasingly by having the most
unique products, in accordance with strategic goals.
This value assessment by consulting individuals as well as
performing the organizational level analysis helps clarify that
the Cisco Technology Radar indeed seems to correspond to a
broad rather than a narrow set of motivations. However, it is
more difficult to assess how this ability directly influences the
quality of foresight thinking. An argument stating that the
radar's ability to correspond with different interests will keep
people's mindsets more independent (and thus increase the
quality of the process through preventing group thinking) may
make intuitive sense, but cannot be directly supported or
rejected based on our data.
4. Discussion
Table 2 summarizes our propositions and the degree of
support found in our data. The most convincing results are
related to proposition 1a, 1b, 1c and 2b, while we consider the
total support for the remaining propositions to be weak or at
best medium. Overall, we still find all the propositions helpful
as input for further answering our guiding research question
about how and why engagement in foresight can impact ways
of thinking and processing information.
The case provided evidence that engagement in the
technology radar seemed to stimulate analytical thinking and
that it helped the revision of mental models (proposition 1a).
The expected trend that regular engagement in the radar
process (proposition 1b) as well as active rather than passive
participation (proposition 1c) increased the payoff was also
supported by the questionnaire data. However, the findings are
based on a small sample and with only partial statistical
significance of the results. As for 1c, however, through the case
study we were able to further specify the meaning of active in
the case of the Cisco Technology Radar; it was in fact the group
that engaged in most discussion and negotiation of views that
tended to rate the radar value highest. This can be taken as
further indication that for foresight to be able to change ones
way of thinking, significant effort in terms of not only acquiring
information, but also processing and discussing it, is a key
factor. However, an alternative interpretation of the question-
naire data backing up this conclusion could be that the
individuals most deeply engaged in the discussions (selection
panelists) feel more ownership of the radar process and thus
are biased to rate the payoffs higher. Still, the relation between
deeper engagement in the radar process and the perceived
value of it remains.
Table 2
Overview and evaluation of results.
Proposition Types of data, evidence/counterevidence Degree of
(e/c) support
(weak,
medium,
strong)
1a) The revision of current mental models is helped by engagement in Observations and interviews (e), radar Medium to
foresight assessments (e), answers from strong
questionnaire (e)
1b) Regular engagement in foresight increases the individual cognitive Answers from questionnaire (e) Medium to
payoff from foresight, compared to only occasional engagement strong
1c) Participative (active) engagement in foresight increases the individual Answers from questionnaire (e), Strong
cognitive payoff compared to engagement only as a reader of end results observations and interviews (e)
(passive)
1d) Individuals with a high preference for analytic thinking are more likely Radar assessments, answers from Weak to
to see larger cognitive benets from technology foresight than individuals questionnaire (e) medium
with a lower preference.
1e) Preparation through foresight activities before a critical decision- Document studies (e), observations and Weak to
making-point will I) shorten the time needed to take an informed decision interviews (e), questionnaire (e/c) medium
at a critical decision-making point and II) increase the quality of a decision
taken under time pressure compared to a situation with no preparation
through foresight.
2a) When foresight is at its best practice, individuals (and the rm) receive a Case analysis through best practice Weak to
collective cognitive bonus from participation. framework, radar assessments (e), medium
observations and interviews (e),
questionnaire (e)
2b) Cultural control mechanisms will be important for inuencing Observations and interviews (e), Medium
motivations to engage in foresight and thus enforce the participation in, document studies (e)
and value creation from organization-wide foresight systems.
2c) A foresight system that corresponds to a broad set of values reecting Case analysis through OCAI framework Weak
many individual interests rather than one main shared rationale for par- (e), radar assessments (e), document
ticipation is important for securing maximum motivation to participate in studies (e)
foresight, while at the same time avoiding limitation of diversity in think-
ing within the foresight activities.
Robustness
S. Boe-Lillegraven, S. Monterde / Technological Forecasting & Social Change 101 (2015) 6282
Evidence can be considered mostly anecdotal and/or based on retrospective
judgments. More experimental design needed to rmly establish causality.
Larger sample is recommended for future research.
Questionnaire sample is very small, but more qualitative data indicate the same
trend. A larger-sample study particularly focused on this question could be
interesting in the future.
The total ndings are more supportive than counter-evidential, but the re-
sults based on the questionnaire were not statistically signicant. However,
statistically signicant results indicated that the radar might be more natural
for rational decision-makers.
Data support that several decision-makers perceive the radar as helpful for
making better and faster decisions. Mainly anecdotal evidence.
Evidence from qualitative data is stronger than questionnaire evidence.
Robustness is vulnerable to the interpretations of the researchers. Future
research could test the relation in a more experimental design.
Findings are ultimately based on the perceptions of individuals and
interpretations of the researchers. There is indication that many mechanisms
for motivating for foresight were already in place before the implementation
of the radar, and that additional motivation efforts mainly strengthened the
intensity of agreement.
Results indicate that we can hardly talk about one unied foresight mindset
within Cisco, and that individuals indeed seem to have different tacit value
systems related to participation. The relation between appealing to a broad
set of values and the quality of foresight thinking cannot be further specied
by the data.
79
80 S. Boe-Lillegraven, S. Monterde / Technological Forecasting & Social Change 101 (2015) 6282
It is also worth reflecting on the result which shows that the
radar process seems to feel more natural for rational decision-
makers. This indicates that the radar foresight process could
have a better fit with people who already have an analytically
dominated thinking style, perhaps in contrast to foresight
approaches more concerned with creating and presenting
scenarios. However, we cannot know to what extent the
match between thinking style and design of the radar process
affected the value creation from it, since we could not establish
statistically significant relations between perceived payoff and
thinking style (proposition 1d). It is also hard to assess to what
extent participation in the radar could have switched peoples
ways of making decisions, even though our case analysis
indicates that most of the process is designed to probe
analytical thinking and more systemized decision-making.
The questionnaire data supports the expectation that the
radar process allows for faster and better information process-
ing (related to proposition 1e). It was, however, only on the
general level that we could establish evidence that indicated a
specific event where the radar enabled a faster and more
informed decision. Still, this finding adds to the literature about
the different roles of foresight, suggesting that the influence on
thinking and decision-making might be considered a measur-
able result in itself.
Our qualitative analysis indicated some kind of collective
payoff related to the saving of processing time and capacity
(proposition 2a). The presence of such a cognitive bonus
seems contingent on a critical mass of individuals participating
as well as a certain level of quality in the process (in our
analysis assessed through the best practice framework). As
suggested also by previous research, control mechanisms do
seem to have had a role in motivating for participation in the
foresight process (proposition 2b). While the culture in Cisco
seems to have been radar friendly already upon introduction,
particularly intrinsic rewards put into place with help from the
HR department could have helped intensify the agreement
regarding the importance of the radar. Still, evident from the
efforts to validate proposition 2c, the radar indeed seems to
appeal to a broad set of values, indicating rather a lower
coincidence of meaning given to participation in the radar.
Even though a direct relation to the quality of the process was
hard to establish in our empirical analysis, the way Cisco seems
to have managed very diverse motivations and sub corporate
cultures is notable. The technology radar seems to function as
some kind of organizational glue in itself, uniting people from
different departments and with different tacit value systems.
Even more than the literature gave reason to expect, a success
criteria and important role of the radar seems to be the way it
makes people think and talk. Indeed, part of the value creation
from the radar can be linked to the way it influences thinking,
and the interaction enabled by the radar seems to catalyze the
changes in mindsets on the individual level.
4.1. Implications
Our findings have implications for research seeking to
further understand through which mechanisms foresight
creates value, and for the practice of designing, implementing
and motivating for participation in technology foresight.
First, we show that cognitive aspects have a role in
determining the value creation from foresight. Awareness
about how certain activities can influence the thinking styles
of individuals (for instance analytic versus heuristic processing
of information) and that individuals have different habits and
preferences with regard to information processing could help
the success of future systematic processes for identifying and
assessing trends and technologies. The study of the Cisco
Technology Radar case also indicates that the effect of changed
mindsets can be seen and measured as a value in its own
right. Tracking the degree of changed mindsets for example
through cognitive mapping (Huff, 1990) could in the future
be one additional way to assess the value creation from
foresight research and practice.
Second, a more deeply rooted explanation for how foresight
contributes to update mental models is provided through our
theoretical framework. In future research, formal hypothesis
based on this explanation could be tested in a more experimental
design, in order to strengthen the practical arguments for why
foresight works. For instance, pre- and post-measures where
mental models are mapped with regard to specific understand-
ings of the future, possibly supplemented with measures of
thinking styles, could be obtained in connection with different
foresight projects. Comparison between active and more passive
involvement in foresight and the effects on mental models and
thinking styles could also be explored in such a design.
It is worth mentioning that the finding related to analytic
processing could be seen as contradictory to existing research
within scenario foresight, which focuses more on scenarios'
memorability and their ability to shift decision-makers over to
use more intuition (Chermack and Nimon, 2008). However,
intuition is per definition involving decision-making based on
existing knowledge, which may lead to biases. This paper
argues, based on theory as well as empirical findings, that
stimulating analytic thinking is a key success criterion of
technology foresight. It thus also compliments the research on
foresight and decision biases and adds weight to the claims that
foresight indeed can reduce such bias (Meissner and Wulf,
2012). Building on previous findings from the scenario
literature and using the terminology introduced in this paper,
links could perhaps be made between heuristic processing and
making the mental models stick, complimenting the analytic
processing needed to update them. The roles and the balance
between analytic and intuitive thinking could be further
researched in relation to foresight.
Third, the observation that while cultural control mecha-
nisms seem important for the success of corporate foresight, the
technology radar in fact corresponds to a broad rather than
narrow set of values, may have implications for further research
as well as the practical design and implementation of foresight
systems. Securing a glue effect by building control mechanisms
that work in different corporate sub-cultures may increase the
success probability of technology foresight systems. Focusing on
efforts that intensify agreement about the foresight being useful,
rather than aspiring to streamline value perceptions and
motivations seems fruitful, based on our case evidence.
In sum, research as well as the design and implementation
of foresight systems can be well served by focusing not only on
the requested output of foresight in terms of new products or
new technologies scouted, but also its value creation through
the systematized information processing and interaction
between decision-makers. In the Cisco case we saw that
individuals participating in the foresight highlighted values
 S. Boe-Lillegraven, S. Monterde / Technological Forecasting & Social Change 101 (2015) 6282
supplementary to the values communicated from the corporate
level. Many of these hidden values were related to social
benefits from foresight. In this perspective, the fact that people
like it might indeed be a relevant aspect to consider when
asked to provide evidence for the usefulness of a foresight
system.
4.2. Limitations and clarications
This paper contributes with a theoretical framework that
was tested and further explored through a practical case. Thus,
there are automatically a number of limitations present. First of
all, the empirical findings were linked to a specific version of
technology foresight and, for instance, not scenario planning,
and cannot uncritically be generalized to a wide foresight
context. However, as detailed in the case description, the radar
initiative does have similarities with other technology foresight
methods and it can therefore be expected that particularly the
implications are relevant also for methodologies such as
horizon scanning and technological forecasting.
The empirical case served to partly validate our theoretical
framework, which hopefully will continue to be challenged in
further research. Perhaps additional theory could have shed
different light on our data and analysis, for instance perspec-
tives on single and double loop learning (Argyris and Schn,
1978). The importance of questioning in the radar process
could have been examined more closely, as this is seen as a
driver of double-loop learning and therefore related to change.
Explicitly mapping out the connection between analytic
processing, heuristic processing and single or double loop
learning could be a task for future research. Argyris' own work
on theories in use (Argyris, 2002) and work comparing
organizational learning theory and theories about different
cognitive styles (Korth, 2000) could serve as inspiration.
The evidence found in the case can rightfully be criticized
for being anecdotal, based on a critically small sample and/or
vulnerable to the perceptions of respondents as well as
interpretations of the researchers. Even though it can be seen
as an advantage that our study used multiple methods in order
to compensate for and reduce some of these risks, future
studies should perhaps aspire to limit the scope by concentrat-
ing on fewer questions and instead increase the pool of same-
source data. For instance, a more formal hypothesis could be
generated as a basis for surveying a larger sample, or the claims
related to analytical processing could be tested through a more
experimental design.
With regard to the finding that the foresight system seems
to be seen as more valuable, or at least natural, for rational
decision-makers, there are many unanswered questions. We
do not know if the participation in the radar process had any
effect on the decision-making styles of the participants. Could it
be that it stimulates people to switch to more rational decision-
making? Or is this type of foresight system more beneficial for
people with rational styles to begin with, while scenario
foresight is more beneficial for intuitive decision-makers?
Future research could explore this further.
Due to concerns about length and focus this paper refrains
from discussing the issue of enough. Even though there can
be established links between analytic thinking and the
successful update of mental models of the future, it does not
mean that everyone always should maximize this updating. We
81
will in this relation end with the well-known point made by
March (1991) that processes like learning, analysis and
technological change involve a delicate trade-off between
exploration and exploitation (p 85). One could imagine that if
all individuals are constantly challenging and updating all
organizational truths and routines, it would hurt the current
business too much and tip the efficiency curve downwards to a
general state of inefficiency. Routines and decisions based on
old knowledge can be extremely beneficial as long as the
environment does not change too much so that old ways do not
apply anymore. The question about which level of mindset
update is enough is a big one, which hopefully will be revisited
and addressed in future research.
4.3. Conclusion
In this paper we had the ambition to advancing the
understanding of how and why foresight can influence ways
of thinking. We did this first by generating propositions rooted
in relevant literature, which were further tested and validated
through an empirical case study of the technology radar
initiative in Cisco. We found that the radar process indeed
seems to influence ways of thinking through a process probing
for analytical information processing and exchange of world-
views, resulting in more frequent update of mental models. We
also found indications of a relationship between more frequent
and active involvement in the radar activities and the payoff in
terms of perceived value. The design of the radar process,
enabling interaction and communication across departments
and functions, seems important for transforming individual
benefits into payoffs observable on the collective level. The
ability of the foresight system to correspond to a broad set of
values and motivate people across departments and functions
its glue effect has likely been a critical success factor in the
case of Cisco. In summary, a central value of this technology
foresight tool seems to be its' systematic probing of analytical
thinking, which helps update mental models and thus
influences decision-making and enables change. While the
analytic probing is helped by specific criteria for reporting and
discussing information, it is the interaction made possible by
the foresight process that seem to determine the ultimate
payoff for individuals as well as on the corporate level.
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Stephan Monterde is the Director of the Technology Intelligence and Strategy
group in Cisco. He holds a Bachelor of Electronics and an MSc in Communication
Systems from the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (EPFL) in Lausanne,
Switzerland. He also holds an MBA from IMD with honors in leadership. He is
leading Cisco's Technology Intelligence efforts, aiming at capturing and
delivering information on technology trends, opportunities and threats. Prior
to joining Cisco in 2007, he was Head of Messaging Services at Orange Group, FT
Global Operations.
Siri Boe-Lillegraven is a PhD researcher at the Department of Business
Administration at Aarhus University, Denmark. She is also afliated with the
Sino-Danish Center for Education and Research, Beijing. Her educational
background spans from business (MBA), innovation and entrepreneurship
(Msc level), journalism and sociology (Ba). She has 10 years of industry
experience, mainly from the newspaper industry and from a science park/
incubator. Her PhD project is concerned with investigating micro-drivers of
organizational change.