The Concept of Poiesis and Its Applicati PDF

The Concept of Poisis and Its Application
in a Heideggerian Critique of Computationally

Emergent Artificiality
Syed Mustafa Ali
A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
Department of Electrical & Electronic Engineering, Brunel University
January 1999
Preface
And the world was One vast cellular automaton (or `CA'), calculating out the instants - and each of
the world's diverse objects was but a subcalculation, a simulation in the One great parallel process.
Rudy Rucker, Wetware
This thesis takes the form of a critique of what I shall refer to as computationalism, the
metaphysical view that the world at its most fundamental level is computational in
nature. A number of issues immediately arise in connection with any such critical study
including the factors motivating the study, the existence of precedents supporting the
critique, the approach adopted and how it differs from other approaches, and finally, the
implications of the investigation for the subject under study. These issues require
consideration.
Why should such a critique be necessary ?

Physics is the study of the most primitive phenomena of the universe. Metaphysics, on
the other hand, is the study of that which is beyond what physics can study; it is the
study of our assumptions about the ultimate nature of reality. But is it reasonable to study
computationalism as a metaphysical position ? I would argue, following Cariani (1989),
that computationalism has become a metaphysical position. No longer is it the guiding
hypothesis uniquely identified with its founding disciplines, cognitive science and the
philosophy of mind. Computationalism has transcended its traditional confines and is
now being investigated in connection with disciplines associated with the study of other
phenomenal domains, for example, the philosophy of life and the philosophy of matter.
According to Bunge (1977), "metaphysics only recently has undergone a revolution so
deep that nobody has noticed it: indeed ontology has gone mathematical and is being
cultivated by engineers and computer scientists." (p.7) As a consequence of the trend
towards viewing computation as ubiquitous in the phenomenal world, and supported by
the conceivability of a unification of phenomena under an integrated scheme grounded
in computation, metaphysical computationalism has become an increasingly attractive
position. Unification is a fundamental goal within science and philosophy, drawing
inspiration from Ockham's Razor, which is captured in the maxim "simplicity is the key",
and exemplified by the unending search for Grand Unified Theories or/and Theories of
Everything. Computationalism, like materialism, idealism and other antecedent
philosophical positions, attempts to provide a basis upon which such a phenomenal
unification might be achieved. However, computationalism, like materialism, idealism
and other positions, is a metaphysical position. It makes claims about reality, that which,
in Kantian terms, is beyond mere phenomenal appearance. Hence, any serious study of
computationalism must, of necessity, involve a consideration of metaphysical issues
thereby justifying the examination of such concerns as reported herein.
What precedents exist in support of such a study ?

The idea that the ontology (that is, being or nature) of the universe is computational is
not original to this study. Nor is the attempt at critically evaluating this metaphysical
position. A number of popular works could be enlisted in support of such a critique; for
example, Theodore Roszak's classic The Cult of Information (1986), Stephen Talbott's
The Future Does Not Compute (1995) and Mark Slouka's War of The Worlds (1995).
Such works are usually written in an attempt to counter what the authors perceive to be
the polemical excesses of adherents of computationalism and its related creeds. Although
global in scope, the style of such works is often rhetorical and hence, generally tends to
be dismissed by the academic mainstream, rather unfairly and somewhat prematurely in
my opinion, as the "neo-luddite ramblings" of "misinformed intellectual light-weights".
However, indirect support for a critique of computationalism from a more scholarly
perspective has been provided by the various scientific and philosophical investigations
of computational models used in connection with phenomenon-specific studies of
matter, life and mind.
What approach is to be adopted and why is it different from others ?

As implied above, and following precedents set by Dreyfus (1979), Searle (1980) and
others, previous approaches to investigating computationalism have mainly involved
evaluating computational analogues of certain natural phenomenal kinds such as matter,
life and mind1. There is an intimate connection between computationalism and another
notion, viz. artificiality, which makes it possible to use the latter to investigate the former
when suitably conceived; hence, the investigations of artificial intelligence, life and
reality reported in the literature. Such studies have, however, tended to ignore the
underlying generic concept of artificiality itself, the one exception being Herbert Simon's
The Sciences of the Artificial (1969). Unfortunately, this work, which introduced the
concept of artificiality, did not adequately clarify the various distinctions holding
between this term and opposing concepts such as naturality (or the natural which can be
contrasted with the artifactual, man-made or synthetic) and reality (or the real which can
be contrasted with Kant's as-if or apparent). It also failed to address the ontological and
epistemological issues associated with the concept from the perspective of that entity
(human being) responsible for asserting that such a thing as artificiality exists.
Consequently, a generic view of artificiality was not readily conceived, thereby rendering
difficult the translation of arguments associated with one kind or instance of artificiality
to other phenomenal kinds. (Most critiques based on argument-translation, when
attempted, have usually been of limited scope, a result of their being grounded in a
relatively superficial and non-generic analysis of what is common between the various
kinds of artificiality).
This study attempts to resolve some of the genericity problems associated with Simon's
concept of artificiality. This is accomplished using a series of conceptual frameworks
that describe the ontological and epistemological relations holding between naturals,
artificials and that which is making (or can make) the distinction, viz. human beings2. A
new concept of artificiality is derived by identifying features common to all instances of
the class of artificiality using these frameworks. Artificiality is defined as a category or
class with artificialities such as artificial intelligence, artificial life and artificial reality
as instances or kinds. A particular form of artificiality based on an emergentist
1
For the sake of argument, it is assumed at this preliminary stage in the discussion that matter, life and mind are
natural phenomena.
2
This should not be taken as implying that human beings are the only beings capable of making the distinction;
rather, that it is only human beings that are known to be capable of making such a distinction.
metaphysics is investigated. This emergent-artificiality enables individual artificial kinds
to be hierarchically unified such that an isomorphism between evolutionary nature (or
naturality) and artificiality is established. This both permits and simplifies the translation
of arguments between the various disciplines and kinds of artificiality, making possible
the application of phenomenological arguments due to Searle, Dreyfus and others in the
context of a computationally-grounded unifying framework of emergent artificiality.
Using such a framework, computationalism as a metaphysical thesis can be evaluated.
What are the implications ?
I believe that the implications of this study will lead to two main developments: First,
the supplanting of computationalism, either by an alternative metaphysical tradition3 or
by a post-metaphysical Weltanschauung (world-view)4; second, and independently, an
interpretative or hermeneutic shift in favour of reinterpreting computation in
anthropocentric (or human-centred) terms. This would be consistent with the pragmatist
(or instrumentalist) attitude towards technology and would contribute greatly to the
appreciation of computer science as an engineering discipline incorporating existential
or humanistic concerns5.
Personal development of the problem

To understand and appreciate the numerous underlying factors motivating any long-term
study, whether of a philosophical nature or otherwise, it is necessary to trace its historical
development back to the point of its inception when the foundations for the study were
first being laid. As Theodore Roszak states, "understanding an idea means understanding
the lives of those who created and championed it."
My study began in opposition to the argument presented in this thesis with an attempt
to realize what would later be identified as a variant of the Leibnizean dream of a
universal language for intellectual discourse. According to MacDonald Ross (1984),
Leibniz's approach was to try and reconcile the logical, rhetorical and geometrical traditions by
blending their three distinct emphases (on formalism, on linguistic proprietary and on
mathematicisation) into the single vision of a formal language notated mathematically. (p.50)
I was motivated by the goal of facilitating unambiguous communication between

members of diverse intellectual communities involved in modelling natural phenomena
with a view to designing artificial analogues of such phenomena. I held that what
Winograd and Flores (1986) describe as "the rationalistic orientation" was the correct
view on the basis of which that goal might be brought to fruition. Inspired by the then
3
For example, Whiteheadian panexperientialism.
4
For example, Heidegger's ontology of Being.
5
This would go some way to alleviating the concerns about neo-Luddism raised by technologists such as
Florman (1976).
recent speculation on the possibility of a "post-symbolic" form of communication6
associated with the emerging field of virtual reality, I embarked upon the ambitious
project of developing what came to be called a generic interactive modelling paradigm
(or GIMP) for modelling systems at the behavioural level. The term `generic' indicated
the universality of the modelling framework and its application in disciplines as diverse
as physics, biology, psychology, sociology, politics and even art. Ìnteractive' marked
the connection to virtual reality and the possibility of a post-symbolic form of dialogue
based on the gestural play of agents embedded within graphical environments or `virtual
worlds'; in this respect, I was particularly inspired by the application of the Aristotelian
theory of dramatic action to human-computer interaction described in Computers as
Theatre (Laurel,91b). Why post-symbolic communication ? On the basis of what I now
understand to be an implicit Heideggerian interpretation of the world, I argued that
perhaps the post-symbolic world of àrtificial reality' might mirror the pre-symbolic
world of natural reality. By `modelling paradigm' was understood the amalgamation of
a particular modelling methodology and an associated modelling technology; hence, the
GIMP project was to have two deliverables, one conceptual and the other, technological.
I began to investigate the concept of a model and search for candidates that might meet
the `genericity' requirement. The McGraw-Hill Dictionary of Scientific and Technical
Terms (Third Edition, 1984) defines a model as
a mathematical or physical system, obeying certain specified conditions, whose behaviour is used to
understand a physical, biological, or social system to which it is analogous in some way [emphasis
added].
The requirement that a system obey certain specified conditions indicates the imposition
of constraints and the definition of boundaries. The problem of how these constraints are
imposed, that is, whether via internal (endosystemic) or external (exosystemic) agency,
is a notion that would become pivotal to the framework I was to later develop for
differentiating between artificial and natural phenomena. Two ideas related to this
problem were briefly considered at this stage of the study: First, that a model is only an
abstraction of the phenomenon it is being used to help understand; hence, a model is, of
necessity, an incomplete representation of reality. This idea was to form the basis for
investigating the difference between the simulation of a natural phenomenon and the
realization of that phenomenon; second, that there is more than one way to abstract away
from a phenomenon, and hence, that modelling is, of necessity, a relativistic activity.
However, at this stage it was still unclear whether such relativism was ontological,
thereby supporting a subjective-idealist position, or merely epistemological, in which
case it would be consistent with variants of objective-realism. The framework for
differentiating between natural and artificial phenomena described herein makes it
possible to resolve this issue.
The next stage of work involved concurrent exploration of the two aspects to the GIMP,
6
Lanier (1992) defines post-symbolic communication as follows: "In the physical world, you can't make physical
changes to your world very quickly. The only thing you can do is use your tongue to form words that refer to
all the possible changes you might make if you could. For example, you could say the worlds, `let's go flying
on a giant squid', even though you can't actually do that in the real world. But in a good shared virtual reality
system, you can just directly make up the objective world instead of using symbols to refer to it [emphasis
added]." (p.69)
viz. its methodology and associated technology. The former necessitated a more detailed
investigation of the notion of interaction within dramatic contexts and the idea of agent-
based causation was introduced. Agents are entities with the capacity to initiate action
(Laurel,91b). A semiotic7 approach was adopted because it was seen as providing the
necessary foundation for analysing the syntax (structure) and semantics (meaning) of
agents and agent-based interaction. Technological issues motivated consideration of the
notion of behaviour. The result was a first attempt at classifying systems according to
their behaviours based on the binary oppositions tangible-abstract and animate-
inanimate: Tangible systems were perceptual while abstract systems were wholly
conceptual; animate systems were `living' whereas inanimate systems were not. At this
stage, I was already starting to establish links between systems modelling and the
emerging discipline of artificial life. I began to evaluate candidate technologies such as
George Cherry's Stimulus-Response Machines (Cherry,91) and was then introduced to
John Holland's work on genetic algorithms (Holland,92). It appeared that I might find
the modelling primitive I was seeking in a synthesis of the two approaches. For this
reason, I spent the next year looking more closely at the connections between genetic
algorithms and evolutionary biology. It was during this time that I came into contact with
the work of Ted Steele (1979). Steele had been reconsidering the ideas of Jean-Baptiste
Lamarck, a predecessor of Darwin, who held that characteristics acquired during
ontogeny (development) could be inherited by an organism and thereby pass into the
phylogenetic (evolutionary) lineage of the species. Steele's work was inspired by the idea
that retroviruses might provide the means by which to transmit somatic (or bodily)
characteristics across Weismann's barrier and into the germline. Such a scheme clearly
contradicted the `central dogma' of modern genetics which states that the passage of
biological ìnformation' is always in the direction DNA to proteins and never the reverse.
Irrespective of the biological validity of such work, I made the connection between
genetic algorithms, Steele's Lamarckian thesis, and the interactive modelling framework
I was attempting to develop. Adopting a form of what might be described as
"computational organicism", I embarked on the development of a biologically-inspired
modelling primitive based on Steele's neo-Lamarckian ideas, viz. the CyberCell (Ali,92).
Ironically, it was during this time that I began to have serious doubts about the
underlying assumptions of the project. Two independent sources were responsible for
placing me in this situation. The first can be traced to the critiques of neo-Darwinism that
I had encountered when studying evolutionary theory. Works ranging from Michael
Denton's Evolution: A Theory in Crisis (1985) to the collection of papers in Evolutionary
Processes and Metaphors (Ho,88) forced me to look beyond contemporary Darwinian
and Lamarckian concepts of evolution. I discovered that the difference between the two
interpretations was not so significant once both schemes were reconceptualized in the
language of modern genetics with its metaphysically dualistic assumptions of chance and
necessity. Implicit arguments against the adoption of a genetically-based behavioural
modelling primitive such as the CyberCell were to be found in critiques of genetic
determinism and biological reductionism such as Not in Our Genes (Rose,84) and The
Doctrine of DNA (Lewontin,91), both of which were popular works written by leading
geneticists. The second source of doubt lay in more direct criticism of the CyberCell
concept by a colleague which forced me to reconsider its status as a modelling primitive
and as the ontological substrate of artificial analogues of natural phenomena: The project
7
Semiotics refers to the scientific study of systems of signs and sign-users.
was an attempt to develop a generic modelling paradigm; yet, it did not seem right that
a biologically-inspired entity such as a cell should be regarded as more primitive than,
say, an atom. After all, I reasoned, what are organisms composed from other than atoms
?
It was at this point that I was introduced to John Conway's "Life", a mathematical `game'
(originally) played using tokens placed in some initial configuration on a potentially
infinite grid of squares (with a maximum of one token per square). Life was a strange
sort of game in that it required no players, merely the repeated global and concurrent
application of an update rule to each square in the grid. Yet, given specific initial
configurations of tokens, it could generate `structures' (or token-patterns), both static and
dynamic, of potentially unbounded complexity. Although based on an analogy with the
growth, reproduction and death of simple biological organisms such as bacteria, the ideas
underlying the Game of Life clearly had implications transcending biology. In particular,
there was the possibility that our universe might itself be computational in nature, not
in the rather unrealistic sense of it being a gigantic Turing machine as had been
previously conjectured, but as the physical instantiation of an object belonging to the
class of mathematical formalisms to which the Game of Life belonged, viz. cellular
automata (CAs). This neo-Laplacian thesis was explored in William Poundstone's The
Recursive Universe (1985) and has increasingly assumed the status of a literal truth,
reappearing in numerous popular works such as The Mind of God (Davies,92),
Complexification (Casti,94) and Darwin's Dangerous Idea (Dennett,95).
I had been interested in the problem of the origin of life for a long time and during my
reading in evolutionary biology, had stumbled across the work of Graham Cairns- Smith
whose "life from clay" hypothesis (Cairns-Smith,71) fascinated me. An abstract
reinterpretation of his theory of proto-biotic evolution in terms of self-organization
provided me with a suitable context in which to investigate a modification to the Game
of Life which I believed would make CAs more realistic when viewed as models of
natural phenomena (Ali,94a).
Although cellular automata might have provided me with the behavioural modelling
primitive for which I had been searching in the context of the GIMP project, I had at this
stage in the project become much more interested in investigating the implications of the
view that the universe was a cellular automaton, that is, an atomistic computer.
Consequently, I redefined my thesis objectives: I would now attempt to integrate the
`sciences of the artificial', disciplines such as artificial intelligence, artificial life,
artificial physics and artificial reality, into a unified framework of àrtificiality'. This
would provide me with the means by which to investigate the limits of
computationalism, the metaphysical view that the underlying reality of the world is
computational in nature (or being). Inspired by Stuart Kauffman's (1993) argument that
natural selection was really only a secondary mechanism operating on the products of
self-organizing processes, I began to look for a broader, more encompassing notion than
evolution. This I found in an idea related to self-organization, viz. emergence, which
provided me with the conceptual basis needed to integrate the various disciplines within
artificiality such that the resulting framework was isomorphic with the natural
phenomenal hierarchy8. The first version of this framework was described in (Ali,94b),
which had as its main theme the argument that conventional interpretations of
functionalism, of which computationalism is a variant, were flawed. A number of
philosophical reasons were advanced in support of the contention that the idea of a
function necessitated the existence of an observer, a position related to notions within
second-order cybernetics for which I was later to discover support in the work of Searle
(1992,1995).
I had been working on integrating the various artificial disciplines using a

computationalist interpretation of the emergentist framework presented by Samuel
Alexander in Space, Time and Deity (1920) when I began teaching on the Foundations
of Intelligent Systems course with Mike Elstob. During the lectures, I found it extremely
difficult to communicate the phenomenological (specifically, Heideggerian) critique of
artificial intelligence (and computationalism in general) that I had been assigned to
certain `hard science' students. I also noticed the way students with opposing views often
talked past each other rather than to each other and it was then that I became convinced
of the importance of clarifying precisely what computationalism meant as well as
exposing the philosophical assumptions underlying this concept. Consequently, my study
broadened to include concerns of a more metaphysical nature as I began to examine
computationalism from an ontological perspective.
Casti (1989) has identified at least four perspectives from which critiques of artificial
intelligence have been attempted: (i) logical and mathematical arguments against the
view that the mind is a computer program based on interpretations of Gdel's theorems,
(ii) aesthetic and ethical arguments based on the implications of such a view for human
self-regard, (iii) philosophical arguments based on the irreducibility of mentalistic
intentionality, and (iv) philosophical arguments based on the irreducibility of non-
mentalistic intentionality. Arguments based on Gdel's theorems have been and continue
to be the subject of endless controversy (Lucas,61) (Benacerraf,67), most of which is
either a continuous restatement of themes or simply polemical in nature. (One need only
investigate the subtlety of the points made in discussions about Penrose's reinterpretation
of Lucas within the comp.ai.philosophy newsgroup to appreciate this fact.) On
the other hand, while I generally agreed with the ethical arguments made in works such
as Joseph Weizenbaum's Computer Power and Human Reason (1984), I was not
convinced they provided the foundation for constructing an alternative to the
computationalist programme9. For this reason, I concentrated on developing a critique
of a more philosophical nature, applying arguments previously made by philosophers
such as Searle and Dreyfus across the various disciplines within artificiality. I discovered
that many of the philosophers were connected to a common tradition within philosophy,
viz. phenomenology; Searle with the early work of Edmund Husserl and Dreyfus with
the existential interpretation of phenomenology due to Martin Heidegger. Although I
gained from both the transcendental and the existential phenomenological perspectives,
it was the latter that had by far the greater impact on my thinking. There are at least two
reasons for this: firstly, transcendental phenomenology can be shown to provide support
8
Assuming, of course, that natural phenomena are hierarchically-structured, irrespective of whether such a
hierarchy is ontic (real) or merely epistemic (apparent).
9
Assuming, of course, that an alternative is possible.
for the computationalist view, at least in the context of its application within cognitive
science and "good old-fashioned" artificial intelligence (Dreyfus,82) (Fodor,80) and this
was precisely the position that I was attempting to critique; secondly, it was in
Heidegger's writings that I discovered the concept of poisis (becoming, coming-forth,
bringing-forth), a concept that was to provide the basis upon which to establish a
phenomenological framework for differentiating natural from artificial phenomena.
I attempted to identify what I believed to be the main contributions of existentialist

thought to a critique of artificiality and in this respect was greatly benefitted by Dreyfus'
(1991) commentary on Division One of Heidegger's Being and Time (1927). As a result
of reading this particular work and also Heidegger's An Introduction to Metaphysics
(1959), I became increasingly aware of the role that categories play in metaphysics.
Whether viewed as objectively discernible features of the physical world as in the realist
tradition or as features of a transcendental subject as in variants of idealism, categories
are the means by which reality is approached. All metaphysics since Aristotle, Heidegger
argued, has been concerned with the epistemological use of abstract categories to
understand the world and in the process has ignored that which is prior to epistemology,
viz. the ontological fact that the world is10. His response to this condition within
philosophy was to develop a set of concrete categories - or existentials - for ontological
analysis, that is, for investigating what he called the question of Being. However, it
should immediately be apparent that irrespective of whether the study is of an ontological
or epistemological nature, in both cases the approach is made through the use of
categories. They are the means by which we `cut' what Heidegger called Being
(existence) into beings (existents). Categories are lines of demarcation, coming into
existence during what Spencer-Brown (1969) has referred to as the àct of severance' or
the `drawing of a distinction', and enable us to bound, constrain and identify as
significant that which we hold to be significant. This last point, viz. that significance, and
by implication meaning, only belongs to that which is capable of appreciating
significance, has deep implications for computationalism in particular and functionalist
philosophy in general.
During my investigations into artificial life, I came across a work which discussed what
was called computational emergence (Cariani,91). It was argued that as a consequence
of the finite nature of the physical substrates in which computational formalisms such
as CAs are implemented, the extent to which emergence in such systems is possible is
itself bounded; hence, computational systems were only capable of supporting emergence
up to some limit. Cariani encapsulated this view in the idea of emergence-relative-to-a-
model. In full agreement with this position, I began to investigate extensions to CA that
would solve this problem. Whereas Cariani had attempted to solve the problem of
infinite or òpen-ended' emergence by postulating an external analog continuum from
which the discrete symbolic primitives in computational systems were generated by
measuring devices (sensors), I chose to remain within the formal computationalist
framework. My investigations resulted in the development of an extension to the
standard CA formalism incorporating the notion of an epistemological "cut" of reality
10
In short, that the world exists entails that there is something rather than nothing. As will be seen in chapters
1 and 6, Heidegger's approach to addressing the problem of explaining why there is something rather than
nothing (assuming that this constitutes a legitimate problem) involves questioning from the perspective of a
historically-embedded existential interpreter. Thus, Heideggerian phenomenology is essentially hermeneutic.
and supporting the potential for infinite or open-ended emergence via an infinite
hierarchy of rules governing the transitions between CA states (Ali,98a). Although the
scheme was well received in session on emergence at the Tucson II: Toward a Science
of Consciousness conference, I had been having serious doubts about its ultimate
significance both during the development of the formalism prior to the conference and
upon my return. After all, it was a formalism and hence, an instance of a categorial `cut'
itself ! This point requires clarification. It was not the use of representations or models
per se that was being criticized, although I certainly held certain modelling schemes to
be superior to others. Rather, I was attempting to critique (1) the tendency towards
identifying models with the phenomenon being modelled, (2) the disregard for the
modelling activity which brought the model into being, and most importantly, (3) that
which was responsible for initiating the modelling activity in the first instance.
At this stage, I became aware of the implications of a tacit assumption made in the
original formulation of the GIMP project, viz. that natural phenomena are systemic. Very
early on in the project I had been exposed to two opinions regarding the ontological
status of systems. One of my supervisors, Robert Zimmer, viewed them as abstractions
dependent on the perspective of an external observer, a relativistic position explored in
(Ali,94b). However, my other supervisor, Mike Elstob, viewed systems as ontologically
primitive, thereby adopting a systems-realist perspective. It became clear to me that
irrespective of which position was adopted, a position had been and had to be adopted,
that is, realism and relativism were themselves instances of categorial `cuts'. Inspired by
this view, I began to build upon ideas that had first been discussed in the Tucson
conference paper. Exposure to numerous ideas presented at this conference had left a
deep impact on me. In particular there was what David Chalmers (1996) called the `hard
problem' of consciousness, viz. the relation of subjective experience to brain
neurophysiology. Consideration of this issue and my interest in the problem of
emergence and the `cut' hypothesis led me to investigate Whiteheadian organicism11 and
panexperientialism (Griffin,88), viz. the view that the phenomenal world is internally-
related and hierarchically-structured with experiential events (or actual occasions) as
ontologically primitive. On this basis, a radical reinterpretation of the notion of
emergence grounded in a synthesis of Heideggerian ontology and Whiteheadian
metaphysics was formulated in an attempt to solve the mind-body (or `hard') problem
(Ali,98b).
At the risk of overstating a point, I would again like to draw attention to Heidegger who
has been singularly instrumental in providing me with the basis upon which to develop
the ideas presented in this thesis. His account of the relation between the Classical Greek
notion of poisis (coming-forth or bringing-forth) and modern technological Ènframing'
(Gestellen) in The Question Concerning Technology (1977) led to a shift of attention
away from semiotics, the science of signs and sign-users, and toward the development
of a complementary discipline of poitics, the phenomenological science of Being,
beings and becoming. In this thesis I have concentrated on developing a poitic
ontological critique of computationalism in contrast to the semiotic epistemological
critiques of others such as Cariani (1989), Harnad (1990) and Fetzer (1990). My reasons
for doing so are connected with the Heideggerian stance I have adopted and an attempt
11
Ironically, it seems that I was being forced to reconsider a variant of my original biologically-inspired GIMP
primitive based on an organicist metaphysics, albeit in post-computational form.
to tip the philosophical balance in favour of considering ontological over epistemological
issues.
Intellectual Debts
A number of people have influenced the development of the ideas presented in this thesis
and none more significantly than my two doctorate supervisors. Robert Zimmer is
responsible for pointing me in the direction of continental philosophy. If it had not been
for his advice to read Husserl, I would never have discovered the difficult, yet highly
inspiring ideas of Heidegger and this thesis would never have got off the ground. Mike
Elstob has been singularly supportive throughout the last four years and to him I owe a
great intellectual debt. His relatively few papers on emergence, indeterminism and
downwards causation, which attempt to establish the reality of volitional autonomy,
made a deep impact on me. Although our views on these issues began to diverge quite
rapidly as my study progressed, our exchanges have always been mutually enlightening.
The work of Peter Cariani (1989) deserves special mention for a number of reasons.
Cariani was probably the first to draw attention to the constrained nature of emergence
within CAs, a consequence of the "closure" of the computational substrates in which such
dynamical systems are embedded. CAs are examples of formal systems and can be
reduced to essentially two components: (i) a set of primitive symbols and (ii) a set of
rules for combining these primitive symbols into symbol structures. Cariani's approach
to the problem of how to design devices supporting òpen-ended' emergence was to
abandon the computationalist approach of attempting to generate novelty through
permutations of rules and investigate methods for constructing new symbolic primitives.
On his scheme, "open" emergence was supported by introducing analog components into
the system in the form of measurement (or sensor) and control (or motor) devices.
Through a system of feedback with the external world by which the performance of the
system was pragmatically evaluated, the hybrid analog-digital system èvolved' new
semantic functions, and, as a corollary, new semantic primitives.
Cariani addressed the problem of semantic emergence from the perspective of a

biologist; hence, his endorsement of an evolutionary approach. In his doctorate thesis,
he argued in favour of developing a "theory of biological semiotics", the need for which
had already been anticipated in the writings of semiotically-inspired biologists such as
von Uexkll (Emmeche,94). However, extending semiotics beyond its immediate
domain of application, viz. the study of human communication, into other domains such
as biology and "evolutionary robotics" rests on the assumption that semiotic processes,
functionalities, and categories are ubiquitous - or perfusive - in nature, an assumption
which sets American semiotics in opposition to Anglo-Continental semiology.
Additionally, there is a contradiction in the idea of a "designed emergence" if the

emergence supported by such devices (or àrtifacts') is understood as an instance of the
same phenomenon that (supposedly) occurs in natural systems which are, on the
Darwinian view, certainly not products of an intentionalistic design process. Yet, this
must be the case if emergent-artificiality is to be interpreted on the "strong" view, that
is, as a realization rather than a mere simulation of the phenomenon since this is
necessitated by the functionalist basis of the "strong" artificiality programme. For reasons
such as these, I strongly disagree with Cariani's view that phenomenology constitutes a
"cognitively impenetrable" realm which does not "explicitly point the way to an
alternative research program." On the contrary, I would argue that existential
phenomenology, taking its lead from Heidegger, provides us with the possibility of a far
more realistic research programme, one which attempts to go beyond categorial thought
and point to the source of the categories. Nonetheless, I am indebted to Peter Cariani,
whom I have met in `cyberspace' (via the internet), and who I regard as a veritable
`comrade in arms' in the intellectual struggle against what we both consider to be the
polemical excesses of philosophically naive adherents of computationalism.
I must also recognize the debt that I owe to the authors of four works: Stephen Pepper,
author of World Hypotheses (1942), for the `root metaphor method' which provided me
with an important early tool for philosophical analysis; Samuel Alexander, author of
Space, Time and Deity (1920), for providing me with the basis of a unifying framework
of computationally emergent artificiality; Herbert Simon, author of The Sciences of The
Artificial (1981), for the first real study of the notion of artificiality as such; and Edward
Fredkin, author of "Digital Mechanics" (1990) for presenting the notion of a cellular
automaton universe as a serious proposition, thereby ensuring that the arguments in this
thesis were not directed at a "straw man".
Finally, I would like to acknowledge the support and encouragement that I have derived
from precedents set by members of what can only be described at this juncture as `the
philosophical underground', the vanguard of what Mike Elstob likes to refer to as "the
new paradigm". In particular, David Bohm for his implicate order thesis and process
philosophers such as David Ray Griffin and Christian de Quincey for their concise and
precise presentation of neo-Whiteheadian panexperientialism.
I should like to end by stating that I think the reader will consider this study to be a
rather ambitious undertaking given my former training as an electronic engineer and
computer scientist. However, despite a lack of formal philosophical training prior to this
study, I believe that critiques such as the one I have attempted are necessary in order to
prevent thinking from descending into dogmatic obscurantism. As Mike Elstob
perceptively informed me, an attack made from within a tradition is so much more
devastating than one made from without. One need only see the difference in impact that
the writings of Hubert Dreyfus (a philosopher) and Terry Winograd (a former
practitioner within the discipline of AI) have had on members of the latter's research
community to appreciate the wisdom and validity of this remark. For this reason,
accusations of naive sophistry notwithstanding, I believe the critique presented in this
thesis to be justifiable. Whether or not it is justified is left to the reader to decide.
However, in my defense, I should like to cite the following Heideggerian (1959) maxim:
When the creators vanish from the nation, when they are barely tolerated as an
irrelevant curiousity, an ornament, as eccentrics having nothing to do with real
life; when authentic conflict ceases, converted into mere polemics, into the
machinations and intrigues of man within the realm of the given, then the decline
has set in.
Chapter 1 Introduction
Chapter 1
There are more things in heaven and earth than are dreamt of
in computationally bounded philosophies.
John Kelly, Artificial Intelligence - A Modern Myth
Introduction
1.1. Overview
In this chapter the connection between scientific and philosophical approaches to the
study of the world and phenomena such as matter, life and mind is introduced by way
of a brief examination of the thought of Erwin Schrdinger. It is shown that science is
ultimately grounded in metaphysics, a domain which is beyond the physical and thereby
beyond the reach of science. A brief history of the development of metaphysical thinking
in the Western philosophical tradition is presented and the term metaphysics is defined.
A framework for investigating the relation between metaphysics and metaphor due to
Pepper (1942) is presented. It is shown that metaphysical systems are either based on
simple `root' metaphors or eclectic combinations of root metaphors. Computationalism,
the metaphysical view that the being (or essence) of the world at its most fundamental
level is computational, is introduced as an example of an eclectic metaphor and its
connections to the ideas of artificiality and emergence are briefly stated. A
phenomenological approach to studying computationalism by investigating emergent-
artificiality is introduced and its basis in existing phenomenological approaches is
examined. Finally, a statement of the thesis, the objectives of this study, the strategy to
be adopted and a summary of each of the remaining chapters is presented.
1.2. Schrdinger's Musings

What is Matter ? Life ? Mind ? How are they related (if at all) ?
Numerous attempts have been made at answering these questions within both the Eastern
and Western philosophical traditions, the generally speculative nature of early schemes
discouraging universal adoption of any single framework. However, with the rise of the
Western experimental method with its foundations in philosophical rationalism,
empiricism and mechanistic-reductionism, it became possible to approach the questions
from a new perspective, viz. science. One relatively recent scientific approach is that due
to Erwin Schrdinger who addressed the question of matter, life and mind - and their
relations to each other - from the perspective of a quantum physicist interested in the
connections of his field to other disciplines such as biology and psychology. In What is
Life ? (1944), Schrdinger investigated the Darwinian theory of evolution, explaining
the phenomenon of mutation in quantum mechanical terms, an idea which was to be
instrumental in laying the foundations for the development of modern molecular biology.
Throughout this work, Schrdinger argued for a position similar to that of von Neumann,
viz. that it is only the organization or construction of living matter that distinguishes it
from non-living matter (chapter 4); both are consistent with, although living matter is not
reducible to, physico-chemical laws. Thus, following Descartes, who dualistically
separated nature into matter and mind, regarding life as a mechanistic phenomenon,
Schrdinger argued for a conception of life in materialistic or physical terms. On his
view,
the new principle that is involved [in life] is a genuinely physical one: it is, in my opinion, nothing
else than the principle of quantum theory all over again. (p.81)
Further statements indicate his support for a mechanistic biology, viz.
with life, we are here obviously faced with events whose regular and lawful unfolding is guided by
a `mechanism' entirely different from the probability mechanism of [classical] physics. (p.79)
[Nonetheless] the clue to the understanding of life is that it is based on a pure mechanism, a `clock-
work'. [In fact] the finest masterpiece ever achieved along the line of the Lord's quantum mechanics.
(pp.82-85)
It might appear from such statements that Schrdinger endorsed a purely scientific
approach to the problems of matter, life, and mind (and their relation), as adopted, for
example, by the positivists1. However, Mind and Matter (1958), in which the many-
minds-but-only-one-world problem was investigated, presents a very different side to
Schrdinger's thinking. For example, the materialistic view of mind is rejected:
Are we not inclining to much greater nonsense, if in discarding [the] gross superstitions [of the
Western pluralistic or many-worlds views] we retain their naive idea of plurality of souls, but
`remedy' it by declaring the souls to be perishable, to be annihilated with the respective bodies ?
(p.88)
1
Briefly, positivism is a form of empiricism in which it is maintained that only that is real which can be observed
(or measured). In this sense, positivism is closely linked to instrumentalism (in which it is maintained that
scientific theories are not true descriptions of an unobservable reality, but merely useful instruments which
enable us to order and anticipate the observable world), pragmatism and idealism.
In its place, a non-Cartesian2 conception of the mind-matter relation similar to the

psychophysical parallelism (chapter 4) of Spinoza is endorsed, viz.
I in the widest meaning of the word, that is to say, every conscious mind that has ever said or felt Ì' -
am the person, if any, who controls the `motion of the atoms' according to the Laws of Nature. (p.87)
Further inquiry reveals the inspirational source of Schrdinger's concept of mind to be

the Vedantic philosophy contained in the Hindu Upanishads. On this mystical view, the
individual self (or mind) and the One (Universal Self or Mind) are identical and real; the
plurality of worldly phenomena is merely an illusion (maya). Hence, Schrdinger is
dualistic in his metaphysics, being committed to mysticism with respect to mind and
mechanism with respect to matter and life. Given the strain of mysticism in his thinking,
it might be asked whether Schrdinger's approach to the above questions is scientific or
not. But what is a scientific approach ?
A naive definition of science might be "the explanation and prediction of phenomena

using the experimental method". On this view, science implicitly rests on the twin pillars
of reductionism and mechanism: To explain is to reduce to a set of ultimate primitives;
to predict is to know the mechanisms governing the behaviour of these primitives. The
`scientific method' is often depicted as the ordered sequence (Casti,89)
observations/facts 6 hypothesis 6 experiment 6 laws 6 theory.
A more sophisticated version of the above scheme incorporating `feedback' between

theory and experiment is shown in Fig 1.1.
Observation
Empirical Laws
} experiment
Laws of Nature
theory
{ Theories
Fig 1.1 Feedback between theory and experiment (Casti,92).
2
As will be seen in chapter 4, Cartesian dualism is substance-pluralistic and hence, stands in contrast with
Schrdinger's substance monism.
However, as Chalmers (1982) has argued, observations are theory-dependent3, thereby

introducing a potentially vicious infinite regress into the above scheme. Moreover, the
theoretical `background' upon which observations are made implicitly incorporates
factors conventionally viewed as being of a non-scientific nature. A detailed historical
investigation of this `background' problem was made by Thomas Kuhn in The Structure
of Scientific Revolutions (1962). Kuhn argued that science is an essentially social activity
which both gives rise to and takes place within what he called a paradigm. Chalmers
captures the essence of the Kuhnian notion of paradigms and the way in which they
evolve over time in the following statement:
A paradigm embodies a particular conceptual framework through which the world is viewed and in
which it is described, and a particular set of experimental and theoretical techniques for matching the
paradigm with nature. But there is no a priori reason to expect that any one paradigm is perfect or
even the best available .. Consequently, science should contain within it a means for breaking out of
one paradigm into a better one. This is the function of revolutions .. [and] when a crisis develops [that
is, when the current paradigm fails to adequately resolve lasting problems], the revolutionary step of
replacing the entire paradigm by another becomes essential for the effective progress of science.
(p.99)
Hence, according to Kuhn, there are two types of scientific activity, viz. `normal' or
intra-paradigmatic science and `revolutionary' or inter-paradigmatic science. A scientific
`revolution' or `paradigm-shift' occurs when evidence of the inability of the existing
3
Cariani (1999) maintains that observations can be theory-dependent in two ways: Either "the choice of
observables is theory-determined" or "the individual observations themselves are theory-determined." (p.1) The
former (which Cariani accepts) is consistent with epistemological constructivism (operationalism) and asserts
the ontological necessity of both observer and observed in the act of observation and the emergence of
observables; the latter (which Cariani rejects) entails a commitment to some form of idealism. According to
Cariani (1989), "[an] observer's states are .. implemented by the process of measurement .. They represent a
classification of the measuring device's interactions with the physical system. This classification is the
categorization into one of two or more discrete symbolic types [emphasis added]." (p.78) On this scheme,
observations are objectivistic in the sense of third-person or externalistic. However, Chalmers' (1982) implicitly
contests this position in maintaining, for example, that "the perceptual experiences that observers have in the
act of seeing is not uniquely determined by the images on their retinas .. What an observer sees, that is, the
visual experience that an observer has when viewing an object, depends in part on his past experience, his
knowledge and his expectations." Furthermore, "the subjective impressions experienced by the observers were
influenced by their expectations [emphasis added]." (p.25) Crucially, such impressions are perceptions and not
interpretations. Chalmers clarifies this position in asserting that "what observers see, the subjective experiences
that they undergo, when viewing an object or scene is not determined solely by the images on their retinas but
depends also on the experience, knowledge, expectations and general inner state of the observer [emphasis
added]." (p.26) Thus, there is a third way in which observations can be theory-dependent, viz. relative to
subjective (first-person, internalistic) state. Against idealistic interpretations of his position, Chalmers'
maintains that he is "certainly not claiming that the physical causes of the images on our retinas have nothing
to do with whatever we see. We cannot see just what we like. However, while the images on our retinas form
part of the cause of what we see, another very important part of the cause is constituted by the inner state of
our minds or brains, which will clearly depend on our cultural upbringing, our knowledge, our expectations,
etc. and will not be determined solely by the physical properties of our eyes and the scene observed [emphasis
added]." (p.27)
paradigm to cope with lasting problems of concern reaches a critical yet undefined break-
point. What is important about Kuhn's work in the context of this discussion is that it
points to something beyond science, something (non-scientific) which is both grounding
and encompassing with respect to science. Although social scientists have seized upon
Kuhn's work in order to argue for due consideration being given to the social, economic
and political forces both motivating and being motivated by science, it is the conceptual
dimension of paradigms which is significant in the context of this study. Conceptual
frameworks (that is, Weltanschauungs or worldviews) are inclusive of both scientific and
non-scientific - scientists might argue pre-scientific - domains and, consequently, are
more encompassing than scientific frameworks. Furthermore, they provide a
`background' to scientific activity and hence, are necessarily prior to science4. This view
of a conceptual framework as both a ground and an encompassing whole is remarkably
similar to the notion of a metaphysical system. Harris (1965) maintains that
the need accordingly remains for the metaphysician's effort to see things together, as Plato
recommended - not to correct, outdo, or modify the pronouncements of science, but to reflect upon
them, to develop their implications and mutual connections, examine their presuppositions, and to
form as complete and systematic a conception of the world as the available evidence permits
[emphasis added]. (p.29)
What is metaphysics ? This question will be examined in greater detail in section 1.3 and
a series of definitions are presented in section 1.3.2; however, it should suffice at this
point in the presentation merely to state that metaphysics is that which is beyond physics
in both the above senses of (1) a prior ground and (2) an encompassing whole.
Given all that has been stated above, the classification of Schrdinger's approach to the
question of matter, life and mind (and the relations between them) remains problematic.
Clearly, if science is taken to imply universal mechanistic reductionism his position
must, ultimately, be viewed as non-scientific; however, if a Kuhnian perspective is
adopted, his position can legitimately be viewed as scientific since, on this view, all
scientific activity takes place within the metaphysical context of a paradigm, and it is at
least conceivable that mysticism (or some other idealistic ontology) might provide a
necessary and sufficient metaphysics for matter, life, and mind (section 1.4). In any
attempt at transcending the diversity of phenomena in order to develop a unified
conception of the world, reductionism necessarily gives way to (some variant of) holism
(chapter 4) and science becomes metaphysics via the interpretation of the phenomenal
world in terms of a set of primitive (ontological) concepts associated with the former.
However, and conversely, science itself is ultimately grounded in metaphysics because
4
As shown in section 1.6.3 and chapters 6 and 7, this `background' is the hermeneutic (or interpretative) circle
in which the interpreter (in this case, scientist) is existentially situated. This situation is given to the interpreter
who finds himself (herself) `thrown' into a world of interactions with phenomena that he (she) did not create.
For this reason, the `background' that is the world is existentially - which means historically - prior to the
interpreter and his (her) interpretative frameworks - in this case, science.
its methodology makes assumptions about the ultimate nature of reality (ontology) and
how this can be known (epistemology).
1.3. A Brief Introduction to Metaphysics

The literature on the origins and historical development of metaphysics within the
Western philosophical tradition is voluminous and a survey of this area of thought is
beyond both the aim and scope of this study. A conventional introduction to post-
Classical metaphysics is provided by Sprigge (1984) and a radical reinterpretation of
metaphysical thought from the perspective of existentialist phenomenology is given in
(Heidegger,59). However, perhaps the most appropriate starting point in the context of
a study concerned with examining the metaphysical claim that the world is computational
is R.G.Collingwood's The Idea of Nature (1945) and it is from this source that an insight
into the historical development of metaphysics will be derived.
1.3.1. A Brief History of Metaphysics
Investigation of the idea of nature within the Western tradition has its origins in pre-
Socratic thought, most notably in the writings of Heraclitus, Parminides and
Anaximander. For the Ionian Greeks (seventh-sixth centuries B.C.), the question "what
is nature ?" was equivalent to the question "what are things made of ?" which was in turn
reducible to "what is the original, unchanging substance which underlies all the changes
of the natural world with which we are acquainted ?" Henceforth, the notion of an
underlying substance became an essential component of metaphysical thinking, although
alternative schemes which replaced the primacy of substance with that of process5 were
postulated (Rescher,96). The organismic worldview of the Greeks, which was developed
most explicitly by Aristotle, was anthropomorphic or `human-shaped', based on an
analogy with the conception of the human being as both mental (thinking) and vital
(living) as well as physical (material); in short, man the microcosm was projected onto
nature the macrocosm. The sixteenth century Renaissance view of nature, by contrast,
was based on an analogy with the Christian idea of a creative and omnipotent God and
the human experience of designing and constructing machines. This mechanistic
metaphysics, which was both product and producer of the newly emerging scientific
approach to the study of nature, expressed itself in various ways: For example, the
deiocentric or `God-centred' view of the world associated with Newton, the
mechanocentric or clockwork universe of Laplace, and the anthropocentric or `human-
centred' view developed by idealists such as Kant within the empiricist-rationalist
5
Processualism is examined briefly in chapter 2 in connection with computationalism and again in chapter 6 in
the context of (1) an ontical (causal) interpretation of poisis as becoming and (2) an ontological (existential)
interpretation of the Heraclitean link between Being and becoming.
tradition. Following the Greeks, Renaissance cosmologists6 held that nothing is knowable
unless it is unchanging, and underlying the appearance of change is an unchanging
reality; hence, the postulate of (i) an underlying `substance' or `matter' whose changing
arrangements and dispositions (primary qualities) were the realities whose appearances
to our senses took the shape of secondary qualities7 and, (ii) a set of `laws' according to
which these arrangements and dispositions changed. Additionally, it should be noted that
for the majority of Greek thinkers (including Plato, despite assertions to the contrary),
life and mind were immanent in the body whereas for Renaissance thinkers from
Descartes onwards, mind (and possibly life) was transcendent, giving rise to dualistic
philosophies of mentalism (matter-mind) and vitalism (matter-life) with all their
attendant problems. These two developments, viz. dualism and mechanism, were
extremely important since they laid the foundations for the development of functionalism
(section 1.5.2), a philosophical position which was to emerge in the latter part of the
twentieth century, and which forms the basis of computationalism (chapter 2), the
metaphysical position examined in this study. However, according to Collingwood
(1945), writing in the first half of the twentieth century and therefore before the
information, communication, and computation-theoretical sciences had begun to emerge,
the modern worldview either was - or, if not, would be - based on an analogy with
human history and defined in terms of process, change, development, progress, and
evolution, all of which rested on the following assumptions:
P change is no longer cyclical but progressive, whereby the latter is understood novelty and not
necessarily improvement
P nature is no longer mechanical
P teleology is re-introduced
P substance [and structure] is resolvable into function
P functionality is defined in terms of minimum space and minimum time (pp.13-24)
Collingwood's metaphysics was inspired by the development of evolutionary thinking

beginning with Hegel and Darwin, through Bergson and Alexander8, and culminating in
6
Mercer (1917) maintains that a cosmology "aims at understanding the governing laws of the universe". (p.44)
By contrast, a cosmogony is "an account of how the world came into being" and, on his view, "the use of the
term is practically confined to the creation myths of primitive peoples .. though it is occasionally extended, in
accordance with its etymology, to include such scientific systems as that of Laplace or the nebular theory [of
matter]." (p.43)
7
The mechanistic distinction between primary and secondary qualities is examined in further detail in chapter
2.
8
The emergentist metaphysics of Alexander (1920), which is grounded in a Space-Time event monism and
which provides the basis for unifying the artificial sciences (AI, A-Life, artificial physics) under
the organicism of Whitehead, viz. "the world as an organism". How could he have
known that his worldview was to be upstaged9 by an eclectic synthesis of Classical and
Renaissance metaphysical concepts, viz. computationalism (section 1.6) ?
1.3.2. What is Metaphysics ?
As stated previously in section 1.3, the literature on metaphysics is extremely vast and
for this reason, it is difficult to determine exactly what constitutes the essence of this
concept. Fortunately, various philosophical dictionaries such as (Walsh,67), (Flew,79),
and (Angeles,81) are beneficial in this respect, the latter of which, in particular, provides
a comprehensive list of definitions of which those regarded as bearing most directly on
the subject matter at hand are reproduced below:
P Metaphysics is the attempt to present a comprehensive account (picture, view) of reality (being, the
universe) as a whole.
P Metaphysics is the study of ultimate reality - reality as it is constituted in itself apart from the illusory
appearances presented in our perceptions.
P Metaphysics is the study of the underlying, self-sufficient ground (principle, reason, source, cause)
of the existence of all things, the nondependent and fully self-determining being upon which all things
depend for existence.
P Metaphysics is the critical examination of the underlying assumptions (presuppositions, basic beliefs)
employed by our systems of knowledge in their claims about what is real.
P Metaphysics is the study of Being as Being and not of "being" in the form of a particular being (thing,
object, entity, activity).
It is important to appreciate at the outset, as Flew maintains, that "any attempt at

characterization of reality as a whole must perforce use concepts originally developed
to distinguish particular elements within reality and hence can only misuse them."
(p.213) This point is developed by Beardsley (1967) who asserts that metaphysical
statements "extend the part metaphorically to the whole [emphasis added]." (pp.286)
Hence, there is a connection between metaphysics and metaphor.
1.4. Metaphysics and Metaphor
Aristotle defines metaphor as "giving the thing a name that belongs to something else ..
computationalism, is described in chapter 5.
9
Anticipating the presentation in chapter 6, it is maintained that Collingwood's historical conception of
metaphysics is consistent with Heidegger's hermeneutic ontology of Being and that to the extent that the latter
constitutes a legitimate basis upon which to mount a critique computationalism (chapter 7), Collingwood's
position is, in fact, valid as a statement regarding the future of metaphysics.
on the grounds of analogy [that is, similarity]" (Poetica, 1457b). The link between
analogies and metaphors on the one hand, and analogies and models on the other
facilitates the association of models and metaphors, that is, conceptual schemes and
frameworks and the metaphorical bases underlying such schemes (Leatherdale,74).
1.4.1. The `Root Metaphor' Theory
This link is developed in the `root-metaphor theory' due to Pepper (1942) which, "if true,
shows the connection of [metaphysical] theories with common sense, illuminates the
nature of these theories, renders them distinguishable from one another, and acts as an
instrument of criticism for determining their relative adequacy." (p.84) Pepper holds that
metaphysical schemes or `world hypotheses' may be generated in essentially two ways,
viz.
1. via analogy (similarity) or
2. via permutations of logical postulates, that is, derivation from a set of premises
(propositional statements which correspond to facts about the world).
However, he maintains that "no conventionalistic world hypothesis has ever been
generated by the postulational method. It is only a possible alternative." (p.89) His
justification for this assertion is that "the postulational method itself is not quite free
from structural presuppositions [or assumptions]" (p.89), the source of which is to be
found in the corroboration of fact with fact which can be shown to be equivalent, in
reduced form, to an existing world hypothesis, viz. formism. Pepper identifies six basic
world theories derived from the following `root' metaphors (Table 1.1):
World Hypothesis Root Metaphor
Formism Similarity
Mechanism Machines
Contextualism History
Organicism Organisms (or Integration)
Mysticism Experience of Love
Animism Common-sense Man
Table 1.1 World Hypotheses and corresponding root metaphors.
The first four hypotheses are regarded as `relatively adequate' whereas the latter two are
viewed as inadequate on grounds of breadth (scope) and depth (precision) of phenomenal
coverage respectively (pp.115-137). The various root metaphors may also be
distinguished according to whether they are analytic (that is, reductionistic) or synthetic
(holistic) respectively (Fig 1.2).
Root Metaphors
Relatively adequate Inadequate
Analytical Synthetic
theories theories
Formism Mechanism Contextualism Organicism Mysticism Animism
Dispersive Integrative
theories theories
(Inadequacy of precision) (Inadequacy of scope)
Fig 1.2 Pepper's `Root' World Hypotheses.
1.4.2. The `Root Metaphor' Method
Pepper upholds the following as maxims, viz.
I A world hypothesis is determined by its root metaphor.
II Each world hypothesis is autonomous.
III Eclecticism (that is, the combination of hypotheses) is confusing.
IV Concepts which have lost contact with their root metaphors are empty abstractions (and lead to
hypostatization, that is, the assumption of intrinsic and ultimate ontological status).
He does not rule out the possibility "that the root metaphor of one theory may merge
with that of another, and eventually all may harmoniously come together [although] this
idea is itself a principle derived from one world theory [viz. organicism, an example
being the synthesis of opposites within Hegelian dialectic], and cannot be affirmed until,
or if, that theory .. should turn out to be completely adequate." (p.105) Nonetheless, it
is not a priori inconceivable that an eclectic theory combining the strengths of different
root-metaphors might be more adequate, that is, expressive, than the root metaphor
theories from which it is composed. However, he maintains that this view is untenable
on the grounds that eclectic theories fail to meet the criteria of relative adequacy, viz.
"achievement in attaining complete precision in dealing with all facts whatever
presented." (p.115) This latter point is critically important since, as will be shown in
chapter 2, computationalism is correctly identified as a member of the class of eclectic
metaphysical systems.
Pepper presents a method for identifying the metaphorical bases underlying metaphysical
frameworks, viz. the `root-metaphor method', which is also the means by which a
worldview or ontology is established:
1. In attempting to understand the world, search for a clue to its comprehension.
2. Select a domain of common-sense fact and attempt to understand other domains in terms of the
selected domain.
3. The selected domain becomes the basic analogy or root metaphor.
4. Attempt to describe the characteristics of this domain by discriminating its structure.
5. A list of the structural characteristics of this domain provide the basic concepts of explanation and
description. These are known as categories.
6. Investigate all other domains of fact whether analyzed or unanalyzed in terms of the categories.
7. Attempt to interpret all facts in terms of the categories.
8. As a result of the impact of these other facts upon the categories, make any necessary qualifications
and adjustments to the categories. (p.91)
However, in step (2), it is unclear what is meant by a `common sense fact'. For Pepper,
it is ùncriticised evidence', "something precritical and probably not critically sound"
(p.39). At this point, a link between `common sense' and the socialisation of
metaphysical claims alluded to in section 1.2 can be established: Just as a metaphor may
become literal (`dead') through extended use within a community of users, so also the
metaphysics associated with a class of metaphysics-defining metaphors can become
hypostatized, that is, canonized in an ontology, via socialisation (maxim IV above). That
this has happened on numerous previous occasions is well attested to within the literature
cited in section 1.3. However, with respect to computationalism (chapter 2), the view that
the world is computational at the fundamental level of its being, something additional
has happened: An eclectic (or synthetic) metaphor has emerged, its root metaphors
conveniently effaced, and the emergent metaphor subsequently hypostatized; hence, the
claims for computationalism as a radical alternative to existing metaphysical schemes.
1.4.3. Problems with Metaphors
Lakoff and Johnson (1980) maintain that the human conceptual system is largely
metaphorical in character and that metaphorical linguistic expressions are systematically
linkable to metaphorical concepts. However, they draw attention to a serious problem
associated with the use of metaphors in conceptual thought, viz.
the very systematicity that allows us to comprehend one aspect of a concept in terms of another .. will
necessarily hide other aspects of the concept. In allowing us to focus on one aspect of a concept .. a
metaphorical concept can keep us from focusing on other aspects of the concept that are inconsistent
with that metaphor. (p.10)
Again, and in the context of metaphysical systems, which are, as Pepper maintains,
ultimately grounded in metaphor, "it is important to see that .. metaphorical structuring
.. is partial, not total. If it were total, one concept would actually be the other, not merely
understood in terms of it." (p.13) Metaphor is closely associated with another idea, viz.
abstraction: Metaphor involves the identification of one thing with another on the basis
of an analogy or perceived similarity holding between them. When the metaphor is taken
as primitive (ontological) and other things defined in terms of it, then it has become the
root metaphor for a particular metaphysics; abstraction, on the other hand, is simply the
means by which similarity and difference is established. For example, if we have a
collection of things and proceed to define all things in terms of a particular thing, then
the thing chosen in order to define the other things determines the root metaphor for the
associated metaphysics while the process by which the thing attains this status is
abstraction. (The root metaphor is also known as an abstraction; hence, the term
abstraction refers both to a process and its product). Problems arise when the fact that
abstraction has occurred is ignored, that is, when the metaphorical basis of a
metaphysical system is disregarded. The possibility of this happening is alluded to by
Rogers (1995) who maintains that
not only do particular concepts, metaphors, etc. bewitch; a certain kind of bewitchment is endemic
to the use of concepts in general. They induce in us a certain kind of mental set. (p.85)
It is argued that this is precisely what has happened in the study of matter, life and mind:
The computational metaphor (chapter 2) guiding recent thinking in physics, biology and
cognitive science has, like its predecessor the machine metaphor, receded into the
background; its generative source, the human being in its capacity as abstractionist10
(that which performs the act of abstraction), having been conveniently removed from the
picture11. However, it is maintained (i) that a thing cannot be a metaphor (or abstraction)
unless it is interpreted as a metaphor (or abstraction) by someone both implying and
being implied by (ii) the existential fact that metaphors (abstractions) are produced by
someone. This leads to the interpretation-production duality introduced in section 1.6 and
described in more detail in chapter 7.
1.5. Computationalism
In this section the concept of computationalism (chapter 2) and its links to notions such
as artificiality (chapter 4) and emergence (chapter 3) are introduced. This is done in order
to prepare the way for an examination of the approach adopted in the critique of
10
Elstob (1982) defines an abstractionist as "a physical system of the kind that can give rise to and sustain
ideational happenings." (p.25)
11
This corresponds to what Baudrillard (1983) has referred to as the `liquidation of referentiality' and will be
discussed in detail in chapters 6 and 7.
computationalism presented in this study (chapters 6 and 7) and briefly introduced in

section 1.6.
1.5.1. What is Computationalism ?
As stated previously, computationalism is the metaphysical view that the world at its
most fundamental (or ontological) level is computational in being (essence).
Computation is usually defined in terms of information processing by a class of abstract
mathematical machines known as Turing machines, whereby ìnformation processing'
is usually meant formal symbol manipulation (chapter 2). Although computationalism
had its origin in the philosophy of mind, it has transcended this discipline to become -
arguably - the guiding ontology in science and philosophy. According to Putnam (1988),
with the rise of computer science, an entirely new paradigm of what a scientific realist account of
intentionality [that is, the directedness of mental states towards objects] might look like presented
itself. The need for a full-length investigation of the question of the scientific reducibility of
intentionality in the age of the computer thus arose. (p.108)
Similar assertions have been made in the context of life (Rifkin,84), viz.
Darwin constructed nature in the image of the industrial machine. The new temporal theory of
evolution is reconstructing nature in the image of the electronic computer (p.200)
and the extension to physical reality itself is widely documented in the literature. For
example, Davies (1992) maintains that
history has thrown up many physical images for the underlying rational order of the world: the
universe as a manifestation of perfect geometrical forms, as a living organism, as a vast clockwork
machine and, most recently, as a gigantic computer. (p.22)
The essence of the computationalist worldview is succinctly captured in an observation

of Davies which echoes the positivist-instrumentalist maxim12, "what cannot can be
measured cannot be talked about in any precise or definite way", viz. "what can't be
computed is meaningless." (p.146) According to Rifkin,
[the computer] is becoming the chief metaphor for the reconceptualization of the origin and
development of the species. It is no mere coincidence that many of the operating principles that
animate the computer happen to be the same operating principles that biologists now claim are the
basis of all living systems. The cosmologists are once again borrowing the organizing technology of
the society and `projecting' it onto nature. To the question How does nature operate ? the new answer
is that it operates in a manner similar to the electronic computer [emphasis added]. (p.201)
In the context of this study, there are (at least) two points to note in connection with the
above statement: First, like all metaphysical systems that assume a position of dominance
12
I am grateful to Peter Cariani (1999) for this concise formulation of the positivist-instrumentalist position.
at some epoch in history, computationalism determines (1) what questions can

(descriptive) - and should (normative) - be asked and (2) how they can - and should - be
answered. On this basis, it is argued that critical evaluation of claims for the sufficiency
of computationalism (and other metaphysical system) is necessary in order to guard
against the possibility of dogmatic obscurantism within the sciences and humanities13.
Hence, the motivation behind the study reported herein; second, and more immediately
relevant is the fact that computationalism is a metaphysics and, as a metaphysics, either
has a defining root metaphor or is defined in terms of a synthesis (èclectic mix') of root
metaphors (section 1.4.2). In this case, the metaphor is clearly identifiable as the
computer. However, since (according to Pepper) this is not a root metaphor (section
1.4.1), it must be a synthetic (or eclectic) metaphor, the precise nature of which is
examined in chapter 2.
In the remainder of this section, links between computationalism, artificiality (chapter

4) and emergence (chapter 3) are briefly examined in order to establish further support
for the view that computationalism constitutes an a priori tenable metaphysical position.
1.5.2. Computationalism and Artificiality
Artificiality can be understood in two distinct senses, viz. (1) artificiality as appearance
and contrasted with reality, and (2) artificiality as artifactuality (or made-ness) and
contrasted with naturality (or givenness)14. Crucially, these distinctions are held to be
orthogonal: For example, the original oil on canvas painting known as "The Mona Lisa"
is real; yet, it is also a man-made object, an artifact and hence, not a natural15. Since
Mona Lisa (the person) is both real and a natural, it follows that reality encompasses both
naturals and artifactuals. By contrast, someone (an actress) impersonating Mona Lisa (the
person), can appear to be Mona Lisa; yet, this person as a person (that is, by virtue of
being a person) is a natural and hence, not an artifact. Since a replica (fake) of "The
Mona Lisa" is both artifactual and apparent, it follows that appearance encompasses both
naturals and artifactuals. These distinctions are summarized in Table 1.2:
13
This statement is not merely polemical and rhetorical. According to Casti (1989), "the modern scientist is in
much the same situation as the artisan of the Renaissance, at least when it comes to needing a patron to finance
pursuit of the muse. The only difference is that nowadays everyone has the same patron - the federal
government. As a result, most funds are allocated by federal agencies, making liberal use of the so-called peer
review process. This involves committees of experts from the various fields getting together and recommending
to the funding agencies those projects and those scholars whose work they feel merits support. According to
the ideology, this process ensures that money is channeled to those ideas, institutions, and individuals showing
the clearest evidence of being able to do something productive with it [emphasis added]." (p.14)
14
The givenness vs. made-ness distinction is examined in chapter 6 and 7.
15
Various objections to this assertion are briefly considered in chapter 4.
Appearance Reality
Artifactuality Replica of Original painting

"The Mona Lisa" "The Mona Lisa"
Naturality `Mona Lisa' Mona Lisa

(an impersonator) (herself)
Table 1.2 Orthogonal Appearance-Reality and Artifactuality-Naturality Distinctions.
It is crucial to appreciate at the outset that the appearance-reality distinction is concerned

with epistemological issues of truth, more specifically, with the possibility of
establishing correspondences (isomorphisms) between natural and artificial (as
artifactual) phenomena as instantiations of some underlying noumenal16 form; the
artifactuality-naturality distinction, by contrast, is concerned with ontological issues of
becoming, more precisely, with the distinct ways in which different phenomena,
specifically, naturals and artificials (as artifactuals), come-to-be. The former distinction
can be classified as noetic and the latter, as will be shown in chapter 6, as poitic.
Postulating the orthogonality of these distinctions is of critical significance because it
supports the possibility of "strong" artificialities (as artifactualities), that is, artifactual
analogues of natural phenomena, whereby analogue is understood realization or
emulation as opposed to mere simulation (chapter 4). By displacing questions concerning
poisis (becoming, coming-forth, bringing-forth) in favour of questions concerning
noesis (knowing), it is possible to argue that naturals and artifactuals are members of a
common class of beings17. However, this necessitates the adoption of a philosophical
position supporting the interpretation of naturals and artificials (as artifactuals) as
instantiations of a univeral essence defined in abstract terms. A philosophy supporting
abstraction of this kind is functionalism18 which was originally developed by Hilary
16
The Oxford Companion to Philosophy (1995) defines noumena as "things that are thought" in contrast to
phenomena as "things that appear". Hence, the rationalistic connection in Kantian metaphysics between thought
and reality: For Kant, "the intelligible world of noumena is known by pure reason, which gives us knowledge
of things as they are [an sich]."
17
Conversely, by establishing the fact that epistemological issues of truth (noesis) are grounded in ontological
issues of becoming (poisis), it is possible to show that naturals and artifactuals are distinct kinds of beings
(chapter 6).
18
Although functionality can be - and on deistic-theistic argument for design theses (chapter 6) has been -
interpreted in teleologically a priori or goal-directed terms, viz. function as final cause, end or purpose,
Darwinian evolution provides the possibility for a non-teleological (or teleonomically a posteriori)
interpretation of functionality: A physical modification or variation (behavioural, structural etc), occurring in
an organism either for the first time or as a characteristic inherited from the phylogenetic line (species), is
considered functional if adaptive, that is, if conferring survival advantage to the organism in the context of its
environment. Moreover, all modifications are held to be either (1) adaptive or (2) non-adpative (`side effects'
or by-products) but also non-deleterious as a consequence of the `weeding out' mechanism of natural selection.
Putnam (and others) in the context of the philosophy of mind. The Oxford Companion
to Philosophy (1995) defines functionalism in the following terms, which have been
generalized to account for the application of this philosophical position to phenomena
other than the mental:
The theory that the condition for being in a mental [or vital or material] state should be given by the
functional role of the state, that is, in terms of its standard causal relationships, rather than by
supposed intrinsic features of the state. The role is normally envisaged as being specified in terms of
which states (typically) produce it and which other states and behavioural outputs will (typically) be
produced by it when the state interacts with further mental [or vital or material] states .. and inputs.
Functionalism is a development of the mentalistic aspect of Cartesian dualism, viz. mind

is to matter as function is to (material) realization. Functionalism is readily linked to
computationalism, viz. function is to (material) realization as software is to hardware19.
However, the connection is a contingent one; many different kinds of functionalism are
possible and computer-functionalism or computationalism is merely one type, albeit the
most familiar in the context of discussions of what Simon (1981) calls the "sciences of
the artificial", that is, artificial intelligence (AI), artificial life (A-Life), artificial physics
(A-Physics) and artificial or virtual reality (A/VR) (chapter 4)20. However, it might be
argued that a transition from functionalism to computationalism is almost inevitable
given the fact that the originator of the former (Putnam) analyzed function in terms of
a class of abstract, ideal, formal-mathematical objects known as Turing machines
(chapter 2). Hence, the link between computationalism and artificiality via functionalism.
1.5.3. Computationalism and Emergence
If computationalism is to provide a sufficient metaphysical basis for artificiality, it must

be shown how phenomena associated with individual artificial sciences can be integrated
into a unified framework. This is necessary for (at least) two reasons: First,
computationalism is a metaphysical position and hence, must, by definition (section
1.3.2), support phenomenal unification; second, functionalism, which provides the
Hence, it no longer appears to be necessary to hold that biological purpose is real; final causation can be
viewed as a merely anthropomorphic interpretation projected onto the behaviours of organisms which are, in
reality, unconsciously generated in response to a contingent environment.
19
If mind and function are conceived in dynamic, processualist (rather than in static, substantialist) terms then
the computationalist duality is more accurately given as process (or program in execution) is to processor. The
link between computationalism and processualism is briefly examined in chapter 2
20
However, as will be seen in chapter 4, it is important to appreciate that the `sciences of the artificial' are not
limited to these disciplines. This follows, in part, from the fact that, for Simon (1969, 1981), artificiality does
not refer to a particular type of artificiality but to the concept of artificiality as such, that is, to what constitutes
the essence of an artifact as an artifact. In chapter 4, it is argued that artificiality must, therefore, be understood
in (at least) two senses, viz. (1) as the universal essence of artifactuals and (2) as particular artifactual domains
(such as AI, A-Life, A/VR etc).
philosophical basis for the possibility of "strong" artificiality (as artifactuality), requires
an isomorphism or one-one correspondence (functional, behavioural, causal, structural
etc) between artificiality and naturality to be established in order to grant the former the
status afforded the latter, viz. reality (section 1.5.3). This necessitates considering (i)
whether naturality is organized; (ii) if organized, the nature of this organization; and (iii)
how such an organization (if its exists) comes into existence. The existence of structure,
pattern, organization, order etc in nature is a necessary condition for the possibility of
science; furthermore, most serious21 philosophy assumes the metaphysical axiom of
universal order in order to get started. In the context of this study, it is assumed that
nature or naturality is organized; hence, "strong" artificiality (as artifactuality) must also
be organized and in such a way as to be isomorphic with naturality. With respect to the
nature of this organization, there are a number of alternatives (chapter 5); however,
perhaps the most common is the hierarchy (chapters 3 and 5), viz. a system of things
arranged in a graded order according to certain criteria: For example, the naturalistic
hierarchy matter6life6mind, where matter is historically antecedent to and a basis for life
(and mind), and life is historically antecedent to and a basis for mind. Crucially, if
naturality is hierarchically-structured structure then artificiality (as artifactuality) must,
of necessity, be hierarchically-structured. This follows directly from the functionalist
requirement for isomorphism between the two kinds of phenomena.
Functionality can be conceived as originating in essentially one of two ways, viz. as a

result of design or as a product of evolution (chapter 6). Similarly, there are essentially
two ways in which to generate a hierarchy, viz. design or emergence. A detailed
investigation of the notion of emergence is presented in chapter 3. In the context of the
current discussion, it is sufficient to identify emergence with the appearance of a new
property (the emergent) arising in a systemic complex as a consequence of a specific
pattern of activity of its components (the substrate). In order for a property to be
considered emergent, it must not be possible for the property to be deduced from the
properties of the substrate. For example, on the emergent-materialist theory of mind due
to Searle (1992), consciousness is a biological property which emerges as a consequence
of neurophysiological processes.
The two possibilities for hierarchy generation, viz. design or emergence, correspond to
the two possibilities for naturality, viz. intentionalistic creation or naturalistic evolution22.
If creationism is false then evolution must have occurred since natural phenomena clearly
21
Certain strains of post-modern thinking such as Derridean deconstructionism and ontological relativism are,
therefore, excluded on this view.
22
The qualifier `naturalistic' is necesaary because supernaturalistic interpretations of evolution are possible
(Mercer,17).
exist and their existence must be accounted for by some naturalistic means23. Hence, the
naturalistic hierarchy must be emergent and, as a consequence of the requirement for
"strong" artificiality (as artifactuality) to be isomorphic with naturality, the hierarchy of
artificialities must also be emergent. Furthermore, the link between computationalism
and artificiality on the one hand, and between artificiality and emergence on the other
must be considered: Computationalism is an ontology; hence, the hierarchy of
artificialities must emerge from a computational substrate24. This leads directly to the
notion of computationally emergent artificiality or CEA (chapter 5).
Computationalism is grounded in the notion of computation, more specifically, symbolic

information processing by Turing machines (section 1.5.1). A Turing machine is
completely specified when its `hardware' (symbol processing machinery) and software
(symbolic program) have been described (chapter 2). By adopting a functionalist
position, this software-hardware duality can be brought into correspondence with
Cartesian mind-body dualism, a generalization of which features in the emergentist
conception of nature described by Samuel Alexander in Space, Time and Deity (1920).
For Alexander, the ultimate stuff of reality is Space-Time, Cartesian dualism finding
expression in Alexander's guiding maxim, "Time is the mind of Space". On this scheme,
matter is emergent from Space-Time, life is emergent from matter and mind is emergent
from life (chapter 5). Alexander's ontology provides a suitable basis for exploring the
links between computationalism, emergence and artificiality, more specifically, for
developing a unified framework of computationally emergent artificiality or CEA
(chapter 5): Space-time events are prior to matter, life, and mind; hence, Space-Time is
an abstract or ideal (that is, non-physicalist) metaphysics (Brettschneider,64).
Computationalism is also an abstract or idealistic metaphysics (chapters 2, 5 and 7);
hence, the possibility of reinterpreting Alexander's ontology in computationalist terms
by establishing an isomorphism between computations and Space-Time events. However,
since the required isomorphism is structural (or behavioural) as well as functional (or
logical)25, Turing machines cannot fulfil this role; hence, the adoption in this study of
cellular automata or CAs (chapters 2 and 5) as the means by which to implement
computationalism, leading to the concept of a unified framework of emergent artificiality
23
Alternatively, natural phenomena could be granted axiomatic status; they are simply given. Such a position is,
however, regarded as stultifying within the reductionist Western scientific-philosophical tradition which seeks
to explain things in terms of other simpler things.
24
Creationism is incommensurable with computationalism if the ontology of the Creator is held to be non-
computational.
25
In short, if functional (or logical) isomorphism is necessary yet insufficient for noumenal (substrate) and
phenomenal (emergent) isomorphism.
grounded in CA-computationalism, viz. computationally emergent artificiality or CEA26

(chapter 5).
1.6. Critique
In this section, the motivation underlying the critique of computationalism presented in
this study is examined and the approach adopted is briefly described.
1.6.1. Why Critique Computationalism ?
Roszak (1986) maintains that
a significant, well-financed segment of the technical and scientific community - the specialists in
artificial intelligence and cognitive science - has leant the computer model of the mind the sanction
of a deep metaphysical proposition (p.217)
an observation which may be generalized to computational models of matter and life and,
conceivably, to reality itself. How could this happen ? According to Rose et al. (1984),
"by a process of the `willing suspension of disbelief', unspoken agreement on an
appropriate level of criticality occurs among the disinterested parties, and a corpus of
scientific knowledge is created, validated and legitimated by its creators." (p.35) As
stated previously, this involves determining (specifying, bounding, circumscribing) the
what and how of a science (that is, valid subject matter and methods for its study), an
activity that is necessarily extra- or meta-scientific since, as Heidegger (1977d) states,
"the sciences are not in a position at any time to represent themselves to themselves, to
set themselves before themselves, by means of their theory and through the modes of
procedure belonging to theory." (p.177) For example, "physics as physics can make no
assertions about physics. All the assertions of physics speak after the manner of physics.
Physics is not itself a possible object of a physical experiment." (p.176) Science is
essentially non-reflexive (that is, incapable of self-reference and self-grounding27)
because of its definition in objectivist terms (Nagel,86). As stated in section 1.2, that
which is both prior to and beyond science, beyond or meta- the physics and providing
the latter with its ontological ground, is metaphysics; hence, the act of defining a science
26
It is worthwhile, at this stage in the discussion, clarifying what is meant by the term computationally emergent
artificality or CEA (chapter 5). This does not refer to the capacity of a computational system to generate
artifacts which are identifiable by the system as artifacts distinguishable (presumably) from computationally
emergent naturals. Although this is an interesting possibility to consider - and is certainly consistent with what
might be required of a "strong" artificial intelligence - this is not what is meant by CEA. Rather, the latter is
a generic term for the class of artifactual analogues of natural phenomena (such as matter, life and mind);
furthermore, such artifactual phenomena as emerge from a computational substrate.
27
On this view, second-order cybernetics, in which reflexivity, self-reference and the intrinsic role of the observer
(subject) are essential, cannot be classified as science.
(and thereby circumscribing a legitimate domain of inquiry and the means by which to
investigate it) constitutes a metaphysical act. Moreover, it is an act which is necessary,
Chalmers (1982) asserts, in order for Kuhnian intra-paradigmatic or `normal' science to
be possible since
if all scientists were critical of all parts of the framework [paradigm] in which they worked all of the
time then no detailed work would ever get done. (p.98)
This position is supported by Jacobs (1995), who maintains, adopting a Heideggerian

perspective28, that "how [a] science came about (by not only determining what beings
were meant to be studied but by already giving what it means `to be' for those certain
beings) is the fundamental question. This question, however, must remain closed off to
science for there to be scientific activity, for if a scientist continually questioned the
ontological basis of his or her science, activity would necessarily cease." (pp.7-8) Hence,
there are two separate issues: (i) what is science and (ii) what is it that makes science
possible ? As stated previously, since the answer to the latter question cannot be
something scientific without a self-referential paradox arising, it must, therefore, be
something both prior to and beyond science, that is, something metaphysical. An insight
into the nature of the metaphysical is given by Nietzsche's assertion that rhetoric
(persuasion) is the ground of dialectic (reason), which, suitably deconstructed
(Norris,82), supports the view that the metaphorical is the ground of the conceptual as
implied in Pepper's (1942) root metaphor theory (section 1.4.1).
Given the link between science, metaphysics and metaphor described herein and in
earlier sections, it might be asked What is wrong with metaphysics ? More specifically,
what is wrong with computationalism ? And is there really something wrong ?
Conceptual schemes (that is, metaphysical systems) and the metaphors on which they are
based are not causes for concern when metaphors and the links between metaphors and
conceptual schemes are readily identifiable, for in such cases, metaphysics is
recognizable as metaphysics (section 1.4.3). Problems arise when a conceptual scheme
is detached from its metaphorical base(s) to become the tacit (or `background') ground
of a paradigm29. It is precisely this kind of problem which leads Chalmers to issue the
following caveat, viz.
if all scientists were and remained normal scientists then a particular science would become trapped
in a single paradigm and would never progress beyond it. (p.98)
28
The existential (or ontological) phenomenology of the German philosopher Martin Heidegger (1889-1976)
provides the basis for the poitic critique of computationally emergent artificiality presented in this study.
Certain key aspects of his early thinking are briefly outlined in what follows. A more detailed examination of
those aspects of his thought directly relevant to this study is presented in chapters 6 and 7.
29
Thus, autonomous metaphysical systems, that is, metaphysical schemes that have, paraphrasing Baudrillard
(1983), `liquidated their referential' (the referential in this case being the associated metaphors), are grounds
that become tacit (or implicit), in short, backgrounds.
In The Question Concerning Technology (1977a), Heidegger drew attention to what he

called the `danger' inherent within Enframing (Gestellen), whereby the latter is meant
that mode of revealing (disclosing, unconcealing) of Being which views everything in
terms of functional standing-reserve (Bestand) or stock ordered according to the
concerns of that which does the ordering, human being (Dasein). On his view,
the revealing that rules in modern technology is [a setting-upon,] a challenging .. which puts to nature
the unreasonable demand that it supply energy that can be extracted and stored as such. (p.14)
The `danger' is described as follows:
Enframing does not simply endanger man in his relationship to himself and to everything that is. As
a destining, it banishes man into that kind of revealing which is an ordering. Where this ordering
holds sway, it drives out every other possibility of revealing .. The rule of Enframing threatens man
with the possibility that it could be denied to him to enter into a more original revealing and hence
to experience the call of a more primal truth. (pp.27-28)
Computationalism, arguably the most recent manifestation of that mode of revealing

which is Enframing, contributes to the danger, perhaps more so than any previous
expression of Enframing since computationalism is a type of functionalism and
functionalism is readily connected with notions such as function, teleology, purpose and
concern. Hence, when a concept, such as computation develops into an ontology such
as computationalism, it becomes imperative to examine the latter, particularly if and
when it assumes the status of the ruling dogma30. Computationalism is a metaphysical
position; hence, like all metaphysical systems, it must be continuously and critically
assessed in order to prevent the computer metaphor from hypostatizing, that is, receding
into the background and blocking the emergence of other approaches to the
conceptualization of reality grounded in other metaphors. Unfortunately, as stated in the
preface, it appears that this has already happened: Appreciation of the metaphorical
status of the statement `the world is a computer' is diminishing and it is being taken for
granted that the computationalistic approach to the world will deliver it over in much the
same way that Laplacians believed Newtonian mechanics would deliver the world over
to them. As Rifkin (1984) observes,
when it comes to the present, there seems to be an unwillingness on the part of the scientists and the
public alike to believe that current cosmological reformulations are subject to the same [historical and
cultural] critique. On the contrary, it is argued, and rather pugnaciously, that for the first time in
history mankind is exposing the real secrets of nature, once and for all [emphasis added]. (p.160)
For this reason, it is maintained that it is necessary to question concerning

computationalism (chapter 6), to study the phenomenon of computationalism in its
30
According to Cariani (1989), there is "a pervasive tendency in artificial intelligence and computer science to
believe that literally everything is a computation." (p.xi)
various manifestations31. At this point, Heidegger's views regarding the possibility of any
such project become important: His recognition of the historicity and situatedness of the
investigator, viz. we are all beings in the world in time, is illustrated by the following
caveat which he issued in the context of his own exploration of the question of Being
(Heidegger,82):
The consideration of Being takes its start from beings. This commencement is obviously determined
by the factual experience of beings and the range of possibilities of experience that at any time are
peculiar to a factical Dasein [that is, particular human being], and hence to the historical situation of
a philosophical investigation. It is not the case that at all times and for everyone all beings and all
specific domains of beings are accessible in the same way; and, even if beings are accessible inside
the range of experience, the question still remains whether, within naive and common experience,
they are already suitably understood in their specific mode of Being. Because the Dasein is historical
in its own existence, possibilities of access and modes of interpretation of beings are themselves
diverse, varying in different historical circumstances. (p.22)
1.6.2. From Philosophy to Phenomenology
Phenomenology, as the name implies, refers to the study of phenomena. Phenomena

comes from the Greek phainomenon which in turn comes from phainesthai, `to appear'
and phainein, `to show' (Angeles,81); hence, phenomenology might be described as the
study of appearances. However, àppearance' can be understood in at least two senses:
(i) appearance as contrasted with reality (Kant); (ii) appearance as the coming to
presence of reality (Heidegger); on the former view, appearance and reality are different
while on the latter view they are the same (although this is a simplification). Adopting
the first view and writing in Critique of Pure Reason (1934), Kant described the
distinction between appearance and reality or phenomena and noumena as follows:
A transcendental use is made of a conception in a fundamental proposition or principle, when it is

referred to things in general and considered as things in themselves; an empirical use when it is
referred merely to phenomena, that is, to objects of a possible experience. (p.182)
The conception of a noumenon, that is, of a thing which must be cogitated not as an object of sense,
but as a thing in itself (solely through the pure understanding), is not self-contradictory, for we are
not entitled to maintain that sensibility is the only possible mode of intuition. Nay, further, this
conception is necessary to restrain sensuous intuition within the bounds of phenomena, and thus to
limit the objective validity of sensuous cognition; for things in themselves, which lie beyond its
province, are called noumena for the very purpose of indicating that this cognition does not extend
its application to all that the understanding thinks .. [Hence,] the conception of a noumenon .. is
connected with the limitation of sensibility, without, however, being capable of presenting us with
any positive datum beyond this sphere. (p.188)
[When] we say, the senses represent objects as they appear, the understanding as they are, the latter
statement must not be understood in a transcendental, but only in an empirical signification, that is,
31
The justification for adopting a phenomenological approach to the question concerning computationalism is
presented in section 1.6.4 and chapter 6.
as they must be represented in the complete connection of phenomena, and not according to what they
may be [that is, as things in themselves], apart from their relation to possible experience, consequently
not as objects of the pure understanding. For this must ever remain unknown to us. (p.190)
In the last statement, Kant identifies three orders: (i) the order of sense (às they appear');
(ii) the order of understanding (às they are'); (iii) the order of the unknown (às they
may be'). (i) and (iii) correspond to appearance (phenomena) and reality (noumena)
respectively; (ii) arises from Kant's attempt to reconcile rationalism and empiricism via
the synthetic a priori, that is, mental structures supplying categories such as causality,
space, time etc which are responsible for `filtering' and ordering sensory experience.
Hence, the human mind is partially responsible for determining what counts as
appearance (phenomena); reality (noumena), however, is permanently beyond its reach.
The two interpretations of being, viz. às they are' and às they may be', lead to an
ambiguity in the way that Kant uses the term àppearance' which Scruton (1982)
identifies as follows:
Kant sometimes writes as though appearances are àppearances of' something, whose reality is hidden
from us. At other times, he writes as though appearances are independent entities, which derive their
name from the fact that we observe and discover their nature. (p.43)
The latter interpretation is consistent with the modern scientific view in which
appearances correspond to physical objects and there is nothing beyond the physical. The
former view, viz. reality encompasses appearance, is developed in Heidegger's
philosophy of Being, although Heidegger employs the term appearance in a radically
different sense to that of Kant (chapter 6). For Heidegger, the appearance-reality
distinction is a product of the division of Being into essence (whatness) and existence
(thatness) as shown in Fig 1.3.
Plato-Aristotle Kant
Whatness Form Noumenon
(essentia) (idea) (reality)
Being
(aletheia-physis)
Thatness Substance Phenomenon

(existentia) (energeia) (appearance)
Fig 1.3 The Division of Being in Metaphysics.
According to Heidegger, Being was originally understood (by the pre-Socratic Greeks)
as aletheia-physis, the emerging power which brings itself forth into presence from
concealment (Heidegger,73). It was with Plato and Aristotle that Being became
fragmented into the oppositions idea (form) and energeia (substance), possibility and
actuality, culminating, in the Kantian duality of reality and appearance (or
representation). The link between representation and appearance is a consequence of the
mediation of phenomena by a representing agency, viz. the human mind with its
"filtering" structures, the synthetic a priori; appearance is representation because it is a
re-presentation of underlying reality by the mind. However, for Heidegger (1959), reality
is appearance; Being is what comes to presence (appears) from concealment, although
it appears or discloses itself multiply in beings (or things), viz. "just as becoming is the
appearance of Being, so appearance as appearing is a becoming of Being." (p.115) A
figurative depiction of the difference between appearance and reality as understood in
Kant and Heidegger is shown in Fig 1.4.
Heidegger Kant
Appearance (being) Appearance (phenomena)
Reality (Being) Reality (noumena)
Fig 1.4 Appearance-Reality in Heidegger and Kant.
The Kantian phenomenal-noumenal or appearance-reality distinction may be viewed as

a staticization of the Heideggerian concept of Being. This can be shown by establishing
a link between the two interpretations of appearance on the basis of the following
statement taken from An Introduction to Metaphysics (Heidegger,59):
Physis is the emerging power, the standing-there-in-itself, stability. Idea, appearance as what is seen,
is a determination of the stable insofar as it encounters vision. But physis as emerging power is by
the same token an appearing. Except that the appearing is ambiguous. Appearing means first: [1] that
which gathers itself, which brings-itself-to-stand in its togetherness and so stands. But second it
means: [2] that which, already standing there, presents a front, a surface, offers an appearance to be
looked at. (p.182)
Thus, Being manifests itself [1] dynamically and continuously as emergence and [2]
statically and discretely as appearance; consequently, for Heidegger, the substance
ontology versus process ontology debate in metaphysics (Rescher,96) is misconceived:
Substance and process are two aspects of the same thing which can only be related into
a unity by appreciating the historicity or temporality of Being as it emerges into
appearance as the Being of beings (things). This issue will be examined in detail in
chapter 6 in connection with a discussion of the unitary relatedness of Being, becoming

and appearance in Heideggerian ontology.
The different understandings of appearance in Kant and Heidegger give rise to an

interesting problem: If appearance and reality are (ultimately) the same, as Heidegger
holds, then to make a distinction between them is meaningless. If, on the other hand, they
are distinct, as Kant argues, then to assert their identity is clearly false; yet, if it is
meaningful to make a distinction, on what basis can the distinction be made ? Kennick
(1967) maintains that this must be the possibility that appearance and reality are
identical. However, this would contradict the Kantian claim for their being
fundamentally distinct; hence, the Kantian formulation leads to a paradox. The
Heideggerian solution to this problem involves the notion of temporality: The Kantian
paradox arises because reality and appearance are regarded as static binary opposites; if,
however, they are regarded as temporally-related aspects, viz. emergence (dynamic) and
appearance (static) respectively, the paradox can be resolved. A similar problem arises
in the context of artificiality: Does the latter imply appearance or reality ? Again, the
Heideggerian solution is to invoke historicity and consider the poisis or coming-forth
(section 1.6.5 and chapter 6) of artificials as contrasted with naturals. This in turn
necessitates considering artificiality from a temporal ontological perspective, viz.
artificiality as artifactuality, as opposed to a static epistemological perspective, viz.
artificiality as appearance (section 1.5.2). In order to clarify the relation between the two
interpretations of artificiality (appearance and artifactuality), it is necessary to develop
a phenomenological framework for investigating the ontological (productive,
organization) aspects of artificiality on the one hand, and the epistemological
(interpretative, observational) aspects of artificiality on the other (section 1.6.5 and
chapter 7). In the course of this study, the implications of adopting Kantian and
Heideggerian interpretations of appearance will be examined: In chapter 4, the former
is shown to lead to an endorsement of functionalism and "strong" computationally
emergent artificiality or CEA (chapter 5); however, in chapter 6, the latter is shown to
provide the means by which the poisis (coming-forth, bringing-forth) of
computationally emergent artificiality may be differentiated from the poisis of
naturality. On this basis a poitic difference, that is, a difference in becoming entailing
a difference in the Being of natural and artificial (as artifactual) phenomena (beings) is
established, thereby undermining the possibility of "strong" CEA.
1.6.3. A Brief Introduction to Heideggerian Phenomenology
In the previous section, phenomenology was defined as the study of appearance.

However, within philosophical circles, phenomenology refers to something much more
specific. In Basic Problems of Phenomenology (1982), Heidegger maintains that
phenomenology is not just one philosophical science amongst others, nor is it the science preparatory
to the rest of them; rather, the expression `phenomenology' is the name for the method of scientific
philosophy in general. (p.3)
The original formulation of phenomenology as a scientific method (and movement) can

be traced to the works of Edmund Husserl, specifically his Logical Investigations (1901)
and Ideas (1913). Husserl began by accepting the Cartesian maxim that the conscious
self (or ego) constitutes the indubitable ground of experience: Cogito ergo sum, "I think,
therefore I am". Following Brentano, he asserted that an analysis of consciousness
reveals it always as consciousness of something, that is, there is an àboutness' associated
with consciousness by which the mind is directed towards objects under some aspect.
This directional teleology of the mind is referred to as intentionality and Husserl
maintained that only mind is intentional, a claim which was later challenged by
Heidegger in Being and Time (1927). Husserl argued that there must be some kind of
content in the mind which accounted for its intentionality. This led him to develop a
general theory of intentional states and distinguish between the contents (or objects) of
consciousness and the conscious act (noesis). The abstract representational structure by
virtue of which the mind is directed towards objects under some aspect is called a noema.
Thinking about the noesis makes it the object of a secondary noesis, a reflexive act; this
is analogous to thinking about the content of a previous act. Hence, time (or temporality)
as the `horizon' of experience is an essential component of Husserlian phenomenology.
However, all of this presupposes Husserl's original contribution, `the phenomenological
reduction', which was made in connection with the Kantian appearance-reality (or
phenomenon-noumenon) problem. As Magee (1987) states,
there can be absolutely no doubt whatsoever that the objects of our consciousness exist as objects of
consciousness for us, whatever other existential status they may have or lack, and therefore that we
can investigate them as such without making any assumptions at all, positive or negative, about their
independent existence. (p.254)
According to Husserl, philosophy should concern itself with appearance (which was
indubitable), more specifically, with the systematic analysis of consciousness and its
objects; the ultimate nature of such objects - an ontological problem - was to be ignored
or `bracketed' since it was unanswerable. Thus, Husserl had effectively eliminated the
noumenal world from inquiry. However, it is important to appreciate that the ontological
question is only unanswerable if (some variant of) the Kantian interpretation of
appearance is adopted. Clearly, in proposing the phenomenological reduction, Husserl
assumed the Kantian appearance-reality distinction as valid. Crucially, by ignoring
ontological issues relating to the coming-to-presence or emergence of that which appears
(Being as physis) and focusing exclusively on epistemological issues relating to the
experiencing of objects already present (Being as idea), Husserlian phenomenology
provided the philosophical basis for the functionalist philosophy of artificiality,
specifically for the artificiality32 known as artificial intelligence. This claim is supported
by the existence of two distinct stages in the development of Husserl's thought
corresponding to what Fodor (1980) has called the `representational theory of mind'
32
Here, artificiality refers to an artificial phenomenon (that is, artifactual analogue of a natural phenomenon) as
opposed to the class of all such phenomena (chapter 4).
(which has already been briefly described) and the `computational theory of
representations' respectively. According to Dreyfus (1982), in the later Husserl, there is
a move away "from the view of intentional content as a logical property of intentional
states to the view of the content as a noema or rule governing the operations which make
intentionality possible" (p.11) This finds expression in two notions associated with
Husserlian phenomenology: (i) eidetic reduction, which involves the reduction of
everyday phenomena to essential phenomena or ideas. Husserl maintained that every
concrete, material object has its essence. Hence, the sciences rest on the basis provided
by phenomenology; and (ii) transcendental reduction, involving the reduction of noesis
(the act of consciousness) to a description similar to that produced when noemata are
analyzed in eidetic reduction. The transcendental reduction is necessary in order for
Husserl to ensure the objectivity of his phenomenology; hence, the reduction of the
subjective empirical ego to the objective Transcendental Ego, the universal Platonic
`form of forms'. This makes possible the computational theory of mind and artificial
intelligence because it allows for functionalism and the notion of multiple realizability:
Subjective human consciousness is merely one realization (or instantiation) amongst
many possible realizations of the universal form that is the Transcendental Ego. As
Dreyfus states,
the constant reference of all mental operations back to their source in the consitutive activities of the
transcendental ego might seem to suggest that for [Husserl] consciousness plays some crucial role
in the organization of experience and in the production of intentionality. If this were indeed the case,
Husserl's phenomenology would be the extreme opposite of a computational theory of
representational contents which treats the rules it postulates as programs that could run on any
`device', whether it be a mind or a nonconscious computer. But, in fact, for Husserl like Kant, the
notion of mental activity is so broadened that it does not require consciousness at all. Indeed, Kant
and Husserl are precursors of cognitivism precisely because their rules operate like programs totally
independently of the awareness of a conscious subject [emphasis added]. (pp.11-12)
Husserl maintained that in order to be considered psychologically real such rules have
to be available to consciousness, a position which would seem to contradict the previous
statement. However, this depends on whether consciousness is necessary or contingent
with respect to cognition. Adherents of computationalism and materialism are divided
on the issue. For some, consciousness is a fiction; cognition does not require
consciousness because consciousness does not exist. For others subscribing to a form of
computationalistic-emergentism (chapter 3), consciousness is an emergent property of
a particular computational organization (Chalmers,96); on this latter view, Husserl's
position might be correct. However, it is the conceivability of cognition as computation
without consciousness which has given rise to the possibility of philosophical zombies,
that is, nonconscious beings which are behaviourally, functionally, and perhaps even
physically indistinguishable from conscious human beings (Gzeldere,95). It is the
possibility of zombies which provides support for Dreyfus' assertion to the effect that
although Husserl's phenomenological reduction was supposed to eliminate (or `bracket')
the noumenal world, the idea of a noumenon was, in fact, tacitly reintroduced in the later
phase of the development of his phenomenology in that experience itself was reduced to
something non-experiential, viz. rules, programs or computations - the objective

Transcendental Ego. The reduction of a phenomenon or experience to the noumenal or
non-experiential is a principal feature of Samuel Alexander's `phenomenological
reduction' which Brettschenider (1964) describes as follows:
Alexander's method of arriving at pure Space-Time is a process that starts with images of material
things and events [in conscious experience], and then strips them one by one of the qualities which
they present to mind. As we rid things of all of their qualities, in effect, we are turning back the pages
of emergent history. Alexander expects this process to bring us ultimately to a residuum of quality-
less simples. This, the simplest stage of existence, is the level of pure Space-Time. (p.3)
It is conceivable that the result of the Husserlian phenomenological reduction could, in

turn, be phenomenologically reduced according to Alexander's scheme, viz. phenomena
are first reduced to a set of rules which are then reduced to a configuration of Space-
Time. This is significant since it establishes a link between cognitivism and
computationally emergent artificiality or CEA as realized in cellular automata (section
1.5.3 and chapter 5). However, what is more significant is that both Husserl and
Alexander are commited to a view that sees the anthropocentricity (human-centredness)
of everyday experience as a derivative (or secondary) phenomenon and thereby capable
of phenomenological reduction. It is precisely this view which Heidegger sets out to
challenge in Being and Time (1927). As Dreyfus (1982) states, "Heidegger attempts to
show that Husserlian intentionality is not self-sufficient. He claims to give a `concrete
demonstration' that the interconnected totality of equipment and social practices which
he calls significance is a condition of the possibility of abstracting meanings, such as
Husserl's noemata." (p.21)
Dreyfus (1991) describes Heidegger's phenomenology as hermeneutic realism. The word

`hermeneutics' derives from Hermes, the messenger of the Greek gods; thus,
hermneuein, `to interpret' and hermneutike (techn), the àrt of interpretation'. As
originally defined by Schleiermacher, the Protestant theologian and Plato scholar,
hermeneutics referred to that discipline concerned with the systematic interpretation of
speech and (sacred) texts; however, the meaning of the term was extended by Dilthey to
refer to the interpretation of all human behaviour and products. Heidegger redefined
hermeneutics as the study of Being commencing with that being for which Being is an
issue, viz. Dasein (human being). In Basic Problems of Phenomenology (1982),
Heidegger outlines the difference between his phenomenology and that of Husserl with
respect to their differing interpretations of the phenomenological reduction:
For Husserl, the phenomenological reduction .. is the method of leading phenomenological vision
from the natural attitude of the human being whose life is involved in the world of things and persons
back to the transcendental life of consciousness and its noetic-noematic experiences, in which objects
are constituted as correlates of consciousness. [On my view,] phenomenological reduction means
leading philosophical vision back from the apprehension of a being [Dasein or human being],
whatever may be the character of that apprehension, to the understanding of the Being of this being.
(p.21)
There are two stages which may be identified in the development of Heidegger's
phenomenology just as there are two stages in the development of Husserlian
phenomenology. In Husserl, the later stage is marked by the transcendental reduction;
in Heidegger, the later stage is marked by `The Turn' (Die Kehre) away from a
hermeneutic (or èxistential analytic') of Dasein and toward a historical study of Being
itself. While it is the thought of the later Heidegger which is of particular significance
in the context of this study, in order to appreciate this later work it is necessary to have
a basic understanding of his earlier writings since the two are intimately connected. In
this respect Hubert Dreyfus' Being-in-the-world (1991), a commentary on Division I of
Heidegger's Being and Time, provides a useful point of entry and it is from here that an
account of the early or pre-Kehre Heidegger will be drawn.
In Being and Time (1927), Heidegger claims to be doing ontology, that is, inquiring into
the nature of the understanding of Being not that we know, but that we are. Why should
he want to do this ? According to Heidegger, an ontological approach to phenomenology
is necessary because the philosophical tradition since Plato has concerned itself
exclusively with epistemological issues, that is, with explaining how ideas in the mind
can be true of the world, and in so doing, has overlooked the most fundamental fact
regarding the world, viz. that it is. Heidegger's project is an attempt at redressing the
balance; more precisely, he argues for the priority of ontology over epistemology. There
are two main aspects of the epistemological approach to the world which Heidegger
rejects: First, the Platonic view that human activity can be explained in terms of theory;
and secondly, the Cartesian view of the mind (as a knowing subject) directed towards the
world (as a known object). The culmination of this Platonic-Cartesian tradition is
identified by Heidegger as Husserlian transcendental phenomenology which, he
maintains, is of derivative (or secondary) status relative to existential (or ontological)
phenomenology.
According to Dreyfus (1991), "Heidegger wants to avoid what he sees as the recurrent
structure of traditional ontology, namely, grounding all kinds of being in a causally self-
sufficient source. He proposes, nonetheless, to show that all beings gain their
intelligibility in terms of the structure of one sort of being [viz. Dasein or human being]."
(p.12) This is an extremely important point in the context of the present study: It implies
that if the Heideggerian approach to Being is correct then "strong" computationalism is
impossible although "weak" or anthropocentric-computationalism (that is,
computationalism-relative-to-human-being) is possible. This is because Being is not to
be conceived causally (chapter 6) while computation is quintessentially viewed in causal
terms, specifically in terms of necessary causation or deterministic mechanism (chapters
2, 6 and 7).
Dreyfus (1991), following Heidegger, defines Being as "`that on the basis of which
beings are already understood'. Being is not a substance, a process, an event, or anything
that we normally come across; rather, it is a fundamental aspect of entities, viz. their
intelligibility." (p.xi) According to Heidegger, there are two main categories of Being:
(i) human being or Dasein and (ii) non-human being, the latter of which may be further
categorized into the ready-to-hand (Zuhandenheit) and the present-at-hand
(Vorhandenheit). Dasein (being-there or rather, being that `site' or `clearing' which
enables Being to come forth from concealment) is ontically distinct from non-human
being in that it has the understanding of Being as its unique characteristic. This
understanding is either (i) preontological (that is, pretheoretical) or (ii) ontological (that
is, hermeneutic); in the former, understanding takes the form of tacit and ineffable know-
how which assumes a `background' of shared practices, skills etc, while in the latter it
takes the form of reflective know-that (or know-what) characteristic of the kind of
understanding usually associated with a conscious cognizing subject. Dasein is a being-
in-the-world where the ìn' of being-in should be understood in terms of concernful
involvement (for example, `being in love')33 and not spatial location (for example, `being
in a box'). The ready-to-hand (or available) is how Dasein encounters non-human being
when coping with the world in an average-everyday unreflective manner. The ready-to-
hand is something which is used in-order-to get something done and is, therefore,
defined in terms of its equipmental functionality with respect to the concerns
(unreflective purposes) of Dasein. However, as Dreyfus (1991) states, "an ìtem' of
equipment is what it is only insofar as it refers to other equipment and so fits in a certain
way into an èquipmental whole'." (p.62) The equipmental whole may be distinguished
from other `wholes' such as the referential and involvement wholes as follows: The
equipmental whole describes the interrelated equipment; the referential whole its
interrelations; and the involvement whole human purposiveness which is defined in
terms of significance, "the background upon which entities can make sense and activities
can have a point." (p.97) Heidegger elucidates the meaning of the ready-to-hand by way
of an example, that of a person engaged in the act of hammering: If all is going well and
the nail is being driven into the wood, then hammer, nail and wood are all transparent
to the one doing the hammering, forming part of the functional network of equipment34.
The present-at-hand (or occurrent), encountered by Dasein in the mode of Cartesian
subject (or thematic ego) reflecting upon objects, is experienced as such for a number of
reasons. As Dreyfus states,
deliberate attention and thus thematic [or representational] intentional consciousness can .. be present,
for example, in curiousity, reading instruments, repairing equipment and in designing and testing new
equipment. Heidegger, however, concentrates on the specific experience of breakdown, that is, on
the experience we have when ongoing coping runs into trouble. (p.70)
There are three modes of breakdown which Dreyfus views as "increasingly serious
disturbances in which a conscious subject with self-referential mental states directed
33
Technically speaking, this is an example of care (chapter 6) as opposed to concern since the relation is between
Daseins rather than between a Dasein and non-Daseins.
34
In fact, the distinction between Dasein and the world in which, as a hammering being, it is situated disappears,
to be replaced by the unity of being-in-the-world.
towards determinate objects with properties gradually emerges [emphasis added]" (p.71)
and which he defines as follows: (pp.71-83)
Q Malfunction, in which there is a transient shift from one form of absorbed coping to another form of
absorbed coping with a corresponding transient shift between things encountered as ready-to-hand
and unready-to-hand.
Q Temporary Breakdown, in which there is a shift from absorbed coping to deliberate coping to
deliberation (reflective planning). The ready-to-hand becomes the unready-to-hand.
Q Total Breakdown, in which there is a transition from involved deliberation and its concerns to
theoretical reflection and its objects. The ready-to-hand becomes manifest as the present-at-hand.
The present-at-hand describes beings (things) viewed independently of functional

context, significance or the equipmental whole, and hence, independently of their
relationship to Dasein. When the ready-to-hand becomes the present-at-hand, it is
revealed as an object with determinate, context-free properties. Dreyfus maintains that
Heidegger "wants to stress three points. (1) It is necessary to get beyond our practical
concerns in order to be able to encounter mere objects. (2) The `bare facts' related by
scientific laws are isolated by a special activity of selective seeing rather than being
simply found. (3) Scientifically relevant `facts' are not merely removed from their context
by selective seeing; they are theory-laden, that is, recontextualized in a new projection
[emphasis added]." (p.81) This is consistent with arguments asserting the theory-
dependency of observation statements (section 1.2).
The transition from a concerned being-in-the-world to a subject reflecting upon objects

emerging during breakdown lends support to Heidegger's contention that the primordial
mode of Dasein is the unreflective or pre-ontological mode:
Heidegger does not deny that we sometimes experience ourselves as conscious subjects relating to
objects by way of intentional states such as desires, beliefs, perceptions, intentions, etc., but he thinks
of this as a derivative and intermittent condition that presupposes a more fundamental way of being-
in-the-world that cannot be understood in subject/object terms. (p.5)
However, what is also thereby asserted is the primacy of the functionally-contextual

nature of the equipmental whole:
For Heidegger, unlike Descartes, Husserl, and Sartre, the object of mere staring, instead of being that
which really is, is an impoverished residue of the equipment we directly manipulate. The bare objects
of pure disinterested perception are not basic things we can subsequently use, but the debris of our
everyday practical world left over when we inhibit action. (p.47)
Heidegger maintains that the ready-to-hand is a more primordial way for things to be
than the present-at-hand. Consequently, for Heidegger, Husserlian phenomenology is
concerned with a secondary or derivative mode of human being. However, Heidegger
should not be understood as merely asserting the primacy of the practical (praxis) over
the theoretical (theoria). As Dreyfus (1991) states, "Heidegger seeks to supplant the
tradition by showing that the ways of Being of equipment and substances [objects with
context-free properties], and of actors and contemplators [Cartesian subjects-knowing-
objects], presuppose a background of understanding of Being - originary transcendence
or being-in-the-world." (p.61) While Heidegger is in agreement with Husserl that
intentionality is an essential component of human activity, he does not associate it
primarily with consciousness but with Dasein in its mode of comportment, that is,
concernful involvement in relation to other beings35. Heidegger refers to the
intentionality or directedness of Dasein as its òntic transcendence'. In order to
understand the nature of Heideggerian intentionality, it is necessary to focus on a hitherto
neglected aspect of Dasein, viz. its temporality. As Dreyfus (1987) states,
[the] three-fold structure - being already in a mood so things matter [attunement], using things so as
to articulate their capacities [discourse], and pressing into new possibilities [intentionality] - is the
structure of Dasein itself. In the second division of Being and Time this three-fold structure of being-
in-a-situation turns out to be equivalent to the past, present and future dimensions of time itself.
Dasein .. is care [or concern] and the structure of care is temporality. (p.265)
Heidegger describes the intentional structure of Dasein in terms of the towards-which

and the for-the-sake-of, non-mentalistic terms corresponding to short term (current) and
long term (final) goals respectively. However, this correspondence is misleading. As
Dreyfus (1991) states, the for-the-sake-of "is not a goal at all, but rather a self-
interpretation36 that informs and orders all my activities." (p.95) Dreyfus (1987) clarifies
the Heideggerian notion of intentionality as follows:
Dasein is simply oriented towards the future, doing something now in order to be in a position to be
able to do something else later on, and all this makes sense as oriented toward something which that
person is finally up to but need not have, and probably cannot have, in mind. Moreover, what it makes
sense to do at any moment depends on the background of shared for-the-sake-ofs available in the
culture. (p.265)
It was stated earlier that there are two stages in the development of Heidegger's
phenomenology, the latter of which was signalled by `The Turn' (Die Kehre), when
Heidegger shifts his attention from a hermeneutic of Dasein to historical thinking on
Being (Sein)37. The distinction between the two stages may be introduced by way of a
statement due to Dreyfus explicating the thought of the Heidegger of Being and Time:
35
Heidegger distinguishes two kinds of care relation, (1) concern or comportment, which is characterized in terms
of Dasein being-amidst non-Daseins, and (2) solicitude, which is characterized in terms of Dasein being-with
other Daseins.
36
Hence, the hermeneutic ontology of Dasein.
37
In chapter 6, this post-Kehre phase of Heidegger's thought is characterized in terms of the question concerning
the Being (Sein) of Being as such (Seyn).
"For Heidegger, scientific theory is an autonomous stance. It is not mere curiousity, nor
is it merely based on an interest in control [emphasis added]." (p.80) This position
conflicts with the account of science given in The Question Concerning Technology and
Other Essays (1977), a post-Kehre work in which science is linked with technology
which is, in turn, linked to the Greek notion of techn under its modern interpretation as
Enframing (Gestellen), that is, ordering for use. Heidegger maintains that it is with Plato
and Aristotle that techn begins to assume this meaning, which leads to the metaphysical
grounding of science in the duality of essentia (whatness) and existentia (thatness).
According to Heidegger, the pre-Socratics had a very different understanding of techn,
a consequence of their very different understanding of Being as aletheia-physis or the
emerging power which brings itself forth from concealment (section 1.6.2 and chapter
6). The thinking of the later (or post-Kehre) Heidegger is marked by a shift (or `turn')
in focus from the question concerning the meaning of Being to the question concerning
the truth of Being (Heidegger,93b). This engenders a corresponding shift (or `turn') in
methodology, viz. a poetic38 approach to the understanding of Being (Heidegger,71) on
the one hand, and an attempt at clarifying the nature of logic and science in order to draw
attention to the `danger' inherent within technology (Heidegger,77) on the other. Of
particular relevance in the context of the current study is Heidegger's understanding of
mathematics (Heidegger,77b), viz.
mathematics is the reckoning that, everywhere by means of equations, has set up as the goal of its
expectation the harmonizing of all relations of order, and that therefore `reckons' in advance with one
fundamental equation for all possible ordering [emphasis added]. (p.170)
By this, Heidegger means to imply that mathematics and modern science (which is
mathematical) are self-fulfilling in the sense that both specify a priori what and how
things are to be encountered, viz. as the Enframed and ordered, a consequence of the fact
that science and mathematics have their metaphysical origins in techn (chapter 6). This
point is of critical importance in the context of this study since computationally emergent
artificiality or CEA (chapter 5) is grounded in CA-computationalism and CAs are
mathematical formalisms (chapter 2).
Crucially, Heidegger maintains that although the Enframing (Gestellen) that is

characteristic of modern theoretical science is a way of revealing Being, it does not
constitute the (only) way of revealing Being; hence, his commitment to pluralistic
realism (chapter 6). On his view,
theory never outstrips nature - nature that is already presencing - and in this sense theory never makes
its way around nature. Physics may well represent the most general and pervasive lawfulness of
nature in terms of the identity of matter and energy; and what is represented by physics is indeed
nature itself, but undeniably, it is only nature as the object-area whose objectness is first defined and
As will become apparent in chapter 6, poetry and poisis stand in close relation in Heideggerian
38
phenomenology.
determined through the refining that is characteristic of physics and is expressly set forth in that
refining. Nature, in its objectness for modern physical science, is only one way in which what
presences - which from of old has been named physis - reveals itself and sets itself in position for the
refining characteristic of science .. Nature thus remains for the science of physics that which cannot
be gotten around. [This follows because] scientific representation, for its part, can never decide
whether nature, through its objectness, does not rather withdraw itself than bring to appearance the
hidden fullness of its coming to presence. Science cannot even ask this question, for, as theory, it has
already undertaken to deal with the area circumscribed by objectness. (pp.173-174)
In this statement, Heidegger means to imply that scientific objectivity prevents the
unconcealment, appearance or emergence of other ways of Being. Clearly, the
Heideggerian concept of emergence (chapter 6) must differ radically from standard
scientific-philosophical concepts of emergence (chapter 3): Broadly speaking, on the
latter, emergence denotes the appearance of new properties in a whole that are not
present in any of its parts, necessitating an a priori commitment to (1) a subject-predicate
ontology and (2) an objectivist (that is, externalist, third-person) conception of properties
(or predicates); on the former (Heideggerian) view, by contrast, emergence is held to
denote the appearing of Being from a state of unconcealment in a mode of revealing
which is prior to the subject-object duality. This is an extremely important point which
has implications for the possibility of "strong" artificiality (as artifactuality), that is,
realization as opposed to simulation (chapter 4). It might have been inferred from section
1.6.2 that Heidegger's (re-)interpretation of appearance as emergence allows for
isomorphisms to be established between artificiality and naturality once the former is
reconceptualized in emergentist terms since on the Heideggerian view the Kantian
appearance-reality duality is actually a unity. However, this would be to ignore the
distinct nature (Being) of the emergence occurring in naturality and artificiality (as
artifactuality) respectively. In the context of the present discussion, it fails to recognize
that natural-emergence is prior to the subject-object duality while artificial-emergence
is grounded in the subject-object duality. In order to clarify this point, it is necessary to
examine - via Heidegger - the Greek notion of poisis (coming-forth, bringing-forth)
which allows physis (naturality) and techn (artificiality as artifactuality) to be
differentiated. The notion of poisis is introduced in section 1.6.5 and discussed more
fully in chapter 6.
The above statement indicating the limitation of the revealing of Being which results
from the adoption of scientific objectivism is significant for another reason: According
to Searle (1992), consciousness is a biologically emergent property caused by
neurophysiological processes (section 1.5.3). However, this position does not solve the
category problem (chapter 7), that is, the problem of explaining how ontological
subjectivity (experience, internality, first-personhood) arises from an ontologically-
objective (non-experiential, externalistic, third-person) substrate. On the Heideggerian
interpretation of emergence outlined in chapters 6 and 7, it is maintained that ontological
subjectivity does not emerge from an ontologically-objective substrate; rather, both
ontological categories emerge from that which is prior, viz. being-in-the-world (or
Dasein). Consciousness is a mode of Being which emerges into unconcealment in a
particular kind of being (Dasein): It is not constructed; it is revealed39. This position is

a departure from more conventional interpretations and applications of Heideggerian
thought with respect to the phenomenon of consciousness: For example, Dreyfus (1992)
and Globus (1995) maintain that connectionist (or bottom-up) approaches to the brain-
mind relation are consistent with Heideggerian thought and may provide the means by
which consciousness is instantiated in artificiality. However, such approaches are
problematic for a number of reasons as will be shown in Part II of this thesis.
1.6.4. Why a Phenomenological Critique?
In the context of discussing the distinction between the conventional (Christian) and
radical Heideggerian interpretations of logos (chapter 6), Heidegger (1959) asks
which interpretation is the true one, the one which simply takes over a perspective into which it has
fallen, because this perspective, this line of sight, presents itself as familiar or self-evident; or the
interpretation which questions the customary perspective from top to bottom, because conceivably -
and indeed actually - this line of sight does not lead to what is in need of being seen. (p.176)
Similarly, in the context of evaluating the sufficiency of computationalism as the

metaphysical basis for a unifying framework of emergent artificiality, it might be asked:
Which interpretation is the true one, computationalism or the philosophy which calls
computationalism into question ? As stated previously in section 1.5.3, Alexander's
metaphysics, suitably reinterpreted in computationalist terms - specifically, under CA-
computationalism (chapters 2 and 5) - provides an appropriate emergentist framework
on the basis of which tentative "strong" artificialities (such as AI, A-Life and A-physics)
can be unified. However, as was shown in section 1.6.2, Heideggerian phenomenology
also provides a suitable conceptual framework within which to examine the relation
between computationalism, emergence and artificiality, albeit from the opposing
position, that is, in support of a critique of computationalism and the possibility of
39
This interpretation of emergence derives support from etymology. According to Room (1986): "merge
(combine, unite, blend, or cause to do this) As first current in the seventeenth century, `merge' meant ìmmerse',
`plunge', more figuratively than literally." According to Ayto (1990): "Merge comes from Latin mergere, which
meant `dive, plunge' (it was also the source of the English emerge (16th), which etymologically means `rise
out of a liquid', immerse (17th), and submerge (17th). Merge was originally used for ìmmerse' in English too,
and the modern meaning `combine into one' did not emerge fully until as recently as the 20th century. It arose
from the notion of one thing `sinking' into another and losing its identity; in the 1920s this was applied to two
business companies amalgamating, and the general sense `combine' followed from it." According to Hoad
(1986): "emerge come to light, arise (16th); rise out of a liquid (17th). emergence (17th); emergent (15th).
merge extinguish or be extinguished by absorption (18th)." According to Klein (1966): "emerge, intr. v., to rise
from a fluid, to appear. - L. emergere, `to come forth, come up, rise, extricate oneself', fr. e- and mergere, `to
dip, immerse, plunge'." According to Partridge (1966): "Emergere, to come to the surface (of an enveloping
liquid), gives us emerge." Finally, according to Glare (1982): "merg ~gere 1. to come up out of the water,
emerge. 2. to come forth (from confinement, concealment ..), emerge. 3. to get clear (of a difficult situation),
extricate oneself. 4. to become apparent, come to light; (of something unexpected) to turn up, present itself, to
appear as a result, to emanate. 5. to emerge from, get clear of, to permit .. to escape."
"strong" artificiality.
It is in the thinking of the later (post-Kehre) Heidegger, when focus has shifted away
from the existential analytic of the Dasein and toward the question concerning the truth
of Sein (Being), that an implicit critique of computationally emergent artificiality or CEA
(chapter 5) is to be found. Most existing phenomenological critiques of
computationalism and artificiality focus on top-down or designed artificiality: For
example, the critique of the symbolic or representationalist approach to artificial
intelligence (AI) presented by Dreyfus (1972, 1979, 1992), which is contested by Casti
(1989) on the grounds that it assumes the correctness of hermeneutic (or existential)
phenomenology40. According to Casti, Dreyfus merely presents "what amounts to
anecdotal evidence involving such pursuits as the acquisition of skills and expertise in
activities like chess playing, driving, poetry writing, and so forth." He goes on to state
that "there are many things I don't like about this line of reasoning, but the most
important is the ex cathedra-like pronouncement: Phenomenology says! On what
grounds, other than faith, can one swallow the conclusions of the phenomenological
philosophers ?" (p.333) However, Dreyfus' critique is not so easily dismissed: The failure
of top-down or symbolic AI to deliver on the polemical claims of its proponents is a well
documented fact which is endorsed by those who were previously active practitioners in
the field (Winograd,86). The intrinsic yet unforseen shortcomings of "Good Old
Fashioned AI" (GOFAI) are readily recognized once it is appreciated that GOFAI
recapitulates Husserlian transcendental phenomenology (section 1.6.3). Analogous to the
way in which Heidegger's approach to phenomenology provides a means by which to
disclose the shortcomings of transcendental phenomenology (Dreyfus,82), specifically,
the problem of articulating the structure of the human life-world (Lebenswelt), Dreyfus'
Heideggerian critique provides a means by which to identify the shortcomings of
GOFAI41. This has led (at least in part) to a `paradigm shift' within AI towards
approaches emphasizing the role of the body in situated cognition (Prem,96). Given the
objective of this study, viz. a critique of computationalism as the metaphysical basis of
a unifying framework of emergent artificiality, it is natural to adopt a phenomenological
approach, specifically a Heideggerian approach, on the basis of precedent (chapter 6).
Two core related assumptions underlying GOFAI are: (i) intelligence requires a mental
representation of the world; and (ii) the phenomena of the world are reducible to context-
free atomic `facts'. If this view is incorrect, as Heidegger and Dreyfus have argued, then
any artificial science which is (i) representationalist and (ii) constituted from context-free
atomic facts may be liable to a critique similar to that of GOFAI. It is an aim of this
40
Casti (1989) encapsulates Dreyfus' anti-AI argument in the following syllogism: "I. The AI community claims
that thinking is the manipulation of formal symbols according to rules. II. Phenomenology claims that knowing,
understanding, perceiving, and the like involve more than just following rules. III. Phenomenology is correct.
Therefore, no amount of AI, however clever, will ever duplicate human thinking." (p.317)
41
A specific example, the Frame Problem, that is, the problem of determining contextually-relevant knowledge,
is briefly examined in chapter 7.
study to investigate the extent to which such a critique applies to other artificialities such
as A-Life and A-Physics conceived as bottom-up (or emergent) phenomena in the
context of a unifying framework of computationally emergent artificiality or CEA
(chapter 5).
According to Heidegger (1927),
the question of Being aims .. at ascertaining the a priori conditions not only for the possibility of the
sciences which examine beings as beings of such and such a type, and, in doing so, already operate
with an understanding of Being, but also for the possibility of those ontologies themselves which are
prior to the ontical sciences and which provide their foundations. (p.31)
On the basis of this statement, Dreyfus (1991) maintains that "the need for such a study
becomes clear whenever a normal science is in crisis, and it is also required by sciences
that are unclear about their method and subject matter." (p.16) It is argued that this is
precisely the case for what Simon (1969) has referred to as the "sciences of the artificial"
(chapter 4) since it is unclear whether artificiality (as artifactuality) constitutes a "strong"
or a "weak" analogue of naturality, that is, realization or simulation of the latter. This
lack of clarity, it is maintained, is a direct consequence of the Kantian distinction
between appearance and reality (section 1.6.2). As stated previously in sections 1.6.2 and
1.6.3, reinterpreting the concept of appearance as emergence (following Heidegger)
enables this problem to be resolved; in short, the poitic difference, that is, the difference
in becoming (coming-forth, bringing-forth) between naturals and artificials (as
artifactuals) entails an ontical difference, that is, a difference in Being between such
phenomena, because Being and becoming stand in essential, unitary relation to each
other (chapter 6). Thus, Heideggerian phenomenology provides an appropriate
framework within which to critically evaluate the possibility of "strong" computationally
emergent artificiality or CEA (chapters 5 and 7).
According to Waterhouse (1981), Heidegger maintains that metaphysics belongs to the

nature of man, viz. "it is the ground phenomenon of Dasein. It is Dasein itself." (p.123)
It was shown previously in section 1.4 that there is a connection between metaphysics
and metaphor, specifically, that the former is grounded in the latter. This view is
supported by Heidegger (1927) who holds that "Dasein has an in-built tendency to
interpret itself in terms of what it confronts - the world." (p.36) However, this should not
be understood to mean that Dasein is primordially metaphysical: In the mode of being-
in-the-world, Dasein is clearly non-metaphysical in coping with the world unreflectively,
that is, unthematically. It is in the mode of the Cartesian ego or subject that Dasein
becomes metaphysical since it is in this mode that metaphysical systems can be
formulated and recognized as metaphysical systems. However, since the Cartesian
subject is a mode of Dasein, metaphysical thinking is also, therefore, a characteristic of
Dasein. One of Dasein's characteristics (or existentials42) is its `thrownness' or

situatedness in a world, whereby `world' is understood a totality of skills, practices,
equipment and other Daseins (chapter 6). If and when Dasein becomes the reflective
Cartesian subject, it projects from its world into thought and becomes metaphysical;
hence, the connection between metaphor and metaphysics in Heideggerian
phenomenology. Dasein is metaphysical because Dasein is in-the-world43. It would seem,
therefore, that Heidegger's phenomenology provides the basis for an analysis of
computationalism: Modernity can be characterized in terms of its association with
information, communication, control and, most importantly in the context of this study,
computation. Hence, the world of modern Dasein is a computational world.
Consequently, when Dasein becomes reflective, its metaphysics is grounded in the
character of that world, the defining metaphor of which is the computer; hence, a
computational metaphysics - computationalism. Although this fact may appear trivial,
it is worth mentioning since it clarifies the nature of the dialectic between technology,
science and metaphysics on the one hand and human society on the other. Moreover, it
enables a link to be established between Dasein and the notion of abstraction (section
1.4.3): Metaphysics can be traced back to metaphor, metaphor to abstraction, and
abstraction to the act of an abstracting agency, viz. Dasein in the mode of the subject
relating to objects whose acts may be either epistemic (interpretative) or ontic
(productive). This leads directly to a consideration of the concept of poisis (coming-
forth, bringing-forth).
1.6.5. Towards a Phenomenology of Poisis
In Philosophy of Existence (1971), Karl Jaspers states that "philosophizing can neither
be identical with nor opposed to scientific thought" (p.11). He further maintains that any
`serious' philosophy must incorporate knowledge gained through the scientific mode of
inquiry. Accepting the validity of this assertion has necessitated incorporating a number
of scientific facts associated with investigations of computation (chapter 2), emergence
(chapter 3) and artificiality (chapter 4) into the unifying framework of computationally
emergent artificiality or CEA presented in this study (chapter 5). It is crucial to
appreciate, however, that on Jaspers' view, philosophy transcends science. As he states,
scientific cognition of things is not cognition of being. Scientific cognition is particular, concerned
with determinate objects, not with being itself. The philosophical relevance of science, therefore, is
that, precisely by means of knowledge, it produces the most decisive knowledge of our lack of
knowledge, namely our lack of knowledge of what being itself is.
42
The distinction between concrete-universals or existentials and concrete-particulars or existentiells is described
in chapter 6.
43
As stated previously, in section 1.6.3, the ìn' of being-in-the-world is an ìn' of involvement and not a spatial
or topological ìn'.
[Furthermore,] scientific cognition can provide no goals whatever for life. It establishes no valid
values. Therefore it cannot lead. By its clarity and decisiveness it points to another source of our lives.
(p.10)
There are (at least) two points to note in connection with the above statements: First, as
Dreyfus (1993) - citing Heidegger and Wittgenstein in support - has argued, the
determinate objects of science are context-free facts (atomic primitives), that is, ontical44
abstractions or `cuttings-out-from' a prior existential whole. Although such `cuts' have
existential status (assuming hermeneutic realism), they are not autonomous as `cuts' (that
is, with respect to their emergence from the prior whole) and hence, necessitate the
existence of a `cutter' or abstractionist (section 1.4.3). This entails support for Jaspers'
assertion, viz. that science requires a grounding in values (since "it cannot lead"), thereby
necessitating a consideration of metaphysical issues since `cutting' involves
anthropocentric selection which is teleologically a priori (or intentionalistic).
Metaphysics, as defined in section 1.3.2, is that which is both prior to and beyond
physics. According to Jaspers' latter statement, goals, purposes, values are both beyond
science and a necessary condition for the possibility of science. Proof of the latter
assertion is afforded by the recognition that selection of phenomena to include in a
scientific study, choice of experiments to perform in order to test a theory etc, constitute
intentional acts, irrespective of whether such acts were reflective or non-reflective45. The
point of divergence between Jaspers and Heidegger is in the latter's assertion that science
is relative to a set of norms (non-mentalistic values) because it is grounded in the
technological way of Being (techn)46. However, Jaspers and Heidegger are in agreement
that intentionality cannot be explained scientifically; hence, the above two statements are
essentially related: An understanding of Being requires an understanding of purposes and
visa-versa. When the understanding of Being takes the form of science, it necessitates
`cutting' or abstraction which in turn necessitates the existence of an intentional agency
responsible for the act of `cutting', viz. an abstractionist.
`Cutting' (or abstraction) can be identified with a shift from what Heidegger (1959)
describes as the logocentric attitude of human beings, whereby logos is meant "collecting
collectedness, the primal gathering principle" (p.128), towards a categorial approach to
Being. Heidegger clarifies the distinction between logos and kategoria as follows, viz.
44
In the context of Heideggerian phenomenology, ontical refers to beings and ontological to the Being of beings
(chapter 6).
45
That is, whether made by Dasein as being-in-the-world or Cartesian subject (ego). While it might appear that
scientific intentionality is necessarily reflective, this is not, in fact, the case: In `normal science', the individuals
(intentional agents) responsible for scientific activity are scientist Daseins in the `world' that is their (tacit)
scientific paradigm (sections 1.2 and 1.6.1).
Techn-Enframing (Gestellen) is a `summoning-forth' of man (Dasein) by Being - and hence, also a `destining-
46
forth' of Being itself - that is directional (intentional, teleological), viz. the ordering of everything as standing-
reserve (Bestand) for use by human beings (chapter 6).
"logos is the steady gathering, the intrinsic togetherness of the essent [thing], that is,
being." (p.130) In short, logos is the connecting back of beings to Being; kategoria, by
contrast, is the abstracting away of beings from Being47. On Heidegger's view, the act
of naming constrains the possibilities for the Being of a thing. This follows because "the
word, the name, restores the emerging essent [thing] from the immediate, overpowering
surge to its being and maintains it in this openness, delimitation, and permanence."
(p.172) Naming involves the differentiation of beings (things and Daseins); however, as
logos, this is always done in the context of an attempt at understanding the Being of
beings rather than the beings themselves (as somehow `separate' from Being48).
According to Heidegger, "logos as gathering becomes the ground of being-human" and
"to be a man means to take gathering upon oneself, to undertake a gathering
apprehension of the being of the essent, the sapient incorporation of appearing in the
work, and so to administer unconcealment, to preserve it against cloaking and
concealment." (p.174) Thus, "being-human was initially grounded in the disclosure of
the being of the essent." (p.175) Hence, according to Heidegger, logos originally referred
to Being's appropriation of man for the task of `gathering' (collecting, linking) beings
back to Being. However, under kategoria, naming leads to the severance (`cutting' or
abstraction) of beings from Being and in such a way as to support the view that beings
are ontologically primitive, that is, independent of relation to Being. As Heidegger states,
with the change of physis [the emerging power] to eidos [the form or idea] and of logos [the gathering
together] to kategoria [the categories] the original disclosure of the Being of the essent [the thing]
ceased (p.188)
The movement from a naming (`gathering') which preserves the connection with Being
to a naming (`cutting') which effaces this connection by postulating the existence of
fundamental categories is, Heidegger argues, what makes metaphysics possible. It could
be argued that any metaphysical system which postulates the existence of a set of
ontological primitives from which everything else is constructed belongs to the general
class of metaphysical systems referred to as atomisms (chapter 2). Crucially, it is
precisely this kind of metaphysics that Dreyfus calls into question and which leads him
to reject the ontological primacy of the determinate, context-free fact 49. As Jaspers
(1971) states,
whatever becomes an object for me is always a determinate being among others, and only a mode of
47
Crudely speaking, logos entails holism whereas kategoria entails reductionism.
48
In chapter 6, it is shown that although Being as such (Seyn) can be without beings, the latter cannot be without
the former. This follows from the fact that beings as beings necessarily partake of Being.
49
According to Heidegger, atomism as such - rather than the specific form given to it by Democritus and others -
characterizes the essence of all metaphysical systems. For this reason, Heidegger's describes his project as an
attempt at moving beyond metaphysics (that is, post-metaphysics) towards what he calls thinking.
being. When I think of being as matter, energy, spirit, life, and so on - every conceivable category has
been tried - in the end I always discover that I have absolutized a mode of determinate being, which
appears within the totality of being, into being itself. No known being is being itself. (p.17)
However, it might be argued that Heidegger's (and Jaspers') position is ultimately self-
undermining since it makes use of categories in articulating the structure of Being. In this
connection, it is important to appreciate (1) that Heidegger's `categories' (more precisely,
existentials) are concrete as opposed to abstract and (2) these `categories' (existentials)
are temporal (or historical) as opposed to eternal. For this reason, Heidegger does not -
cannot - claim finality for his phenomenological investigations of Being. Although this
might appear repugnant to conventional realism, it is fully consistent with hermeneutic
realism and affords value to the hermeneutic project: Articulating the structure of Being
hermeneutically50 gives an articulation of Being; what it does not give, however, is the
(only) articulation of Being51.
At the end of section 1.6.4, it was maintained that the notion of `cutting' leads directly
to consideration of the concept of poisis. This point requires clarification. As will be
shown in chapter 6, the concept of poisis can be interpreted in two senses, viz. ontical
(secondary) and ontological (primary): Ontical poisis refers to the way in which beings
become, that is, come-into-being, from other beings. It is causally-productive and has
two basic forms52: (1) physis, that is, self-causation, self-becoming or autopoisis, and
(2) techn, that is, other-causation, other-becoming or allopoisis (Heidegger,77a).
Ontological poisis, by contrast, refers to the coming-forth of beings from Being (and the
going-back of beings to Being). It is incipiently-emergent and marked by a movement
from originary physis (poisis as such) to derivative physis (autopoisis). The continuity
between originary and derivative physis - and discontinuity between originary physis and
techn (since the latter is mediated by derivative physis) - is of critical significance
because (1) physis also denotes naturality in contrast to techn, which denotes artificiality
(as artifactuality), and (2) originary physis is ontologically in-finite whereas derivative
physis and techn are finite. As will be shown in chapters 6 and 7, the continuity of finite
(closed) naturals with infinite (open) naturality as such allows the possibility of
ontological category emergence, that is, the emergence of new kinds of beings; by
contrast, the continuity of finite (closed) artificials (as artifactuals) with finite (closed)
naturals blocks the possibility of ontological category emergence. This follows from the
50
That is, interpreting the phenomenon of Being from within Being.
51
As will be shown in chapter 6, this does not entail support for metaphysical relativism: On Heidegger's view,
there is only one correct way that the world can be interpreted (or viewed) relative to a particular set of
interpretative practices; hence, his commitment to realism. However, there are many interpretative practices;
hence, his commitment to pluralism. On this basis, Dreyfus (1991) characterizes Heidegger's position as
pluralistic realism.
Heteropoisis (Maturana,80) is not a basic form but a composite of auto- and allopoisis.
52
fact that infinitude (in some sense of the term) is a necessary condition for categorial-
openness53. The various relations between Being, naturals and artificials (as artifactuals)
and between ontological and ontical poisis (coming-forth, bringing-forth, becoming)
are shown in Fig 1.5. (B denotes Being, bN denotes naturals and bA denotes artificials.)
(allopoisis)
Techn
(bA)
(Poi sis)
POITIC DIFFERENCE
Physis
(B )
(bN)
Physis
(autopoi sis)
Fig 1.5 Relations between beings and Being and types of poisis.
Heidegger's ontological difference is the difference between beings and the Being of
beings (chapter 6). In this study, a new concept - the poitic difference, that is, the
distinction in becoming (that is, coming-forth, bringing-forth) between naturality and
artificiality (as artifactuality) - is introduced. It is maintained that naturals and artificials
(as artifactuals) are ontically different (that is, distinct as beings) for three reasons: First,
Being and becoming stand in essential, unitary relation (chapter 6); second, naturals and
artificials (as artifactuals) are poitically different (that is, distinct in their becomings);
third, originary poisis as such (Being-physis) is continuous with derivative autopoisis
(beings-physis) and discontinuous with allopoisis (beings-techn). In short, the ontical
difference is grounded in the poitic difference is grounded in the ontological difference.
Although precedents certainly exist for the poitic difference (Heidegger,77a)
53
Cariani (1989) contests the role of infinity in open emergence, arguing that finite evolutionary-robotic devices
grounded in the analog continuum are capable of open-ended construction of symbolic primitives and hence,
infinite or open emergence as a consequence of open-ended possibilities for measurement. However, as shown
in chapter 6, this position is problematic for (at least) two reasons: First, it is unclear whether the analog
continuum is real: For example, on computationalism, reality is ultimately discrete (granular) and hence, the
possibilities for measurement are ultimately finite; second, Cariani's argument against infinity appears to be
incoherent since in postulating measurement as an open-ended process, infinity is (tacitly) reintroduced into
the system.
(Maturana,80), until now it has not been explicitly formulated as a difference;

furthermore, previous conceptions of this distinction have either (i) ignored its grounding
in the ontological difference (Maturana,80) or (ii) only implied such a grounding
(Heidegger,39).
The link between `cutting' and poisis as techn (that is, allopoisis) follows from the
connection between abstraction and artificing (that is, building, constructing,
organizing), viz. both involve movements between parts and wholes (chapter 6).
However, `cutting' is necessarily prior to artificing since it is responsible for generating
the ontological primitives used in the production of artifacts. Although artifact-
production (that is, artificing) can occur through design (top-down construction) or
emergence (bottom-up construction), in both cases a set of ontological primitives
(àtoms') must first be established by being `cut-out-from' the prior existential whole that
Heidegger refers to as the `background'. As stated previously in section 1.6.3, Heidegger
(1977a, 1977b) maintains that science is grounded in technology and technology in
techn under its modern interpretation as Enframing (Gestellen). On this view, Being is
revealed as a causal network of objects having determinate, context-free properties, such
objects being ordered according to human concerns; hence, there is an implicit
connection between techn-Enframing (Gestellen) and Cartesian (that is, subject-object)
intentionality (chapter 7). This link is highly significant: Since human beings are the
source of techn, that is, artificing (chapter 6), their artifacts will, of necessity and at
some level of their Being, be compositional, that is, synthesized from components,
irrespective of the nature of the composition process, viz. design (top-down) or
emergence (bottom-up). In chapter 6, techn is interpreted in terms of the triadic relation
between artificers (productants), substrates (substrata) and artifacts (products) and in
chapter 7, a distinction is made between "soft" (or pure) and "hard" (or impure) artifacts:
In the former, matter - the component (or substratum) level - is (naturally) given and
form - the system (or product) level - is (artifactually) made; in the latter, both matter
and form are made. Such a classification is made possible by the re-interpretation of the
poitic difference in terms of a phenomenological framework of historical ontic
(organizational, productive) and epistemic (observational, interpretative) relations
between natural and artificial (as artifactual) phenomena and what is referred to as the
anthropic component, that is, the human being in its capacity as artificer-interpreter
(chapter 7). Computation is identified as an instance - in fact, the defining exemplar - of
"hard" artificiality and since "hard" (or pure) artifacts can be shown to be ontologically-
closed, it follows that computation must be ontologically-closed, a fact which has
negative implications for the possibility of "strong" computationally emergent
artificiality or CEA (chapter 5).
In the context of a critique of AI, Kelly (1993) has argued that the tendency to
exaggerate the capabilities of computers arises as a consequence of
P a tendency to anthropomorphise our artifacts.

P the, often latent, assumption that complexity will inevitably give rise to higher-level phenomena, even
up to intelligence and understanding.
P the mireading of signal as symbol in attempting to interpret the ontology of machines.
P an undercurrent of structuralism in its more extreme forms as indicated by an earnest attempt to

elevate essentially syntactic expressions to meaning and intelligence.
P a reliance on the unlimited power of science to achieve through reductionist analysis a construction
of understanding and meaning and intelligence.
P the wider assumption that rationality permits an all-inclusive embrace of even human phenomena.
P a belief in the adequacy of language to articulate fully a comprehensive apprehension of reality.
Kelly maintains that although "the computational metaphor has given us valuable
insights into the possible nature of human mentation and the more refined exploitation
of computers .. there is always a danger that it will be pressed too far." (p.8) While
Kelly's observations apply to types of artificiality other than AI, it is the
anthroporphization of artifacts which is of particular significance since it points to a
wider tendency, viz. morphization, that is, projection of characteristics, properties or
features associated with one phenomenal domain (category) onto another (and visa-
versa), based on a shift in the categorial `cut', that is, change in the definition of
categories, made by the anthropic component (human artificer-interpreter). An
appreciation of the link between morphization and `cutting' or abstraction is important
because the latter supports functionalism and multiple-realizability (chapter 4) and,
thereby, the possibility of "strong" computationally emergent artificiality or CEA
(chapter 5). Morphization occurs in both the natural sciences and the "sciences of the
artificial": For example, analytic-reductions such as matter6computation (Davies,92),
life6computation (Dawkins,95), and mind6computation (Fodor,80), and synthetic-
emergences such as computation6matter (Fredkin,90), computation6life (Langton,89b),
and computation6mind (Minsky,85) emergents (Fig 1.6).
Natural Artificial
Science Functionalism Science
life mind life mind
computation morphization computation
matter matter
Fig 1.6 Morphization in natural and artificial science.

Isomorphisms (behavioural, structural, functional etc) can be established between the two
domains (artificiality and naturality) by adopting a functionalist metaphysics (chapter 4).
Since the establishment of isomorphisms necessarily involves morphization, this results
in the conflation of the categories of naturality and artificiality (as artifactuality) and
their subsumption under a new generic category, viz. phenomenality. However, it is
crucial to appreciate that morphization is made possible by interpreting the distinction
between artificials and naturals in epistemological terms, that is, in terms of the
appearance-reality distinction. In section 1.5.2 it was argued that an orthogonal
ontological distinction exists and in this section the latter has been shown to be grounded
in the poitic difference between naturals and artificials as artifactuals (chapter 6). In the
context of this study, which is concerned with evaluating the sufficiency of
computationalism as the metaphysical basis of a unifying framework of emergent
artificiality, this latter distinction is of critical significance: As stated in section 1.6.2, for
Heidegger, there is no appearance-reality discontinuity in naturals since originary physis
(that is, poisis as such) is continuous with derivative physis (that is, autopoisis).
However, physis (autopoisis) is categorially distinct from techn (allopoisis) which
means that a poitic isomorphism cannot be established between naturals and artificials
(as artifactuals). Since Being and becoming (poisis) stand in essential, unitary relation,
this means that an ontical (or ontological) isomorphism cannot be established between
naturals and artifactuals - irrespective of whether epistemological isomorphisms
(behavioural, functional, strcutural) can be constructed. In short, insofar as the object
of concern is ontology (that is, the Being of natural and artificial (as artifactual) beings),
epistemological issues (as traditionally conceived) are simply irrelevant: Naturals and
artificials are ontologically distinct.
It is maintained herein that the possibility of "strong" computationally emergent

artificiality or CEA (chapter 5) is grounded in two assmptions, viz. (1) the relevance (or
necessity) of the (Kantian epistemic) appearance-reality distinction and (2) the
irrelevance (or contingency) of the (Heideggerian ontic) artifactual-natural dstinction.
In order to appreciate this fact, it is necessary to examine the ontic (productive,
organizational) and epistemic (interpretative, observational) relationality that holds
between natural and artificial (as artifactual) phenomena and the anthropic component
(artificer-interpreter); hence, the need for a phenomenology of poisis (chapter 7).
In section 1.6.3, it was briefly argued that consciousness might be emergent, but in a
radically Heideggerian sense. The significance of this for poisis, computationalism,
emergence and artificiality requires clarification and the means by which this will be
attempted is through a brief discussion of Descartes' maxim, cogito ergo sum. According
to Walsh (1967), if the validity of the Cartesian dictum - which is usually interpreted as
"I think therefore I am" - is accepted then the certainty of metaphysical statements must
derive from their status as the products of the ego's reasoning. However, Heidegger
(1967) has warned against this naive interpretation of the cogito:
In Ì posit' the Ì' as the positer is co- and pre-posited as that which is already present, as the being.
The Being of beings is determined out of the Ì am' as the certainty of the positing. The formula which
the proposition sometimes has, `Cogito ergo sum', suggests the misunderstanding that it is here a
question of inference .. [However,] Descartes himself emphasizes that no inference is present. The
sum is not a consequence of the thinking, but vice versa; it is the ground of thinking, the
fundamentum. (pp.278-279)
Thus, it appears that Descartes was himself aware that the inversion of the dictum, viz.
sum ergo cogito or "I am therefore I think", must also hold: If there is such a thing as a
thinking thing, then it must partake of Being since it exists and to exist is to partake of
Being; moreover, Being is prior to thought (Heidegger,59). Arnold (1992) has argued
that the Cartesian dictum should be reinterpreted as "I experience therefore I am": On
this view, it is ontological subjectivity, that is, conscious experience or awareness, and
not rationality which provides the indubitable ground of all things, a position adopted by
the early Husserl. However, the Heideggerian argument can be applied to this (re-
)interpretation of the maxim yielding "I am therefore I experience".
As stated previously in section 1.6.3, Heidegger's post-Kehre thinking is concerned with

establishing (that is, unconcealing) the truth of Being. However, the existential analytic
of Dasein undertaken in Heidegger's pre-Kehre period must be viewed as preparatory
relative to the post-Kehre project since in order to understand Being it is necessary to
understand that being for which Being is an issue, viz. Dasein. But what is it about
Dasein that makes it possible for Being to be an issue ? According to Heidegger, the
primordial mode of human existence is being-in-the-world which is non-thematic (that
is, unconscious) and characterized by coping, that is, a "pre-ontological understanding"
of Being. It might be argued, however, that the ability to reveal (or unconceal) pre-
ontological understanding necessitates the existence of a different kind of understanding,
specifically, conscious (or thematic) reflection since the former is only knowable to
human beings in their capacity as conscious subjects. In support of this contention,
Waterhouse (1981) cites Husserl's objection to Heideggerian ontology, viz. knowledge
of Being is also knowledge, so epistemology must be primary. In an attempt at answering
this criticism, Dreyfus (1991) maintains that
Heidegger would probably claim that his hermeneutics is a special form of involved deliberate
attention .. If this is so, then Heidegger must mean to distinguish his involved thematic analysis of
existence, which reveals that in which we always already dwell, from the detached, objectifying
thematization characteristic of any discipline from physics to factual history. (p.83)
This argument is not entirely satisfactory since it is a fact that Heidegger is only able to
do hermeneutics because he already is a thematizing or reflecting being. Moreover, when
the emergence of Cartesian consciousness from non-conscious Dasein is investigated
scientifically, that is, assuming a materialist metaphysics, it immediately leads to what
is referred to as the "hard problem" (chapters 4 and 7), viz. how subjective experience
can be generated by objective matter. Accepting the reality of this problem renders
emergent-materialist interpretations of Heidegger's thought such as those presented by
Dreyfus (1991, 1992) and Globus (1995) problematic54. The issue can be resolved if
Heidegger's (1959) support of Parminides' maxim, viz. thinking and Being are the same,
captured in the statement "there is a reciprocal bond between apprehension and Being"
(p.145), is taken to imply the ontological primacy of Being-Thinking or Being-
Experiencing. Such a view appears to be consistent with panpsychism (de
Quincey,94,96) and panexperientialism (Griffin,88a,88b,93,98)55: On the former, which
is a variant of animism, phenomena are held to be conscious all the way down the
phenomenal hierarchy; on the latter, which is a more sophisticated view, experience is
predicated necessarily at the lowest-level in the phenomenal hierarchy and contingently
at higher levels, consciousness being a high-level experience.
Although panpsychism lends support to the "strong" artificiality possibility of

experiential AI, viz. everything is experiential so AI is also experiential, on
panexperientialism, which is grounded in Whitehead's (1978) philosophy of organism,
this is not necessarily the case56. Panexperientialists maintain that only primordial matter
is necessarily experiential. While it is certainly possible that phenomena other than
primordial matter can be experiential, even conscious - this is trivially true since human
beings are instances of conscious phenomena - it is not necessarily the case that all
phenomena are experiential. Panexperientialism is based on a hierarchical view of the
world in which experience at one phenomenal level in the hierarchy contributes to the
production of experience at a higher level. Whitehead distinguished in his philosophy
between two types of organisms, viz. simple aggregates and genuine individuals: In the
former, the organism is a non-experiential whole composed of parts which are
themselves experiential, a consequence of the particular kind of organization associated
with aggregates which leads to the `cancelling out' of the individual experiences of the
parts in the whole. Genuine individuals, by contrast, are experiential, enjoying a different
order of experience than their parts, because of the specific organization of these parts
in the whole that is the individual. Thus, on panexperientialism, organization (or form)
is the fundamental concept, a position which allows for the possibility of conflating
panexperientialism with functionalism, and, thereby, computationalism, the latter of
54
As stated previously in section 1.6.3, there is (at least) one other way of interpreting Heideggerian emergentism,
viz. as a movment from that which is prior to ontological objectivity (matter) and ontological subjectivity
(mind) to ontological subjectivity (mind). As shown in chapters 6 and 7, on this scheme, there are no "hard"
or category problems as such; rather there is the problem of explaining incipient emergence (chapter 6), that
is, the movement from the ontological (existential) to the ontical (causal).
55
In fact, this is not the case since panexperientialism is based on a processualist metaphysics (chapter 2),
whereas Being-Thinking is neither substantial nor processual; rather, it is the existential ground of the
categories of substance and process (chapter 6).
56
Experiential AI is merely possible on panexperientialism. However, in chapter 7 it will be shown that this latter
position is problematic since it fails to take into consideration the implications of the poitic difference (chapter
6) between naturals and artificials (as artifactuals) for the question concerning emergence (Ali,98b).
which is intrinsically linked to formism (chapter 2). This is readily shown by considering
again the "hard problem" reinterpreted as the problem of crossing ontological categories.
If, as Nagel (1979) states, it is impossible "to derive a pour soi [mental subject] from an
en soi [material object]" (p.188), the solution to the "hard problem" must lie in the
subsumption of the categories of mind and matter either in a meta-category or in
something which is prior to the categories57.
If panexperientialism can be conflated with computationalism then the "hard problem"

can be solved by postulating a computational metaphysics: On this view, computation
is claimed to be a meta-category subsuming the categories of matter and mind because
it is assumed that the maxim "hardware is to software as matter is to mind" is valid
(chapter 2) and hardware and software are logically (functionally) equivalent (chapter
5). However, Tallis (1994) maintains that three of the terms in the above maxim (matter,
hardware, and software) belong to the same ontological category - the objective -
whereas mind belongs to a different ontological category - the subjective. For precisely
this reason, computation is incapable of providing an ontology based on a meta-category
subsuming matter and mind and cannot solve the "hard problem" (chapter 7). Moreover,
although computation is ontologically-objective (externalistic, non-experiential, third-
person), it is not objectively real in the way that things in the natural world are
objectively real58. Computation is an instance of what Searle (1995) refers to as
institutional or socially-constructed facts that are ontologically inter-subjective59 rather
than ontologically-objective. In chapter 7, such arti-facts are classified as "hard" (or
pure) - in contrast to "soft" (or impure) - and characterized in terms of a priori epistemic
(designed) and a posteriori ontic (made) relationality relative to the anthropic component
(artificer-interpreter). It is crucial to appreciate that "hard" artifacts are ontologically-
ideational (or formalistic) - that is, their Being is defined purely in formal terms -
because specification of forms entails closure (circumscribedness, boundedness) to
emergence.
As stated previously, techn-Enframing (Gestellen), that is, allopoisis or bringing-forth

by human beings, necessarily involves `cutting' (abstraction) as a preliminary phase in
artificing. `Cutting' is necessary in order to identify what are to count as parts,
irrespective of whether the `cutting' activity is performed in the context of analysis
(interpretation) or as the basis for further activity in synthesis (production), and
irrespective of whether the latter involves top-down design or bottom-up emergence
57
On panexperientialism, this meta-category is prior and is the experiential event or actual occasion. On
Heideggerian pluralistic-emergentism (chapter 6), by contrast, what is prior to ontological objectivity and
subjectivity is being-in-the-world.
58
Assuming some variant of realism is correct.
59
First-person experience, by contrast, is intra-subjective (chapter 7).
(chapter 7). All `cutting' necessarily produces objective entities since `cutting' is done
with the artificer or productant in the mode of the Cartesian subject relating to objects;
furthermore, artificing (synthesis, production) is necessarily carried out in the same mode
and characterized in terms of a movement between objects (chapters 6 and 7). This leads
to the formulation of the following two axioms which, in conjunction with the
assumption of the validity of the "hard problem" can be used to formally decide on the
possibility of "strong" computationally emergent artificiality or CEA (chapter 5), viz.
Techn (T) necessitates `cutting' (C) T 6C (1)

`Cutting' generates objects (O) C6O (2)
Axiomatizing the "hard problem" (chapter 7):
Objects cannot generate subjects (S) O6~S (3)
Applying modus ponens to (1), (2) and (3):
Techn cannot generate subjects T6~S (4)
If the above axioms are correct, which will be established in the course of this study, then
it follows that "strong" CEA is impossible since it leads to a problem, viz. the "hard
problem" (chapter 7), which cannot be solved on the assumption of computationalism -
an ontologically-objective (externalistic, non-experiential, third-person) metaphysics
(chapters 2, 6 and 7). In short, computationalism is insufficient as a metaphysical basis
for a unifying framework of "strong" emergent artificiality which, given the existential
fact that naturality has `solved' the "hard problem", implies that nature does not (only)
compute.
1.7. Thesis
This thesis may be formally stated as follows:
Computationalism is insufficient as a metaphysical basis for a unifying

framework of "strong" emergent artificiality.
1.8. Objectives
While this thesis is concerned with evaluating computationalism in the context of
artificiality, its implications necessarily transcend the "strong" artificiality debate. Just
as the negative results of the classical (top-down, symbolic) computationalist AI project
had negative implications for the computational theory of mind, it is argued that the
negative results arising from the computationally emergent artificiality or CEA project
should have negative implications for computational-naturalism. As Barrow (1991)
states,
perhaps the image of the universe as a computer is just the latest predictable extension of our habits
of thought. Tomorrow, there may be a new paradigm." (p.204)
A consequence of the possibility for morphization (section 1.6.5) afforded by the

abstracting tendency within functionalism, is the possibility of critiquing a naturality
conceived in functionalist - in this case, computationalist - terms via a critique of
artificiality. Previous critiques of artificiality have tended to focus on the shortcomings
(ontological, epistemological etc) associated with specific artificialities (such as AI and
A-Life). What is conspicuously absent from the literature, however, is indication of any
concerted effort to unify the artificialities into a single framework and thereby provide
the means by which to evaluate candidate ontologies claimed to be able to support the
emergence of artifactual analogues of phenomena held to have emerged in the natural
world. For this reason, a unifying framework of computationally emergent artificiality
or CEA (chapter 5) has been developed as part of the critical evaluation of
computationalism reported in this study.
1.9. Strategy
The approach to establishing the validity of the above thesis (section 1.7) is briefly
outlined as follows:
1. Examine the concepts of computationalism (chapter 2), emergence (chapter 3)

and artificiality (chapter 4) in order to establish a philosophical basis for their
unification.
2. Develop a unified framework of computationally emergent artificiality or CEA

realized in a cellular automaton substrate based on a computational interpretation
of Alexanderian metaphysics (chapter 5).
3. Investigate the distinction between ontical (causal, productive) and ontological

(existential, incipient) concepts of poisis (becoming, coming-forth, bringing-
forth) with a view to defining a poitic difference between naturals and artificials
grounded in Heidegger's ontological difference between beings and Being as
such (chapter 6).
4. Explicate the poitic difference via a phenomenological framework for evaluating

designed and emergent artificiality based on ontic (productive, organizational)
and epistemic (interpretative, observational) relations between phenomena
(naturals and artificials) and the anthropic component (artificer-interpreter). Use
this framework to distinguish between "hard" (or pure) and "soft" (or impure)
artifacts and classify computationalism as an instance of "hard" artificiality.
Establish the validity of the thesis (section 1.7) by showing how
computationalism fails to solve the category problem, viz. the problem of

explaining how ontological subjectivity can emerge from an ontologically-
objective substrate (chapter 7).
1.10. Note to the Reader

Although the thesis can be stated briefly, establishing its validity necessitates detailed
examination of a wide variety of intricately related issues, both scientific and
philosophical in nature. For this reason, and to anticipate possible criticisms of the study
on the grounds that it sets out to attack a "straw man", it has been necessary to provide
extended analyses of certain critical concepts such as computationalism (chapter 2),
emergence (chapter 3), artificiality (chapter 4) and unification (chapter 5). Additionally,
and assuming a basic unfamiliarity with continental philosophy (specifically,
existentialist ontology) on the part of the reader, a detailed critical overview of basic
concepts within Heideggerian phenomenology relevant to this study has been presented
in chapter 6.
The dissertation is structured in three parts: Part I Construction (chapters 2-5), Part II
Deconstruction (chapter 6-7), Part III Reconstruction (chapter 8).
Chapter 2 Computationalism
Chapter 2
Every physical system in the universe, from wheeling galaxies
to bumping proteins, is a special purpose computer in the sense
that every physical system in the universe is implementing
some computation or other.
E.Dietrich, Thinking Computers and Virtual Persons.
Computationalism
2.1. Overview
In this chapter the concept of computation is examined. This is necessary in order to

make explicit the assumptions underlying computationalism, the metaphysical basis of
the unified framework of emergent artificiality described in chapter 5. The idea of a
formal system provides the starting point for the investigation given the initial
identification of computation with symbol manipulation. This leads to the notion of an
èffective procedure' which is formalized in the mathematical concept of a Turing
machine. The concept of a Universal Turing machine (UTM) and the Church-Turing
Thesis are introduced as the basis of computationalism. Various concepts of computation
are examined and computationalism is defined. The issue of connectionism is briefly
considered and arguments are presented in favour of realizing UTMs in discrete,
massively-parallel, locally-interacting media known as cellular automata. This leads to
two related concepts, viz. Universal Cellular Automata and Digital Mechanics. The
relation between computationalism and the physical world is examined in preparation for
the presentation of the unifying framework of computationally emergent artificiality
described in chapter 5. Finally, in preparation for the critique of computationalism
presented in Part III of this study, the computer metaphor is shown to be reducible to a
set of root metaphors and the link between computationalism and process philosophy is
briefly examined.
2.2. What is Computation ?

The McGraw-Hill Dictionary of Scientific and Technical Terms (Fifth Edition) defines
computation as "the act or process of calculating; the result so obtained." However,
Feigenbaum et al. (1983) maintain that "the computer [is] badly misnamed. `Computer'
implies only counting and calculating, whereas this unpromising hunk of wires, tubes,
switches, and lights [is], in principle, capable of manipulating any sort of symbol." (p.37)
Boden (1977) argues similarly: "computers do not crunch numbers [that is, calculate];
they manipulate symbols", whereby symbol is meant "a meaningless cipher that becomes
meaningful by having meaning assigned to it by a user." (p.15) This identification of
computation with meaningless symbol manipulation leads directly to the notion of a
formal system.
2.3. Formal Systems
In this section the definition, interpretation and properties of a formal system are briefly
described.
2.3.1. Definition
A formal system is a rigorously defined, that is, unambiguous, system of symbols and
rules for forming and manipulating symbol structures in which only the form or `shape'
of the symbols and their combination in symbol structures is considered; possible content
or meaning associated with the symbols - whether intrinsic or extrinsic - is ignored. For
this reason, formal systems are often referred to as token systems (Moody,93),
emphasizing the purely syntactical (formal or structural) and semantically-independent
(meaning-less) nature of the primitives in such systems.
A formal system comprises
Q an alphabet composed of a set of distinct (discrete) primitive symbols. A finite

sequence of symbols is called a symbol structure or string
Q a grammar or set of formation rules defining how symbols in the alphabet may
be combined to generate well-formed formulae (wffs), that is, legal strings
Q a set of axioms or legal strings (wffs) which are given a priori
Q a set of inference or transformation rules defining how further legal strings (wffs)
may be generated from existing strings
A theorem is a legal string (wff) capable of being produced by a finite sequence of

applications of the inference rules to the axioms. The sequence of application of the rules
constitutes the proof or derivation of the theorem.
For example, consider the formal system with
alphabet {A,B}
grammar all strings s are wffs
axiom A
inference rules A 6 AB
sB 6 sBB
As 6AAs
The operator `6' denotes ìs replaced by' and indicates the application of an inference rule
to an axiom or theorem. On this scheme, AAABB is both a legal string and a theorem.
However, ABAB is a legal string but not a theorem since it is not provable from within
(ìnside') the system, that is, there is no proof sequence that leads to the production of
this string. Thus, inference rules introduce a level of constraint in addition to that
provided by grammar.
2.3.2. Interpretation of Formal Systems
According to Garnham (1988), "rules [in a formal computational system] make direct
reference only to formal properties of symbols, but the choice of rules depends on what
the symbols they manipulate stand for." (p.229) Consequently, a formal system requires
an interpretation which is achieved by assigning meaning to the tokens of the system.
On this basis, tokens are rendered symbolic in a Peircean semiotic or significative sense,
viz. a symbol (or sign) is something which stands as something (else) in some respect or
other for somebody (Fetzer,90). There is a connection between the symbol and that to
which it refers, the latter providing the symbol with its meaning; hence, the implication
that meaning (semantics) is imparted to formal systems (syntax) exosystemically, that
is, from without (òutside') the system. For this reason, meaning is held to be extrinsic
to formal systems. However, this position has been contested: For example, Pylyshyn
(1980) maintains that semantics can effectively be reduced to syntax, viz. "all relevant
semantic distinctions [must] be mirrored by syntactic distinctions - i.e. by features
intrinsic to the representation itself." (p.113). On this view, semantics is intrinsic to a
formal system because semantics is reflected in or reducible to syntax and formal
systems are syntactical entities. As will be seen in chapter 3, the debate over intrinsic vs.
extrinsic semantics has implications for the debate over intrinsic vs. extrinsic emergence
as a consequence of the link between semantics and observation on the one hand, and
observation and emergence on the other (Cariani,89) (Cariani,91).
An interpretation that satisfies (makes true) the axioms and theorems of the system is
called a model. Formal systems are of value because, under suitable interpretation,
isomorphisms, that is, one-one mappings or correspondences, may be established
between primitives in a formal system (axioms, rules of inference) and primitives in a
natural system (states, natural laws). This leads to a variant of the modelling relation due
to Newton1 (Fig 2.1) and briefly described as follows:
1
According to Casti (1989), this modelling relation is implicit in Newtonian mechanics. However, Cariani (1989)
traces the explicit introduction of this model to Helmholtz, Hertz and Mach in the 19th Century and its recent
formulation to Rosen.
1. Using the interpretation, encode states of the world and causal laws into axioms
and rules of inference in the formal system.
2. Derive theorems in the formal system.
3. Using the interpretation, decode theorems back into states of the world to which
they correspond.
natural system formal system
encoding
N M
decoding
observables theorems
Fig 2.1 Newtonian modelling relation.
The problem is to discover rich and true isomorphisms between parts (or the whole) of
reality and formal systems2. However, it must be recognized from the outset that in order
for this to be possible it is necessary to adopt a specific epistemology and ontology
(metaphysics) with respect to the world which entails viewing the latter in terms of a set
of context-free, determinate facts or àtoms' in specific relations to one another
(Dreyfus,93). The precise organization (structure or pattern) of these atoms at any instant
constitutes the global system state at that instant (Elstob,84). Rosen (1988) maintains that
the encoding-decoding operations must be non-formal since they involve mappings from
continuous (or analog) to discrete (or digital) domains and visa-versa. This is significant
because in a formal system, the alphabet is fixed; although possibly infinitely many
strings can be produced by applying the inference rules to previously generated strings
(theorems), the set of system primitives is itself `closed', that is, finite and static.
However, robotic-functionalist systems are able to augment (extend) or alternatively
substitute (replace) one alphabet for another using measurement processes to generate
new alphabetical primitives or symbols (Cariani,89). Such systems are hybrid analog-
digital devices, that is, systems which include non-discrete components that produce
symbols via a grounding in the external physical world (Harnad,90). It is crucial to
appreciate that a formal system - as a formal system - exists (or rather, subsists) in the
abstract, disembodied, and static sense of a Platonic form (section 2.7.2). Furthermore,
2
Richness and truth are here viewed epistemologically: The former is associated with prediction (or anticipation)
and the latter with explanation (or understanding).
all possible theorems for a formal system exist (or subsist) - as potentialities requiring
actualization or embodiment in a suitable medium or substrate3 - once its alphabet,
grammar, axioms and inference rules have been specified since the latter are all fixed
(static). In this connection, it is interesting to note with Simon (1981) that
all mathematics exhibits in its conclusions only what is already implicit in its premises .. Hence all
mathematical derivation can be viewed simply as change in representation, making evident what was
previously true but obscure. (p.153)
This point is extremely significant to the debate on computational emergence which is

discussed in chapters 5, 6 and 7. Since hybrid devices are not digital computers -
although they belong to the class of machines with discrete computational elements
(Cariani,89) - they will not be considered further in this study4.
2.3.3. Properties of Formal Systems
There are two properties of a formal system which arise in relation to interpretation:
Q Consistency
every axiom and theorem of a formal system upon interpretation in some possible
world is a truth of that world, that is, there exists at least one non-contradictory
interpretation in which a string and its negation are not both provable, that is,
theorems.
Q Completeness
there exists a possible world for which all its truths are, under a suitable
interpretation, axioms or theorems of the formal system. This may also be stated
as the requirement that all àdmissible' strings be provable. Thus, the formal
system described in section 2.3.1 is incomplete under the interpretation that all
strings are wffs; however, if another interpretation whereby this is not the case
(that is, ABAB is not a wff) can be found, then the system will be complete with
respect to that interpretation.
However, Gdel has shown that for any formal system F that is finitely describable,
3
In chapter 7, it will be shown that formal and computational systems, as instances of "hard" artificiality (as
artifactuality) are embodied - as idealizations - in the mind of the artificer-interpreter.
4
As will be seen in what follows, the relevance of hybrid devices to the debate on computationalism is
questionable since their capacity to provide a framework within which to address some of the problems
associated with the latter rests on the assumption that the physical world is ontologically continuous, the
position ultimately contested by proponents of the computationalist thesis (section 2.6.6).
consistent and powerful enough to prove the basic facts about elementary arithmetic,
I. F is incomplete, and
II. F cannot prove its own consistency.
As Tipler (1995) states
Any formal system powerful enough to express the axioms of arithmetic contains a self-referential
statement equivalent to `This statement is unprovable'. If it is true, then the statement itself is
unprovable, and arithmetic is incomplete .. On the other hand, if the statement is false, then, since it
is equivalent to a statement of arithmetic, arithmetic would be logically inconsistent. (p.25)
Hence, any such system F will necessarily be either (i) incomplete and consistent, yet
unable to prove its consistency, or (ii) inconsistent. Gdel's theorems, which constrain
the axiomatization of the world, are limitations only on the extent to which a descriptive
law for every phenomenon may be constructed (Casti,89). However, they become
extremely relevant to the debate on computationalism since the latter in its "strong"
version is a formistic ontological thesis (section 2.7.2) and hence, must account for
everything in terms of mechanical (law-like) transformations.
2.4. Computation
The Microsoft Press Computer Dictionary (Second Edition) defines a computer as
any machine that does three things: accepts structured input [data], processes it according to
prescribed rules [a program], and produces the result as output.
Computers are essentially of two kinds: analog and digital. Analog computers are
continuous devices while digital computers are discrete devices. The metaphysical
position defined and examined in this thesis, viz. computationalism, is grounded in the
latter, viz. discrete devices; hence, the grounding relation between the digital computer
metaphor and computationalism (section 2.7). Casti (1989) defines a computer as
a machine for transforming one set of meaningless symbols into another; in short, a device for
physically executing the operations called for by the rules of a formal logical system. (p.268)
However, the concept of a computer as a symbol-manipulating machine remains

problematic since it is unclear what is meant by a machine. Kelly (1993) identifies the
following characteristics as fundamental to the notion of a machine: function, design,
determinism, explicitness, automaticity and mediacy. He further agues that "any dilution
of these properties would constitute a departure from a historical understanding of the
nature of machines and invite a charge of redefinition." (p.4) Yet, according to Toulmin
(1993), this redefinition has already taken place as a result of
the evolution of the modern scientific world view [which] transformed the concepts of `machine' and
`mechanism' to a point at which their originators would scarcely recognize them. (p.140)
Toulmin maintains that in seventeenth century thought, a machine was regarded as "an
instrument for transmitting outside action". The notion of a `living' or `thinking machine'
was ruled out not because of anything in the empirical content of the science of the
period, but as a consequence of the canonical definitions of matter and machine
respectively. For this reason, he holds that
if Descartes, Newton or Leibniz had been shown a late 20th century computer, they could only have
reacted by declaring "That's not a `machine' at all!" (p.146)
However, certain key ideas have been retained in the modern concept of a machine. For
example, Newell (1980) defines a machine as
a system that has a specific determined behaviour as a function of its input. By definition, therefore,
it is not possible for a single machine to obtain even two different behaviours, much less any
behaviour." (p.148)
According to this view, function and determinism are held to be characteristic of modern
machines including computers which leads directly to the notion of an effective
procedure.
2.4.1. Effective Procedures
Garnham (1988) defines an effective procedure as
one that could be carried out automatically by a machine, with no human intervention - one whose
result, when computed by a person, does not depend on ìntuition' or any other process not open to
objective inspection [emphasis added]. (p.225)
However, the notion of `machine' in the above definition remains somewhat vague,
thereby engendering arguments over what is to be taken as constituting the abstract
essence (or universal form) of an effective procedure. In order to resolve this problem,
it is necessary to redefine the notion of an effective (or mechanical) procedure in terms
of a machine designed specifically for this purpose. This leads directly to the concept of
a Turing machine.
2.4.2. Turing Machines
A Turing machine (Turing,36) is a formal model of an effective procedure. Turing

machines (TMs) possess the two essential properties of any model of an effective
procedure, viz. (i) each procedure is finitely describable, and (ii) each procedure consists
of discrete steps, each of which could be carried out mechanically, that is, without what
Minsky has referred to as ìnnovation' or ìntelligence' (Minsky,67). The following
description of TMs is taken from Hopcroft and Ullman (1979):
A TM consists of a finite control, an input tape that is divided into cells, and a tape head
that scans and prints (that is, reads from and writes to) one cell of the tape at a time (Fig
2.2). The tape has a leftmost cell but is infinite to the right. Each cell of the tape can hold
exactly one of a finite number of tape symbols. Initially, the n left-most cells, for some
finite n$0, hold the input, which is a string of symbols chosen from a subset of the tape
symbols called the input symbols. The remaining infinity of cells each hold a blank,
which is a special tape symbol that is not an input symbol.
a1 a2 ... an-1 an B ..
Finite
Control
Fig 2.2 A Turing machine.
On each move and depending on the symbol in the cell scanned by (read from) the tape
head and the state of the finite control, the TM performs the following operations, viz.
changes state, prints (writes) a symbol into the cell, replacing what was printed there,
moves its head left or right one cell position or halts (that is, remains in the current state).
A Turing machine (TM) is formally defined as follows:
TM = (Q, G, ', *, q0, B, F),
where
Q is a finite set of states,

' is a finite set of allowable tape symbols,
B a symbol of ', is the blank,
G a subset of ' not including B, is the set of input symbols,
* is a next-move function, a mapping from Q'6 Q' {L,R}
(* may, however, be undefined for some arguments),
q0 in Q is a start state,
F f Q is a set of final states.
2.4.3. Extensions to Turing Machines
Various extensions to TMs such as
Q a bidirectional infinite tape

Q multiple tapes
Q nondeterministic operation
Q multidimensionality of tape
Q multiple tape heads
result in a machine which can be shown to be equivalent (in computational power) to the
standard TM (Minsky,67). TMs are equivalent in computing power to digital computers
and to the most powerful mathematical notions of computation (Hopcroft,79);
consequently, the TM has become the accepted formalization of an effective procedure.
2.4.4. Computability and Decidability
Computability is usually defined with respect to TMs. For example, Minsky (1967) states
that
a function f(x) will be said to be Turing-computable if its values can be computed by some Turing
machine Tf whose tape is initially blank except for some standard representation of the argument x.
The value of f(x) is what remains on the tape when the machine stops. (p.135)
Informally, a computable function is one which can be generated by a finitely defined

mechanical procedure; conversely, an uncomputable function is one which cannot be so
generated, even by executing an infinite number of steps. For example, the number pi
is computable, even though its expansion is infinite and seemingly random, since the
procedure or algorithm for determining its expansion (to any desired number of decimal
places) is finite. Thus, the notion of an effective procedure leads to the concept of a TM
and the latter defines what is meant by computability.
The notion of decidability is related to computability via a question: Is there a general

procedure (that is, algorithm or TM) for determining in advance (deciding) whether or
not a particular program (TM) will halt after a finite number of steps ? Turing showed
that no such procedure exists (or can exist), that is, given a TM Tf and a tape with an
input data set I, there is no way in general to say if Tf will ever finish processing I.. This
`Halting Problem' is essentially Gdel's Incompleteness Theorem (section 2.3.3) as
applied to TMs. What is significant in the context of this study is the question of which
processes are Turing-computable and which (if any) are not; clearly, the possibility of
conceiving the existence of uncomputables as such does not entail the non-existence of
computational analogues of natural phenomena such as matter, life and mind (chapters
4 and 5)5. Furthermore, according to Cariani (1989), the question of computability only
arises if the tapes of a TM are allowed to be infinite in length; TMs with finite tapes are
equivalent to finite state machines (FSMs). On this basis and given the Finite Automaton
(section 2.5.3) and `finite nature' (section 2.6.6) theses, it follows that the universe must
be a FSM and natural phenomena must all be computable.
2.4.5. Universality and The Universal Turing Machine (UTM)
Newell (1980) provides the following informal definition of the notion of universality:
For any class of machines, defined by some way of describing its operational structure, a machine
of that class is defined to be universal if it can behave like any machine of the class .. The notion of
universality thus arrived at is relative, referring only to a given class of machines [emphasis added].
(pp.149,150)
The latter position is endorsed by McMullin (1993a) who maintains the distinction
between computation universality and construction universality, whereby the latter is
understood the ability of a machine to build or construct any other machine in the same
class given the appropriate program and materials (chapter 5). (Importantly, universal
construction necessitates support for self-reproduction. This is because a universal
constructor can construct all machines including the machine that is itself.) Minsky
(1967) defines a Universal Turing machine (UTM) as follows:
A universal Turing machine (UTM) is a [Turing] machine U with the property that for each and every
Turing machine T, there is a string of symbols dT such that if the number x is written in standard
notation on a blank tape, followed by the string dT, and U is started in q0 on the leftmost symbol of
dT,, then when the machine stops the number f(x) will appear on the tape, where f(x) is the number that
would have been computed if the machine T had been started with only x on its tape. (p.136)
McMullin (1993a) maintains that a UTM is doubly universal since
it is firstly universal with respect to all [Turing machine] computations (which give it its original
title); but this then turns out (at least if the Church-Turing Thesis is accepted) to mean that it is
universal with respect to the computations of any effective computing system whatsoever, not `just'
those of the [Turing machine] system. (p.4)
According to Newell (1980), "the class of all Turing machines is very large - by using
enough states (and it may take a very large number) the input-output behaviour of any
physical mechanism can be approximated as closely as required." (p.152) It must be
remembered that digital computers can only approximate UTMs since no physical
machine has an infinitely large memory (or `tape'). TMs therefore provide an idealistic
model of computation (Garnham,88) since physical computers are, in reality, finite state
5
In fact, on the "strong" computationalist position, natural phenomena such as matter, life and mind are
themselves computational in nature.
machines (FSMs) (Cariani,89). This limitation certainly applies to artifactual computers,

that is, to computational devices; however, it is an open issue whether the universe itself
is finite or infinite6. Consequently, it is an open issue whether the universe is a UTM or
FSM (assuming it is ontologically computational). Hence, TMs (as originally conceived)
are ontologically-idealistic as opposed to existentially-constructable entities.
The concept of universality described above is intrinsically Platonic or formistic (section

2.7.2) in nature: Functionality is defined purely in abstract behavioural terms, the
situatedness of functional activity, that is, the context in which behaviour is regarded as
functional, being ignored. While it may indeed be the case that two systems are universal
with respect to the Platonic (or space-time independent) aspect of their functionality, this
functionality may necessitate specific spatio-temporal conditions in order to be realized.
If this is the case, then can it really be said that the functionality of two systems operating
in two different spatio-temporal contexts is identical ? Pattee (1995a), in the context of
a discussion of the evolution of biological organisms, makes a similar point regarding
the necessity of including spatio-temporal responsivity requirements in the definition of
functionality: Two systems must generate identical behaviour within identical spatio-
temporal observation frames in order to be considered functionally equivalent. Only by
assuming a Platonic position is it possible to reduce functionality to context-free
behavioural activity. According to Heidegger, however, the capacity for conceiving
function in this way is restricted to a particular class of systems with the capacity for
abstract, thematic reflection (chapters 1 and 6), viz. human beings (or Dasein); on his
view, the abstract Platonic conception of functionality is incomplete since human beings
are concretely `thrown' into the historical situation that is `world' (chapter 6). Thus, there
is at least one kind of Being that is not adequately conceived in terms of ahistorical
functionality.
2.4.6. The Church-Turing Thesis (CTT)
The Church-Turing Thesis (or CTT) states that any process which could naturally be
called an effective procedure can be implemented by running a suitable program (TM
specification) on a UTM. An alternative formulation of the CTT (Hopcroft,79) is that
the intuitive notion of `computable function' can be identified with the class of partial recursive
functions, i.e. the class of integer functions computable by Turing machines, assuming that the
intuitive notion of `computable' places no bounds on (i) the number of steps or (ii) the amount of
storage (i.e. space-time requirements) involved in computation.
Although one cannot prove that the TM model is equivalent to the intuitive notion of an
effective procedure or computer, there seem to be compelling arguments for this
position, specifically the fact that universal recursive functions, Post canonical systems,
Markov algorithms etc are all equivalent to UTMs. Minsky (1967) asserts that "any
6
Additional support for this position is provided by evolutionary cosmology (chapter 6).
procedure which could `naturally' be called effective, can in fact be realised by a (simple)
machine." (p.105) However, he recognizes the problems associated with this position,
which is an informal statement of the CTT, emphasizing that it is "a subjective matter,
for which only argument and persuasion are appropriate; there is nothing here we can
expect to prove." (p.108) As Newell (1980) states,
Church's statement is called a thesis because it is not susceptible to formal proof, only to the
accumulation of evidence. For the claim is about ways to formalize something about the real world,
i.e. the notion of machine or determinate physical mechanism. (p.150)
The CTT raises a number of interesting issues. For example, Minsky (1967) states that
[the] most obvious application [of the notion of an effective procedure] is to computation and
computers, but I believe it is equally valuable for clear thinking about biological, psychological,
mathematical, and (especially) philosophical questions. (p.viii)
This generic application of the concept of an effective procedure (or computation)

throughout the phenomenal hierarchy leads to the notion of computationalism.
2.5. Computationalism
The origins of computationalism, the metaphysical view that the world at its most
fundamental level is computational in nature, can be traced to two related disciplines,
viz. computational psychology and the philosophy of mind. The essence of the original
notion is captured in the following statement of McMullin (1993b), viz.
all mental states and events, can, in principle, be completely reduced, without residue, to states and
events of some universal computer (p.1)
and is clarified by the dictum "mind is to brain as program is to hardware" (Johnson-

Laird,88), a computational variant of Cartesian mind-matter dualism referred to in the
literature as the "strong" AI thesis (Searle,80) or, more explicitly, computationalism
(Dietrich,90) (Shapiro,95). Sharples et al. (1989) define computationalism as
the notion that the operation of the mind can be explained entirely in terms of the formal, or
functional, properties of a computational system.
Thus, computationalism is a type of functionalism (chapter 1), the latter of which is

associated with notions such as multiple-realizability and medium independence (chapter
4). The functionalist position can be formally stated as follows:
a computational state s1 is identical to a computational state s 2if the causal

relations holding between s1, its inputs, outputs and other states are identical to
the casual relations holding between s2, its inputs, outputs and other states.
Significantly, the identity relation holding between two computational states makes no
reference to the properties of the substrate or media in which the computations are
realized beyond the capacity of these media to support computation. Hence, in
computationalism, form is separable from matter and the mind can be understood
without doing neurophysiology since it is independent of the brain in the same way that
programs are independent of hardware (Searle,80). It is important to appreciate that
multiple realizability is a general statement about the functional or causal equivalence
of phenomena rather than a specific statement about the nature of phenomena such as
mind. This makes possible the extension of the original mentalistic concept of
computationalism to other phenomenal domains such as biology leading to the vitalistic
dualism, `life is to body as program is to hardware', known as the "strong" A-Life thesis
(Sober,91). However, its application to physics leads to an interesting situation
necessitating an inversion of the hardware-software relation: `matter is to computation
as program is to hardware'. What was previously identifiable as hardware (matter) in the
mind-brain and life-body relations is now defined as software and what was previously
associated with software (computation) is now identified with hardware. However, are
`soft-hardware' and `hard-software' coherent concepts ? In Kantian terms, moving from
phenomena (the physical) to noumena (the metaphysical) has necessitated inverting the
hardware-software dualism (Fig 2.3):
Hardware Software
Brain Mind (Mentalism)
Body Life (Vitalism)
Computation Matter (Materialism)
Fig 2.3 Computational Phenomenal Dualisms.
The dissimilarity between `computational-materialism' and other computational

phenomenal dualisms is described by Rosen (1987) as follows:
Although .. the mechanical theories of physics (and the field theories, too, for that matter) are closely
related in their form to the ideas of Turing, and to the formalizations his machines execute, there is
one obvious difference. Namely, a system of particles is, in a sense, all hardware. The dualism
between state (phase) and dynamical law is at root not the same as the dualism between hardware and
software, which is inherent in the `mechanization' of formal processes by Turing machines. For
instance, in our little embodiment of mechanics by a two-tape machine, the tape processor (the
`hardware' of the machine) has no counterpart in the physics of the system; the mechanical system
itself has, in turn, become all software. (p.9)
Assuming the above inversion is valid, it is worthwhile assessing the status of the
computationalist thesis. There are at least three perspectives on this issue: First, there are
those such as Bringsjord (1996) who maintain that computationalism, as a thesis about
mentality, can be and already has been refuted using variants of Searle's Chinese Room
argument; second, there are others such as McMullin (1993b), who are sympathetic to
this position, yet maintain that the arguments used to support it are weak; and finally,
there are those such as Dennett (1995) who continue to uphold variants of the
computationalist position on the basis of the following statement made by Pylyshyn
(1980), viz.
computation is the only worked-out view of process that is both compatible with a materialist view
of how a process is realized and that attributes the behaviour of the process to the operation of rules
upon representations (p.113)
While there may be grounds for refuting computationalism within AI, cognitive science
and the philosophy of mind, it is unclear at the outset whether (and if so, how) such
arguments extend to computational life (Keeley,93) and/or computational matter
(Fredkin,90). Statements such as the following due to Newell et al. (1976) support this
latter cautionary view, viz.
the phenomena surrounding computers are deep and obscure, requiring much experimentation to
assess their nature. (p.114)
General formulations of computationalism, such as that any physical structure in which

states and state transitions can be interpreted as representing some other system is a
computer (Churchland,92), support the application of the concept throughout the
phenomenal hierarchy. For example, the idea that the world is a formal system of the
Turing machine kind is expressed in the following speculation by Hofstadter (1979):
One could suggest .. that reality is nothing but one very complicated formal system. Its symbols do
not move around on paper, but rather in a three-dimensional vacuum (space); they are the elementary
particles of which everything is composed .. The [formation and transformation rules] are the laws
of physics, which tell how, given the position and velocity of all particles at a given instant, to modify
them, resulting in a new set of positions and velocities belonging to the `next' instant. So the theorems
of this grand formal system are the possible configurations of particles at different times in the history
of the universe. The sole axiom is (or perhaps, was) the original configuration of all the particles at
the `beginning of time'. (p.53)
This position is endorsed by Tipler (1995) who defines the human being as
nothing but a particular type of machine, the human brain as nothing but an information processing
device, the human soul as nothing but a program being run on a computer called the brain. Further,
all possible types of living beings, intelligent or not, are of the same nature, and subject to the same
laws of physics as constrain all information processing devices [emphasis added]. (p.xi)
However, perhaps the boldest statement of the computationalist thesis is that appearing
in (Tallis,94):
Physical systems are .. computational systems, processing information, just as computers do, and
scientific laws may be considered as algorithms. This extraordinary view is enhanced by the
observation that in post-classical (quantum) physics many physical quantities normally regarded as
continuous are in fact discrete: nature is thus more amenable to digitization. In other words, the
universe is not merely a huge computer: it is a huge digital computer. (p.31)
In order to further clarify the notion of computationalism, three related theses will now
briefly be examined: (i) the Physical Symbol System Hypothesis, (ii) the Physical
Church-Turing Thesis, and (iii) the Finite Automaton Thesis.
2.5.1. The Physical Symbol System Hypothesis (PSSH)
The Physical Symbol System Hypothesis (PSSH) (Newell,76) states that
a physical symbol system has the necessary and sufficient means for general intelligent action
whereby `general intelligent action' is meant "behaviour appropriate to the ends of the
system." (p.116) On this definition, a physical symbol system is necessarily a teleological
(goal-directed) entity. While this might be acceptable for mind and life, the notion of
teleological matter is incoherent with respect to Newtonian and post-Newtonian physics
and the PSSH assumes the latter. Hence, in order to facilitate generalization of the PSSH
to life and matter, it is necessary to redefine it as follows:
a physical symbol system has the necessary and sufficient means for generating phenomena such as
matter, life and mind.
Newell et al. (1976) define a physical symbol system (PSS) as
Q a set of physical patterns called symbols
Q a set of physical structures called expressions composed from a number of instances (or tokens) of
symbols related in some physical way
Q a set of processes for producing new expressions (symbol structures) from existing expressions
The crucial issue for Newell (1980) is realizability:
a physical symbol system .. is realizable in our universe [and] its notion of symbol is a priori distinct
from the notion of symbol that has arisen in describing directly human linguistic, artistic and social
activities. (p.141)
Simon (1981) expands on the latter point by asserting the ontological nature of the PSS
concept:
The computer is a member of an important family of artifacts called symbol systems, or more
explicitly, physical symbol systems. Another important member of the family (some of us think,
anthropomorphically, it is the most important) is the human mind and brain. (pp.26-27)
Two notions are associated with a PSS:
Q Designation: An expression designates an object if, given the expression, the system can either (i)
affect the object itself or (ii) behave in ways depending on the object.
Designation therefore necessitates establishing the equivalent of encoding (sensor,

measurement) and decoding (effector, control) relations between objects and a PSS.
Q Interpretation: The system can interpret an expression if the expression designates a process and if,
given the expression, the system can carry out the process.
According to Pylyshyn (1980), "[syntactic or symbolic] expressions are ìnterpreted' by

the built-in functional properties of the physical device." (p.113) Thus, a PSS is argued
to be capable of self-interpretation. However, the most important feature about PSSs as
regards the bearing of the PSSH on the issue of computationalism is that
symbol systems form a class - it is a class that is characterised by the property of universality ..
Central to universality is flexibility of behaviour .. a universal machine is one that can produce an
arbitrary input-output function; that is, that can produce an independence of output on input.
(Newell,80;p.147)
As Newell (1980) states, "our situation is one of defining a symbol system to be a

universal machine, and then taking as a hypothesis that this notion of symbol system will
prove adequate to all of the symbolic activity this physical universe of ours can exhibit,
and in particular all the symbolic activities of the human mind." (p.155)
From the above, it is observed that PSSs are distinguishable from formal systems
(section 2.3) in two ways: (i) the primitives and operations in a PSS are physical and
hence, subject to the laws of physics; (ii) symbols in a PSS exist ontologically, that is,
independent of human interpretation. If the laws of physics are themselves recast in
formal (syntactic) terms and a "strong" formalist or computationalist view of reality is
assumed (chapters 4 and 5), PSSs become identical with formal systems. Newell et al.
(1976) maintain that a PSS is part of a larger world which includes objects, that is,
entities which are not PSSs. This might appear to entail the view that the reduction of
PSSs to formal systems cannot be complete (that is, totalistic). However, under
formalism, the ontology of objects is also ultimately formal (section 2.5.2); hence, the
dualism of objects and physical symbol systems reduces to an ontologically monistic
formal system. The two kinds of entities can be functionally distinguished for certain
kinds of PSS: a mental or vital PSS is goal-directed whereas an object (material PSS) is
not; however, whether such distinctions are intrinsic or extrinsic is an open issue.
2.5.2. The Physical Church-Turing Thesis (PCTT)
Randall (1996) defines four increasingly "strong" versions of the Church-Turing thesis:
CTT(1) All computable things correspond to a lambda-form or Turing Machine. (Mathematical)
CTT(2) All physical things correspond to a Turing Machine. (Physical)
CTT(3) All thinkable things correspond to a Turing Machine. (Mental/Epistemological)
CTT(4) All things correspond to a Turing Machine. (Ontological)
Acceptance of the validity all four versions of the CTT leads Randall to argue for the
existence of immaterial (non-physical) computables only:
computable uncomputable
physical dissolution to void rejected by CTT(2) &
(material) (forms = reality) dissolution to void
non-physical accepted by all rejected by CTT(4)
(immaterial) CTTs
Table 2.1
On Randall's view, CTT(2) or the Physical Church-Turing Thesis (PCTT) must

ultimately be replaced by CTT(4), that is, the Ontological CTT (OCTT). This is a
consequence of the dissolution to void suffered when physical entities are analysed in
order to determine what constitutes their `similarity in difference': The reality of physical
entities is defined by the extent to which they participate in Platonic forms (or ideas) to
which the mind has access (section 2.7.2); hence, entities can have no real existence apart
from the forms. On Randall's view, physics must be reduced to form since "any attempt
to define physical things as things-in-themselves apart from the forms suffers dissolution
into nothingness, as [happens] for static sets." (p.10) However, the metaphysical nature
of the commitment to identify existence or Being with form must be recognized (chapter
1)7: Randall's reduction of the PCTT to the OCTT only holds if Platonism is assumed a
priori; crucially, an existential-computationalist position is consistent with the PCTT.
Moreover, Randall's claim that physical uncomputables are meaningless is problematic
since examples of physical uncomputables have been documented in the literature
(Calude,95). However, the OCTT is the basis of computationalism; hence, although the
PCTT provides a sufficient framework within which to investigate the emergence of
7
Furthermore, and as will be seen in chapter 6, the conception of Being (or existence) in static (that is, Platonic)
terms is highly problematic.
artificial analogues of natural physical phenomena from a computational substrate, the

PCTT must be viewed as subsumable by the OCTT8.
Rosen (1991) describes the PCTT as follows:
through equivocation on the word `machine', Church's Thesis can be painlessly transmuted into an
assertion about the material world itself; an assertion about what can be entailed in the causal world
of material phenomena. That is, Church's Thesis can be interpreted as an assertion about the structure
of the category of all models of any material systems. (p.9)
According to Rasmussen (1991b), the PCTT entails holding that "a universal computer
at the Turing machine level can simulate any physical process." (p.768) The problem
with this position is that the word `simulate' is ambiguous: Does it imply appearance (as-
if, simulation proper) or reality (instantiation, realization) ? On the "strong" (ontological)
interpretation of computationalism it must be the latter. (The difference between
simulation, realization and emulation is discussed in chapter 4).
Svozil (1993) maintains that the CTT includes a physical as well as a syntactic claim by
specifying which types of computations are physically realizable: "As physical
statements may change with time, so may our concept of effective computation." A
corollary of this is that digital computers are physical systems which are universal up to
finite complexities. Thus, according to Svozil, physics constrains computation. However,
if the PCTT is afforded ontological status the position is reversed. As Rosen (1991)
argues, the implications of the CTT for the mathematical and physical worlds are quite
different:
In mathematics, Church's Thesis does no .. damage, because whatever is not simulable is thereby
relegated to the category of ìneffective' .. Gdel's Theorem already tells us that, in these terms,
almost all of Number Theory is thereby rendered ìneffective'. But the material world is different;
whatever happens, or can happen in it, must thereby be èffective'; at least, it must be so in any
normal usage of that term. Hence the equation èffective' = `simulable', which is the essence of
Church's Thesis boxes us in from the outset to a world of simple systems; a world of mechanisms.
(p.11)
Thus, while physics may constrain computation, computation also constrains physics.
(This issue is examined further in chapter 4 in the context of a computational theory of
matter.)
2.5.3. The Finite Automaton Thesis (FAT)
This "strong" (or ontological) version of the finite automaton thesis (FAT) states that the
universe is a finite automaton, whereby finite automaton is meant a computational device
8
To the extent that mind (more specifically, consciousness) is a natural, yet non-physical phenomenon, this
subsumption becomes necessary.
which is finite in all its features, for example, a TM with a finite number of internal
states, finite number of input and output symbols, finite tape etc. This version of the
thesis involves the following two claims (Svozil,93), viz.
Q the `laws of nature' are mechanistic, that is, computable in the Church-Turing sense
Q under certain `mild' assumptions, the computational capacities of physical systems are finite
The `weak' (epistemological) version of the FAT merely states that there are phenomena
in automaton universes which translate into physics and which are only sensibly analyzed
using algorithmic techniques. The FAT is closely connected to the finite nature thesis
(section 2.6.6); however, it is an open issue whether the universe it itself finite or
infinite. Hence, the status of the FAT is a priori undecided and, perhaps, undecidable,
given the endosystemicity of human observers9. However, computationalistically, the
universe is either a finite automaton or a UTM.
2.5.4. Concepts of Computation
Emmeche (1993) (1994) proposes to extend the definition of computation by

distinguishing four concepts (as contrasted with kinds) of computation:
Q COC1: Formal or algorithmic (symbolic) Reality

Q COC2: Informal, intuitive, or `mathematical' Mind
Q COC3: Biological Life
Q COC4: Physical or non-representational (non-symbolic) Matter
Emmeche (1994) maintains that the problem of the different concepts of computation
may be resolved by adopting a pluralistic stance, viz. "that we simply face different kinds
of computations." (p.19) However, this view is incoherent: If there are many kinds of
computations, what is it that allows them to be identified as computations ? It must be
that they are members of the universal class of computations. Hence, computational-
pluralism must, somehow, reduce to computational-monism.
Following Fetzer (1990), Emmeche (1994) further argues for a semiotic (significative
or sign-based) understanding of the concept of computation, viz.
it is by no means clear how to speak rationally about computations without presupposing the
existence of a complex system including (a) a conceptual structure of symbols, rules of
manipulations, and well-formed strings as axioms to be manipulated; plus (b) an organism or a well-
designed physical device that in some way can do the manipulations; and thirdly, (c) an interpreter,
that makes sense of (a) and (b). (p.19)
However, assuming the ontological form of the PCTT (section 2.5.2), (i) these triadic
9
That is, the situatedness of human observers within the physical universe.
functions must be realizable by a PSS that is itself a formal system and (ii) COC2-COC4
must be reducible to COC1.
2.5.5. Definition: Computationalism
This metaphysical position may be stated in Kantian terms as follows: The noumenal
reality underlying phenomenal appearance is computational; hence, all natural and
artificial phenomena are, ultimately, computational phenomena. This statement is to be
interpreted in the "strong" ontological sense implied by the maxim, "Being is
computation" (chapter 6), and not in the "weak" epistemological sense that computation
merely provides a means for understanding (explaining and predicting) the various
manifestations of Being.
2.5.6. Analog Devices and Connectionism
There may be a problem with the Church-Turing thesis given that it was originally
formulated in the context of discrete computational devices, that is, digital computers.
Siegelmann (1995) has argued that analog connectionist devices such as analog recurrent
neural networks (ARNN) have super-Turing capabilities; consequently, there may be a
need to complement the Church-Turing thesis with an analog computation thesis.
However, others have argued that this view is incorrect since it assumes, for example,
that neural network coefficients can have arbitrarily large accuracy, that is, an infinite
amount of information may be packed into each coefficient (Knight,96). Such devices,
it is argued, are not physically realizable and since they clearly violate the finite automata
thesis (FAT) (section 2.5.3) and Fredkin's finite nature thesis (section 2.6.5) will not be
considered further herein10.
Regarding connectionist systems (that is, networks of elements with weighted links),
Kelly (1993) observes that "there is some dispute about the real nature of connectionism,
whether it is truly a new paradigm or is merely another mode of implementation of
essentially classical systems." (p.202) This observation is supported by (1) the
computational equivalence of discrete-state artificial neural networks and Turing
machines (Bringsjord,90), (2) the ontological relation between declarative (or functional)
programs and artificial neural networks (Salt,96), and (3) the formal equivalence of
discrete-state artificial neural networks and symbolic computational systems (such as
classifier systems and semantic networks) which can be shown by reduction to a generic
10
However, as stated in section 2.5.2, the existence of physical uncomputables has been documented in the
literature. According to Cariani (1989), hybrid analog-digital devices constitute examples of finite, physical,
uncomputable systems capable of open emergence (chapters 3 and 6). On this hylomorphic view, the physical
universe is held to be finite in extent yet offering infinite capacity for classification via measurement. It is hard
to see how this eliminates the role of infinity completely and, if Knight's criticisms of infinities in ARNNs
extend to Cariani's evolutionary robotic devices, it must be the case that the equivalent of a TM tape of infinite
length has been tacitly reintroduced into the picture.
mathematical formalism based on graph-theoretic concepts (Farmer,90). Since discrete

nature is assumed in this study (section 2.6, chapters 4 and 5), analog devices and neural
networks must be reducible to discrete devices.
2.6. Implementing Computationalism
In this section the cellular automaton formalism, which provides the means for realizing
the computationalist world view described in section 2.5, is introduced. Only
deterministic, that is, non-probabilistic, cellular automata (CAs) are considered.
However, this does not present any problems since nondeterminism adds nothing to the
power of TMs (section 2.4.3) and the class of CAs which are of ultimate interest in the
context of this study, viz. Universal CAs (or UCAs), are computationally equivalent to
UTMs.
2.6.1. From Turing Machines to Cellular Automata
Putnam (1988) maintains that
functionalists have abandoned the Turing machine formalism, and so far we have only the vaguest
descriptions of what the computational formalism is supposed to be. Without a computational
formalism, the notion of a `computational state' is meaningless. (p.84)
Although Putnam's comments were made in the context of an evaluation of the

functionalist programme within cognitive science and the philosophy of mind, they have
much broader implications for an ontological computationalism grounding artificial
analogues of natural phenomena such as matter, life and mind. Specifically, there is a
need to redefine computationalism in terms of a new formalism, one which will support
functional isomorphisms with natural phenomena. Assuming an emergentist perspective
(chapters 3 and 5), it becomes necessary to examine the way in which a computational
ontology must be realized in order to provide the ground for an artificial analogue of the
lowest level in the natural phenomenal hierarchy, viz. the material or physical level.
Hillis (1985) describes the two senses in which `computational model' may be
understood: (i) "a model of all possible computational worlds", that is, a
"metacomputational theory" or (ii) "a model of a particular computational system" and
"physics may be such a model" (p.142). Analogously, Pattee (1995a) differentiates
between two interpretations of computation: (i) "computation as a universal, abstract
dynamics to which even the laws of physics must conform" and (ii) "computation as a
locally programmable, concrete, material process strictly limited by the laws of physics."
(p.29) Given the nature of the study described in this thesis, it could be argued that
`computational model' must be understood in the first sense since computationalism is
a metaphysical position and hence, encompassing of the physical (chapter 1). However,
given the specific form of computationalism presented in this study, viz. a
computationalism supporting the emergence of artificiality (or artificial analogues of
natural phenomena), the computational model must support computational analogues of

physical concepts since the physical level constitutes the lowest level in the phenomenal
hierarchy.
In the context of a discussion of `why computer science is no good', Hillis (1985) asks
whether or not there will ever be "a model of computation that is as powerful and
beautiful as our models of physics", maintaining that "computer science is missing many
of the qualities that make the laws of physics so powerful: locality, symmetry, invariance
of scale." (p.137) Locality means that objects must be in contact in order to interact with
each other; action at a distance is not allowed. As Hillis states, "our old models of
computation impose no locality of connection, even though the real world does." (p.139)
(This Newtonian view is problematic since it ignores non-local physical interaction
between particles at the quantum level. However, as discussed in chapter 5, attempts
have been made to overcome such problems within classical or Newtonian systems.)
Symmetry implies reversibility, viz. physical laws apply irrespective of the `direction' of
time. Again, as Hillis states, "in physics .. many fundamental quantities are conserved,
whereas in our old models of computation, data can be created or destroyed at no cost."
(p.138) (This is an idealization since in a closed system - and the universe is assumed
closed under this argument - entropy, which measures the degree of disorder in a system,
increases as a consequence of the dissipation of energy in the form of heat during
collisions between bodies within the system.) Invariance of scale simply means that
physical laws apply irrespective of the size of the objects concerned. (Again, this is an
idealization: As stated in chapter 4, when objects are very small, quantum effects start
to become significant, and when moving close to the speed of light, relativistic effects
become significant). Assuming the problems described above - which arise under
idealized conditions - can be overcome, a computational substrate supporting analogues
of physical properties such as locality, symmetry, and invariance of scale provides a
suitable candidate for defining what is meant by computation and realizing (or
implementing) ontological computationalism. As will be seen in what follows and in
chapter 5, the cellular automaton (CA) is such a substrate. Informal introductions to CAs
based on an examination of the Game of Life are provided in (Berlekamp,82),
(Gardner,83) and (Poundstone,85); more detailed investigations of elementary CAs are
described in (Wolfram,83b,84b,86). In the following sections the CA formalism and
some of its basic properties are described; CA models of specific natural phenomena
such as matter, life and mind are discussed in chapter 5.
2.6.2. Cellular Automata and Computationalism
A cellular automaton (CA) provides a suitable mathematical framework (formalism) for

modelling natural systems with large numbers of discrete degrees of freedom; in this
respect, they are the discrete equivalent of models based on systems of differential
equations. CAs represent universes of pure information (Stonier,92) and may be regarded
as "stylised, synthetic universes" (Toffoli,87) of the Newtonian kind: Space is
represented as a uniform Cartesian grid or lattice of cells with each cell containing a
finite amount of information (`matter'); absolute time advances in discrete steps and
ùniversal laws' are expressed by an update rule which is locally defined and globally
applied. Wolfram (1984a) identifies the following five characteristics as defining
standard CAs:
1. They consist of a discrete lattice of sites.
2. They evolve in discrete time steps.
3. Each site takes on a finite set of possible values.
4. The value of each site evolves according to the same deterministic rules.
5. The rules for the evolution of a site depend only on the local neighbourhood of sites around it.
Standard CAs provide general discrete models of homogeneous systems whose global
behaviour is determined by the long-term time evolution of local interactions. It must be
recognized from the outset that standard CAs are `closed' systems (chapter 3) since the
dynamics of such systems over time is completely determined by the initial state of the
lattice cells and the local interaction rule (Aleksic,92).
A cellular automaton (CA) can be viewed either (i) as a computer, or (ii) as a logical
universe, a structure into which may be embedded higher order computational structures
including `virtual' computers (Langton,90). This is a consequence of the fact that in a
CA, objects interpretable as passive data and objects interpretable as computational
devices are both assembled out of the same kind of structural elements and are subject
to the same fine-grained laws. Hence, CAs can be viewed either as information
transducers or informationally autonomous systems (Toffoli,87). Langton clarifies the
distinction as follows:
On the first view, an initial configuration constitutes the data that the physical computer is working
on, and the [state] transition function implements the algorithm that is to be applied to the data.
On the second view, the initial configuration itself constitutes a computer, and the [state] transition
function is seen as the `physics' obeyed by the parts of this embedded computer. The algorithm being
run and the data being manipulated are functions of the precise state of the initial configuration of the
embedded computer. In the most general case, the initial configuration will constitute a universal
computer. (pp.15-16)
Clearly, for CAs to provide a means of realizing computationalism, the latter of the two
positions must be adopted. According to Wolfram (1985),
one expects the fact that computers are as powerful in their computational capacities as any physically
realizable system can be, so that they can simulate any physical system [emphasis added]. (p.735)
2.6.3. Definition: Cellular Automaton (CA)
Cellular automata (CAs) are discrete dynamical systems consisting of d-dimensional

(d$1) lattices of cells in which each cell is a finite state machine (FSM) - or finite state
automaton (FSA) - defined by the following triplet:
< S, N, R > (2.1)
S is the set of states that each FSA may assume. SN is the set of input neighbourhood
states each of which is defined as the cross product of the states of those cells covered
by a template of size |N|$1. (By convention a cell is included in its neighbourhood).
Examples of neighbourhood templates when d=2 for lattices with different geometries
(square and hexagonal respectively) are shown in Fig 2.4. CAs with d=3 (Bays,87a) are
particularly interesting since their geometries correspond to the perceived three-
dimensions of the natural world and therefore provide a suitable basis for modelling the
universe (chapter 5). R:SN6S is the state-transition rule defined by associating a unique
next state in S with each possible neighbourhood state in SN. Since there are |S| possible
states which can be assigned for each of the Q=|SN| possible input neighbourhood states,
there are |SQ| possible state-transition rules R which can be defined. For example, in a
binary CA with a neighbourhood of three cells (S=2, N=3), there are 256 possible state-
transition rules.
(a) (b) (c)
Fig 2.4 Various 2-D neighbourhood templates.
A CA is defined by the 5-tuple:
< k, S, L0, N, R > (2.2)
where k with k$1 is the size of the lattice (number of cells); L0 is the initial configuration
of cells in the lattice at time t=0 (L00L and |L|=|S|k); and S, N and R are as defined in
(2.1). The lattice is either spatially (i) infinite (k=4), (ii) finite and periodic or (iii) finite
and non-periodic. In standard CA, the local update rule R is applied globally (each FSA
computes the same function) and synchronously (all cells are updated simultaneously).
For example, consider the 1-D periodic CA defined as follows:
S = {0,1}
|N| = 3
k = 10
L0 = 0010110100
R = 00060, 00161, 01061, 01160, (XOR function)
10061, 10160, 11060, 11161
The space-time evolution of this CA is as follows:
0010110100 (t = 0)
0110000110 (t = 1)
1001001001 (t = 2)
0111111110 (t = 3)
1011111101 (t = 4)
The space-time evolution of this CA (rule 150 following the Wolfram coding scheme)
for 100 iterations (t = 0..99) with an initial configuration density DINIT = 0.01 (lattice cells
are initially assigned to be in the `1' or òn' state with probability 0.01) is shown in Fig
2.5:
Fig 2.5 1-D CA space-time evolution (rule 150).
Conway's Game of Life rule (Berlekamp,82) is particularly interesting as an example of

a 2-D CA that is capable of supporting universal computation. The rule is extremely
simple: (i) if a dead cell is surrounded by exactly three live cells at time t then it will be
live at time t+1; (ii) if a cell is in the live state and surrounded by either two or three live
neighbouring cells at time t then it will remain live at time t+1 else it will die. Given a
precise initial configuration of the lattice, this CA can generate an extremely diverse
array of structures including blinkers (periodic oscillators), gliders (translating
oscillators), puffer trains (dynamic structures which generate `debris', that is, static
structures) and most importantly with respect to the construction of universal computers,
glider guns (dynamic structures which emit gliders at regular intervals). An example of
a glider is shown in Fig 2.6:
tn tn+1 tn+2 tn+3 tn+4
Fig 2.6 Space-time evolution of a glider.
After four iterations, the glider has translated diagonally by one cell. Gliders and other
structures will be examined further in chapter 5 when various CA models of the universe
are presented.
2.6.4. Describing the Structure of CAs
The following table describes a set of isomorphisms between natural systems, continuous
dynamical systems, formal systems and TMs based on the Newtonian modelling scheme
introduced in section 2.3.2:
Natural Dynamical Formal Computational

primitives number field alphabet tape symbols
state-space state manifold All symbol strings strings All tape patterns
state state symbol string tape pattern
initial state initial conditions axioms input tape pattern
laws vector field inferences program instructions
state-sequence trajectory derivation sequence sequence of tape patterns
observables attractors theorems output
Table 2.2 Isomorphisms between various systems.
Since CAs are discrete dynamical systems, they are readily described in terms which are
analogous to those used in the description of continuous dynamical systems:
Dynamical System CA
number field FSM states
state manifold state-space
state state
initial conditions initial state
vector field state-transition function
trajectory trajectory
attractors attractors
Table 2.3 Isomorphism between continuous dynamical systems and CA.
In continuous dynamical systems described by systems of differential equations, a

manifold is an n-dimensional space analogous to a surface. In a discrete dynamical
system such as a CA, a topological manifold corresponds to the space defined by the
geometry of the cell lattice. For example, in a finite two-dimensional CA with periodic
boundary conditions, the topological manifold is a torus; in a three-dimensional CA, it
is a toroid. The state manifold, on the other hand, defines the space of possible global
states that the dynamical system can assume; however, it is more usual to refer to the
state manifold of a CA as its state-space. In continuous dynamical systems, each point
in the state manifold is described by a set of coordinates based on some number field:
For example, each body in a gravitational system is described by three position
coordinates and three velocity coordinates. In a CA, each point in the state-space is
described by the state of the FSA at the corresponding lattice site. A CA state is defined
as the global pattern formed by the states of the FSAs at each cell in the lattice; the state-
space is the set of all such states. A state-transition function or rule is the equivalent of
a vector field in a continous dynamical system and determines how the CA evolves in
space-time. In both discrete and continuous dynamical systems, a trajectory is a sequence
of states, a basin of attraction is the set of all trajectories converging on an attractor, and
the basin of attraction field is the set of all basins of attraction for a particular system. (In
deterministic systems such as CA the basins are discontinuous, that is, unconnected).
Attractors mark the end points in dynamical systems. In continuous dynamical systems,
there are three kinds of attractors: (i) fixed point, (ii) limit cycle, and (iii) chaotic or
`strange' attractors. However, in discrete dynamical systems such as CA, four kinds of
attractor have been identified corresponding to four classes of behaviour (Wolfram,83b),
the first three of which are directly analogous to those identified in continuous dynamical
systems:
Class I evolution leads to a homogeneous state

Class II evolution leads to a set of stable or periodic structures
Class III evolution leads to a chaotic pattern
Class IV evolution leads to complex structures, sometimes long-lived
A detailed study of the basin of attraction fields for a range of CAs and a related
formalism, the random-boolean network (Kauffman,93), is presented in (Wuensche,93).
An example of a basin of attraction field is shown in the following graphical state-space

portrait (Fig 2.7). The topology of the portrait is that of transient branching trees rooted
on attractors; the directionality of the graph is from the outermost branches to the
innermost attractor sites. Nodes in the network represent global system states and arcs
represent the transitions between states. States without precursor states are referred to as
`Garden of Eden' states.
Fig 2.7 Example of a basin of attraction field.

[Source: (Wuensche,93)].
2.6.5. Universal Cellular Automata (UCAs)
CAs supporting behaviour in class IV, that is, generation of complex structures such as
translating periodic oscillators or `gliders', are of interest since the structures they
produce can be used to construct universal computers (CA equivalents of UTMs). A
Universal CA (UCA) is a computation-universal or UTM-equivalent CA capable of
simulating the behaviour of any other CA (Fredkin,90). The empirical or constructive
proof of computational universality for the two-dimensional CA known as the Game of
Life is described in (Berlekamp,82) and outlined for the three-dimensional version of the
same CA in (Bays,87a). However, computation-universal one-dimensional CAs also
exist provided |N-1| DIV 2 > 1 or/and |S| > 2 (Wolfram,83b).
2.6.6. "Digital Mechanics"
Laplace maintained that given the position and momentum of every particle in the
universe at any given time, it is possible to predict the past or future of each particle.
This formulation of the mechanistic idea of determinism (section 2.7.4) introduces the
notion of reversibility, viz. that the spatio-temporal evolution of a system may be run
backward as well as forward. The Laplacian thesis was formulated in the context of a
consideration of linear systems, which do not suffer the unpredictability effects
associated with the n-body problem. (The latter arises from interactions involving n
bodies, where n$3; classical or Newtonian physics is unable to predict the outcome of
such events because analytical solutions of n-body systems of interaction cannot be
generated.) It can be shown that the Laplacian position is epistemologically untenable
given the chaotic behaviour of non-linear dynamical systems; however, it remains intact
as an ontological thesis finding its modern expression in computationalism. The idea that
the future state of the universe can be completely determined by applying the the laws
of physics to its current state provides the foundation for digital mechanics (DM)
(Fredkin,90), a computationalist theory of nature based on the cellular automaton (CA)
formalism. Briefly stated, Fredkin argues that some CA model, a reversible universal
CA, may be programmed to act like physics. In order for DM to model both classical
(Newtonian) and post-classical (quantum) physics, it is necessary to assume the `finite
nature' thesis which is closely related to the finite automaton thesis (section 2.5.3):
I the universe is finite in the amount of information contained in a finite volume of space-time
II the universe is finite in the total volume of space-time
On this point, Fredkin maintains that
finite nature may or may not be true, but surely the assumption is not known to be false. If finite
nature turns out to be false then DM is irrelevant as an exact model, but it might be useful as an
approximate model (the way computers are presently used to model physics). (p.256)
Additionally, Fredkin maintains that DM must be computation-universal (section 2.4.5):

If microscopic physics (assuming finite nature) was not universal, it would not be
possible to macroscopically construct ordinary computers; however, since this is
possible, it might be inferred that nature is an instantiation of a UTM. As Fredkin states,
finite nature does not just hint that the informational aspects of physics are important, it insists that
the informational [that is, syntactic] aspects are all there is to physics at the most microscopic level
However, simply because nature is computation universal does not necessarily imply that
it is a UTM since it is quite possible that nature supports a more powerful form of
information processing (Rasmussen,91b). Additionally, the notion of information and
information-processing is itself problematic since information implies the existence of
an entity which can be informed. A possible solution to this problem is provided in the
ambiguity of the closing words in the above statement, viz. "at the most microscopic
level": It is conceivable that entities with the capacity for being informed may emerge
from the syntactic DM substrate; thus, syntax can give rise to semantics with the latter
as an emergent property (chapter 3) of the substrate. This idea is explored in chapter 5
where an emergentist scheme based on DM is presented as a unifying framework for
computational matter, life and mind.
2.6.7. Computationalism and The Physical World
Barrow (1991) maintains that it is an unresolved issue whether the symmetry of physical
laws or the notion of computation is fundamental:
Is the Universe a cosmic kaleidoscope or a cosmic computer, a pattern or a program? Or neither? The
choice requires us to know whether the laws of physics constrain the ultimate capability of abstract
computation. Do they limit its speed and scope? Or do the rules governing the process of computation
control what laws of Nature are possible? (pp.203-204).
The possible ways in which physics constrain the possibilities for computation are
discussed in chapter 5. As a preamble to that discussion, it is worth considering the
following: In order for reality to be computational at its most basic level, that is, in order
for computationalism to be an ontological thesis, it is necessary that the universe do only
computable things. However, it is recognized that uncomputable mathematical operations
exist, at least in some abstract sense11 (section 2.4.4). In order to reconcile this fact with
the computationalist thesis, it is necessary to maintain that computationalism is a thesis
about existence and since "Being is computation" (section 2.5.5 and chapter 6), that is,
to exist is to be computable, uncomputables do not exist; rather they subsist in a separate
Platonic realm (section 2.7.2) or in the imagination. However, there are (at least) three
problems with this position: First, the claimed physical existence of uncomputables
(section 2.5.2); second, the fact that mind (more precisely, imagination) is capable of
conceiving the possibility of uncomputables and yet is, in some sense12, a physical
phenomenon (Penrose,89) (Penrose,94); third, on this view, subsistence is equivalent to
non-existence (since uncomputable) and yet subsistence is surely a way (or mode) of
Being implying, thereby, that Being somehow transcends both computationalism and
existence (chapters 6 and 7).
Barrow maintains that the concept of computation may need to be redefined given the
quantum theoretical picture of reality (since quantum computation is more powerful than
TM computation). However, under computationalism, physical theories based on
mathematics involving non-TM-computable entities must be reducible in principle to
theories which are describable in purely TM-computational terms. In chapter 5,
arguments for subsuming quantum theory into computation theory based on a CA
realization of digital mechanics (section 2.6.6.) will be presented.
11
For example, as Platonic objects in the mind.
12
To the extent that mind is phenomenon within the natural universe, mind can be viewed as physical; however,
this should not be taken as supporting conventional materialism.
2.7. Deconstructing Computationalism
The previous sections were concerned with constructing a view of reality based on the
concept of the computer. In this section, the computer metaphor is shown to be reducible
to a synthesis of the form and machine metaphors. This reduction allows for the
grounding of computationalism in at least three antecedent metaphysical positions, viz.
determinism, mechanism and formism. Additionally, and as a consequence of the
commitment to realize computationalism in a cellular automaton (CA) substrate, there
is a need to examine a fourth metaphysical position related to mechanism, viz. atomism.
The importance of reducing computationalism to antecedent metaphysical positions is
that it provides a point of entry for a critique of the former: Potential shortcomings of
computationalism may be identified by examining the actual (that is, existing)
shortcomings associated with its philosophical precedents.
2.7.1. Computers, Forms and Machines
Putnam (1988) claims that computer science heralded the birth of a new paradigm
(chapter 1) in the sense that it created a new metaphor for thinking about reality.
However, is the computer metaphor new in the sense that it defines a `root' metaphor
(chapter 1) ? As stated previously (section 2.4), Toulmin (1993) maintains that the notion
of the machine has evolved through history. Are computers simply a new kind of
machine ? In order to answer this question, it is necessary to examine the possible
connections between the computer metaphor and other existing root metaphors,
specifically the metaphors of form and machine. It could be argued that the adoption of
a `bottom-up' or connectionist approach to realizing computationalism (such as that
based on CAs) necessitates that notions associated with other root metaphors such as
organism and context be considered; the organismic interpretation of Physical Symbol
Systems and the implied contextualism of cellular automata (section 2.6.1) appears to
support this contention. However, it could also be maintained that ideas associated with
organism (or integration) and context (or history) are only epistemologically-significant
when considering the phenomena emerging from a computational substrate and not
ontologically-relevant to consideration of the substrate itself. Since this view seems to
reflect computationalist thinking in general, and since it is computationalism as ontology
that is under scrutiny in this study, it has been adopted, viz. the `world hypothesis'
(chapter 1) computationalism is assumed to be derived from the synthesis of two root
metaphysical systems, viz. formism and mechanism.
2.7.2. Formism
The root metaphor of formism (or Platonism) is similarity (Pepper,42). In formism,

objects of perception have independent dual aspects: (i) particularity (which is specific)
and (ii) quality (which is universal). For example, the tree outside my window is a
specific tree; however, tree refers to the universal concept or quality of tree-ness which
is independent of any particular tree. Other formistic categories include (iii) relation,
which is the similarity between pairs of particulars and (iv) character, which refers either
to a quality or relation.
There are two basic kinds of formism, viz. immanent and transcendent. In immanent
formism, the basic categories are characters, particulars and participation, that is, ties
between characters and particulars. Full appearance of characters in particulars is
necessary. In transcendent formalism, the basic categories are norms, matter and a
principle of exemplification which materializes the norms. Partial appearance of norms
in matter is sufficient. However, both kinds of formism acknowledge:
I categories of forms (characters, norms)

II the appearance of these forms in nature
III the connection between categories I and II
Particulars without characters are held to exist, particulars with characters are held to
exist concretely, and forms are said to subsist. Hence, particulars exist in the material
world, while forms subsist in the world of Platonic ideas.
According to Pepper (1942), causality in formism is the result of
the participation of patterns, norms, or laws in basic particulars through the forms of time and space.
(p.175)
Causality is the determination of the characters of certain basic particulars by a law which is set in
motion by the characters of other basic particulars which participate in that law. A law, in other
words, is a bridge from one set of basic particulars to another set, determining the characters of one
set by those of the other. (pp.176-177)
A law is not a basic particular, nor a concrete existent particular (i.e. a single exemplification of the
law), nor a collection of concrete existent particulars (i.e. a class). A law is a form [and] this is one
of the fundamental distinctions between formism and mechanism. (p.177)
The formistic notion of causality finds expression within discrete dynamical systems
such as CAs in (i) states, which are configurations (shapes, patterns, or forms) that the
elements in a system can assume and (ii) state-transition functions (or rules), which are
meta-configurations (shapes, patterns, or forms) mapping configurations to
configurations. The total state of a system is the pattern produced by its elements.
Additionally, the basin of attraction field in a finite lattice CA (section 2.6.4) can be
viewed as a Platonic form. (An infinite lattice CA whose states are algorithmically-
compressible (Chaitin,90), that is, can be described using a representation of shorter
length than the states themselves, also has a basin of attraction field - although its nodes
are not states but the compressed representation of these states - and thus, can also be
viewed as a Platonic form).
The main weakness of formism is that is does not lead to a systematic or unified
metaphysics. As Pepper (1942) states,
[Formists/Platonists] regard system as something imposed upon the parts of the world by other parts,
so that there is an inherent cosmic resistance in the world to determinate order as well as a cosmic
trend to impose it. (p.143)
2.7.3. Mechanism
The root metaphor of mechanism is the machine (Pepper,42). Angeles (1981) defines
mechanism as the theory that all phenomena are physical and can be explained in terms
of material changes, that is, matter in motion. There are two important aspects to
mechanism:
Q the whole is neither ontologically prior to the parts nor causally efficacious upon them, but merely
the sum total (quantitatively and qualitatively) of the interacting parts.
Q all phenomena can be explained in terms of the principles by which mechanistic systems, that is,
machines, are explained without recourse to intelligence as an operating cause or principle.
This view is consistent with Runes (1960) who defines mechanism as the theory of total
explanation by efficient, as opposed to final, causes (chapter 6). Broad (1925) lists four
essential characteristics of a `purely mechanistic' ontology:
Q a single kind of stuff, all of whose parts are exactly alike except for differences of position and
motion;
Q a single fundamental kind of change, viz. change of position [or location]. (Changes of higher order -
e.g. velocity, acceleration - are derived from the change in position);
Q a single elementary causal law, according to which particles influence each other by pairs;
Q a single and simple principle of composition, according to which the behaviour of any aggregate of
particles, or the influence of any one aggregate on any other, follows in a uniform way from the
mutual influences of the constituent particles taken by pairs.
Pepper (1942) provides a detailed description of the notion of mechanism beginning with
a description of its basic categories:
Primary categories (effective)
Q Field of location
Q Primary qualities
Q Laws holding for configurations of primary qualities in the field (primary laws)
Secondary categories (ineffective)
Q Secondary qualities
Q A principle for connecting the secondary qualities with the first three primary or effective categories
Q Laws, if any, for regularities among secondary qualities (secondary laws)
Primary and secondary qualities may be differentiated as follows:
Such qualities as alone are relevant to the description of the efficient functions of a machine are
historically called primary qualities. (p.192)
[Consequently,] qualities which are observed in parts of a machine but are not directly relevant to its
action have been called secondary qualities. (p.193)
It is important to realize that what is to count as a primary quality is determined by

function, that is, a goal (or telos). This should be obvious given the fact that machines -
which provide the root metaphor underlying mechanism - are artifacts designed to fulfil
human purposes; hence, the possibility of a connection between mechanism and
teleology or intentionality.
Pepper identifies two basic kinds of machines: (i) discrete, in which action occurs by
contact (for example, the push-pull machine) and (ii) consolidated, in which action
occurs at a distance (for example, the orbits of planets arising from gravitational fields).
These correspond to the two ways in which to view CAs: (i) local neighbourhood
interaction between cells (FSAs) and (ii) global basin of attraction fields describing
overall CA behaviour. Discrete mechanism is defined by a polarity of chance (or
accident) and necessity: Chance results from the independence of details (for example,
time independent of space, one atom being independent from another etc); necessity
arises as a consequence of determinism (section 2.8.4). Chance can be identified in CA-
computationalism (chapter 5) with the definition (or specification) of the CA substrate
itself (section 2.7.2); necessity may be identified with the operation of the CA once it has
been so defined. This is because both initial state and state-transition rule are givens
(chapters 6 and 7) and hence, contingent when viewed from within the CA system13
whereas the evolution of CA phenomena is deterministic, that is, driven by necessity.
However, according to Pepper (1942), discrete mechanism ultimately leads to
consolidated mechanism:
13
However, if some version of the anthropic principle (chapter 6) holds, the selection of initial state and state-
transition rule may be far from arbitrary (contingent), in fact, necessary and highly-specific. Yet, this position
is also problematic since if the many-universes interpretation of quantum theory (chapter 4) is valid, it is simply
the case that the universe in which human observers exist merely happens to be one universe among potentially
many in which the emergence of observers is possible, thereby undermining the uniqueness of the universe
inhabited by human beings. The significance of the givenness of initial state(s) and law(s) of evolution in the
context of the distinction between naturality (or natural phenomena) and artificiality (or artifactual analogues
of natural phenomena) is examined in chapters 6 and 7.
Discrete mechanism is .. internally contradictory. It implies strict similarity and, consequently, the
formistic categories. Indeed, not only are laws threatened with the status of forms, but also the atoms
[for] what about the similarity of the atoms and the configurations ? The intention is to reduce
similarities to configurations of ultimate differentiations of the spatiotemporal field - to draw nature
completely and solidly into that field .. To achieve this end, however, [the mechanist] must
consolidate his categories. The primary qualities and the laws must become structural features of the
spatiotemporal field as intimately involved in it as the dimensions of space with one another.
Similarity can then be relegated to the structure of that field and kept from flying into subsistent
forms. (pp.211-212)
As will be shown in chapter 5, the shift from discrete to consolidated mechanism finds
one of its most sophisticated expressions in the emergentist metaphysics of Alexander
(1920), viz. matter, life and mind as Space-Time complexes. It is highly significant, as
Pepper goes on to state, that "there are no laws in consolidated mechanism; there are just
structural modifications of the spatio-temporal field. And there are no primary qualities,
for these are resolved into field laws, which are themselves resolved into the structure
of the field." (p.214) Furthermore,
a completely consolidated [that is, unified] universe would be a completely mechanized and internally
determined universe. (p.207)
This is consistent with the computationalist position. However, as will be shown in

chapter 7, a mechanistic view - and hence, by the same token, a computationalist view -
of nature is untenable because of the problem of the irreducibility of secondary qualities
to primary qualities (Russell,67). This problem, known as the mind-body problem
(chapter 4), `hard' problem (Chalmers,96) or category problem (chapter 7), is essentially
identical to what Pepper (1942) refers to as the `problem of unresolved discreteness', viz.
the inability of mechanism to explain how and why secondary qualities should occur
given that they are superfluous to a mechanistic ontology14. Adopting a more modest
position based on a hierarchical view of phenomenal reality in which the world is merely
ultimately grounded at the ontological level in a mechanistic monism - a position known
as emergent-materialism or simply emergentism (Mayr,82) - does not resolve the
problem, irrespective of whether or not emergents are held to be causally efficacious.
However, as shown in chapter 6, this does not preclude the possibility of some (radical)
emergentist position being correct. The connection between mechanism and emergentism
is examined in chapter 3 in connection with an investigation into the meaning of
computational emergence.
2.7.4. Determinism
Angeles (1981) defines determinism as the view that every event has a cause; further,
that all things in the universe operate in accordance with causal laws, that is, that
everything is absolutely dependent upon and necessitated by causes. For current
14
Secondary qualities are epiphenomenal and hence, non-causal on conventional mechanism.
purposes, a cause may be defined as `something which brings something about', the latter
something being referred to as an effect of the cause. A cause can have more than one
effect in a world provided the effects are logically and physically consistent. For
example, switching on an electric light brings about the illumination and the heating of
a room; however, switching on a light cannot bring about both the illumination and the
darkening of the room since in this case the effects are logically and physically
inconsistent. Additionally, an effect can have more than one cause implying a many-one
mapping between causes and effects which allows for the possibility of functionalism15.
Aristotle identifies four kinds of causality, viz. material, efficient, formal and final
causality (chapter 6); however, materialism recognizes only material and efficient
causation which is mapped into the scientific language of particles and the physical laws
governing their interactions. Formal systems (and computationalism) retain the idea of
material and efficient causation in the notion of axioms (initial states) and inference rules
(state-transition rules) respectively.
Philosophically-speaking, there are two kinds of determinism, viz. epistemological and

ontological. A system is epistemologically-deterministic if its future state can be
predicted from a knowledge of its current state and the laws governing the behaviour of
the system: Two-body collisions in classical Newtonian systems are epistemologically-
deterministic since the outcome of the collisions can be predicted from a knowledge of
the position and momentum of the bodies and Newtonian mechanics. A system is
ontologically-deterministic if effects follow necessarily from causes, that is, the relation
between causes and effects is either one-one or many-one. (Here an effect refers to the
state of a system at a particular instant which contrasts to its usage in the previous
example, viz. switching on an electric light, where an effect refers to what might be
called a sub-system state. The concept of systems and subsystems is described in chapter
3). Ontological determinism implies that the state of a system s at time t suffices to fix
its state s' at time t+1 irrespective of whether a description of s' can or cannot be
produced at t; current events are completely (that is, totalistically) caused by previous
events. It is significant that systems can be ontologically-deterministic and at the same
time epistemologically-non-deterministic: For example, deterministic randomness
(Davies,87) is a characteristic of computational non-linear dynamical systems. However,
epistemological non-determinism becomes epistemological determinism if the causal
sequence of the system can be replayed. This latter point has crucial implications for the
possibility of emergence in closed or finite systems as will be shown in chapter 3.
2.7.5. Atomism
The view developed by early Greek Philosophers such as Leucippus, Democritus and
Epicurus (5th Century BC) that reality is composed of atoms, viz. minute material
particles that are the ultimate constituents of all things having properties such as size,
15
However, as shown in chapter 6, Bunge (1959) maintains that the causal relation is one-one.
shape, position, arrangement and movement as intrinsic. Atoms are eternal, simple,
separate, irreducible, uchangeable and infinitely many of them exist moving in empty
space. Objects are formed as a consequence of collisions between atoms. (Angeles,81)
This translates into the language of CAs as follows: Atoms are identifiable with lattice
cells in the òn' or `1' state (in CAs with binary or two-state FSAs), empty space as cells
in the òff' or `0' state; objects are identifiable with patterned groupings of cell states: For
example, the glider structure in Conway's Game of Life (section 2.6.3) is a pattern of five
cells in the òn' state. In making use of the notion of pattern, this interpretation of CAs
in atomistic terms ultimately becomes parasitic on formism. However, this is consistent
with the claim that computationalism constitutes an eclectic, that is, synthetic,
metaphysics (section 2.7.1).
2.7.6. A Note on Process Philosophy
All the previous metaphysical positions, and atomism in particular, assert the ontological
primacy of substance over process, that is, of thing (being) over activity (becoming).
However, as Rescher (1996) states, "in a dynamic world, things cannot do without
processes. Since substantial things change, their nature must encompass some impetus
to internal development. In a dynamical world, processes are more fundamental than
things. Since substantial things emerge in and from the world's course of changes,
processes have priority over things." (p.28) Thus, substances are redefined as manifolds
or complexes of processes. Consequently, Rescher (1996) maintains that while a process
ontology can be monistic, a substance ontology is necessarily dualistic: "processes
without substances are perfectly feasible in the conceptual order of things, but substances
without processes are effectively inconceivable." (p.46)16 A process may be defined as
a coordinated group of changes in the complexion of reality, an organized family of occurrences that
are systematically linked to one another either causally or functionally. (p.38)
The primacy of process might appear to support an interpretation of computationalism

as metaphysically processual: Computationalism is grounded in the notion of
computation which can be understood in dynamic terms, viz. a computation is a program
in execution or a process. This conceptual link between computationalism and process
ontology is further strengthened because
the basic idea of process involves the unfolding of a characterizing program through determinate
stages. The concept of programmatic (rule-conforming) developments is definitive of the idea of
process: The unity/identity of a process is the unity/identity of its program [emphasis added]. (p.41)
Additionally, "the shift in orientation from substance to process - from a substantive

unity of hardware, of physical machinery, to a processual unity of software, of
progamming or mode of functioning" (p.108) leads to the view that "processes, seen
16
This is a consequence of the problem of generating change from stasis which leads to the Zeno paradoxes.
abstractly, are inherently structural and programmatic - and, in consequence, universal

and repeatable." (p.74) From such statements, it might appear that the philosophical
precedent of computationalism is processism rather than atomism or mechanism.
Furthermore, against formism (Platonism), it is held in process ontology that a physical
object is identified as the thing it is, "not by a continuity of its material components or
its physical form but by a processual or functional unity [emphasis added]." (p.52); it is
unity of law or functional typology which is important as contrasted with unity of being
(individualized specificity). Finally, process philosophy views nature as characterized
by "creative innovation, productive dynamism, and an emergent development of richer,
more complex and sophisticated forms of natural existence [emphasis added]" (p.101),
which is consistent with the concept of computationally emergent artificiality (chapter
5).
However, identifying CA-computationalism with processism is problematic for (at least)

five reasons: First, according to Rescher (1996), "the identity of things is discrete
(digital); that of processes is continuous (analogic)" (p.53). On this view, CA-
computation must be interpreted as non-processual and derivative of processes which are
computationally-analogue17. If a processualism of this kind is adopted, CA-
computationalism must be incorrect; second, upon closer examination, it is readily shown
that the mechanism underlying processism is very different to that underlying
computationalism. For example, Rescher maintains that
process philosophy rejects a pervasive determinism of law-compulsion. Processists see the laws of
nature as imposed from below rather than above - as servants rather than master's of the world's
existents. Process metaphysics envisions a limit to determinism that makes room for creative
spontaneity and novelty in the world (be it by way of random mutations with naturalistic processists
or purposeful innovation with those who incline to a theologically teleological position). (p.98)
Processes are not the machinations of stable things; things are the stability patterns of variable
processes. (p.99)
To be sure, it is certainly possible to minimize the significance of novelty by conceiving of the role
of process in nature as consisting in a fixed number of elemental process types themselves fixed for
all time - through whose combination and interplay all other natural processes arise. But such a hard-
edged, atomistically stabilitarian view of process does violence to the spirit of the enterprize of
process philosophizing .. Processuality does not happen simply at the ground-flow level of things,
events and phenomena. The types of items at issue can change as well. (p.81)
This is significant since states are defined as ontological absolutes in CAs: A FSA has
a finite and static set of states and its functional connectivity to other FSAs (in a standard
CA) is uniform (regular, symmetrical), finite and static; hence, the CA structures
generated during execution are ontologically reducible to a finite set of static primitives.
17
On Rescher's view, such processes must be computational since processes are computational (though not
necessarily discrete or digital) by definition (that is, essentially).
As will be seen in what follows (chapters 3, 6 and 7), this implies that the emergence of
structures in CAs is either (i) static and finite (`closed') assuming a finite lattice or (ii)
potentially infinite, yet constrained to formal constructions using a fixed alphabet in the
case of an infinite lattice (Cariani,89) (Ali,98a); third, the notion of state does not appear
within processism. In its place there is the notion of (inner) condition/structure, order or
situation. This is highly significant since computationalism, being a variant of
mechanism, is either (1) ontologically-externalistic or (2) topologically-internalistic
(chapter 6); experiential-internalism (chapter 7) is excluded on this metaphysics or
interpreted as epiphenomenal. However, processualism, unlike mechanism, is not
definitionally-inconsistent with experiential-internalism; fourth, the space-time of
processualism is not "a matrix of order imposed on natural process from without by the
structure of a process-independent stage on which natural processes must play
themselves out." (p.95) However, this classical Newtonian conception of space-time
appears to be central to CA-computationalism (chapter 5): The notion of a Cartesian
space-time grid is an ontological absolute in CAs; in a processual metaphysics, by
contrast, the grid is emergent from physical processes; finally, as Rescher (1996) states,
in atomistic systems "the properties of substances are never touched by change, which
affects only their relations" (p.10) and this is certainly the case in CAs. As stated
previously, the set of states of a FSA - the equivalent of substance in a CA - are static
and finite.
The above arguments lead to the following position: While it may be reasonable to
interpret computationally emergent artificial phenomena (for example, analogues of
matter, life and mind) in processual terms, it is simply not the case that computationalism
is consistent with a processual ontology (noumenal ground). As Rescher (1996) states,
"nature's processes follow patterns - but not in a rigidly programmed and preordained
predetermined way [emphasis added]" (p.82) and, as will be shown in chapters 6 and 7,
this is inconsistent with the ontological determinism associated with computationalism.
For this reason, formism, mechanism, determinism and atomism can be viewed as
necessary and sufficient in order to classify the ontological essence of computationalism.
2.7.7. Computationalism, Metaphor and Metaphysics
The computer is a machine, but a machine with a flexibility derived by abstracting away
its functional form; hence, the synthesis or eclectic mix of formism and mechanism in
computationalism. This implies that computationalism is a permutation of two logical
postulates, in this case of two metaphysical systems, thereby refuting Pepper's assertion
of the mere possibility of the postulational method (chapter 1). However, it is interesting
to consider whether metaphor production could occur in a computational substrate. As
Pepper concedes,
at the break of the century, when the potentialities of the new symbolic logic were dawning upon
men, there were some who expected that mathematical logical systems would yield all that traditional
metaphysical systems had, and more too, and would therefore in time completely supplant the
traditional modes of metaphysical thought. These hopes have waned. But the possibility still remains
of using the apparatus of symbolic logic as a means of generating world theories. (pp.87-88)
Lugowski (1989) describes a framework for generating metaphor using a "metaphor for
metaphors" based on "meta-stable dynamical systems that shift amongst contextually-
cued attractor states" (p.355), a notion which readily translates into the language of CA-
computationalism (section 2.6.4). Given that metaphysics is ultimately metaphorically
grounded and accepting Lugowski's claim for computational metaphor generation, what
must a computationalism that supports metaphor (and hence, metaphysics) generation
look like ? In other words, what kind of computationalism could give rise to the concept
of computationalism ? Johansson (1993) argues in favour of defining computationalism
in connectionist or fuzzy logic terms, such a position being motivated by the view that
information processing in the brain must be `poetic' in nature if the intrinsic vagueness
or indeterminacy associated with metaphors is to be addressed. A simpler approach
might involve embedding a `virtual' machine capable of supporting universal
computation in a computational substrate (chapter 5), leading, perhaps, to what might be
referred to as `metaphysics via computation'. According to Pepper,
the idea is to conceive a world theory in the form of a deductive system with theorems derived from
postulates. Once [we] obtain such a system .. new world theories might then be generated like
geometries by simply adding or dropping or changing a postulate and noting the result in the self-
consistency of the system and in the application of the theorems to all the observed facts of the world.
(p.88)
Chapter 3 Emergence
Chapter 3
We are the intelligence that preceded us in its new material
representation - or rather, we are the re-emergence of that
intelligence, the latest embodiment of its struggle for survival.
Fred Hoyle, The Intelligent Universe
Emergence
3.1. Overview
In this chapter the notion of emergence is investigated. The aim is to clarify the meaning
of the concept and examine its formulation in the context of a computationalist
metaphysics in preparation for the development of the unifying framework of emergent
artificiality described in chapter 5. First, a popular definition of emergence is presented
and the historical background to the idea is given. A problem associated with the notion
of self-organization having bearing on the issue of emergence is identified. Basic system-
theoretical concepts associated with the modern formulation of emergence are introduced
and phenomenological issues (concepts of emergence and types of emergent) are
discussed. A formal framework for emergence, the distinction between emergent
computation and computational emergence, and the nature of emergence in cellular
automata are briefly examined. Finally, two philosophical perspectives associated with
the concept of emergence are identified involving consideration of (i) epistemological
issues (intrinsic and extrinsic observation, observational relativism, reductionism) and
(ii) ontological issues (open and closed emergence, downwards causation, pluralism).
3.2. What is Emergence ?

In this section, the motivation underlying a consideration of the notion of emergence is
briefly described and the concept of emergence is defined.
Chapter 3 Emergence
3.2.1. Motivation: The Unification of Artificiality
It may be argued that it is the inability to deal with what are considered the `hard' or
defining problems of artificial intelligence (AI), for example, situated-action, computer
vision etc, that has led to the displacement of top-down symbolic (or explicitly-
representationalist) approaches by bottom-up or connectionist strategies. According to
Langton (1989b), however, this trend or `paradigm shift' (chapter 1) does not extend
across artificiality (chapter 4), that is, the sciences of the artificial (Simon,81); the
discipline of artificial life (A-Life) adopts a bottom-up approach by definition.
Furthermore, and following this definitional precedent, the bottom-up approach has been
applied to other artificial sciences: For example, artificial culture (Gessler,94) at a level
above AI and artificial physics (Fredkin,90) at a level below A-Life, the logical
conclusion to this project being artificial reality (A/VR) (Benedikt,91). Applicability of
the connectionist approach across phenomenal domains lends support to CA-
computationalism (chapters 2 and 5); however, what remains unclear is how such
phenomena are to be unified given the assumption that the world is a coherent whole
(chapter 1). Various schemes for unifying such disciplines are conceivable and are
examined in chapter 5 where a unifying framework for artificiality (that is, artificial
analogues of natural phenomena such as matter, life and mind) is presented. In
preparation for the discussion in that chapter, it is necessary to investigate a concept that
is central to the bottom-up approach, and which provides a means for unifying artificial
domains based on an isomorphism with the phenomenal hierarchy that is assumed to
have evolved in the natural world (chapter 1), viz. emergence.
3.2.2. Definition: Emergence
Popular scientific and philosophical discourse holds that the essence of the concept is
traceable to an observation made by the ancient Greeks, viz. that
"the whole is more than the sum of the parts."
However, this statement is at best incomplete since it does not clarify the distinction (if
any) between emergence and related concepts such as holism and self-organization. More
importantly, it does not describe the way(s) in which a whole is more than the sum of its
parts; that is, it fails to clarify the ontological 1 and epistemological 2 issues associated
with the concept. An attempt at articulating a more precise definition of emergence has
been made by Mayr (1982) who maintains that
emergence denotes the appearance of new characteristics in wholes that cannot be deduced from the
1
Ontology refers to the study of the being or nature of things.
2
Epistemology refers to the study of how things are known.
Chapter 3 Emergence
most complete knowledge of the parts, taken separately or in other partial combinations. (p.63)
This definition is clearly an improvement on the original maxim since it addresses both
the ontological and the epistemological issues associated with the concept. Appreciation
of this dual perspective is crucial since it provides a means by which the concept of
emergence can be examined within the scheme of ontic (productive, organizational) and
epistemic (interpretative, observational) relations between systems (section 3.4.1) and the
anthropic component (human artificer-interpreter) briefly introduced in chapter 1 and
described more fully in chapter 7. However, the above statement clearly does not
constitute a formal definition of emergence. In an attempt at constructing such a
definition, various philosophical schemes which provided the basis for modern
formulations of emergence will be briefly discussed in order to trace the development
of the concept to its modern systems-theoretical forms. The objective is to examine the
various issues associated with the concept and thereby provide a basis for the critique of
the unifying framework of computationally emergent artificiality presented in chapter
7.
3.2.3. Historical Background
It is to Chapter VI of J.S.Mill's A System of Logic Ratiocinative and Inductive (1843) that

perhaps the first implicit reference to the concept of emergence in a modern scientific
context can be traced. Mill describes what he calls heteropathic laws as "laws of
combined agency [which] are not compounded of the laws of the separate agencies"
(p.375) and goes on to state the following:
as a general rule, causes in combination produce exactly the same effects as when acting singly:
[however,] this rule, though general, is not universal: that in some instances, at some particular points
in the transition from separate to united action, the laws change, and an entirely new set of effects
are either added to, or take the place of, those which arise from the separate agency of the same
causes3: the laws of these new effects being again susceptible of composition, to an indefinite extent,
like the laws which they superseded [emphasis added]. (p.376)
However, the earliest documented use of the term èmergence' is attributed to the
philosopher of science George Henry Lewes in the middle of the nineteenth century
(Kenyon,41). Lewes anticipated the epistemological conclusions drawn from modern
research into the behaviour of complex non-linear4 dynamical systems by distinguishing
3
This concept of emergence is consistent with both cumulationist (or inclusivist) and non-cumulationist
(Bunge,60) emergentism as described in chapter 5.
4
Linear systems obey the superposition principle since they are decomposable into independently analyzable
components and composition of understanding of the isolated components leads to full understanding of the
system. The principle does not hold for non-linear systems since in this case, primary behaviours of interest
are properties of the interactions between components as contrasted with properties of the components
themselves; isolating the components necessarily leads to the disappearance of interaction-based properties
Chapter 3 Emergence
between resultants and emergents: In the former, the sequence of steps which produce
a phenomenon are traceable whilst in the latter they are not. Thus, according to Lewes,
emergence is a statement of the epistemological limitations of phenomenal observation.
In the twentieth century, the concept of èmergence' was formally introduced by Conroy
Lloyd Morgan in Instinct and Experience (1912) and a theory based on the concept was
developed in his Emergent Evolution (1923). Like Lewes, Morgan regarded the
distinction between resultants and emergents as inductive and empirical, and not
metaphysical. Emergence was understood as implying that the higher orders of being
produced in the evolutionary process were not mere resultants of what went before and
were not contained in them as an effect is in its efficient cause; hence, emergentism was
not equivalent or reducible to mechanism. Blitz (1992), who has extensively researched
Morgan's philosophy of emergent evolution, maintains that it consists of three premises:
(1) evolution is a universal process of change productive of qualitative novelties
(2) qualitative novelty is the emergence of a property not possessed by any of its parts
(3) reality can be analyzed into levels consisting of systems characterized by emergent properties
However, Morgan's scheme was purely descriptive and did not provide an explanation
for the phenomenon of emergence (Collingwood,45). It was in Samuel Alexander's
Space, Time and Deity (1920) and J.C.Smuts' Holism and Evolution (1926) that the first
attempts at an explanatory framework for emergent evolution were made. On Smuts'
view of emergence, nature is permeated by an impulse towards the creation of wholes;
novelty, the defining characteristic in Morgan's scheme, is considered as a merely
derivative phenomenon. Alexander, on the other hand, anticipated modern notions of
self-organization (section 3.3) and functionalism (chapter 1) by identifying emergence
with the tendency for things to arrange themselves into new patterns which as organized
wholes possess new types of structure and new properties or 'qualities'. The connection
to functionalism is implied in the conception that quality depends on pattern
(organization, form or structure). Alexander's concept of emergence provides the basis
for the unifying framework of computationally emergent artificiality presented in this
thesis and a detailed examination of his metaphysics (ontology) will be made in chapter
5 when this framework is described.
3.2.4. Towards A Theory of Emergence
One of the earliest presentations of the concept is that given by Broad (1925) who
provides the following outline for a theory of emergence:
Q there are certain wholes, composed (say) of constituents A, B, and C in a relation R to each other;
(Langton,89b).
Chapter 3 Emergence
Q all wholes composed of constituents of the same kind as A, B, and C in relations of the same kind as
R have certain characteristic properties;
Q A, B, and C are capable of occurring in other kinds of complex where the relation is not of the same
kind as R;
Q the characteristic properties of the whole R(A,B,C) cannot, even in theory, be deduced from the most
complete knowledge of the properties of A, B, and C in isolation or in other wholes which are not of
the form R(A,B C).
Pap (1952) clarifies the epistemological character of the above scheme as follows:
a law correlating a quality Q with causal conditions of its occurrence can, without obscurantism, be
argued to be a priori unpredictable if the predicate designating Q is only ostensively definable [that
is, via a posteriori observation of Q]. (p.304)
Hence, "an emergent law is deducible only a posteriori, or unpredictable a priori."

(p.305) He goes on to state that,
if to say that quality Q (or relation R) is absolutely emergent is to say that the law correlating Q (or
R) with quantitative physical conditions is a priori unpredictable, it follows that absolute emergence
is relative to a system of semantic rules. (p.310)
As will be seen in what follows, this position anticipates Cariani's (1989) concept of
emergence-relative-to-a-model (section 3.5.1). An alternative scheme is presented by
Pepper (1926) who identifies emergence as a kind of change different from that of
random changes ("chance occurrences") and mechanistic changes ("shifts"):
emergence .. is a cumulative change, a change in which certain characteristics supervene upon other
characteristics, these [latter] characteristics being adequate to explain the occurrence on their level.
(p.241)
Supervenience is the idea that a higher level phenomenon is (causally) dependent on a

lower level phenomenon for its existence5: For example, mental phenomena are
(causally) dependent on the occurrence of physical events in the brain. However, the
supervenience relation between a mental event and the associated physical event does not
entail a one-one mapping between substrate and emergent (or supervenient): Many
physical brain states can support the same mental state; thus, mind is said to be multiply-
realizable (chapters 1 and 4). As Klee (1984) states, there are "multiple distinct
determinative micro-bases for the same macro-property" (p.56) Hence, there is a close
relationship between supervenience and functionalism. Pepper's cumulationist
formulation implies, however, that emergents (that is, the products of emergence) must
be epiphenomenal or non-causal; thus, the possibility of `downward' causation (section
5
Chalmers (1996) defines supervenience as follows: "B-properties supervene on A-properties if no two possible
situations are identical with respect to their A-properties while differing in their B-properties." (p.33)
Chapter 3 Emergence
3.9.2) is rejected a priori.
According to Pepper, the theory of emergence involves three propositions:
(1) there are levels of existence defined in terms of degrees of integration; (2) there are marks which
distinguish these levels from one another over and above the degrees of integration; (3) it is
impossible to deduce the marks of a lower level from those of a higher. (p.241)
On this basis, the concept of emergence, originally conceived in terms of the relations
between parts and wholes, is readily recast in systems-theoretic terms: For example,
Pepper's propositions are directly associated with three issues: (i) complexity (section
3.4.5), (ii) types of emergent (section 3.5.2) and (iii) the limits of reductionism (section
3.8.3). Prior to investigating such issues, however, it is necessary to briefly examine the
connection between emergence and a historically antecedent concept, viz. self-
organization. An appreciation of the notion of self-organization is important because the
latter gives rise to a problem which bears directly on the issue of emergence as will be
shown in the following section and again in chapter 6.
3.3. Self-Organization: Problems in Emergence
Perhaps the earliest reference to self-organization in the history of Western thought is to

be found in the writings of the Ionian Greeks (7th-6th centuries B.C.). For the Greek
Anaximander, the undifferentiated substance of reality was `the Boundless' - or apeiron6
- which was spatio-temporally infinite and qualitatively indeterminate (Collingwood,45).
The link between Anaximander and self-organization is cosmological, viz. "a world is
.. a thing that makes itself [that is, self-organizes] wherever a vortex arises in the
Boundless [on account of creative processes within the Boundless which take the form
of rotary movements]; hence a world is also a world-maker or a god [emphasis added]."
(p.35) Modern formulations of the concept of self-organization are traceable to the works
of the early cyberneticists (Yovits,60,62) (von Foerster,62) (Yates,87), and there is
general agreement as to the meaning of this concept. Zwierlein (1984) defines self-
organization as "the phenomenon that some (i.e. non-linear dynamic) systems may by
irreversible processes spontaneously generate a structure of higher complexity than the
original starting point." (p.290) Similarly, Garfinkel (1987) defines self-organization as
the general term for the processes by which order and structure emerge and Heylighen
(1993) as "a spontaneous (i.e. not steered or directed by an external system) process of
organization, i.e. of the development of an organized structure." (p.1) Von der Malsburg
(1987) defines self-organization in the following terms:
Q There is a system (section 3.4.1) consisting of a large number of microscopic elements. The system
initially is in a relatively undifferentiated state.
6
A Heideggerian interpretation of the concept of the apeiron is presented in chapter 6.
Chapter 3 Emergence
Q There are self-amplifying fluctuations (i.e. deviations from) the undifferentiated state.
Q Some limitation of resources forces competition among fluctuations and selection of the fittest (i.e.
the most vigorously growing) at the expense of others.
Q Fluctuations cooperate. The presence of a fluctuation can enhance the fitness of some of the others,
in spite of the overall competition for resources in the field. (In many systems the `fitness' of a
fluctuation is identical with the degree of cooperativity with other fluctuations.)
Q Whole systems of cooperatively interacting fluctuations emerge as ordered, differentiated states, or

ordered modes - the order often extending over a wide area.
In the context of a discussion of the evolution of biological systems, Erwin (1994)

distinguishes between internal, external, and hybrid emergence: In the first, emergence
has its origin in processes internal to a system (that is, endosystemic); in the second,
emergence is attributed to processes that are external to the system (or exosystemic), that
is, in its environment; in the third, both approaches are involved in emergence.
Identification of which type of emergence (internal, external or hybrid) is occurring in
a given system is important since it enables a problem associated with the notion of self-
organization to be resolved. This is the semantical and ontological problem of self-
organization which may be informally stated as follows:
does self-organization imply organization of self by self or organization of self by other7 ?
This problem is closely related to another within philosophy, viz. that of relating being
to becoming. Rescher (1996), maintains that according to Aristotle, "something which
is coming into being cannot (ex hypothesi) be said to exist as yet." (p.126) However, he
contests this position in arguing that
at the point of its genesis, a substance is already somehow at hand, since ìt' already is doing
something - viz., emerging into existence - so that there already is a something to which that coming-
into-being can be attributed. We therefore cannot flatly and unqualifiedly deny the thing's existence
either. The claim of its existence is thus neither strictly true nor strictly false. (pp.126-127)
There are a number of points to note in connection with the above statement: First,
Aristotle and Rescher are committed to different concepts of existence. For the former,
a substantialist, existence is static in the sense that it atemporally (that is, ahistorically)
defines the substantiality of a substance (chapter 6). For Rescher, by contrast, existence
is dynamic (temporal, historical) because processual; second, it could be argued that it
is only a posteriori the emergence of the substance (being, phenomenon) that ìt' can be
identified as a substance (that is, as an ìt') and ìts' genesis and becoming associated with
it; in short, prior to its attaining stability as a substance, there is simply is no ìt' because
the self-other distinction has not yet emerged; third, and consistent with this latter
7
Here `self' is to be understood as synonymous with thing, object, entity etc, and òther' with context, world,
environment etc. Experiential connotations of subjectivity and objectivity are not intended.
Chapter 3 Emergence
position, it might be argued that while the substance (ìt') is emerging, it is not ìt' itself
but ìts' ground8 which brings ìt' into existence. Ontically-speaking, the relationship is
that of ground to consequent with the former both causally and temporally prior to the
latter. (Inclusion of the temporality condition necessitates excluding the possibility of
retroactive causation which is discussed in section 3.6.2.) However, in the above
statement, Rescher fails to establish the link between existence and causality, which
Elstob (1984) encapsulates in the following maxim, viz. "something exists if it makes a
difference". A corollary of this maxim is the necessity of there existing at least two
existents (beings) in which case the self-other distinction already holds and hence, is non-
emergent (that is, not self-organizing) since each existent (self) must act causally on (at
least) one other in order to exist. On this view, there cannot, ultimately, be any absolutely
self-organizing beings since all beings are to some extent other-organized.
However, this does not, thereby, entail the view that absolute self-organization as such
is impossible. According to Heidegger, what is historically prior to the Aristotelian
being-becoming and self-other dualities is aletheia-physis, the emerging power which
brings itself forth (appears or emerges) into presence from concealment. Although this
appears to merely restate Rescher's above argument for interpreting a being in the
process of becoming as a self-organizing being (existent), this is, in fact, not the case
since aletheia-physis does not refer to a being or class of beings (existents) but to the
Being of beings, that ground of which beings partake which has both continuous and
discrete (chapter 1) and static and dynamic (chapter 6) aspects and which is itself not a
being. (On this basis, Heidegger's (1959) seemingly paradoxical assertion to the effect
that Heraclitus - archetypal philosopher of change and process - and Parminides -
archetypal philosopher of stasis and substance - are in ontological agreement9 can be
explained by identifying beings and becoming(s) as different aspects of the manifestation
(or unconcealment) of Being.)
Thus, while Heideggerian thought and process metaphysics both appear to provide a
means for connecting being and becoming, it is, in fact, only the former which is able
to do so. This is because on Heidegger's view (chapter 6), Being is modally-pluralistic,
manifesting as both substance and process, neither of which is ontologically-primordial
relative to the other; processualism (chapter 2), by contrast, is modally-monistic since
substances are held to emerge from - and hence, are ontologically-derivative relative to -
processes. (This categorially-monistic aspect of process as such holds irrespective of
whether processes are ultimately reducible to a single processual kind or are type-
8
A Heideggerian interpretation of the concept of ground is presented in chapter 6.
9
As Heidegger states, "Heraclitus, to whom is ascribed the doctrine of becoming as diametrically opposed to
Parminides' doctrine of being, says the same as Parminides." (p.97) However, as will be shown in chapter 6,
this `sameness' does not necessarily entail identity such that dynamic becoming is reduced to static being;
rather, on Heidegger's view, sameness entails unitary relatedness.
Chapter 3 Emergence
pluralistic.) However, this position is problematic since it is unclear how stable entities
of any particular kind can emerge in a non-formistic - or, more precisely, purely
immanentist - processual substrate10. Types, kinds, classes, categories etc are fundamental
to human discourse (linguistic or otherwise): Humans are `cutters' (that is, categorizers
or classifiers) of reality (chapters 1 and 6). Yet if human ontology is processual, how can
the `cutting' ability emerge since `cutting' implies discretisation while processes are
continuous11 ? The problem therefore reduces to explaining how discreteness arises from
continuity and has led some processually-inclined system theorists to adopt a form of
symbol-matter dualism as an alternative to a pure process philosophy (Cariani,89).
Additionally, in its recognition of the historicity of the relationship between Being and
beings or - ontically-speaking - between ground and consequent, the Heideggerian view
provides a more appropriate framework within which to examine notions of self-
organization and emergence. For example, returning to the original problem, viz. does
self-organization refer to organization by self or by other: On the Heideggerian view,
discrete self-other distinctions imply a duality which is inconsistent with the continuum
aspect of the Being-beings relation; however, if the ontological connection of self with
10
This is the basis of Collingwood's (1945) criticism of Alexander's (1920 ontology (chapter 5). Whitehead's
(1926) solution to the problem is to incorporate a Platonic realm of ideas into process metaphysics, viz. the
eternal objects. However, Pepper (1942) maintains that this results in an èclectic [or confusing ontological]
mix'. Maturana and Varela's (1980) autopoietic solution will be examined in chapter 6.
11
In the context of a discussion of the emergence of events in perception, Avrahami et al. (1994) present what
they refer to as the cut hypothesis which has two forms: (1) Form I - "a sub-sequence of stimuli is cut out of
a sequence to become a cognitive entity if it has been experienced many times in different contexts [emphasis
added]." (p.239); and (2) Form II - "a sub-sequence of stimuli is cut out of a sequence to become a cognitive
entity for someone, if it has been experienced many times, with different sub-sequences preceding and
following it on the various occasions [emphasis added]." (p.245) Crucially, on their view, "definition of events
by goals or by òur concerns' is .. problematic [because] in order to explain how a subject may decompose a
temporal sequence, we need a theory of goal structure. Lacking it, the investigator can at best apply her or his
own conception of goals, her or his own structures of meaning. Such a method would lack any predictive power
whatever." (p.243) There are (at least) two points to note in connection with the latter statement: First, it is quite
possible that while specific goals are subjective (that is, particular), goal structure is itself objective (that is,
universal). This position is supported by Heidegger's analysis of the existential structure of human being or
Dasein (chapters 1 and 6) and his distinction between concrete-particulars (existentiells) and concrete-
universals (existentials), both of which are defined intentionalistically (that is, teleologically) in terms of
concerns, proximal (or relative) and distal (or absolute) respectively. It is interesting to note that, according to
Avrahami et al., "although òur concerns' determine the boundaries of what we perceive, the `concerns'
themselves derive from perceiving reoccurrence." (p.259) However, this position is problematic since for
something to be identified as re-occurrent, it must first be identified as occurrent, thereby necessitating the
existence of an a priori - and hence, non-emergent - classification scheme (for example, Kantian schemata).
In this connection, it is significant that Avrahami et al. accept the following problem with the cut hypothesis,
viz. "what aspects of similarity are necessary for one sequence to be regarded as a recurrence of another.
Without an answer to this question, the conditions required for categorization cannot be explored, and the full
account of the emergence of events cannot be given." (p.246); second, as will be seen in what follows, it is lack
of predictive power which characterizes the emergent event as emergent.
Chapter 3 Emergence
other is accepted, it follows that self-organization must be interpreted as organization of

self by that which is prior to self and other because, ontically-speaking, Being is to
being(s) as ground is to consequent(s) as prior is to self and other (chapter 6).
Epistemological support for this position is provided by observational-relativism (section
3.8.2): The frame of reference of an observer (system-describer) can always be reduced
such that system is subsumed into environment; thus, it might appear that in the limit
there is no system only environment. However, in this event there is no system or
environment, only that which is prior, viz. the undifferentiated substrate. The role of the
observer or epistemological `cutter' (chapter 1) is fundamental to the discussion on
emergence and self-organization since the observer defines the conditions under which
Being manifests as beings and things become identifiable as things. However, an
interesting case to consider is the reverse, when the frame of reference of the observer
is enlarged such that system and environment become identical; again, it might appear
that in the limit there is no environment only system when, in fact, there is only the
undifferentiated substrate. Is self-organization possible in these limiting situations ?
These issues are fundamental to the debate on emergence within `closed' computational
systems and are addressed in sections 3.4.1 and 3.9.1.
Finally, and linked to the semantic problem of self-organization understood from the
perspective of the relation between being and becoming, it is unclear whether or not it
is meaningful to refer to things which do not physically exist, that is, things which
neither are nor have material (physical) referents. Unicorns and the present King of
France are examples of such things. Mathematical intuitionists would also include certain
types of numbers such as the irrationals whose expansion is infinite since they cannot be
constructed in a finite universe: Irrationals can be generated algorithmically since finite,
terminating procedures exist for producing successive digits in their expansions;
however, the expansions must be finite if the universe is itself finite and if such
expansions are to physically exist (chapter 2). Hence, if the universe is finite, such
entities clearly cannot be part of the material world. However, entities such as human
beings are clearly also capable of conceiving them (at least, in the abstract). How is this
possible if human beings are finite, physical entities ? There appear12 to be two basic
solutions to this problem: Either (i) there exists a Platonic realm of subsistent forms to
which the mind has access which contains such physically non-realizable entities
(chapter 2) or (ii) the mind (human, and possibly other kinds) must somehow be capable
of generating abstract categories (including those containing non-realizable infinites).
If the latter position is adopted and the universe is, in fact, finite and physical then mind
must, in some sense, be a non-physical phenomenon. As Rosen (1991) has pointed out,
the relation between subsets and sets is not the same as that between sets and `setness';
the last term is a conceptual abstraction, and hence, necessarily non-physical. Both
possibilities, viz. Platonism and generative (human) capacity for abstraction lead to
12
In fact, there is a third possibility, grounded in the ontological difference between Being and beings (chapter
6), and involving the poisis (coming forth) of existential modalities as instances of the givenness of Being.
Chapter 3 Emergence
consideration of the notion of poisis (chapters 1 and 6): Human beings as teleological
entities can conceive of entities before the latter are brought forth into material existence.
Moreover, the actualization of a conceptual potentiality by an intentional agency involves
artificing or artifact production in two ontical modalities (potential and actual). To what
extent does postulating the existence of a self (being, thing) prior to its coming into being
necessitate postulating the existence of an intentionalistic (that is, a priori teleological)
agency capable of both conceiving (as a potentiality) and realizing (as an actuality) this
self and what implications does this have for self-organization as such ? These questions
necessitate investigating notions such as artifactual-emergence and other-organization
and are addressed in chapters 6 and 7.
3.4. Basic Concepts

In this section various concepts associated with contemporary theories of emergence
derived from cybernetics and systems theory are briefly examined.
3.4.1. Systems
The idea of a system is a basic concept within modern theories of emergence and a
conceptual prerequisite of functionalism (chapter 1) and artificiality13 (chapter 4).
Defn: a system S (or internal environment) is (3.1)
SC a set of components cp where p 0 P (some finite index set)

SR : SC6SC a set of relations rq where q 0 Q (some finite index set)
S : SCSR a network of relations between components
A system may be viewed as performing a function if (i) a second set of components and
relations defining the environment E external to S is specified and (ii) an input-output
(coupling) relation between E and S is defined:
Defn: an environment E (or external environment) is (3.2)
EC a set of components cm where m 0 M (some index set)

ER : EC6EC a set of relations rn where n 0 N (some index set)
E : ECER a network of relations between components
13
The link between systems and artificiality is established by Simon (1981) as follows: an artifact is an interface
between an inner environment or system and an outer environment, the environment proper of the system.
Chapter 3 Emergence
Defn: an input-output (coupling) relation IR-OR is (3.3)
IR : EC6SC a set of relations ri where i 0 I (some index set)

OR : SC6EC a set of relations rj where j 0 J (some index set)
Thus, the system maps a set of inputs (from the environment to the system) to a set of
outputs (from the system to the environment). This input-output mapping defines the
functional pathways of the system. However, this description is incomplete since only
the topology (structure) of the system-environment coupling has been specified. In order
to complete the description it is necessary to define each component and each relation:
For example, in a cellular automaton (chapters 2 and 5), each component is a finite state
machine (FSM) and relations are connections between FSMs. Furthermore, as Heylighen
(1993) states, "no absolute distinction can be made between internal and external, i.e.
between system and environment. What is `system' for one process is ènvironment' for
another one." (p.3) Hence, the system-environment coupling relations are relativistic
irrespective of whether this relativism is functional (ontological) or observational
(epistemological). (There is no system-environment boundary in a CA; the system is the
environment. However, system-environment boundaries can be identified between
computationally-dynamic space-time structures supported by the CA although it is
unclear whether these boundaries are ontological or epistemological.)
The relations between a system and its environment are shown in Fig 3.1:
c9
c2 c 72
c1
c5 c3
c13
c4
c8
S6S S6E E6S E6E

Fig 3.1 Example of a system-environment coupling.
Chapter 3 Emergence
Essential to definitions (3.1)-(3.3) is that S be finite while E can be finite or infinite: If

both S and E were infinite, it would be impossible to distinguish a system from its
environment; S would be identical to E (and visa-versa). On the above definitions,
system and environment are conceptually similar with respect to form. This is consistent
with an autopoietic (or self-generating) systems perspective (Maturana,80) in which the
connection between an organism and its environment is viewed in terms of a network of
perturbation relations between coupled systems14. (The ontology of autopoietic systems
is examined in more detail in chapter 6.)
The link between systems and emergence may be stated as follows: Emergence occurs
during the becoming or coming-into-being of the system-environment duality. A system,
as defined above, necessitates description at two levels, viz. (1) the component (or parts)
level and (2) the system (whole or functional) level. Furthermore, the coming-into-being
of systems fufills one of the requirements for emergence, viz. non-reductionism, since
system descriptions cannot be epistemologically reduced to descriptions at the component
level, even if causality is strictly `bottom-up' (section 3.4.2); components (parts) are only
identifiable with respect to systems (wholes) and visa-versa. (The ontological possibility
of `top-down' or retroactive causality is discussed in section 3.9.2; in this latter case, it
is not only description which is two-level but causation as well.) However, this view of
the link between systems and emergence is incomplete since it fails to distinguish
systemic emergence from chaos, whereby the latter is meant simply the unpredictability
that arises as a consequence of the non-linear properties of certain dynamical systems
such as Newtonian n-body systems (chapter 2). In order for a system to qualify as
genuinely emergent, it must possess properties which its components do not possess and
these are broadly of two kinds, viz. structural and functional (section 3.5.2).
3.4.2. Hierarchies
The two-level description of systems leads directly to the notion of a hierarchy. Simon
(1981) defines a hierarchy as
a system that is composed of interrelated subsystems, each of the latter being in turn hierarchic in
structure until we reach some lowest level of elementary subsystem. (p.196)
It is important to note, however, that this recursive definition is motivated by purely

epistemological concerns; it states how a system may be observed or interpreted.
Ontological issues, for example, how the system is causally organized or produced, are
not addressed. Adopting the causal perspective enables two different approaches to
hierarchy construction to be identified, viz. top-down and bottom-up.
14
Maturana and Varela (1980) reject the definition of autopoietic systems as stated in conventional systems-
theoretical terms (that is, in terms of inputs and outputs) maintaining that the correct characterization of the
organism-environment relation is in terms of exosystemic perturbations and endosystemic organizational
homeostasis. However, their point is moot since, irrespective of interpretation, such relations do in fact exist.
Chapter 3 Emergence
Q top-down (designed or planned)
The system subsists as an a priori potentiality in the Platonic sense of an abstract

transcendent form (structure) or mental artifact (concept) awaiting actualization in
matter; on this scheme, the system-environment boundary is pre-defined.
Q bottom-up (emergent or evolutionary)
The system comes into being as an a posteriori teleological actuality, form (structure)
and telos (function) arising as a consequence of the establishment of a coupling relation
between components. Systems become separable and identifiable from their
environments once partial or relative causal closure is established in the former,
assuming this is possible (section 3.9.1).
A detailed account of the conceptual issues associated with hierarchies is given in chapter
5 in the context of a presentation of the unifying framework of computationally emergent
artificiality developed and described in this thesis.
3.4.3. Partitionings
System hierarchies must be distinguished from system partitionings: In the former, both
the set of subsystems and their interrelations are necessarily specified, while in the latter,
specification of the subsystems alone is sufficient. Fig 3.2 shows the difference between
system hierarchies and system partitionings.
(a) (b)
S
strong link
weak link
Fig 3.2 (a) system hierarchy (b) system partition.

Chapter 3 Emergence
It should be noted, however, that systemic structures other than hierarchies and
partitionings are possible: Hofstadter (1979), for example, describes a system of `tangled
loops' or heterarchies in which the relations between levels are non-linear and
characterized by a high degree of feedback. According to Silberstein (1998), emergent
phenomena are characterized by heterarchical relationality, a view which derives support
from Heylighen's (1993) assertion that
all fundamental types of abstract order which can be found in emerging systems, such as hierarchies,
symmetries, periodicities, cycles, partitions, etc can be generated by the recursive combination of
extremely simple `closure' operations [and] the emergence of cyclical distinctions .. may lead to
heterarchical, non-linear architectures. (p.5)
3.4.4. Near-Decomposability
Simon (1973) maintains that multi-level hierarchies constitute the most stable and
efficient structures for systems of even moderate complexity (section 3.4.5): The time
required for a system to evolve by natural selection is much shorter (logarithmic) if the
system is structured as a series of levels of subsystems rather than composed from the
primitive system components. Simon (1981) further maintains that the bottom-up
construction of hierarchies tends to produce systems which are either decomposable or
near-decomposable, systems in which intra-subsystemic interactions are strong (high
cohesion) and inter-subsystemic interactions neglible or weak (low coupling)
respectively. Near-decomposability ensures that the short-term behaviour of each of the
component subsystems is approximately independent of the short-term behaviour of the
other components; in the long term, the behaviour of any one of the components depends
in only an aggregate (or statistical) way on the behaviour of other components. Near-
decomposability facilitates abstraction and reductionism (section 3.8.3) by an appeal to
the "empty worlds hypothesis", viz. most things are only weakly connected to most other
things; hence, "for a tolerable description of reality only a tiny fraction of all possible
interactions needs to be taken into account." (p.221) However, what constitutes a
`tolerable' level of description varies depending on context, the level of precision
required being motivated by relevance to either the observer/interpreter or/and
organizer/producer of the system.
Q Historicity
Near-decomposability has been criticised by Wimsatt (1972) who maintains that it fails
to distinguish the decomposability or stability of subsystems before they aggregate in the
system from their decomposability or stability as isolated components after they have
aggregated. Such criticism appears justified in the context of biological systems
assuming (as Wimsatt does) geological time, which allows for a process of mutually
coadaptive changes under the optimizing forces of natural selection. This important
observation has also been made by Kenyon (1941), who points out that a possible
consequence of emergent evolution is that the parts in the new whole may be modified:
Chapter 3 Emergence
For example, a set of components {a,b,c,d} might interact to form the emergent whole
X. When X is subsequently fractionated (decomposed) along `natural' hierarchical
boundaries, X may reduce to components {e,f,g,h} where {a,b,c,d} is not isomorphic with
{e,f,g,h}. Thus, emergent evolution redefines the components of the whole via dynamical
construction of a hierarchical structure within the whole. This position is consistent with
the non-cumulationist15 account of emergence proposed by Bunge (1969) and discussed
in chapter 5.
Q Relativity
Rosen (1977) maintains that because a system can be decomposed on a number of

equally `natural' partitionings, objective decomposition is impossible. However, Simon
(1981) argues to the contrary by appealing to the role of what may be identified as
Kantian synthetic a priori (that is, categorial `filters') in observation and perception:
The fact .. that many complex systems have a nearly decomposable, hierarchic structure is a major
factor enabling us to understand, describe and even `see' such systems and their parts. Or perhaps the
proposition should be put the other way round. If there are important systems in the world that are
complex without being hierarchic, they may to a considerable extent escape our observation and
understanding. Analysis of their behaviour would involve such detailed knowledge and calculation
of the interactions of their elementary parts that it would be beyond our capacities of memory or
computation. (pp.218-219)
Simon reinforces this objectivist conception of system decomposition by maintaining that

"in most systems in nature it is somewhat arbitrary as to where we leave off the
partitioning and what subsystems we take as elementary." (p.196) However, this view
may be contested on the grounds that it fails to recognize the role of the observer-
interpreter who identifies a system as a system by regarding certain phenomena
(properties, behaviour etc) as systemic and others as non-systemic according to certain
relevance criteria. Non-systemic phenomena are considered `side-effects' and for certain
types of system, for example, linear dynamical systems, may be negligible. However, for
other types of system, such as non-linear dynamical systems, side-effects can be the
source of an exponentially-increasing disorder leading to increasing unpredictability (an
epistemological problem) and instability (an ontological problem) of system behaviour.
Q Locality
15
Silberstein (1998) is also committed to this position, viz. "all ontologically emergent properties/entities have
unique causal capacities that constrain or supersede the behaviour of the parts in question. But some cases of
emergence present us with even more radical violations of mereological supervenience or part/whole
reductionism. [For example, there are cases of `fusion' which] is characterized by the original or subvenient
property going out of existence or being ùsed up' in producing the emergent property or `fused instance' .. In
such cases, the subvenient property instances literally no longer exist at the same time as the emergent property
instance." (p.474)
Chapter 3 Emergence
Another criticism at a much more fundamental level involves the underlying premise on
which the notion of near-decomposability is based, viz. weak inter-subsystemic
interaction. Bechtel (1986) refers to this as the "localizationalist" perspective and
proponents of this view argue that although organization is present in a system, it is
inessential to the explanation of the system. However, Bechtel contests this position
maintaining that
sometimes it is the case that a system performs a task because some part of it performs that task. In
such cases a localizationist account is correct .. Moreover, even in cases where the localizationist
account turns out to be incorrect, it is sometimes reasonable to begin one's research by trying to find
localized components which may perform the task one is trying to explain What one learns about the
components of the system may show that no component performs the whole task and may provide
critical guidance in developing an explanation that attributes a major role to the integration of the
components. (p.34)
3.4.5. Complexity
Ever since the theory of emergent evolution was first articulated, it has been appreciated
that the occurrence of emergence is contingent on the complexity of the substrate. For
example, Langton (1990,1991b), following a basic insight due to von Neumann (1966),
postulates the existence of an èdge of chaos', a region of self-organized criticality lying
between ordered (periodic) and random (chaotic) behavioural regimes to which, it is
conjectured, certain kinds of complex non-linear dynamical systems evolve. Although
complexity is a necessary condition for emergence, to infer that complexity is sufficient
for emergence does not constitute an explanation; the nature of the relationship between
complexity and emergence remains to be specified. However, the problem is further
compounded by disagreement over the definition of the metric used to measure the
complexity of a systemic substrate (component level). Edmonds (1995) describes various
complexity metrics in the context of a study of the link between complexity and
biological evolution and Bennett (1990) presents the following list of metrics gathered
from a review of the literature associated with measuring complexity in physical systems:
Q Life-like properties
Q Thermodynamic potential
Q Computational universality
Q Computational space-time complexity
Q Algorithmic information
Q Long-range order
Q Long-range mutual information
Q Logical depth
Q Thermodynamic depth
Q Self-similar structures and chaotic dynamics
Disagreement over how to measure complexity has led, in at least one case, to the view
that it may be impossible to provide an objective definition of the concept (Horgan,95).
For example, von Neumann argued that complexity was the essential characteristic of
life. However, Bennett (1990) has criticised this view on the grounds that it does not
Chapter 3 Emergence
differentiate between potential and actual complexity; the former is a static, structural
concept while the latter is a dynamical, control concept (Pattee,73b). On the basis of
these arguments, it is proposed that complexity should be regarded as an observationally-
relativistic measure (section 3.8.2) in the sense that it is defined with respect to epistemic
perspective: The emergent properties of a system in which we are interested define (via
selection amongst alternatives) the metric we use to measure substrate complexity. This
position is consistent with that of Tallis (1994) who argues against the idea of intrinsic
complexity. However, Edmonds (1995) maintains that even relativistic formulations of
the concept are problematic on the grounds that notions of complexity can usefully be
applied only to constructions within a given language; this leads to a consensually-
defined as opposed to objectively-defined concept of complexity16. Edmonds proposes
the following definition of complexity, viz.
that property of a language expression which makes it difficult to formulate its overall behaviour,
even when given almost complete information about its atomic components and their inter-relations.
(p.6)
On his view, complexity is observationally-relativistic and "only revealed through

interaction with the complexity of another system (typically us)." (p.3) It might be
argued, however, that since complexity metrics are products of human design or
anthropo-artifacts (chapter 6), complexity is a concept which is only meaningful with
respect to human artificers (producers); to assert otherwise entails a charge of
anthropomorphism, that is, projection17 of human characteristics onto non-human
entities. Clearly, this is an issue which impacts heavily on the debate regarding the
sufficiency of computationalism as the metaphysical basis for a unifying framework of
emergent artificiality.
16
This position is consistent with Maturana and Varela's (1980) consensualist interpretation of cognitive linguistic
function, that is, autopoietic languaging.
17
According to Tallis (1994), morphization, projection or "transferred epithet" is usually bi-directional, that is,
properties associated with one class of beings are associated with another and visa-versa. For example,
"machines are described anthropomorphically and, at the same time, the anthropic terms in which they are
described undergo a machine-ward shift. These same terms, modified by their life amongst machines, can then
be re-applied to minds and the impression created that minds and machines are one." (p.2) In this connection,
the following statement by Gould (1986) is highly significant, viz. "if we take the mathematical structures
devised to describe the worlds of celestial mechanics, statistical mechanics, quantum mechanics, continuum
mechanics ... and just plain mechanics, and then map the human world unthinkingly onto such structures, is
it possible that the human world so decribed can be anything but mechanical ? In brief, does the mathematical
`language' chosen allow the description, and allow our thinking, to appear as anything but mechanistic ?" (p.3)
Chapter 3 Emergence
3.5. The Phenomenology of Emergence
In the following section, the phenomenology18 of emergence is described. Various

concepts of emergence are discussed and different types of emergent are presented.
3.5.1. Concepts of Emergence
Similar to the four concepts (as contrasted with types or kinds) of computation postulated
by Emmeche (chapter 2), there are various concepts of emergence which can be
identified. For example, Pattee (1989) presents the following three concepts:
Q syntactic emergence (for example, symmetry-breaking and chaos), characterized by non-symbolic,

rate-dependent, continuous dynamical systems;
Q semantic emergence (for example, genetic and cognitive creativity), characterized by symbolic rate-
independent, discrete dynamical systems in which it is possible for the emergent to stand for a
referent. "Semantic emergence operates on existing data structures that are the result of completed
measurements or observations" (p.73);
Q measurement emergence, characterized by the production of a record of some type of classification

of the environment in a measuring device.
Cariani (1989,1991) also presents three concepts of emergence:
Q Computational (formally based, Platonistic) in which global patterns arise from local micro-
deterministic computational interactions; for example, `gliders' in the Game of Life (chapter 2) or
swarming and flocking behaviour in artificial ecologies etc.
Q Thermodynamic (physically based, materialistic) in which stable structures arise as a consequence

of self-organization in physico-chemical systems far from equilibrium; for example, dissipative
structures (Prigogine,84). However, Anderson et al. (1987) have argued that the structures emerging
in dissipative systems are, in fact, unstable. Simon (1981) postulates a statistical concept of
emergence based on the notion of near-decomposability in hierarchical systems.
Q Relative-to-a-model (functionally based, pragmatic) in which emergence is defined as the deviation

of the behaviour of a system from an observer's model of it: if an observed system changes its internal
structure and behaviour to such a degree that it becomes necessary to modify the observer's model
in order to continue to predict its behaviour, then such systemic changes are considered emergent
relative to the model.
Emergence-relative-to-a-model is similar to a concept of emergence due to Nagel (1961)
18
Phenomenology as understood in the context of the present discussion should not be confused with its technical
use within philosophy as described in chapters 1 and 6; in the current context, phenomenology simply refers
to the identification of a concept of emergence and its associated emergents (products), that is, a metaphysics
and the phenomena which follow. More precisely, a phenomenology is defined by a concept of emergence and
specification of types of emergent.
Chapter 3 Emergence
who maintains that "although a property may indeed be an emergent trait relative to some
given theory, it need not be emergent relative to some different theory" (pp.370-371).
On this view, "the distinction between an emergent trait and a nonemergent one would
shift with changes in interest and with the purposes of an inquiry." (p.377) Umerez et al.
(1993) differentiate three forms of the concept of emergence-relative-to-a-model:
(1) emergence with respect to a concrete19 model: error
(2) emergence with respect to a concrete theory: change
(3) emergence with respect to a concrete paradigm: crisis
(1) necessitates a change in the model, but within a fixed theoretical framework; (2)
necessitates a change in both the model and the theoretical framework, but within the
scope of the existing paradigm; (3) necessitates a complete change of the entire approach
(model, theory and paradigm). Umerez et al. associate (2) with self-organizing behaviour
in which the relations between the observables at the two levels (substrate and emergent)
are fixed or static; this type of self-organization is described as structural emergence. (3)
is associated with functional behaviour and the relations between the observables at the
two levels (substrate and emergent) are dynamic.
The most popular concept of emergence within the philosophy of mind is that due to
Churchland (1985) in which emergence is defined as a relation between a phenomenon
and two theories describing it, viz.
a property P specified by its embedding theory T1 is emergent with respect to the properties of an
ostensibly reducing theory T2 just in case
1. P has real instances;

2. P is co-occurrent with some property or complex feature recognized in T2, but nevertheless
3. P cannot be reduced to any property postulated or definable within T2.
Manthey (1990) supports this view maintaining that "an emergent phenomenon is a
product of a hierarchy relation between conceptual levels". What is problematic about
this view is that it is unclear whether the emergent relation is objective or subjective; in
the latter case, emergence depends on the choice of observation frames adopted by the
theoretician and Churchland's concept reduces to the second form of emergence-relative-
to-a-model described by Umerez et al. (1993).
3.5.2. Types of Emergent
There are a number of different types or kinds of emergent reported in the literature;
however, many of them are associated with specific concepts of emergence. Emergents
19
A concrete model is a model of a physical system.
Chapter 3 Emergence
are properties (or qualities) arising during a process and fulfilling one of the following
conditions (Klee,84):
Property P is emergent at a level of organization in a system, with respect to the system's lower-level
microstructure MS, when and possibly only when either:
(1) P is unpredictable in principle from MS (i.e. unpredictable even from an ideally complete theoretical
knowledge of MS in the limit of scientific inquiry)
or
(2) P is novel with respect to MS
or
(3) MS exhibits a much greater degree of variance and fluctuation from moment to moment than does the
level of organization where P occurs; P's constant and enduring presence in the system would not
seem to be wholly determined by MS
or
(4) P has direct determinative influence and effects on at least some of the properties in MS.
Interestingly, and as Klee states, (3) is consistent with supervenience (section 3.2.4) and
functionalism, viz. "multiple distinct micro-bases for the same macro-property" (p.56).
More important, however, is the fact that (i)-(iii) are consistent with a cumulationist view
of emergence while (iv) necessitates adopting a non-cumulationist position (chapter 5).
Emergent properties (or, more simply, emergents) broadly fall into the following two
categories:
Q structural
In the context of a discussion of emergence occurring in systems of distributed,

concurrent and asynchronously-coupled computational processes, Manthey (1990)
defines the necessary and sufficient conditions for structural emergence20 as follows:
Necessary conditions
1. There are at least two processes

2. These processes interact via either memory or synchronization
3. The putative emergent phenomenon [invariant structure] cannot - even in principle - be expressed by
a single process.
Sufficient Conditions
1. The phenomenon occurs.
20
In this context, a structural emergent is simply a stable configuration in space-time, irrespective of whether this
configuration is static or dynamic (periodic).
Chapter 3 Emergence
However, Manthey admits that the "delicate issue of observation" is ignored on this
scheme.
Q functional
Heylighen (1993) identifies at least three kinds of functional emergents, viz. boundaries,
organizations, and control relations. However, it is an open issue whether such functions
are intrinsic (ontological) or extrinsic (epistemological); in the latter case, emergence is
relative to an observer. While it is certainly the case that something must have a function
in order to be considered a system21 (section 3.4.1), it does not follow that systematicity
is necessarily an intrinsic property of certain configurations of matter. Even if it is held,
following Pepper's conjecture (1926), that there can be no emergent properties other than
emergent `laws', there is still the problem that a law is defined in terms of a set of
observables which necessitates the existence of an observer. This leads directly to the
epistemological problem of intrinsic and extrinsic emergence discussed in section 3.8.1.
3.6. Formalism, Computationalism and Emergence
In this section, various formalisations of the concept of emergence are briefly examined
in preparation for the presentation in chapter 5 of a unifying framework of
computationally emergent artificiality. Simon (1981) anticipates a formal framework for
emergence in his conception of hierarchical systems, viz.
hierarchic systems are usually composed of only a few different kinds of subsystems in various
combinations and arrangements .. Hence we can construct our description from a restricted alphabet
of elementary terms corresponding to the basic set of elementary subsystems from which the complex
system is generated. (p.221)
3.6.1. Basics
In order to explain the behaviour of any whole in terms of its structure (or organisation)
and components, the following two independent pieces of information are necessary
(Broad,25):
Q how the parts behave separately, i.e. when not in the whole
Q the law(s) according to which the behaviour of the separate parts is compounded when they are acting
together in any proportion and arrangement
Such requirements translate isomorphically into a distributed formal-computational
21
Contrary to the assertions of Maturana and Varela (1980), this holds for autopoietic as well as non-autopoietic
(or allopoietic) systems since the former have organizational-homeostasis as their function. Hence, it is argued,
functionality is essential to systemicity.
Chapter 3 Emergence
model of the corresponding system (Langton,89b), viz.
Q a description of the behaviour of each member of a set of behavors, each of which is an automaton
(for example, finite state machine (FSM), Turing machine (TM) etc)
Q a description of the set of local rules governing the interactions between behavors (for example, the
state-transition rule for the FSM, Turing machine specification etc)
3.6.2. A Formal Framework for Emergence
Baas (1993,1997) describes a formal framework for emergence involving three

components which are arbitrarily defined, viz. primitives, observations, interactions:
Primitives {Si 1} is a set of first-order structures, where i 0 J (some index set, finite or
infinite).
Observations Obs1(Si1) denotes the properties of structure Si1 registered by the observational
mechanism Obs1 which may be internal or external to the system.
Interactions Int1 is the set of interactions between the elements of {Si1} allowed by Obs1(Si1).
S2 = R(S1i, Obs1, Int1)i0J, where R is the result of interactions between primitives and S2 is a second-order
structure.
First-Order Emergence P is an emergent property of S2 iff P 0 Obs2(S2), but P Obs2(S1i) i.
The validity of the above framework might be contested on the grounds that it assumes
properties to be objectively definable a priori the interactions between the objects with
which they are associated. For example, on Elstob's (1984) view (section 3.9.1),
properties arise during interactions and are contextually-determined by the interaction;
hence, they are only determinable a posteriori the interaction22.
Baas differentiates between concepts of emergence on the basis of computability or

decidability:
Q deducible (or computable or decidable) emergence - in which there is a deductive or computational

process D such that P 0 Obs2(S2) can be determined by D from (S1i1, Obs1, Int1). Obs is algorithmically
defined.
Q observational (or undecidable) emergence - in which P is an emergent property which is non-

deducible. Obs is non-algorithmic, e.g. the truth function in formal systems capable of supporting
arithmetic; such systems have statements whose truth value cannot be deduced within the system
(Gdel incompleteness theorem).
Deductive emergence in formal or computational systems is epistemically relative,
22
However, as shown in chapter 6, this position is itself problematic.
Chapter 3 Emergence
describing the extent to which the `Platonic landscape' defined by the attractor-space (or
basin of attraction field) of the system has been `mapped' by an observer (chapter 2).
(This holds only for finite computational universes or infinite computational universes
which are algorithmically compressible.) Simon (1981) alludes to deductive emergence
in asserting that "all mathematics exhibits in its conclusions what is already implicit in
its premises ... Hence all mathematical derivation can be viewed simply as change in
representation, making evident what was previously true but obscure." (p.153)
Furthermore, the non-algorithmic nature of Obs - in observational or undecidable
emergence - can be effectively (practically) overcome using Myhill's theorem as shown
in chapter 5; hence, on the computationalist view, it is conceivable that observational
emergence might reduce to deducible emergence.
3.6.3. Computational Emergence
Broad (1925) maintains that the difference between mechanism and emergentism lies in
the fact that emergence does not occur through substituting certain determinate values
for determinate variables in a general law which connects the properties of any whole
with those of its separate constituents and with its structure. However, the distinction
between emergentism and mechanism is obscured in many computationalist theories of
emergence. For example, Darley (1994) presents a rigorous definition of emergence
based on the concept of computational complexity (section 3.4.5). On this scheme,
emergence is viewed as the result of a phase change in the amount of computation
necessary for optimal prediction of certain phenomena, viz.
emergent phenomena are those for which the amount of computation necessary for prediction from
an optimal set of rules, classifications and analysis, even derived from an idealised perfect
understanding, can never improve upon the amount of computation necessary to simulate the system
directly from our knowledge of the rules of its interactions. (p.412)
A similar position, viz. simulation as the optimal means of prediction in emergent

systems, is argued by Rasmussen et al. (1995). Darley views emergence in computational
systems of finite size and finite time as analogous to undecidability in systems of infinite
size and time capable of supporting universal computation. Furthermore, whether a
system is emergent or non-emergent is an undecidable proposition. Hence, the term
èmergence' may be regarded as an epistemological statement on the undecidability of
certain classes of computational phenomena. However, this view fails to distinguish
emergence from mere chaos (section 3.4.1) and, more importantly, is contested by
Cariani (1989) who maintains that
for Turing machines with finite tapes, the .. Halting Problem disappears completely, along with all
other computability issues [emphasis added] (p.178)
the implication being that emergence in finite computational systems - that is, finite state
machines - is a decidable issue, viz. such systems are, ultimately, closed or bounded in
their potential for emergence (Ali,98a).
Chapter 3 Emergence
3.6.4. Emergent Computation and Computational Emergence
As stated in section 3.5.1, computational emergence necessitates a computational

substrate. By contrast, emergent computation (Forrest,90) necessitates a computational
ontology for both substrate and emergent, that is, the phenomenon emerging from the
computational process is itself a computational product; hence, emergent computations
constitute a subclass of computationally emergent phenomena. Of course, it is trivially
the case that the products of computational emergence will themselves be computational
since it is assumed that no new ontological kinds are generated in the process. However,
Forrest's position is much stronger, being motivated by ideas such as virtual machines
and embedded computer hierarchies (chapters 2 and 5), viz. an emergent computation
refers to the production either of (i) components which can be used in the construction
of a virtual machine or (ii) the virtual machine system itself. The concept of emergent
computation can be understood at three levels:
Q substrate a collection of agents (or behavors), each following explicit instructions
Q emergent interactions among the agents (according to the instructions) giving rise to global
patterns of behaviour at the macroscopic level, i.e. epiphenomena
Q interpretive natural interpretation of the epiphenomena in computational terms
This concept of emergence is consistent with the notion of global constraints in systems
with computational substrates described in section 3.9.2. Even if the question of the
epiphenomenality or otherwise of emergents is ignored, interpreting the epiphenomena
in computational terms is a contentious issue because there are at least two possibilities
with respect to any such interpretation, viz. (i) computation "in the eye of the beholder"
(extrinsic emergence) and (ii) computation inherent in the system itself (intrinsic
emergence) (section 3.8.1).
Additionally, it is conceivable that non-computational substrates might give rise to

phenomena which are interpretable as emergent computations; in fact, physical
computers can themselves be viewed in this way: Computers are material artifacts
emerging as a consequence of human design activity. Ontologically, their operation is
governed by physical laws; however, epistemologically, their behaviour can be given a
functional interpretation. Temporarily ignoring the possibility of a computationalist
interpretation of the laws of physics (chapters 2, 4 and 5), this consititutes at least one
instance of the emergence of computation from a non-computational substrate; in this
case, the efficient cause of the phenomenon - the means by which the computer comes
into existence - is a human artificer (producer, organizer). If the various concepts of
computation identified by Emmeche (chapter 2) are accepted, it may be possible to
extend the list of computational emergents arising from non-computational substrates.
This gives rise to the notion of heterogeneous emergent computation wherein a substrate
with one kind (concept) of computational ontology facilitates the emergence of a global
phenomenon of a different kind of computational ontology; accepting the validity of
Chapter 3 Emergence
Emmeche's scheme, this may be the case in the natural world. However, as Emmeche has
argued, such a position ultimately rests on the pluralistic assumption that attributing
computational properties to natural phenomena (as contrasted with the computationalism
intrinsic to computational artifacts, viz. computers) is metaphysically correct.
Finally, emergent computation may also be interpreted as ènvironmental' computation

since in systems capable of supporting such emergence, it may be argued that
information processing occurs by the components in the system (the òrganisms' or local
systemic level) acting on the system as a whole (the ènvironment' or global systemic
level) (Millonas,94).
3.6.5. Emergence in Cellular Automata (CAs)
There are two problems concerning cellular automata or CAs (chapters 2 and 5)
involving issues related to emergence and artificiality: (i) the forward problem and (ii)
the inverse problem (Gutowitz,90). The forward problem can be described as follows:
Given a CA rule, determine (predict) its properties. Clearly, this involves consideration
of the epistemological issues associated with emergence; however, it is important to
realize that the forward problem is not identical to the emergence problem since it does
not suffice to differentiate emergence from unpredictability (chaos). The inverse problem
can be described as follows: Given a description of some properties, find a rule or set of
rules which have these properties. If the properties belong to a natural phenomenon, for
example, a living or cognizing organism23 (assuming they can be listed), then the attempt
to realize these properties in a CA assumes (of necessity) the validity of functionalism
and multiple-realizability (chapter 2), the basis of artificiality (chapter 4). The
phenomenon of emergence in CAs will be examined further in chapter 5 in connection
with the presentation of a unifying framework of computationally emergent artificiality.
3.7. Philosophical Issues: Introduction
The problem with Mayr's definition of emergence (section 3.2.2) is that the notion of an
emergent `characteristic' is ambiguous. It is possible to refine the definition by adopting
the position of Searle (1992) who, following Pepper (1926), distinguishes two kinds of
emergence, viz. (i) "Emergent1" (or property-emergence) and (ii) "Emergent2" (or law-
emergence).
3.7.1. Property-Emergence
Emergent1 features (or characteristics) are ontically but not epistemically reducible
(section 3.8.3); while their existence may be explained by the causal interactions of
23
For Maturana and Varela (1980), these terms are synonymous; however, in this study, they are taken to be
distinct.
Chapter 3 Emergence
components at lower levels in a system, the properties of the emergents are not deducible
from the properties and laws governing the interactions of the components. This is
consistent with the conventional account of the theory of emergence (or èmergentism')
as a materialistic philosophy (Mayr,82).
3.7.2. Law-Emergence
Emergent2 features are neither ontically nor epistemically reducible and are, according
to Searle, based on a "much more adventurous conception": A feature F is emergent2 if
and only if F is emergent1 and F has causality that cannot be explained by the causal
interactions of its components. Searle rejects the possibility of emergent2 on the grounds
that the existence of any such features would seem to violate even the weakest principle
of the transitivity of causation (Searle,92). However, this view rests on the assumption
of universal determinism (chapter 2), a controversial metaphysical position given the
apparent indeterminism of physical systems at the quantum level (chapter 4). It appears
that Searle (and others) regard emergent2 frameworks as dualistic (mentalistic or
vitalistic) positions which introduce into the explanation of phenomena elements which
are logically and scientifically unecessary. However, as Wilkinson (1979) has pointed
out, the notion of emergent laws (as contrasted with emergent properties) need not
violate the existing framework of physical laws; emergent laws may complement
physical laws by augmenting them, thereby extending the set of natural laws24. On this
view, a phenomenon at a particular level in the (natural) phenomenal hierarchy is
ontically-consistent-with but not ontically-reducible-to phenomena at lower levels in the
hierarchy25.
Searle's scheme leads to a consideration of the concept of emergence from two

philosophical perspectives:
Q Epistemological - concerned with issues of interpretation and observation: For

example, are phenomena intrinsically or extrinsically emergent ? Is emergence
observationally-relativistic or absolute ? Is reductionism possible ?
Q Ontological - concerned with issues of production and organization: For

example, is emergence closed (bounded) or open (unbounded) ? Are emergents
causal or non-causal (epiphenomenal) ? Is emergence ontically-monistic or
pluralistic, cumulationistic or non-cumulationistic ?
24
The notion of emergent or evolutionary laws has been described in (Lovejoy,27) and a recent application of
this idea in the context of an emergentist framework resolving inconsistencies between classical (special-
relativistic) and quantum (non-local) accounts of physics is presented by Silberstein (1998).
25
As will be seen in chapter 5, this constitutes an instance of ontological-cumulationism.
Chapter 3 Emergence
3.8. Epistemological Issues
In the following sections a number of epistemological issues associated with the concept
of emergence including intrinsic and extrinsic emergence, the problem of observational
relativism and the limits of reductionism are examined.
3.8.1. Intrinsic and Extrinsic Emergence
For Crutchfield (1994), the appearance of novelty in dynamical systems, identified as the
phenomenon of emergence, necessitates answering the following related questions: "For
whom has the emergence occurred ?" and "to whom are the emergent features `new' ?"
(p.2). This leads directly to consideration of the concept of observation. Crutchfield
identifies two possibilities for the observer of an emergent phenomenon with respect to
its situatedness, viz.
Q extrinsic emergence
the observer of the phenomenon is external to the phenomenon, that is, the phenomenon
is observed. Functionality is contingent on the assignment of systemic status by the
external observer; systematicity is an interpretation.
Q intrinsic emergence
the observer of the phenomenon is internal to the phenomenon, that is, the phenomenon
is self-observing. Functionality is necessary since the phenomenon is performing a
function (observation); the phenomenon is a system rather than being merely
interpretable as a system.
Crutchfield interprets emergence in a manner consistent with Cariani's concept of

emergence-relative-to-a-model (section 3.5.1), that is, as a non-transient deviation from
a normative model of the phenomenon. Intrinsic emergence is described by Crutchfield
as follows:
In the emergence of coordinated behaviour .. there is a closure in which the patterns that emerge are
important within the system .. [Such] patterns take on their `newness' with respect to other structures
in the underlying system. Since there is no external referent for novelty or pattern, we can refer to this
process as ìntrinsic' emergence.
What is distinctive about intrinsic emergence is that the patterns formed confer additional
functionality which supports global information processing .. during intrinsic emergence there is an
increase in intrinsic computational capability (p.3)
Hence, the connection between intrinsic emergence and emergent computation (section
3.6.4). Crutchfield further states that
Chapter 3 Emergence
the closure of `newness' evaluation pushes the observer inside the system. This requires in turn that
intrinsic emergence be defined in terms of the `models' embedded inside the observer. The observer
in this view is a subprocess of the entire system. (pp.3-4)
On this view, which is similar to the concept of organizational-homeostasis in autopoietic

systems theory (Maturana,80), emergence is primarily conceived as ontological, viz.
increased system functionality due to component level interactions; epistemological
issues such as novelty to an observer are of only secondary significance. Emmeche
(1992) supports this view, viz. "emergent properties must be observable, but they appear
because of the system of interactions among the lower-level objects (and not because of
observation)." (p.93) Thus, intrinsic emergence assumes a realist position in contrast to
the observational relativism (section 3.8.2) associated with extrinsic emergence.
It is important to note that Crutchfield acknowledges use of the concept of a model "in
a sense that is somewhat more generous than found in daily scientific practice."(p.4). On
his computational-realist or computationalist (chapter 2) view, models are held to exist
implicitly in the dynamics and behaviour of processes as behavioural entities
necessitating "excavation" rather than as cognitive entities "in the eye of a beholder".
This position has a number of corollaries:
1. Maintaining that a model of a phenomenon is ìn' the phenomenon necessitates

holding that both models (artifacts) and natural phenomena are ontically
systemic. This position may be termed systemic realism and is the metaphysical
view which asserts that an isomorphism exists between epistemology
(knowledge, representation) and ontology (being, reality).
2. Furthermore, maintaining that a model of a phenomenon is ìn' the phenomenon

entails tacit a priori adoption of an objectivist and exclusivist (that is, non-
pluralist) position; on such a view, only one system model is possible, viz. that
in which epistemology coincides with ontology.
3. However, it could be argued that èxcavation' is not an objective process since

there are, in fact, many possible models of a system, each capable of being
produced from a perspective at least partially determined by concerns intrinsic
to the modeller (Rosen,77).
4. Thus, it could be maintained that intrinsic emergence ultimately degenerates into

extrinsic (or observationally-relativistic) emergence. Hence, emergence-relative-
to-a-model or rather relative-to-a-modeller (since excavation is performed by an
observer external to the system) appears to be the appropriate framework for the
concept26.
26
It could be argued that (4) is a simple non sequitur which arises from the conflation of epistemology with
ontology and that genuine intrinsic (or observer-independent) emergence is possible. This is because, following
Chapter 3 Emergence
Crutchfield defines intrinsic emergence in terms of three concepts: (i) dynamical systems
theory, (ii) computation theory, and (iii) inductive inference, the latter involving
algorithmic reconstruction of a minimal machine (formal-computational description)
belonging to an assumed model class from a set of primary and secondary observations.
These are observations of the phenomenon and detection of regularities in a series of
increasingly-accurate models belonging to different model classes respectively.
Organization is extracted from phenomena using "minimally-biased discovery
procedures" (p.2). However, what constitutes a `minimal' set of procedures is an open
issue and depends on the assumptions made during the modelling process. Furthermore,
induction as a scientific method has been subject to intense philosophical criticism since
(at least) Hume27. Crutchfield (1994) maintains, however, that
èmergence' is meaningless unless it is defined within the context of processes themselves ..

emergence defined without this closure leads to an infinite regress of observers detecting patterns ...
The regress must be folded into the system, it must be immanent in the dynamics. (pp.9-10)
In support of a position lying somewhere between intrinsic and extrinsic emergence,

Emmeche (1992) argues for an observational interpretation of selection pressure, viz.
"the environment acts as an observer that `sees' and àcts upon' higher-level properties,
thereby establishing recurrent interactions within and between the different levels."
(p.93) This requires a more sophisticated scheme than simple self-organizing dynamics,
viz. differential reproduction of a set of variant self-representations leading to emergent
evolution via natural selection. However, while the observer is certainly external to the
system, it is not an observer in any conventional sense of the term. Moreover, in the limit
of the system-environment boundary reducing such that system and environment become
identical (with the system enlarging to the environment), this form of emergence
transforms into intrinsic emergence.
The intrinsic versus extrinsic argument can, ultimately, be reformulated as a debate

regarding claims for two different truth schemes, intrinsic emergentists supporting a
coherence theory of truth, extrinsic emergentists supporting a correspondence theory of
truth28. A similar argument arises in the debate over computationalism, viz. whether it
Kant, it is consistent to maintain that multiple models of a phenomenon are possible while simultaneously
asserting that the phenomenon (in this case, emergence) as it is in itself is unitary; epistemic pluralism is
consistent with ontic monism (Searle,95). (A yet more radical position, viz. ontological pluralism (Dreyfus,91),
is investigated in chapter 6.) However, this position necessitates rejecting the proposed isomorphism between
ontology and epistemology, a relation which is fundamental to the systemic-realist position adopted by
Crutchfield and definitive of intrinsic emergence.
27
Chalmers (1982) provides a precise and concise summary of the main arguments against induction.
28
The Oxford Companion to Philosophy (1995) defines the coherence theory of truth as "a theory of truth
according to which a statement is true if it `coheres' with other statements - false if it does not." Crucially, for
computationalism, "the theory is more plausible for axiomatic systems where `coherence' can take the definite
Chapter 3 Emergence
is intrinsic or extrinsic (chapter 2).
3.8.2. Observational-Relativism
In section 3.4.5, it was maintained that the phenomenon of emergence depends on

complexity: Simple phenomena involve simple linear dynamical interactions between
components and the behaviour of such systems is predictable via theory. Complex
phenomena involve complex non-linear dynamical interactions between components and
the behaviour of such systems is unpredictable even if the principles (laws, rules etc)
governing the interactions are deterministic. In such cases, there appears to be no
alternative to simulation (Rasmussen,95). However, it has also been shown that the
complexity metric can be defined in a number of different, observationally-relativistic
ways and, crucially, it is this relativism which provides support for extrinsic emergence.
For example, Tallis (1994) adopts a similar position vis-a-vis complexity to that held by
Cariani (1989,1991), viz. observational-relativism, in stating that "complexity is in the
eye of the beholder". Kampis (1991) clarifies this position by postulating a hierarchical
view of system description (section 3.4.2): Any `complex' system composed of a number
of components may be transformed into a `simple' system by identifying it as a
component of a `complex' system at a higher level of abstraction. Since emergence
depends on complexity, complexity on degree of abstraction, and abstraction on the
concerns of the observer which are relative, emergence must, therefore, be relative to the
observer.
In section 3.4.2, it was argued that emergent processes generate hierarchical structures
via bottom-up composition. The reverse process, top-down decomposition or reduction
of phenomena, will now be examined in preparation for a discussion of the ontological
issues associated with emergence in section 3.9.
3.8.3. Emergence and Reductionism
Reductionism, the attempt to explain phenomena in terms of the properties and laws
associated with lower levels in a phenomenal hierarchy, is one of the basic tenets of
modern science and exists in three distinct forms (Ayala,87):
Q ontological: This refers to the position that the physico-chemical laws are universal; on this view,
biological and psychological phenomena, such as life and consciousness respectively, must not
contradict these laws.
Q methodological: This refers to the position according to which we should attempt to explain all
form of being derivable from the axioms." The correspondence theory of truth "maintains that the truth of a
proposition p requires the following two conditions to be met: (1) it is a fact that p, and (2) the proposition
corresponds to that fact" and is essentially, a theory of the relation (ismorphism) between representation and
reality. A recent defense of the correspondence theory of truth against the pragmatist (or instrumentalist) theory
of truth is presented in (Searle,95).
Chapter 3 Emergence
phenomena from the known natural laws, i.e. one should follow the reductive method whenever
possible (Occam's Razor) and to the extent that its application is meaningful. Thus, methodological
reductionism is a heuristic position.
Q epistemological: This refers to the statement that all phenomena can be factually reduced, at least ìn
principle', to lower phenomenal levels and ultimately to physics and the properties of matter.
Searle (1992) further distinguishes ontological and epistemological reductionism as

shown in the following diagram (Fig 3.3):
reductionism
ontological epistemological
6 object property causal theory logical
6 object property causal theory logical
Fig 3.3 Types of reductionism.
At this point in the discussion, it is necessary to determine the relationship between

reductionism and emergence. Obviously if the emergence of laws (section 3.7.2) is
possible, epistemological reductionism is impossible and methodological reductionism
becomes a necessarily incomplete explanatory strategy. In the remainder of this section,
discussion will be restricted to the relation between epistemological reductionism and the
emergence of properties (section 3.7.1) as opposed to laws.
In those cases in which knowledge of the components of a system precedes knowledge

of their organised aggregates (for example, in machines and other artifacts) the properties
that are said to èmerge' as a result of the act of combination may be regarded as the
realization of the potential of the individual parts (Simon,71). This view is supported by
Harris (1965) who maintains that:
[the emergence of new properties or qualities and levels of integration] is not ineluctable. It is not,
of course, always explicable as soon as it is detected, but the novelty is attributable to the new form
of organization and once that is fully understood it should be scientifically comprehensible.
Moreover, the novelty is a continuous outgrowth from the foregoing phase. It is not a discrete
supervenient addition in principle unaccountable in terms of its contributory factors. Certainly, it is
not rendered intelligible by analysis alone. It is a product of synthesis and can be explained only by
the principles of synthesis. Potentiality in the earlier and more primitive of the latter and more
Chapter 3 Emergence
elaborate must, however, be preserved and the aim of science is always to trace the continuity
between them in as great detail as possible [emphasis added]. (p.487)
However, Ayala (1985a) considers this position to be vacuous because it assumes an a

priori definitional position. To illustrate the point, he cites an argument due to Broad
(1925): Are the properties of common salt, that is, sodium chloride, simply the properties
of the elements sodium and chlorine when they are combined according to the formula
NaCl ? If among the properties of sodium and chlorine, we include their combination in
table salt and the properties of the latter, the answer would be in the affirmative (a
posteriori); otherwise it would be in the negative (a priori). The solution is, therefore,
definition-dependent, reflecting the epistemic status of the observer. Consequently, he
maintains that the notion of emergent properties is `spurious', arguing for its
reformulation in terms of propositions expressing human knowledge, a position which
is consistent with Cariani (1989), viz. emergence-relative-to-a-model (section 3.5.1). As
Ayala states,
the proper way of formulating questions about the relationship between complex systems and their
components is by asking whether the properties of complex systems can be inferred from knowledge
of the properties that their components have in isolation. The issue of emergence cannot be settled
by discussions about the nature of things or their properties, but is resolvable by reference to our
knowledge of these objects [emphasis added]. (p.75)
On such a view, a property that is regarded as emergent at a particular time might be

considered non-emergent at a later more advanced state of knowledge when and if the
emergent properties are included in the list of properties associated with the components
whose interaction gave rise to the property. Thus, designation of a property as emergent
involves the assignment of an epistemic interpretation to a phenomenon by the observer
of the phenomenon (Kampis,91). However, there is a problem with the above view with
respect to the possibility of component isolation: According to the definition in section
3.4.1, a system exists within an environment unless it is closed, that is, autonomous, in
which case system and environment are identical. Assuming that system and
environment are not identical, how can a system be isolated from its environment given
that its continued existence is predicated on the existence of this environment ? Given
the assumption that isolation is possible by `removing' the system from one `suitable'
environment (for example, air) and `placing' it in another (for example, a vacuum), it
remains the case that what counts as the environment for isolation and, as a corollary,
the properties of the isolated system depend on the environment selected. Are the
ìsolated' properties of salt its properties in air or in a vacuum ? Obviously, this is
established by a convention which is in turn motivated by a concern for reducing
interactions between the system under consideration and other systems. But whether this
is true for all systems is an open issue: For example, physico-chemical systems are
Chapter 3 Emergence
examples of what might be called relatively-closed systems29. Vital (or biological) and
mental (or cognitive) systems, by contrast, are instances of what might be called
relatively-open systems (section 3.9.1) for which isolation may be impossible30.
Theories of emergence require `complete knowledge', that is, knowledge of (i) all the
properties the components (parts) possess when individually isolated from the candidate
system (whole), (ii) all the properties possessed by systems which are formed when some
or all of the components stand to each other (or to additional components) in relations
other than those between the components in the candidate system, and (iii) all the
properties of the components in these other systems (Nagel,61). It is assumed that the
isolation process (that is, the act of observation or measurement) generates objective
information, viz. the properties of each component. However, this is only true if the
system is uniquely decomposable (section 3.4.4), that is, if only one hierarchical
description is possible31 . Simon (1981) argues in favour of system decomposability on
the grounds that our epistemological apparatus (sensori-motor system and nervous
system including the brain) has evolved to facilitate our `seeing' systems. As stated
previously, Rosen (1977) has contested this objectivist position, arguing that a system
may be decomposed in many ways motivated by and depending on the interests
(intentionality) of the analyst-modeller. Observation and measurement have become for
human beings activities which have transcended the possibilities afforded by the body;
yet, the way in which we construct such instruments is at least partially determined by
what we select for study. Thus, system description is a relativistic activity, and since a
component may also be regarded as a system (section 3.8.2), component property
description is also relativistic. An attempt at formulating a weaker version of the
requirement for isolation could be made by stating the conditions under which isolation
takes place; however, the logical conclusion of this is a vicious infinite regress because
it is then required to state the conditions under which those isolating conditions hold etc.
The result is that isolation cannot be performed objectively, a result indicated by Rosen
29
`Relatively' because even in Newtonian mechanics where the effects of physical forces decay exponentially,
such effects are still present. Systems separated at great distances are weakly connected, thereby allowing for
relative system closure and hence, isolation. It should be noted here that this argument assumes an absolute
view of space and time which, according to special relativity theory (chapter 4), is inaccessible to an
endophysical observer, that is, an observer situated within the physical universe.
30
As will be seen in chapter 6, factical science (for example, physics, biology, psychology etc) represents merely
one way (or modality) of describing the ontology (Being) of phenomena (beings). According to Heidegger,
human beings - and, derivatively, all other beings - have a way of way of Being, viz. being-in-the-world (or
Dasein), that is essentially contextual in which case, the (Cartesian) approach of atomistically isolating human
being in order to determine its essence is incorrect.
31
Whether such a description is attainable constitutes a separate issue concerned with the tractability of the
analysis.
Chapter 3 Emergence
in his arguments against objectivism in systems science32.
3.9. Ontological Issues

Ontology is the study of being and, as metaphysics, of that which is primordial and
encompassing (chapters 1 and 6). Consequently, ontological inquiry must concern itself
at least in part with questioning the validity of the metaphysical assumptions underlying
scientific and philosophical frameworks (chapter 1). In the following sections, three
ontological issues associated with the concept of emergence are examined: (i) open
(unbounded) vs. closed (bounded) emergence, (ii) causal vs. non-causal (epiphenomenal)
emergents, and (iii) pluralistic vs. monistic emergence33.
3.9.1. Open and Closed Emergence
Theories of emergence involve at least two levels of description, viz. the component,
local or substrate level and the system, global or emergent level. On a systems-
theoretical emergentist view, a system is held to arise from within a substrate once a set
of causal relations attains partial or relative closure (section 3.4.2); as a corolary of such
a view, the environment is held to be that part of the substrate which does not form part
of the system. Thus, both systems and environments are emergents34 (section 3.3). While
closure is most usually discussed in the context of systems, it is interesting to examine
the concept in the context of its application to environments. There are essentially two
kinds of environment (open and closed) which may be differentiated on the basis of two
binary parameters, finitude and dynamicity: (i) a closed environment (CE) is either [1]
finite and static (both components and relations are defined as fixed sets) or [2] infinite
and static; (ii) an open environment (OE) is either [1] finite and dynamic (components
and/or relations are defined as variable sets) or [2] infinite and dynamic. The various
forms of open and closed environments are shown in Fig 3.4 (overleaf).
32
This position is consistent with arguments establishing the validity of the Frame Problem (chapter 7) in artificial
intelligence.
33
The related issue of cumulationistic vs. non-cumulationistic emergence will be examined in chapter 5.
34
This issue is examined in chapter 6 in the context of a more detailed investigation of the semantic and
ontological problem of self-organization introduced in section 3.3.
Chapter 3 Emergence
FINITUDE
finite infinite
OE[1] OE[2]
CE[1] CE[2]
Fig 3.4 Summary of environmental kinds.
Using the notation introduced in section 3.4.1 augmented by the temporal parameter t,
the four kinds of environmental description can be formally defined as follows:
Defn: open (OE) and closed (CE) environments (3.4)
OE[1] : ECx(t) ECx(t+1) w ERy(t) ERy(t+1) x, y < 4
OE[2] : ECx(t) ECx(t+1) w ERy(t) ERy(t+1) x, y # 4
CE[1] : ECx(t) / ECx(t+1) v ERy(t) / ERy(t+1) x, y < 4
CE[2] : ECx(t) / ECx(t+1) v ERy(t) / ERy(t+1) x, y # 4
Open and closed systems may be defined by analogy with terms in (3.4) as follows:
Defn: open (OS) and closed (CS) systems (3.5)
OS[1] : SCi(t) SCi(t+1) w SRj(t) SRj(t+1) i, j < 4
OS[2] : SCi(t) SCi(t+1) w SRj(t) SRj(t+1) i, j # 4
CS[1] : SCi(t) / SCi(t+1) v SRj(t) / SRj(t+1) i, j < 4
CS[2] : SCi(t) / SCi(t+1) v SRj(t) / SRj(t+1) i, j # 4

Chapter 3 Emergence
The system-environment coupling relation has two basic forms which describe the extent
to which the system may be viewed as partially- or relatively-closed:
(1) WEAK coupling (relatively-closed)
{IRa , ORb a,b | a60, b60}
(2) STRONG coupling (relatively-open)
{IRa , ORb a,b | a64 or b64}
There are a number of interesting permutations of the system-environment relation which

are worthy of consideration. The most usual is where ES, that is, the environment is
distinct from the system and the two are connected via an input-output relation IR-OR
(section 3.4.1). Meehl et al. (1956) define emergence under this scheme in terms of a
movement within function space (that is, the space of all possible system descriptions
defined over some finite set of observables). Such movements represent changes in the
functional specification of systems and entail a connection to concepts such as extrinsic
emergence (section 3.8.1) and emergence-relative-to-a-model (3.6.1). A more interesting
relation occurs when E/S, that is, when system and environment are identical and either
(i) finite or (ii) infinite but algorithmically-compressible 35. In this case external
distinctions between emergent and substrate cannot be made. In terms of the scheme due
to Meehl et al., function space itself becomes functionally-specifiable (via a meta-
function) and there can be no emergence since there is no movement within function
space. The entity can still be regarded as self-organizing if internal distinctions are
allowed; this corresponds to a form of intrinsic emergence (section 3.8.1). However, it
is unclear how and why internal distinctions arise. Various schemes have been suggested
in the literature, for example, symmetry breaking (Jantsch,80) (Silberstein,98) and the
calculus of indications (Spencer,69). Nonetheless, the issue is far from resolved since
such schemes necessarily make recourse to contestable metaphysical assumptions (for
example, tychism or ontical randomness).
The above definitions of closure with respect to systems and environments allow four
classes of emergence to be identified (Fig 3.5).
35
This latter possibility raises an important question, viz. is it the environment itself that is algorithmically-
compressible - in which case "strong" computationalism, viz. reality is computational, must be true - or is it
merely the case that description(s) of the environment are algorithmically-compressible ?
Chapter 3 Emergence
SYSTEM
open closed
I II
III IV
Fig 3.5 Classes of emergence.
Examples of class I and II emergence include processes occurring in formal and

computational systems (section 3.6). Simon (1981) maintains that closed systems contain
the emergent (that is, the phenomenal product of emergence) in the substrate, an
intrinsically Platonic-Aristotelian view of emergence as the unfolding of form
(potentiality) in matter (actuality). Examples of emergence in classes III and IV are much
more controversial: Formalization of systems with open environments is impossible since
by definition they are never complete or fully specifiable.
3.9.2. From Emergence to Emergentism
Most current theories of emergence are concerned almost exclusively with

epistemological issues as against ontological issues, with the `knowing' of emergence as
opposed to the `being' of emergence. For example, Nagel (1961) distinguishes emergence
as a thesis about the nonpredictability of certain properties of things, from emergence as
the temporal, cosmogonic process described in the work of writers such as Morgan,
Alexander and Smuts. Simon (1971) argues that emergence either refers to that which
is (at least statistically) predictable in principle or is a non-scientific concept, thus
supporting the position held by Ayala (section 3.8.3). Nearly all theories involve the tacit
adoption of a set of underlying materialist metaphysical assumptions, viz. determinism,
mechanism, reductionism (ontological and methodological if not epistemological). The
necessity of a physical (material) substrate for emergence is maintained on the grounds
that observed changes in emergents follow observed changes in the material substrate
(Kenyon,41). Non-materialistic theories of emergence are rejected on the grounds that
"emergents are [thereby] regarded as spiritual creations emanating from an unknown
shadowy world." (p.48)
However, alternative conceptions of emergence based on different metaphysical

assumptions have been proposed in the literature. For example, Elstob (1986) argues for
Chapter 3 Emergence
a theory of emergent evolution which both grounds and is grounded in an indeterministic

metaphysics contrasting with the earlier assertions of Pepper (1926) and Nagel (1961)
that "neither a belief in indeterminism nor in teleological causation is essential to
emergent evolution." (p.377) Elstob (1984) holds that emergent levels are causally-
closed and hence, relatively independent of other levels in the systemic hierarchy,
essentially a restatement of the position originally articulated by Smuts (1926). The
emergence of a phenomenal (systemic) level is viewed as contingently dependent on
global context (supersystemic level) and necessarily dependent on components
(subsystemic level). However, Elstob maintains that both contextual and component
dependencies are relatively weak and of secondary importance when compared with the
strong interactions occurring at the phenomenal level, thereby contesting the view that
systems are `nearly-decomposable' (Simon,81) (section 3.4.4). Properties (and hence,
phenomena) arise from interactions occurring within specific contexts. A stable system
exhibiting characteristic properties is produced when a complex of interactions attains
causal closure. However, Kim (1992) rejects this view on materialist grounds. On his
view, causality is a bottom-up phenomenon which occurs only at the most primitive level
in the phenomenal hierarchy, viz. the material or physical level36. As he states,
there are no causal powers that magically emerge at a higher-level and of which there is no
accounting in terms of lower-level properties and their causal powers and nomic connections (p.18)
The incompatibility of the above two views is a consequence of the incompatability that
arises from the adoption of two different metaphysical schemes (ontologies). Elstob's37
position is interesting because it is consistent with the possibility of `downwards
causation' in which systems emerging from a substrate via bottom-up causal processes
modify the substrate via top-down causal processes which come into existence at the
emergent level. On this view, causality is not a single level phenomenon; rather it is level
specific. This is important because it means that epistemological reductionism of higher
level phenomena to phenomena at some primitive or substrate level is impossible.
(However, as stated previously, there are problems with such non-cumulationist schemes
as will be shown in chapter 5.)
3.9.3. Downwards Causation
According to Mayr (1982), the two most important characteristics of emergence are as
follows:
1. that the wholes generated can in turn become parts of higher-level systems; thus, emergents are
`janus-faced' and can act as holons, that is, as both parts and wholes, (Koestler,74).
36
In short, the physical universe is held to be causally-closed (Chalmers,96).
37
Elstob's position is critically examined in chapter 6 in connection with a discussion of arguments supporting
Heideggerian pluralistic emergentism.
Chapter 3 Emergence
2. wholes can affect the properties of lower-level parts.
Feature (1) is relatively uncontroversial; as an instance of (2), Campbell (1974) cites

systems undergoing natural selection: Environmental selection forces operating at the
phenotypic level determine, in part, distribution at the genotypic level. Campbell
maintains that causation must, therefore, be interpreted from two complementary
perspectives, viz. (i) upwards - direct, instantaneous (synchronic), physical, and (ii)
downwards - indirect, historical (diachronic), selective and cybernetic. Klee (1984) has
contested this position, maintaining that "there is a difference that is being ignored in this
case between determinative connections between levels in a system, and determinative
connections between two independently functioning systems .. the nature of the
determinative connection between, for example, any one of cells in my body and the
organ it is a micro-part of is not the same as the determinative connection, if any,
between myself and another person [or any other object external to my body]." (p.58)
Notwithstanding this criticism, Klee accepts that feature (2) is open to at least three
different interpretations described in the literature, viz. downward causation or
`retroactive causality' (Elstob,84) via (i) dual control, (ii) global constraints or (iii)
supplementary laws, alternative schemes which Davies (1987) has identified with three
types of organizing principle, viz. (i) weak, (ii) logical, and (iii) strong.
3.9.3.1. Weak (dual control)
Weak organizing principles are formulated in terms of external constraints, boundary

conditions, initial conditions, degree of non-linearity, degree of feedback, distance from
equilibrium etc and are statements about the general way in which systems tend to self-
organize (Davies,87).
Pattee (1973b) identifies two types of constraint both of which are arbitrary and give rise
to a hierarchical order in systems, viz. structural and control constraints, the latter
producing control hierarchies via dynamic control of lower level system components. It
is important to clarify the distinction between a control hierarchy and the notion of a
near-decomposable system hierarchy due to Simon (1981). According to Pattee,
in a control hierarchy, the upper level exerts a specific, dynamic constraint on the details of the
motion at the lower level, so that the fast dynamics of the motion at the lower level cannot simply be
averaged out. The collection of subunits that forms the upper level in a structural hierarchy now also
acts as a constraint on the motions of selected individual subunits. This amounts to a feedback path
between levels [emphasis added]. (p.77)
Pattee locates the source of hierarchical control in decision-making or measurement, that

is, the classification of alternatives according to rules of constraint which are the result
of local and arbitrary structures and which act non-holonomically to reduce the number
of degrees of freedom in the system (Pattee,72). Classification takes the form of the
`writing' of a record which, on his view, is a statistical (and hence, irreversible) process
(Pattee,71). However, the origin of such records and the constraints which generate them
Chapter 3 Emergence
is an unsolved problem. Although Pattee agrees with Simon that control constraints must
emerge as a statistical property of interactions between system components, he differs
as to the nature of the reverse relation by arguing in favour of downwards causation from
the higher to lower level(s). Thus, on Pattee's view, there are at least two conceptions of
systems: (i) near-decomposable systems in which higher level behaviour is statistically
emergent from the interactions of lower level components, and (ii) constrained systems
in which the ìnterface' between levels organizes the individual dynamics of the lower-
level components by a process of classification involving measurement.
Elstob (1984) formulates an interpretation of downwards causation, viz. retroactive

causality, in terms of the relative independence of levels in an emergent hierarchy, viz.
the emergent level, which evolves from the component level but which has a causality that is
relatively independent of the component level, can create conditions that give rise to component level
interactions that would not occur in the absence of the emergent level. (p.87)
Polanyi (1965) presents a scheme in which the boundary conditions left open by a lower
level principle are determined by a higher principle38, for example, the boundary
conditions of the laws of mechanics may be controlled by the operational principles
which define a machine; in (Polanyi,66) this is described as the `principle of marginal
control'. A similar position is argued by Simon (1971): (Functional) mechanisms are
ontically but not epistemically reductive; a machine is consistent (or compatible) with
the physico-chemical laws, but not uniquely determined by such laws because it
represents only one of a large number of possible arrangements of matter. Thus, it is not
possible to deduce the particular structure or/and function of a machine from the
physico-chemical principles alone. The nature of the relation between lower and higher
level principles is described in (Polanyi,65) as follows:
Q The higher principles which characterize a comprehensive entity cannot be defined in terms of the
laws that apply to its parts in themselves.
Q The operations of higher principles rely quite generally on the action of the laws governing lower
levels and are compatible with such laws.
Thus, according to Polanyi, certain kinds of things are subject to dual control. In
(Polanyi,68), two types of boundary condition are identified which may be described as
(i) observation boundary conditions (concerned with that which is bounded), and (ii)
control boundary conditions (concerned with that which is bounding). Type (ii) boundary
conditions are those which are primarily involved in dual control, the degree of control
exercised depending on the exact nature of the conditions. In (Polanyi,66), the control
boundary conditions are identified as emergent:
38
Polanyi (1968) locates the source of the ontology of higher level principles in the concept of fields.
Chapter 3 Emergence
If each higher level is to control the boundary conditions left open by the operations of the next lower
level, this implies that these boundary conditions are in fact left open by the operations going on at
the lower level. In other words, no level can gain control over its own boundary conditions and hence
cannot bring into existence a higher level, the operations of which would consist in controlling these
boundary conditions. Thus, the logical structure of the hierarchy implies that a higher level can come
into existence only through a process not manifest in the lower level, a process which thus qualifies
as an emergence. (p.45)
In the above scheme, bottom-up causation is necessary but not sufficient for the
emergence of higher levels. Thus, holism is distinguished from emergence since only in
the latter does irreducibility constitute a necessary condition for the occurrence of the
phenomenon.
Bechtel (1986) describes a similar concept in the context of a discussion on teleological

explanation and the nature of the mapping between reducing (lower) and reduced
(higher) levels in a system description: `Background conditions' denote "particular sets
of conditions under which the regularities characterized by the reduced level theory hold"
(p.33). He goes further to state that background conditions "constrain the lower level
components to do the particular tasks needed for the whole system." (p.33) Adopting a
position similar to Elstob, Bechtel maintains that systemic interactions are identifiable
at three levels, viz. (i) the subsystemic or component level, (ii) the systemic level at
which the system functions as a whole, and (iii) the supersystemic or environmental
level.
3.9.3.2. Logical (global constraints)
Global constraints constitute the least controversial interpretation of `downward

causation': Global system dynamics are the product of local subsystem interaction
dynamics (bottom-up causation). However, the global structure constrains the local
dynamics by canalizing interactions, selectively `freezing out' certain interactions (top-
down `causation'). The nature of the canalization is best understood in system dynamical
terms (chapter 2), viz. trajectories (sequences of global system states), attractors (the end
state or sequence of end states of a given trajectory) and basins of attraction (the set of
all trajectories that converge on a given attractor). The set of all basins of attraction
constitutes the basin of attraction field and its topology is that of a `landscape' of
branching transient trees rooted on attractors. (The attractor basins constituting the basin
of attraction field are discontinuously connected in discrete deterministic systems). The
generation of global macrostructure from the deterministic interactions of local
microstructures places the concept of emergence associated with logical organizing
principles in direct opposition to that associated with the weak organizing principle of
Polanyi described in section 3.9.3.1. Emergence via logical or global constraint is shown
in Fig 3.6 (overleaf).
Chapter 3 Emergence
Global Dynamics
(Emergent level)
constrain
produce
Local Dynamics
(Substrate level)
Fig 3.6 Emergence via global constraint.
An alternative formulation of the concept of global constraints is given in terms of

`software laws' (Davies,87), logical rules and theorems concerned with system
organization, information and complexity independent of specific physical mechanisms;
hence, a link between software laws, functionalism and multiple-realizability (chapters
2 and 4). Such laws are not logically deducible from the underlying `hardware' laws
traditionally studied in physics although they are compatible with the physical laws.
Software laws are organizing principles which `harness' physical laws rather than
supplementing them and apply to emergent phenomena, inducing their appearance and
controlling their form and behaviour by holistically modifying global system behaviour.
3.9.3.3. Strong (Supplementary Laws)
The concept of supplementary laws may be formulated in two ways: (i) substitutive -
existing physical laws are modified; (ii) additive - existing physical laws are augmented
by new laws. This position constitutes the most radical interpretation of downwards
causation and necessitates a consideration of the distinction between monistic and
pluralistic ontologies. (As stated previously, the issue of cumulationistic vs. non-
cumulationistic emergence is addressed in detail in chapter 5.)
3.9.4. Pluralism
In the preceding sections, emergent phenomena have been variously described.

According to Searle (1992), emergents can be broadly distinguished into two kinds, viz.
(1) properties (qualities, features or characteristics) and (2) laws (section 3.7). An
alternative classification scheme based on behaviour and briefly described in section
3.5.2 distinguished between structural and functional emergents. However, in the present
context, the critical issue is the ontology or being of emergents. There are basically two
Chapter 3 Emergence
positions: (1) emergents as apparent and (2) emergents as real39. This appearance-reality
distinction should not be confused with the epiphenomenality-causality distinction
(section 3.9.2), although the two distinctions are related. As stated previously, according
to Forrest (1990), apparent-emergents are logically entailed by the bottom-up causation
of a computationally-monistic substrate (section 3.6.4). However, the view that
emergents are merely epistemological artifacts, that is, appearances, has been contested
and two variants of the opposing ontological-pluralist position have been proposed: (i)
cumulationistic-pluralism and (ii) non-cumulationistic-pluralism. An early
cumulationistic scheme grounded in a space-time event monism was developed by
Alexander (1920) and is described in chapter 5 along with a non-cumulationistic scheme
due to Bunge (1969). In this section, a recent cumulationistic framework is examined
since it is relevant to the debate over pluralism vs. monism.
Emmeche et al. (1997) advocate ontological pluralism in the context of a materialistic

and evolutionary perspective in which reference is made to "the `local' existence of
different ontologies" (p.1). This position is further supported by the assertion that
"emergence .. is creation of new properties regardless of the substance involved
[emphasis added]." (p.5); hence, the view that emergence is "exactly that reasonable
aspect of vitalism which [it] is worth[while] to maintain" (p.3). (However, it should be
noted that the extent to which ontologies can differ and substances can be disregarded
in this scheme is clearly bounded at the outset by the a priori commitment to
materialistic evolution40.) Emmeche et al. clarify their position as follows:
if ontologically interpreted .. emergence will characterize the one and only `creative force' in the
whole universe and if epistemologically interpreted, it will be a name designating a large scope of
various and perhaps very different types of processes. (p.6)
Such processes are hierarchically structured as a series of phenomenal levels in which
a level is constituted by the interplay between a set of elementary entities and processes acting on a
level below (the initiating conditions), constrained by specific boundary conditions (that may have
an environmental origin relative to the emerging entities) that determines the `shape' or `form' of the
entities at the emerging level. (p.19)
This is consistent with Darwinian (that is, selectionist) accounts of the origin of boundary
conditions (Baas,93) (Emmeche,92) in which the environment of a system acts as the
observer (section 3.8.1). Furthermore, Emmeche et al. maintain - contrary to Bunge
(chapter 5) - that
levels are inclusive .. the psychological level is built upon the biological and the physical, the
biological upon the physical: phenomena on one level cannot be reduced to the lower level, but on
39
It should be noted that the reality status of the process of emergence is not contested on this position.
40
Assuming the modern externalistic and mechanistic view of matter described in chapter 4.
Chapter 3 Emergence
the other hand they can never change the laws of the lower level. Biological phenomena cannot
change physical laws - but neither can physical laws as we know them fully explain biological
phenomena. The fact that levels are inclusive means that a lower level is a necessary condition for
the higher level, and that the higher level supervenes upon the lower. (p.8)
Thus, emergence is viewed as (1) consistent with ontological reductionism and

epistemological non-reductionism and (2) a supervenience or coupling relation between
phenomenal levels as contrasted with a parallel decoupling of phenomenal levels.
However, ontological reductionism does not entail ontological monism since ontological
inclusion does not preclude ontological expansion (section 3.7). With respect to the
maxim defining emergence (section 3.2.2), Emmeche et al. maintain that
what is `more' about the whole is a specific series of spatial and morphological relationships between
the parts (p.17)
and these relationships are held to be both epistemologically and ontologically

significant. As they go on to assert,
ontologically, there exist other entities than elementary particles. These entities are no less material
or materialistic existing than elementary particles. By materialistic we only mean that these entities
exist independent of a human subject, that is without any subject having thought of, measured or
otherwise related itself to the entity. They exist not only epistemologically but also ontologically -
understood as independent, objective, and materialistic existence - one might as well say realistic -
without reducibility to elementary particles. (p.17)
There are a number of problems associated with this version of ontological pluralism:
First, that reality includes the ontologically-subjective as well as the ontologically-
objective (Searle,92;95) is a fact which Emmeche et al. accept, yet, it will be argued, do
not fully appreciate in the context of the `hard problem' (Chalmers,96) of consciousness;
second, and relatedly, this type of pluralistic emergentism necessitates a form of
categorial creatio ex nihilo (that is, creation from nothing) which is problematic given
the adoption of the Lucretian maxim, ex nihilo nihil fit (conventionally interpreted as the
assertion that nothing comes from nothing) and the First Law of Thermodynamics
(chapter 4)41.
41
The relation between emergence and the ex nihilo maxims will be examined in chapter 6.
Chapter 4 Artificiality
Chapter 4
The cool universe of digitality has absorbed the
world of metaphor and metonymy.
Jean Baudrillard, Simulations.
Artificiality
4.1. Overview
In this chapter, the notion of artificiality is investigated. An interpretation of the concept
due to Simon (1969) is briefly described and links between this concept and notions of
functionalism and computationalism are examined. Attempts at unifying various
"sciences of the artificial" (artificial analogues of natural phenomena) under Simon's
concept are shown to be problematic, thereby necessitating a reformulation of the notion
of artificiality. An alternative definition of the concept is developed via comparison and
contrast with the idea of naturality (nature or `the natural'). Three interpretations of the
ontological status of artificiality (simulation, replication,
emulation/duplication/realization) are described and "weak" and "strong" notions of
artificiality are defined. The Turing Test, a standard by which the ontological status of
artificialities (artificial phenomena or artificials) may be evaluated with respect to
corresponding naturalities (natural phenomena or naturals), is introduced. The possibility
of unification under the new interpretation of artificiality is considered. Three natural
phenomena (matter, life, mind) are then investigated and artificialities corresponding to
these phenomena (AI, A-Life, A-Physics) are described. Finally, the idea of artificial
reality (A/VR) is briefly examined.
4.2. What is Artificiality ?
The Oxford English Dictionary (Second Edition, 1989) defines artificiality as

1. The quality or state of being artificial; artificial character or condition. 2. with pl. an artificial thing
or characteristic.
and artificial as
1. Made by or resulting from art or artifice; contrived, compassed, or brought about by constructed
skill, and not spontaneously; not natural. a. Artificial in result, as well as in process. b. Of natural
products or results, artificially produced, e.g. Artificial light. 2. Made by art in imitation of, or as
substitute for, what is natural or real. 3. Merely made up; factitious; hence, feigned, fictitious. 6.
Displaying much skill; a. of things: skilfuly made or contrived. b. of persons: skilled in constructive
art, skilful.
Although the above definitions capture the manifold meanings of artificiality, they suffer
from a lack of precision and do not, therefore, provide suitable foundations upon which
to establish a science or philosophy of the artificial. Herbert Simon's The Sciences of the
Artificial (1969, 1981) was probably the first major work in which an attempt at a precise
definition of the concept of artificiality was made. Although it was originally conceived
in the context of specific domains for a specific purpose (section 4.2.1), an appreciation
of Simon's concept of artificiality is necessary for (at least) three reasons: First, it
represents one of the earliest attempts at unifying phenomenal domains based on a
postulated analogy between artificials and naturals; second, by focusing on issues of
production (synthesis) over interpretation (analysis), Simon's concept of artificiality
provides an appropriate point from which to initiate an investigation of the ontological
issues associated with the distinction in poisis (coming-forth, bringing-forth) between
naturals and artificials (chapter 6); third, and relatedly, this shift in focus serves to
redefine the debate over "strong" vs. "weak" artificiality in terms of this ontological
distinction as opposed to the conventional epistemological distinction between
appearance and reality1.
4.2.1. "The Sciences of the Artificial"
Simon (1969) originally developed his concept of artificiality in the context of three
domains, viz. (1) economics, (2) psychology of cognition, (3) planning and engineering
design; however, in (Simon,80), the concept of artificiality was extended to include
cognitive science. It should be appreciated at the outset that a connection between
Simon's concept of artificiality and the notion of teleology or goal-directedness is implied
in the choice of domains. The significance of this link, more specifically, the problems
to which it gives rise, are addressed in section 4.2.5.
The idea of artificiality can be introduced by way of an examination of the contrast

between artificial and natural sciences. Simon (1981) offers the following definition of
1
In chapter 6, it will be shown that the ontological artificial-natural distinction is grounding relative to the
epistemological artificial-real distinction.
a natural science, viz.
a natural science is a body of knowledge about some class of things - objects or phenomena - in the
world: about the characteristics that they have; about how they behave and interact with each other.
(p.3)
However, this definition applies equally well to the artificial sciences (that is, the
sciences of artifacts). Simon clarifies the distinguishing characteristics of artificial
sciences via an informal statement of the artificiality thesis, viz.
certain phenomena are àrtificial' in a very specific sense: they are as they are only because of a
system's being molded, by goals or purposes, to the environment in which it lives [emphasis added].
(p.ix)
Thus, according to Simon, the defining characteristic of artifacts is that they are
teleological. However, whether the teleology is ontical or epistemological, that is,
whether artifacts are actually goal-directed or whether or it is merely the case that they
cannot be described in non-teleological terms is an open issue2. For present purposes it
should suffice to note that Simon's view of artificiality implies teleology, and teleology
of a specific kind, viz. the adaptation of a system to its environment. Clearly, a
connection between the concept of artificiality and Darwinian evolution by natural
selection is intended. The establishment of such a link and, additionally, Simon's
assertion that the role played by natural selection in the biological world is analogous to
that played by rationality in the sciences of human behaviour facilitates the identification
of naturality (or nature) with artificiality and visa-versa. However, Simon (1981)
cautions against naive identifications of artifacts and naturals, thereby contesting a
possible subsumption of artificiality into naturality. As he states,
a forest may be a phenomenon of nature; a farm certainly is not. (p.5)
From this statement, it can be inferred that in order to prevent the subsumption of
artifacts into nature, it is necessary to recognize man's products as artificial in the sense
of artifactual (implying synthetic or man-made). However, it could be argued, assuming
a naturalistic position in which everything is considered a part of nature, that man
himself is a product of nature; consequently, man's products must also be natural
products and hence, artificiality can be subsumed into naturality3. In fact, this position
2
The opposing positions in the debate over the ontological status of intentionality - genuine (or originary) and
as-if (or derivative) - are presented in (Dennett,87) (Searle,92) (Dennett,95) (Searle,95).
3
Dennett (1995) appeals to an argument of this kind in his attempt at undermining the distinction between
naturals and artificials and, in particular, Searle's (1992) argument for genuine (or originary) intentionality.
appears4 to be supported by Simon himself, viz.
those things we call artifacts are not apart from nature. They have no dispensation to ignore or violate
natural law. (p.6)
Simon (1981) defines the `boundaries for the sciences of the artificial' as follows:
Q Artificial things are synthesized (though not always or usually with full forethought) by man.
Q Artificial things may imitate appearances in natural things while lacking, in one or many respects, the
reality of the latter.
Q Artificial things can be characterized in terms of functions, goals, adaptation.
Q Artificial things are often discussed, particularly when they are being designed, in terms of
imperatives as well as descriptives.
According to Simon, artificiality is (i) synthetic (or artifactual), (ii) apparent, (iii)
teleological, and (iv) normatively-interpretable. However, it is an open question whether
or not these terms can be applied to nature: On creationism (chapter 6), phenomena
regarded as natural by human beings are held to have been synthesized by a supernatural
agency; as a corollary of this, natural phenomena may be imitations (that is, appearances)
of another order of reality (`supernature'). This view leads to a replacement of the simple
artificial-natural and appearance-reality dualities by a possibly infinite series of such
dualities. Hence, it is at least conceivable that naturality may be subsumed into
artificiality5. This position is supported by the following observation:
[artificial systems] are adapted to man's goals and purposes. They are what they are in order to serve
man's desire to fly or to eat well. As man's aims change, so too do his artifacts - and vice-versa. (p.6)
However, from this statement it should be appreciated that nature could only be
subsumed into artificiality if the former could be objectively identified as teleological.
Since this may be impossible (logically or/and empirically), it provides a basis upon
which to differentiate artificiality from naturality. For example, the behaviours of
artificial systems, biological systems and human beings are distinguishable with respect
to the nature of the associated teleology: Rationally-directed human behaviour is a priori
goal-directed or intentional; adaptive evolutionary behaviour (assuming the standard
4
In fact, this argument is a non sequitur since the consistency of artifacts with natural law does not entail the
subsumption (and identification) of artificials into naturals: It is quite conceivable, under the assumption of
pluralism (chapters 5 and 6), that artifacts are ontologically-distinct from yet also ontologically-dependent on
naturals.
5
This position is consistent with the adoption of an idealistic solution to the measurement problem in quantum
theory (section 4.7.4.4). On this view, the creation of matter and, thereby, the `natural' (physical) world, is held
to be a consequence of the collapse of the quantum wave function by consciousness (Goswami,93).
Darwinian account) is a posteriori goal-directed or teleonomic6 (Mayr,82). Thus, the

epistemic status of the teleology in natural and artificial systems with respect to human
beings is different. This, it is argued, is a necessary consequence of the difference in
ontical status of artifacts and naturals: The former are man-made whereas the latter are
not. Thus, in contradistinction to assertions by Levin (1979) and McGinn (1987) to the
effect that the intrinsic nature or Being of an object is logically independent of the
manner of its genesis or becoming, it is asserted that how things come into existence,
what Heidegger refers to as their historicity (chapters 1 and 6), is critically significant;
to assert otherwise is to assume an a priori Platonic position in which the phenomenal
substance-attribute duality is considered ontologically primitive, and the coming-forth
or poisis of substances and attributes (the latter of which are contextually-defined on
the Heideggerian view) is regarded as irrelevant (chapter 6). However, adopting a
substance-attribute position engenders serious problems: Specifically, variants of Zeno's
paradoxes, viz. how dynamic processes can arise in static substances, a problem which
led Plato to deny the reality of change (Rescher,96); more generally, the broader problem
of emergence (chapter 3).
Close examination of the above statements reveals Simon's concept of artificiality as

somewhat ambiguous with respect to its ontological status: On the one hand, artificiality
is viewed as, in some (possibly weak) sense, identical to naturality, viz. human
rationality is analogous to Darwinian evolution; on the other, it is maintained that
artificiality and naturality are distinct, viz. a farm is not a natural object. However, if
Simon's concept of artificiality is to provide a basis for unifying matter, life and mind
when the latter are defined in computational terms, it is necessary that an isomorphism
(that is, one-one mapping) of some kind exist between naturality and artificiality. This
leads directly to a consideration of the link between artificiality and functionalism.
4.2.2. Artificiality and Functionalism
Functionalism is the view that the state of a system is defined by its functional role, that
is, in terms of the causal relationships between the state, other states, and inputs and
outputs to and from the system (chapters 1 and 2). A functionalist account of systems is
consistent with both top-down and bottom-up approaches to system construction, that is,
with rationally-directed design or/and emergent evolution; hence, it is readily linked to
the notion of artificiality as conceived by Simon. Functionalism necessitates adopting a
`black box' conception of systems in which the latter are held to be hierarchically
decomposable or fractionable (Rosen,93) into collections of sub-systems (chapter 3) with
6
According to Campbell (1985), "teleonomy asserts that the function of a biological structure .. is not what the
structure will usefully do for the organism but the effect that the homologous structure in the ancestors had on
survival in past generations. Teleonomic function thereby refers to past effects instead of present purpose."
(p.153)
sub-systems at the lowest (most primitive) level in the hierarchy being realized directly
(physically). Furthermore, systems are held to be partitionable, by which it is meant that
the internal ènvironment' of a system is separable from its external environment. Since
the notion of partitioning is central to Simon's concept of artificiality and the possibility
of functionalism, it merits further examination.
The concept linking artificiality, functionalism and partitioning is teleology. According

to Simon (1981), fufilment of purpose or adaptation by an artificial system to a goal
involves a relation among three terms:
1. the goal (teleology or purpose) of the system
2. the character (or ontology, that is, internal ènvironment') of the system
3. the environment of the system
Nature impinges on the artifact through two of the three relations that characterise it, viz.
the being of the artifact itself (2), and the external environment in which it acts (3).
Hence, an artifact may be conceived as an interface between an internal environment (the
substance and organization of the artifact), and an external environment (the
surroundings in which it operates). The external environment can therefore be viewed
as determining the conditions for goal-attainment. As Simon states, "if the inner
environment is appropriate to the outer environment, or vice-versa, the artifact will serve
its intended purpose." (p.9) There are essentially two advantages in partitioning the
internal from the external environment when studying an adaptive artificial or natural
system: (i) prediction of behaviour from a system's goals and its external environment
requiring only minimal assumptions about the internal environment; (ii) homeostasis or
maintenance of system state by isolating the internal environment of the artifact from the
detail of its external environment (Simon,81). Moreover, according to Simon,
in the best of all possible worlds - at least for a designer - we might even hope to combine the two sets
of advantages we have described that derive from factoring an adaptive system into goals, outer
environment, and inner environment. We might hope to be able to characterize the main properties
of the system and its behaviour without elaborating the detail of either the outer or inner
environments. We might look toward a science of the artificial that would depend on the relative
simplicity of the interface as its primary source of abstraction and generality. (p.12)
As a corollary to (i) and (ii), it becomes possible for different implementations of

internal environments to accomplish identical or similar goals in identical or similar
external environments. For example,
airplanes and birds, dolphins and tunafish, weight-driven clocks and spring-driven clocks, electrical
relays and transistors. (p.11)
This position is equivalent to a claim for multiple-realizability, that is, the existence of
a one-many mapping between phenomena and media in which such phenomena can be
realized. A sufficient condition for multiple-realizability is, therefore, production of

behaviour (or functionality) identical to that of the target phenomenon. On an essentialist
view (in which all members of a class share a set of common properties), this may be
formally stated as follows:
A system s belongs to a phenomenal class P if s generates a behaviour B which

is identical to that generated by all known members of P, that is, {x0P |
B(s)/B(x), sx} ] s0P.
Assuming a non-essentialist position (in which some members of a class share common
properties):
A system s belongs to a phenomenal class P if s generates a behaviour B which

is identical to that generated by at least one known member of P, that is, {x0P
| B(s)/B(x), sx} ] s0P.
According to Simon (1981), "resemblance in behaviour of systems without identity of

the inner systems is particularly feasible if the aspects in which we are interested arise
out of the organization of the parts, independently of all but a few properties of the
individual components." (p.21) Thus, the teleology (or final causality) associated with
artificiality and functionalism is reducible to organization (or formal causality) on
Simon's definition of the concept. This is significant since it implies the tacit adoption
of Platonism (chapter 2) in postulating (1) the inessentiality of the connection between
form (behaviour) and matter7 (medium) and (2) the relative significance of the former
over the latter; in short, multiple-realizability is grounded in the assumption that the
form-matter or behaviour-medium relation is contingent rather than necessary.
Although Simon identifies artificial with artifactual (or man-made), he does not hold this
term as necessarily equivalent to synthetic. The distinction between the two is clarified
by way of an example, viz.
a gem made of glass colored to resemble sapphire would be called artificial, while a man-made gem
chemically indistinguishable from sapphire would be called synthetic. (p.7)
On this basis, artificing would seem to allow for multiple-realizability with respect to
both substance and process whereas synthesis allows for multiple-realizability only with
respect to process8; artificiality is, therefore, a less constrained (or constraining) concept
than synthesis. As Simon (1981) states,
7
On the "strong" or ontological version of the Church-Turing Thesis described in chapter 2, matter is reducible
to computation and computation, in turn, to form.
8
In chapters 6 and 7, a similar distinction is made between "hard" (or pure) and "soft" (or impure) artifacts: In
the former, both matter and form are made while in the latter only form is made, matter being given.
artificiality connotes perceptual [epistemological] similarity but essential [ontological] difference,

resemblance from without rather than within [emphasis added]. (p.17)
He offers the following clarification of this view, viz. "the artificial object imitates the
real by turning the same face to the outer system, by adapting, relative to the same goals,
to comparable ranges of external tasks [emphasis added]" (p.17). This leads directly to
consideration of an important issue associated with artificiality and functionalism which
concerns the ontological status of artificialities (that is, artificial analogues of natural
phenomena): Whether a functional representation of a phenomenon - the causal `role' -
when suitably instantiated by a physical substrate or medium - the causal òccupant'
(Sterelny,90) - is a simulation or a realization of the phenomenon (section 4.3.3). Even
if a functional-realist position is adopted in which function is viewed as intrinsic to
systems (chapters 2 and 3), resolution of the problem depends on the availability of a
complete functional description of all necessary causal relations at every level in the
systemic hierarchy. If it is impossible to attain such a description then, ultimately, in
some future unforseen context, the behaviour of a functional realization (that is, an
instantiation) of the original systemic phenomenon will begin to deviate from the
observed behaviour of the phenomenon itself. In this event, the inadequacies of the
former, with respect to its capacity for attaining functional isomorphism with the latter,
will become manifest. This leads to what may be described as `phenomenal leakage' or
the appearance of `side effects'. Simon (1981) describes it as follows:
Often we shall have to be satisfied with meeting the design objectives only approximately. Then the
properties of the inner system will 'show though'. That is, the behaviour of the system will only partly
respond to the task environment; partly it will respond to the limiting properties of the inner system.
(p.16)
Thus, side effects occur if an essentialist-functionalist perspective is adopted in which

causal relations within systems are distinguished as functional and non-functional.
However, this distinction leads to further problems (other types of side effect or
phenomenal leakage) since it requires specification of either a context-in-which
(objectivist) or perspective-from-which (subjectivist) the distinction can be made. These
issues will be discussed in greater detail in chapter 7 when the distinction between "hard"
(or pure) and "soft" (or impure) artifacts is examined.
4.2.3. Artificiality and Computationalism
In the previous sections, the connection between artificiality and functionalism has been
examined. A possible connection between artificiality and computationalism is implied
by the fact that the latter is a type of functionalism (chapters 1 and 2). According to
Simon (1981), however, this link is more than just possible; its establishment follows
almost inevitably once the issue of substrates supporting functionality is addressed, viz.
no artefact devised by man is so convenient for this kind of functional description as a digital
computer. It is truly protean, for almost the only ones of its properties that are detectable in its
behaviour (when it is operating properly!) are the organizational properties. (p.22)
This view is further reinforced by Simon's identification of the essence of computation

with the mutually-related concepts of function and organization:
A computer is an organization of elementary functional components in which, to a high

approximation, only the function performed by those components is relevant to the behaviour of the
whole system. (p.22)
The link between computers and physical symbol systems (chapter 2) is described as
follows: "the computer is a member of an important family of artifacts called symbol
systems, or more explicitly, physical symbol systems [PSSs]. Another important member
of the family (some of us think, anthropomorphically, it is the most important) is the
human mind and brain." (pp.26-27) Simon's conception of the relation between
artificiality, PSSs, and digital computers may be formally stated as follows: {A1P}eC,
where A denotes the set of all artificialities, P the set of all PSSs, and C the set of all
digital computers. (The possibility of natural PSSs and artificial non-PSSs is supported
on this definition.) Crucially, Simon maintains that
computers have transported symbol systems from the platonic heaven of ideas to the empirical world
of actual processes carried out by machines or brains, or by the two of them working together. (p.28)
Thus, there is an almost natural link between artificiality and computationalism9.
4.2.4. Unification of Domains
Collingwood (1945) has argued for two senses by which nature (or `naturality') may be
understood, viz. nature as (i) the principle behind natural things, something which makes
its possessor behave the way it does, the source of which, by definition, is within the
thing itself, and (ii) the sum total or aggregate of natural things. By analogy, artificiality
may be understood as (i) the principle underlying the production of artifacts (via design
or evolution as discussed in section 4.2.1) and (ii) the sum total or aggregate of artifacts,
viz. artificiality as "the fields of knowledge of which the subject-matter is partly man-
made [emphasis added]" (Vickers,81). Thus, in addition to its definition as a principle,
viz. "a Theory of Design, where àrtifacts' (the fabricated implements of humankind) are
endowed with ìntelligence'" (Van Gigch,90), whereby ìntelligence' is understood
adaptability, artificiality can also be used to denote the unification of artificial domains,
understood as implying the identification and subsequent consolidation of artificialities
(that is, artifactual analogues of natural phenomena) under the unifying principle of
artificiality as artifactuality. This dual interpretation enables artificiality to meet one of
the requirements of a unifying conceptual framework: On the one hand, it is defined in
9
Only almost since it is an objective of this thesis to argue that artificiality and computation are
anthropocentrically artifactual (chapter 7), and hence, not natural (except in a trivial, derivative sense).
terms of the universal as opposed to the particular, and is concerned with the essence (or
what-ness) of artificial domains (ontology) and how this can be known (epistemology);
on the other, it simultaneously refers to the totality of such domains as instances of
phenomenal artificiality. (On the basis of the definition of artificiality given in sections
4.2.1 and 4.2.2, the artificial `science' associated with an artificial `domain' may be
identified with the organized body of theoretical and empirical knowledge about
adaptation with respect to systems belonging to the given domain.)
As stated previously in section 4.2.1, the concept of artificiality can be applied to

anything that can be regarded as adapted to some situation, in particular to the living
things that are assumed to have evolved as a consequence of natural selection. On this
basis, attempts have been made to extend the concept both ùpwards' and `downwards'
in the phenomenal hierarchy via the adoption of an evolutionary epistemology: For
example, Darwinian explanations of consciousness, language and culture (Dennett,95)
on the one hand, and evolutionary accounts of cosmology (Smolin,97) on the other. For
present purposes it suffices to accept that Simon's concept of artificiality appears to
provide a basis for unifying matter, life and mind contingent on the possibility of
teleological interpretations of such phenomena.
4.2.5. Problems with Simon's Concept
Prem (1995) argues that Simon's concept of artificiality leads to the following relation:
Artificial is to normative and synthetic as natural is to descriptive and analytic. He
maintains this on the basis of the following statement by Simon (1969), in which it is
asserted that the scientist of the artificial
is concerned with how things ought to be - how they ought to be in order to attain goals and to
function (p.7).
Teleology (functionality, goal-directedness, adaptation) is central to Simon's concept of

artificiality and it is precisely this fact that renders this concept problematic, preventing
its adoption as a means by which to unify artificialities (that is, artificial analogues of
natural phenomena). However, this appears to contradict the closing statement of the
previous section to the effect that unification of phenomena is possible under Simon's
concept. In fact, this is not the case since it was explicitly stated that unification is only
possible if phenomena can be interpreted teleologically. The problem with this position
is that on the current scientific view, matter is defined in non-teleological terms. Hence,
unless one is prepared to endorse some form of neo-Aristotelianism in which entelechies
(that is, self-directing agencies) are permitted, artificial matter cannot be integrated with
other intrinsically teleological artificialities (such as life and mind10) under Simon's
10
On the standard scientific view, both life and mind are teleological; however, teleology in the former is
teleonomic (that is, a posteriori or epistemically teleological) whereas - on both folk psychological and
sophisticated philosophical accounts (Searle,82) (Searle,92) - teleology in the latter is intentionalistic (that is,
concept of artificiality. This teleology problem arises from Simon's adoption of a

mechanistic interpretation of biology and an organismic interpretation of machines
(Newell,76) and his postulation of a hybrid concept grounded in these notions as the
metaphysical basis upon which to formulate a concept of artificiality. However, as a
consequence of the teleology problem (with respect to matter), Simon's ontical
primitives, viz. functional artifacts, cannot be ontically primitive with respect to the
unified framework of computationally emergent artificiality presented in chapter 5. For
this reason, it is necessary to consider alternative conceptions of artificiality.
Negrotti (1991e) presents the following list of characteristics as definitive of the concept
of artificiality:
1. An artificial device is a machine which reproduces some essential functions of a sub-system of a

natural system.
2. In the artificial sub-system the number of homologous components is reduced.
3. In the artificial sub-system the homologous components are structurally different.
4. In the artificial sub-system new components may appear.
5. In the artificial sub-system new types of internal and external relations may appear.
6. In the artificial sub-system, some kinds of internal or external relations are lost, and others may be
added.
7. Every artificial device is a machine, but not all machines are to be conceived as artificial devices.
8. The performances of an artificial device usually show a different spectrum (sometimes wider and
sometimes narrower) compared to the one shown by the correspondent natural sub-system.
9. The research and the development of enhancements of the artificial device consist in the deepening
of its own artificial characteristics as such and, usually, this moves the new generations of the device
further and further from the natural sub-system.
10. The artificial device will be accepted as a good reproduction of the natural system if, and only if, its
functioning allows a good reproduction of the main and essential features and performances of the
natural sub-system.
Detailed examination of the entries in the above list reveals a number of issues which are
central to the debate over artificiality. For example, in (1) it is assumed that nature is
ontically systemic; moreover, natural systems are assumed to be nearly-decomposable
(chapter 3); in (2) it is implied that artificiality involves abstraction from naturality; (3-
6) support the concept of multiple-realizability; (7) is consistent with a mechanistic
interpretation of nature; (8) indicates the likelihood of `side-effects' (section 4.2.2); (9)
describes artifact evolution; and in (10) a substantialist (or substance-attribute) ontology
a priori or ontically teleological).

is assumed. Negrotti's concept of artificiality appears to be an improvement on that due

to Simon since teleology is not explicitly associated with artificiality. However, (1)
makes reference to functionality which appears to be a teleological concept11. Ultimately,
what is required is a conception of artificiality in which artifacts are defined in non-
functional terms.
4.3. Artificial and Natural
One possible approach by means of which a non-teleological conception of artificiality

may be formulated is via an examination of related and opposing terms. A natural place
to begin is with the idea of nature itself. However, scientific and philosophical literature
associated with this concept is extremely vast and a survey of it is beyond the aim and
scope of this study12. Consequently, recourse has been made to definitions provided by
various philosophical dictionaries. This move may be justified on the grounds that what
is being sought is a new understanding of naturality and artificiality rather than a
historical understanding of these concepts13 . As Heidegger might say, what is required
is to think these ideas afresh, to question concerning artificiality.
4.3.1. What is Nature ?
The Oxford Companion to Philosophy (1995) defines natural as follows:
Belonging to or concerned with the world of nature, and so accessible to investigation by the natural
sciences. `Natural' may be contrasted with various terms such as àrtificial', ùnnatural', `supernatural',
`non-natural'. The first three of these occur in ordinary language, though ùnnatural' in particular leads
to problems about its real meaning. But `non-natural' is a philosopher's term, and (non-naturalistic)
is the usual contrast terms to `natural' or `naturalistic' in philosophy. Roughly it refers to what cannot
be studied by the methods of the natural sciences, or defined in terms appropriate to them, and is
applied to subject-matters that are essentially abstract, or outside space and time.
Lacey (1995) clarifies the philosophical meaning of `non-natural' by stating the
11
This view is contested by Searle (1992, 1995) who maintains, on Darwinian grounds, that the teleology of
natural systems incapable of supporting conscious intentional states and processes is extrinsic, that is,
epistemically imposed by an external observer. This position is supported by Nagel (1961), Simon (1971) and
the contributors to (Rescher,86). However, it is important to appreciate that even if functional accounts of
phenomena in non-teleological (or Darwinian) terms are possible, there remains the problem of explaining the
origin of the replicating species (functional entities) in such accounts. In short, naturalistic-functionalism, while
discharging the proximal (or local) teleology problem (of particulars), does nor discharge the distal (or global)
form of this problem; hence, the persistence of the Intelligent Design argument under ènlightened' creationism
(chapter 6).
12
Collingwood (1945) provides a good introduction to this subject.
13
Ironically, in chapter 6, it will be argued that this new understanding of (the distinction between) naturality and
artificiality is grounded in the notion of historicity.
following as a necessary condition for naturalism:
The important thing for the naturalist in the metaphysical sphere is that the world should be a unity
in the sense of being amenable to a unified study which can be called the study of nature, though it
may not always be easy to say what counts as a sufficient degree of unification. (pp.604-605)
Ruse (1995) presents the following three definitions of nature:
Q Everything that there is in the physical world of experience, broadly construed. The universe and its
constituents, in short.
Q The living or animate as contrasted with the non-living or inanimate.
Q That which sees everything, especially the organic world, set off against humans and the
consequences of their labours.
Angeles (1981) presents the following comprehensive definition of nature:
(L., natura, from natus, `born', `produced'; the past participle of nasci, `to be born'). 1. The universe.
The existing system of all that there is in time and space. Everything that happens (good and bad).
2. The powers (forces) that cause (produce, create) existing phenomena. 3. The origin (or foundation)
of everything. 4. The ground for the explanation of things. 5. The essence of a thing; its essential
characteristics. 6. The natural endowments of a thing. 7. The physical constitution of a thing. 8. An
original, primitive state of things unadulterated and uncultivated by humans. That which happens
without human interference.
Flew (1979) defines nature as follows "the content, structure, and development of the
spatio-temporal world as it is in itself. Sometimes man is allowed to be part of Nature
and sometimes not, whereas for the theist Nature is always the work but never a part of
God." On this view, nature is identified with the Kantian noumenal world or reality as
contrasted with the phenomenal world of appearance (chapter 1). In Aristotelian
philosophy, nature (or naturality) is also identified with the totality of natural beings
(Runes,60); this is analogous to the way artificiality may be defined as the totality of
artificial things (section 4.2.4).
An alternative approach is to define naturality negatively by comparison and contrast

with a number of opposing terms (Runes,60), viz.
Q artificial
Q unnatural (or abnormal)
Q conventional (or customary)
Q intellectual (or deliberate)
Q subjective
Additionally, both Flew (1979) and Runes (1960) identify a link between naturality and
the absence of will or volition14. This interpretation of naturality can be restated in

Heideggerian terms as follows: `natural' implies transparent (non-reflective, non-
thematic) coping in-the-world (chapters 1 and 6). The link between naturality and
volition can also be formulated in essentialist terms, viz. naturality as associated with
necessity15 and artificiality with contingency. Such a scheme is consistent with Simon's
interpretation of artificiality and the concept of multiple realizability (section 4.2.2).
Another way of defining natural is in theistically-nomic terms, viz. nature as the law-like
contrasted with supernature as the miraculous. However, this contrast is readily shown
to be problematic on epistemological grounds: What might be deemed a miraculous
event at one point in time could be given a naturalistic16 explanation at a later more
advanced stage of knowledge17.
According to the dictionary definitions given in section 4.2, àrtificial' can be associated
with the following: (i) design in process, (ii) design in product, (iii) imitation of nature,
or/and (iv) substitution of nature. In support of this view, Hepburn (1967b) identifies
artificiality with the imposition of some kind of àlien' causality on a natural causal
substrate, viz.
in one group of cases the natural is contrasted with the artificial or conventional. This contrast
requires some conception of how the object or organism would behave by reason of its immanent
causality alone, the causal factors that are particular to that type of thing and make it whatever it is -
a stone, a fish, or a man. The artificial and conventional are seen as interferences, modifying by an
alien causality the characteristic patterns of behaviour [emphasis added]. (p.454)
On the basis of this definition, artificiality can be identified with a network of causal
relations that supervene (chapter 3) on the causal network of the natural substrate.
Although this formulation of the concept of artificiality does not make explicit reference
to functionality, its identification with the notion of supervenience supports the
establishment of such a link. If such a definition is adopted, it becomes identical with
Simon's original concept. Hepburn further maintains that separating nature from artifact
is not easy since "organism and environment, individual and cultural climate, are in
ceaseless interplay." (p.454) This point is extremely important since it appears to (i)
support the functionalist thesis and (ii) undermine the distinction between artificiality and
naturality. Detailed arguments against this inference are presented in chapter 6 based on
14
On this view, sleeping would be considered natural whereas deciding to write a novel would not.
15
For example, sleep is necessary for the maintenance of human biological existence.
16
Clearly, this argument appeals to a God-of-the-gaps conceptualization of supernaturality.
17
While this is certainly possible for events occurring within the world, the possibility remains of a miraculous
interpretation of the world as a whole, if the latter is a meaningful concept. The implications of this Kantian
distinction are examined in chapter 6.
(1) the essential, historical and unitary relation between Being and becoming and (2) the
distinction in Being between naturals and artificials the follows from the distinction in
their respective modes of poisis (coming-forth, bringing-forth). For present purposes,
it is merely assumed that the distinction is valid.
The various distinctions between naturality and its opposing terms18 are graphically
summarized in Fig 4.1:
UNNATURAL
(normative)
ARTIFICIAL
(productive)
NON-NATURAL
(categorial)
NATURAL
SUBJECTIVE
(experiential)
SUPER-NATURAL
(theological)
INTELLECTUAL CONVENTIONAL
(intentional) (social)
Fig 4.1 Naturality and its oppositions.
Specific distinctions between naturality and artificiality are listed in Table 4.1:
NATURALITY as ARTIFICIALITY as
The World Processes of design

Living things Products of design
Non-artifactuals The set of artifacts (or artifactuals)
The set of naturals Imitation
Causality Substitution
Being Phenomena
Modes (or ways) of Being
Ontology
Noumena
18
In this connection, it is interesting to note with Heidegger (1939) that "whatever range has been attributed to
the word `nature' in the various ages of Western history, in each case the word contains an interpretation of
beings as a whole, even when `nature' seems to be meant as only one term in a dichotomy. In all such
dichotomies, `nature' is not just one of two equal terms but èssentially' holds the position of priority, inasmuch
as the other terms are always and primarily differentiated by contrast with - and therefore are
determined by - nature." (p.184)
Table 4.1 Naturality-artificiality distinctions.
4.3.2. Towards A New Concept of Artificiality
Sokolowski (1988) presents the following example in order to distinguish two ways in
which the term àrtificial' may be used:
The word artificial is used in one sense when it is applied, say, to flowers, and in another sense when
it is applied to light. In both cases something is called artificial because it is fabricated. But in the first
usage artificial means that the thing seems to be, but really is not, what it looks like. The artificial is
merely the apparent; it just shows how something else looks. Artificial flowers are only paper, not
flowers at all; anyone who takes them to be flowers is mistaken. But artificial light is light and it does
illuminate. It is fabricated as a substitute for natural light, but once fabricated it is what it seems to
be. In this sense the artificial is not the merely apparent, not simply an imitation of something else.
The appearance of the thing reveals what it is, not how something else looks. (p.45)
Artificiality is, therefore, interpretable in two senses: (1) artificiality as appearance and
(2) artificiality as reality. (On both schemes, the artifactual aspect of artificiality, that
is, its made-ness (chapters 6 and 7), is accepted as an irreducible fact which cannot be
the subject of further study. This follows, according to Heidegger (1959), from the
reduction of Being to a mere binary predicate: A thing either exists or does not exist; its
mode of poisis (becoming, coming-forth) is considered irrelevant to its Being which is
interpreted in essentialist terms.) On the first interpretation, material identity is a
necessary condition for phenomenal identity: A paper flower and a real flower are not
phenomenally identical since natural flowers are not made of paper. On the second
interpretation, functional identity is a sufficient condition for phenomenal identity. The
physicality of the realizing substrate is viewed as a merely contingent factor; thus,
artificial light and natural light are both instances of the class of illuminating things. The
two interpretations follow from the adoption of different ontological schemes: (1)
assumes a "weak"19 form of identism or physicalism; (2) is grounded in functionalism and
the concept of multiple-realizability. It is significant to note that, again, a connection has
emerged between functionality and artificiality. Furthermore, the ontological question
concerning artificiality has been replaced by an epistemological question: Questioning
concerning the possible difference in poisis (coming-forth) of phenomena (naturals and
artificials) has given way to inquiry into the reality status of such phenomena, thereby
undermining the productive foundation underlying Simon's concept of artificiality.
The reconceptualization of the question of artificiality in terms of the epistemological

problem of the relation between phenomena and noumena or appearance and reality
(chapter 1) leads directly to an examination of the notion of simulation and other related
concepts.
19
Here, `weak' is taken to mean "not necessitating the epistemological reduction of phenomena".
4.3.3. Simulation, Replication and Emulation
Perhaps the earliest reference to the concept of simulation is Plato's notion of mimesis,
implying the imitation and representation of something by something else. The modern
technical literature on simulation is vast; however, a precise formulation of the concept
remains somewhat elusive although attempts have been made in this regard
(Rasmussen,95). Various definitions of the concept have been proposed in the scientific
and philosophical literature. For example, Searle (1980) defines simulation in terms of
`black box' functionality, viz. "the right input and output and a program in the middle
that transforms the former to the latter." This black box conception is supported by Prem
(1995) who maintains that "a characteristic feature of simulations is that not all entities
decode into something in the real world." (p.3) Simulation therefore implies abstraction
which in turn implies functionalism. It is significant to note, following Webb (1991), that
simulation can be distinguished from replication: In the former, causal capacities and
structure are represented whereas in the latter they are reproduced. The distinction
follows from (i) the assertion that reproduction is non-representational and (ii) the
observation that simulation is grounded in representation or modelling. The latter
necessitates that reference be made to the interpretative (epistemological) and productive
(ontological) roles of a modeller (chapter 7), viz.
simulating a system involves someone constructing a correspondence between the causal capacities
and structure of a system and the capacities and structure of the simulation, so that the simulation
produces behaviour that corresponds to that of the system. (p.248)
Webb states the conditions for replication in functionalist terms as follows: "For the
replication of the behaviour to occur, there must at some level be an identity of capacities
and structure between the replication and the system." (p.249) However, this position is
problematic since it is unclear whether the identity relation is ontic or epistemic, that is,
intrinsic to the system or projected onto the system by the modeller in its role as
interpreter. Fetzer (1990) presents a somewhat different argument based on a semiotic-
representationalist position: The simulation-replication distinction does not arise as a
consequence of the representation-reproduction distinction, but as a result of the
distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic representations respectively. As he states,
simulations might .. be said to involve figurative representations (from an èxternal' point of view),
whereas replications involve literal representations (from an ìnternal' point of view) - assuming that
[the latter] is something that humans can do. (p.63)
A third possibility is emulation (or duplication). Fetzer (1990) holds that emulation
involves "affecting the right functions by means of the same - or similar - processes
implemented within the same medium. A relation of emulation between systems of
different kinds thus entails that they be constituted of similar material (or components)."
(p.18). Emulation is consistent with weak identism/physicalism (section 4.3.2) since both
positions assert identity of material substrate (medium) as a necessary condition for
phenomenal identity. The difference between simulations, replications and emulations
can be stated as follows:
Q simulation of a natural system involves capturing the functional connections between inputs and
outputs of the system in a causal model.
Q replication of a natural system involves (1) capturing the functional connections between inputs and
outputs of the system in a causal model (2) via processes that correspond to, viz. are the same as or
are similar to, those of the natural system.
Q emulation of a natural system involves (1) capturing the functional connections between inputs and
outputs of the system in a causal model (2) via processes that correspond to, viz. are the same as or
are similar to, those of the natural system (3) in the same medium that the natural system is realized.
Hofstadter (1981b) differentiates between simulation and emulation in the context of a

computational medium (substrate) as follows:
The verb èmulate' is reserved for simulations, by a computer, of another computer, while `simulate'
refers to the modelling of other phenomena, such as hurricanes, population curves, national elections,
or even computer users. (p.380)
Furthermore, he states that "simulation is almost always approximate, depending on the

nature of the model of the phenomenon in question, whereas emulation is in a deep sense
exact." (p.380) Emulation makes possible the functional embedding of tokens (instances
of a type) within other tokens conditional on the assumption of type identity between the
tokens: For example, it is possible to embed computers (Turing machines) within other
computers (Turing machines) leading ultimately to the construction of a `virtual machine'
hierarchy (chapters 2 and 5). The difference between simulation and emulation can be
stated as follows:
simulation involves a mapping between heterogeneous types while emulation

involves a mapping between tokens (or instances) of the same type.
A corollary of the above statement is that computers are held to be capable of simulating
non-computational things and emulating computational things. This point is extremely
important since "strong" artificiality (section 4.3.5) rests on the assumption that what
appears (phenomenally, epistemically) to be non-computational is in reality
(noumenally, ontically) computational, thereby allowing for the possibility of emulating
- as opposed to merely simulating - non-computational phenomena.
Tipler (1994) presents a different interpretation of the difference between simulations

and emulations:
In a simulation, a mathematical model of the physical object under study is coded in a program. The
model includes as many attributes of the real physical object as possible (limited of course by the
knowledge of these attributes and also by the capacity of the computer). The running of the program
evolves the model in time. If the initial model is accurate, if enough key features of the real object are
captured by the model, the time evolution of the model will mimic with fair accuracy the time
development of the real object, and so one can predict the most important key aspects which the real
object will have in the future .. An absolutely precise simulation of something is called an emulation.
(pp.206-207).
On this view, material identity is not explicitly stated as a necessary condition for
emulation; hence, both simulation and emulation can be defined in terms of a mapping
between heterogeneous types. For Tipler, simulation becomes emulation if a behavioural
isomorphism can be established between a phenomenon and the model of that
phenomenon20. The implication is that if the mapping is exact, the model must be
functionally isomorphic with the noumenal ground of the phenomenon. Crucially, on this
basis, Tipler is led to uphold the "strong" artificiality thesis (section 3.4.5).
4.3.4. Simulation and Realization
It is important to be absolutely clear about the distinction between the simulation of a

phenomenon and the duplication or realization of that phenomenon. For example,
Hofstadter (1981a) maintains that artificial (simulated) hurricanes and natural hurricanes
are instances of a common phenomenal class, viz. the class of hurricanes. However, this
position necessitates the situatedness (or endophysicality) of artificial observers within
computer simulations. On Hofstadter's view,
if the program were incredibly detailed, it could include simulated people on the ground who would
experience the wind and the rain just as we do when a hurricane hits. In their minds - or, if you prefer,
in their simulated minds - the hurricane would not be a simulation but a genuine phenomenon
complete with drenching and devastation. (p.74)
This view has been contested by Searle (1980,1992) and Sober (1991) who maintain that
artificial analogues of natural phenomena and the natural phenomena themselves are
ontically distinct: The former are non-causal as artificial analogues of natural
phenomena whereas the latter are causal as the natural phenomena themselves. As Sober
states,
it is sometimes suggested that, when a computer simulation is detailed enough, it then becomes
possible to say that a computer is an instance of the objects and processes that it simulates. A
computer simulation of a bridge can be treated as a bridge, when there are simulated people on it and
a simulated river flowing underneath .. The problem with computer simulations is not that they are
simplified representations, but that they are representations. Even a complete description of a bridge -
one faithful in every detail - would still be a very different object from a real bridge [emphasis added].
(p.764)
However, this argument can be contested on the grounds that it assumes a priori that a
20
Tipler implicitly adopts the Newtonian modelling relation described in chapter 2.
particular observational perspective, viz. extrinsic or exosystemic21 observation, is the

only possible perspective that can be adopted. However, this assumption is untenable
under naturalism since on such a view, human beings (and possibly22 other entities) are
observers that are intrinsic - or endosystemic23 - to the world: A computer simulation is
only a simulation to an observer who is able to transcend the simulation and attain a
`God's Eye' view of the system, thereby allowing representation to be distinguished from
reality; for observers within the simulation, representation is reality. However, it is
unclear whether intrinsic observation can occur in an artificial, more specifically,
computational, world. Rasmussen (1991b) has stated this as a necessary condition
(postulate 4) within his metaphysical framework for artificial reality:
One of the criteria for a process to be alive involves adaptive organism-environment responses. This
implies that even the simplest living object, for example, a hypothetical process implemented on a
computer, must have a primitive notion of itself and its surrounding environment. Such responses
imply the existence of an internal model of the world. The living object perceives a reality .. Reality
can, thereby, acquire its meaning through a conscious conception of the world, via an organization
of the information we get from our senses [emphasis added]. (p.769)
Tipler (1994) argues for a similar position, basing his view on the anthropic principle24,
viz. "the simulations which are sufficiently complex to contain observers - thinking,
feeling beings - as subsimulations exist physically." (p.210) However, Rasmussen (and
Tipler) appears to endorse two conflicting positions: On the one hand, a commitment to
Gibson's (1966) idea that perception is not grounded in conscious sensation (that is,
secondary qualities or qualia) but on the detection of information (implicitly viewed
either in terms of primary qualities or as a primary quality itself); on the other hand, a
commitment to the view that meaning (semantics) is acquired via a "conscious
conception of the world", implying a link between perception and consciousness and
thus, between perception and sensation. However, this is, in fact, not the case since
Rasmussen holds that consciousness can be defined in terms of the organization of
sensory information, implying, thereby, a functionalist view of consciousness25. In this
21
That is, an observational perspective external to the system.
22
Only possibly since it is unclear whether an observation counts as an observation in the absence of the
possibility for appreciating this fact (chapter 6).
23
That is, an observational perspective internal to the system.
24
Gale (1986) defines the Anthropic Principle briefly as "a causal link between the existence of intelligent
observers and the properties of the universe which they observe." (p.104) A more detailed interpretation of the
concept is presented in chapter 6.
25
In chapter 7, it will be shown that functionalist accounts of consciousness - like all materialist accounts
(Searle,92) - fail to address the `hard' problem of consciousness, viz. how ontological subjectivity (that is, what-
it-is-likeness) can emerge from an ontologically-objective substrate. This point is of critical significance since
connection, it is significant to note that Rasmussen appeals to a notion of modelling

similar to that of Crutchfield (1994) which has been described by the latter as "somewhat
different from the standard conception" (chapter 3). However, this notion of modelling
is problematic since it leads back to the problem of observation: In short, is it meaningful
to speak about the construction of models in the absence of an agency capable of
consciously interpreting such constructions as models ? Additionally, there is a need to
consider the issue of whether it is necessary that an organism construct an internal
representation or model of its environment in order to respond adaptively in a
homeostatic or evolutionary sense. For example, Maturana and Varela (1980) present a
framework for organism-environment relations in which explicit internal models are
absent; the `model' is implicit in the dynamical coupling relation between the systemic
structures of organism and environment (chapters 3 and 6). Such autopoietic (or
organizationally-homeostatic) systems are held to be ontically non-representational;
however, artificial analogues of such systems realized in computational media
(substrates) are representational at the most primitive level of their being. Hence,
artificial analogues of autopoietic systems are models in the conventional sense, and can
be interpreted as such by their creators26. Notwithstanding these problems, however,
Hofstadter (1981a) maintains that the confusion surrounding the simulation-realization
debate is epistemological, a consequence of confusing levels of description. On his view,
the laws of physics don't get torn apart by real hurricanes [just as no computer ever gets torn apart in
the process of simulating winds]. In the case of the simulated hurricane, if you go peering at the
computer's memory expecting to find broken wires and so forth, you'll be disappointed. But look at
the proper level. Look into the structures that are coded for in the memory. You'll see that some
abstract links have been broken, some values of variables radically changed, and so forth. There's
your flood, your devastation - real, only a little concealed, a little hard to detect .. You recognize a
hurricane by its effects. You have no way of going in and finding some ethereal èssence of hurricane',
some `hurricane soul', located right in the middle of the eye! It's the existence of a certain kind of
pattern - a spiral storm with an eye and so forth that makes you say it's a hurricane. (pp.74-75)
The problem with this argument is that it assumes that syntax (structure) is intrinsic to
physics. However, this computational-realist position has been contested by Searle
(1992), Tallis (1994) and Lanier (1995b) who maintain that the stucture of computer
hardware and software reflects intentional human concerns and is, thereby, ontologically
parasitic on human intentionality. Furthermore, and relatedly, how is an effect
recognized as an effect? For an effect to be detectable, it is necessary that some
difference exist between states of the world prior to and posterior to causation (chapter
3). However, what is to count as a difference has two aspects, viz. ontological and
it undermines the possibility of conscious intrinsic or endosystemic observation and hence, of "strong"
computationally emergent artificiality (chapter 5). This is because the latter as a "strong" assertion must be
capable of artifactually-instantiating analogues of all natural phenomena and since it cannot instantiate
consciousness, it is incomplete.
26
As shown in chapter 6, such systems are, at the most primitive level of their being, allopoietic or artifactual.
epistemological: Ontically, on a realist-objectivist view it is necessarily the case that for

an effect to be counted as an effect, it must make a difference irrespective of whether or
not the effect is observed; from an epistemological perspective, by contrast, it is
necessarily the case that an observation is made and that observation is motivated by
intentional (although not necessarily conscious) concerns, viz. selection of what is to
count as of interest in the act of observation. On the latter view, effects are
observationally-relativistic. A simple demonstration of the correctness of this assertion
is given by considering what happens when an electric light is switched on in a room: If
one is interested merely in the function of illumination, then the effect of pressing the
light switch is that the room becomes illuminated27 . Thus, the effect of the cause
(pressing the switch) is that certain previously invisible objects in the room become
visible; heating and other `side effects' of the light are usually ignored. While it might
be argued that this is simply a case of epistemological incompleteness, viz. all effects are
objectively present yet undisclosed in the specific observational act, it is precisely this
point which provides support for observational-relativism; that is, there is always the
possibility that there may exist undisclosed properties. This is what leads to the List
Fallacy for naturals (section 4.4), that is, the problem of defining naturals in terms of a
list of properties, since it is impossible to prove that lists are ever complete28. As will be
shown in chapter 7, the List Fallacy is further compounded by the existence of objective1
phenomena, whereby objective1 is meant real, which are not objective2, whereby
objective2 is meant accessible from a third-person (or externalistic) perspective
(Nagel,86).
4.3.5. "Strong" and "Weak" Artificiality
The notion of `strength' as applied to artificiality was originally introduced by Searle

(1980,1984) in the context of a critique of cognitive science and artificial intelligence
(AI): "strong" AI is the epistemologically-reductive view that minds are computers;
"weak" AI, on the other hand, is the methodologically-reductive view in which it is held
that minds can be investigated via the use of computers29. The strength concept can also
be applied to other `sciences of the artificial' such as artificial life (Sober,91) which leads
to the following generic formulation: "strong" artificiality implies emulation, duplication
or realization; "weak" artificiality implies simulation. "Strong" artificiality is consistent
with computationalism (chapter 2); however, on the "weak" view of artificiality,
computers are regarded as tools, that is, artifacts in the conventional anthropocentric
27
Ceteris paribus, that is, all other things being equal (or under normal conditions).
28
As will be argued in chapters 6 and 7, the List Fallacy does not arise for artifactuals since their being is
specified (made). Thus, epistemological constraints follow ontological constriants (specifically, mode of poisis
or coming-forth).
29
Brief descriptions of epistemological and methodological reductionism are given in chapter 3.
sense of the term. Pattee (1989) claims that many of the controversies associated with
computational artificiality, for example, whether an artifactual analogue of a natural
phenomenon is an instance of "strong" or "weak" artificiality, arise as a consequence of
the multiple uses of the term `computation', viz.
Q computer-dependent realization of phenomena

Q computer simulation of phenomenal behaviour
Q construction of theories of phenomena deriving from simulations
Q testing of theories of phenomena via simulations
This position is supported by Haken et al. (1993) who, in the context of a discussion of
the link between computers and metaphor, maintain that
when we consider the machine as a metaphor and more specifically the computer as a metaphor for
human thinking we find ourselves in an ambivalent situation. At the same time the computer is a tool
for and the subject of thinking. (p.4)
The possibility of viewing the computer both as the `root metaphor' (chapter 1) of
computationalism (chapter 2) and as a tool or artifact gives rise to two sets of oppositions
involving the concept of artificiality, viz. (i) artificiality as appearance vs. reality and (ii)
artificiality as artifactuality vs. naturality respectively. If (ii) can be displaced by (i) then
"strong" artificiality - more specifically, "strong" computationally emergent artificiality
(chapter 5) - is possible since on this view natural reals and artifactual reals are possible;
that is, artifactuality is only contingently-related to appearance and naturality to reality30.
However, if, as is argued in chapter 6, (ii) is grounding relative to (i), "strong"
artificiality is impossible. In the following sections, "strong" artificiality is assumed to
be possible and the means by which it can be realized are investigated, commencing with
a discussion as to how the appearance-reality - or as-if (simulation) vs. as-is (realization)
- question can be decided.
4.3.6. The Turing Test
The Turing Test was developed by Alan Turing (1950) in response to the question of
whether or not a machine could be capable of thought. Turing argued that the original
formulation of the question was problematic since terms such as `machine' and `thought'
are ambiguous. Consequently, it was proposed that the question be replaced by a variant
of what he referred to as the "imitation game":
It is played with three people, a man (A), a woman (B), and an interrogator (C) who may be of either
sex. The interrogator stays in a room apart from the other two. The object of the game for the
interrogator is to determine which of the two is the man and which is the woman. He knows them by
labels X and Y, and at the end of the game he says either `X is A and Y is B' or `X is B and Y is A'.(p.40)
30
In short, the appearance-reality distinction can be overcome on this view because distinction in poisis
(coming-forth, becoming) is inessential to the Being of phenomena.
The object of the game for A or/and B is to render C incapable of making a correct
identification. Furthermore, C is only allowed to interrogate A and B in a way which
does not immediately decide the issue. For example, in the original version of the game,
C would not be allowed to see A or B since this would almost certainly make it possible
to determine who was the man and who the woman. In Turing's variant, A is replaced by
a computer and C is only allowed to communicate with A and B via typewritten answers;
this follows from his associating intelligence with linguistic capability. If A cannot be
identified as the computer, it is said to have `passed' the Turing Test. According to
Turing, passing the test is a sufficient (but not necessary) condition for intelligence.
Various objections to the test based on theological, ethical, logical, experiential,
epistemological and even paranormal grounds were considered and refutations attempted
by Turing31.
Although the Turing Test is held to be scientific since it meets Popper's criteria of
falsifiability and generates results which are repeatable and objective, it has been the
subject of endless criticism within the philosophy of mind. This is a consequence of its
being essentially operationalistic or/and behaviouristic in nature. Behaviourism and
operationalism are philosophical positions in which mental concepts such as "thinking"
are defined in terms of overt (or objective) behaviour or dispositions to behave, thereby
providing a deductive basis upon which claims for the existence of mental phenomena
can be made. The problem with these positions is that thinking is, at least in part, clearly
an internal (subjective) activity (Searle,80) (Searle,92); consequently, behavioural or
operational analyses of a mental concept will, of necessity, be incomplete, thereby giving
rise to the possibility of what Sober (1991) has called type-1 errors, viz. the passing of
the test by computers which do not think. However, other interpretations of the test are
possible: For example, the inductive interpretation due to Moor (1976). On this position,
it is not necessary for additional evidence to be gathered before a justified inductive
inference (as to the presence of thought in a machine) can be made. However, there is
then the problem of induction as identified by Hume, viz. on what basis is an inference
to count as `justified' (Chalmers,82) ? A third possibility is to view the Turing Test as
involving abductive (or heuristic) reasoning on the basis of overt behaviour, viz.
If an object O has property P it will generate behaviour S.

X generates behaviour S.
Therefore, it is likely that X has property P.
Other criticisms of the test have been based on assertions that it is too easy, too narrow
or too shallow (Moor,92). Additionally, it could be argued that the Turing Test merely
measures the ability of a candidate system to deceive its interrogator (Shieber,94) and
that the test is, therefore, flawed since intelligence intrinsically involves truthfulness
31
It is interesting to note that Turing held the argument from extrasensory perception to be the only serious
grounds for objecting to the validity of his test. However, the extent to which any of his refutations of the
(other) arguments can be considered final and binding is highly contestable.
(Epstein,96). However, this argument assumes a realist position with respect to truth
claims; on a pragmatist or evolutionary view (Dennett,95), truth is merely identical to
what confers survival value, and is, therefore, defined with respect to the contingency of
the environment. On such a view, there are no necessary truths32 and it is quite possible -
even probable - that, at least in some environments (places and times), truth is deception.
Perhaps the strongest criticism of the Turing Test, however, is that made by Lanier
(1995a)33. On his view,
the problem with the Turing Test is that it presents a concundrum of scientific method. We presume
that improvement to machines takes place, so there is a starting state in our experiments where the
humanis considered `smarter', whatever that means, than the computer. We are measuring a change
in human ability to discriminate between human and machine behaviour. But the human is defined
as the most flexible element in the measurement loop at the start, so how do we know we aren't
measuring a state change in the human, rather than in the computer ? Is there an experimental
difference, in this setup, between computers getting `smarter' and humans getting `stupider' ? I don't
think so. (p.79)
Although originally formulated in the context of intelligence (or mind), the Turing Test
is readily applied to other phenomena: For example, Dennett (1978) describes a Turing
Test for determining whether a machine has intentionality and Sober (1991) has outlined
a Turing Test for artificial life. It is an implicit assumption within computationalism that
the Turing Test provides an appropriate means of measuring the extent to which
artificialities (or artificial phenomena) are behaviourally isomorphic with corresponding
natural phenomena. For this reason, Turing Tests for various artificialities are proposed
in the following sections.
4.3.7. Artificiality and Emergence
In chapter 1, possible links between computationalism and artificiality on the one hand,
and between computationalism and emergence on the other were briefly introduced. A
potential third link between artificiality and emergence was not explicitly considered;
however, such a connection follows naturally if artificiality is identified with simulation
since a relation exists between simulation and emergence in the context of non-linear
dynamical systems. As Rasmussen et al. (1995) state,
a simulation is a mechanism which interacts many state transition models of individual subsystems
(i.e. system components) and thereby generates system dynamical phenomena. (p.2)
32
As Nagel (1998) has shown, the strong relativist version of this position, viz. everything is relative, is
ultimately self-defeating.
33
A variant of Lanier's "dumbing down" argument gives rise to three possibilities for how the Turing Test can
be passed: (1) A has 'smartened up' to the level of B so that C is unable to distinguish between them; (2) B has
`dumbed down' to the level of A so that C is unable to distinguish between them; (3) C has `dumbed down' its
test criteria such that it is unable to distinguish between A and B.
The simulation-as-artificial-as-apparent connection is implied by statements such as "a

simulation is a representational mechanism that is distinguished by its capacity to
generate relations that are not explicitly encoded [emphasis added]" (p.8) and the
artificiality-emergence link is made explicit by the following assertion: "simulation is a
natural method to study emergence." (p.8) However, it should not be inferred that this
link only holds for simulation, that is, "weak" artificiality since, on computationalism,
naturality is itself ontologically-computational in which case the possibility of simulation
collapsing onto realization34 is not precluded.
4.3.8. Functionalist Unification Reconsidered
In order for artificiality to serve as a unifying concept for the various artificialities
(artificial analogues of natural phenomena), it was argued that it must be definable in
non-teleological terms (section 4.2.5). On the basis of the investigations into artificiality
made in the preceding sections, it should be possible to define artificiality in purely
behavioural terms. However, the concept of multiple-realizability must be retained
otherwise the artificiality as artifactuality project collapses by definition. Consequently,
it is necessary to separate the concept of multiple-realizability from that of functionalism.
This is possible because the entailment relation is as follows: Functionalism necessitates
multiple-realizability but not vice-versa. This would seem to imply that
computationalism has been undermined; however, this is not the case. Computationalism
is indeed retained as the ground of artificiality; however, in a form necessarily purged
of any teleological connotations. Whether this is meaningful or even possible constitutes
the essence of arguments presented in Part II of this study. For the remainder of this
chapter and the next, computationalism will be accepted as both ontologically correct and
the basis of artificiality.
4.4. Natural and Artificial Phenomena
In the following sections, three kinds of natural phenomena (matter, life, mind) are
presented and the corresponding artificial analogues (A-Physics, A-Life, AI) are briefly
described. It must be appreciated at the outset that any attempt to provide definitions for
such phenomena leads to what Kelly (1993) has referred to as the List Fallacy (section
4.3.4), the error of maintaining that a list of properties can provide a necessary unity:
It is all too easy to adopt A, B, C, ... as the base properties upon which to construct an artifact and then
conclude that when these properties are realized the phenomenon partially characterised by the
properties is also realised. This conclusion may be justified when the construct is an artificial one
defined by the properties, but is unlikely to be true when a `natural' phenomenon is at issue. (pp.65-
66)
34
In fact, on the assumption of computationalism, simulation collapses onto emulation since both simulation and
simulated are ontologically-computational.
The definitional approach is grounded in (at least) two principles: (i) metaphysical
realism35 and (ii) a substance-attribute (subject-predicate, object-property) ontology. In
conjunction with (i) and (ii), the set of properties associated with an object is held to be
finite and knowable (that is, epistemically-tractable). While appreciating the
philosophical problems associated with the definitional approach (for example, the
impossibility of confirming that a list of properties is exhaustive of the phenomenon
being investigated), it might be argued that its use is necessary if discourse of any kind -
scientific, philosophical or otherwise - is to be possible. This is a consequence of the
existential fact that the world must be `cut' (chapters 1 and 6) in order to be dealt with;
the alternative is to adopt a position based on Wittgenstein's concluding remark in the
Tractatus, viz. "that of which we cannot speak, we must pass over in silence", and refrain
from discourse completely36. It might be objected that this latter approach is only
possible with respect to the `cutting' associated with linguistic discourse; human
existence necessitates some kind of `cutting' of the world since human beings are
embodied beings-in-the-world and the body `cuts' the world during its interaction with
the latter. However, if Heidegger is right about the primacy of unreflective coping
(chapter 1), then the body-world duality is a derivative way (or mode) of Being capable
of being recognized as such only once it has emerged from the primordial condition of
being-in-the-world. On this view, `cutting' is a necessarily Cartesian activity; beings-in-
the-world do not `cut' the world (chapter 6).
Consequently, the definitional approach will be adopted in this and the following chapter
subject to the caveat that the definitions presented might possibly be incomplete or even
incorrect. It should also be understood at the outset that the definition problem has
different implications with respect to naturality and artificiality: While it might be
impossible to provide complete definitions of natural phenomena, it is possible to
provide complete definitions for artificialities, particularly if the latter are interpreted as
simulations of the former. This follows from the fact that simulations are complete in
an a priori sense because they present partial views of phenomena; a candidate
realization, that is, an emulation of a natural phenomenon, may be incomplete because
35
Naive realism is the metaphysical position in which an objective reality is held to exist independently of
observation by humans and/or any other beings capable of observational acts. Stated simply, on this view,
reality is held to be òut there'. Searle (1992, 1995), while defending realism, has been led to modify its basic
form somewhat, viz. external realism, the view that although there is a reality independent of representation,
this reality is not completely ontologically-objective in the third-person (externalistic, non-experiential) sense;
this is because "some mental states, such as pains, are ontologically-subjective [that is, first-person,
experiential, internalistic], but they are not representations. They are representation independent but not mind
independent." (p.152)
36
This argument holds irrespective of whether an essentialist or non-essentialist position is adopted. In the
former, class (or category) membership is defined in terms of necessary properties; in the latter, class
membership is specified in terms of sufficient properties, that is, Wittgensteinian family resemblances
(Lakoff,87). However, both positions necessarily involve `cutting' (category production) on the basis of some
criteria (necessary or sufficient).
it is an open question whether or not the set of properties associated with the
phenomenon can or has been listed in its entirety. (As stated earlier, this necessitates
assuming metaphysical realism and a substance-attribute ontology.) In an attempt to
circumvent problems associated with terminological definition, Fetzer (1990) advocates
the adoption of what might be termed artificiality criteria as contrasted with artificiality
definitions, "where the criterion functions as a (usually reliable, but not therefore
infallible) evidential indicator for deciding, in a given case, whether or not that case is
an instance of this property" (p.5). This is consistent with the abductive interpretation of
the Turing Test described in section 4.3.6 and is the approach adopted herein.
In the following sections, various criteria for recognizing material (or physical), vital (or
biological) and mental (or cognitive) phenomena are presented based on the assumption
of a computationalist ontology, viz. computationalism (chapters 2 and 5). Detailed
investigations of each phenomenon are, however, beyond the aim and scope of this
study; for this reason, recourse has generally been made to presentations in the non-
technical literature. In defending this approach against charges of excessive naivety, it
is necessary (and perhaps also timely) to restate the thesis objective, viz.
To establish that computationalism does not provide a sufficient metaphysical

basis for a unifying framework of "strong" emergent artificiality.
What is being investigated is the possibility of phenomenal unification based on a

computationalist ontology; what is not being attempted is contribution to the knowledge
base associated with a particular phenomenal domain. (Arguments in favour of pursuing
the former have been presented in chapter 1.) Nonetheless, while being aware of the
possible problem of constructing arguments directed at `straw men', it is maintained, with
Schrdinger (1944), that
I can see no escape from this dilemma .. that some of us should venture to embark on a synthesis of
facts and theories .. at the risk of making fools of ourselves. (p.vii)
4.5. Mind
In the following section, the concept of mind is briefly introduced. The presentation has
three objectives: (1) to identify some of the basic features associated with mind and
provide brief descriptions of these characteristics; (2) to outline how these characteristics
can be interpreted in computational terms; and (3) to examine the possibility of a link
between mind and life.
4.5.1. What is Mind ?
Describing mind is extremely difficult; defining mind, even more so. Irrespective of
whether an essentialist or non-essentialist (that is, cluster-based) approach is adopted,
problems remain. Penrose, writing in The Emperor's New Mind (1990), reluctantly
admits that
we shall be having enough trouble with coming to terms with `consciousness' as it stands, so I hope
the reader will forgive me if I leave the problems of `mind' and `soul' essentially alone! (p.525).
Unfortunately, `definitional modesty' becomes problematic when attempting to explore

possible connections between "computers, minds and the laws of physics". Can such
investigations proceed in the absence of a prior conception of mind ? Arguing that a
conception might emerge from such investigations does not solve the problem: How can
mind be recognized since re-cognition necessitates cognition, that is, prior understanding
of that which is being recognized, in this case, mind. Reasoning in this way leads to one
of two possibilities: Either (i) mind is defined a priori or (ii) it is excluded as a subject
of investigation. However, if defined, there is always the possibility that the definition
will be incomplete (section 4.4). As Putnam (1967) states,
the hypothesis that any inventory includes a list of all ultimate `building blocks' of causal processes
that there are is a synthetic one and cannot be regarded as true by pure logic. (p.92)
What has not been presented is a third possibility, the hermeneutic approach (chapter 1),
which is, in fact, the approach implicitly adopted in most investigations of phenomena
(natural or otherwise): An a priori conception (definition) is proposed and subsequently
refined during the course of investigation. This may result in contraction, expansion or
even complete replacement of a concept by another, thereby following the general
pattern of change associated with Kuhnian paradigms (chapter 1).
While appreciating the necessity of a definitional approach (in the hermeneutic sense),
there is still the problem of how to `break into' the hermeneutic circle (chapter 1) and
provide a concept of mind which is likely to prove fruitful, that is, conducive of
refinement. In this connection, the following statement due to Harth (1982) is most
pertinent:
Mind is a troublesome word. We have inherited it from the Latin mens. However, we look in vain for
its equivalent in some other languages. In German we have Seele (soul), Geist (spirit), Verstand
(intellect), Vernunft (reason), Germut (disposition), Gedachtnis (memory), Meinung (opinion),
Absicht (intent) - but no word has all the shades of meaning of mind. In general, we have no difficulty
in the use of the word. The context makes clear which of the above or other meanings are intended.
But trouble arises when we try to define mind or make pronouncements about its relationship with
the brain. (p.234)
In order to maximize the possibility of definitional refinement (and thereby provide

scope for further investigation), a relatively comprehensive definition of mind must be
adopted. The following list due to Edney (1994) is proposed:
Q feeling
Q emotion
Q thinking, cogitation, ratiocination, reasoning
Q intelligence
Q verbalization
Q will, volition, decision
Q memory
Q imagination, foresight, vision
Q intuition
Three notions will be briefly examined in what follows, viz. (i) intelligence, (ii)
intentionality, and (iii) consciousness.
4.5.2. Intelligence
Moody (1993) maintains that defining intelligence is just as problematic as defining

mind. The Oxford Companion to Philosophy (1995) offers the following definitions: "An
intelligent creature is one capable of coping with the unexpected. An intelligent person
is one in whom memory and the capacity to grasp relations and to solve problems with
speed and originality are especially pronounced." The Oxford Companion to the Mind
(1987) provides the following generic definition, viz. "the capacity to learn from
experience, and adapt to one's environment." Neisser (1979) defines intelligence in non-
essentialist terms, that is, with respect to a `prototype'. On his existentialist conception,
intelligence is a cluster concept or Wittgensteinian family resemblance. His justification
for this approach is that
there are no definitive criteria of intelligence, just as there are none for chairness; it is a fuzzy-edged
concept to which many features are relevant. Two people may both be quite intelligent and yet have
very few traits in common - they resemble the prototype along different dimensions .. [Intelligence]
is a resemblance betwen two individuals, one real and the other prototypical. (p.185)
However, there are (at least) two problems with this position: First, the possibility (in
fact, near certainty) of multiple prototypes being proposed, thereby rendering the
definition meaningless because of its potential expansion to all individuals; second, it
fails to differentiate what people mean by ìntelligence' from what ìntelligence' means
in itself (an sich)37. The former such definitions are relativistic and folk-psychological
as opposed to realistic and objective. (Consequently, choice of approach necessarily
involves metaphysical issues.) More conventional approaches involve making use of
quantitative metrics such as IQ or ìntelligence quotient' and g (or `general intelligence')
factor analysis (Spearman,27). However, Kamin (1981) has contested the validity of
these approaches on the grounds that they are genetically reductive, making little or no
allowance for the role of learning and environmental (specifically sociological) factors.
Another significant criticism against quantitative approaches involves the argument that
such metrics inevitably incorporate cultural bias (Gould,81). Interestingly, Turing
(1948), an early advocate of machine or artificial intelligence (section 4.5.9), maintained
that "the idea of ìntelligence' is itself emotional rather than mathematical" (p.2). This
37
Assuming, of course, that an objective (that is, observer-independent) definition of intelligence exists.
would seem to undermine the prospect of formulating an objective (universal) concept

of intelligence and at the same time provide support for Neisser's position. This
subjectivist approach finds expression in Fetzer's (1990) semiotic view of intelligence
in which the latter is defined in terms of rationality and associated with notions such as
ends, action, beliefs, and humanity. While it might be argued that this is a somewhat
anthropocentric definition, it is useful since it makes possible the establishment of a
connection between intelligence and intentionality.
4.5.3. Intentionality
The notion of intentionality was introduced in chapter 1 in connection with a discussion

of Husserlian phenomenology. In summary, an anlysis of consciousness reveals it always
as consciousness of something, that is, there is an àboutness' associated with
consciousness by which the mind is directed towards objects under some aspect.
Thoughts, beliefs, desires, intentions would all be regarded as instances of intentional
phenomena; pains, the experience of redness and other primitive sensations (`qualia')
would not, although thoughts about such experiences would be regarded as intentional.
The directedness of consciousness is referred to as intentionality and, according to
Husserl, can be accounted for via reference to an abstract representational structure
within consciousness, viz. the noema. Using a phenomenological procedure called the
transcendental reduction (chapter 1), Husserl was able to reduce the subjective ego
(consciousness) to what he referred to as the Transcendental Ego. What is significant
about this reduction is that it involves a movement from one ontological category
(subjectivity) to another (objectivity). (The Transcendental Ego must be - and is,
according to Husserl - non-conscious since it is identified as an objective formal
structure.) The reduction of a subjective Cartesian ego to the objective Transcendental
Ego defined in representational (formal) terms provides support for the multiple-
realizability thesis since anything capable of instantiating the representational structure
of the Ego would be capable of consciousness. Hence, by arguing that consciousness is
ultimately representational in character, Husserl laid the foundations for the
computational-functionalist or cognitivist approach to the mind (chapter 1).
The significant point in the context of the present discussion is that intelligence seems
to imply some form of goal-directedness or teleology (section 4.5.2) and in the context
of the mind, this takes a specific form, viz. intentionality. According to the Husserlian
view, however, intentionality necessitates consciousness38.
38
It could be objected that unconscious, subconscious or, more accurately, non-conscious forms of intentionality
are conceivable; hence, consciousness may not be a necessary condition for intentionality. This is consistent
with Heidegger's position, viz. the non-representational (non-mentalistic) intentionality associated with Dasein
(being-in-the-world) is primordial relative to the representational (mentalistic) intentionality associated with
the Cartesian subject or ego (chapter 1). However, it must not be forgotten that recognition and, moreover,
articulation of the non-representational mode of human being necessitates a `switch' from Dasein to Cartesian
ego; even if Heidegger's assertion that `language is the house of Being' is accepted, that is, hermeneutic
4.5.4. Consciousness
Consciousness, like mind and intelligence, is extremely difficult to define. Nagel (1979)
offers the following definition, viz.
an organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something that it is like to be that
organism - something it is like for the organism. (p.166)
Both Nagel (1979, 1986) and Searle (1984, 1992) maintain that consciousness is an
intrinsically and irreducibly subjective or `first-person' experiential phenomenon.
According to Nagel, you have to be the thing to know what it is like to be the thing, that
is, epistemological identity (of experience) necessitates ontological identity (of existence)
and visa-versa. This position has a number of interesting corrolaries. For example,
the fact that we cannot expect ever to accomodate in our language a detailed description of Martian
or bat phenomenology should not lead us to dismiss as meaningless the claim that bats and Martians
have experiences fully comparable in richness of detail to our own. (p.170)
Furthermore,
even if I could by gradual degrees be transformed into a bat, nothing in my present constitution
enables me to imagine what the experiences of such a future stage of myself thus metamorphosed
would be like. (p.169)
The conceivability of this position leads him to conclude that
perhaps anything complex enough to behave like a person would have experiences. But that, if true,
is a fact which cannot be discovered merely by analyzing the concept of experience. (p.167)
This leads to the famous problem of other minds (section 4.5.5), a modern formulation
of which provides the basis for arguing against the Turing Test as a test for mind, or,
more specifically, consciousness (section 4.3.6). Before examining the other minds
problem, it is worthwhile examining the link between consciousness and intentionality.
Penrose (1990), for example, implicitly argues for a `stronger' connection between
consciousness and intentionality than that described in section 4.5.3, maintaining that
consciousness necessitates intentionality:
To be conscious, I have to be conscious of something. (p.525)
discourse is the means by which the structure of Being is articulated, it is an existential fact that this discourse
is carried out by human beings in the mode of the Cartesian ego. (Derrida and other deconstructionists might
contest this position, maintaining that a text (discourse) is òpen' in the sense that interpretation can transcend
the meaning originally intended by the author. This is why literary criticism is best described as a hermeneutic
activity (chapter 1). However, while accepting the validity of this argument, it remains the case that criticism
is carried out in the mode of the Cartesian ego. Hence, the above argument stands.)
This position is supported by Goswami (1993) who proposes an idealist interpretation

of mind, defining consciousness in terms of four associated concepts, viz. (1) awareness,
(2) objects (thoughts, feelings etc), (3) a subject (experiencer), and (4) identification of
consciousness as the ground of all being. Penrose goes further to claim that
consciousness is a necessary condition for intelligence, the latter a "subsidiary"
phenomenon associated with the former. In (Penrose,94), the link between consciousness
and intelligence is elaborated as follows:
my own use of the term ùnderstanding' certainly implies that a genuine possession of this quality
would require some element of awareness to be present. Without any awareness of what some
argument is all about, there can surely be no genuine understanding of that argument .. Awareness
is indeed something, and this something may be present or absent, at least to a degree. (p.37)
Penrose maintains, therefore, that subjectivity has genuine ontological status, viz. it is
something. Furthermore, he holds that
ìntelligence' requires ùnderstanding' .. and ùnderstanding' requires àwareness'. (pp.38-39)
On his view, awareness is the passive aspect of the phenomenon of consciousness.

However, "consciousness has an active aspect also, namely the feeling of free will."
(p.39) The argument for a necessary link between mind and consciousness is implicitly
supported by Levin (1979) who in the context of a discussion of artificial intelligence
maintains that "the proponent of artificial minds has achieved an empty victory if `mind'
is so construed that a being can have a mind without being conscious: he just shifts the
philosophical problem to machine consciousness." (p.186) However, Moody (1993) has
contested this view, maintaining that non-sentient intelligence is readily conceivable and
citing a number of examples involving unconscious problem solving in support of this
contention. Moody's position is interesting because it is consistent both with (i) a
Heideggerian interpretation of intentionality in terms of ìntelligent' situated activity or
coping (chapter 1) and (ii) a definition of intelligence in biological terms (section
4.5.10).
4.5.5. The Other-Minds Problem
The fact that conscious experience has an irreducibly subjective aspect, viz. "only I can
know what it is like to be me", gives rise to an interesting problem: Since I can only ever
have access to my own conscious experiences (via reflexive acts of self-consciousness),
what grounds do I have for believing that other beings have mental experiences
(sensations, thoughts etc) similar to my own or even have experiences at all ? The vast
majority of proposed solutions to the other-minds problem can be placed somewhere
between the following two extremes: On the one hand, solipsism, the view that my mind
is the only mind (or thing) that exists, everything else being, in some sense, a product of
my mind. This is the position of the Cartesian sceptic who maintains that everything
beyond "cogito ergo sum" or "I think therefore I am" is dubitable; on the other hand,
panpsychism (chapter 1), the view that everything in the universe is conscious. This
position, which is essentially a modern form of philosophical animism39, is often
advanced on the grounds that since subjective (experiential) phenomena cannot be
reduced to objective (non-experiential) phenomena (chapter 7), subjectivity must be a
fundamental ontological category (Chalmers,96).
The most popular position, however, involves inductive inference of consciousness or

subjective experience on the basis of behavioural evidence; specifically, one draws a
widespread analogy from one's own behaviour and internal mental states to the internal
states of others when their behaviour is similar. On this view, the problem of other-minds
reduces to one of determining the set of behavioural criteria which are necessary and/or
sufficient for the attribution of consciousness to an entity. However, it is unclear whether
the link between behaviour (objective, external) and conscious experience (subjective,
internal) is necessary (that is, essential) or merely contingent. Searle (1992) presents
three different positions with respect to this issue: (1) ~BvE, (2) Ev~B, and (3)
Bv~E, where B denotes behaviour, E denotes conscious experience, ~ denotes logical
necessity and denotes logical possibility. (3) or the zombie argument is of particular
importance in the context of the artificiality debate: If consciousness is a necessary
condition for intelligence (Penrose,94), the Turing Test for artificial intelligence must
be invalid since, as a behaviouristic (that is, ontologically-objective, third-person,
externalistic) test, it cannot provide a means by which to confirm the presence or absence
of consciousness. It is crucial to note that the other-minds problem follows from the
Cartesian separation of subject from object; it does not arise for non-mentalistic Dasein
or being-in-the-world (chapter 6).
4.5.6. The Mind-Body Problem
The necessity-contingency problem with respect to the link between behaviour and
conscious experience leads directly to consideration of the so-called `hard problem'
(Chalmers,96) within the philosophy of mind. This is the problem of explaining how an
ontologically-objective substrate can give rise to ontological-subjectivity (that is,
conscious experience) and is a restatement of the famous mind-body problem, viz. the
problem of determining the nature of the link between mind and matter. For substance-
dualists such as Descartes, the mind-body relation was a relation between two kinds of
stuff, res extensa (matter or spatially extended stuff) and res cogitans (mental stuff).
However, substance-dualism is unacceptable on the modern scientific worldview since
the latter is based on the assumption of a monistic metaphysics, viz. one kind of stuff
39
Pepper (1942) identifies the root metaphor (chapter 1) of animism as man; consequently, in animist thinking,
the world is interpreted in anthropomorphic (or human-like) term, consciousness being a defining characteristic
of human being.
which is physical40. Additionally, substance-dualism is held to be problematic because

it cannot explain the link between the two kinds of stuff without invoking a `God of the
gaps' (Griffin,88). Since Descartes, numerous alternatives to the dualistic position on the
mind-body problem have been developed. Stapledon (1939) provides the following
graphical summary of four positions (Fig 4.2):
" $ ( * " $ ( *
a b c d a b c d
(a) (b)
" $ ( *
a b c d
" $ ( *
a b c d
(c) (d)
Fig 4.2 Four kinds of mind-body relation. (", $, ( etc refer to mental events; a, b, c etc
refer to material events.)
In Fig 4.2 above, (a) represents Cartesian substance-dualism, (b) epiphenomenalism, (c)
dual-aspect theory, and (d) psychophysical parallelism.
Bunge (1977a) has identified ten kinds of behaviour-mentation relation (Table 4.2):
Philosophy of Mind Explanation of behaviour Explanation of mentation
Idealism, panpsychism, Manifestation of the Autonomous and

phenomenalism workings of a spirit spontaneous activity of the
(individual or worldwide); mind coverable by law
no precise laws. containing only mentalist
predicates.
40
Furthermore, if the physical universe is causally-closed as is maintained, for example, by Chalmers (1996), it
becomes impossible to explain non-physical interaction between the physical world and the mental world in
a way that does not undermine the principle of the transitivity of causation. However, the argument for causal-
closure has been contested from a number of positions including mentalism (Marres,89), panexperientialism
(Griffin,98) and radical emergentism (Silberstein,98).
Neutral monism, dual- Manifestation of a non- Manifestation of a non-

aspect theory mental, non-physical being; mental, non-physical being;
explainable with a single set explainable with a single set
of laws translatable into of laws translatable into
mentalist and physicalist mentalist and physicalist
terms. terms.
Eliminative materialism, Outcome of stimuli, hence Mentation non-existent,

behaviourism describable by S-R laws (no hence not to be explained.
intervention of CNS).
Reductive materialism Motor outcome of physical Physical activity of the CNS.

CNS events, hence
explainable in physical
terms.
Emergent materialism Motor outcome of biological Biological activity of plastic

CNS events, explainable sub-systems of CNS,
with the help of biological explainable with the help of
laws, some of which contain biological laws containing
new predicates. new predicates.
Mutual independence of Biological events Mental events explainable in

mind and body explainable in purely purely mentalist terms plus
physiological terms plus possibly theological ones.
Psychophysical possibly theological ones.
parallelism, pre-
established harmony
Epiphenomenalism Motor outcome of CNS Non-motor effect of CNS

events. activity.
Animism Motor outcome of mental Unexplainable except

events (e.g. intending and possibly in supernatural
wishing). terms.
Interactionism Under dual control of body Autonomous though

and mind; only partially influenced by bodily events;
explainable. unexplainable by science.
Table 4.2. Various proposed solutions to the Mind-Body Problem.
Computational-functionalism (computationalism) is absent from both the above schemes.

According to Boden (1987), this is because "the `new' concept of machine provided by
AI, viz. the hardware-software dichotomy, largely resolves the mind-body problem".
(p.4) However, it is important to examine the validity of this claim.
4.5.7. A Functionalist Conception of Mind
Sober (1991) holds that "functionalism in the philosophy of the mind is best seen as an
empiricial thesis about the degree to which the psychological characteristics of a system
constrain the system's physical realization." (p.754). Functionalists view mind in terms
of a set of essential connections between beliefs, desires, memories, and other mental
states. Mental states can be broadly classified into two kinds: (i) experiential states
involving sensory qualities and (ii) intentional states involving propositional attitudes.
Lacey (1988) defines `strong' functionalism as the thesis that "mental states must
themselves be analyzable in such a way that eventually all mental or psychological terms
are eliminated; if they cannot all be eliminated we have only weak functionalism."
(p.397) Lacey further maintains that "only strong functionalism would have any hope of
explaining how mind might emerge in a material universe." (p.397) Various functionalist
theories of mind have been proposed in the literature, the majority of which are framed
in computational terms: For example, Putnam (1960, 1967) defines mind in terms of
programs for Turing machines, thereby supporting the hardware is to software as brain
is to mind analogy presented in chapter 2. Additional support for a functionalist
conception of mind is provided by interpreting thought in symbolic terms. According to
Hillis (1988), "it seems likely that symbolic thought can be fruitfully studied and perhaps
even recreated without worrying about the details of the emergent system that supports
it." (p.180) Hence,
[one approach to the mind is to] build a model of the emergent substrate of intelligence. This artificial
substrate for thought would not need to mimic in detail the mechanisms of the biological system, but
it would need to exhibit those emergent properties that are necessary to support the operations of
thought [italics added]. (p.180)
This emergentist approach (chapter 3) assumes functionalism since it makes a claim for
the multiple-realizability of mind. However, a functionalist theory of mind is not limited
to a theory of intelligence. For example, Rucker (1985) implicitly assumes a functionalist
position in defining personhood or `self' in formalistic terms as follows:
Daily one eats and inhales billions of new atoms, daily one excretes, sheds, and breathes out billions
of old ones. Physically, my present body has almost nothing in common with the body I had twenty
years ago. Since I feel that I am still the same person, it must be that Ì' am something other than the
collection of atoms making up my body. Ì' am not so much my atoms as I am the pattern in which
my atoms are arranged. Some of the atom patterns in my brain code up certain memories; it is the
continuity of these memories that gives me my sense of personal identity. (p.146)
Additionally, Hofstadter (1981a) maintains that "emotions are an automatic by-product

of the ability to think" (p.81) and that
the ability to think, feel, and consciousness are just different facets of one phenomenon, and no one
of them can be present without the others .. consciousness has got to come from a precise pattern of
organization [and] requires a certain way of mirroring the external universe internally, and the ability
to respond to that external reality on the basis of the internally represented model .. what's really
crucial for a conscious machine is that it should incorporate a well-developed and flexible self-model.
(pp.81-82)
His commitment to "strong" functionalism leads him to an emergentist position with

respect to the mind-body problem; more specifically, to a computational-emergentist
solution of the `hard problem' of conscious experience (section 4.5.6), viz.
eventually, when you put enough feelingless calculations together in a huge coordinated organization,
you'll get something that has properties on another level. You can see it - in fact, you have to see it -
not as a bunch of little calculations, but as a system of tendencies and desires and beliefs and so on.
(p.84)
There are a number of problems with this position which will be examined in chapter 7
when the category problem, that is, the problem of explaining how ontological
subjectivity can emerge from an ontologically-objective substrate, is addressed41 . For the
remainder of this section, it will be assumed that Hofstadter's (1979) claim to the effect
that "all brain processes are derived from a computational substrate" (p.561) is valid.
Acceptance of this form of functionalism leads directly to the computational theory of
mind.
4.5.8. The Computational Theory of Mind (CTMi)
The computational theory of mind (CTMi), like computational theories of life (section
4.6.2), matter (section 4.7.6) and other phenomena, is based on the assumption that the
ontological version of the Church-Turing Thesis (CTT) and the general form of the
Physical Symbol System Hypothesis (PSSH) are both valid (chapter 2). The ontological
CTT states that all processes42 (natural or artificial) are effective (or mechanical)
procedures and can be implemented by running suitable programs (Turing machine
specifications) on a Universal Turing machine. The general PSSH states that a physical
symbol system (PSS) provides the necessary and sufficient conditions for realizing any
phenomenon, natural or artificial (chapter 2).
Newell (1980) presents the following list of essential (necessary) properties of mind:
Q Behave as an (almost) arbitrary function of the environment

Q Operate in real-time
Q Exhibit rational, that is, effective adapative behaviour
Q Use vast amounts of knowledge about the environment
Q Behave robustly in the face of error, the unexpected, and the unknown
Q Use symbols (and abstractions)
Q Use (natural) language
Q Exhibit self-awareness and a sense of self
Q Learn from its environment
Q Acquire its capabilities through development
41
Clearly, the category problem - as defined herein - is almost identical to the `hard' or mind-body problem
(section 4.5.6), the distinction being that proposed solutions to the category problem must be emergentist in
nature. This is because this study is concerned with evaluating the sufficiency of computationalism as a
metaphysical basis for "strong" emergent artificiality.
42
Substances (that is, objects) are, on this view, processually-constituted (chapter 2).
Q Arise through evolution

Q Be realizable within the brain as a physical system
Q Be realizable as a physical system
He maintains that "the notion of general intelligence can only be informally

circumscribed, since it refers to an empirical phenomenon." (p.171) In an earlier paper,
Newell and Simon (1976) maintain that "symbols lie at the root of intelligent action."
(p.114) This leads Lakoff (1987) to identify what he refers to as
The Algorithmic Mind position: Every cognitive process is algorithmic in nature; that is, thought is
purely a matter of symbol manipulation (p.339)
According to Newell (1980), "that humans are physical symbol systems implies that
there exists a physical architecture that supports that symbol system" (p.174); further,
"there must exist a neural organization that is an architecture - i.e. that supports a symbol
structure." (p.174) Hence, both mind and brain are defined in terms of PSSs. In
(Newell,90), the following are identified as the basis of a behaving system:
Q knowledge
Q representation
Q computation
Q symbol-manipulation
Q architecure
Q intelligence
Q search and problem spaces
Q preparation and deliberation.
Newell asserts that "theories of human cognition are ultimately theories of physical,
biological systems" (p.42) and proceeds to define the mind in Darwinian terms as
follows:
I want to take mind to be the control system that guides the behaving organism in its complex
interactions with the dynamic real world .. The mind then is simply the name we give to the control
system that has evolved within the organism to carry out the interactions to the benefit of that
organism or, ultimately, for the survival of its species. (p.43)
A variant of the PSSH, qualified by the necessary condition that a PSS be a knowledge-
level system, is presented as the basis of a unified theory of cognition. (A knowledge
level system is one which contains knowledge about the goals the system is to pursue and
the means by which such goals can be achieved.) This leads Newell to define intelligence
in the following terms:
intelligence is the ability to bring to bear all the knowledge that one has in the service of one's goals
.. Intelligence is [therefore] relative to goals and relative to knowledge. (pp.90-91)
The issue of intentionality in the context of the CTMi is addressed by Dyer (1990) who
asserts that,
the simulation of intentionality is the same as embodying intentionality because the `simulation' of
information processing on a computer is information processing. (p.312)
However, the assumption that intentionality is to simulated intentionality as information

processing is to simulated information processing is problematic: The `simulation' of
information processing is information processing because computers are information
processors, that is, their ontology (nature or being) is defined in terms of their capacity
to process information. Hence, simulated and simulator belong to the same ontological
category, thereby allowing for emulation (section 4.3.3). However, it is not necessarily
the case that intentionality (simulated) and information processing (simulator) belong to
the same ontological category43.
With respect to an explanation of consciousness in terms of the CTMi, Hofstadter et al.

(1981b) begin by asserting that
the mere fact that [consciousness] has resisted for so long all attempts to characterize it suggests that
our conception of it is at fault. (p.8)
However, this position assumes that subjectivity is reducible to objectivity. McGinn

(1987) describes the computationalist view of consciousness as follows:
The idea .. is that the brain has (in addition to material and functional properties) computational
properties; and it is these that ùnderlie' the presence and operations of consciousness. (p.285)
Exploring links between the ontological CTT, the PSSH and the computationalist view
of mind, McGinn (1987) argues that a connection follows almost naturally once it is
accepted that computation implies the attribution of propositional content to
computational devices and propositional content is usually expressed in symbolic terms.
Thus, the central concept underlying the CTT and PSSH is the notion that phenomena
are ultimately reducible to symbols or representations. In order for this view to avoid the
problem of what it is that the symbols refer to (or what it is that the representations are
re-presentations of), it is necessary to claim ontological self-sufficiency for
computationalism: On this view, symbols are self-referential; they do not represent
anything or, as Baudrillard (1983) states, they are their own pure simulacrum (chapter
6).
4.5.9. Artificial Intelligence (AI)
In the previous section, the CTMi was outlined; in this section, artificial intelligence (AI)
43
Following Searle (1992, 1995) and Tallis (1994), it might be argued that intentionality and information
processing belong to separate ontological categories since the former is an intrinsic, ontologically-subjective
phenomenon while the latter is an extrinsic, ontologically-objective phenomenon, that is, an institutional fact
(or artifact).
is briefly examined. The distinction between the CTMi and AI is essentially

methodological: The CTMi starts from the natural phenomenon of mind and attempts
to interpret it in computational terms; AI, on the other hand, starts from the artificial44
phenomenon of computation and attempts to interpret it in mental terms. Both
approaches converge under the assumption of functionalism (chapter 1).
Artificial intelligence, like natural intelligence, is notoriously difficult to define. For

example, the Handbook of Artificial Intelligence (Vol.I) (Barr,81) defines AI as
the part of computer science concerned with designing intelligent computer systems, that is, systems
that exhibit the characteristics we associate with intelligence in human behaviour - understanding
language, learning, reasoning, solving problems, and so on [emphasis added].
and the Encyclopedia of Artificial Intelligence (Vol.I) (Shapiro,92) as
a field of science and engineering concerned with the computational understanding of what is
commonly called intelligent behaviour, and with the creation of artifacts that exhibit such behaviour
[emphasis added].
Three notions are common to the above definitions: (i) intelligence; (ii) creativity or
design; and (iii) behaviour. The latter notion can itself be understood in at least three
senses as previously stated (section 4.3.3). Perhaps the best indicator of the definitional
problem with respect to AI is a paper by Negrotti (1991d) presenting a list of "One
Hundred Definitions of AI [or artificial intelligence]" which includes the following: (1)
study of the corresponding natural phenomenon (for example, "study of intelligence by
building and analysing computer programs", "study of apparently or actually intelligent
behaviour in machines" etc); (2) simulation of the corresponding natural phenomenon
(for example, "simulation of human behaviour by a machine", "simulation of purposeful
behaviour" etc); (3) instantiation of the corresponding natural phenomenon (for example,
"cognitive mechanics", "mechanical epistemology?" etc). From the above sample of
definitions it can be inferred that AI is both (i) a means by which the phenomenon of
intelligence (and more broadly, mind) can be studied, and (ii) either a simulation or
instantiation of the phenomenon of intelligence itself; hence, AI can be considered as
both a tool for and the phenomenon of study, corresponding to "weak" and "strong"
positions (section 4.3.5) respectively. Boden (1987) defines AI as "the use of programs
as tools in the study of intelligent processes, tools that help in the discovery of the
thinking-procedures and epistemological structures employed by intelligent creatures."
(p.17) AI is explicitly identified as "the study of computer programs [emphasis added]."
(p.3) Hence, it might be inferred that Boden is committed to `weak' or soft AI. However,
there is implicit support for the PSSH in the assertion that "intelligence may be defined
44
This statement is not intended to imply at this stage in the discussion that "strong" computationalism is invalid.
It merely indicates that human beings have come to know computers by constructing them. Hence, computers
are human artifacts and their functionality is, therefore, artifactual.
as the ability creatively to manipulate symbols, or process information, given the

requirements of the task in hand." (p.17)
Kelly (1993) maintains that
rather than requiring a theory of intelligence, Artificial Intelligence may be viewed as building such
a theory. (p.37)
This view is both important and problematic: The former because it identifies AI with
synthesis or artifactuality, thereby drawing attention to the poitic (coming-forth,
becoming) aspect associated with artificiality (chapter 6); the latter because, like all
synthetic approaches, it necessitates the prior existence of a definition of the
phenomenon it is attempting to realize (on a `strong' interpretation of AI) while at the
same time attempting to construct this very definition. (This is a restatement of the re-
cognition problem discussed in section 4.5.1.)
4.5.10. Connections Between Mind and Life
Current strategy in AI has moved away from the top-down design of intelligent systems
and towards the bottom-up evolution of such systems45. For example, Fogel et al. (1966)
define intelligence in evolutionary terms as
the ability of any decision-making entity to achieve a degree of success in seeking a wide variety of
goals under a wide range of environments. (p.2)
A potential link between intelligence and life is established in the assertion that
"intelligent behaviour is also exhibited by creatures at much lower levels in the
phylogenetic series." (p.3) Evolution plays an important role within naturalistic accounts
of intelligence since it provides the basis for an emergentist account of mind, and a
possible reduction of mentality to the non-mental. Hence, Scriven (1953) maintains that
if intelligence is to be defined and explained, this will have to be done at least partially
in biological terms. However, McGinn (1987) contests the validity of this view, arguing
that "being biologically alive is not a necessary condition of consciousness, but that it is
necessary that a conscious being should behave like a living thing (of a certain
sophistication)." (p.283) Poundstone (1986) goes a stage further in speculating about the
possibility of artificial intelligence (AI) without artificial life (A-Life) in a computational
context. In response, Scriven (1953) maintains that
there is an essential connection between the capacity for complex behaviour and Consciousness; the
one is a necessary condition of the other. But it is not a sufficient condition; and though we may
decide that living things are Conscious from their behaviour, we cannot decide if everything is
45
It is interesting to note that such a move derives support from Simon's (1969) establishing a link between
intelligence and evolution as the basis of the artificiality concept (section 4.2.1).
Conscious from its behaviour. Life is itself a necessary condition of Consciousness, and though
behaviour is a factor which sometimes decides the question whether a certain system is alive, it is
again not the only one [emphasis added]. (p.34)
Newell et al. (1976) hold that "there is no ìntelligence principle', just as there is no `vital
principle' that conveys by its very nature the essence of life." (p.115) Vitalism is the view
that there exists some kind of special substance, principle or `force', for example,
Bergson's lan vital or Dreisch's entelechia, which is responsible for life. The inherent
dualism in vitalistic accounts means that emergence in an ontologically reductive sense
(chapter 3) is rejected. The vitalist holds that the matter-life relation is discrete; non-
living physico-chemical matter cannot give rise to living biological entities. The
ontologically-reductive emergentist, on the other hand, maintains that life is continuous
with matter, reflecting a difference of degree and not of kind. The nature of the
difference is often expressed in organizational or informational terms. For example,
Stonier (1992) maintains that "just as information is a basic, physical property of the
universe, so is intelligence a product of the evolution of information systems." (p.15) His
concept of intelligence is important since it supports a continuum view between
intelligence and vitality (life):
Intelligent activity, for the most part, involves an ability of a system to analyse its environment, and
then to make an intelligent response. An intelligent response may result in one of three states:
1. The system has enhanced its own survivability.

2. The system has enhanced its own reproducibility.
3. If the system is goal-oriented, it has enhanced the achievement of that goal. (p.15)
However, Adler (1990) has contested the continuum thesis on the following grounds:
In the life of all other animals, mind is embodied completely. Mind is found entirely imbedded in
physical organs. Mind is in matter. Only in man does mind rise above matter or over matter, by virtue
of man's having a mind that has intellectual as well as sensitive powers, conceptual as well as
perceptual thought, the power to think about what is unperceived and totally imperceptible. (pp.5-6)
A variant of this argument is briefly examined in chapter 6 in connection with

Heidegger's intentionalistic account of the existential as-structure, that is, the human
being's capacity to understand and appreciate a phenomenon as the phenomenon that it
is46. However, in what follows, it will be assumed that the continuum thesis is valid.
4.6. Life
In this section, the concept of life is discussed. The presentation has three objectives: (1)
identify the basic properties of life (assuming an essentialist position) without providing
46
Searle (1995) presents an alternative account of this structure, viz. X counts as Y in context C, from a neo-
Husserlian perspective.
a detailed technical presentation of these characteristics47 ; (2) outline how these

characteristics can be interpreted in computational terms; (3) examine the possibility of
a reduction of life to matter. In addition, the relationship between the `natural'
phenomenon of life and its artifical analogue, artificial life (AL or A-Life) is
investigated. The concepts in this section are discussed in much greater detail than those
associated with the phenomena of mind (section 4.5) and matter (section 4.7). This has
been necessary for two reasons: First, life is assumed, on the continuum view, to be the
`bridge' between matter and mind. Hence, it is likely that an investigation of life will
contribute to an understanding of the other two phenomena; second, life is perhaps the
paradigmatic example of an emergent phenomenon and hence, an examination of this
concept is essential in order to evaluate the unifying framework of computationally
emergent artificiality presented in chapter 548.
4.6.1. What is Life ?
According to The Oxford Companion to Philosophy (1995),
this, the distinguishing feature of organisms, is best thought of as involving some kind of complex
organization, giving an ability to use energy sources for self-maintenance and reproduction. Efforts
to find some distinctive substance characterizing life have proven as futile as they have been heroic.
The one thing which is clear is that any analysis of life must accept and appreciate that there will be
many borderline instances, like viruses. Inconvenient as this may be for the lexicographer, this is
precisely what evolutionary theory would lead us to expect.
A survey of various dictionaries leads to the following three definitional categories:
1. Life as an organization distinct from inorganic matter (with an associated list of properties)
2. Life as a certain kind of animated behaviour
3. Life as a special, incommensurable, quality - vitalism
Vitalism (section 4.5.10) is, according to mainstream biological thought, unacceptable

since it posits a dualistic conception of reality, thereby conflicting with ontological
monism, the ideal of science. Moreover, scientific advances in fields such as
biochemistry, molecular biology, and perhaps most importantly, molecular genetics, have
led to almost complete rejection of the idea of a vitalistic `ghost in the machine'.
47
Technical details are purposely ignored for two reasons: (i) methodological - simplicity of analysis, and (ii)
ontological - abstraction is a necessary condition for multiple-realizability and functionalism.
48
As will be seen in chapter 7, this claim is highly questionable since the category problem, viz how ontological
subjectivity emerges from an ontologically-objective substrate, constitutes a far more radical instance of
emergence given an ontologically-objective interpretation of life. This is because in the latter case, the
emergence of life from matter does not appear to involve ontological category creation.
According to the vast majority of biologists, Descartes got it almost right49; living things
are machines. For example, Mayr (1982) rejects substance-dualism on the grounds that
"the concept of consciousness cannot even approximately be defined and therefore
detailed discussion is impossible." He further maintains that
as far as the words `life' and `mind' are concerned, they merely refer to reifications of activities and
have no separate existence as entities .. The avoidance of nouns that are nothing but reifications of
processes greatly facilitates the analysis of the phenomena that are characteristic for biology. (pp.74-
75)
In place of the substance-dualism associated with vitalism, Mayr proposes a processual

conception (chapter 2) of life:
Attempts have been made again and again to define `life'. These endeavors are rather futile since it
is now clear that there is no special substance, object, or force that can be identified with life. The
process of living, however, can be defined. There is no doubt that living organisms possess certain
attributes that are not or not in the same manner found in inanimate objects. (p.53)
Mayr goes on to present the following list of characteristics by which living organisms
differ from inanimate matter, viz.
Q Complexity and Organization

Q Chemical Uniqueness
Q Quality
Q Uniqueness and Variability
Q Possession of a Genetic Program
Q Historical Nature
Q Natural Selection
Q Indeterminacy
Sagan (1985) presents the following five definitions of life: (pp.985-986)
Q Physiological: any system capable of performing a number of functions such as eating, metabolizing,
excreting, breathing, moving, growing, reproducing, self-repair, responding to external stimuli.
Q Metabolic: any system with a definite boundary, continually exchanging some of its materials with
its surroundings, but without altering its general properties, at least over some period of time.
Q Biochemical: any system that contains reproducible hereditary information coded in nucleic acid
molecules and that metabolize by controlling the rate of chemical reactions using enzymes.
Q Genetic: any system capable of evolution by natural selection.
Q Thermodynamic: any system which is òpen' in the sense of exchanging light, heat, matter etc with
its surroundings (or ènvironment'). The Second Law of Thermodynamics states that in `closed'
systems, non processes can occur which increase the net order of the system. Living systems are
49
His mistake was to assert a substantialist yet non-physicalist conception of mind.
localized regions within the universe (a closed system) where there is a continuous increase in order
(at the expense of an increase in disorder of the rest of the universe.)
Although there appears to be no single property by which something may be classified

as living, according to Farmer et al. (1991), a list of generic properties is likely to include
the following:
Q Life is a complex pattern in space-time

Q Self-reproduction
Q Information storage of a self-representation
Q Possession of a metabolism
Q Functional interactions with the environment
Q Interdependence of parts
Q Stability under environmental perturbation (robustness)
Q Ability to evolve
Q Growth/expansion
Self-reproduction and information storage of a self-representation feature in a number

of lists associated with information-theoretic definitions, for example, those of von
Neumann (1966) and Orgel (1973). (In chapter 5, self-reproduction is taken to be the
defining characteristic of life.)
Mayr (1982) adds the following to the above list:
Q Emergence of new and unpredictable qualities at hierarchical levels
while Emmeche (1993) argues in favour of including
Q Autonomy (with respect to human beings)
The identification of life with autonomy is supported by Polanyi (1962), viz.
instances of morphological types and of operational principles subordinated to a centre of

individuality .. [Furthermore,] no types, no operating principles and no individualities can ever be
defined in terms of physics and chemistry [emphasis added]. (p.383)
Consistent with his interpretation of the concept of emergence (chapter 3), Polanyi
(1968) expands upon the above statement as follows:
if the structure of living things is a set of boundary conditions, this structure is extraneous to the laws
of physics and chemistry which the organism is harnessing. Thus the morphology of living things
transcends the laws of physics and chemistry. (p.1309)
Emmeche argues for the identification of autonomy as the defining feature of life on the
grounds that "this criterion reflects [1] the evolutionary fact that life is not a predesigned
but a naturally evolved phenomenon, and [2] the ecological fact that life is usually not
dependent on us for its existence, so an artificially created organism should be able to go
on living a life of its own within a natural environment [emphasis added]." (p.561) The
latter condition, viz. naturality of environment, is extremely important since it raises the
issue of whether or not computational `life-forms' are autonomous. This is because
computational life-forms are embedded in ùniverses' (computers) which are artifactual.
Challenging Emmeche's first claim, viz. life is an evolutionary phenomenon, in the
context of artificial and possibly even natural life is much more controversial, involving
(1) a local to global shift with respect to questions of ontology and epistemology and (2)
consideration of the possible validity of enlightened creationism (chapter 6).
Assuming evolutionary theory as valid, Maynard Smith (1986) defines life in terms of
two properties, viz.
1. Possession of a metabolism (biochemical, physiological)

2. Functionality of organismic parts (genetic, evolutionary)
Evolution is defined in terms of three concepts: (1) multiplication, (2) variation, and (3)
heredity. Put simply, if variation in a population of entities fulfilling these three
conditions differentially affects the capacity for survival and reproduction, then that
population will evolve. Emmeche (1992), assuming a structuralist position, criticizes
Darwinian theory for being "unable to give any satisfying account of the nature of
developmental and evolutionary constraints" (p.467), and on this issue is supported by
many of the contributors to (Ho,88). As Emmeche states,
we cannot by the present theory of biology distinguish between possible and impossible forms of life
.. The genetic code, for example .. might have been differently composed. However, its presumed
arbitrarity might not be due to historically frozen accidents and various external and (with respect
to the living system) contingent causes; rather some general biochemical constraints on possible forms
of protein synthesis and regulation not yet understood may have acted lawfully in the process of
creation of this specific code, disallowing the formation of other code tables [emphasis added].
(p.467)
This view is consistent with that of Kauffman (1995) who argues in favour of
augmenting the neo-Darwinian explanation of biology with what might be described as
a field-theoretic biology defined in dynamical systems terms. Kauffman's approach
supports a computational conception of life, locating it within the larger context of an
emergentist (or self-organizing) conception of nature; consequently, it supports the idea
of computationally emergent artificiality (chapter 5).
Dennett (1995) maintains that a necessary condition for life is the existence of an
autonomous metabolism on the basis that "it is a deep if not utterly necessary condition
for the sort of complexity that is necessary to fend off the gnawing effects of the Second
Law of Thermodynamics. All complex macromolecular structures tend to break down
over time, so, unless a system is an open system, capable of taking in fresh materials and
replenishing itself, it will tend to have a short career." (p.127) He also points to the
existence of a more or less definite boundary distinguishing the organism (living entity)
from everything else as an additional necessary condition; this enables self-preservation

to be constrained within finite limits. This latter characteristic, which is linked to the
notion of autonomy, is contestable since it assumes that the idea of a biological organism
or biological self is well-defined. Maturana and Varela (1980) present an alternative
formulation based on systems theory (chapter 3) in which the organism-environment
distinction is viewed as epistemological.
The thermodynamic conception of life is particularly important in the context of this

study because of the link between thermodynamics and information theory on the one
hand and the link between information and computation on the other. For this reason, the
thermodynamic definition of life will be examined further.
4.6.2. Towards a Computational Theory of Life (CTL)
A precedent for the thermodynamic (entropic) or informational approach to life can be

found in Herbert Spencer's First Principles (1872). Spencer defined evolution as
a change from a state of indefinite, incoherent homogeneity towards a state of definite, coherent
heterogeneity. (p.396)
The notion of evolution as a movement from disorder to order was explored by

Schrdinger (1944) who established a link between genetics and thermodynamics by
maintaining that life was to be defined in `negentropic' terms, that is, in terms of a
genetically-based propensity towards the maintenance of order. Following this approach,
Chaitin (1970) restated the problem of life and evolution in terms of organization and
complexity: According to algorithmic information theory, the complexity of a
phenomenon is equal to the length of the shortest program necessary to compute the
phenomenon. On this basis, Chaitin argues that the life question can be defined as the
problem of the relation between wholes and parts, viz.
if both are equally complex, the parts are independent (do not interact). If the whole is very much
simpler than the sum of its parts, we have the interdependence that characterizes a living being. (p.15)
Thus, phenomenal emergence, in this case, the emergence of life from matter, implies
a reduction in complexity and an increase in organization. According to Chaitin,
complexity and organization are, therefore, in reciprocal relation. This informational or
entropic conception of life finds support within biology. For example, Orgel (1973)
maintains that
it is difficult, if not impossible, to find a rigid definition of life that incorporates all of our intuitive
ideas. Instead, we can make a list of the attributes that help us to decide whether or not a system is
living - reproduction, metabolism, excitability, and so on - and agree to call an organism alive if it
possesses a suitable selection of these attributes. This is a useful approach in introductory discussions
of terrestrial biology, but it is not so useful when one discusses alien forms of life. In the latter case,
it is too difficult to complete the list; it is impossible to enumerate all the types of behaviour that
might characterize nonterrestrial forms of life. (pp.191-192)
Orgel lists the following as necessary and sufficient conditions that a structure must fulfil
in order to qualify as `living':
1. The object is complex and yet well-specified.

2. The object is able to reproduce (or alternatively, the object may be the descendant of related objects
that can reproduce, even if it is itself `sterile').
Furthermore, these conditions imply that
(a) the object is a product of natural selection (or human technology), and
(b) the information needed to specify the object is stored in a structure that is stable for the reproductive
lifetime of the object.
Orgel maintains that "a new term for such `living' organisms, whether terrestrial or not,
must now be introduced. They are Complex Information-Transforming Reproducing
Objects that Evolve by Natural Selection - CITROENS." (p.193) He goes on to state that
we are familiar with many products of technology that fail to be CITROENS only because they do
not reproduce autonomously. There is, thus, an exception to the rule that objects of high information
content must be the products of human ingenuity. This exception does not weaken the argument, since
the intelligent 'creators' in this case are themselves the products of natural selection. (pp.196-197)
This leads Orgel to an informational or computational view of life. He argues that

biologists should "concentrate on the structure and behaviour [function] of .. objects
rather than their status as `living' or `nonliving' beings." (p.189) This approach leads to
the following position, viz. "living organisms are distinguished by their specified
complexity." (p.189) However, he maintains that
these vague ideas can be made more precise by introducing the idea of information. Roughly
speaking, the information content of a structure is the minimum number of instructions needed to
specify the structure. One can see intuitively that many instructions are needed to specify a complex
structure. On the other hand, a simple repeating structure can be specified in rather few instructions.
(p.190)
Orgel's position is important since it provides implicit support for a computational

functionalist (that is, computationalist) approach to life, viz.
the structure and behaviour of an object would need to be nonrandom and reasonably complicated
to interest the student of extraterrestrial [or artificial] life. We have already seen that a great deal of
information is needed to specify the structure of a complicated nonrandom object. It may be
concluded that anything that we would want to call `living' would have to have a high information
content [that is, be specified by a large number of instructions]. (p.192)
A concept closely related to the computational theory of life (CTL), viz. artificial life (or
A-Life), is described in section 4.6.6. However, before discussing that concept it is
necessary to examine some notions associated with the concept of life.
4.6.3. The Continuum Hypothesis
Life can be interpreted on an emergentist framework in essentially two ways: (1) as a

discrete (or binary) property which appears with a specific organization of the non-living
substrate; and (2) as a property which is continuous with the other properties of the non-
living substrate. An early advocate of a discrete-essentialist approach was Broad (1925)
who maintained that "all bodies which would be said to be àlive' behave differently in
many ways from all bodies which would be said not to be àlive' [emphasis added]."
(p.53) This position was also advanced by von Neumann (1966) who postulated a
threshold of complexity separating `simple' systems from `complex' systems; according
to this view, the former are able to produce systems of lower complexity only, whereas
the latter, by contrast, are able to create systems of higher complexity than themselves.
Hence, according to von Neumann, life necessitates a certain degree of complexity.
Bennett (1990) has contested this view on the grounds that it fails to differentiate
between potential and actual complexity. In support of this contention, he cites the
example of a corpse: It is structurally complex and, on a computationalist view, structure
(form, syntax) implies function. But is it alive given that the function is not being
computed, that is, actualized ? This necessitates a consideration of the distinction
between programs and processes (chapter 2). On the computationalist view, the former
are potentially the latter whereas the latter are actualizations of the former. The problem
then becomes how to transform a program into a process, that is, how to convert
something which is static into something which is dynamic. Including a physical
substrate (`hardware') on which the program (`software') executes is unacceptable from
a computationalist perspective since computation would then be supervenient on matter
and hence, non-ontological in a primordial sense.
Levy (1992) provides the following overview of the continuum hypothesis:
Some scientists suggest that the definition-of-life question is a red herring. Life, they say, should be
gauged on a continuum, and not granted according to binary decision. A rock would certainly be low
on any continuum of aliveness, and a dog, a tree, and a human being would rank highly. More
ambiguous systems would fall in a middle region of semi-aliveness - somewhere below bacteria,
which almost everyone agrees are alive, and somewhere above rocks. Viruses, which some biologists
consider living and others do not, would reside in the upper reaches of this middle ground. Below that
would would be complex systems that no one really considers to be alive but that display some
behaviours consistent with living organisms - things such as the economy and automobiles. (pp.6-7)
This position is endorsed by Farmer (1991) who also maintains that life should be
considered as a continuum property of organizational patterns, with some more or less
alive than others. Levy further states that "there is a particular advantage in regarding life
in this manner: using systems that no one would classify as truly alive, biologists could
nonetheless isolate the qualities of life." (p.7) Godfrey-Smith (1994) describes three
versions of the continuum thesis based on an analysis of Spencer and Dewey's
approaches to the mind-life relation, viz.
Ontological
Weak Continuity: Anything that has a mind is alive, although not everything that is alive has a mind. Cognition
is an activity of living systems.
Strong Continuity: Life and mind have a common abstract pattern or set of basic organizational properties. The
functional properties characteristic of mind are an enriched version of the functional properties which are
fundamental to life in general. Mind is literally life-like.
Methodological
Methodological Continuity: Understanding mind requires understanding the role it plays within entire living
systems. Cognition should be investigated in this whole organism context. (p.83)
Weak continuity is closely related to the discrete life hypothesis as described above
whereas strong continuity may be identified as the continuum hypothesis proper. Orgel's
(1973) position on this issue is interesting:
It follows immediately that any `living' system must come into existence either as a consequence of
a long evolutionary process or a miracle .. At first, replicating structures are formed that have low but
nonzero information content. Natural selection leads to the development of a series of structures of
increasing complexity and information content, until one is formed which we are prepared to call
`living'. (p.192)
This statement can be interpreted as asserting that life is ontically continuous with yet
epistemically distinct from matter, a view which is consistent with the emergence-
relative-to-a-model concept (chapter 3) described by Cariani (1991) in which ontological
reductionism without epistemological reductionism is maintained. Pattee (1989) defines
the problem of life in terms of the measurement problem, viz. the production of records.
However, in addition to the `downwards' problem of explaining life in terms which are
consistent with a physico-chemical ontology, there is also an ùpwards problem', viz.
explaining the emergence of mind, more specifically consciousness, from a non-mental
substrate (chapter 7). Adoption of either thesis (continuum or discrete) necessitates
describing life at two complementary levels, viz.
Level 1 - `building blocks' or components of life (physical-chemical explanation)

Level 2 - `characteristics' or properties of life (biological explanation)
The discrete-continuum issue conceals a much deeper problem, viz. the monism-
pluralism issue with respect to categorial ontology (chapters 3, 5, 6 and 7). For example,
Needham (1974) maintains that
it would be correct to say that the living differs from the dead in degree and not in kind because it is
on a higher plane of complexity of organization, but it would also be correct to say that it differs in
kind, since the laws of this higher organization only operate there. (p.55)
The question is whether or not the laws at the higher level are ontologically reducible to
those at the lower level. If not, then a form of ontological pluralism is necessary. A
difference of degree implies an intra-categorial difference whereas a difference of kind
implies an inter-categorial distinction. Intra-categorial difference tends towards
categorial monism whereas inter-categorial distinction tends towards categorial
pluralism. Although it is possible to assert an inter-categorial pluralism with respect to
epistemology while maintaining an intra-categorial monism with respect to ontology and,
in fact, this is the position adopted by most proponents of the concept of emergence
(chapter 3), this does not solve the category problem (chapter 7) since the latter is
ontological not epistemological. It is interesting to note that category problems (of one
kind or another) are ubiquitous throughout naturality and artificiality. For example, in
the context of a discussion of artificial life (section 4.6.6), Bedau (1991) assumes a
Cartesian position with respect to the life-mind relation in maintaining that
the simulation-or-reality debate seems more tractable in artificial life than in artificial intelligence
because ALife can sidestep some of AI's sharpest thorns - life need not involve subjectivity and self-
consciousness. (p.498)
However, Bedau's assertion that
progress on ALife's simulation-or-reality debate might even help break the impasse in the analogous
debate in AI (p.498)
is problematic because of the other-minds problem (section 4.5.5) and the possibility of
ontological pluralism with respect to the categories of subjectivity and objectivity, viz.
ontological subjectivity cannot be reduced to ontological objectivity (chapter 7).
4.6.4. Life and Functionalism
A functionalist approach to life is implicit within Orgel's (1973) information-theoretic

formulation of the concept (section 4.6.2). This move, involving a dualistic separation
of form from matter and the identification of necessary vital properties with the former,
is supported by Simons (1983) who maintains that
living systems can be recognized according to how they process information and energy, how they
are structured, how they behave, and so on, rather than by the specific chemistries by which they
accomplish their tasks [emphasis added]. (p.6)
According to Simons, "the idea that life can be recognized independently of the
substance out of which it is constructed derives support from modern functionalism ..
Functionalism is largely concerned with mental phenomena but some of its elements are
equally applicable, mutatis mutandis, to an identification of the characteristics whereby
life is to be recognized." (pp.7-8) In support of this position, Sober (1991) states that
recent philosophers of biology have made the [functionalist] point by arguing that an organism's
fitness is the upshot of its physical properties even though fitness itself is not a physical property.
What do a fit cockroach and a fit zebra have in common ? Not any physical property, any more than
a wood and wire mousetrap must have something physical in common with a human mouse catcher.
Fitness is multiply realizable. (p.753)
Sober is led to assert that "behaviourism is a mistake in psychology, but it may be the
right view to take about many biological properties." (p.759) This view is based on the
assumption that the causal mechanism involved in, for example, photosynthesis within
plant cells is both (1) objectively describable (epistemological assumption) and (2)
objective in nature (ontological assumption). This ontic and, as a corollary, epistemic
objectivity makes Turing Tests for life (section 4.6.8) a realistic possibility; furthermore,
the separation of form from matter and the association of behaviour with the former
provides support for the multiple-realizability thesis, and thereby, the CTL. As Simon
(1983) states,
if a system can reproduce and also handle energy and information in appropriate ways then the system
has a claim to be regarded as living. A corollary is that the genesis of the system is irrelevant. A
mechanically assembled system [or artifactual system] may reasonably be regarded as living if its
internal functions and behaviour in the world fulfil the necessary criteria. (p.7)
It should be noted that functionalist, essentialist accounts of life are ahistorical with
respect to poisis (coming-forth or becoming). However, it may well be the case, as will
be argued in chapter 6, that the nature of poisis places constraints on Being such that
(i) the Being (that is, ontology) of naturals and the being of artificials (as artifactuals) are
necessarily distinct ontological modalities and (ii) the possibilities for emergence in the
former are essentially different from those associated with the latter50.
Prior to examining vitalistic functionalism in the context of A-Life (section 4.6.6), it is

worthwhile briefly examining a case study.
4.6.5. Bedau's Concept of Life: A Case Study
Bedau (1996) begins by asserting that "we can only search for life if we have a prior
conception of what life is." (p.333) This view is consistent with the hermeneutic solution
to the recognition problem described in section 4.5.1. He considers three alternative
conceptions of life, viz.
1. life as a loose cluster of properties (or Wittgensteinian family resemblances)

2. life as a specific set of properties (the essentialist thesis)
3. life as metabolization
He regards (1) as "a fall-back position that can be justified only after all candidate
unified views have failed." (p.335) After discussing various essentialist conceptions of
50
Specifically, that naturals support open ontological emergence whereas artificials (as artifactuals) support
closed (or bounded) emergence (chapters 6 and 7).
life (2), Bedau concludes that what is missing from all such accounts is a unifying cause,
that is, a single cause which is responsible for generating the diverse range of properties
that can be associated with life. With respect to (3), Bedau maintains that "any possible
form of life that persists in the face of the second law of thermodynamics apparently
must have a metabolization .. [Thus], metabolization is at least a necessary condition of
all physical forms of life." (p.337) However, metabolization is not a sufficient condition
since this would entail viewing candle flames and vortices as living entities, a position
which conflicts with scientific intuition. Furthermore, it is doubtful whether
metabolization can account for the other properties characteristic of life.
For this reason, Bedau proposes a conception of life defined in terms of the evolutionary
process of adaptation, referring to "the suppleness of the adaptive process and its
unending capacity to produce novel solutions to unanticipated changes in the problems
of surviving, reproducing, or, more generally, flourishing [emphasis added]." (p.338) He
further maintains that "natural selection will yield supple adaptation only if the criteria
for selection change as the system evolves." (p.339) These views in combination lead
Bedau to assert that
the entity that is living in the primary sense of that term is the supplely adapting system itself. Other
entities that are living are living in a secondary sense by virtue of bearing an appropriate relationship
to a supplely adapting system. (p.339)
On this basis, a definition of life is proposed, viz.
A x is living iff x is living1 or x is living2.

B x is living1 iff x is a system undergoing supple adaptation.
C x is living2 iff there is some living1 system y such that either (1) x meets condition A1 and y meets
condition B1 and x bears relation C1 to y or (2) x meets condition A2 and y meets condition B2 and x
bears relation C2 to y or ... or (n) x meets condition An and y meets condition Bn and x bears relation
Cn to y.
Bedau states that "whereas some might refer only to a system's capacity [or potentiality]
to undergo supple adaptation, I hold that life involves the exercise [or actualization] of
this capacity. For me the key is not supple adaptability but supple adaptation." (p.340)
Hence, Bedau's scheme meet's Bennett's criticism of von Neumann with respect to
potential and actual complexity (section 4.6.3).
Bedau's definition is important because it is able to handle anomalous cases such as

viruses and mules, the latter of which are clearly living yet non-reproductive. As Bedau
states, "these infertile organisms exist only because of their connections with other,
fertile organisms which do play an active role in a biosphere that undergoes supple
adaptation." (p.340). (On Bedau's scheme, viruses and mules would be classified as
living2.) However, Davidge (1992) has contested the validity of this `populational'
approach, arguing that "life does not occur at the general level, it occurs at the individual
level; it is not populations that are alive, but individuals." (p.450) In response, Bedau
states that,
one might worry that it is a category mistake to think that an evolving system could be alive. This
worry originates with the idea that individual organisms are the entities that are alive and concludes
that life cannot be a population undergoing supple adaptation, since the whole evolving population
of organisms is of a different logical category from an individual organism. However, this objection
has no force for those who are seeking the fundamental explanation of the diversity of living
phenomena. Supple adaptation would provide this explanation even though an individual living
organism is itself only a small and transitory part of the whole adapting population." (p.340)
As stated previously, Bedau identifies supple adaptation with the open-ended evolution
of adaptive traits, viz. "if we continually see (on a relatively long time scale) new clusters
of traits that are persistently used (on a relatively short time scale) significantly more
than would be expected in the absence of adaptation, then we have positive evidence for
the occurrence of the process of supple adaptation." (p.346) A quantitative metric for
measuring supple adaptation based on trait usage is defined which leads him to assert that
"a system's level of vitality V(t) reflects the extent to which new significant adaptations
are arising and persisting. So if we view life as supple adaptation, we can use a system's
vitality V(t) to define the degree to which it is living or involves life. By this sort of
means, a system's usage distribution U(t,u) and vitality V(t) could figure centrally in the
explanation of the system's supple adaptation, and perhaps even the explanation of the
extent to which the system involves life." (p.354)
The concept of supple adaptation is a development of the idea of intrinsic adaptation

introduced in (Packard,89) and subsequently refined in (Bedau,91). In intrinsic-
adaptation, teleology is an a posteriori or teleonomically-emergent property of the
system while in extrinsic-adaptation, systemic teleology is specified a priori. Naturalistic
evolution is held to be the paradigmatic instance of the former while genetic algorithms
and learning in supervised artificial neurals nets may be identified as examples of the
latter. However, there is a problem with both supple adaptation and intrinsic adaptation.
Davidge (1992) maintains that living systems must only be teleological in an a posteriori
sense and Bedau (1991) supports this position. However, while the teleology at the
global (systemic, populational) level is assumed to be emergent or a posteriori, it is in
fact parasitic on the a priori teleology of components (that is, individuals) at the local
level. In the computational models investigated by Bedau and Packard, the components
are `bugs' whose behaviour (ethology) is limited to foraging. However, foraging is a
teleological activity. Hence, the global a posteriori teleology of the bug population is
supervenient on the local a priori teleology of individual bugs. Hence, contrary to claims
made by Bedau (1991, 1994), teleology - at least in this case - is not emergent in the
sense of an inter-categorial distinction or difference of kind (section 4.6.3). What is
required is the emergence of teleology in a non-teleological substrate via some form of
self-organizing process (chapter 3). Although Bedau and Packard's models do not
provide such a substrate, since their model tacitly assumes a teleological substrate (bug
ethology) as ontologically primitive, other models have been proposed which do provide,
at least in theory, the necessary framework. These are briefly examined in chapter 5. One
potential candidate is Tierra (Ray,91), an A-Life ecosystem in which organisms are

identified with self-replicating code segments within the `virtual machine' universe
(chapters 2 and 5) provided by the CPU and RAM of a computer. It is often claimed by
computationalists that teleological behaviour in Tierra is a posteriori or emergent.
However, upon closer inspection this assertion can be shown to be false. For example,
competition for resources is explicitly coded into the Tierran universe. As Ray (1994)
himself states,
evolving digital organisms will compete for access to the limited resources of memory space and CPU
time, and evolution will generate adaptations for the more agile access to and the more efficient use
of these resources. (p.14)
However, competition is a teleological activity. Furthermore, and perhaps more

importantly, Tierran organisms are not primordially-emergent, that is, they do not
emerge from the computational substrate in which they are embedded via self-
organization; rather the Tierran `world' has to first be `seeded' with a primitive
population of replicators which, under Darwinian evolution, evolves to generate
organisms of increasing diversity and complexity. As Ray (1991) admits,
while the origin of life [that is, primordial biotic emergence] is generally recognized as an event of
the first order, there is another event in the history of life that is less well known but of comparable
significance: the origin of biological diversity and macroscopic multicellular life during the Cambrian
explosion 600 million years ago .. The work presented here aims to parallel the second major event
in the history of life, the origin of diversity. Rather than atempting to create prebiotic conditions from
which life may emerge, this approach involves engineering over the early history of life to design
complex evolvable organisms, and then attempting to create the conditions that will set off a
spontaneous evolutionary process of increasing diversity and complexity of organisms .. From a
single rudimentary ancestral creature [or `seed'] containing only the code for self-replication,
interactions such as parasitism .. hyer-parasitism, sociality, and cheating have emerged spontaneously
The crucial point to appreciate in the context of the present discussion is the non-
emergence of teleology in the categorial sense. Hence, rather than demonstrating how
teleology may be reduced to the non-teleological, such studies in fact support the
hypothesis that teleology is a categorial primitive, that is, teleology is ontological. This
is consistent with the Aristotelian claim that final causation constitutes a primitive, non-
reducible type of causation (chapter 6).
4.6.6. Artificial Life (A-Life)
Langton (1989b) defines artificial life (A-Life) as
the study of man-made [artifactual] systems that exhibit behavious characteristic of natural living
systems. It complements the traditional biological sciences concerned with the analysis of living
organisms by attempting to synthesize life-like behaviours within computers and other artificial
media. By extending the empirical foundations upon which biology is based beyond the carbon-chain
life that has evolved on Earth, Artificial Life can contribute to theoretical biology by locating life-as-
we-know-it within the larger picture of life-as-it-could-be. (p.1)
While criticizing A-Life researchers for their naivety with respect to adherence to
technical detail, Miller (1995) asserts that "`life as it could be', logically and extra-
terrestrially" (p.17) constitutes a valid research programme for A-Life. However, Miller
goes on to state that "A-Life, despite its pretenses to expanding the scope of possible
biologies, has been tied far too tightly to real biology." (p.20) This statement refers to
the problem of distinguishing necessary from contingent properties and its solution will
determine the extent to which life in general is coupled to the specificity of terrestrial
life. Belew (1991) maintains that "ALife's goal is to abstract the `logical form' of life,
independent of the particulars of the carbon-based biological life (BLife) forms that arose
on this planet and with which biology is almost exclusively concerned." (p.8) This
position is supported by Langton (1989b) who asserts that
life is a property of form, not matter, a result of the organization of matter rather than something that
inheres in matter itself .. It is effects, not things, upon which life is based - life is a kind of behaviour,
not a kind of stuff - and as such, it is constituted of simpler behaviours, not simpler stuff. (p.41)
The A-Life approach can be summarized as follows:
Whereas biology has largely concerned itself with the material basis of life, Artificial Life is
concerned with the formal basis of life .. [It] starts at the bottom, viewing an organism as a large
population of simple machines, and works upwards synthetically from there - constructing large
aggregates of simple, rule-governed objects which interact with one another nonlinearly in the support
of life-like, global dynamics. The `key' concept in AL is emergent behaviour. (p.2)
This leads to the following methodology within A-Life research (Langton,89b):
Q bottom-up rather than top-down modelling

Q local rather than global control
Q simple rather than complex specifications
Q emergent rather than prespecified behaviour
Q population rather than individual simulation
The above methodology is based on three assumptions, viz.
1. "that the `logical form' of an organism can be separated from its material basis of construction, and
that àliveness' will be found to be a property of the former, not of the latter." (Langton,89b;p.11)
2. "that the essential nature of the fundamental principles of life can be captured in relatively simple
models." (Bedau,92;p.494)
3. The continuum hypothesis (section 4.6.3) : "the ALife-AI claim is, `The smartest dumb thing you can
do is stay alive.' That is, ALife represents a lower bound for AI." (Belew,91;p.9)
Emmeche (1993) presents five different conceptions of life: (p.559)

Q GOFBO: Good Old Fashioned Biological Organisms

Q MOMACE: Modern Macromolecular-based Cells
Q ABLI: Abstract Life (in a biochemical medium or formal/symbolic space)
Q ROLI: Robotic Life (animats, nanobots, neo-cybernetic systems etc)
Q CYBERLIFE: life-like structures in virtual realities
Wheeler (1996) defines an animat as an artificial animal or artificial autonomous agent,

whereby the latter is meant
any adaptive system which, while in continuous long-term interaction with its environment, actively
behaves so as to achieve certain goals. (p.210)
The animat approach has been investigated by Steels (1994) in the context of an
exploration of assumption (3), viz. the continuum hypothesis. However, it will not be
examined further in the context of the present discussion since it is a non-computational51
form of A-Life. Various problems associated with life have been studied and the results
of such investigations presented in the proceedings of the A-Life conferences
(Langton,89a) (Langton,91a) (Varela,92) (Langton,93) (Brooks,94b) (Moran,95): For
example, self-organization, the origin of life, evolutionary dynamics (punctuated
equilibria, coevolution, Lamarckism etc), learning and communication, cultural
evolution, and philosophical issues such as necessary-contingency and necessity-
sufficiency problems with respect to the properties of life, matter-form relations and the
simulation-realization issue. Most such investigations take place ìn silico', that is, in
computational media (or substrates). According to Langton (1989b),
computers provide an alternative medium [to `wet' carbon-chain chemistry] within which to attempt
to synthesize life. Modern computer technology has resulted in machinery with tremendous potential
for the creation of life in silico. (p.39)
Langton goes on to list the following properties of computational (or in silico) A-Life:
1. They consist of simple programs or specifications.
2. There is no single program that directs all of the other programs (ie: distributed control).
3. Each program details the way in which a simple entity reacts to local situations in its environment,
including encounters with other entities.
4. There are no rules in the system that dictate global behaviour (This is not strictly correct; the 'physics'
of the computational substrate is a global unifying property of the system).
5. Any behaviour at levels higher than the individual programs is therefore emergent.
Support for the in silico approach to A-Life is provided by Orgel (1973) who maintains,
51
Non-computational because not completely computational in ontology: Robotic A-Life may contain formal,
computational elements; however, the former cannot be abstractly specified completely in terms of the latter.
in the context of a discussion of the genetic program, that
nothing comparable to it exists in the inanimate world, except for manmade computers. (p.55)
Additional support for the computational approach to A-Life is implicit in one of the
foundational concepts underlying computationalism and conventional AI, viz. the
physical symbol system hypothesis or PSSH (chapter 2). Statements by Newell et al.
(1976) in which computers are referred to as "our organism, the machine" (p.113) and
assertions such as "the machine - not just the hardware, but the programmed, living
machine - is the organism we study" (p.113) establish a clear link between the PSSH, the
CTL and A-Life.
4.6.7."Strong" and "Weak" A-Life
"Strong" and "weak" positions corresponding to those defined for AI can be established
for A-Life. Belew (1991) defines the "strong" position as follows:
ALife simulations are, or at least can become, first-class examples of living systems. (pp.12-13)
However, a more precise formulation, distinguishing "strong" from "weak" A-Life, is

presented by Kawata et al. (1994):
In the weak approaches, Artificial Life programs are made to simulate the life of known, existing
organisms in order to understand the processes of real organisms. In the strong approach, researchers
try to create Artificial Life, and search for the nature of life that may or may not be found on Earth.
(p.417)
Miller (1995) distinguishes between "strong" and "weak" A-Life as follows, viz.
`strong A-Life' (computer processes as realizations of living systems) versus `weak A-Life' (computer
processes as simulations of living systems). (p.21)
Emmeche (1991) identifies "strong" (realization) and "weak" (simulation) theses

associated with three forms of A-Life, viz. (i) computational (`software'), (ii) robotic
(`hardware') and (iii) chemical (`wetware'). Additionally, two multiple-realizability
positions are defined, viz. (1) "the thesis of medium-dependent life in multiple possible
media" (p.83), and (2) the Platonic/formalist thesis of medium-independent life
connected with notions of either self-organization and emergence or a qualitative set of
life criteria. On the first view, physicality (that is, material embodiment) is a necessary
condition for life while on the second view it is a merely contingent property.
Before examining a Turing Test for life, it is worthwhile reconsidering a problem which
was introduced earlier in the context of mind and which has a direct bearing on the
simulation-realization issue. In section 4.5.8, the idea that the simulation of intentionality
is identical to intentionality was briefly investigated and shown to be based on the
assumption that intentionality and information processing belong to the same ontological
category. A similar claim can be made in the context of the CTL or A-Life. For example,
Taylor et al. (1989) maintain that in RAM, an A-Life ecosystem simulator, it is observed
that
the life of an organism is in many ways similar to the execution of a program and .. the global
(emergent) behaviour of a population of interacting organisms is best emulated by the behaviour of
a corresponding population of co-executing programs [emphasis added]. (p.275)
The same argument originally presented in section 4.5.8 in the context of the CTMi can
be applied here, viz. emulation (or realization) can only be applied intra-categorially and
it is precisely whether or not life and computation belong to the same category that is to
be established52.
4.6.8. A Turing Test for Life
The Turing Test was described in section 4.3.6. In terms of the presentation introduced
there, a Turing Test for life would involve replacing the computer, A, with a
computational A-Lifeform and replacing the human subject, B, with a living organism.
A would then attempt to replicate the behaviour of B. The Turing Test for life assumes
with Sober (section 4.6.4) that life is an objectively definable physical phenomenon.
Consequently, the partition separating A and B from the interrogator, C, must be
relocated. (The function of the partition is to conceal the ontology of the participants
from the interrogator such that immediate classification on the basis of non-essential
evidence is prevented.) Defining the partition in a computational A-Life context is
problematic: If A and B must be observed directly, it will be obvious which is the natural
life-form and which the A-Lifeform. A possible solution to this problem involves
adopting a definition of life such as that presented by Bedau (section 4.6.5) and
comparing indirect evidence of lifelike behaviour, for example, trait usage (that is, allele
expression) statistics in a population of organisms. The problem with this approach is
that it may not always be possible to gain access to details regarding the corresponding
parameter in the natural organism.
There are other problems with the Turing Test for life. As Moreno et al. (1994) state,
"we still do not know what is contingent and what is essential - universal - in the basic
mechanisms of living phenomena." (p.406) However, it should be recognized that the
mere statement of the necessary-contingency problem as a problem assumes
52
However, Keeley (1993) contests this position on the grounds that the first-person problems associated with
mind and consciousness do not extend to life which, on the conventional biological view, is a third-person (or
ontologically-objective) phenomenon in the same way that information-processing or computation is a third-
person phenomenon. This position may, in turn, be contested following Searle (1992, 1995), Tallis (1994) and
Lanier (1995b), who maintains that computation as distinct from intrinsic natural phenomena such as life is
an extrinsic phenomenon that is ontologically-dependent on human beings.
functionalistic-essentialism a priori; that is, the very possibility of defining a Turing Test
for life necessitates holding life to be definable in functionalistically-essentialist terms
and not to be a cluster concept. Additionally, as Emmeche (1992) states,
it is not clear what kind of criteria can be used to evaluate theories and models of `life as it could be'
in a non-trivial subset of possible worlds .. As anything is possible in pure imagination, AL has to
take recourse to the earthly biology to see if a particular instance of an artificially constructed model
of life has a plausible behaviour. (p.468)
This point is extremely important since it draws attention to the necessarily geocentric
(or earth-centred) nature of Turing Tests for life and, by implication, to the fact that a
categorial `cut' (chapter 6) must be made in order to classify an A-Lifeform as a
simulation or realization (instantiation) of life.
On the basis of such criticisms, Davidge (1992) maintains that "there is no [currently
existing] test equivalent to the Turing Test of AI" (p.448). However, he offers the
following as an element of a possible Turing Test for life: "AL systems can be judged
on the correspondence between their proposed level of biological analogy and their
implementation primitives." (p.453) In this connection, the following table listing
analogies between hardware and wetware is presented:
Natural Life Artificial Life
energy energy
atom electron
carbon silicon
molecule transistor
biochemical process logic gate
organelle ALU, registers
cell processor
multicellular multiprocessor
Table 4.3 Vitalistic analogies between wetware and hardware.
However, this approach is incompatible with an in silico or computationalist - that is,

software - approach to A-Life53. For this reason, other formulations of the Turing Test
for life must be considered. Pattee (1989) maintains that A-Lifeforms should (in order
to be testable against empirical real-world evidence) only be delimited by adherence to
universal physical laws and natural selection. He holds that "strong" emergence
(realization as opposed to simulation) could form the basis of a Turing Test for life if
there was consensus on how to recognize emergent behaviour. However, identifying life
53
Strictly-speaking, this criticism is incorrect since computationalism supports the construction of virtual machine
hierarchies (chapter 2 and 5) and hence, the substitution of hardware by software and visa-versa; in short,
computational (or software) analogues of hardware analogues of wetware are possible, in which case Davidge's
definition of the Turing Test for A-Life may be valid.
with emergence is problematic since although emergence is a necessary condition for life
(assuming an evolutionary perspective), it is clearly not a sufficient condition: For
example, NaCl is emergent from Na and Cl, yet is not viewed as living (chapter 3).
Pattee clarifies his position by identifying a particular concept of emergence, viz.
measurement, as characteristic of living systems. On his view,
new measurements can be considered as one of the more fundamental test cases for emergent
behaviour in artificial life models. For this purpose, we may define a generalized measurement as a
record stored in the organism of some type of classification of the environment. This classification
must be realized by a measuring device constructed by the organism. The survival of the organism
depends on the choice and quality of these classifications, and the evolution of the organism [or
species] will depend on its continuing invention of new devices that realize new classifications.
(pp.73-74)
Consequently, Pattee is led to maintain that
by formalization of life, one may be throwing out the whole problem, that is the problem of the
relation of symbol to matter (p.69).
He presents three possibilities for the symbol-matter mapping, viz.
1. we can simulate everything by universal symbol systems (PSSs).

2. we can realize universal symbol systems with material constructions.
3. we can realize endless types of structures and behaviours by symbolic constraints on matter. (p.70)
On this framework, it appears that "strong" computationalism - that is, realization as

opposed to simulation - is impossible. However, it is an open question whether or not
matter can be reduced to computation (in which case the symbol-matter distinction
becomes merely epistemic). In short, if a computational interpretation of matter is
possible, Pattee's classification of computational A-Lifeforms as necessarily simulations
("weak" A-Life) must be invalid. A computational conception of matter is described in
section 4.7 and chapter 5.
Finally, it is worthwhile examining a claim by Davidge (1992) to the effect that

"intelligence and life are inseparable. If you recognize one, you will recognize the other."
(p.448) If Penrose's position, viz. intelligence is inseparable from awareness and
consciousness (section 4.5.4), is accepted, then life is seen both to imply and be implied
by consciousness. This view leads to a form of panpsychism (chapter 1) with respect to
the phenomena of life and mind. However, according to Keeley (1993), life is an
ontologically-objective phenomenon whereas consciousness is an ontologically-
subjective phenomenon; consequently, it is possible to pass a Turing Test for life on the
basis of objective behavioural evidence and yet fail a Turing Test for mind (more
precisely, consciousness) because of the other-minds problem (section 4.5.5)54.
4.6.9. Problems with the CTL
There are a number of issues associated with the computational theory of life (CTL). In
this section, five related problem areas are identified and briefly discussed, viz. (i)
abstaction, (ii) physicality, (iii) embeddedness, (iv) hermeneutics, and (v) morphization.
4.6.9.1. Abstraction
Rosen (1993) maintains that "understanding how something works also tells you how to
build it, and conversely." (p.93) According to Rosen, in a machine, epistemology and
ontology coincide (a position which is explored in detail in chapters 6 and 7). A machine
is "fractionable" or decomposable (chapter 3), that is, can be partitioned into components
which can be analyzed separately and then synthesized to produce the original machine.
This allows for the separation of structure from function and supports the possibility of
multiple realization. However, Rosen argues that life is non-fractionable: For example,
the engine and airfoil of a bird (a natural) is its wing. In this case, two functions are
located within one physical structure; in an aeroplane, by contrast, engine and airfoil are
separate structures. Taking the bird apart kills the bird whereas taking the plane apart
does not prevent it from being put back together again55.
Emmeche (1992), while accepting the possibility of system decomposition in principle,

questions whether or not
life [is] a multi-media-realizable phenomenon because it is intrinsically computational, or because

the form of movement of any specific natural phenomenon (that can be described by an algorithm)
can be realized by a computational setup. (p.467)
The CTL is based on the assumption that what is essential to life is a pattern of
movement, a dynamic processual organization which is formalizable in computational
terms. However, this view assumes a priori (1) that the matter-form distinction is valid
and that form can be objectively abstracted from matter and (2) that matter itself,
ultimately reduces to form (chapter 2 and section 4.7.6). This commitment to realism
within the context of the CTL is criticized by Emmeche who provides implicit support
for observational-relativism (chapter 3) in his adoption of a semiotic perspective, viz.
54
In defense of Davidge, Keeley might argue that it is not the former's position that is incorrect, but Penrose's
assertion of a necessary link between intelligence and consciousness. On this view, emergentism is retained
while panpsychism is rejected.
55
Interestingly, Simon (1969) cites the same example, viz. bird and aeroplane, in arguing the case in favour of
functional decomposition. However, his argument is at a purely conceptual level, and hence, does not conflict
with Rosen's position.
our models of the logic of living systems are not necessarily instances of the true logic inherent in the
very systems themselves .. The physical/chemical processes within an organism are of a different
kind, described by a different set of theories, than the processes within a computer running some
programme. Their functions may be similar on some level of description, but the inherent logic of the
processes, on the physical/chemical level (and probably on higher levels as well), is likely to be
different. (p.469)
While contesting realism in the context of computationalism, the matter-form distinction

is held to be valid; consequently, he accepts the possibility that life may be a
computational phenomenon although the concept of computation (chapter 2) would have
to be redefined in a vital (that is, biological) context. However, if computation is an
artifactual concept and if life is a computational phenomenon, it follows that life must
be artifactual. This view is unacceptable on a naturalistic evolutionary (specifically Neo-
Darwinian) framework. There are two possible solutions to this problem: Either (1)
computation is a natural phenomenon or (2) life is a non-computational phenomenon56.
Emmeche (1992) lists three objections to functionalism and the multiple-realizability

thesis, viz.
1. It does not guarantee that our formalization of specific systems - whether mental, biological, or
physical - can catch all the essential factors that govern such a system. There might even be aspects
of the system that are in principle unformalizable.
2. The construction (of any material kind) that implements the formal structure .. is still in need of our
interpretation in order to give any meaning .. semantics is not intrinsic to syntax.
3. The functioning of a construction implementing some formal structure may well be functionally
equivalent to other implementations (or realizations) on one chosen level of description, while on
another level it may show dissimilar properties that from a biological point of view may seriously
affect its chances of survival in a realistic environment (pp.471-472).
Three issues are identified: (i) the possibly irreducible role of matter in life, (ii) the
importance of hermeneutics or interpretation in the context of formal-computational
systems, and (iii) abstraction, which has been dealt with already. However, what is most
significant from the point of view of this study and yet which is not included in the above
list is the assertion that "one cannot separate cognition from volition and emotion [since]
these `psychical' properties are features of genuine biological processes. As the `psyche'
of man or animal in this sense is medium-dependent, so is a living organism's teleonomic
orientation and relation to its environment." (p.472) This point, which is central to the
critique of computationalism presented in this thesis, will be examined separately in
chapter 7. In the remainder of this section, two problems associated with embodiment
(physicality and embeddedness) and two problems associated with interpretation
56
In chapters 6 and 7, explicit arguments will be presented against (1) and implicit arguments in favour of (2).
(hermeneutics and morphization) will be examined57.
4.6.9.2. Physicality
In defense of the view that embodiment or physicality is an important, perhaps

necessary, condition for vitality, Emmeche (1992) presents instances of biological
phenomena58 involving processes which are apparently 59 incapable of being described
in purely computational terms. In support of this position, Moreno et al. (1994) maintain
that a strict formalist approach to modelling life will ultimately prove unsuccessful
because information implicit in the dynamics associated with matter cannot be
completely captured in a formal representation. They argue that
if it were the case that the relations among components arise from their material properties, the
complex organization of living systems could not be fully understood except by recourse to the
properties of living matter. (p.407)
In support of this contention, they cite an example, the problem of self-reference,

maintaining that "it is not very clear that a self-reference understood as a syntactic
connectivity of components is enough to explain other living phenomena such as self-
reproduction or evolution. Those seem to require some sort of semantics that appears to
be very much in-built in the specific materials that take part in the living organization."
(p.408) Thus, consideration of the embodiment issue leads directly to two related
problems, viz. embeddedness and hermeneutics. The link between the two is the notion
of truth: Computationalism assumes an axiomatic variant of the coherence theory of truth
whereas hylomorphic (Cariani,91) or hybrid computationalist-physicalist schemes
assume some variant of the correspondence theory (chapter 3). Moreno et al. (1994) also
hold that
any formal or computational model has to code directly or indirectly all the information that specifies
the behaviour of the system. Therefore, if a given material structure has in-built information we
should go down into the lower level of specification until the properties only derive from the
computational primitives present in the model. (p.408)
However, is this possible ? What level of analysis is necessary or/and sufficient for
capturing the behavioural dynamics of a living system ? If Emmeche (1992) is correct,
any such attempts at decomposition and synthesis will of necessity be observationally-
relativistic (chapter 3). Alternatively, it might be the case that all levels are important,
57
It should be appreciated, however, that issues associated with embodiment and interpretation are also linked.
58
For example, metabolic pathways within cells, generation of three-dimensional structures during DNA and
protein folding etc.
59
It is important to include this condition because it has not yet been established whether or not matter can be
redefined in computational terms (section 4.7.6).
that is, the organization must be `correct' all the way down, in which case functionalism
would be incorrect. Randall (1996) has argued that on a Platonistic view, matter
ultimately reduces to a duality of form and void; hence, any properties associated with
matter must ultimately derive from a particular type of form or organization (chapter 2).
Thus, a formalist decomposition is logically possible assuming Platonism; however, this
approach can be contested on (at least) two grounds: (i) epistemic - it is impossible to
ensure that a lowest level of analysis has been attained. That is, it is impossible to be
certain that the behavioural atoms or primitives in a system are primitive; (ii) ontic -
forms are static and hence, cannot account for the dynamics of living systems (Zeno's
paradoxes of motion). A formalist decomposition is problematic since it necessitates a
non-formalist substrate in which to be realized (or actualized)60 . Software requires
hardware on which to execute; hence, the elements in the software-hardware duality,
although functionally-interchangeable, cannot be reduced to a monism of either
component. Emmeche (1991) supports this critique maintaining that
the `reproduced' entities [in computational systems] do not really as intended contain all the
information needed for determining the process of reproduction. From a purely formal point of view
this may be the case, but the physical machine that realizes the process, and which is not reproduced,
supports the embedding universe of the reproducing automata and acts as a co-determiner of the
process, but is itself not determined by it [emphasis added]. (p.85)
Appeals to virtual machine hierarchies (chapters 2 and 5) do not resolve the problem,
according to Emmeche, since "there is still an additional external machine whose
determination does not depend on the process of reproduction." (p.85) As Moreno et al.
(1994) state, "(1) there is a deep entanglement between logical form or `software' and
material structure or `hardware' (part of the information is implicit in the structure of the
components) and (2) an independence between organization and structure would require
to make explicit the information that specifies the organization." (p.409) On this basis,
Emmeche (1991) maintains that "in an autonomous living system, we cannot make the
distinction between the entity being reproduced and an ultimate machine whose
properties do not depend on the process of reproduction and which is not reproduced
itself." (p.85) However, this view is problematic since a distinction is made between the
dynamic reproducing entity and the (assumed) static physico-chemical natural laws
which provide the ontological substrate in which reproduction is realized. In short, if the
natural laws can be interpreted computationally, this objection to computationalism is
untenable. This possibility is examined briefly in section 4.7 and more fully in chapter
5.
4.6.9.3. Embeddedness
Emmeche (1991) maintains that "it is the intrinsic and causal property of the
biosemiotics [or biological signifying capacities] of the cell that explains why real self-
60
This argument will be explored in further detail in chapter 7.
reproduction is complete, while modeled self-reproduction involves external sign-

relations between the observer and the system modeled." (pp.85-86) A distinction
between the two kinds of self-reproduction can be made because the human being stands
in a different set of ontic and epistemic relations with respect to each type of system, viz.
physical and computational. In the case of computational artifacts, a `God's Eye' or
exosystemic view is possible; that is, a correspondence relation can be established
between artificial (as artifactual) and natural phenomena. However, if the interpreter-
producer is embedded within the system (Rasmussen,91), it becomes impossible to
establish a relation of correspondence between artificial (as artifactual) and natural
phenomena since the only phenomena accessible to the observer on this view are
`natural' phenomena, that is, phenomena embedded within the observer's world. Hence,
it can be argued that self-reproduction in a computational universe is complete from an
embedded (or endosystemic) perspective. However, as stated in section 4.3.4, the
necessary and sufficient conditions for endosystemicity are a matter of dispute.
Davidge (1992) maintains that the organism-environment distinction is a necessary

property of living systems. According to Emmeche (1994), however,
it is not clear what an environment of a `program-organism' is. The interface between a cell and its
environment is spatially well-defined; this is not so for the abstract life in a computational model
Yet this criticism of computational A-Life is problematic: For example, if an organism

is defined as a dynamic pattern of cells in particular states in a cellular automaton (CA),
then the environment can be defined as the states of all other cells which are not included
in the pattern. For example, if a glider (chapters 2 and 5) is identified as an òrganism'61,
the pattern produced by the states of all cells not included in the glider pattern could be
taken as constituting its ènvironment'. It is important to appreciate that on this view, it
is not the cells in the CA which are differentiable into organism and environment but the
dynamic pattern of cell states. Cariani (1989, 1991) has criticized this view on the
grounds that the distinction is ìn the eye of the beholder', that is, observationally-
relativistic; epistemological as opposed to ontical. However, if, as Fredkin (1990)
maintains, computational atomism is correct with respect to the ontology of the world,
then the organism-environment duality is ultimately grounded in a discrete, yet
connected substrate; consequently, the organism-environment duality would indeed be
merely epistemological, a consequence of an arbitrary `cut' of the dynamics of the
computational substrate into patterns classified as organisms and environments. This
position is supported by Helmreich (1992) who maintains, on the basis of an autopoietic
conception of living systems (chapter 6), that "organisms are always already part of their
environment." (p.389) However, Helmreich (1994) is critical of computational A-Life
because invariably
61
This is a simplification for the purposes of argument; gliders do not self-replicate and hence, are not living on
an essentialist account of life.
the individual in this formulation is seen as ontologically prior to its environment, prior to its
resources, and prior to other individuals. (p.22)
This leads directly to a consideration of the hermeneutic contextuality of organisms.
4.6.9.4. Hermeneutics
Helmreich (1992) maintains that "our abstractions of `life's formal properties' are
inescapably grounded in an historical, epistemological, and cultural context. In
particular, I maintain that religious, philosophical, and political systems of knowledge
strongly guide the way we think about life, artificial or otherwise." (p.385)
Consequently, he is extremely critical of the computationalist approach to A-Life, viz.
"language can never give us an unmediated description of the world, and attempts to
formalize language as a kind of calculus neglect its essentially hermeneutic nature."
(p.386) Helmreich (1994) contests the validity of the functionalist assumption implied
in Langton's locating life-as-we-know-it within a larger conception of life-as-it-could-be
which involves (i) a movement towards the adoption of a modal logic-based view of life,
viz. functionalistic-essentialism (section 4.6.8), and (ii) the bifurcation of Being as physis
into potentiality and actuality (chapters 1 and 6). He maintains that
a theory that pretends to such a transcendent position cannot help but start with a biology that we
already `know' through socially conditioned language and traditions. (pp.2-3)
The belief that organisms are usefully thought of as programs (said more carefully, that genotypes
are programs and phenotypes are the processes set into motion by those programs) makes it plausible
to think of programs as varieties of organisms. And once organismic identity is flattened out like this,
so is the definition of life, such that digital organisms suddenly come alive. (p.12)
This position is supported by Emmeche (1994) from a semiotic perspective, viz.
one fundamental problem common for all criteria when used in the context of computational `strong
A-life' is, that they are really not criteria for life in the usual biological sense, but that they already
represent another concept of life, namely life as an abstract, non-material phenomenon, and thus their
relevance as a kind of `conceptual anchor cable' to the physical world of known plants and animals
is dubious [emphasis added]. (p.5)
Consequently, he is led to assert that
one could be tempted to say that what is being studied in Artificial life .. is not even life as an abstract
phenomenon, it is the life of abstract concepts ascribed to a specific interpretation of formal
computational structures. (p.5)
However, there is a problem with both Helmreich's and Emmeche's positions in that their
criticisms against computationalism can be directed against systemic (more specifically,
cybernetic) approaches in general; thus, Maturana and Varela's (1980) autopoietic system
conception, which Helmreich identifies as an alternative to computationalism, may itself
suffer from problems similar to those associated with the latter (chapter 6).
4.6.9.5. Morphization
If functionalism is problematic for the above stated reasons, then why does it continue
to exert such a pull on the scientific and philosophical imagination ? Why is
computationalism so readily embraced ? Perhaps an example can help to answer this
question. According to Simons (1983),
a system may be said to be `feeding' when it systematically extracts energy from an appropriate
source in order to support its internal life processes and its behaviour in the world. (p.6)
On the basis of this definition, W.Grey Walter's (1950) electronic `tortoises', whose
behaviour was defined as (1) move towards dim light, (2) move away from bright light,
(3) recharge from a brightly lit `kennel' when batteries run low, would be defined as
living. However, automatically-steered cars capable of extracting fuel from gas stations
(and perhaps other cars) would also have to be identified as living according to this
definition. But would we be prepared to define cars as living ? Refusal to do so could be
criticized on the grounds that the tortoises had been accepted because of
anthropomorphism while the cars had been rejected because of anthropocentrism.
However, the a posteriori nature of car teleology with respect to human beings (chapter
7) blocks their interpretation in vital terms; whether or not functionalism in the context
of in silico or computational life is valid is an open issue since it is unclear at this stage
whether computational systems can generate teleology through some kind of autonomous
self-organizing processes.
Functionalism supports morphization (chapter 3) or abstraction across categories such

that entities belonging to different classes can be re-identified as members or instances
(tokens) of a common subsuming class or category (type). What is often overlooked,
however, is who it is that is doing the abstraction; the human being (or group of human
beings) responsible for morphization is (are) almost invariably left out of the picture,
thereby leading to a realist-objectivist position with respect to the categories. As an
example of such a position, consider the following statement due to Simons (1983), viz.
"computers do not need to be carbon-based in order to do sums or to take decisions."
(p.9) The implication is that if arithmetic is multiply-realizable and life is also multiply-
realizable, there is no reason in principle why life cannot be realized in a computational
substrate since arithmetic can be realized in a computational substrate. The problem with
this view is that it is not clear whether computation is multiply-realizable. It may well
be the case, as Searle (1992), Kelly (1993), Tallis (1994) and Lanier (1995b) have
argued, that computation necessitates intentionality and that syntactic information
processing is non-intentional if the human interpreter is excluded from the process. On
this basis, computational life will be an instance of life only if the human interpreter
reckons it as such62.
4.6.10. Connections Between Life and Matter
Throughout the discussion in section 4.6, it has been maintained that in order for life to
be explained, this must be done with reference to matter. Simon (1971) offers the
following remarks in support of an emergentist position with respect to life:
We discern two separate tendencies among biologists with respect to the concept of life. These are
revealed in the difference between speaking of the 'characteristics' of life, and speaking of the
'building-blocks' of life. [However,] if life is to be defined or explained, as opposed to being
described, it will have to be in terms of what is not alive; otherwise it must be regarded as an
unexplained primitive. (p.193)
The expression 'living matter' is to be understood as signifying, not a special type of matter, or even
ordinary matter specially arranged, but matter which happens to be situated in such a way as to bear
a certain relation to a living organism. It is in this sense, and this sense alone, that it can be said that
the organism confers life on matter, rather than the other way around. (p.195)
In the following section, the nature of matter, which on the emergentist framework
provides the ontological substrate for life, will be investigated.
4.7. Matter
In this section, the concept of matter is investigated. The presentation has two main
objectives: (1) identify the main differences between the classical and modern
conceptions of matter; (2) outline a computational theory of matter (CTMa) which
incorporates the defining characteristics associated with the information-theoretical
approach to physics. The treatment in this section is necessarily brief and based on key
texts such as Sir Arthur Stanley Eddington's The Nature of the Physical World (1928)
and various works by P.C.W.Davies (1987, 1989, 1991). A more precise formulation of
the computational theory of matter (CTMa) will be presented in chapter 5 when an
implementation of computationalism based on the cellular automaton (CA) formalism
is described in the context of a unifying framework of emergent artificiality.
4.7.1. What is Matter ?
As with mind and life, the concept of matter is somewhat difficult to define.
Collingwood (1945) presents a historical overview of the concept in connection with a
broader analysis of the the idea of nature and the subject is dealt with explicitly in
(Toulmin,62). In many of the philosophical dictionaries, matter is defined negatively by
62
On this view, the ontological status of computational life is observationally-relativistic, that is, epistemically-
grounded.
placing it in opposition to the concept of mind. This Cartesian dualist approach is based
on the assertion that there are two types of `stuff' in the world, viz. (1) res extensa
(spatially-extended stuff) and (2) res cogitans (mental stuff). However, this definitional
approach becomes problematic on a materialist metaphysics since substance-dualism
must be rejected and hence, the mind reduced to matter. An alternative formulation in
monistic terms can be traced to the pre-Socratic Greeks who defined matter in terms of
a conservation principle, viz. matter is the fundamental stuff of existence which is
preserved during any process of physical change. (This idea finds modern expression in
the First Law of Thermodynamics, viz. in a closed system, matter-energy cannot be
created or destroyed.) The Greeks were also responsible for the idea that all matter is
built out of a small number of basic units, the original atoms (chapter 2). However, in
this century, as a consequence of the work of Rutherford, it has been empirically
demonstrated that atoms are not elementary particles at all, but composite structures with
internal parts. Further investigation along this line of inquiry has revealed numerous
levels of intra-atomic structure leading to the discovery of a `particle zoo'. For example,
atoms have been decomposed into three broad species of particles: (1) bosons which
include gluons, photons, W (weak) particles, Z particles and the Higgs boson; (2) quarks
(up, down, charm, strange, top, bottom); and (3) leptons (electrons, electron-neutrinos,
muons, muon-neutrinos, tauons, tauon-neutrinos).
Following Einstein's discovery of the interconvertibility of matter and energy and

diffraction experiments which revealed wave-particle complementarity, matter has come
to be discussed in terms of energy, particles, waves, and fields of force. The interrelation
between these concepts is dense: For example, Davies (1987) maintains that "the higher
the energy, the less structure and differentiation there is both in subatomic matter itself
and the forces that act upon it." (p.124) Consequently, matter is able to assume a variety
of forms. As temperatures are increased, matter passes through the familiar solid, liquid,
gaseous and plasma phases. In the last of these phases even atoms lose their structure,
becoming dissociated into electrons and ions. However, even this picture may be
incomplete. As Davies states,
if some very recent ideas are to be believed, as the temperature reaches the so-called Planck value of
1032 degrees, all matter is dissolved into its most primitive constituents, which may be simply a sea
of identical strings existing in a ten-dimensional spacetime. Moreover, under these extreme
conditions, even the distinction between spacetime and matter becomes nebulous. (p.125)
Kaku (1997) describes the essence of superstring theory as follows:
In superstring theory, the subatomic particles we see in nature are nothing more than different
resonances of the vibrating superstrings, in the same way that different musical notes emanate from
the different modes of vibration of a violin string .. Likewise, the laws of physics - the forces between
charged particles, for example - are the harmonies of the strings; the Universe is a symphony of
vibrating strings. And when strings move in 10-dimensional space-time, they warp the space-time
surrounding them in precisely the way predicted by general relativity. So strings simply and elegantly
unify the quantum theory of particles and general relativity. (p.34)
According to Eddington (1928), "the whole trend of modern scientific views is to break
down the separate categories of `things', ìnfluences', `forms', etc., and to substitute a
common background of all experience." (p.7) This breakdown is facilitated via the
measurement process and, as Eddington states, on the scientific view "measures
themselves afford no ground for a classification by categories" (p.7) although the prior
existence of an external world accessible via the measures is a necessity63.
4.7.2. Classical Physics
The classical or Newtonian concept of matter is grounded in two metaphysical

assumptions, viz. atomism and determinism, which together provide the basis for the idea
of mechanism (chapter 2). According to Davies (1983), atomism is characterized by the
belief that there exist "a small number of truly elementary particles which have no
internal parts and which are the building blocks of all matter." (p.48) Moreover, as
Davies and Gribbin (1992) state,
like the Greek Atomists before him, Newton treated matter as passive and inert. Indeed, inertia played
a central role in his theory of the world. If a material body is at rest, then according to Newton's laws
it will remain forever at rest unless acted upon by an external force. Similarly, if the body is moving,
it will continue to move with the same speed and in the same direction unless a force acts to change
it. Thus matter is entirely passive. (p.5)
Newtonian physics assumes a substantialist metaphysics in contrast to a processual

ontology (chapter 2). The notion of a `substance' has been referred to repeatedly
throughout this thesis, specifically in connection with the essentialist interpretation of
phenomena. But what is a substance ? According to Cobb (1988),
a substance is that which depends on nothing else for its existence. It is a thing that remains
fundamentally the same regardless of its relations. An atom was defined by the Greeks to be a unit
of substance. Modern mechanism is built on this notion. Everything that is not an atom is nothing but
a structure of atoms. The atoms are not affected by the structures in which they are arranged. The
structures behave like machines and are not inherently affected by their relations to other things. They
can be externally affected by other things by having some of their parts separated from others, but the
character of the separated parts is not affected by this separation. (p.107)
Bohm (1988) maintains that "although the more recent physics has dissolved the
mechanistic view [it] is still the dominant view as far as effectiveness is concerned."
(p.60) He identifies three postulates associated with mechanism, viz.
1. The world is reducible to a set of basic elements.
2. These elements are external to each other.
3. Interactions do not affect the internal nature of the elements.
63
In this sense, science (specifically, physics) is committed to some version of metaphysical realism.
Postulate (3) leads to a consideration of the interaction dynamics of classical systems.

Newtonian mechanics is based on a specific form of determinism, viz. "billiard-ball"
Laplacianism in which interactions between elements are local and take the form of
pushes and pulls - action by contact (chapter 2). Furthermore, as Prigogine et al. (1984)
maintain, Newtonian science is based on the assumption that "at some level the world is
simple and is governed by time-reversible fundamental laws." (p.7) This view has been
contested as follows:
the artificial may be deterministic and reversible. The natural contains essential elements of
randomness and irreversibility. This leads to a new view of matter in which matter is no longer the
passive substance described in the mechanistic worldview but is associated with spontaneous activity
However, under computationalism it may be possible to reconcile these positions since

certain types of non-linear dynamical systems (chapter 2) whose behaviour at the local
(component) level is deterministic are capable of generating `chaos', that is,
unpredictable or non-deterministic behaviour at the global (systemic) level. Although the
macroscopic behaviour can be generated deterministically, this behaviour is non-
computable64 (chapter 2). Because it is possible for a system to be both deterministic
(locally) and non-computable (globally), it is possible to reconcile chance and necessity.
Consequently, `deterministic randomness' (Davies,87) could provide the conceptual
bridge between classical (reversible) and non-classical (irreversible) phenomena. This
possibility, which is embedded in the connection between thermodynamics, information
theory and computation theory, is implicit in the computational theory of matter
presented in 4.7.6.
In summary, the defining concepts of classical physics (mechanism) are atomism and
reversibility as described above; additionally, there is the postulate of absolute space and
time. Many ideas associated with classical physics have been retained in modern physics,
for example, notions such as particles and laws65, as evidenced by the discussion in
section 4.7.1. However, a number of recent developments within physics, in particular
those associated with the relativity and quantum theories, have necessitated reconsidering
the basic assumptions underlying the concept of matter.
4.7.3. The Theory of Relativity
The first major challenge to classical physics during this century was associated with the
introduction of the special and general theories of relativity: The former was responsible
for replacing absolute space and time with the unified relativistic notion of four-
dimensional spacetime while the latter provided an interpretation of gravity in
64
Hence, the crucial distinction between computationality (ontology) and computability (epistemology).
65
Nagel (1961) provides a detailed account of the logical structure of physical laws.
geometrical terms, specifically in terms of the geometry of the spacetime manifold.
4.7.3.1. The Special Theory of Relativity
According to Bohm (1980), the principle difference between the relativistic and the
Newtonian conceptions of the world is that
relativity introduces new notions concerning the order and measure of time. These are no longer
absolute, as was the case in Newtonian theory. Rather, they are now relative to the speed of a
coordinate frame. (p.123)
Spacetime frames are not intrinsic to the universe, but to observers within the universe
(Eddington,28); consequently, from an endophysical perspective, there is no such thing
as the spacetime framework of the universe. On Einstein's model, the three spatial
dimensions and single temporal dimension of the world are unified into a single
structure, the four-dimensional spacetime block universe which has the status of a
property-less extension until a metric is imposed on it. Rucker (1985) describes the
distinction between the Newtonian model and the Einsteinian model as follows: In the
former, "space is made up of locations [while in the latter] spacetime is made up of
events. An èvent' is just what it sounds like: a given place at a given time." (p.137)
Consequently,
in the block universe there is no objectively existing `Now' [since relativity theory implies that it is
impossible to permanently mark a given space location from within the block universe]. Nothing is
moving in the block universe .. (p.149)
Wolf (1991) describes the special theory of relativity as
a set of rules that enable an observer to calculate what another observer sees when he is moving at
a fixed velocity past the first observer (p.327)
and Davies (1991) presents a similar formulation, viz. "the simultaneity of events that
are separated in space is relative. Different observers in different states of motion
measure different durations [and distances] between the same pair of events." (p.70)
Significantly, although all observation and interaction in the world is relativistic, the
underlying laws governing such interactions are absolute. As Rucker (1985) states,
the laws by which the states of physical systems undergo change are not affected, whether these
changes of state be referred to the one or the other of two systems of coordinates in uniform
translatory motion. (p.150)
The special theory of relativity is based on two assumptions:
1. The speed of light is constant.

2. Absolute motion is undetectable.
The speed of light defines an upper bound for the speed of propagation of a signal,
whereby a signal is meant a physical, information bearing entity such as an electron or
photon. This is readily apparent when the notion of a light cone, viz. the volume traced
out in spacetime from a source of light, is investigated: Two spacetime points which lie
within each other's light cone are causally connected because they can exchange signals
and experience each other's influences. Thus, the speed of light constrains the causal
relations of physical systems. As Bohm (1980) states,
if we went faster than light, then, as a simple calculation shows, the electromagnetic fields that hold
our atoms together would be left behind us (as the waves produced by an airplane are left behind it
when it goes faster than sound). As a result, our atoms would disperse, and we would fall apart. So
it would make no sense to suppose that we could go faster than light. (p.122)
According to Eddington (1928), the special theory of relativity is significant because it

necessitates distinguishing between two events, viz. "the original event, somewhere out
in the external world and .. a second event, viz. the seeing by us of the first event." (p.53)
However, it has both epistemological and ontological implications: On a materialist (or
physicalist) framework, the speed of light is a restriction on both knowing and doing,
that is observation and action, since both are ultimately reducible to the motions of
particles (or waves) and conversion of energy from one form to another.
Alexander (1920), whose metaphysics provides the basis for the unified framework of
computationally emergent artificiality described in chapter 5, hypothesized an absolute
Space-Time maintaining that the implications of relativity theory were not "in any way
inconsistent with their being pure events or point-instants which have their àbsolute'
position in Space-Time." (Vol.I, p.89) He further clarified this position by stating that
whatever modifications it introduces into the Newtonian mechanics it leaves Time and Space and
Motion in their ancient reality, or rather it leaves us still with Space-Time in itself as a total from
which perspectives are selections; and therefore in that sense absolute and independent of observers.
(Vol.I, p.91)
However, this view is correct only with respect to exophysical observation, that is, with
respect to an observer capable of a `God's Eye' view of the universe.
4.7.3.2. The General Theory of Relativity
Wolf (1991) describes general relativity as
the theory of the universe that explains the presence of gravity as the distortion of space and time
together. If a spacetime distortion is present, there must be matter. (p.327)
The general theory of relativity incorporates a theory of gravity entailing the view that
1. matter and energy distort space

2. distortions of space affect the motions of matter and energy.
As Rucker (1985) states, "space .. serves as the medium for transmitting gravitational
effects. Mass affects space, space affects mass." (p.79) Force-fields are both continuous
and local on Einstein's general theory of relativity. As Whittaker states in the
introductory note to Eddington's The Nature of The Physical World (1928), "gravity is
not a force acting at a distance, but an effect due to a modification of space in the
immediate neighbourhood: secondly, it is propogated from point to point of space, being
ultimately connected with the presence of material bodies." (p.viii) Fields of force are
represented as structural properties of four-dimensional space-time; moreover, fields
self-organize into material particles (Harris,65). Four kinds of force, viz.
electromagnetic, gravitational, strong nuclear and weak nuclear, have been identified.
However, at high energies, the electromagnetic and weak nuclear forces combine into
the èlectroweak' force; thus the four forces are in fact reducible to three forces and it is
conjectured that at higher energies unification of the electroweak with the strong nuclear
force and ultimately with the gravitational force may be possible, leading to a unified
force field.
4.7.3.3. Beyond Relativity Theory
Bohm (1988) maintains that relativity theory transcends classical mechanism in that
instead of having separate little particles as the constituents of matter, Einstein thought of a field
spread through all space, which would have strong and weak regions. Some strong regions, which
are stable, represent particles. (p.62)
However, a retroactive link between relativity theory and mechanism is identified, viz.
relativity theory retains certain essential features of mechanism, in that the fields at different points
in space were thought to exist separately and not to be internally related. The separate existence of
these basic elements was emphasized by the idea that they were only locally connected, that the field
at one point could affect a field only infinitesimally nearby [emphasis added]. (p.63)
Furthermore, although radically post-Newtonian in rejecting the idea of an objective,

observer-independent reality, the theory of relativity retains a Newtonian perspective
with regard to the nature of material objects themselves. As Casti (1992) states,
on matters pertaining to the static and dynamic attributes of Newton's particles - e.g. mass, electric
charge, velocity, spin - relativity theory is silent or, more accurately, tacitly accepts the Newtonian
precepts .. Instead Einstein's theories focus upon the other half of the Newtonian doublet, the
unexplained forces (particularly gravity) (p.419)
4.7.4. Quantum Theory
Bohm (1988) identifies four postulates as defining quantum theory, viz.
1. All action or motion is traceable to a discrete indivisible unit called a quantum.

2. Matter and energy have a dual nature; depending on context, things can manifest as waves or
particles.
3. Non-local connection between things.
4. Holistic organization of parts.
On the quantum theoretical view, every physical situation is characterized by a wave

function. However, as Bohm (1980) states, "this is not directly related to the actual
properties of an individual object, event, or process. Rather, it has to be thought of as a
description of the potentialities within the physical situation." (pp.128-129). This leads
Davies et al. (1992) to assert that
we live not in a cosmic clockwork, but in a cosmic network, a network of forces and fields, of
nonlocal quantum connections and nonlinear, creative matter. (p.11)
However, "there remains a sense in which quantum mechanics is still a deterministic

theory. Although the outcome of a particular quantum process might be undetermined,
the relative probabilities of different outcomes evolve in a deterministic manner.
[Hence,] as a statistical theory, quantum mechanics remains deterministic .. Quantum
mechanics builds chance into the very fabric of reality, but a vestige of the Newtonian-
Laplacian world view remains." (p.27) According to Penrose (1989),
probabilities do not arise at the minute quantum level of particles, atoms, or molecules - those evolve
deterministically - but, seemingly, via some mysterious larger-scale action connected with the
emergence of a classical world that we can consciously perceive. (p.292)
Classical systems evolve in a locally deterministic and reversible manner; quantum

systems, on the other hand, evolve in a way that is globally (statistically) deterministic
and reversible. Irreversibility, that is, an àrrow of time' (section 4.7.5), arises in both
systems as a consequence of measurement (although the nature of the measurement
operation is different in each case). The essential distinctions between relativity theory
and quantum theory are summarized in Table 4.4:
Relativity Theory Quantum Theory
continuous discrete
deterministic nondeterministic
local non-local
Table 4.4 Basic distinctions between relativistic and quantum systems.
A number of interesting properties are associated with the behaviour of systems at the
quantum level, a few of which are briefly discussed in the following sections.
4.7.4.1.The Double-Slit Experiment
In Young's double-slit experiment, light from a point source passing through two nearby
slits produces an interference pattern on a screen thereby demonstrating the wavelike
nature of light. If one of the slits is blocked, the interference pattern disappears.
However, if the source is modified so that only a single photon (unit of light energy)
passes through the slit system, the pattern is repeated. Given that a single photon
(particle) can only pass through one slit, it must somehow `know' of the existence of the
other slit such that it can `decide' where it belongs in the interference pattern that is built
up from the millions of particles passing through the slits which hit the screen. Davies
(1992) maintains that Young's experiment provides "evidence for the holistic nature of
quantum systems, with the behaviour of individual particles being shaped into a pattern
by something which cannot be explained in terms of the Newtonian reductionist
paradigm." (p.205)
4.7.4.2. The Uncertainty Principle
The Heisenberg uncertainty principle states that all observable microscopic quantities are
subject to random fluctuations in their values such that these can only be described
probabilistically. According to Davies (1992),
you cannot know, at any instant, both the position and the momentum of a quantum particle. Indeed,
[the principle] goes deeper - it says that a quantum particle does not possess both a definite
momentum and a definite position simultaneously. (p.213)
Heisenberg's uncertainty principle involves the production of epistemological constraint

as a consequence of ontology: It does not merely state that human observational
capacities are limited; rather it states that these capacities are limited because reality is
intrinsically indeterministic. This led Bohr to formulate his famous complementarity
principle. Davies describes the link between the Heisenberg uncertainty principle and
Bohr's notion of complementarity as follows:
the trade-off between position and momentum [which are conjugate attributes of a particle] is another
example of quantum complementarity at work. It turns out to bear a close relation to the wave-particle
complmentarity. The wave associated with an electron is, by its very nature, a spread-out thing, and
does not have a definite position, although it does encode information about the electron's momentum.
By contrast, the particle associated with an electron is, by its very nature, something with a well-
defined position; but a wave collapsed to a point carries no information about the momentum of the
electron. Measure the position of an electron, and you do not know (nor does the electron know) how
it is moving; measure the momentum of an electron, and neither you nor the electron know where it
is located. (p.214)
Furthermore,
the fact that electron waves are waves of probability is a vital component of quantum mechanics and
in the quantum nature of reality. It implies that we cannot be certain what any given electron will do.
Only the betting odds can be given. This fundamental limitation represents a breakdown of
determinism in nature. It means that identical electrons in identical experiments may do different
things. There is thus an intrinsic uncertainty in the subatomic world. (p.202)
4.7.4.3. The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) Experiment
Penrose (1989) briefly describes a variant of the EPR experiment as follows:
Suppose that two spin-one-half particles - which I shall call an electron and a positron (i.e. an anti-
electron) - are produced by the decay of a single spin-zero particle at some central point, and that the
two move directly outwards in opposite directions. By conservation of angular momentum, the spins
of the electron and positron must add up to zero, since that was the angular momentum of the initial
central particle. This has the implication that when we measure the spin of the electron in some
direction, whatever direction we choose, the positron now spins in the opposite direction! The two
particles could be miles or even light-years apart, yet that very choice of measurement on one particle
seems instantaneously to have fixed the axis of spin of the other! (p.365).
The results of the experiment are interpreted by Davies (1992) as follows:
assuming one rules out faster-than-light signalling, it implies that once two particles have interacted
with one another they remain linked in some way, effectively parts of the same indivisible system.
This property of `nonlocality' has sweeping implications. We can think of the Universe as a vast
network of interacting particles, and each linkage binds the participating particles into a single
quantum system. In some sense the entire Universe can be regarded as a single quantum system.
(p.217)
4.7.4.4. The Measurement Problem and The Interpretation Problem
Casti (1989) defines the measurement problem as "the question of how and when the act
of measurement `collapses' the wave function" (p.440) and the interpretation problem
as "determination of the nature of a quantum object when it is in its unmeasured state"
(p.440). Various solutions to both problems have been proposed, a number of which are
summarized in Table 4.5:
School Wave function Unmeasured Attributes

collapse (interpretation)
(measurement)
No objective reality exists
Copenhagen (Bohr) by measuring device do not exist
Consciousness (Schrodinger, Von by conscious mind do not exist

Neumann, Wigner)
Austin (Wheeler) from communication created by meter option
Duplex (Heisenberg) from measurement act only phenomena are real

Many Worlds (Everett, Deutsch) no collapse all possibilities are real
Objective reality exists

Naive Realist (Einstein) no always exist
Quantum Logic (Von Neumann) (not addressed) always exist
Quantum Potential (Bohm) no always exist
Transactional (Cramer) yes always exist
Table 4.5 Solutions to the quantum measurement and interpretation problems.
4.7.4.5. The `Hidden Variables' Interpretation
This is based on postulating the existence of variables hidden from observation which
take the form of quantum probabilities. The values of these variables are unknown prior
to measurement, values which, if known, would account for measurement uncertainty.
Penrose (1989) maintains that a hidden-variable theory would be consistent with all the
observational facts of quantum physics if the theory supported non-locality: Hidden
parameters must be able to instantaneously affect parts of the system in arbitrarily distant
regions (as happens in the EPR experiment). However, implementing non-locality leads
to problems with special relativity since field interactions are local on the latter.
(Relativity theory and quantum theory are, as a result, apparently incommensurable
physical frameworks.) The hidden variables or `naive realist' position is important
because, on certain interpretations, it can be shown to be consistent with classical
mechanics in postulating local determinism, viz. "God does not play dice". For this
reason, it becomes the natural interpretation of quantum theory in the context of the
realization of quantum phenomena in deterministic formalisms such as cellular automata
(chapter 5). However, an alternative, the observer-participant interpretation, has also
been advanced in the context of computationalism (section 4.7.6).
4.7.5. Thermodynamics
Although the major developments in twentieth century physics, viz. relativity theory and
quantum theory, are extremely important, it is to the nineteenth century laws of
thermodynamics that the origin of the computational theory of matter (CTMa) can be
traced. Thermodynamics becomes important when the temporal evolution of a system
is considered. The existence of an àrrow of time' is a basic fact of everyday experience.
However, its explanation is another thing entirely. For example, Eddington (1928)
considers the possibility that "we might appeal to consciousness to suffuse the whole -
to turn existence into happening, being into becoming." (p.76) However, he maintains
that "without any mystic appeal to consciousness it is possible to find a direction of time
on the four-dimensional map by a study of organization." (p.76) This leads directly to
the second law of thermodynamics and the mathematical concept of entropy.
Briefly, the Second Law of Thermodynamics states that the entropy or degree of disorder
(randomness) in a closed system always increases with time. The law is statistical in the
sense that it applies to a group of individuals (for example, physical particles) as
contrasted with more basic physical laws (for example, Newtonian mechanics) which
apply to the individuals themselves. While the Second Law necessitates the reversibility
(time-symmetry) of the underlying laws (irrespective of whether they are classical,
relativistic or quantum), it itself introduces an irreversibility or àrrow of time' into the
description of a system at the group or statistical level. This follows directly from (1) the
act of measurement in which a `coarse grain' statistical view of the system at the global
(or group) level is produced and (2) the non-linear nature of the interaction dynamics at
the local (or individual) level. Eddington (1928) linked the Second Law of
Thermodynamics to the study of organization and this connection, under its modern
information-theoretical interpretation, has been used in formulating computational
theories of natural phenomena. (The application of thermodynamic and information-
theoretical concepts to biology was discussed in section 4.6.2.)
Heisenberg (1979) described thermodynamics as a `bridge' between classical and

quantum physics by virtue of its concern with observation and measurement, viz.
thermodynamics leaves classical physics and goes into the region of quantum theory, for it speaks
about situations of observation; it does not speak about the system as it is, but about the system in a
certain state of being observed, namely in the state of temperature equilibrium. (pp.11-12)
It is important to note that the Laws of Thermodynamics are instances of what Eddington
has called `secondary laws'. As he states,
I have called the laws controlling the behaviour of single individuals `primary laws', implying that
the second law of thermodynamics, although a recognized law of Nature, is in some sense a
secondary law .. Some things never happen in the physical world because they are impossible; others
because they are too improbable. The laws which forbid the first are the primary laws; the laws which
forbid the second are the secondary laws. (p.82)
He further maintains that,
secondary law is not in conflict with primary law, nor can we regard it as essential to complete a
scheme of law already complete in itself. It results from a different (and rather more practical)
conception of the aim of our traffic with the secrets of Nature. (p.83)
4.7.6. A Computational Theory of Matter (CTMa)
Davies and Barrow (1992) maintain that the classical materialistic conception of nature
has given way to an informational or computational conception. On their view,
matter as such has been demoted from its central role, to be replaced by concepts such as
organization, complexity and information. (p.9)
The link between thermodynamics and the computational theory of matter (CTMa) is the
mathematical concept of information due to Shannon and Weaver (1949). The
information content or negative entropy associated with a message is proportional to the
amount of prior uncertainty it resolves; uncertainty can itself be quantified in relation to
the number of possible states of affairs that might be the case. The information content
(in binary digits or bits) of a discrete process A with K states, each state having
probability pi is defined as follows:
j
K
H(A) '& pi log2 pi (4.1)
i'1
The amount of information carried by any message will be determined by the number
of possible alternatives that have been selected from and the relative prior probabilities
of the different messages. However, the above formulation of information in
probabilistic terms does not map easily onto the idea of information as conceived in in
a computational context. As Zurek (1989) states,
the information which is being processed by the computer is a concrete `record', a definite sequence
of symbols. Its information content cannot be represented adequately in terms of Shannon's
probabilistic definition of information. One must instead quantify the information content of the
specific, well-known `record' in the memory of the computer - and not its probability of frequency
of occurrence, as Shannon's formalism would demand. (p.ix)
This leads to the notion of algorithmic information content as independently developed

by Kolmogorov, Solomonoff and Chaitin (1990). The algorithmic information content
of a physical entity is given by the size, in bits, of the most concise message (for
example, the shortest Turing machine program that can execute on a UTM) which
describes that entity with the requisite accuracy. Regular systems can be specified by
means of concise descriptions; hence, algorithmic information content can be regarded
as a measure of disorder (or irregularity). Bennett (1982) has shown that the average
algorithmic entropy of a thermodynamic ensemble has the same value as its statistical
(ensemble) entropy. Consequently, it is at least conceivable that a consistent
thermodynamics could be built on an algorithmic foundation. Furthermore, and most
importantly, attempts have been made to map the relativity and quantum theories -
Eddington's `primary laws' - onto a computational framework grounded in algorithmic
information theory (Zurek,89) which has clear links to secondary laws (thermodynamics)
as stated above.
4.7.6.1. Thermodynamics and Self-Organization
One of the major problems with the above approach is reconciling thermodynamic laws
describing the increase in disorder or randomness of a system (entropy) with what Davies
(1987) has referred to as "laws of organization" which describe an increase in
information (decrease in entropy). On his view,
organization is a quality that is most distinctive when it refers to a process rather than a structure ..
It might be said that order refers to the quantity of information (i.e. negative entropy) in a system,
whereas organization refers to the quality of information. (pp.75-76)
As Davies (1989) states,
whereas entropy is a measure of information loss, organization (or depth) refers instead to the quality
of information. Entropy and depth are not each other's negatives. (p.62)
Depth refers to the amount of "work" or information processing a system has to do in

order to reach a particular state. It is crucial to appreciate that both sets of laws are
mutually consistent: For example, evolution is marked by an increase in the complexity
of living systems66. This fact can be reconciled with the Second Law because can living
systems are open systems exchanging matter and energy with their environments; in their
most encompassing sense, these environments are identical with the universe which is
held to be a closed system. Consequently, local evolutionary increases in complexity are
offset by global increases in the entropy of the universe. However, there is a problem,
viz. explaining how non-reversible systems can emerge from reversible systems, an issue
which will be discussed further in chapter 5.
4.7.6.2. The Physical Church Turing Thesis (PCTT)
Wolfram (1985) maintains that
one expects the fact that computers are as powerful in their computational capacities as any physically
realisable system can be, so that they can simulate any physical system. (p.785)
If the Physical Church Turing Thesis (PCTT) (chapter 2) is true, then the above
statement implies that it will be impossible to distinguish a simulated universe from the
genuine article; as Davies (1992) states, the universe becomes its own simulation. This
position is advanced by Fredkin (1990) in connection with the "digital mechanics"
concept, viz. the universe as a computer, specifically a giant cellular automaton (chapters
2 and 5). Tipler (1994) develops this idea is some detail:
a perfect simulation [that is, an emulation] exists if the physical universe can be put into one-to-one
correspondence with some mutually consistent subcollection of mathematical concepts. In this sense
of `simulation' the universe can certainly be simulated, because `simulation' then amounts to saying
that the universe can be exhaustively `described' in a logically consistent way. Note that `described'
does not require that we or any other finite (or infinite) intelligent being can actually find the
description. It may be that the actual universe expands into an infinite hierarchy of levels whenever
66
However, Chaitin (1970) maintains that this is only true when considering the phylogenetic hierarchy: In terms
of the ontogeny of individual organisms, the reverse actually holds, that is, the complexity of the organism
(whole) is less than the complexity associated with the organism considered as a simple sum of its parts.
Chaitin maintains that this is due to the multifaceted nature of the structural and functional coupling
between parts in organisms, a position that is supported by Rosen (1993).
one tries to to describe it exhaustively. In such a case, it would be impossible to find a Theory of
Everything. Nevertheless, it would still be true that a `simulation' in the more general sense existed
if each level were in one-to-one correspondence with some mathematical object, and if all levels were
mutually consistent (`consistency' meaning that, in the case of a disagreement between levels, there
is a rule - itself a mathematical object - for deciding which level is correct). The crucial point of this
generalization is to establish that the actual physical universe is something in the collection of all
mathematical objects. This follows because the universe has a perfect simulation, and we agree to
identify the universe with its perfect simulation, that is, with its emulation. Thus, at the most basic
ontological level, the physical universe is a concept [emphasis added]. (p.209)
Further support for this view is provided by Davies (1989) who maintains that
the laws of physics define the allowed mechanical operations that occur in the physical universe, and
thence the possible activities of a Turing machine. These mechanical operations thus determine which
mathematical operations are computable and define for us what might be called simple solvable
mathematics (like addition). For some reason, those same laws of physics can be expressed in terms
of this simple mathematics. There is thus a self-consistency in that the laws generate the very
mathematics that make those laws both computable and simple. (p.66)
He summarizes this position in the following diagram (Fig 4.3):
laws of
physics
simple solvable allowed

mathematics mechanical
processes
computable
mathematical
functions
Fig 4.3 Closure of physics and computation.
If this self-consistent loop is to provide the basis for "strong" computationalism, viz. the
ontological Church Turing Thesis or OCTT (chapter 2), it must account for non-physical
phenomena such as mind. The observer-participant position proposed by Wheeler in
connection with the quantum interpretation and measurement problems (section 4.7.4)
provides a suitable framework within which to develop such a scheme.
4.7.6.3. Wheeler's `Meaning Circuit'
D'Espagnat (1981) defines matter as that which is both (1) conserved in change and (2)
concrete in experience. This definition is consistent with a conception of physics in

which the act of observation (and thereby, the existence of observers) is fundamental,
that is, irreducible. The idea is developed most thoroughly in the meaning circuit
concept: In Einstein's universe, space, matter (or energy), and fields of force are
geometrically defined; for example, gravity is the curvature of spacetime caused by
massive centres of attraction. However, Wheeler (1979) maintains the need for a pre-
geometrical physics grounded in mathematical logic on self-referential grounds, viz.
logic is the only branch of mathematics that has the power to think about itself. This magic feature
may be the indication that in logic we must look for the branch of mathematics out of which, in some
as yet unconceived way, the physical world is somehow constructed (p.57)
This leads Wheeler to propose the `meaning circuit', a bootstrap theory in which the
universe is conceived as a closed system supporting the evolution of observers
responsible for collapsing the quantum wave function describing the universe that
brought them into existence. Penrose (1989) describes the meaning circuit as follows:
the evolution of conscious life on this planet is due to appropriate mutations having taken place at
various times. These, presumably, are quantum events, so they would exist only in linearly
superposed form until they finally led to the evolution of a conscious being - whose very existence
depends upon all the right mutations having àctually' taken place! It is our own presence which, on
this view, conjures our past into existence. (p.381)
Wheeler (1989) describes the meaning circuit as a "vision of the world as self-
synthesized" in the sense of a "self-referential deductive axiomatic system" (p.9). He
elaborates the nature of this scheme as follows:
No structure, no plan of organization, no framework of ideas underlaid by another structure or level

of ideas, underlaid by yet another level, and yet another, ad infinitum, down to bottomless blackness.
To endlessness no alternative is evident but a loop such as: Physics gives rise to observer-
participancy; observer-participancy gives rise to information; and information gives rise to physics.
(p.8)
As to the notion of an observer-participant, Wheeler defines it as "one who operates an

observing device and participates in the making of meaning." (p.13) With respect to the
possible role of consciousness in observation, he offers the following caveat:
we .. steer clear of the issues connected with `consciousness'. The line between the unconscious and
the conscious begins to fade in our day as computers evolve and develop - as mathematics has - level
upon level upon level of logical structure. We may someday have to enlarge the scope of what we
mean by a `who'. (p.15)
On this basis, Wheeler presents a CTMa grounded in the following premises, viz.
1. The world cannot be a giant machine, ruled by any pre-established continuum law.
2. There is no such thing at the microscopic level as space or time or spacetime continuum.
3. The familiar probability function or functional, and wave equation or functional wave equation, of
standard quantum theory provide mere continuum idealizations and by reason of this circumstance
conceal the information-theoretic source from which they derive.
4. No element in the description of physics shows itself as closer to primordial than the elementary
quantum phenomenon, that is, the elementary device-intermediated act of posing a yes-no physical
question and eliciting an answer or, in brief, the elementary act of observer-participancy. Otherwise
stated, every physical quantity, every it, derives its ultimate significance from bits, binary yes-or-no
indications (p.3).
Wheeler summarizes this idea in the phrase "it from bit" and maintains that "every item
of the physical world has at bottom - at a very deep bottom, in most instances - an
immaterial source and explanation." (p.5)
Laszlo (1993) maintains that proponents of such `bootstrap' theories
contest [the conventional atomistic view] that the physical world is built of identifiable building
blocks. There are no basic particles; everything is built of everything else. Particles are made of other
particles by binding forces that are themselves created by the exchange of particles among particles -
the observed world lifts itself into existence by its own bootstraps. In Heisenberg's [and Wheeler's]
view this bootstrapping world is built as a mathematical structure; thus there is no use asking to what
beyond themselves, the formulas of physics would refer. (p.34)
The meaning circuit concept is important because it supports a closed universe view
(chapters 2 and 3) and the "strong" artificiality thesis (section 4.3.5). This is because, by
adopting a variant of the coherence theory of truth (chapter 3), it provides a self-
grounding interpretation which, according to Wheeler (1989), is the only67 alternative to
a `tower of turtles', that is, an infinite regress. For this reason, Rasmussen (1991b) has
adopted the participatory interpretation in defining the necessary and sufficient
conditions for "strong" A-Life, viz.
Postulate 1: A universal computer at the Turing machine level can simulate any physical process
(Physical Church-Turing thesis).
Postulate 2: Life is a physical process.
Postulate 3: There exist criteria by which we are able to distinguish living from non-living objects.
Postulate 4: An artificial organism must perceive a reality R2, which, for it, is just as real as our "real"
reality, R1, is for us (R1 and R2 may be the same).
Postulate 5: R1 and R2 have the same ontological status.
Postulate 6: It is possible to learn something about the fundamental properties of realities in general,
67
This statement must be qualified because, as will be shown in chapter 6, alternative frameworks such as
supernaturalism and Heideggerian ontology allow the universe to be grounded without necessitating an infinite
regress of levels. (Supernaturalism grounds the universe in God and Heideggerian ontology in Being.)
and of R1 in particular, by studying the details of different R 's.

2 An example of such a
property is the physics of a reality.
Postulates (4-6) are grounded in an ontological version of the coherence theory of truth
(chapter 3). This is significant because coherence theories assume a specific set of ontic
(productive) and epistemic (interpretative) relations between a human being (anthropic
component) and its world and, as will be shown in chapter 7, epistemic relations are
intimately bound up with ontic relations under the concept of poisis (coming-forth,
bringing-forth). If it can be shown that the mode of poisis is different in naturals and
artificials (chapter 6) then the above postulates and as a corollary, the "strong"
computational artificiality thesis, will be undermined.
4.7.6.4. Artificial Physics (A-Physics)
Artificial physics may be defined as the study of artifactual systems that exhibit
behaviours characteristic of natural physical systems. A two-level explanatory
framework can be proposed in which the `characteristics' level (2) includes concepts such
as matter, energy, force, velocity etc and the `building block' level (1) is defined in terms
of computation. A computational concept of matter based on the cellular automaton
formalism is described in detail in chapter 5 in connection with a unifying framework
of emergent artificiality. However, it is worthwhile briefly considering two opposing
approaches (top-down and bottom-up) to artificial physics (or A-Physics): Hayes (1979)
applies the top-down approach characteristic of conventional symbolic AI to A-Physics,
describing a formalization of common-sense knowledge about the everyday physical
world of objects, shape, space, movement, substances (solids and liquids), time etc.
Although this is the standard approach in artificial reality (A/VR) development as
described in section 4.8, it does not map readily onto an emergentist framework.
Rasmussen et al. (1991a), on the other hand, present a computational framework for self-
programmable matter based on the notion of a modified von Neumann machine and
discuss how this framework can be translated to alternative schemes capable of
supporting universal computation, for example cellular automata (chapters 2 and 5).
According to Rasmussen et al.,
the term programmable indicates that the dynamics of such systems have a clear computational
interpretation and that functional properties can be programmed into the system via the elements. The
term matter indicates that the dynamics is defined through the interactions of the fine-grains of the
system, e.g. at the level that defines the `physics' of the system. Thus, self-programmable matter is
a dynamical system of interacting elements, with associated functional properties, which through their
autonomous dynamics develop new compositions of elements with new associated functional
properties. Such systems are characterized by an ability to construct novel elements within
themselves. (p.213)
4.7.7. Matter and Intentionality
Mind and life are readily interpreted in teleological (goal-directed, intentional) terms;
moreover, the (almost) natural attribution of teleology to such phenomena facilitates the
establishment of a link between human intelligence and biological adaptation, a link
which is fundamental to Simon's concept of artificiality (section 4.2.1). Applying a
teleological interpretation to matter, however, would generally be considered to entail
a category error although there is clear historical precedent for such a move with
Aristotle and neo-Aristotelian process philosophers such as Whitehead (1978).
According to Serres (1981),
the word `matter' is derived from the Latin materia denoting something substantial and massive,
whereas the Greek word doesn't correspond to that at all. The Greek ule has a very practical meaning
referring to the basic material used by a craftsman, for instance by a carpenter. [Thus, Matter has a
concrete or experiential meaning which indicates] the work that is put in, the transformation of things.
(p.180)
In both Plato and Aristotle, matter is defined in opposition to form. The transformation
of matter on the Aristotelian scheme is interpreted in terms of the doctrine of the four
causes, viz. material, efficient, formal and final causation (chapter 6). The idea of a
transformation of matter from an indeterminate to a determinate condition via the
imposition of form leads naturally to a teleological or intentionalistic view of matter.
Serres (1981) maintains that since the beginning of the twentieth century, "physicists
have talked about atoms, molecules, particles, quantum fields and many other things like
that, but they hardly ever used the word `matter'. It is only used any longer by
metaphysicists: for instance by materialists." (p.183)
A link between matter and intentionality is proposed in a modern context by Pattee

(1995b), who presents the following definition of matter based on the distinction
between physical laws and symbols, viz.
by matter and energy [are meant] those aspects of our experience that are normally associated with
physical laws. These laws describe those events that are as independent of the observer as possible,
i.e. independent of initial conditions. The laws themselves are moot until we provide the initial
conditions by a process of measurement. Laws and measurements are necessarily distinct categories.
Laws do not make measurements, individuals make measurements. Measurement is an intentional
act that has local significance and hence involves symbolic aspects usually in the form of a numerical
record [emphasis added]. (p.11)
Thus, on Pattee's view, intentionality enters into the discussion at the ìnterface' between
matter and symbol during the measurement process.
4.8. Reality
In this section, the concept of artificial and virtual reality is briefly examined. This
concept is important because it encapsulates the notion of artificiality in a totalistic sense,
viz. reality as the aggregate of all phenomena (material, vital, mental etc).
4.8.1. What is Reality ?
This is a difficult concept to define, one which is intimately tied up with other related
notions such as truth and appearance68. For present purposes, reality is identified with the
phenomenal world, that is, with (1) the world as experienced through the senses and (2)
the domain within which agents - that is, entities which are capable of initiating action -
are situated. Defining reality in these simple terms is important because it leads directly
to the concept of artificial (or virtual) reality or, to paraphrase Langton (1989b), from
reality-as-it-is to reality-as-it-could-be.
4.8.2. Artificial (or Virtual) Reality (A/VR)
Baudrillard (1983) captures the essence of virtual reality (or, in his terms, the
hyperreality that is the simulacrum) in the following statement:
This is a completely imaginary contact world of sensorial mimetics and tactile mysticism; it is
essentially an entire ecology that is grafted on this universe of operational simulation, multisimulation
and multiresponse. (p.140)
Spring (1991) and (Heim,93) define `virtual reality' via a composition of entries from
Webster's Dictionary, viz. "a fact or real event that is such in essence, but not in fact".
Hence, virtual reality is committed to functionalistic-essentialism: A virtual reality (VR)
is not required to duplicate the contingency of the natural world (naturality) but its
essential characteristics. Foley (1987) identifies three components as essential in artificial
realities (ARs), viz. imagery, behaviour and interaction, while Burdea (1994) defines
virtual reality in terms of immersion, interaction and imagination. Krueger (1991)
supports the functionalist conception of ARs maintaining that what is important about
an AR is the capacities it provides for creating synthetic realities for which there are no
antecedents. This view is endorsed by Heim (1993) and also by Laurel (1993) who
asserts that "the primary concern of VR is not constructing a better illusion of the world;
it is learning to think better about the world, and about ourselves." (p.214)
Walser (1991) defines virtual reality in terms of the related concept of cyberspace:
Cyberspace as a phenomenon is analogous to physical space. Just as physical space is filled with real
stuff (so we normally suppose), cyberspace is filled with virtual stuff. Cyberspace, the medium,
enables humans to gather in virtual spaces. It is a type of interactive simulation, called a cybernetic
simulation, which gives every user a sense that he or she, personally, has a body in a virtual space.
Just as cybernetic simulation is a special kind of interactive simulation, a cyberspace, the
phenomenon, is a special kind of virtual space, one that is populated by people with virtual bodies.
[Crucially,] a cyberspace must have at least one human player (since a cyberspace emerges from a
cybernetic simulation, which embodies a person), but the other players can be AI programs running
on decks [i.e. physical entry points into cyberspace] that are not being used by humans. (p.58)
68
A Heideggerian interpretation of these concepts is presented in chapter 6.
Cyberspace, as defined above, is consistent with Wheeler's meaning circuit, more

specifically, with the irreducibility of observer-participation. This position is endorsed
by Pimentel et al. (1993) who maintain that an essential component of VR ontology is
support for designed (or participative) experience, viz. every sensory detail is a design
decision. (p.147) As Pimentel et al. state, virtual reality is the experience of being in
another world, a world governed by selected laws, and inhabited by objects (and actors)
with whatever properties the creator chooses to design. (p.16) Heim (1993), following
Heidegger, defines a world as "a total environment for human involvement"; the World
is identified as the "horizon or totality of all involvements".69 The notion of involvement
is very closely connected to the idea of presence. Sheridan (1992) defines the sense of
`virtual presence' as "feeling as if you are present in the environment generated by the
computer" and proposes three principal determinants for the sense of presence:
1. extent of sensory information

2. control of relation of sensors to environment
3. ability to modify physical environment
According to this view, two necessary conditions for involvement are: (1) a sense of
immersion and (2) the capacity for interaction. These provide the basis upon which a
Turing Test for artificial or virtual reality may be constructed. However, Pimentel et al.
(1993) have contested the first condition maintaining that the experience of involvement
appears to require triggering of the user's imagination rather than stimulation of his or
her senses; consequently, imagination is of higher priority than immersion if the latter
is interpreted in the sense of "degree of similarity with reality". As they state, "neither
the designer nor the user actually believes the actions on the stage or in the computer are
real, but they agree to pretend as if they are real [emphasis added]." (p.154)
Consequently, they argue for a redefinition of immersion in essentialist terms, that is, in
terms which are independent of the contingency associated with sensations occurring
during human interactions with the real world.
4.8.3. A Turing Test for Reality
Adopting the terminology associated with the description of the Turing Test in section
4.3.6, a Turing Test for reality, would involve replacing B (the human candidate) by the
world considered in various ways, viz. physically, experientially, socially etc and
determining whether or not a computer-generated A/VR supports involvement or virtual
presence, that is, the experience of presence within an environment by means of a
communication medium (Steuer,92). Such a medium would need to provide a sense of
immersion and the possibility for navigation and interaction within the artificial reality
such that the interrogator would not be able to use sensory cues to determine whether or
69
Consequently, the world incorporates the virtual worlds created by human artificers.
not his or her current environment was real or virtual70 (Shapiro,92). In discussing the
requirements for a virtual reality to pass the Turing Test for AR, Walser (1991) notes
that "what matters is the extent to which players are willing to suspend disbelief in the
illusion that they inhabit bodies apart from their physical bodies." (p.56) This position
is supported by Heim (1991) who argues for a distinction between reality and artificial
reality, viz. "cyberspace should evoke imagination, not repeat the world." (p.33) Heim
further states that,
Cyberspace can contain many alternate worlds, but the alternateness of an alternate world resides in
its capacity to evoke in us alternate thoughts and alternate feelings [emphasis added]. (p.33)
Walser (1991) supports this position, viz. "the art .. is not in what the spacemaker [or
creator of the virtual reality] constructs, but in the communication of insight which the
spacemaker cannot construct (that is, some aspect of a deeper truth or higher reality)."
(p.57) This leads Heim (1991) to list three features by which reality might be
differentiated from A/VR and which must be embodied in artificial worlds if such
alternate realities are to pass the Turing Test for reality: (1) mortality/natality; (2)
temporality or continuity of events from the past into the future; and (3) care or concern.
The latter criterion is interesting because it establishes a link between A/VR and
intentionality (chapters 1 and 6). However, there is problem with defining immersion in
terms of involvement such that experiential isomorphism with the real world is regarded
as contingent: It negates the possibility of a Turing Test for matter since the latter
necessitates that the essential features of the physical world as perceived by the senses
are incorporated as test criteria (for example, the relativistic, quantum and
thermodynamic properties of physical systems).
4.8.4. The Ontological Status of Virtual Worlds
One of the principle distinctions between conventional approaches to A/VR and the
approach to reality construction described in this thesis, viz. computationally emergent
artificiality (chapter 5), is in methodology: Virtual worlds are usually constructed top-
down whereas an autonomous artificial universe is constructed bottom-up via emergent
processes (chapter 3). This reflects in the choice of ontological primitives for the virtual
worlds: Conventional approaches to A/VR construction assume pluralism (heterogeneous
primitives) whereas computationally emergent artificiality is based on a monism, viz.
computationalism (chapter 2). For example, in NPSNET, a workstation-based, 3D visual
simulator for virtual world exploration and experimentation (Zyda,92), the physics of the
artificial world is constructed via interaction with the system user under a Newtonian
(object, force) framework:
70
Interestingly, Dennett (1991), a proponent of functionalism and supporter of the "strong" AI programme, adopts
what might be regarded as a "weak" AR position in asserting that hallucinations indistinguishable from reality
are probably impossible.
Objects are defined with the defobject token .. This structure is flexible and useful for building
complex objects from simpler sub-objects. An object can be given many physical properties using
the defphysics token. These properties include the object's initial location and location constraints in
the environment, initial orientation and orientation constraints, initial linear and angular velocities and
constraints on each, the object's mass and centre of mass, the object's ability to absorb forces
(elasticity), the dimensions of a bounding volume and a local viewpoint for the object.
Forces are defined and added to an object's force list with the defforce token. Two types of force are
supported: deforming and non-deforming. Deforming forces are used for object explosions and
bending. Non-deforming forces are used to alter an objects linear and angular velocities. Forces can
be specified as awake or asleep. This allows the selective application of previously defined forces.
(p.150)
However, there have been attempts to move away from classical top-down conceptions
of the world towards approaches incorporating self-organization. For example, Walser
(1991) maintains that
under the classical scientific view there is no need to give a place to the human body in any account
of human reason because the classical view presupposes the existence of an objective reality with a
rational structure. Reason is treated as a purely abstract system for converging step by step on the one
correct description of the world. Under the new view, however, the world is not assumed to have a
rational structure, and there is no sense in trying to find one. Instead, there are many possible worlds,
as many as sentient beings can invent and experience. (pp.53-54)
Walser argues for a relativistic conception of reality, viz. "a virtual reality is a
consensual reality that emerges from an interactive simulation .. in contrast to a
consensual reality that emerges from the ordinary physical world. By consensual reality
I mean the world, or a simulation of the world, as viewed and comprehended by a
society" (p.55) and further, "a virtual reality is `consensual' in that its players [that is, the
humans involved in the interaction] have agreed, explicitly or implicitly (by virtue of
their participation), to relate to it in the same way, to `play fair'. But the reality is
constructed through an organic process of give and take among the players, whether
through cooperation, conflict, negotiation, compromise, agreement, force, abstention, or
whatever." (p.55)
In contrast to this èvolutionary-emergent' interpretation, Laurel (1991a, 1991b)

emphasizes an ìntentionalistic-design' interpretation of virtual reality based on the
paradigm of dramatic interaction. For Laurel (1991a), the issue is "whether virtual
worlds and the experiences people have in them are or are not designed." (p.95) Laurel
maintains that the Aristotelian conception of dramatic action involves the actualisation
of potentiality via a progression through probability culminating in necessity which, in
turn, involves the imposition of constraints by agents, that is, those with the capacity to
initiate action. On her view, "the course of the action and the outcome can be variable,
but only within the universe of possibilities created by the elements of environment,
situation and character." (p.96) Thus, Laurel proposes that "virtual worlds should, in
some sense, be designed. By `designed' I mean that a world and the experiences that one
can have in it are consciously shaped. The fact is that by their very nature virtual worlds
are designed, whether we admit to it or not." (p.97) Hence, virtual or artificial realities
are ontically a posteriori with respect to the human being (anthropic component), that
is, they are artifacts (chapter 7). This position is clarified by the following assertion in
(Laurel,91b), viz. "an obvious but easily overlooked element of situation-building is the
fact that all of the relevant aspects of the situation-building must be successfully
represented." This is the conventional top-down symbolic view of world construction.
However, in the postscript to the 1993 edition of Computers as Theatre, Laurel appears
to reverse the position argued in (Laurel,91a) and (Laurel,91b) in maintaining that
as an activity becomes less artifactual (like painting or literature) and more ephemeral (like
conversation or dancing), sensory immediacy and the prosody of experience gain primacy over
structural elegance in the realtime stream of events. In shared virtual worlds, structural elegance
becomes much less about the progression of events and more about facilitating the emergence of
patterns and relationships [emphasis added]. (p.208).
Furthermore, "rather than figuring out how to provide structure with pleasing emotional
textures, the problem becomes one of creating an environment that evokes robust
projective construction [emphasis added]." (p.209) She concludes by stating that "as long
as designers see themselves as authors of one-to-many experiences, all of us will only
be bottom-feeding on the fringes of fundamentally non-interactive forms." (p.212) Can
the two positions, viz. A/VR as designed vs. A/VR as emergent be reconciled ? The
debate over the ontological status of artificial (or virtual) worlds has been defined in
terms of whether the artificiality is "strong" in the sense of realization (emulation) or
"weak" in the sense of simulation. However, it will be argued in chapter 6 that this
epistemological approach to the problem of artificiality (which is grounded in the
Kantian appearance-reality distinction) obscures a more primordial issue, viz. the
ontological question concerning the distinction in poisis (coming-forth or becoming)
of artificials (or artifactuals) as contrasted with naturals.
Chapter 5 Unification
Chapter 5
Life needs something to live on, intelligence needs something
to think on, and it is this seething infomation matrix which
CAs can provide.
If AI is the surfer, CA is the sea.

Rudy Rucker.
Unification
5.1 Overview
In this chapter, a unifying framework of emergent artificiality grounded in a
computationalist metaphysics is presented. First, an approach to unification based on
Simon's concept of artificiality and briefly described in chapter 4 is re-examined. A
problem with this approach is reviewed and an appropriate solution strategy outlined.
The notion of unification is investigated and a brief survey of various approaches to
unification described in the literature is presented. It is argued that the requirement for
ontological-monism eliminates most schemes from consideration as the basis of a
unifying framework of computationally emergent artificiality. However, a metaphysical
framework developed by Samuel Alexander (1920) is presented as providing the
foundation upon which a computational framework can be constructed; detailed
investigation of Alexander's metaphysics and the establishment of an isomorphism
between his Space-Time event ontology and CA-computationalism is shown to support
this view. Various issues associated with the emergence of artificialities (that is, artificial
analogues of natural phenomena) in a CA substrate are examined in the context of a
unifying framework of computationally emergent artificiality. Finally, a number of
outstanding problems associated with Alexanderian metaphysics are shown to be capable
of resolution under CA-computationalism.
5.2. Towards Unifying Artificiality
In chapter 1 it was maintained that if computationalism is to ground artificiality, it must

be shown how individual artificialities (that is, artifactual analogues of natural
phenomena) can be integrated into a unified framework. The following two arguments
were advanced in support of this contention, viz.
1. Computationalism is a metaphysical position and by definition (chapter 1) must support phenomenal

unification, and
2. Functionalism, which provides the philosophical basis for the possibility of artificiality (chapter 4),
necessitates an isomorphism or one-to-one correspondence (functional, behavioural, causal, structural
or otherwise) between artificiality and naturality to be established in order to grant the former the
status afforded the latter, viz. reality (as opposed to mere appearance).
The second reason necessitates consideration of (i) whether naturality (or nature) is
organized; (ii) if organized, what shape or form this organization takes; and finally, (iii)
how this organization comes into existence. As to the first of these issues, it is crucial to
appreciate that the existence of structure, pattern, organization, order etc in nature is a
necessary condition for the possibility of science (section 5.3.1) since if nature is to be
understood scientifically, it must be assumed (a priori) that it is organized. Hence, and
consistent with the second of the two reasons listed above, viz a commitment to
functionalism, artificiality must also be organized; moreover, organized so as to be
isomorphic (in some sense) with naturality. Regarding the form of this organization,
there are a number of possibilities and in the first part of this chapter various schemes
will briefly be examined. However, from the outset it should be appreciated that the most
widely accepted is that of the hierarchy (chapter 3), viz. a system of phenomena
arranged in a graded order: For example, the naturalistic hierarchy matter6life6mind in
which matter is historically antecedent to and the basis of life (and mind) and life is
historically antecedent to and the basis of mind. If a hierarchical naturality is valid then
a hierarchical artificiality is necessitated as a consequence of the requirement for (some
kind of) isomorphism between the two domains and with the organizational `shape' of
the former (naturality) determining that of the latter (artificiality).
In chapters 1 and 4, it was stated that functionality can be conceived as originating in

essentially one of two ways, viz. as a result of design or as a product of evolution1.
Similarly, in chapters 3 and 4, it was maintained that there are essentially two ways in
which to generate a hierarchy, that is, by design or via emergence. In the context of the
current discussion, emergence can briefly be equated with the appearance of a new
property (the emergent) arising in a complex as a consequence of a specific pattern of
activity of its elements (the substrate). In order for a property to be considered emergent,
it must not be deducible from the properties of the substrate (chapter 3). The two
possibilities for hierarchy generation, viz. design or emergence, correspond to the two
possibilities for naturality, that is, creation or evolution (chapter 6). Evolution must have
occurred if a non-teleological, that is, non-creationistic, explanation for nature is correct
since natural phenomena clearly exist and their existence must be accounted for by some
1
The concept of evolution is briefly examined in chapter 6 in connection with an investigation of the ontical
notion of poisis.
means (chapter 4). (Alternatively, such phenomena could be granted ontologically-

primordial status; however, such a position is generally regarded as stultifying within the
reductionist Western scientific-philosophical tradition which seeks to explain things in
terms of other smaller2 things, a metaphysical commitment which may be traced back
to Greek atomism as was shown in chapter 2). Hence, the naturality hierarchy must be
emergent and, as a consequence of the necessity for artificiality to be isomorphic with
naturality, the artificiality hierarchy must also be emergent. Furthermore, and as stated
in chapters 1 and 2, computationalism is an ontology; hence, the artificiality hierarchy
must `come forth' or emerge from the computational substrate. Creationism is
inconsistent with computationalism since the existence of a creator would negate the
ontological (or primordial) status of computation. The poisis (coming-forth) of
computational artificiality is described in this chapter and evaluated in Part II of this
study.
5.2.1. Artificiality as Unifier and Unified
In chapter 4, Simon's concept of artificiality was investigated. It was seen that

artificiality can be understood in (at least) two senses on his view: First, as denoting the
principle by which domains (such as rational thought and evolution by natural selection)
might be unified; and second, as a generic term for artificial (as artifactual) analogues
of natural phenomena3. In this latter sense, artificiality denotes a universal class or
category with artificialities as particulars or members of this class. In summary,
artificiality as principle (or unifier) is responsible for integrating (or unifying)
artificialities as domains (or the unified). The concept of artificiality was shown to be
closely linked to a number of key notions associated with computationalism; for
example, functionalism (chapter 1) and multiple-realizability (chapter 4). However,
Simon's concept of artificiality, and as a corollary, his approach to unification, is
problematic when viewed from the perspective of the unification of artificialities. This
is because Simon defines artificiality in terms of systemic adaptation to environment and
adaptation is a teleological notion which does not readily extend `downwards' to matter,
the posited lowest phenomenal level in the artificiality hierarchy4.
2
The scientific-philosophical perspective contrasts strongly with the orthodox theological perspective in which
the ultimate (onto-theological) explanation for things is not the smallest or most atomic but the largest and most
encompassing, that is, God. This position holds for most strains of mysticism as well (chapter 1). It will be
shown that the atomism associated with mainstream Western science and philosophy also contrasts strongly
with Heidegger's ontology of Being and the concept of incipience, that is, originary poitic emergence devloped
and presented in this thesis (chapter 6).
3
Hence, the `sciences' of the artificial (Simon,69) (Simon,80) (Simon,81).
4
This argument appears to hold even if the teleology of adaptation is teleonomically a posteriori or merely
functional as opposed to intentional (or teleologically a priori) since matter is not ordinarily conceived in
functionalistic terms (chapter 4); in fact, according to Dennett (1995), functionalism is ultimately grounded in
materialism (or physicalism).
5.2.2. The Teleology Problem Revisited
An attempt was made in chapter 4 to define artificiality in non-teleological terms so as

to resolve the conflict between the concept and a non-teleological view of matter. (Matter
must be included within the artificiality hierarchy since it constitutes a basic phenomenal
kind.) However, as discussed in the section on artificial physics, there have been moves
toward the redefinition of matter in computational terms, viz. the computational theory
of matter (CTMa) proposed by Wheeler, Fredkin, Toffoli and others. If this approach is
valid and if computation is, in some sense, functional (teleological), then matter itself
becomes teleological and Simon's artificiality principle can be extended throughout the
phenomenal hierachy, both upwards and downwards. However, there are a number of
problems with the artificiality principle as conceived by Simon: For example, even if
matter is teleological, its teleology is not of the same order (or degree) as that associated
with the teleological primitives of his scheme (which are either mental-rational or
biological); it is simply the case that Simon's primitives are not sufficiently primitive to
realize the teleology of matter5, a teleology which if anything (according to current
systems-theoretical thinking) takes the form of self-organization (chapters 3 and 6).
Alternative schemes have been proposed which attempt to address this problem. For
example, Campbell (1985) presents a framework (Fig 5.1) in which the phenomenon of
evolution is variously realized across a broad teleological spectrum ranging from simple
self-organization (physical systems) through natural selection (a posteriori or as-if
intentionality associated with biological systems) and culminating in self-adaptation (a
priori or genuine intentionality associated with conscious, volitional entities). According
to Campbell, as the evolutionary hierarchy is ascended, new evolutionary processes
evolve which support increased autonomy and new kinds of teleology; hence, a
distinction is made between intra-phenomenal evolution and inter-phenomenal or meta-
evolution in which new teleological mechanisms arise.
5.3. Towards A Unification of Artificiality
Although schemes such as those due to Campbell and others address many of the
problems associated with the conventional approach to unifying artificialities, various
problems remain outstanding. Perhaps the most immediate is the need to clarify what is
entailed by unification. Consequently, in this section the notion of unification is briefly
examined. (It should be noted at the outset that a more detailed review of the literature
on unification is beyond both the aim and scope of this study.) Various scientific and
philosophical works have dealt with the issue explicitly; however, it is implicit in any
attempt at explaining the phenomenal world.
5
That is, not unless one is willing to concede the `dumbing down' of living matter to non-living matter, involving
what might be described as a form of `property-hiding'. However, this position is unacceptable since it violates
the very essence of conventional emergentism which is loosely captured in the maxim "more from less".
Organization Emergent Property Analysis Format
Information about
AI future self
Future causality Future self-reference
Information about self Self reference

AL Information
recursive causes are
their effects Cybernetics
Entropy/Negentropy Unidirectional cause Thermodynamics

and effect
Mechanical objects Newtonian mechanics
AP Deterministic cause
and effect
None (elementary Quantum mechanics
particles only) Acausal
Fig 5.1 Campbell's Evolutionary Hierarchy.
5.3.1. Unification as Idea and Ideal
Unification as an idea is related to the metaphysical view that the world6 constitutes (in
some way) a connected totality, a whole or unity and its origins in the Western tradition
are traceable at least to the Ionian Greeks (Collingwood,45). The belief in the unity of
nature is a cornerstone of modern science, specifically of physics, and, as Barrow (1991)
states, is aesthetically motivated by a heuristic maxim or ideal, viz. Ockham's Razor,
which normatively identifies the simplest possible explanation of a thing with the actual
explanation of the thing. Interestingly, it is an appeal to Ockham's Razor and other
aesthetic criteria such as beauty and truth - what Barrow refers to as `prospective
elements' - which leads him to argue against a computational or mathematical theory
theory of everything. Appealing to the Gdel incompleteness results within logic and the
existence or Platonic subsistence of uncomputable numbers (chapter 2) in support of this
position, Barrow maintains that "no non-poetic account of reality can be complete". As
he states,
unlike many others that we can imagine, our world contains prospective elements [such as beauty,
simplicity and truth]. Theories of everything can make no impression upon predicting these
prospective attributes of reality; yet, strangely, many of these qualities will themselves be employed
in the human selection and approval of an aesthetically acceptable Theory of Everything. There is no
formula that can deliver all truth, all harmony, all simplicity. No Theory of Everything can ever
6
In fact, use of the term `the world' and its identification with "the totality of all that exists" conceals a tacit a
priori commitment to metaphysical unification in the assumption that such a totality is both meaningful and
real (that is, existent). For example, if a processualist (chapter 2) interpretation of existence (or Being) is
adopted then the substantialist notion of `the world' as the totality of existents at an instant is undermined: The
interpretation of `world' as identical to instantaneous universal state commits, according to this latter view, what
Whitehead (1926) has called the Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness, that is, "the accidental error of mistaking
the abstract for the concrete." (p.66) I am grateful to Mike Elstob for the above point.
provide total insight. For, to see through everything, would leave us seeing nothing at all. (p.210)
Newell's (1990) views on the nature of unification, expressed in the context of a

consideration of unified theories of cognition, may be generalized and extended to other
phenomenal kinds. As he states,
a unified theory will unify our existing understanding of [a phenomenon]. It will not be a brand-new
theory that replaces current work at every turn. Rather, it will put together and synthesize what we
know. On the other hand, it can't just be a pastiche, in which disparate formulations are strung
together with some sort of conceptual bailing wire. Its parts must work together. (p.16)
Newell lists the following as characteristic of unification, viz.
1. Unification is always an aim of science

2. Bringing all parts to bear on a behaviour
3. Bringing multiple constraints to bear
4. Increased rate of cumulation
5. Increased identifiability
6. Amortization of theoretical constructs
7. Open the way to applications
8. Change from discriminative to approximative style
9. Solve the irrelevant-specification problem (p.18)
Feature (6) is of particular interest since it is consistent with the logical end result of
repeated application of Ockham's Razor, viz. monism, of which computationalism is a
particular kind.
5.3.2. Issues in Unification
In this section, various approaches to unification are examined. The work of systems
theorist Mario Bunge, who has investigated concepts such as emergence, levels and
hierarchies in detail, provides a suitable interpretative framework within which to
examine the different unification strategies. His characterization of each approach is
simple, systematic and rigorous and will be followed in this study. However, before
examining Bunge's scheme, it is worthwhile briefly considering some other views in
order to gain an appreciation of the various positions within the movement towards
scientific or/and philosophical unification. For example, Polanyi (1966) argues for "a
picture of the universe filled with a strata of realities, joined together meaningfully in
pairs of higher and lower strata." (p.35) Clearly, this statement entails support for a
hierarchical view of nature (and by extension, in the context of this study, of
artificiality). Gerard (1969) maintains that systems (chapter 3) both imply and are
implied by hierarchies; consequently, nature (and artificiality) must be hierarchically
structured if nature consitutes a unity, that is, system. This follows from the fact that
`system' implies an entity containing subordinate units in some relationship to each other; and that
implies hierarchy, superordinate and subordinate levels. Conversely, hierarchy implies units related
to each other at different levels; and that is a system. (p.226)
Pattee (1969), who is interested in autonomous hierarchy production, that is, the
emergence of hierarchies in closed systems (chapter 3), lists three conditions for a
hierarchy, viz.
1. autonomy, that is, a closed physical system

2. elements in the system which obey laws of physics
3. collections of elements which constrain individual elements (p.163)
Significantly, condition (2) is consistent with ontological reduction (although, not

necessarily to a monism). Rosen (1969) offers the following interpretation of hierarchies
addressing both the epistemological and ontological aspects of the concept:
A hierarchically organized system is simply one which is (a) engaged simultaneously in a variety of
distinguishable activities, for which we wish to account, and (b) such that different kinds of system
specification or description are appropriate to the study of these several activities. (pp.179-180)
This position is consistent with Rosen's and Cariani's emergence-relative-to-a-model

concept (chapter 3) and as Rosen states, "the idea of a hierarchical organization simply
does not arise if the same kind of system description is appropriate for all [functions or
behaviours]." (p.180) He lists three requirements for solving the problem of hierarchical
organization in the context of a discussion of thermodynamics:
1. The universality of the underlying microdynamics, viz. any aspect of system behaviour can, in
principle, be expressed in terms of the micro-description.
2. A determination of how the state variables of the macro-description could actually be described in
terms of the microdynamics, i.e. in terms of the observables of the microsystem. This is a non-trival
requirement and is a necessary condition for universality.
3. The implementation of (2) to actually derive the kinetic properties of the macrosystem from those of
the microsystem.
In this example (thermodynamics), (2) and (3) are what statistical mechanics does. Rosen
is, however, sceptical about the success of applying the above in the context of life and
mind on the grounds that a very specific historical ordering of concepts made possible
the above reduction: First, a phenomenological specification of macrosystem behaviour
(the gas laws); second, a specification of the microsystem dynamics (Newtonian
mechanics); and third, a connecting formalism (statistical mechanics). As he states,
if the gas laws had not been known first, they would never have been discovered through statistical
mechanics alone. Formalism will indeed enable you to form any averages you want, but it will not
tell you what these averages mean, and which of them are useful and important in specifying and
describing macrosystem behaviour. (p.187)
This position is supported by Gerard (1969), viz. "it is perfectly meaningless to measure
something, with higher and higher degrees of precision, if the thing you measure is more
or less meaningless." (p.219) Thus, for Rosen (and Cariani), hierarchies are
epistemological constructs7, a view which is supported by Tallis (1994) who argues

against observer-independent hierarchical-realism in the context of a discussion of the
mind-body problem.
Berlinkski (1986) argues for a stronger view, maintaining that biology is not reducible
to physics and citing Darwinian evolutionary theory in support of his position:
The usual Darwinian concepts of fitness and selection [are concepts] that do not figure in standard
accounts of biochemistry, which very sensibly treat of valences and bonding angles, enzymes and
metabolic pathways, fats and polymers - anything but fitness and natural selection. (p.235)
Following Rosen, he further states that "the standard and, indeed, the sole example of
reduction successfully achieved involves the derivation of thermodynamics from
statistical mechanics." (p.234) Consistent with this position, Miller (1995) is led to
criticize what he views as "messianic predictions that theoretical biology will be
revolutionized, perhaps with emergence replacing evolution as the central explanatory
principle of life." (p.16) However, Kauffman (1993, 1995) has contested the
exclusiveness of natural selection in evolution maintaining that self-organization may in
fact play the dominant role in generating the phylogenetic hierarchy; thus, the stage is
set, at least in principle, for a reduction of neo-Darwinian theory to some simpler
theoretical framework. Finally, mention might be made of Laszlo (1993) who maintains
that a unified conception of the world is scientifically possible based on "a concept of
reality organically shaped by interacting universal fields" (p.26). According to this view,
science .. may have already reached the portals of real insight into the unitary interactive process that
generates the diverse and consistent orders of the distinct yet not categorically discrete realms we
customarily identify as `matter', `life', and `mind'. (p.20)
5.3.3. Bunge's Approaches to Unification
The underlying notion which unifies all the above positions is that of hierarchy,
irrespective of whether hierarchies are viewed as ontological or epistemological, real or
apparent. However, other schemes for phenomenal unification have been proposed in the
literature and it is important to have some appreciation of their character.
According to Bunge (1963), if the notion of a phenomenal level is accepted as

phenomenologically (but not necessarily epistemologically or ontologically) primitive,
nine interpretations of the level concept can be distinguished: (pp.36-48)
1. Degree (qualitative difference is not a necessary condition)

Defn: An object belongs to a degree Dn higher than another degree Dn-1 if and only if it surpasses in
at least one respect all the objects belonging to the lower degree.
7
As will be seen in chapter 7, this position is supported by Maturana (1997).
(1) Dn=D'n-1; (2) Dn>Dn-1
2. Degree of Complexity (qualitative difference is not a necessary condition)

Defn : An object belongs to a degree of complexity Cn higher than another Cn-1 if and only if the
number of its constituents and consequently the number of its interrelations is larger than both the
number of elements and mutual relations of the objects belonging to the lower degree.
(1-2) as above; (3) |x|(Cnx)>|x|(Cn-1x)
3. Degree of Analytic Depth

Defn: A piece of knowledge (description, hypothesis, theory, technique, method) belongs to a degree
of analysis An deeper than another An-1 if and if it accounts for a larger number of features of the
referents common to both pieces of knowledge or if it explains some properties occurring in An-1 in
terms of concepts peculiar to An or if it decomposes its objects more thoroughly than An-1 does or if
it reveals a finer mesh of relations.
(1-2) as above; (4) An-1(PcS)An, where P denotes ìs part of' and S denotes ìs subsumed under'
4. Emergent Whole
Defn: An emergent whole is an entity that, in some respects, behaves as a unit; if complex, it is highly
integrated and has qualities which its parts lack; and it arises from lower order units and may give rise
to higher order emergent wholes.
(1-3) as above; Wn(P1S)Wn+1, where P denotes ìs part of' and S denotes ìs subsumed under'
5. Poistem
Defn: A poistem is a system of interrelated qualities or variables. Symbolically, the n-th poistem is
the n-th set of qualities Pn = {Qi}n.
(6) (i)(n)Qi0Pn; (7) (i)(k)(R)QiRQk; (8) Pn@Pn+10
6. Rank (top-down graded hierarchy)

Defn: A rank (or grade in a hierarchy) is an element in a discrete linear sequence such that its status
is higher or lower than the neighbouring ranks and such that, unless it is the highest of all, it is
dependent in some respects on the higher ranks.
(1) as above; (9) Rn>Rn+1; (10) Rm@Rn=0, mn; (11) Rn dep Rn-1, n1, where `dep' denotes dependency;
(12) |x|(Rn-1x)<|x|(Rnx)
7. Layer
Defn: A layer or stratum is a section of reality characterized by emergent qualities. Symbolically:
Sn={Qn}, where `Qn' designates one of the nova peculiar to Sn.
(1) as above; (13) Sn-1 prec Sn, where `prec' denotes a precedence relation (temporal, causal, logical
etc); (14) Sm@Sn=0, mn
8. Rooted Layer (cumulative, superpositional)

Defn: An object belongs to a rooted layer Yn higher than another Yn-1 if and only if, in addition to all
the qualities that characterize Yn-1, it has a set of emergent qualities Qn of its own.
(1) as above; (15) Yn em Yn-1, where èm' denotes èmerges from'; (16) Yn=Yn-1+{Qn}; (17) Ym@Yn0
9. Level (proper)
Defn: A level is a section of reality characterized by a set of interlocked properties and laws, some
of which are thought to be peculiar to the given domain and to have emerged in time from other
(lower or higher) levels existing previously.
(18) Ln em Ln-1 where èm' denotes èmerges from'
A graphical representation (Bunge,60) of each concept is shown in Fig 5.2:
1 Degree 2 Degree of complexity 3 Degree of Analytical

Dn+1 Depth
Cn+1 An-1
Dn
Cn An
Dn-1 Cn-1 An+1
4 Emergent Whole 5 Poistem Pn-1 6 Rank

Wn+1
Wn-1 R1
R2
Pn R3
Wn Pn+1 R4
7 Layer 8 Rooted Layer 9 Layer (Proper)

Ln+1 L'n+1
Sn+1 Yn+1
Sn Yn Ln L'n
Sn-1 Yn-1 Ln-1 L'n-1
Fig 5.2 Bunge's nine interpretations of the level concept.
Bunge objects to the layer concept (7) maintaining that is unlikely that the new qualities
at a level n subsist in a way which is completely independent of qualities at n-1.
However, he also contests the cumulationist position which postulates the existence of
conservative (or property-preserving) emergent phenomena in the external world, viz.
"it would seem that the superposition of patterns occurs in the highest levels only,
whereas the spontaneous emergence of qualities in nature is not cumulative, some
qualities being lost in the process of emergence." (p.45) This leads Bunge to propose the
concept of an emergent layer or organization8 (9), a complex fusion of the positive
aspects of each of the other concepts, most notably that of the emergent whole (4) and
the poistem (5). These two concepts are important because they allow for an
ontologically non-reductive emergentism9 , which is the position held by Bunge (1969)
as shown in the following summary of his metaphysics:
8
Bunge (1969) distinguishes phenomena structured as a series of organizational levels from phenomena
structured hierarchically; on his view, hierarchies involve valuative relations of domination and superiority
which are absent from organizational levels. This position is consistent with Simon's (1981) distinction between
hierarchies and partitionings (chapter 3).
9
As stated in chapter 3, Bunge's emergentism is fundamentally non-cumulationistic.
Ontology Epistemology Methodology

(Integrated Pluralist) (Realist)
O1 Reality (= the world) is a E1 The real level structure is M1 Start by limiting your
level structure such that every knowable and scientific inquiry to one level. Should this
existent belongs to at least one knowledge is a level structure level prove insufficient, scratch
level of that structure. that matches the former. its surface in search for further
levels.
O2 In the course of every E2 Every newly formed science M2 Face emergence and try to
emergence process (self- has its peculiar objects and explain it: begin by attempting
assembly or evolution) some special methods. And, although to explain novelty away but,
properties, hence also some every science retains some of should this move fail, take it
laws, are gained while others the ideas typical of the parent seriously.
are lost. science(s), it does not preserve
them all and it introduces new
concepts absent from the latter.
O3 The newer levels depend on E3 The understanding of any M3 Explain the emergence of
the older ones both for their level is greatly deepened by every level in terms of some of
emergence and for their research into the adjacent the older levels without
continued existence. levels, particularly the skipping any intermediate level.
underlying ones.
O4 Every level has, within E4 Every level of science has, M4 Begin by investigating your
bounds, some autonomy and within bounds, some autonomy class of facts on their own
stability. and stability. level(s): introduce further levels
only as required.
O5 Every event is primarily E5 Every system and every M5 Start by finding or applying
determined in accordance with event can be accounted for the intralevel laws. Should this
the set of specific laws that (described, explained or strategy fail, resort to
characterize its own level(s) and predicted, as the case may be) hypothesizing or applying
the contigous levels. primarily in terms of its own interlevel laws.
levels and the adjoining levels,
without necessarily involving
the whole level structure.
Table 5.1 Bunge's Metaphysics
There are (at least) three points to note in connection with the above scheme: First, O2
is consistent with an intersectional (or poistem-like) view of the relations between
phenomenal levels. (It is interesting to consider how level intersection might occur; in
this respect, the work of Van Gigch (1990) who describes an approach to domain
unification based on inter-paradigmatic conflict resolution via epistemological
abstraction or metamodeling, is particularly relevant.) However, it conflicts with the
cumulative hierarchical view of the relations between phenomenal levels which is
characteristic of other more conventional emergentist frameworks, for example, that due
to Alexander (section 5.4); second, O3 implies strict causal dependency of higher
phenomenal levels on lower levels. It could, therefore, be argued that higher phenomenal
levels are, in some sense, non-causal or epiphenomenal (chapter 3). This issue will be
addressed further in connection with an examination of Alexander's metaphysics; third,
consistent with conventional views as to the relations between the various forms of
reductionism (chapter 3), Wimsatt (1972) maintains that a commitment to
epistemological reductionism is entailed in the bias towards theoretical (ontological)
monism. However, Bunge (1963) is critical of attempts at epistemological reduction of
phenomena to ontologically-monistic substrates - what he refers to as "philosophical
Dadaism". He contests this position, arguing that it is possible - in fact, necessary - to
adopt ontological pluralism while maintaining a commitment to epistemological
reductionism: On his view, epistemological reductionism entails partial theoretical
reduction of a higher level phenomenon to a lower level phenomenon; not only is
totalistic reduction not a necessary condition for epistemological reduction, but,
according to Bunge, this is simply not possible since ontological pluralism is both
phenomenologically and metaphysically correct. Hence, O5 is problematic because it
reinforces Bunge's a priori commitment to ontological pluralism, a view which seems
to contradict the assertion that his scheme is `scientific' given aesthetic consensus in
favour of a link between science and atomistic reductionism as articulated in Ockham's
Razor and manifested in the goal of an ontically-monistic theoretical framework. It could
be argued that only in a naive or `folk'-phenomenological sense are phenomena self-
determining or self-causing; ultimately, the causality associated with all higher level
emergent phenomena reduces to the causality of the ontological substrate. (This position
is characteristic of monistic ontologies in general and Alexander's framework in
particular as will be seen in section 5.4). Although it is tempting to reason that if Oi, then
Ei and if Oi and Ei, then Mi, Bunge (1969) offers the following criticism of this line of
argument, viz.
even assuming that our methodology is correct .. we would not be justified in inferring that it verifies
the metaphysics and the epistemology behind that methodology .. All we can do is to draw the
following weak (nondeductive) inferences:
If Oi, then Ei
Now, Ei
Hence, maybe Oi
and
If Oi and Ei, then Mi
Now, Mi
Hence, maybe Oi and Ei (p.27)
Bunge further maintains that "to the extent to which our methodology works, the
ontology and the epistemology behind it look plausible .. whether or not our metaphysics
and epistemology of levels are actually true, they seem to have been fruitful." (p.28) The
problem with this view is that Mi because Ei; that is, the methodology works because
epistemological realism has been adopted a priori. Hence, there is a circularity involved
in the abductive justification of Bunge's metaphysics.
5.3.4. Problems with Bunge's Framework
Bunge's (1969) commitment to ontological-pluralism leads him to postulate the

following two metaphysical theses, viz.
1. In the course of every emergence process (self-assembly or evolution) some properties, hence, also
some laws, are gained while others are lost.
2. The newer levels depend on the older ones both for their emergence and for their continued existence.
Although the properties lost and gained are those associated with a new phenomenal
level, this view is problematic since the whole discourse on properties presupposes a
commitment to a substance-predicate metaphysics in which substance remains unchanged
regardless of processes undergone; in short, emergent phenomena correspond to the
appearance of new properties associated with an unchanging noumenal substance or
substrate. On this latter view, the vital is also physical. If, however, life is an emergent
phenomenon which results in the displacement of certain physical properties, it may be
that the properties associated with the emergent are such as to prevent the occurrence of
the (physical) process which brought the emergent into existence. There are basically
two solutions to this problem: (1) embrace a `strong' (or totalistic) decoupling between
phenomenal levels or (ii) adopt cumulationism10. The former entails a kind of parallelism
(as in Spinoza) and is problematic since the connection between emergent levels is
unexplainable in even methodologically-reductive terms; the latter leads to a position
close to that of Alexander (1920) who is, in fact, able to incorporate Bunge's non-
cumulationist arguments into his framework (section 5.4.4).
Yet another problem with Bunge's approach in the context of the unification of
artificialities arises as a consequence of his a priori commitment to ontological
pluralism. As stated in chapters 1 and 2, computationalism is a monistic metaphysics;
hence, Bunge's framework is unsuitable as a foundation for unifying computationally
emergent artificiality (chapter 5). For this reason it is necessary to consider other
approaches to unification grounded in a monistic ontology and supporting phenomenal
emergence. In this connection, a metaphysical scheme developed by Samuel Alexander
and based on a Space-Time event monism is presented as a suitable foundation upon
which to construct a unified framework of computationally emergent artificiality.
Adoption of this framework is motivated by two considerations: First, according to
Alexander (section 5.4), Space-Time is ontological; empirical existents (emergents) are
phenomenal. This is consistent with the Kantian appearance-reality or phenomenon-
10
This position is implicitly endorsed by Maturana and Varela (1980) in their conception of the autopoietic
organization as embedded in (and supervenient on) physical space (chapter 6). It is crucial to appreciate that
Bunge's non-cumulationism is not necessarily self-defeating under a substance-property metaphysics. This is
readily shown by distinguishing necessary from contingent properties; the former are cumulationistic (and
preserved in the emergent) while the latter can be non-cumulationistic (and displaced in the emergent).
noumenon distinction (chapter 1), a distinction which is intrinsic to computationalism

(chapter 2) and artificiality (chapter 4); second, it is conceivable that Alexanderian
Space-Time is isomorphic with CA-computationalism, that is with a computationalism
implemented (or realized) by a cellular automaton (chapter 2).
5.4. Alexander's Metaphysics

In this section, the Space-Time ontology of Samuel Alexander is briefly investigated. An
examination of this metaphysical scheme is necessary since it describes one of the
earliest attempts at unifying phenomena under an emergentist framework in which the
notion of pattern or organization (form, structure) is categorially primitive; hence, it
establishes a precedent for computationally emergent ontologies such as those based on
cellular automata (section 5.5). The following account is drawn from Alexander's Space,
Time and Deity (1920) and discussions of this work appearing in (Collingwood,45) and
(Brettschneider,64).
5.4.1. Introduction
Alexander presents a unified metaphysical framework based on a continuous and infinite

Space-Time event ontology. Before presenting a detailed description of this framework,
three important aspects will be briefly examined: First, according to Brettschneider
(1964), Alexander's metaphysics is internalist and idealist nothwithstanding claims by
Alexander to the contrary, viz. that it is externalist (realist) and empiricist. Brettschneider
justifies this interpretation of Alexanderian metaphysics on the basis of Alexander's
commitment to a ontological coherence theory of truth (chapter 3). This point is
extremely important because it immediately establishes a connection between
Alexanderian metaphysics and CA-computationalism. the latter of which is also held11
to be grounded in an internalist or ìntrinsic' (Crutchfield,94) view of truth and reality
(chapters 2 and 3).
Secondly, Alexander, like the materialist philosophers before him, makes a distinction
between categories and qualities: categories are the primordial, that is ontological,
properties of space-time; qualities associated with empirical existents (or space-time
complexes) are phenomenal and have merely (contingent) factual status. Moreover, since
the categories are ontological, they are non-emergent (that is, necessary), and present in
all orders of empirical existence whereas qualities are emergent. But emergent in what
sense ? According to Alexander, quality is pattern- or organization-dependent.
Furthermore, qualities are held to be objective: As Collingwood (1945) states, quality
11
It is important to distinguish between topological-internalism, which is being asserted in this context, and
experiential-internalism, which is not. In chapters 6 and 7, it is argued that computationalism is incapable of
supporting the latter as a consequence of the fact that it is a variant of mechanism and hence, ontologically-
objective (or externalistically non-experiential).
is "not a mere phenomenon, it does not exist merely because it appears to a mind; it
exists as a function of structure in the objective world." (p.160) Alexander goes on to
state that "quality belongs to things as mind or consciousness belongs to life-processes
of a certain configuration" (Vol.II, p.47) and according to Brettschneider,
quality is the mind of structure or form .. Just as mind emerges from body, so quality emerges from
structure [and] coherence is the agent that pulls together the co-presences of space-times that make
up qualities .. In Aristotelian terms, the finite patterns of pure Space-Time are material causes; the
restlessness of Time is the efficient cause; coherence as the principle or organization of Space-Time
is the formal cause; and quality as the emergent unity of Space-Time organization is the final cause
However, although Alexander unequivocally maintains that emergents are not

epiphenomenal (or non-causal), the opposite is clearly the case since on his scheme
causation is categorial; hence, all causation is bottom-up and all orders of empirical
existence are ontically, although not epistemically, reducible to space-time complexes.
Thirdly, Alexander is emphatic in asserting that "quality is not a category but an

empirical generalization of the various specific qualities of things, or a collective name
for them all" and that "experience does not acquaint us with quality as such; as it does
make us acquainted with quantity or substance as such." (Vol.I, pp.326-327) He holds
that "quality is to specific qualities as colour is to red, green, and blue" and that "even
if [it] could be maintained [that there is a plan of colour], it cannot be held that there is
any plan underlying red and hard and life which is modified into these specific qualities."
(Vol.I, p.327) Furthermore, he maintains that "complexity in Space-Time makes
everything a complex, but not a quality. It is specific sorts of complexes which are hard
or sweet. Complexity as such is not a qualitative but a quantitative or purely spatio-
temporal determination .. Quality is therefore not categorial but empirical." (Vol.I,
pp.327-328) However, as will be argued in chapters 6 and 7, this view is problematic on
(at least) two counts: First, quality can be universally defined following Nagel's (1979)
formulation, viz. quality as internal subjective-experience or what-it-is-like-ness; and
secondly, Whiteheadian panexperientialism (chapter 1) provides a framework within
which specific qualities can be constructed according to plans. According to this latter
scheme, while it is correct to hold that not all complexes are quality-bearing12, quality
is, nonetheless, ontically primitive and hence, both empirical and categorial.
Additionally, this position is consistent with Alexander's claim (which, according to
Brettschneider, is problematic on his metaphysics) that both the ontological categories
and empirical existents can be experienced.
12
According to Whitehead (1978) and Griffin (1988, 1998), complexes of actual occasions can assume one of
two forms, viz. genuine individuals which are experiential and mere aggregates which are not. However, the
ontological primitives in both are experiential, that is, quality-bearing. Consequently, quality is an ontological
category.
5.4.2. Space-Time
As stated above, Alexander's metaphysics is based on an infinite and continuous Space-

Time event ontology. Before discussing this ontology in detail, it is worthwhile briefly
comparing the various views on the nature of space and time. In this respect, a summary
of the three main positions due to Bunge (1977b) is particularly informative (Table 5.2):
Container View Prime-stuff View Relational View
Proponents naive or commonsense Clifford, Alexander, Aristotle, Leibniz,

view, Democritus, Einstein, Wheeler Mach, Whitehead
Newton, Laplace
Characteristic spacetime-matter geometric spacetime spacetime = network

s dualism, monism, of relations among
static space and time, self-existing (absolute), factual items, viz.
non-physical things = spacetime things and their
spacetime, changes
self-existing (absolute)
Table 5.2 Three views of spacetime
According to Bunge, on the prime-stuff view of spacetime, "there is no need of semantic

hypotheses (`correspondence rules') [since] the border line between formal science and
factual science disappears - perhaps also that between constructs and things [emphasis
added]." (p.280) This point is critical since it is consistent with the coherence-theoretical
view of reality implicit in the computationalist position.
For Alexander, reality is Space-time or motion itself; a single, self-contained infinite

stuff taking the form of a continuous plurality of point-instants or events which are the
ultimate constituents of all things. On this view, empirical things or substances are parts
or modes of this stuff. The latter is not to be confused with substance; stuff is prior to
substance, which is identifiable with physical or empirical existence13. Space and Time
are totalities which denote the two abstract aspects of the one absolute infinite stuff of
Space-Time; space and time denote finite `regions' of Space and Time respectively.
According to Alexander, "Time is repeated in Space" and "Space is repeated in Time"
(Vol.I, p.48). These one-many relations can be visualized graphically as shown in Fig
5.3:
13
This point is important on two counts: First, it necessitates a non-substantialist interpretation of Alexander's
metaphysics. Hence, Rescher (1996) is apparently justified in identifying Alexander's scheme as processualist
(chapter 2); second, and in the context of this thesis, it establishes a precedent for considering ontology (that
is, the study of Being) in non-substantialist terms. A scheme based on the Heideggerian notion of Being, a non-
substantialist and non-processualist ontology (Dreyfus,92), is outlined in chapter 6.
(a)
tn
tn+1
tn
tn-1 (b)
Fig 5.3 (a) Time repeated in Space; (b) Space repeated in Time.
In (a) "Time is repeated in Space", viz. a one-many correspondence between an instant

(tn ) and the points it occupies ({si,..,sj}dS, where S is the infinite set of all points) is
established; in (b) "Space is repeated in Time", viz. a one-many correspondence between
a point (s)i and its occurrences over a number of instants (tn-1,..,tn+1) is established. This
framework enables Alexander to formulate a concept of motion. On his scheme,
points do not of course move in the system of points, but they change their time coefficient. What we
ordinarily call motion of a body is the occupation by that body of points which successively become
present, so that at each stage the points traversed have different time-values when the line of motion
is taken as a whole. (Vol.I, p.61)
The above point can be restated as follows, viz. "the meaning of motion is .. not that the
point of space itself moves as if it were a material body shifting its place, but that the
time of a point ceases to be present, and the present is transferred to another point
continuous with it." (Vol.I, p.272) As Brettscheider (1964) observes, "a stretch or block
of space moves along as it changes its time-coefficients." (p.24) Alexander describes "a
grouping or complex of point-instants or pure events [as] a configuration of space-time
or of motion." (Vol.I, p.210) This conception of motion provides the basis for his view
of objects, that is, empirical existents: According to Alexander, finite ontological
existents are
continuously connected groupings of motions, and they are connected through the circumambient
Space-Time with other such groupings or complexes. In less metaphorical language, they are
complexes of motion differentiated within the one all-containing and all-encompassing system of
motion [that is, the system of Space-Time]. (Vol.I, p.138)
According to Brettschneider (1964), "an object or entity is, in his terms, a sequence of
Space-Time relations." (p.27) Furthermore, "an object should not be thought of as a
static, unchanging entity despite appearances to the contrary. Instead it should be
conceived of as a process." (p.25) Thus, Alexanderian ontology is fundamentally
processual (chapter 2) in character. Alexander goes on to assert that
in any point-instant the instant is the mind or soul of its point; in a group of points there is a mind of
those points, which upon the primary level of Space-Time itself is the corresponding time of that
complex. (Vol.II, p.39)
Hence, the statement that `Time is the mind of Space and Space is the body of Time'. It
should not, however, be understood from these statements that mind is primordial;
Alexander uses these expressions in a purely analogical or functionalistic (chapters 1 and
4) sense. As he states,
I do not mean as Leibniz meant that things on their different levels possess varying degrees of
consciousness, from the distinct stage of intelligence down to the confused stage of matter. On the
contrary mind is mind and Time is Time. Mind exists only on its own level of existence. I mean that
in the matrix of all existence, Space-Time, there is an element Time which performs the same function
in respect of the other element Space as mind performs in respect of its bodily equivalent. The points
of Space have no consciousness in any shape or form, but their instants perform to them the office
of consciousness to our brains .. [Hence,] rather than hold that Time is a form of mind we must say
that mind is a form of Time. This second proposition is strictly [as opposed to analogically] true. Out
of the time-element .. the quality of mind as well as all lower empirical qualities emerge, and this
quality mind belongs to or corresponds to the configuration of time which enters into the space-time
configuration which is proper to the level of existence on which mind is found [emphasis added].
(Vol.II, p.44)
Brettschneider (1964) maintains that Alexander's conception of Space-Time is closer to

the absolute or Newtonian ("container") view than to the relational view of Space-Time;
for Alexander, "things are not only related spatially, but they themselves occupy spaces
and have spatial forms [emphasis added]." (p.1) However, Alexander (1920) argues for
a stronger position, anticipating developments within relativity theory (chapter 4) as to
the link between matter, energy and spacetime:
Another hypothesis as to the connection between things or events and the Space and Time they
occupy is that Space and Time are not merely the order of their coexistence or succession, but are,
as it were, the stuff or matrix (or matrices) out of which things or events are made, the medium in
which they are precipitated and crystallised; that the finites are in some sense complexes of space
and time [emphasis added]. (Vol.I, p.38)
As Brettschneider states, "Alexander would have us abandon the common sense notions
of Newtonian physics that construe things and their relations as so much `matter in
motion'." (p.63) Alexander maintains that matter is nothing other than "a complex of
motion, that is made out of the original stuff which is Space-Time." (Vol. II, p.50) This
is of decisive significance since standard cellular automata (CAs), as introduced in
chapter 2 and examined further in section 5.5, provide a means by which to implement
computational emergentism. CAs map isomorphically onto Newtonian-type dynamical
systems and it is at least conceivable that a variant of the CA formalism supporting
relativistic phenomena can be constructed; consequently, a connection can be established
between CA computationalism and Alexanderian metaphysics.
However, there is a distinction between Alexanderian metaphysics and standard CAs

with respect to motion: Motion in CAs at the level of `matter' assumes the atomistic or
Newtonian form, that is, `particles' changing their locations in space over time. In section
5.5, a variant of the standard CA formalism will be examined which can be used to
resolve this difference, thereby establishing a more complete correspondence between
Alexanderian metaphysics and CA-computationalism. Another distinction that arises
between the two, viz. CAs and Alexanderian Space-Time, is that the former are ontically
discrete and only contingently infinite - as, for example, in Conway's Game of Life
(chapter 2) - while the latter is ontically continuous and necessarily infinite. The
assertion of spatio-temporal infinitude is contestable given a `Big Bang' scenario, that
is, an origin of the physical universe. (One possible solution to this problem involves the
adoption of an inflationary cosmology (Linde,94) in which the Big Bang is viewed as
merely one `bang' amidst a potential infinity of bangs14.) With respect to the postulate
of a spatio-temporal continuum, Fredkin (1996) states that
amazingly, there is not, in all of physics, science, or nature, a single case where a basic phenomenon
once in doubt as to whether it was continuous or discrete is now known to be continuous. Of course,
insofar as the prime quantities of physics, measures of space-time, we can speak of scales that show
no deviation from continuous, but no one can claim that we know that space-time physics is
continuous, as opposed to discrete, down at more microscopic levels such as at Planck's length.
(p.120)
In support of this position, Toffoli (1994b) maintains that
the problem with differential equations [which is the scientific mode of approach on a continuum
view of nature] is that the recipe itself is an infinitesimal one, and has to be executed over a set of
points having the infinity of the continuum. It's a task for angels, not for men; we can only carry it out
in an approximate way. (p.3)
Consequently, Toffoli, following Fredkin, postulates an atomistic ontology for the

natural world, viz. "the ingredients of our physical worlds are discrete particles" (p.3)
which is reflected in a computational context by the assertion that "it is differential
equations that are the poor man's cellular automata - not the other way around!" (p.4)
The continuum postulate is held to emerge as a consequence of averaging, viz.
as soon as the numbers [of objects in a system under consideration] become large enough for averages
to be meaningful - say, averages over spacetime volume elements containing thousands of particles
and involving thousands of collisions - a definite continuum dynamics emerges. (p.5)
This leads Toffoli to postulate the following:
1. Continuous-looking behaviour is bound to emerge, at a macroscopic scale, from virtually any fine-
grained mechanism.
2. Virtually all of the differential equations of physics are among those that are known to be limiting
14
This idea is examined in more detail in chapter 6.
behaviours of simple, discrete fine-grained mechanisms (p.12).
The grounding of an epistemological continuum in an ontologically discrete substrate

raises an interesting issue introduced in chapter 3: On this view, the physical world is
ontologically discrete and finite. The real-number contiuum emerges from averaging
over a large but finite number of discrete objects. Since the universe is finite,
computation of reals generate numbers with finite expansions. However, if materialism
is correct and the physical world is all there is, how can minds conceive of (not actualize
or compute) numbers with infinite expansions ?
Finally, it is worthwhile comparing Alexanderian Space-Time and Einsteinian spacetime

as shown in Table 5.3:
Einsteinian spacetime Alexanderian Space-Time
static and finite block universe dynamic and infinite block universe
event ontology event (point-instant) ontology
absolute underlying laws absolute underlying laws
absolute motion undetectable (physically) absolute motion postulated (metaphysically)
matter and energy distort space; space Space-Time is primordial; matter and energy
affects motion of matter and energy are emergents of Space-Time
forcefields = structural properties of forcefields = Space-Time universals
spacetime
matter = stable regions in forcefield matter = stable regions in forcefield
spacetime continuous Space-Time continuous
local field action local interactions of space-time complexes
no objective, observer-independent reality absolute Space-Time
arrow of time = result of measurement arrow of time = ontical; time is ontological
and directional
deterministic deterministic
matter/energy primordial matter/energy derivative
Table 5.3 Comparison of Einsteinian spacetime and Alexanderian Space-Time.
As stated in chapter 4, Alexander maintains that his conception of Space-Time is

consistent with the Einsteinian spacetime block view of the world; hence, Alexander's
ontology does not violate relativity theory. However, there is a problem: Einsteinian
spacetime is static whereas Alexanderian Space-Time is dynamic. According to the
former, it is things, that is, complexes of space-time, which are dynamic; the world
considered as a whole is itself static since it is identical to the spacetime block.
Furthermore, on the Einsteinian view, matter is primordial and responsible for the
curvature of space. According to Alexander, on the other hand, matter and gravitational
forces are empirically emergent from Space-Time. (For this reason, Euclidean geometry
is an abstraction of Einsteinian spacetime, whereas it is a primordial characteristic of the
ontological uniformity of Alexanderian Space-Time; this is important because Euclidean
geometry is assumed in the definition of standard CAs15.)
5.4.3. Categories
Alexander (1920) identifies the following as the ontological categories of Space-Time:
Q identity, diversity, existence

Q universality, particularity and individuality
Q relation
Q order
Q substance, causality, reciprocity
Q quantity and intensity
Q whole, part, number
Q motion
and maintains that
[as] to the question whether the a priori characters of the world are derived in some manner from
experience of things or are primordial and ultimate, the answer is that they are primordial; they do not
come into being otherwise than as all things come into being and because things come into being. All
things come into being endowed with the categories and with all of them. They are the determinations
of all things which arise within Space-Time, which is the matrix of things, `the nurse of becoming'.
(Vol.I, pp.330-331)
Thus, Collingwood (1945) is led to maintain that according to Alexander, "space-time

is the source of the categories, but they do not apply to space-time; they belong only to
what exists, and what exists is not space-time itself but only the empirical things in it16;
but these things possess categorial characteristics for one reason and one reason only -
namely, that they exist in space-time. Hence Alexander regards them as depending on
the nature of space-time: that is, he aims at deducing them from the definition of space-
time as its necessary consequences [emphasis added]." (p.162) On Collingwood's
reading, Alexander's position is paradoxical: On the one hand, the categories are a priori,
that is, non-emergent; on the other hand, Space-Time is the source of the categories.
Hence, with respect to the primordial stuff, categories are a posteriori. The paradox is
resolved by contextualizing the senses of emergence: Categories are a priori with respect
15
Although this is true in principle, this is not the case in fact since the role of geometrical factors is not explicitly
addressed in the definition of CAs. An extension to the standard CA formalism, viz. Masked CAs (or MCAs),
in which Euclidean geometrical factors are incorporated explicitly is described in (Ali,94a).
16
However, as will be seen in chapter 6, this position is problematic since to the extent that Space-Time is, it must
partake of Being and hence, exist (in some sense of the term).
to empirical existents and a posteriori with respect to Space-Time; hence, there are
directional relations from the ontological substrate (Space-Time) to the categories and
from the categories to empirical existents. Relations of this kind will be examined in
chapter 6 when the link between Being, beings and categorial `cutting' is investigated.
Brettschneider (1964) maintains that the Alexanderian categories are a priori since "they
are properties or basic determinations of Space-Time .. which emerge as Space moves
along its coefficients of Time." (p.34) (This view is consistent with that of Collingwood
(1945) as stated previously.) To reiterate a distinction made in section 5.4.1, categories
are ontological, necessary and non-emergent whereas qualities are phenomenal
(empirical), contingent and emergent. Only the categories of universality, relation,
substantiality, causality and motion will be examined in this section since it is these
categories which are of defining significance in connecting Alexanderian metaphysics
and CA-computationalism: Universality is important since it relates to the issue of self-
organization which in a CA is supported by the necessary existence of attractors (chapter
2); an examination of the Alexanderian category of substance is important because
substances are usually held to be ontologically primitive. Alexanderian substances, it will
be seen, are equivalent to space-time patterns in CAs; finally, it is necessary to examine
the categories of causality and motion since these categories are intuitively primitive and
manifested in the context of CA-computationalism as state-transitions. (Only a brief
outline of the idea of existence is presented below; the whole-part and existence
categories will be examined in greater detail in chapter 6 when the concept of poisis (or
coming-forth) and the link between Being and beings are investigated.)
5.4.3.1. Identity, Diversity, Existence
Brettschneider (1964) maintains that for Alexander, "the identity of a thing lies in its
particular organization of space-times, and because it occupies a particular set of point-
instants, and not others [emphasis added]"; furthermore, "one thing is different from
another because differences in organization of space-times are occasioned by the
occupation of different sets of space-times by different finite entities [emphasis added]."
(p.35) According to Alexander, "being is the determinate occupancy of a portion of
Space-Time in such a way that the rest of Space-Time is excluded from this portion.
Being is .. determinate, spatio-temporal existence. A finite entity approaches the absolute
in being as its internal organization increases in all-inclusiveness and harmony." (p.36)
Accordingly, existence is closely connected with the category of substance which is
discussed below. Importantly, for Alexander, being is not epistemological; empirical
existents (or emergents) are real and not merely observational artifacts. This position is
consistent with "strong" computationalism in which an ontological version of the
coherence theory of truth (chapter 3) is assumed.
5.4.3.2. Universality
According to Brettschneider (1964),

Plato regarded Space as the matrix of which things are modeled after the image of the Forms.
Alexander, however, does not regard form as a property of Space. It is a configuration of Space-Time.
Space-Time is not only the stuff of which material things are constituted, but, like the Platonic Forms,
it is historically prior to matter. Matter is a finite determination of pure Space-Time. (p.59)
On Alexander's view, the forms are themselves patterns of Space-Time17. In place of

Platonic forms or ideas subsisting in a transcendent realm and only immanent in matter
(chapter 2), Alexander advances a strict immanentist position, referring to the pervasive
features of space-time complexes as `laws of construction', `plans', `habits' or simply,
universals. Furthermore, universality implies both "identity of kind" (Vol.I, p.208) and
"a category or determination of Space-Time." (Vol.I, p.214) A superficial reading of
Space, Time and Deity (1920) presents conflicting positions regarding the category of
universals: On the one hand, there are statements in support of Platonic formism (chapter
2) such as "empirical universals are plans of configuration of particulars which are
identical in kind. They may be called patterns of configuration or, to use the old Greek
word, `forms' of Space-Time. They are essentially in their simplest terms spatio-temporal
forms or shapes." (Vol.I, pp.214-215); on the other hand, the idea of universals itself is
contested. For example, it is maintained that "strictly speaking, there is no such thing as
a particular or a universal. All things are individuals." (Vol.I, p.208). The apparent
contradiction is resolved once it is appreciated that the categories are "a priori plans of
configuration" (Vol.I, p.215) and that universality is "begotten like the other categories
by Time on Space." (Vol.I, p.217) Alexander clarifies this position as follows:
the form or configuration of motion belongs not to Space but to Space-Time or motion, and form does
not affect the matter from without, but belongs intrinsically to any finite piece of Space-Time
[emphasis added]. (Vol.II, p.49)
Thus, a commitment to immanentism is implied. Additionally, Alexander is explicit in

his rejection of a transcendent Platonic realm of subsisting ideas:
[On the transcendentalist view,] plans, it may be thought, of space-time are nothing but the universals
of different patches of Space-Time, the circular plan, for example, the universal of all circular patches.
They are but particular applications of a conceptual universal which is prior to Space and Time and
is supplied from understanding or thought, it matters not how. Universality belongs to Space-Time
but comes down upon it, either it may be imagined from mind or from some eternal regions as the
Forms are supposed to enter Space by Timaeus. Our answer is the old one. It is not because there are
universals that any space-time has a plan, but because Space-Time is uniform .. and admits a plan
that existents which are patches of space-time possess universality [emphasis added]. (Vol.I, p.217)
[Hence,] the universal subsists in so far as its particulars exist and is spatio-temporal though not
particular .. It is not timeless or eternal as being out of time, but as being free from limitation to a
particular time. (Vol.I, p.222)
This position is clarified by the statement that "there is no question of any plan [or form]
17
However, this position is problematic for a number of reasons which are discussed in section 5.7.
mediating between the particular and the uniformity of Space-Time; the plan is an
embodiment of that uniformity. The universality of the plan is the capacity of Space-
Time to respond on each occasion according to that plan [emphasis added]." (Vol.I,
pp.219-220) Furthermore, "particulars are complexes of space-time and belong therefore
to the same order or are of the same stuff as the universals which are plans of space-
time." (Vol.I, pp.220-221) According to Brettschneider (1964), "the universal is real
because it is Space-Time and has identifiable patterns or configurations that are
discernible because repeated now and again." (p.37) Brettschneider goes on to make the
following important point regarding the subsumption relation between universals and
particulars, the latter of which are equivalent to organizations of point-instants:
The relation between particular and universal is not simply a logical subsumption of classes; it is an
historical relation. A configuration of Space Time, i.e. a determinate finite existent, is a particular.
To ascribe universality to a particular is to make an historical judgement, a judgement in fact about
the possibility of repetition in Space-Time [emphasis added]. (p.37)
This purely immanentist and historical view of universals is consistent with the
interpretation of emergents18 in CAs in which dynamic spatio-temporal organizations are
interpreted in contingent, immanentist, non-formalistic and processualist terms (chapter
2).
5.4.3.3. Relation
According to Alexander,
relations .. are the spatio-temporal connections of things, these things themselves being also in the
end spatio-temporal complexes. Since Space-Time is continuous, the connecting situation which
constitutes a relation is but spatio-temporal continuity in another form. The relations and the things
they relate are equally elements in the one reality and so far are separate realities .. [Things] must at
least be connected in Space and Time, and it is plain that they must be connected by all the relations
which arise out of the categories, seeing that categories are pervasive features of all things. (Vol.I,
p.249)
Brettschneider (1964) offers the following explanation of the distinction between internal
and external relations19:
Relations are external when outside of and not inherently connected to the terms they come between.
On this account, the fact of a relation makes no difference to the terms related. When a term enters
into a relation with another term, the connection is accidental to the terms as related. In other words,
it matters not to rider, horse, or destination whether I or anybody else ride a cock-horse or anything
18
As will be shown in chapters 6 and 7, CA substrates, by contrast, are defined in formalistic and mechanistic
terms. Furthermore, since emergents follow of necessity from the definition and intialization of such
computational systems, the former can - derivatively - be interpreted formalistically.
19
The difference between internal and external relations is examined in more detail in chapter 7.
else to Banbury Cross or any other place you choose. The realist holds that the range of significance
of the variables of a propositional function is limited only by the universe of discourse. The fact of
a relation does not enter into the being of the terms related. The terms refer to separate, discrete
entities. The realist transforms the logical doctrine of external relations into an ontological doctrine.
A thing is not necessarily altered when it enters into a relation. When my typewriter rests on top of
my desk, its essential being is by no means modified by this relation. In a pluralistic universe [as
entailed by certain strains of externalistic realism] each thing is what it is, and cannot both be itself
and something else at the same time. In its discreteness it is discontinuous with other existents. Were
an entity continuous with other existents not itself, then its intrinsic nature would be altered by its
relations [emphasis added]. (pp.44-45)
Brettschneider (1964) offers the following summary of Alexander's metaphysics with

respect to the issue of relations:
Alexander's universe is patterned along lines set forth by the objective idealists. It is a [monistic]
block universe of internally connected Space-Time relations. Every element in the universe is
connected with every other element. Determinate finite existents are but highly coherent patterns of
organization of the primal stuff of which all things are constituted. All relations are therefore internal.
But some elements are more closely related than others. The distinction between internal and external
relations is thus a difference in degree and not in kind. This is the doctrine of degrees of reality [which
is fundamental to objective idealism]. Every element of Space-Time is connected with every other
element in terms of spatio-temporal perspectives. The Alexanderian universe is thus a unity bound
by internal relations. It is not a `seamless' unity, but the universe, taken as a whole in terms of its
basic constituents, is one. The basic stuff of pure Space-Time is disparated into different patterns of
organization. These are finite events, things, substances, etc. These participate as individuals in either
internal or external relations. (pp.49-50)
Thus, relations are both internal and external, depending on whether a holistic or partial
perspective is adopted; the internalist perspective is, however, ontological and a priori
since finites which are externally-related emerge from the infinite matrix of Space-Time.
It is important to appreciate from the outset that the internal relations in Alexander's
Space-Time metaphysics are ontologically different to those appearing in objective
idealist schemes such as Whiteheadian panexperientialism (chapter 1). This distinction
is linked to the fact that on Alexander's framework, qualities are emergents which appear
ex nihilo (that is, from nothing 20) as correlated properties of specific space-time
complexes; in panexperientialism, by contrast, experience is ontological, that is, non-
emergent and not merely empirical (Whitehead,78) (Griffin,98). This point is extremely
important since, as has been shown, Alexanderian ontology and CA-computationalism
can be closely related. For example, in standard CAs, the state-transition function for
each FSM is defined in purely externalist terms (chapters 2, 6 and 7); however, the
functional connectivity of the FSMs establishes a functionally- continuous (in the sense
of connected) substrate. In what sense, then, can spatio-temporal patterns emerging in
a CA be regarded as "separate realities", that is, as discontinuous entities or, in
Alexanderian terms, èmpirical existents' ? Cariani (1989, 1991) has examined this issue
in some detail, maintaining that the delineation of local patterns (finite existents) within
20
The various interpretations of the concept of nothing are examined in chapter 6.
CAs (the Space-Time substrate21) involves a shift in observational frames between

micro- and macro-dynamic levels of system description: Space-time patterns are
identifiable as discrete entities at the global (emergent) or macro-level by observers
situated at that level; these patterns are unobservable at the local (substrate) or micro-
level. This might appear to contrast with Alexander's position since, as Brettschneider
(1964) maintains, "what he calls finite only appears to be so from the standpoint of other
finites." (p.54) However, if the intrinsic observer perspective (chapter 3) is adopted, then
spatio-temporal patterns are discernible only because of the "filtering" capacities of
observers who are themselves (on this view) internal to the system. Both the intrinsic-
emergence or intrinsic-observation perspective within CA-computationalism and
Alexander's conception of the link between empirical existents and Total Space-Time are
based on an implicit adoption of the ontological interpretation of the coherence theory
of truth (or reality), that is, objective idealism, and a commitment to a doctrine of reality
defined in terms of internal relations (chapter 7). As Brettschneider (1964) states,
"Alexander's finites are not externally related by any means. They are not the separate,
discrete entities that thoroughgoing realists insist upon. They appear finite only when
viewed from the standpoint of a limited perspective, not when seen in relation to Total
Space-Time, the synthesis of all perspectives." (p.55) However, as shown in section 5.7,
CAs at the ontological or component (FSM) level are externally-related systems22.
5.4.3.4. Substance
According to Alexander,
all existents, being complexes of space-time, are substances, because any portion of Space is temporal
or is the theatre of succession [and] all succession is spread out in space. (Vol.I, p.269)
Furthermore,
qualities .. are correlated with certain motions; and it is indifferent for our purpose whether the
quality belongs, as will be here maintained, to the motion itself; or belongs to mind and is the mental
correlate of the motion, as is the belief of those who distinguish primary and secondary qualities, but
recognize a primary correlate of the secondary quality. A thing or complex substance is then a contour
of space (i.e. a volume with a contour) within which take place the motions correlated to the qualities
of the thing; and the complex substance or thing is the persistence in time of this spatial contour with
its defining motions. (Vol.I, p.270)
The persistence of a piece of Space in Time which results from the retention of the configuration of
its movements according to its law of construction does not of course imply that the piece of Space
21
It must be appreciated from the outset that the spatio-temporal substrate in a CA is not necessarily infinite;
hence, CA Space-Time is not necessarily fully isomorphic with Alexanderian Space-Time (which is infinite
by definition).
22
As stated previously, this position is explained further in chapters 6 and 7.
is stationary as a whole. On the contrary, no substance occupies the same place continuously, if only
because of the movement of the earth or other heavenly body, and it may change its place also by
locomotion or transference. But the contour and internal configuration remain within limits the same,
though not the position of the whole thing. (Vol.I, p.271)
Brettschneider (1964) maintains that "in Alexander's architectonic design, substance

evolves out of an infinite with which the finite is continuous, not discontinuous23 .. Total
Space-Time is a continuous whole. It breaks up into finite substances through the agency
of the coherence of spatial elements changing temporal coefficients." (p.53) Since
Alexander does not allow for a Platonic realm of forms, it is necessary for him to
postulate Time as the creative principle which gives rise to substances (empirical
existents) through its own irreducible action. In certain CAs, by contrast, creative self-
organization is a consequence of the existence of attractors which are themselves
necessary consequences of the irreversibility (section 5.5.5) of the local FSM state-
transition function in the CA. As stated previously, and consistent with Alexander's
scheme, CA-substances or empirical existents are identifiable with the dyamic spatio-
temporal patterns formed by groups of cells (FSMs) in specific states.
5.4.3.5. Causality
According to Alexander, "there is no causality in the continuance without change of the

same motion .. a motion does not cause its own continuance, is not as it were the cause
of itself, but is itself [emphasis added]." (Vol.I, pp.281-282) For Alexander, cause and
effect must, therefore, be different, that is, result in different motions. In addition, causes
precede effects; on his scheme, temporally-retroactive causation (chapter 3) is disallowed
due to the asymmetrical `forward-directionality' of Time. Furthermore, Alexander
maintains that
the only self-contained reality in which all causality is immanent [or internally-affective; that is,
causality is between the substances within a complex substance] is the universe itself, and its
immanent causality is but the transeunt [that is, externally-affective] causality of the existents it
contains. (Vol.I, p.284)
Since Alexander adopts an ontological interpretation of the coherence theory of truth, he

is led to assert that "there is no causal relation between the infinite whole and any one
of its parts. There is only such relation between one part and another." (Vol.I, p.288) The
interpretation of causality that this view necessitates will be examined further in chapter
6. However, it should be sufficient to note here that this view is consistent with CA-
computationalism; causation occurs "bottom up" in CAs, viz. at the ontological or
substrate level of functionally-connected FSMs.
23
In this connection, Alexanderian Space-Time is similar to Heideggerian Being (chapters 1 and 6).
5.4.3.6. Motion
On Alexander's view,
it might be objected that a motion or a bit of Space-Time is a really existent concrete thing and
therefore cannot be a category. Such an objection would imply a complete misunderstanding of the
nature of categories. They are not expressing mere adjectives of things, but concrete determinations
of every space-time. Existence is the occupation of any space-time. (Vol.I, pp.320-321)
Thus, for Alexander, motion is both a category and an empirical existent, that is, a space-
time complex. This position is explicitly asserted in the follows statement, viz.
as to motion it is to be described indifferently as empirical or categorial, for it is the meeting-point

of the two. (Vol.II, p.67)
This is, in fact, the case for all the categories as stated previously in section 5.4.3.
Furthermore, Alexander maintains that
point-instants are real but their separateness from one another is conceptual. They are in fact the
elements of motion and in their reality are inseparable from the universe of motion; they are elements
in a continuum. So far from being finites, they are the constituents which are arrived at as the result
of infinite division and belong to the same order as the infinites. Consequently they must be regarded
not as physical elements like the electrons, but as metaphysical elements, as being the elementary
constituents of Space-Time or Motion. (Vol.I, p.325)
Hence, "movement is anterior to things which are complexes of movements, and it is

quite true that that movement is a stuff of which things are made and this is not a mere
relation between things which already exist and are said to move." (Vol.I, p.329) In the
context of CA-computationalism, the primordiality of motion is substituted by the
primordiality of computation which is manifested at the ontological (or substrate) level
in the state-transitions of the functionally-connected FSMs which realize the CA.
5.4.4. Emergence
It was stated in section 5.3.4 and has been restated throughout section 5.4 that emergence
is a foundational concept in Alexander's metaphysics. Although the categories associated
with Space-Time are non-emergent as appearing in finite empirical existents
(phenomena), according to Alexander, the (secondary) qualities associated with specific
space-time complexes are emergent, viz.
the emergence of a new quality from any level of existence means that at that level there comes into
being a certain constellation or collocation of the motions belonging to that level, and possessing the
quality appropriate to it, and this collocation possesses a new quality distinctive of the higher
complex. (Vol.II, p.45)
Although "ascent takes place, it would seem through complexity .. at each change of
quality the complexity as it were gathers itself together and is expressed in a new
simplicity." (Vol.II, p.70); consequently, as Brettscheider (1964) states, "Alexander
thinks of the different qualities of existence as forming a discontinuous series." (p.29)
On Alexander's view, "life is not a consciousness with something of its powers left out,
nor materiality consciousness with still larger omissions and imperfections. The
difference is one of kind or quality and not of degree." (Vol.II, p.69)
Alexander's concept of emergence can be contrasted with that due to Bunge (1979a). It
can be argued that the former adopts what may be described as a cumulative or
`conservative' approach to emergence: As Brettschneider (1964) states, "the emergence
of a new quality refers to the rearrangement of a particular complex of Space-Time at
a given level of existence in such a way that a new pattern develops in addition to the
older finite features [emphasis added]." (p.57) Consequently, it could be asserted that on
Alexander's scheme, the mental is also neural, biological, physico-chemical and spatio-
temporal and such that none of the properties associated with lower order phenomena are
displaced following the emergence of the new phenomenon with its associated
properties. Bunge (1979) contests this position maintaining that preservation of
properties does not constitute a necessary condition for emergence, viz.
the breakdown (dismantling) of a system, and the substitution of some of its components, are
emergence processes .. Every assembly process is accompanied by the emergence of some properties
and the loss of others. I.e. let the parts of a thing x self-assemble into a system during the interval [t,t'].
Then the system lacks some of the properties of its precursors - i.e. px(t)-px(t') - but on the other
hand it possesses some new properties - i.e. px(t')-px(t). (p.30)
However, Alexander's position is, in fact, consistent with both Brettschneider's

interpretation of it and Bunge's alternative since as Alexander states, "the empirical
qualities of the `material' are carried up into the body of the higher level but not into its
new quality [emphasis added]." (Vol.II, p.70) (On Alexander's scheme, the dualistic
abstractions of Space and Time are analogous to body and mind; thus, property-
preservation occurs at the empirical substrate level while simultaneously property-loss
occurs at the qualitative level of the emergent.) This interpretation of his position is
supported by the following statements:
The body or stuff of each new quality or type of soul has itself already its own type of soul, and
ultimately the body of everything is a piece of Space-Time, the time of which is the soul-constituent
which is identical with the body-constituent. (Vol.II, p.69)
A complex of processes on a level L with the distinctive quality l becomes endowed, within the whole
L-thing or body, with a quality l' and the whole thing characterised by this quality rises to the level
L'. The processes with the emergent quality l' constitute the soul or mind of a thing or body which is
on the level L. The mind of a thing is thus equivalent only to a portion of that thing .. Thus the soul
of each level is the soul of a body which is the stuff of which it may be called the form. (Vol.II, p.68)
Thus far in the discussion it has been stated that Alexander's scheme is emergentist: For
example, and according to Collingwood (1945), on Alexander's ontology, the world of
nature appears "as a single cosmic process in which there emerge, as it goes on, higher
orders of being." (p.158) What has not yet been addressed is why emergence should
occur at all. In short, what causes the emergence of finite quality-bearing empirical
existents ? Alexander maintains that
empirical things or existents are .. groupings within Space-Time, that is, they are complexes of pure
events or motions in various degrees of complexity. Such finites have all the categorial characters,
that is, all the fundamental features which flow from the nature of any space-time, in an empirical
form - each finite has its proper extension and duration, is built on the pattern of its specific universal,
in a substance of a certain sort and the like. (Vol.II, p.45)
New orders of finites come into existence in Time; the world actually or historically develops from
its first or elementary condition of Space-Time, which possesses no quality except .. the spatio-
temporal quality of motion. But as in the course of Time new complexity of motions comes into
existence, a new quality emerges, that is, a new complex possesses as a matter of observed empirical
fact a new or emergent quality [emphasis added]. (Vol.II, p.45)
It would appear from this last statement that there is no reason (that is, necessity) for
emergence, it simply (and contingently) happens; that is, emergence is merely an
"empirical fact". This view is supported by the following statement, viz.
the higher quality emerges from the lower level of existence and has its roots therein, but it emerges
therefrom, and it does not belong to that lower level, but constitutes its possessor a new order of
existent with its special laws of behaviour. The existence of emergent qualities thus described is
something to be noted, as some would say, under the compulsion of brute empirical fact, or, as I
should prefer to say in less harsh terms, to be accepted with the `natural piety' of the investigator. It
admits no explanation [emphasis added]. (Vol.II, pp.46-47)
However, this interpretation of Alexander's position is incomplete as the following

statement establishes:
Empirical things come into existence, because Space-Time of its own nature breaks up into finites,
the lowest such finites being simple motions of different velocities or intensities of motion and
different extents of it. Time and Space, either of them, creates differences in the other or breaks it up.
But in a special sense Time is the author of finitude, for it is the transition intrinsic to Time which in
the first place makes motion possible, and secondly provides for the ceaseless rearrangements in
Space through which groupings of motions are possible. Time could not do its work without Space;
but, this being presumed, Time is the principle of motion and change. (Vol.II, pp.47-48)
Thus, according to Alexander, it is the restlessness of Time, which is the source of all
movement and motion in the world24, that is responsible for the creativity manifested in
emergent evolution, in short, for cosmogenesis (Brettschneider,64): "Time is the ordering
[or coherence] quality of the extended structure that is Space." (p.73) Importantly,
24
In this connection, it is interesting to note that on Heideggerian ontology, Temporality (or time) is the `horizon'
for the interpretation of Being (or existence). However, as will be seen in chapter 6, Heideggerian Being, in
contrast to Alexanderian existence with its grounding in a Space-Time event monism, is radically pluralistic.
change is not regarded as categorial (that is, ontological25) since "change always implies
movement and is movement from one movement to another. Change is an alteration in
something else, viz. in movement." (Vol.I, p.330) However, detailed examination of this
position by Brettschneider (1964) reveals the following problems:
the functions of ordering and creating [of finite empirical existences from infinite Space-Time] require
an agent of efficient causation. Alexander's Spinozistic tendencies require that he look within the
system for this efficient agent. He is confronted by three possibilities: (1) Space-Time may act upon
itself; in efficient causation, however, there must be some differentiation between that which effects
a change and that upon which a change is effected 26; (2) Space may act upon Time; or (3) Time may
act upon Space. (p.21)
Alexander adopts the third alternative. However, as Brettschneider points out, this
contradicts his assertion that Space and Time are co-equal àbstractions' of the one
Space-Time continuum (section 5.4.2). Furthermore, "Alexander's organizing relations
must somehow be imported into Space-Time's manner of functioning, since Space-Time
is an irreducible simple. Alexander accomplishes this by making motion a function of
time. This is what he means by the inherent restlessness of Space-Time." (p.21) This is
analogous to the temporal actualization of state-transitions in the basin of attraction field
characterizing the behaviour of a (non-reversible) CA. Hence, in both Alexanderian
metaphysics and CA-computationalism, the ordering or coherence principle is
ontological, that is, intrinsic to the system itself; consequently, both schemes are
necessarily committed a priori to the idea of emergence as self-organization (chapter 3).
The validity of the application of this concept in natural and artificial contexts will be
critically examined in chapter 6 when the interpretation of emergence as poisis
(coming-forth, bringing-forth, becoming) is examined.
In this study, three phenomenal levels (matter, life and mind) have been identified and
briefly described (chapter 4), phenomena which provide the means by which to examine
the possibility of a unification of computationally emergent artificiality. This selection
is very close to that made by Alexander (1920) himself, viz.
roughly speaking, the different levels of existence which are more obviously distinguishable are
motions, matter as physical (or mechanical), matter with secondary qualities, life, mind. (Vol.II, p.52)
The scheme outlined in section 5.5 identifies motions, matter (bearing both `primary' or
mechanical and `secondary' or experiential qualities), life and mind. In both Alexander's
25
This marks yet another point of distinction between Alexanderian and Heideggerian ontology: As will be seen
in chapter 6, on the latter, categories (Kategoria) are hypostatizations (static closures) of the logos which
reflects an essentially dynamic openness to categorial (more precisely, modally existential) emergence in
Being.
26
Hence, the problem of self-organization discussed in chapter 3.
ontology and CA-computationalism, motions are viewed as categorial features of and

empirical emergents from Space-Time; on CA-computationalism, motions are identified
with computations (that is, programs in execution or processes). Before this
computationalist scheme is outlined, Alexander's conception of matter, life and mind will
be briefly examined.
5.4.5. Matter
The phenomenon of matter was discussed implicitly during the examination of

ontological Space-Time and categoral motion in sections 5.4.2 and 5.4.3 respectively.
However, Collingwood (1945) provides the following summary of the Alexanderian
conception which serves to further explicate many of the underlying issues involved:
everything that exists has a place-aspect and also a time-aspect. In its place-aspect it has a
determinate situation; in its time-aspect it is always moving to a new situation; and thus Alexander
arrives metaphysically at the modern conception of matter as inherently possessed of motion, and of
all movements as relative to each other within space-time as a whole. The first emergence is the
emergence of matter itself from point-instants: a particle of matter is a moving pattern of point-
instants, and because this is always a determinate pattern it will have a determinate quality. (p.160)
As Brettschneider (1964) states,
matter is the first level of emergence. Specific organization patterns of Space-Time are denoted by
matter; that is, matter is finite, the simplest type of construct to emerge out of infinite Space-Time's
primordial nature. (p.61)
Alexander identifies inertia or mass and energy as characteristic empirical existents at

the level of matter. In contrast to proponents of mechanism who, taking their lead from
Hume, distinguish between primary and secondary qualities (chapter 2), he maintains
that "shape, size and motion and number (the traditional primary qualities) are not
qualities at all. They are [categorial] determinations of the thing, but are misnamed
qualities because the secondary characters, colour, temperature, taste, and the like, are
qualities, and the primary features are ranged into one class with them as a contrasting
group within the class." (Vol.II, p.56) For Alexander, "the secondary quality is the mind
or soul of its corresponding vibration or whatever the primary movement may be."
(Vol.II, p.59) This leads him to endorse a generic version of the identity theory (chapter
4) in the context of the emergence of empirical phenomena:
[the] secondary qualities are thus a set of new qualities which movements of a certain order of
complexity have taken on, or which emerge with them; and the material movements so complicated
can no more be separated from the secondary quality (which is not merely correlated with them but
identical with them) than the physiological processes which are also psychical can be what they are
in the absence of the conscious quality. (Vol.II, p.59)
Anticipating ideas already discussed in connection with an examination of a unifying

teleological framework presented by Campbell (section 5.2.2), Alexander speculates as
to whether "in these ages of simpler [material] existence something corresponding to the
method pursued by nature in its higher stages, of natural selection [was in operation] ..
whether that is to say, nature or Space-Time did not try various complexes of simple
motions and out of the chaos of motion preserve certain types." (Vol.II, p.55) As stated
previously (section 5.3.2), it may be that the notion of self-organization, which is, in fact,
implicit in Alexander's commitment to a coherence-theoretical position (section 5.4.4),
is a more appropriate teleological concept for matter.
5.4.6. Life
Alexander is emphatic in stating that "life is not an epiphenomenon of matter but an

emergent from it." (Vol.II, p.64) Furthermore, and importantly, he maintains, against the
vitalists, that "the directing [or teleological] agency is not a separate existence but is
found in the principle or plan of the constellation." (Vol.II, p.64) (This supports the link
between a coherence-theoretical position and self-organization stated in section 5.4.5.)
As Collingwood (1945) states, for Alexander
living organisms .. are patterns whose elements are bits of matter. In themselves these bits of matter
are inorganic; it is only the whole pattern which they compose which is alive, and its life is the time-
aspect or rhythmic process of its material parts. (p.160)
This position is clarified by Alexander himself as follows:
Life [is] an emergent quality taken on by a complex of physico-chemical processes belonging to the
material level, these processes taking place in a structure of a certain order of complexity, of which
the processes are the functions. A living process is therefore also a physico-chemical one; but not all
physico-chemical processes are vital, just as every mental process is also physiological but not all
physiological ones are mental. (Vol.II, pp.61-62)
Alexander does not examine the conditions necessary for something to be classified as
living in any detail; on his view, organization (or complexity) is necessary but not
sufficient for life (additional necessary characteristics including self-regulation and self-
reproduction). However, from the above statements, it should be clear that his
formulation of the nature of the living is consistent with the computational theory of life
(CTL) and the possibility of artificial life or A-Life (chapter 4). Statements such as the
following indicate implicit antecedent support for the computationalist thesis:
If the study of life is not one with a peculiar subject-matter, though that subject-matter is resoluble
without residue into physico-chemical processes, then we should be compelled ultimately to declare
not only psychology to be a department of physiology, and physiology of physics and chemistry, but,
if we are consistent, to be a chapter, like all the other sciences, of mathematics, which deals with
motion and Space and Time [emphasis added]. (Vol.II, p.63)
Assuming the computational theory of matter (CTMa) described in chapter 4, the

following statements provide upport for "strong" A-Life (that is, realization as opposed
to mere simulation), viz.
if we regard the organism as behaving according to the laws determined by its own peculiar structure,
a material machine may, since it also obeys the laws of its structure, be said to be alive .. The
difference of the material and the organic `machine' lies in the comparative rigidity of the one and the
plasticity of the other. Plasticity is not realised by matter but waits for life. But if we could secure the
right sort of machine it would be an organism and cease to be a material machine. We have no right
therefore to confuse the definiteness of mechanism with its materiality, and on this ground cut off the
continuity between the material structure and the emergent order of vital structure. The true antithesis
is that of the vital and the material and not of the vital and mechanical [emphasis added]. (Vol.II,
p.66)
5.4.7. Mind
According to Collingwood (1945), on Alexander's scheme "mind is a pattern of vital

activities." (p.161) Consistent with his commitment to an emergentist position,
Alexander maintains that "every object we know is a fragment from an infinite whole
[Space-Time], and every act of mind is correspondingly a fragment out of a larger
though finite mass." (Vol.I, p.23) However, while it is true that "empirical things are
complexes of space-time with their qualities" (Vol.II, p.3), Alexander maintains that
the nature of mind and its relation to body is a simpler problem in itself than the relation of lower
qualities of existence to their inferior basis. (Vol.II, p.3)
Consistent with his view of matter (section 5.4.5), he offers an identity-theoretical

position with respect to mind:
We are forced .. to go beyond the mere correlation of the mental with [associated] neural processes
and to identify them. There is but one process which being of a specific complexity, has the quality
of consciousness; the term complexity being used to include not merely complexity in structure or
constitution of the various motions engaged, but also intensity, and above all unimpeded outlet, that
is, connection with the other processes or structures with which the process in question is organized.
(Vol.II, p.5)
However, not all neural processes are held to be mental on his view, viz.
while every mental process is also neural, it is not merely neural, and therefore also not merely vital
.. assuming that the conception of localization of mental functions in specific regions of the brain is
physiologically correct, we may safely regard locality of the mental process as what chiefly makes
it mental as distinct from merely neural, or what distinguishes the different sorts of mental processes
from one another. (Vol.II, p.6)
..without the specific physiological or vital constellation there is no mind. All less complex vital
constellations remain purely vital. Thus not all vital processes are mental. (Vol.II, p.7)
Mind is identical with some physical counterpart and is connected by some physical connections
which need not necessarily be themselves mental ones, carrying the mental quality. (Vol.II, p.25)
Two elements of Alexander's conception of mind are of particular interest in the context
of this study, viz. consciousness and determinism.
5.4.7.1. Consciousness
Alexander maintains that what Chalmers (1995, 1996) has referred to as the "hard
problem" of consciousness, viz. how subjectivity (the mind) can emerge from an
objective substrate (the brain), does not constitute a problem since mind is merely an
emergent empirical fact which must be accepted in a spirit of `natural piety':
No physiological constellation explains for us why it should be mind. But at the same time, being thus
new, mind is through its physiological character continuous with the neural processes which are not
mental. It is not something distinct and broken off from them, but it has its roots or foundations in all
the rest of the nervous system. It is in this sense that mind and mental processes are vital but not
merely vital. (Vol.II, p.8)
Alexander rejects physicalist versions of conscious inessentialism (Flanagan,95), a thesis

which asserts the logical possibility of non-conscious `zombies' that are behaviourally
and physically indistinguishable from their conscious counterparts:
The mental state is the epiphenomenon of the neural process. But of what process ? Of its own neural
process. But that process possesses the mental character, and there is no evidence to show that it
would possess its specific neural character if it were not also mental. On the contrary, we find that
neural processes which are not mental are not of the same neural order as those which are. A neural
process does not cease to be mental and remain in all respects the same neural process as before.
(Vol.II, pp.8-9)
Searle (1992) maintains that "consciousness .. is a biological feature of human and

certain animal brains. It is caused by neurobiological processes and is as much a part of
the natural biological order as any other biological features such as photosynthesis,
digestion, or mitosis [emphasis added]." (p.90) Alexander appears to hold a slightly
different view: Brains do not cause minds; rather, minds are the empirical qualities
associated with certain neurophysiological states27. However, Searle's position is indeed
identical with this position although it serves to clarify that due to Alexander since it is
explicit about the conditions under which mind emerges, viz. specific neurophysiological
organization. Evidence supporting an identification of Searle's and Alexander's positions
can be found in (Searle,92):
Consciousness is not a `stuff', it is a feature or property [cf. Alexander's empirical quality] of the
brain in the sense, for example, that liquidity is a feature of water.
There is no `link' between consciousness and the brain, any more than there is a link between the
liquidity of water and H2O molecules. If consciousness is a higher-level feature of the brain, then
there cannot be a link between the feature and the system of which it is a feature. (p.105)
[However,] consciousness is a causally emergent property of systems [emphasis added]. (p.112)
27
Hence, Alexander appears to be committed to some version of supervenience (chapter 3).
Crucially, both views assume causal reductionism which Searle defines as follows:
This is a relation between any two types of things that can have causal powers, where the existence
and a fortiori the causal powers of the reduced entity are shown to be entirely explainable in terms
of the causal powers of the reducing phenomena. (p.114)
However, Searle maintains that causal reduction does not necessarily entail ontological
reduction (chapter 3); specifically, a causal reduction of mental processes to
neurophysiological processes does not entail an ontological reduction of subjectivity to
an objective substrate. Thus, Searle is forced to adopt with Bunge (1977b, 1979a) a form
of ontological pluralism. However, for Alexander, who is committed to a Space-Time
monism, it is not ontological pluralism which is necessitated but qualitative or
phenomenal pluralism. According to Alexander, the ontological categories constitute a
finite set and quality is not included in this set; qualities are merely the emergent `mental'
aspects associated with specific empirical complexes of space-time. Tallis (1994) has
criticized Searle's position maintaining that it is nonsensical to hold that mental states are
both realized in and caused by brain states. Searle's position is based on the view that
causality can legitimately occur between different levels in a phenomenal system.
However, if levels are merely descriptive (or epistemological) devices, then Searle's
position reduces to the notion that causality occurs between different levels of
description (or syntax). But this would be problematic since Searle contests (1) the
validity of the representationalist position within cognitive science and the philosophy
of mind (Searle,80) (Searle,84) (Searle,92) and (2) the view that syntax (that is,
descriptive or representational structure) is causal28. Thus, it would appear that - suitably
interpreted - Alexander's formulation is, after all, more accurate; mental states are not
caused by certain brain states, but are identical with brain states although not merely
identical with such states since brain states which are also mental possess a quality not
possessed by brain states which are not mental, viz. experientiality (ontological-
subjectivity, first-personhood or what-it-is-like-ness). Mental states are not causal but
emergent; causality occurs only at the ontological (or substrate) level of Space-Time
(despite Alexander's arguments to the contrary). The quality of mentality is not caused,
but emerges ex nihilo (chapter 6). As stated previously, according to Alexander,
consciousness must be accepted as an empirical (qualitative) fact in a spirit of `natural
piety'. Finally, Searle (1992) maintains that "the ontology of the unconscious is strictly
28
Searle (1992) describes the computational theory of mind (CTMi) - or "Strong AI" - as follows: "The thesis is
that there are a whole lot of symbols being manipulated in the brain, 0's and 1's flashing through the brain at
lightning speed and invisible not only to the naked eye but even to the most powerful electron microscope, and
it is these that cause cognition. But the difficulty is that the 0's and 1's as such have no causal powers other than
those of the implementing medium because the program has no real existence, no ontology, beyond that of the
implementing medium. Physically speaking, there is no such thing as a separate `program level.'" (p.215) This
latter position is consistent with the argument presented in chapters 6 and 7 to the effect that relative to
becoming, computation is ontologically-ontical (that is, defined in terms of the causality of the implmenting
substrate), and relative to Being, computation is ontically-ontological in that it prosthetically-extends the
intentional capacities of the human user, viz. IA or intelligence amplification (Brooks,94a).
the ontology of a neurophysiology capable of generating the conscious." (p.172) This

position is anticipated by Alexander, who identifies the unconscious with
neurophysiological complexes àwaiting completion' so as to enter into consciousness.
On his view, "[mental processes, memories, dispositions etc] would thus form a
permanent undercurrent of the mental life, but would remain purely physiological till
called upon to enter into the psychical neural constellation." (Vol.II, p.28) Hence,
in the absence of the completing conditions which evoke consciousness, the mind slips into a
physiological or psycho-physical disposition, which is only potentially conscious, but is actually
unconscious. (Vol.II, pp.60-61)
5.4.7.2. Determinism
Alexander advances a form of compatibilism29 with respect to freedom and volition. He

maintains that the conflict between qualitative mental freedom and bodily determinism
is merely apparent. As he states,
choice between two alternatives seems at first sight to distinguish completely between voluntary
choice and ordinary physical causality. For when two forces are operative upon a physical body the
effect is the resultant of the two effects of the separate causes; whereas in choosing, one or the other
motive is adopted and the other disregarded [emphasis added]. (Vol.II,p.321)
However, according to Alexander
freedom is nothing but the form which [deterministic] causal action assumes when both cause and
effect are enjoyed [that is, subjectively experienced] (Vol.II,p.315)
Hence, "freedom does not mean indetermination." (Vol.II,p.330) Alexander goes on to

state that "there is nothing in free mental action which is incompatible with thorough
determinism. Neither is such determinism incompatible with novelty." (Vol.II,p.323).
According to Alexander, "determinism and prediction are .. distinct ideas, and
determinism is compatible with unpredictability and freedom with predictability
[emphasis added]." (Vol.II,p.329) Hence,
not only may mental action be determined and yet unpredictable, it may be free and yet necessary
[since] the necessity that the will obeys is the `necessity' of causation, the determinate sequence of
event upon its conditions. (Vol.II,p.329)
Alexander is committed to a form of epistemological indeterminism which allows for

what Davies (1992) has referred to as `deterministic randomness'. As the former states,
29
The Oxford Companion to Philosophy (1995) defines compatibilism as " a view about determinism and
freedom that claims we are sometimes morally dree and responsible even though all events are causally
determined."
the determinism of the free act means no more than this, that is has followed in fact from its
antecedents, as they exist in the character of the agent and the circumstances which appeal to him for
action. The freedom consists in the act of choice; there is no power of choosing behind the choice
itself, no freedom of choice but only freedom experienced in choice. (Vol.II,p.330)
Hence, for Alexander, freedom is epiphenomenonal, the qualitative correlate of a specific

empirical existent; it is causal only to the extent that the spatio-temporal complex with
which it is identical is causal and all causation is ontologically bottom-up from the
Space-Time substrate to the emergent phenomenon.
5.4.8. From Space-Time to CA-Computationalism
As shown above, Alexander's ontology provides a suitable foundation upon which to

base an examination of the links between computationalism, emergence and artificiality:
Space-time events are prior to matter, life, and mind. If such phenomena are regarded as
concrete then Space-Time must be viewed as abstract (Brettschneider,64). However,
computation is also abstract. Hence, the possibility of reinterpreting Alexander's
ontology in computational terms by establishing an isomorphism between computations
and Space-Time events. However, a computationalism which maps onto Alexander's
Space-Time monism is not readily realized (or visualized) in terms of Turing Machines
(chapter 2). An alternative realization of computationalism supporting structural as well
as behavioural (and functional) isomorphisms with a Space-Time event ontology is to
be found in cellular automata or CAs (chapter 2). As Toffoli and Margolus (1990) state,
"cellular automata are more expressive than Turing machines, insofar as they provide
explicit means for modeling parallel computation on a spacetime background." (p.229)
Consequently, cellular automata have been adopted as the means by which to realize
computationalism in this study. In the following section, a unified framework of
emergent artificiality grounded in CA-computationalism is outlined.
5.5. Computationally Emergent Artificiality (CEA)
In this section, a unified framework of emergent artificiality (A-Physics, A-Life, AI)

grounded in a CA substrate (CEA) and isomorphic with Alexander's emergent
phenomenal hierarchy of naturality (section 5.4) is described. In the discussion that
follows, the CA analogue of physics and matter, viz. CA-matter, a CA-based realization
of the computational theory of matter or CTMa (chapter 4), is examined in detail. There
are (at least) three reasons why this is necessary: (1) CA-matter denotes the first
emergent phenomenal level in the artificiality hierarchy; (2) computational theories of
life (CTL) and mind (CTMi) were examined in chapter 4 whereas discussion of the
CTMa was postponed; (3) CA-life and CA-mind - that is, CA-based realizations of the
computational theories of life and mind respectively - can be linked directly to notions
such as computation- and construction-universality (chapter 2), concepts which have
been extensively studied and widely reported in the literature. However, perhaps the
most important reason for examining the link between CA-matter and CA-
computationalism is implicit in the following assertion of Davies (1992), viz.
the laws of physics act as the 'ground of being' of the universe. (p.73)
In this study, both ontological and epistemological issues associated with

computationalism are being examined. If physics is the ground of being, that is, if
physics is ontological then it becomes necessary to examine the link between CA-
computationalism and physics so as to determine whether the former can in fact subsume
the latter, thereby rendering it derivative and phenomenal as opposed to ontological. If
this is the case, then CA-computationalism can replace physics as the ontological ground
of the phenomenal universe (Steinhart,98).
5.5.1. Cellular Automata (CAs) Reviewed
The basic characteristics of cellular automata (CAs) were presented in chapter 2; hence,
in the following sections only extensions to the standard model are described. However,
before these extensions are discussed it is worthwhile reviewing a few of the properties
of standard CAs relevant to the issues under consideration.
5.5.1.1. Finitude
Standard CAs are finite in at least two senses: First, as Toffoli and Margolus (1990)
state, CA `laws' are finitary, that is, "by means of the local [FSM state-transition] map
one can explicitly construct in an exact way the forward evolution of an arbitrarily large
portion of a cellular automaton through an arbitrary length of time, all by finite means."
(p.230); second, spacetime is assumed to be discrete with a finite amount of information
(state) contained in a finite volume of spacetime (cell). Although this postulate of the
finite nature thesis (chapter 2) is adopted in this study, and hence, only digital or discrete
CA are considered, non-discrete CA have been reported in the literature; for example,
MacLennan (1990) presents a variant of the Game of Life (chapter 2 and section 5.5.2)
based on a continuous spatial automaton, that is, a CA in which both cells and possible
cell states are continuous entities. The other postulate of the finite nature thesis, viz. that
the universe is itself a large but finite automaton is not a necessary assumption within
standard CAs; for example, the Game of Life was originally conceived in the context of
an infinite lattice.
5.5.1.2. Universality
Fredkin (1990) defines a universal cellular automaton (UCA) as a machine that can
exhibit any (and every) kind of mechanistic, locally finite behaviour. As he states,
if you can imagine a process that could take place in a particular CA of any degree of complexity,
then the same process can also be done by any CA that happens to be universal even though the
universal CA is governed by a drastically simpler rule than the complex CA. (p.255)
This is important since according to Fredkin,
if two processes are identical except for a coordinate transformation, they must be the same process.
(p.264)
Thus, "if any particular CA is a good model of microscopic processes in physics, then
every UCA could be programmed to exhibit the isomorphic behaviour (after a space-
time mapping) [emphasis added]." (p.255) This makes possible the embedding of
machines (CAs) within machines leading to the production - via design or emergence -
of a virtual machine hierarchy (chapters 2 and 4). As will be shown in sections 5.5.5 and
5.5.6 when techniques for converting irreversible or non-reversible CAs (or NRCAs) into
reversible CAs (or RCAs) are presented, it is logically possible to embed non-reversible
UCAs (or NRUCAs) in reversible UCAs (or RUCAs) and vice-versa, a consequence of
them both being members of the class of UCAs. Consequently, Fredkin maintains that
"it is even feasible to use a non-reversible model to model a reversible process; it is just
aesthetically obnoxious." (p.257) Additionally, Fredkin argues for a connection between
physics and universality, viz.
if microscopic physics (assuming finite nature) was not universal, then it would be tautologically true
that the construction of an ordinary computer would not be possible; but nature allows us to construct
computers! (p.257)
Taken generally, the above statement implies that a phenomenon must already exist as
a potentiality in a supporting substrate if the emergence of that phenomenon from within
that substrate is to be possible. This point is extremely important since it entails a
reinterpretation of the standard view of emergence (chapter 3) as will be shown in
chapters 6 and 7. However, Toffoli and Margolus (1987) implicitly subscribe to the
conventional interpretation of emergence in terms of creatio ex nihilo (chapter 3). As
they state,
it is often too easy to arrive at models that display the expected phenomenology just because the
outward symptoms themselves, rather than some deeper internal reasons, have been directly
programmed in .. We want models that talk back to us, models that have a mind of their own. We
want to get out of our models more than we have put in [emphasis added]. (p.142)
5.5.1.3. Emergence
Computational emergence, emergent computation and the phenomenon of emergence in

CAs were discussed in chapter 3. As stated earlier in that chapter, a possible consequence
of emergent evolution is that the parts in the new whole may be modified. To recap, a
set of elements {a,b,c,d} might interact to form an emergent whole X; however, when
X is analyzed into its components, these may be {e,f,g,h} where {a,b,c,d} is not
isomorphic with {e,f,g,h}. The original components have been modified during
construction of the whole, viz. the emergent or systemic phenomenon, implying that the
structural components used to construct an emergent whole can act as `scaffolding' which
is not discarded once the whole has been constructed, but is reintegrated into the whole
in modified form; alternatively, the component structures may be retained in the new
whole without modification or discarded completely30. The three possibilities, viz. (1)
component redefinition, (2) component retention, and (3) component disintegration can
be demonstrated in the context of CAs if the components (elements) are identified with
CA spacetime complexes (patterns). In contrast, primitive CA events (state-transitions)
are atomic and ontologically static; at this (substrate) level, {a,b,c,d}/{e,f,g,h}.
5.5.1.4. Hierarchies
Adamides et al. (1992) describe a variant of standard CAs, viz. hierarchical cellular
automata (HCAs), which they define as "structures of simple CA that transfer state
information in one direction at a time, from a specific level of hierarchy to a higher or
lower one, depending on the definition of the direction of transfer." (p.518) Hierarchical
structure in HCAs is ontological, that is, the CA substrate is itself hierarchically
structured. This contrasts strongly with, for example, UCAs in which it is (emergent or
designed) phenomena which are hierarchically structured via embedding of virtual
machines in a substrate which is itself ontically non-hierarchical in structure. (It is
logically possible that HCAs might also support an embedded virtual machine hierarchy.
In this case, such a HCA would be regarded as doubly-hierarchical since both its
ontology and phenomenology would be hierarchically structured.) The difference
between a HCA and a UCA supporting an embedded machine hierarchy is shown in Fig
5.4:
(a)
(b)
Fig 5.4 (a) standard two-dimensional CA; (b) two-dimensional HCA.
30
This is consistent with Cairns-Smith's (1985) notion of genetic takeover in the context of the origin of life
problem.
5.5.2. Why CEA is Possible
CEA is possible because computationalism or computational-functionalism (chapter 2)

supports the dualistic decoupling of emergent(s) from substrate, phenomenon from
noumenon, appearance from grounding reality and hence, allows for multiple realization
(chapter 4); computationalism is possible, that is, not a priori objectionable on logical
grounds, since it is a `relatively adequate' (albeit eclectic) world hypothesis (chapters 1
and 2). The link between emergence (chapter 3) and the hardware-software dualism
supported by computationalism (chapter 2) is described by Hillis (1988) in the context
of the philosophy of mind as follows, viz. "it seems likely that symbolic thought can be
fruitfully studied and perhaps even created without worrying about the details of the
emergent system that supports it." (pp.179-180)
Although the detailed rules of interaction are very different from the interactions of real molecules
[in a fluid], the emergent phenomena are the same. The emergent phenomena can be created without
understanding the details of the forces between the molecules or the equations that describe the flow
of the fluid [emphasis added]. (p.187)
However, it is important to appreciate at the outset that the range of possible candidate
substrates will, in fact, be highly constrained, the multiple-realizability thesis
notwithstanding. This is because any candidate must demonstrate (functional and
behavioural) sufficiency with respect to its role as a substrate for the computational
emergence of artificial analogues of natural phenomena such as matter, life and mind.
5.5.3. Towards CEA: The Game of Life (GOL)
Conway's Game of Life (GOL), which is capable of supporting the computational

emergence (chapter 3) of isomorphic analogues (functional, behavioural) of physical
(material), biological (vital) and psychological (mental) phenomena, is, a priori, a viable
candidate for the realization of CEA. While there are a number of requirements which
must be met in order that the GOL support CEA, for example, provision of a necessary
minimum space and time for phenomenal production, precision in initial organizational
configuration (since, as will be shown in section 5.5.9, the GOL is highly non-robust)
etc, nonetheless, the GOL does, in principle, provide what is, a priori, a viable
ontological substrate for the implementation of a unified framework of CEA. Detailed
accounts of the phenomena which can be generated by the GOL are presented in
(Berlekamp,82), (Gardner,83) and (Poundstone,86). Table 5.4 is a non-exhaustive list31
of some basic and derivative32 types of GOL structure:
31
For example, the breeder (Poundstone,86), one of the most complex GOL structures after embedded virtual
computers (Berlekamp,82), has not been included.
32
Glider-guns and other higher-order structures are considered derivative (or complex) since they can be
constructed from a combination of suitably positioned translating oscillators and static structures
Phenomenal Class Description

Blankers unstable structures
Blocks, Beehives etc static structures
Blinkers, Flip-Flops etc oscillators
Gliders, Spaceships etc translating-oscillators
Glider-guns translating-oscillator generators
Puffer-trains translating translating-oscillator generators
Table 5.4 Basic and derivative types of GOL structure.
The rich phenomenology of the GOL CA makes possible the establishment of

isomorphisms (functional, behavioural) between various elements in Alexander's
emergentist metaphysics and those which of necessity must appear in a CA-
computationalism supporting CEA. A non-exhaustive list of these correspondences is
shown in table 5.5:
Alexanderian Metaphysics CA-Computationalism

(GOL-based)
Ontological Substrate a single infinite plurality of a single infinite lattice of cells

point-instants (events) each containing a finite state
machine
Matter moving patterns of events translating oscillators or gliders
Life moving patterns of matter self-reproducing structures or

breeders (Poundstone,86)
Mind moving patterns of life computation-universal

structures or embedded virtual
computers (Berlekamp,82)
Table 5.5 Isomorphisms between Alexander's metaphysics and CA-computationalism.
At this point in the discussion, it is worthwhile examining the GOL realization of CEA
in slightly more detail. This will provide a clearer understanding of how
computationalism attempts to subsume earlier materialist conceptions of naturality.
5.5.3.1. GOL-Matter
Berlekamp et al. (1982) maintain that if CA-computationalism is correct and the universe
is a computer then
what we call motion may be only simulated motion. A moving particle in the ultimate microlevel may
(Berlekamp,82).
be essentially the same as one of our gliders, appearing to move on the macrolevel, whereas actually
there is only an alteration of states of basic space-time cells in obedience to transition rules that have
yet to be discovered [emphasis added]. (p.849)
This position is consistent with the `primal-stuff' interpretation of Space-Time proposed

by Alexander and described in section 5.4.2. Additionally, the GOL can be extended so
as to incorporate various empirical features associated with the physical world; for
example, Bays (1987a, 1987b, 1990, 1991, 1992) presents a number of three-dimensional
versions of the GOL based on cubic and spherical lattice geometries. Importantly, it has
been shown that a cubic variant can be structured so as to contain an infinite number of
parallel two-dimensional universes, each of which allows for the evolution of Conway
GOL objects, thereby demonstrating the GOL's capacity for the embedding of computers
and the construction of virtual machine hierarchies (chapters 2 and 4).
5.5.3.2. GOL-Life
The possibility of self-reproduction is entailed by the computation universality of the

GOL as anticipated by von Neumann (section 5.5.7). As Berlekamp et al. (1982) state,
Eaters [that is, static glider-consumers] and guns can be made by crashing suitable fleets of gliders,
so it's possible to build a computer simply by crashing some enormously large initial pattern of
gliders. Moreover, we can design a computer whose sole aim in Life is to throw just such a pattern
of gliders into the air. In this way one computer can give birth to another, which can, if we like, be
an exact copy of the first [emphasis added]. (p.848)
Moreover, a CA-based variant of evolution via natural selection is also logically possible,
viz.
among finite Life patterns there is a very small proportion behaving like self-replicating animals.
Moreover, it is presumably possible to design such patterns which will survive inside the typical Life
environment (a sort of primordial broth made of blocks, blinkers, gliders, ...). It might for instance do
this by shooting out masses of gliders to detect nearby objects and then take appropriate action to
eliminate them. So one of these ànimals' could be more or less adjusted to its environment than
another. If both were self-replicating and shared a common territory, presumably more copies of the
better adapted one would survive and replicate. (p.848)
[Hence,] it's probable, given a large enough Life space, initially in a random state, that after a long
time, intelligent, self-reproducing animals will emerge and populate some parts of the space
The latter statement assumes that intelligence is continuous with life (chapter 4) and
leads directly to the GOL interpretation of mind.
5.5.3.3. GOL-Mind
The GOL supports universal computation (chapter 2). Furthermore, using logic gates
(NOT, AND, OR) constructed from suitably positioned glider guns and other basic
structures, it is possible to ground or embed a virtual computer, that is a CA equivalent

of a universal Turing machine, in the GOL substrate. A constructive proof is presented
in (Berlekamp,82). Computation-universality is directionally important for (at least) two
reasons: (1) ùpwardly' because it has been correlated with intelligence in
computationalist theories of the mind and is readily extended to cope with the
phenomenon of intentionality if an objectivist-behaviourist interpretation of the latter is
adopted (chapter 4). The phenomenon of consciousness (subjectivity, first-personhood
etc) is explained in emergentist terms: Following Alexander, CA-computationalists
maintain that consciousness is an emergent phenomenon associated with a specific
organization of its causal substrate, viz. the brain; (2) `downwardly' because
computation-universality supports simulability (chapter 4) and, thereby, the simulation
(or realization) of other phenomena characteristically associated with life such as
autonomy, growth, metabolism and evolution.
5.5.4. Problems with the GOL
While it might appear that the GOL is sufficient (functionally, behaviourally) as a

substrate for CEA, close examination reveals this position as both naive and incorrect.
One of the main problems with the GOL with respect to CEA is that it is
informationally-dissipative, that is, irreversible; however, as Gutowitz (1990) states,
"fundamental physical laws are (microscopically) time-reversal invariant, hence a
cellular automaton which is to model such physics should be time-reversal invariant as
well." (p.viii) Thus, the GOL is not a suitable substrate for realizing microscopic physics.
In addition, GOL causation does not support quantum non-locality and relativistic effects
(chapter 4) are not readily incorporated due to the scale invariance of structures in the
CA. While it is true that the GOL can support the virtual machine embedding of, for
example, Newtonian (classical or reversible) systems, this is not an efficient33 approach.
For this reason, it is necessary to extend the basic CA model to incorporate the requisite
features as described below.
5.5.5. Reversible and Irreversible CAs
In the previous section, notions of reversibility and irreversibility were introduced in the
context of CAs. Reversibility is a universal characteristic of physical law for phenomena
above the quantum level and is a necessary condition for the Second Law of
Thermodynamics to hold. As Wolfram (1984b) states, "the laws of thermodynamics give
a general description of the overall behaviour of systems governed by microscopically
non-dissipative (reversible) laws." (p.viii) In locally-interacting systems which have a
33
Èfficient' in the sense of parsimonious. Since there are no a priori reasons necessitating that the state-transition
function of the CA substrate implementing CEA be irreversible, therefore, in accordance with Ockham's Razor,
a reversible state-transition function will be assumed. This entails a simplification of the relationship between
substrate and first level emergent, viz. matter.
finite amount of information per site (for example, standard CAs), reversibility is
equivalent to the Second Law. Reversibility also provides a sufficient condition for the
conservation of various physical quantities such as energy, momentum etc (Toffoli,87).
CAs are forwards-deterministic systems, that is, for every global CA state, the CA rule
specifies a unique successor state34. Reversible (or invertible) CA are both forwards and
backwards deterministic; hence, a unique predecessor state exists for all CA states except
Garden of Eden configurations (chapter 2). The rule allowing the trajectory (or global
state-sequence) to be traversed in reverse is known as the inverse rule with respect to the
original forward rule. (A CA is called time-reversal invariant if the forward and inverse
rules are identical under a suitable transformation of the final state generated by the
forward rule into the initial state of the the reverse rule.) Margolus (1984) defines
reversible cellular automata (or RCAs) as
computer-models that embody discrete analogues of the classical-physics notions of space, time,
locality, and microscopic reversibility. (p.81)
Toffoli and Margolus (1990) hold that bijectivity35constitutes a necessary condition for
reversibility in dynamical systems where reversibility in CAs is defined as follows:
A cellular automaton is invertible [or reversible] if its global map is invertible, i.e. if every
configuration - which, by definition, has exactly one successor - also has exactly one predecessor. In
the context of dynamic systems, invertibility coincides with what the physicists call `microscopic
reversibility'. (p.231)
However, in CAs injectivity36 is equivalent to invertibility (reversibility) since CAs are

deterministic (chapter 2) and hence, all states are reachable in the forwards direction of
spatio-temporal evolution37. Thus, CAs are a special case of dynamical systems in which
bijectivity reduces to injectivity.
Reversibility of CAs has been widely investigated in the literature. Toffoli and Margolus
(1989) present a general introduction to the concept of invertibility and detailed
presentations of the concept have been made in (Fredkin,82,90,96), (Margolus,84,93)
and (Toffoli,77,78,80,89,90,94a,94b). However, before examining how invertibility can
be implemented in CAs, it is worthwhile considering the following remark due to
Capecci (1979), viz.
34
This corresponds to a surjective mapping (see Glossary).
35
See Glossary.
36
See Glossary.
37
This includes Garden of Eden states (chapter 2) which are axiomatically reachable.
it is impossible to establish a reversible relation of cause and effect except when we are dealing with
entities which are eternal and which are achieved by abstraction [emphasis added]. (p.38)
If this statement is correct - and to maintain that this is the case necessitates holding with
Prigogine and Stengers (1984) that the "arrow of time" (directionality) associated with
thermodynamic processes (chapter 4) is ontical as opposed to merely epistemic - then
it is possible that both Newtonian mechanics and RCAs are abstract epistemological
constructs (that is, artifacts), products of a `cutting' of the world that ignores its intrinsic
temporality or historicity (chapter 6). In the context of the present discussion, this view
will be regarded as in conflict with the reversibility and determinism of both the classical
and quantum formalizations of microscopic phenomena (chapter 4) and hence, will not
be considered further.
5.5.5.1. Implementing Reversibility
If a CA is invertible, then its inverse is a cellular automaton and a local FSM state-
transition map for the inverse CA can be defined; however, the invertibility of a n-
dimensional CA is undecidable (chapter 2) for n$1 (Toffoli,90). For this reason,
constructive or synthetic (as opposed to deductive or analytic) approaches have been
adopted in the context of RCA implementation. Toffoli and Margolus (1987) describe
a number of possible schemes for implementing reversibility in CA, for example,
alternating sublattices, the guarded-context technique etc. However, possibly the simplest
and most general approach is the second-order technique suggested by Fredkin which
involves specifying the forward-time dynamics of a CA as
st+1 = J(st) - st-1 (5.1)
where st is the state of the CA at time t and J is the forward state-transition rule. (5.1)
guarantees the reversibility of the dynamics for an arbitrary J. The reverse-time
dynamics are given in (5.2) and are determined by solving (5.1) for st-1. Time-reversal
invariance is supported by applying J / J-1 to suitably defined time-reversed states.
st-1 = J(st) - st+1 (5.2)
Importantly, the global time evolution generated by (5.1) is not guaranteed to be

invertible unless suitable boundary conditions are chosen, such as no boundary (that is,
an infinite or periodic space) or `fixed' boundaries (cell values on the boundary are not
allowed to change with time) (Margolus,84). The above scheme is important since it
shows that in spite of the rarity of reversible CAs (or RCAs), the ones that are
constructable are at least as many as the corresponding irreversible or nonreversible CAs
(or NRCAs) (Toffoli,90).
Yet another approach to RCA implementation involves the notion of partitioning. In

addition to providing a means by which to implement reversibility in CA, the
partitioning technique is significant in connection with the debate over the relative
autonomy of levels in a phenomenal hierarchy. A partitioned cellular automaton (PCA)
is a variant of standard CA in which
1. the lattice is partitioned into a collection of finite, disjoint and uniformly arranged blocks;
2. a block-transition rule is defined and uniformly applied to each block in the lattice. Blocks are not
allowed to overlap and information is not exchanged between adjacent blocks;
3. the block-partitioning is changed at each iteration such that there is overlap between the blocks used
at consequtive iterations. This ensures casual connectivity (i.e. dependency) of cells in the lattice.
Hence, a PCA is essentially a standard CA with `coarse' granularity. (Standard CAs are,
by contrast, `fine' grain since the block size collapses to that of a lattice primitive, that
is, a unit cell). Space-time uniformity is achieved by the cyclicity of the partitioning
strategy. It is important to note that PCAs can be implemented in standard CAs using
more states and neighbours (Toffoli,87). The inverse rule is generated by applying the
forward rule in reverse, that is, bt6bt+1 becomes bt7bt+1 or rather bt6bt-1, where bt denotes
a partitioning block of states at time t. However, there must be a one-one correspondence
between òld' and `new' block states such that the rule consequent is a permutation of the
rule antecedent. The distinction between NRCAs and PCAs is shown in Fig 5.5:
t t+1 t+2 t t+1 t+2

(a) (b)
Fig 5.5 (a) NRCA; (b) PCA.
(Squares denote cells, circles denote operators.)
5.5.5.2. Billiard-Ball Mechanics (BBM)
Features associated with both schemes are integrated in the `billiard-ball' model of CA-
computation or BBM-CA (Margolus,84) which makes use of the notion of conservative
logic (Fredkin,82). This implies conservation in the output of the number of 0's and 1's
that are present in the input to a gate, viz. a primitive RCA element composed from a
block of lattice cells. According to Toffoli (1980),
in conservative logic, all data processing is ultimately reduced to conditional routing of signals.
Roughly speaking, signals are treated as unalterable objects that can be moved around in the course
of a computation but never created or destroyed. (p.640)
Hence, the consistency of conservative logic with the microphysical basis underlying the
laws of thermodynamics (chapter 4). Furthermore, as Landauer (1967) states,
conservative logic is consistent with the non-production of information. This point is
extremely important in the context of emergence and self-organization which are usually
interpreted as information-generating (or negentropic) processes. (However, it is
important to recognize that RCAs cannot support self-organization by definition since
they are non-surjective38 automata (Wolfram,84b).)
Conservative logic is essentially a type of logic which is consistent with the physics of
microscopically reversible or classical (Newtonian) systems. The billiard-ball model
(BBM) of computation (Fredkin,82) is a classical mechanical system obeying a
continuous dynamics; more precisely, a system of `hard' (momentum-conserving)
spheres and `mirrors' (or reflecting surfaces). By suitably restricting the initial conditions
the system can assume and by only looking at the system at regularly spaced time
intervals, the BBM can be made to perform a digital process. According to Margolus
(1984), "the key insight behind the BBM is this: every place where a collision of finite-
diameter hard spheres might occur can be viewed as a boolean logic gate." (p.86) The
Fredkin gate (Fredkin,82) shown in Fig 5.6 implements a BBM logic gate. This gate,
which is its own inverse, is a reversible (invertible) universal logic element; thus, any
invertible logic function can be constructed out of Fredkin gates.
A B C A' B' C'

A A' 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 1 0
0 1 0 0 0 1
B B' 0 1 1 0 1 1
1 0 0 1 0 0
C C' 1 0 1 1 0 1
1 1 0 1 1 0
1 1 1 1 1 1
Fig 5.6 The Fredkin (Reversible Logic) Gate.
38
Non-surjective here implies injectivity and hence, non-existence of a basic of attraction field.
For example, by presetting line B to `0' and discarding A' and B' on the output, the AND
function can be computed. Furthermore, as Wolfram (1984b) states,
cellular automaton rules may be combined by composition. The set of cellular automaton rules is
closed under composition, although composition increases the number of sites in the neighbourhood.
(p.3)
Hence, by cascading a NOT gate (inverter) and an AND gate, a NAND gate can be
constructed (Toffoli,80). This is important since NAND gates (like NOR gates) are
universal logic elements which can be used as the basic (or àtomic') primitives from
which to construct computers (UTMs). However, as Toffoli and Margolus (1990) state,
in an invertible cellular automaton the gates [or local FSM state-transition maps] will have to be
invertible; because of this constraint, a complete, self-contained logic design will have to explicitly
provide, besides circuitry for the desired logic functions, additional circuitry for functions (analogous
to energy supply and heat removal in ordinary computers) concerned with entropy balance. (p.234)
By taking a long time to perform the computation, a physical realization of a reversible

logic gate can expend arbitrarily little energy. Consequently, Bennett and Landauer
(1985) maintain that "there is thus no minimum amount of energy that must be expended
in order to perform any given computation." (p.41) While this result makes possible
more efficient designs of computers with respect to energy constraints, it does not entail
that energy expenditure can be reduced to zero; physical realizations of computers have
moving parts and hence, generate friction which leads to the dissipation of energy in the
form of heat. It would appear, therefore, that only abstract (`Platonic') RCAs can attain
zero energy expenditure. Toffoli (1980) admits this in stating that "it appears possible
to design circuits whose internal power dissipation under ideal physical circumstances
is zero [emphasis added]." (p.633) Furthermore, if Prigogine and Stengers (1984) are
correct and microscopic fluctuations constitute an irreducible feature of the physical
world then classical thermodynamics and the notion of reversibility are idealizations
which apply to certain stable macroscopic structures such as those for which classical
mechanics was developed as a descriptive device. Bennett and Landauer (1985) point out
additional problems with systems based on reversible logic:
For example, do elementary logic operations require some minimum amount of time ? What is the
smallest possible gadgetry that could accomplish such operations ? Because scales of size and time
are connected by the velocity of light, it is likely that these two questions have related answers. We
may not be able to find these answers, however, until it is determined whether or not there is some
ultimate graininess in the universal scales of time and length. (p.45)
At the other extreme, how large can we make a computer memory ? How many particles in the
universe can we bring and keep together for that purpose ? The maximum possible size of a computer
memory limits the precision with which we can calculate. (p.45)
If the universe is a finite UCA, then it only approximates the computational capability
of a UTM (chapter 2). (A finite UCA is equivalent to a UTM with a large but finite
tape.) Thus, there will be numerical entities (such as pi) whose expansion can only be
computed to finite precision. This point is important: If the universe is infinite, the
complete expansion of pi can be generated. However, in a finite universe it cannot,
which leads to an interesting question, viz. is pi really infinite or is it equal merely to its
computable expansion, an expansion whose length is at least partially determined by the
physical constraints on computation imposed by the universe ? Such questions lead
ultimately into metaphysical territory with Platonists such as Penrose (1994) subscribing
to the former position and instrumentalists (finitist-constructivists) such as Cariani
(1989) subscribing to the latter. Bennett and Landauer (1985) advance a variant of the
latter view supporting the postulated closure between physics, mathematics and
computation described in chapter 4:
The inevitable deterioration processes that occur in real computers pose another, perhaps related,
question: can deterioration, at least in principle, be reduced to any desired degree, or does it impose
a limit on the maximum length of time we shall be able to devote to any one calculation ? That is, are
there certain calculations that cannot be completed before the computers' hardware decays into
uselessness ? Such questions really concern limitations on the physical execution of mathematical
operations. Physical laws, on which these answers must ultimately be based, are themselves
expressed in terms of such mathematical operations. Thus we are asking about the ultimate form in
which the laws of physics can be applied given the constraints imposed by physics that the laws
themselves describe [emphasis added]. (pp.45-46)
5.5.5.3. BBM-CA
A RCA implementing the BBM (a BBM-CA) is readily constructed since RCAs model
space as being uniformly filled with uniformly-connected gates (Margolus,84). Toffoli
(1980) maintains that in combinational (or causally non-iterative) networks, structural
reversibility and functional invertibility coincide whereas in sequential (or causally
iterative) networks, the network is said to be reversible if its combinational part is
reversible. On this basis, Toffoli and Margolus (1990) conjecture that all RCAs are
structurally invertible, that is, can be (isomorphically) expressed in spacetime as a
uniform composition of finite invertible logic primitives. As an example of the BBM-
CA, consider the following two-dimensional binary RCA: The (Cartesian) lattice is
divided into 22 blocks of cells and each block is treated as a conservative logic gate
with four inputs (current state) and four outputs (next state). The local update rule shown
in Fig 5.7(a) is applied to the 22 blocks using alternately the solid and dotted blocking
regimes. The application of this rule in the modeling of particle collisions39 is shown in
Fig 5.7(b).
39
It should be noted that this technique introduces a 1-block delay in the result as shown.
dotted solid dotted
solid dotted solid

(a) (b) 1-block delay
Fig 5.7(a) BBM-CA rule; (b) particle collision.
In the following sections, CA realizations of the computational theories of matter, life

and mind discussed in chapter 4 will be presented. Implementation of the artificial
analogue of each natural phenomenon is not described in detailed, nor are the
artificialities integrated under a single CA. It is assumed that since CA-computationalism
in either its RCA or NRCA form can realize each phenomenon individually, a unified
framework of CEA is logically possible. The grounds for this assumption are examined
in section 5.5.9.
5.5.6. CA-Matter
Matzke (1996) defines information as "just another kind of energy or matter (or visa
versa)" and holds that "information laws are toplogical constraints that precede physical
laws." (p.223) This is consistent with Wheeler's notion of a pregeometric foundation for
physics, briefly mentioned in the context of the computational theory of matter or CTMa
(chapter 4). The CTMa can be implemented under RCA-computationalism using the
digital mechanics framework introduced in chapter 2 and described in more detail below.
As a precursor to the presentation of this scheme, the nature of the link between CAs and
physics will be examined.
Vichniac (1984) distinguishes three ways in which CAs may be used to simulate physics,
viz. "(1) CAs as computational tools; (2) CAs as fully discrete dynamical systems. In this
approach, cellular automata are relevant to physics only insofar as dynamical systems are
relevant to physics; (3) CAs as original models for actual physical phenomena, possibly
competing with existing continuum models." He goes on to state that
many of these CA universes are inhabited by beings that are most often seen in the theoretical
physicists menagerie, such as symmetries and conservation laws, a conspicuous arrow of time in
reversible microscopic dynamics, order parameters and non-ergodicity, non-separability, causality

and light cone, relaxation to chaos through period doublings, and, most instructively, the appearance
of complex phenomena and large scale correlations resulting merely from a very simple short-range
interaction. (p.97)
Toffoli and Margolus (1987) describe the application of CAs in the modeling of various
physical phenomena including diffusion, fluid dynamics, Ising system dynamics and,
implicit in the discussions of section 5.5.5, classical and thermodynamic processes.
Ablowitz et al. (1991) describe a class of stable time-reversible multistate CAs
possessing a large array of coherent particle-like structures governed by rich
particle-interactions including particle production. However, there are a number of
phenomena that have not been successfully incorporated into RCAs. For example,
according to Margolus (1993), relativity is not supported since "there is no real notion
[in a CA universe] of the `same' composite system in various states of motion." (p.3)
Although CA models of quantum-mechanical (or QM) phenomena such as wave-particle
complementarity (Gernert,86) and analogues of Heisenberg uncertainty (Ingerson,84)
have been described, it is generally held that there is a limit to the modeling capabilities
of CAs with respect to QM. According to Davies (1992),
Heisenberg's uncertainty principle puts paid to the notion that the present determines the future
exactly. Of course, this supposes that quantum uncertainty is genuinely intrinsic to nature, and not
merely the result of some hidden level of deterministic activity. In recent years a number of key
experiments have been performed to test this point, and they have confirmed that uncertainty is indeed
inherent in quantum systems. The universe really is indeterministic at its most basic level. (pp.30-31)
The same point is made in a computational context by Wolfram (1983a), viz.
the Church-Turing thesis states that no system may have computational capabilities greater than those
of universal computers. The thesis is supported by the proven equivalence of computational models
such as Turing machines, string-manipulation systems, idealized neural networks, digital computers,
and cellular automata. While mathematical systems with computational power beyond that of
universal computers may be imagined, it seems likely that no such systems could be built with
physical components. This conjecture could in principle be proved by showing that all physical
systems could be simulated by a universal computer. The main obstruction to such a proof involves
quantum mechanics [emphasis added]. (p.17)
Furthermore, Feynman (1982) has proved mathematically that classical computers can
never simulate non-locality. Margolus (1993) presents the following list of characteristics
incorporated into CAs from computation theory and physics as well as a number of
features which are absent in CA-Matter (Table 5.6).
Computation Physics Missing
digital space relativity

exact time quantum mechanics
universal locality of interaction
finite infon. propagation speed
3-dimensional interconnectivity
conservation laws
microscopic reversibility
finite entropy for finite system
entropy proportional to volume
Table 5.6 Computational and physical characteristics of CA-Matter.
5.5.6.1. Digital Mechanics (DM) Revisited
Digital Mechanics or DM (Fredkin,90) refers to CAs which have been programmed to

act like physical systems. Fredkin assumes the finite nature thesis (chapter 2), the main
implication of which is that a finite volume of space-time can be exactly represented by
a finite number of bits; thus, physics can be reduced to discrete computation. He
maintains that "DM like systems may be useful for creating approximate models of
continuous phenomena, but if finite nature is true, then DM can be an exact model
[emphasis added]" (p.255) in which case simulation gives way to emulation (chapter 4).
DM is described as follows, viz.
to be complete, everything in our universe (the exact present state) would be a consequence of the
rule, the size and shape of the cellular space, the boundary conditions (which can be eliminated if the
space wraps; e.g., if cell coordinates are treated modulo some number), the initial conditions and the
time (which would be an integer, the number of time steps from the initial conditions to the present.
(p.258)
According to Fredkin, the implications of this thesis are as follows:
finite nature would mean that our world is an informational process - there must be bits that represent
things and processes that make the bits do what we perceive of as the laws of physics. This is true
because the concept of computational universality guarantees that if what is at the bottom is finite,
then it can be exactly modelled by any universal machine. (p.259)
The following arguments in support of finite nature, viz.
as an informational scientist it is not that we see DM as a possible model of physics, rather it is that
we see no way to model physics without the incorporation of much of what is in DM. In other words,
to a programmer who believes in finite nature, physics cannot be imagined in microscopic detail
without its having most of the characteristics of DM; unless one resorts to magic. A programmer who
does not believe in finite nature, knows that he can only model physics on a computer by making the
same kinds of assumptions that DM makes. (p.259)
DM and computation-universal RCAs (or RUCAs) are closely connected. According to

Fredkin,
for each RUCA, there are one or more .. informational processes [which can supervene on the RUCA
substrate]. DM is simply an informational process that runs on a RUCA and that in one way or
another should be able to model nature. (p.259)
Fredkin presents the following list of correspondences between DM (grounded in some

supporting RUCA) and physics (Table 5.7):
Physics DM
digit-transition D
length L, the inter-cell distance
time T, one CA clock cycle
energy D/T
momentum D/L
mass DT/L2
angular momentum D
action
charge (+ or -) space-time parity of D, even or odd

charge quantization stable D orbits in 3-space
color structure orientation:N-S, E-W, U-D
2-state system (spin) actually, measuring one bit!
conservation laws conservation of information
isotropy asymptotic isotropy
continuity discreteness
infinitesimals the digit, units of length and time
infinities large but finite
special relativity asymptotic special relativity
general relativity consequence of the DM process
measurable acceleration measurable velocity
measurable rotation measurable angular orientation
group theory properties consequence of RUCA symmetries
particle masses stabkle structures in the RUCA
too many parameters the rule, and the initial conditions
why is there anything ? answer: unknowable determinism
compex amplitudes 2-phase clock, time dimensions depth 2
spin 1/2 smallest D orbit
isotopic spin projection of D orbits that represent charge
form of the photon each particle is a digital machine where its

form of the electron spin, momentum energy, charge, color etc.
form of the quark is represented by information or by a
form of the gluon particular information process
form of the neutrino
Table 5.7 Correspondences between Physics and DM (Fredkin,90).

Cursory examination of this table shows DM to be capable of modeling (or realizing on

the "strong" computationalist view) both relativistic and quantum mechanical
phenomena. However, these issues warrant further consideration. With respect to
relativity, Toffoli (1989) maintains that
quantitative features of special relativity and at least qualitative features of general relativity emerge
quite naturally as epiphenomena of very simple computing networks [flat, uniform lattice gas CAs].
Thus, relativity appears to be of the right form to be an emergent property, whether or not that is the
way it comes about in physics. (p.317)
However, Fredkin (1990) states that
we now know of reasonable approaches that allow the physics of DM to be Lorentz invariant [that
is, relativistically correct] even though the process runs on a Cartesian lattice. The lattice remains
Cartesian, but measurements made from within the DM model by sending simulated photons back
and forth to make measurements can be expected to give relativistically correct results [emphasis
added]. (p.258)
Furthermore,
a DM system can be asymptotically isotropic. Nearly all trace of the preferred space-time coordinate
system, its anisotropy, its absolute reference frame and its absolute lengths and times can be totally
washed out so as to become relativistically correct as the scale of events moves away from the most
microscopic. (p.262)
Thus, by adopting an endophysical (or intra-systemic) as opposed to exophysical (or

extra-systemic) perspective, that is, by embedding the observer within the DM-RUCA
universe, Fredkin maintains that relativistic effects will be observed; DM-RUCAs are
absolute (Newtonian, classical) only from the privileged perspective of an external
observer who can assume a "Gods-Eye" view of the DM-RUCA universe. This is
possible for human beings with respect to DM-RUCAs since human beings are the
artificers of these virtual worlds and hence, stand outside of (or beyond) them.
With respect to QM, Fredkin (1990) maintains that "DM may be capable of using
mechanistic, deterministic, and local rules as a substrate and yet produce behaviour that
obeys the laws of QM." (pp.259-260) How is this possible ? Fredkin claims that the
conflict between classical and quantum mechanics is merely apparent. By adopting a
variant of the `hidden variables' interpretation of QM (chapter 4) and utilizing a
distinction between light cones and information cones, Fredkin is able to explain
quantum non-locality under DM:
In DM, there is an information cone that is loosely equivalent to our current idea of the light cone of
ordinary physics. However, the information cone does not have the intuitive kind of local causality
we sometimes attribute to the light cone. In DM it is simply incorrect to say that only events within
the information cone of the past can influence an event in the present. This is surprising, but really
has to do with the nature of DM. The state of a particular cell is absolutely determined by the state
of its immediate neighbours in space-time [emphasis added]. (p.264)
... in every reversible CA, the space-time neighbours of a cell always include both the past and the
future .. this means that there are reasonable DM models where every cell is a deterministic function
of cells through a region of space, the information cone, that includes parts of space not in the obvious
light cone. Thus the language we use to describe situations where the concept of a light cone is used,
may make little sense in DM [emphasis added]. (p.264)
Using the second-order construction technique (section 5.5.5), the various components
in the information cone for a RUCA cell can be defined as shown in Table 5.8:
Computing the Formalism
future Cx,t+1 = F1(Cx-1,t, Cx+1,t, Cx,t-1, Cx,t)

present Cx,t = F2(Cx-1,t, Cx+1,t, Cx,t-1, Cx,t+1)
past Cx,t-1 = F3(Cx-1,t, Cx+1,t, Cx,t+1, Cx,t)
right (of light cone) Cx+1,t = F4(Cx-1,t, Cx,t, Cx,t-1, Cx,t+1)
left (of light cone) Cx-1,t = F5(Cx+1,t, Cx,t, Cx,t-1, Cx,t+1)
Table 5.8 Computing the information cone in a RUCA cell.
Consequently,
the present is no more a consequence of the past than it is a consequence of the future. A location is
no more the immediate consequence of its local neighbourhood than it is a consequence of very
distant points in space-time. Consider a given event: if we have partially determined certain states in
its past [via the imposition of local initial conditions] and arrange that in its future certain other states
will be determined, those states that will be determined in the future will have an effect on the event!
(pp.264-265)
Furthermore,
the past can only be totally determined for an event if the total state of all of space-time is determined.
(p.265)
Fredkin maintains that "this very property of DM can allow for mechanistic models of
the mysterious events of QM" (p.265) such as non-locality since "in DM, everything is,
in some sense, involved in a computation with everything else." (p.267) Thus, DM
implies that "QM can be modelled by Newtonian mechanics; but not in a way that would
easily have occurred either to Newton or to the average quantum mechanic." (p.269)
5.5.7. CA-Life
The computational theory of life (CTL) was described in chapter 4 and a number of
properties such as growth, metabolism, autonomy, self-repair, self-reproduction and
evolution were identified as characteristic of biological systems. If the CA substrate
supports CEA (in this case the emergence of life) and if the substrate is computation-
universal (that is, if the CA is a UCA) then computational analogues of each of these
properties can be constructed. Put simply, if life is algorithmic, CA-Life is logically

possible. Various CA models of biological phenomena have been reported in the
literature: For example, Burks and Farmer (1984) have investigated the issues associated
with modeling the evolution and functionality of DNA sequences using CAs. This is
possible because "the DNA molecule can be viewed as a one-dimensional lattice, with
four states per lattice site, that is capable of producing copies of itself." (p.158);
Ermentrout and Edelstein-Keshet (1993) describe various uses of CAs in the modeling
of biological phenomena. However, in what follows, only three properties associated
with CA-Life, viz. self-reproduction, evolution and autonomy will be considered for
purposes of illustration.
5.5.7.1. Self-Reproduction
Von Neumann40 (1966) was interested in determining what kind of logical organization
is sufficient for an automaton to be capable of self-reproduction41. Langton (1984)
describes his approach as follows:
If self-reproduction is being carried out by a (highly complex) biochemical machine, then that
machine's behaviour is describable as a logical sequence of steps, i.e. as an algorithm. Now, if an
algorithm can be performed by any machine at all, then there is a Turing machine which can perform
the same algorithm. For this reason von Neumann set out to demonstrate the existence of a Turing
machine which could affect its own reproduction. If such a Turing machine exists, it is entirely
plausible that the processes by which living organisms reproduce themselves, and by implication,
other processes on which life itself is based, are algorithmically describable and, therefore, that life
itself is achievable by machines (p.135)
Von Neumann presented a construction- and computation-universal self-reproducing

structure using a two-dimensional CA in which each cell could assume one of twenty
nine states and in which the cell neighbourhood comprised five cells. Later work by
Codd (1968) demonstrated that it was possible to reduce the number of cell states (to
eight) while retaining universality. Langton goes on to state that
[von Neumann's] Turing machine is suitably modified so that, as output, it can `construct' in the array
[that is, the CA lattice] any configuration which can be described on its input tape. Such a machine
is called a universal constructor. His machine will construct any machine described on its input tape
and, in addition, will also construct a copy of the input tape and attach it to the machine it has
40
Cariani (1989) has contested the computationalist claim that von Neumann himself subscribed to a
computationalist interpretation of self-reproduction and evolution. Cariani maintains that according to von
Neumann, the genotype-phenotype distinction in biological systems corresponds to an analog-digital (or in
Cariani's terms, a nonsymbolic-symbolic) distinction. If computation is understood as implying digital (or
discrete) symbol manipulation - as is held in this thesis (chapter 2) - then Cariani's interpretation of von
Neumann's position is clearly correct.
41
It is important to note that there are two levels of automata: (1) the embedding CA substrate and (2) the
embedded self-reproducing automaton.
constructed. Now, self-reproduction follows as the special case where the machine described on the
tape is the universal constructor itself. The result of the construction process is a copy of the universal
constructor together with an input tape which contains its own description, which can then go on to
construct a copy of itself, together with a copy of its own description, and so on indefinitely. (pp.135-
136)
The information on the `tape' is used in two ways: (1) as instructions (for construction)
which are to be interpreted (corresponding to the genotypic process of translation in
biological organisms) and (2) as uninterpreted data which is copied directly and attached
to the newly constructed automaton (corresponding to the genotypic process of RNA
transcription). Although computation- and construction-universality is a sufficient
condition for self-reproduction, it cannot be a necessary condition since this would entail
viewing natural biological systems as non-self-reproductive, for as Langton states, "none
of these have been shown to be capable of universal construction." (p.137) This leads
Langton (1987) to distinguish between trivial and non-trivial reproduction as follows:
the former involves simple (passive) replication whereas the latter involves complex
(active) self-reproduction mediated by a representation or description of the
reproducing/reproduced entity. On this view, non-trivial non-universal self-reproduction
is possible; consequently, in (Langton,84) an 8-state model for the self-reproduction of
simple (yet non-trivial) non-universal automaton structures is presented in which the
description of the automaton is stored in a dynamic "loop" (as opposed to static "tape").
Perrier et al. (1996) present a self-reproducing system supporting universal computation
(but not universal construction) which is completely realizable and based on a synthesis
of the approaches of von Neumann, Codd and Langton. However, they maintain that "the
issue of trivial versus non-trivial self-reproduction is far from settled; as a simple
counter-argument to Langton's viewpoint consider the observation that essentially any
behaviour of a CA ultimately results from application of the cellular rule [emphasis
added]." (p.337) Since the self-reproducing automaton is embedded in a CA, self-
reproduction is ultimately reducible to the `physics' of the CA substrate.
It is worthwhile considering the nature of the relationship between computation- and

construction-universality. Computationalists such as Langton (1989b) hold that there is
a necessary link between the two as stated above; however, McMullin (1993a) argues
that computation universality does not entail construction universality. As he states,
"there are no such things as AT-constructors or, more particularly, AT-reproducers" (p.3),
where AT denotes a Turing machine (chapter 2). This does not mean that Turing-
equivalent devices supporting universal construction are impossible; rather that Turing
machines as originally conceived by Turing were not designed to support construction-
universality. Correspondingly, McMullin holds that von Neumann's automaton was
designed to demonstrate construction-universality; support for computation-universality
was merely a contingent feature of the automaton and not essential to the proof. The
conflation of computation- with construction-universality appears to have arisen from
the fact that "von Neumann's attempted solution to [the problem of spontaneous, open-
ended growth of complexity within automata] was heavily, and explicitly, influenced by
Turing's formulation of a certain formalised class of `computing machines'." (p.2)

McMullin maintains that computation and construction constitute different functional
(phenomenal, behavioural etc) kinds; moreover, functionalities which are substrate-
relative: Universal-computation was defined in the context of Turing machines whereas
universal-construction was defined in the context of CAs. However, if computation-
universality can be defined independently of substrate, that is, if the Church-Turing
thesis (chapter 2) is true, then a substrate supporting both universal-construction (such
as CAs) and universal-computation becomes a logical possibility; a construction-
universal substrate supporting the emergence of a computation-universal structure
thereby becomes possible. McMullin alludes to this in stating that "it can ultimately
prove useful to say something about the `computational' powers of A-constructors and/or
their offspring" (p.5), whereby A-constructor is understood an automaton belonging to
a class of automata, each of which is capable of automaton-construction. More than
being merely useful, this is necessary if mind (consciousness, intentionality, intelligence
etc) is emergent from life; the former can, for the sake of argument, be viewed as a
computation-universal phenomenon arising in a construction-universal substrate which
is itself computation-universal (assuming the Church-Turing thesis) although this latter
property does not become manifest prior to the emergence of mind. Put simply, on this
view, mind is implicit in life. (This important idea will be investigated further in chapters
6 and 7 in the context of a re-examination of the notion of emergence.)
Thus far, the discussion has focused on self-reproducing automata implemented in

irreversible CA substrates, that is, in NRCAs. Toffoli (1977) has shown how non-trivial
irreversible processes (such as universal computation and universal construction) can be
implemented in a reversible substrate by constructively embedding a n-dimensional CA
in a n+1-dimensional RCA (n$1). (Morita et al. (1989) have proven the computation-
universality of one-dimensional RCA.) Toffoli maintains that "if one concentrates one's
attention only on [the embedded CA, a hyperplane in the embedding RCA substrate], one
observes irreversible phenomena; the ìnformation content', so to speak, of the process
gradually decreases." (p.230) This focusing of attention only on the CA corresponds to
the specification of an observation frame, and involves a measurement or `cut' of the
RCA substrate (chapters 1 and 6); the irreversible CA (or NRCA) is thus, an abstraction
or `virtual machine' embedded within the RCA substrate (section 5.5.9). While this
approach allows for the embedding in real-time of a NRCA in a RCA, it is possible to
simulate any NRCA using a RCA of the same dimensionality if the requirement for real-
time simulation is relaxed (Morita,92). Importantly, as Morita et al. (1995) state, "from
these results, existence of computation- and construction-universal (and thus self-
reproducing) RCA can be concluded." (p.1) They present a scheme for implementing
self-reproduction in a RCA using a variant of CAs called partitioned cellular automata
(PCAs). Since PCAs are a subclass of CAs, it is conjectured that construction-
universality in a RCA is possible. However, they correctly observe that "if we use these
èmulation methods' to convert an irreversible CA to an RCA, a large amount of garbage
signals are generated and spread out in reversible cellular space." (p.1) (As stated
previously in section 5.5.6, these can usually be handled in RCAs by setting up some of
the gates to act as `heat sinks' (Toffoli,80).)
5.5.7.2. Evolution
Arbib (1969) briefly discusses a conclusion which follows from a result in recursive
function (or Turing-computability) theory due to Myhill, viz. finite programs contain the
possibility of infinite improvements in successive generations of offspring without
requiring any randomness in the mutations. Hence, a completely deterministic
mechanism for biological evolution is possible and has been described in the context of
the GOL, a non-reversible universal CA (or NRUCA) in section 5.5.3. Myhill's result is
important since, as Laing (1988) has argued, it provides a means by which to effectively -
that is, contingently or pragmatically, not logically or absolutely - overcome the
limitations on automata which follow from Gdel's theorems (chapter 2). As Arbib
(1988) states,
while Gdel's incompleteness theorem points to an inevitable limitation of any axiomatization of

arithmetic, Myhill's theorem points out the much less well-known fact that this limitation can be
effectively overcome. And, of course, this process may be iterated mechanically again and again.
(p.184)
Thus, by incorporating the possibility of deterministic variation and selection into the
CA, it is logically possible to implement evolution in self-reproducing CA structures. As
Berlekamp et al. (1982) state, an implication of evolution is the emergence of
increasingly ìntelligent' self-reproducing entities. Thus, CA-Life becomes the route to
CA-Mind (assuming CTMi, that is, the computational theory of mind described in
chapter 4).
5.5.7.3. Autonomy
Emmeche (1991) maintains that "in an autonomous living system, we cannot make the
distinction between the entity being reproduced and an ultimate machine whose
properties do not depend on the process of reproduction and which is not reproduced
itself." (p.85) However, this view is problematic since a distinction can be made between
the dynamic reproducing entity and the (assumed) static physico-chemical natural laws
which provides the ontological substrate in which reproduction is realized. Hence, if a
computational interpretation of physics (CA-matter) is possible (section 5.5.6),
Emmeche's objection becomes untenable. A CA-like approach to modeling the
emergence of autonomous self-reproducing structures has been explored by McMullin
and Varela (1997) who report on a new computational implementation of autopoietic
theory in the context of autocatalytic chemistry42. Other approaches include that of
Pargelis (1996) and Koza (1993), the latter of whom describes a scheme for the
42
This model is examined in further detail in chapter 6 in connection with a discussion of the link between
autopoiesis, computationalism and mechanism.
"spontaneous emergence of self-replicating computer programs, sexual reproduction, and

evolutionary self-improving behaviour among randomly created computer programs
using a computationally incomplete set of logical functions." (p.259)
5.5.7.4. CA-Matter to CA-Life. How ?
If a computational or information-theoretic view of life (chapter 4) is adopted, then it

follows necessarily that life is realizable in a UTM (or, equivalently, UCA). However,
according to Fredkin (1990), life, in its most basic form, cannot be a RUCA phenomenon
since it is clearly a non-reversible phenomenon (Prigogine,84). Fredkin asserts this
despite Toffoli's (1977) proof that construction-universal (and hence, self-reproducing)
structures can be embedded in RUCA. (Toffoli might argue that Fredkin and Prigogine's
position rests on the adoption of a local perspective: On such a view total information
regarding the automaton is impossible; hence, reversibility of life is also impossible43.
By adopting a global or "God's Eye" view in which total systemic information is
possible, the reversibility problem can be solved.) However, yet another problem
concerns the emergence of CA-Life in a substrate which is a RUCA; since RCAs do not
support self-organization (Wolfram,84b), how can CA-Life emerge from CA-Matter,
and yet it must do if a unified framework of CEA is possible. Proposed solutions to this
problem are examined in section 5.5.9.
5.5.8. CA-Mind
In the materialistic theory of mind, the sequence of thoughts in a rational process is

causally determined not by the logical implications of the object about which we are
thinking but simply by the physical changes occurring in the brain. This view
immediately gives rise to the following problem: How can logic exist in or be supported
by a universe which is ontologically material ? Logic exists at the conceptual level, yet
materialism or mechanism (chapter 2) necessitates that secondary qualities (such as
concepts) are grounded in primary qualities. However, explanations of the nature of this
grounding are generally unsatisfying, thereby giving rise to the mind-body problem
(chapter 4). Computationalists maintain that computationalism subsumes both the logical
and physical aspects of naturalistic processes under the concept of computation; hence,
the above problem does not arise44. Furthermore, in the context of the philosophy of
43
In support of this contention, Margolus (1984) maintains that the embeddedness (or endophysicality) of
observers within CA universes makes possible the perception of entropy increase: "from the point of view of
creatures `living' inside an RCA, their inability to make use of complicated correlations between large numbers
of cells means that for all practical purposes, the entropy of the automaton increases." (p.83)
44
CA-computationalism supports both (1) the grounding of logic in physics, for example, Fredkin and Toffoli's
billiard ball model of computation (Fredkin,82) and (2) the grounding of physics in logic, for example, the
supervenience of digital mechanics on a RUCA substrate (Fredkin,90).
mind, Putnam (1988) has contested the viability of token-token45 functionalism

maintaining that
physically possible sentient beings just come in too many `designs', physically and computationally
speaking, for anything like òne computational state per propositional attitude' functionalism to be
true. (p.84)
However, this position does not rule out type-type functionalism. As Putnam states,
moving from the requirement that the `states' of speakers with the same reference (or believers with
the same belief) be identical to the requirement that they be equivalent under some equivalence
relation which is itself computable, or at least definable in the language of computational theory plus
physical science, gives us enormous additional leeway [emphasis added]. (p.85)
Ths supports the notion of multiple-realizability (chapters 2 and 4) with respect to the
correspondence (many-one) between brain states and mental states and is a strong
indicator of surjectivity (Appendix). Surjectivity both implies and is implied by
irreversibility; hence, in moving from CA-Matter to CA-Mind (via CA-Life), the RUCA
substrate supporting CA-Matter must somehow give rise to a NRUCA. (This issue is
examined in section 5.5.9.) Furthermore, surjectivity implies self-organization (chapter
3) and thus, the emergence of mind. As a corollary, and with respect to the issue of
intentionality (chapter 4), it is possible that entities with the capacity for being informed,
viz. CA-Minds, may emerge from CA-Matter; in computational terms, this can be
interpreted as syntax (matter) giving rise to semantics (mind) with the latter as an
emergent property (chapter 3) of the former. Additionally, interpreting intelligence and
intentionality in behaviourist terms, that is, by adopting the intentional stance
(Dennett,85), CA-Mind can be realized independently of the postulated emergence of
consciousness.
There are no theoretical reasons for the impossibility of CA-Mind given the assumption
that intelligence (as the determining characteristic of mind) is a computational
phenomenon; indeed, this position is consistent with the classical view of AI (chapter 4).
Furthermore, CAs may be shown to provide support for the possibility of "strong" AI
(chapter 4) once it is recognised that they are formally (computationally) equivalent to
neural networks and semantic networks (Farmer,90). Although it is uncommon to find
examples of CA-based models of the mind or brain in the literature, there have been
notable counter-examples: For example, Wuensche (1993) has modelled memory and
cognition using CAs and random boolean networks and computational modeling of
microtubular function within cytoskeletal lattices using CAs was first reported in
(Smith,84). On the basis of this latter idea, Hameroff et al. (1988) have developed a
series of CA-based models of microtubular action in the brain, viz. microtubular
automata or MTAs. As they state,
45
That is, an isomorphism, or one-one correspondence, between brain states and mental states.
biological activities including guidance and movement of single-celled organisms, transport of

molecules within cells, and cognitive functions of the human brain may utilize MTA behaviour .. In
nerve cell axons and dendrites, massively parallel arrays of interconnected MT and neurofilaments
could serve as specialized information circuits. MT automata gliders (8 to 800 meters/sec) may exist
as traveling depolarization waves, solitons, or localized electrostatic fields which bind and transport
molecules. In nerve cells, traveling gliders may correlate with traveling nerve membrane action
potentials. Nerve membrane depolarization may interact with MT automata by transiently altering
dipole coupling thresholds via ionic fluxes, voltage gradients or direct connection to the cytoskeleton.
This coupling of the brain/mind as a hierarchy of nested automata with a previously overlooked basal
dimension. (p.543)
Appealing to quantum non-locality (chapter 4) in order to explain the ùnitary sense of

self', non-deterministic free-will and non-algorithmic ìntuitive' processing, Hameroff
(1994) maintains that cytoskeletal microtubules within neurons could be a possible site
for quantum effects. Specifically, "consciousness may emerge as a macroscopic quantum
state from a critical level of coherence of quantum-level events in and around a specific
class of neurobiological microstructure: cytoskeletal microtubules within neurons
throughout the brain." (p.92) This leads Hameroff to assert that
brain-wide microtubule-based quantum states, when coupled to synaptic events and neuronal firing,
can help account for [various] properties of consciousness (pp.93-94)
Thus, consciousness in CA-Minds, according to Hameroff, is taken to be an emergent

phenomenon. This approach is consistent with a recognition of the "hard problem" of
consciousness (that is, experience, ontological subjectivity, first-personhood or what-it-
is-likeness) described in chapters 4 and 746, a problem which is not adequately resolved
on the behaviourist interpretation of mind.
5.5.9. Emergence and Embedding
Svozil (1993) provides a clear statement of the role of automata such as CAs under the
finite nature thesis in the production of artificial realities, viz.
every automaton is a universe of its own, with a specific `flavour', if you like. Programmers may
create `cyberspaces' (a synonym for automaton universes) of their imagination which are, to a certain
extent, not limited by the exterior physical laws to which they and their hardware obey. Seen as
isolated universes, some of these animations might have nothing to do with our physical world. Yet,
others may serve as excellent playgrounds for the physicist. (p.22)
Additionally, Davies (1992) maintains that if physics is identical to computation, then

the universe becomes not only equivalent to, but identical with its own simulation, that
is, the universe becomes its own emulation (chapter 4). These two statements are
46
As stated previously in chapter 4, the "hard" problem (Chalmers,96) is slightly different to the category problem
(chapter 7) in that the latter demands an emergentist solution to the problem of the relation between ontological
objectivity and subjectivity.
important since they assert that the universe can both simulate (Svozil) and be simulated
(Davies) by itself, entailing the embedding of universes and the construction (via design
or emergence) of virtual machine hierarchies (chapter 4). The notion of CA embedding
has already been discussed in connection with the embedding of construction- and
computation-universal NRUCAs in RUCAs in section 5.5.7. Additionally, it is possible
to embed RUCAs in NRUCA substrates; this is readily demonstrated by the fact that
RUCA universes can be simulated using nonreversible programs (software) executing
on nonreversible physical computers (hardware). NRUCAs can simulate47 RUCAs and
visa versa since both are instances of UCAs which are, in turn, CA realizations of UTMs.
This equivalence is graphically represented in Fig 5.8:
RUCA
NRUCA
Fig 5.8 Equivalence of RUCAs and NRUCAs.
Moreover, since software and hardware are mutually interchangeable - a basic result
arising from the duality of computing systems (chapters 2 and 4) - virtual worlds
(machines) can be nested (embedded) to arbitrary depth as shown in Fig 5.9:
universal
cellular
automaton Virtual Machine (VMk+1)
(UCA)
RUCA NRUCA
universal
cellular Virtual Machine (VMk )
automaton
(UCA)
RUCA NRUCA
universal
cellular
automaton
Virtual Machine (VMk-1 )
(UCA)
Fig 5.9 Nesting of virtual machines. (Branching indicates a choice of UCA.)
According to Tipler (1996),
Turing machines can emulate other Turing machines. In fact, there is one Turing machine, called the
universal Turing machine, which can emulate all Turing machines, including itself. We can thus have
a hierarchy of machines emulating other machines. Turing machine T0 may be a real machine, but
47
In fact, emulate since both simulator and simulatee are of the same ontical kind, viz. computational universes.
inside it there is a virtual Turing machine T1, and inside T1 there is a virtual machine T2, which in turn
codes virtual machine T3, and so on. These levels of virtual machines inside virtual machines are
called levels of implementation. The higher-level machines operate completely obliviously of the
machines on lower levels. For nothing happens to the higher levels if one or more of the lower level
machine are replaced by other completely different machine - provided, needless to say, that the
replacement machines are capable of emulating the higher-level machines at the same speed. As a
general rule in computers, machines from various levels do not mix, but this is done to simplify life
for human computer programmers rather than something required by the mathematics. If a machine
is transferred to a higher level of implementation, it is said to be uploaded, and if it is transferred to
a lower level of implementation, it is said to be downloaded. (pp.36-37)
It should be noted from the above statement that a primitive or ontical (substrate) level
of Turing machine or CA is necessary in order to ground the hierarchy; thus, the
embedding is unidirectional rather than bidirectional (as was implied in fig 5.9). (Ali
(1998a) describes a bidirectionally infinite scheme for embedding CAs in which the
grounding problem is solved by postulating observers capable of `cutting' the hierarchy,
thereby establishing a substrate and laws of physics governing its behaviour relative to
the observers.) The role of T0 (or, equivalently, CA0) is crucial: it is responsible for
dynamically realizing or actualizing the static embedded virtual machine potentialities;
in short, T0 (or CA 0) is a necessary condition for executing the essentially Platonic
entities embedded within it, converting them from passive programs into active processes
(chapter 2). This is an extremely important point which will be addressed further in
chapter 6.
5.5.9.1. Conditions For Embedding
Toffoli (1978) describes some of the requirements for embedding systemic phenomena
within computational media such as CAs:
In general, the embedding of a particular guest system, or object, in an assigned host system, or
medium, is achieved by suitably constraining the initial conditions of the medium. In this way, both
parameters and state variables of the object system are mapped into state variables of the medium.
(p.395)
This procedure is equivalent to microprogramming. Furthermore, assuming a uniform

or isotropic medium,
the embedding should be realized in such a way as to prevent undue interference on the objects
behavior on the part of the surrounding portion of the medium or environment. (p.396)
Toffoli (1978) makes an important point regarding the possibility of support for non-
reversible phenomena in reversible environments, viz. "an embedded object or observer
can perform irreversible tasks only at the cost of gradually contaminating the
surrounding environment with computation by-products - the second law of
thermodynamics still holds - while in an irreversible medium the necessary negative
entropy can be extracted, so to speak, from the irreversibility of the medium itself. (As
a consequence, the modelling of irreversible systems in a reversible medium requires that

the medium be infinitely extended)." (p.399) Consequently, Toffoli (1977) maintains that
a necessary condition for embedding stable NRCAs is that the RCA substrate must be
propagation-unbounded48. (However, this conflicts with the second axiom in Fredkin's
(1990) finite nature thesis (chaper 2), viz. finitude of the universe.) An additional
requirement is identified by Toffoli as follows:
In order to identify a particular embedded system, or object, in a given medium, one has to specify
a `portion' of the medium itself, associated with the object's extension, and initial conditions or other
constraints for this portion, associated with the object's structure. (p.397)
Specifying a `portion' of the medium necessitates the drawing of a distinction (Spencer-

Brown,69) - a `cutting' (chapter 6) - within the medium; alternatively, it can be viewed
as necessitating measurement (Pattee,95), thereby involving the act of observation
(Cariani,89). Hence, if a CA universe is to be self-contained, it must support the
emergence of intrinsic observers (chapter 3). According to Toffoli (1977), "a model
capable of supporting a wide range of computing and constructing capabilities makes it
possible to explicitly characterize the observer and its interaction with the observed
system." (p.214) Hence, for Toffoli, observation can be defined in objective terms49. This
position is supported by Adami et al. (1996) who define information as the mutual
entropy between two systems while maintaining that
information is not a list of symbols [for] without referring to an environment that a string is to be
interpreted within, the notion of information is meaningless. (p.7)
They further maintain that in the context of reversible Turing machines (chapter 2) with
finite tapes (representing physical universes), any strings computed from the tapes
correspond to measurements performed on the abstract universe; hence, measurement is
reducible to computation. The reduction is supported by the unification of
thermodynamics, information theory and computation theory under the concept of
entropy (chapter 4). What is problematic with this position is that no explanation as to
why a measurement occurs is forthcoming. Computation, according to Adami, is
equivalent to symbol-manipulation; furthermore, any physical manipulation of physical
objects can be interpreted computationally once such objects are assigned symbolic
status. However, Cariani (1989) contests the postulating of computational processes, that
is, symbolic manipulation of primitive observables, in the absence of an observational
Given the global CA map J, the propagation of a configuration c is the sequence Jtc|t=0..4. A propagation
48
is bounded if the corresponding sequence of configuration diameters is bounded. A CA is propagation-

unbounded if every configuration except the blank one has an unbounded configuration.
49
Searle (1992) has implicitly contested this position in asserting that syntax is not intrinsic to physics. On his
view, systemic observables cannot be defined independently of the intentionality of the observer and
intentionality is grounded in consciousness. Hence, an objectivist account of observation is considered
problematic.
reference frame. Thus, it is meaningless to speak of observation or measurement in the

absence of observers. This line of critique can be extended further: is it meaningful to
speak of observations in the absence of conscious observers ? The point is well made by
Eddington (1928) who maintains that
although a change described as sorting is the exact opposite to a change described as shuffling we
cannot imagine a cause of sorting to be the exact opposite of a cause of shuffling. Thus a reversal of
the time-direction which turns shuffling into sorting does not make the appropriate transformations
of their causes. Shuffling can have inorganic causes, but sorting is the prerogative of mind or instinct.
We cannot believe that it is merely an orientation with respect to the time-direction which
differentiates us from inorganic nature [emphasis added]. (p.99)
5.5.9.2. The RCA6NRCA Problem
Computational analogues of the phenomena associated with classical and quantum

physics are realizable in RCAs (section 5.5.6); however, life is an irreversible
phenomenon. Although, CA-Life (a NRCA) can be embedded in CA-Matter (a RUCA),
if CEA is true then this embedding must arise spontaneously; that is, a RCA6NRCA
transition (Ali,94b) must occur. However, Bennett and Landauer (1985) maintain that
since the output is implicit in the input, no [reversible] computation ever generates information. (p.38)
Thus, computational or deductive emergence (chapter 3) - which, by definition, involves

the production of information (Baas,93) - is not supported by reversible computational
systems such as RUCAs50. This result is consistent with Polanyi's (1966) interpretation
of emergence in which it is asserted that a system cannot define its own boundary
conditions (chapter 3). However, specification of such conditions is necessary for
demarcating structures (such as living organizations). In RCAs they are of necessity non-
emergent and must be designed into the system, externally preset as initial conditions.
Wolfram (1984b) maintains that "self-organizing behaviour occurs by virtue of the
irreversibility of cellular automaton evolution" (p.34) and that "evolution to attractors
from arbitrary initial states allows for `self-organizing' behaviour in which structure may
evolve at large times from structureless initial states. The nature of the attractors
determines the form and extent of such structures." (p.3) Thus, as stated previously,
irreversibility is a necessary condition for self-organization and, by association,
emergence. The distinction between NRCAs and RCAs with respect to their respective
capacities for emergence is shown in Table 5.9 (overleaf).
50
It is assumed for the sake of present argument that irreversible computation is not an a priori infomationally-
closed phenomenon; this is true in NRCAs when the size of the lattice approaches infinity and the CA rule is
complex or class IV (chapter 2).
NRCAs RCAs
surjective injective
self-organizing (or emergent) non-self-organizing (or non-emergent)
òpen' systems (negentropic) `closed' systems (entropic)
Table 5.9 Comparison of NRCA and RCA properties.
Surjectivity contributes to the stability (robustness) of NRCA structures; for example,

structural perturbations (or "noise") caused by collisions with other CA structures are
tolerated to a much greater extent than is the case in functionally isomorphic RCAs. This
is important because life is a relatively robust phenomenon (chapter 4). However,
NRCAs are still extremely brittle. As Wolfram (1984b) states,
the fraction of configurations which may be reached after one time step in cellular automaton
evolution, and which are therefore not on the periphery of the state transition diagram, gives a simple
measure of irreversibility. (p.4)
This point can be made more formally as follows. Let sd denote the total number of
nodes (states) at a depth d in the state-transition graph for an attractor basin in the basin
of attraction field associated with a NRCA. (Depth is measured from the attractor to
nodes on its basin; d=0 denotes the attractor.) Let sk denote the number of nodes
converging on a parent node at depth d-1, where d$1. sk/sd can be used as a naive51
measure of the robustness of the parent node at d-1. (Attractors are maximally robust,
that is, sk/sd=1, with respect to each basin of attraction in the basin of attraction field.) As
stated above, RCAs (that is, injective automata) are even less robust than NRCAs. As
Toffoli (1980) states,
computation [and by association, construction] in reversible systems requires a higher degree of

"predictability" about the environment's initial conditions than computation in nonreversible ones.
(p.643)
For this reason, Landauer (1967) argues against reversible computation:
Information processing inevitably has to lose information .. If we do not lose information, we are
handling numbers, in a calculation which has been rigidly forseen, step by step. In a general-purpose
computational process, we must be able to do more than that; we must have the ability to make
decisions during the computation. This is turn consists of the ability to take intermediate
computational results and from them, rather than from all the intricate history leading up to these
signals, proceed further. If we do not throw away information about the history, a given logical signal
will depend on the exact way it was reached; then, after a sufficient number of steps, the
accumulation of these historical characteristics would lead to errors .. [A] standardization process
[is used to eliminate] the earlier unnecessary history [emphasis added]. (p.107)
51
`Naive' since the structure (topology, geometry etc) of the CA state-space has not been taken into consideration
in the definition of the metric.
`Standardization' implies measurement, a necessarily statistical process involving the

selection and quantification of certain characteristics to the exclusion of others
(Pattee,95). (Clearly, this is a form of `cutting' as will be argued in chapter 6.) This leads
Wolfram (1985) to propose the following solution to the RCA 6NRCA problem. He
identifies two necessary conditions for applying thermodynamic principles to CAs, viz.
(1) reversibility (invertibility) and (2) "coarse-graining". As he states,
to apply thermodynamics one must also `coarse-grain' the system, grouping together many
microscopically-different states to mimic the effect of imprecise measurement. Coarse-graining in
cellular automata may be achieved by applying an irreversible transformation, perhaps a cellular
automaton rule, to the cellular automata configurations. A simple example would be to map the value
of every other site to zero.
Again, the problem with this scheme is that a graining-operator cannot spontaneously
emerge from the CA substrate since it is a RCA and hence, does not support self-
organization. For this reason, Cariani (1989) maintains that measurement (a non-
computational process on his scheme) constitutes an irreducible phenomenon involving
the specification of an observational reference frame by an endophysical (intra-systemic)
observer, that is, an observer situated within the universe. On this basis,
computationalists such as Crutchfield (1994) have argued analogously in favour of
intrinsic (that is, endophysical) emergence with CA-type systems. However, the
measurement problem arises since computational emergence necessitates specification
of Obs (Baas,93), that is, an observational reference frame (chapters 3 and 6) which, on
CEA, must itself be emergent.
An alternative approach which retains substrate reversibility (and hence, is consistent

with CA-Matter) while simultaneously supporting self-organization is implicit in the
following statement. Svozil (1990) maintains that "the capability of computable
functions to `produce' uncomputable output on computable initial values may have some
far-reaching consequences in the physical perception of reversibility .. [For example,]
the creation of algorithmic complexity may be perceived as a formal aspect of
irreversibility." (p.425) On this basis, he goes on to offer the following conjecture:
a .. technically rather subtle and speculative contribution to an arrow of time would be a reversible
CA whose time evolution is recursively enumerable [or computable] but whose inverse is
uncomputable. This would correspond to a computable bijection f(x)=y whose inverse f-1(y) is
uncomputable. (p.426)
According to Toffoli and Margolus (1990), the dynamics of a CA will be invertible

(reversible) if the state-transition function is invertible. However, can an invertible CA
(RCA) be embedded in a non-invertible substrate (NRUCA) such that the dynamics of
the invertible CA `virtual machine' in the backward-time direction are non-invertible ?
This question can be answered in the affirmative if non-invertibility or backwards non-
computability is a consequence of lattice directionality as contrasted with state-transition
rule directionality (or surjectivity). Thus, Petrov (1996,1997) presents an extension of
the basic CA formalism, viz. CAs on infinite homogeneous directed graphs, in which it
is possible to obtain asymmetrical configurations from a single non-blank cell in the
initial configuration, using perfectly symmetrical rules and homogeneous space. The
significance of this scheme is that it provides a means by which to explain the origin of
asymmetry in a homogeneous universe with symmetrical laws. In support of this
framework in a physical context, Petrov (1996) states that
there are no serious reasons to state that homogeneous space has to be modeled only by lattice
structures; according to us every topologically homogeneous cellular structure could be a worthy
candidate for a discrete mathematical model of any physical phenomenon. (p.279)
Additionally, in support of this framework in a biological context, Petrov (1996) argues

against the equating of non-trivial reproduction with self-reproduction, viz.
although the process of reproduction of living organisms always leads to the appearance of same-of-
kind, it is more a process of resemblance than an act of exact duplication of the prime source. The
preservation of some parental attributes and the mutation of others is the basis of the improvement
of species and of the appearance of new ones [emphasis added]. (p.280)
Petrov identifies the "Big Bang" with a Garden of Eden (GOE) state and explains the
"arrow of time" as a consequence of the injectivity (reversibility) of the underlying finite
CA. (Importantly, the CA that is the universe must be injective or reversible and not
bijective or invertible in order that GOE configurations are possible.) However, the
asymmetry is non-emergent in the "strong" sense implied by creatio ex nihilo (chapter
6), that is, a genuinely new feature or characteristic of the universe since although the
vertices in the digraph are indiscernible, the edges are discernible and directionally-
labelled and it is this orientation which accounts for the asymmetry. Thus, irreversibility
is, in fact, artifactual, that is, non-emergent in the strong sense since the directionality
of evolution is a manifestation of the directionality of the lattice. However, it should be
recognized at the outset that Petrov uses the term invertibility in a slightly different sense
to Fredkin. As he states (1997),
the problem is that what we call `reversible CAs' are, in fact, `properly injective CAs on finite
configurations only'. These should be defined as CAs for which every finite configuration has not
more than one (finite) predecessor, and it is important to add that there exist some configurations,
which under these rules have no predecessor at all (`Garden-of-Eden' configurations). To make things
clear, what we call ìnvertibility', is equivalent to `bijectivity over the set of all finite configurations
only'.
Furthermore, thus far it has only been shown how trivial reversible rules (such as XOR)
can give rise to irreversible structures; it has not been shown how non-trivial reversible
rules can generate universal irreversible structures (such as computers and constructors).
However, this approach offers one of the most promising routes to the realization of
CEA under a CA substrate.
5.6. CA-Computationalism: Beyond Alexander
CAs provide the means by which to solve a number of outstanding problems associated
with Alexander's metaphysics.
5.6.1. Logical Necessity
Collingwood (1945) has criticised Alexander's ontology on the grounds that its strict
immanentist approach to categories - a consequence of adopting a naive empiricism -
fails to establish grounds for necessary causal connection between spatio-temporal
events:
It looks as if Alexander, deeply influenced by Kant but resolving at all costs to avoid Kant's
subjectivism, had cut out the Kantian [transcendental] categories altogether, because they are merely
subjective necessities of thought, and contented himself with the [immanent and empirically-
grounded] schemata by themselves. But if you cut out the category of cause and substitute its schema,
you are cutting out the idea of necessary connection and trying to content yourself with mere uniform
succession. (p.163)
Furthermore,
if the method of philosophy is purely empirical, if the universal means merely the pervasive, the
necessary merely the actual, thought merely observation, a system built on this method can have in
it no driving force or continuity; there is an element of arbitrariness in every transition, and a reader
who stubbornly asks, `why should space-time generate matter; why should matter generate life; why
should life generate mind ?' and so on, will get no answer; he will only be told that he must not ask
such questions but must accept the facts in a spirit of natural piety. Yet if the child is the father of the
man, surely the first duty of natural piety is to respect, and endeavour to satisfy, the childish tendency
to ask questions beginning with why. (p.163)
CA-computationalism solves the above problem by implementing a variant of formism

(chapter 2): At the substrate level, the local (FSM) state-transition function in a CA is
fixed (static) and deterministic; derivatively, the global (CA) state-transition function or
basin of attraction field is static and implicit in the functional connectivity of the FSMs,
the FSM state-transition function and the initial state configuration of the CA.
Importantly, the formism of CAs is not in the patterns, but in the `laws of form' which
are responsible for pattern generation. This position is consistent with Alexander's
internalist view of relations. As Brettschneider (1964) states, "on Alexander's grounds,
relations cannot have the status of logical subsistents [that is, Platonic forms] because
they go to make up an individual. The structure of the individual does not permit
connection by abstract or formal relations." (p.46)
5.6.2. Explanation of Emergence
Brettschneider (1964) maintains that "in his discussion of the transitional stage between
infinite and finite motion [the former being associated with Space-Time and the latter
with complexes of space-time], Alexander seems to advocate an hypothesis of

spontaneous generation. It is quite in order to infer that he is talking about the genesis
of something from nothing [emphasis added]." (p.60) However, if an idealist
interpretation of Alexander is adopted, in which components within the metaphysical
system are internally as opposed to externally related (that is, if an ontological
coherence-theoretical as opposed to correspondence-theoretical position is adopted), the
creation problem is resolved since "the difference between infinite and finite is of degree,
not kind." (pp.60-61) Furthermore,
organization as a categorial property is immanent in pure Space-Time. Organization is possible

because the inherent restlessness of Time causes Space-Time to restructure itself constantly .. The
elements and conditions of cosmogenesis are present in pure Space-Time. There are no additives.
(p.62)
However, this solution is purely descriptive. As Brettschneider states, "on these grounds
philosophy may only describe the process of creative evolution as a fait accompli. We
may neither proffer explanations nor legislate for the universe .. Emergence is a fact of
nature for Alexander; its existence [or rather, its occurrence] cannot be denied; its
awesomeness induces the attitude of `natural piety'." (p.61) The important and
controversial issue of creatio ex nihilo (creation from nothing) which is intimately bound
up with discussions relating to the maxim ex nihilo nihil fit (from nothing comes
nothing) is examined in chapter 6 in connection with a preliminary investigation of the
relations between Being and beings under poisis (coming-forth or becoming). Again,
CA-computationalism solves this problem through a variant of Platonism at the level of
CA-Matter, viz. by postulating static and deterministic state-transition functions as the
"laws of physics" in CAs. Thus, CA-computationalism is consistent with an
interpretation of emergence as the ùnfolding' of form implicit in the structure of the CA.
(A similar position advanced by Simon (1981) was described in chapters 2 and 4.)
5.6.3. Identity as Empirical
Alexander (1920) states that
what changes are compatible with the retention of substantial identity is an empirical question which
can only be decided by reference to each case or kind of cases. (Vol.I, p.273)
As will be argued in chapter 6, where the notion of `cutting' first introduced in chapter
1 is examined in further detail, categorial identity depends on the way in which
categories are established, that is, where categorial boundaries are drawn. Again, the
issue of forms (whether viewed as Platonic or as conceptual, and thereby,
anthropocentric) arises and again, CA-computationalism provides a solution to this
problem in terms of the unfolding of stable structures in the basin of attraction field.
5.6.4. A CA model of Alexanderian Space-Time Incorporating Reversibility
The basis for constructing a CA model of Alexanderian Space-Time is contained in the

work of Ilachinski (1987) and Halpern (1989, 1990). As Halpern (1989) states, in
standard CAs "only the values of the sites are altered. The lattice structure itself is
unaffected by these rules." (p.405) Halpern presents an extension of the standard CA
formalism in which rules defining the evolution of the lattice structure are incorporated;
hence, Topological Automata (TAs), in which both site values and site connectivities (or
links) evolve. This extended CA formalism can itself be modified such that only the link-
patterns evolve as a function of time; thus, CA space-time evolution can be defined
purely in terms of changes in the pattern of connections between cells. Redefining the
`state' of a cell in terms of the degree of its connectivity to other cells provides support
for a non-Newtonian (or non-`container') interpretation of CAs and is consistent with
Alexander's (and Wheeler's) conception of geometrical spacetime as the primal-stuff of
reality. Defining cell-state in terms of connectivity allows for the reduction of the (cell-
state, cell-link) dualism to a geometrical monism and thereby eliminates a degree of
freedom (arbitrariness) associated with TAs. Furthermore, Fredkin's second order
technique (section 5.5.5) can be used to generate a RCA version of the Alexanderian TA
and it is conceivable that Petrov's (1996) digraph approach can be incorporated so as to
support self-organization in a reversible TA substrate.
Chapter 6
Originality consists in nothing other than decisively seeing and thinking
once again at the right moment of vision that which is essential, that
which has already been repeatedly seen and thought before.
Martin Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics.
Poisis
6.1 Overview
In this chapter, the concept of poisis is critically examined. The relevance of this
concept to the question concerning the possibility of "strong" computationally emergent
artificiality or CEA (chapter 5) is addressed and previous examples of questioning
concerning CEA are briefly described. Poisis can be interpreted in two sense, viz.
ontical and ontological. Ontical poisis refers to the causal (that is, productive) becoming
(coming-forth, bringing-forth) of beings from other beings. Four kinds of ontical poisis
can be identified, viz. evolution, self-organization, creation and making. The (ontical)
concept of computational poisis is investigated and its ontology explicated as
externalistic (that is, ontologically-objective) and operationally-necessary (or
deterministic). Ontical poisis is problematic since it does not allow the maxim creatio
ex nihilo (creation from nothing) - an absolutist interpretation of which is a necessary
condition for ontological emergence (that is, emergence of ontological categories) - to
be rendered commensurable with the maxim ex nihilo nihil fit (nothing comes from
nothing), an absolutist interpretation of which is assumed on ontical poisis. It is argued
that the solution to this problem involves appreciation of what Heidegger has referred
to as the ontological difference between beings and Being. The meaning and truth of
Being are established by examining the relation between this concept and specific
opposing concepts with which it stands in essential, unitary relation, viz. Dasein, beings,
nothing, thinking, appearance and becoming. An ontological concept of poisis is
formulated on the basis of the ontological difference and ontological analysis of the two
basic modes of poisis, viz. physis (or poisis) and techn (or allopoisis). Ontological
poisis is defined as an incipient (originative, creative) movement between Being and
beings and is shown to stand in continuous relation to physis and discontinuous relation
to techn. On this basis, a poitic difference between naturals and artificials (as
artifactuals) is established and formally defined. The ontological concept of poisis is
Chapter 6 Poisis
shown to be radically distinct from Maturana's (ontical) concept of autopoiesis. Finally,

three kinds of emergentism (structuralist, physicalist, pragmatist) are critically examined
and a radical Heideggerian concept of emergence, pluralistic emergentism, which
attempts to address the problem of ontological emergence is outlined.
6.2. Introduction
In this chapter, the concept of poisis is investigated preparatory to the presentation of
a phenomenological framework for clarifying the distinction between naturals and
artificials (as artifactuals) in chapter 7. It is argued that (traditional) metaphysics
conceives poisis in ontical (or productive) terms as a causal relation of becoming
between beings. On this interpretation of the concept, four kinds of poisis can be
identified, viz. evolution, self-organization, creation and making, each of which is
grounded in a set of tacit assumptions concerning the meaning and validity of the
maxims ex nihilo nihil fit (nothing comes from nothing) and creatio ex nihilo (creation
from nothing). It is shown that each kind of ontical poisis gives rise to a similar set of
problems when the issue of ontological emergence (chapter 3) is considered and that this
follows from the fact that the latter can be shown to involve absolute creatio ex nihilo
whereas ontical poisis, as a relation between beings, is committed to absolute ex nihilo
nihil fit and only a relativistic interpretation of creatio ex nihilo. Given that such
problems arise when poisis is interpreted ontically, it follows that a possible solution
lies in a non-ontical interpretation of the concept.
According to Heidegger, traditional ontology (metaphysics) has failed to appreciate the

ontological difference between beings and the Being1 of beings: Being is not a being; it
is that which grounds beings, that is, allows them to be. This fact is of crucial
significance since it establishes a link between Being and nothing (no-thing).
Furthermore, since Being can be shown to stand in essential, unitary relation to
becoming, it follows that Being must be viewed as having both static and dynamic
aspects. Given the fact that Being and nothing are (in some sense) the `same' (since
neither are beings), it therefore follows that nothing must itself have both static and
dynamic aspects. This is important because it allows for the possibility of a non-ontical
absolutist interpretation of creatio ex nihilo. (On this basis, the ex nihilo maxims can be
rendered commensurable and the problem of ontological emergence resolved. This
constitutes the essence of Heideggerian pluralistic emergentism as formulated in this
thesis.)
The grounding of beings in Being (that is, the ontological difference) points to an
ontological poisis that is grounding relative to ontical poisis and which assumes the
form of an incipient (creative, originative, ontologically-emergent) movement between
1
In this study, the word `Being' is used in its capitalized form to emphasis the existential reality of this
difference.
Chapter 6 Poisis
Being and beings. The nature (Being) of ontological poisis can be clarified via a
phenomenological (that is, ontological2) examination of its two ontical modes, viz. physis
(or autopoisis) and techn (or allopoisis) and the distinction between them. On the
basis of this investigation, it is shown that physis has, in fact, two interpretations, viz.
derivative physis as autopoisis (following Aristotle) and originary physis as poisis as
such (following the pre-Socratics), and, consequently, that ontological poisis
(incipience) stands in continuous relation with ontical poisis as physis and discontinuous
relation with ontical poisis as techn. This fact is of critical importance because it
enables a poitic difference, that is, a difference in the becoming (coming-forth,
bringing-forth) of beings, to be established between naturals and artificials (as
artifactuals). Given the unitary relation of Being and becoming, it follows that a
difference in poisis entails a difference in the Being of beings; in short, an ontical
difference between naturality and artificiality (as artifactuality) follows from the poitic
difference which, in turn, is grounded in the ontological difference and the existential
facticity of ontical and ontological poisis. On this basis, it is possible to undermine the
significance of the Kantian appearance-reality distinction in the debate over the
possibility of "strong" computationally emergent artificiality or CEA (chapter 5)3: By
establishing the fact (1) that appearances (beings) stand in essential, unitary relation to
appearings (becomings) and (2) that Being pluralistically supports two basic ontical
modes of appearing (or poisis), viz. physis and techn, of which the former is
continuous with ontological poisis, it is possible to show that isomorphisms cannot be
established between artificials (as artifactuals) and naturals. This follows from the fact
that isomorphisms are relations between beings and Being is not a being4 . In short, the
Kantian appearance-reality distinction is grounded in the (Heideggerian) distinction
between artificiality (as artifactuality) and naturality and hence, the ontological question
concerning the possibility of "strong" CEA can be ontologically-answered (in the
negative).
It is important to re-emphasize at this point in the discussion that this study is concerned
with determining the sufficiency of computationalism as the metaphysical basis of a
unifying framework of emergent artificiality; hence, the critique presented herein is
aimed at a specific kind of "strong" artificiality, viz. CEA (chapter 5). Although this
chapter is not principally concerned with critique (since it is merely preparatory), it is
essential to maintain an awareness of the distal subject of inquiry throughout the
2
As stated in chapter 1, Heideggerian phenomenology coincides with ontology, that is, the systematic analysis
of the structure of Being.
3
This is of crucial significance because it is this very distinction which makes functionalism, multiple-
realizability and hence, "strong" CEA possible (chapters 1 and 4).
4
Hence, to the extent that natural beings are poitically-continuous with Being, the former cannot be placed in
poitic isomorphism with artificiality (as artifactuality).
Chapter 6 Poisis
presentation in order to focus the discussion. For this reason, it is worthwhile briefly
reviewing some of the central claims of CEA by way of a related statement of the
position.
6.2.1. Computationalism as "Digital Metaphysics"
Beavers (1996a) defines a metaphysics as "not a science or a mode of inquiry, but the
way that Being is named and diversified into beings by the language of a particular time
and place." (p.1) In computationalism (chapter 2), Being is identified with computation
and is diversified into computational phenomena (beings). More specifically, in
computationally emergent artificiality (or CEA), artificialities (chapter 4), that is,
artifactual analogues of natural phenomena, are held to emerge (chapter 3) from a
cellular automaton (or CA) substrate (chapter 5). Steinhart (1998) presents a concise
formulation of what might be identified as a related form of computationalism, viz.
computationally emergent naturality (CEN), in stating that
ultimate reality is a massively parallel computing machine sufficiently universal for the realization
of any physically possible world. Ultimate reality is computational space-time, and that is just the
universal metaphysical hardware into which particular physical worlds are programmed. We refer to
this system of ideas as digital metaphysics. (p.117)
Digital metaphysics can be encapsulated in the assertion
physical reality is to metaphysical reality as software is to hardware (p.118)
and, according to Steinhart, "hypothesizes that computational space-time is both

necessary and sufficient for the realization of any physically possible world." (p.125) The
primitives of nature are identified as computational monads (following Leibniz),
consistent with the central ontological claim of CA-computationalism (chapter 5). On
this view,
monads alone are real; everything else is some appearance distributed over and supervening on
monads. An appearance is a function mapping every monad in a world onto its state. Some
appearances are patterns. A pattern is an appearance that exhibits some spatio-temporal invariance
.. [Digital metaphysics] argues that all things are patterns over some set of monads. Patterns are
analyzable mereologically and taxonomically. Thus quarks, electrons, atoms, molecules, organisms,
humans, characters, brains, minds, languages, ethical norms, religions, economies, nations, planets,
stars, etc., are all equally patterns over sets of monads. Only abstract objects, like numbers, remain
absent from this list. At the most general taxonomic level, all patterns are material, and the matter in
a world is the totality of patterns in its appearances. (p.123)
There is a problem with the above statement in that it asserts that only abstracts (such
as numbers) are absent from the list. However, conscious experience is clearly concrete
in the sense that it is, that is, partakes of Being or exists and yet cannot be included in the
above list - Steinhart's assertion to the contrary notwithstanding - since it is an
ontologically-subjective phenomenon whereas computation, being a form of mechanism
Chapter 6 Poisis
(chapter 2), can be shown to be ontologically-objective (section 6.4.3 and chapter 7). In
short, the category problem, that is, the problem of how to generate ontological-
subjectivity from an ontologically-objective substrate (chapter 7), arises in maintaining -
following Alexander (chapter 5) - that consciousness (or `mind') is a pattern (or
functional mapping) emergent from computational space-time. This point is significant
because it is a central problem for both CEN and CEA, in fact, for computationalism as
such. Furthermore, it will be seen that this is a problem which is critical for determining
the poitic capacities of computational systems and, thereby, the essence of
computational Being: In short, computational Being (as such) limits computational
becoming and computational becoming limits computational Being (as exemplified in
beings). However, this position is (implicitly) contested by Steinhart who maintains that
it is not Being and becoming that stand in essential, unitary relation but Being and
function. On his view, "[computational] nature is what [computational] nature does. It's
existence and its functionality are identical: Each basic element of nature is the program
that is true of it." (p.120) This position is a restatement of Aristotle's assertion in Book
II, ch.VII of the Physics to the effect that
what a thing is, and what it is for, are one and the same, and that from which the change originates
is the same in form as these.
Thus, for Steinhart, Being is identical to functionality (more precisely, functional-

necessity implying mechanistic determinism); becoming, in the sense of modality of
origin or genesis, is attributable either to God or a quantum fluctuation in the vacuum
(section 6.4.2.3). As he goes on to state,
digital metaphysics is consistent with both fine-tuning versions of the teleological argument for God
and with atheistic cosmology. On the one hand, if God exists, then the cosmological picture painted
by digital metaphysics contains a God at least like that of the Neoplatonism of Plotinus, Proclus, and
Porphyry. On the other hand, if God does not exist, then the cosmological picture painted by digital
metaphysics is of an eternal computational space-time in which, somehow, material reality happened
(e.g. the Big Bang as a spontaneous event in the quantum vaccum). In any case, digital metaphysics
provides conceptual resources for the development of many classical metaphysical arguments
There are (at least) three problems with this position: First, it assumes that Being and
becoming (in the sense of origination) are intrinsically separable, that is, inessentially-
related. However, in section 6.5, various arguments are presented which challenge the
validity of this assumption; second, it fails to appreciate the ontological difference
between Being and beings (section 6.5.4) by identifying the former with a particular kind
of being, viz. computation; finally, if computationalism is a valid metaphysical position
then God (or the quantum fluctuation) must Himself (itself) be computational in essence
(nature), in which case digital metaphysics must be a bootstrap theory (chapter 4). Yet,
Steinhart's scheme indeed provides `conceptual resources for the development of many
classical metaphysical arguments'. This is because in asserting that the computational
universe may have an origin in something which stands in relation to it as an òther' (that
Chapter 6 Poisis
is, an exo-systemic or exophysical5 cause), he concedes the possibility that computational

space-time is a being rather than Being as such. This move places digital metaphysics
firmly within the classical metaphysical tradition which is understood by Heidegger to
be characteristically onto-theological (section 6.5.4), that is, grounded in assumptions
about God (existence, essence, attributes etc) and his role as (1) highest being (First or
Necessary cause) and (2) determinant of the universal essence (Being) of beings. Both
creationism (God) and evolutionism (quantum vacuum) are viable alternatives given the
assumption of digital metaphysics. In fact, creationism would seem to follow directly
from the grounding of metaphysical computationalism in the metaphor of the computer
and the latter in the `root' metaphors of form and machine (chapter 2) since machines are
quintessentially artifactual. Furthermore, as will be seen in section 6.4.2.1, evolutionism
does not necessarily undermine creationism because the onto-theological problem of
First (or Necessary) cause remains. The significance of these issues in the context of this
study is that they serve to establish the sense in which computationalism does not - in
fact, cannot on account of its metaphysical status - transcend traditional problems
associated with earlier metaphysical systems. This will be seen to be significant in the
context of the question concerning ontological emergence and its necessary grounding
in an absolutist interpretation of creatio ex nihilo and implies that if there is a concept
of poisis that can support this type of emergence then it must be non-metaphysical and
hence, non-computational. To the extent that Being grounds poisis (sections 6.5.8 and
6.6), it follows that Being must itself be non-computational.
6.3. The Question Concerning CEA
The aim of this investigation is to determine whether or not "strong" computationally

emergent artificiality or CEA (chapter 5) is possible. In this section, the possibility of
CEA is considered as a question and previous related questionings concerning
artificiality are briefly examined in order to clarify the distinction between the type of
questioning presented in this study and that presented previously by other questioners.
However, in order to understand CEA as a question, it is necessary to understand what
questioning means, that is, what questioning is as such.
6.3.1. On The Essence of Questioning as such
According to Heidegger (1977a), "questioning builds a way" and "the way is a way of
thinking." (p.3) Consistent with this position, Kovacs (1990) maintains that, for
Heidegger, "the essence of philosophy .. consists in questioning, in the meditative
(essential) thinking of Being" (p.137), that is, in the dynamic openness of thought, which
stands in antinomic contrast to the static closure of faith (or belief - theological or
otherwise). In the context of discussing what he takes to be the fundamental question of
5
The concepts of endo- and exo-systemicity are briefly defined in chapter 3. Endo- and exophysicality denote
interpretations of these concepts under physicalism (or materialism).
Chapter 6 Poisis
metaphysics, viz. Why is there something rather than nothing ?6 Heidegger (1959)
maintains that "to question is to will to know" (p.20) and "not to let ourselves be led
astray by overhasty theories, but to experience things as they are on the basis of the first
thing that comes to hand." (p.30) Consistent with his endorsement of hermeneutic
realism (chapter 1 and section 6.5.4), he asserts that
the essent [that is, particular being or thing] is not changed by our questioning. It remains what it is
and as it is. Our questioning is after all only a psycho-spiritual process in us which, whatever course
it may take, cannot in any way affect the essent itself. (p.29)
Furthermore, and significantly, he maintains that
questions do not just occur like stones and water. Questions are not found ready-made like shoes and
clothes and books. Questions are, and are only as they are actually asked. A leading into the asking
of the fundamental questions is consequently not a going to something that lies and stands
somewhere; no, this leading-to must first awaken and create the questioning. (p.19)
It might be argued that since Being (existence) is taken to be synonymous with

computation under computationalism (section 6.2.1), the above statement can be taken
to apply to the question concerning computationalism (CEN and CEA) which thereby
assumes the status of a fundamental question. Implicit in all this is the need to determine
the Being of that being which is capable of raising questions or, on Heidegger's view,
of being-led-to questioning, of appreciating questions as questions7. This provides the
motivation for Heidegger's (1927) existential analytic of the Dasein (Being-There or that
being for which Being is an issue), the structure of which is briefly examined in section
6.5.3. Crucially, questioning in the context of this study involves determining (1) how
the questioner (Dasein) relates to the questioned (CEA) and (2) whether the questioned
(CEA) could, in turn, become a questioner (Dasein)8. Hence, the necessity of adopting
an approach (method) supporting the investigation of the ontic (productive,
organizational) and epistemic (interpretative, observational) relationality of phenomena
(natural and artificial) to the anthropic component, that is, the human being in its
capacity as artificer-interpreter (chapters 1 and 7).
6.3.2. Previous Questioning Concerning Artificiality
Previous critiques of artificiality - primarily, of artificial intelligence or AI (chapter 4) -

have centred almost exclusively on thought experiments proposed by Searle (1980, 1984,
6
Witherall (1998a) provides an excellent survey of various scientific, philosophical and theological responses
to this question.
7
That is, appreciation of question-ness.
8
This possibility is a necessary condition for "strong" CEA.
Chapter 6 Poisis
1990a, 1990b) and applications of the Heideggerian thought contained in Being and Time
(1927) as presented by Dreyfus (1972, 1979, 1988, 1991, 1992). For the purpose of this
study, however, it is necessary to turn to the later works of Searle and Heidegger (and,
subsidiarily, to others). It might be argued that the reason for this is that former critiques
were framed in the context of non-emergent, symbolically-grounded conceptions of
artificiality and hence, do not apply to the kind of emergent, connectionist artificiality
associated with CEA (chapter 5). However, this is not necessarily the case: Searle, for
example, maintains that his Chinese Room thought experiment (Searle,80), which was
originally conceived in a symbolic context to show that syntax does not entail semantics,
is applicable in a connectionist context, viz. the `Chinese Gym' (Searle,90b). Yet, this
position appears to be problematic given his later assertion (Searle,92) that
among their other merits, at least some connectionist models show how a system might convert a
meaningful input into a meaningful output without any rules, principles, inferences, or other sorts of
meaningful phenomena in between. This is not to say that existing connectionist models are correct -
perhaps they are all wrong. But it is to say that they are not all obviously false or incoherent in the
way that the traditional cognitivist models .. are. (pp.246-247)
Similarly, while Dreyfus (1998) remains "skeptical about both GOFAI and neural
networks" (p.210) as currently conceived, he also affirms (Dreyfus,92) that it is
reasonable to hold that
mechanisms exist in the brain that can in principle be understood and duplicated in hardware so as
to produce artificial intelligence in restricted domains (pp.xliv-xlv)
and this despite the assertion that "it looks likely that the neglected and then revived
connectionist approach is merely getting its deserved chance to fail." (p.xxxviii) Thus,
"strong" artificiality9 as such remains a possibility for both Searle and Dreyfus10. On the
basis of the link between computationally emergent artificiality (or CEA) and
connectionism (chapters 2 and 5), it is conceivable that Searle and Dreyfus (and others)
might endorse a "strong" interpretation of CEA, particularly given their support for
metaphysical realism with respect to the physical universe and Searle's (1995) explicit
commitment to materialistic atomism (chapter 2), the latter of which is fundamental to
CA-computationalism, the basis of CEA as investigated in this study. As he states,
two features of our conception of reality are not up for grabs. They are not, so to speak, optional for
us as citizens of the late twentieth and early twenty-first century. It is a condition of your being an
educated person in our era that you are apprised of these two theories: the atomic theory of matter and
9
By "strong" artificiality is meant the emulation or realization (as opposed to mere simulation) of a natural
phenomenon by an artifactual analogue (chapter 4). The specific meaning of "strong" that Searle attaches in
connection with his definition of Strong AI (artificial intelligence) is not intended.
10
Consistent with proponents of situated cognition, Dreyfus (1996) maintains that "the way brains acquire skills
from input-output pairings can be simulated by neural-networks, but such nets will not be able to acquire our
skills until they have been put into robots with a body structure like ours." (p.20)
Chapter 6 Poisis
the evolutionary theory of biology. (p.6)
In this connection. it is crucial to appreciate that for Searle (1997), "Strong AI is not
about the specific capacities of computer hardware to produce emergent properties
[emphasis added]." (p.13) Again, "the thesis of Strong AI is not that a computer might
`give off' or have mental states as emergent properties, but rather that the implemented
program, by itself, is constitutive of having a mind. The implemented program, by itself,
guarantees mental life." (p.14) This follows from the fact that, on his definition of the
concept, "Strong AI .. is about programs and not about the emergent properties of silicon
or other physical substances." (p.14) Searle (1992, 1997) rejects top-down computer
functionalism (or computationalism) in favour of an emergentist materialism. The
problem with his position - and hence, with the potential scope of his critique of
artificiality - lies in its failure to adequately appreciate tendencies within physics (and
the other natural sciences) towards interpreting nature - and hence, matter -
computationally, viz. the Computational Theory of Matter or CTMa (chapter 4)11.
Given the anti-computationalist stance of phenomenologically-oriented philosophers

such as Searle and Dreyfus with respect to GOFAI, it is important to understand how and
why they might endorse a "strong" interpretation of CEA. It is argued herein that CEA
is a possibility for Searle and Dreyfus because both their respective critiques of AI are
primarily grounded in epistemological concerns (Dreyfus' commitment to Heideggerian
ontology notwithstanding). In short, the question concerning the possibility of "strong"
artificiality has been approached in terms of the Kantian appearance-reality distinction
(chapter 1). For example, in contesting the "strong" computationalist thesis, Fetzer
(1990) is led to assert that
digital machines would be `fundamentally similar' to human beings only if they were subject to the
same range of factors, which is plainly not the case .. In its weak sense, these systems are
`fundamentally different' merely because they are implemented by means of different material (or
`media'). In its strong sense, these systems are `fundamentally different', not merely because they are
implemented by means of different material (or `media'), but because their modes of operation - their
processes and programs - are not either similar or the very same. (p.87)
While this argument is valid, it is important to appreciate that it addresses the question
of "strong" computationalism via consideration of two issues, viz. (1) "weak" - the
difference in material (or medium) and (2) "strong" - the difference in form (or
operational modality). There are (at least) two points to note in this regard: First, an
implicit commitment to questioning in Platonic-Aristotelian terms, viz. matter (hyle) and
form (eidos); and secondly, a metaphysical bias of form (`strong') over and against
11
Searle's position is rendered untenable if, as Randall (1996) argues, matter can - and, ultimately, must - be
reduced to form (chapter 2). This latter position is both consistent with and establishes the ontological
(metaphysical) grounds for a "strong" interpretation of the bi-directionally infinite hierarchy of embedded
virtual machines in the unifying framework of computationally emergent artificiality (or CEA) described in
chapter 5.
Chapter 6 Poisis
matter (`weak'). As stated in chapter 1, the matter-form distinction is consistent with the
distinction between thatness (existence) and whatness (essence), a distinction which
culminates in the Kantian duality of noumenon (reality) and phenomenon (appearance)12.
This circumscription of the means by which to approach the question concerning
computationalism obscures an orthogonal distinction which, it is maintained, is of
grounding significance with respect to the apearance-reality distinction, viz. the
artificial-natural distinction (that is, the distinction between artifactuals and naturals). By
neglecting considerations relating to the different ways of coming-to-be (or becoming)
associated with artificials (as artifactuals) and naturals, that is, by ignoring issues of
poisis (coming-forth or bringing-forth), on the grounds that genesis (becoming) and
functionality (Being) are separable concerns - and thereby adopting a priori a
metaphysical position supporting computational functionalism and multiple-realizability
(chapters 2 and 4) - it has been possible to conflate the artifactual with the natural and
occasion the "strong" interpretation of CEA. If this argument is correct and if Being and
becoming can be shown to be intrinsically (essentially) connected then "strong" CEA in
the sense of realization is impossible; in short, if what it is to be something depends on
how that something came to be then a fundamental distinction in becoming - that is, a
poitic difference - entails an ontical difference, that is, a difference in the Being of
beings and hence, an ontological distinction between naturality and artificiality.
For this reason, in attempting to critique "strong" CEA it is necessary to investigate the
relationship of Being to becoming, that is, poisis (coming-forth or bringing-forth). In
this connection, the later (post-Kehre) works of Heidegger (generally neglected due to
the rhetorical force of arguments presented in Being and Time (1927) in the context of
Heideggerian critiques of symbolic AI) are especially significant and provide a basis
upon which to establish (1) a poitic difference between naturals and artificials (as
artifactuals) and (2) a phenomenological framework13 for clarifying the various ontic
(productive, organizational) and epistemic (interpretative, observational) relations
between naturals, artificials and artificer-interpreters (chapter 7). However, before such
a framework can be presented, it is necessary to examine the phenomenon of poisis as
it appears in (traditional) metaphysics and in Heideggerian phenomenology; the former -
12
For Plato, the noumenal (real) corresponds to form and the phenomenal (or apparent) to matter. This is because
on his metaphysics, matter is pure possibility which becomes actuality via the immanent (or concrete)
manifestation of - more precisely, approximation to - form. However, the point serves to illustrate that
irrespective of which particular dualistic position is adopted, a dualistic position has nonetheless been adopted.
13
As will be shown in chapter 7, this framework is phenomenological in (at least) three senses: First, it recognizes
the essentiality (and hence, ineliminability) of the human being - or anthropic component - in the study of
phenomena. (For Husserl, the anthropic component is identical to the transcendent Cartesian ego or
consciousness while for Heidegger, it is identical to Dasein, that is, situated being-in-the-world); second, it
emphasizes the temporality (and hence, historicality) of the relation between the human being and the
phenomenon under study; finally, it takes into consideration the embeddedness of both the human being and
the phenomenon under study within a tacit Background (chapter 1).
Chapter 6 Poisis
that is, the ontical concept of poisis - provides both a hermeneutic context14 and a
motivating factor15 for the latter - that is, the ontological concept of poisis. The adoption
of a phenomenological approach, can be justified on (at least) three grounds: First,
previous successful16 critiques of artificiality have followed adoption of a
phenomenological stance (Husserlian, Heideggerian or otherwise). Hence, it is only
reasonable to anticipate, from an a priori position, that such an approach might also yield
some measure of success in a related context (assuming that connectionist and symbolic
artificiality are indeed related); second, Heidegger's later works contain detailed
phenomenological analyses of the concept of emergence (Heidegger,93b) and the
ontology of artifacts (Heidegger,39) (Heidegger,77). In chapter 7, it will be shown that
CA-computationalism is an instance of "hard" (or pure) emergent-artifactuality; hence,
Heidegger's investigations of emergence and artifactuality are relevant to the question
concerning the metaphysical sufficiency of CA-computationalism; finally, it must be
appreciated that this study is concerned with evaluating the possibility of "strong" CEA.
While the latter denotes a class of phenomena whose essence has been variously
articulated in some detail (chapters 4 and 5), the existential problem of such phenomena,
viz. their relationality to Being as artificial beings, remains undisclosed, that is, as a
question unasked (section 6.3.1). Phenomenology is uniquely suited to addressing
questions of this sort and hence, is an appropriate philosophical medium within which
to conduct such an investigation.
6.3.3. Questioning Concerning CEA
In this chapter, the phenomenological foundations for the critique of computationally

emergent artificiality (or CEA) presented in chapter 7 are established. The questioning
presented herein attempts to explicate the connections between the three conceptual
foundations of CEA, viz. computationalism (chapter 2), emergence (chapter 3) and
artificiality (chapter 4). It might be argued that such connectedness follows from (or is
entailed by) the unification of the concepts in CEA (chapter 5). Furthermore, it is
important to appreciate that this connection between concepts (in this case, computation,
emergence and artificiality) is a posteriori their synthesis in another concept (CEA).
However, it is quite possible that there exists an a priori connection between the
concepts. This possibility is motivated by Heidegger's (1959) success in analyzing Being
14
That is, a setting within which to question.
15
As a consequence of the various problems that arise in connection with interpreting poisis in ontical (that is,
causal or productive) terms.
16
`Success' here refers simply to the fact that arguments such as Searle's (1980) Chinese Room thought
experiment and Dreyfus' (1979) Heideggerian critique of attempts to represent situations in terms of context-
independent facts constitute real obstacles to the project of Strong AI (as traditionally conceived) and to such
an extent that they have acted as a catalyst motivating research into new approaches, for example,
connectionism and situated cognition.
Chapter 6 Poisis
on the basis of its opposition to terms such as becoming, appearance, thought and the
ought: According to Heidegger, that which is set up in opposition to something must
originally have been unified with it. Thus, questioning concerning CEA involves
questioning concerning the possibility of unification, that is, the possiblity that
computationalism, emergence and artificiality share a common ground.
It is the contention of this study that this ontological ground is poisis. However, the
interpretation of poisis presented in this study differs markedly from that presented by
other theorists such as Maturana and Varela (1980), who define the concept in terms of
cybernetics and systems theory (chapter 3 and sections 6.4.2.4 and 6.6). Following
Heidegger, poisis is interpreted herein as coming-forth or bringing-forth (the distinction
is clarified in the course of this chapter). Although its origins in Greek thought are
widely appreciated, the concept of poisis as presented by Heidegger departs somewhat
radically from traditional (metaphysical) interpretations. Principally, this is because
Heidegger understands poisis in terms of its relation to his central concern, viz. the
question concerning Being17: Heideggerian poisis, unlike other interpretations of the
concept, is grounded in the ontological difference between beings and Being (section
6.5.4). In order to clarify the distinction between Heideggerian and conventional
understandings of this notion, the concept of poisis must be examined both
metaphysically or ontically (that is, as a relation between beings) and
phenomenologically or ontologically (that is, as a relation between beings and Being as
such).
6.4. Ontical Poisis
In this section, the concept of poisis is investigated from an ontical perspective, that is,
as a relation between beings. First, some basic concepts associated with the concept are
briefly examined. Second, four types (or kinds) of ontical poisis are described, viz.
evolution, self-organization, creation and making, in an attempt to establish the causal-
productive essence of the concept. Third, the essence of poisis under computationalism
is examined in relation to the four kinds of ontical poisis previously identified. Finally,
the question of ontological18 emergence and its relation to the ex nihilo maxims
interpreted under ontical poisis is considered.
17
If Heidegger (1939, 1959, 1977a) is correct, this is also how the Greeks approached the meaning of the concept
of poisis. Viewed from this perspective, so-called orthodox interpretations of the concept - with whom
Heidegger's is clearly at variance - are, in fact, highly heterodox.
18
Here, ontological retains its conventional (metaphysical) meaning as that which is concerned with Being in
contrast to epistemological as that which is concerned with knowing.
Chapter 6 Poisis
6.4.1. Basic Concepts
In this section, four concepts are identified as foundational to ontical poisis, viz.
process, change, becoming and causation. Each of the concepts is briefly examined
preparatory to the attempt at clarifying the essence of the ontical (productive) notion of
poisis in the following sections.
6.4.1.1. Process and Change
The notion of a process was first introduced in chapter 2. Rescher (1996) presents a
detailed exposition of this concept from a metaphysical perspective; however, according
to Runes (1960), a process can be defined simply as
[1] a series of purposive actions, generally tending toward the production of something. [2] A
systematic forward movement, resulting in growth or decay.
Both the above definitions are teleological, that is, involve reference to goals and goal-
directedness: In the former, the teleology is a priori because goals (or `purpose') are
causal (section 6.4.1.3); In the latter, the teleology is a posteriori (or teleonomic)
because goals (which are responsible for `forward movements') are postulated for
epistemological (that is, explanatory) purposes only as in, for example, neo-Darwinian
evolution (section 6.4.2.1). Crucially, however, the second definition makes use of the
notion of systematicity implying functionality and, thereby, directionality; hence, it can
also be interpreted in a priori teleological terms.
The Oxford Companion to Philosophy (1995) defines process as follows:
a process is a series of changes with some sort of unity, or unifying principle, to it
and process philosophy as
the doctrine that either what is is becoming, or that what is ultimately consists in change, or both.
One of the earliest formulations of what might be described as a "strong" interpretation

of process philosophy is that due to Heraclitus who held that panta rhei, viz. àll is flux,
change, flow'. This position is described as "strong" because it holds becoming to have
ontical priority over Being; in contrast, the opposing "weak" position asserts the priority
of Being over becoming. One of the main consequences of this position is summarized
in the fifty-first Heraclitean fragment as follows (Kahn,79):
One cannot step twice into the same river, nor can one grasp any mortal substance in a stable
condition, but it scatters and again gathers; it forms and dissolves, and approaches and departs.
(The significance of Heraclitean thought for the ontological question of becoming is

Chapter 6 Poisis
examined in section 6.5.8.) According to Harris (1965), "the available evidence and the
consensus of scientific opinion point to a primitive physical matrix which is some sort
of activity or process actuated by principles intrinsic to itself." (p.146) As he goes on to
state,
this primal `substance' of the world seems to be a sort of Heraclitean flux out of which individualized
entities emerge in the course of its own particular activity, as a result of its involution upon itself,
which produces in it specific forms or patterns. These are themselves first constituted by systematic
interrelation of processes, and secondly, by further, more complex mutual interaction, contribute to
the creation of new, more potent and more significant types of entity. [Furthermore,] the primordial
activity itself is of such a kind as necessarily to issue in the forms that actually emerge. (p.147)
Whitehead (1978), inspired by the thought of Heraclitus, presents an organismic account

of becoming, which he describes as "a creative advance into novelty" (p.28), in which
process (as against substance) is afforded ontological priority. He maintains that "it
belongs to the nature of a `being' that it is a potential for every `becoming'" (p.22) and
that "how an actual entity becomes constitutes what that actual entity is .. Its `being' is
constituted by its `becoming'." (p.23) Furthermore, Whitehead holds atomism to be
metaphysically correct19; consequently, on his view "there is a becoming of continuity,
but no continuity of becoming." (p.35) On this basis he defines change as "the difference
between actual occasions comprised in some determinate event." (p.73)
One of the earliest formulations of what may be identified as a "weak" interpretation of

process philosophy, and one in which the notion of process is explicitly described in
causal terms (section 6.4.1.3), is that given by Aristotle in On Generation and
Corruption20 (350 BC). On this scheme, and as Angeles (1981) states, change is defined
in terms of (i) temporal succession, (ii) reference to that which remains unchanged
throughout the change (an identity or substance), and (iii) that which changes (the state
of the identity or its predicates). Since causation provides the means by which to clarify
the nature of production (and hence, tentatively, process and change), it will be
investigated in somewhat greater detail in what follows. However, before ths concept is
examined it is necessary to investigate a notion related to both process and causation in
Aristotelian metaphysics, viz. becoming.
19
Whitehead's organismic ontology is atomistic to the extent that it posits a plenum of discrete entities as
primitive. As Rescher (1996) states, "Whitehead insisted upon irreducibly atomic units of process - àctual
occasions' - themselves altogether indecomposible and serving as basic units or building blocks out of which
all larger processes are then constituted. This process atomism is certainly a theoretical possibility. But it is a
dubious proposition - and one that is at odds with the spirit of process philosophy. Why, after all, should
process be seen as in discretized units ?" (p.89) However, in Whitehead's defense, it should be pointed out that
his àtoms' are not the `vacuous actualities' of traditional materialism; on the contrary, àctual occasions' are
experiential events of finite duration which for an interrelated nexus with all other actual occasions and in such
a way that these relations are partly constitutive of the Being (actuality) of these events.
20
Translated by H.H.Joachim.
Chapter 6 Poisis
6.4.1.2. Becoming
Angeles (1981) defines becoming as follows:
1. The act of changing from one form of existence to another. (Mere change of position or of motion
is not considered becoming.) 2. That kind of change actualizing the potentiality of something toward
being something other than what it once was, in a process of realizing its goal, purpose, or end. 3. In
Plato and the Platonists, becoming refers to ordinary sensuous experience and the mundane world in
which things come and go, in contrast to the true being the unchanging, eternal Ideas or Forms.
Definition (1) is consistent with Aristotles identification of becoming (or `coming-to-

be) with change in substance21 (for example, fire to water) and his distinguishing motion
from becoming. Definition (2) is supported by Runes (1960) who maintains that,
according to the medieval scholastics,
any kind of change is actualization of potencies. It is often called, following Aristotle, a `movement,
because movement is a striking instance of becoming, and because the thing `moves from the lower
level of potentiality to the higher of actuality. Actualization is achieved only by a factor which is act
itself. The act is in this sense prior to the potency not only in nature but also in time.
Given the central place of becoming in Aristotelian metaphysics, it is worthwhile

examining his formulation of the concept in some detail. Furthermore, given the monadic
interpretation of digital metaphysics and CA-computationalism (section 6.3.1) and the
similarity between Leibnizean monadology and Aristotelian organicism22 (Whitehead,78)
(Rescher,96), it is at least conceivable that an Aristotelian interpretation of becoming
might inform on CA-computationalism and CEA. CA-computationalism (chapter 5) is
readily interpretable in Aristotelian substance-predicate terms: Substances can be
identified with FSM `monads' (cells in the CA lattice) and predicates with states that the
FSM monads can assume. However, in CA-computationalism, substances cannot change
into other substances. This follows from the fact that since the (local) state-transition rule
for each FSM monad is identical, all substances as substances are ontically identical;
hence, CA-computationalism is monistic in contrast to Aristotelian substantialism.
Crucially, this would seem to imply that CA-computationalism does not support
Aristotelian becoming (coming-to-be and passing-away) as defined below.
Aristotle (Metaphysics, Book ), ch.VIII) maintains that "`substance' has two senses: (a) the ultimate substratum
21
which cannot be further predicated of anything else [i.e. the matter], and (b) that which is individual and
separable, i.e. the shape or form."
22
It should be noted here that in the Physics, Aristotle distinguished three kinds of monadic substance: (i) mind,
(ii) the automatic and (iii) luck. Mind is internally self-causing; the automatic is externally other-caused; luck
(the concurrent or contingently-composed) lies somewhere in between. For Aristotle, the automatic applies to
animals other than man and to many inanimate objects (Book II, ch.VI). Clearly, the kind of monad consistent
with CA-computationalism is the automatic entailing negative implications for the possiblity of "strong" CEA
from an Aristotelian perspective.
Chapter 6 Poisis
In Book ', ch.II of the Metaphysics, Aristotle states that
some things are said to `be' because they are (a) substance; others because they are (b) modifications
of substance; others because they are (c) a process towards substance, or (d) destructions or privations
or qualities of substance, or (e) productive or generative of substance or of terms relating to substance,
or (f) negations of some of these terms or of substance itself.
Writing in On Generation and Corruption (350 BC), he goes on to assert that
those .. who construct all things out of a single element [that is, the monists], must maintain that
coming-to-be and passing-away are àlteration'. For they must affirm that the underlying something
always remains identical and one; and change of a substratum is what we call àltering'. Those, on
the other hand, who make the ultimate kinds of things more than one [that is, the pluralists], must
maintain that àlteration' is distinct from coming-to-be: for coming-to-be and passing-away result
from the consilience [or combination] and dissolution of the many kinds. (Book I, ch.I)
Hence, for pluralists such as Empedocles, becoming is identical to combination: There

is no change either in the qualities associated with substances nor in the four substances
(Earth, Air, Fire, Water) themselves. For Aristotle, alteration involves a change in the
qualities associated with substances, the latter of which are themselves unchanged as a
result of the process. As he states,
if the change is àlteration', then the substratum is a single element; i.e. all things which admit of
change into one another have a single matter. And, conversely, if the substratum of the changing
things is one, there is àlteration'. (Book I, ch.I)
In conceiving alteration in terms of the changes associated with things (or beings),
Aristotle implicitly adopts an ontical stance, that is, one concerned with being(s) qua
being(s). This may be contrasted with Heidegger's ontological stance in which concern
lies with the relation between beings and Being as such (section 6.5). In the context of
the previous statement, it is significant to note that CA-computationalism is a monistic
ontology; hence, the becoming (coming-to-be and passing-away) of CA structures must
assume the form of alteration in the CA substrate. Given that computation can be defined
in terms of abstract symbol manipulation (chapter 2), it follows that computational
becoming - or alteration - involves representational change. This is significant because,
according to Simon (1981), "all mathematics exhibits in its conclusions only what is
already implicit in its premises [and] all mathematical derivation can be viewed simply
as change in representation, making evident what was previously true but obscure
[emphasis added]." (p.153) Given the closure (chapter 3) of computational substrates
(such as CAs), it would thereby seem to follow that the possibilities for becoming and
emergence (chapter 3) under CA-computationalism are highly circumscribed.
For Aristotle, becoming - in contrast to combination and alteration - involves a reciprocal

change between related substances (for example, fire and water). On his view,
when the change is in constitutive factors [that is, substances], there will be coming-to-be or passing-
Chapter 6 Poisis
away; but when it is in the thing's qualities, i.e. a change of the thing per accidents, there will be
àlteration'. (Book I, ch.II)
[Furthermore,] there is ùnqualified coming-to-be' (though it is a passing-away-of-something) and

ùnqualified passing-away' (though it is a coming-to-be-of-something). For this distinction of
appellation depends upon a difference in the material out of which, and into which, the changes are
effected. It depends either upon whether the material is or is not `substantial', or upon whether it is
more or less `substantial', or upon whether it is more or less perceptible. (Book I, ch.III)
[Hence,] coming-to-be is a passing-away of what is not and passing-away is a coming-to-be of what

is not. (Book I, ch.III)
Aristotle's interpretation of becoming, grounded in the maxim ex nihilo nihil fit, that is,
"nothing comes from nothing", leads to the view that emergence is an epistemological
phenomenon (chapter 3). Justification for this assertion is provided by the following
statements:
just as people speak of a `passing away' without qualification when a thing has passed into what is
imperceptible and what in that sense ìs not', so also they speak of à coming-to-be out of a not-being'
when a thing emerges from an imperceptible. Whether, therefore, the substratum is or is not
something, what comes-to-be emerges out of a `not-being'; so that a thing `comes-to-be out of a not-
being' just as much as it `passes away into what-is-not'. Hence it is reasonable enough that coming-to-
be should never fail. (Book I, ch.III)
And again,
`matter', in the proper sense of the term, is to be identified with the substratum which is receptive of
coming-to-be and passing-away. (Book I, ch.IV)
Aristotle's classification of the various kinds of change is shown in Table 6.1:
Classification Kind
Substance Becoming Matter
Predicate Alteration Quality

Growth Quantity
Motion Place
Table 6.1 Aristotelian classification of kinds of change.
In Book II, ch.X of On Generation and Corruption, Aristotle establishes a clear link
between becoming and efficient causation as associated with motion:
it is far more reasonable that what is should cause the coming-to-be of what is not, than that what is
not should cause the coming to be of what is. Now that which is being moved is, but that which is
coming-to-be is not; hence, also, motion is prior to coming-to-be.
Chapter 6 Poisis
What is absent from consideration in the above framework is the emergence of substance
as such. For Aristotle this is meaningless since substance is identified with Being
(existence) and the latter is clearly fundamental (or primordial). However, as Whitehead
(1978) and pre-Socratic philosophers such as Anaximander and Heraclitus before him
have argued, process is not reducible to substance. On this basis, a sharp distinction is
drawn in metaphysics between Being and becoming, the former interpreted substantially
and the latter processually. However, if Heidegger is correct, Being as such is neither
substantial nor processual (Dreyfus,91); rather it is the ontological ground of the
modalities of Being and becoming as traditionally conceived.
There are (at least) two additional problems with the Aristotelian notion of becoming in
the context of this study: First, there is a problem associated with one of the ex nihilo
maxims. Atiyeh (1967) states that
according to Aristotle, the world cannot have come to be because there is no such thing as absolute
becoming. Everything that becomes comes from something, that is, what is actually existent must
have come before what was potentially existent. (p.51)
However, this assumption is questionable given that it entails the assertion of an absolute
causal ground (First cause) which itself does not come into being, yet (necessarily)
partakes of Being (section 6.4.2.3). Hence, there arises the question concerning the Being
of this First Cause. Yet, the Aristotelian position, grounded in an ontical interpretation
of the maxim ex nihilo nihil fit, ignores the ontological difference between Being and
beings (section 6.5.4); Second, implicit in section 6.4.2.1, where becoming is
reinterpreted ontically (causally) on evolutionist schemes (such as Darwinism), is the
view that Being cannot be defined in terms of fixed (static) categories associated with
a substance-predicate metaphysics. This follows from the fact that evolution is held to
be intrinsically processual, entailing a dynamic, emergent and contingent view of
categories.
6.4.1.3. Causation
In this section, the concept of causation, which was briefly introduced in chapter 2 in the
context of a discussion of the notion of determinism, is examined. Given the vast and
extremely diverse literature available on the subject, a detailed survey of the concept is
clearly beyond the scope (and aim) of this study. Consequently, inquiry has been
restricted to examination of a few key texts, principally, Mario Bunge's Causality (1959).
Before examining Bunge's account of causality and causation, however, it is worthwhile
briefly considering some other formulations of the concept.
Significantly, Mercer (1917) maintains that the generic (or universal) category of
causation has its origin in the (specific) or particular kind of causation associated with
human volition:
Chapter 6 Poisis
The cue moves - the ball moves; there is all that can be known from the outside. Whence, then, comes
our conviction that there is a causal connection between the two events ? From the direct experience,
the player has that he puts forth effort to move the cue. It is not, as Kant would have us believe, that
we subjectively supply a category to the phenomena: but that we have a direct experience of force
exerted at one end of the series of happenings and intuitively infer that force is at work throughout.
The subjective factor is the key to the whole situation. For the force which the player exerts, and of
which he is conscious, is proceeded by a volition; and unless we assume an unbridgeable gap, it is
at least reasonable to infer that the force throughout the series is of the nature of will. (p.132)
Apart from our sense of putting forth effort, we could not so much as form the concept of Force, and
therefore not of Causation. We are thus driven on to recognize the significance of the fact of Will.
(p.vi)
The principle of causality, broadly viewed, is the outcome of a demand on our part that everything
shall be rational. Can we find a more rational basis for it than the experience we have when we put
forth a definite and conscious effort ? Thus viewed, the cosmos becomes a manifestation of Will
definitely and consciously directed towards the attainment of ends, and the cosmic process reveals
to us the methods employed for attaining these ends [emphasis added]. (p.136)
Furthermore, "when [the scientist] speaks of causation, he is importing into phenomena

(and rightly so, as I hold) his immediate experience of effects following on his own
volitions [emphasis added]." (p.38) Again,
in the concept of law there is the same subjective character, stripped of which the universe is reduced
to a mere series of happenings - of bare facts without connection. The scientist reads into them
causation and order. Why should he regard as irrational and unknowable the reading into it of
purpose? (p.193)
This interpretation of causation is supported by Gale (1986) who argues for a link
between anthropocentrism and teleology, viz. "one can argue most plausibly .. that our
race's first notions of causality developed out of our self-consciousness of our own
modes of causality, especially that of purposive willing. Thus from the start, teleology
was necessarily a main mode of causal modeling." (p.103) These arguments are
consistent with Heidegger's (1927) claim that the ontical category of causation is
grounded in the ontological existential of skillful coping (Dreyfus,91), for example, in
the handling of equipment in order to achieve specific ends as in design and production
(techn). This interpretation is supported by Mercer who maintains that
when we consider that man is not separate from the universe, but an integral part of it, his seeking to
trace causality in the universe is the universe seeking to explain itself in and through its most highly
developed part [which for Heidegger is Dasein, that being for which Being is an issue]. (p.118)
Assuming Mercer's and Heidegger's arguments for an anthropocentric origin of the

notion of causation to be valid, it still remains to give an account of the notion of
Chapter 6 Poisis
causality as such in ontical - that is, productive23 - terms.
The Oxford Companion to Philosophy (1995) defines causality as
the relation between two items one of which is the cause of the other
and Barnes (1982) maintains that
in Aristotle's view, to ask for a cause is to seek the `because-of-which': it is to ask why something is
the case. A question `Why ?' requires an answer `Because'; so explanatory sentences which cite
causes can always be expressed in the form `X because Y'. (p.52)
In Physics (II, 3, 7) and Metaphysics (Book A, ch.III), Aristotle identifies four types of
cause:
(i) the definition, essence, or essential nature of the thing [formal cause]; (ii) its matter or substratum
[material cause]; (iii) its source of motion [efficient cause]; and (iv) opposite to the third, the ènd' or
`good', which is the goal of all generation and movement [final cause].
In Metaphysics (Book ), ch.II), he offers the following three oppositions as means by

which to classify causes: (1) actual vs. potential; (2) posterior vs. prior; and (3) genus vs.
instance. Bunge (1959) identifies the formal and material causes as "causes of being" and
the efficient and final causes as "causes of becoming". (p.32) (This is interesting in the
context of an examination of becoming under computationalism since, on the basis of
arguments presented in chapter 2, it appears that efficient and formal causation are more
appropriately linked. This would seem to follow from the ontical externality associated
with form (structure, syntax) and mechanism.)
Hence, for the Greeks there were four causes and, as Collingwood (1945) points out,
not one of these was regarded as an event prior in time to its effect. Even the efficient cause, for
Aristotle, is not an event, but a substance which is the seat of power: thus the efficient cause of a new
organism is not the event or act of generation but the parent which did that act. (p.75)
However, in the eighteenth century, a new definition of `cause' was established in

metaphysics by Hume: An event antecedent to and necessarily connected with another
event called the effect. This was motivated by the rise of an empiricist-rationalist
conception of science, one of whose consequences was the reduction of Aristotle's four
causes to a single cause, viz. efficient causation. Consistent with Heidegger's (1977)
analysis of the historical change in the interpretation of techn, viz. from its
identification as a mode (way) of disclosing Being in Greek thought (section 6.6.3) to
23
The link between the ontical and the causal (or productive) follows from the fact that the former is concerned
with relations between beings and, in the context of this study, it is only those relations which bear on the issue
of poisis (becoming, coming-forth, bringing-forth) that are relevant.
Chapter 6 Poisis
its modern24 identification with Enframing (Gestellen) with the latter's grounding in
mathematical representation (ta mathem~ta) and empirical control over nature conceived
as standing-reserve (Bestand), Bunge (1959) asserts that
some of the grounds for the Renaissance reduction of causes to the causa efficiens were the following:
(a) it was, of the four [Aristotelian causes], the sole clearly conceived one; (b) hence it was
mathematically expressible; (c) it could be assigned an empirical correlate, namely, an event (usually
a motion) producing another event (usually another motion) in accordance with fixed rules; the
remaining causes, on the other hand, were not definable in empirical terms, hence they were not
emprically testable; (d) as a consequence, the efficient cause was controllable; moreover, its control
was regarded as leading to the harnessing of nature, which was the sole aim of the instrumental
(pragmatic) conception of science advocated by Bacon and his followers [emphasis added]. (pp.32-
33)
According to Bunge, Locke "regarded causation as a connection, acknowledging

production as its distinctive mark" whereas Hume "held that causation is only a relation,
and moreover one relating experiences rather than facts in general." (pp.5-6)
Furthermore,
Hume emphasized .. that it [is] not .. empirically verifiable that the cause produces or engenders the
effect, but only that the (experienced) event called `cause' is invariably associated with or followed
by the (experienced) event called èffect'. (p.6)
In Treatise of Human Nature, Hume argued that
we can never demonstrate the necessity of a cause to every new existence, or new modification of
existence without showing at the same time the impossibility there is, that any thing can ever begin
to exist without some productive principle; and where the latter proposition cannot be proved, we
must despair of ever being able to prove the former. (Book I, Section III)
On the basis of statements such as the above, Grene (1963) maintains that "Hume has
demonstrated conclusively that all the items of our experience are separable and that
therefore no two of them can be connected by a necessary relation such as that of cause
and effect is supposed to be." However, Bunge contests this position, arguing that
causation is not a category of relation among ideas, but a category of connection and determination
corresponding to an actual trait of the factual (external and internal) world. (p.6)
Furthermore, Bunge maintains that
24
There remains some controversy as to whether techn-Enframing (Gestellen) is a modern or postmodern
phenomenon. To the extent that modernity can be characterized in terms of the (essentially) Cartesian relation
between subjects and objects, it would appear that Enframing must be post-modern since it attempts to subsume
the subject into the objective, thereby reducing the ontological `distance' between the subjective and the
objective (Risan,96). However, in the context of the question concerning CEA, the validity of such
subsumptions and reductions is highly questionable (chapter 7). Consequently, Enframing has been
characterized as an essentially modern phenomenon.
Chapter 6 Poisis
the Humean formula [that is, if C(ause), then E(ffect) always] expresses, indeed, the conditionalness,
unsymmetry, and lack of exception that characterize the causal link; but it accounts neither for the
uniqueness nor for the genetic character of the relation between C and E. It does not convey the
productivity or efficacy of causation: it does not, in short, say that the effect happens to be produced
by the cause, but only that it is regularly conjoined [that is, correlated] to it. (p.44)
While Bunge is certainly correct in asserting that "Hume presupposed what he set out to
prove, namely, that there is no connection between past and future" (p.45), from Hume's
perspective, it is precisely the genetic or productive aspect of causation which is
contestable since it cannot be definitely demonstrated (that is, proven) to exist.
Consistent with his assertion of the validity of an ontologically-pluralistic metaphysics

(chapter 5), Bunge maintains that
causation (efficient and extrinsic) is only one among several categories of determination; there are
other types of lawful production, other levels of interconnection, such as statistical, teleological, and
dialectical determinacy. (p.30)
It should be noted that while Bunge subscribes to determinism, it is a pluralistic form of

this thesis that he adopts. On his scheme, the mechanistic determinism described in
chapter 2 which was held to be definitive of computationalism, is merely one kind of
determinism among others. Hence, for Bunge, monistic computationalism cannot be
ontologically primitive since mechanism or computationalism (a particular) is not
exhaustive of determination (the universal) and monism is subsumable by pluralism and
yet incapable of subsuming pluralism25.
With respect to the doctrine of efficient causation (that is, mechanism), Bunge states that
"natural causes are always changes (events or processes) originating other changes."
(p.149) On this basis, and in the context of discussing causation in natural systems, he
maintains that
strict causal lines or chains simply do not exist; but in particular respects, in limited domains, and for
short time intervals, they often afford both a satisfactory approximate picture and an adequate
explanation of the essential mechanism of becoming. (p.133)
However, it must be appreciated that causation on the above scheme is defined in terms
of singular relations between cause and effect; multiple causation and multiple
interconnecting interactions are not regarded as `causal' although they are held to be
modes of determination. Bunge holds that laws are "patterns of being and becoming, and
as such relate qualities" (p.211) and goes on to make the following important point
regarding the ontical nature of causation (production):
25
Clearly, computationalists must reject both of these theses (pluralism and subsumption) and maintain that all
other kinds of determination are (1) merely phenomenal (apparent) and (2) reducible (in principle) to
mechanistic or causal determination (noumenal or real).
Chapter 6 Poisis
although causal explanations are framed in terms of environmental agents, not every account of being
or becoming in terms of the action of the environment need be causal. In order to be causal, an
explanation must assign the whole power of origination or production to what is outside the object
concerned [emphasis added]. (p.174)
He goes on to state that "ideal schemes of change may be purely causal, purely random,
purely self-determined, and so on; real changes, on the other hand, are always a mixture
or, better, a combination of several types of becoming." (p.218) Thus, for Bunge,
causation means efficient causation which, in turn, means other-production; that is,
production-wholly-by-other or, in Maturana and Varela's (1980) terms, allopoiesis
(section 6.4.2.4). The implications of this view of causation and mechanism for CA-
computationalism and CEA are examined in section 6.4.4.
Alexander (1920) makes an important point regarding the directionality of causation:

Following Hume, he maintains that causes always precede effects. In order to resolve the
problem of (apparently) temporally-retroactive causation in which future events are held
to causally influence present events, Alexander adopts the Aristotelian distinction
between actual and potential causes, identifying the former as ontically physical and the
latter as ontically-mentalistic (that is, conceptual or experiential):
[Consider] the future event as it will be when it is actual, in which case it becomes not future but
present; and the future as it is enjoyed [in the mind], before it is realised. Such enjoyment is the future
in idea, and this is the only way in which the future as future can be enjoyed. This future enjoyment
is causal to its own realization as a present. But this enjoyment drives us not a fronte but a tergo like
all other causality. The transition is still from the before to the after. For the future as future precedes
the future as it is when it has become a present and precedes it in the order of my enjoyment .. If Time
be taken seriously all causality proceeds from actual present to actual future, and is never determined
by the actual future [but only by the enjoyed future present to mind]. (p.288)
Anticipating this position in Summa Theologica (Part I, Question 2, Article 1), St.
Thomas Aquinas maintained that
in the observable world causes are found to be ordered in series; we never observe, nor ever could,
something causing itself, for this would mean that it preceded itself, and this is not possible. Such a
series of causes must however stop somewhere; for in it an earlier member causes an intermediate
and the intermediate a last (whether the intermediate be one or many). Now if you eliminate a cause
you also eliminate its effects, so that you cannot have a last cause, unless you have a first. Given
therefore no stop in the series of causes, and hence, no first cause, there would be no intermediate
causes either, and no last effect and this would be a mistake. One is therefore forced to suppose some
first cause, to which everyone gives the name `God'.
Hence, the problem of the directionality of causation and the problem of the genetic (or
productive) structure of causation are connected. Aquinas' argument is problematic
because it assumes an absolutist position with respect to the end points of a series.
However, it is possible that `first' and `last' do not designate absolute points, but relative
positions in a sequence that is (1) infinite or/and (2) circular (that is, self-contained).
Bunge lists the following as essential characteristics of causation: (i) conditionalness; (ii)
Chapter 6 Poisis
uniqueness; (iii) one-sided dependence of effect on cause; (iv) invariability of

connection; (v) productivity or genetic nature of link. (p.48) Like Aquinas, he appears
to consider only two possibilities regarding the genetic connectivity of causes involving
recourse either to (1) the notion of a First Cause (upheld by Aristotle) or (2) the notion
of an infinity of courses (rejected as unactualizable by Aristotle26). However, as Davies
(1983) points out, there is another possibility, viz. finite (or infinite) circular causation.
Such a scheme is implicit in Wheeler's meaning loop concept associated with the
participatory interpretation of quantum theory (chapter 4) which involves implicit
adoption of an ontical version of the coherence theory of truth. The topologies of some
possible causal schemes are shown in Fig 6.1:
(a) E1 E2 E3 E4
(b) 4 E1 E2 E3 E4 4
E2 En
(c) E1 E3 (d) 4 4
E4 Em
Fig 6.1 Four causal schemes (e denotes an event): (a) finite-linear, (b) infinite-linear, (c) finite-circular,
(d) infinite-circular.
Kant criticizes Plato for maintaining (in the Timaeus) that the world is a world of
process or becoming and that all becoming must have a cause. According to the former,
asserting such a position leads to category error since the relation between effect and
cause is a relation between one becoming or process and another, that is, between
phenomena and not between the sum total of phenomena and something which is not a
phenomenon. This position is supported by Alexander (1920) who maintains that
there is no causal relation between the infinite whole and any one of its parts. There is only such
relation between one part and another. (p.288)
Davies (1983) also supports this view in stating that "asking for a cause of the universe
26
An actual infinity is a metaphysical fiction for Aristotle because of his commitment to a static, Parminidean
interpretation of Being (actuality, existence) and its opposition to dynamic becoming. If, following Heidegger
(1959), Being and becoming are unified and interpreted in historically-dynamical terms, viz. Being as enduring
presencing, the Aristotelian argument collapses.
Chapter 6 Poisis
has a different logical status from asking for a cause of the individual object or event
within the universe." (p.37) Furthermore, "[cause] and effect are temporal concepts and
cannot be applied to a state in which time does not exist." (p.39) However, Collingwood
(1945) has contested the Kantian argument on the grounds that it "only holds good if the
word `cause' has its eighteenth century meaning, first definitely established in
metaphysics by Hume, of an event antecedent to and necessarily connected with another
event called the effect." (p.75) As he goes on to state,
to a Greek, anything goes by the name `cause' which in any of the various senses of that word
provides an answer to a question beginning with the word why. As we all know, Aristotle was to
distinguish four senses of that world, and hence four kinds or orders of cause: material, formal,
efficient, and final. And not one of these was regarded as an event prior in time to its effect. Even the
efficient cause, for Aristotle, is not an event, but a substance which is the seat of power: thus the
efficient cause of a new organism is not the event or act of generation but the parent which did that
act. If then we ask why there is a world of nature, we are asking a question which does not necessarily
involve the fallacy of applying the category of causation, understood as Kant and Hume understood
it, to something outside the realm of phenomena and possible experience. Indeed we are asking a
question which Kant himself thought it legitimate to ask .. a question which we must ask as soon as
we realize that the world of nature does not explain itself, but presents itself to us as a complex of
facts demanding explanation. There is certainly one way of explaining these facts by exhibiting the
relations between them: that is, explaining any one of them in terms of the rest; but there is another
kind of explanation which is equally necessary, namely explaining why facts of the kind we call
natural should exist at all: this is what Kant called metaphysics of nature, and this is the type of
inquiry to which the Timaeus belongs. (pp.75-76)
In Polanyi's (1966) terms, philosophical analysis in terms of proximate causation

involves the adoption of a coherence-theoretical perspective whereas analysis in terms
of distal causation involves some form of correspondence-theoretical position. In this
distal context, one is inquiring as to the cause of causation conceived in its proximate
sense. However, this conventional metaphysical (ontical, productive) approach to the
question of proximate causality does not address the existential (ontological) question
concerning the Being of causation as such. Yet, clearly it is this issue which requires
clarification. Davies (1983) argues that "it is not clear that the universe is a thing" (p.37).
However, if the universe exists, that is, the universe is, then it must partake of Being and
hence, be a being. To the extent that beings are things, the universe must also be a thing.
While he is correct in stating that "if it is defined as a set of things it runs the risk of
paradox" (p.37), he fails to appreciate the facticity of the universe and its existential (that
is, ontological) dependency on Being as such. Given the connection between causality
and ontical poisis and the existential problems associated with the former, it follows that
ontical poisis must itself be existentially problematic. Hence, the need to consider the
possibility of a non-ontical poisis.
In concluding this section, it is worthwhile briefly noting that according to Campbell

(1985), "contrary to its superficial appearance, causal behaviour is not an inherent
property of matter as such. Instead, causality emerges only from organization of matter.
Poorly organized material admits only rudimentary forms of causality. As matter
Chapter 6 Poisis
becomes progressively more organized it sequentially acquires qualitatively new

capacities for causal interactions." (pp.154-155) This provides the basis for establishing
a link between causation and evolution, one of four different types of ontical poisis
(production) briefly examined in the next section.
6.4.2. Types of Poisis
In this section, four kinds of ontical (that is, productive) poisis, viz. evolution, self-
organization, creation and making are briefly examined in an attempt at establishing the
essence of ontical poisis preparatory to clarification of the essence of computational
poisis in the following section.
6.4.2.1. Evolution
As with causation, the literature on evolution is extremely vast and a survey of the
concept beyond both the aim and scope of this study. However, it is necessary to clarify
the philosophical meaning of this idea (in terms of mechanisms and their underlying
metaphysical assumptions) for (at least) two reasons: firstly, the notion of evolution has
a historical link with the notion of emergence (chapter 3); secondly, evolution is indeed
a type or kind of ontical (causal, productive) poisis and, it has been suggested
(Dennett,95), is perhaps even definitive and originary (or fundamental) with respect to
the poisis associated with naturality.
According to Ruse (1986), evolution refers to the "natural unfolding and change of
organisms down through the generations, from earlier forms, widely different" (p.1) via
a process known as natural selection which Huxley (1942) defines as "the differential
transmission of inheritable variations." (p.16) Dhobzhansky et al. (1977) define
variations as "features of organisms that have come about by natural selection because
they serve certain functions and thus increase the reproductive success of their carriers."
(p.498) On their view, evolution refers to
a series of partial or complete and irreversible transformations of the genetic composition of

populations, based principally upon altered interactions with their environment. It consists chiefly of
adaptive radiations into new environments, adjustments to environmental changes that take place in
a particular habitat, and the origin of new ways for exploiting exisiting habitats. These adaptive
changes occasionally give rise to greater complexity of developmental pattern, of physiological
reactions, and of interactions between populations and their environment. (p.8)
Maynard-Smith (1972) describes Darwinism as "the idea that evolution is the result of
natural selection" and maintains that "the main task of any theory of evolution is to
explain adaptive complexity." (p.82) He lists three conditions as necessary for the
evolution of adaptively complex organisms: (1) multiplication, (2) heredity and (3)
variation (mutation). Dobzhanky et al. (1977), in turn, view evolution in terms of "(1)
interactions between organisms and their environment that are highly diverse both
historically and geographically; (2) the continuity of heredity and cultural tradition; and
Chapter 6 Poisis
(3) the occasional disturbance of these regularities by chance." (p.1) They go on to state
that three main processes - mutation, genetic recombination, and natural selection - are
universal and inevitable consequences of the nature of individual organisms, of the
genetic structure of populations, and of the diversity of population-environment
interactions." (p.5) Darwinian evolution is often crudely identified with Herbert
Spencer's maxim `survival of the fittest'. However, as Ho and Saunders (1982) point out,
in order to rescue Darwinism from being a tautology of the `survival of those that survive', it is
necessary to demonstrate that individuals possessing what is deemed to be an adaptation reproduce
more successfully, that is, are more fit than those not possessing it. The identification of adaptations
and the measurement of the fitness of adaptations become the primary aims of evolutionary studies.
(pp.85-86)
Maynard-Smith defines fitness as "the probability of survival and reproduction" which

leads him to redefine neo-Darwinism as the "survival of the adaptively complex" (p.84).
According to Ho and Saunders (1982), "the neo-Darwinian approach to evolution is

exclusively teleological" (p.86). However, Maynard-Smith holds that teleological
evolution is a distinct process in which "a succession of mutations occur which are
individually non-adaptive but which together adapt the organism to a new environment."
(p.86) Theoretical support for such a process can be found in Kimura's (1982) neutrality
theory of mutations which Ayala (1985b) describes as
the hypothesis that most of the protein and DNA variants found in natural populations are functionally
equivalent. If so, protein polymorphisms are evolutionary noise; genetic variants encoding protein
variation would change in frequency not by the adaptive process of natural selection but rather as a
consequence of random sampling through the generations. (p.83)
However, according to Dawkins (1986), "neutral evolution is, by definition, random;

[whereas] adaptive evolution is, by definition, non-random [that is, directional]." (p.304)
For this reason, Ayala postulates an alternative scheme based on
functional loss [which] occurs in the so-called `pseudo-genes' - DNA segments with high sequence
similarity to the functional genes from which they have arisen by duplication, which have, however,
accumulated changes that make them unable to produce a functional protein chain. An intriguing
hypothesis, yet unconfirmed, is that pseudogenes may sometimes evolve into functional genes with
roles different from those of the original gene from which they are derived. This hypothesis proposes
that the functional divergence of genes may often be mediated by pseudogenes: before it acquires a
new function, the divergent gene may have been unable to function for a period of time. (p.76)
Given the speculative nature of such schemes and the presumed validity of Dawkins'
criticisms, Ho and Saunders may indeed be correct, viz. adaptive evolution is a
teleological process, however, one in which the teleology (directionality or goal-
directedness) emerges a posteriori. According to Dawkins (1986), Darwinian evolution
via natural selection, which can be defined as a process of blind variation followed by
selective retention, suffices to generate adaptive complexity and the appearance - or as-if
Chapter 6 Poisis
structure - of design (directionality, teleology) in biological organisms. As he states,

"non-random reproduction, where there is hereditary variation has consequences that are
far-reaching if there is time for them to be cumulative." (p.xi) On his view, "each
successive change in the gradual evolutionary process was simple enough, relative to its
predecessor, to have arisen by chance. But the whole sequence of cumulative steps
constitutes anything but a chance process, when you consider the complexity of the final
end-product relative to the original starting point. The cumulative process is directed by
nonrandom survival." (p.43) Single-step and cumulative (or Darwinian) selection can be
distinguished as follows:
in single-step selection the entities selected or sorted .. are sorted once and for all. In cumulative
selection, on the other hand, they `reproduce'; or in some other way the results of one sieving process
are fed into a subsequent sieving, which is fed into .. and so on. The entities are subjected to selection
or sorting over many `generations' in succession. The end-product of one generation of selection is
the starting-point for the next generation of selection, and so on for many generations. (p.45)
Dawkins stresses that "chance is a minor ingredient in the Darwinian recipe" and that
"the most important ingredient is cumulative selection which is quintessentially
nonrandom." (p.49) He summarizes this position as follows:
No matter how improbable it is that an X could have arisen from a Y in a single step, it is always
possible to conceive of a series of infinitesimally graded intermediates between them. However
improbable a large-scale change may be, smaller changes are less improbable. And provided we
postulate a sufficiently large series of sufficiently finely graded interrmediates, we shall be able to
derive anything from anything else, without invoking astronomical improbabilities. We are allowed
to do this only if there has been sufficient time to fit all the intermediates in. And also only if there
is a mechanism for guiding each step in some particular direction, otherwise the sequence of steps
will career off in an endless random walk.
It is the contention of the Darwinian world-view that both these provisos are met, and that slow,
gradual, cumulative natural selection is the ultimate explanation for our existence. (p.318)
Thus, the following are necessary conditions for Darwinian evolution: (1) existence of
replicators27, (2) adaptivity of at least some mutations, (3) sufficient time. The first
condition necessitates consideration of the origins problem; the second must be examined
since there is always the possibility that genetic recombination gives rise to either
adaptively-neutral or deleterious phenotypic effects. With respect to the third condition,
Laszlo (1993), following Lorentz, contests the role of Darwinian evolution in the
production of species28, on the grounds that sufficient terrestrial time has simply not been
available for `chance and necessity' (that is, blind variation and selective retention) to
generate the diversity of living forms appearing in the fossil record and the biosphere.
27
Organic (that is, carbon-based) or otherwise since Darwinian evolution is defined in functional (and hence,
substrate-generic) as opposed to physical (and hence, substrate-specific) terms (Dennett,95).
28
Natural selection at the subspecific level, accounting for variations within species, is not contested.
Chapter 6 Poisis
As Dawkins (1995) himself points out,
this is a matter of principle rather than fact. It may or may not be the case that some episodes of
evolution take a sudden turn. There may be punctuations or rapid evolution, or even abrupt
macromutations - major changes dividing a child from both its parents. There certainly are sudden
extinctions - perhaps caused by great natural catastrophes such as comets strking the Earth - and these
leave vacuums to be filled by rapidly improving understudies, as the mammals replaced the dinosaurs.
Evolution is very possibly not, in actual fact, always gradual. But it must be gradual when it is being
used to explain the coming into existence of complicated, apparently designed objects, like eyes. For
if it is not gradual in these cases, it ceases to have explanatory power at all. Without gradualness in
these cases, we are back to miracle, which is simply a synonym for the total absence of explanation
While it is certainly the case that from an endosystemic29 perspective, Darwinian

evolution is a posteriori teleonomic (that is, teleological) with respect to its products,
viewed exosystemically, the process itself (as contrasted with its contingent products)
is a priori teleological since, as Dawkins (1986) himself states, it is a (generic)
mechanism for generating improvement. As Dhobzhansky et al.(1977) state,
to consider a directional sequence progressive, we need to add an evaluation, namely that the
condition in the later members of the sequence represents a betterment or improvement .. Progress,
then, may be defined as systematic change in a feature belonging to all members of a sequence in
such a way that posterior members of the sequence exhibit an improvement of that feature. (p.509)
As stated previously in chapters 1 and 4, evolution is increasingly being described in

information-theoretical and computationalist terms. For example, Dawkins (1995)
maintains that "life is just bytes and bytes and bytes of digital information." (p.22) On
this basis, he is led to assert that
we - and that means all living things - are survival machines programmed to propagate the digital
database that did the programming. Darwinism is now seen to be the survival of the survivors at the
level of pure digital code. (p.22)
Following Sewall Wright, both Dawkins (1986, 1995) and Dennett (1995) interpret
evolution in terms of the gradualistic traversal of `genetic space' or `Design space', viz.
the phase-space of possible organismic genotypes. Dennett interprets Darwinian
evolution specifically as an algorithmic (or computational) process occurring in this
space. According to his view,
Darwin's great insight was that all the designs in the biosphere could be the products of a process that
was as patient as it was mindless, an àutomatic' and gradual lifter [that is, a bottom-up `crane' as
opposed to top-down `skyhook'] in Design Space. (p.188)
[Thus,] an impersonal, unreflective, robotic, mindless little scrap of molecular machinery is the
29
Endosystemicity should here be taken to imply endoprocessuality (that is, within- or internal-to-process) and
similarly, exosystemicity as exoprocessuality (that is, without- or external-to-process).
Chapter 6 Poisis
ultimate basis of all agency, and hence meaning, and hence consciousness, in the universe. (p.203)
Dennett maintains that the intentionality or directedness associated with human design
activity, creativity and artificing is ultimately grounded in the non-intentionalistic
processes associated with evolution via natural selection:
we are not just designed, we are designers, and all our talents as designers, and our products must
emerge non-miraculously from the blind, mechanical processes of Darwinian mechanisms of one sort
or another. (pp.135-136)
This is because, on his view,
there is only one Design Space, and everything actual in it is united with everything else. (p.135)
Dawkins (1986) supports this position in asserting that "effective searching procedures
become, when [a] search-space is sufficiently large, indistinguishable from true
creativity." (p.66) However, Dawkins (1995) also points out that "unlike human
designers, natural selection can't go downhill [in design-space] - not even if there is a
tempting higher hill on the other side of the valley." (p.92)
The above position is problematic since it fails to account for the existential facticity
(that is, actuality) of Design Spaces as such. Spencer-Brown (1969) has shown that a
universe comes into being when a space - which here means `void' - is severed. Either
(1) the void is self-severing in which case there arises the possibility of self-referential
paradox depending on whether or not the void itself is included in the space of beings.
(This would entail reifying the void - an ontical `nothingness' - into a thing or being.);
or (2) a `severer' (that is, a being capable of making existential-actual, as contrasted with
purely conceptual-potential, distinctions) must be postulated. Hence, there are two kinds
of space, viz. (i) pre-`cut' space (or void) which provides the necessary existential ground
for (ii) post-`cut' space (a space of potentiality and actuality). However, while Design
Space may indeed contain every-thing, that is, all beings (whether actual or potential),
it does not and cannot contain Being as such which is not a thing (that is, no-thing or
nothing30 ) and yet the existential condition for the possibility of Design Spaces. The
problem with the computationalist position is that it assumes the existence of Design
Spaces as given; consequently, the ontically poitic (causal, productive) question
concerning the origin (ex nihilo31) of such spaces remains unaddressed. As will be shown
in sections 6.5.7 and 6.6.3, according to Heidegger (1977), opening-up a space involves
30
The existential relation between Being and nothing is examined in section 6.5.5.
31
Here, ex nihilo is used in the relativistic sense described by Aquinas, that is, to refer to the endosystemic
coming into being (or becoming) of a new phenomenal order from previously existing orders (section 6.4.2.3).
Chapter 6 Poisis
Enframing (Gestellen)32. On this basis, it might be argued that originary-creativity lies

in the production (specification, delineation, demarcation) of a space as contrasted with
the derivative-creativity that follows from the actualization of potentialities in this space.
Dawkins (1986) grounds his computational interpretation of Darwinism in the following

mechanistic postulate:
when the ricochets of atomic billiard balls chance to put together an object that has a certain,
seemingly innocent property, something momentous happens in the universe. That property is an
ability to self-replicate (p.xiii)
As stated in chapter 5, reversible (that is, Newtonian or `billiard-ball' mechanical)

universes do not support self-organization. Hence, if Newtonian (or some other
reversible) mechanics is considered fundamental to physical law, it appears that one of
two scenarios must apply: either (1) life is a chance phenomenon, in which case it is,
statistically-speaking, a highly improbable event that is impossible to explain; or (2) life
is a phenomenon which must be `programmed' into the universe explicitly via
specification of initial and boundary conditions33. This latter scenario immediately gives
rise to the question of who or what was responsible for setting up (or selecting) such
conditions. The former approach to solving the problem, viz. who, leads to what is
known as the intelligent design thesis associated with creationism and is briefly discussed
in section 6.4.2.3. The latter approach to solving the problem, viz. what, becomes
possible if inflationary universe or multi-universe cosmologies are allowed. It is
worthwhile briefly exploring this latter solution since in postulating the universality of
natural selection, Darwinism can be extended beyond the biological and psychological
domains to the physical domain. Consequently, it is conceivable - given the
computational or algorithmic interpretation of Darwinian evolution presented by
Dawkins, Dennett and others - that natural selection is the process by which the
phenomenal hierarchy of matter, life and mind in CEA (and CEN) is generated.
One of the earliest formulations of `cosmological Darwinism' is that due to Mercer

(1917) who maintains that
[if] we could really prove that the present [cosmological] order had a beginning, it would not follow
that this was the beginning of creation. We might retire on the venerable idea of a rhythm - the idea
so remarkably revived by Herbert Spencer in his `First Principles'. Or we might hold that the present
order is but one of a succession. For all we know, there may have been, and there may still be to
come, an endless series of differing reconstitutions of cosmic processes - in other words, an endless
32
It is significant that the òpening' of a space involves the `closing' (or `cutting') of Being. To this extent, Being
as such is the prior ground of the spatial (whether physical, logic or otherwise).
33
On the basis of the framework presented in chapter 5, an alternative scheme involves embedding Newtonian
mechanics in a non-reversible physical substrate (corresponding, under CA-computationalism, to the
embedding of a RCA in a NRCA which is possible if the latter is computation and construction universal).
Chapter 6 Poisis
succession of evolutions of the same Energy as is now manifested to us. (p.22)
He defines a cosmogony as "an account of how the world came into being" and goes on
to state that "the use of the term is practically confined to the creation myths of primitive
peoples .. though it is occasionally extended, in accordance with its etymology, to
include such scientific systems as that of Laplace or the nebular theory [of matter]."
(p.43) By contrast, a cosmology "aims at understanding the governing laws of the
universe". (p.44) In postulating Darwinian evolution as a universal principle, an attempt
is made at subsuming cosmogony under cosmology. On this basis, Mercer holds that
the beginning of Genesis may be regarded as the opening out of a new cycle of creation after the
completion of its predecessor - the emerging of a fresh purpose. (p.46)
The implications of inflationary universe scenarios presented by Linde and others for a
Darwinian interpretation of cosmological genesis (Smolin,92) are described by Morris
(1990) as follows:
new universes could be created out of the empty space within universes that already exist. In other
worlds, it is possible that universes might reproduce themselves.
The idea that universes might reproduce themselves, that they might begin as quantum fluctuations
in previously existing universes, seems to be a .. fruitful hypothesis, since it could easily have
observable consequences. There might be some way that we could see universes being born. (p.177)
Furthermore,
it is possible that there could be a kind of `genetic code' that would cause daughter universes to
resemble their parents. Even in such a case, there could presumably be `mutations'. Our universe, for
example, could be a mutated descendant of a universe in which the laws of physics were just different
enough that the creation of life was impossible. (p.180)
On this scheme, both the traditional ex nihilo maxims are upheld: ex nihilo nihl fit, (that
is, nothing comes from nothing or, alternatively, something comes from something) with
respect to the global relation between `parent' and `child' universes; creatio ex nihilo (or
creation from nothing), with respect to the local relation between such universes. (Global
relations involve movements from universes to universes while local relations involves
movements from empty space within universes to their òffspring' universes.) However,
the above scheme - which was anticipated by Peirce (Sheldrake,88) - is problematic since
holding physical laws to be immanent creations of natural processes occuring in time
rather than transcendent eternal principles (Platonic ideas) leads to one of two
possibilities regarding the evolutionary process itself: Either (1) the process is itself
evolutionary in origin, in which case the possibility of an infinite regress of meta-
processes arises; or (2) the evolutionary process is non-evolutionary (Rescher,96), in
which case the universality of the principle is compromised since it is not self-referential.
According to Davies (1983),

Chapter 6 Poisis
what is usually regarded as `the universe' might in fact be only a disconnected fragment of spacetime.
There could be many, even an infinite number of other universes, but all physically inaccessible to
the others. With this definition of ùniverse', the explanation for our cosmos does not lie within itself -
it lies beyond. It does not involve God, only spacetime and some rather exotic physical mechanism.
[Thus,] everything that we can, in principle, perceive in our universe may still have been created by
natural causes a finite time ago, and .. what (if anything) lies outside our spacetime may not be
entirely supernatural [emphasis added]. (p.42)
However, if the `rather exotic physical' mechanism exists, it must partake of Being;
consequently, while it might be possible to exclude an ontical (causal) God from
consideration, Being as such cannot be so excluded. That Davies himself comes to a
similar conclusion is evidenced by the following statements:
suppose that horses had always existed. The existence of each horse would be causally explained by
the existence of its parents. But we have not yet explained why there are horses at all - why there are
horses rather than no horses, or rather than unicorns, for example. Although we may be able to find
a cause for every event (unlikely in view of quantum effects), still we would be left with the mystery
of why the universe has the nature it does, or why there is any universe [or cosmos] at all. (pp.42-43)
Physics can perhaps explain the content, origin and organization of the physical universe, but not the
laws (or superlaw) of physics itself. (p.216)
Quantum physics has to exist (in some sense) so that a quantum transition can generate the cosmos
in the first place. Many scientists believe that the question of why the laws of physics are what they
are in meaningless, or at least cannot be answered scientifically. (p.217)
However, the question Why is there something rather than nothing ? is a meaningful
question (albeit a non-scientific one) for the following reason: Ontically-speaking, either
the universe is categorially-closed or it is categorially-open. Irrespective of which
scenario is factically correct, creatio ex nihilo occurs and requires explanation. This is
because the emergence of categories which are ontically irreducible to (or discontinuous
from) other prior categories - for example, ontological-subjectivity as emergent from an
ontologically-objective substrate (chapter 7) - implies the emergence of such categories
from nothing (section 6.4.2.3). However, whether this nothing is relativistic (equivalent
to ontical non-being) or absolute remains to be established (section 6.5.5).
It is important to note that the computationalist interpretation of Darwinian evolution is

grounded in a genocentric (or gene-centered) view of the process. According to Dawkins
(1995), "the true utility function of life, that which is being maximized in the natural
world, is DNA survival." (p.123) Williams (1996) supports this position, describing the
survivalist thesis in the following terms:
continued physical survival is ordinarily significant in evolution only if it increases the likelihood or
extent of [genetic] reproduction. (p.59)
Thus, it is not the continued physical survival of beings which is the driving force behind
Chapter 6 Poisis
evolution, but rather the survival of informational DNA. However, it must be appreciated
that this position follows from conceiving heredity in exclusively genetic terms which
lends support to computationalist assertions such as "heredity is not only particulate but
digital" (p.50). This genocentric account of heredity is problematic because it ignores (1)
the existential fact that the complex biochemical machinery of the cell is also, of
necessity, inherited during reproduction and (2) the possibility that this `machinery' is
analog (as opposed to digital) in nature.
The genocentric position has a number of important implications for evolution. For
example, Dawkins (1995) maintains that "DNA neither cares nor knows. DNA just is.
And we dance to its music." (p.155) On this basis he is led to maintain that
the universe we observe has precisely the properties we should expect if there is, at bottom, no design,
no purpose, no evil, and no good, nothing but blind, pitiless indifference. (p.155)
Keller (1991) points out that rather than allowing nature to be purged of its historically
animistic character and reconceived in neutral terms, such individualistic conceptions of
the organism-environment relation tacitly promote the interpretation of nature as the
"hostile" òther'. That this is indeed the case can be shown by briefly comparing
Darwinism with an equally if not more individualistic evolutionary thesis due to
Nietzsche. According to Stern (1979), for Nietzsche, life "is not a mere desire-to-survive,
but a wanting to grow" (p.109), which Schacht (1983) defines as "the enhancement of
[an organism's] tranformative capacity in the context of its actual relationships to other
systems." (p.248) Stern goes on to state that
life is the enduring form of all the processes in which force manifests itself and in which different
contenders grow unequally; it is the attempt to encompass and subjugate as much as in its power, and
it derives pleasure and a sense of well-being from that process alone. (p.110)
With respect to the doctrine of the survival of the fittest, Stern points out the following:
To the question, `Fittest for what ?' Darwin would reply `For survival', but to Nietzsche this is not a
self-evident answer: why should the idea of mere survival provide a more valid teleology than, say,
the living organism's `desire to discharge its force', that is, its `will to power'. (p.111)
Schacht (1983) supports this view, maintaining that
it is erroneous to suppose that responses .. are made only along lines serving to bring about the (re)-
establishment of internal and external equilibrium, and to ensure self-preservation to the extent that
they do occur. They are more appropriately regarded simply as special cases or partial aspects of
those more comprehensive forms of activity and interaction which collectively render the processes
of life a matter of growth and decline. The transformative assertion and counter-assertion they involve
is destructive as well as productive of order and stability; and their general tendency is toward the
transcendence rather than the perpetuation of existing patterns. (p.243)
Nietzsche's thought provides the basis for critique of both the notion of `selfish'
Chapter 6 Poisis
replicators (Dawkins,95) and Darwinian cosmologies (Smolin,97) since, on his view,

according "primacy in the realm of life to a procreative impulse .. suffers from the same
double effect as does the self-preservation hypothesis, of attributing ultimacy to a
principle that is at once teleological and superfluous." (p.244) Nietzsche shifts the locus
of evolution from the species to the individual, maintaining that self-replication is
emergently-grounded in the will-to-power and that "procreation is the consequence of
an impotency [which renders necessary a distributed organizational functionality]."
(p.245) On this basis, he is led to present an alternative to the conventional (Darwinian)
interpretation of utility:
ùseful' in respect of the acceleration of the tempo of evolution is a different kind of ùseful' from that
in respect of the the greatest possible stability and durability of that which is evolved [emphasis
added]. (p.246)
For Nietzsche, the essence of life is the will-to-power, that is, the drive to establish and
maintain the superiority of the individual (self) over the collective (other). Hence, the
negative implications (for Nature) of "struggle" between organism and envronment
culminates in a quintessentially individualistic metaphysics and visa versa. As Keller
(1991) states,
much of contemporary evolutionary theory relies on a representation of the ìndividual' - be it the

organism or the gene - that is cast in the particular image of man we might call the `Hobbesian man':
simultaneously autonomous and oppositional, connected to the world in which it finds itself not by
the promise of life and growth but primarily by the threat of death and loss, its foremost need being
the defense of its boundaries. (p.87)
She goes on to assert that "the very same move that defines self-interest and altruism as
logically opposed makes independence [that is, autonomy] virtually indistinguishable
from competition." (p.89) Again,
so automatic is the association between scarcity and competition that, in modern ecological usage,
competition has come to be defined as the simultaneous reliance of two individuals, or two species,
on an essential resource that is in limited supply .. Since the scarcity of resources can itself hardly be
questioned, such a definition lends to competition the same a priori status. (p.90)
It is worthwhile briefly considering the (possible) historical basis for the view that the
organism-environment (or, more generally, the self-other) relation is competitive as
opposed to cooperative since this is a question concerning origins, incipence and hence,
poisis (becoming, coming-forth, bringing-forth) 34. Fundamentally, it appears that the
issue resolves to a difference in the interpretation of opposition: In Western philosophy,
natural forces are held to be in conflict, a view which can be traced back to Heraclitus
(Heidegger,59); In Eastern philosophy, by contrast, and specifically within Taoism, such
forces are held to be complementary, that is, in harmony (Watts,75). These positions can
34
In this instance, the origin, incipience or poisis (coming-forth) of competitiveness.
Chapter 6 Poisis
be reconciled (that is, rendered commensurable) if they are interpreted epistemologically,

viz. conflict as endosystemic and harmony as exosystemic.
Evolution via natural selection has been contested on a number of grounds. For example,
according to Ho et al. (1988),
the relationship between organism and environment forms a seamless whole in development: the
physiological processes generating variations are themselves set in motion by so called `selective
forces' in the environment so that it is seldom possible to tell where variations end and selection
begins .. There is no rigid separation between a somatic phenotype that varies and a germline
genotype that is subject to selection; consequently, the distinction between variation and natural
selection lacks any firm ontological basis. In most cases the concept of natural selection is simply
misused. (p.5)
On this basis they contest the validity of genetic reductionism, maintaining that "genetic
coding mechanisms would be useless were there not vital functions, such as irritability
and metabolism, to be encoded" (p.7), and support the adoption of a structuralist biology:
Non-randomness implies a local determinism, but not a mechanical or laplacian determinism. In other
words, it does not lead to finality, or a unique end state. Chance and accident will still be expected
to play a role, else there would not have been a diversity of proteins, organisms, social organizations
and cultures. The problem with neo-Darwinism is not that it places exclusive emphasis on chance or
accident in the generation of variation but that it so often ignores (or does not take into explicit
account) any possible structure of the probability space involved, whether in the emergence of life
or in the evolution of organisms and social organizations. (pp.7-8)
As stated previously, Ho and Saunders (1982) hold that "the neo-Darwinian approach to
evolution is exclusively teleological." (p.86) However, Searle (1995) contends that the
notion of function in teleological explanations is anthropocentric, more precisely, that
it is observationally-relativistic and hence, artifactual (or institutional) whereas evolution,
by contrast, is a natural process and hence, non-teleological (although functional)35. Ho
and Saunders go on to state that
Darwinian natural selection depends on the following: (1) the presence of heritable variations in
individual organisms; (2) the potential for Malthusian (i.e. geometric) increase in populations; (3) the
limitation of the resources in the environment. Given these conditions, there will be competition for
survival and reproduction in which the fittest variants will eventually win. This leads to an
improvement in the adaptation of the species over a number of generations, and if the process is
continued (especially if there is a change in the environment), there will be a gradual transmutation
of species. (p.86)
They hold that Darwinism is committed to two metaphysical assumptions, viz. (i)
35
However, Searle's (1995) position is itself problematic since it is impossible to establish that nature is non-
teleological. This follows from the fact that nature is the given, that is, the ontically a priori with respect to the
human artificer-interpreter and hence, its teleological status cannot be determined in anything other than an
epistemically a posteriori sense, that is, observer-relativistically (chapter 7).
Chapter 6 Poisis
efficient (or external causation) and (ii) tychism (that is, randomness or chance):
[T]he essence of Darwin's theory is that the efficient cause (which replaces the final cause) of
evolution is external to the organism: whatever purpose or design apparent in the organisms are solely
the outcome of chance variations and the necessity of the struggle for survival. (pp.88-89)
With respect to the interpretation of evolution in mechanistic (or ontically-externalist)

terms, Whitehead (1926) states the following:
a thoroughgoing evolutionary philosophy is inconsistent with materialism. The aboriginal stuff, or

material, from which a materialistic philosophy starts is incapable of evolution. This material is in
itself the ultimate substance. Evolution, on the materialistic theory, is reduced to the role of being
another word for the description of the changes of the external relations between portions of matter.
There is nothing to evolve because one set of external relations is as good as any other set of external
relations. There can be mere change, purposeless and unprogressive. But the whole point of the
modern doctrine is the evolution of the complex organism from antecedent states of less complex
organisms. The doctrine thus cries aloud for a conception of organism as fundamental for nature.
(p.130)
With respect to the role of chance in the production of variations and its relation to the
mechanism of natural selection, Dawkins (1986) maintains that
variation and selection work together to produce evolution. The Darwinian says that variation is
random in the sense that it is not directed towards improvement, and that tendency towards
improvement in evolution comes from selection.
[That] there is no bias in the mutational variation that is offered up for selection .. means only that
mutation is not systematically biased in the direction of adaptive improvement. (p.308)
However, Williams (1996) maintains that "adaptationist stories are not about evolution
so much as about its absence." (p.26) The pragmatic (contingent) effect of natural
selection is described as follows:
We now know, from abundant experiments on the evolutionary potential of living organisms, that
they are capable of evolving far more rapidly than is normally observed today or found in the fossil
record. What natural selection mainly does is to cull departures from the currently optimum
development of the features shown by organisms. (p.43)
Thus, "the process proposed by Darwin as the major cause of evolution is now thought
to operate mainly to prevent evolution." (p.44) This is consistent with positions in which
the role of natural selection as the generative force of evolution is contested. For
example, according to Ho and Saunders (1982),
since natural selection depends on there being variations, the real mechanism of evolution must lie
in the processes whereby variations are generated. By insisting that variations arise at random, or
purely by chance, neo-Darwinists have effectively banished them from scientific investigation
altogether. (p.90)
Chapter 6 Poisis
Sherman (1997) maintains that "`chance' is the naturalist's disappointment with the parts
of the world that cannot be controlled. `Design' is the affirmation of the world in both
the areas we understand and those we do not." (p.9) Contesting the adequacy of the
`chance and necessity' or variation and selection thesis, Fagerstrm et al. (1996) maintain
that
major transitions in evolution - such as the origin of life, the emergence of eukaryotic cells, and the
origin of the human capacity for language, to name but a few .. cannot be described satisfactorily by
established models of microevolution. What is needed is an open-ended model, in which evolutionary
novelties (or rather, representations thereof) can continue to arise indefinitely. This model must be
related to a currently nonexisting theory of variation, which in turn must be related to the theory of
organization of objects, the evolution of which we would like to describe [emphasis added]. (p.2040)
For example, as Nelson (1993) states, "objectively determining [the] optimality [of
adaptations] is far from obvious." (p.3) Citing Endler (1986) in support, Nelson holds
that while natural selection and other mechanisms such as Kimura's genetic drift can
explain the spread of variants and adaptations in populations, they cannot explain the
origin of such features; hence, the appeal to the metaphysical "black box" of chance in
Dennett's (1995) description of the neo-Darwinian thesis. Additional support for this
position is provided by Ayala (1985b) who maintains that
we lack a satisfactory theory to account for the origin of evolutionary novelty. Mendelian genetics
coupled with the theories of mutation and natural selection provide an adequate conceptual
framework to explain how genes change through time, but they are insufficient for a full
understanding of how genes came to be. (p.72)
Nagel (1986), however, goes much further in his critique of Darwinism36:
the Darwinian theory of natural selection, assuming the truth of its historical claims about how
organisms develop, is a very partial explanation of why we are as we are. It explains the selection
among those organic possibilities that have been generated, but it does not explain the possibilities
themselves. It is a diachronic theory which tries to account for the particular path evolution will take
through a set of possibilities under given conditions. It may explain why creatures with vision or
reason will survive, but it does not explain how vision or reasoning are possible. These require not
diachronic but timeless explanations. The range of biological options over which natural selection can
operate is extraordinarily rich but also severely constrained. Even if randomness is a factor in
determining which mutation will appear when (and the extent of the randomness is apparently in
dispute), the range of genetic possibilities is not itself a random occurrence but a necessary
occurrence of the natural order. The possibility of minds capable of forming progressively more
objective conceptions of reality is not something the theory of natural selection can attempt to explain,
since it doesn't explain possibilities at all, but only selection among them. (pp.78-79)
36
Nagel (1997), in defending rationality against evolutionary epistemology, is led to the view that "the
recognition of logical arguments as independently valid is a precondition of the acceptability of an evolutionary
story about the source of that recognition. This means that the evolutionary hypothesis is acceptable only if
reason does not need its support. At most it may show why the existence of reason need not be biologically
mysterious." (p.136)
Chapter 6 Poisis
This position is supported by Berlinski (1996) who maintains that natural selection is
"the filter but not the source of change" (p.10) and by Koestler (1978) who argues that
"it is a common fallacy among evolutionists to confuse the process of elimination of the
unfit with the process of evolution towards some undefinable ideal of `fitness'." (p.171)
According to Gould (1997), "at a minimum, in explaining evolutionary pathways through
time, the constraints imposed by history rise to equal prominence with the immediate
advantages of adaptation." (p.4) In arguing for a pluralistic approach to the study of
evolution, he contests Dennett's (1995) algorithmic interpretation of the process: While
natural selection (as interpreted under neo-Darwinism) may provide a necessary
condition and a mechanistic basis for "the engineering side of biology" (p.5), it is far
from being established that it constitutes a sufficient condition for the explanation of
biological phenomena. For example,
natural selection does not explain why many evolutionary transitions from one nucleotide to another
are neutral, and therefore nonadaptive. Natural selection does not explain why a meteor crashed into
the earth 65 million years ago, setting in motion the extinction of half the world's species. (p.5)
Anticipating the neo-structuralist approaches adopted by Kauffman (1996) and others

involving application of chaos and complexity theory to biology, Ho and Saunders
(1982) maintain that "the new opposition to neo-Darwinism acknowledges the
complexity and organization in living things." (p.90) There are two points to note in this
respect: firstly, as Dennett (1995) has argued, it is not necessarily the case that neo-
Darwinism and complexity-theoretical approaches are mutually exclusive. This position
is supported by the fact that the former assumes a metaphysical duality of `chance and
necessity' while the latter maintains that chance can be rendered epistemically
commensurable with ontical necessity given the capacity for generation of "deterministic
randomness" (Davies,93) in non-linear dynamical systems (chapter 2) and the hidden-
variables interpretation of quantum phenomena (chapter 4); secondly, and more
importantly, it might be argued that structuralist approaches are implicitly committed -
with neo-Darwinism - to an externalistic metaphysics defined in terms of efficient
causation. However, Rose et al. (1984), supported by Bateson (1988), criticize the
passive view of the organism that is motivated by an externalist interpretation of
evolution, implicitly citing the Baldwin effect in defense of their position:
Organisms do not simply adapt to previously existing, autonomous environments; they create,
destroy, modify, and internally transform aspects of the external world by their own life activities to
make this environment. Just as there is no organism without an environment, so their is no
environment without an organism. Neither organism nor environment is a closed system; each is open
to the other. (p.273)
Consequently, postulating an autonomous environment - and, by implication, an

ontology defined in terms of external relations - is problematic:
The problem with trying to describe an autonomous environment is that there is an infinity of ways
in which the bits and pieces of the world can be put together to make environments. We must make
a clear distinction between an unstructured external world of physical forces, and the environment
Chapter 6 Poisis
(literally, the surroundings) of an organism, which is defined by the organism itself. (p.273)
They offer the following list of ways in which organisms determine their environments,
viz (i) construction, (ii) transformation, (iii) transduction and (iv) alteration of the
statistical pattern of environmental variation (pp.274-275). In support of such an
interpretation of the organism, Piaget (1976) provides the following remarks:
behaviour is teleological action aimed at the utilization or transformation of the environment and the
preservation or increase of the organism's capacity to affect this environment. (p.x)
Controversially, this leads to the "the idea of the organism itself affecting the inception
and canalization of new hereditary forms, and this as a consequence of its exploratory
behaviour." (p.xiv) As he goes on to state,
it is behaviour which calls forth that diversity (and, ultimately, specificity) in forms of adaptation for
which the evolution of life is necessarily responsible; for behaviour, be it cause or effect, is
inextricably bound up with the life of the organism. (pp.xvii-xviii)
Arguing for a Nietzsche-like interpretation of the organism (as a will-to-power or locus

of activity striving to extend its sphere of influence), Piaget maintains that
while it is true that the adaptations that characterize varieties of behaviour all naturally facilitate
survival, they also have a much broader raison d'tre in that they serve to increase the powers of the
individual or species by putting greater means at their disposal - means which require that behaviour
be adapted to often highly differentiated aspects of the environment ..
We are forced to conclude that the ultimate aim of behaviour is nothing less than the expansion of the
habitable - and, later, of the knowable - environment. (p.xviii)
Furthermore,
this expansion begins as 'exploration' in animals of various degrees of complexity, but it extends far
beyond the needs of immediate utility, and of precautions, until we find it operating on levels where
a part is played by simple curiousity about objects or events, as well as by the subject's pursuit of
every possible activity. There exists, therefore, a practical and cognitive adaptation far more general
in nature than adaptation-survival, an adaptation that calls not only for selection's mechanisms of
acceptance and rejection but also for a structuring of the environment by the organism itself37
[emphasis added]. (pp.xviii-xix).
Structuralist interpretations of evolution are supported by Winograd and Flores' (1986)

contention that "the functioning of an organism as a structure-determined system with
the potential for disintegration leads to adaptation and evolution." (p.45) Adopting the
autopoietic systems view of Maturana and Varela (1980) described in sections 6.4.2.4
37
This is, in a sense, a restatement of the concept of evolution presented by Herbert Spencer in First Principles
(1862), viz: a change from an incoherent homogeneity to a coherent heterogeneity, and involves two notions:
(i) differentiation and (ii) order.
Chapter 6 Poisis
and 6.6.5, they go on to assert that
the mechanism by which an organism comes to function adequately in its medium is one of selection,
which includes both the selection of structural changes within an individual and the selection of
individuals by the possibilities of survival and disintegration. A plastic, structure-determined system
that is autopoietic [that is, organizationally-homeostatic, where the organizational relations are
productive or ontic] will by necessity evolve in such a way that its activities are properly coupled to
its medium. Its structure must change so that it generates appropriate changes of state triggered by
specific perturbing changes in its medium; otherwise it will disintegrate. (p.45)
However, this position becomes problematic once it is appreciated that Maturana and
Varela want "to adhere to the scientific tradition of explanation in terms of deterministic
physical systems" (p.40), that is, in terms of mechanistic causation (chapter 2 and section
6.4.1.2). This is because it is unclear whether the notion of selection can have meaning
in a deterministic system: For example, how can selection among alternatives occur in
such a universe ? More to the point, how can there be alternatives ? Winograd and Flores
refer to "possibilities of survival and disintegration" but in a closed, mechanistic system
(chapter 2) possibilities are epistemic only and follow from the endosystemicity, that is,
embeddedness of observers; shifting to an exosystemic (or exophysical) perspective
transforms possibility into necessity (under ontological assumptions of closure,
mechanism and determinism). The point is well-made by Brettschneider (1964) who, in
the context of an examination of Alexander's metaphysics (chapter 5), maintains that
assuming an ontological interpretation of the coherence theory of truth, that is, a
coherence theory of reality,
the movement toward coherence is a process of adjustment if change is viewed from the perspective
of the whole, and also if we look within the whole to the elements of the system. It is a process of
adaptation if the movement toward coherence is a change viewed from the larger perspective and if
we look from the part to the whole [emphasis added]. (p.71)
Hence, either (1) selection is ontical, in which case determinism is undermined and some
form of tychism (chance or randomness) introduced as ontical with all the attendant
problems as described above, or (2) selection is epistemical, in which case it must be
grounded in an ontical process, for example, self-organization (section 6.4.2.2)38.
(Maturana and Varela (1980) adopt the latter position in asserting that the process of
evolution is contingent on autopoiesis and the existence of species is contingent on
individuals.) As stated in chapter 3, self-organization is a problematic (more precisely,
paradoxical) concept because of semantic confusion as to whether or not it involves
ontical-reflexivity (that is, causation of self by self). Attempting to address the problem
by appealing to the medium within which an autopoietic system is embedded and thereby
enlarging the boundaries of the system under consideration such that the (self-
organizing) autopoietic system can be reinterpreted as allopoietic (other-organized)
38
A third alternative involves an appeal not to chance (tychism) - which is considered on this view as an ontical
`black box' - but to creativity, intentionality, volition and will.
Chapter 6 Poisis
remains problematic since, as Kant argued, there remains the question of the existential
status of the whole: Is this autopoietic or allopoietic39 ? If the former, the above problem
arises; if the latter, there is the need to consider the òther' which can always be included
in an enlarged system to generate a new autopoietic whole, thereby engendering the
Kantian question, ad infinitum. Clearly, the solution to this problem - if a solution exists
- cannot involve notions such as causation, production or ontical poisis (coming-forth
or bringing-forth) as such.
In addition to the above criticisms, Darwinism may also be contested from an aesthetic
perspective. According to Davies (1993), "it is hard to see how abstract mathematics has
any survival value. Similar comments apply to musical ability [and other artistic or
aesthetic capacities]." (p.152) As he goes on to state,
there is no reason to believe that the [conceptual] method springs from a refinement of the [sensorial
method]. They are entirely independent ways of coming to know about things. The [latter] serves an
obvious biological need, the [former] is of no apparent biological significance at all. (p.153)
[This is because] survival depends on an appreciation of how the world is, not on any hidden
underlying order [emphasis added]. (p.155)
However, this contingent and pragmatist reading of Darwinism is problematic since it

can be (and has been) argued that knowledge of such a "hidden underlying order" allows
for the construction (or `modeling') within the organism of possible-world scenarios (that
is, potentialities as against mere actuality), thereby contributing to the probability of
organismic survival in future environments (Dennett,96). This position is supported by
Campbell (1985) who presents a pluralistic framework of evolution (chapter 5) in which
the evolutionary potential associated with self-organization is extended by natural
selection (re-active) and self-adaptation (pro-active) involving `future causality', that is,
final causation or a priori teleological behaviour on the part of the organism itself. As
he states, "it becomes increasingly evident that organisms evolve special structures to
promote their capacities to evolve, and that these structures enormously expand the scope
of the evolutionary process [emphasis added]." (p.152) On his view,
future causality is the relationship of .. attainable preconceived future organizational states to the
events that bring them into being through preconception. Future causal analysis inquires into the
qualities of a future situation that are necessary and sufficient for them to emerge from the behaviour
induced by future self-reference, and into the roles of these qualities in the self-realizing process. It
implies that the future acts causally on the present through the proxy of a descriptive
prerepresentation. (p.162)
This interpretation of final causality is consistent with that of Alexander (1920) who
maintains that cause necessarily precedes effect (section 6.4.1.3); on both schemes,
`future' (or final) causes are equivalent to preconceived effects and hence, are
39
If there is no self (en heauti) there can be no other (en alli) and visa versa.
Chapter 6 Poisis
existentially prior, being (conceptual) potentialities `held in the mind' awaiting (physical)
actualization.
Dawkins (1986) maintains that
our own existence once presented the greatest of all mysteries, but that .. is a mystery no longer
because it is solved. Darwin and Wallace solved it, though we shall continue to add footnotes to their
solution for a while yet. (p.ix)
In the context of this study, it should be noted that while Darwinian evolution (that is,
blind variation and selective retention) might explain the evolution of biological
organisms and conceivably that of universes (Smolin,97), it is incapable of answering
the more fundamental question, Why is there something rather than nothing ? This is
because its concern is with the ontical, that is, with beings (objects) and becomings
(processes), rather than with the ontological, that is, with Being as such (the existential
ground of the ontical). As Ross (1985) states,
evolution is a goal-directed spread-out way of coming to be from secondary causes. (p.224)
The implication is that an additional framework is required to explain coming to be (or

becoming) from primary causes and Ross points towards such a scheme in asserting that
"evolution suggests emergence, but emergence does not require evolution." (p.225)
However, the implicit appeal to primary (or First) causes - and hence, some kind of
creationism (section 6.4.2.3) - is itself problematic since, as stated in section 6.4.1.3,
there remain questions concerning (i) the Being (that is, existential status) of causation
as such and (ii) of Being as such. Emphasis on genetic (causal, productive) relationality
and tacit adoption of the self-sufficiency of infinite generative regress conceals the issue
of the ontological difference (section 6.5.4) between Being and beings (in this case,
between Being and processual becomings). Consequently, it is maintained, on
Heideggerian grounds, that the concept of evolution is unable to provide an adequate
basis for determining the essence (or nature) of existence, the relation between existence
and existents, and the poitic distinction (if any) between naturals and artifactuals. For
this reason, it is necessary to consider alternative, possibly more inclusive, ontically-
poitic frameworks.
6.4.2.2. Self-Organization
The notion of self-organization was briefly introduced in chapter 3 in the context of an

examination of the concept of emergence. However, it is implicit in the unifying
framework of computationally emergent artificiality (or CEA) presented in chapter 5
since, as has been argued, if computationalism is a sufficient metaphysics, it must be self-
sufficient, both (i) statically in its (permanent) adoption of computation as its `root
metaphor' (chapters 1 and 2) and (ii) dynamically - or organizationally - in its capacity
to define a (noumenal) substrate capable of generating all phenomena from itself. The
Chapter 6 Poisis
latter issue which gives rise to the question of whether `self-organization' refers to
organization of self (1) by self, (2) by other or (3) by that-which-is-prior was examined
in chapter 3 and is re-examined in this section. However, before this is attempted, it is
worthwhile briefly reviewing some formulations of the concept.
In contrast to the presentation in chapter 3, where it was maintained that the origin
(within Western philosophy) of the concept of self-organization may be traced to
Anaximander, Shalizi (1995) traces its origin to the thought of the Greek atomist
Democritus. This difference in origin is of critical importance since for Anaximander -
like Heraclitus - ultimate reality is continuous and processual whereas for Democritus,
it is discrete and substantial and this difference in ontology has implications for how (or
in what terms) self-organization is conceived. For example, in the discussion of
becoming in Aristotle (section 6.4.1.2), it was stated that for the atomists, becoming
essentially meant association and dissociation, viz. combination of originary existents (or
primitive atoms). This interpretation of self-organization (or becoming) stands in contrast
to that of the processists (chapter 2) for whom beings (that is, ontical existents) are
grounded in becoming (Rescher,96). (However, both conceptions are problematic to the
extent that if beings or becomings are, they must partake of Being as such, the essence
and existence of which transcends substance and process.)
Prior to defining the term `self-organization', it is necessary to clarify what is meant by

òrganization' as such. According to Davies (1987),
organization is a quality that is most distinctive when it refers to a process rather than a structure ..
It might be said that order refers to the quantity of information (i.e. negative entropy) in a system,
whereas organization refers to the quality of information. (pp.75-76)
To the extent that qualities necessitate positing the existence of an observer, self-
organization may be interpreted (at least partially) as an epistemological phenomenon.
Ashby (1962) presents a somewhat more formal definition in stating that "the theory of
organization is partly co-extensive with the theory of functions of more than one
variable." (p.256) According to this latter view, organization is defined in terms of
conditionality or constraint. As Ashby himself states, "the presence of organization
between variables is equivalent to the existence of a constraint in the product-space of
the possibilities [between two events]." (p.257) Crucially, and in support of Davies, he
holds that self-organization is (at least partially) an epistemological phenomenon:
the real world gives the subset of what is; the product space represents the uncertainty of the observer
.. The `constraint' is thus a relation between observer and thing.
[Hence,] a substantial part of the theory of organization [is] concerned with properties that are not
intrinsic to the thing but are relational between observer and thing. (p.258)
This position can be shown to be closely related to Cariani's (1989, 1991)

epistemological conception of emergence, viz. emergence-relative-to-a-model (chapter
Chapter 6 Poisis
3). Furthermore, implicit support for an organization-order distinction is provided by

Shalizi (1996), who, investigating various metrics for quantifying self-organization
(entropy, correlation length, algorithmic-information complexity, statistical complexity
and logical depth), all of which are problematic (either conceptually or practically),
concludes that while formalization of the concept of self-organization in quantitative
terms is not a priori impossible, it continues to remain elusive because of the
epistemically-intuitive (Ì know it when I see it') aspect associated with the phenomenon.
Despite such problems, the notion of self-organization has been and continues to be
variously defined: For example, Ashby (1962) presents a definition of the concept in
terms of a dynamical relation between parts and wholes, viz.
the system that starts with its parts separate (so that the behaviour of each is independent of the others'
states) and whose parts then act so that they change towards forming connections of some type. Such
a system is `self-organizing' in the sense that it changes from `parts separated' to `parts joined'. (p.266)
Prigogine and Stengers (1984), by contrast, define self-organization in terms of the

theory of dissipative structures and the spontaneous emergence of order in nonlinear
systems away from thermodynamic equilibrium. (A dissipative system, as the name
implies, expends energy in order to maintain its structure and hence, is òpen' (chapter
2) with respect to its environment.) Haken (1993) defines self-organization in terms of
synergetics, which he describes as "the cooperation of individual parts of a system that
[deterministically or stochastically] produces macroscopic spatial, temporal, or functional
structures." (p.126) Significantly, Herbert Spencer in First Principles (1862) defined
evolution as self-organization, viz. a change from an incoherent homogeneity to a
coherent heterogeneity. On this scheme, it is possible to reduce evolution to self-
organization and such a reduction is supported by Lucas (1997b) who maintains that the
Darwinian concept of evolution by natural selection can be subsumed under the notion
of self-organization via a shift in epistemological perspective:
It is well know in physics that gravity and electromagnetic forces both can act from outside a system
(fields) and within (interconnections). To some extent this is just a difference in our viewpoint,
whether we include the `source' in our system or not - if the source is much larger than the other
components then it makes sense to treat it as an external invariant, simplifying the equations (the
effect of the `system' on the source is then considered negligible). (p.1)
According to Lucas,
we need to ask to what extent can higher level interactions self-organize and what is the influence of
selection in, say, an ecosystem. Here we return to our initial distinction between external and internal
processes. For our predator/prey interaction the predator was regarded as an external selective force
on the prey behaviour (itself now regarded as a self-organizing phenotype). Yet we can also regard
this from a higher level, as an ecosystem, where the interactions between the constituents are then
internal to the system. We now have a self-contained co-evolutionary system, similar to our cell, and
the system will evolve in time to form a balance, an Evolutionary Stable System (ESS).
Chapter 6 Poisis
Taking a step upwards, the whole planet is interconnected by winds, birds, etc., so we could regard
that in turn as a co-evolving organism - the Gaia theory .. [Hence,] the concept of èxternal selection'
is simply a convenient simplification in what is always essentially a two-way process. Self-
organization by feedback mechanisms seems to be a feature of every level of evolution, a hierarchy
of order, emergent from initial disorder. (p.4)
Whereas Ashby (1962) defined self-organization in terms of evolution (as selection),

Lucas, following the implicit lead of Spencer, maintains that evolution (as selection) can
be viewed in terms of self-organization. Arguments - such as those presented by Dawkins
and others - against self-organization, on the grounds that it undermines the universality
of Darwinian evolution (which may extend to cosmological phenomena) are, on Lucas'
view, problematic since Darwinian evolution is, in fact, a local (as opposed to global or
universal) phenomenon which occurs between `parts' (organisms). Lucas (1997a) defines
self-organization as
the evolution of a system into an organized form in the absence of external constraints (p.3)
and goes on to maintain that
the essence of self-organization is that system stucture (at least in part) appears without explicit
pressure or constraints from outside the system. In other words, the constraints on form that interest
us are internal to the system and result from the interactions between the components, whilst being
independent of the physical nature of those components. The organization can evolve either in time
or space, can maintain a stable form or can show transient phenomena. General resource flows into
or out of self-organizing systems are to be expected, although not critical to the concept itself. (p.2)
However, this position is problematic since components (parts) are components relative
to systems (wholes): Even if the components are actual and the systemic whole only
possible or potential, the whole as a whole is a necessary condition for the parts as parts.
If the whole is identified with the `self', then the self must, in some sense of the term,
exist (perhaps subsist as a Platonic idea or a concept in a mind) prior to its coming into
being (with the latter conceived in terms of actuality). On this interpretation, self-
organization becomes identical with Aristotelian unfolding as in Bohm's (1980) explicate
unfolding of the enfolded implicate order40. In partial support of Ashby's interpretation
of self-organization in selectional terms, Selfridge (1962) identifies three aspects of self-
organization, viz. (i) recognition (affect), (ii) evaluation (telos) and (iii) compilation
(effect). He maintains that "all self-organization needs is ability to discriminate among
40
Bohm's framework is problematic since, as Laszlo (1993) has pointed out, "Bohm's two layer universe does
not evolve: it subsists. Everything that comes to be in the explicit order is already given in the implicate order.
Yet the origins of this order are not explained: the implicate order .. is merely postulated." (p.52) On the basis
of the view presented in this study, it might be remarked that to poitically question concerning the ontical (that
is, causal or productive) origins of the implicate order is to fail to appreciate the need to question concerning
the Being of causation as such. If the implicate order was identical to Being as such itself, Laszlo's question
would be meaningless since causality is a genetic relation between beings and Being is not a being. However,
the implicate order as an order is a being; hence, Laszlo's criticism stands.
Chapter 6 Poisis
alternatives" (p.3) and, on this basis, argues for a conception of artificial (or artifactual)
self-organizing systems which includes "people as components" (p.7). The implication
for natural systems is that a selectional component is necessary but not necessarily
anthropic. In the absence of human intentionality (teleology), there arise questions
concerning how and why potentiality (possibility) is transformed into actuality
(necessity)41. For Prigogine and Stengers (1984), the short answer to both questions
involves appealing to the doctrine of tychism (chance), viz. irreducible and irreversible
microscopic fluctuations as metaphysically primitive. However, as stated in section
6.4.2.1, chance may, in fact, be merely epistemic as opposed to ontic. Implicitly
transcending the oppositions which are central to the debate over evolution vs. self-
organization, Jantsch (1980) presents a unifying framework for evolution grounded in
the concept of self-organization as interpreted in terms of dissipative structures,
synergetics, autopoiesis (Maturana,80), general systems theory and cybernetics. Baas
(1993, 1997), by contrast, identifies self-organization with emergence, defining evolution
in terms of a formalization of the latter (chapter 3).
Whitaker (1995) maintains that self-organization applies to "phenomena which appear

to determine their own form and process(es) [emphasis added]." (p.1) This definition is
important since it reinforces the connection between self-organization and epistemology
identified previously. He presents the following list of interpretations of the concept:
(p.2)
1. Self-creation - the notion that a given system's origin is somehow determined by its character or the
specific circumstances in which it occurs.
2. Self-configuration - the notion that a given system actively determines the arrangement of its
constituents parts.
3. Self-regulation - the notion that a given system actively controls the course of its internal
transformations, typically with respect to one or more parameters.
4. Self-steering - the notion that a given system actively controls its course of activity within some
external environment or a general set of possible states.
5. Self-maintenance - the notion that a given system actively preserves itself, its form, and/or its
functional status over time.
6. Self-(re-)production - the notion that a given system generates itself anew or produces other systems
identical to itself.
7. Self-reference - the notion that the significance of a given system's character or behaviour is
meaningful only with respect to itself.
41
The question of the Being of possibility and necessity, potentiality and actuality as such remains unaddressed
by this local or endosystemic form of ontical questioning.
Chapter 6 Poisis
Definitions (1) and (2) are of particular significance in the context of this study since
they give rise to a number of problems associated with the self-other distinction. For
example, with respect to (1), it might be asked whether it makes (logical) sense to assert
that a system's character (that is, its features, properties or attributes) determine its origin.
In Aristotelian terms this would be equivalent to holding that substance follows predicate
and is problematic since it is unclear what if anything it is - and it surely must be
something - that predicates attach to if they are held to be existentially prior to
substances. (One possible solution involves attaching predicates to potential substance.
However, if Aristotle's proof in the Metaphysics (Book 1, Ch.VIII) that actuality is prior
to possibility is correct, this solution is, in fact, a non-solution.) Clearly, if self-creation
as defined by Whitaker is possible, some kind of processualist metaphysics (chapter 2)
must be upheld. However, to the extent that processes occur, they exist or are and hence,
can be viewed as beings (things, substances), albeit of a dynamic kind42 . Furthermore,
`creation' determined by "special circumstances in which it occurs" can hardly be
understood as organization of self by-self; rather, the environmental connotations implied
by `circumstances' (or context) support interpreting self-creation as organization of self
by-other. However, even this latter interpretation is problematic since the self-other
duality is emergent from that which is prior to both self and other. This `prior' can be
either (i) a `lower-order' self-other duality (entailing the possibility of an infinite regress
of such dualities) or (ii) that which is simply prior to self-other dualities as such.
According to Maturana and Varela (1980), `self' and òther' emerge once causal-closure
has been attained. But attained by what ? Clearly, this cannot be the system (or the
environment) since systems (and environments) are the result of such closure. (In fact,
systems can neither be nor be identified prior to such closure.) Prior to the emergence of
self and other, there is no distinction between system and environment (chapter 3); rather
there is simply the `background' or substrate of both which is an unbroken whole or
plenum43. This position is endorsed by Maturana and Varela themselves, viz.
without unity in some space an autopoietic [that is, self-producing or organizationally-homeostatic]

system is not different from the background in which it is supposed to lie, and, hence, can only be a
system in the space of our description where its unity is conceptually stipulated. (p.94)
However, given that causation (section 6.4.1.3) is a relation between beings (things), it
must be the case that a self-other distinction also exists at the level of the substrate if the
latter supports causation. This is because in relating beings, causation necessitates
delineation of existence into self-other dualities and hence, the adoption of some kind of
atomism (chapter 2). If the causal relation is mechanistic, that is, if the àtoms' are
externally-related and the change in their combinations is governed by necessity, the
42
This position is consistent with Aristotle since on his scheme substances are capable of self-movement.
43
The question concerning the ontology of this substrate (discrete, continuous) is not addressed at this point in
the discussion.
Chapter 6 Poisis
substrate will itself be mechanistic as in the autopoietic systems conception of Maturana

and Varela (1980). It would seem, therefore, that rather than the self-other relation being
viewed as emergent in an absolute sense from the substrate, a higher-order (epi-
)phenomenal self and other emerge as causally-supervenient on a grounding self and
other in the substrate. However, the problem of self and other is then shifted to the
substrate itself: Given the ontical nature of the substrate, it is legitimate to question
concerning the causal origins (poisis) of the self and other (that is, the atoms which are
selves and others with respect to each other). Either this substrate is grounded in yet
another which is itself dualistic (thereby rendering possible an infinite regress of self-
other substrates) or it must be ontically non-dualistic44 . This follows from the fact that
the duality of self and other under any form of atomism ensures that such ontologies are
ontical, that is, characterized in terms of relations between beings. The question
concerning the Being of these beings and the distinction between the former and the
latter, viz. the ontological difference (section 6.5.4) remains unaddressed.
6.4.2.3. Creation
In this section the notion of creation is examined. It should be noted from the outset that
the presentation has been restricted to an analysis of how the concept is employed in
science, philosophy and theology. (Naive-creationism has not been investigated since it
is in direct conflict with the idea of evolution45.) In order to clarify what is meant by
`creation', it is worthwhile briefly considering some of the definitions provided in various
philosophical dictionaries. For example, The Oxford Companion to Philosophy (1995)
defines creation as
the bringing of something into existence.
In classical Judeo-Christian cosmology, this means the bringing of the universe (or
world) into existence from nothing, viz. creatio ex nihilo. As Flew (1979) states,
[Creation is] the action required both to produce the Universe out of nothing and to be its
indispensable sustaining cause. Thus, on the first count, the Demiurge of Platos Timaeus, presented
as shaping already existing raw materials is precisely not a Creator, whereas, inasmuch as he
44
To this extent, Cariani's (1989, 1991) semiotic-functionalist alternative to computationalism does not suffer
from the problems associated with the scheme presented by Kampis (1991), viz. component-systems. Briefly,
this follows from the fact that Cariani adopts a continuum metaphysics with respect to the ontology of naturals.
45
Naive creationism (or `creation science') is grounded in a literalist reading of the Christian creation story as
narrated in the Book of Genesis. McIver (1988) provides an excellent annotated biobliography of the literature
associated with this position. Enlightened creationism, by contrast, while contesting the validity of naturalistic
theories of the origin of life and proposing an alternative thesis, viz. ìntelligent design', is consistent - on some
formulations of the position - with naturalistic evolution. To the extent that the problem of the origin of life
remains a real problem whereas its evolution has been established as fact, enlightened creationism is a position
worthy of consideration.
Chapter 6 Poisis
produces the Universe ex nihilo (from nothing), the God of Mosaic theism is.
Angeles (1981) presents a radically different concept of creation as follows:
(L., creare, `to create, `to cause to exist, `to bring into being). 1. The bringing of something new
into existence out of something previously existing. 2. The activity of constructing, making, building,
shaping, or the product of such activity.
This definition is consistent with the classical Greek maxim, ex nihilo nihil fit,
conventionally interpreted as `nothing comes from nothing'. On this scheme, creation is
viewed as a genetic relation between beings. Adopting this maxim in order to explain the
relation between God and (all) other beings, Mercer (1917) extends the notion of creation
to human beings as follows:
it is certain that we ourselves are, in a very real sense, creators. On the one side, we are products of
the cosmic process; but on another side we can direct, within limits, the course it shall take, both as
regards our individual development and also the world outside of us. (p.30)
Conversely, Kelsey (1985) interprets creatio ex nihilo by analogy with anthropic making
(section 6.4.2.4), maintaining that
the freedom of God's active relating to the world find's better analogues in the relationships between
persons and artifacts constituted by purposeful human productive actions than in those provided by
logical, spatial, or nonpersonal causal relationships. (p.178)
This leads to the creationist position which Angeles (1981) defines as follows:
1. The view that the universe and its life forms were produced (and are being produced) by a
supernatural agent. 2. All things begin and continue to exist only through the decision, plan, and
activity of a supernatural being (God). 3. Matter (the universe) was created instantaneously by God
out of nothing. 4. The human soul is separately created and presented by God at birth (or conception).
(1) and (2) are relevant to (at least) the following two issues: (i) the origin of the universe
(assuming it has not always existed46 ) and (ii) the origin of life. Significantly, the latter
issue remains an outstanding problem within biology, primarily because of the `chicken
and egg' paradox that arises in connection with cell self-replication (chapter 4): Protein
`constructors' (ribosomes) within cells assemble (other) proteins by reading codons
(triplets of nucleotide bases) from the messenger RNA (or mRNA, a working copy of a
segment of DNA used in the process of gene translation into protein) and then linking
the relevant amino acids carried by the transfer RNA (or tRNA, a special-purpose
molecule carrying an amino acid at one end and its corresponding anti-codon at the other
end). A necessary condition for cell replication with respect to proteins is the existence
46
That is, assuming a Big Bang scenario is correct. The question of whether this cosmological origins scenario
is absolute (global) or relative (local) is not at issue here. (A local interpretation of the creation event was
briefly examined in section 6.4.2.1 in connection with a discussion of cosmological Darwinism.)
Chapter 6 Poisis
of DNA since this specifies the cell-machinery (proteins) to be constructed; however, a

necessary condition with respect to DNA is the existence of the protein cell-machinery
since this reads the DNA specification. Hence, postulating DNA (or protein) as
historically prior and protein (or DNA) as posterior leads to an existential paradox due
to the causal dependency of DNA on protein and visa versa. Various solutions to this
problem have been proposed including the life-from-clay hypothesis (Cairns-Smith,85)
and the RNA-world theory. However, while the emergence of catalytic RNA within a
prebiotic `soup' has been regarded by many as the most tenable hypothesis for the origin
of life, the origin of this RNA itself remains problematic (Orgel,94). Kauffman (1993,
1995) maintains that in order to address the latter problem it is necessary to appeal to the
notion of self-organization (section 6.4.2.2), specifically the autocatalysis of simple
organic molecules in the primordial soup (Cohen,96).
However, self-organization can be shown to be problematic when the informational (as

contrasted with physico-chemical) nature of biological macromolecules is taken into
consideration. According to Yockey (1977), "the orderliness of the crystal precludes [its]
capacity to function as a code .. Informational macromolecules can code genetic
messages and therefore carry information because the sequence of bases or residues is
affected very little if at all by physicochemical factors." (p.380) With respect to the
specific informational nature of DNA, Yockey (1981) maintains that
consideration of the adaptor operation of the genetic code mechanism shows clearly that natural
intersymbol influence reflected by the ìnstructions in the amino acids themselves' must be removed
from the protein formation process. The òrder' in the naturally formed amino acid polymers is
therefore an impediment and not a means of `self-organization' which leads to informational
biomolecules and from thence to a genome. (p.26)
In support of this position, Meyer (1997), following Polanyi (1968), correctly states that
"the forces of chemical necessity .. produce redundancy or monotonous order, but reduce
the capacity to convey information and create novelty." (p.22) Furthermore,
the properties of nucleotide bases and amino acids do not make any specific sequences ìnevitable'
as self-organizationalists claim. Significantly, information theory makes clear that there is a good
reason for this. If chemical affinities between the constituents in the DNA message text determined
the arrangement of the text, such affinities would drastically diminish the capacity of DNA to carry
information. (p.21)
Yockey (1981) goes on to assert that "the information content of amino acid sequences
cannot increase until a genetic code with an adaptor function has appeared. Nothing
which even vaguely resembles a code exists in the physico-chemical world. One must
conclude that no valid scientific explanation of the origin of life exists at present." (p.26)
On this basis, he is led to maintain (Yockey,77) that "a genetic code of some sort must
have existed from the very beginning of life." (p.393) Given that RNA must possess
some kind of code if it is to function as an informational macromolecule, the above
problems associated with DNA must extend to it. Furthermore, Mills and Kenyon (1996)
Chapter 6 Poisis
contest the sufficiency of the RNA-world hypothesis on the grounds that the complexity
of polynucleotide sequences in biological organisms does not support a self-organizing,
autocatalytic origin of life scenario. Consistent with this appeal to complexity, Behe
(1996) contests the validity of neo-Darwinism on the basis of the (apparently) irreducible
complexity of biological organisms viewed at the molecular level. An ìrreducibly
complex' system is
a single system which is composed of several interacting parts that contribute to the basic function,
and where the removal of any one of the parts causes the system to effectively cease functioning. (p.5)
According to Behe, "since natural selection requires a function to select, an irreducibly

complex biological system, if there is such a thing, would have to arise as an integrated
unit for natural selection to have anything to act on [emphasis added]." (p.5) This would
seem to follow from the link between functionality and systemicity and the fact that
systems or wholes have components or parts (chapter 3). However, Behe maintains that
"an irreducibly complex system cannot be produced gradually by slight, excessive
modifications of a precursor system, since any precursor to an irreducibly complex
system is by definition non-functional47." (p.5) He goes on to assert that the existence of
irreducibly-complex biological structures is problematic for Darwinism because
phylogenetic gradualism and functionality are incommensurable postulates for such
systems. However, Orr (1996) contests this thesis:
An irreducibly complex system can be built gradually by adding parts that, while initially just
advantageous, become - because of later changes - essential. The logic is very simple. Some part (A)
initially does some job (and not very well, perhaps). Another part (B) later gets added because it helps
A. This new part isn't essential, it merely improves things. But later on, A (or something else) may
change in such a way that B now becomes indispensable. This process now continues as further parts
get folded into the system. And at the end of the day, many parts may all be required. (p.4)
In the context of discussing Behe's example of a mousetrap as an instance of an

irreducibly complex system, Orr (1997) maintains that
under the Darwinian scenario, all the parts can change through time and there is no reason to think
we started with anything like a holding bar, spring, or platform. Indeed this is the whole point of the
scenario: no single current part can do the job, so none could possibly represent the ancestral system.
Instead most or all of the parts likely changed through time, growing, in the process, more
interdependant. (p.2)
47
Interestingly, this notion is similar to that associated with the concept of autopoiesis (Maturana,80) in which
causal-closure in a system (chapter 3) constitutes a necessary and sufficient condition for productive,
organizational homeostasis, viz. the maintenance of existential selfhood. Since the autopoietic organization
(or form) is static although material instantiations or autopoietic structures are dynamic, the origins problem
arises in connection with this abstract processual form. Darwinian solutions to this problem are not forthcoming
since in autopoietic systems theory, the individual is prior to the species and organization is prior to structure -
arguments against metaphysical Platonism notwithstanding. Furthermore, autopoiesis is a discrete phenomenon
in the sense that a system either is or is not autopoietic. The concept of an autopoietic system is defined in
section 6.4.2.4 and examined again in section 6.6.5.
Chapter 6 Poisis
Behe's argument appears to rest on the (erroneous) assumption that functionality is

essential (or ahistorically-absolute), static (or fixed) and discrete whereas evolution
shows that it is, in fact, existential (or historically-contingent), dynamic (or changing)
and continuous. However, the factical continuity of functionality does not explain the
existence of functionality as such. It should be noted at this point in the discussion that
the problem of explaining functionality as such is a motivating factor underlying
enlightened creationism. According to Nelson (1993a), "in a strong sense .. the truth or
falsity of naturalism is the whole game." (p.5) This position is endorsed by Ruse who
Nelson cites as stating the following:
it seems to me very clear that at some very basic level, evolution as a scientific theory makes a
commitment to a kind of naturalism, namely, that at some level one is going to exclude miracles and
these sorts of things, come what may [emphasis added]. (p.8)
... evolution, akin to religion, involves making certain a priori or metaphysical assumptions, which
at some level cannot be proved empirically. (p.8)
It is important to appreciate that supernaturalism can be maintained despite the existence

of design imperfections in nature, since, as Sherman (1997) points out, contrary to the
claims of proponents of Darwinian naturalism such as Dennett (1995),
any argument that assumes that God, being perfect, could only create perfect entities [or only create
the best possible world as in Lebniz's monadology], rests on the dubious idea that a perfect being
could only want to create other perfect beings. There is, of course, no reason to assume this, and in
fact has the undesirable consequence of making God far more limited than the intelligent creatures
He is believed by Theists to have created. (p.6)
Imperfections in biological design cannot show Theism to be false, because it is always open to the
Theist to point out that it is logically possible that God chose to create imperfect beings, either
directly or indirectly through a process that had this as one of its effects. (p.10)
According to Nelson (1993b), the notion of Ìntelligent Design' is held to be non-

scientific for the following reasons: (p.14)
1. It does not explain by natural law

2. It invokes unobservables
3. It is not testable
4. It does not make predictions
5. It is not falsifiable
6. It provides no mechanisms
However, each of the above is problematic: (1) assumes metaphysical naturalism a

priori; (2) ignores temporality issues associated with observation and the role of past
events in scientific explanation. Yet, as Nelson states, "while natural laws may play a
background role in our assumptions, historical explanations (in evolutionary theory, for
instance) would not work without the events they postulate." (p.15); (3) and (5) ignore
the fact that the given (or ontically a priori) must be explained at least partially in
Chapter 6 Poisis
inferred, historical terms as opposed to induced, empirical terms; (4) is incorrect since
intentionality (goal-directedness), qualified by the condition ceteris paribus (that is, "all
things being equal"), is perhaps paradigmatically-definitive of what is in principal
predictable; (6) is problematic since unless infinite causal regress is allowed, all
explanations must ultimately be grounded in that which is non-reducible, that is,
something for which there is no mechanistic (or causal) explanation. If, however, the
argument is against the causal veracity of intentionality as such, it being maintained that
no `bridging laws' exist to connect physical phenomena with formistic `supernatural
design principles' - a variant of the classical argument against Cartesian dualism - it
should be appreciated that this is also an outstanding problem within the philosophy of
mind in an anthropic context, viz. the category problem (chapter 7). Furthermore, Meyer
(1997) maintains that design is empirically-testable since "designed events leave a
complexity, and information theoretic signature, that allows us to detect design reliably.
When these criteria are present, scenarios involving design, constitute better explanations
than those that rely exclusively on chance and/or deterministic natural processes." (p.30)
On this basis he reasons that
whenever high information content .. is present in an artifact or entity whose causal story is known,
invariably creative intelligence - design - has played a causal role in the origin of that entity. Thus,
our knowledge of causal powers, not our ignorance, leads to the acceptance of design as the best
explanation for the origin of biological information in a prebiotic context. (p.31)
That cause C can produce effect E, makes it a better explanation of E than some other cause D that
has never produced E and which seems incapable of doing so on theoretical grounds, even if D may
later demonstrate causal powers of which we are presently ignorant. (p.32)
Dembski (1996) describes the Intelligent Design (ID) thesis as follows:
Intelligent Design holds that intelligent causation is an irreducible feature of the bio-physical
universe, and furthermore that intelligent causation is empirically detectable. (p.1)
ID can be detected using a three-stage explanatory filter which determines whether a

given phenomena arises as a consequence of (i) law(s), (ii) chance or (iii) design. (The
latter is identifiable with Polanyi's (1966, 1968) higher principles (chapter 3) and takes
the form of emergent boundary conditions or constraints.) Dembski maintains that the
following two conditions must hold of necessity if the presence of ID is to be signalled
reliably: (1) specification of the phenomenon and (2) low probability of phenomenal
occurrence. Furthermore, he claims that
even though the explanatory filter is not a reliable criterion for eliminating design [due to the problem
of false negatives], it is .. a reliable criterion for detecting design [and] successfully avoids false
positives. (p.5)
Dembski maintains that his position is supported by inductive evidence:
in every instance where the explanatory filter attributes design, and where the underlying causal story
Chapter 6 Poisis
is known, it turns out design actually is present. (p.5)
There are (at least) two problems with this position: First, it could be argued - for
example, by Dennett (1995) - that Dembski's position is a simple non sequitur since the
inference of design does not follow of necessity from a complete causal account of
phenomenal production: According to the neo-Darwinian thesis, chance and necessity
are sufficient for explaining apparent (or as-if) design. Thus, Dembski's assertion begs
the question; Second, it assumes that causally-sufficient (that is, complete and correct)
accounts of the ontical poisis (becoming) associated with phenomena are possible.
However, determining an ùnderlying causal story' is problematic since it is unclear
whether the poisis of the given, viz. the ontically a priori, can be known a posteriori
due to the problem of induction (Chalmers,82).
Anticipating ID, Mercer (1917) asks "is it not reasonable, if we discover àim or goal'
in some of the parts [of the phenomenal world such as biological organisms and,
preeminently, human beings] to infer that purpose had a place in the creative activity
from which the whole proceeds ?" (p.172) Consequently,
we cannot argue that the Cosmos does not contain design because it selects - the argument is rather
quite the other way. Indeed, when we discover directivity in the Cosmos, Selection at once takes its
place as one of the modes in which this directivity manifests itself. Things are what they are because
they have been selected for realization out of an indefinite host of possibilities. The way is clear to
postulate a Supreme Designer. (p.171)
This enlightened-creationist position is reconciled with a Darwinian approach to

cosmology (section 6.4.2.1) by asserting that "a Supreme Designer could build up a
stable and purposive universe on a basis of what we might, from this [externalistic and
endophysical]48 point of view, call `fortuitous' variations [emphasis added]." (p.170)
Mercer qualifies this position by maintaining that chance is grounded in epistemic
incompleteness:
there cannot be anything that is really fortuitous. Observed regularity of sequence we know:
contingency we know: spontaneity as self-determination we know: but Chance is a goddess painted
on the dissolving clouds of ignorance. There is no becoming for which there is not a definite cause.
(p.169)
He presents a scheme of creative evolution grounded in the ex nihilo nihil fit maxim in
which "the universe manifests a perpetual Becoming that is the outcome of inherent
powers of expansion and growth." (p.65) According to Mercer, "the constitution of the
cosmos is such that, given certain conditions, certain happenings become possible. [For
example,] the potentialities of organic life were there from the start, and were made
manifest when the conditions were fulfilled." (pp.74-75) Crucially, he correctly points
48
Externalistic because observers relate to the observed as subjects to objects and endophysical because such
observers are embedded within the universe of phenomena.
Chapter 6 Poisis
out that "when it is claimed that the principle of evolution has attained a cosmic scope,
it must not be imagined that every form or mode of Being falls under its sway [for] it
applies only to Becomings - to processes." (p.79) Hence, "[there are] modes of Being
which are outside of and independent of all time processes - nay, which constitute the
very conditions of there being a time process at all. These time-modes which do not
become, but simply are, constitute so many limitations to the application of the principle
of evolution." (p.80) This position involves tacit adoption of an interpretation of Being
in which the stability associated with the latter is understood as implying fixity or stasis.
However, as Heidegger (1959) has shown, Being was originally understood by the
Greeks as prior to the duality of stasis and change (section 6.5.1); hence, Heidegger's
rendering commensurable the apparently opposing positions of Heraclitus and
Parminides.
Consistent with this evolutionary creation thesis, Ayala (1985b) maintains that
the sudden creation of the world and of life are not explanations by natural processes. (p.60)
However, Morris (1990) describes a number of cosmological theories, such as that due
to E.P.Tryon, in which it is held that the universe could have emerged from the inflation
of a quantum fluctuation in the vacuum. A necessary condition for such a scenario is that
the total energy in the universe be exactly zero (matter is positive energy while
gravitational attraction is negative energy). In this context, Davies (1983) refers to the
possibility of "a deep cosmic principle at work which requires the universe to have
exactly zero energy. If that is so the cosmos can follow the path of least resistance,
coming into existence without requiring any input of matter or energy at all." (p.32) As
he states,
the gravitational field is only a spacewarp - curved space. The energy locked up in a spacewarp can
be converted into particles of matter and antimatter .. Thus, matter appears spontaneously out of
empty space. (p.31)
However, as Morris points out,
we don't know whether the matter-energy content of the universe is really zero. When we have two,
very large and apparently equal numbers, it may be impossible to tell whether or not they exactly
cancel each other [emphasis added]. (p.69)
If it turns out that the total energy of the universe is zero, there is still the need to explain
the existence of this `deep cosmic principle', that is, the Being of this principle remains
to be questioned (and tentatively answered)49 and this nothwithstanding ontical (or
49
Additionally, exclusion of an exo-energetic origin for the universe does not entail rejection of a theistic
explanation for the origin of the universe since it is unclear whether or not categories such as matter or energy
can be meaningfully associated with God nor whether He is limited by such categories if they can be
meaningfully applied.
Chapter 6 Poisis
causal) and ontological (or phenomenological) issues pertaining to existents such as

spacewarps and singularities50. Furthermore, appeals to randomness (ìndeterminate
quantum fluctuations') are problematic since it is always possible that randomness is, in
fact, merely epistemic. (This is entailed by the possibility of quantum theory being
subsumed by a physics in which indeterminism is not considered ontically primitive51.)
Possible solutions to the anthropic coincidences associated with the postulated deep
cosmic principle involve appeals to (i) the Anthropic Principle52, (ii) the Many-Worlds
interpretation of quantum theory (chapter 4) or (iii) a combination of (i) and (ii)53.
However, such explanations are problematic for (at least) three reasons: First, (ii) clearly
violates Occam's razor; second, the existence or otherwise of multiple universes is
endosystemically untestable; and third, although the quantum interpretation problem is
solved, the category problem (chapter 7) remains. Furthermore, even if it is accepted that
the origin of the universe can be explained in terms of a quantum fluctuation in the
vacuum, it must be noted that this form of creatio ex nihilo proceeds according to the
50
Davies (1983) maintains that "a singularity is most certainly not a thing. It is the boundary of a thing
(spacetime)." (p.34) However, this position is problematic since if boundaries exist, they must be, that is,
partake of Being. For Heidegger, Being is multiply-moded (Dreyfus,91); thus, Davies assertion may be viewed
as unnecessarily conservative in limiting Being to objects and processes.
51
This does not necessarily imply a deterministic physics (such as Newtonian mechanics). If determinism was
logically entailed, this would be equivalent to the hidden variables interpretation of quantum theory (chapter
4). Another possibility suggests itself under a broader interpretation of the notion of physics as derived from
the Greek physis, viz. intentionalisitic autopoisis or volitional self-emergence. This is consistent with
Schopenhauer's view of the world as will and Whitehead's organismic - or panexperientialist - metaphysics.
52
Craig (1988) maintains that "the Anthropic Principle is essentially an attempt to complete the job, begun by
Darwinian evolution, of dismantling the teleological argument [for Divine design] by showing that the
appearance of design in the physical and cosmological quantities of the universe is just that: an appearance
due to the self-selection factor imposed on our observations by our own existence." (p.389) Morris (1990)
distinguishes two versions of the Anthropic Principle, viz. (1) the Weak (or epistemic) Anthropic Principle
(WAP) - "what we can expect to observe must be restricted by the conditions necessary for our presence as
observers." (p.216) and (2) the Strong (or ontic) Anthropic Principle (SAP) - "the universe must be such as to
admit the creation of observers within it at some stage." (p.218)
53
For example, Gale (1986) describes three versions of the strong anthropic principle: (1) Purposive - "the
universe evolved properties sufficient for the generation of observers in order to bring about observers" (p.106);
(2) Ensemble - "the universe evolved properties sufficient for the generation of observers because either (i) it
simply happens to be one of many universes in which the properties are such as to permit the evolution of
observers (many-worlds scenario) or (ii) the properties have emerged as a result of (possibly) infinitely many
cycles of cosmological explosion, evolution and collapse (inflationary scenario)." (p.107); (3) Self-caused - the
universe evolved properties sufficient for the generation of observers as a consequence of stochastic processes
(quantum fluctuation). Wheeler's participatory interpretation of quantum theory can be combined with (2), (3)
and the notion of cyclic causation to generate a scheme grounded in the notion of the `meaning circuit' (chapter
4). On this view, "that universe comes into existence which, through the participation of intelligent observers,
can come into existence via the act of observation itself. On this view, the observer and the observed are linked
together in a self-excited loop of self-causation [emphasis added]." (p.108)
Chapter 6 Poisis
deterministic laws of quantum theory; hence, the question of the causal origin and
phenomenological Being of such laws remains outstanding. This argument is supported
by Davies (1983) who, as stated previously, maintains that "quantum physics has to exist
(in some sense) so that a quantum transition can generate the cosmos in the first place."
(p.217) However,
physics can perhaps explain the content, origin and organization of the physical universe, but not the
laws (or superlaw) of physics itself. (p.216)
This need to explain (ontically) the laws (or superlaw) of physics is a motivating factor
behind theistic arguments asserting the contingency of the world and its causal grounding
in a necessary being, viz. God. In Summa Theologica (Part I, Question 2, Article 3),
Aquinas upholds the Aristotelian doctrine of actuality as prior to potentiality maintaining
that "nothing can be reduced from potentiality to actuality, except by something in a state
of actuality". On this basis, he goes on to argue as follows:
We find in nature things that are impossible to be and not to be, since they are found to be generated,
and to corrupt, and consequently, they are possible to be and not to be. But it is impossible for these
always to exist, for that which is possible not to be at some time is not. Therefore, if everything is
possible not to be, then at one time there would have been nothing in existence. Now if this were true,
even now there would be nothing in existence, because that which does not exist only begins to exist
by something already existing. Therefore, if at one time nothing was in existence, it would have been
impossible for anything to have begun to exist; and thus even now nothing would be in existence -
which is absurd. Therefore, not all beings are merely possible, but there must exist something the
existence of which is necessary. But every necessary thing either has necessity caused by another,
or not. Now it is impossible to go on to infinity in necessary things which have their necessity caused
by another, as has been already proved in regard to efficient causes. Therefore we cannot but
postulate the existence of some being having of its own necessity, and not receiving it from another,
but rather causing in others their necessity. This all men speak of as God.
However, there are a number of problems with this position. For example, according to
relativity theory, spacetime (that is, space and time) is an emergent from the creation
event (Big Bang). Given the theistic premise that God created the world, Davies (1983)
asks
what does it mean to say that God has caused time to come into existence, when by our usual
understanding of causation a cause must precede its effect ? Causation is a temporal activity. Time
must already exist before anything can be caused. The naive image of God existing before the
universe is clearly absurd if time did not exist - if there was no `before'. (p.44)
Yet this statement is itself problematic for (at least) three reasons: (1) It assumes that
causation is, of necessity, temporally-defined. However, none of Aristotle's four causes
are defined in terms of temporality (section 6.4.1.3); (2) it assumes that God is in time.
However, according to Augustine, God is eternal and stands outside of (or beyond) time.
As Hepburn (1967a) states,
God's eternity is not an endless temporal succession, nor did time exist until the world existed.
Chapter 6 Poisis
Agreeing here with Plato's Timaeus, it must be said that time and the world began together. (p.253)
Again, "God's eternity is not to be taken as endless temporal duration but as something
qualitatively different - a completeness and a changelessness that knows none of the
successiveness of temporal experience with its `not yet' and `no longer'." However, as
Hepburn points out, "it becomes very hard .. if not impossible, to see how the eternal and
nontemporal God can act upon the temporal and noneternal world." (p.253) This follows
from conceiving God in ontical terms (as a being) and as separate from His creation; (3)
it fails to consider the possibility that time is an existentiell (particular, ontical)
manifestation of an existential (universal, ontological) structure, viz. Temporality
(section 6.5.3). According to Heidegger, Temporality manifests itself multiply as
instances of time (similar to Bergon's durations and Whitehead's actual occasions).
Hence, it is conceivable that spacetime, which emerged from the cosmological creation
event (viz. the local - if not global - Big Bang), is itself grounded in a more primordial
temporal structure, viz. Temporality as such. (However, clearly if Temporality is, it must
partake of Being while Being as enduring presencing (Wesen) must partake of
Temporality. It follows thereby that Being and Temporality must be closely related.
According to Heidegger (1927), they are, in fact, identical.)
Yet another problem arises in connection with the assertion that God is the Supreme
being and Necessary (or First) Cause of the universe. According to Davies (1983), if God
is interpreted ontically as the Supreme being among beings,
what, then, is the explanation for the total system of God plus the physical universe of space, time and
matter? In short, what explains God ? The theologian answers: `God is a necessary being, without
need of explanation; God contains within himself the explanation of his own existence'. But does this
mean anything ? And if it does, why can't we use the same argument to explain the universe: The
universe is necessary, it contains within itself the reason for its own existence ? (p.47)
On this basis, he goes on to assert that
[while] the idea of a physical system containing an explanation of itself might seem paradoxical to
the layman .. it is an idea that has some precedence in physics [and also in coherence theories of
truth]. While one may concede (ignoring quantum effects) that every event is contingent, and depends
for its explanation on some other event, it need not follow that this series either continues endlessly,
or ends in God. It may be closed into a loop. (p.47)
However, this argument fails to appreciate the necessity of grounding both the universe
(the whole) and its contents (or parts) in Being as such. This grounding is both existential
or ontological and causal or ontical; furthermore, it is meaningless to seek the cause of
Being as such since the latter cannot be transcended54 and causality as such partakes of
Being in that it is a genetic relation between beings.
54
According to Jaspers (1971), Being is Transcendence itself whereas for Heidegger, Being is It itself (section
6.5.2).
Chapter 6 Poisis
In Summa Theologica (Part I, Question 45, Article 2), Aquinas maintains that
ancient philosophers .. considered only the emanation of particular effects from particular causes,
which necessarily presuppose something in their action; whence came their common opinion that
"nothing is made from nothing" [or ex nihilo nihil fit]. But this has no place in the first emanation
from the universal principle of things.
Thus, according to Mercer, "in primitive mythology .. we discover two main modes of
conceiving the beginning of the world - the one, that of making out of a pre-existing
material; the other, that of generation." (p.11) The former is expressed in the maxim ex
nihilo nihil fit (nothing comes from nothing or, alternatively, something comes from
something) and the latter in the maxim creatio ex nihilo (creation from nothing) which
he traces to the Rig Veda. Mercer maintains that "whether [ex nihilo nihil fit] be allowed
or not, at any rate its opposite [viz. creatio ex nihilo] is in a full sense inconceivable."
(p.28) However, this position only holds if Being is interpreted (erroneously) in ontical
terms (that is, as a being) since, as Heidegger (1993a, 1993b) has argued, the ontological
difference between beings and Being (section 6.5.4) supports the identification of Being
and nothing (section 6.5.5) and there is a need to ground beings in Being; hence, the
possibility of creation - as grounding not causation - ex nihilo. Furthermore, this position
is contested by Aquinas who, in Summa Theologica (Part I, Question 45, Article 1),
counsels that
we must consider not only the emanation of a particular being from a particular agent, but also the
emanation of all being from the universal cause, which is God; and this emanation we designate by
the name of creation .. which is the emanation of all being, [and] is from the "not-being" which is
"nothing".
However, this position immediately becomes problematic since God is viewed as a being
(albeit the Supreme or highest being), and hence, if the transitivity of causation is not to
be undermined, must be the cause of Himself (since He is the cause of all beings), which
entails, given Aquinas' acceptance of the maxim creatio ex nihilo, that He is also from
"nothing". Yet, this contradicts the statement that God is a necessary being standing (as
an object) over against nothing and responsible for actualizing the potentialities of the
world. Furthermore, maintaining that God is self-causing (or self-organizing) engenders
semantic (interpretative) and ontical (productive) problems (chapter 3 and section
6.4.2.2) since it is logically inconsistent to assert that a being is self-creating. According
to Mercer,
ex nihilo needlessly outrages common sense, trained reason, and scientific postulates. It is assuredly
simpler and more natural to hold that the Creation is, in some mode of externalization, the expression
and embodiment of the will, the mind, the love of an eternal God. Such a doctrine does not in any
wise interfere with emphasis on the transcendence of the Creator; and it gives content, full and rich,
to emphasis on His immanence. (p.35)
Given the problems that arise when creatio ex nihilo is postulated in a theological context
in which God is conceived ontically (as the Supreme being), it is almost inevitable that
Chapter 6 Poisis
this maxim should be viewed as
disastrous to theistic cosmology, because there is then no way of arguing from the nature of the
creature to that of the Creator; the universe is no longer a manifestation of God's own nature, but a
Becoming from an inconceivable Nothing. (p.29)
However, there are (at least) four problems with this argument: first, that inference is
necessarily from creature(s) to Creator is a methodological assumption; furthermore, an
assumption which undermines theism since in extrapolating from the finite to the
infinite, the conception of God is constrained by its association with the finite (or
created), viz. God possesses only those attributes which are manifested in creation.
Additionally, in extrapolating from creature(s) to Creator, God is conceived as a being
among beings (whether He be conceived as a necessary or Supreme being) and hence,
the problem of the ontological difference between Being and beings as such (section
6.5.4) arises; second, it is not necessary to view nothingness in absolute terms: for
example, on Spencer Brown's (1969) scheme, a universe comes into existence when a
space is severed. It is not inconsistent with this framework to postulate a creator
embedded within this spatial nothingness who is causally responsible for `cutting' the
world into Being, a position which is commensurate with Aquinas' view of the
emanation of all beings other than God. (However, there then remains the question of
the Being of this creator and of the (spatial) nothingness in which the creator is
embedded.); third, Mercer assumes that nothing must be conceived a priori in statical
terms whereas Heidegger (1993a) has argued for its formulation in dynamical terms, viz.
the nihilation of the nothing (section 6.5.5); fourth, there remains the possibility that God
can be identified with Being as such and thereby conceived ontologically.
In support of the maxim ex nihilo nihil fit, Mercer (1917) maintains that
there is nothing in the range of our experience which has not a sufficient cause, or sufficient reason,
in the self-existing nature and properties of ultimate Being. (p.28)
However, this view is correct if and only if Being is identified with Being as such rather
than with a particular being, such as God, the Supreme being (Kovacs,90). Furthermore,
interpreting sufficiency in causal terms via implicit appeal to the notion of a First Cause
(or Necessary Being) is problematic since, as Herbert Spencer argued in First Principles
(1862), if the First Cause is infinite or unlimited it cannot be rendered intelligible. This
follows from the fact that the causation is a relation between finite beings. On the other
hand,
if the First Cause is limited, and there consequently lies something outside of it, this something must
have no First Cause - must be uncaused. But if we admit that there can be something uncaused, there
is no reason to assume a cause for anything. If beyond that finite region over which the First Cause
extends, there lies a region, which we are compelled to regard as infinite, over which it does not
extend - if we admit that there is an infinite uncaused surrounding the finite caused; we tacitly
abandon the hypothesis of causation altogether. (p.30)
Chapter 6 Poisis
There are a number of important points to note in connection with the above statement:
first, Spencer was writing before quantum mechanical phenomena had been discovered.
Significantly, such phenomena are, at least on the conventional interpretation, considered
acausal. Hence, his rejection of the existence of the uncaused is potentially problematic;
second, rejection of causalism (that is, the doctrine of universal causation) is not only
entailed by the existence of acausal phenomena but also by the notion of a First Cause
since in postulating this as a cause which generates effects but which is itself not an
effect of a prior cause, the transitivity of the causal principle is undermined; third,
Spencer alludes to what is (logically) required in order to solve the problem of causation,
viz. its abandonment, not to a Humean re-interpretation of the notion in non-genetic (or
non-generative) relational terms but to a grounding in that which is prior to causation;
that which is not the ontical cause of causation but rather its ontological ground, viz.
Being, the existential ground of causation as such.
In Summa Theologica (Part I, Question 45, Article 1), Aquinas states that
this preposition "from" (ex) [in the maxim creatio ex nihilo or "creation from nothing"] can comprise
the negation implied when I say the word "nothing", or can be included in it.
In the former, relative-nothing is asserted and the ex is understood merely to imply an

order (that is, an existential ordering). In the latter, absolute-nothing is maintained and
the ex is held to entail material causation. Re-interpreting the distinction between
absolute- and relative-nothing in the normative context of the maxim ex nihilo nihil fit,
Mercer (1917) maintains that creatio ex nihilo is epistemic as opposed to ontic. This
position can be restated in systems-theoretical terms as follows: creatio ex nihilo is an
endosystemic (or endophysical) maxim describing creation from a topologically-
internalistic perspective whereas ex nihilo nihil fit is an exosystemic (or exophysical)
maxim describing creation from a topologically-externalistic perspective with respect to
the created system. Consistent with Mercer's relativistic position, Bunge (1959) proposes
to combine the principle of lawfulness with that of productivity, that is, the ancient principle
according to which nothing comes out of nothing or passes into nothing. An alternative formulation
of this principle is: There are neither absolute beginnings not absolute terminations, but everything
is rooted to something else and leaves in turn a track in something else. (pp.24-25)
He goes on to assert that "everything is determined in accordance with laws by

something else [and that] this statement may be termed the principle of determinacy."
(p.26) Bunge maintains that "it is a philosophical assumption of science confirmed by
the results of scientific research [and] clearly cannot be refuted, since future investigation
is expected to confirm it wherever it may now seem to be falsified." (p.26) Thus, Bunge -
like Mercer - rejects the ontical interpretation of creatio ex nihilo. (Both are thereby
implicitly committed to an ontical form of the coherence theory of truth, that is, a
coherence theory of existence.) However, ontologically-speaking, the totality of things
(èverything') is grounded in that which is neither a part of nor identical with the whole
of things. This follows from the fact that, at least in some sense, the whole is and hence,
Chapter 6 Poisis
must partake of Being as such. Thus, beyond beings as a whole there lies Being and
hence, beyond causal determinism there lies existential determination (or grounding).
Furthermore, Bunge's rejection of the identity of production and causation on the
grounds that "as science [for example, quantum theory] shows us .. some things are
produced in a noncausal way" and his assertion that "causation is a particular case of
production" (p.47) are problematic since the Being of the productive process (that is, the
connection between Being and becoming) remains unaddressed.
In summary, it appears that there are two kinds of creation grounded in two ex nihilo
maxims: (1) creatio ex nihilo or creation from nothing and (2) ex nihilo nihil fit or
creation from something. If these positions are considered epistemical (as on Mercer's
and Bunge's schemes), it is possible for them to be reconciled. However, it is interesting
to consider whether these positions can be rendered commensurable if interpreted
ontically. The following example indicates how this might be achieved: creatio ex nihilo
can be interpreted as creation of anything (not merely the original state of the universe)
from nothing. On this basis, the emergence of irreducible ontical categories (or
modalities of Being) from prior existing ontical categories can be viewed as an ontically-
relativistic form of creatio ex nihilo since it involves the `creation' of ontically (and not
merely epistemically) novel existents (in this case, categorial beings) from a substrate
which neither manifests nor conceals such categories55 , and to this extent, is nothing
(nihilo) relative to them. The category problem (chapter 7) in the philosophy of mind,
viz. how ontological-subjectivity can emerge from an ontologically-objective substrate,
appears to represent an instance of ontically-relativistic creatio ex nihilo56. Interestingly,
a link between the category problem and the maxim creatio ex nihilo is implicit in the
definition of creation given by Runes (1960), viz.
the production of a thing from nothing either of itself or of a subject which could sustain the finished
product. In other words, both the material as well as formal causes are produced ex nihilo, or, as in
the case of certain doctrines on the soul, the formal cause is produced ex nihilo without any intrinsic
dependence on the material cause of the total entity, man; which material cause in this case would
be the body.
This conception of creatio ex nihilo in consistent with both self-organization (section

6.4.2.2) and other-organization; hence, what appears to be essential to the concept is that
the substrate is nothing, that is, non-existent with respect to the emergent. As shown in
the above example, the nothingness of the substrate can be conceived as relative (that is,
as a local - or contextual - ontical nothing). However, it must be appreciated that
ontically-relativistic creatio ex nihilo can also be interpreted as ontically-relativistic ex
nihilo nihil fit since, clearly, in the above example, ontological-subjectivity does appear
to emerge from a prior existing substrate (which is ontologically-objective) and this
55
That is, a substrate in which such categories are neither causal nor potential.
56
Assuming, of course, that panexperientialism (chapter 1) is incorrect.
Chapter 6 Poisis
substrate as an existent is something rather than (absolutely) nothing57. (This substrate

is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the becoming of the emergent
phenomenon.) It is the appeal to apparently incommensurable ex nihilo maxims which
renders the category problem (chapter 7) intractable to analysis and the notion of
emergence problematic (section 6.4.4). Is creatio ex nihilo conceived in ontically-
absolute terms an incoherent maxim ? According to Mercer (1918), if a Creator exists,
it must presumably be something (a being) and hence, not nothing; thus, creatio ex nihilo
collapses to ex nihilo nihil fit. It is important to note that this argument is grounded in
(at least) two assumptions, viz. (1) nothing is static (void), that is, non-generative and (2)
creatio ex nihilo necessitates the existence of a creative being and hence, must be
ontically-relativistic. However, it will be shown that (i) nothing can be conceived in
dynamical terms (section 6.5.5) and (ii) that conceiving the Creator as a being (albeit,
the Supreme being) entails the collapse of creatio ex nihilo onto ex nihilo nihil fit and the
adoption of a metaphysics of beings. However, there then arises the problem of the
ontological difference between beings and Being as such (section 6.5.4).
It only remains to briefly consider the link between creation and making, the notion
under investigation in the following section. Contrary to the conventional identification
of creationism with anthropic-artificing, Sherman (1997) claims that it is "naturalism
[which is] a metaphysical position produced by the motive of technological control" (p.1)
and that "value-free thought comes out of a controlling consciousness." (p.5)
Furthermore, as he goes on to state,
although the naturalistically conceived world is value-free, naturalism is at heart a negative value
judgement, the decision that reality is not good and we will have to make it good. (p.7)
In contrast to this inference from naturalism (as opposed to from nature), Sherman
maintains that
Socrates proposes a completely axiological [or aesthetically-normative] form of causal explanation.

To explain an event is to say why it is good that it happened as it did. [Thus,] explanations do not
occur in the purely descriptive or value-free language of naturalism. (p.2)
However, Darwinists maintain that axiological (that is, normative) explanations can be
reinterpreted in naturalistic, pragmatic and adaptationist (that is, purely descriptive)
terms. According to Dennett (1995), this necessitates adopting an intentionalistic (more
specifically, functionalist) view of naturalistic evolution, albeit for epistemological
purposes only. On Sherman's view, however, this approach is problematic since there is
a necessary connection between teleology and axiology (that is, between function and
value). Additionally, Dennett's position is problematic because it is unclear whether or
not a pour soi (for-itself or teleological emergent) can be generated from an en soi (in-
itself or non-teleological substrate), viz. the category problem (chapter 7). That the origin
57
That is, the substrate is, in this particular context, at most an ontically-relative nothing as stated previously.
Chapter 6 Poisis
of life remains an outstanding problem indicates that it may also involve categorial
creatio ex nihilo with respect to teleology. In this connection, Wacome (1996) maintains
that
there is a difference between what we may call creating something and merely being causally
responsible for its existence. If someone creates something, she selects it from among the possibilities
and intends for it, rather than other possible things, to exist. (p.2)
Furthermore,
we regard a human being as having created something, and not merely causally responsible for it, so
long as enough of its relevant features are explainable by appeal to her having selected them from
among the possibilities, where what counts as ènough' and `relevant' are contextually determined.
(p.3)
The importance of intentionality (or a priori teleology) in creation (or design) will be
briefly examined in chapter 7. It should suffice at this point in the discussion to note that
on this position, computational substrates such as cellular automata (CAs) must be
viewed as created and computationally-emergent phenomena (such as CEA) as caused.
Hence, if there is a distinction between naturals and artificials (as artifactuals), with the
former viewed as (1) non-created (that is, self-existent), (2) self-created or (3) non-
anthropically-created, the distinction must be traced to the difference in ontical poisis
(becoming) associated with the substrates (or grounds) of naturality and artificiality
respectively. Herbert Spencer, writing in First Principles (1862), identified three
possible explanations for the origin of the universe, viz. (1) self-existence, (2) self-
creation (or self-organization) and (3) other-creation (or creation by external agency).
Assuming causation as a primitive (or irreducible) ontological category, Spencer
maintained that
of these the last is useless: it commits us to an infinite series of such agencies, and even then leaves
us where we were. By the second we are led into the same predicament; since .. self-creation implies
an infinite series of potential existences [whose being requires (causal) explanation in turn]. We are
obliged, therefore, to fall back on the first, which is the one commonly accepted and commonly
supposed to be satisfactory. [However,] self-existence is inconceivable. (pp.27-28)
Additionally, as stated previously, invoking a supernatural agency as a First Cause or

Aristotelian Unmoved Mover is problematic since as an agency, this cause partakes of
Being; consequently, the poisis (or coming forth) of this entity must be addressed.
Appealing to arguments based on naturalistic self-causation (Rosch,94) as in self-
organizing scenarios (section 6.4.2.2) is equally problematic since there remains the
problem of explaining why there is something rather than nothing, in this case, why there
is a circular chain of causes rather than no chain of causes at all58. Hence, the poitic
58
The answer to this question must be framed in non-causal terms since if causal, it would have to be
incorporated into the circle of causation thereby generating a new question of the same kind, ad infinitum.
Chapter 6 Poisis
question concerning the Being of the world remains (section 6.5.3). That causal
explanations of the poisis (coming-forth, bringing-forth or becoming) of naturality give
rise to apparently irresolvable problems irrespective of the causal scheme adopted
provides support for one of the central positions argued in this thesis, viz. that there is
a need to ground the causal (or ontical) in that which is both prior to causation and its
existential ground, viz. Being as such.
6.4.2.4. Making
In this section the notion of making is briefly examined. It might be argued that making
constitutes the most primordial form of ontical poisis (becoming). On this view, all
kinds of ontical poisis, for example, evolution (section 6.4.2.1), self-organization
(section 6.4.2.2) and creation (section 6.4.2.3), are held to be instantiations or particulars
of the universal category making. It might also be maintained that making is essentially
identical to production, that is, genetic (or generative) causation (section 6.4.1.3). In
support of this claim, the Collins English Dictionary, Third Edition (1991) provides the
following comprehensive list of meanings of the verb `to make' grounded in the notion
of causality:
1. to bring into being by shaping, changing, or combining materials, ideas, etc.; form or fashion;
create: to make a chair from bits of wood; make a poem; 2. to draw up, establish, or form: to make
a decision; make one's will; 3. to cause to exist, bring about, or produce: don't make a noise; 4. to
cause, compel, or induce: please make him go away; 5. to appoint or assign, as to a rank or position:
they made him chairman; 6. to constitute: one swallow doesn't make a summer; 7. (also intr.) to come
or cause to come into a specified state or condition: to make merry; make someone happy; 8. (copula)
to be or become through development: he will make a good teacher; 9. to cause or ensure the success
of: your news has made my day; 10. to amount to: twelve inches make a foot; 11. to be part of or a
member of: did she make one of the party ? 12. to serve as or be suitable for: that piece of cloth will
make a coat; 13. to prepare or put into a fit condition for use: to make a bed; 14. to be the essential
element in or part of: charm makes a good salesman; 15. to carry out, effect, or do: to make a gesture;
16. (intr.; foll. by to, as if to, or as though to) to act with the intention or with a show of doing
something: they made to go out; he made as if to hit her; 17. to use for a specified purpose: I will
make this town my base; 18. to deliver or pronounce: to make a speech; 19. to judge, reckon, or give
one's own opinion or information as to: what time do you make it ? 20. to cause to seem or represent
as being: that furniture makes the room look dark; 21. to earn, acquire, or win for oneself: to make
friends; make a fortune; 22. to engage in: make love not war; 23. to traverse or cover (distance) by
travelling: we can make a hundred miles by nightfall; 24. to arrive in time for: he didn't make the first
act of the play
Various ontical notions feature in this list including creation (in the sense of
intentionalistic or teleological human artificing) and becoming (conceived in terms of
a movement from possibility through necessity, that is, actualization of potentiality in
the Aristotelian sense). However, it should be readily apparent that the notion of
causality is implicitly considered primitive with respect to making in the above list of
definitions, thereby providing a basis upon which to formalize the latter term. In short,
it is (reductively) implied that to make is to cause, which stands in contrast to the
assertion (in section 6.4.1.3) that production (in the sense of anthropic-artificing) is the
Chapter 6 Poisis
ground of causation. Furthermore, it should be appreciated that it is primarily59 genetic

(that is, efficient) causation which is held to be characteristic of making; hence, to make
is to cause generatively, or alternatively, to produce. Again, in contradistinction to the
ontological (or existential) assertion that human production is the ground of causation,
it is maintained that ontically, production is causation and, furthermore, that causation
as such is the ground of human production (that is, anthropic-artificing or techn).
Consequently, conventional metaphysics - which identifies the ontical (productive,
causal) as the concern of ontology (defined as the study of what is) - conceives poisis
in terms of notions such as production and causation: to become, to come-forth, to bring-
forth, to be brought-forth are all defined in terms of the productive (or causal) relation
between a producer (or cause) and the produced (or effect). That ontical poisis is a
productive (or causal) notion can be shown by examining the two fundamental forms (or
modes) of poisis in Greek thought, viz. physis (naturality) and techn (artificiality).
Collingwood (1945) maintains that the Greeks conceived two sets of oppositions, viz.
what and how60, with respect to beings: (1) Physis (NLF4H) - what things are when left
to themselves vs. Techn (J,P<Z) - what human skill can make of things; (2) Physis
(NLF4H) - how things behave when left to themselves vs. Bia ($4") - how things behave
when interfered with. He goes on to list three basic meanings of physis (nature) in
Aristotelian metaphysics: (p.81)
1. The source of movement or change (which for Aristotle is in the thing itself).
2. Primitive matter.
3. Essence or form (of natural, that is, self-moving, things).
Clearly, physis (nature) is here conceived in terms of the doctrine of the four causes
(section 6.4.1.3); hence, causation must be either prior to or equiprimordial with nature.
However, to the extent that nature can be defined or explained in terms of causation, it
can be reduced to the latter. Thus, ontically-speaking, causation must be the ground of
physis; that is, physis is a mode of causation or production. According to Lovitt (1977),
for the Greeks the coming into the `present' out of the `not-present' was poisis .. This `bringing-forth'
was manifested first of all in physis, that presencing wherein the bursting-forth arose from within the
thing itself. Techn was also a form of this bringing-forth, but one in which the bursting-forth lay not
in the thing itself but in another. (p.xxiv)
Crucially, this `bursting-forth' - interpreted ontically - denotes causation, that is
59
Following Bunge (1959), final causes must also be taken into consideration. On his view, final causes are
constitutive of production because they are causes of becoming (as contrasted with Being) and they are causes
of becoming because they refer to an envisaged end or goal.
60
Interestingly, that things are - the question of Being as such and its relation to existents (that is, beings) - is
already, at this stage, tacitly passed over in favour of ontical questioning concerning the essence (or `whatness')
of existents.
Chapter 6 Poisis
production61. As Heidegger (1977) states,
the modes of occasioning, the four [causes] are at play ... within bringing-forth. Through bringing-
forth, the growing things of nature [that is, physis] as well as whatever is completed through the crafts
and the arts [that is, techn] come at any given time to their appearance. (p.11)
Again,
not only handcraft manufacture, not only artistic and poetical bringing into appearance and concrete
imagery, is a bringing-forth, poisis. Physis also, the arising of something from out of itself, is a
bringing-forth, poisis. Physis is indeed poisis in the highest sense. For what presences by means
of physis has the bursting open belonging to bringing-forth, e.g. the bursting of a blossom into bloom,
in itself (en heauti). In contrast, what is brought forth by the artisan or the artist, e.g. the silver
chalice, has the bursting open belonging to bringing-forth not in itself, but in another (en alli), in the
craftsman or artist. (pp.10-11)
Interpreted ontically (that is, causally or productively), the Greek distinction between the
bursting-forth of physis (en heauti) and that of techn (en alli) clearly anticipates
Maturana and Varela's (1980) distinction between autopoietic and allopoietic systems
respectively (Mingers,95). On this scheme, systems (chapter 3) are viewed as machines,
whereby the latter is meant "a unity in the physical space [that is, the space in which the
phenomenology of autopoiesis of living systems - or allopoiesis of non-living systems -
takes place], defined by its organization, which connotes a non-animistic outlook, and
whose dynamics is apparent." (p.136) Notions such as determinism and mechanism
(chapter 2) are held to be ontologically primitive on this framework; furthermore,
rejection of animism and a commitment to the identification of existence (or being) with
àpparent' (that is, externally-observable) dynamics or processual instantiation (via a
physical structure) of a static organization (or form) - for example, the causal closure of
the autopoietic organization - entails a reduction of becoming (that is, poisis) to
externalistic efficient causation. This assertion is supported by the following statement
of Whitaker (1995), viz. "autopoietic theory is a `systemic perspective', because it
addresses its subjects in terms of their being formal and functional wholes [emphasis
added]." (p.2) The implication is that systemicity is entailed by externality (form) and
61
This point is highly significant. It is maintained herein that interpreting `bursting-forth' in causal terms effects
a reduction of the former to the latter, blocking the interpretation of bursting-forth as incipience or originary
power (Heidegger,93b), which, according to Heidegger (1977), manifests itself as the four causes. (This
reference to manifestation is significant since it points to the hidden or concealed as a non-causal prior.)
Determining what is prior, viz. causation or origination (conceived non-causally), is crucial to determining how
emergence is to be conceived with respect to the ex nihilo maxims: on the one hand, if causation is prior, then
ex nihilo nihil fit and an ontical (productive) view of emergence must ground the ontological (existential,
hermeneutic); on the other hand, if origination is prior, then creatio ex nihilo and an ontological (that is,
existential, in the sense of non-causal or pre-causal) view of emergence must ground the ontical (causal,
productive). Alternatively, neither may have priority: under ontological-pluralism and hermeneutic-realism
(Dreyfus,91), the ontical and the ontological refer to commensurable modalities of Being. A consequence of
adopting this latter position is that it becomes possible to reconcile the ex nihilo maxims via a radical
reinterpretation of nothingness as will be shown in what follows.
Chapter 6 Poisis
mechanism (function), both of which are considered definitive with respect to the
essence of production (as efficient causation).
Maturana and Varela (1980) identify three kinds of ontical poisis (or production): (1)
autopoiesis (or self-production, that is, production of self by self), (2) allopoiesis (or
other-production, that is, production of other by self), and (3) heteropoiesis (or human-
production, that is, anthropic-artificing or production of other by humans). Autopoietic
systems can be formally defined in self-referential (or reflexive) terms as follows:
An autopoietic machine is a machine organized (defined as a unity) as a network of processes of

production (transformation and destruction) of components that produces the components which: (i)
through their interactions and transformations continuously regenerate and realize the network of
processes (relations) that produced them; and (ii) constitute it (the machine) as a concrete unity in the
space in which they (the components) exist by specifying the topolgical domain of its realization as
such a network. (pp.78-79)
Maturana and Varela list four properties associated with autopoietic systems: (1)
autonomy (or organizational homeostasis), (2) individuality (or maintenance of identity),
(3) unity (or processual self-bounding), and (4) closure (or absence of inputs and
outputs). They further maintain that
autopoietic machines are unities because, and only because, of their specific autopoietic organization:
their operations specify their own boundaries in the processes of self-production. This is not the case
with an allopoietic machine whose boundaries are defined by the observer, who by specifying its
input and output surfaces, specifies what pertains to it in its operations [emphasis added]. (p.81)
On their view, allopoietic systems are "machines that have as a product of their
functioning something different from themselves" (p.135) in contrast to autopoietic
systems which have as the product of their functioning the maintenance of self.
According to Mingers (1995), "systems which do not produce themselves are called
allopoietic, meaning òther-producing' - for example, a river or a crystal." (p.11) Again,
allopoietic systems .. do not define their own organization but depend on an observer to determine
their identity. They rely on other systems for their continued production, and the result of their activity
is something other than themselves. This is not to say that autopoietic systems cannot be treated as
allopoietic either by an observer or by other entities with which they interact. (p.38)
However, as Maturana and Varela state,
although an autopoietic machine can be treated as an allopoietic machine [by enlarging the
observational frame], this treatment does not reveal its organization as an autopoietic machine. (p.81)
From the above statements, it is clear that an allopoietic system, as well as being a
producer (or cause), can also be viewed as a produced (or effect). While producer and
produced are (organizationally) identical in autopoietic systems, they are non-identical
in allopoietic systems; this follows from the fact that only autopoietic systems are
Chapter 6 Poisis
organizationally-homeostatic. As Maturana and Varela affirm, it is possible to transform

an autopoietic system into an allopietic system by expanding the observational frame62.
Significantly, the class of allopoietic systems contains the sub-class of heteropoietic (or,
more precisely, anthropopoietic) systems. Maturana and Varela (1980) describe
heteropoiesis as "the space of human design" (p.136) and maintain that systems capable
of heteropoiesis are "organisms [that is, biological machines] that .. appear capable of
specifying some purpose in advance .. and conduct all their activities towards this
attainment" (p.85). Hence, there is a link between heteropoiesis (or human-artificing) and
teleological activity, more specifically, conscious intentionalistic design (chapter 7).
According to Harris (1965),
human artifacts are devices for bringing about willed results. They are designed by conscious beings
for specific purposes. They are deliberately planned to serve ends. They are all without exception
teleological. Any machine theory in biology is therefore crypto-teleological and any talk of
physiological or genetic mechanisms implies some form of teleology. (p.264)
On this basis, he is led to assert that there is a necessary connection between teleology
and mechanism as such, viz.
no mechanistic approach can ignore teleological aspects implicit in the presence of devices
performing specific functions however properly they are designated `mechanisms'. (p.265)
However, Maturana and Varela reject teleology (in the sense of vitalistic or mentalistic
purpose) and teleonomy (in the sense of non-vitalistic or non-mentalistic goal-
directedness) on the grounds that the latter are merely descriptive (that is, epistemic)
notions which have no bearing on the ontology of autopoietic and allopoietic machines.
As they state,
the observer puts .. machines either conceptually or concretely to some use, and thus defines a set of
circumstances that lead the machine to change, following a certain path of variations in the input.
[Hence,] the implications in terms of design alluded to by the notion of function are established by
the observer and belong exclusively to his domain of description. (pp.85-86)
On this basis, they are led to assert that the aim or purpose of a machine "lies in the
domain of the observer" (p.86). However, this position is problematic since it does not
follow that because an external observer can interpret a machine teleologically or
teleonomically that such a machine is only purposeful extrinsically, that is, observer-
relativistically (chapters 3 and 7). It is not inconsistent with Maturana and Varela's
constructivist epistemology (Mingers,95) - although it is in contradiction with their
If X6 Y denotes the productive relation between systems then in autopoietic systems X/Y and in allopoietic
62
systems XY. (An allopoietic system can be both creator and created but not with respect to itself.) It is crucial
to appreciate that not every allopoietic system can be transformed into an autopoietic system via contraction
of the observational reference frame.
Chapter 6 Poisis
relativistic ontology - to hold that a machine has an intrinsic teleology or teleonomy

which is objectively indiscernible to an external observer.
On the basis of the concept of production in the metaphysics of Aristotle and the
autopoietic systems theory of Maturana and Varela (1980), the notion of making can be
formalized as a triadic relation involving three elements, viz. productant, substratum and
product. This relation is, in turn, composed from the causal relations holding between
the components. On this scheme, autopoiesis occurs when productant and product
coincide63; allopoiesis, when productant and product differ; and heteropoiesis, when the
productant is a human artificer and hence, different to the product. The triadic relation
for allopoietic and heteropoietic systems is shown in Fig 6.2(a) and for autopoietic
systems in Fig 6.2(b):
PRODUCT PRODUCT
Fi
M, Fi
PRODUCTANT M
PRODUCTANT/SUBSTRATUM
E, Fo E, Fo
SUBSTRATUM
(a) (b)
M=material, E=efficient, Fo=formal, Fi=final causation
Fig 6.2 Triadic relationality in (a) allopoietic, heteropoietic and (b) autopoietic systems.
In concluding this discussion on making, it is worthwhile briefly contrasting the ontical

interpretation of poisis (becoming) originally conceived by the Greeks (specifically
Aristotle) and subsequently independently developed by Maturana and Varela with
another interpretation, viz. that presented by Plotinus in the Enneads. The justification
for such a comparison is that the thought of Plotinus can be viewed as on the way to
Heidegger with respect to an ontological interpretation of poisis (that is, an
interpretation of becoming in non-causal terms). As stated previously, ontical poisis can
63
As Barnes (1982) observes, in Aristotelian causality efficient causes do not always precede their effects; in fact,
simultaneity of efficient causes and effects is the norm. Hence, it is legitimate to maintain that for certain
systems, the actuality of efficient causality is in the product since in such cases movement is in the thing
moved. This allows for a synthesis of the Aristotelian notion of production and autopoietic systems theory.
Chapter 6 Poisis
be identified with production or efficient causation, that is, the impact of one material
(or physical) being on another, whether locally by direct contact or non-locally via the
action of fields (chapter 2). In contrast, Deck (1967) maintains that, for Plotinus,
production is an idealistic (that is, mentalistic) process grounded in contemplation:
Nature contemplates. The nature in trees, plants, and the earth contemplates. Further, nature produces
trees, plants, and the earth by contemplating. Contemplation is thus productive - productive of
concrete, substantial realities. (p.19)
Only the One, which is beyond the duality of knowledge, seemingly does not contemplate, and
produces the Nous [the Intelligence or Knower that belongs to the realm of ideas] in a different way.
In all other instances, producing comes about through contemplating. (pp.19-20)
On Plotinus' view, ordinary making - involving learning and planning - is praxis. As

Deck states,
a maker, a man of praxis, must seek to produce; he must `resolve' to produce. He must act, either
directly or through others, in the physical universe in a physical way, producing sensible things by
sensible means. He uses hands, levers, tools. He is obviously a maker. (p.116)
This type of making is to be contrasted with that associated with the instantiation of
forms (as in Platonism) via contemplation which Plotinus refers to as poisis. As Deck
points out, the contrast between poisis and praxis "is clearly not, as it is in Aristotle ..
one between making and doing, between artistic activity and moral activity." (p.120) He
describes the essence of poisis as follows:
A knower which has firm possession by knowledge of the true beings is automatically productive ..
[Thus,] the sensible things fall forth from or come to the producer, without a movement of the
producer toward the sensible things .. The imitation [by sensible matter] happens without the imitated
exerting any effort to make it happen. This is poisis. (p.120)
[E]ffects in the physical world are inferior which do not flow from a knowledge that is above learning,
planning, or seeking. Praxis is inferior to poisis. (p.121)
Furthermore,
the common notion of making .. allows not only for the action of a physical agent upon a physical
thing, but also for a `thinker' or `planner' as an agent. Plotinus' `praxis' corresponds almost entirely
with making understood in this broader sense. It is real making.
[By contrast,] poisis, the making done by the more real producers, the Nous, the soul, and nature,
is not merely connected with knowledge, with contemplation, but is identical with them. In the
doctrine of poisis, Plotinus has extended significantly the notion of making: poisis is more real
making.
Poisis, as Plotinus sees it, does not correspond exactly to Aristotle's efficient causality. But as a
genuine making, which seems analogous to ordinary making and is not coincident with either formal
or final causality, it can be called a real efficient causality. (pp.128-129)
Chapter 6 Poisis
As conceived by Plotinus, poisis is similar to absolute creatio ex nihilo (section 6.4.2.3)

which is described by Aquinas in Summa Theologica (Part I, Question 45, Article 2) as
follows:
In things which are made without movement, to become and to be already made are simultaneous
[and] since creation is without movement, a thing is being created and is already created at the same
time
This is because both creatio ex nihilo, conceived in absolute terms, and poisis as defined
by Plotinus both involve making without movement, that is, without efficient causation
as conventionally understood64. For this reason, Deck wonders
whether a `making' which takes place on these terms is making in any recognizable sense. Can there
be said to be making when the maker does not attend at all to the thing made ? Yet Plotinus calls it
making, and consistently holds that it is a type of making superior to ordinary making. (p.120)
He concludes by asserting that
Plotinus has seen an extension of `making' into regions where Aristotle did not suppose that it existed.
And if we are at all able to appreciate Plotinus' argument that the Nous is more real than the sensible
world, we will also understand that the Nous is more properly an effcient cause than are efficient
causes in the sensible world, that it is, as he says, the ontic maker, poits onts. (p.128)
Plotinus' scheme is interesting because his view of efficient causation and his concept of
poisis as `falling forth' differ radically from Aristotle and the tradition (which includes
Maturana and Varela in this context). According to Dreyfus (1992),
a product must be produced in some way; and if it isn't produced in some definite way, the only
alternative seems to be that it is produced magically. (p.232)
If beings are viewed ontically, the relation between them must be productive, that is,
causal; however, the grounding of beings and the causal relation between them in Being
as such is then ignored. Clearly, if Being as such is not a being and hence, non-causally
defined (since causality is a relation between beings), the relation between Being as such
and beings65 must also be non-causal. Thus, if beings are viewed ontologically, the link
between beings and Being as such must be both non-productive and, more importantly,
the existential ground of (or condition for) production and causation as such. Contrary
to the implications of Dreyfus' assertion, however, this does not entail the endorsement
64
This point is subtle: according to Plotinus, poisis is a form of efficient causation in that it is productive, that
is, generative (giving rise to beings). However, clearly this form of efficient causation is not a movement
between physical beings (although it is certainly a movement between ontical beings as such). Furthermore,
it is possible to reverse the terms of discussion and speak of existential movements (between beings and Being
as such) which are non-causal.
65
Relations are also beings because as existents, they partake of Being as such.
Chapter 6 Poisis
of `magic' since the latter is itself a form of (non-naturalistic) causation whereas

existential (or ontological) grounding is non-causal.
6.4.3. Computational Poisis
In the previous section, four kinds of ontical poisis (becoming) were briefly examined,
viz. evolution, self-organization, creation and making. In this section, the essence of
ontical poisis in CA-computationalism is investigated with reference to these four kinds.
It is maintained herein that to the extent that evolution, creation, self-organization and
making are processes which can be defined in terms of externality, efficient causation
and operational necessity (or mechanistic-determinism), CA-computationalism supports
these kinds of ontical poisis (becoming)66; further, that computationalism is not merely
the means by which ontical poisis as such may be instantiated (or realized), but that
ontical poisis is computation, viz. the "strong" interpretation of computationally
emergent artificiality (or CEA) from a poitic (or productive) perspective.
In the context of a discussion on the essence of machines and mechanism (chapter 2),
Kampis (1991) maintains that
a key property is invariance. Whatever intricate courses the processes of mechanistic systems may
take, they always remain within the limits of the same transition function. Their entities are also
invariant and eternal. They never become worn-out or shabby, they never cease to exist. The Universe
never gains or loses anything from its paraphernalia. Time disappears from this Universe; the present,
the past and the future are simultaneously available for the thought. All states coexist mathematically.
The dynamics of the system is transformed into the statics of generative formal structures that span
the trajectory (or the computation sequence) as a geometrical (or logical) object. We are left with a
motionless Universe where motion was replaced by non-motion. (p.189)
Furthermore,
machines are natural examples of [created as opposed to creative] systems. When making a machine,
one literally creates a little universe with its own rules, one which will produce no unexpected
behaviours. A machine will only do what we tell it to do (as long as it keeps its integrity as a machine
and does not break down). It will only reflect the information that we have put into it during its design
and manufacturing process. A machine is understood as a special system whose parts stand in a pre-
fixed relationship with each other. The transparency of machines is not a property of their material,
since ultimately a single atom is perhaps as little transparent as the whole Universe; machine
transparency has its origin in the given phenomenal domain and abstraction where the machine has
but a delimited potential. It can only unfold a single course of pre-defined (and hence known) events.
(p.194)
Hence, an essential characteristic of machines - and this paradigmatically includes

computers, computational substrates such as cellular automata (or CAs) and
computational ontologies such as CA-computationalism since computers are formally
66
Additionally, such processes must, of course, be computable (chapter 2).
Chapter 6 Poisis
defined in terms of Turing machines (chapter 2) - is operational necessity, that is,

invariance or determinism; furthermore, an operational necessity either (1) imposed from
without by another (that is, allopoietically) or (2) simply existent67. To this extent, an
artifactual computer cannot be a self-organizing noumenon (substrate), although it can
support the emergence of phenomena (emergents) which might be interpreted
(epistemically) as self-organizing or autopoietic68 . (It would appear that CEA is non-
autopoietic and hence, metaphysically insufficient since not self-sufficient. However, to
the extent that CEA converges on computionally emergent naturality or CEN (section
6.2.1) under assumptions of metaphysical realism, and given that CEN is a non-
artifactual (that is, non-anthropically artifactual) ground for CEA, this argument does
not necessarily hold.)
Mercer (1917) maintains that there is an intimate connection between causality,

determinism and mechanism:
necessity, in a general sense, signifies a state or condition that cannot be otherwise than it is. As
applied to the happenings of the universe, it assumes the invariable and universal sway of natural law.
Given a cause A, the effect B must inevitably follow, at all places and at all times. Necessity, thus
viewed, is mechanical - it is, in a double sense, à dead certainty' [emphasis added]. (p.142)
However, he may interpreted as contesting the validity of the computationalist thesis in

the context of naturality, in maintaining that "our universe is not a ready-made system
which merely works on like a machine, but is a universe in the making which manifests
development and growth - it is the scene of continuous creation." (pp.1-2) In support of
this critique of necessity, Bunge (1959) states that
if the accompanying conditions are contingent upon the cause [then the formula if C happens under
the same conditions, then (and only then) E is always produced by it] expresses more than a simple,
direct causal bond: the efficient cause involved in it acts in combination with the processes inherent
in the object concerned, and the cause must then be regarded as the unchainer or triggerer of a
process rather than as the necessary and sufficient producer of the effect. (p.49)
In order that a cause may produce its normal effect, other causes (background causes, or conditions)
must concur; the interference of new circumstances, a change in the background, may prevent a
causal connection from taking place - and this is a source of possibility. (p.104)
Dreyfus (1979) argues similarly in discussing the necessity of incorporating ceteris

paribus - "all (other) things being equal" - conditions in causal accounts. However, in
67
That is, neither allopoietic (other-produced) nor autopoietic (self-produced) but nonpoietic (or uncaused).
68
For example, under CA-computationalism, NRUCA substrates can support the emergence of supervenient
phenomena which at the phenomenal level can be viewed as self-organizing (chapter 5). Again, while the
NRUCA noumenon itself is either (1) allopoietic (other-produced) or (2) simply (and irreducibly) existent - it
cannot be autopoietic (or self-produced) - its phenomena can be interpreted as autopoietic at that level.
Chapter 6 Poisis
CEA, processes are ìnherent' or intrinsic only if viewed endosystemically (that is, from
the perspective of the processes themselves) and post-genetically69. With respect to CA-
computationalism, intrinsicality and contingency holds locally at the level of individual
cells (FSMs); globally, CAs are governed by extrinsicality and necessity (chapters 2 and
5). Maturana and Varela (1980) maintain that
the organization of a machine, be it autopoietic or allopoietic, only states relations between

components and rules for their interactions and transformations in a manner that specifies the
conditions of emergence of the different states of the machine which, then, arise as a necessary
outcome whenever such conditions occur. Thus. the notions of purpose and function have no
explanatory value in the phenomenological domain which they pretend to illuminate because they
do not refer to processes indeed operating in the generation of any of its phenomena [emphasis
added]. (p.86)
While they are correct in implying operationally-necessary, bottom-up causation in the

context of CAs, their characterization of the ontology of artifactual CA substrates is
incorrect since it is clearly the case that final causality (or teleology) is manifested at the
local (or substrate) level in the anthropically-specified (or given) functionality of the
state-transition function. (Moreover, since CAs are deterministic, causality at the global
(CA or phenomenal) level is supervenient on causality at the local (FSM or substrate)
level; hence, global final causation is derived from local final causation via (1)
specification of the CA boundary conditions, inter-cell connectivity and state-transition
function, and (2) initialization of the CA lattice state.)
Bunge (1959) defines causal determinism (or causation) as "determination of the effect
by the efficient (external) cause." (p.18) Closely related and, according to Bunge,
erroneously conflated with causation, is mechanical determinism (or mechanism), that
is, "determination of the consequent by the antecedent usually with the addition of
efficient causes and mutual actions." (p.18) Common to both types of determinism -
which differ only in that the former is an injective (or one-one mapping) while the latter
is a surjective (or many-one mapping)70 - is efficient, that is, external or other causation.
As Bunge states,
the causal principle is a particular case of the principle of determinacy [and] essentially obtains when
determination is effected in a unique or unambiguous way by external conditions. (p.27)
Given the connection between causation, mechanism, determinism and computation, it

is correct to infer that yet another essential characteristic of computationalism - as
indicated in the discussion of operational necessity - is externality of relation: in CA-
computationalism, the relation between cells in the lattice is ontically-objective and non-
69
Exosystemically, the Being of artificiality is (allopoietically) given by the artificer and hence, extrinsic.
70
Formal definitions of injection, surjection and bijection are presented in the Appendix.
Chapter 6 Poisis
constitutive with respect to cell ontology; hence, CA-computationalism is essentially

ontically-dualistic, the duality being that of cells (in particular states) and the relations
between them. Furthermore, as Bunge states,
as understood in modern times, causal determinism asserts the universal operation of efficient
causation. Now, by definition, of all kinds of cause, the efficient cause is the motive or active one;
it is, moreover, an agent acting on things ab extrinseco and one that cannot act on itself. The efficient
cause is, in short, an external compulsion; hence, an essential mark of (efficient) causation is
externality. (p.174)
In the context of CA-computationalism this position appears problematic since the state-
transition function operates on a purely formal (syntactic, structural) basis and is,
therefore, extrinsic in the sense of ontically-objective71 (chapters 4 and 7) and yet (in
many CAs) it is defined in self-referential terms72. However, while it is indeed the case
that, locally, the current state of a cell in the CA lattice contributes to the determination
of its next state, all CA parameters (that is, state-transition function, initial lattice state,
boundary conditions etc) are specified extrinsically. According to Bunge, "the doctrine
of causality holds [that] a thing can acquire its determinations solely by the action of
efficient causes external to it" (p.198). This applies to artifactual self-referential systems
(such as the CA substrate supporting CEA) since their originary being is given (`thrown
out') by the artificer in the role of òther', viz. extrinsic, efficient cause. This
interpretation is implicitly supported by Bunge who states that
when carried consistently to its extreme consequences, the doctrine of efficient causality may lead
to indeterminism; it could not be otherwise, since the scholastic concept of quality and alteration as
accidentia that are alien to the essence of things, and that are stamped on them from the outside like
removable tags, is complementary to the belief that nothing (save God) can be self-caused, but
everything must be determined ab extrinseco by something else. (p.202)
Hence, while efficient causation is consistent with the view that the relation between
causes and effects is necessary, it entails holding that the properties associated with
causal events are externally given or artifactual; this follows from the fact that in ontical
poisis (becoming), substances (or causes) are held to be essential (in the sense of
primitive or irreducible and necessary) whereas qualities are held to be accidental (in the
sense of derivative or reducible and contingent). Given that CA-computationalism is
essentially identical to efficient causation, it appears that all properties associated with
computation must be determined simultaneously with the specification of the respective
CA parameters. Crucially, given that efficient causation is essentially òther' causation
in the sense of externalistic or ontically-objective causation, it follows that computation
must also be externalistic or ontically-objective. Hence, in the CA-computationalism
71
Although, according to Bunge (1959), formal causation is viewed (along with material causation) as intrinsic
or internal on the Aristotelian scheme of causation (p.177).
72
In such CAs, the next state of a cell is a function of the current state of neighbouring cells and of the cell itself.
Chapter 6 Poisis
associated with CEA, quality follows essence which is externally given (that is,
artificed).
Bunge (1959) maintains that
self-movement and the corresponding self-determination are just the opposite of causal determination;
indeed, whatever is spontaneous in some respect and to some extent is not caused - though it is not
therefore indeterminate. (p.49)
As stated previously, the self-referentiality of the state-transition function associated with

certain CAs supports the interpretation of such systems as locally autopoietic or self-
determining; consequently, it is possible to view CAs as non-causal (Cariani,89)
(Kampis,91). Given that causality is held to be both primitive (irreducible) and
externalistic (ontically-objective) and given that, globally, CA-computationalism is
equivalent to efficient causation (that is, allopoiesis or other-determination), it might be
inferred that, locally, the non-causality (autopoiesis or self-determination) of CAs is
internalistic or ontically-subjective. On this basis, it would appear that CA-
computationalism and CEA can solve the category problem (chapter 7), viz. the problem
of generating ontological subjectivity from an ontologically-objective substrate.
However, the above conclusion is a non sequitur since it is grounded in an erroneous
assumption, viz. that the connection between the notion of `self' and ontological
subjectivity is both logically necessary and mutually implicative (that is, self and ontical-
subjectivity are coextensive terms). Close examination of what is meant by `self' in
mechanistic theories of self-organization and autopoiesis such as that presented by
Maturana and Varela (sections 6.4.2.4 and 6.6.5) clearly and definitively establishes that
what is necessary and sufficient for self-hood on such schemes is reflexive relationality:
The mechanistic concept of `self' is essentially topological (structural, formistic) as
opposed to experiential; hence, the question of ontological subjectivity simply does not
arise. (Interestingly, Rosen (1997) argues for an interpretation of experiential selfhood
which is consistent with topological selfhood. Appealing to `higher-order' mathematical
structures such as the Klein bottle as concrete means by which to clarify the paradoxical
nature of the ontological unity underlying the ontical subject-object duality, he maintains
that
this paradoxical body would stand before me in such a way as also to stand within me. It would
present itself to me from the inner core of itself and I would recognize that core as my own. That is
to say, the three-dimensional object and the dimension constituting my lived subjectivity would be
utterly open to one another, would permeate each other in an unobstructed, boundless exchange.
(p.10)
On this basis, he suggests that
the `fourth dimension' needed to complete the formation of the Klein bottle engages the inner
dimension of human being; it is not just another arena for reflection, one that stretches before us;
rather, it is folded within us, entailing the prereflective depths of our subjectivity. (p.13)
Chapter 6 Poisis
It must be appreciated, however, that this scheme cannot be realized computationally;

this follows from the fact that computationalism is globally - and hence, essentially -
externalistic (that is, ontically-objective) whereas Rosen's concept of Being is prior to
the internal-external (or subject-object) duality.)
It is worthwhile examining the notion of self-organization (or autopoiesis) more closely

since, causally- or ontically-speaking, it is a necessary condition for "strong" CEA. In
this respect, the observations of Ashby (1962), who identifies the essence of mechanism
with "law-abiding" behaviour and "regularity" (p.61), are highly significant. Ashby
maintains that
a `machine' is that which behaves in a machine-like way, namely, that its internal state, and the state
of its surroundings, defines uniquely the next state it will go to. (p.261)
It should be noted that (1) "internal state" in the above statement should be interpreted
topologically, that is, consistent with the notion of ontically-objective (and non-
experiential) form (shape, structure, syntax) and (2) "defines uniquely" implies
determinism or necessity. As Lucas (1997a) states in the context of CAs and random
boolean networks, "the attractors of a system are uniquely determined by the state
transition properties of the nodes (their logic) and the actual system interconnections
[that is, the functional topology]." (p.7) Ashby denies that machines can be self-
organizing on the basis of the following argument:
Define the set S of [machine] states so as to specify which machine we are talking about. The
òrganization' must then be identified with f, the mapping of S into S that the basic drive of the
machine (whatever force it may be) imposes. Now the logical relation here is that f determines the
changes of S:- f is defined as the set of couples (si,sj) such that the internal state of the system will
force state si to change to sj. To allow f to be a function of the state is to make nonsense of the whole
concept. (pp.267-268)
As stated previously, it might be argued that at the global level of a CA, self-
organization (or autopoiesis) is impossible since the state-transition function is both fixed
(static) and externally specified. Only by postulating some kind of scheme involving
meta-rules73 (Cariani,89) (Ali,98a) can the global state-transition function change.
However, with respect to the CA rule, such meta-rules must be considered exosystemic
or external to the CA system: If a metarule is incorporated into a CA, the resulting
extended system must be viewed as globally other-organized (or allopoietic) since both
CA and metarule are externally-specified or extrinsic74. This point has been alternatively
73
Informally, a metarule can be recursively defined as a rule which determines either (1) how the state-transition
rule associated with a CA changes or (2) how a `lower order' metarule changes.
74
For this reason, a necessary condition for open-ended emergence in CAs with finite lattices is existence of a
bidirectionally infinite hierarchy of transition primitives (Ali,98a). (On such a scheme, there is no distinction
between primitive state-transition functions and meta-rules since states are rules and rules are states - hence,
Chapter 6 Poisis
stated by Ashby as follows:
we start with the set S of states, and assume that f changes, to g say. So we really have a variable, "(t)
say, a function of time that had at first the value f and later the value g. This change .. cannot be
ascribed to any cause in the set S; so it must have come from some outside agent, acting on the system
S as input. If the system is to be in some sense `self-organizing', the `self' must be enlarged to include
this variable ", and, to keep the whole bounded, the cause of "'s change must be in S (or "). Thus the
appearance of being `self-organizing' can be given only by the machine S being coupled to another
machine (of one part) .. Then the part S can be `self-organizing' within the whole S+". (pp.268-269)
On this basis, he concludes that
only in the partial and strictly qualified sense can we understand that a system is `self-organizing'
without being self-contradictory. Since no system can correctly be said to be self-organizing, and
since use of the phrase `self-organizing' tends to perpetuate a fundamentally confused and
inconsistent way of looking at the subject, the phrase is probably better allowed to die out. (p.269)
Notwithstanding such criticisms, it is worthwhile pressing the issue and considering the
following: As stated previously in section 6.4.2.4, Maturana and Varela (1980) maintain
that man-made machines (or artifacts) such as cars are not autopoietic since
[although] there is an organization given in terms of a concatenation of processes, yet, these processes
are not processes of production of the components which specify the car as a unity since the
components of a car are produced by other processes which are independent of the organization of
the car and its operation. (p.79)
The above statement raises an important question with respect to the poitic status of
computationally emergent artificiality (or CEA): given that human artifacts are, by
definition, heteropoietic, can human artifacts (more specifically, machines) capable of
supporting universal construction and self-replication (chapter 4) such as specific CA-
structures embedded within UCAs (chapter 5) also be autopoietic since they are,
apparently, capable of self-organization ? If the issue remains confined to consideration
of phenomena and substrate ontology is ignored, UCAs can indeed be held to support the
emergence of autopoietic systems, viz. a form of computational-autopoiesis
(McMullin,97). However, as Maturana and Varela state
allopoietic machines have an identity that depends on the observer and is not determined through their
operation, because its product is different from themselves. (pp.80-81)
Hence, CAs cannot - at the level of the substrate - be autopoietic since the identity of
CAs (initial and boundary conditions, state-transition rules etc) are specified by an
a `Janus-faced' (Koestler,78) ontology beyond the duality of substance and process - interpreted at the
appropriate level in the hierarchy.) However, such a hierarchy is globally static; a potentiality of process
necessitating existence of a local agency capable of `cutting' a finite hierarchy from the infinite whole and,
thereby, actualizing the processual potentiality.
Chapter 6 Poisis
external artificer75. Thus, at the determining (or defining) ontical level (that is, at the
level of the substrate), CAs are allopoietic systems. Given the link between allopoiesis
and ontical techn or artifactuality, and the distinction between the latter and physis or
naturality (section 6.4.2.3), it appears that CA-computationalism cannot support the
emergence of artifactual analogues (in the sense of realizations) of natural phenomena
and hence, computationalism is not a sufficient metaphysical basis for "strong"
artificiality. However, this argument is problematic since, as stated previously in section
6.4.2.4, autopoietic systems can be converted into allopoietic systems via a shift in the
observational frame. Hence, there is a need to consider the distinction between physis
(naturality) and techn (artificiality) from a different perspective, one which is prior (or
posterior) to the epistemic self-other (or subject-object) distinction associated with
Maturana and Varela's (1980) framework.
In concluding this section, it is worthwhile briefly re-examining the possibilities for

production (that is, ontical poisis) on CA-computationalism. Since the notion of
production is closely tied to that of efficient or genetic causation (section 6.4.2.4), it
follows that the limitations associated with this kind of causation must be duplicated
within computationalism. Significantly, Bunge (1959) maintains that "causation is
insufficient to produce qualitative changes" although "it usually does take part in them."
(p.198) Given the above identification of computation wth efficient causation, it follows
that computation is insufficient to produce qualitative change. Consequently, as stated
previously, given the ontical-objectivity (or externality) of computation, CA-
computationalism cannot support the emergence of ontological subjectivity; hence,
computationalism is not a sufficient metaphysical basis on which to ground the
emergence of artifactual analogues of natural phenomena: CEA is only partially
isomorphic with naturality. According to Bunge, "only the study of inner processes in
their actual contexts explains satisfactorily the emergence of novelty." (p.186) He goes
on to assert that a commitment to a substance-predicate metaphysics "exclude[s] the
emergence of authentic novelty in the sum total; [it] just allow[s] for the circulation, not
the apearance of novelty." (p.199) Again, "for mechanism, `higher' [as in èmergent'] can
only mean more complex, never qualitatively richer." (p.208) Crucially, this argument
applies to CA-computationalism since CAs are readily interpreted in substance-predicate
terms with cells (FSMs) corresponding to substances and the set of states associated with
each cell corresponding to the predicates that attach to substances. Interestingly, Bunge
anticipates Simon's (1981) implicit criticism of the possibilities for emergence in formal
and computational systems (chapter 2), in maintaining that
productivity is as absent from mathematics as from the Humean formula of causation. (p.45)
75
If the CA in question is an anthropo-artifact, it follows (trivially) that the proximate artificer is human; if nature
is a CA, that is, if CEN (section 6.3.1) is true, it follows that the artificer must be God (or some another
embedding CA).
Chapter 6 Poisis
This point is clarified as follows:
if the hypothetical patients on which the causal agents act are passive things incapable of spontaneity
or self-activity - incapable, in short, of adding something of their own to the causal bond - then it
follows that, in a sense, effects preexist in their causes. (p.203)
As stated previously, it might be argued that since the current state of a cell (FSM)
contributes to the determination of its next state, then this next state (effect) does not
preexist in its previous state and the states of neighbouring cells (cause). However, since
state-transition function, cell connectivity (that is, topology of inter-cell relations), initial
state and boundary conditions - in short, all CA parameters - are determined (specified
or given) externally, effect does indeed follow cause and hence, Bunge's statement does
apply to CA-computationalism. Consequently, Kanada and Hirokawa (1994) are correct
in contesting Maturana and Varela's (1980) deterministic machine conception of self-
organization (that is, autopoiesis) and, implicitly, the notion that computationally-
emergent phenomena are, in some ontical sense, autonomous with respect to the
artificers of their computational substrates (noumena):
the growth of a self-organizing system is autonomous, and, thus, its behaviour is unpredictable, or
it is observed as nondeterministic or driven by noise that comes from the outside of the system.
However, these properties are not sufficient conditions for self-organization, of course. If the
behaviour is predictable, i.e., observed as deterministic, it is not a self-organizing system, but the
organization is fully controlled by external laws or rules. In particular, in the case of computational
systems, deterministic systems are (indirectly) organized by humans, because the rules, i.e., the
programs, are written by humans. This does not constitute self-organizing computation. (p.84)
Finally, according to Bunge
the qualitative immutability asserted by causalism means that one cannot expect to obtain, from a
given set of causes, whatever effect one's fancy events, but only those effects that the given conditions
can possibly bring out .. [T]his is included in the general principle according to which nothing is
produced ex nihilo and in arbitrary ways [consistent with] the essence of general determinism
However, it must be appreciated that this principle, viz. ex nihilo nihil fit, is being
asserted in an ontical, that is, causal context; given recognition of this fact, it does not
follow - of necessity - that this maxim also applies with respect to the grounding of
causation in Being as such.
6.4.4. Emergence and the Ex Nihilo Maxims
In this final section on ontical poisis (becoming), it is argued that the notion of
emergence (chapter 3) - as ontically (that is, causally or productively) interpreted - is
grounded in incommensurable ex nihilo maxims, viz. ex nihilo nihil fit, that is, nothing
comes from nothing or - alternatively - something comes from something and creatio ex
nihilo, that is, creation (of something) from nothing. However, before the basic argument
Chapter 6 Poisis
is examined, it is worthwhile briefly reviewing some formulations of the notion of

emergence from an ontical perspective.
Emmeche et al. (1997) maintain that
emergence seems to require patterns whose stability and reproducability over time is assured by self-
organization. (pp.10-11)
On their view, autopoiesis constitutes a necessary condition for the existential (or
organizational) homeostasis of emergents. However, given that an autopoietic system can
always be reinterpreted allopoietically (thereby undermining the contention that
autopoiesis is ontical as opposed to merely epistemical) and given that autopoiesis cannot
explain originary ontical poisis (becoming) since it cannot explain the existential origin
of the autopoietic organization as such, it should be clear that autopoiesis does not
provide a sufficient framework within which to conceptualize emergence. According to
Ross (1985), the relation between substrate and emergent is isomorphic with that
between medium and message. Furthermore, consistent with Polanyi (1966) and Elstob
(1984), Ross maintains that the emergent, while causally-supervenient76 on the substrate,
is not causally-determined by it; on his view, the material substrate (hyle) is regarded -
implicitly following Aristotle - as a source of potentiality awaiting actualization and
òbedient' with respect to the emergent:
Something, whether a human or a message, is emergent with respect to a medium (or class of media)
just in case it cannot be except in the medium, although its structure is inaccessible from the medium,
which has only òbediential potency' for the structure. (p.227)
Importantly, for Ross, while the medium must be ontically-concrete (that is, material or
physical), the emergent phenomenon can be ontically-abstract (that is, non-material or
non-physical)77:
76
Elstob's conception of supervenience differs somewhat from the standard formulation which Chalmers (1996)
describes as follows: "B-properties [high-level] supervene on A-properties [low-level] if no two possible
situations are identical with respect to their A-properties while differing in their B-properties." (p.33) In terms
of modal (or possible worlds) logic, supervenience describes a simple (bottom-up) entailment relation. Formally
(or mathematically), supervenience describes an injective or surjective mapping (Appendix) from the set of A-
properties to the set of B-properties; such functions entail a commitment to determinism with respect to the
relation between properties. For Elstob (1984), phenomena are autonomous with respect to their `noumenal'
substrates (chapter 3), which are held to be ontically necessary but insufficient conditions for the emergence
of the former. On this scheme, bottom-up determinism is rejected and a radical conception of emergence similar
to that formulated by Polanyi (1966, 1968) is postulated. Given the distinction between the conventional
interpretation of supervenience and Elstob's more radical formulation of the concept, it is, perhaps, more
appropriate to refer to the latter in terms of `downwards' or `retroactive' causation (chapter 3) and the idea of
`causal-harnessing' or supersistence.
77
With respect to the maxim, "the whole is more than the sum of the parts", Emmeche et al. (1997) hold that
"what is `more' about the whole is a specific series of spatial and morphological relationships between the
Chapter 6 Poisis
a system realization that is nonrecursive requires a medium for being .. and components .. but need
not itself be a material being. Thus a statement, a thought, a conjecture, can really exist, expressed
in sound or writing, and not be a material thing. That snaps the stranglehold of materialism on being.
We have being materially but are not just material things. (p.236)
Consistent with Meehl and Sellars (1956) and Searle (1992), Ross describes such `system
realizations' (emergent phenomena) in terms of laws which are nonreducible to those
governing the substrate:
Emergent systems satisfy laws for their successive transformational states that their modules and
ultimate components do not. One reason for this is that the same states could have had other
components. (p.237)
He goes on to state that
to say something èmerges' in nature is to say, not by what process it appears, but rather that it
subsists in material components, as does a radio, but, unlike a radio, ìnaccessibly from them' .. and
independently of them as individuals. (p.228)
Ross defines subsistence as "existence in a medium but not in a subject" (p.227). To be

a subsistent emergent is to be a subject and not be in a subject; hence, on his view, and
contrary to Alexander (1920) and the tradition78, emergents are not mere (epi-
)phenomenal predicates (or qualities) which attach to noumenal subjects (or substances),
but subjects (or substances) in their own right, albeit supervenient on substrates which
provide the necessary yet insufficient conditions for their emergence79. Ross maintains
that
parts." They further maintain that "if form, structure, relation, Gestalt etc. are no longer considered as
subjectivist features but rather as objectively existing then form and matter may unite as equally objective."
(p.17) However, it is only in potential subsistence (as in Plato's realm of ideas) that forms are objectively
identifiable since it is only in potentiality that they are discontinuous and separable. According to Whitehead
(1978), actualized forms are contingent and contextually (that is, spatio-temporally) embedded within a nexus
of existential relations between actual occasions (existents) whereas potential forms (èternal objects') are
necessary, context-free and ingressive (or ontically contributive) in the production of contingent, context-
sensitive actualities. For Whitehead, structure is neither absolutely objective nor absolutely subjective; rather
it is both subjective and objective, the relation between the components of the subject-object duality being
temporally-emergent as opposed to coexistential.
78
Interestingly, Emmeche et al. (1997) imply that the tradition asserts precisely the opposite: "it is more or less
explicitly assumed that emergence gives rise to not only new properties, but a new natural kind, defined by the
new set of properties. But how many new properties does it take to constitute a new natural kind ? [emphasis
added]" (p.7)
79
Significantly, Emmeche et al. (1997) distinguish between (1) historical and (2) structural explanations of
emergence maintaining that "there will always exist some conditions for the creation of a new property. The
question is: will these conditions exist autonomously, so to speak side by side with the created properties, or
does the act of creation in the same moment create conditions and product ?" (p.8)
Chapter 6 Poisis
emergent evolution .. is a contingent though inevitable outcome given the right initial conditions,
constants, quantities, and such. (p.244)
Contingency is manifested by the fact that (1) the relation between substrate and
emergent is one of correlation and not of reduction80 and (2) the kind of Being associated
with the emergent is not determined by that associated with the substrate. Controversially
(from the perspective of the tradition), Ross further claims that
when a system of systems becomes complex enough, it is organized by a different energy that acts
in parallel with the physical forces of the components, converting physical action and chemical events
into parallel phenomena and vice-versa, just as meaning can supervene (nonreductively) on the
physics of printing. (p.238)
On his view, psychic (or mental, as in conscious and volitional) energy is said to be
"from the being of God". (p.239) This scheme is problematic for (at least) two reasons,
rejection of naturalism notwithstanding: firstly, it is ontically dualistic since it involves
two kinds of energy (physical and psychical). Hence, all the problems traditionally
associated with substance dualism arise in connection with this framework81 (chapter 4);
secondly, grounding psychical energy in the Being of God (implicitly understood as a
necessary or First Cause) is problematic since if God is conceived ontically as a being
among beings (albeit as the Supreme being), there remains the question of the
ontological difference between beings and Being as such (section 6.5.4).
It was shown in section 6.4.2.3 that creatio ex nihilo and ex nihilo nihil fit can be
rendered commensurable if interpreted epistemically. However, it was maintained (in the
same section) that these maxims can also be rendered commensurable if held to be
ontically-relativistic (or local). On an emergentist framework, this is necessary because
emergents (for example, experiential qualia which are ontically-subjective) are
irreducibly supervenient82 on pre-existent substrates (for example, matter which is held
80
According to Emmeche et al. (1997), "to describe an event is not an explanation." (p.13)
81
It will be shown that the problem of dualism can be dissolved by existentially abstracting from instances of
substances (physical, psychical) to substance as such; while individual substances are beings, substance as
such is grounded in Being as such and hence, individual substances are unifiable under Being. Arguments
against dualism appealing to (1) thermodynamic principles such as the First Law of thermodynamics (chapter
4) which refers to the conservation of energy (Griffin,98) and (2) the closure of the physical universe
(Chalmers,96) are problematic since as Marres (1989) states, according to the theory of double causation (a
modern form of interactionism), "the chain of physical causes and effects does not need to have gaps. On this
view when the mental acts on the physical, the physical cause is not sufficient. So the continuity and causal
activity of the physical world are preserved, although that world is not regarded as a causally closed system."
(p.178) This position will be examined further in chapter 7 in connection with a discussion of the emergence
of consciousness and intentionality.
82
That is, substrates are necessary but insufficient for emergence: necessary because without the substrate, the
emergent cannot be (exist); insufficient because the ontical kind (Being) associated with the emergent is
Chapter 6 Poisis
to be ontically-objective); consequently, the problem of emergence can be reduced to the

problem of the commensurability of the two ex nihilo maxims. If ex nihilo nihil fit is a
movement between beings and creatio ex nihilo a movement between being(s) and
nothing, then the ontical (that is, causal or productive) processes associated with the two
maxims can be related as shown in Fig 6.3:
creatio ex nihilo
b b b b' b' b'
ex nihilo nihil fit ex nihilo nihil fit
Fig 6.3 Relation of ontically-relativistic ex nihilo maxims (b and b' denote irreducible
kinds of being; n denotes nothing.)
However, if ontical-objectivity (`matter') is held to be prior to ontical-subjectivity

(`mind') and nothing is conceived statically as void, it appears that while the maxims can
indeed be rendered commensurable, this does not resolve the category problem (chapter
7) associated with the emergence of ontical subjectivity from an ontically-objective
substrate; in short, ontical-objectivity and the void do not provide a framework within
which to meaningfully explain the emergence of ontical subjectivity. Given that an
ontically-relativistic interpretation of the maxims cannot provide a solution to this
problem, it is worthwhile considering whether or not an ontically-absolute interpretation
of (one or both of) these maxims may provide the basis for such a solution. Clearly, if
interpreted absolutely, the maxims are incommensurable. Even if one maxim is
interpreted absolutely and the other relativistically, this does not solve the category
problem (chapter 7) because nothing (nihilo) continues to be interpreted ontically as the
void. Hence, in order to generate a solution grounded in these maxims it is necessary to
interpret them in other than ontical terms. It will be shown in the following section that
by interpreting the maxims ontologically via a reinterpretation of the notion of nothing,
it is possible to render the maxims commensurable and in such a way as to solve the
category problem associated with the emergence of ontical subjectivity from the
ontically-objective.
discontinuous with that of the substrate.

Chapter 6 Poisis
Evolutionary theory on the orthodox interpretation of Darwinism is gradualistic,

entailing a commitment to a postulated continuity in the forms (or kinds) of Being. In the
context of an examination of the mind-body problem (chapters 4 and 7), Griffin (1998)
maintains that continuity constitutes a fundamental or substantive principle and holds
that it "follows from the acceptance of evolution in a naturalistic framework, which
forbids positing any jumps that would imply some supernatural insertion into the causal
nexus." (p.30) As he goes on to state,
the idea that somewhere late in the evolution of the universe an entirely new type of actuality has
sprung into existence would seem either to require a supernatural cause or to constitute an even more
incredible miracle. (pp.50-51)
Consequently, he argues in favour of the adoption of panexperientialism (chapter 1)

given the irreducibility of ontical subjectivity to the ontically-objective, viz. the category
problem (chapter 7), and the postulated continuity of being which entails a commitment
to the maxim ex nihilo nihil fit interpreted absolutely. However, Griffin's formulation of
the principle of continuity is problematic for (at least) three reasons: first, it does not
follow that positing discontinuity in nature entails supernaturalism unless Being as such
is viewed as supernatural. However, to interpret Being in this way is problematic since
Being is primarily identifiable with physis which is the mode of poisis (becoming)
associated (crudely) with naturality. Being as such is not supernatural - such terms apply
to God (conceived ontically). Being is the existential ground of the natural; second,
consistent with Dreyfus (1991) who maintains - following Heidegger - that the existential
structure of Being is discontinuous or discrete, Palmer (1997) argues that the surface
(phenomenal) continuity associated with beings, which the Western philosophical and
scientific tradition83 takes to indicate a continuity of Being, conceals a deep (noumenal)
fragmentation within Being84. If such arguments are correct - and phenomenological
evidence indicates this to be the case (Heidegger,59) (Palmer,96) - continuity cannot be
a substantive principle. On the contrary, it must be placed among those principles which
Griffin refers to as "softcore, commonsense" (p.16); third, as stated earlier (section
6.4.2.3), there are a number of problems associated with the maxim ex nihilo nihil fit: for
example, the unintelligibility and impossibility of an infinite actuality (according to
Aristotle) which necessitates the postulation of a First Cause which, in turn, undermines
the transitivity of the causal principle. Furthermore, and ultimately, there is the problem
83
This tradition includes Whiteheadian organicism on which panexperientialism (chapter 1) is based since as
Whitehead himself states in Process and Reality (1978), "the safest general characterization of the European
philosophical tradition is that it consists in a series of footnotes to Plato" and "by stating my belief that the train
of thought in these lectures is Platonic, I am doing no more than expressing the hope that it falls within the
European tradition." (p.39)
84
In section 6.5.4, it is argued that the structure of Being, that is, of the Being of beings, is discontinuous (or
discrete) and hence, pluralistic while Being as such is itself continuous and monistic. This constitutes the
essence of the Heideggerian solution to the metaphysical problem of the relation between the One and the
Many.
Chapter 6 Poisis
of the ontological difference between beings and Being as such (section 6.5.4). It is
interesting to note that radical (heterodox) evolutionary theory is characteristically
punctuational postulating discontinuity in the forms (kinds) of Being. In contrast with
the orthodox interpretation of Darwinism, there is an implicit commitment to relativistic
(or local) creatio ex nihilo. However, while this scheme is consistent with empirical
evidence (for example, the gaps in the fossil record) supporting an ontical - as contrasted
with orthodox epistemic - interpretation of evolution as `jumpy', it fails to address the
problems associated with causation and the question of Being as such described above.
Given these problems, it is necessary (as stated previously), to consider the possibility
of absolute creatio ex nihilo and the meaning of nothing from an ontological perspective.
Furthermore, nothing must be conceived absolutely: if viewed ontically as relative to a
being (such as God) postulated as an agency acting on it, the problem of the ontological
difference (section 6.5.4) arises both for this being and for the nothing (or void, which,
from an ontical perspective, is thereby reified into a being). Hence, there is a need to
consider the meaning of Being as such and its relation to the nothing. Furthermore, there
is a need to reconsider the Being of nothing given that conventionally, absolute nothing
is held to be static (void) and non-generative. This leads to a rethinking of the notion of
emergence, the differentiation of ontical emergence (as a causal or productive movement
between beings) from ontological emergence (as an existential or incipient - that is
originative - movement between Being as such and beings) and the distinguishing of the
ontical emergence of phenomena from the phenomenon of emergence as such.
While Griffin (1998) is correct to maintain that "in affirming the emergence of a new
type of actuality, generally with a new type of causal power" (p.51), the principle of
continuity is violated, it does not follow that emergence is thereby rendered untenable.
It is maintained herein that while computationalism, an externalistic and deterministic
metaphysics, is incapable of providing a sufficient ground for the ontical emergence of
actualities such as the ontically-subjective (or experiential), this does not preclude the
possibility of an emergentist thesis as such. Given that problems arise when emergence
is viewed ontically (causally, productively) and when ontically irreducible phenomena
are considered, it is possible that a solution might involve embracing some form of
ontological (that is, existential) conception of emergence. This `shift' in focus from the
ontical to the ontological is necessary to the extent that the difference between beings
(phenomena) and Being as such (the ultimate ground of phenomena) is real.
6.4.5. Summary
In this section it has been shown that causation (or mechanistic production) cannot be
primitive since it is a relation between beings. This follows from the fact that both beings
and the relations between them necessarily partake of Being in some sense: if the causal
relation ìs' - whether it ìs' actual, possible or existent in any other sense - then cause,
effect and the relation between them are, of necessity, grounded in Being; in short,
Chapter 6 Poisis
causation as such is grounded in Being as such, and, as will be seen, it is, thereby, the
latter which is primitive (in the sense of primordial). It appears, therefore, that
consideration of ontical (causal) poisis leads to questioning concerning Being. However,
the present study is not primarily concerned with the question of Being; rather, it is the
possibility of "strong" CEA that is at issue. Hence, it is necessary to consider to what
extent meditation on the question of Being can inform on the question concerning CEA
(section 6.3). In this connection, it is maintained that a hermeneutic (interpretative)
examination of the notion of Being and its related concepts provides both the motivation
and basis upon which to conceive85 an ontological (incipient) poisis. Further, the
distinction between the ontical (causal, productive) and the ontological (existential,
incipient) which follows from the ontological difference between beings and Being
(section 6.5.4) is held to ground the poitic difference (section 6.6.4) between artificial
(as artifactual) poisis or techn and natural poisis or physis86. It is argued that this
difference is of critical significance for the question concerning CEA.
6.5. Heidegger's Phenomenology of Being
In section 6.6, the notion of ontological poisis (coming-forth and bringing-forth) is

examined. In order to establish the meaning of this concept - and thereby distinguish it
from ontical poisis (section 6.4) - it is necessary to examine what is meant by Being as
such since ontology is, principally, the study of being87 (chapter 1). It might be argued
85
Here, `conception' should not be taken to imply `construction' as in artificing. Following Heidegger, it is
maintained that the conception of ontological poisis (coming-forth) presented herein is motivated by Being
itself: On hermeneutic realism (section 6.5.2), the meaning of Being is disclosed rather than created. However,
this disclosure is not of something static and eternal (as in Platonism); rather the disclosure is itself a dynamic
poisis of Being itself.
86
Heidegger (1977) employs the term `nature' is a highly specific sense, viz. in reference to beings conceived as
objects, that is, as occurrent, factical standing-reserve (Bestand) ordered by Dasein in its mode of Enframing
Cartesian subject (ego); consequently, nature and physis - interpreted (according to Heidegger) as the Greeks
understood the term - are not synonymous. In this study, `nature' or naturality is defined simply as the given
or ontically a priori relative to the anthropic component (subject) in its role as interpreter (observer) and
artificer (organizer); by contrast, artificiality (or artifactuality) is defined as the made or ontically a posteriori
relative to the interpreter-artificer (chapter 7). Ontical a priority should not be held to entail the view that
naturality is itself ontical; rather, naturality should be viewed as multi-moded - ontical and ontological. To the
extent that the term ontological can be applied to physis, nature and physis can, therefore, be held -
provisionally - to be identical. It must be appreciated that Heidegger's concern is with the ontological difference
between Being and beings, while this study is concerned with the difference in mode of poisis between kinds
of beings as well as that between beings and Being as such: hence, the need to clarify the meaning of physis
or autopoisis, techn or allopoisis, and poisis as such (section 6.6).
87
In this and earlier chapters, a distinction between beings and Being as such (or simply, Being) has been made.
While the latter is identical to being as such (or simply, being), the capitalized form, viz. `Being', will continue
to be used in order to ensure that the distinction between beings (things, essents) and being as such (the ground
of beings) is rigidly upheld. In certain cases where this typographical convention is not upheld, context should
Chapter 6 Poisis
that to investigate ontical poisis is to investigate Being as such; this would seem to
follow from the fact that òntical' and òntological' are equivalent terms. However, this
assertion, grounded in conventional metaphysics which conflates the ontological with the
ontical and thereby obscures the ontological difference between beings and Being as
such (section 6.5.4), assumes that Being is modally-continuous, monistic and equivalent
to actuality, existence (existentia) or thatness (chapter 1 and section 6.5.2). Following
Heidegger, it is argued that this position is incorrect: The modal structure of Being as
such is discrete and pluralistic. Being is multiply-moded (section 6.5.4) which, according
to Kovacs (1990), means that there are many ways of to-be88. In this study, two modes
(or ways) of Being as such which are referred to as the ontical (causal, productive) and
the ontological (existential, incipient) are distinguished89. The poisis associated with the
first mode was examined in the previous section. In the following section, that associated
with the second is investigated. Given that the ontological as a modality of Being is
distinct from the ontical, it is necessary to clarify the nature90 of the ontological (in this
Heideggerian sense of the term) in preparation for a preliminary presentation of the
concept of ontological poisis (section 6.6). According to Heidegger (1959), Being as
such can be approached from an ontological (existential) perspective via hermeneutical
(that is, interpretative) analysis of the opposition between this concept and others which
are essentially related (that is, related in essence or way-of-being). Following his
precedent, the relation between Being and a number of such concepts, viz. Dasein,
beings, nothing, thinking, appearance and becoming will be examined, the selection
being motivated by relevance to the question concerning ontological poisis.
provide the necessary basis for clarification.
88
Being as such is held to be modally-pluralistic, the plurality of beings (essents, things) partaking of these
modalities notwithstanding. It is crucial to appreciate that Being as such (Seyn) itself is unitary while its
manifestation (or unconcealment) in beings, viz. the modal Being (Sein) of beings, is pluralistic. This
constitutes the essence of Heidegger's solution to the problem of the relationship between the One and the
Many, viz. unity in diversity, where the ìn' signifies unconcealment. These issues are discussed further in
section 6.5.4.
89
According to Dreyfus (1991), the term òntological' refers to Being as intelligibility or meaning. (It is of critical
importance to appreciate that, for Heidegger, these latter concepts are not subjective in an epistemological
sense: intelligibility or meaning is a mode of Being just as facticity or ontical existence is a mode of being.)
However, this interpretation of the ontological is grounded in the pre-Kehre period of Heidegger's thought
which is dominated by concern with the existential analytic of Dasein, a stage considered prepatory to
questioning concerning the meaning and truth of Being as such. In this study, the term òntological' is extended
to cover the meaning of Being in both the pre- and post-Kehre phases; hence, ontological can be taken to refer
both to intelligibility or meaning (relative to Dasein) and incipience (relative to Being itself). It should be
assumed that the context in which the term is used enables the sense intended to be disambiguated.
90
That is, the ontology of the ontological. The implied circularity is consistent with the hermeneutic (that is,
historically-reflexive) approach adopted herein.
Chapter 6 Poisis
6.5.1. The Question of Being
Heidegger maintains that the thinking of every great thinker is dominated by a single
thought. As he states, somewhat poetically, in From the Experience of Thinking (1947),
"to think is to confine yourself to a single thought that one day stands still like a star in
the world's sky." In this regard, he is himself no exception. Throughout the pre- and post-
Kehre (or `Turn') phases of his thinking, Heidegger was concerned with the question of
Being, its meaning and its truth. In An Introduction to Metaphysics (1959), the question
Why is there something rather than nothing ? is held to be the fundamental question in
philosophy, the ground-question of ontology which both informs and motivates his
inquiry. A detailed exposition of the entire Heideggerian project is beyond both the scope
and aim of this study; consequently, the presentation and discussion must, of necessity,
be restricted to consideration of those basic insights regarding the question that emerged
during Heidegger's phenomenological (that is, ontological) investigations which serve
to explicate the meaning of ontological poisis. However, before such concerns are
addressed, it is worthwhile briefly considering the philosophical sources which have
informed Heidegger's meditations on Being, a momentary departure from the main
concerns of this study which can be justified on (at least) two grounds: firstly, if explicit
solutions cannot be found within Heidegger's thought to problems associated with the
issue at hand, viz. the meaning of Being and ontological poisis, it may be possible to
locate them within the sources which inspired his thinking; secondly and relatedly,
shortcomings in such works and the historical attempts at their resolution may indicate
ways in which shortcomings within Heidegger's thinking - for example, adoption of
historically-contingent or idiosyncratic assumptions91 - can be addressed.
May (1996) maintains that "Heidegger himself would have us believe that the origins of
his thinking lie solely in the West, with the ancient Greeks and certain figures in the
Judaeo-Christian tradition" (p.vii). This position is supported by Sikka (1997) who
identifies connections between the thought of Heidegger and four medieval mystical
theologians (Bonaventure, Eckhart, Tauler and van Ruusbroec). Interestingly, however,
May goes on to assert that "a major impetus for Heidegger's `new beginning' (as he
himself calls it) - for the trajectory of a path of thinking that is to lead beyond (or around
or beneath) Western metaphysics - came from non-Western sources about which he
maintained an all but complete silence". (p.x) In particular,
Heidegger's work was significantly influenced by East Asian sources. It can be shown, moreover, that
in particular instances Heidegger even appropriated wholesale and almost verbatim major ideas from
the German translations of Taoist and Zen Buddhist classics. (p.xviii)
According to Parkes (1987b), "Heraclitus [is] the Western thinker closest in spirit to
Taoism, and to whom Heidegger ascribes the deepest understanding of Being [among the
91
For example, Heidegger's (1959) attitude towards Greek and High German with respect to other languages.
Chapter 6 Poisis
pre-Socratic philosophers]." (p.108) Significantly, both Heraclitus and classical Taoists

such as Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu hold flux (change, process, dynamism) to be primitive,
adopting the flowing of water as their guiding `root' metaphor (chapter 1). While
Heidegger attempts to transcend the processual approach to the question of Being as
such, maintaining that the latter cannot be understood in terms of notions such as
substance, process, event (Dreyfus,91) - all of which are, on his thinking, ontical beings -
a number of similarities between Heideggerian and Taoist thinking, particularly between
statements in the Tao Te Ching of Lao Tzu and Heidegger's Basic Concepts (1993b),
have been revealed (Parkes,87a) (Miller,93) (May,96). For example, Lao Tzu's
description of the (eternal, unwavering) Tao or `Way' (Waley,97) bears a striking
resemblance to Heidegger's interpretation of Being as such, an interpretation derived
from unorthodox readings of original Greek Heraclitean, Parminidean and
Anaximanderian fragments. In chapter 21, it is said that
For the Way is a thing inpalpable,

incommensurable.
Incommensurable, impalpable.
Yet latent in it are forms;
Impalpable, incommensurable
Yet within it are entities.
However, according to Stambaugh (1987),
unlike Lao-Tzu who begins by saying that the Way or tao that can be told of (literally, that can be
wayed), is not the eternal tao, Heidegger has a good deal to say about the Way. What finally could
not be told of for Heidegger was Being. (pp.79-80)
In support of this position, and in the context of a discussion of the distinction between
Wittgensteinian and Heideggerian thinking on the `background' (chapter 1), Dreyfus
(1991) states that
Heidegger and Wittgenstein have a very different understanding of the background of everyday
activity. Wittgenstein is convinced that the practices that make up the human form of life are a
hopeless tangle [and hence,] warns against any attempt to systematize this hurly-burly .. Heidegger,
on the contrary, thinks that the commonsense background has an elaborate structure that it is the job
of an existential analytic to lay out. (p.7)
From the above statement, it might be concluded that, for Wittgenstein, the Way -
understood to mean Being as such - is ultimately unintelligible (viz. that which "must be
passed over in silence") whereas, for Heidegger, the Way has a discernible structure.
However, it is important to appreciate that according to Heidegger, the Way that can be
described is the Way as path, as questioning, specifically, as questioning concerning the
Being (Sein) of beings (Seiendes); this Way or tao is, like the articulatable Way of the
Taoists, not ultimate (in their terms, not the èternal' tao), and hence, not identical to
Being as such (Seyn) which stands to the Being (Sein) of beings as concealment (or
Chapter 6 Poisis
hiddenness) stands to unconcealment (or manifestation).92 Stambaugh's distinction

between the approaches of the Taoists and Heidegger to the question of Way is further
undermined by Watts (1975), who maintains that although Lao Tzu indeed held the
eternal tao to be unarticulatable (that is, unintelligible), like Heidegger, he in fact
presented in the Tao Te Ching (1997) an extended treatise on the Way, thereby thinking
the unthinkable. As Watts states, Lao-Tzu began by maintaining that `The Tao which can
be explained is not the eternal Tao' "and then [went] on to write a whole book about it."
(p.24)
According to May (1996),
Heidegger admits .. that there is a `deeply hidden kinship' between East Asian thought and his own
attempts at thinking. But he is not prepared, apart from the occasional hint, to explicate the content
or extent of this kinship. (p.46)
However, Carman and Van Norden (1997) contest this position, maintaining that
Heidegger had and maintained a highly internal interpretation of the tradition to which he himself
belonged, and his interest in things Eastern rather pales in comparison with his immersion in things
Western. [Furthermore, he was skeptical] concerning the prospects of any synthesis of Asian and
European thought. (p.2)
Their argument is based on Heidegger's (1966) interview with the German magazine Der
Spiegel in which he stated his conviction "that a change can only be prepared from the
same place in the world where the modern technological world originated. It cannot
come about by the adoption of Zen Buddhism or other Eastern experiences of the world
.. Thinking will only be transformed by a thinking that has the same origin and destiny."
Consequently, they hold that
the prospect of `superseding' our current technological understanding of being holds no promise
whatever that Western post-metaphysical thinking will bear any resemblance to cultural traditions that
were to all appearances never metaphysical or technological to begin with. (p.2)
However, Miller (1993), many of the contributors to (Parkes,87), and May (1996) have
argued that close examination of Heidegger's Basic Concepts (1993b) and Lao Tzu's Tao
Te Ching does indeed reveal striking similarities in both content and expression. Hence,
there are (at least) two possible explanations for Heidegger's statement in the Der Spiegel
interview, determination of the validity of which is beyond both the scope and intent of
this study: (1) Concealment of sources for personal, academic gain or/and (2)
concealment of sources motivated by the nature of the philosophical teaching and method
in which Heidegger had immersed himself (May,96). In affirmation of the second
92
It is crucial to appreciate, however, that Seyn and Sein are not distinct or separate from each other in an
essentialist sense: The former refers to Being in reference to itself while the latter refers to Being in reference
to beings. The difference between Seyn and Sein is examined further in sections 6.5.2 and 6.5.4.
Chapter 6 Poisis
explanation, it might be argued that Heidegger's statement implies endorsement and

acceptance of the central insights of Zen Buddhism and Taoism as the telos (goal, end-
point) of Westen philosophy, and yet negation of an inauthentic93 adoption of these
insights. Certainly, this argument is consistent with Heidegger's hermeneutic (or
interpretative) approach to the question of Being and his emphasis on the `thrownness'
(or given historical situatedness) of the interpreter.
Finally, it is worthwhile briefly responding to a more general criticism that has been
made in the secondary literature, viz. that Heidegger reads his thinking (on Being) into
classical texts (specifically, the works of Heraclitus, Parminides and Anaximander, not
to mention those of Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu). It should suffice to merely state Steiner's
(1978) position on this issue:
because all philosophic thought rethinks and creates for itself a precedent, for uses either of authority
or of refutation, the status of different philosophers and philosophic schools alters and is perennially
arguable. There are as many `Platos' as there are metaphysics, epistemologies and political positions.
(Does Sir Karl Popper's Plato designate the same figure as Rousseau's or Gilbert Ryle's?) [emphasis
added] (p.11)
6.5.2. Being as such (Seyn)
Kovacs (1990) maintains that, for Heidegger, "philosophy is not the science of being(s)
but the foundational science of Being (ontology, using phenomenology as the method
of inquiry)." (p.209) In point of fact, Heidegger (1982) equates phenomenology with
scientific ontology, albeit science conceived hermeneutically94 or historically in contrast
to the ahistorical rationalistic and empiricist science associated with traditional
metaphysics. Levinas (1996) clarifies the technical phenomenological distinction
between ontical (occurrent, extant, factical) science and ontological (as intelligible95)
science via consideration of the modality (or way) of Being with which each science is
concerned:
the science that studies a be-ing is, for Heidegger, ontic, and it is necessary to distinguish it from the
science of the being of a be-ing which alone is ontological. (p.15)
Jaspers (1971) supports the shift in concern from ontical science to ontological science
(or phenomenology), arguing strongly that "reality [interpreted ontically] is nothing but
93
Ìnauthentic' because not thought through a consideration of Western philosophy, the tradition within which -
according to Heidegger - (modern) technological man both emerged and is embedded.
94
Hermeneutics is defined by Steiner (1978) as the understanding of understanding (or the interpretation of
interpretation).
95
In this study, which draws on both pre- and post-Kehre Heideggerian thought on Being, ontological refers to
both intelligibility and incipience.
Chapter 6 Poisis
what can be known about .. by natural knowledge - that is, in the end, a banal facticity
[devoid of meaning and significance]." (p.93) Similarly, Wittgenstein (1961) maintains
that "the urge towards the mystical [or ontological] comes of the non-satisfaction of our
wishes by science. We feel that even if all possible [ontically-]scientific questions are
answered our problem is still not touched at all. Of course in that case there are no
questions any more; and that is the answer." (p.51) According to Grimsley (1967),
the fundamental distinction around which Heidegger's thought revolves is .. that between the ontic
and the ontological, between particular `beings' (Seiendes) and `Being' (Sein). The former represents
the area of `crude existents', the domain of `what-is'. Opposed to this sense of `being' or èxistence'
there is the more fundamental `Being' (Sein) of these existents, the being that has assumed structure,
intelligibility and meaning. [This is the Being of beings.] Finally there is the idea of Being (Seyn) in
general as opposed to the Being of particular existents (`fundamental' as opposed to `regional'
ontology). (p.43)
From the above statement, the following distinctions emerge: (i) beings (Seinedes) or the
ontical; (ii) the Being (Sein) of beings or the ontological and derivative, `regional' or
modal; (iii) the Being of Being as such (Seyn) or the ontological and primordial,
`fundamental' in the sense of incipiently-grounding with respect to modalities of Being
(Sein). While ontical beings (or existents) can be viewed as merely extant or present, the
ontological Being of beings (or existence) is the ground of extantness, the presencing of
what presences, of what is that; furthermore, this presencing is intelligibility or meaning
itself. Significantly, Kovacs (1990) maintains that, for Heidegger, "the ontological
assumptions of the (natural, cultural, humanistic, theological) sciences govern their ontic
(concrete) descriptions of the particular beings; the rediscovery of the ontological
concepts and assumptions, then, leads to a new and deeper grasp of the ontic notions and
descriptions." (p.208) Thus,
philosophy is not a worldview (with ontic claims, with established attitudes towards beings) but the
foundational science of Being, a structural interpretation of the potentialities of Being (ontological
claims); it unearths and examines the implicit and often unthought assumptions and (ontological)
understandings that govern the nonphilosophical sciences (biology, physics, psychology, theology).
(p.209)
In the context of this study, the above statements are highly significant for the following
reasons: first, in attempting to clarify the poitic difference (section 6.6.4) between
naturals and artificials (as artifactuals), a difference which is itself grounded in the
ontological difference (section 6.5.4) between beings and Being as such, it is essential
to focus questioning on naturality and artificiality (or artifactuality) as such and not on
instances of the respective phenomena (that is, specific naturals and artifactuals such as
those described in chapter 4); second, given the historicity of the ontological and the
grounding of the poitic difference in the ontological difference, it would appear to
follow that the poitic difference must itself involve considerations of historicity (or
temporality). However, before such issues can be examined further, it is necessary to
investigate what is meant by `Being'. According to Steiner (1978), Heidegger holds that
"to enquire into Being is not to ask: What is this or that ? It is to ask: What is ìs' ?"
Chapter 6 Poisis
(p.145) In terms of traditional metaphysics, it is not to question concerning the essence

(what-ness) of beings or existents but to appreciate the significance of existence (that-
ness) as such or, as Heidegger and others (such as Leibniz) have stated, `Why there is
something rather than nothing'. In this connection, Kovacs (1990) maintains that
Heidegger's reflections on the nature of metaphysics as the core of philosophy (the thinking of Being)
distinguish the leading-question from the ground-question. The leading-question, the question that
guides traditional metaphysics, is essentially the following: What is being as such ? [However,] this
question is concerned with `what' (a) being is, with the `whatness' of beings in general (thus reducing
metaphysics to physics); it does not thematize Being as such, even though its formulations in the
history of philosophy represent an inquiry into the Being of beings. The history of traditional
metaphysics is dominated by the leading-question, by the study of beings as such without going
beyond (particular) beings to Being as such. The ground-question of (genuine) metaphysics is focused
not on the `whatness' but on the `why' of being(s), on the fact (rather: event, process) `that' there are
beings (on the `thatness' of beings, on Being as such). The ground-question of metaphysics in the final
analysis is the following: Why are there beings at all ? This question is an inquiry into the wonder
`that' there are beings and not rather nothing; it thematizes Being; it tries to think and say that `Being
is'. The ground-question is a truly ontological question; it is a concern with Being. (p.135)
Before considering the `ground-question' further, it is worthwhile briefly examining what

Heidegger means by ground. In Basic Concepts (1993b), he asserts that "whatever
grounds everything and gives ground to everything is itself the ground" (p.2) and that
"grasping the ground means reaching the ground of everything in an understanding that
not only takes notice of something but is, as a knowing, a standing and a stance.
[Furthermore,] knowing the ground does not first need a `character' in order to have
stability. This knowing is character itself." (p.3) Significantly, Heidegger holds that
`Ground-Concepts' means to say: grasping the ground of everything, and that means to attain a
relation to the `ground' of everything. What `ground' means here must be clarified step by step, along
with what the relation to the ground consists in, to what extent a knowing belongs to this relation, and
to what extent this relation is even itself a knowing. Thus it would be premature if we wanted to
equate `ground' with `cause' of everything, and wanted furthermore to interpret this cause as a first
cause in the sense of a creator according to the Bible and Christian dogma. It would also be premature
to believe that with these `concepts' it is solely a matter of representing the ground. It is rather a
question of extending our thinking toward the manner in which the ground includes us in its essence,
not the manner in which we take the ground to be merely an òbject' and use it for an èxplanation of
the world'. (p.16)
According to Sikka (1997), "what grounds the totality of what-is and is therefore
primordial ground cannot itself have a ground. [Hence,] being and ground are the same.
But because being, precisely as primordial grounding, cannot itself have a ground, being
is at the same time the abyss [or non-ground]." (p.162) This latter statement is highly
significant in the context of the relation between Being and Nothing; however,
examination of this issue will have to be postponed until section 6.5.5 since the topic of
concern in the present discussion is the ground-question rather than the question of
ground as such.
Tymieniecka (1966) holds that "the question: `Why is there something rather than
Chapter 6 Poisis
nothing?' appears as the most fundamental question because the real problem is, how is
it that something exists at all ? It is .. the terminal of the major array of philosophical
questions, and thus it synthesizes all philosophical questioning bearing upon the whole
of reality and being." (p.9) According to Heidegger (1959), "no questioning and
accordingly no single scientific `problem' can be fully intelligible if it does not include,
i.e. ask, the question of all questions." (p.6) Furthermore, as stated above (by Kovacs),
"this question is not just any occurrence but a privileged happening that we call an
event." (p.5) Heidegger's approach to clarifying the ontological difference (section 6.5.4)
between Being and beings involves consideration of the question of Being as such. As
he states,
within the purview of metaphysics and thinking on its level, we can, to be sure, consider the question
about being as such as merely a repetition of the question about the essent as such. In this case the
question about being as such is just another transcendental question, though one of a higher order.
But this interpretation of the question about being as such bars the road to its appropriate unfolding
.. [Furthermore,] the reinterpretation of the question of being as such tends to take the same form as
the question of the essent as such, chiefly because the essential origin of the existent as such and with
it the essence of metaphysics remains obscure. (pp.17-18)
From this statement, it would appear that in order to gain an understanding of the
meaning of Being as such, it is necessary to examine the meaning of beings and, thereby,
of metaphysics. The notion of metaphysics was briefly examined in chapter 1 where it
was identified as that which is both encompassing and grounding (in the sense of
primordial or fundamental). However, it might be argued that such an interpretation fails
to adequately express the meaning of metaphysics as it has manifested itself historically,
viz. as a concern with being(s) qua being, that is, with the essence of existents. For this
reason, it is necessary to reconsider the meaning of metaphysics from the perspective of
phenomenology, that is, Heideggerian ontology.
According to Aylesworth (1993), metaphysics is
the conception of being only as the being of beings [in the sense of an abstract universal], and the
conception of humanity as just another being (the rational animal) among others [that is, without
unique relation to Being as such]. (p.xiii)
Furthermore, he maintains that it is "only in turning away from being [that we are]
confronted with beings, including ourselves, in the first place." (p.xiii) This position is
supported by Grimsley (1967) who maintains that, for Heidegger,
whenever metaphysics has raised the question of Being it has always identified it with the existent -
whether it is with the totality of the existents or with a particular existent which has been accorded
absolute priority in the hierarchy [emphasis added]. (p.87)
The above statement is highly significant in the context of the present study since
Chapter 6 Poisis
computation can itself be viewed as an existent96, thereby undermining Steinhart's (1998)

assertion that Being (or existence) is computation (section 6.2.1). This position is
supported by the fact that in making such an assertion - in which Being is reduced to that
which it grounds, viz. computation - the copula ìs' is employed and yet its meaning (in
this context) remains unquestioned. Historically, this `turning away' (from Being to
beings) finds its earliest (post-Socratic) expression in the duality of essence and
existence; however, it is with Descartes, that this movement finds its culmination in the
modern duality of subject and object or res cogitans (thinking being) and res extensa
(extended being) respectively. In this connection, Heidegger (1977c) maintains that
Descartes can be overcome only through the overcoming of that which he himself founded, only
through the overcoming of modern, and that means at the same time Western, metaphysics.
Overcoming means here, however, the primal asking of the question concerning the meaning, i.e.,
concerning the realm of the projection or delineation, and thus concerning the truth, of Being - which
question simultaneously unveils itself as the question concerning the Being of truth. (pp.140-141)
It is of critical significance to appreciate, following Heidegger (1977b), that
in the history of Western thinking, indeed continually from the beginning, what is, is thought in
reference to Being; yet the truth of Being remains unthought, and not only is that truth denied to
thinking as a possible experience, but Western thinking itself, and indeed in the form of metaphysics,
expressly, but nevertheless unknowingly, veils the happening of that denial. (p.56)
According to Heidegger (1993c), "metaphysics does indeed represent beings in their

Being, and so it thinks the Being of beings. But it does not think the difference of both."
(p.226) Consistent with this view of traditional metaphysics, Dennett (1996) holds that
ontology is concerned "with what exists." (p.2) Grimsley (1967) maintains, however, that
according to Heidegger, "any ontology which fails to grasp the meaning of Being must
remain confused and inadequate." (p.39) Given that Dennett defines ontology in terms
of the essentia (essences or what-ness) of beings as opposed to the èssence' of Being
itself, addressing what beings are as opposed to recognizing the significance of the fact
that beings are (rather than nothing), it follows that (conventional) ontology - on
Heidegger's view - must be inadequate: Metaphysics fails to appreciate (and thereby
obscures) the ontological difference between beings and Being as such; hence, the
meaning of Being remains unaddressed97 . According to Heidegger (1977c), what is
essential in a fundamental metaphysical position embraces
1. The manner and mode in which man is man, i.e., is himself; the manner of the coming to
96
Briefly, if computation or computational processes exist, they must partake of Being as such in some sense.
To the extent that that which partakes of Being can be identified as a being (or beings) and hence, an existent
(or existents), computations are, therefore, existents.
97
It is an objective in what follows to establish that the latter question is a legitimate (that is, meaningful)
question.
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presence of selfhood, which is not at all synonymous with I-ness, but rather is determined
out of the relation to Being as such
2. The interpretation of the coming to presence of the Being of whatever is
3. The delineation of the coming to presence of truth
4. The sense in which, in any given instance, man is measure (p.145)
However, Heidegger (1959) maintains that
if we consider the question of being in the sense of an inquiry into being as such, it becomes clear to
anyone who follows our thinking that being as such is precisely hidden from metaphysics, and
remains forgotten - and so radically that the forgetfulness of being, which itself falls into
forgetfulness, is the unknown but enduring impetus to metaphysical questioning. (p.19)
Hence, in attempting to think through the essence of Being as such, it is necessary to

transcend conventional metaphysics. However, it is important at this point in the
discussion to examine the extent to which Heidegger is justified in holding that the
question of Being has been forgotten by (traditional) metaphysics. For Heidegger,
Aristotle is representative - indeed, originative (with Plato) - of conventional
metaphysical thinking and according to Barnes (1982),
when Aristotle says that there is a science which studies being qua being, he means that there is a
science which studies beings, and studies them qua being; that is, a science which studies things that
exist (not some abstract thing called `being'), and studies them qua existing. (p.25)
[Furthermore,] to study something qua existent is to study just those features of the thing which are
relevant to its existing - and not any of the many other features of the thing; it is to study it under its
existential hat. Everyone who does not study fictions studies `beings', things that exist; the student
of being qua being studies just those aspects of existent things which belong to them in virtue of the
fact that they exist. (p.25)
There are (at least) two points to note in regard to the above statements: first, as will be
argued in section 6.5.4, `fictions' are also beings and hence, èxist' (that is, partake of
Being) in some sense (as imaginaries); second, studying beings qua being means
studying beings as existents. However, without clarifying the meaning of existence (or
Being) as such, it is impossible to identify which features of an existent are relevant to
its existing98. Yet, and as will be argued below, without a prior (albeit tacit or `pre-
ontological') understanding of Being it is impossible to identify existents as existents. To
the extent that this issue is ignored by conventional metaphysics, Heidegger is, therefore,
correct in his thesis regarding the forgotten-ness of Being.
98
It will be argued in section 6.5.4 that existence or Being as such cannot be identified with survival - as in
Darwinian evolution (section 6.4.2.1) - since the latter only makes sense in the context of competition between
beings for access to limited resources. To the extent that beings, behaviours and resources all exist (in some
sense), all partake of Being as such which is transcendent with respect to them.
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It is important to appreciate at the outset that Being as such is not a mere mental
abstraction as maintained, for example, by conceptualists99. Heidegger (1949a) is
emphatic in asserting that
Being is not a product of thinking. It is more likely that essential thinking is an occurrence [that is,
ereignis or `lighting-up' event] of Being. (p.387)
Hence, as Waterhouse (1981) states, for Heidegger, "Being transcends thought: the Being
of things transcends our conceptualization of them as beings" (p.14). These statements
are significant since Heidegger (1959) endorses Parminides maxim, viz. Being and
Thinking are the same, and yet rejects both conceptualism and idealism. In order to
resolve this apparent paradox in his ontology, it is necessary to clarify what Heidegger
understands by `sameness'. (This issue will be discussed in section 6.5.6 when the
opposition between Being and thinking is briefly examined.) Given that Being is not a
mere abstraction, it remains to clarify how it can be understood. According to Heidegger
(1959), "the word `being' is indefinite in meaning and yet we understand it definitely.
`Being' proves to be totally indeterminate and at the same time highly determinate."
(p.78) This is because "to speak of an essent as such includes: to understand it in advance
as an essent, that is, to understand its being [emphasis added]." (p.82) Furthermore,
Heidegger (1982) maintains that "we are able to grasp beings as such, as beings, only if
we understand something like being." (p.10) Miller (1993) maintains that
it may seem strange to say that we ask after the meaning and at the same time insist that we already
understand Being, but .. it is actually precisely because we have an understanding that we can ask.
The understanding of Being beforehand is not a full understanding; it is the incompleteness of our
understanding which necessitates our asking. And not only that, but also this understanding tells us
that as existing beings we have an understanding of Being already; the nature of Being is such that
we already [partially] understand it. (p.2)
According to Heidegger,
the being which belongs to every essent whatsoever, and which is thus dispersed among all that is
most current and familiar, is more unique than all else .. Everything else, each and every essent, even
if it is unique, can be compared with other things. Its determinability is increased by these
possibilities of comparison. By virtue of them it is in many respects indeterminate. Being, however,
can be compared with nothing else. Over against being, the only other is nothing. And here there is
no comparison. If being thus represents what is most unique and determinate, the word `being' cannot
be empty. And in truth it never is empty. (p.79)
As he goes on to state, "everything that is not simply nothing is, and for us even nothing
`belongs' to being." (p.85) (This is because although nothing denotes the absence (or
non-presence) of beings, as nothing it also denotes the presence (Being) of absence and
hence, partakes of Being as such.) Significantly, Heidegger maintains that
99
This point will be discussed in greater detail in section 6.5.4.
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because the meaning and concept of `being' have supreme universality, meta-physics as `physics' [that
is, as a concern with being(s) qua being(s)] cannot go higher to define them more closely. It has only
one way left, from the universal to the particular essent. In this way, it is true, it fills in the emptiness
of the concept of being, namely with the essents. Yet the admonition Àway from being; go to the
particular essents', shows that metaphysics is mocking itself without knowing it. For the much-
vaunted particular essent can only disclose itself as such insofar as we already understand being in
its essence [emphasis added]. (p.86)
As Macquarrie (1973) states, Being "cannot indeed be known or conceptualized in the

way that finite beings can be known, for being itself is `totally other' from beings. Yet
it is no mere haze or empty word (as Nietzsche claimed) but the most concrete of
realities." (p.247) For Heidegger (1973), "the primordially decisive essence of Being"
can be identified with "emergent presencing in what is unconcealed." (p.5) Crucially, he
maintains that
in the beginning of its history [within Western thought], Being opens itself out as emerging (physis)
and unconcealment (aletheia). From there it reaches the formulation of presence and permanence in
the sense of enduring (ousia). Metaphysics proper begins with this. (p.4)
In An Introduction to Metaphysics (1959), Heidegger asserts that the following

oppositions to Being have emerged in the Western philosophical tradition, oppositions
which define the concept and yet distort its originary, incipient meaning as aletheia-
physis (that is, the emerging power of self-unconcealment):
over against becoming being is permanence [that is, ousia].
Over against appearance being is the enduring prototype, the always identical [that is, idea].
Over against thought it is the underlying, the already-there.
Permanent, always identical, already-there, given - all mean fundamentally the same: enduring
presence, on as ousia. (p.202)
He further maintains that "if all that is opposed to being in the distinctions is not nothing,
then it is essent100 [that is, partakes of Being] and ultimately more so than what is
regarded as essent in the restricted, current view of being [viz. mere actuality, existence
or thatness]. But in what sense of being are becoming and appearance [and] thinking ..
essent ? Certainly not in the sense of the being from which they are distinguished. But
this sense of being has been the current one ever since antiquity." (p.203) Consequently,
he is led to conclude that "the sense of being that has been accepted up until now does
not suffice to name everything that ìs'." (p.204) On this basis, he argues that
being must be experienced anew from the bottom up and in all the breadth of its possible essence ..
Thus a fundamental inquiry into the .. distinctions shows that the being which they encircle must itself
100
In fact, Heidegger (1959) defines the essent as "an overcoming of nothingness." (p.28)
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be transformed into the encircling circle and ground of all the essent. The one basic differentiation,
whose intensity and fundamental cleavage sustain history, is the differentiation between being and
the essent [emphasis added]. (p.204)
Heidegger (1959) asserts, quite simply, that "the essent is. It is given, it confronts us."
(p.27) However, as indicated above, this is-ness came to be understood by the Greeks as
ousia (that is, enduring in the static sense of permanence) which "can signify both: the
presence of something present and this present thing in the what of its appearance.
Herein is concealed the source of the subsequent distinction between existentia and
essentia." (p.181) Significantly, as will be shown in section 6.5.6, ousia does not denote
emergent-presencing or physis, which, according to Heidegger, was the way in which
Being was originally thought by the Greeks: Ousia is static while physis has both static
and dynamic aspects. According to Stambaugh (1973), "with Plato's distinction of
essence (whatness) and existence (thatness), the difference between Being and beings is
obscured, and Being as such is thought exclusively in terms of its relation to beings as
their first cause .. and thus itself as the highest of those beings." (p.x) With respect to the
latter assertion, Kovacs (1990) maintains that, "for Heidegger the question to be asked
is the question of the meaning of Being as Being and not as a quality of a particular
being." (p.67) In the context of the former, he holds that "the primacy of Being in
relation to beings is not identical with the idea of causal connection." (p.179) He further
maintains that "Being and the alteration of the destiny of Being cannot be thought of as
operational causal connections. The primordial originality (the primacy) of Being is
beyond the cause-minded thinking; ontological phenomenology goes beyond the
metaphysical level of thinking." (p.177) For example,
the grounding-minded [that is, ontical or metaphysical] interpretation of the question `Why are there
beings at all and not rather nothing ?' ultimately refers all being to a particular being (as their cause
and ground), and thus it ignores the fact that the `why' of this question relates to all beings, even to
the grounding being itself because the grounding being is still one of the particular beings. (p.138)
Crucially, for Heidegger "the why-question, referring to the ontical origin of the World,
is made possible by the ontological understanding of `grounding', by the comprehension
of Being, by the ontological truth that renders possible ontical truth." (p.151) His
distinction between ontological (existential or hermeneutic) and ontical (causal or
productive) accounts of Being is described by Kovacs (1990) as follows:
The comprehension of Being .. is not achieved in the discovery of beings. The explanation of Being
through beings is situated in the perspectives of origin and causality. This is a `mythological'
explanation in Heidegger's view. (p.48)
However, it must be appreciated that the òrigin' referred to in the above statement is an
ontical origin, viz. a First or Necessary Cause; in the post-Kehre period, Heidegger
(1993b) refers to an ontological ìncipience' associated with Being as such in which the
four Aristotelian modes of causality are manifested (Heidegger,77a). (Thus, on the
Heideggerian view, causation is grounded in incipience.) According to Kovacs, an
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accidental result of Heidegger's project in Being and Time (1927) is `demythologization'

involving a re-examination of
the Aristotelian, scholastic definition of philosophy as the exploration (science) of things (beings)
according to their last (ultimate) causes. (p.52)
In this connection, it is critical to re-emphasize, as does Sikka (1997), that for Heidegger,
"being is not a cause [but is] to be experienced and thought as simultaneous with beings
as their ground." (p.97) However, she maintains that this ground can be interpreted
causally, if the notion of causation is extended beyond its metaphysical application (as
a relation between beings), viz.
it would be the infinite cause of all finite essences in the sense of being the inexhaustible source of
beings, the original boundlessness which reveals its essence as origin by sending the boundaries to
beings and holding sway over them, and which reveals its essence as the boundless by refusing any
limitation, where the sense of both of these revelations must be thought temporally. Being itself, as
the unlimited or in-finite, would then reveal its essence precisely by withdrawing it, by holding itself
back from any conclusive delimitation. Different conceptions of being might then themselves belong
to the finite presencing of its own inexhaustible essence. (p.95)
Yet Lovitt (1977) maintains that, according to Heidegger, "both man and being are
finite" (p.xiii), apparently deriving support for this position from a statement in
Heidegger's (1949a) essay What is Metaphysics ?, viz. "Being is finite in essence"
(p.377). Furthermore, Grimsley (1967) maintains that "the Dasein's captivation by ..
existents reveals - however indirectly - that it stands in a special relationship to Being.
If the Dasein is limited and finite it is only because Being itself is limited and finite."
(p.83) However, while it is indeed the case that Being as disclosed (that is, the Being of
beings) is finite since that which discloses Being - Dasein as a clearing within Being -
is finite, it does not thereby follow that Being as such is finite. In fact, this interpretation
is positively undermined by Heidegger's (1993b) identification of Being with
Anaximander's apeiron101 (boundless or infinite) which he interprets as the "repelling of
limit" (p.95), thereby drawing attention to the dynamic aspect associated with Being as
such. This assertion is supported by Sikka (1997) who maintains that "Being as apeiron
is in-finite in the sense that presencing prevents beings from stiffening into subsistence"
and that "the ordering of being both sends and refuses limit." (p.93) (Significantly,
Heidegger distinguishes between the Being (Sein) of beings which is finite (since beings
101
According to Knauss (1957), "Anaximander thought of [the apeiron] in the manner of an Encompassing of all
the elemental materials contained in it; and not, indeed, as a mere summation of all things, but as something
that penetrates, rules and regulates everything. Being, therefore, is really thought of as Being and not as a mere
heap of all existing things." (p.142) Jaspers, following Anaximander, describes the Transcendence of the
Encompassing (that is, that which is beyond the dualism of subject and object) as follows: "the eternal, the
indestructible, the immutable, the source, the encompassing of all encompassing - this can be neither visualized
nor grasped in thought ... When we cover it with categories such as being, cause, origin, eternity,
indestructibility or nothingness, when we call it by these categorical ciphers, we have missed it already." (cited
in Macquarrie (1973), p.246).
Chapter 6 Poisis
are finite) and Being (Seyn) itself (or Being as such) which is in-finite (Sikka,97).)
Consequently, it is maintained that the meaning of the statement "Being is finite in
essence" must be restricted to consideration of the Being of beings (essents) and not
Being as such (that is, the Being of Being). Grimsley (1967) interprets finitude "not as
a particular given quality of the Dasein but as a characteristic which subjects all existence
to a constant though frequently concealed precariousness." (p.61) If àll existence' is
understood to mean existents as a whole (or all existents), then it is correct to infer
finitude in the context of the Being of beings while simultaneously holding that the
Being of Being (that is, Being as such) is infinite. Significantly, Stambaugh (1973)
maintains that
when the distinction of essence and existence arises, it is essence, whatness, which takes priority. The
priority of essence over existence leads to an emphasis on beings. The original meaning of existence
as physis, originating, arising, presencing, is lost, and existence is thought only in contrast to essence
as what `factually' exists. In contrast to what `factually' exists here and now [that is, beings], Being
is set up as permanent presence (nominal) abstracted from presencing (verbal) in terms of time-space.
(p.x)
Thus, (conventional) metaphysics conceives both beings and Being as such in static
terms. As Heidegger (1973) states, in post-Socratic thought from Plato and Aristotle
onwards, "the Being of beings lies in actuality" (p.1); furthermore, "in the language of
metaphysics, àctuality', `reality', and èxistence' say the same thing." (p.2) He defines
the actual as "the completed act or product of an activity. This product is itself in turn
active and capable of activity. [However,] the activity of what is actual can be limited
to the capacity of producing a resistance which it can oppose to another thing in different
ways." (p.1) Given that beings (or existents) are viewed as essentially recalcitrant, their
activity can, in fact, be reinterpreted negatively as a form of passivity; consequently,
Being (or existence) refers to passive givenness (section 6.6.2). For this reason,
Heidegger maintains that metaphysics obscures the originary meaning of Being (as active
or dynamic presencing), reducing the concept to a mere universal predicate, albeit of a
non-standard kind (section 6.5.4). He also maintains that "the actual being, is
incomprehensible in its beingness when thought in terms of idea." (p.9) For example,
how should Aristotle be able at all to bring the Ideas down to actual beings if he has not in advance
conceived the individual actual being as that which truly presences ? But how should he reach the
concept of the individual real being's presence, if he doesn't previously think the Being of beings in
the sense of the primordially decided essence of Being in terms of presencing in unconcealment ?
(p.9)
Significantly, "because thatness remains unquestioned everywhere in its nature, not,

however, with regard to actual beings (whether they are or are not), the unified essence
of Being, Being as the [dynamic] unity of whatness and thatness, also determines itself
tacitly from what is unquestioned." (p.11)
Given Heidegger's extensive critique of the philosophical tradition, it is worthwhile

Chapter 6 Poisis
briefly examining where he himself stands in relation to metaphysics. According to Sikka

(1997),
there is in Heidegger a kind of temporalized meta-metaphysics, a revised metaphysics in which

traditional metaphysical concepts are expanded through a deep and constant awareness of the
historicality and finitude of existence. (p.145)
Given the radical historicity of the `new' metaphysics (or `thinking'), she is led to assert
that "there can be no question here of philosophy's finding the [final] ànswer' to the
meaning of being." (p.153) This position is supported by Dreyfus (1991), viz.
"Heidegger never answered his original question concerning the sense of being." This
is because "each interpretation accounts for some modes of intelligibility but leaves out
others." (p.39) According to Sikka,
purely formal determinations like `the good' and `being itself' can finally do no more, but also no less,
than point to this mystery as the inexhaustible source of all that is. They do then refer and mean, but
in the manner of beckoning to what is hidden. They indicate the mystery. Since what is indicated here
can be disclosed only in a finite manner, the word that reveals can do so only in the manner of
concealing. It both names and does not name. (p.153)
Thus, Being is a universal (in the sense of fundamental, primordial, irreducible) concept
and as Heidegger (1959) states,
beyond the domain of this most universal concept `being', there is, in the strictest sense of the word,
nothing more, on the basis of which being itself could be more closely determined. The concept of
being is an ultimate. (p.40)
However, while Being as such is ultimately unthinkable and unapproachable102 , it is of

critical significance to appreciate that Being (or nothing) is an ontological ultimate and
hence, the ground of the ontical ultimates postulated in conventional metaphysics,
whether such ultimates be matter, spirit, thought, substance, process or computation
(chapters 2 and 5). As Jaspers (1971) states,
102
According to Grimsley (1967), "Heidegger points out at the very outset that the great difficulty attendant upon
all discussions of Being is that although we cannot help using the idea, it is really indefinable. It is the most
general of all concepts and yet the most incomprehensible; it cannot be derived from any higher concepts
[because there are none - it is an ultimate] and it cannot be represented by lower [because this would be to
conflate Being as such with beings]. The generality of the problem might exclude the possibility of finding a
solution were it not that the very asking of the question means that an answer is in some sense present to the
mind of the questioner. To ask ourselves concerning the meaning of Being implies that Being is (however
obscurely) present to us." (p.39) This position is supported by Wittgenstein who asserts, in Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus (1921), that "when the answer cannot be put into words, neither can the question be put into
words. If a question can be framed at all, it is also possible to answer it." (6.5) Consistent with this assertion,
and as reiterated in what follows, limited (finite, peiron) approach to the unlimited (infinite, a-peiron) is
possible hermeneutically, that is, historically and it is in this way that the temporal structure of Being (Seyn)
as the Being (Sein) of beings (Seiendes) - the existential modalities - unfolds (or unconceals).
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whatever becomes an object for me is always a determinate being among others, and only a mode of
being. When I think of being as matter, energy, spirit, life, and so on - every conceivable category has
been tried - in the end I always discover that I have absolutized a mode of determinate being, which
appears within the totality of being, into being itself. No known being is being itself. (p.17)
Macquarrie (1972) encapsulates the significance of the distinction between the

ontological ultimacy of Being as such and the ontical ultimates of metaphysics in the
following statement: "the positivist gives up long before the mystic does." (p.152)
In questioning concerning the Being (Sein) of beings (Seiendes) and concerning Being
(Seyn) as such, Heidegger - by thinking through the èssence' of èxistence' or the
`whatness' of `thatness' - attempts to reveal - or unconceal - the why of Being itself, viz.
its meaning and truth. As should have become readily apparent by now, and as Kovacs
(1990) himself states, "the very expression of thought on Being is difficult; it requires
a new vocabulary and a new way of speaking that often borders on bursting the
boundaries (tests the ultimate limits) of language." (p.252) For this reason, Steiner
(1978) maintains that Heidegger, like Plotinus (section 6.4.2.4), "operates in the shadow-
area between rational speech and `something else'. It is [therefore] almost a contradiction
to expect daylit clarity." (p.19) Kovacs points toward this `something else' in asserting
that, according to Heidegger, "language .. is not as much utilitarian [or adaptive] as
poetic103 [emphasis added]." (p.211) Furthermore,
the poetic word is philosophical; it ascends from beings (multiplicity) to Being (oneness, origin,
unity). The calculating and technological imperialisms of scientific rationality (scientism) and
intellectual metaphysics lack this openness and freedom toward the truth of Being and that of beings.
They cannot grasp the deeper dimensions of the human World and history. Poetizing and thinking,
then, represent seeking (openness) and questioning. Poetry, therefore, is part of the search for the truth
about human `dwelling' and about the divine. (pp.214-215).
This position is endorsed by Pggeler (1987) who maintains, rather obscurely, that
the thinkers who say Being prepare the way for the poetical, so that poets stay on the track of the
divine and `trace for related mortals the way to the turning'. (p.70)
As he goes on to state, perhaps even more enigmatically, "Being or its truth can be not
only a neutral structural openness, but possibly also that which brings Dasein into
salvation and thereby shows itself through the unapproachable mystery as the Holy."
(p.59) From statements such as these, it could - and has - been argued that poetry is far
103
According to Heidegger (1993c), "language is not the utterance of an organism; nor is it the expression of a
living thing. Nor can it ever be thought in an essentially correct way in terms of its symbolic character, perhaps
not even in terms of the character of signification. Language is the clearing-concealing advent of Being itself
[emphasis added]." (p.230) Hence, Heidegger's implcit critique of the primordiality of the semiotic function
of language (Dreyfus,91).
Chapter 6 Poisis
too obscure a medium of expression for the task of philosophy, in this context, ontology
or the study of Being. However, Steiner (1978) insists that, for Heidegger,
poetry is not language in some esoteric, decorative or occasional guise. It is the essence of language
where language is, where man is bespoken, in the antique, strong sense of the word. (p.138)
Adopting a somewhat poetic means of expression himself, Heidegger (1993c) holds that
"language is the house of Being. In its home man dwells. Those who think and those who
create with words are the guardians of this home." (p.217) Expanding on this latter
statement, Kovacs maintains that "in the ìs' dwells and emerges Being, [and] what the
ìs' names occurs in and as out of Being, that which properly is Being" (p.178). As
Heidegger himself states
Man is .. `thrown' from Being itself into the truth of Being, so that ek-sisting in this fashion he might
guard the truth of Being, in order that beings might appear in the light of Being as the beings they are.
Man does not decide whether and how beings appear, whether and how God and the gods or history
and nature come forward into the clearing of Being, come to presence and depart. The advent of
beings lies in the destiny of Being. But for man it is ever a question of finding what is fitting in his
essence that corresponds to such destiny; for in accord with this destiny man as ek-sisting has to
guard the truth of Being. Man is the shepherd of Being. (p.234)
Again, "man is not the lord of beings [that is, being-there (Dasein) is not Being as such
(Seyn) or even the Being (Sein) of beings]. Man is the shepherd of beings [that is, the Da,
`clearing' or `there', of Being which is thrown104 by, from and for the latter]."
Furthermore, "in his essential unfolding within the history of Being, man is the being
whose Being as ek-sistence105 consists in his dwelling in the nearness of Being. Man is
the neighbour of Being." (p.245) Expressions such as `man is the neighbour and the
shepherd (or guardian) of Being' and `language is the house of Being in which the latter
dwells', and terms such as èk-sistence', `thrownness' and `dwelling' among countless
others serve to establish - as Steiner (1978) appreciates - the fact that "no aspect of
Heideggerian thought can be divorced from the phenomenon of Heidegger's prose style."
However, as he goes on to remark, "to Heidegger's detractors, this style is an
abomination [which] is nothing more than bombastic, indecipherable jargon." (p.16) For
many, Heidegger is quite simply
a `language-mystic', a `meta-theologian', an ominous symptom of the moral and intellectual disarray

of our time. [Some have gone so far as to assert] that even a polemical discussion of Heidegger's case
is merely futile. His writings are a thicket of impenetrable verbiage; the questions he poses are sham-
questions; the doctrines he puts forward are, so far as anything at all can be made of them, either false
or trivial. To try and analyse Heideggerian òntology', the study and theory of the nature of Being and
existence, is to speak or speak of nonsense - non-sense, in the most drastic connotations of the term.
(pp.11-12)
104
The existential structure of `thrownness' is briefly examined in section 6.5.3.
105
The notion of ek-sistence (or standing out) is briefly examined in sections 6.5.3 and 6.5.4.
Chapter 6 Poisis
While such criticisms may be valid at a superficial level106, detailed investigation of a

number of his central works establishes that there is indeed evidence to support his
central thesis, viz. that the distinction between Being and beings has been forgotten -
furthermore, that this forgetting has, in turn, also been forgotten - and that the question
concerning Being as such is both legitimate and yet remains unaddressed by
(conventional) metaphysics. With respect to the ìmpenetrability' or esoteric nature of
his language, it must be appreciated from the outset that Heidegger is, in questioning
concerning Being as such, attempting to both transcend and yet, at the same time,
encompass the rational107. However, this does not mean that his project is ìrrational' in
the sense in which this term applies to the thinking of the romantic philosophers (such
as Voltaire) or the early existentialists (such as Kirkegaard); rather, it should be viewed
as supra-rational. In the Letter on Humanism (1993c), Heidegger maintains that
because we are speaking against `logic' people believe we are demanding that the rigor of thinking
be renounced and in its place the arbitrariness of drives and feelings be installed and thus that
ìrrationalism' be proclaimed as true. For what is more `logical' than that whoever speaks against the
logical is defending the alogical ? (p.249)
However, as he goes on to state, "to think against `logic' does not mean to break a lance
for the illogical but simply to trace in thought the logos108 and its essence, which
appeared in the dawn of thinking, that is, to exert ourselves for the first time in preparing
for such reflection. [Moreover, it must be appreciated that] irrationalism, as a denial of
ratio, rules unnoticed and uncontested in the defense of `logic', which believes it can
eschew meditation on logos and on the essence of ratio, which has its ground in logos."
(p.251) In response to the contention that Heideggerian phenomenology (or ontology)
is non-rigorous since it is neither scientific nor logical as conventionally (that is,
metaphysically) conceived and hence, cannot be other than a mere subjective
undertaking, Heidegger propounds "the law of the fittingness of thought on the history
of Being" which he defines in terms of "rigor of meditation, carefulness in saying,
frugality with words." (p.265) However, it is crucial to appreciate, following Steiner
106
According to Heidegger (1939), "only when language has been debased to a means of commerce and
organization, as is the case with us, does thought rooted in language appear to be a mere `philosophy of words',
no longer adequate to the `pressing realities of life'. This judgement is simply an admission that we ourselves
no longer have the power to trust that the word is the essential foundation of all relations to beings as such."
(p.214)
107
This follows from the fact that in questioning concerning Being as such, it is necessary to question concerning
the ontological foundations of logic and reason. Whether ontology is itself rational (an implicit assumption of
metaphysics) or otherwise can only be determined hermeneutically, that is, by questioning rationality from
within rationality; however, such a circular - or, more precisely, spiral - self-reflexive movement points to that
which lies beyond rationality as its incipient ground.
108
Heidegger's interpretation of logos is examined in section 6.5.6 in connection with the distinction between
Being and thinking.
Chapter 6 Poisis
(1978), that
human speech, either through some inherent limitation or because the impress upon it of conventional
logic and grammar is too incisive, cannot give an answer which, simultaneously, answers to, is
authentically answerable to, the nature of the question [concerning the meaning and truth of Being],
and satisfies normal criteria of intelligibility. (pp.145-146)
For example, consider the following assertion due to Sikka (1997):
being itself can be considered a being, that is, can be said to be. In a sense, it can, since it is not
nothing [in the sense of a mere static void]; and in a sense it cannot, since it is not one being among
others [and hence, is nothing, that is, no-thing]. (p.86)
To what extent are Being and Nothing the same in the sense of identity as opposed to
belonging-together (Heidegger,59) ? Since Nothing is (given) in some sense (for
example, as simultaneously - and paradoxically - both the absence of presence and the
presence of absence109 ), it must partake of Being; hence, Being as such must - in some
sense - be the ground of Nothing. (This renders intelligible Heidegger's (1993c) rather
cryptic assertion that Nothing is the `veil' of Being.) However, Being is not a being: To
view it as such and thereby question it as a being, that is, to question concerning the
Being of Being, engenders an infinite self-referential hermeneutic regress110. Although
the happening or èvent' of this regress is itself significant, since Being manifests as the
Being (Sein) of beings (Seiendes), the question concerning the meaning of Being (Seyn)
as such, or Being as it is in itself (an sich), remains unaddressed. Yet, if Being is not a
being then it is no-thing or Nothing. These issues, which are complex and paradoxical,
will be examined further in section 6.5.5. Sikka is led to conclude that "the linguistic
problems [associated with questioning concerning Being] are insurmountable." (p.85)
Given that linguistic paradox arises in the attempt to articulate the structure of Being as
such, it would seem, as Steiner (1978) maintains, that for Heidegger, the only resort is
tautology111: "We cannot explicate [in the precise sense of `make explicit'] the ìsness'
109
I owe a debt of gratitude to my wife, Tasleem Akhtar Ali, who first unconcealed the phrase "presence of
absence" to me in a love poem. The term appears in (Heidegger,39) in connection with a definition of the
concept of steresis, viz. "the presencing of an absencing." (p.227) According to Heidegger, steresis "as
absencing is not simply absentness; rather, it is a presencing, namely, that kind in which the absencing (but
not the absent thing) is present." (pp.226-227)
110
As will be shown in section 6.5.4, this regress of Being (Seyn) unfolds historically as the Being (Sein) of beings
(Seiendes), viz. the emergent temporal structure of the existential modalities.
111
The problem of paradox can be traced to the copula ìs' which is spoken in every attempt at the articulation of
Being. Interestingly, certain semitic languages such as Arabic do not appear to engender such a paradox; this
follows from the fact that the copula simply does not exist (Nasr,81). Hence, Heidegger's assertion that
language is the house of Being might stand; however, this requires abandoning his contention that "along with
German the Greek language is (in regard to its possibilities for thought) at once the most powerful and most
spiritual of all languages." (p.57) Waterhouse's (1981) criticism of Heidegger's position on the grounds that one
Chapter 6 Poisis
of Being. We can only state it tautologically: Sein ist Sein (`Being is Being')." (p.146)
Heidegger (1993c) provides explicit support for this assertion in responding,
tautologously, to the question What is Being ? with the statement: "It is It itself." (p.234)
Furthermore, he maintains, radically, that "perhaps ìs' can be said only of Being in an
appropriate way, so that no individual being ever properly ìs'." (p.238) By this is
implied that Being as such and the copula ìs' are the same112 (in some sense) and that
beings, since they partake of Being, are derivative with respect to the ìs'. (The copula
is examined further in section 6.5.4). However, as previously stated, while it might
indeed be the case that, ultimately (as Seyn), Being can only be explicated tautologically,
it does not thereby follow that Being cannot be understood proximally (as Sein) in other
than tautologous terms. (It is crucial to appreciate that for Heidegger, this does not mean
that Being must be approached through beings such that the former is understood as
referring to that which is common, in the sense of universal, to the latter, viz. brute,
factical existence and static, Platonic essence. If this were the case, Heidegger would be
placed squarely within the very tradition that he rejects. Rather, it is to accept that Being
as such (or Seyn) can only be approached hermeneutically, that is, through a historical,
interpretative movement between beings and Being as such in which the Being (Sein) of
beings is disclosed historically, contingently and particularly113.) For example, Sikka
(1997) maintains that "being is not what-is, but the truth of what-is; it is meaning"
(p.182) and, as Heidegger showed in Being and Time (1927), meaning (or intelligibility)
is relative to Dasein, that `site' or `clearing' (Da) of, from and for Being as such at which
the latter comes to presence (that is, manifests or emerges into unconcealment) in beings;
hence, proximally, the Being (Sein) of Being as such (Seyn) can be disclosed through the
disclosure of the Being of that being for which Being as such is an issue. Furthermore,
and of crucial significance in the context of this study, clarification of the distinction
between this being (Dasein) and other beings (Seiendes), and between beings and Being
language is as good as another with respect to its possibilities for articulating the structure of Being is itself
unjustified, particularly in light of the problems associated with Greek and (presumably) other Indo-European
languages. Hence, it is possible to adopt - as a tentative working hypothesis - the view that certain languages
are more suitable than others for disclosing different modalities in the existential (temporal, historical) structure
of Being as such.
112
Either as in identity or in belonging-together (Heidegger,59).
113
According to Heidegger (1993b), in traditional metaphysics, the meaning of being (or existence) is held to be
exhausted by modal logic. viz. actuality, possibility (or potentiality) and necessity. However, the identification
of being with extantness (actuality or that-ness) and its universal application to beings is, Heidegger maintains,
both premature and inadequate since it fails to clarify the meaning of existence as such: the meaning of the
Being of actuality, possibility and necessity remains unaddressed. For this reason, Heidegger draws a
distinction between beings (Seiendes) on the one hand, Being as such (Seyn) on the other, and the Being of
beings (Sein) which historically mediates the relation between the two. Crucially, this mediation takes place
in the `clearing' or Da (There) assigned by Being to this task, viz. Da-Sein (There-Being) or Dasein (section
6.5.3). Thus, Dasein is the `site' at which the historical structure of Being as such (Seyn) unfolds (unconceals)
itself as Being (Sein); hence, the meaning of Being as such can only be understood historically as the Being
of beings which is itself historical.
Chapter 6 Poisis
as such (Seyn), allows the poitic difference between naturals (or naturality) and
artifactuals (or artificiality) to be clarified since the relation between Being, Dasein and
beings is hermeneutic114. According to Sikka (1997), "the nature of being can be
indicated via Dasein because the essence of Dasein is itself constituted by its being an
indication of being, by its pointing beyond itself to being." (p.75) This position is
supported by Kovacs (1990) who maintains that
the hermeneutics of human existence .. leads to the hermeneutics of Being, and the interpretation of
Being, in turn, relates back again to the understanding of human existence. This `hermeneutic circle'
is an integral element of human understanding; it is the indispensable background for the discernment
of meanings, of meaningfulness. (p.217)
As stated at the beginning of this section, according to Heidegger (1927),

"phenomenology is the science of the Being of entities - ontology," (p.61) Significantly,
Hofsdadter (1982) maintains that, on the view of the former, "ontology is the doctrine
of the revelation of being through the temporality which is the being of a certain being,
the Dasein." (p.xxx) According to Dreyfus (1991), the pre-Kehre (`Turn') Heidegger of
Being and Time (1927), whose (proximal) concern is with an èxistential analytic of the
Dasein',
claims that he is doing ontology, that is, asking about the nature of this understanding of being that
we do not know - that is not a representation in the [sense of a] corresponding to the world - but that
we simply are. (p.3)
Hofsdadter goes on to assert that "being and Dasein belong together, they enter into their
own peculiar identity, because the Dasein's being is temporality; but by way of
temporality what is disclosed is all being, not the Dasein's being alone." Thus, as stated
previously herein and reiterated in section 6.5.4,
being is not a being; being is not even that being, the Dasein, which we ourselves are, each of us. We
are here only as the Da in and through which beings and their being can be unveiled. Being needs us
to be given115 - the only sense in which one can say that being ìs'. But being is not given as the
subject. It is given in ways which vary with the age and the understanding-of-being allotted to the
Dasein: as ousia, entelecheia, actualitas, position, absolute Idea, Geist, and in the modern world,
according to Heidegger's later thinking, under the aegis of Gestell - that enframing, placing,
positioning in which all beings are exhibited as stock, resource for processing. (p.xxxi)
114
Crudely, Being (Seyn) gives rise to beings (Seiendes) and Dasein, viz. that being which discloses the Being
(Sein) - or meaning (Sinn) - of beings (that is, brings Being forth into unconcealment or presence). As
Heidegger states, Being is presencing, and presencing to that which is capable of appreciating presence. As
will be shown in section 6.5.4, this `that' is, in fact, not a that (a mere extantness) but rather a who and it is for
this reason that Heidegger (1982) contests the universal conceptions of essence and existence in (conventional)
metaphysical thinking.
115
However, as Sikka (1997) points out, while Being needs Dasein to be given as the Being (Sein) of beings
(Seiendes), the former does not need the latter to give, that is, to be that which gives, given-ness as such (Being
as Seyn).
Chapter 6 Poisis
Hence, there is immediately established a need to question concerning the Being

structure of that being for whom Being is an issue in order to clarify the meaning (and
truth) of Being as such. As Hofstadter (1982) goes on to state,
we cannot begin in ontology with some abstractly universal and indifferent notion of being, which
might then be broken down into its different kinds, and so forth. That notion, the traditional one,
stems from the degenerate modification of being which we have in mind when we treat every being
as an instance of extantness, presence-at-hand, the being characteristic of natural things. The only
proper beginning in ontology is with the original horizon for the projection of being and with an
equally original projecting of being upon that horizon. We must first get to the horizon. Therefore,
the only proper beginning in ontology is with the being, the Dasein in whose existence the horizon
exists. (p.xxvi)
This position is supported by Grimsley (1967) who maintains that, while it is indeed the
case that "Being assumes may diverse forms .. if we wish to examine exhaustively one
particular form it is best to begin, not with the world which cannot give us a direct
answer, but with the only form which willingly lends itself to interrogation by us."
(pp.39-40) As Zwierlein (1984) states,
there is one thing, and only one, in the whole universe which we know more about than we could
learn from external observation. That one thing is man. We do not merely observe man, we are man
Such statements point to Heidegger's (1927, 1982) pre-Kehre approach to the question
of Being in which he presented an existential analytic (or phenomenology) of just such
a `form', viz. human being or, more generally, Dasein (There-Being or Being-There),
that being for which Being as such is an issue. Given that Dasein is that being capable
of raising the question of Being, it is necessary to briefly examine its structure.
6.5.3. Being and There-Being (Dasein)
Kovacs (1990) maintains that according to Heidegger,
the essential relationship of the human being to Being is situated within (founded on) `the relation of
Being to the essence of the human being'. (pp.180-181)
This study is concerned with determining the possibility of "strong" CEA (chapter 5) via
a consideration of the relation between the poisis (coming-forth or bringing-forth)
associated with naturals and artificials (as artifactuals) respectively; consequently, it can
be viewed as an investigation of the essential relationship of the human being (as
artificer-interpreter) to Being (as the source of poisis of naturals and - via the human
artificer - artifactuals). However, it follows from the above statement that, in order to
clarify the nature (or essence) of this relation, it is necessary to clarify the relation of
Being to the essence of the human being, in short, to question concerning the Being
(Sein) - that is, meaning (Sinn) - of human being or, more generally, Dasein. According
to Kovacs (1990), "questioning is not merely the exercise (application) of a human
Chapter 6 Poisis
faculty, but is a mode or a way of Being of a being. It is a potentiality of [Dasein or]

There-being's Being: its way of `to-be'." (p.48) Furthermore,
There-being is characterized by existentiality and by comprehension of Being through the

comprehending of its own Being. Therefore, there is a need first to understand man as There-Being
in order to ask the question about Being. Man as a questioning being is the way to the questioning
of Being, leading, finally, to Being as the questioned. (p.48)
This position is consistent with the following assertion of Heidegger (1982), viz.
"ontology has for its fundamental discipline the analytic of the Dasein. This implies at
the same time that ontology cannot be established in a purely ontological manner. Its
possibility is referred back to a being, that is, to something ontical - the Dasein. Ontology
has an ontical foundation, a fact which is manifest over and over again in the history of
philosophy down to the present." (p.19) A complete presentation of what Heidegger
(1927) refers to as the èxistential analytic of the Dasein' - that is, a (hermeneutic)
description of the existential structures of human being from within that structure - is
beyond both the aim and scope of this study116. In what follows, analysis of the Being
(Sein) structure of human being (Dasein) is limited to investigation of those
characteristics of the latter which bear on the issue at hand, viz. determination of the
essence - or, more precisely, modal Being (Sein) - of the poitic difference (section 6.6.4)
between naturals and artifactuals. Given the grounding of this difference in the
ontological difference between beings and Being as such (section 6.5.4), and the
grounding of the latter in the ground question of metaphysics, viz. Why is there
something rather than nothing ? (section 6.5.2), it follows that clarification of the
capacity for (or possibility of) appreciating the ground question and the ontological
difference - in short, for what Heidegger calls transcendence - allows for clarification
of the Being (Sein) of the poitic difference. Hence, the (brief) investigation of those
characteristics of the Dasein principally associated with transcendence.
when .. we come to the question of man's Being, this is not something we can simply compute by
adding together those kinds of Being which body, soul, and spirit respectively possess - kinds of
Being whose nature has not as yet been determined. And even if we should attempt such an
ontological procedure, some idea of the Being of the whole must be presupposed [emphasis added].
(p.74)
In the context of this study, the above statement is of critical significance since it appears
to undermine at the outset the possibility of constructing - or artificing - the essence of
human being. If this is indeed the case then "strong" CEA is impossible; in short, and as
116
A concise - and yet relatively precise - introduction to Heidegger's existential analytic of the Dasein as it
appears in Being and Time (1927) is presented in (Steiner,78). A more detailed and authoritative study of
Heidegger's thought, focusing specifically on Division I of the above work (in which the existential structure
of being-in-the-world is examined) is described in (Dreyfus,91).
Chapter 6 Poisis
Heidegger states, the Being (Sein) of man simply cannot be `computed'. (This issue will
be examined further in chapter 7.) For Heidegger, the Being of the whole, that which
cannot be computed, is Dasein - literally, `There-being' (or `Being-there') - which,
together with World, forms the gestalt117 structure, being-in-the-world, an existential
unity which is historically-emergent from, of and for Being as such (Seyn)118. As
Grimsley (1967) states,
Dasein is `being-in-the-world'. This expression must not be interpreted in any ontic sense as though
it referred to the Dasein's factual existence or the idea of its being found alongside other existents:
being-in-the-world has an ontological significance in that it emphasizes the fundamental mode of the
Dasein's possibility as Being: it is a unity expressing the a priori conditions involved in the idea of
the Dasein as a certain kind of essence. (pp.46-47)
Crucially, and as will be seen in what follows, "the world is not an òbject' for a
[cognizing] `subject', because `concern' [that is, the the significance of the world for
Dasein] expresses more than mere understanding and the artificial separation of subject
and object. Because I am concerned with the world I am implicated in it from the very
first. The world and Dasein are terms which are unthinkable without each other and are
simply two aspects of a single structure - being-in-the-world." (pp.49-50) Furthermore,
any division between subject and object must follow and not precede this notion of being-in-the-
world. [Hence,] we do not first of all consider man and the world as separate entities and then put
them together to obtain being-in-the-world [emphasis added]. (p.47)
The latter statement is of critical significance in the context of this study for (at least)
two reasons: Firstly, in artificing, Dasein relates to artifacts as a subject relating to
objects (chapter 7). To the extent that Dasein is a mode of Being which "strong"
artificiality must be able to instantiate (or realize) by definition119, "strong" artificiality
must be able to support being-in-the-world. However, according to Heidegger (1927),
being-in-the-world is an irreducible ontological (that is, existential) structure: Attempting
117
Dreyfus (1992) maintains that "a gestalt defines what counts as the elements it organizes; a plan or a rule
simply organizes independently defined elements." (p.245) In the former, principles of organization cannot be
separated from the elements which they serve to organize.
118
According to Grimsley (1967), "transcendence involves .. both the Dasein and the world - a fact which is
scarcely surprising in view of the essential unity of being-in-the-world. In other words, transcendence is
important as the foundation or ground which makes possible the emergence of all particular existents both
human and non-human. It thus reaches back to a level which is far more radical than the usual questions
concerning the `subject' and òbject', for it is a necessary presupposition for the appearance of both." (p.82)
119
This follows from the fact that artificiality (as artifactuality) refers to artifactual analogues of natural
phenomena and, to the extent that Being can be identified with physis and the latter, in turn, with nature or
naturality, "strong" artificiality necessitates totalistic (in the sense of complete, all-inclusive, encompassing)
isomorphism - causal, functional, behavioural etc - with Being. Since Being grounds being-in-the-world,
"strong" artificiality, as totalistically-isomorphic with the former, must also be capable of such grounding.
Chapter 6 Poisis
to construct (that is, artifice) such a structure is problematic since, as stated previously,
artificing or making (section 6.4.2.4) is an ontical activity between subjects (productants)
and objects (substrates and products) while being-in-the-world is irreducible and
ontologically prior to this mode of being. Hence, it would appear that "strong"
artificiality is impossible; Secondly, the ontical constrains the possibilities for the
ontological while the latter renders the former intelligible120 (section 6.5.4) such that
neither can be reduced to the other. Although occurrent beings (Seiendes) exist in-
themselves, that is, independently of the existence of Dasein, the existence of the latter
is necessary for the unconcealment of beings as available (ontological equipment) or as
occurrent (ontical nature). As Dreyfus (1991) states, "while natural entities are
independent of us, the being of nature depends upon us." (p.255) The apparent paradox
associated with this statement is resolved once it is appreciated that the existence of
naturals refers to their partaking of Being as such (Seyn) while the being of nature refers
to the understanding (that is, meaning, intelligibility or sense) of the Being (Sein) of
beings, for which the existence of a being capable of raising the question of Being -
Dasein - is necessary. Heidegger (1984) maintains that "the cosmos can be without
human beings inhabiting the earth, and the cosmos was long before human beings ever
existed." (p.169) However, this does not imply a commitment to realism as
conventionally understood; Nagel's (1986) objectivistic `view from nowhere' is possible
only because of a someone who is somewhere, viz. Dasein, the being that is `there'. As
Dreyfus (1991) states,
if it were not for Dasein as a clearing in which entities could be encountered, the question of whether
there could be entities independent of Dasein could not be asked, and more important, without
Dasein's giving meaning to the occurrent way of being, the question would not even make sense But
since humans do exist and have an understanding of occurrentness as a way of being, we can make
sense of the questions, What was here before we started to exist ? and even What would be left of
nature if Dasein ceased to exist ? (pp.256-257)
The above statement is important because it renders intelligible Heidegger's (1959)

assertion that "strictly speaking we cannot say: There was a time when man was not. At
all times man was and is and will be, because time produces itself only insofar as man
is." (p.84) According to Dreyfus, it is crucial to appreciate that
we must ask these questions from within that understanding of being that alone gives sense to the
questions. We cannot meaningfully ask, What would have been occurrent if Dasein had never existed
? if by that we mean, What would have been the case if the above question made no sense [given that
Dasein is the condition for making sense] ? That would be to treat being - [as] intelligibility - as if it
were in itself [that is, occurrent.] There is no intelligibility in itself. We cannot ask whether things
were intelligible before we were around, or if they would go on being intelligible if we ceased to
120
It is worthwhile re-emphasizing at this point in the discussion that intelligibility, meaning, truth etc are, for
Heidegger, ontological structures of Dasein as opposed to epistemological characteristics associated with a
subject (that is, Cartesian ego). In this sense, they relate to Being as such rather than merely to a postulated
knowing of Being.
Chapter 6 Poisis
exist. Intelligibility is not a property of things; it is relative to Dasein. When Dasein does not exist,
things are neither intelligible nor unintelligible. If Dasein does not exist, things are not revealed as
anything, even as occurrent. (p.257)
He goes on to state that "since we do exist and make sense of entities as occurrent, we
make sense of things as being independent of us, even though this mode of intelligibility,
i.e., this way of being, like any other depends on us. [Hence,] since we understand
occurrentness, we can understand that occurrent entities would have been even if Dasein
had never existed." (p.257) According to Heidegger (1982),
being-in-the-world belongs to the Dasein's ontological constitution [and] must be sharply

distinguished from the intraworldliness, being within the world, of extant entities, since
intraworldliness does not belong to the being [that is, Sein] of the extant, or in particular to that of
nature, but only devolves upon it via Dasein]. Nature can also be without there being a world, without
a Dasein existing. [However, there is no understanding of the being of beings or of being as such
without Dasein]. (p.175)
Given that beings exist independently of and even prior to Dasein while the latter is the
necessary condition for the possibility of appreciating this fact and given that Dasein as
being-in-the-world cannot be reduced to a subject (or self) relating to objects (or others),
it follows that the ontological is irreducibly emergent relative to the ontical: While
ontical nature provides a necessary condition for the existence of Dasein, the former is
insufficient with respect to the latter since being-in-the-world is an ontological structure
existentially prior to ontical subjects and objects. It is important to note that both ontical
subjectivity and ontological being-in-the-world - which is the existential condition for
the ontological Being (Sein) of subjects and objects but not for the ontical existence (or
facticity) of beings (Seiendes), which partake of Being as such (Seyn) directly - are
irreducible to an ontically-objective substrate. This is significant because
computationalism is an externalistic metaphysics (section 6.4.3).
It is appropriate at this point in the discussion to briefly examine the phenomenological

concept of world since the latter is a constitutive element in the gestalt structure of
Dasein as being-in-the-world. Heidegger (1993b) defines world (or, more precisely,
worldliness) as the ontological condition for beings as a whole: It is the necessary
condition for the possibility of beings `showing up' as beings, that is, for the appreciation
of the Being (Sein) of beings (Seiendes) via that being for which Being is an issue, viz.
Dasein. As stated previously, Dasein is being-in-the-world; hence, it is meaningless to
refer to Dasein without referring simultaneously to world. Yet, according to the
(metaphysical) tradition, the factical existence of the world is questionable. As Dreyfus
(1991) states,
since Descartes, philosophers have tried to prove the existence of a world of objects outside the mind.
Kant considered it a scandal that such a proof had never been successful. Heidegger holds that the
scandal is that philosophers have sought such a proof. (p.248)
Chapter 6 Poisis
As will be seen in what follows, one of the reasons for this `scandal' is that the tradition
does not distinguish between the causal universe and the existential world. Dreyfus
maintains that the problem of the world is only a problem if posed in terms of a question
concerning the nature of the relation between a self-contained occurrent subject and
occurrent objects external to this subject. This is because there then arises the possibility
of a false relation between, for example, the network of intentional states in the mind of
the Cartesian subject (or ego) which represent the structure of the World (on Husserl's
scheme) and the World as it is in itself. However, according to Heidegger (1927),
the question of whether there is a world at all and whether its being can be proved, makes no sense
if it is raised by Dasein as being-in-the-world; and who else would raise it ? (pp.246-247)
In support of this position, Macquarrie (1973) maintains that "it makes sense to claim
that the world exists, but [it is necessary] to establish the point here that this kind of
existence must be very different from the existence of particular things or animals or
persons, since this latter kind of existence is understood to imply that the existent in
question occurs [spatially] in the world." (p.63) According to Kovacs (1990), "the World
is not a thing. It is a phenomenon of encounter between There-being and beings" (p.62);
again, "the World .. is not a thing, not even a conglomeration of all things, but the basic
way of human existence, a network of meanings." (p.224) For Heidegger (1927), the
world, like equipment121, constitutes a structured referential whole, viz. significance,
which Dreyfus (1991) defines as "the background upon which entities can make sense
and activities can have a point." (p.97) Significantly, Kovacs (1990) maintains that,
according to Heidegger, it is "through There-being [that] the worldliness of the world
comes about." (p.59) It is crucial to appreciate that this `coming about' (that is, coming-
forth or becoming) of world is not a causal but a hermeneutic becoming: Dasein does not
create the world and the World does not create Dasein; rather they are equiprimordial
and mutually-dependent èlements' in the existentially-emergent gestalt being-in-the-
world. According to Grimsley (1967), "there is .. a constant interaction between the two
poles of Being. I cannot exist without the presence of this not-self which I call the world
[which is genuinely `transcendent' since independent of Dasein with respect to ontical
facticity or existence], and yet the `world' remains meaningless until it is related to my
possibilities." (p.49) This position is supported by Tymieniecka (1966) who maintains
that "the conception of the individual and of the world are necessarily correlated" (p.13)
but that reality (that is, the totality of the individual and the world) is contingent. (In this
connection, it is important to note that the relation between Being as such (Seyn) and the
emergent gestalt being-in-the-world is neither causal nor hermeneutic but incipient122.)
121
As stated in chapter 1, equipment refers to praxically-functional being, to something used in-order-to get
something done.
122
As stated previously (section 6.5.2), the term ontological as used in this study covers both (i) the hermeneutic-
existentiality of Dasein and World and (ii) the incipient-existentiality of Being as such.
Chapter 6 Poisis
Hence, with respect to the Cartesian-Kantian problem of the world, that is, of
determining the way in which human being `goes-out' to prove the existence of the
world, Kovacs maintains that "for Heidegger's phenomenology, the idea of a `going-out'
to discover the World (a going out into the World) is meaningless. There-being as
characterized by the to-be-in-the-World is òut' already precisely because it is to-be-in-
the-World at all times. This constitution of There-being is the foundation of knowledge
as a way (a mode) of `to-be'." (p.59)
Thus far in this study, a distinction has been made between the ontical (causal,
productive) and the ontological (existential, hermeneutic). However, Heidegger (1927),
in fact, distinguishes four senses of World which are summarized in Table 6.2 below:
Inclusion Involvement
(Universe) (World)
Entity Ontical-Categorial Ontical-Existentiell
Mode of Being Ontological-Categorial Ontological-Existential
Table 6.2 Four Senses of World (Dreyfus, 91; pp.89-91)
It is critical to appreciate that, for Heidegger, `World' and Ùniverse' are not coextensive:
As stated above, world is an èlement' of the gestalt structure being-in-the-world, a
structure which emerges incipiently from, for and by Being as such (Seyn). The world
is defined by Dasein, who is the source of significance; however, the world - that is, the
network of beliefs, values and practices into which Dasein is `thrown' (by Being as
such)123 - simultaneously defines Dasein. The existential-contextuality of Dasein and the
irreducibility of the ontological (existential) to the ontical (causal) are significant in the
context of this thesis because they provide support for holding that being-in-the-world
cannot be (atomistically) constructed - that is, artificed - from contextually-independent
ontical beings (Seiendes), specifically, externalistically-related objects. For this reason,
the gestalt structure of being-in-the-world should not be viewed as a whole reducible to
or composable from parts in any other than a derivative hermeneutic sense: Worlds are
not causally-artificed or made (section 6.4.2.4) but are hermeneutically formed on the
basis of a given incipience. At this point in the discussion, it is worthwhile briefly
comparing Heidegger's interpretation of world with that of two other phenomenologists
who have considered the question concerning the meaning (Sinn) of this concept.
According to Husserl, a distinction must be made between objective reality on the one
123
This network can never be made fully explicit - that is, there always remains a tacit or hidden `background'
against which beings stand-out as `foreground' - because, as will be seen in section 6.5.7, every disclosure (or
ùnconcealing') of a way of Being (Sein) is simultaneously a closure (or `concealing') of other ways of Being.
Furthermore, disclosure is essentially historical and hence, it is meaningless to refer to `the' structure of world
(or worldliness) as if it were a static, eternal entity such as a Platonic idea or form.
Chapter 6 Poisis
hand and its subjective meaning (which is constituted by the Cartesian ego124) on the
other: Objects exist independently of conscious (subjects); however, this existence is
meaningless. As Kovacs (1990) states,
the meaning of the world is a given meaning: a meaning given, constituted by the subject
(consciousness). The constituting activity of subjectivity, however, is not idealistic; constitution is
not creation. The world as the object gives, reveals itself, to the view of consciousness as the source
of its meaning [emphasis added]. (p.29)
Furthermore, "Husserl's notion of the constituting activity of consciousness (intentional

constitution) cannot be identified with the metaphysical principle of causality; it refers
to the teleology and the structural unity of consciousness as giver and receiver of
meaning. The constitution of the world by the subject is not creation." (p.30) It is
important to realize that Husserl's phenomenology is ontical to the extent that it is
concerned with the essence - or what-ness - of beings as opposed to the Being (Sein) of
essence itself (section 6.5.4). In addition, it is anthropocentric (more precisely,
egocentric). As Kovacs states,
scientific, rigorous knowledge is the knowledge of essences; in the act of intentionality beings present
(give) themselves to consciousness. To know being scientifically is to know its essence as a meaning
(intention) presenting itself with absolute necessity to consciousness (meaning, the essence of being
is constituted in reason) [emphasis added]. (p.32)
Thus, Husserl "is not analyzing subjectivity as the adequate cause of what is constituted
(constitution is intentional, not creation, not causal) but, rather, as the condition of
possibility for the emergence of meaning and being (reality)." (p.32) Significantly,
Heidegger (1959), like Husserl, is committed to a realist position with respect to the
existence (meaning extantness) of beings. As he states, "everything else ìs' no less even
if we ourselves are not." (p.70) However, as stated previously, it is crucial to appreciate
that for Husserl, Being is an essence presenting itself to the cognizing ego which
becomes, thereby, the arbiter of the truth of Being (section 6.5.6); Heidegger, by
contrast, conceives Being as given to Dasein (section 6.5.3), viz. that being capable of
appreciating the Being (Sein) of beings (Seiendes) - including the Being of other Daseins
- from, for and by Being as such (Seyn) and not primarily via conscious thematization
(chapter 1). Hence, the egocentrism (Cartesianism) of the Husserlian position, viz. Being
as that-which-stands-over-against, that which presents itself as object to a subject, is
rejected.
In opposition to both Heidegger and Husserl, Tymieniecka (1966) maintains that
the world does not emerge in prereflective experience as a puzzle which we could compose from
separated beings (as ontology would have it), neither is it a system of intentional structures. On the
contrary, it is an organized totality of beings following its own laws. (p.20)
124
As will be shown in chapter 7, this distinction has implicitly been adopted by Searle (1995).
Chapter 6 Poisis
On this view, both bottom-up atomism and systemic intentionality (understood following
Husserl and the pre-Kehre Heidegger) are rejected in favour of some kind of formism
(chapter 2) in which laws are held to be static and eternal. This Platonic interpretation
of her position is supported by statements in which mention is made of "the intrinsic
rational pattern of beings themselves" (p.21) and "the constitutive system of the totality
of being [which] corresponds as a postulational correlate to the conjectural inference
which has its foothold in the intrinsic pattern of the individual." (p.22) Essentially, on
her scheme, pattern (or form) at the cosmic level is inferred inductively from pattern at
the level of the individual. However, asserting that there is a pattern to the individual
constitutes an eidetic (that is, formistic or essentialistic) position grounded in Husserlian
phenomenology. According to Waterhouse (1981), Heidegger, by contrast, maintains that
only "things present-at-hand can have essential properties which determine their Being.
Dasein cannot. Dasein has only characteristics, which are possible ways for it to be. Its
essence lies in its way of Being, its èxistence'." (p.66) Tymieniecka (and Husserl) are
incorrect to the extent that they conceive the Being of beings, including Dasein,
universally (that is, generically) in terms of the duality of essence and existence (section
6.5.4) without questioning concerning the Being (Sein) of essence, existence or Being
as such (Seyn): To the extent that laws exist (or subsist), they partake of Being as such;
hence, the question of the Being of the laws governing the totality of organized beings
remains. Finally, there is the question of the `rational' pattern of beings which, in turn,
fails to address the question concerning the Being of rationality itself and its grounding
in logos (sections 6.5.2 and 6.5.6).
In concluding this discussion of the phenomenon of world, it is worthwhile briefly

considering the following assertions of Kovacs (1990):
[In Heidegger's ontology,] the traditional meaning of transcendence as going beyond the World .. is
changed; transcendence becomes the meaning of the World itself [emphasis added]. (p.61)
The human being is destined to the World and to itself; it transcends to the World as its ultimate
meaning and not to God as the creator of its life and of the World [emphasis added]. (pp.224-225)
It is significant that the above statements - which accurately describes Heidegger's pre-
Kehre thinking as contained in Being and Time (1927) - can be used to support a "strong"
interpretation of CEA grounded in an ontological125 version of the coherence theory of
truth. The basic argument can be sketched as follows: Given that Dasein is `destined to'
and `transcends to' the (natural) world as its ultimate meaning, Dasein must be grounded
in and emergent from world; Transcendence is `worldly' and the world has priority
relative to Dasein with respect to transcendence. Similarly, `Dasein' (that is, the
artifactual analogue of Dasein) is `destined to' and `transcends to' the `world' (that is, the
125
Ontological is here used in its conventional (metaphysical) sense, that is, as contrasted with epistemological,
and not its technical, phenomenological sense (following Heidegger) in which it is opposed to the ontical (or
occurrent).
Chapter 6 Poisis
artifactual analogue of the world) as its ultimate meaning; hence, `Dasein' must be
grounded in and emergent from `world'. This position is problematic for a number of
reasons: First, the basic premise underlying the above argument is clearly false since
close examination of the second of Kovacs' statements reveals that human being is
destined to the world and to itself. According to Tymieniecka (1966), "there has never
been any doubt as to the fact that the world is existentially insufficient. This
insufficiency has been termed `contingency'." (p.23) On this basis, it might be argued
that Dasein is the transcendent meaning of the world; that the Being (or intelligibility)
of the world is grounded in and relative to Dasein, which has, thereby, existential
priority relative to the world. In fact, this position appears to derive support from Kovacs
(1990) who maintains that
the World exists for the sake (in view) of There-being; There-being is the meaning, the ultimate
`whereunto' of the World. There-being. however, is its own end as advancing continually toward its
own potentialities; it exists for its own sake (in view of itself) and not for the sake of something else
(some other reality); the meaning of There-being is There-being. There-being is essential freedom;
it transcends beings and passes beyond them to the World and to Being. This passing beyond
(transcending) is the realization of its own potentialities (self-creation) as well as the structuring
(creation) of the World. There-being becomes (is what it is) by projecting (throwing) itself into and
by assuming its own potentialities and thus by constructing (forming, building) the World at the same
time. Every action of There-being is a realization of its own potentialities. There-being as
transcending is freedom. The radical capacity to transcend, then, makes possible the formation of the
World as well as the process of self-realization (self-creation). The meaning of the World and the
meaning of human reality are interpreted according to this foundational significance of transcendence
and freedom. (p.112)
This anthropocentric interpretation of Dasein is problematic, however, because

intelligibility of World (in Dasein) must be counterbalanced by situatedness of Dasein
(in World); hence, Dasein and World, in the incipiently-emergent gestalt structure being-
in-the-world, are, in fact, equiprimordial126. Hence, it is incorrect to infer that Dasein
emerges from world or visa versa; that world is existentially prior to Dasein or visa
versa. (What is temporally prior to Dasein is the ontical (or factical) universe; however,
as stated previously, ontological being-in-the-world cannot be reduced to - which means
cannot be produced (or caused) by - interactions between ontical objects within a
universe; thus, the existential structure being-in-the-world must be an incipient or
emergent gestalt). Furthermore, anthropocentrically asserting that Dasein is its own
meaning and end (telos) is problematic because this position is explicitly undermined in
Heidegger's post-Kehre meditations on Being: As Sikka (1997) points out, in this period
Dasein is increasingly shown to have a meaning relative to Being as such (Seyn), for
example, as the `guardian' and `shepherd' of the latter. It is significant that implicit
126
Given the ontical facticity of the existence of the universe prior to the appearance of Dasein (and the
phenomenon of World), it is necessary to postulate ontological being-in-the-world as modally-emergent relative
to ontical nature. (However, as stated previously, naturality as used in this study encompasses both the ontical
and the ontological; hence, ontical nature is a mode of naturality.)
Chapter 6 Poisis
support for this position is given by Kovacs himself, viz. Being "`needs' and uses man
(it is not `something' for itself without relation to man) as the `There' of its manifestation,
as its `shepherd'." (p.254); Secondly, neither Dasein nor world, nor the gestalt being-in-
the-world exhaust the possibilities for transcendence associated with Dasein: In what
follows, it will be shown that restricting the Being (Sein) of Dasein to being-in-the-world
is not wrong but incomplete; Finally, neither Dasein nor world are identical to Being as
such (Seyn). In the existential experience of anxiety (section 6.5.5), when the Nothing
nihilates and beings-as-a-whole recede from Dasein, it is Being as such (Seyn) and not
world (which is equiprimordial with Dasein) which is unconcealed; hence, the possibility
for transcending world and appreciating the ontological difference between beings and
Being as such (section 6.5.4). Given the latter (further, higher) possibility for
transcendence, there immediately arises the question concerning the difference in world-
transcendence associated with Dasein (natural) and `Dasein' (artificial as artifactual)
respectively. It is argued herein that the world (that is, naturality127) is - ultimately -
grounded in Being as such (Seyn); artificial (as artifactual) worlds, by contrast, are
locally (that is, proximally) grounded in their artificers and, ultimately, both artificers
and artifacts are grounded in Being as such. The relations between Being, world, Dasein,
`world', and `Dasein' are as shown in Fig 6.4 below:
World
Being `World'
I
Dasein
III
II `Dasein'
IV
III not isomorphic with I Y IV not isomorphic with
II. (III is a being; I is Being as such.)
Fig 6.4 Existential Relations in Naturality and Artificiality.
Neither world nor Dasein are isomorphic with Being as such (Seyn). According to
proponents of "strong" emergent-artificiality, this fact is irrelevant since the isomorphism
required is between being-in-the-world and `being-in-the-world' and it appears that such
an isomorphism can be sustained. An isomorphism is a relation of correspondence and
its correctness is determined by the match between appearance (or representation) and
127
Here, naturality refers to the class of naturalities considered as instances of that class (chapter 4) and not
naturality as such, which as stated previously (section 6.4.5) can be identified with Being as such.
Chapter 6 Poisis
reality128. It is significant that arguments for "strong" artificiality are grounded in

attempts at establishing isomorphisms between appearance and reality because this latter
distinction is interpreted following Kant, viz. appearance and reality or phenomenon and
noumenon are separate (discontinuous, discrete) and the relation between them is static
(that is, atemporal or ahistorical). According to Kant, noumena are abstract and
intangible like Platonic forms. This point is crucial because, as stated in chapter 1, the
decoupling of form from matter supports the possibility of multiple-realizability,
functionalism and hence, "strong" artificiality: By separating appearance from reality and
considering the becoming of beings as irrelevant to the Being of beings, it is possible to
argue that two beings whose modes of becoming are distinct are, in fact, phenomenal
instances (appearances) of an underlying noumenal form (reality). Thus, correspondence
is between (a) being and (a) being or (an) appearance and (an) appearance); the relation
between appearance and reality is unintelligible. As will be seen in section 6.5.7,
Heidegger's post-Kehre thought provides a basis upon which to undermine this position:
If the emergence or appearance of a being is an appearing in which the specific modality
of poisis (coming-forth, bringing-forth, becoming) associated with the emergence
(incipience) of that being presences (endures) throughout the Being (Sein) of the being,
it follows that a poitic difference (section 6.6.4) - that is, a difference in the way in
which beings come-forth - between that being and another being entails an existential
difference between them. If it can be established that the mode of poisis associated with
artifactuals is distinct from that of naturals then "strong" artificiality is impossible.
It is appropriate at this point in the discussion to investigate the notion of transcendence.

However, before this can be attempted, it is necessary to clarify the relation between
Dasein and its existential structures (or characteristics). It is important to appreciate at
the outset that Heidegger (1927) rejects the dualism associated with Aristotle's substance-
property (or subject-predicate) metaphysics. On his view, the relation between Dasein
and its characteristics assumes the form of a simple identity: In short, Dasein is its
characteristics; that is, the existential structures of Dasein - which are ways or modes of
Being - exhaustively determine what it is (or, alternatively, what it means) to be Dasein.
As should be evident at this point in the presentation, the existential characteristics of
Dasein are precisely that, viz. existential or relative-to-world129. According to Kovacs
(1990), "the ontological structure (expressed in the existentials) is not the drawing board
of the imagination, but the ground of `daily life'." (p.49) Existentials are concrete and
contextual as opposed to abstract and acontextual. However, this concreteness and
128
As stated in section 6.5.6, the correspondence theory of truth - on the basis of which isomorphisms between
phenomena are established as correct - is grounded in primordial truth as the disclosure (unconcealment) of
Being (Sein) via Dasein.
129
It is important to appreciate that the notion of `worldliness' does not entail a commitment to materialism; for
Heidegger, matter and the Ùniverse' of (metaphysical) materialism, are ontical beings which are grounded in
the ontological structure of World. Hence, Heidegger's ontology of being-in-the-world is consistent with both
materialism and idealism: Dasein would still be in-the-world if the world was spiritual rather than material.
Chapter 6 Poisis
contextuality does not entail holding that the Being (Sein) of Dasein is socially-
constructed as is asserted under radical constructivism. On Heidegger's ontology, a
distinction is made between existentials and existentiells: The former are essential (or
universal) in that they define possible ways (or modes) of Being (Sein) which Dasein can
assume while the latter are historically-contingent (or particular) in that they refer to
actual ways of Being (Sein) which Dasein has assumed130. According to Macquarrie
(1973), "Dasein's èssence' is constituted not by properties but by possible ways of
being." (p.67) As he goes on to state,
the first basic characteristic of existence is its emergent, ecstatic, transcendent elusiveness. Most
objects within the world can be described in terms of a few fixed characteristics - a metal, for
example. But man is not just constituted by some given properties. He thrusts himself into
possibilities of existence. (p.70)
This position is supported by Waterhouse (1981) who states that "things present-at-hand
can have essential properties which determine their Being. Dasein cannot. Dasein has
only characteristics, which are possible ways for it to be. Its essence lies in its way of
Being, its èxistence'." (p.66) Significantly, Heidegger (1949b) maintains that Dasein
alone exists131 whereas things (beings) presence. As he states,
the being that exists is the human being. The human being alone exists. Rocks are, but they do not
exist. Trees are, but they do not exist. Horses are, but they do not exist. Angels are, but they do not
exist. God is, but he does not exist. The proposition `the human being alone exists' does not at all
mean that the human being alone is a real being while all other beings are unreal and mere
appearances or human representations. The proposition `the human being exists' means: the human
being is that being whose Being is distinguished by an open standing [that is, ek-sistence] that stands
in the unconcealedness of Being, proceeding from Being, in Being. (p.284)
This view is endorsed by Dreyfus (1991), viz.
130
However, the universality and essentiality of existentials is not to be interpreted as implying stasis, eternality
or ahistoricality; as stated in section 6.4.1.3, existentials are themselves historically-incipient modalities of
Being as such (Seyn).
131
Interestingly, Macquarrie (1973) maintains that "it is the pour-soi (`for-itself') of Sartre that corresponds to the
Dasein of Heidegger, and to [Jasper's] Existenz. But Sartre's pour-soi gets defined in terms of negation and
freedom. The pour-soi comes into being (exists, emerges) by separating itself from the en-soi (ìn-itself'). The
en-soi has its being in itself, and this is essential being. The pour-soi is free to choose its essence. Its being is
its freedom. Yet, paradoxically, its freedom is also its lack of being." (pp.67-68) Crucially, while for Heidegger,
man's èssence' is his existence, "Sartre [maintains] that existence precedes essence." (p.71) It will be shown
in section 6.5.5 that Being as such (Seyn) is the `same' as Nothing (Nichts). Given that Being (Seyn) is the
incipient-ground of Dasein, the `site' at which the latter presences as the Being (Sein) of beings (Seiendes), it
might be argued - following Sartre - that Dasein is Nothing. However, this would be to fail to distinguish
relative-nothing (and the corresponding relative creatio ex nihilo and ex nihilo nihil fit associated with Dasein)
from absolute-nothing or Nothing as such; hence, Sartre's subjectivist position is rejected (Heidegger,93c).
Chapter 6 Poisis
existence does not mean simply to be real. Stones and even God do not exist in his sense of the term.
Only self-interpreting beings exist. (p.15)
It might be argued that this position is problematic since if the class of self-interpreting
beings is not identical to the class of human beings - and this appears to be the
implication of Dreyfus' statement - then non-human Daseins must exist. This position
is implicitly supported by Macquarrie (1973) who maintains that "Dasein is an
ontological term. It designates man in respect of his being: and if this kind of being is
found elsewhere than in humanity, then the term Dasein could be appropriately applied."
(p.66) However, if this is indeed the case, it is unclear why God and stones should be
excluded a priori from this category of beings since it is conceivable - under assumptions
of theism or animism respectively - that the latter are self-interpreting. Defending the
exclusion by appeal to the grounding of self-interpretation in existentials such as being-
amidst (that is, concern with beings) and being-with (that is, solicitude of other Daseins)
is problematic because Dasein's essence is èxistence' which means transcendence, viz.
the capacity to appreciate the ontological difference between beings and Being as such
(section 6.5.4); hence, the defining characteristic of Dasein is not its relation to other
beings, other Daseins or the World, but rather to Being as such (Seyn). Is it not possible
that God and stones can - in some way - transcend to Being132 ? In support of this latter
position, it is significant that Heidegger (1995) upholds an existential variant of the other
minds problem133, viz. "as far as we know", human being and Dasein are coextensive.
From this, it would appear that ontology (Being) is determined (that is, constrained) by
epistemology (knowing). Consequently, it is reasonable to question whether there is - or
even can be - a non-arbitrary basis upon which to justify the exclusion of God and stones
from the class of self-interpreting beings. In attempting to address this question, it is
crucial to appreciate that, for Heidegger, knowing is a way (mode) of Being;
furthermore, Dasein's knowing is not primarily the thematic reflection of an autonomous
Cartesian subject (or ego) but rather the situated comprehension of a language-using
being-in-the-world. On Heidegger's view, logos, that is, capacity for language, is a
necessary condition for the possibility of transcendence. However, it is important to
appreciate that the representational function of language is grounded in its primary
(ontological) functionality as a way of disclosing or ùnconcealing' Being as such (Seyn)
via the `gathering' of beings (Seiendes)134. As Heidegger (1959) states, "logos as
132
Here it is assumed that God is interpreted ontically, that is, as a being (Seiende) rather than ontologically, that
is, via identification with Being as such (Seyn).
133
The other-minds problem was briefly introduced in chapter 4 and will be examined further in chapter 7. The
òther-Daseins' problem, by contrast, can be defined as the problem of determining whether beings of another
ontical kind - and hence, possessing either an alternative language capacity or no language capacity at all - can
be a `there' (Da or `clearing') for Being, that is, a `site' at which Being can manifest (unconceal, come to
presence).
134
This issue will be examined further in section 6.5.6.
Chapter 6 Poisis
gathering becomes the ground of being-human" (p.174) and "being-human was initially
grounded in the disclosure of the being of the essent." (p.175) Man is the `gatherer' or
gathering-being (Seiende) who is summoned-forth from, by and for Being as such (Seyn)
in order to disclose the Being (Sein) of beings (Seiendes); hence, Heidegger's (1993c)
apparently cryptic assertion, viz. "Being comes, clearing itself [via the clearing or `Da'
that is Dasein], to language." (p.262) As stated previously, man does not create (natural)
beings135; rather, he is the clearing or `site' within Being as such (Seyn) in which Being
(Sein) - that is, intelligibility or meaning - presences as beings (Seiendes) and in which
this presencing has significance136. According to Heidegger, "to be a man means to take
gathering upon oneself, to undertake a gathering apprehension of the being of the essent,
the sapient incorporation of appearing in the work, and so to administer unconcealment,
to preserve it against cloaking and concealment." (p.174) As stated in section 6.5.2,
language (logos) is the `house' of Being, that in which it `dwells' or manifests through
the `clearing' or `site' provided by Dasein, the language-using `shepherd' of Being. Is it
possible that other than human beings can have language ? Can God and stones speak ?
There would appear to be only two answers to this question, viz. yes and no: The former
is grounded in anthropomorphism (that is, extension of Dasein to beings other than
human beings) while the latter is grounded in what might be called ànthropo-
chauvanism' (that is, restriction of Dasein to human beings). However, what is
significant about these contrasting positions is that they are anthropocentric: Both come-
forth from a human Dasein, a self-interpreting being who can be no interpretation other
than its own. Hence, the answer to the question of Dasein is relative to the one asking
the question, viz. human Dasein137. In short, both the restriction of Dasein to human
135
Furthermore, to the extent that techn (artificing) is a mode of poisis (coming-forth or bringing-forth) - as is
physis (natural emergence) - and poisis refers to the becoming belonging to Being as such, man does not -
ultimately - create even his own artifacts (creations). This follows from the fact that man is, himself, a coming-
forth (or becoming) of Being (as physis); hence, in Polanyi's (1966) terms, man's proximal artifacts are distally-
derivative of incipient naturality (understood as identical to physis). Yet, contrary to Dennett's (1995) assertions
regarding the grounding of genuine and as-if intentionality in `Mother nature' (that is, Darwinian evolution via
natural selection), this distal grounding of techn in physis does not entail support for functionalism and
"strong" CEA. This follows only if it can be shown that the Being (Sein) and becoming (poisis) of beings
(Seiendes) is universal, implying a tacit commitment to ontical monism. In section 6.5.4, it will be shown that
a monistic interpretation of Being (Sein) is problematic.
136
According to Heidegger (1959), "being-human was initially grounded in the disclosure of the being of the
essent" (p.175), that is, with Dasein's being summoned (or gathered) forth by Being as the `clearing' within
which Being as such (Seyn) can self-manifest (unconceal) as thw Being (Sein) of beings (Seiendes). As he goes
on to state, "man should be understood, within the question of being, as the site which being requires in order
to disclose itself. Man is the site of openness, the there. The essent juts into this there and is fulfilled. Hence
we say that man's being is in the strict sense of the word `being-there'. The perspective for the opening of being
must be grounded originally in the essence of being-there as such a site for the disclosure of being." (p.205)
137
As will be seen in section 6.5.4, this does not imply subjectivistic relativism (as in Kant); on the contrary, it
is an argument for hermeneutic realism, that is, for appreciating the situatedness of the interpreter within the
hermeneutic (interpretative) circle (more accurately, spiral), a circle which is the historical situation into which
Chapter 6 Poisis
being and the projection138 of Dasein beyond human being are interpretations of the
Being (Sein) of beings (Seiendes) by human Dasein, itself sent-forth by Being as such
(Seyn). It appears, therefore, that the question concerning the logos of God and stones
is undecidable: Given that discourse is only possible between members of a language-
using community who share a common language, and given that this language is itself
grounded in the shared `background' practices of the community - practices which are
relative to the Being (Sein) of the beings in the community - it follows that because God
and stones are not human beings and hence, do not belong to the community of human
language-users, it is impossible to determine whether or not they have a logos of their
own. This result is important because it appears to lend support to the "strong"
artificiality thesis: Given that the Being of artifacts is distinct to human being (section
6.6), it follows that the question concerning whether artificial (as artifactual) Dasein is
possible must be undecidable. However, this argument is based on the assumption that
the way in which the Being (Sein) of artifactuals is distinct from human being is identical
to the way in which the Being of other naturals139 such as stones and God140 is distinct
from the latter, a premise that is contested herein. In this study it is argued that there is
a fundamental difference between naturals and artifactuals, viz. the former are given
while the latter are made; further, that because the Being (Sein) of a being (Seiende) is
essentially historical - which means historical in essence - this difference in poisis
(coming-forth, bringing-forth, becoming) cannot be ignored. As will be shown in section
6.6 and chapter 7, the poitic difference, that is, the difference in the way in which
naturals and artifactuals respectively come-forth, has a number of implications, most
significant of which is the negation of the possibility of "strong" CEA as a consequence
Dasein is `thrown' by Being. As stated in section 6.5.2, Dasein does not create or construct Being; Being is
prior to Dasein and is the incipient ground of the latter. Rather, Dasein is the `site' (or point) within the
hermeneutic circle of Being which is used by Being to facilitate its unconcealment (manifestation, coming-to-
presence).
138
In this context, projection refers to morphization, that is, to the reinterpretation of the Being (Sein) of one kind
of being in terms of the Being of another kind of being (and visa versa).
139
Man is a natural to the extent that he is given, that is, `thrown-forth' by, from, of and for Being as such (Seyn).
It is important to appreciate that this `throwing' of Dasein into the World is an ontological (or existential) as
opposed to an ontical (or causal) event: Dasein is incipiently thrown by Being as such into an involvement
whole (the ìn' of being-in-the-world); Dasein is not a product of the causal activity of Being as such (which
thereby becomes a being - perhaps the ontical God of theology - since the causal relation holds between beings)
nor is the ìn' of being-in-the-world spatial (topological, geometrical). Hence, while Dasein and World are
indeed emergent (viz. the unitary gestalt being-in-the-world) from Being, this emergence is not causal but
incipient. It is significant that causality (section 6.4.1.3) can be traced to the maxim ex nihilo nihil fit as
conventionally interpreted, viz. as implying a movement between beings. Incipience, by contrast, can be traced
to this maxim as reinterpreted following Heidegger, viz. ex nihilo omne ens qua ens fit, an interpretation that
renders it commensurable with the maxim creatio ex nihilo (section 6.5.5).
140
God is here interpreted as natural to the extent that He (It) is `given' as opposed to `made'. A realist, ontical
(or metaphysical) theology is thereby assumed.
Chapter 6 Poisis
of the undermining of the Kantian appearance-reality distinction (section 6.5.7).
For Heidegger, man's existence is ontological (as opposed to ontical): It is

phenomenological èxistence' not metaphysical existence. According to Dreyfus "to exist
is to take a stand on what is essential about one's being and to be defined by that stand."
(p.23) Significantly, Levinas (1996) maintains that "understanding of being characterizes
man not as an essential attribute, but [as] man's very mode of being. It determines not his
essence, but his existence. No doubt, if we consider man as a be-ing, the understanding
of being constitutes the essence of this be-ing. But to be precise .. man's essence is
simultaneously his existence." (p.16) This position is supported by Hofstadter (1982),
who states that
the Dasein doesn't have understanding as a property. The Dasein is its understanding. And if and
when it develops ontology, the Dasein is ontological in this peculiar way: it is its ontology, it exists
its understanding-of-being within its life-comportments. (p.xxiv)
Consequently, as Kovacs (1990) points out, "there is a circular relationship between

comprehension and existence. Since knowing is a way of `to-be', an authentic
comprehension (and thus knowing oneself and others) cannot be achieved independently
from an authentic mode of existence (`to-be')." (p.76) It is crucial to appreciate that, for
Heidegger, èxistence' means ek-sistence (literally, `standing-out' from within Being).
As Macquarrie (1973) states,
mans exists in the .. sense that among all the beings that may be observed on earth he `stands out' [or
emerges] as the only one that not only is but takes over its being in awareness of who or what it is and
of who or what it may become. (p.69)
Furthermore, "to èxist' is not simply to `be', but is rather to be faced with the choice of
`to be or not to be', to gain existence in the full sense or to let it slip away." (p.76)
Consequently, "man does not have a fixed nature [and so] the question about a `nature'
in man must be answered negatively if nature is conceived in either static or subhuman
terms." (p.71) It follows, thereby, that the relation between existentials (concrete or
situational universals) and existentiells (concrete or situational particulars) must be
historical since it involves the dynamically-contingent actualization - which means
appearance as appearing (section 6.5.7) - of possibility. For this reason, Heidegger's
ontology is correctly classified as historical-essentialism141 or, as stated in chapter 1 and
section 6.5.4, hermeneutic-realism.
141
Hence, Feenberg's (1997) critique of Heidegger's essentialism on constructivist - which in this context, means
historicist - grounds is (at least partly) misconceived. This argument is supported by the fact that if
constructivism is a coherent metaphysical position, it must have an essence (definition) and hence, can be
subsumed under essentialism. It is interesting to consider whether it is even possible to transcend essentialism:
Even processualism - of which radical constructivism is a variant - is essentialist to the extent that it can be
encapsulated in the maxim, èverything changes except change itself' (Rescher,96).
Chapter 6 Poisis
Although Dasein is indeed a being (Seiende) among beings (Seiendes), it is unique in

that it has the appreciation of Being as its defining characteristic; in short, Being (Sein)
is an issue for it142. As stated in chapter 1 and again in section 6.5.2, Being (Sein) denotes
intelligibility, sense or meaning. Thus, the defining characteristic of Dasein is its
appreciation of meaning (Sinn). In this connection, it is significant that, according to
Dreyfus (1991),
Heidegger's phenomenon as understood by phenomenology bears a striking resemblance to what he

calls Dasein's preontological understanding of being and the modes of intelligibility it reveals
Furthermore, "Heidegger calls the shared agreement in our practices as to what entities
can show up as a preontological or pretheoretical understanding of being." (p.19) Thus,
Heidegger holds that Dasein's appreciation of Being (Sein), that is, intelligibility, is not
necessarily thematic (conscious, reflective). As Dreyfus goes on to state, it is possible
to "embody an understanding of being that no one has in mind. We have an ontology
without knowing it." (p.18) It follows, therefore, that consciousness does not constitute
a necessary condition for meaning and interpretation: Dasein's preontological mode of
understanding - which takes the form of involved skillful and practical coping in the
world - is an authentic, non-mentalistic and, crucially, primal or originary mode of
intentionality. According to Dreyfus (1991),
Dasein, as being-in-the-world, is always already outside itself, formed by shared practices, and
absorbed in active coping. (p.163)
There are (at least) two problems with the above statement: First, reference to being
òutside' appears to lend support to the view that Dasein is ontically-objective as is
asserted in, for example, behaviourism, a kind (or variant) of externalistic-materialism.
However, if this was indeed the case, the category problem (chapter 7), viz. how ontical
subjectivity can emerge from an ontically-objective substrate, would immediately arise.
It is significant that Heidegger - like Wittgenstein - neither denies the existential reality
(or Being) of ontical subjectivity nor holds the latter to be derivative of (or emergent
from) ontical objectivity (Dreyfus,91); rather, ontical objects and subjects are held to be
emergent from the primordial gestalt being-in-the-world. Hence, òutside' must be
understood existentially, that is, as implying the ìn' of meaningful involvement
142
For this reason, Dasein is held to be the ontic-ontological `bridge' between Being as such (Seyn) and beings
(Seiendes). According to Kovacs (1990), "There-Being has a threefold primacy before all beings. Its ontical
primacy consists in the fact that this being (There-being) is determined in its own Being through existence; it
is `defined' by the comprehension of Being and it can decide its own relation to existence. The ontological
primacy means that this special being (There-being) is in itself òntological' (the comprehension of Being is
its own way of `to-be'). Because of this prerogative, There-being comprehends the Being of all other beings
or entities that are not like There-being. Therefore, There-being has a third primacy; it is the ontic-ontological
condition of all ontology. This is the primacy of There-being as the to-be-questioned before all other beings.
Hence, There-being is indeed the condition of all ontology." (p.49)
Chapter 6 Poisis
(concern, comportment) as opposed to the ìn' of spatial (geometrical, topological)

situatedness. According to Macquarrie (1973), "what distinguishes man's èxisting' from
biological evolution [interpreted as an ontically objectivistic phenomenon] is that man
does not transcend his given situation in terms of `laws of nature' operating from the
outside, but in terms of images of himself which he seeks consciously to realize - he
considers `the kind of being he is, and what it is that he wants to do and to become'
[emphasis added]." (p.70) This interpretation is supported by Dreyfus himself who
maintains that "`Da' in German means both `here' and `there' (`yonder'), or rather it
doesn't distinguish these two meanings" and that "Dasein's there is not a geometrical
perspective, it is a moving center of pragmatic activity in the midst of a shared world."
(p.164); Second, interpreting Dasein in terms of `shared practices' and `pragmatic
activity' or praxis is problematic because according to the post-Kehre Heidegger of Letter
on Humanism (1993c), theoria (theory) or/and praxis (practice) do not provide the means
by which to transcend143 the world to its transcendent ground, viz. Being as such (Seyn).
These apparently contradictory positions can be reconciled by appreciating that
transcendence has (at least) two stages, viz. from beings (Seiendes) to world (Welt) and
from world to Being as such (Seyn), thereby mirroring the two phases (pre- and post-
Kehre) of Heidegger's thought. Hence, interpreting Dasein praxically (Ihde,74) (Ihde,79)
(Margolis,83) (Dreyfus,91) (Hickman,96) is not incorrect; however, it is false144 since
incomplete145.
143
It is crucial to appreciate that transcendence of World does not entail commitment to idealism: Transcendence
is not to a Platonic realm of Ideas; as stated previously, realms such as the material and formal (that is, ideal
or spiritual) are ontical (that is, existentiells). On Heidegger's view, transcendence is to that which grounds such
realms, viz. the ontological-existentiality of Being as such (Seyn).
144
In the primordial Heideggerian sense of truth (section 6.5.6).
145
In a footnote to the essay On the Essence of Ground (1929), Heidegger maintains that "if indeed one identifies
the ontic contexture of items of utility, or equipment, with world and interprets being-in-the-world as dealing
with items of utility, then there is certainly no prospect of any understanding of transcendence as being-in-the-
world as a `fundamental constitution of Dasein.' The onrological structure of beings in our ènvironing world'
- insofar as they are discovered as equipment - does, however, have the advantage, in terms of an initial
characterization of the phenomenon of world, of leading over into an analysis of this phenomenon and of
preparing the transcendental problem of world. And this is the sole intent .. of the analysis of the environing
world, an analysis that as a whole, and considered with regard to the leading goal, remains of subordinate
significance." (p.370) Significantly, an implicit refutation of the instrumentalist-pragmatist thesis is contained
in the following statement from Being and Time (1927): "The ready-to-hand things with which we concern
ourselves are not the causes of our concern, as if this were to arise only by the effects of entities within-the-
world." (p.403) Heidegger goes on to state that concern (or care) is not derivable from the ready-to-hand and,
contrariwise, the ready-to-hand is not derivable from concern. On his view, the two are not "just present-at-
hand together .. a `connection' subsists between them" (p.403), thereby pointing to the irreducible emergent
gestalt structure of Being-in-the-world. Hence, the continuity and situatedness of the pre-Kekre project with
and within the post-Kehre reflection on the truth of Being as such (Seyn), thereby confirming the existential
analytic of Dasein and world as preparatory to that of Being as such (Seyn). Consequently, and as Heidegger
(1929) states in another footnote in the context of a discussion of Dasein "as potentiality for being, in
possibilities that gape open before its finite choice, i.e., within its destiny", the praxical (pragmatist,
Chapter 6 Poisis
Kovacs (1990) maintains that, according to Heidegger,
There-being is disposition [attunement or mood], comprehension [understanding], and logos

[language or discourse]; these are the Being-characteristics of There-being as `There'. These elements
must be understood in the ontological sense; they are ontological structures and not merely ontical
quantities. (p.82)
This follows from the fact that Dasein is not an Aristotelian substance (or subject) to
which may be attached (somewhat arbitrarily) a set of properties (or predicates). As
Dreyfus (1991) states, "Dasein is not an organism and not an ego containing a stream of
private experiences, but rather is a mode of comportment [or intentionality, that is, a way
of directionally-relating to beings]." (p.160) The intentional structure of Dasein was
briefly described in chapter 1. It is important to note in the current context that adopting
this position does not entail holding that Dasein cannot be(come) a conscious subject
(Cartesian ego) or that consciousness does not exist, only that the latter is a mode146 of
Dasein - an ontical existentiell - which is derivative of the primordial modality of being-
in-the-world (an ontological existential)147. Heidegger's rejection of the primacy of the
autonomous Cartesian subject is significant since, as Sherman (1997) states, "the quest
for autonomy produces nihilism simply by cutting us off from transcendence." (p.5)
Nihilism follows because the Cartesian subject (or ego) is considered to be independently
of its objects (other beings), thereby obscuring the ontological difference between beings
and Being as such (section 6.5.4)148. According to Heidegger (1927), the capacity for
appreciating this difference is the defining characteristic of Dasein, viz. "Dasein is
instrumentalist) interpretation of Dasein and world remains a "futile attempt to think Da-Sein while shielding
the truth of beyng [that is, Being as such (Seyn)] in its turning." (p.134)
146
It is crucial to appreciate that in this study modality is used in two senses: In this section, it refers to the various
ways in which Dasein can be, that is, to the Being (Sein) of Dasein; however, in section 6.5.4, it refers to the
discontinuities in Being (Sein) which historically manifest as the unconcealment of Being as such (Seyn).
147
According to Heidegger (1949b), "once èxistence' is understood correctly, the èssence' of Dasein can be
thought, in whose openness Being itself announces and conceals itself, grants itself and withdraws; at the same
time, this truth of Being does not exhaust itself in Dasein, nor can it by any means simply be identified with
it after the fashion of the metaphysical proposition that all objectivity is also subjectivity." (p.283) In asserting
the primordiality of Dasein relative to the Cartesian subject (or ego), Heidegger is led to maintain that
"consciousness does not itself create the openness of beings, nor is it consciousness that makes it possible for
the human being to stand open for beings. Whither and when and in what free dimension could the
intentionality of consciousness move, if in-standing were not the essence of the human being in the first
instance ?" (pp.284-285) Thus, "to be a self is admittedly one feature of the essence of that being which exists;
but existence does not consist in being a self, nor can it be defined in such terms." (p.285)
148
This difference is obscured in opposing subjects to objects while failing to address the existential fact that
subjects and objects are (kinds of) beings and hence, partake of Being as such.
Chapter 6 Poisis
ontically distinctive in that it is ontological." (p.32)149 In clarification of this position,

Grimsley (1967) maintains that
man reveals himself as a particular being whose distinguishing mark is to be able to question himself
concerning the meaning of his own being [that is, the ontical characteristic of Dasein is to be
ontological]. (p.41)
Hence, as Sikka (1997) states, "Dasein .. is not itself an entity like the entities which
everyday absorption in the world encounters, and .. its own nature cannot be understood
in terms of theirs. It realizes that its own substance, unlike theirs, is ek-sistence, a
constant standing outside and beyond, a constant transcendence." (p.78) In this
connection it is significant that according to Heidegger (1959), "being-there can be
maintained only if it is at all times creatively transcended." (p.63) In fact, according to
Grimsley (1967), "it is only because the Dasein is transcendence that it can go beyond
itself as mere existent and examine the question of its relation to its own Being." (p.80)
As Kovacs (1990) states,
There-being is considered as Transcendens, that is, as a being that passes beyond things (beings) to
Being, because it comprehends the Being of beings. The comprehension of the Being of beings is the
very structure of There-Being. The human capacity to transcend to other beings, to the World, and
ultimately to Being is not some external attribute but an essential quality of the inner Being of There-
being, of what There-being is as an individual. (p.52)
Furthermore,
the inmost capacity of the human being to transcend is the most primordial phenomenon of existence.
Thus human self-transcendence is much more than a psychological (or axiological or even
theological) quality; it is grounded in the ontological potentiality to relate to the Being of all beings,
to reach out to Being even beyond the realm of particular beings. The acts of intentionality of human
consciousness (ontic-existentiell transcending), such as knowing, perceiving, valuing, loving,
believing, giving and receiving meanings, are made possible by and grounded in the primordial
(existential-ontological) transcending; they are rooted in relating to Being. (p.219)
It is important to appreciate that "the transcendence of human existence is an ontological-

existential, not an ontical-existentiell structure" (p.218), whereby the former are meant
"the essential qualities of existence, of Dasein." (p.234) As will be seen in section 6.5.4,
existentials can be extended to include qualities of existence beyond those associated
with Dasein; in fact, given the incipient-grounding of Dasein in Being as such (Seyn)150,
149
As will be seen in section 6.6, the reverse holds for artificiality (as artifactuality), viz. artifactuals are
ontologically-ontical: Their meaning is determined (artificed or `made') on the basis of their standing over
against subjects (artificers-interpreters) as objects (artifacts-instruments).
150
Dasein is the Da of Seyn, that is, the `site' or `clearing' at which Being as such unconceals. Dasein is an
emergent coming-forth (poisis) of Being as physis, viz. autopoisis (section 6.1).
Chapter 6 Poisis
such an expansion becomes necessary151. It follows, therefore, that Dasein's

transcendence is grounded in its Being (Sein) the `There' (Da), that is, `site' or `clearing'
in Being as such (Seyn) at which the ùnconcealment' (or presencing) of the latter as the
Being (Sein) of beings occurs. As Heidegger (1959) states,
the being-there of historical man means: to be posited as the breach into which the preponderant
power of being bursts in its appearing, in order that this breach itself should shatter against being.
(p.163)
In an attempt at clarifying this rather cryptic formulation, he goes on to state that "man
should be understood, within the question of being, as the site which being requires in
order to disclose itself. Man is the site of openness, the there." (p.205) In support of this
position, Jaspers (1971) maintains that Existenz - which corresponds to the Heideggerian
Dasein - "is the self-being that relates to itself and thereby also to transcendence from
which it knows that it has been given to itself and upon which it is grounded." (p.21)
According to Sikka (1997), "Dasein is the in-between of the ontico-ontological
difference, the place of the jointure between beings and being, and an adequate
interpretation of it must take into account both of these `dimensions', as well as
attempting to clarify the nature of Dasein's standing between them." (p.76)152
Significantly, as stated at the start of this section, Heidegger (1993b) holds that "the
relation to the essential, wherein historical man becomes free, can have its origin only
within the essential itself" (p.5); hence, man's relation to Being has its origin with the
latter. As Sikka (1997) states,
the `there' of `being-there' is something sent by the sending of being, and what is sent in this `there',
the clearing of being, is being itself. The Da is the lighting up of being, in which being lights itself
up. In a sense, it is being, in that it is a clearing provided by being for itself and within itself, but it
is also different from being itself in that it is a mode of being, a kind of being, namely, being-there.
Dasein is, therefore a reflection of being in which being reflects itself to itself and which comes to
be through an act of providing on the part of being itself. Far from Dasein's creating being and so
projecting it in its own image, Dasein is itself a projection of being, a clearing whose `mission' is to
reflect being. (p.65)
This position is supported by Grimsley (1967) who maintains that,
if man is thrown into the world, he is thrown there by Being. Hence the heroic resolve by which man
takes upon himself his own being-for-death is inseparable from the necessity of establishing a
relationship with Being and of attaining in Heidegger's phrase àn ec-static indwelling into the truth
151
On this view, both the ontical (causal, productive) and the ontological (existential, hermeneutic) are existential
modalities, that is, (non-exhaustive) modes of Being as such (Seyn). Hence, the ontological categories
(associated with the Ùniverse') and the ontological existentials (associated with the `World') described in Table
6.2 are both existential modalities of Being as such.
152
This position is supported by Heidegger (1993b) who maintains that "we belong to being, and yet not. We
reside in the realm of being and yet are not directly allowed in." (p.75)
Chapter 6 Poisis
of Being'. No doubt man still remains in a privileged position in relation to Being because he is (as
far as we know) the only existent capable of this ec-static encounter and so of `letting existents be'.
Yet his importance does not lie in his existence for its own sake (hence Heidegger rejects the
`humanism' which makes man the centre of all things) but only as a means of shedding light on the
reality (Being) which is greater than himself. (pp.81-82)
Crucially, however, Sikka holds that "being as presencing is the approaching, the
becoming present in the sense of coming into presence, of that which concerns, and such
an approaching can occur only `for' that being whose being is essentially care: Dasein.
Being as presencing is thus eventuated only in the event of Dasein. This is actually a
tautologous statement, for it just says that being is only there in being-there [emphasis
added]." (p.178) It is worthwhile at this point in the discussion briefly examining the
relation between world and the existential care-structure of Dasein. According to Parkes
(1987b), "traditional ontology has taken as its primary theme `things of nature' rather
than `things invested with value'" (p.110); specifically, nature interpreted ontically and
objectivistically, that is, in terms of notions such as causation and production. However,
as Dreyfus (1991) points out
a theory of the physical causal powers of natural kinds tells us only what is causally real, it cannot
account for Dasein's ability to deal with entities in various ways and so make intelligible various ways
of being, thereby disclosing various beings including the entities described by physical science. Thus
science cannot be a theory of ultimate reality. (pp.260-261)
Kovacs (1990) maintains that, for Heidegger, "reality ultimately depends on concern as
Being depends on the comprehension of Being. [Hence,] the whole problem of reality
is `replaced' by the question about Being and by the comprehension of Being through
There-being as to-be-in-the-World [emphasis added]." (p.95) Grimsley (1967) defines
concern (conscience, care) as "the Dasein calling to itself to understand the most
authentic possibilities of its own existence." (p.65) According to Kovacs, Heidegger
holds that
There-being is defined by facticity and existentiality; it always finds itself as being in a situation of
thrownness and as having a task to be accomplished (There-being is project.) .. This situation is
brought about by the relatively rare phenomenon of anxiety. (p.92)
As will be seen in section 6.5.5, anxiety is intimately connected with the existential
experience of Nothing which is, in turn, the means by which the ontological difference
between beings and Being as such (section 6.5.4) emerges into unconcealment (or
presence). In the context of the current discussion, which is concerned with the
existential analytic of the Dasein and its relation to world and Being as such (Seyn), it
is sufficient to note with Kovacs that
anxiety discloses all the three elements or ontological characteristics (facticity, existentiality,
fallenness) of There-being as to-be-in-the-World. The [structural] unity of these three elements in the
Being of There-being is concern. This means that There-being is concerned about its own being
(existentiality), that is, with being free for the potentialities of authenticity and inauthenticity, all of
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which bring There-being to an awareness of its thrownness into the World (facticity), and that in the
World it is to be concerned with beings in the World (fallenness) [emphasis added]. (p.93)
Crucially, with respect to the ontological difference, he maintains that
concern as such cannot be reduced to an ontic [causal, context-free, determinate] quality of a being.
Concern is, indeed, the Being [and hence, the meaning] of There-being. The reason for this
irreducibility is simply that `Being cannot be èxplained' through being'. Here lies the difficulty in
dealing with the Being-question. However, it is quite clear that the problem of the ontological
difference is already present in this context. Being cannot be reduced to a mere quality of a being; the
structural unity of There-being cannot be reduced to (or considered as) a more original element in the
ontic sense. The ontological question cannot be resolved through a metaphysical reduction of Being
to a being. (p.94)
According to Dreyfus (1991), "care describes Dasein's most basic structure as thrown
into making its being an issue [such that] this thrown care-structure is what is called to
to become an authentic self." (p.242) In support of this position, Grimsley (1967)
maintains that Dasein, as possibility, "is constantly moving `beyond' or àhead' of itself.
Yet while it always moves beyond itself, it also moves towards itself, because this
movement constitutes its very essence. The Dasein can `pro-ject' itself and, so to speak,
hurl itself forward." (p.46) Furthermore,
the very act of projection through which my possibilities are made actual involves an inevitable
restriction and limitation of my being. The choice of a single possibility necessarily excludes the
fulfilment of all the rest, so that my freedom has only to express itself to be restricted. Moreover, the
existence of ourselves as beings who are already `there' constitutes a further limitation, a sort of
nullity that is imposed upon us by our very condition. Even our most authentic possibilities are,
therefore, bounded by the limitations of our existential condition. Indeed, in so far as we become
authentic by willing these possibilties, we help to create our nullity and so are `guilty' at the very
moment when we are thought to be most free. We are guilty because we are finite, the paradox being
that we are guilty of the finitude that we cannot overcome and that we can only achieve existence by
being guilty, that is, by accepting and àssuming' this Existence which is àhead' of itself in a world
into which it is already `thrown'. Hence the call of conscience is the call to make a choice - not of
conscience as such (which, being primary, cannot be chosen) but of the `will-to-have-conscience', the
will to be the beings whose authentic possibility is to take upon themselves their own radical finitude.
(p.67)
Furthermore, "this fundamental attitude by which the Dasein is revealed as the `will to
have conscience', with its existential mood, comprehension, and language is what
Heidegger calls `resolve'." (p.68) Resolve manifests itself in the fact that
Dasein can never remain merely passive but must always àct'. Action does not mean restless physical
activity directed to practical ends but a certain inner determination which transforms every situation
into a means of self-realization - whether in the domain of thought or deed. Authentic resolute
existence is thereby prevented from falling under the domination of habit. Yet because it is always
striving to combine the willed and the imposed, the universal attitude and the particular concrete
concern, the conquests of resolute existence must always be precarious. Existence can never become
a state which has been attained once and for all. The striving must constantly be renewed, since the
presence of das Man [that is, `the They', the àverage' and `public' being which provides Dasein with
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its norms and standards] and the tendency to `fall' under its sway are always lying in wait to entrap
the man who has failed to unite resolve [future], conscience [present], and guilt [past] into the totality
of Care. (p.69)
The basic existential structures of Dasein are summarized in Table 6.3 below:
Affectedness Understanding
(Sensibility.) Articulation. Significance.

The world
Mood. Specific significations. Room for maneuver.
Current world. Actions showing up as
Things showing up as what it makes sense to do.
The clearing (noun), the mattering.
situation.
Being-in Thrown. Falling. Projecting.

Current activity, being-
my-there, clearing (verb). In a mood. Absorbed in coping. Pressing into possibilities.
The Self How it's going with me. Being what I am doing. Ability-to-be-me.
Care Facticity. Fallenness. Existence (or

Being-already in. Being-amidst. existentiality).
Being-ahead-of-itself.
Temporality Past. Present. Future.
Table 6.3 Basic Existential Structures of Dasein (Dreyfus,91)
From the above statements and table, it should have become apparent at this point in the
presentation that, according to Heidegger (1927), "the primordial unity of the structure
of care lies in temporality [emphasis added]." (p.375) Significantly, Heidegger (1982)
maintains that
if indeed the understanding of being belongs to the Dasein's existence, this understanding too must
be based on temporality. The ontological condition of the possibility of the understanding of being
is temporality itself. (p.228)
Grimsley (1967) provides a concise yet precise description of the existential concept of
temporality and its relation to the care structure: On his view, for Heidegger, "the
combination of [the] three aspects of the Dasein as Existence which is ahead of itself
(future), as facticity which is already there (past), and as a fallen being which is
concerned with objects (present) leads to the emergence of a single principle capable of
unifying them into a unified whole. This principle is called `temporality'." (p.70)
According to Waterhouse (1981), "[Dasein] is not what it is, since it is thrown into a
factical being not of its own making; and it is what it is not, since it constantly projects
itself towards unrealized future possibilities." (p.98) However, as he goes on to state, "the
Chapter 6 Poisis
fact that Dasein has a future, and in this sense is `not-yet', does not mean that it is an
incomplete `ready-to-hand' process .. Dasein is inevitably a `not-yet', but the not-yet of
its possibilities need not prevent its integration as a whole." (p.96) Interestingly,
Grimsley (1967) maintains that this `temporal whole' associated with Dasein has both
internal and external aspects. As he states, for Heidegger,
although temporality seems at first sight to be evolved from within the Dasein itself, it is seen - upon
closer examination - to involve an ontological, a priori relationship to a not-self. Even as possibility
and as a being that is àhead' of itself the Dasein pro-jects itself towards something that it is not. The
Dasein ìs' not yet its own future. Moreover, the existence of the Dasein as `there' means that it is
already in the world, related to a not-self and, even within the limits of its own being, no longer
completely identifiable with its own past. As Existence, therefore, the Dasein is òutside' itself in
respect both to its past and its future. But this externality is inseparable from its own internal
possibilities as Existence, so that the apparently incompatible elements of self and not-self cannot
destroy the temporal unity of the Dasein. Although the temporal ec-stasies seem to move away from
the Dasein towards a not-self in order to become explicit, they cannot be severed from their inherence
in the fundamental structure of the Dasein or completely split off from one another. This means that
temporality is characterized by a fundamental ambiguity. On the one hand, the three ec-stasies cannot
be reduced to a single term and, on the other, their unity cannot itself be broken up. If there was
nothing but this unity, then the whole idea of time would vanish through the fact of the Dasein's being
swallowed up into a self-presence. If the three ec-stasies were in their turn to break loose from one
another then time itself would be destroyed. The ec-stasies maintain a constant relation with one
another without ever becoming identified. (pp.73-74)
He goes on to assert that "temporality .. is an active, creative process constituting the

unity of Care, that it is èc-static', that of its three moments the future has priority and
that it is essentially finite [since Dasein is finite]." (p.71) This position is supported by
Dreyfus (1991) who maintains that "Dasein as thrown, falling, projecting, i.e., as being-
already-in, being-amidst and being-ahead-of-itself, can now be seen to have what
Heidegger calls an ecstatic temporal structure, i.e., the activity of clearing is outside
itself in opening up the past, present, and future." (p.245) However, it is crucial to
appreciate with Levinas (1996) that, for Heidegger,
time .. is not a characteristic of the essence of reality, a something, or a property; it is the expression
of the fact of being or, rather, it is that fact of being itself. In a way it is the very dimension in which
the existence of being comes about. To exist is to be `temporalized'. (p.13)
As he goes on to state, "the fact that the structures [of Dasein] studied are modes of
existing and not `quiddities' allows us to guess their kinship with time which is not a be-
ing but being." (p.32) In short, and following Waterhouse (1981), it is argued that
"temporality is not an entity." (p.101) In support of this position, Grimsley (1967)
maintains that
Dasein is not ìn time' as though time were some kind of objective reality, a `thing' which contains
human existence with it as part of its content. Nor is temporality an indefinite succession of `nows'
which are somehow united in order to produce time. Because it forms part of the very structure of
Care itself, and constitutes, so to speak, its warp and woof, temporality ìs' not, but `temporalizes
itself' or `creates time' from within its own structure. The three moments of time are unfolded from
Chapter 6 Poisis
within the temporalizing essence of the Dasein itself. Moreover, as the use of propositions like
`to(wards)', `back', and ìn' suggests, temporality seems to move outside itself. It is as though the inner
potentiality of the Dasein moves òutside' itself and becomes concrete in its three temporal moments
of past, present, and future. This outward-moving tendency is what Heidegger calls the èc-static'
character of temporality, the three moments being the èc-stasies' (cf. ek-stasis, a `standing-out')
which seem to come forth from this basic process and so provide a foundation for the conventional
view of time as succession. (It is only on the basis of this original temporality that conventional time
is possible.) Properly speaking, the three moments of temporality cannot exist separately, for one èc-
stasy' necessarily involves the other two, though perhaps in a subordinate or marginal capacity.
(pp.70-71)
Significantly, Dreyfus (1991) interprets the ecstatic temporal structure of Dasein in

praxical terms, adopting the pre-Kehre interpretation of temporality presented in Being
and Time (1927) and Basic Problems of Phenomenology (1982). On this basis, he argues
that
equipment, as what is taken for granted as already a resource (the with-which), applied in present
coping (the in-order-to), and directed toward some outcome (the towards-which), forms a clearing
(noun) that has what Heidegger calls a horizontal temporal structure. If we then add that Dasein, as
falling, must manifest itself through its absorption in the world, we see that the temporal ecstasies of
Dasein's way of being must map onto the temporal horizon of the world of everyday activity. We
then can finally understand at the most complete and satisfying level how and why each Dasein,
through its there, its centred openness, is the world. Thus Heidegger concludes, `Dasein is its world
existingly'. (p.245)
However, this position is problematic since, as stated previously, according to the

Heidegger of the post-Kehre period, world is not the ultimate transcendental ground of
Dasein: rather, Being as such (Seyn), which is identical neither with world nor with
Dasein but is transcendent relative to both, is this ultimate ground.
6.5.4. Being (Sein) and Beings (Seiendes)
In previous sections, numerous references have been made to what Heidegger calls the
ontological difference between Being and beings. While it is highly likely that by this
stage in the discussion an implicit understanding of what is meant by this distinction will
have emerged, it is worthwhile considering it explicitly. In section 6.5.2, Being as such
(Seyn) was investigated and in section 6.5.3, the Being (Sein) of a particular being
(Seiende), viz. Dasein (Being-There or There-Being, that being for which Being is an
issue), was briefly examined. Various arguments were presented in the former which
appear to lend support to the view that the ultimate - or distal - meaning of Being as such
eludes phenomenological analysis, thereby necessitating recourse to tautologies such as
`Being is Being' and Ìt is It Itself' in order to render this concept intelligible153. However,
153
In section 6.5.5, the meaning of Nothing is examined. Significantly, as will be seen, the ultimate or distal
meaning of Being as such (Seyn) can be approached via consideration of the relation between this concept and
the phenomenological concept of Nothing.
Chapter 6 Poisis
in the same section it was also maintained that the meaning of Being as such might be
approached proximally via phenomenological analysis of the Being (Sein) of beings
(Seiendes)154. Yet the distinction between Being as such and the Being of beings remains
unclear. As Grimsley (1967) states,
Being emerges and becomes real or (as Heidegger would say) is essentialized through the existents,
while at the same time being obscured by them. Only through the existent can we become conscious
of Being, and at the same time it is because of the existent itself that Being is obscured. The existents
and Being are therefore distinct and yet inter-dependent. (p.87)
According to Heidegger (1993b), "we stand betwen two equally unavoidable limits. On
the one side, we immediately make being into a being when we think it and say of it
`being ìs'', thus disavowing the proper work of being: we cast being away from us. On
the other side, however, we can never disavow `being' and the ìs' wherever we
experience a being. For how should a being be in each case a being for us without our
experiencing it as a being, without our experiencing it in respect to its being ?" (p.68)
However, he maintains that "being itself forces us into this situation with no way out and
even brings it about." (p.69) As he goes on to state,
Being is every time, with every attempt to think it, converted into a being and thus destroyed in its
essence; and yet being, as distinguished from all beings, cannot be denied. Being itself has just this
kind of essence: it brings human thinking into an impasse. When we know that, we already know
something essential about being. [Yet,] in saying something about being we make it into a `being' and
thus cast it away. But being has always already cast itself toward us. Casting-away and at the same
time casting-toward, no way out in any direction. (p.70)
On this basis, Heidegger is led to consider the following possibility, viz. "what if the
impasse into which being places us when we want to comprehend it must first be
perceived as a sign that points toward where we are already placed in principle, since we
comport ourselves toward beings ?" (p.70) In short, and as stated previously (section
6.5.3), Dasein is the ontico-ontological `bridge (or as Da, the `site' of an ìmpasse')
between beings and Being as such (Seyn).
Consistent with the phenomenological analysis of Being as such (section 6.5.2) and
Nothing (section 6.5.5), Sikka (1997) holds that
it is essential not to consider the ìt' that bestows being upon what-is as another being of some sort,
whether a substance or a subject. In a sense, when that which allows the presencing of what is present
is considered as being itself, it is also just presencing considered in itself. It is be-ing in itself, without
relation to beings .. Whether considered as nothing or as being itself, this ground and end of beings,
the ultimate meaning of beings as that in reference to which they are and are comprehensible, is never
fully visible. (p.161)
154
Being as such (Seyn) and the Being (Sein) of beings (Seiendes) cannot be the `same' in the sense of identity
since if this was the case, the distinction between them would not have arisen.
Chapter 6 Poisis
Full `visibility' would only be possible if Being as such were finite and static155, as is the
case, for example, in a closed system (chapter 3); however, as stated in section 6.5.2,
Being as such (Seyn) is infinite, manifesting dynamically (temporally, historically) as the
finite Being (Sein) of beings (Seiendes). From the opposition between Being as such
(Seyn) - which is infinite and unitary - and beings (Seiendes) - which are finite and
pluralistic - the meaning of Being (Sein) emerges as the existential relation between the
two which is itself finite and pluralistically-unitary156. According to Kovacs (1990), "the
fixation of man on beings, his dispersion [or `fallenness'] in the midst of and attachment
to beings (things) .. transform him (that is, human beings for the most part) into a source
of confusion about Being and thus also about his true (human) nature." (p.216) This
position is supported by Heidegger (1993b) who maintains that "when we say `beings
are', we distinguish each time between beings and their being, without noticing this
distinction at all." (p.22) Crucially, this latter distinction is what Heidegger refers to as
the ontological difference and it points to the existential fact that beings partake of Being
as such. In this study, much use has been made of the notion of `partaking' with respect
to the relation between Being and beings; however, what is meant by the term remains
unclear. This is problematic because on at least one of its meanings,`to partake' is
synonymous with `to receive' and the latter can be linked to the question concerning the
becoming, coming-to-be, or coming-forth - that is, poisis - of beings, viz. how or in
what way beings receive their Being. As stated at the beginning of this chapter, this study
is concerned with establishing whether or not artificials (as artifactuals) and naturals can
be distinguished on the basis of their respective modes of poisis (coming-forth,
bringing-forth). For this reason, it is necessary to determine whether the Being (Sein) of
beings (Seiendes) is universal to - and hence, continuous between - beings as the
(metaphysical) tradition affirms or whether Being is, in fact, particular to - and hence,
discrete between - particular beings as Heidegger affirms in opposition to the
tradition157. The presumed validity of the former view provides support for functionalism
and multiple-realizability, and, in the specific context of this study, for "strong" CEA;
however, if the latter view is correct, "strong" CEA is undermined since, for Heidegger,
beings are dynamic, historically-contingent and particular relative to their respective
modalities of poisis. As will be shown in what follows, Heidegger maintains that the
structure of disclosure (unconcealment) of Being as such (Seyn) - in the Being (Sein) of
beings (Seiendes) - is itself dynamic and historical, viz. Being as presencing as opposed
to (static) presence; hence, Being and poisis (coming-forth, coming-to-be, becoming)
155
The epistemological ìnvisibility' arising from the Kantian separation of phenomena and noumena (chapter 1)
is implicitly rejected herein.
156
Being (Sein) might also be interpreted as a unity (Seyn) in diversity (Seiendes) and is Heidegger's way of
solving the traditional (metaphysical) problem of the relation between the One and the Many.
157
As stated previously, since Heidegger distinguishes between the Being (Sein) of beings (Seiendes) and Being
as such (Seyn), he is able to resolve the problem of the relation between the Many and the One, or an ontical
diversity grounded in ontological unity.
Chapter 6 Poisis
are historically - which, for Heidegger, means essentially158 - linked. If the essence of a
thing (being) is historical, it follows that two things can be identical in essence only if
their respective histories - including, crucially, their modes of poisis - are identical159.
It will be seen in section 6.6 that there are, broadly, two kinds (or modes) of ontological
poisis, viz. physis and techn; further, that these modes are fundamentally distinct with
respect to Dasein (section 6.5.3) or the anthropic component as artificer-interpreter
(chapter 7); and that ontological poisis is not identical to, but rather, encompassing of,
ontical poisis (section 6.4). However, before such issues can be examined, it is
necessary to establish that Being (Sein) is discrete, that is, discontinuous, in structure. It
should be appreciated at the outset that if this is indeed the case, ontological poisis as
interpreted by Heidegger entails a commitment to radical emergentism and a rejection
of "strong" CEA. (This point will be examined in section 6.7 when a new framework for
emergence grounded in Heideggerian ontology is outlined.)
Dreyfus (1991) maintains that "Heidegger wants to avoid what he sees as the recurrent
structure of traditional ontology, namely, grounding all kinds of being in a causally self-
sufficient source." (p.12) According to Stambaugh (1987),
metaphysics thinks the Being of beings as summum ens and causa sui, as the highest being and as the
cause of itself. (p.88)
To the extent that Leibniz is representative of the metaphysical tradition, this statement
is correct since, as Kovacs (1990) points out, "for Leibniz, the Being of a thing (the
thingness of a thing, the beingness of a being) is its quality of being created by God
[emphasis added]." (p.130) From these statements, it might be inferred that metaphysics
conceives Being (Sein) as the self-caused highest being and beings (Seiendes) as other-
caused lower beings, where `self-causation' is understood as self-organization (section
6.4.2.2) and òther-causation' as creation (section 6.4.2.3), viz. autopoiesis and
allopoiesis (section 6.4.2.4) respectively. However, as stated in chapter 3 and again in
section 6.4.2.2, the notion of self-causation or self-organization is highly problematic160.
It is significant that Leibniz identifies beings as ens creatum, that is, things created by
God. If the concept of Being (as God) is to avoid the problems associated with self-
158
Thus, essence for Heidegger is not static but dynamical (temporal, historical). To this extent, it is perhaps more
appropriate to refer to Heideggerian essence as essencing
159
In fact, if essence is historical then becoming is continuous with - yet distinguishable from - Being which
manifests as the end or telos associated with finite beings. According to Heidegger, that which is originary
(poisis) presences throughout the Being of a being; hence, the enduring of becoming in Being.
160
Causation, following Hume, is a relation between beings (section 6.4.1.3). If a being is self-caused (or self-
causing) it must be both its own cause and its own effect. However, how can a self cause itself if it does not
already exist as the causal self which brings itself into existence ? Appealing to a processual (chapter 2) view
of the self does not solve this problem since to the extent that a self is differentiable (from an òther'), the self
is a discrete (albeit) dynamic entity, and, therefore, a being among beings.
Chapter 6 Poisis
causation (as self-creation), it is necessary that Being itself be uncaused. This

interpretation of Being is supported by Aquinas who, in Summa Theologica (Part I,
Question 44, Article 1), states that
all things which are diversified by the diverse participation of being, so as to be more or less perfect,
are caused by one First Being, Who possesses being most perfectly.
This position is based on Plato's statement in the Parminides that unity must come before
multitude and Aristotle's assertion (in the Metaphysics) that whatever is greatest in being
and greatest in truth is the cause of every being and every truth161. Yet, Aquinas goes on
to assert, anticipating Heidegger, that causation "does not enter into the essence of being
as such". He then proceeds to infer on this basis that an uncaused being (a First Cause
or Unmoved Mover) can and must be since it is - on his view - necessarily the source of
all other beings. Thus, for Aquinas, Being (as God) is the Uncaused First and Necessary
Cause of all causation and beings. While this interpretation of Being clearly addresses
at least one of the problems associated with the traditional (metaphysical) view, viz.
Being as causa sui, it fails to address the ontological difference between beings and
Being as such, thereby ignoring the existential question concerning the Being (Sein) of
this Uncaused First and Necessary being (God)162. Kovacs (1990) holds that
Beings .. according to Heidegger, may not be grasped in their Being merely by tracing (by telling a
story, by explaining) them back to a final, ultimate being, because the ultimate being (God), even
though the highest, is still (just) a being. (p.43)
As he goes on to state,
the question of Being transcends the question of God because the concept of Being as such
ontologically transcends the notion of God as a particular (even though the highest) being according
to traditional metaphysics. But the notion of God historically functioned also as an ontological
concept, as the concept of Being; therefore, any reexamination of the comprehension of Being brings
about a confrontation (dialogue) with the philosophical conceptualization of God. (p.209)
161
As stated in section 6.5.2, Aristotelian metaphysics is concerned with being qua being which, in fact, means
beings qua beings; the question concerning Being as such is rejected as meaningless. In Book ' of the
Metaphysics, and consistent with the view that causation is a relation between beings (section 6.4.1.3), Aristotle
identifies metaphysics with the science of the first causes of beings as such. However, following Heidegger
(1977a), this position may be reversed and the question concerning the Being of causation raised (section 6.4).
This is not to question concerning the cause of causation since such questioning remains within an ontical
(causal) framework engendering either circularity (infinite regress) or the arbitrary postulation of a First or
Necessary cause (which undermines the transitivity of the causal principle). Rather, ontological or existential
questioning - in the Heideggerian sense - provides the basis for questioning concerning the ground of causation
as such. That Being as such must (in some sense) be prior to causation follows from the fact that if causes are
(that is, exist), they must partake of Being. However, in Aristotle, the ontological question of Being is
completely ignored in favour of the ontical question of beings.
162
According to Heidegger, the theological difference between God or the Supreme being and all other beings is
an ontical difference since what is contrasted is kinds of beings and not beings with Being as such (Kovacs,90).
Chapter 6 Poisis
It follows that "the God-event [takes] place within and is contingent on the Being-event,
on the destiny of Being." (p.179) This is because "if [God] is, [he] is a being and as a
being stays in Being, in the essence of Being." (p.178) Thus, "the basic sense of wonder
(the radical question) about Being goes beyond the notion (and the question) of the
highest being (God) [that is, on the ontical interpretation of God as highest (or Supreme)
being among beings]; it is not a theological contemplation of beings but a questioning
about (and of) God." (p.204)163 It is important, in the context of this study, to appreciate
the significance of the God question (that is, the question concerning the meaning or
Being (Sein) of God), for the question concerning the possibility of "strong"
computationally emergent artificiality (or CEA). According to Kovacs (1990),
Heidegger realized very early in his philosophical development the significance of the `death of God',
of the nature of pluralism in philosophy. Thus, the way the notion of God is thought or not thought
(yes, no, one, many, Spirit, Matter, Will, Life) basically determines the philosophical activity, the
freedom, the creative journey of the human mind. (p.202)
If Heidegger is correct then it follows that any attempt at questioning concerning the
essence of the distinction between naturality and artificiality, necessitates considering the
God-question, that is, the way in which the Being of God is understood. In this
connection, Waterhouse (1981) maintains that "Heidegger is a man who wants to talk
about the presence of God in all things - but can't use the word `God'." (p.13) However,
Dreyfus (1991) implicitly contests this position in stating that "if one writes Being with
a capital B in English, it suggest some entity; indeed, it suggests a supreme Being, the
ultimate entity." (p.11) (Significantly, he is equally critical of writing Being with a
lower-case b "since this attempt to make `being' look more like a form of the verb `to be'
than like a noun has its own risks." (p.11) As reiterated throughout this study, for
Heidegger, Being is neither entity nor substance (noun) nor process nor event (verb), but
the self-limiting164 ground of all such beings.) Waterhouse goes on to state that
"Heidegger was not .. sure that theology was possible: didn't it presuppose a naturalistic
conception of God for which no justification could be offered ?" (pp.53-54) Consistent
with this assertion, Sikka (1997) maintains that if Being is identified with God and the
163
As a theological aside, Kovacs (1990) presents detailed arguments - based on statements in the Letter on
Humanism (1993c) - against interpreting Heidegger's rejection of òntotheology' as entailing atheism.
According to Kovacs, the existential analytic contained within Being and Time (1927) and the hermeneutic
method associated with the later post-Kehre works implicitly point the way toward a new, non-causal
`questioning' of the meaning of God. As he states, "the phenomenological criticism of the traditional
philosophical function of God as the creator (producer) of all other beings and of the notion of beings as created
by the highest being (God) .. does not represent a judgement on the theological (anthropological, ontic) value
of these teachings; its intention is nothing else but the questioning of their function in interpreting the Being
of beings (ontological significance)." (p.226) This position is endorsed by Sikka (1997) who explores some of
the possibilities for this questioning in the context of a comparison of Heidegger's thought with that of four
medieval mystical theologians within the Christian tradition.
164
Being as such (Seyn) manifests itself both dynamically (`limiting') and statically (`limit').
Chapter 6 Poisis
latter with the Supreme or Highest being (among all other beings), this (naturalistic)
conception of God and Being must be rejected since it does not account for the
ontological difference (between Being and beings). However, as she goes on to state,
while it is indeed the case that Being cannot be identified with an ontical God, it does
not thereby follow that God cannot be identified with ontological Being as such (Seyn);
in fact, according to Sikka, this is precisely the position that medieval mystics (such as
Bonaventure and Eckhart) adopted within the Christian tradition165. Returning to the
question concerning the Being (Sein) of beings (Seiendes) posed at the start of this
section, it should, by this point in the discussion, be clear that metaphysics is, as Kovacs
(1990) states, "theological in nature; it views Being as God, as the highest among all the
particular beings. This is the reason for the phenomenological rejection [but not
necessarily ontical denial] of the Cause-God." (p.160) According to Heidegger,
metaphysics understands the question of Being in ontotheological terms, viz. (i) what is
Being in general, that is, what is the Being of particular beings (traditional ontology) and
(ii) what (and how) is the highest of beings (conventional theology). Sikka (1997)
defines onto-theo-logic similarly as
considering the ground of being as that which is common to every being (onto-logic) and considering
this ground in terms of the highest being as the first cause and ultimate reason of all beings (theo-
logic). (p.61)
Metaphysics, on Heidegger's view, is concerned with being(s) qua being(s) and the
theological difference between a First (or Necessary) Cause or being and all other
(derivative) causes or beings; the ontological difference between Being and beings,
which subsumes the theological difference, remains unaddressed. Significantly, he
maintains that identifying ontology (section 6.5.2) with metaphysics entails holding that
beings can be universally (that is, generically) conceived in terms of the duality of
essence (what-ness) and existence (that-ness). However, Kovacs (following Heidegger)
contests this dualistic universal conception of Being, arguing that its adoption is, at best,
premature, and, at worst, erroneous: Ontology is the (scientific) study of Being as such
and it remains to be seen whether the question concerning the meaning and truth of
Being can be adequately addressed by metaphysical thinking (that is, in terms of
universal essence and existence). Before the universal conception of Being (as essence
and existence) is examined, it is worthwhile briefly considering how the Being (Sein) of
beings (Seiendes) has been viewed in the metaphysical tradition from the (ontical)
perspective of beings.
In Book ), ch.VII of the Metaphysics. Aristotle maintains that "things are said to `be' (1)
accidentally and (2) essentially, i.e. by their own nature per se .. [Furthermore,] the kinds
of essential being are shown by the categories; the word `being' has as many meanings
165
A similar position is adopted within sufism, that is, Islamic mystical theology. A lucid introduction to the latter
from a Taoist perspective is presented by Murata (1992) while a detailed study of perhaps the most important
mystical philosopher-theologian within this tradition, Ibn al-'Arabi, appears in (Affifi,79).
Chapter 6 Poisis
as there are categories [of beings]." As he goes on to state,
things are said to exist .. in many ways, but all with reference to one starting-point. For some are said
to exist because they are substances, others because they are affections of substances, others because
they are paths to substance or destructions or privations or qualities or producers or creators of
substances or of things said to exist by reference to substance, or are negations of these or of
substance. (Metaphysics IV 2, 1003b5-10)
Hence, for Aristotle, the pivotal notion with respect to the question of Being is
substance. Barnes (1982) maintains that, on the Aristotelian view, "a thing is a substance
if it is both an individual (a `this so-and-so', something capable of being designated by
a demonstrative phrase), and also a separable item (something non-parasitic, a thing
whose existence is not a matter of some other thing's being modified in some way or
other)." (p.44) It is crucial to appreciate that this position assumes that beings
(substances) are non-relationally determined, a view which is contested by both
Heidegger and Whitehead (chapter 9)166. Barnes further states that "unlike Plato's Forms,
which exist forever and never alter, Aristotle's substances are for the most part temporary
things which undergo a variety of alterations." (p.46) Additionally,
matter and form are logical parts of substances: an account of what substances are requires mention
both of their stuff and of their structure. Nor should we imagine the matter as the physical aspect of
a substance and the form as a sort of non-physical additive: both stuff and structure are aspects of the
unitary physical object. (p.48)
Barnes maintains that, for Aristotle, "existence, like healthiness, possesses unity in
diversity; and substance is the focal point of existence as health is of healthiness. That
is the chief way in which the class of substances is primary in relation to the other
categories of being." (p.43) However, substance denotes the existence or `thatness' of
beings and not of Being as such. That this must be the case follows from the fact that in
postulating substance as primitive, Aristotle ignores the question concerning the Being
of substance as such, viz. substantiality. In this connection, the following statement of
Kovacs (1990) on the ambiguity surrounding the term substantia - which he identifies,
166
The Being of a `relationally-determined' being is constituted by its relation to other beings. On this scheme,
which, in metaphysical idealism, is known as the doctrine of internal relations (chapter 5 and 7), beings cannot
be independently of other beings. To this extent, Heidegger's existential ontology of the Dasein bears striking
similarity to Whitehead's (1978) organismic metaphysics of actual occasions (experiential events). Although
Heidegger (1977) appears to endorse ontical atomism, he rejects this thesis in an ontological context, that is,
with respect to the Being of Dasein: Dasein is a being-in-the-world, that is, a being relationally-involved with
other beings (Care, being-amidst) including other Daseins (Solicitude, being-with). Crucially, neither Dasein
nor the World is primordial (section 6.5.3); rather, each is equiprimordially dependent on the other and both -
as a gestalt - emerge (or arise) incipiently from Being as such (Seyn). Thus, for Heidegger, the Being of Dasein
(and World) is relationally-determined. Whitehead is forced to adopt a somewhat more radical position (from
a Heideggerian perspective), viz. ontical relational-determinism; this is necessitated by the rejection of
Alexander's (1920) doctrine of emergence (chapter 5) and the acceptance of the reality of experience and
creativity.
Chapter 6 Poisis
following Heidegger, with confusion regarding the ontological difference between Being
and beings - is highly significant:
the term substantia means the Being of a being that is a substance (this is the notion of substantiality,
an ontological term), and at the same time it also means the being itself (a substance, an ontic term)
A similar problem arises in connection with the Cartesian understanding of Being in

terms of the duality of res extensa (extended substance) and res cogitans (thinking
substance). As Kovacs (1990) states,
Being is expressed and described through the determinations and the attributes of the (particular)
beings in question. This means that being is accessible as a quality (determination, attribute) of a
being (and of beings in general) even though Being (itself) is not accessible as (a) being. In Descartes,
those determinations and attributes of the particular beings(s) are taken as the expression of Being
that satisfies the unexpressedly presupposed meaning of Being and that of substantiality. This is the
ontological foundation of the Cartesian interpretation of the `World'. The notion of substance
functions ontologically (substantiality) and ontically (substance) at the same time and this is the
reason for the ambiguity of this philosophy. (p.66)
According to Barnes (1982), Aristotle maintains that
if you study the primary substances on which all other entities are dependent, then you will implicitly
be studying all existents qua existent. Not everyone has found that suggestion compelling, and
Aristotle's primary philosophy is sometimes thought to consist of two quite distinct parts, a general
metaphysics which studies beings qua being, and a special metaphysics which studies the principles
and causes of things. (p.26)
For Aristotle, the question "what is Being ?" is simply equivalent to the question "what
is substance ?" Yet there remains the existential fact that substances and substantiality
are not the same (in the sense of identity): Clearly, the former are existents (or beings);
yet, while the identification of the latter as an existent (or being) does not seem
appropriate, it does not thereby follow that substantiality and Being as such are identical.
Rather, it would seem that substantiality (or substance as such) is a way (or mode) in
which Being as such (Seyn) discloses itself historically (that is, temporally) in - or as -
the Being (Sein) of beings (Seiendes); in short, substantiality is an interpretation (Sein
as Sinn or meaning) of Being as such (Seyn) or, alternatively, an existential modality of
Being as such167. To this extent, there remains unaddressed the question concerning the
Being of substantiality as such and the underlying question concerning Being as such.
As stated previously, for Aristotle there are as many senses of Being as there are
categories of beings. However, Heidegger maintains that while the ontological difference
between Being (Sein) and beings (Seiendes) is implicit in Aristotelian metaphysics, it
167
The notion of an existential modality is described later in this section; however, it is worthwhile briefly stating
in passing that the ontical (causal, productive) and ontological (hermeneutic, existential) are non-exhaustive
modalities of Being as such (Seyn).
Chapter 6 Poisis
never becomes explicit since the question concerning Being as such (Seyn) remains
unaddressed. Rather than pursue the latter question, Aristotle simply adopts the
conception of Being in terms of universal existence - thatness or the material aspect of
substantiality - and essence - whatness or the formal aspect of substantiality.
Furthermore, following Plato, he affords essence priority over existence; hence, his
metaphysics is an inquiry into being qua being which, in fact, means beings qua beings
or beings qua the categories (of Being). Crucially, the question concerning the Being of
categories, viz. categorial-ness as such, notwithstanding the question concerning Being
as such, remains unaddressed168. It will be seen in what follows and in section 6.5.6 that
the notions of category and existential modality are distinct, thereby lending indirect
support to Heidegger's claim to be òvercoming' metaphysics169.
It is worthwhile at this point in the discussion, briefly contrasting the position of

Aristotle with that of Kant vis-a-vis the interpretation of Being. According to Heidegger
(1982), Kant maintains that "being, or existence, is not a real predicate". As he goes on
to state,
[For Kant] that is real .. which belongs to a res, to a thing in the sense of a Sache, to its inherent or
essential content, its whatness .. Kant says, the actuality of something actual, the existence of an
existent, is not a real predicate [and that] actuality is not a real determination. [The] meaning of this
negative proposition is that actuality, existence, is not itself anything actual or existent; being is not
itself a being. But how does Kant define the meaning of existence positively ? He makes existence
equivalent to absolute position, and he identifies being with position in general. (p.43)
Crucially, for Kant, Being is idealistically grounded in space and time, with the latter
conceived as synthetic a priori mental structures associated with a cognizing subject (or
ego)170. As Heidegger states, "in absolute position the object of the concept, the actual
being corresponding to it, is put into relation, as actual, to the concept that is merely
thought." (p.45) Furthermore, "actuality, existence, equals absolute position equals
perception." (p.46) Heidegger contests this idealistic171 thesis as follows:
How am I to provide [that is, produce] something thought .. with a perception ? Something like
existence is surely not a perception. Perception is itself something that is, a being, an action
performed by the ego, something actual in the actual subject. This actual thing in the subject,
168
This latter question is of critical significance in connection with the notion of `cutting' as will be shown in
section 6.6.3.
169
Existential modalities are distinct from categories in (at least) one sense, viz. the former are historically-
incipient (or emergent) whereas the latter are eternally given.
170
This grounding of Being in space and time is similar to Alexander's (1920) assertion that being is a fundamental
(or ontological) property (or, more precisely, category) associated with Space-Time (chapter 5); however, on
the latter scheme, Space-Time exists independently of the existence of the subject (or Cartesian ego).
171
As Griffin (1998) states, this position is summarized by Berkeley in the maxim, `to be is to be perceived'.
Chapter 6 Poisis
perception, is surely not actuality, and this actual thing in the subject is not at all the actuality of the
object. Perception as perceiving cannot be equated with existence. Perception is not existence; it is
what perceives the existent, the extant, and relates itself to what is perceived. (p.47)
Consequently, he is led to assert that "Being, to be sure, is not identical with positedness,
but positedness is the how in which the positing of an entity assures itself of the being
of this posited entity." (p.50) It would appear, therefore, that the Kantian interpretation
of Being is inadequate. Interestingly, and by contrast, Heidegger (1982) maintains that
on the medieval concept of being (or existence), "actuality is not a res [that is, substance,
thing or being], but it is not on that account nothing. It is explained, not by reference to
the experiencing subject, as in Kant, but rather by reference to the creator." (p.104) As
he goes on to state,
the two meanings of actuality and the actual, that which acts inwards on the subject or which acts
outwards on something else, presuppose the first meaning, which is ontologically prior, that is,
actuality understood with reference to actualization and being enacted [or Being as presencing
(physis)]. That which acts inwards upon the subject must itself already be actual in the first sense of
the word, and interconnections of efficacious action are possible only if the actual is extant .. [Thus,]
the two concepts essentia and existentia are an outgrowth from an interpretation of beings with regard
to productive comportment. (pp.104-105)
However, Heidegger maintains that "it is in no way proved and immediately evident that
[essentia and existentia] holds good of every being. This question becomes decidable
only if it is established beforehand that every being is actual - that the realm of beings
actually extant coincides with actuality, and that every being is constituted by means of
a whatness." (p.111) On this basis, he argues that
not every being is an extant entity, but also not everything which is not an extant entity is therefore
also a non-being or something that is not [thereby implicitly contesting, for example, Sartre's assertion
that the human being or pour soi (that is, the for-itself) is nothing]. Rather, it can exist or .. subsist or
have some other mode of being. (p.28)
It is appropriate at this point in the discussion to briefly consider the validity of the claim
for universality associated with the notions of essence and existence in the metaphysical
tradition. According to Stambaugh (1987),
Heidegger's definition of metaphysics is clear and univocal. Metaphysics begins with the separation
of essence and existence, of the `what' and the `that'. This occurs explicitly with Plato. Nietzsche saw
this separation occurring in Plato as the separation of the true world from the apparent world, the
world of Being (the Forms) from the world of becoming. Heidegger defines essence as what is
possible and what makes possible. If there is going to be a tree, treeness makes that actual tree
possible; the tree becomes a tree by participating in treeness. The actually existing tree is then the
real, reality. Essence thus has to do with possibility, existence with reality [that is, actuality]. (p.88)
For Plato, reality is formal essence (Being) while appearance is physical or material
existence (becoming). Heidegger, by contrast, does not - like Plato and Kant - oppose
reality to appearance; rather, on his ontology, the opposition is between reality or
Chapter 6 Poisis
actuality (existence) and possibility (essence). This is consistent with his rejection of the
Kantian separation of phenomenon from noumenon (chapter 1): For Heidegger,
phenomenon and noumenon are identical to the extent that the appearance of a being
(phenomenon) coincides with what that being is in itself (noumenon)172; however, it must
be appreciated that this identity only holds between beings. As stated previously, there
is an ontological difference between beings and Being as such, the latter of which
withdraws into concealment as the former come-forth (poisis) into unconcealment (or
presence). This (self-)concealment of Being as such and the unconcealment of beings
from, by (and for) Being as such supports Heidegger's opposition (in the above
statement) between possibility as a source of beings and actuality as beings themselves
respectively. However, as will be seen shortly, while Heidegger opposes actuality to
possibility, he holds neither one nor the other nor both to be exhaustive of Being as such;
hence, in the above statement, Heidegger should be understood as opposing essence to
existence - by opposing possibility to actuality - in the context of metaphysics, a kind of
thinking (about Being) which he attempts to òvercome' in his thinking. This position is,
in fact, supported by Stambaugh who states that "the separation of essence and existence
occurs within the realm of beings; it is not applicable to the division of Being and
beings." (p.89) However, while this assertion appears correct with respect to the relation
(specifically, ontological difference) between beings and Being as such, it is also the case
that Heidegger's (1959) hermeneutic (or existential analytic) of Being constitutes - on his
own terms - an inquiry into the essence of Being as such. This position is supported by
Sikka (1997) who holds that "the unconcealment of beings in their being, which is at the
same time that àctive upsurge' of being [Sein] from nothing [which is identical to Being
as such or Seyn], is as much essential as existential." (p.182) For this reason, Stambaugh
is led to maintain that
the significance of the ontological difference [between Being and beings] is not without some
ambiguity. [Heidegger] is trying to work his way out of a metaphysically tainted conception of the
ontological difference to a conception more appropriate to his direction of the step back out of
metaphysics. (p.89)
Given this ambiguity, it is worthwhile considering in passing whether questioning

concerning the ontological difference is feasible; specifically, whether it is possible to
clarify the nature of the distinction between Being and beings in other than metaphysical
172
This follows from the fact that Heidegger rejects monistic-essentialism, more specifically, the claim within
subject-predicate (or substance-attribute) metaphysics that what a thing is can only be discovered by abstracting
away from the concrete existential situation (or phenomenon) to some underlying context-free, atomistic
substrate, for example, the `matter' of materialism (Dreyfus,91). As will be seen in what follows, he insists that
the concrete situation - that is, appearance or phenomenon - is an authentic thing-in-itself (ding-an-sich): On
his view, while it is indeed the case that an ontological emergent is dependent on its ontical substrate, the
former is not reducible to the latter; hence, his adoption of hermeneutic realism and ontological pluralism.
Chapter 6 Poisis
terms (that is, in terms of the distinction between essence and existence)173. While it is
certainly beyond both the aim and scope of this study to address such issues, the
following approach might (tentatively) be of value in this regard in that it attempts to
redress the imbalance associated with an essentialist approach to questioning concerning
existence (Being). Briefly, the method involves hermeneutic analysis of the possibilities
arising from permutating essence and existence as shown in Table 6.4 below:
X of Y Y
Essence Existence
X Essence
Existence
Table 6.4 Permutations of essence and existence.
For example, while it is, according to Heidegger, legitimate to ask what is Being as such
(X=essence,Y=existence), it must also be appreciated that Being as such is and,
furthermore, that to the extent that essence is as such, the latter must partake of Being
(X=existence, Y=essence). This is consistent with the fact that in asking What is Being
? the copula ìs' is understood a priori (albeit tacitly). Yet, the possible
phenomenological value of such an inquiry notwithstanding, the question concerning the
validity of conceiving the Being (Sein) of beings (Seiendes) in terms of universal essence
and existence remains. For this reason, it is necessary to examine the traditional
metaphysical interpretation of these concepts in more detail. Macquarrie (1973) provides
the following brief (and tentative) characterization of essence, of what essence is, of the
essence of essence (X=essence, Y=essence on the above scheme):
essence is characterized by abstractness and universality. Furthermore, essences lend themselves to

the operations of rational thought, to analysis, comparison, and synthesis, in ways which the sheer
contingency and `thatness' of existence resist. (p.61)
This definition is important in connection with this study for (at least) two reasons:
Firstly, the link between essence and rational manipulation (analysis, comparison,
synthesis) entails a connection between essence and computation via the connection
between rationalism and computationalism (chapter 2); Secondly, and relatedly, it must
be appreciated that artificialities, that is, artifactual analogues of natural phenomena
173
According to Heidegger (1929), "the ontological difference is the `not' between beings and Being." (p.97)
Hence, a phenomenological analysis of the Nothing (section 6.5.5) may provide a (tentative) alternative
framework within which to address this question.
Chapter 6 Poisis
(chapter 4), are defined (that is, existentially-conceived) essentialistically174. This point
is of critical significance since the identification of Being with essence (which is
necessarily static175) allows for the possibility of multiple realization, viz. a single
essence (such as matter, life or mind) implemented in multiple ways (for example,
naturally or artifactually). Taken together, these two factors provide support for "strong"
CEA (chapter 5). However, consistent with Heidegger, Jaspers and the other
existentialists, Macquarrie maintains that the emphasis on essence conceals issues
relating to the historicity and contingency of beings (phenomena). In the context of this
study, these assume decisive importance since, it is herein argued, on the basis of a
consideration of such issues, a poitic difference176 (section 6.6.4) between naturality and
artificiality can be established: In short, by conceiving existence or the Being (Sein) of
beings (Seiendes) historically (dynamically, temporally), it becomes possible to
differentiate phenomena according to the respective ways (or modes) in which they
come-forth or are brought-forth. Clark (1995) maintains that
calling a piece of elementary stuff, or an aggregate of elementary bits, by one name or another says
nothing about what ìt' is. (p.6)
However, even if the essence or what-ness of a thing can be determined177, this in no way
explains why the thing, the what, is; in short, the existence or that-ness of the thing rather
than its non-existence, non-being or nothingness (section 6.5.5) remains unaddressed. To
the extent that a thing exists, it is a being and hence, partakes of Being as such; however,
the how and why of the Being of this being are not exhausted by its consideration in
terms of (static) essence: On the contrary, the poisis (becoming, coming-forth, bringing-
forth) of the being needs to be clarified.
It was maintained earlier that Being as such is not exhausted by the modes of possibility
and actuality. Prior to examining this claim, it is necessary to briefly clarify the meaning
and relation of these existential modes with respect to each other and to Being. In Book
1, ch.VIII of the Metaphysics, Aristotle states that "actuality is in all cases prior to
174
This holds even if the essence of a (natural) phenomenon is held to be processual since on artificiality
processes are conceived functionalistically (chapters 2 and 4).
175
Even `dynamic essences' such as the organization (not structure) of autopoietic systems (Maturana,80) are
static since they can be abstractly defined. To the extent that any thing (being) can be defined, it has a static
essence.
176
Briefly, the difference in incipience or originary becoming (coming-forth, bringing-forth) associated with
naturality and artificiality respectively. This is obscured in the appeal to essence (abstract, static, atemporal)
over existence (concrete, dynamic, temporal) with the latter conceived, following Heidegger, as presencing
(section 6.5.8).
177
The essence of naturals is given by Being as physis while that of artifactuals is made by Dasein (which is itself
given by Being) in its role as anthropic component, that is, artificer-interpreter (chapter 7).
Chapter 6 Poisis
potentiality both in definition and in substance; and in time it is in a way prior and in a
way not." In connection with this assertion, Barnes (1982) maintains that
the first point is true: in defining a potentiality we must specify what it is a potentiality for, and in
doing that we name an actuality. (To be a builder is to be capable of building, to be visible is to be
able to be seen.) Since the reverse is not true (actuality does not in the same way presuppose
potentiality), an actuality is prior in definition to its correlative potentiality. But the claim that
actuality is prior to potentiality in time is less plausible [since] causation need not be - and usually
is not - a matter of transmission. (p.50)
There are (at least) two points to note in regard to the above statement: Firstly, this
teleological argument appears valid in both design (or a priori teleological) and
evolutionary (or a posteriori teleonomic) contexts (section 6.4.2.1): In neo-Darwinism,
novel (or emergent) phenotypic structures (and their genotypic counterparts) are only
held to be adaptive if they contribute to the survival of the organism; to this extent,
potentiality (of adaptive characteristic) is defined relative to actuality (existence and
ethology178 of organism). However, it should be noted that survival - that is, persistence
of existence179 - refers, in this context, to the survival of beings: Darwinian evolution is
defined - and hence, is only meaningful - in the context of a population (or plurality) of
beings (or existents) competing for access to limited resources (which are, themselves,
existents). This is consistent with the Aristotelian position since on the latter, the priority
of actuality over potentiality is defined in the existential context of concern with being(s)
qua being(s); as stated previously, the question of the relation of Being (Sein) to actuality
(and potentiality), further, of Being as such (Seyn) remains unaddressed in his
metaphysics. To this extent, actuality (and potentiality) are, themselves, in need of
grounding and, according to Sikka (1997), this ground is - for both Heidegger and certain
medieval mystical theologians (such as Bonaventure and Eckhart) - pure possibility180,
the groundless ground or abyss that is Nothing (section 6.5.5); Secondly, it might be
argued that the causal relation between categories (in this context, existential modes such
as potentiality and actuality) must be genetic (section 6.4.1.3) since to assert otherwise
engenders the category problem181 (chapter 7). However, this problem can be resolved,
178
The relevant ethology (or behaviour) in this context is that which contributes to the continued survival -
maintenance or/and enhancement - of the organism.
179
Existence is here interpreted statically as extantness or thatness. Heidegger rejects this ontical interpretation
of (conventional) metaphysics maintaining that existence is persistence, or, more precisely, persisting (that is,
enduring presencing).
180
Pure possibility is to be distinguished from possibility or potentiality, or, more precisely, from relative
possibility or potentiality. Pure possibility (possibility as such or absolute possibility) refers to Being as such
(Seyn) while relative possibility (like relative actuality) applies to beings (Seiendes).
181
For example, the attempt to derive an intentionalistic pour soi (for-itself) from a non-intentionalistic en soi (in-
itself) (Nagel,74) or subjective experience from objective non-experiential matter (Griffin,88) (Griffin,98).
Chapter 6 Poisis
and, moreover, without adopting the Humean interpretation of causation as a merely

contingent relation between experiential events. The solution lies in appreciation of the
ontological difference between beings and Being as such; more specifically, in
recognizing that causation is a relation between beings (Seiendes) which fails to account
for the Being (Sein) of beings and of the causal relation (or causation) itself (section
6.4.1.3). As will be seen in section 6.7, Heidegger upholds a form of radical emergentism
in which causation is incipiently-grounded as an ontical relation within a broader - in the
sense of encompassing - ontological framework.
In An Introduction to Metaphysics (1959), Heidegger maintains that "the limitation of

the meaning of `being' remains within the sphere of actuality and presence, of
permanence and duration, of abiding and occurrence." (p.92) However, in Basic concepts
(1993b), he undermines this position with the following statement: "the possible is the
not yet actual, but this not-actual is nevertheless no mere nullity. The possible also ìs',
its being simply has another character than the actual." (p.21) As he goes on to state,
beings do not exhaust themselves in the actual. To beings belong the wealth of the possible and the
stringency of the necessary. The realm of beings is not identical to the domain of the actual. In terms
of number, but above all in terms of modality, we mean more than the actual when we say `beings'.
(p.22)
For Heidegger (1959, 1993b), Being as such is the ground of beings-as-a-whole.

Crucially, Miller (1993) maintains, with Heidegger, that the latter "is not to be
considered as the merely actual. Beings-as-a-whole encompasses not only the actual, but
the possible and the necessary as well." (p.3) In this connection, it is significant that
according to Kovacs (1990), Heidegger holds that
in modern metaphysics the law of reason is above the Being of beings; the superiority of reason and
the inferiority of the Being of beings are ensured by the laws and principles of reason. (p.129)
The above statement is consistent with Heidegger's (1993b) assertion that "for
metaphysics (ontology) it is clearly decided, beforehand and without any consideration
that these three types of beings, also simply called `the' `modalities' (actuality,
possibility, necessity), exhaust the essence of being. That a being is either actual,
possible, or necessary strikes ordinary understanding as a truism [emphasis added]."
(p.22) This òrdinary understanding' that determines `beforehand' the essence of Being
as such is reason manifesting as logic. As stated in section 6.5.2, setting reason and its
laws and principles (logic) over Being as such (Seyn) is problematic since the question
concerning the Being (Sein) of logic thereby remains unaddressed. Furthermore,
according to Heidegger (1977, 1993b), the modal potentiality that follows from the
interpretation of logos as ratio - which ultimately becomes logic (section 6.5.6) - implies
an Enframing (Gestellen) and, thereby, a bounding of Being as such, which is, in itself
(an sich), the In-finite Nothing (sections 6.5.2 and 6.5.5). In terms of dynamical systems
theory (chapter 2), this Enframing assumes the form of a potentiality space defined
Chapter 6 Poisis
relative to an actual or set of actuals182. This is consistent with Jaspers' (1971) following
assertion, viz. "the basic situation of temporal existence makes possible the actuality of
the exception as original truth in opposition to fixed universality." (p.44) He goes on to
state that potentiality limits Being to that which can be conceptualized; however,
"authentic reality is the being that cannot be thought in terms of possibility" (p.69). On
his view, Being as such, while encompassing both potentiality and actuality, is not
exhausted by these modalities.183 This position is consistent with that of Miller (1993)
who argues that "just because beings-as-a-whole includes the actual, possible, and
necessary does not mean that they exhaust its essence [emphasis added]." (p.3) Sikka
(1997) provides support for this view in pointing out that "a being may or may not exist
but it still, in some sense, is." (p.86) Thus, possibility and actuality (existence) are modes
of Being as such and yet neither identical to nor exhaustive of the latter184.
In connection with his existential analytic (or hermeneutic) of Being, Heidegger (1959)
is led to raise the following important question concerning the copula ìs':
Does the ìs' become manifold on the strength of the content brought to it in the different sentences,
i.e. by virtue of the realms concerning which they speak, or does the ìs', i.e. being, conceal within
itself the multiplicity whose concentration enables us to make manifold essents accessible to us, each
as it is ? (p.91)
In short, is the existential `movement' from beings to Being or from Being to beings ?
It is consistent with the former to maintain - with the (metaphysical) tradition - that
Being is merely an empty abstraction. According to Waterhouse (1981), Heidegger holds
that the tradition has neglected ontology because of three presuppositions, viz. "that
Being is the most ùniversal' concept, that it is indefinable, and that it is `self-evident'."
(p.56) Dreyfus (1991) maintains that "on this mistaken view, `beingness' (as Heidegger
puts it in his marginal corrections to Being and Time) is a property like any other, except
that it is the most general property. It is arrived at by abstraction. We look at oaks,
maples, firs, etc., and abstract treeness. Then from trees and bushes and flowers we
abstract plantness. Then we get to the `livingness' of all living things. Finally we arrive
at entities that have in common only beingness." (p.10) However, as Heidegger (1959)
states, "it is in general open to question whether the universality of being is a universality
182
Dawkins (1986) and Dennett (1995) provide excellent introductions to the general notion of potentiality
space(s) in discussing the `design' space(s) associated with genetic code(s) (section 6.4.2.1). It is significant
that the specification of an actuality establishes a potentiality space since this implies that Aristotle is correct
in asserting the priority of act over potency both causally and logically. However, for a being to be actual it
clearly must also be possible; hence, the need to ground actuality (and potentiality) in possibility as such.
183
For Jaspers, possibility and potentiality (finite) are synonymous. For this reason, what Sikka refers to as pure
possibility (or possibility as such) should be identified not with possibility but the infinite Encompassing.
184
Crucially, even logically impossible beings such as square circles - which are neither actual nor possible - are,
that is, partake of Being as such, in some sense (specifically, as the impossible).
Chapter 6 Poisis
of genus. Aristotle already suspected this. Consequently it remains questionable whether

an individual being can ever be regarded as an example of being, in the same way that
oak is an example of `tree as such'. It is doubtful whether the modes of being (being as
nature, being as history) represent `species' in the `genus' being." (p.81) This position
is supported by Dreyfus who maintains that "`Being' does not behave like a very general
predicate [or genus]. For example, the being of numbers seems not to be the same as, but
at best only analogous to, the being of objects, and the being of real objects differs from
the being of imaginary objects such as unicorns [or the being of logical impossibilities
such as square circles]." (p.10) Anticipating such remarks concerning the possible
multiple modality of Being as such, Macquarrie (1973) asks "what kind of existence
would one ascribe to a number ? Was Bertrand Russell's suggestion that, with respect to
numbers, relations, and the like, one should speak of `subsistence' rather than of
èxistence' any more than a verbal convention ?" (p.64) In the context of an investigation
of the copula ìs' and its meaning within logical propositions, Heidegger (1982) considers
the following proposition advanced by Mill, viz. "the centaur is a fiction of the poets":
If we examine this proposition more closely, it indeed appears that something is asserted in it, namely,
what the centaur is. But this whatness which is asserted of the centaur expresses, precisely, a way of
the centaur's being. Its intended meaning is that things like centaurs exist only in an imaginary way.
This proposition is an assertion about existence. If this proposition is to be understood at all in its
restrictive form and signification, existence in the broadest sense must in a certain way be thought
in thinking it. Its intended meaning is: Centaurs do not exist actually but are only [that is, partake of
Being as] inventions of the poets. This proposition is, again, not a verbal judgement; the ìs' also does
not signify existence in the sense of being extant, but it nevertheless expresses a certain mode of
being [emphasis added]. (p.204)
Significantly, the above statements provide support for the assertion made previously,
viz. Being as such is not exhausted by actuality (nor by logical possibility or/and
necessity). On this basis, Heidegger is led to conclude that the following are implied in
the ìs':
(1) being-something (accidental), (2) whatness or being-what (necessary), (3) being-how or howness,
and (4) being-true, trueness. The being of beings means whatness, howness, truth. Because every
being is determined by the what and the how and is unveiled as a being in its whatness and howness,
its being-what and being-how, the copula is necessarily ambiguous. However, this ambiguity is not
a `defect' but only the expression of the intrinsically manifold structure of the being of a being - and
consequently of the overall understanding of being. (p.205)
Heidegger (1959, 1993b) identifies the ambiguity (or vagueness) of the copula as a
positive characteristic, specifically, that which enables Being to manifest (or unconceal)
multiply (or infinitely) and discretely (or pluralistically) in beings; thus, the existential
movement is from Being (Seyn) to beings (Seiendes)185. This is consistent with the fact
185
This is the case both primordially and derivatively: With respect to the former, Being as such (Seyn) incipiently
comes-forth in beings; with respect to the latter, the Being (Sein) of beings emerges into unconcealment via
appreciation of the ontological difference by the transcendent - or, more precisely, transcending - Dasein, itself
Chapter 6 Poisis
that beings as such can only be disclosed on the basis of a prior understanding of Being
as such irrespectively of whether such understanding takes the form of tacit pre-
understanding or explicit thematic reflection (chapter 1); hence, as Heidegger (1982)
states, "as a priori, being is earlier than beings." (p.20) Interestingly, and contrary to
Heidegger's assertion that the scholastics interpreted Being analogously (that is, as
beingness), Sikka (1997) maintains that the medieval theologian Saint Bonaventure holds
with Heidegger that "the idea of ens per se is also .. the idea of unlimited and perfect
being, and it is according to this idea that the intellect grasps limited and imperfect forms
of being. It then cannot be derived from those finite forms of being by way of abstraction,
because its presence to the mind is a prior condition for recognizing them [emphasis
added]." (p.26) Significantly, for Bonaventure,
`Being itself' is not any particular being, since particular being is always finite, always mixed with
the not-being of potentiality, nor is it any universal being, any general category or genus under which
a specific region of finite being may be subsumed. It is also not analogous being [or beingness], since
that has the least actuality, and therefore the least being, of all. It is a transcendental beyond all
limitation and determination, and is the all-inclusive unity of the divine essence. (p.34)
Furthermore, "being itself surpasses all bounds. It is in itself outside and beyond all that
is, and yet it is not shut out or remote from anything, since all that is is from it, through
it, and in it. It is below all things as their ground and source, their unconditioned
condition, but this being below is at the same time being highest of all." (p.38)
It is appropriate at this point in the discussion to re-examine the claim of universality

associated with notions of essence and existence in the metaphysical tradition. According
to Heidegger (1982), "every being has a way-of-being [that is, Sein]. The question is
whether this way-of-being has the same character in every being - as ancient ontology
believed and subsequent periods have basically had to maintain even down to the present
- or whether individual ways-of-being are mutually distinct." (p.18) More precisely, "the
question arises whether the thesis that essentia and existentia belong to every being
remains valid in this form - whether it can be made to hold in its purportedly universal
ontological validity for every being in general." (p.119) In short, it is necessary to
determine whether the Being (Sein) of beings (Seiendes) is exhausted in universal (or
general) essence and existence. Heidegger maintains that
beings present at hand can certainly be interpreted ontologically in the horizon of production. It can
certainly be shown that in every instance a whatness having the characteristics mentioned belongs
to being-at-hand. Nevertheless, the question remains whether the whole universe of beings is
exhausted by the at-hand. Does the realm of the extant, the at-hand, coincide with the realm of beings
in general ? Or is there any being that, precisely due to the sense of its being, cannot be conceived
as being at hand ? In point of fact, the being that can least of all be conceived as extant, at hand, the
Dasein that in each instance we ourselves are, is just that to which all understanding of being-at-hand,
actuality, must be traced back. (p.119)
an incipience from, for and of Being as such.

Chapter 6 Poisis
Significantly, "if the Dasein exhibits an ontological constitution completely different

from that of the extant-at-hand, and if to exist, in our terminological usage, means
something other than existere and existentia (einai), then it also becomes a question
whether anything like Sachheit, thingness, whatness, reality, essentia, ousia, can belong
to the ontological constitution of the Dasein." (p.119) According to Heidegger,
even a rough consideration shows that the being we ourselves are, the Dasein, cannot at all be
interrogated as such by the question What is this ? We gain access to this being only if we ask: Who
is it ? The Dasein is not constituted by whatness but - if we may coin the expression - by whoness.
The answer does not give a thing but an I, you, we. [Hence,] this what, with which we also ask about
the nature of the who, obviously cannot coincide with the what in the sense of whatness. In other
words, the basic concepts of essentia, whatness, first becomes really problematic in the face of the
being we call the Dasein. (p.120)
From the above statement, it appears that Heidegger upholds a variant of the category
problem (chapter 7), viz. the problem of explaining how ontological-subjectivity can
emerge from an ontologically-objective substrate; however, on his view, subjectivity is
not associated primarily with the thematizing activity of an ontical Cartesian ego, but
rather with the ontological Dasein, who, as being-in-the-world, is non-thematically - yet
intentionalistically - involved in coping with the equiprimordially-presencing World
(section 6.5.3). The Heideggerian - or existential-phenomenological - category problem
can be described as the problem of explaining how a who (emergent) can emerge from
a what (substrate). However, Heidegger goes on to state that
it is not only the question of the relationship of whatness and extantness but at the same time the
question of the relationship of whoness and existence - existence understood in our sense as the mode
of being of the being that we ourselves are. Formulated more generally, the thesis that essentia and
existentia belong to each being merely points to the general problem of the articulation of each being
into a being that it is and the how of its being. (p.120)
For Heidegger, the how of the Being (Sein) of Dasein, that is, the èssence' of that
èxistent' that is the Dasein, is distinct with respect to the how of the Being (Sein) of all
other beings (Seiendes), which can be characterized by extantness (or present-at-
handedness)186; consequently, while continuing to employ concepts such as essence and
existence187, Heidegger rejects universality in their interpretation, in direct opposition to
186
Another way (or mode) in which the Being (Sein) of beings (Seiendes) can be characterized is as the ready-to-
hand, equipmental or available (chapter 1).
187
However, Heidegger (1927) differentiates the existence of Dasein from the existence of other beings (Seiendes)
by referring to it as èxistence' (that is, existence in quotes) or ek-sistence.
Chapter 6 Poisis
the (ontically-monistic)188 position of (conventional) metaphysics189. According to

Heidegger (1993c),
Ek-sistence identifies the determination of what man is in the destiny of truth. [By contrast,] existentia
is the name for the realization of something that is as it appears in its Idea [that is, essentia or what-
ness]. The sentence `Man ek-sists' is not an answer to the question of whether man actually is or not;
rather, it responds to the question concerning man's èssence'. (p.230)
Crucially, "ek-sistence", that is, the being (Seiende) that is Dasein, "can .. never be
thought of as a special kind of living creature among others." (p.228) Significantly,
however, he goes on to maintain that "it remains an open question whether through
existentia - in these explanations of it as actuality, which at first seem quite different -
the Being of a stone or even life as the Being of plants and animals is adequately
thought." (p.229) Thus, it appears that appreciation of (1) the ontological difference
between beings and Being as such, and (2) the distinction between Dasein and other
beings, has a number of implications; specifically, in the context of this study, the
possibility that non-Daseins can be further differentiated and on the basis of a distinction
which is itself grounded in the ontological difference. This is significant since capacity
for appreciating the ontological difference - the defining characteristic of Dasein -
undermines the possibility of "strong" artificial intelligence (chapter 4). This follows, as
will be seen in section 6.6, from the fact that artifacts are ontologically-ontical whereas
Dasein is ontically-ontological (or transcendent): Dasein refers to that being which
moves (existentially, hermeneutically) from beings to Being; artifactuality, by contrast,
refers to that modality of Being characterized by a movement from Being to beings
mediated by Dasein as anthropic component or artificer-interpreter. If non-Daseins (for
example, stones, plant, animals and computers) can also be differentiated, for example,
into naturals and artifactuals on the basis of a difference in their respective modes of
poisis (coming-forth, bringing-forth), it may also be possible to undermine "strong"
artificiality, more specifically, "strong" CEA as such. Significantly, Heidegger (1982)
goes on to state that "Èk-sistence', in fundamental contrast to every existentia and
èxistence', is ecstatic dwelling in the nearness of Being. It is the guardianship, that is,
the care for Being." (p.246) In section 6.5.3, it was shown that, for Heidegger, the
structure of Care is Temporality which has three ècstases', viz. thrownness (past),
fallenness (present) and projection (future). Thus, with respect to Dasein, existence is
identical to èk-sistence' and the latter to èk-stasis'; Being and Time are, thereby, one
and the same.
To reiterate, Heidegger maintains that "under the heading of `being' we now have not
188
For Heidegger, Being as such (Seyn) is monistic in that it is the in-finite, unitary, ungrounded ground (or
abyss); however, the Being (Sein) of beings (Seinedes) is pluralistic (and finite) as are beings themselves.
189
Significantly, as Dreyfus (1991) states, Heidegger opposes both substantialism and processualism to the extent
that such ontologies are ontical, that is, defined in terms of beings (entities, substances, events, processes).
Chapter 6 Poisis
only essentia and existentia but also whoness and existence in our sense190. The
articulation of being varies each time with the way of being of a being. This way of
being cannot be restricted to at-hand extantness and actuality in the traditional sense. The
question of the possible multiplicity of being and therewith at the same time that of the
unity of the concept of being in general becomes urgent." (p.120) Hofstadter (1982)
maintains that, according to Heidegger,
in the case of the Dasein there is no what or essence in the ordinary and traditional sense, and the
Dasein's existence is not the extantness (presence, at-handness) of the traditional ontology, whose
thinking of being was indifferent as regards the being of a stone and the being of the Dasein. Instead,
the Dasein's mode of being is Existenz - the specific mode of being that belongs to a transcending,
intentionalistic being which projects world and thus whose being-in-the-world differs from the mere
being within a world of natural beings. (p.xix)
However, Heidegger recognizes the possibility that "even when the Dasein does take
cognizance that it itself is not another being, this does not include the explicit knowledge
that its mode of being is different from that of the being which it itself is not. Rather, as
we see in the example of antiquity, the Dasein can ontologically interpret itself and its
mode of being with regard to the extant at-hand and its way of being. The specific
question about the ontological constitution of the Dasein gets blocked and confused by
many preconceptions which are grounded in the Dasein's own existence." (p.121) Thus,
Dasein has as a possibility (that is, as an existentiell response within the possibilities
afforded by its existential structure), fallenness (section 6.5.3), viz. being `lost' amidst
(or absorbed into) beings, even if this èvent' - which can be viewed as an abstract kind
of morphization - does not occur between Dasein as a being and other beings (for
example, animals or computers) but between Dasein as a mode (or way) of Being and
other modes (or ways) of Being (for example, essence and existence). Yet, it should be
clear from the previous statement that even this inauthentic response to thrownness
(section 6.5.3), that is, to being-in-the-world, to concernful situatedness among beings,
is itself grounded in Dasein's way of Being which is, according to Heidegger, unique191.
For this reason, he is led to state that
the ontological difference between the constitution of the Dasein's being and that of nature proves to
be so disparate that it seems at first as though the two ways of being are incomparable and cannot be
determined by way of a uniform concept of being in general. Existence [or rather, Existenz] and
extantness are more disparate than, say, the determinations of God's being and man's being in
traditional ontology. For these two latter beings are still always conceived as extant. (p.176)
190
That is, whoness and èxistence' or ek-sistence (transcendence).
191
The uniqueness of Dasein with respect to Being does not logically entail the uniqueness of human being with
respect to Being since, as stated in section 6.5.3, it is possible that there exist non-human Daseins. This follows
from the fact that Dasein is also a mode (that is, existential modality) of Being (Sein) rather than merely a
specific being (Seiende).
Chapter 6 Poisis
In this connection, Hofsdadter (1982) attempts to clarify "the four basic aspects of being"
in terms of "its difference from beings, its articulations into opposed moments (such as
essentia and existentia, whoness and existence), its modifications and unity (such as the
differentiation of the being of natural [and artificial (as artifactual)] beings and the being
of the Dasein, and their unity in terms of being itself), and its truth-character (such as,
for instance, is revealed in the Da of the Dasein)." (p.xxviii)
On the basis of the preceding analysis, it appears - contrary to the metaphysical assertion
of the universality of essence and existence with respect to the Being of beings - that
Being as such (Seyn) is, in fact, multiply-moded; that is, the Being (Sein) of beings
(Seiendes) is discrete or discontinuous, particular (local, specific) rather than universal
(global, general). In direct opposition to Griffin (1998), who, as seen in section 6.4.4,
asserts ontological continuity as a substantive, that is, fundamental or grounding,
metaphysical principle, Jaspers (1971) supports Heidegger in stating that
all progress in knowledge shows ever more decisively that the world as we know it contains
discontinuities between the modes of being. As our knowledge becomes clearer we find a gaping
chasm between inorganic nature and life, between life and consciousness, between consciousness and
spirit - and yet above and beyond all these discontinuities there is a union and a unity that, although
constantly receding, is the presupposition and task of knowledge. (p.74)
Interestingly, this position is, in turn, (implicitly) supported by Williams (1996) who
maintains that phenomena are domain-separable, whereby domain is understood "some
aspect of existence, such as the material universe, that can be discussed with a recognized
list of descriptors [or conceptual vocabulary]." (p.228) He distinguishes four such
domains, viz. (1) material (physical), (2) moral (ethical), (3) mental (experiential) and
(4) codical (informational). What is significant about such a formulation in the context
of the present study is that there appears to be an explicit appreciation that the
informational - or computational - aspect of Being is merely one mode of existence (or,
more precisely, Being) among others. The implication is that Being as such (Seyn) is
neither identical to nor exhausted by computationalism192 . Further support for
Heidegger's thesis of ontological discontinuity with respect to the Being (Sein) of beings
(Seiendes) is provided by Ross (1985) who maintains that
Being differentiates analogously by emergence. To be for a stone is different from to be for a plant
(for which to be is to live), or an animal (for which to be is to live sentiently), or a human (for whom
to be is to rational-animalize, as D.P.Henry phrased it). (p.245)
According to Sikka (1997), for Saint Bonaventure "being itself is omnimodum [that is,
192
However, it is unclear whether the discontinuity in Being (Existence) implied in the above statement is
ontological or merely epistemological.
Chapter 6 Poisis
multiply-moded193], not because it is the essence of all things, but because it is the cause,
the ground and origin, of all essences." (p.38) However, "while being is differentiated
in itself [that is, multiply-moded], it does not thereby become multiple so as to have
another to itself." (p.82) For Heidegger (1993b), "there are certainly different modes of
being, but precisely of being, which is never respectively this and that and thus
constantly a plurality like beings" (p.44); again, "there are various modes of the same
being, but there is no various being in the sense that being could break up into something
multiple and numerous." (p.60) On the contrary, and as stated in sections 6.5.2 and 6.5.5,
"Being is the emptiest and at the same time a surplus, out of which all beings, those that
are familar and experienced as well as those unfamiliar and yet to be experienced, are
granted their respective modes of being." (p.43) Heidegger presents the following
`guidewords for reflection on Being' which are connotative as opposed to denotative:
(pp.42-65)
Being is the emptiest and at the same time a surplus.
Being is the most common and at the same time unique.
Being is the most intelligible and at the same time concealment.
Being is the most worn-out and at the same time the origin.
Being is the most reliable and at the same time the non-ground.
Being is the most said and at the same time a keeping silent.
Being is the most forgotten and at the same time remembrance.
Being is the most constraining and at the same time liberation.
To this list may be added the following guideword based on Heidegger's analysis of the
fragment of Anaximander (section 6.5.2), viz.
Being is the repelling of limits and at the same time the source of limit.
It is crucial, for the purposes of this study, to appreciate fully the implications of the
Heideggerian thesis concerning the multiple-modality of Being as such (Seyn), that is,
the discontinuity in the Being (Sein) of beings (Seiendes). This follows from the
existential fact that if Being (Sein) is indeed discrete - and, thereby, pluralistic - it
becomes possible, in principle, to distinguish kinds of beings according to the
distinctions within Being (Sein) itself since Being (Sein) defines what and how it is to-be
193
More precisely, Being as such (Seyn) is all-moded, that is, encompassing of all modalities or Being (Sein) of
beings (Seiendes).
Chapter 6 Poisis
a particular kind of being194. Consequently, it is necessary to describe - provisionally,

tentatively - the structure of Being (Sein). In the brief discussion of this issue that
follows, only the distinction between ontical categories (static, eternal, ahistorical) and
ontological existential modalities (dynamic, temporal, historical) is considered. It must
be appreciated at the outset that, according to Heidegger, Being (Sein) does have a
structure. That this is the case has been established by Sikka (1997) who maintains that
Heidegger's creative appropriation of Greek thought in his own struggles to articulate the òrdering'
of being .. is one in which `being' is conceived as radically historical. Its shapes are historical ones,
as for Hegel, but without any necessary logical progression. And the text in which these shapes are
inscribed can be read in many ways, perhaps an infinite number of ways, depending upon the
hermeneutic situation of the reader, where that situation is itself historically shaped and thus a part
of the very text that is being read [emphasis added]. (p.48)
Furthermore, "Heidegger affirms that there is an order - and thus a meaning - which
rules over the shifting views of the being of beings through Western history [emphasis
added]." Significantly, "there is a power .. that orders even the ordering of history within
this history, and this is a power over which man does not rule [emphasis added]." (p.58)
However, as she goes on to state, "Heidegger questions both the notion of any eternal and
unchanging order and the supremacy of logic in determining the truth of what-is. [Yet,]
insofar as the clearing or lighting of the Da [in Dasein] reflects the truth of being in its
various manifestations, it reveals the order in which and according to which being
manifests itself in beings. As a clearing in which truth comes to be, Dasein, too, reflects
the organization or logos of being, the `logic' of being in its appearing." (p.65) Hence,
for Sikka, the coming-forth of being is logical; however, logic is to be considered in
historical (contingent, dynamic) as opposed to ahistorical (necessary, static) terms since
"there are no eternal, immutable, and universally applicable laws which could be
articulated once and for all." (p.69) She goes on to state that "the being [Sein] of beings
[Seiendes] is the free gift of being [Seyn]" (p.162) which `lets' beings be; by contrast,
"the timeless plenitude of being [that is, Seyn] .. has no `need' of anything because it ìs'
all things." (p.172) Significantly,
being as letting, cannot be said to be determined by laws if these are conceived as other to it, for the
other to being is nothing. On the other hand, the way the letting occurs is not chaotic. It is an-archic
in a literal sense, since being does not have an arch, a first principle or ground, but is arch as
primordial grounding. The sending of being, then, does not have laws but is itself law as dispensation
(nomos). The giving of being is also the giving or dispensing of law (nemein), a giving constrained
by nothing outside itself. (pp.162-163)
From this it follows that Being as such (Seyn) unconceals itself - or presences - as the
Being (Sein) of beings (Seiendes) and in such a way that the structure of this
194
What these distinctions are (èssence') and how they come-to-be (èxistence') will be discussed in section 6.6
in connection with an examination of the modes of poisis (coming-forth, bringing-forth) associated with
naturals and artificials (as artifactuals).
Chapter 6 Poisis
unconcealing - or presencing - itself emerges historically (dynamically, temporally) with

the emergence of the beings of which it is the Being (Sein). In short, structure exists but
since existence (rather, Being) is temporal (dynamical, historical), this structure is, itself,
temporal: Again, structure is and the ìs' (Being) is structured. The elements195 in the
discontinuous structure of Being (Sein) are the existential modalities. It is critical to
appreciate that these are not equivalent to Platonic ideas (transcendent) or Aristotelian
forms (immanent): According to Heidegger (1959), the ideas or/and forms arise when
logos becomes idea. Logos is (originally, incipiently) collecting collectedness, the
collecting of beings into their relation with Being (section 6.5.6). Furthermore, logos is
intimately related to (in fact, belongs to) aletheia-physis as the emerging power of
unconcealment which has both statical and dynamical aspects; idea, by contrast, is that
which remains of logos, viz. its statical aspect, following the emergence
(unconcealment) of the essent (being). As Heidegger (1959) states,
that which places itself in its limit, completing it, and so stands, has form, morph. Form as the
Greeks understood it derives its essence from an emerging placing-itself-in-the-limit. (p.60)
This historical limiting (dynamic, temporal) becomes an ahistorical limit (static, eternal);
hence, the movement from logos (collecting collectedness) to kategoria (categories)
described in section 6.5.6. Significantly, form (idea) or what-ness (essentia) is held to
be separable from matter or thatness (existentia); this position holds for Plato and
Aristotle as much as for Kant whose separation of phenomenon (appearance) and
noumenon (reality) is also conceived statically (chapter 1 and section 6.5.7). Existential
modalities, by contrast, are appearances of Being as such which - as will be seen in
section 6.5.7 - means appearings; hence, there is a dynamic connection between Being
as such and the existential modalities which define the structure of the Being (Sein) of
beings (Seiendes). The existential modalities are unconcealments of Being (Sein) by
Being as such (Seyn): They are not static and eternal; rather they are stable in the sense
that they endure or persist in and through time. This endurance or persistence must be
understood dynamically as an enduring or persisting which engenders the statical aspect
of the modalities (through self-limiting).
According to Heidegger (1959), essents (or beings) are unconcealments of Being as such,
that is, of aletheia-physis. To the extent that existential modalities are and yet are not
Being as such, they are essents and hence, partake of Being as such as essents. However,
it cannot be emphasized sufficiently that existential modalities are not identical to
categories; the latter are associated with idea and ousia whereas the former are associated
with logos and physis (section 6.5.6). Categories are static determinants of beings,
atomistically `cut' from Being (section 6.6.3); existential modalities are persistent (in the
195
The ontical undertones associated with this term are unfortunate; however, it is consistent with the existential
fact of discontinuity in the structure of Being (Sein) to employ some form of designator implying discreteness.
Hence, the use of the term èlement'.
Chapter 6 Poisis
dynamic sense of stable and enduring) aspects of beings which are related to Being as
such through the logocentric `collecting' of the Dasein196. To this extent, becoming,
appearance, thinking, experiencing, feeling, values etc, are all dynamic emergents of
Being as such and permanent to the extent that they continue to endure (or persist) in
time. Hence, the existential modalities are themselves temporal and, therefore, non-
eternal; their Being, like the Being (Sein) of beings as such (which they themselves are
since they partake of being), is an enduring, persisting. The various relations between
beings (Seiendes), the Being (Sein) of beings, Being (Seyn) as such and Dasein are
shown in Fig 6.5:
being-there beings
(Dasein) Being of beings (Das Seiendes)
( Sein)
Being of beings
(Sein)
Being as such
(Seyn)
Fig 6.5 Existential Relations between Being as such (Seyn), Dasein and the Being (Sein)
of beings (Seiendes).
It is both appropriate and necessary at this point in the discussion to conclude this section
by briefly examining how the existential modalities relate to each other. That they do,
in fact, relate is entailed by the fact that they constitute a structure - albeit of a historical
(temporal, dynamical) kind - specifically, the structure of Being (Sein). Given that Being
and its structure are temporal, it follows that the relation between the existential
modalities must also be historical. (This point was alluded to earlier in connection with
some observations - due to Sikka - concerning the similarity between Hegel and
Heidegger with respect to the intrinsic historicity of Being.) In this study, it is argued that
the historical structure of Being, as manifest in the appearance (or unconcealment) of the
existential modalities, points to radical emergentism (section 6.7) as the explanation for
this phenomenon. However, before that thesis is examined, it is worthwhile briefly
investigating how the various modalities connect, especially given the category
problem197 that appears to exist between the ontical (that is, extant or existent) and the
196
It must be appreciated, however, that Dasein is `summoned forth' or appropriated by Being (with the latter
manifesting as logos) for this event (ereignis).
197
This ontological category problem is distinct from the ontical category problem described in chapter 7; the
former is grounded in the ontological difference (section 6.5.4) between beings and Being as such while the
Chapter 6 Poisis
ontological (that is, èxistent' or ek-sistent). Dreyfus (1991) provides an excellent

overview of this problem and outlines an authentic Heideggerian solution. For example,
with respect to the Aristotelian account of causation, he maintains that
if, like Aristotle, one wants to relate a wide variety of phenomena rather than to predict and control
them, one may reveal final causes rather than the sort of causal powers discovered by modern physics.
Thus there may be only one right answer to the search for physical causes, but many different
projections can reveal nature as it is in itself. (p.261)
The central Heideggerian insight to be gained from this example is that "different
theories can reveal different aspects of nature [by concerning themselves with the asking
of] different kinds of questions." (p.262)
While Kuhn (1962), following Kant, embraces a form of epistemological relativism - in

which knowledge of reality is held to be unattainable - Heidegger, by contrast, adopts
what Dreyfus refers to as pluralistic realism, viz. knowledge of reality is multiply-
attainable. Dreyfus maintains that "one can reject the claim that there is a correct
description of reality and still hold that there can be many correct descriptions including
a correct causal description of objectified physical nature." (p.265) Significantly,
for a plural realist there is no point of view from which one can ask and answer the metaphysical
question concerning the one true nature of ultimate reality. Given the dependence of the intelligibility
of all ways of being on Dasein's being, and the dependence of what counts as elements of reality on
our purposes the question makes no sense. (p.262)
Dreyfus goes on to state that for Heidegger, "different understandings of being reveal
different sorts of entities and since no one way of revealing is exclusively true, accepting
one does not commit us to rejecting the others." (p.263) However, he qualifies this
position by maintaining that
of course, not just any cultural interpretation will disclose entities. If instead of encountering heroes
or saints, a culture begins to develop practices for encountering aliens that are round and give out
beams of light, it may well be that nothing at all will show up. But there are no clear limits as to what
kinds of cultural entities can be encountered [since to specify such limits in an a priori manner would,
of necessity, involve tacit projection of an existing or actual conceptual `filter' onto an autonomous
interpretation-space]. (p.263)
For example, in natural science "nature is teaching the natural scientist, not nature's own
language, since only a Platonist thinks that representations exist independently of
meaningful practices, but rather nature is leading natural scientists to improve their
language for representing her under one aspect." (p.264) Thus,
there is no right answer to the question, What is the ultimate reality in terms of which everything
becomes intelligible ? The only answer to this metaphysical question is that Dasein, the being whose
being is an issue for it, is the being in terms of whose practices all aspects of the real show up,
latter is grounded in the ontical difference between ontical-objectivity and ontical-subjectivity.

Chapter 6 Poisis
because it is the source of sense, i.e., of the understanding of being and reality. (p.264)
However, it is important to appreciate that Dasein is not the source of Being as such nor
of itself; rather Dasein is an òpening' or `clearing' within Being by and for Being.
Furthermore, to the extent that Dasein is, it partakes of Being as such; hence, it is, in
fact, the Being (Sein) of Dasein that is the source of sense (Sinn or meaning). As
Heidegger (1927) states,
Being (not beings) is dependent upon the understanding of being; that is to say, reality (not the real)
is dependent upon care. (p.255)
According to Dreyfus, "Heidegger's task is to show that the real must be disclosed on the
basis of our being-in-the-world and yet it can be ìn itself'." (p.15) Hence, it simply does
not follow that because Dasein is an existential (or ontological) precondition for
ontology, therefore, the factical (or ontical) existence of entities disclosed theoretically
is determined by Dasein. As Dreyfus states, "Heidegger never concluded from the fact
that our practices are necessary for access to theoretical entities that these entities must
be defined in terms of our access practices." (p.253) On the contrary, "Heidegger seems
to hold that there can be many systems of practices that support assertions that point out
many different and incompatible realities. But (1) given any specific criterion of truth,
i.e., any specific set of pointing-out practices, at most one system can be right .. And (2)
even if a system does succeed in pointing out things as they are, that does not show that
the kinds it discovers are the ultimate basis of reality. Reality can be revealed in many
ways and none is metaphysically basic. [According to Heidegger,] as finite beings
capable of disclosing [that is, opening up a domain or clearing within which entities can
be discovered], we work out many perspectives - many lexicons - and reveal things as
they are from many perspectives. And just because we can get things right from many
perspectives, no single perspective is the right one." (p.280) In this connection, and in
the context of this study, the following observations of Dreyfus are highly significant:
If one wants to undermine the illegitimate authority of natural [or artificial as artifactual] science,
especially physics, in our culture, it would be sufficient to demonstrate that although natural [or
artificial] science can tell us the truth about the causal powers of nature [or artificiality as
artifactuality], it does not have a special access to ultimate reality [which is Being as such, the poitic
ground of naturality and artifactuality]. (p.252)
Ontology, as the science of everything that is, must make a stronger claim than natural science. [For
example,] natural science tells us how hammers work but not what hammers are. It does not have to
account for the being of equipment such as hammers, but only for the causal powers of the natural
kinds of material such as iron and wood out of which hammers are made. Heidegger contends that
nature can explain only why the available works; it cannot make intelligible availableness as a way
of being because nature cannot explain worldliness. (p.113)
Chapter 6 Poisis
It can be argued further that while nature can explain why the available works198, it
cannot provide an explanation for why nature works nor why there is a nature at all. This
is consistent with Collingwood's (1945) Kantian assertion to the effect that nature is not
self-explanatory (section 6.4.1.3). (In sections 6.5.2 and 6.5.5, the question Why is there
something rather than nothing ? is shown to be central to Heidegger's post-Kehre
thinking, in which phenomenological inquiry shifts from the existential analytic of the
Dasein (section 6.5.3) to historical-poetical analysis of Being as such (Seyn). However,
as stated in chapter 1, it must be appreciated that this Kehre (or `Turn) only marks a
change in emphasis within the Heideggerian project: The two phases of Heidegger's
thinking are intimately connected in that the former, concerned with the existential
analytic of Dasein, is preparatory for the latter, viz. hermeneutical investigation of Being
as such.) Given these existential facts, Dreyfus is led to maintain that
1. Worldliness [that is, having of world] cannot be understood in terms of nature.

2. Nature can be made intelligible only on the basis of worldliness.
[Furthermore,] nothing is intelligible to us unless it first shows up as already integrated into our world,
fitting into our coping practices. (pp.113-115)
He goes on to state that, according to Heidegger,
traditional ontology failed to distinguish ontic (causal) explanations from ontological

(phenomenological) accounts of significance (p.121)
which is of critical importance since "nature by itself obviously cannot explain

significance." (p.115) However, it is crucial to appreciate that this position assumes what
Griffin (1988) has referred to as the `disenchantment of nature', viz. that nature is wholly
devoid of experience, meaning and purpose. Alternative metaphysical systems such as
animism, organicism and panexperientialism (chapter 1) contest this position on the
grounds that it engenders a category problem (chapter 7), viz. the `hard' problem of
explaining how ontological subjectivity can emerge from an ontologically objective
substrate (Chalmers,95)199. Given that the validity of such schemes cannot be excluded
a priori, the notion of nature self-explaining significance is not precluded. Furthermore,
if nature is identified with physis (section 6.6.2) and the latter with Being as such, it
follows of necessity that nature can explain significance since it, as Being, gives rise (via
`thrownness') to Dasein by, from and for itself (that is, for Being)200. However, Dreyfus
198
That is, how "occurrent nature sets limits as to what can be done with equipment" (p.110), or, more generally,
how the ontical constrains the possibilities of the ontological.
199
Ontology is to be interpreted here on its conventional (metaphysical) meaning.
200
Significantly, Dreyfus (1991) maintains that physis (that is, Being as such) cannot be understood in terms of
Dasein's concerns. However, to the extent that Dasein is the Da of Seyn, that is, the clearing within Being as
such brought forth - via physis or autopoisis (section 6.6.2) - in, by, from and for the latter, it follows that
Chapter 6 Poisis
must be understood here as using `nature' in the specific sense of the occurrent, objective
(or ontical), that is, as that which is the concern of objectivistic natural science and, in
this context, he is surely correct. The relation between the ontical and the ontological is
shown in Fig 6.6:
ONTICAL renders
intelligible
constrains
functionality of ONTOLOGICAL
Fig 6.6 Existential Relations between Ontical and Ontological Modalities.
On the basis of the previous arguments, Dreyfus (1991) is led to describe Heidegger as
a "minimal hermeneutic realist" (p.253), which he defines as the view that
a science's background cannot be used to justify the claim that the objects of science exist
independently of the activity of the scientists, nor can this understanding dictate what structure the
science's objects must have. (p.254)
Sikka (1997) indicates a fundamental corollary of hermeneutic realism, viz. its

structured-openness or open-structure, in asserting that "no final definition of Dasein and
beings is possible, precisely because definition is always possible, always subject to
revision in light of new projections of being." (p.105) However, as stated previously, it
must be appreciated that with respect to a particular criterion of truth, only one
formulation is valid; it is simply the case that there are many kinds of (non-exclusive)
truth criteria, for example, ontical (causal) and ontological (phenomenological) truth. To
the extent that all truths are manifestations of Being as such (which is unique), truth is
unitary, while to the extent that there is a plurality of kinds of truth (since Being
manifests itself is various modalities), truth is pluralistic; hence, Heidegger's solution to
Dasein can - and, ultimately, must - be understood in terms of its relation to physis. (This point is discussed
further in section 6.5.6, where an implicit edorsement of this position is made by Heidegger himself.) Thus,
the existential analytic of Dasein presented by Heidegger in Being and Time (1927) is indeed preparatory with
respect to the question of Being; however, it is preparatory in (at least) two ways: first, the hermeneutic of
Dasein which prepares the way for a hermeneutic of Being in turn gives rise to a further hermeneutic of Dasein.
(This position is endorsed both by Dreyfus and Heidegger (1982) himself, viz. the meaning of `man' must be
re-thought in every age.); second, consideration of physis engenders consideration of poisis and the distinction
in its two basic modalities relative to Dasein, viz. autopoisis or physis and allopoisis or techn. Hence, the
question of the poitic difference (section 6.6.4) arises.
Chapter 6 Poisis
the traditional metaphysical problem of the relation between the One and the Many. In
support of this statement, Wacome (1996) offers the following remark:
that there can be an adequate scientific explanation of human origins does not preclude there being
a further, more comprehensive explanation. (p.10)
On this basis, it might be argued that the so-called ènd of science' posited by Horgan
(1996) does not entail an end to the questioning of existence as such; rather it indicates
the need for a new and different kind of questioning which, although non-scientific (in
the conventional sense of this term), is not anti-scientific in any epistemically-relativistic
sense. Furthermore, the existence of this new kind of questioning, which is irreducible
or òrthogonal' to scientific questioning, provides evidence in support of pluralistic
realism and ontological pluralism. Heidegger (1977a) associates the `danger' of
technology with the forgetfulness of Being (section 6.5.2). However, he maintains, with
Hlderlin, that "where the danger is, grows the saving power also" (p.28): in the ènd' -
which means the completion - of science (and hence, in the nihilistic withdrawal of man
from Being), the question of Being (and, thereby, the possibility of overcoming nihilism)
again `lights up'; man becomes authentic Dasein, that is, the `clearing' or Da within
Being in which the question of Being can be and is asked. Heidegger (1959) identifies
this question as the ground question of philosophy, viz. Why is there something rather
than nothing ? (sections 6.5.2 and 6.5.5) and, it is significant that Horgan concurs with
this view given his commitment to empiricism.
6.5.5. Being and Nothing (Nichts)
In sections 6.5.2 and 6.5.4, Being as such (Seyn) and the Being (Sein) of beings
(Seiendes) were briefly examined and a link between these phenomenological concepts
and the existential structure of Nothing201 was established. In this section, the distinction
between ontological Nothing and ontical Nothing (sections 6.4.2.3 and 6.4.4) is
investigated in preparation for clarifying the ontological concept of poisis (coming-
forth, bringing-forth) presented in section 6.6. The approach adopted involves comparing
and contrasting conventional (metaphysical) interpretations of the concept of Nothing
with Heidegger's existential (phenomenological) formulation of this notion. Clearly, it
is beyond both the aim and scope of this study to survey the entire contents of Western
metaphysical thinking on this issue; hence, the presentation has been restricted to
consideration of the thought of Bergson, a philosopher whose ideas on Nothing are
typical of the (metaphysical) tradition that Heidegger calls into question. However, in
the process of this investigation, the views of Aristotle, Kant, Hegel and Whitehead will
also be briefly examined.
201
In what follows, the concept of Nothing is written in upper case in order to distinguish its phenomenological
(ontological) meaning from its conventional (ontical) meaning as used in section 6.4.
Chapter 6 Poisis
As a first example of (conventional) metaphysical thinking on what is meant by

`Nothing', Seidel (1994) presents an application of the Kantian transcendental categories
to this concept, of which the noumenon (that is, ding-an-sich or thing-in-itself) is taken
as a relativistic (or non-absolute) representative. On his view, "Nothing must be a
noumenon - more properly, nouemena are nothing." (p.257) He goes on to state that
"reason conceives of [the] noumenon without contradiction, but cannot find a noumenal
object in intuition." (p.258) Thus, "if nothing is to become an object, and still remain
nothing, it will nevertheless remain inaccessible to intuition. Consequently, as an object,
nothing must be noumenal and problematic." (p.259) It is crucial to appreciate that
Nothing is here identified as a being (an object). Seidel goes on to state that
[the] categories of none, uniqueness, and omission [associated with nothing] come about by rendering
unity, plurality and totality indeterminate by depriving them of a (phenomenal) object. (p.260)
Yet, it is not clear whether this a priori negative identification of the Nothing with the
negation (or `deprivation') of Being202 is correct. (As will be seen in what follows, for
Heidegger, Being and Nothing must, in some sense, be the same since Being is that
which is fundamental and prior to beings and hence, not a being, that is, no-thing or
Nothing.) Seidel goes on to assert that
qualities have degrees ranging from zero = negation to any non-zero degree = reality. Intuition begins
with reality, for only a non-zero magnitude can be given in [sensible] experience. A zero magnitude
intensity is precisely where intuition fails. Yet a concept attaches to this failure-point: that of lack or
absence of the quality expected. (p.261)
However, this view is problematic since it is unclear how a lack of quality (zero or
negation) can give rise to quality (reality) given the staticity of the Kantian Nothing, viz.
a universe `deprived' of beings (that is, a void)203. As shown in section 6.5.4, Being is
prior to beings; thus, beings must derive from Being. However, Being is not a being and
hence, Nothing. The implication is that Nothing is prior to and the source of beings. How
is this possible if Nothing is static (void) ? According to Brock (1949),
`nothingness', if not clearly conceived as a problem, is taken to be the metaphysical

counterconception to what actually and substantially is; [however,] if envisaged as a problem, it is
seen to belong to the `Being' itself of all that is. (p.236)
Heidegger's (1993b) solution to the above problem involves postulating a dynamic
202
For Kant, Being refers to that which is common (universal) to beings as a whole, viz. beingness, which he
identifies with position (section 6.5.4).
203
This problem also arises in connection with Pearce's zero ontology (Witherall,98b) which attempts to resolve
the fundamental question (Witherall,98a), viz. Why is there something rather than nothing ? by identifying the
universe with zero via the summation of conserved constants, viz. physical properties such as mass, energy,
momentum etc.
Chapter 6 Poisis
conception of the Nothing, viz. Nothing as `nothing-ing' or `to nothing'204. In support of

this position, Sikka (1997) asserts that it is "the simplicity which appears to
unaccustomed eyes as a void that appears to be nothing." (p.82) Anticipating criticism
of this position, Brock (1949) maintains that "it is obvious that this vision and outlook
of Heidegger, once grasped, is likely to arouse dispute. In its favour reference may be
made to early myths, such as the Greek one of Chaos preceding all Titans and Olympian
gods, to early philosophy and to the beginning of Genesis." (p.232) However, as stated
in section 6.5.4, it should be appreciated that, for Heidegger, the activity of the Nothing
is not chaotic but highly (self-)structured in its poisis (bringing-forth) of beings.
Heidegger's dynamical conception of the Nothing is important because it points towards
a positive interpretation of the concept beyond its negative identification with the (static)
Kantian void.
In the context of a critical examination of Hegel's dialectic, Kamal (1989) asserts the
validity of the maxim ex nihilo nihil fit (that is, `nothing comes from nothing'),
maintaining the necessity of interpreting becoming in ontical (causal) terms. As he states,
the passage of Being into Nothing and Nothing into Being gives birth to the sub-categories of
Coming-to-be and Ceasing-to-be. This deduction is reasonable only when Being is a determinate
being, otherwise nothing can come out from an absolute nothingness. (p.32)
If Being and Nothing are identical and becoming necessitates that Being be identical with
determinate being (that is, things), then Nothing must also be identical with things in
which case, ex nihilo nihil fit must be correct since on this interpretation from nothing
comes nothing is identical to from thing comes thing. However, to identify Nothing with
thing is to reify the former (Bunge,59) and, moreover, entails logical contradiction; more
importantly, this move leads to concealment of the distinction between Nothing and thing
204
Witherall (1998a) rejects this interpretation of Nothing, viz. "the nothing noths", as "an absurdity, a kind of
philosophical joke, which neatly expresses the absurdity of the situation that we confront when we think about
the fundamental question [Why is there something rather than nothing ?]" (p.16) His argument rests on the
assumption that to associate functionality with the Nothing - Nothing-ing - is to reify it into a being and thereby
undermine the philosophical meaning of the concept. As he states, "if nothingness contains something, then
it must be something, which is impossible." (p.16) On this basis, he argues for a nihilistic interpretation of
Nothing as the (static) void of (traditional) metaphysics. However, in the context of a discussion of physis in
Aristotelian metaphysics, Heidegger (1939) maintains that both motion (dynamism) and rest (stasis) are kinds
of movedness (movement). (Stasis, for Heidegger, refers to the end or telos of movement and is not an
unchanging permanence but a stable, enduring presencing.) The implication is that Being as physis has both
static and dynamic aspects. Given that Being and Nothing are the `same' (in some sense), it is legitimate to hold
that the latter also has both static and dynamic aspects. Furthermore, if associating functionality (dynamism)
with the Nothing is problematic since reifying, why is associating a lack of functionality (stasis) acceptable,
that is, non-reifying ? Appealing to the naive commonsense fact that a lack or negation is characteristic of
nothingness is problematic since, as will be shown in what follows, ontical negation is derivative of the
ontological Nothing which manifests in the phenomenological experience of anxiety. (Ontological Nothing is
no mere concept; it is a concrete existential phenomenon.) It appears, therefore, that Witherall's position is, in
the final analysis, ineffectual as a critique of Heidegger's dynamic interpretation of Nothing.
Chapter 6 Poisis
and hence, between Being and beings, a distinction which Heidegger refers to as the
ontological difference (section 6.5.4). Given that this problem arises in connection with
the maxim ex nihilo nihil fit, it is interesting to speculate whether its solution may lie in
adoption of the maxim creatio ex nihilo. Pggeler (1987) maintains that, for Heidegger,
the `creative' is only admitted as the drawing forth from a source whose resources remain
unreachable. (p.72)
This source is Being as such (or the Nothing) and hence, implies creatio ex nihilo.
However, as will be shown in what follows, this position can be rendered
commensurable with the maxim ex nihilo nihil fit if the latter is suitably reinterpreted
(Heidegger,93a).
According to Aristotle, writing in On Generation and Corruption (350 BC),
qualified coming-to-be is a process out of qualified not-being (e.g. out of not-white or not-beautiful),
but unqualified coming-to-be is a process out of unqualified not-being. Now ùnqualified' means
either (i) the primary predication within each Category, or (ii) the universal, i.e. the all-
comprehensive, predication. Hence, if ùnqualified not-being' means the negation of `being' in the
sense of the primary term of the Category in question, we shall have, in ùnqualified coming-to-be',
a coming-to-be of a substance out of not-substance. But that which is not a substance or a `this' [that
is, a being or thing] clearly cannot possess predicates drawn from the other Categories either - e.g.
we cannot attribute to it any quality, quantity, or position. Otherwise, properties would admit of
existence in separation from substances. If, on the other hand, ùnqualified not-being' means `what
is not in any sense at all', it will be a universal negation of all forms of being, so that what comes-to-
be will have to come-to-be out of nothing. (Book I, 3)
Given his endorsement of a substance-attribute (or subject-predicate) metaphysics and

the maxim ex nihilo nihil fit, Aristotle is led to reject ùnqualified coming-to-be'.
However, it is important to appreciate why he refuses to accept the validity of creatio ex
nihilo. On the traditional view205, Parminides is held to maintain that there is no opposite
to Being which is statically-conceived as one unchanging, unmoving, real existence;
non-being or Nothing has no place in his metaphysics and all becoming is viewed as
illusory. Upholding this (static) interpretation of Being, Aristotle maintains that coming-
to-be from absolute Nothing is impossible; however, becoming from relative Nothing
(a not-being) - which is identical to relative Being (a being) - is possible. On his scheme,
205
Heidegger (1959) maintains that Parminides and Heraclitus `say the same'. While this can be shown to be the
case with respect to the relation between Being (Physis) and Thinking (Logos), it is also possible to interpret
Parminides' concept of Being consistently with the Heraclitean notion of Being, viz. all is change (panta rhei).
This can be established in (at least) two ways: (i) By appreciating the ontological difference between beings
and Being as such (section 6.5.4) and hence, the nothingness of Being relative to the thingness of beings, and
(ii) by interpreting Being with respect to the horizon of Temporality (section 6.5.3) as enduring presencing
rather than static presence. It follows from the latter that Being is unchanging in that its essence as dynamic
presencing - equivalent to Heraclitean flux - does not change. To paraphrase Rescher (1996), àll is change
except change which is permanent'.
Chapter 6 Poisis
being is identified with actuality (or extantness) and not-being with potentiality.
Consequently, he holds that
coming-to-be necessarily implies the pre-existence of something which potentially ìs', but actually
ìs not'; and this something is spoken of both as `being' and as `not being' .. The passage, then, into
what ìs' not except with a qualification is unqualified passing-away, while the passage into what ìs'
without qualification is unqualified coming to be. (Book I, 3)
However, he accepts that "the question might be raised whether substance (i.e. the `this')
comes-to-be at all." (Book I, 3) Thus, Aristotle implicitly undermines his own position
is pointing towards the need to question concerning the Being of substance (section
6.5.2) and clarify the ontological difference between beings and Being as such (section
6.5.4), a distinction which remains unaddressed on his metaphysics.
Bergson (1911), following Aristotle, identifies the Nothing with the static void which is
relative to beings. As he states,
a glass may have always been full, but the liquid it contains nevertheless fills a void. In the same way,
being may have always been there, but the nought which is filled and, as it were stopped up by it, pre-
exists for it none the less, if not in fact at least in right. In short, I cannot get rid of the idea that the
full is an embroidery on the canvas of the void, that being is superimposed on nothing, and that in the
idea of `nothing' there is less than in that of `something'. Hence all the mystery. (p.291)
Rather than adopt Heidegger's (1949a) approach (as will be described in what follows)
and investigate the Nothing and its relation to relativistic negation and the `not', he
maintains simply that "it is necessary that this mystery should be cleared up." (p.291)
Bergson's analysis is important because it is characteristically ontical: In asserting that
`nothing' is less than `something', he remains within what Heidegger has referred to as
the calculable (that is, quantitative) realm of beings. This is apparent in his comparing
Nothing with something, that is, with a being or beings and in terms of relative measure
(`less' and `more'). For Bergson, Nothing is less than being; it is an ontical emptiness that
contrasts with the fullness of being (as beings). As will be seen, for Heidegger (1993b),
ontological emptiness or Nothing is identical with Being which is the ungrounded
ground of beings; it is the emptiest emptiness which is simultaneously - and therefore -
the fullest (as manifest in beings). As he states,
Being [or Nothing] is the emptiest and at the same time a surplus, out of which all beings, those that
are familar and experienced as well as those unfamiliar and yet to be experienced, are granted their
respective modes of being. (p.43)
Anticipating what follows, it is here maintained that the emptiness of Being is Nothing,
but not the static Nothing of the void nor of negation; rather it is the dynamic Nothing
that nihilates (that is, repels beings) and is functional relative to Dasein with respect to
the possibility of the latter's appreciation of the ontological difference (between beings
and Being as such).
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It is important to appreciate at the outset that Bergson's interpretation of Nothing and the
notion of ex nihilo follows that of Aquinas with respect to the latter's first meaning of the
term (section 6.4.2.3), viz. as relative to ex nihilo nihil fit (which is assumed to be
absolute). As he states,
the negation of a thing implies the latent affirmation of its replacement by something else which we
systematically leave on one side. But the negative form of negation benefits by the affirmation at the
bottom of it. Bestriding the positive solid reality to which it is attached, this phantom objectifies itself.
Thus is formed the idea of the void or of a partial nought, a thing being supposed to be replaced, not
by another thing, but by a void which it leaves, that is, by the negation of itself. Now, as this operation
works on anything whatever, we suppose it performed on each thing in turn, and finally on all things
in block. We thus obtain the idea of absolute Nothing. (p.312)
Bergson contests the validity of such a concept of Nothing, maintaining that "the
suppression of absolutely everything implies a downright contradiction in terms, since
the operation consists in destroying the very condition that makes the operation
possible." (p.299) As he goes on to state,
we cannot imagine a nought without perceiving, at least confusedly, that we are imagining it,
consequently that we are acting, that we are thinking, and therefore that something [that is, we, the
imaginer] still subsists. (p.294)
This position is problematic since it is grounded in a non sequitur, viz. because thought
of the Nothing necessitates the existence of a thinker, therefore, an intrinsically (or
independently) existing Nothing - prior to conception - is impossible. On metaphysical
realism, an ùnthought' Nothing is possible; in fact, if the ontological difference between
beings and Being as such (section 6.5.4) is accepted, its existence can be shown to be
necessary. To assert otherwise (with Bergson) is to tacitly adopt some form of
subjectivistic-idealism conflating Being with thought, more specifically, the thought of
Nothing with Nothing as it is in-itself (an sich)206. Heidegger maintains that Nothingness
- the ground of negation, the nugatory and the `not' - is fundamentally non-conceptual.
Revealing itself in the existential mood of anxiety, the Nothing is experienced. It is
critical to appreciate that this experience issues forth from Being as such (Seyn) to
Dasein who is `summoned-forth' for this event (ereignis) by Being (Heidegger,77a).
Consequently, for Heidegger, the Nothing of active imagination (or creative thought) is
derivative, a negative Nothing grounded in the primordiality of positive ontological
206
While Heidegger upholds the Parminidean maxim, viz. Being and thought are the same - which appears to
support Bergson's position - close examination of this statement in fact justifies holding the opposing thesis:
in maintaining that Being and thought are the same, the unity and identification of each with the other is shown
to be intrinsic to and issue forth from Being as such. This is clearly supported by Heidegger's (1959) insistence
that becoming, appearance, thought and the ought stand in contrast to Being from out of Being itself. Thus, in
asserting that Being and thought are the same, Heidegger rather affirms the grounding of the latter in the
former. This is, in turn, supported by Heidegger's (1949a) assertion that "Being is not a product of thinking.
It is more likely that essential thinking is an occurrence [that is, ereignis or `lighting-up' event] of Being."
(p.387)
Chapter 6 Poisis
(phenomenological, existential) Nothingness. Yet, Bergson insists that Nothing is

identical with possibility (more precisely, potentiality) and this in relation to actual
beings207. As he states,
suppose, then, that the principle on which all things rest, and which all things manifest possesses an
existence of the same nature as that of the definition of the circle, or as that of the axiom A=A: the
mystery of existence vanishes, for the being that is at the base of everything posits itself then in
eternity, as logic itself does. (p.292)
There are (at least) two problem with this position: First, and as will be seen shortly, it
is highly questionable whether logic is àt the base of everything' ìn eternity' since, as
Heidegger (1949a) has shown, logic must itself be grounded in Being as such (sections
6.5.2 and 6.5.6); Second, and relatedly, grounding everything in a being (for Bergson,
a `principle') gives rise to the problem of the transitivity of causation (in postulating such
a being as First or Necessary cause) while ignoring the problem of the ontological
difference between beings and Being as such (section 6.5.4). In spite of the problems
associated with Bergson's analysis of Nothing, it is interesting to note that his thinking
provides an excellent starting point from which to investigate Heidegger's ontological
(or existential) identification of the Nothing with Being. This is because he maintains
that "the idea of Nothing, if we try to see in it that of an annihilation of all things, is self-
destructive and reduced to a mere word; and that if, on the contrary, it is truly an idea,
then we find in it as much matter as in the idea of All." (p.314)
Consistent with Bergson, Whitehead implicitly adopts the maxim ex nihilo nihil fit, viz.
nothing comes from nothing (or, alternatively, something comes from something).
However, it might be argued that his position is inconsistent because, on his ontology,
actual occasions (or events), as subjects, contribute to their own becoming208 via
selection of ingressing eternal objects (that is, immanently-manifesting Platonic forms)
in the constitution of emergent superjects (or objects). As Whitehead states,
the doctrine of the philosophy of organism is that, however far the sphere of efficient [or òther']
causation be pushed in the determination of components of a concresence [that is, being or thing] -
its data, it emotions, its appreciations, its purposes, its phases of subjective aim - beyond the
determination of these components there always remains the final reaction of the self-creative unity
of the universe. (p.47)
The self-causation associated with actual occasions is analogous to the First or Necessary
causation attributed to God which ultimately undermines the transitivity of the causal
principle. Creative self-causation is simply inconsistent with ontical ex nihilo nihil fit;
hence, as stated in section 6.4.2.3, it must involve creatio ex nihilo, viz. something from
207
To this extent, his interpretation of Nothing (or non-being) both anticipates and is consistent with that of
Whitehead (1978).
208
That is, events are - in some sense - autopoietic or self-organizing (section 6.4.2.2).
Chapter 6 Poisis
nothing. Yet, Whitehead (1978) insists, with Mercer (1917), that
it is a contradiction in terms to assume that some explanatory fact can float into the actual world out
of nonentity. Nonentity is nothingness. Every explanatory fact refers to the decision and to the
efficacy of an actual thing. (p.46)
There are (at least) two problems with this position: First, in associating efficacy209with
actual things (beings), it assumes (a priori) that nothingness is static (void). However,
as will be seen, Heidegger presents a phenomenological interpretation of the Nothing in
which functionality (or dynamism) is associated with the latter, viz. incipient nihilation,
and this without reifying Nothing into a being; Second, it ignores the question
concerning the actuality of actual beings and hence, fails to address the ontological
difference between beings and Being as such (section 6.5.4).
According to Tymieniecka (1966),
we are tempted to attribute a distinctive and positive denotation to the entirely mind-construed
concept of nothingness, putting it on the same level with being, as its counterpart or alternative. With
the next step, we consider being as relative to nothingness, and the existence of beings, reality, and
being-as-such as a `conquest over nothingness'. Whether we then equate nothingness with the void
or, as contemporary thinkers do, endow it with a specific plenitude by positing it as an alternative to
being, we vitiate the question by pinning it down too promptly to the assumed instant of its origin,
its emergence from nothingness, which is supposed to have always preexisted. (pp.9-10)
She further maintains that "should we attribute a positive value to nothingness and accept
it as existentially equivalent to being, we would be drawn into a delusive scheme of the
mind moving within the narrow circle of its own artifacts. We would fail to approach
being in its own right. That is, since being embraces all there is, it cannot have a
counterpart, and must account for its reasons itself." (p.10) Additionally,
by inquiring as to the reason of something, of beings, of the universe, of reality and being itself, we
do not anticipate a `ground' from which something emerges, a primeval substance, stuff, substratum.
All would partake of being in the essential sense of existential dependence, and consequently could
not be its reason or condition. But if nonbeing is not, and if being embraces all there is, what then can
be the reason or condition of being ? [emphasis added] (p.11)
For Tymieniecka (1966), the real individual being is the `middle term' between being
and nothingness; for Heidegger (1927), Dasein mediates beings and Being as such.
These positions can be reconciled by appreciating that the former is an ontical
interpretation: that is, Being (on Tymieniecka's scheme) refers, in fact, to beings (as a
whole). However, for Heidegger, Being as such is not identical with the totality of beings
(that is, beings as a whole). Being is not a thing (being) and hence, is the same as
Nothing. By interpreting it ontologically, Tymieniecka's nothingness can be identified
209
Here, the notion of efficacy is understood as a generic term covering two orthogonal kinds of movement, viz.
ontical efficient causation (6.4.1.3) and ontological incipience.
Chapter 6 Poisis
with Heideggerian Being as such.
Griffin (1988), following Bergson (1911) and Whitehead (1978), claims that
Heideggerian ontology is nihilistic. This position is supported by Palmer (1998) who
holds that nihilism follows from the identification of Being and Nothing 210. However,
according to May (1996),
the inquiry into the `meaning of Being', which for [Heidegger] has been forgotten and so `still
remains' to be answered, is at the same time an inquiry into Nothing, and into the meaning of Nothing
in contrast to the nothingness of nihilism. (p.22)
Nihilism is concern with beings and the forgetfulness of Being. As Heidegger (1959)
states, "to forget being and cultivate only the essent - that is nihilism". On his view, "to
press inquiry into being explicitly to the limits of nothingness, to draw nothingness into
the question of being - this is the first and only fruitful step toward a true transcending
of nihilism." (p.203) Heidegger (1977b) describes the distinction between nihilistic
ontology (metaphysics) and an ontology which accounts for the relation between Being
and Nothing as follows:
Nihilism means: Nothing is befalling everything and in every respect. Èverything' means whatever
is, in its entirety. And whatever is stands there in every respect proper to it when it is experienced as
that which is. Hence nihilism means that Nothing is befalling whatever is as such, in its entirety. But
whatever is, is what it is and how it is out of Being. Assuming that every ìs' lies in Being, the essence
of nihilism consists in the fact that Nothing is befalling Being itself. (pp.110-111)
However, Heidegger (1977c) maintains that
Nothing as that Nothing which pertains to the having-of-being is the keenest opponent of [the] mere
negating [that is the defining characteristic of nihilism]. Nothing is never nothing; it is just as little
a something, in the sense of an object; it is Being itself, whose truth will be given over to man when
he has overcome himself as subject, and that means when he no longer represents that which is as
object [emphasis added]. (p.154)
This is consistent with Heidegger's (1977a) asserting - following the poet Hlderlin - that
"where danger is, grows the saving power also." (p.34) In this context, the `danger' which
manifests as nihilism is the interpretation of Nothing as the ground of (rather than the
`same' as) Being - as Sartre (incorrectly) inferred the position of Heidegger to be from
the latter's What is Metaphysics ? (1949a) - while the `saving power' is the re-awakening
of the question of the meaning and truth of Being from the nihilation of the nothing
which manifests the ontological difference (section 6.5.4) and the belonging of Nothing
to Being in this manifestation. This is the sense in which Being and Nothing are the
`same', viz. belonging-together or unitary relatedness and not mere identity.
210
As will be seen, the relation between Being and Nothing is highly complex and Heidegger's thinking on this
issue takes many turns. It should suffice at this stage in the discussion to point out that interpreting Heidegger's
affirmation of the `sameness' of Being and Nothing in terms of identity is premature.
Chapter 6 Poisis
It is interesting to note that even Jaspers (1971), who is representative of the existentialist
tradition which seeks to overcome the limitations associated with (conventional)
metaphysics, maintains that
we are overcome by a feeling of nothingness the moment we imagine that we have transformed all
of reality into conceivability; that is that we have put this total conceivability in place of reality. Then
the thought that there need be no reality is a sign that the nothingness of conceivability is sufficient
to itself. But it is not sufficient to us, who in this nihilation of reality experience our own nihilation.
Rather, the awareness of [transcendental] reality liberates us from the illusory world of what is merely
thinkable. (p.70)
It is crucial to appreciate that the totality of beings or beings-as-a-whole (Heidegger,93b)

is not identical to Being as such and hence, to equate them (as does Jaspers) is nihilistic.
The limit point of Nothingness does not, according to Heidegger, entail nihilism since
Nothingness has a function in relation to that which transcends beings, viz. Being as
such: The `nihilation' of the Nothing - that is, the repelling of beings from Dasein - gives
rise to the existential mood of anxiety and it is in this mode of Dasein that the
ontological difference between beings and Being as such emerges. According to Brock
(1949),
the `nothing' is said essentially not to attract, but to repel, thereby bringing about the withdrawal or
retreat on the part of the individual. But while the repelling force is thought to emanate from the
`nothing', experienced in the state of dread [that is, anxiety], the attention of the individual is drawn
and fixed to the things in the world, as they slide away and sink; it is as if the `nothing', in repelling
the individual, was pointing to them, inducing him to get a proper hold of them, impossible as this
is in the very state of dread. (pp.229-230)
Thus, the Nothing belongs to Being in the sense that via the nihilation of beings, Dasein
comes transcendingly to an authentic appreciation of the ungrounded ground of beings,
that is, Being. As Brock goes on to state,
while being under the impact of `nothingness', which manifests itself, being inseparably bound up
with the things in the world, by which man is surounded, man transcends all the things. That
`nothingness', rightly understood, is `beyond' the things that are, and that man's exposure to it in the
state of dread is of a transcending nature, is a notion worth considering. For transcend we must, too,
and transcend we do when thinking, authentically, of Being. And thus `nothingness', in its
metaphysical sense seems, as Heidegger points out, not to be merely the counter-conception to
anything that is, but, more fundamentally, to belong together with `Being', the essence and ground
of what is. (p.232)
To this extent, ontological Nothingness enables nihilism to be transcended. Steiner

(1978) maintains that "the Nichts [or Nothing] is not nihil. Nothingness is not negation
of Being. The very word teaches us that: no-thing-ness signifies a presentness, an
existential `thereness', which is not naively enclosed in, circumscribed by, any particular
extant, any specific object. `Das Nichten des Nichts ìs' das Sein': the negation of
nothingness ìs' Being." (p.146) (Thus, Nothingness can be viewed simultaneously as the
Chapter 6 Poisis
absence of presence and the presence of absence211.) While this statement is clearly
tautological, as stated previously (section 6.5.2), Heidegger does not thereby argue that
it is meaningless; on his view, the tautologies that arise whenever the question of Being
is raised point beyond the questioning to Being as such itself, which is - in the final
analysis - inarticulatable for both Wittgenstein and Heidegger (and the medieval mystical
theologians not to mention the Taoists).
Before examining Heidegger's interpretation of the Nothing in detail, it is worthwhile

briefly responding to a criticism made by Bunge (1959, 1977) to the effect that the
question Why is there something rather than Nothing ? (section 6.5.2) is vacuous on
logical and empirical grounds. As Heidegger (1959) maintains,
it cannot be decided out of hand whether logic and its fundamental rules can, altogether, provide a
standard for dealing with the question about the essent as such. It might be the other way around.
Perhaps the whole body of logic as it is known to us, perhaps all the logic that we treat as a gift from
heaven, is grounded in a very definite answer to the question about the essent; perhaps, in
consquence, all thinking which solely follows the laws of thought prescribed by traditional logic is
incapable from the very start of even understanding the question and guiding it toward an answer.
Actually it is only an appearance of strict, scientific method when we invoke the principle of
contradiction and logic is general, in order to prove that all thinking and speaking about nothing are
contradictory and therefore meaningless. In such a contention `logic' is regarded as a court of justice,
established for all eternity, whose rights as first and last authority no rational man will impugn.
Anyone who speaks against logic is therefore tacitly or explicitly accused of irresponsibility. And the
mere accusation is taken as proof and an argument relieving one of the need for any further, genuine
reflection. (p.25)
For this reason, he counsels that "the man who wishes truly to speak about nothing must
of necessity become unscientific. But this is a misfortune only so long as one supposes
that scientific thinking is the only authentic rigorous thought, and that it alone can and
must be made into the standard [as in ground] of philosophical thinking. But the reverse
is true [emphasis added]." (p.25) Heidegger maintains that the way to a
phenomenological (and, thereby, ontological) understanding of the Nothing is via the
existential experience of anxiety which is not brought about by proximal `fear' of this or
that being but by distal `dread' in the face of the retreat of beings-as-a-whole from the
concern of Dasein (section 6.5.3). According to Sikka (1997), "the experience of nothing
permits the experience of the vastness, the clear and expansive openness, of that which
gives all that is the `grant' to be, namely, being itself." (p.145) As Heidegger (1993a)
states, "in anxiety, the nothing is encountered at one with beings as a whole." (p.102)
Thus, the Nothing that is the ground and incipient source of beings is revealed in anxiety,
when beings withdraw from Dasein and the possibility of there being Nothing rather than
something (section 6.5.2) comes to presence. Heidegger maintains that "as the repelling
211
Ontical nothing refers to the absence of beings; however, this ontical absence is itself grounded in ontological
presence (Being), viz. nothing-ness, the presence of absence. To the extent that ontical nothing is the opposite
of beings and yet is grounded in an ontological nothingness which partakes of Being, it follows that ontical
nothing is itself grounded in Being which has no opposite. Being is ontological Nothing.
Chapter 6 Poisis
gesture toward the retreating whole of beings, [nihilation] discloses these beings in their
full but heretofore concealed strangeness as what is radically other - with respect to the
Nothing. [Thus,] in the clear night of the nothing of anxiety the original openness of
beings as such arises: that they are beings - and not nothing." (p.103) Hence, the
functionality of the Nothing lies in its capacity for repelling beings from the concern of
Dasein; anxiety under the nothing-ing of the Nothing is necessary and sufficient - on
Heidegger's view - for an authentic response to fallenness (that is, being-lost amidst
beings), viz. transcendence (appreciation of the ontological difference between beings
and Being as such). As Grimsley (1967) states, "the Dasein transcends not merely
towards itself, the existent and the world, but also towards the ontological realm of
Nothing and so ultimately towards Being itself." (p.85) According to Heidegger (1993a),
"Being held out into the nothing - as Dasein is - on the ground of concealed anxiety is
its surpassing of beings as a whole. It is transcendence." (p.106) Crucially, he asserts that
"without the original revelation of the nothing, no selfhood and no freedom." (p.103) He
further maintains that
only on the ground of the original revelation of the nothing can human existence approach and
penetrate beings. But since existence in its essence relates itself to beings - those which it is not and
that which it is - it emerges as such existence in each case from the nothing already revealed. (p.103)
As he states,
[the] wholly repelling gesture toward beings that are in retreat as a whole, which is the action of the
nothing that oppresses Dasein in anxiety, is the essence of the nothing: nihilation. It is neither an
annihilation of beings nor does it spring from a negation. Nihilation will not submit to calculation in
terms of annihilation and negation. The nothing itself nihilates [emphasis added]. (p.103)
Grimsley (1967) maintains that "nothing `nihilates' .. because it is an active power which
exerts a dissolvent effect upon our world. However, it is only when we have experienced
Nothing that we can become aware of the full implications of Being." (p.85) Yet, he goes
on to assert that
the exact nature of the relation between Being and Nothing remains obscure. Being and Nothing, we
are told, `hang together', and the ultimate reason for this seems to be that Being itself is finite in
essence212. (p.86)
Heidegger (1949a) maintains that "Nothing, conceived as the pure Òther' than what-is,
is the veil of Being. In Being all that comes to pass in what-is is perfected from
everlasting." (p.392) Thus, Being is permanent (as presencing) relative to the
impermanence of beings (as presencings). In this connection, Heidegger's concept of
Being is similar to Rescher's (1996) basic principle within process philosophy, viz. all
is change except change itself. Significantly, Heidegger holds that
212
However, as was shown in section 6.5.2, Being is finite in essence to the extent that the Being (Sein) of finite
beings or essents is finite; Being as such (Seyn) is infinite.
Chapter 6 Poisis
no matter where and however deeply science investigates what-is it will never find Being. All it
encounters, always, is what-is, because its explanatory purpose makes it insist at the outset on what-
is. But Being is not an existent quality of what-is, nor, unlike what-is, can Being be conceived and
established objectively213. This, the purely Òther' than everything that ìs', is that-which-is-not. Yet
this `Nothing' functions as Being. (p.384)
For this reason, he cautions that "it would be premature to stop thinking at this point and
adopt the facile explanation that Nothing is merely the nugatory, equating it with the
non-existent." (p.384) As he goes on to state,
instead of giving way to such precipitate and empty ingenuity and abandoning Nothing in all its
mysterious multiplicity of meanings, we should rather equip ourselves and make ready for one thing
only: to experience in Nothing the vastness of that which gives every being the warrant to be. That
is Being itself. Without Being, whose unfathomable and unmanifest essence is vouchsafed us by
Nothing in essential dread [that is, in existential anxiety], everything that ìs' would remain in
Beinglessness. But this too, in its turn, is not a nugatory Nothing, assuming that it is of the truth of
Being that Being may be without what-is, but never what-is without Being [emphasis added]. (p.385)
In support of this position, Brock (1949) maintains that "`nothingness', and its experience
by man, is the indispensable pre-requisite for the things in the world to come into their
own and to be known and treated for what they are." (pp.231-232) On this basis,
Grimsley (1967) is led to ask the following question: "Does this mean, therefore, that
Nothing is simply Being itself as it appears to us through our experience of crude
existence and finitude ?" (p.86) However, as he goes on to state,
in a long discussion of the dialectical conception of nothingness, Sartre rejects any effort to make it
a form of Being. He criticizes Hegel for putting Being and non-being on the same ontological plane.
Being must precede Nothing and be its basis. This was the point of the .. observation that nothingness
`haunts' Being. We do not need non-being in order to conceive of Being and we can make an
exhaustive examination of Being without finding the least trace of nothingness. On the contrary,
nothingness can have only a derivative existence which is drawn from Being, on whose `surface' it
may be said to exist. (p.99)
However, the above statement is problematic since it fails to adequately distinguish

between non-being which is relative (to beings) and Nothing which is absolute (and the
`same' as Being). In short, both non-being and beings are kinds of beings (as is implicit
in the schemes of Bergson and Whitehead); Being as such - which is neither a being nor
a not-being - is, therefore, Nothing.
While Bunge (1977b) is correct - although for the wrong reasons - in asserting that
Heidegger (and Sartre) "regard nothingness as an entity" (pp.158-159), Heidegger
(1993a) maintains that "the nothing is neither an object nor any being at all." (p.104)214
213
Thus, for Heidegger - in contrast to Kant - Nothing is not an object.
214
As stated previously, nothingness is nothing-ness, that is, the presence of absence and hence, partakes of Being;
in this sense, it can be viewed as a being. However, ontological Nothing is the incipient ground of nothingness
Chapter 6 Poisis
Furthermore, and contrary to Sartre, Heidegger holds that "the nothing comes forward
neither for itself nor next to beings, to which it would, as it were, adhere. For human
existence, the nothing makes possible the openedness of beings as such. The nothing
does not merely serve as the counterconcept of beings; rather, it originally belongs to
their essential unfolding as such. In the Being of beings the nihilation of the nothing
occurs." (p.104) Here Heidegger refers to nihilation with respect to the possibility of
transcendence, viz. Dasein's appreciation of the ontological difference. As he goes on to
state, "in its nihilation the nothing directs us precisely towards beings." (p.104)
Heidegger (1993b) maintains that
it is indeed correct that the Nothing is not a being and can never and nowhere be made into a being,
for we think the Nothing as the negation of beings purely and simply. But the question remains
whether the Nothing itself consists in the negation of beings, or whether the negation of beings is
simply a representation of the Nothing, which the Nothing requires of us when we set out to think it.
For the Nothing is certainly no being, but nevertheless `there is given' the Nothing [emphasis added].
(p.45)
Crucially, and as stated previously, he holds that "Nothing presences" and, therefore, "is
not merely the absence and lack of beings." As Heidegger goes on to state, "if the
Nothing were only something indifferently negative, how could we understand, for
example, horror and terror before the Nothing and nihilation ? Terror before [that is, in
the face of] the Nothing ..." (p.45) According to Brock (1949), "in `nothingness', as
bound up with the things in the whole, we experience a `vast spaciousness' which gives
every single thing the warrant to be. It is, Heidegger suggests, as if `Being' itself - though
then not yet recognized in its essence - was transmitting `nothingness', in the state of
genuine dread [that is, anxiety], to man. It thus remains an open question whether
`nothingness', as a metaphysical phenomenon, is really as `negative' as it may appear at
first sight to someone who has not acquainted himself deeply with its problem." (p.243)
It follows that Nothing must also have a positive determination since as Heidegger
(1993b) states, "there is given the Nothing in spite of the fact that beings are [emphasis
added]." (p.45) Even more radically he maintains that "the Nothing does not need beings
in order to be the Nothing as a result of their elimination [in negation]." (p.46) (This
supports Heidegger's (1993a) assertion that Nothing is the ground of (logical) negation
and not visa versa.) According to Heidegger (1993a), the Nothing is the source of
negation: "negation is grounded in the not that springs from the nihilation of the
nothing." (p.105) As Brock (1949) states,
[Heidegger] argues (a) that the `not' cannot be a `derivative' of negation. To negate something, the
something to be negated must first be `given'. And something of the `not' character can be envisaged
only if and when we, in all our thought, anticipate that there is the `not'. Thus negation is thought to
be `dependent' on a somehow `given' `not', and not vice versa. (b) This argument, basing negation on
the `not', is followed up by the other one, tracing the `not' back to its origin from the functioning of
`nothingness', as the manifestation of which in the realm of thought the `not', and thus negation, is
and identical to Being as such (Seyn) which is not a being.

Chapter 6 Poisis
interpreted. It is obvious that by this way of argumentation the idea of an autonomous `Logic' is
profoundly challenged. (p.234)
However, Sikka (1997) maintains that
there might .. be an ambiguity in Heidegger's reflections on Nothing in Basic Concepts [since] the
reflections on nothing .. suggest that the confrontation with annihilation and devastation and the
ability to endure these, which is the ability to endure the nihilation of nothing, `clears' Dasein for
being. It would then clear Dasein for wonder in the face of the fact that there are beings and not rather
nothing. In this case, nothing and being would be essentially related but not essentially identical. They
would, in fact, be opposites, and it could then be said that nothing occurs in full flight from being and
being in full flight from nothing. The problem is, this would suggest that nothing does need beings,
since one must then, to have the experience of being, experience that beings are, and the experience
that beings are obviously requires that there be beings. (p.84)
Sikka's solution to this problem is to distinguish between Being qua presencing (that is,
the Being (Sein) of beings) and Being qua what makes presencing possible, viz. Being
as such (Seyn):
Being qua presencing, the occurrence of beings, is suspended in nothing and arises from nothing.
Nothing is then the source of all presencing and so in spite of, or because of, its emptiness, it is an
overflowing abundance. But this is being itself, not presencing but the hidden source of presencing,
that which lets all things be, the nothingness of which consists not in nonbeing but in being the
impenetrably dark origin of beings. (p.85)
This is consistent with Heidegger's (1993b) assertion that "the Nothing needs being" and
that, "indeed, perhaps the Nothing is even the same as being. For the uniqueness of being
can never be endangered by the Nothing, because the Nothing ìs' not something other
than being, but this itself." (p.46) In the Letter on Humanism (1993c), he further
maintains that "Being nihilates - as Being" and that "the nihilating in Being is the essence
of what I call the nothing. Hence, because it thinks Being, thinking thinks the nothing."
(p.261) According to Heidegger (1993b),
that the Nothing ìs' the same as being, that the Nothing is related in its essence to being, if not
essentially one with it, we can also surmise from what has already been said about being: `Being is
the emptiest'. Is the Nothing not the emptiest emptiness? (p.46)
However, he maintains that
in the extremity of the desired annihilation of all beings [in thinking the possibility of the Nothing],
and precisely here, being must appear. It appears as something unprecedented and untouched, from
out of which stem all beings and even their possible annihilation. Being first lets every being be as
such, that means to spring loose and away, to be a being, and as such to be ìtself'. Being lets every
being as such originate. Being is the origin. (p.52)
As Miller (1993) states, "it is Being which even allows us to be in order to wish the
annihilation of any being .. Being is the origin of all things, even of the Nothing." (p.6)
While it is clear that Nothing is not a thing (that is, a being), to the extent that there is
Chapter 6 Poisis
Nothing, the latter must, in some sense, partake of Being as such. Hence, Miller's latter
statement would appear to be correct. This, in turn, would seem to imply that the
assertion, "Nothing: Being: Same" must be interpreted analogously to the way Heidegger
(1959) interprets Parminides' assertion "Being and thinking are the same", viz. as unity
in the sense of belonging-together not identity. This interpretation is supported by
Heidegger's (1993b) maintaining that Nothing belongs to Being and implies that since
Being is the origin (or ground) of Nothing (with the latter belonging to the former), it
is existentially prior to Nothing. Given that Nothing is the limit for beings which, in
nihilation, discloses Being as such (and hence, the ontological difference between Being
and beings), it follows that Being must itself be unoriginated. To assert the opposite is
meaningless since Being as such is an ultimate or limiting concept (section 6.5.2); that
is, it encompasses or grounds all other concepts and yet is itself ungrounded. As
Heidegger (1993c) maintains, Being as such ìs It Itself', the fundamental, irreducible
ground of all beings. However, given the ontological difference between beings and
Being as such (section 6.5.4), it would seem to follow that Nothing is identical - rather
than merely belongs - to Being since the latter is not a being and, therefore, Nothing.
Hence, the seemingly paradoxical result that Being is both the incipient ground of
Nothing and yet, simultaneously Nothing itself, a paradox which dissolves once it is
appreciated that Being as such is the ground of itself215. Thus, it would appear that Being
and Nothing are either the `same' in the sense of identical or that Nothing is an existential
modality of Being216. As Heidegger states, "that the ìs' has the character of the copula
shows clearly enough the extent to which its meaning must be characterized by emptiness
and indeterminacy. For only thus can the ìs' suffice for the various uses that are
constantly demanded of it in discourse." (p.30) Thus,
it remains to be asked whether or not being is precisely something other than merely a name for the
most empty concept, whether being is not always and actually a surplus from which all fullness of
beings, however they might present themselves, originates .. Being would then be not only something
abstracted and set aside from beings, but contrarily, and at the same time, it would be what exercises
its essence in each being everywhere and above all. (p.59)
Pearce (1995) maintains that as a consequence of the fact that in the universe as a whole,
the conserved constants (electric charge, angular momentum, mass-energy) add up to
(cancel out to) exactly zero,
nihilism and plenism .. are taken as physically and logico-mathematically equivalent. (p.7)
There are (at least) three problems with this position: Firstly, as argued in section 6.4.2.3,
215
In section 6.5.2, it is maintained that the tautologous statement, "It is It Itself", constitutes the limit point for
reflection on the meaning of Being.
216
In this sense, a distinction would need to be drawn between Being as such as ontological Nothing and
ontological nothingness as an existential modality of ontological Nothing.
Chapter 6 Poisis
it has not been conclusively demonstrated that the conserved constants sum to exactly
zero; Secondly, even if this is the case, the plenism (or nihilism) of beings-as-a-whole
is a calculated Being (or Nothing): This computational Being-Nothing (i) is not the
`same' as the phenomenological (that is, ontological) Being-Nothing described by
Heidegger and (ii) is, in fact, grounded in the latter; thirdly, it is assumed a priori that
Being and Nothing are statical. However, if this is indeed the case, the coming-forth (or
poisis) of beings cannot be explained and it is, therefore, necessary to postulate an
agency (that is, source of change or movement) additional to Being and Nothing. To the
extent that such an agency is a being, it partakes of Being as such; hence, the ontological
difference (section 6.5.4) and the question concerning the incipient origin of this agency
(being) arises which, again, cannot be solved under assumptions of statical Being-
Nothing leading to a vicious infinite regress. Thus, nihilism or plenism, as statically-
conceived, cannot be metaphysically primitive.
To the extent that Being is not a being and hence, is - in some sense - identical to
Nothing (whose function is to nihilate), it is conceivable that nihilation is also involved
in incipient poisis (section 6.6), that is, the existential movement from Being to beings.
If nihilation is the ground of indication, severance or distinction making - each of which
can be identified with logical negation217 , itself grounded in the not - it follows that
Nothing is the source of beings since, as Spencer-Brown (1969) has shown, "a universe
comes into being when a space is severed or taken apart" (p.v). This position derives
support from the following statements: "in the Being of beings the nihilation of the
nothing occurs." (p.104); "negation is grounded in the not that springs from the nihilation
of the nothing." (p.105) Hence, the creative (poitic) source must be the Nothing. This
position is further supported by Heidegger's stating that "the nothing does not remain the
indeterminate opposite of beings but reveals itself as belonging to the Being of beings"
and the following assertion:
ex nihilo omne ens qua ens fit [that is, from the Nothing all beings as beings come to be]. (p.108)
Thus, Heidegger reinterprets the ex nihilo nihil fit maxim as "from nothing, nothing
comes to be", that is, comes into presence (or unconcealment) from concealment; in
short, from Nothing (Being) come beings. The medieval bridge maxim, viz. ex nihilo fit -
ens creatum or "from nothing comes - created being" is thereby appropriated, subject to
its revision following appreciation of the ontological difference218. However, there are
(at least) two problems with the above argument which attempts to identify the incipient
poisis of the Nothing with logical negation: First, it must be appreciated from the outset
217
For example, I am not you, self is not other.
218
According to Heidegger, the tradition interprets this maxim relative to a creator God who is conceived as a
being (albeit the Supreme being) among beings. However, Sikka (1997) contests Heidegger's claim for the
necessity of interpreting God ontically (as a being).
Chapter 6 Poisis
that Nothing is interpreted by Heidegger (1993a) ontologically: in stating that ìn the
Being of beings the nihilation of the nothing occurs', Heidegger is pointing to the fact
that in transcending from beings to Being - that is, in appreciating the ontological
difference (section 6.5.4) - beings are repelled from Dasein as concerns. However, to
the extent that Being is not a being and yet incipiently gives rise to beings, it follows that
if Nothing and Being are the same in the `strong' sense of identity rather than the `weak'
sense of belonging (with Nothing as the `veil' of Being), then the incipient movement
from Being to beings must simultaneously be an incipient movement from Nothing to
beings. Hence, the above statement can be inverted, viz. ìn the nihilation of the nothing
the Being of beings occurs'. Following Sikka's (1997) distinction between Being (Sein)
qua presencing and Being (Seyn) qua the source of presencing (section 6.5.2), it follows
that the `nihilation of the nothing' must be similarly interpreted in two senses: (1) as the
repelling of beings, which thereby necessitates the existence of beings; (2) as the
incipient ground of beings; Second, the interpretation of the `nihilation of the nothing'
in logical terms following Spencer-Brown (1969) is problematic since, on this scheme,
it is a logical universe and not a phenomenological world that comes into being.
Furthermore, distinction-making, indication and severance (or `cutting') presupposes that
which can be distinguished, viz. beings. Hence, incipient nihilation must transcend
distinction-making and be its ground which supports Heidegger's assertion, stated above,
that the Nothing is the ground of the not and negation and not visa versa. (In short, and
more generally, what is being asserted is that the phenomenological is the ground of the
logical and not visa versa.) Significantly, Sikka (1997) maintains that
the nothing at the heart of being in Heidegger's earlier conception .. corresponds not to the nothing
which .. is being itself, but to the negativity of creatures as contingent and, in a peculiar way, also to
the not being that closes every determinate being into its finitude. (p.149)
In short, and as stated previously, a being is simultaneously also a not-being relative to

another being. While it might be argued that this conception of Nothing (as not-being)
resembles that due to Bergson (1911) and Whitehead (1978), viz. relative-nothing, in
fact, this is not the case. As Kovacs (1990) states, "the Heideggerian notion of Non-being
is not the same as the traditional understanding of nothing (Non-being). The notion of
Non-being in Heidegger cannot be grasped without at the same time understanding
There-being, because There-being itself is essentially involved in the entire question of
Non-being, in the encounter with nothing." (p.154) Thus, and crucially, the pre-Kehre
concept of Nothing, while relative to beings, is not a logical concept, but a
phenomenological experience (or èncounter'). As Kovacs goes on to state, "beings as
beings are `born' out of the experiencing of Non-being, out of the manifestation of Non-
being to There-being [emphasis added]" (pp.155-156). With respect to Heidegger's later
(post-Kehre) conception of the Nothing (or absolute-nothing), which is identified as
infinite possibility, Sikka maintains that it
is nothing, not not-being, but being itself as the source of all possibility. Considered in itself, this
source is the negation of negation, the pure affirmation of being. (p.152)
Chapter 6 Poisis
The various senses of Nothing discussed herein are summarized in Table 6.5:
Ontical Ontological
Relative non-being Nothingness

(Aristotle, Bergson, (pre-Kehre Heidegger)
Whitehead)
Absolute void Nothing (Being)

(Pearce) (post-Kehre Heidegger)
Table 6.5 Four senses of Nothing.
In concluding this section, it is worthwhile briefly comparing the Heideggerian concept

of Nothing219 as presented above with the notion of Nothing (or nothingness) as it
appears in Eastern thought, specifically Taoism since, as was shown in section 6.5.1,
Heidegger's thought either borrows from or implicitly mirrors this tradition in many
respects. In chapter 23 of The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu (Watson,68), it is stated
that
being cannot create being out of being; inevitably it must come forth from nonbeing. Nonbeing is
absolute nonbeing .. (p.257)
This position is supported by Lao Tzu who states, in chapter 40 of the Tao Te Ching
(Waley,97), that "for though all creatures under heaven are the products of Being, Being
itself is the product of Not-Being." If by `being' is understood a being (or beings) and
absolute nonbeing refers to Nothing (or Being as such) then the above statement points
to the necessity of grounding the causal (in the sense of genetic or productive) relation
between beings in a coming-forth - or poisis (section 6.6) - from Nothing: Beings can
only create beings out of themselves relativistically; in order to explain their factical
existence as such, it is necessary to postulate that which is not a being, viz. Being as such
which is equivalent to Nothing or absolute non-being220. Furthermore, relativistic creatio
ex nihilo - which involves a movement between beings - does not address the question
concerning the Being (Sein) of beings and hence, cannot explain why there are beings
rather than Nothing (section 6.5.2), only that there are beings.
219
For Heidegger, the line between Being and beings is the ontico-ontological difference, the Being of beings and
hence, the `site', `clearing', topos or place of Being, viz. Dasein. According to Silverman (1989), "as essence
of man, the difference of line, as polysemous, as multiple otherness, as not the same, and as crossed out,
constitutes a space that is not a space, not a concrete line, not a mark of what is - but rather a mark of what is
not. Between Being and beings, the ontico-ontological difference cannot be, it cannot constitute a positive
entity. Hence Heidegger calls this line of difference - nothingness. Nothingness here is not a vacuum, not a
chaotic emptiness. Rather it is what is not [and hence, partakes of Being as such] - for both Being and beings
are and [the line between Being and beings] is between yet neither one nor the other." (pp.158-159)
220
As Bergson (1911) states, relative non-being is co-present with relative being (that is, beings).
Chapter 6 Poisis
Kitaro Nishida's Intelligibility and the Philosophy of Nothingness (1958) presents an

investigation into the philosophy of Nothing from a position synthesizing elements of
Zen Buddhism and Western metaphysics (Plato, Kant and Hegel). In the introduction to
the English translation of this work, Schinzinger (1958) maintains that
`Nothingness' is the transcendental and transcendent unity of opposites. The last enveloping to which
our thinking, feeling, and acting self penetrates, in which all contradictions have been resolved, and
in which the abyss between the thinking subject and the thought object disappears, in which even the
opposite position of [ontical] God and soul no longer exists - this last in which every being has its
`place' and is thereby defined as being, cannot itself be defined as being, and does not have its place
in anything else; therefore it is called non-being, or Nothingness. Nothingness is the transcendental
and transcendent unity of opposites. Here the soul in its greatest depth, is a clear mirror of eternity.
(p.30)
It could be argued that if Nothingness is to function as an ungrounded ground (the `last'),

then it must be in some sense since functionality necessitates Being. However, this does
not entail holding that Nothingness is a being; Being is in Being, that is, Being is the
self-grounding ground, partaking of itself. Hence, if Nothingness is identified with Being
(as in Heidegger), it can act as a ground for beings without giving rise to the problem of
the ontological difference (section 6.5.4). Identification of Nishida's concept of
Nothingness and the Heideggerian notion of Being (Heidegger,93a) is further supported
by the following statement:
all being is a self-unfolding of the eternal, formless nothingness; all finite forms are shadows of the
formless. (p.37)
In postulating unfolding as characteristic of Nothingness it might be argued that the

Nothing is processual (chapter 2), specifically, an autopoitic process. However,
Heidegger maintains that Being (and hence, Nothing) cannot be understood in terms of
process (Dreyfus,91). To the extent that the latter is identified as a being, viz. a process,
this indeed follows. However, it is not a priori inconsistent with Heidegger's position to
identify Being and Nothing with the ground of processes which might be identified as
processuality (or process as such). Yet, Heidegger (1959) does not adopt this position;
rather, he maintains that Being (and Nothing) are the ground of substance and process,
further, of the duality of substantiality and processuality. This position appears to be
supported by Bunge (1977b) who contests the monistic priority of either substance or
process in maintaining that
an event is a change in the condition (state) of some thing and therefore cannot be studied apart from
it any more than things can be studied apart from their changes. (p.4)
However, it is crucial to appreciate that his appeal to a duality of substance and process
is grounded in an ontical interpretation of the maxim ex nihilo nihil fit. As he states,
nothing comes out of nothing and no thing reduces to nothingness. If this were not so we would make
no effort to discover both the origin of new things and the traces left by things that have been
Chapter 6 Poisis
destroyed. (p.17)
As was shown in sections 6.4.2.3 and 6.4.4, ontically-relativistic (or local) ex nihilo nihil
fit is commensurable with ontically-relativistic creatio ex nihilo. Significantly, both refer
to the causal, productive relation between beings while the question concerning the
Being (Sein) of such beings and of Being as such (Seyn) remains unaddressed; hence,
Bunge's formulation of the need to transcend both substantialism and processualism is,
at best, incomplete.
6.5.6. Being and Thinking (Logos)
In section 6.5.4, the ontological difference between beings and Being as such was
discussed. According to Eldred (1996), this `difference of all differences' is, for
Heidegger, intimately tied up with the meaning of the adverb/conjunction às', viz. "the
as [is] the hallmark of access to beings as such." (p.8) Searle (1995) presents an ontical
interpretation of the as-structure and an ontological (existential, hermeneutic)
interpretation of this structure is described in (Heidegger,95). However, since Krell
(1992) has (correctly) identified the as-structure with Dasein's capacity221 for logos (an
existential structure) and because logos is a basic opposition to Being (Heidegger,59),
it is necessary to examine the former (logos) in order to clarify its distinction from the
latter (Being). Furthermore, to the extent that an understanding of the (ontical and
ontological) functionality of the as-structure is necessary for understanding artificiality
(or artifactuality) as such, and given the link between the as-structure and logos, it is
necessary to examine - albeit in a preliminary fashion - the relationship between logos
and artificiality, specifically, between logos and an artificiality grounded in
computationalism (chapter 2), viz. computationally emergent artificiality or CEA
(chapter 5).
According to Heidegger (1959), "with the change of physis [that is, the emerging power]
to eidos [that is, the form or idea] and of logos [that is, the gathering together] to
kategoria [that is, the categories] the original disclosure of the being of the essent
ceased" (p.188). Various thinkers have proposed metaphysical schemes involving
different numbers and kinds (or types) of categories. For example, Aristotle, writing in
the Categories (350 BC), lists ten categories, viz. substance, quantity, quality, relation,
place, time, position, state, action and affection; Peirce identifies three, viz. firstness,
secondness and thirdness (Merrell,91); and, as stated previously in chapter 5, Alexander
(1920) presents seventeen categories grouped into eight subsuming classes. However,
221
It is important to appreciate that a capacity must not be understood as an attribute associated with a substance
or subject: Dasein (here, human being or man) is not a subject in this Aristotelian (metaphysical) sense since
man's essence is his èxistence', or, more precisely, his ek-sistence. His capacities - that is, existential structures
or modalities are ways of to-be, not properties that can be attached to an underlying substrate; for Heidegger,
there simply is no underlying substrate, there are only ways of to-be. The logos existential was briefly described
in section 6.5.3.
Chapter 6 Poisis
what appears to have been ignored on all such (metaphysical) schemes is appreciation
of categorial-ness, that is, the ontological Being (Sein) of categories as categories and
the grounding of categories in Being as such (section 6.5.4). Crucially, Heidegger (1959)
maintains that
ever since idea and category [both of which are taken to constitute the basis of thought] became
sovereign, philosophers have tormented themselves in vain, seeking by every possible and impossible
strategem to explain the relation between statement (thinking) and being - in vain, because they never
again carried the question of being back to its native ground and soil, thence to unfold it. (pp.190-191)
For Heidegger, historically-speaking - which, on his view, means àccording to the Being
(Sein) of Being as such (Seyn)' - this questioning became impossible because "thought
establishes its domination (in respect to the crucial determination of essence) over being
and at the same time over what is opposed to being." (p.195) For example,
as soon as logos in the sense of statement assumes the rule over being, the moment being is
experienced and conceived as ousia, [statical] already-thereness, the distinction between being [as
descriptive actuality] and the ought [as normative possibility] is in preparation. (pp.195-196)
Furthermore, the change in the meaning of Being and thought - from physis and logos
to ousia (as idea) and kategoria respectively - engenders oppositions between being and
appearance (section 6.5.7) on the one hand and being and becoming (section 6.5.8) on
the other222. Significantly, Heidegger maintains that
becoming and appearance are situated as it were on the same plane as the being of the essent .. In
them what is distinguished from being comes to us from the essent itself. We find it in the realm of
the essent. (p.116)
Thinking, by contrast, "sets itself off against being in such a way that being is placed
before it and consequently stands opposed to it as an object"; hence, "being takes on its
entire interpretation from thinking [emphasis added]." (p.116) According to Heidegger,
thinking brings something before us, represents it. This representation always starts from ourselves,
it is a free act, but not an arbitrary one, for it is bound by the fact that in representing we think of what
is represented and think it through by dissecting it, by taking it apart [that is, via analysis] and putting
it together again [that is, via synthesis]. (p.118)
Hence, thinking as representation223 can be linked to artificing - or techn-Enframing
222
The opposition between Being and the ought is not explicitly considered in this study; however, the relation
to the ought is implicitly examined in section 6.5.4 in connection with the (metaphysical) interpretation of
Being as such in terms of actuality, possibility and necessity.
223
The identification of thinking with representation is critical since, as Heidegger points out, representation is
re-presentation, that is, the presencing (or making present) again that which presenced (or was made present)
aforetime. This is only possible if that which was present has a (static) essence which can presence (or be made
Chapter 6 Poisis
(Gestellen) - which means production or making (section 6.4.2.4), viz. a triadic relation
between productant (or artificer), substratum (or material) and product (or artifact).
According to Jaspers (1971), "the basic character of reason is the will to unity." (p.54)
This appears to be consistent with Heidegger's (1959) identification of thinking with
logos and his interpretation of the latter as `collecting collectedness' which means,
according to Sikka (1997), "being as the gathering and uniting principle of what-is"
(p.46). However, Heidegger maintains that in the hermeneutic movement from logos
through kategoria to ratio (or logic), a hypostatization occurs which results in the
concealment of the ontological difference between beings and Being as such. Crucially,
according to Heidegger, logos originally stood in opposition to kategoria, the latter of
which are (statical) abstractions from Being. Significantly, the categorial abstracting
associated with metaphysics involves both the subtraction - or `cutting' - of beings (parts)
from Being as such (ground) and the addition - or `joining' - of beings (parts) to `Being'
(whole); hence, the connection between thought, representation and the categories.
Ontological Being as such must be distinguished from ontical `Being' because Being as
such is not a sum of parts (as is asserted by reductionists such as Dawkins) nor a whole
which is, in some sense, more than the sum of its parts (as is asserted by emergentists
such as Alexander); rather, Being as such is the ground of parts and wholes, of
components and their functional-organizational interaction in systems, of systemicity as
such (chapter 3). This point is critical because it points to the impossibility of
synthesizing Being via the organizational-structuring (that is, àdding' or `joining') of
analytically-isolated beings, thereby constituting a limit to the possibilities for artificing
and artificiality (as artifactuality). Thus, with respect to the `(will to) unity' associated
with reason (ratio, logic), Heidegger maintains that it is an artifactual unity, an ontical
unity of conjoined beings, an Enframed (Gestellen) unity relative to the Dasein as
anthropic component (that is, artificer-interpreter).
As stated in section 6.5.2, Heidegger (1959) is highly critical of the identification of

thought with logic. This is because "reflection on the essence of thinking is .. of a very
particular kind when it is undertaken as reflection on logos [understood as statement] and
becomes logic. `Logic' and `the logical' are not simply the only possible ways of defining
thought." He maintains that "the source from which the essence of thinking is
determined, namely aletheia and physis, being as unconcealment .. has been lost by
`logic'." However, on his view, "it was no accident that the doctrine of thinking should
have become `logic' [emphasis added]." (p.120) According to Heidegger,
logic was able to arise as an exposition of the formal structure and rules of thought only after the
division between being and thinking had been effected and indeed, only after it had been effected in
a particular way and in a particular direction. Consequently logic itself and its history can never throw
adequate light on the essence and origin of this separation between being and thinking. Logic itself
present) at any time since it is, itself, timeless (or eternal) and universal (in the sense of a Platonic idea or form).
Hence, a commitment to representational thinking entails a commitment to essentialism. This is highly
significant because artificialities and artificiality as such (chapter 4) are essentialistically-conceived.
Chapter 6 Poisis
is in need of an explanation and foundation in regard to its own origin and its claim to provide the
authoritative interpretation of thinking. (p.121)
To the extent that computational systems are formal systems (chapter 2) and the latter,
formalizations of logical systems, it would appear that computationalism is itself ìn need
of an explanation and foundation in regard to its own origin'. Given the grounding of
logic in aletheia-physis and the connection between logic and computation (chapter 2),
it would appear to follow that computation is also grounded in aletheia-physis. To the
extent that the latter is how Being was originally conceived, at least by the Greeks whose
thinking provides the basis of the Western philosophical tradition in which
computationalism is situated, it therefore follows that Steinhart's (1998) identification
(reduction) of Being with (to) computation is erroneous; on the contrary, given that
computation is (a process), that is, occurs or happens, it must partake of Being as such
(Seyn). Given the connections between computation and representation224 on the one
hand, and between representation and statement (or discourse) on the other, it is
significant that according to Heidegger (1959), "originally logos did not mean speech,
discourse [or statement]" (p.124) and that "long after the noun logos had come to mean
discourse and statement it retained its original meaning in the sense of `relation of the
one to the other'." (p.125) According to Heidegger, Being (as aletheia-physis) and
thinking (as logos) are unified but opposing terms. It is worthwhile briefly examining the
validity of this (Parminidean) claim by considering Heidegger's identification of the
ideas of two thinkers that the (metaphysical) tradition has placed in opposition, viz.
Heraclitus and Parminides. An appreciation of how Heidegger understands the
Parminidean maxim, "being and thinking are the same", is important since on its
conventional (metaphysical) interpretation, it appears to provide support for
computationalism225. On the basis of an analysis of two Heraclitean fragments, Heidegger
1) permanence and endurance are characteristic of the logos; 2) it is togetherness in the essent, the
togetherness of all essents, that which gathers; 3) everything that happens, i.e. that comes into being,
stands there in accordance with this permanent togetherness; this is the dominant power. (pp.127-128)
224
This connection is readily established through phenomenological analysis of how Being as such bifurcates into
essence and existence, only to be subsequently interpreted in terms (substance and form) which ultimately lead
to the identification of Being with representation and the latter with computation. For example, Heidegger
(1973) who maintains that "between energia and the primordial essence of Being (aletheia-physis) stands the
idea [or form]." (p.10) Furthermore, this "Idea [or form] becomes idea, and this becomes representational
thought." (p.11) Additionally, Heidegger (1959) holds that "ousia [that is, the statical aspect of Being] .. began
to be interpreted as substantia [that is, substance, of which] the concept of function is only its mathematical
variant." (p.194) Hence, the connection between representation and computation via the hypostatization of the
concept of Being as such.
225
Briefly, if computation is the basis of thought (chapter 4) and if thought is identical to Being (Parminides), then
computation is either identical to Being or its ground (Steinhart,98).
Chapter 6 Poisis
On his view, logos means "collecting collectedness, the primal gathering principle ..
which is in itself permanently dominant." (p.128) Hence, for Heidegger, logos - like
physis, the emerging power - has both dynamic (`collecting') and static (`collectedness')
aspects. Furthermore,
logos is the steady gathering, the intrinsic togetherness of the essent, i.e. being. [In fact], kata ton
logon [or àccording to collectedness'] means the same as kata physin [or àccording to being'].
(p.130)
On this basis, he concludes that "physis and logos are the same. Logos characterizes
being in a new and yet old respect: that which is, which stands straight and distinct in
itself, is at the same time gathered togetherness in itself and by itself, and maintains itself
in such togetherness." (p.131) According to Heidegger, the Heraclitean maxim panta rhei
refers to the gathering of the conflicting, that is, Being as such. As he states,
the popular interpretation of Heraclitus tends to some up his philosophy in the dictum panta rhei,
èverything flows'. If these words stem from Heraclitus to begin with, they do not mean that
everything is mere continuous and evanescent change, pure impermanence; no, they mean that the
essent as a whole, in its being, is hurled back and forth from one opposition to another; being is the
gathering of this conflict and unrest. (pp.133-134)
Having examined Heidegger's interpretation of the Heraclitean fragments with respect

to the relation between physis and logos, it is now appropriate to consider his explication
of the Parminidean dictum, viz. to gar auto noein estin te kai einai. Heidegger rejects the
traditional interpretation of this maxim as "thinking and being are the same" on the
grounds that it leads to an (erroneous) endorsement of idealism. As he states, on the
conventional (metaphysical) view,
noein is understood as thinking, an activity of the subject. The thinking of the subject determines what
being is. Being is nothing other than the object of thinking, that which is thought. But since thinking
remains a subjective activity, and since thinking and being are supposed to be the same according to
Parminides, everything becomes subjective. Nothing is in itself. (pp.136-137)
Heidegger, by contrast, maintains that "receptive bringing-to-stand is meant in noein. It

is this apprehension that Parminides says to be the same as being." (p.138) Furthermore,
on his interpretation, to auto and te kai do not imply "empty indifference", that is,
"sameness in the sense of mere equivalence" (p.138); rather, sameness and unity refer
to "the belonging together of antogonisms. This is original oneness." (p.138) This
position is essentially identical to that which follows from Heidegger's interpretation of
the Heraclitean dictum, panta rhei, viz. the gathering of conflict: Consistent with his
interpretation of the Heraclitean relation between physis and logos, he holds that "being
and thinking in a contending sense are one, i.e. the same in the sense of belonging
together [emphasis added]." (p.138) For Heidegger,
Being means: to stand in the light, to appear, to enter into unconcealment. Where this happens, i.e.
where being prevails, apprehension prevails and happens with it; the two belong together.
Chapter 6 Poisis
Apprehension is the receptive bringing-to-stand of the intrinsically permanent which manifests itself
.. To [physis] belongs apprehension, which shares in its power. (p.139)
In chapter 1, it was argued that according to the tradition, thinking is the means by which
being is disclosed. This notion is expressed in the Cartesian maxim cogito ergo sum ("I
think therefore I am"). However, this egocentric position fails to take into consideration
the existential facticity underlying (or grounding) the capacity for formulating this
maxim, viz. to think, one must be (a thinking thing). According to Heidegger, "being
dominates, but because and insofar as it dominates and appears, appearing and with it
apprehension must also occur. But if man is to participate in this appearing and
apprehension, he must himself be, he must belong to being. But then the essence and the
mode of being-human can only be determined by the essence of being." (p.139)
Furthermore, "if appearing belongs to being as physis, then man as an essent must belong
to this appearing. Since being-human amid the essent as a whole is evidently a particular
mode of being, the particularity of being-human will grow from the particularity of its
belonging to being as dominant appearing. And since apprehension - accepting
apprehension of what shows itself - belongs to such appearing, it may be presumed that
this is precisely what determines the essence of being-human." (pp.139-140) The latter
statement is significant for (at least) three reasons: First, to the extent that man belongs
to appearing and the latter to Being as physis (section 6.5.7), it follows that the poisis
(coming-forth, becoming) of Dasein is physis. This is consistent with the assertion made
in section 6.5.4 to the effect that physis gives rise to the emergent gestalt of being-in-the-
world, viz. the non-reducible coupling of Dasein and World (section 6.5.3); Second,
since being-human is a mode of Being and being-an-artificer a mode of being-human
(section 6.6), it follows that poisis (coming-forth, bringing-forth) is not exhausted in
techn (that is, artificing). The implication is that there is (in Being) that which is beyond
artificiality (as artifactuality) and hence, artificiality can neither ground nor share identity
(as in isomorphism) with Being as such; Finally, for Heidegger, thought as apprehension
stands in opposition to being from out of being itself. As he states,
apprehension, as Parminides says, is not a faculty belonging to a man already defined; apprehension
is rather a process in which man first enters into history as a being, an essent, i.e. (in the literal sense)
comes into being. Apprehension is not a function that man has as an attribute, but rather the other way
around: apprehension is the happening that has man [emphasis added]." (p.141)
This is significant since in sections 6.5.3 and 6.5.4 it has been argued that the essence of
man is èxistence' (that is, ek-sistence or transcendence), viz. appreciation of the
ontological difference between beings and Being as such. Here Heidegger identifies the
essence of man with logos as apprehension. Thus, logos and ek-sistence must be the
`same' which, in turn, implies that logos and Sein (Being) are the `same'. This
interpretation is supported by Heidegger's poetic assertion, `language is the house of
Being', that in which Being `dwells' (section 6.5.2). Consequently, Heidegger is led to
interpret the Parminidean maxim as "a definition of the essence of man from out of the
essence of being itself" (p.144) such that "the maxim does not say: `Thinking and being
Chapter 6 Poisis
are the same'. It says: `There is a reciprocal bond between apprehension and being'."
(p.145) As he states, "legein and noein, to gather and to apprehend, are a need and an act
of violence against the overpowering [of Being as the emerging power], but at the same
time only and always for it." (p.176) Furthermore, "unconcealment [that is, aletheia] is
[the] heart and core, i.e. the dominant relation between physis and logos in the original
sense. The very essence of dominance is emerging-into-unconcealment [that is, physis].
But apprehension and gathering [that is, logos] govern the opening up of unconcealment
for the essent." (p.190)
At this point in the discussion, it is appropriate to briefly examine Heidegger's

understanding of the notion of truth. According to Kovacs (1990), Heidegger identifies
primary (originary, ontological) truth with
dislosedness, discoveredness; it is the coming forth (of beings) from the dark into the light, a
breaking-out from the enclosure and a breaking-into the disclosure. Truth is essentially historical and
relational. It is a progressing disclosure, a process of enlightening, and not an object of possession
once and for all. (p.98)
Significantly, he maintains that "truth is truth for and of There-being. Truth is a structure
(a function) of There-being as `There' (luminousity and disclosure). And because There-
being is finite, truth is temporal; there is no sense speaking of èternal truths'." (p.99)
According to Macquarrie ( 1973),
Heidegger keeps coming back to the Greek conception of truth as -82,4", literally, un-hiddenness.
Truth `happens', as it were, when concealments are stripped away and when things emerge into
openness. But this implies that truth is rooted in existence, in the Dasein, in `subjectivity' (though
Heidegger is careful to avoid this term of Kierkegaard). For the Dasein is the clearing in the opacity
of being, man is the place [that is, `clearing' or Da] where openness occurs, so that he is ìn the truth'
(or in the untruth of concealment) in virtue of the very fact that he ex-sists. (pp.138-139)
Furthermore, Kovacs maintains that "beings are true because they are discovered, but
There-being is true because it is disclosedness." (p.97) As he goes on to state,
There-being is a project; it can choose its own mode of `to-be'. Disclosedness as a mode of `to-be',
consequently, is the truth of existence (what There-being truly is). Truth is a mode of authenticity.
However, because There-being is fallen and can choose inauthenticity - that is, it can be lost in the
daily commerce with beings [and neglect the ontological difference] - it is also in the ùntruth'. To be
in the untruth means to cover up beings and to close off There-being itself. Truth belongs to the
comprehension of Being. In the same way that Being can be misinterpreted, so truth can be distorted.
The historical destiny of truth depends on the degree of the authenticity and on the degree of
inauthenticity of There-being's existence. (p.97)
This position is supported by Grimsley (1967) who holds that
Truth as the uncovering of hitherto concealed existents necessarily involves the idea of untruth,
because the emergence of a particular existent into openness is always accompanied by the obscuring
of the existents in their totality. To say of one existent that it ìs' is to lose sight of the totality of which
Chapter 6 Poisis
it forms part. Now since this totality is more fundamental than any particular unit (for the single
existent can only emerge against the background of the world), and since it is obscured by this
emergence, a particular `truth' would seem to be possible only on the basis of a pre-existent
concealment of truth as a whole, that is, on the basis of a pre-existent untruth, for `the concealment
is yet older than the letting-be itself'. (pp.84-85)
However, while Dasein is necessary for the unconcealment of Being and yet distinct
from the latter in that it is a being, it is not separate from Being as such since it partakes
of the latter. Furthermore, the necessity of Dasein with respect to the unconcealment of
Being is, in fact, a necessity of Being itself since Dasein is a sending-forth of, from, and
for Being as such with the latter in the poitic (coming-forth, becoming) modality of
physis. This position is supported by Jaspers (1971) who maintains that "the thinker's
reality is prior to his thought" (p.70) and, further, that this "reality appears to us as
historicity." (p.72) According to Sikka (1997), "the power of disclosure is not something
human standing apart from being but is itself made possible, and ruled over in its
structure, by the power and governing order of being. Thinking belongs to being." (p.55)
As she goes on to state, "the logos is .. dependent upon Dasein but only as a locus. Logic,
as language, the speaking (articulation) of being, appropriates Dasein and not the other
way around." (p.67) This position is consistent with that of Grimsley (1967) who
maintains that
the whole idea of truth as the adequation of the `representation' and the òbject' is itself possible only
on the assumption that the object has already revealed itself in some way. (p.83)
According to Kovacs (1990), for Heidegger,
the truth of an expression, of a judgement, is not the result of an assimilation of an object by the
intellect but the consequence of the discoverability of beings and of the discovering attitude of There-
being. The expression (assertion) that is true shows forth being as it is; it is a letting be seen of
being(s) in its (their) discoveredness. Truth, then, depends on discovering [that is, dis-covering or
unconcealment]. (p.96)
This position is supported by Macquarrie (1972) who maintains that "[Heidegger]

understands the relation of language to reality in terms of the making unhidden that
which which is talked about. Language is not a picture of reality, to be judged true if
there is a point-to-point correspondence between the picture and the fact it `represents'.
The locus of truth is not in the proposition but in the reality itself. Language lets what
is talked about stand out and be seen for what it is [emphasis added]." (p.147)
Consequently, secondary (derivative, ontical) truth as correspondence of an assertion to
a state of affairs is, for Heidegger, grounded in primary (or ontological) truth, that is, the
unconcealment of Being as such (Seyn) in the Being (Sein) of beings (Seiendes) through
the `disclosedness' of the Dasein. Thus, according to Heidegger (1959), primary truth is
in the being (reality) and only derivatively in the proposition. This position is supported
by Dreyfus (1991), who maintains that
Heidegger .. is no Platonist. The agreement of assertions with states of affairs requires that the states
Chapter 6 Poisis
of affairs be described or interpreted and requires the shared practices [which are dynamic and
historical as opposed to static and eternal] that make possible meaning and pointing out. Therefore
truth cannot be an abstract timeless relation of correspondence between propositions and facts.
(p.278)
However, he insists that "Heidegger is not a conventionalist either. The practices that
make possible agreement between assertions and states of affairs under some description
are not up to us - we are thrown into them. Moreover, what shows up depends on what
entities there in fact are. The truth is not subjective." (p.278) This brings Heidegger into
conflict with ontological-constructivists such as Maturana (Mingers,95) on the one hand,
and artifactual-constructivists such as Searle (1995) on the other, the latter of whom
argues that the being of socially-constructed (or ìnstitutional') facts - which are, thereby,
artifacts - is conventional. It is quite possible that Heidegger and Searle are both correct:
If truth is not a matter of convention (Heidegger) and yet artifacts are matters of
convention (Searle), then it would seem to follow that artifacts are neither true nor false,
in short, that it is meaningless to apply such notions to artifactuals. To the extent that
artifacts are products of artificer-interpreters (section 6.6), that, is Cartesian subjects
(productants) relating to objects (substrata) in the production of other objects (products),
Searle's position is valid; hence, the criticism of artificiality (as artifactuality) with
respect to truth and Being is upheld.
6.5.7. Being and Appearance
This study is concerned with evaluating the possibility of "strong" computationally

emergent artificiality or CEA (chapter 5). The concept of artificiality was briefly
introduced in chapter 1 and a detailed examination of the notion made in chapter 4.
Preliminarily in chapter 1 and again in section 6.3.3, an attempt was made at clarifying
the meaning of this concept by placing it in opposition to two others, viz. reality and
naturality. Proceeding on the basis of these oppositions, it is herein argued that the
(Kantian) epistemological distinction between artificiality-as-appearance (phenomenon)
and reality (noumenon) is existentially-grounded in the (Heideggerian) ontological
distinction between artificiality-as-artifactuality (techn) and naturality (physis). This
position can be encapsulated in the following maxim: noesis (Knowing as perceiving)
is grounded in poisis (Being as becoming). An appreciation of the grounding of the
epistemological in the ontological is critical for the present study because the debate over
the possibility of "strong" CEA - usually, over instances of CEA such as artificial
intelligence (AI) or artificial life (A-Life) - has traditionally been framed in epistemic
terms, specifically, in the attempt at establishing the truth of postulated isomorphisms
(behavioural, functional etc) between natural phenomena and their artifactual analogues.
On the conventional view, such isomorphisms prove correct the `match' between
(artificial and natural) phenomena, thereby raising artifactuals from the status of mere
simulations of naturals to emulations or realizations of such phenomena (chapter 4).
However, notwithstanding the tacit a priori assumption - which Kelly (1993), following
Whitehead, identifies as an instance of the existential `fallacy of misplaced concreteness'
Chapter 6 Poisis
- that such an isomorphism is possible, it is argued that this epistemic approach, viz.
deciding the truth or correctness of an implementation (or embodiment) relation between
naturality and artificiality226, is implicitly committed to a specific kind of truth, viz. the
correspondence theory. This is significant since, as stated in section 6.5.6, Heidegger
maintains that truth as correspondence is grounded in an antecedent kind of truth, viz.
originary or primal truth as disclosedness, unconcealment, aletheia. Given the (unitary)
relatedness of aletheia and physis (chapter 1), it is not a priori inconceivable that
modality of poisis (coming-forth, bringing-forth) impacts upon possibility for noesis:
If physis is a modality of poisis, there must be other modalities of poisis, thereby
lending support to a postulated poitic difference (section 6.6.4) between naturality and
artificiality. On this basis, the unity of aletheia-physis may be set in opposition to the
unity of aletheia-techn227 and, crucially, because these are unities and not mere
conjoinings - that is, because these concepts are, according to Heidegger, essentially-
related rather than merely contingently-connected - it follows that the poitic difference
affects the possibilities for aletheia, for unconcealment and hence, for noesis. If this
argument is valid, the question concerning "strong" CEA can be resolved ontologically
by appeal to the poitic difference between naturals and artifactuals. However, before this
argument can be developed further and because the debate over "strong" CEA (or its
phenomenal instances) has traditionally been framed in terms of the relation between
appearance and reality, it is necessary to briefly examine how the relation between Being
and appearance is understood in Heidegger as contrasted with its interpretation in the
metaphysical tradition, specifically, Plato and Kant.
it was in the Sophists and in Plato that appearance was declared to be mere appearance and thus
degraded. At the same time being, as idea, was exalted to a suprasensory realm. A chasm .. was
created between the merely apparent essent here below and real being somewhere on high. (p.106)
Crucially, for Plato, this ideal realm (of reality) is static (eternal, unchanging); the
physical (or material) realm, by contrast, is held to be dynamic (changing) and thereby
illusory or apparent. As Heidegger (1977d) states, "the `real', in the sense of what is
factual, now constitutes the opposite of that which does not stand firm as guaranteed and
which is represented as mere appearance or as something that is only believed to be so."
(p.162) Furthermore, according to Heidegger (1977c), "that the beingness of whatever
is, is defined for Plato as eidos [aspect, view] is the presupposition, destined far in
226
Encapsulated in this relation is the assumption that the artifactual is capable of alternatively realizing - that is,
instantiating in an alternative substrate - that which is essential in (and, thereby, definitive of) the natural.
227
Although aletheia-techn is derivative of (or grounded in) aletheia-physis, it remains, for Heidegger (1977a)
an authentic unitary relatedness because techn is itself an authentic mode of revealing (or unconcealment).
As he states, "techn is a mode of altheuein. It reveals whatever does not bring itself forth and does not yet
lie before us, whatever can look and turn out now one way and now another." (p.13)
Chapter 6 Poisis
advance and long ruling indirectly in concealment, for the world's having to become
picture." (p.131) Commencing with Plato, Being has been successively identified in the
(metaphysical) tradition with eidos, essence, idea and, finally, with representation
(`picture'). This historical progression in the interpretation of Being as such - which for
Heidegger is a `destining' from, of and for Being itself - is of decisive importance since,
as stated previously (in section 6.5.6), representation is re-presentation, that is, to make
present again that which was present aforetime. Given that the (metaphysical) tradition
interprets making-present ontically, that is, causally or productively, it follows that re-
presentation is equivalent to re-production or copying. This position is supported by
Heidegger (1971) who maintains that according to the tradition, "appearing is .. the
emergence of the copy [of the idea]." (p.184) Following Heidegger it might be argued
that on the view of traditional metaphysics, appearance is phenomenal replication (in the
strong sense of emulation or realization as opposed to the weak sense of simulation),
thereby lending support to functionalism, multiple-realizability and the possibility of
"strong" CEA. Identifying Being with the essence (or what-ness) of beings - and ignoring
the ontological difference between beings and Being as such (section 6.5.4) - allows the
former to be hypostatized (that is, rendered static) such that it can be multiply-
instantiated. This follows directly from the separation or decoupling of essence (form)
from existence (matter), a discontinuity which ultimately finds expression in the Kantian
duality of noumenon (reality) and phenomenon (appearance) mediated by the Cartesian
subject (or ego). According to Kant (and Plato), the triadic relation between appearance,
reality and the subject is static (eternal, unchanging)228 and grounded in a static concept
of Being (section 6.5.4). Given the problems associated with the latter229, it is necessary
to question concerning the Being (Sein) of appearance, specifically, of the necessity of
dualistic separation of appearance (phenomenon) from reality (noumenon).
On Heidegger's (1959) view, "at first sight the distinction seems clear. Being and
appearance means: the real in contradistinction to the unreal; the authentic over against
the inauthentic. The distinction implies an evaluation - the preference is given to being
.. Often the distinction between being and appearance is carried back to our first
distinction - being and becoming. The apparent is that which from time to time emerges
and vanishes, the ephemeral and unstable over against being as the permanent." (p.98)
However, as he goes on to state,
familiar and self-evident as the distinction is, we do not understand in what way a fundamental
separation occurs between precisely being and appearance. The very fact that it occurs suggests that
the two are related. Wherein does the bond consist ? (p.99)
Heidegger maintains that in order to answer this question "we must understand the
228
This does not, of course, entail that the elements (components, relata) of this relation are themselves static
although this is not ruled out on the Platonic-Kantian view.
229
Specifically, how stasis can give rise to dynamism or substance to process (Rescher,96) (Ali,98a).
Chapter 6 Poisis
hidden unity of being and appearance." (p.99) Crucially, he holds that "the essence of
appearance lies in the appearing. It is self-manifestation, self-representation, standing-
there, presence [as in presencing, enduring]." (p.100) Thus, appearance means appearing.
On this basis, he goes on to establish an intimate connection between Being as physis and
appearance, viz. "Phyein, self-sufficient emergence, is phainesthai, to flare up, to show
itself, to appear [that is, appearance as appearing]." (p.101) As he goes on to state, "for
the Greeks standing-in-itself [or physis] was nothing other than standing-there, standing-
in-the-light. Being means appearing. Appearing is not something subsequent that
happens to being. Appearing is the very essence of being [emphasis added]." (p.101)
Given that the essence of appearance lies in appearing and that the latter is the essence
of Being, it might be argued that Being and apearance are the same in the sense of
identical. However, Heidegger forestalls this interpretation in maintaining that "for the
Greeks appearing belonged to being, or more precisely .. the essence of being lay partly
in appearing." (p.103) On his view,
the essence of being is physis. Appearing is the power that emerges. Appearing makes manifest.
Already we know then that being, appearing, causes to emerge from concealment. Since the essent
[that is, a being] as such is, it places itself and stands in unconcealment, aletheia. (p.102)
As stated in chapter 1 and again in section 6.5.4, prior to its bifurcation into essence and
existence, Being as such (Seyn) was conceived by the pre-Socratic Greeks as aletheia-
physis, that is, the emerging power which brings itself forth into unconcealment as the
Being (Sein) of beings (Seiendes). According to Heidegger, there is, therefore, a primal
connection between Being as appearing (self-unconcealment) and primordial truth or
disclosure (section 6.5.6), viz.
the Greek essence of truth [more precisely, a-letheia or un-concealment] is possible only in one with
the Greek essence of being as physis. On the strength of the unique and essential relation between
physis and aletheia the Greeks would have said: The essent is true insofar as it is. The true as such
is essent. This means: The power that manifests itself stands in unconcealment. In showing itself, the
unconcealed as such comes to stand. [Primordial] truth as un-concealment is not an appendage to
being [emphasis added]. (p.102)
This point is highly significant since it implies that Being is Truth (and visa versa) and
thereby appears to lend support to the "strong" CEA thesis: In short, CEA exists; hence,
"strong" CEA must be true. However, this is a non sequitur since what the connection
between Being (as Physis) and Truth (as aletheia) does, in fact, establish is that beings
as beings are primordially true to the extent that they partake of Being as such. Given
the fact that Being is mutiply-moded (section 6.5.4) - of which the poitic modes physis
and techn are instances - and given the essential relatedness of Being and Truth, it
would appear to follow that the poitic difference (section 6.6.4) between naturality and
artificiality (as artifactuality) is paralleled in a distinction in the truths associated with
naturality and artificiality respectively; in short, their modes of coming-forth (or
bringing-forth) are distinct and hence, their truths are distinct. With respect to the
correspondence of one phenomenon (artificial) to another (natural), it must be
Chapter 6 Poisis
appreciated that this is a derivative truth relation which is grounded in primordial truth
as unconcealment or disclosure (section 6.5.6) and undermined by the pluralistic nature
of the latter as manifested in the two modes of poitic Being (naturality or physis and
artificiality or techn). This position is supported by Heidegger who maintains that
on the basis of the Greek interpretation of being as physis, and only on this basis, both truth in the
sense of unconcealment and appearance as a definite mode of emerging self-manifestation belong
necessarily to being. (p.109)
Thus, for Being as physis, appearance is truth and truth is appearance. However, it is
critical to appreciate with Heidegger that it is only on this mode of Being - that is, as
physis - that apearance and truth belong together (originally, primordially) with Being
in unitary relatedness, implying, thereby, that other modes of Being cannot sustain this
connection. Given that poisis (coming-forth, bringing-forth) has two modes, viz. physis
and techn, it follows that the latter does not support the relation between truth,
appearance and Being, thereby undermining the possibility of "strong" CEA. However,
as Heidegger goes on to state,
because being, physis, consists in appearing, in an offering of appearance and views, it stands,
essentially and hence necessarily and permanently, in the possibility of an appearance which precisely
covers over and conceals what the essent in truth, i.e. in unconcealment, is. (p.104)
In short, the essent (a being), as an appearance, conceals its (originary, incipient)

grounding in Being as appearance (that is, appearing). Consequently, the primordial truth
of the essent, its Being (Sein) as an unconcealment of Being as such (Seyn), is concealed.
Crucially, the ontological difference between beings and Being as such (section 6.5.4)
is obscured and appearance (a being) is taken for appearing, which means, for Being as
such. However, while it is indeed possible that appearance can be mistaken for Being as
such, it is incorrect to infer on that basis - following the processualists (chapter 2) - that
Being is thereby identical to appearing (becoming). According to Heidegger, Being as
such is the existential ground of both process (dynamism) and substance (stasis); hence,
"appearance, just as much as appearing, belongs to the essent." (p.104) However, this
formulation is itself misleading since, for Heidegger, static (or eternal) appearance is a
hypostatization of stable appearance (presencing, enduring, persisting), itself an aspect
of Being which follows from the self-limiting of dynamic appearing. Since Being is
Temporality230 there is no such thing as the static231.
230
According to Heidegger (1949b), "in presencing there prevails, in an unthought and concealed manner,
presence and duration - there prevails time. Being as such is thus unconcealed in terms of time. Thus time
points to unconcealedness, i.e., to the truth of Being." (p.286) Again, "Being is not something other than time:
`Time' is a preliminary name for the truth of Being, and this truth is what prevails as essential in Being and thus
is Being itself." (p.285)
231
Hence, the identification of stasis as hypostatization.
Chapter 6 Poisis
Crucially, Heidegger maintains that
appearance belongs to being itself as appearing. Being as appearance is no less a power than being
as unconcealment. Appearance takes place in and with the essent itself. But appearance not only
makes the essent as such appear as what it actually is not; it not only cloaks itself as appearance
insofar as it shows itself as being. Because appearance thus essentially distorts itself in its cloaking
and dissembling, we rightly say that appearance deceives. This deception lies in the appearance itself.
Only because appearance itself deceives can it deceive man and lead him into illusion [emphasis
added]. (pp.108-109)
It is worthwhile emphasizing that the essent (a being) appears às what it is not' when it
is regarded by the Cartesian subject (or ego) - not the authentic Dasein who appreciates
the ontological difference between beings and Being as such (section 6.5.4) - as separate
or autonomous relative to Being. More specifically, ìllusion' follows from holding
(erroneously) that the essence (or what-ness) of a being can be detached from its
incipient poisis (coming-forth, bringing-forth); or, alternatively, `deception' follows
from the identification of Being with essence, and the decoupling of essence from
existence (viewed historically). The latter position is implicitly supported by Macquarrie
(1973) who interprets existence in dynamic terms as follows:
to èxist' or èx-sist' (Latin: ex-sistere) meant originally to `stand out' or èmerge'. Thus the verb
probably had a more active feel about it than it has now. To exist was to emerge or stand out from the
background as something really there. Putting it more philosophically, to exist is to stand out from
nothing. Nowadays, however, the notion of existence has become altogether more passive. To èxist'
is more likely to be understood as `lying around somewhere' than as `standing out somewhere'
Yet Heidegger (1959) maintains that "existasthai, èxistence', `to exist', meant for the
Greeks precisely nonbeing [that is, to depart from generated permanence]. The
thoughtless habit of using the words èxistence' and èxist' as designations for being is
one more indication of our estrangement both from being and from a radical, forceful,
and definite exegesis of being." (p.64) It must be appreciated, however, that the
association of existence with non-being in Greek thought follows from the identification
of Being with ousia (static permanence) as opposed to physis (dynamic enduring). For
Heidegger,
being means [physis, that is] emerging appearing, to issue forth from concealment - [consequently,]
concealment, its origin in concealment, belongs to it essentially. This origin lies in the essence of
being, of the manifest as such. Being inclines back toward it, both in great silence and mystery and
in banal distortion and occultation. (p.114)
Furthermore, "the essence of appearing includes coming-on-the-scene and withdrawing,

hither and thither in the truly demonstrative, indicative sense. Being [Seyn] is thus
dispersed among the manifold essents [as the Sein of Seiendes]. These display themselves
as the momentary and close-at-hand." (p.102) Significantly, the connection between
Being and emerging appearing points to a link between Being and becoming (section
Chapter 6 Poisis
6.5.8) on the one hand, and, as stated at the beginning of this section, between becoming
and appearance, on the other. Heidegger holds that
what is situated in becoming is no longer nothing and it is not yet that which it is destined to become.
In view of this `no longer and not yet', becoming is shot through with nonbeing. Yet it is not pure
nothing, but no longer this and not yet that and as such perpetually other. Consequently it looks now
this way and now that. It presents an intrinsically unstable aspect. Thus seen, becoming is an
appearance of being. (p.114)
From the above statement, and as argued previously, it might be inferred that being is
identical to appearance. However, Heidegger implicitly contests this assertion in stating
that
in the initial disclosure of the being of the essent, it was .. necessary to oppose becoming as well as
appearance to being. On the other hand, becoming as èmerging' belongs to physis. If we take them
both in the Greek sense - becoming as coming-into-presence and going-out of it; being as emerging,
appearing presence; nonbeing as absence - then the reciprocal relation between emerging and
declining is appearing, being itself. Just as becoming is the appearance of being, so appearance as
appearing is a becoming of being. (pp.114-115)
If appearance is denoted by ", Being by $ and becoming by (, the relations between the
three concepts can be formalized as follows: (/"($) v "/(($). These relations describe
the ways in which Being is similar to appearance and becoming; however, the ways in
which Being is opposed to appearance and becoming must also be described. This is
because Heidegger follows Heraclitus in asserting that Being stands in unitary relation
to that with which it is in opposition or conflict (polemos). Thus,
Being in the sense of physis is the power that emerges. As contrasted with becoming, it is
permanence, permanent presence. Contrasted with appearance, it is appearing, manifest presence.
(p.125)
It is important to appreciate that the above relations hold for Being as physis. In techn,
by contrast, the relation between Being and appearance is mediated by a subject
(productant) standing in ontically-poitic (causal, productive) relation to objects
(substratum and product). This mediation severs the original (given) unity of Being and
appearance (that is, aletheia-physis) by polarizing it into the duality of essence and
existence, form and matter, product and substratum. Hence, it is maintained that Being
and appearance constitute a unity under physis (autopoisis, naturality) and a duality
under techn (allopoisis, artificiality).
At this point in the discussion, it is appropriate to briefly consider how Heidegger's

ontological interpretation of appearance, reality (Being) and the relation between them
contrasts with Kant's epistemological interpretation. Heidegger (1971) maintains that
since Plato, the (metaphysical) tradition has interpreted appearance and reality on what
is now referred to as the Kantian view, dualistically postulating a `higher' realm of static
subsisting forms or noumena (reality) standing in relation to a `lower' realm of dynamic
Chapter 6 Poisis
existing material beings or phenomena (appearance); furthermore, this static relation

between noumena and phenomena is held to be mediated by a Cartesian subject (or
ego)232. Heidegger rejects this ontology on the grounds that it disregards the coming-to-
be (becoming) of the essent (thing, being) which is a movement from possibility -
identifiable233 with Being (Seyn) - to actuality - which he identifies with beings
(Seiendes). On his view, Being as such (Seyn) and beings (Seiendes) are existentially-
related in that the former manifests (unconceals) in the latter as the Being (Sein) of
beings, this manifesting being mediated by the Dasein; hence, there is a distinction (that
is, ontological difference) but no discontinuity (in the sense of separation) between
beings and Being as such234. As stated in section 6.5.4, Heidegger holds phenomena
(appearance) and noumena (reality) to be identical to the extent that the appearance of
a being (phenomenon) coincides with what that being is in itself (noumenon). For
Heidegger, both reality and appearance are real - that is, partake of Being - because the
former denotes possibility while the latter denotes actuality and both are modalities of
Being, viz. concealed and unconcealed presence (that is, presencing) respectively: On his
view, there is no substance or substrate (noumenon) underlying phenomena, no `vertical'
relation between two separate realms. Rather, appearance and reality are `horizontally' -
which means temporally (dynamically) - related as `foreground' (beings, Seinedes) and
`background' (Being, Sein)235. The difference between the Kantian (or epistemological)
and Heideggerian (or ontological) intepretations of the appearance-reality relation are
summarized by Macquarrie (1973) as follows:
whereas the Kantian philosophy sought to link the phenomenon as appearance to a reality that never
appears, the task of phenomenology is to show the structual interrelatedness of the single moments
or aspects that constitute the phenomenon. The `being' of the phenomenon is more than any particular
apearance of it, and it is the business of `phenomenological ontology' to reveal to us what this being
is. (p.25)
232
Crucially, this formulation does not entail that a phenomenon be (ontically) static in itself, only that it be
(ontologically) static as the phenomenon. On this basis, it is possible to identify functional processes as
phenomena and apply the Kantian relation between a process (phenomenon, appearance) and its underlying
substrate (noumenon, reality) accordingly. This move is supported by the fact that processes are beings and
hence, can be identified with respect to (dynamic) essence.
233
Identifiability should not to be taken to imply logical identity since Being as such (Seyn) is not exhausted by
the terms of modal logic.
234
As stated previously at the start of section 6.5, this constitutes the essence of Heidegger's solution to the
metaphysical problem of the relation between the One and the Many.
235
It is crucial to appreciate this `foreground-background' or actuality-possibility duality is itself temporally-
embedded within possibility as such - which means Being as such (Seyn): According to Heidegger, Being as
such discloses itself as a historical sequence of incipient èpochs', each of which is characterized by a
movement between a `foreground' and `background', both of which are interpreted relative to the hermeneutic
practices associated with the Dasein dwelling within that epoch.
Chapter 6 Poisis
According to Grimsley (1967), "`phenomenon' is not used in the Kantian sense as

àppearance' which is contrasted with the `noumenon' or `thing-in-itself' but as a means
of indicating `what shows or manifests itself'." (p.41) Furthermore,
to say that the `being' of a phenomenon is `hidden' [that is, concealed] does not mean that there is
another reality or substance lying concealed behind the appearances but merely that we ourselves
have failed to uncover what in fact is revealed. (p.42)
The Kantian separation of appearance (or phenomenon) from reality (noumenon) may
be re-stated, in Platonic-Aristotelian terms, as the separation of matter (existence) from
form (essence). This separation is of critical significance because it supports the
possibility of functionalism and multiple-realizability which are necessary conditions for
computationalism and "strong" CEA (chapter 4). If the separation of appearance
(existence) from reality (essence) supports computationalism, it would seem to follow
that the identification of phenomena with noumena negates it. However, postulating a
simple identity relation as a means by which to undermine computationalism (and
thereby "strong" CEA) fails to address the question of the staticity (that is, stasis or non-
historicity) of the Kantian position. As stated previously, the Heideggerian solution is to
re-state the problem in terms of the distinction between beings and Being: Although the
former are not identical to the latter, there is an essential historical connection between
the two, viz. beings as finite, temporal disclosures (unconcealments) of Being. As
Grimsley (1967) states, "the phenomenon of Being [that is, its unconcealment as
appearances] is not .. Being itself but is based on and related to Being." (p.96) Whereas
for Kant (and Plato), there are two domains (phenomenal and noumenal), for Heidegger,
there is a single domain (Being as such or Seyn) which is only ever partially unconcealed
in time (as beings or Seiendes) via the activity of a particular being (Dasein)236. The
implications of the difference between Kant and Heidegger with respect to the
appearance-reality relation are as follows: For Kant, a complete picture of the
phenomenal world is possible; however, the noumenal world - although static - remains
epistemologically inaccessible. For Heidegger, a complete picture of the world of beings
(Seiendes) is possible relative to a specific interpretation (or hermeneutic) - that is, an
existential modality or Being (Sein) - `given' by Being as such (Seyn); however, Being
as such (Seyn) - because only historically-disclosable - remains ontologically
inaccessible. In short, Being cannot be encapsulated in a (metaphysical) framework
because it is essentially open, whereas Kantian noumena are essentially closed (chapter
3).
It is crucial to appreciate that the conventional (that is, Kantian) formulation of the
apearance-reality problem does not consider modality of poisis (coming-forth, bringing-
forth, becoming) as significant since it is framed in essentialist (that is, static, ahistorical,
236
More precisely, Being as such (Seyn) unconceals as the Being (Sein) of beings (Seiendes) under the
hermeneutic or historical interpretation of Being (Sein) associated with the Dasein (`clearing') of a particular
(incipient) epoch.
Chapter 6 Poisis
atemporal) terms. In asking whether one phenomenon is a realization of another, it is

assumed that there is a static essence (functional, behavioural or otherwise) that
encapsulates what-it-is-to-be that phenomenon. Furthermore, and more importantly, the
separation of essence from existence enables the former to be realized multiply in
instances (kinds) of the latter, thereby lending support to functionalism and the
possibility of "strong" CEA. However, the duality of essence (essentia, idea) and
existence (existentia, energeia) obscures the fundamental unity of Being as such
(aletheia-physis) and the historical-relatedness of Being and beings, a relatedness which
takes the form of a poitic (coming-forth, bringing-forth) `movement' from Being to
beings in one of two modes, viz. physis and techn. According to Heidegger (1959),
physis is the emerging power, the standing-there-in-itself, stability. Idea, appearance as what is seen,
is a determination of the stable insofar and only insofar as it encounters vision. But physis as
emerging power is by the same token an appearing. Except that the appearing is ambiguous.
Appearing means first: that which gathers itself, which brings-itself-to-stand in its togetherness and
so stands. But second it means: that which, already standing-there, presents a front, a surface, offers
an appearance to be looked at. (p.182)
Thus, for Heidegger Being cannot be separated into the duality of essence and existence
in anything other than a temporally-aspectual (or historical) sense; the `static' (`so
stands') and `dynamic' (`brings-itself-to-stand') aspects of Being are precisely that, viz.
historically-related aspects of the unitary Being (Sein) of beings (Seiendes). This point
is extremely important: In identifying Being as dual-aspect and such that its aspects
manifest (unconceal) historically, the possibility of separating essence from existence -
and hence, for multiple-realizability, functionalism and, ultimately, "strong" CEA - is
undermined. This follows from the fact that the way (mode) in which a being (Seiende)
comes-to-be is constitutive of the Being (Sein) of that being because Being (Sein) is
historical. Given that there are, broadly, two ways to come-to-be, that is, two modalities
of poisis, viz. physis and techn (section 6.6), and that the Being of a being means - at
least partially - the becoming associated with that being, it follows that two beings with
different modes of poisis (coming-forth, bringing-forth) differ with respect to their
Being and this means, with respect to what and how they àre'. Significantly, Heidegger
maintains that
from the standpoint of space, the difference between appearing [as in physis] and appearing [as in
idea] is this: appearing in the first and authentic sense as bringing-itself-to-stand in togetherness
involves space which it first conquers; as it stands there, it creates space for itself; it produces space
and everything pertaining to it; it is not copied. Appearing in the second sense emerges from an
already finished space [that is, from a given being]; it is situated in the rigid measures of this space,
and we see it by looking toward it. The vision makes the thing. Now this vision becomes decisive,
instead of the thing itself. Appearing in the second sense merely circumscribes and measures the
space that has already been opened [emphasis added]. (p.183)
It might be argued that the appearing associated with physis involves the incipient
Chapter 6 Poisis
òpening' of a potentiality space237 - in terms of dynamical systems theory (chapter 2),

the specification of a state space - via the self-closure (self-limiting, self-`cutting') of
Being as such (Seyn) while the appearing associated with idea refers to the actualization
of potentiality - viz. traversal of trajectories (that is, state-sequences) within the opened
state space. Significantly, Heidegger associates the first kind of appearing with (1)
authenticity and (2) originality (in the sense of historical singularity). Consequently, it
might be argued that although the artificial (as the artifactual) can indeed simulate (that
is, `copy') naturality, it is this very fact, viz. capacity for simulation or replication, which
undermines the capacity of artificiality for origination: While it is indeed the case that
techn-Enframing (or artificing) of the artifactual involves opening a space (via
`cutting'), it must be appreciated that techn, as a modality of poisis, is historically-
posterior to physis238; thus, the (artifactual) space opened by techn is relative to the
primordial space opened by physis239.
Crucially, the artifactual space thereby opened is - simultaneously - closed to further

opening (origination, incipience, emergence): This follows from the fact that techn-
Enframing involves the specification, bounding and determination of Being from
without, that is, exosystemically or allopoitically, by an artificer externally relating to
the artifact as a subject (productant) relating to an object (product). Thus, the artifactual
is incapable of the appearing that is physis since, as an artifact, its being is given to it by
the òther' (rather than by `self')240. Significantly, according to Heidegger,
from the standpoint of the idea, appearing now takes on a new meaning. What appears - the
phenomenon - is no longer physis, the emerging power, nor is the self-manifestation of the
appearance; no, appearing is now the emergence of the copy. Since the copy never equals its
prototype, what appears is mere appearance, actually an illusion, a deficiency. Now the on [that is,
essent or being] becomes distinct from the phainomenon [as is the case in Kant]. And this
development brings with it still another vital consequence. Because the actual repository of being is
the idea and this is the prototype, all disclosure of being must aim at assimilation to the model,
accomodation to the idea. The truth of physis, aletheia as the unconcealment that is the essence of
237
In section 6.4.2.1, potentiality spaces were identified with the `Design Spaces' or genetic landscapes associated
with neo-Darwinian evolution.
238
As Heidegger (1959) states, "only the power that emerges of itself [that is, physis] can, as presence, come to
define itself as appearance and ready-made subject [or, in modern terms, as object]." (p.186)
239
For this reason, it is necessary to distinguish potentiality from possibility: The former is defined relative to
actuality. (In this sense, Aristotle is correct in holding the actual to be prior to the potential); the latter, by
contrast, is the ground of both actuality and potentiality. Potentiality refers to a space, that is, an existential
modality or Being (Sein); possibility refers to spatiality as such, that is, Being as such (Seyn). In terms of
dynamical systems theory, potentiality is state-space while possibility is the incipient ground of state-space as
state-space, that is, of state-space-ness.
240
It is important to note that the issue of internal - in the sense of ontically subjective or experiential - relations
has not been addressed in this context since it constitutes a separate problem (chapter 7).
Chapter 6 Poisis
the emerging power, now becomes homoisis and mimsis, assimilation and accomodation,
orientation by..., it becomes a correctness of vision. (pp.184-185)
Thus, the Kantian appearance-reality duality is grounded in the Heideggerian appearing-

appearance unity, itself grounded in the unitary relatedness of Being as such (Seyn) and
beings (Seiendes) through Being (Sein), and it is this Heideggerian move from duality
to unity which undermines the possibility of multiple-realizability, functionalism and
"strong" CEA.
6.5.8. Being and Becoming
In this final section on Being and its conceptual opposites, the relation between Being
and becoming is briefly examined. At this point in the presentation, the meaning of
ontological becoming and its relation to Being should be apparent, if only implicitly241;
however, it is necessary to clarify the meaning of this concept prior to investigating a
related notion, viz. ontological poisis (coming-forth, bringing-forth), in section 6.6.
As stated previously (section 6.5.2), Heidegger (1959) holds that "over against becoming
being is permanence [that is, ousia]". (p.202) From this statement, it follows that
becoming must refer to change. In section 6.4.1.2, becoming was defined (following
Aristotle) in terms of a movement from potency (or potentiality) to actuality and from
one substance to another. Aristotle upholds the maxim ex nihilo nihil fit, viz. nothing
comes from nothing; hence, on his view, coming-to-be (and passing-away) denotes a
movement between a not-being (substance) and a being (substance). This interpretation
of the concept of becoming is supported by Mercer (1917) who maintains that
we evidently cannot apply [the concept of causation] to existence, as such, but only to change. For
if there is to be change, there must be something which undergoes the change; change cannot itself
produce that which changes. That would be equivalent to Nothing producing Being. (p.119)
Clearly, Aristotle (and Mercer) situate the notion of becoming squarely within an ontical
context: It is beings that change, that become (or come-to-be) other beings; Being itself -
the underlying substratum of change - is held to be static (unchanging). However, this
position is problematic: If Being is static then it cannot give rise to beings242 and yet this
must be possible since it is an existential fact that there are beings and the ìs-ness' of
beings - that is, the fact that beings àre' - points beyond beings to Being itself (section
6.5.4); hence, neither the becoming of beings nor the Being of beings nor Being as such
241
A preliminary investigation of the relation between being and becoming was made in section 6.5.7 in
connection with an examination of the relations between becoming, appearance and reality.
242
This follows from the fact that `giving rise to' denotes movement - although not necessarily causation which
is a movement between beings (section 6.4.1.3) - and hence, dynamism.
Chapter 6 Poisis
can be ignored. Yet if the latter is interpreted statically, it appears to be impossible to

resolve the conflict between the stasis of Being and the change of beings given the
grounding of the latter in the former; in short, how can stasis give rise to that which
changes ? According to Stern (1979), Nietzsche rejected the notion of Being on the
grounds that it undermined (that is, arrested) "the eternal process of becoming."
However, he was forced to hold that "life exploits even this mendacious doctrine of
Being in order to make the idea of an eternal flux endurable." (p.111) This position is
supported by Rescher (1996) who holds that processuality - that is, the persistence of
process as such - necessitates stability, viz. everything changes except change itself or,
alternatively, change is unchanging (stable). Significantly, Heidegger (1959) maintains
that Nietzsche's thought is classical (metaphysical) to the extent that the latter interprets
Being in statical terms, contrasting it with dynamic becoming. On his view, the
opposition and distinction between being and becoming in conventional metaphysics
comes directly to mind from the standpoint of a conception of being that has congealed [that is,
hypostatized] into the self-evident. What becomes is not yet. What is need no longer become. What
ìs', the essent, has left all becoming behind it if indeed it ever became or could become. What ìs' in
the authentic sense also resists every onsurge of becoming. (p.95)
In contesting this (metaphysical) position, Heidegger attempts to establish that Being as

such (Seyn) encompasses the dynamism associated with becoming in that it refers to `that
which comes to stand (dynamic, processual aspect) and remains standing (static,
substantial aspect)', viz. presencing as the self-limiting unconcealment of the emerging
power of Being in beings (Seiendes)243. As he states,
erect standing-there, coming up [coming to stand] and enduring [remaining standing] is what the
Greeks understood by being. Yet what thus comes up and becomes intrinsically stable encounters,
freely and spontaneously, the necessity of its limit, peras. This limit is not something that comes to
the essent [that is, a being] from outside. Still less is it a deficiency in the sense of a harmful
restriction. No, the hold that governs itself from out of the limit, the having-itself wherein the
enduring holds itself, is the being of the essent; it is what first makes the essent into an essent as
differentiated from a nonessent. Coming to stand accordingly means: to achieve a limit for itself, to
limit itself. Consequently, a fundamental characteristic of the essent is to telos, which means not aim
or purpose but end. Here ènd' is not meant in a negative sense, as though there were something about
it that did not continue, that failed or ceased. End is ending in the sense of fulfillment. Limit and end
are that wherewith the essent begins to be .. [Furthermore,] that which places itself in its limit,
completing it, and so stands, has form, morph. Form as the Greeks understood it derives its essence
from an emerging placing-itself-in-the-limit. (p.60)
For Sikka (1997), "the steadiness of being consists in the steadiness of Anwesung, of the
process of coming to presence. This process is itself not bounded. Its unbounded,
infinite, nature consists, rather, precisely in refusing any final fixity. But determinate
243
For Heidegger (1959), the ìs' of ontical actuality and the `becoming' associated with ontical potentiality are
emergently-grounded in the primordial ontological unity of aletheia-physis, viz. the emerging power of Being
as such (Seyn) which comes-forth into unconcealment - or presences - as the Being (Sein) of beings.
Chapter 6 Poisis
realization - and all realization is necessarily determinate - requires limitation. The

actual form that comes to presence .. involves the `choosing' or picking out of a finite set
of possibilities from the infinite set that belongs to being as ground, to what has
sometimes been described as `the infinite sea of substance'." (p.94) The link between
Being as physis (presencing) and the notions of telos (end) and morph (form) will be
investigated further in section 6.6.2. At this point in the discussion, it is important to
merely appreciate with Sikka (1997) that
Being as presencing is not merely the being present of the while, not mere persistence of the while,
but the process of coming to be and passing away, presenc-ing. The necessity, unity, uniqueness, and
initiality of being itself lie in the way these characteristics may be thought in application to presencing
as the arising, enduring and departing of beings .. While present beings come to be, linger, and pass
away, presencing has a certain steadiness. It does not itself come to be or pass away and is, in this
sense, always and at all times the same. (p.92)
In this sense, and as Heidegger (1959) states, "Heraclitus, to whom is ascribed the
doctrine of becoming as diametrically opposed to Parminides' doctrine of being, says the
same as Parminides." (p.97) Thus, what does not change (Parminides) is change
(Heraclitus). This position has a number of significant implications. For example, Miller
(1993) holds that
there ìs' nothing new, there ìs' nothing but Being, whether explicately conceived (beings) or
implicately conceived (Being). (p.18)
Given that Being is infinite possibility - as contrasted with the finite potentiality of
beings - it necessarily encompasses all beings - static (substantial) and dynamic
(processual) - and the relational `movements' between them244 (that is, actualizations of
potentiality). There cannot be anything (that is, any being) new to Being as such (Seyn)
since to assert as much would be to reify Being into a being and set the new in opposition
to it. This move is erroneous to the extent that the new must itself partake of Being as
the new and hence, cannot transcend Being245. However, it does not immediately follow
thereby that emergence is a merely epistemological phenomenon (chapter 3). As stated
in section 6.5.4, the structure of Being is a temporal (historical) unfolding; however,
contrary to Miller, it is not an unfolding of that which is already enfolded as in Bohm's
(1980) implicate order philosophy (section 6.4.2.2) since Being does not refer to the
totality of beings - that is, beings-as-a-whole - in their concealment. As Heidegger
(1949b) states, "metaphysics never answers the question concerning the truth of Being,
for it never asks this question. Metaphysics does not ask this question because it thinks
Being only by representing beings as beings. It means beings as a whole, although it
244
Such relations themselves partaking of Being as such (Seyn) in their own way or Being (Sein).
245
As stated at the beginning of section 6.5.1, all oppositions to Being (for example, becoming, appearance, truth)
are oppositions as beings and hence, partake of Being as such.
Chapter 6 Poisis
speaks of Being. It names Being and means beings as beings [emphasis added]." (p.281)
Unfolding - more precisely, presencing - is what Being as such (Seyn) is in itself: There
is no prior enfolded if by the latter is understood a static (that is, eternal) order awaiting
unconcealment since the order of beings (and thereby Being) is historical (open,
contingent); hence, what is concealed (enfolded) is not another order (implicate or
hidden as opposed to explicate or revealed) but the possibility for order, that is,
orderedness as such. Furthermore, this historical emergence of beings occurs from and
for Being as such (Seyn) via the `site' or `clearing' it opens up within itself, viz. Dasein
(section 6.5.3). From the perspective of Dasein, Being as such continues to manifest
(unconceal) novelty via its disclosure (presencing) in beings; in short, the emergence of
new beings takes place at that place (`site' or Da) within Being reserved for this
happening. Dasein òccupies' the (existential) space between beings and Being as such
whose statical essence is dynamism (flux, temporality). As Miller states, "Being opens
up the space between beings and between Being and beings and places us into this open
space." (p.6) However, from the same perspective (of Dasein) and as stated previously,
Being as such remains itself - it does not stand in opposition to the new - since the Being
of emerging beings (and of emergence itself) is not a being. Being is, therefore, the
àdvancing edge' of openness and hence, the `same' as the new.
In the preceding discussion, it has been argued that Being is not to be interpreted
statically, in opposition to dynamic becoming; that Being and becoming are, in fact, a
relational unity; that Being has both static (more precisely, stably enduring) and dynamic
aspects. This latter point is crucial because Heidegger also emphatically maintains that
Being is not to be interpreted in processist (as against substantialist) terms. As stated
previously, Dreyfus (1991) maintains that
Heidegger must have been aware of this danger [of interpreting Being processually], since at the point
where he says being is not an entity, he writes in the margin of his copy of Being and Time, `No! One
cannot make sense of being with the help of these sorts of concepts.' To think of being in terms of
concepts like entity, or process, or event is equally misleading. (p.11)
However, in Basic Concepts (1993b), Heidegger appeals to a fragment that has come
down from Anaximander in order to elucidate the meaning of Being. Given that
Anaximander (along with Thales, Heraclitus and Anaximines) is viewed as a philosopher
of process within the (metaphysical) tradition, some interpreters such as Palmer (1996)
have been led to interpret Heidegger's concept of Being processually. Yet, this reading
of Heidegger and his appeal to Anaximander and Heraclitus is problematic since to
interpret the thought of these thinkers processually is - according to Heidegger - incorrect
(in the sense of derivative, non-originary) and because such an interpretation is
metaphysical. Significantly, a process is finite in essence although its manifestation may
be infinite246; however, the Anaximanderian apeiron which Heidegger identifies with
246
Consider the irrational number pi: while the algorithm (program or processual essence) for computing
successive digits in the expansion of this number is finite, the execution of this algorithm (processual existence)
Chapter 6 Poisis
Being as such (Seyn) is a "repelling of limits" (section 6.5.2), that is, a dynamical infinite
which self-limits in and as (finite) beings (Seiendes). This self-limiting is the source of
the stability (that is, the enduring presencing) of that which comes-to-be through self-
limiting, viz. beings. This unlimited self-limiting clearly cannot be a process since the
latter as a being is finite (bounded); hence, Heidegger's assertion that Being as such
(Seyn) is neither substance nor process but the ontological ground of substance and
process as such, viz. substantiality and processuality.
In concluding this section, it is worthwhile briefly re-examining a critical statement from

section 6.5.7, viz. Becoming is the appearance of Being and appearance (as appearing)
is a becoming of Being. According to Heidegger, becoming denotes a coming-into-
presence and a going-out-of-it. Yet this becoming is not something separate from Being
as presencing; rather, becoming denotes the presencing of the unstable, of that which has
yet to reach its end (telos) in and as beings (which endure). Thus, Being is that power
which permanently presences throughout becoming (poisis); hence, the latter has both
ontical and ontological interpretations: On the former, becoming denotes the ontical
movement between beings which assumes one of two modes, viz. physis (understood
following Aristotle) or techn; on the latter, becoming denotes the ontological movement
between Being and beings which is simultaneously an unconcealing and a concealing,
that is, physis (understood following Heraclitus). These distinctions form the basis of the
discussion in the following section (6.6) which is concerned with clarifying (1) the
meaning of ontological poisis and (2) the poitic difference between naturals and
artificials (as artifactuals).
6.6. Ontological Poisis

In section 6.4 the ontical concept of poisis (as a relation between beings) was examined
and a detailed investigation of Heidegger's phenomenology of Being was presented in
section 6.5. In this section it will be shown that this concept and the latter
philosophy provide the basis upon which to establish the meaning of ontological poisis
as a relation between beings and Being. First, the distinction between ontical and
ontological poisis is briefly described and two modes associated with the latter, viz.
physis (autopoisis) and techn (allopoisis), are identified. Second, a Heideggerian
interpretation of each modality is presented in an attempt to clarify the non-causal,
incipiently-grounding nature of ontological poisis relative to ontical poisis. Third, the
distinction between the two modes of ontological poisis, viz. the poitic difference, is
defined. Finally, Heidegger's ontological concept of poisis is compared and contrasted
with Maturana and Varela's (ontical) concept of autopoiesis.
Prior to considering the above, it is worthwhile briefly re-establishing the validity and
necessity of ontological questioning concerning poisis (becoming, coming-forth,
is potentially infinite.
Chapter 6 Poisis
bringing-forth) by way of a response to the following statement of Dreyfus (1991), viz.
[Heidegger] is not interested in when and how a human organism gets existence as its way of being
or in what specific understanding of being it gets. Such questions, about specific cases not general
structures, Heidegger calls existentiell. (p.23)
Is it necessarily the case that all questioning concerning "origins" is of an existentiell

(particular, non-essential) nature ? This might appear to be the case given Heidegger's
rejection of ontical (or causal) poisis as an approach to the question concerning Being
(Kovacs,90). However, it can be shown that in his later post-Kehre writings, the question
of origins resurfaces and in the context of ontological questioning concerning Being: For
example, in Basic Concepts (1993b), Heidegger examines an Anaximanderian fragment
in order to disclose the incipient (originative, creative) essence of Being as such (Seyn)
(section 6.6.2); and in the essay The Question Concerning Technology (1977a), the
question of origins is addressed in the context of an explication of the relations between
physis, techn and Enframing (Gestellen) (section 6.6.3). Hence, it is incorrect to
maintain that Heidegger is uninterested as to the when and how of Dasein's coming-to-be
(or becoming) since the post-Kehre thought - which focuses on Being as such (Seyn) as
opposed to Dasein - is (at least partially) concerned with the appearing of Dasein from,
by and for Being. Furthermore, there remains the question concerning the relationality
of the existential modalities (section 6.5.4): Given Heidegger's rejection of Platonism
and the relation between the ontical and the ontological, it is necessary to clarify the way
in which such structures emerge (unconceal) into presence. In section 6.5.3, the coming
into being of ontological world (as mediated by the Dasein) is referred to as a
hermeneutic becoming, in contrast to the causal becoming (section 6.4.1.2) of ontical
beings. However, it is important to appreciate that this dichotomy does not exhaust the
possibilities for the coming-forth (poisis) of Being since incipience is reducible neither
to causation nor to hermeneutics.
6.6.1. From Ontical to Ontological Poisis
Waterhouse (1981) maintains that "the basic concepts employed determine the
possibilities of progress in a science, and each special science delimits an area of entities
as its field. But if the Being of those entities is itself obscure, then the basic concepts
cannot be properly clarified." (p.58) This study is concerned with evaluating the
sufficiency of computationalism as the metaphysical basis of a unifying framework of
emergent artificiality. In order to determine whether or not "strong" CEA (chapter 5) is
possible, it is necessary to question concerning CEA (section 6.3), that is, to clarify the
ontological Being (Sein) of computation, emergence and artificiality in the context of the
unified concept of CEA. Preparatory investigations of computation, emergence and
artificiality were made in chapters 2, 3 and 4 respectively; however, in section 6.4.3, the
relation between computation and ontical poisis (becoming) was examined and
problems associated with ontological emergence in relation to ontical poisis were
defined in section 6.4.4. In this section it will be shown that the essence (Being) of
Chapter 6 Poisis
artificiality (as artifactuality) lies in poisis as techn in contrast to the essence of

naturality which lies in poisis as physis. Clearly, the question concerning the
(ontological) Being of CEA must be addressed in terms of poisis. Given the possibility
of distinguishing naturality from artificiality on the basis of difference in poisis, and
given the unitary relation of computation, emergence and artificiality (as artifactuality)
in CEA under poisis, it would appear to follow that "strong" CEA is impossible.
However, before this can be established, it is necessary to clarify the meaning of the
ontological concept of poisis.
In section 6.4, the concept of poisis was examined from an ontical perspective, that is,
as a relation between beings. This relation was identified as essentially productive (that
is, genetically-causal) and grounded in the maxim ex nihilo nihil fit, viz. nothing comes
from nothing or, alternatively, something comes from something247. It was shown that
irrespective of the type or kind of ontical poisis considered - evolution (section 6.4.2.1),
self-organization (section 6.4.2.2), creation (section 6.4.2.3) or making (section 6.4.2.4) -
ontical poisis is, ultimately, problematic and for the following reasons: Firstly, a failure
to appreciate the ontological difference, that is, the distinction between beings and the
Being of beings (section 6.5.4). This distinction is critical because in ontical poisis, the
concept of causation plays an ontologically primitive (or categorial) role in explaining
how there come-to-be beings. In order to prevent the possibility of vicious, infinite
regress in causal explanation either (i) a First (or Necessary) cause - which undermines
the transitivity of the causal principle - or (ii) circular causality - which is paradoxical
since self-referential - must be postulated. The problem with both these approaches is
that they fail to address the question concerning the Being of causation, that is, the
grounding of the latter in Being as such: To the extent that causation is a (genetic)
relation between beings, it is itself a (relational) being and hence, partakes of Being. For
this reason, causation (or production) and ontical poisis cannot be ontologically
primitive; secondly, causation is an externalistic relation and hence, ontologically-
objective. Consequently, the category problem (chapter 7) associated with the emergence
of ontological subjectivity from an ontologically-objective substrate arises. Ontical
poisis, a genetically-causal relation, cannot address this problem of ontological
emergence because the externalism of causation entails a movement from ontological
objectivity to ontological objectivity consistent with ex nihilo nihil fit. The need to
explain the emergence of ontological subjectivity necessitates adopting some form of
creatio ex nihilo (or creation from nothing); yet, interpreting this maxim in anything
other than relativistic terms (sections 6.4.2.3 and 6.4.4) is rejected on the grounds that
nothing (nihilo) must be static since empty (void). Crucially, as shown in section 6.5.5,
this latter assumption is highly questionable: If dynamism (movement, functionality) is
a thing (being) then nothing cannot be dynamic else it would `contain' a being and hence,
not be a true nothing. However, if valid, this argument must also apply to nothing as
stasis (rest, non-functionality) since rest (stasis) and movement (dynamism) are
247
Ex nihilo nihil fit can, therefore, be alternatively rendered as ex ens ens fit.
Chapter 6 Poisis
derivative of moved-ness (section 6.6.2) and hence, stand in unitary relation to each
other. Hence, the a priori interpretation of nothing in statical terms to the exclusion of
its dynamical aspects is arbitrary and problematic. This point is further supported by the
ontological difference (section 6.5.4), viz. Being is not a being (thing) and hence, must -
in some sense - be the `same' as nothing. To the extent that Being can be shown to have
both static and dynamic aspects (section 6.5.8), it follows that nothing must also have
static and dynamic aspects, viz. the nothing-ing of the nothing (section 6.5.5). Thus, by
embracing the ontological difference, it becomes possible to resolve the problem of
ontological emergence: Being is not a being; therefore, Being is nothing. Being grounds
beings; hence, nothing grounds beings which means creatio ex nihilo as a movement
between nothing (or Being) and beings. However, it is critical to appreciate that this
movement must be non-causal since causation is a relation between beings. What, then,
is the essence of this non-causal movement between beings and Being, of ontological
poisis? Following Heidegger's methodological precedent in relation to the question
concerning Being (section 6.5.2), viz. from beings to Being and thereby to an
appreciation of the ontological difference (section 6.5.4), the approach adopted herein
is to `transcend' from becomings (ways or modes of poisis) to becoming (poisis as
such) and thereby to an appreciation of the poitic difference (section 6.6.4) between
modes of becoming, specifically, naturality and artificiality (as artifactuality).
According to Lovitt (1977), "for the Greeks the coming into the `present' out of the `not-
present' was poisis." (p.xxiv) It should be noted at the outset that this identification of
the essence of poisis (becoming) with presencing is significant since presencing is the
meaning of physis and hence, of Being (section 6.5). From this, it follows that becoming
and Being must be the `same' in some sense248. This is of critical importance because if
there is a poitic difference (section 6.6.4) between naturals and artifactuals, this
difference in becoming has implications for the Being of these beings and, thereby, for
the possibility of "strong" CEA. For Heidegger (1939), "making, poisis, is one kind of
production, whereas `growing' (the going back into itself and emerging out of itself),
physis, is another. Here `to pro-duce' cannot mean `to make' but rather: to [incipiently]
place something into the unhiddenness of its appearance; to let something become
present; presencing." (p.221) Consistent with this position, Heidegger (1967)
distinguishes ta physica, that is, things insofar as they originate and come-forth from
themselves (naturality) from ta poioumena, that is, things insofar as they are produced
by the human hand and stand-forth as such (artificiality). Heidegger (1973) reaffirms this
distinction in maintaining that bringing-forth "can occur in the manner of physis
(allowing something to emerge of itself) or in the manner of poiesis (to produce and
represent something)." (p.5) According to Ihde (1979), "poisis is both making and
bringing forth, but bringing forth is presencing and thus is a praxical truth." (p.108) On
this basis, it is possible to distinguish an ontical (or productive) and an ontological (or
248
In section 6.5.8, this `sameness' was identified as unitary relatedness, viz. becoming as the dynamic aspect of
Being.
Chapter 6 Poisis
existential) poisis; however, interpreting bringing-forth and presencing in praxical

terms has been shown to be problematic (section 6.5.3). According to Heidegger (1977a),
and following the Greeks (specifically, Aristotle), poisis has two modalities, viz. techn
- which is correctly interpreted as other-bringing-forth (or allopoisis) - and physis - or
self-bringing-forth (that is, coming-forth or autopoisis) - respectively249. As he states,
not only handcraft manufacture, not only artistic and poetical bringing into appearance and concrete
imagery [that is, techn], is a bringing-forth, poisis. Physis also, the arising of something from out
of itself, is a bringing-forth, poisis. Physis is indeed poisis in the highest sense. For what presences
by means of physis has the bursting open belonging to bringing-forth, e.g. the bursting of a blossom
into bloom, in itself (en heauti). In contrast, what is brought forth by the artisan or the artist, e.g. the
silver chalice, has the bursting open belonging to bringing-forth not in itself, but in another (en alli),
in the craftsman or artist. (pp.10-11)
Although originary techn is readily associated with praxis, the link between physis and
praxis is much less clear, particularly given Heidegger's (1993b) identification of physis
with incipience (section 6.6.2). Thus, physis and techn are ways (or modes) of poisis
(coming-forth, bringing-forth) and techn as making or production is one kind of poisis
as opposed to the latter being one kind of production. This renders intelligible the latter
part of Heidegger's (1939) statement identifying production - now replaced by poisis -
with presencing. In this study, it is Heidegger's (1977a) later post-Kehre interpretation
of the grounding of physis and techn in poisis that has been followed. Physis and
techn correspond to natural and artificial (as artifactual) modes of bringing-forth
respectively. As will be shown in what follows, physis can be interpreted as natural-
emergence (section 6.6.2) and techn as artifactual-production (section 6.6.3). While the
Greeks - as interpreted by Heidegger - conceived only this opposition, four permutations
are in fact possible as shown in Table 6.6 below:
NATURAL ARTIFACTUAL
EMERGENCE (1) physis (autopoisis) (4)
PRODUCTION (3) (2) techn (allopoisis)
Table 6.6 Emergence-Production and Natural-Artificial Permutations.
It is maintained herein that (1) gives rise to (2) which, in turn, supports (3) and (4);
further, that the latter two permutations involve morphization (chapter 1), that is,
conflation of the modes of Being: (3) signifies mechanomorphization of nature (that is,
interpreting nature in causal or productive terms) while (4) indicates
anthropomorphization of machines (that is, interpreting machines in existential or
249
Lovitt (1977) maintains that "`bringing-forth' was manifested first of all in physis, that presencing wherein the
bursting-forth arose from within the thing itself. Techn was also a form of this bringing-forth, but one in which
the bursting-forth lay not in the thing itself but in another." (p.xxiv)
Chapter 6 Poisis
hermeneutic terms).
Crucially, Heidegger (1977d) identifies coming-forth and bringing-forth - that is, poisis
- with work. As he states, "to work is to bring hither and forth, whether something brings
itself forth hither into presencing of itself [physis] or whether the bringing hither and
forth of something is accomplished by man [techn]." However, it is important to
appreciate that "the fundamental characteristic of working and work does not lie in
efficere and effectus, but lies rather in this: that something comes to stand and to lie in
unconcealment." (p.160) Thus, the essence (that is, ontological Being) of poisis does
not lie in efficient (that is, genetic) causation (or production) as is held to be the case on
the ontical view of metaphysics (section 6.4); rather, it lies in Being as presencing, viz.
originary250 physis as incipient emergence. Thus, while Heidegger (1977a) does not deny
the manifestation of Aristotelian causality in the `bursting-forth' that is poisis - whether
it be physis (self-coming-forth or autopoisis) or techn (other-bringing-forth or
allopoisis)251 - he does contest the assertion that causality is ontologically primitive.
This is entailed by his questioning concerning the essence (Being) of bringing-forth as
such, a questioning which is not answerable in terms of causation since the latter is an
ontical relation between beings, but rather in terms of incipient (that is, existential)
movement - more specifically, concealment (lthia) and unconcealment (althia) -
between beings and Being as such. As he asks,
how does bringing-forth happen, be it in nature or in handwork and art ? What is the bringing-forth
in which the fourfold way of occasioning [that is, causation] plays ? Occasioning has to do with the
presencing of that which at any time comes to appearance in bringing-forth. Bringing-forth brings
hither out of concealment forth into unconcealment. Bringing-forth comes to pass only insofar as
something concealed comes into unconcealment. This coming rests and moves freely within what we
call revealing. (p.11)
According to Heidegger (1929), "what is peculiar to the first discovery of the `four
grounds' [that is, causes] is that it does not yet distinguish in principle between
transcendental grounds and specifically ontic causes. The transcendental grounds appear
merely as the `more universal' in relation to the ontic. The originary character of the
transcendental grounds and their specific character of ground remain covered over
beneath the formal characterization of `first' and `highest' beginnings." (p.131) During
this pre-Kehre period of his thinking, Heidegger identifies the transcendental ground of
presencing with that being for which Being (presencing) is an issue, viz. Dasein,
250
As will be seen in section 6.6.2, originary (pre-Socratic) physis or poisis must be distinguished from derivative
(post-Socratic) physis or autopoisis.
251
As he states, "the modes of occasioning, the four are at play, then, within bringing-forth. Through bringing-
forth, the growing things of nature as well as whatever is completed through the crafts and the arts come at any
given time to their appearance." (p.11)
Chapter 6 Poisis
specifically, Dasein as ek-sistent (standing-out as the `there', `site' or `clearing' of Being)

and ek-static. As shown in section 6.5.3, ek-stasis points to the fact - discovered through
the existential (that is, phenomenological) analytic - that the structure of Dasein is
correctly characterized as Care (or concern) which is itself grounded in temporality. As
he states,
establishing, taking up a basis, and legitimation each in their own way spring forth from a care for
steadfastness and subsistence, a care that in turn is itself possible only as temporality. [Hence,] the
essence of ground is the transcendental springing forth of grounding, strewn threefold into projection
of world, absorption within beings, and ontological grounding of beings. (p.132)
It follows thereby that causality is grounded in hermeneutic-existentiality. However, in

his later post-Kehre thinking, Heidegger relativizes this transcendental anthropocentric
ground in relation to the absolute transcendental ground, viz. Being as such (Seyn); this
move is necessary because as a being, Dasein clearly partakes of Being and hence,
cannot play the role of self-sufficient ground (section 6.5.3). Thus, transcending
causation to hermeneutical Being (Sein) does not correctly - in the sense of completely -
clarify the distinction between ontical and ontological poisis. Following Heidegger
(1959), it is maintained that, for this purpose it is necessary to consider "what is
essentially the same in physis and techn." (p.16) The implication is that there is a need
to transcend the two modes of ontological poisis to their unitary ground, viz. poisis as
such: Although physis and techn are indeed two modes of ontological poisis, it is
crucial to appreciate that they delimit the possibilities for ontological poisis (coming-
forth, bringing-forth) associated with beings (Seiendes) and not Being as such (Seyn).
Analogous to the way in which Being (Sein) is always the Being (Sein) of beings
(Seiendes), physis (autopoisis) and techn (allopoisis) are always the becomings
(poisis) - or coming-forths, bringing-forths - of beings; that this is indeed the case, viz.
that the poisis associated with physis and techn is that associated with beings, follows
from the fact that the self-other distinction is a distinction which is only meaningful in
the context of a plurality wherein concepts (such as self and other) have their opposites
(other and self). However, as stated previously (section 6.5), Being as such (Seyn) has
no other and hence, no self; it is beyond (that is, transcendent with respect to such
dualities). Thus, Being cannot be identified with physis as autopoisis (and certainly not
with allopoisis). As will be seen in section 6.6.2, Heidegger's solution is to move
forward from a post-Socratic (specifically, Aristotelian) concept of physis as autopoisis
to an earlier pre-Socratic (specifically, Heraclitean-Anaximanderian) concept of physis
as poisis as such.
6.6.2. Physis
In chapter 1, it was maintained - following Collingwood (1945) - that for the Ionian
Greeks, the question What is nature ? is equivalent to What are things made of ? which,
in turn, is equivalent to What is the original, underlying substance which underlies all
the change of the natural world ? There are (at least) two points to note in this regard:
Chapter 6 Poisis
Firstly, in each of these questions Being is spoken - What is nature, What are things
made of, What is the original, underlying substance which underlies all the change of the
natural world - and yet the essence (Being) of Being as such (Seyn) remains
unquestioned. (That the Ionians - on Collingwood's interpretation of them - should have
reduced the question of nature (Being) to that of an underlying substance or substrate (a
being) indicates their failure to appreciate the ontological difference between beings and
Being as such.); second, and more importantly in the context of the present discussion,
if Heidegger (1959) (1993b) is correct this intepretation of pre-Socratic questioning -
which culminates in a question about substances - is a projection of modern philosophy
onto Greek thought. On his view, the pre-Socratics (principally Anaximander and
Heraclitus) conceived Being as physis, interpreting the latter in terms of presencing-forth
into unconcealment. It is crucial to appreciate that presencing has both static and
dynamic aspects252 (section 6.5.8). It is interesting to note that a vestige of this pre-
Socratic unitary conception of physis is retained by Aristotle in opposition to Plato who
interprets physis in terms of an ontological duality of substance (stasis, Being) and
process (change, becoming): According to Heidegger (1939), Aristotelian "physis is ..
the being-on-the-way of a self-placing thing toward itself as what is to be pro-duced, and
this in such a way that the self-placing is itself wholly of a kind with the self-placing
thing to be pro-duced [emphasis added]." (p.223) From this it clearly follows that for
both Aristotle and Heidegger, there is no discontinuity between the becoming (process)
and the Being (substance) of a being (section 6.5.8). This point is of critical significance
in the context of this study since it entails that apparently-identical beings - that is,
beings presenting an identical appearance (statical form) - are differentiable (that is,
distinguishable) on the basis of their appearing (dynamical forming) which means in
their Being (Sein). Preparatory to any further discussion of the pre-Socratic concept of
physis in relation to the question concerning ontological poisis (coming-forth, bringing-
forth), it is necessary to briefly examine Aristotle's later interpretation of this notion.
This is because it is in reaction to Aristotle's (metaphysical) concept of physis that
Heidegger goes back to the pre-Socratics in order to go forward to a post-metaphysical
interpretation of physis grounded in an appreciation of the ontological difference between
beings and Being as such (section 6.5.4).
In order to really appreciate the distinction between the pre- and post-Socratic
(specifically, Aristotelian) concepts of physis as interpreted by Heidegger, it is necessary
to briefly examine the latter's position with regard to the relation of physics to
metaphysics in Aristotle. While physics is clearly concerned with the study of beings, it
might be thought that metaphysics as a `going beyond' physics transcends beings to their
ontological ground, viz. Being as such. According to Heidegger (1939), however, "in
general it makes little sense to say that the Physics precedes the Metaphysics, because
metaphysics is just as much `physics' as physics is `metaphysics'." (p.185) This follows
252
Hence, the possibility of reconciling the positions of Heraclitus and Parminides (Heidegger,59) traditionally
(that is, metaphysically) interpreted as processualism and substantialism respectively.
Chapter 6 Poisis
from the fact that according to Heidegger (1949b), "metaphysics thinks beings as beings"
(p.277) and is, thereby, concerned with the ontical to the exclusion of the ontological as
ontological. For Heidegger (1939), "metaphysics is that knowledge wherein Western
historical humanity preserves the truth of its relations to beings as a whole and the truth
about those beings themselves. In a quite essential sense, metaphysics is `physics', i.e.,
knowledge of physis (epistem physis)." (p.185) Heidegger (1949b) goes on to assert that
"the truth of Being may .. be called the ground in which metaphysics, as the root of the
tree of philosophy, is kept and from which it is nourished." Yet, "metaphysics, insofar
as it always represents only beings as beings, does not recall being itself. Philosophy
does not gather itself upon its ground. It always leaves its ground - leaves it by means
of metaphysics. And yet it never escapes its ground." (p.278) From these statements, it
appears that Aristotle's concept of poisis (becoming, coming-forth, bring-forth) must
be ontical since it is metaphysical and hence, defined in terms of relations between
beings.
According to Angeles (1981), and as stated previously (section 6.6.1), Aristotle

distinguishes two kinds of poisis, viz. physis - that is, self-coming-forth or autopoisis
- and techn - that is, other-coming-forth or allopoisis:
1. That which is not made by humans is called PHYSIS, `nature', in contrast to TECHNE, which refers
to all things made by humans. 2. Nature is a teleological system and makes nothing without a purpose
in two senses: (a) natural objects serve purposes other than their own purposes which interrelate as
part of larger purposive schemes, and (b) there exists in the universe an overall pattern or order
(purpose or design) that is being imitated throughout nature. 3. The cause (principle, law, source) of
all change (motion, movement). An understanding of nature entails an understanding of the
characteristics and kinds of motion. 4. The innate, immanent impulse for activity in all things (in
contrast with TECHNE, which is a transcendent or external impulse for activity). This includes the
material in which and through which this impulse (active form) expresses itself.
Clearly, on the basis of the above statement, Aristotle's interpretation of poisis

(becoming) must be viewed as ontical and for the following two reasons: Firstly, it is
defined in terms of causation which is a relation between beings (section 6.4.1.3);
secondly, physis and techn refer to self-causation and other-causation respectively. To
the extent that the self-other distinction is real, a plurality (at least a duality) must exist.
But a plurality (or duality) of what ? As stated previously (section 6.6.1), Being as such
(Seyn) has no other and hence, no self; consequently, the self-other (physis-techn)
distinction must hold for beings. Consistent with (3), Heidegger (1939) maintains that
"Aristotle explicitly emphasizes what he perceives to be decisive for the projection of the
essence of physis, namely, kinesis, the state of movedness. And therefore the key issue
in the question about `physics' becomes one of defining the essence of movement."
(p.186) According to this position, "physei-beings are in the state of movedness. But
physis itself is the arch, the origin and ordering of movedness. From this we may
readily conclude that the character of physis as origin and ordering will be adequately
determined only when we achieve an essential insight into that for which physis is the
origin and over which it is the ordering power: kinesis." (p.207) Hence, for Aristotle, the
Chapter 6 Poisis
essence of Being (physis) is, of necessity, determined relative to beings thereby

supporting Heidegger's contention that metaphysics (for Aristotle) is concerned with
beings qua beings to the exclusion of the question concerning the meaning and truth of
Being as such (Seyn). This position is supported by his assertion that "the being of physis
and physis as being remain unprovable because physis does not need a proof, for
wherever a physei-being stands in the open, physis has already shown itself and stands
in view." (p.201) On this basis, Heidegger, following Aristotle, identifies physis as
autopoisis which is, in fact, equivalent to self-organization (section 6.4.2.2). As he
states,
a physei-being, in itself, from itself and unto itself, is such an origin and ordering of the movedness
of the moving being it is: moved of and by itself and never incidentally. Thus the characteristic of
standing of and by itself must be accorded in a special way to physei-beings. (p.207)
Consistent with this position, Heidegger maintains that the essence of Being as physis lies
in enduring presence, that is, stability. On his view, "`the stable' means two things. On
the one hand, it means whatever, of and by itself, stands on its own, that which stands
`there'; and at the same time `the stable' means the enduring, the lasting." (p.188) Thus,
"physis is ousia, beingness - that which characterizes a being as such; in a word: being."
(p.199) Crucially, "the decisive principle that guides Aristotle's interpretation of physis
declares that physis must be understood as ousia, as a kind and mode of presencing
[specifically, of being-present of and by itself, presencing]." On this basis, he concludes
that "it is now a question of understanding movedness as a manner and mode of being,
i.e., of presencing." (p.200) For example, "physis is the origin and ordering (arch) of
the movedness of something that moves of itself." (p.203) Hence, according to
Heidegger, "for the Greeks movement as a mode of being has the character of emerging
into presencing." (p.191) Furthermore, "movedness means the essence from which both
movement and rest are determined." (p.216) This latter point is extremely important
since to the extent that Being can be identified with physis, physis with movedness, and
the latter as the unitary essence of both motion (dynamism) and rest (stasis), it follows
that Being can be identified as having both static and dynamic aspects (section 6.5.8).
This is, in turn, of critical significance with respect to the question concerning the
possibility of ontological creatio ex nihilo (creation from nothing): Since Being and
nothing are, in some sense, the `same' (section 6.5.5) and because the former has both
static and dynamic aspects, so does the latter. Thus, nothing (Being) can be creative and
it is this creativity which allows for the possibility of ontological emergence (chapter 3
and section 6.4.4) and a solution to the category problem (chapter 7).
It is appropriate at this point in the discussion to consider other ways - apart from
movedness - in which physis is understood by Aristotle. According to Heidegger (1939),
hyle (matter) and morph (form) are, for Aristotle, ways of understanding the essence of
physis and such that "physis, spoken of in [these] two ways, is not a being but a manner
of being." (p.215) On his view, "hyle is the appropriate orderable, that which, like flesh
and bones, belongs to a being that has in itself the origin and ordering of its movedness.
Chapter 6 Poisis
But only in being placed into the appearance is a being what and how it is in any given
case." (p.214) Morph, by contrast, is "the act of standing in and placing itself into the
appearance." (p.211) Crucially, "we find what is physis-like only where we come upon
a placing into the appearance; i.e., only where there is morph. Thus morph constitutes
the essence of physis or at least co-constitutes it." (p.212) However, he goes on to state
that
by translating morph as placing into the appearance, we mean to express initially two things that are
of equal importance to the sense of the Greek term but that are thoroughly lacking in our word `form'.
First, placing into the appearance is a mode of presencing, ousia. Morph is not an ontic property
present in matter, but a way of being. Second, `placing into the appearance' is movedness, kinesis,
which `moment' is radically lacking in the concept of form. (p.211)
Thus, for Aristotle, interpreted following Heidegger, form is essentially dynamic.

Furthermore,
the appearance and the placing into the appearance must not be taken Platonically as standing apart
unto themselves, but as the being (Sein) in which an individual being stands at any given moment -
for example, this person here. To be sure, this individual is from hyle and morph, but precisely for
this reason it is a being and not a way of being - not physis, as are morph and hyle in their
togetherness. (p.215)
According to Heidegger (1939), "as the placing into the appearance, morph surpasses
the orderable (hyle) insofar as morph is the presencing of the appropriateness of that
which is appropriate, and consequently, in terms of presencing, is more original."
Crucially, he goes on to state that "morph as placing into the appearance is only now
explicitly grasped as genesis." (p.220) Hence, the link between form (morph) and
incipience (arch). Furthermore,
in genesis as self-placing, production is entirely the presencing of the appearance itself without the
importation of outside help - whereas such outside help is what characterizes all `making'. Whatever
produces itself, i.e., places itself into its appearance, needs no fabrication. (p.222)
It should be apparent at this stage in the presentation that the Aristotelian concept of
poisis as physis (self-becoming, self-coming-forth, self-bringing-forth), while having
ontological foundations in (i) kinesis (movedness), (ii) arch (origin and ordering), (iii)
hyle (orderability), (iv) genesis (appearing), (v) morph (appearance) not to mention
ousia (stable presencing), is clearly ontical, that is, concerned with the Being (Sein) of
beings (Seiendes) and such that the question of the meaning of Being as such (Seyn) -
and hence, poisis as such - is ignored. As stated previously, for Aristotle, poisis
(becoming) is always poisis of a being, irrespective of whether it assumes the form of
physis (autopoisis) or techn (allopoisis). According to Rosch (1994), "that a thing
arises from itself [autopoisis], from something other [allopoisis], from both and from
neither, exhaust all the possibilities of how any one event can be related to another."
(p.62) However, these four possibilities for poisis (coming-forth, bringing-forth) are
only ontically exhaustive, that is, exhaustive with respect to the possibilities for relations
Chapter 6 Poisis
between events (beings, essents): Since this analytical framework has been defined in the
context of relations between beings, it is - by definition - ontical and hence, fails to
address the possibilities arising from consideration of the ontological difference between
beings and Being (section 6.5.4); in short, Rosch's scheme is not ontologically exhaustive
because the possible relations between beings (events, essents) and Being as such are not
considered. However, such relations and the possibilities arising thereby are extremely
significant: For example, Rosch's nothing (`from neither') is equivalent to ontical void
since it is defined in terms of relations between events. Crucially, this void is static and
hence, non-generative. Ontological nothingness (relative) and ontological Nothing
(absolute), by contrast, transcendently ground this ontical nothing and, moreover, can be
shown to have both static and dynamic aspects (section 6.5.5). Although non-causal, they
are capable of incipient-emergence, that is, giving-forth beings and it is on this basis that
the problem of ontological emergence can be addressed. It appears, therefore, that
Aristotelian poisis - as an ontical (causal, productive) relation between beings - must
be grounded in a transcendent, ontological concept of poisis. As stated previously, this
argument is supported by the need to ground the self-other distinction in that which is
both unitary and prior to it, viz. Being as such (Seyn). In this connection, it is interesting
to note that according to Mercer (1917),
Spinoza [described the] ultimate Being as Causa sui - the Self-caused. But this is clearly illegitimate,
for it implies Becoming; and not only so, but Becoming out of Nothing. (p.119)
This position is problematic in an ontological context since it follows from the

ontological difference between beings and Being (section 6.5.4) that Being and Nothing
must, in some sense, be the `same' (section 6.5.5). Furthermore, Being (and hence,
Nothing) is the ground of becoming and stands in unitary (that is, essential) relation with
the latter (section 6.5.8). While Mercer is correct in asserting that "the ultimate Ground
of the cosmic process simply exists" (p.119), he fails to adequately question concerning
the Being of this ground253 in postulating it as simply existent: As stated previously
(section 6.5.8), this position is problematic (and ultimately untenable) because if
becoming is wholly remote from (or òther' to) Being, the latter must be conceived
statically, in which case there arises the problem of explaining how the dynamic (beings)
can emerge from the static (Being). The Heideggerian solution is to identify Being
(Ground) as presencing in which both static (rather, stably-enduring) and dynamic
(emergent) aspects manifest in the self-limiting (telos)254 of unlimited (or in-finite) Being
in and as limited (or finite) beings. However, Mercer is correct in maintaining that Being
as the ùltimate Ground' is not self-caused because it is prior to the self-other
253
In a footnote to the essay Introduction to `What is Metaphysics?' (1949), Heidegger asserts the following:
"Being and ground: the Same." (p.278)
254
According to Heidegger (1939), the presencing of beings involves end [telos] by which is meant "not the result
of stopping the movement, but .. the beginning of movedness as the ingathering and storing up of movement."
(p.217)
Chapter 6 Poisis
distinction255 which is a necessary condition for causation as a relation between beings.

For this reason, the notion of self-causation is also problematic in an ontical context in
which self-causing (or autopoietic) beings such as living systems (Maturana,80) are held
to have emerged because there then arises the question concerning that within (and from)
which emergence occurs, viz. a substrate: To the extent that this substrate is - posterior
to the emergence of the autopoietic system - òther' to the emergent `self', it appears that
ontical autopoiesis must, in fact, be incipiently-grounded in allopoiesis (or other-
causation). However, this allopoietic òther' is itself emergent with the autopoietic `self';
hence, allopoiesis cannot be the ground of autopoiesis256. It follows, thereby, that ontical
autopoiesis and allopoiesis must be grounded in in that which is prior to both, viz.
ontological poisis of a radically non-Aristotelian (and hence, non-metaphysical) kind.
Alternatively, since Aristotelian physis and techn refer to ways (or modes) of Being
(Sein) associated with beings (Seiendes), they must be grounded in that which is prior
to both, viz. Being as such (Seyn). Significantly, this point is appreciated by Heidegger
(1939) himself. His solution, which involves a radical re-thinking of the meaning of
physis via recourse to pre-Socratic (and, therefore, pre-Aristotelian) thought, provides
a basis upon which to establish the meaning of poisis as such. As he states,
the physis that Aristotle conceptualized can be only a late deivative of originary physis. And a much
weaker, much harder-to-hear echo of the original physis that was projected as the being of beings, is
still left for us when we speak of the `nature' of things, the nature of the `state', and the `nature' of the
human being, by which we do not mean the natural `foundations' (thought of as physical, chemical,
or biological) but rather the pure and simple being and essence of those beings. (p.229)
Thus, even in the pre-Kehre period, Heidegger was preparing the way for an
interpretation of Being as physis which transcended the metaphysical interpretation of
the concept presented by Aristotle257. In the post-Kehre essay Introduction to `What is
Metaphysics?' (1949b), the break with the earlier Aristotelian reflection on physis is
completed, viz.
in whatever manner beings are interpreted - whether as spirit, after the fashion of spiritualism; or as
matter and force, after the fashion of materialism [and its modern variant, computationalism]; or as
becoming and life; or as representation, will, substance, subject, or energeia; or as the eternal
recurrence of the same - every time, beings as beings appear in the light of Being [emphasis added].
255
However, Being continues to be referred to as a self from ìts' perspective - which means from the perspective
that is given to it - because from the perspective of that being which can raise the question concerning Being,
viz. Dasein, Being remains the òther'; this follows from the fact that although Dasein is from, for, by and
within Being as such (Seyn), it is not identical with the latter.
256
This result is highly significant since it implies that artificing (techn) cannot give rise to an artificiality which
is isomorphic with naturality (physis).
257
This fact supports the contention that Heidegger's pre- and post-Kehre phases of thought constitute aspects of
a single project, viz. the question concerning the meaning and truth of Being.
Chapter 6 Poisis
(p.278)
Further indications as to the direction Heidegger's post-Kehre thinking on physis as

poisis was to take are provided in the pre-Kehre work, An Introduction to Metaphysics
(1959). For example, Heidegger maintains - consistent with the Aristotelian (or ontical)
interpretation of physis as autopoisis - that physis denotes "self-blossoming emergence
(e.g. the blossoming of a rose), opening up, unfolding, that which manifests itself in such
folding and perseveres and endures in it; in short, the realm of things that emerge and
linger on." (p.14) On this basis, Mingers (1995) asserts that the Heideggerian notion of
physis (poisis en heauti or autopoisis) is identical to the concept of autopoiesis (self-
organization or self-production) defined by Maturana and Varela (sections 6.4.2.2 and
6.4.2.4). However, this identification is problematic since for Heidegger, physis is not
a natural process whereas autopoiesis refers to the (processual) òrganization of the
living'. As Heidegger states,
physis, the realm of that which arises is not synonymous with .. phenomena, which today we regard
as part of `nature'. This opening up and inward-jutting-beyond-itself must not be taken as a process
among other processes that we observe in the realm of the essent. Physis is being itself [that is, Being
as such], by virtue of which essents come and remain observable. (p.14)
Hence, and as will be seen in what follows, pre-Kehre Heideggerian physis as autopoisis
is grounded in post-Kehre Heideggerian physis as poisis258; furthermore, physis as
poisis also grounds allopoisis (that is, poisis en alli or techn), viz. "physis originally
encompassed heaven as well as earth, the stone as well as the plant, the animal as well
as man, and it encompassed human history as a work of men and the gods; and ultimately
and first of all, it meant the gods themselves as subordinated to destiny [emphasis
added]." (p.14) On Heidegger's view,
physis means the emerging and arising, the spontaneous unfolding that lingers. In this power rest and
motion are opened out of original unity. This power is the overpowering presence that is not yet
mastered in thought, wherein that which is present manifests itself as an essent. But this power first
issues from concealment, i.e., in Greek: altheia (unconcealment) when the power accomplishes itself
as a world [emphasis added]. (p.61)
Hence, the Being (Sein) of beings (Seinendes) and the becoming (poisis) of becomings
(autopoisis and allopoisis) are grounded in Being as such (Seyn), that is, physis or
poisis as such. Crucially, "the realm of being as such and as a whole is physis - i.e. its
essence and character are defined as that which emerges and endures [emphasis added]."
(p.16) On this basis, Heidegger, following the Greeks, defines emergence in terms of
appearance and presence; however, these are interpreted in their verbal (or dynamical)
forms, viz. as appearing (or standing-out-of-itself, emerging) and presencing (or
258
In this sense, the pre-Kehre period of Heidegger's thought is correctly characterized as a reflection on Being
from the perspective of beings while the post-Kehre period is a reflection on Being from the perspective of
Being itself.
Chapter 6 Poisis
enduring) respectively259.
In Basic Concepts (1993b), Heidegger attempts to clarify the essence of Being as such
(physis) via a radical (ontological) re-intepretation of an Anaximanderian fragment, viz.
whence emergence is for what respectively presences also an eluding into this (as into the Same)
emerges accordingly the compelling need; there is namely what presences itself (from itself), the fit,
and each is respected (acknowledged) by the other, (all of this) from overcoming the unfit according
to the allotment of temporalizing by time. (p.87)
This rather esoteric formulation can be rendered more exoteric (that is, explicit) by
appreciating, with Heidegger, that "all Greek thinkers have experienced and grasped the
being of beings as the presencing of those things that are present." (p.95) As he goes on
to state, "Beings are - thought in Greek - what presences. What emerges and evades
emerges into presence and goes away out of presence." (p.90) Crucially, "nothing is said
about beings except that èmergence' is peculiar to them and that elusion emerges from
them. Thus we are talking about what is peculiar to beings, and that is the being of
beings." (p.90) Again, "'<,F4H [genesis]: emergence; NL@D [phuora]: elusion. The
last mentioned word says more clearly that it is a question of evasion, meaning going
away, as distinguished from coming forth." (p.89) According to Heidegger,
that from out of which emergence is peculiar to what respectively presences is the same as that back
into which elusion .. emerges. [Furthermore,] the former, from out of which emergence presences,
is just the latter, away into which evading presences (p.91)
This `former' and `latter' is Being as such (physis) whose dynamic aspect - presencing
or the how of presence - and static aspect - presence or the what of presencing260 - are
manifest in both emergence and its unitarily-related (`same') opposite, viz. elusion
(evasion). He goes on to assert that "emerging from the same and eluding into the same
correspond to the compelling need. The compelling need is what all emergence and all
elusion correspond to, when they emerge from the same and go into the same." (p.91)
Thus, in contrast to conventional (metaphysical) interpretations of this fragment261,
Heidegger holds that emergence is not governed by an a priori necessity; rather,
necessity itself emerges with the emergence (coming-forth) and evasion (or going-back)
of beings (Seiendes) from Being as such (Seyn). In this sense, and as stated in section
6.5.4, the structure of the Being (Sein) of beings (Seiendes) - that is, the structure of the
259
As stated previously, Heidegger regards the Greek concept of ousia (stasis, permanence) as an atemporal
hypostatization of physis (which is held to have both static and dynamic aspects, viz. appearing and enduring
presencing respectively).
260
Thus, and as stated in section 6.5.4, for Heidegger, the traditional (metaphysical) duality of essence (what-ness)
and existence (that-ness) is, in fact, an aspectual duality of essence (what-ness) and existence (how-ness).
261
Heidegger mentions two, one due to Nietzsche and another by Diels.
Chapter 6 Poisis
existential modalities - is historically-contingent and incipient. That this is the case, viz.
that the structure of Being (Sein) is a creatively-emergent262 unfolding (as opposed to an
explication of an implicate order as on Bohm's (1980) scheme) which generates necessity
incipiently is readily established since on Heidegger's view, emergence and incipience -
or arch (origination) - are essentially related. This position is supported by his pre-
Kehre reflections on the meaning of arch. As Heidegger (1939) states,
on the one hand, arch means that from which something has its origin and beginning; on the other
hand it means that which, as this origin and beginning, likewise keeps rein over, i.e., restrains and
therefore dominates something else that emerges from it. Arch means at one and the same time,
beginning and control. On a broader and therefore lower scale we can say: origin and ordering.
[Thus,] arch as originating ordering and as ordering origin. The unity of these two is essential.
(p.189)
Heidegger (1993b) goes on to assert that
arch is that from which something emerges, but that from which something emerges retains, in what
emerges and its emerging, the determination of motion and the determination of that toward which
emergence is as such .. The arch releases emergence [dynamic becoming] and what emerges [static
Being] such that what is released is first retained in the arch as enjoinment. (p.93)
Thus, becoming and Being stand in unitary relation under presencing (physis), that is,
emergence-elusion or poisis as such. According to Heidegger, enjoinment can be
grasped in a three-fold way: (p.94)
1. Prevailing egress [or going-out] of emergence and elusion.

2. Pervading determination of the transition between emergence and elusion.
3. Holding the opened domain of egressing pervasiveness.
Thus, "the arch is itself an egress that everywhere prevails, that includes everything in
its enjoinment and through this inclusion predetermines a domain and opens anything
like a domain in the first place [emphasis added]." (p.93) This latter point is critical with
respect to the question concerning the poitic difference (section 6.6.4) between physis
262
In Summa Theologica (Part I, Question 45, Article 2), Aquinas maintains that "in things which are made
without movement, to become and to be already made are simultaneous [and] since creation is without
movement, a thing is being created and is already created at the same time." However, it is important to
appreciate that movement can be interpreted in two senses: (1) ontically, in which case it refers to a causal
relation between beings (section 6.4.1.3); and (2) ontologically, in which case it refers to an incipient (or
creative) relation between Being as such and beings. The simultaneity of Being and becoming with respect to
creation (that is, incipience) follows from the fact while beings are in time, Being itself is Time, that is, the
Temporality which throws-forth the temporality of beings, a temporality which is relative to the temporality
of that being whose existential structure - as care - is temporality, viz. Dasein (section 6.5.3). Hence, as Sikka
(1997) states, although "the Christian theological notion of creatio ex nihilo is nonetheless opposed to the
Greek notion that ex nihilo nihil fit .. they still have in common the sense of an ordering principle that is in
some way the origin of what-is." (p.51) This ordering principle (nomos) is Being as such (Seyn) which discloses
itself historically (temporally) as the Being (Sein) of beings (Seiendes) via Dasein.
Chapter 6 Poisis
(or autopoisis) and techn (or allopoisis) since it implies that in incipient-emergence,
which is a movement from Being as such (Seyn) to beings (Seiendes), the Being (Sein)
of the latter is determined (fixed) in an originary (or ontologically-creative, open)
movement from possibility (as such) to actuality and potentiality263; thus, arch-
incipience denotes the historically-contingent circumscription of existential modalities.
On the basis of the above statements, it is maintained that the end (telos) of a being
(Seiende) - and this means its Being (Sein) or presencing as the being that it is - is
determined in incipience and retained from emergence (coming-forth) to elusion (going-
back); thus, a distinction in poisis entails a distinction in Being. On this basis, naturality
- that is, physis or autopoisis - can be distinguished from artificiality - that is, techn or
allopoisis - which thereby undermines the possibility of "strong" CEA (chapter 5).
According to the conventional interpretation of the Anaximanderian fragment, J

B,4D@< (to apeiron) refers to the limitless or ìnfinite'. However, as stated in section
6.5.2, Heidegger (1993b) contests this (implicitly) statical interpretation of the B,4D@<,
alternatively interpreting it (in dynamical terms) as the `repelling of limit'.264 Crucially,
J B,4D@<, that which repels all limits, relates itself solely to the presencing of what presences, and
it relates itself to this as DP, that means now in the threefold manner of egress, pervasiveness, and
disclosure of domain. (p.94)
In short, Being as such (Seyn), the in-finite repelling of limits, sends-forth (finite) beings
(Seiendes) - egress - which as enduring presencings - pervasiveness - manifest Being
(Sein) - disclosure of domain. This threefold structure of enjoinment (egress,
pervasiveness, disclosure) applies to the in-finite because "enjoinment is being itself, and
enjoinment is B,4D@<, the repelling of limit. Enjoinment is repelling." (p.95)265
Significantly, Heidegger maintains that "the presencing of what endures has in itself a
connection with and an inclination toward duration." (p.96) However, as he goes on to
state
263
According to Polanyi (1966), "to trust that a thing we know is real is .. to feel that it has the independence and
power for manifesting itself in yet unthought of ways in the future." (p.32)
264
It is interesting to note that according to Heidegger (1939), "in Greek thought, what comes to be and passes
away is what is sometimes present, sometime absent - without limit." Furthermore, "whatever becomes present
and absent without limit has of and by itself no presencing, and it devolves into instability." Thus, "beings
proper are present of and by themselves and for this reason are encountered as what is always already present
.. Non-beings, on the other hand, are sometimes present, sometimes absent, because they are present only on
the basis of something already present; that is, along with it they make their appearance or remain absent."
(p.206) As will be seen in what follows, this pre-Kehre static interpretation of Being is overturned by a later
post-Kehre interpretation of the concept (Heidegger,93b) in which it is held that "transition [and hence,
dynamism] belongs to the essence of being." (p.105)
Clearly, therefore, "the B,4D@< cannot be thought as a being." (p.94)

265
Chapter 6 Poisis
being is presencing, but not necessarily duration unto lasting permanence .. Presencing is
distinguished by (X<,F4H, emergence. Mere presence, in the sense of the present at hand, has already
set a limit to presencing, emergence, and has thus given up presencing. Duration brings non-essence
into presencing and takes from it the possibility of what belongs to presencing as emerging-forth and
opening-up, that is, returning and eluding. (p.97)
This point is critical: To the extent that the artificial comes-to-be as the artifactual (that
is, through artificing), its poisis (coming-forth, bringing-forth) is causal (ontical,
productive); causation is a relation between beings viewed as occurrent (extant), that is,
present-at-hand. According to the above statement, the present-at-hand limits (or
constrains) emergence (as presencing). It follows, thereby, that "strong" artificiality (as
artifactuality), specifically "strong" CEA, is impossible since the type or kind of
emergence that is possible for CEA, viz. computational emergence (chapter 3), is not
equivalent to ontological emergence as presencing or poisis as such: The former is
ontologically closed (since limited) while the latter is ontologically open (since a
repelling of all limits). According to Heidegger,
the enjoinment of presencing is a repelling of `limit', whereby limit means the closing off of
presencing into a final presence, into the permanence of a mere presence. Accordingly, if presencing
is to be preserved in its eggresive essence, then emergence must emerge as a going back into the same
This point is significant since it points to a mode of coming-forth (poisis) in which

presencing is not preserved in its egressive essence, that is, a mode in which going-back
(into Being) is prevented. Crucially, Heidegger identifies this with closure. As will be
shown in section 6.6.3, this closure results from `cutting' (that is, abstracting) beings
away from Being via techn-Enframing (Gestellen) when the subject gathers Being - as
opposed to is gathered by Being - into beings taken as the extant (static, present-at-
hand). For this reason, Heidegger maintains that
emergence actually emerges as what eludes, it actually appears in this emergence when it is a
transition. In transition emergence gathers itself in its essential fullness. In transition, as the
emergence of the unity of emerging and evading, consists the respective presencing of what
presences. However, transition does not involve itself in the limit of permanence. Thus transition
preserves what is enjoined in enjoinment: J B,4D@<. (p.98)
In short, the dynamic aspect of physis retains its dynamism in coming-forth and going-
back. Furthermore, "the repelling of limit within presencing [J B,4D@<] shows itself
to be the enjoinment of the authentic being of beings." (p.98) Thus, "repelling is the
prevailing salvation of the essence of presencing, this, however, in the essential way of
refusing the limit." Crucially, however, Heidegger holds that
enjoinment is not thought as something effective [or causal]. Upon what is being supposed to `work'
? Perhaps upon beings. But beings àre' indeed only what they are ìn' enjoinment, indeed, as
enjoinment. But enjoinment cannot cause and bring about beings, for everything effective is already
a being, and enjoinment is being. Therefore, how does being let beings be ? (p.99)
Chapter 6 Poisis
On his view, Being as such (Seyn) lets beings be as a consequence of the non-essence of
presencing, viz. duration or permanence (ousia). Thus, beings arise from Being as such
due to the possibility of permanence within the presencing of Being, a possibility which
must be overcome by Being if it is to retain its essence as presencing, as the B,4D@<
(in-finite). According to Heidegger,
the self-defense of essence .. means the salvation of the essence of presencing. Salvation of essence
is preservation of the incipient [or originary]. Such preservation of the essence is at the same time a
self-defense against permanence as the non-essence of presencing. This essential salvation is the
doubled preservation of essence .. To need and necessity, thus grasped, belongs the warding off of
duration and permanence, because this threatens essence [that is, presencing] as non-essence [that
is, permanence]. (p.100)
Thus, the necessity of an essential repelling of limits emerges contingently (that is,
historically) with the possibility of a non-essential limiting of presencing in static
presence. Furthermore, "the inception is the essence of presencing as enjoinment of the
presencing of what presences in each case: being itself" (pp.100-101); hence, the relation
between Being and beings is not causal, but historically-incipient: Beings emerge as
essents (that is, stable durations or presencings) of essencing Being as such (that is,
presencing). Yet, Heidegger appears to contradict his previous position in asserting that
being, i.e. presencing, consists in itself of endurance unto permanence. To the essence of presencing,
taken for itself, belongs this persistence: that presencing presences, i.e. finds its finality in an
endurance and its completion in such an end (limit). In the presencing of what presences lies duration
as persisting in permanence. (p.101)
However, as he goes on to state
permanence is contrary to the egressively enjoined essence of being, contrary to the arch, contrary
to the apeiron, the repelling of limit. But what presences essentially and yet contrary to the essence
is the non-essence. What solidifies the enjoined upon itself, unto permanence and contrary to
enjoinment, is the unfit. This does not come to what presences from just anywhere, but is included
in the essence of presencing and belongs to the necessity of being. This is, in itself, as the repelling
of limit, already related to limitation unto permanence and thus to the unfit as a presencing possibility
(inclination). [Hence,] to the extent that what respectively presences corresponds to the essence of
presencing, it does not consist in and solidify into duration unto permanence [emphasis added].
(p.102)
Crucially, Heidegger maintains that "the unfit belongs to the essence of presencing as
non-essence." However, "the essential tendency toward the unfit presences, but is
overcome." (p.102) This statement may be interpreted in terms of an ontological
movement from Being to beings, followed by an ontical movement between beings and
finally, an ontological movement from beings to Being, viz. B6b, b6b', b'6B, where B
denotes Being as such (Seyn) and b and b' denote beings (Seiendes) of the same Being
(Sein), that is, existential modality (section 6.7). On this basis, it is correct to interpret
permanent presence (Being as static ousia rather than dynamic physis) as non-essential
and hence, a hypostatization of stable, enduring Being as presencing (section 6.5.6).
Chapter 6 Poisis
According to Heidegger,
in transition, i.e. when what presences overcomes the unfit and does not persist unto permanence,
what presences fits itself in each case to its own presencing, and accommodates itself to this. In this
way it fulfills the `when' and `how long' that are allotted to each respective being. In overcoming the
unfit, what presences corresponds to the allotment of temporalizing by time. And conversely, this
correspondence with `time' is nothing other than overcoming the unfit. [Hence,] time is the allotment
of presencing for what presences in each case. (p.104)
Heidegger (1939) maintains that for the Greeks, "`being' means: presencing into the
unhidden." Crucially, "what is decisive is not the duration and extent of the presencing
but rather whether the presencing is dispensed into the unhidden and simple, and thus
withdrawn into the hidden and inexhausted [emphasis added]." (p.206) From this it
follows that presencing refers to the unconcealment of finite beings and the simultaneous
concealment of in-finite (apeiron) Being. Significantly, the original (Heraclitean)
meaning of physis incorporates both these aspects of unconcealment and concealment:
Self-hiding belongs to the predilection of being; i.e., it belongs to that wherein being has secured its
essence. And the essence of being is to unconceal itself, to emerge, to come out into the unhidden -
NF4H. Only what in its very essence unconceals and must unconceal itself, can love to conceal itself.
Only what is unconcealing can be concealing. [Thus,] being is the self-concealing revealing, NF4H
in the original sense. Self-revealing is a coming-forth into unhiddenness, and this means: first
preserving unhiddenness as such by taking it back into its essence. (pp.229-230)
Importantly, and as stated previously, Heidegger (1959) maintains that Being as such
(Seyn) - or physis - can subsume both Being (Sein) and becoming:
Physis means the power that emerges and the enduring realm under its sway. This power of emerging
and enduring includes `becoming' as well as `being' in the restricted sense of inert duration. Physis
is the process of a-rising, of emerging from the hidden, whereby the hidden is first made to stand.
(pp.14-15)
Heidegger (1993b) maintains that "what is past is always a no-longer-being, but what has
been is being that still presences but is concealed in its incipience." (p.73) Somewhat
cryptically, he refers to "the inclusion that gathers out of itself and into itself, a gathering
that grants the Open where all beings are. `Ground' means being itself and this is the
inception." (p.74) Crucially,
[the] inception is not the past, but rather, because it has decided in advance everything to come, it is
constantly of the future. (p.13)
Furthermore, "emergence is not an abandonment of that from whence it has emerged."

(p.97) According to Heidegger, "emergence first actually sets the `from whence' into
presencing, so the return into the `from whence' can only be the essential fulfillment of
presencing." (p.98) The above statements are of critical significance since they imply that
the specific way (or mode) in which a being comes-forth or is brought-forth - that is, the
poisis or becoming of a being - is retained in the Being (Sein) of that being: in short,
Chapter 6 Poisis
origin (incipience) and becoming cannot be separated - made `past' - from Being; they
are essentially related. This has the crucial consequence that a difference in origin and
becoming, viz. a poitic difference (section 6.6.4), entails a difference in Being and,
thereby, undermines the possibility of "strong" CEA (chapter 5).
As stated previously, the existential modalities, that is, the Being (Sein) of beings
(Seiendes), are held to be incipiently-emergent from Being as such (Seyn); hence, the
structure of Being as physis, that is, as naturality, is historical. Yet, according to
Grimsley (1967),
since human existence is being-in-the-world, the world as well as the Dasein may be said to have a
history. It is not surprising, therefore, that the world's utensils [or equipment] should be called
`historical'. Unauthentic history, however, sees this historical aspect of objects as a quality which
belongs to them in their own right. By identifying the historical and the objective in this way such an
attitude effects an artificial and erroneous separation of the Dasein from the world, for the world has
a history only because the Dasein pro-jects itself temporally as being-in-the-world, thereby
uncovering or discovering the world's existents. The world-historical embraces the world's objects
only is so far as they are associated with the historicity of the Dasein itself. (pp.77-78)
The implication is that naturality is ahistorical prior to the incipient emergence of Dasein
and world (as the gestalt being-in-the-world); in short, the ontological Dasein-not-
Dasein (or self-other) structure is a necessary condition for historicity. This position is
supported by Margolis (1988) who maintains that according to Heidegger,
the union of nature and history obtains only at that `primordial', unanalyzable point at which Sein is
first `disclosed' in terms of an array of what appears as Da-sein and what is utterly unlike Dasein, that
is, at a point logically prior to any and all such distinctions. (p.220)
However, on pluralistic realism it is consistent to assert that objects (beings) are not
historical in-themselves (that is, as beings) and yet can be historical independent of
Dasein. This follows from the fact that beyond beings (Seiendes) and Being (Sein) as
mediated by Dasein there is Being as such (Seyn) which is the incipient ground of the
former (section 6.5.4). On this basis, it is necessary to conceive historicity as multiply-
moded: On the one hand, there is the historically-equipmental Being (Sein) of beings that
is relative to Dasein; on the other hand, there is the incipient manifestation of Being as
such (Seyn) in the historical structure of the Being (Sein) of beings, viz. the existential
modalities266. As Pggeler (1987) states, on this view
266
The implication of this position is that the Being (Sein) of beings (Seiendes) assumes two forms: (1) a pre-
Kehre anthropocentric form; and (2) a post-Kehre non-anthropocentric form. Neither form is ontologically-
reducible (chapter 3) to the other; rather, they are incipiently-emergent modalities from, of, by and for Being
as such (Seyn). This move is necessary in order to address a fundamental deficiency in Heidegger's
interpretation of Being, viz. the meaning (way) and truth (fact) of the ontical Being of beings prior to the
emergence of Dasein and ontological Being. For as Kovacs (1990) states, Heidegger "seems to underestimate
the philosophical significance of .. the weight of the possible (though limited) ontological contribution of the
ontic levels of experience." (p.253)
Chapter 6 Poisis
naturalness is .. something historical: the natural world, the everyday, the life-world are not
fundamental, but are rather a historically variable product, which in relation to other arrangements
can direct us to a new encounter with nature [emphasis added]. (p.54)
According to Sikka (1997), Heidegger maintains that "dik [or commanding-structuring]

gives the directive that orders the structure of beings. It thus belongs, along with physis
and logos, to the understanding of being among the early Greek thinkers." (p.52)
(Significantly, this directive is both structure and command267.) Critically, she goes on
to state that techn (section 6.6.3) stands in opposition to dik. However, it is crucial to
appreciate that "the conflict of power (deinon) in which the violence of techn breaks out
against the overpowering power of dik is never of such a sort that techn could be said
to master or rule over dik, for dik, as governing order, always orders techn as well."
(pp.52-53) In short, techn can never encapsulate dik which entails that techn cannot
encapsulate physis. This point is critical since it undermines the possiblity of "strong"
CEA: Techn-Enframing (Gestellen) or artificiality (as artifactuality) represents (that is,
re-presents) what has presenced268, viz. physis or naturality. Since the latter is open while
the former is closed, techn cannot encapsulate (contain, encompass, bound) the
possibilities associated with physis. This applies both to physis as poisis - that is, with
respect to Being as such (Seyn) - and as autopoisis - that is, with respect to natural
beings (Seiendes) - since on Heidegger's view, beings and Being, becomings and
becoming are unitarily-related in essence269. As Heidegger, states
theory never outstrips nature - nature that is already presencing - and in this sense theory never makes
its way around nature. Physics may well represent the most general and pervasive lawfulness of
nature in terms of the identity of matter and energy; and what is represented by physics is indeed
nature itself, but undeniably it is only nature as the object-area, whose objectness is first defined
through the refining that is characteristic of physics and is expressly set forth in that refining. Nature,
in its objectness for modern physical science is only one way in which what presences - which from
of old has been named physis - reveals itself and sets itself in position for the refining characteristic
of science. Even if physics as an object-area is unitary and self-contained, this objectness can never
embrace the fullness of the coming to presence of nature. Scientific representation is never able to
267
The idea of Being as such (Seyn) ordering and commanding-forth beings (Seiendes) into Being (Sein) has a
parallel in Spencer-Brown's (1969) calculus of indications, viz. "commands .. call something into being, conjure
up some order of being, call to order, and .. are usually carried in permissive forms such as let there be so-and-
so .." (p.79)
268
That is, the static or stable, enduring aspect - end (telos) - of presencing and not its incipient-emergent, that is,
dynamic aspect.
269
In this connection, it is interesting to note with Cariani (1989) that "the ability to computationally generate any
behaviour once it has been defined gives rise to the illusion that this behaviour must have been generated via
similar means [emphasis added]." (p.43) In short, a posteriori the event (ereignis) of emergence, a
computational (mechanistic, deterministic) explanation for the becoming of the emergent can be found in terms
of relations involving prior existents. (In this sense, a posteriori (that is, after the event of) emergence, creatio
ex nihilo `collapses' onto ex nihilo nihil fit.) Elstob (1986) argues similarly in rejecting forwards determinism
(Laplacian mechanism, computationalism) while accepting backwards determinism.
Chapter 6 Poisis
encompass the coming to presence of nature; for the objectness of nature is, antecedently, only one
way in which nature exhibits itself. Nature thus remains for the science of physics that which cannot
be gotten around [emphasis added]. (pp.173-174)
Hence, "scientific representation, for its part, can never decide whether nature, through
its objectness, does not rather withdraw itself than bring to appearance the hidden
fullness of its coming to presence. Science cannot even ask this question, for, as theory,
it has already undertaken to deal with the area circumscribed by objectness." (p.174) Yet,
for Heidegger, "[the] impotence of the sciences is not grounded in the fact that their
entrapping securing never comes to an end; it is grounded rather in the fact that in
principle the objectness in which at any given time nature, man, history, language,
exhibit themselves always itself remains only one kind of presencing, in which indeed
that which presences can appear, but never absolutely must appear." (p.176) The
objectivistic Ènframing' that is the defining characteristic of both science and artificing
on its modern technological interpretation is examined in the following section.
6.6.3. Techn
In this section, the ontological concept of techn is investigated in connection with the
possibilities for poisis (coming-forth, bringing-forth) associated with artificiality,
specifically, CEA. Although the notion of techn was examined in section 6.4.2.4, it is
important to appreciate that the presentation was ontical (causal, productive), viz. techn
as a kind of making. While this interpretation is not incorrect, it is incomplete since its
ontological foundation - that is, the relation of techn as mode of poisis to Being as
such (Seyn) - remains to be addressed. According to Caws (1979), who supports
Heidegger's (1977) etymological approach in the context of questioning concerning the
Being (Sein) of technology, "the concepts invoked by the philosophy of technology are
embedded in a linguistic tradition that we ignore at the risk of talking nonsense." (p.228)
Thus, a link is established between techn and logos (section 6.5.6), viz. technology "is
not merely the theory of the practical arts; it is the practical arts themselves, regarded as
an activity of reason - the logos in the techne, rather than the logos of the techne."
(p.227) On Heidegger's view, techn is an embodiment of logos irrespective of whether
these terms are interpreted on their pre-Socratic (classical) meaning, viz. as bringing-
forth and collecting-collectedness, or their later (modern) meaning, viz. as Enframing
(Gestellen) and specification (or `cutting')270 respectively. However, as will be seen in
what follows, on the former (classical) interpretation, the artificer is gathered into the
artifact by Being while on the latter (modern) interpretation, the artificer gathers Being
into the artifact (Heidegger,77a) (Ali,98b). (This distinction is of critical significance
since the former relation denotes a movement from the finite (closed) to the in-finite
270
The link between specification and `cutting' follows from the fact that specification is specific-ation, that is,
the defining-delimiting of a being from Being as such (Seyn) while `cutting' involves abstraction from the
concrete - and, hence, from Being as such since on Heidegger's view there is no Platonic dualism of beings
(material) and Being (formal) - to the ideal - that is, the essence (idea, what-ness) of a being.
Chapter 6 Poisis
(open), viz. a being6Being movement or transcendence (section 6.5.3), while the latter
relation denotes a movement from the in-finite (open) to the finite (closed), viz. a
Being6being movement.) However, Caws' position is somewhat more definite: On his
view, techn is an embodiment of logos with the latter interpreted as reason (that is,
ratio)271. This latter point is crucial since it implies that a necessary condition for techn
(artificing) is thematic reflection which follows from the existential fact that reason is
essentially connected with the intentionality of a Cartesian subject (or ego)272. This is
consistent with Ihde's (1979) distinction between (what he interprets as) Heideggerian
praxis, that is, non-thematic coping or being-in-the-world (chapter 1 and section 6.5.3),
and techn which, according to Dreyfus, (1991) can involve "deliberate attention and
thus thematic intentional consciousness .. in curiousity, reading instruments, repairing
equipment and in designing and testing new equipment [that is, in artificing] [emphasis
added]." (p.70) On this basis, and as will be shown in chapter 7, it is possible to construct
a framework for distinguishing naturals and artificials (as artifactuals) on the basis of
ontic and epistemic relations between such phenomena and the anthropic component, viz.
the historically-embedded human artificer-interpreter (subject).
According to Heidegger (1977a),
technikon means that which belongs to techn. We must observe two things with respect to the
meaning of this word. One is that techn is the name not only for the activities and skills of the
craftsman, but also for the arts of the mind and the fine arts [emphasis added]. (pp.12-13)
This latter point, viz. that techn includes the arts of the mind, (for example, thematic
planning, design etc), is consistent with the link between techn and reason stated
previously. However, Heidegger goes on to state that "the other point that we should
observe with regard to techn is even more important. From earliest times until Plato the
word techn is linked with the word epistem." (pp.12-13) As Heidegger (1959) states,
techn means neither art nor skill to say nothing of technique in the modern sense. We translate
techn by `knowledge' [which] is the ability to put into work the being of any particular essent. The
Greeks called art in the true sense and the work of art techn, because art is what most immediately
brings being (i.e. the appearing that stands there in itself) to stand, stabilizes it in something present
(the work) .. It is through the work of art as essent being that everything else that appears and is to
be found is first confirmed and made accessible, explicable, and understandable as being or not being
.. [The work of art] brings about the phenomenon in which the emerging power, physis, comes to
shine. (p.159)
Although Heidegger (1977a) does not deny the link between techn and ontical
production (making), he does question its validity with respect to determination of the
271
In his pre-Kehre thought, Heidegger (1959) adopts a similar position, viz. "techn [or allopoisis] is creating,
building in the sense of a deliberate pro-ducing [emphasis added]." (p.16)
272
Winograd and Flores (1986) refer to this as the rationalistic orientation.
Chapter 6 Poisis
ontological foundation (essence, Being) of techn. On his view, "it is as revealing, and
not as manufacturing, that techn is a bringing-forth." (p.13) For this reason, "the
possibility of all productive manufacturing lies in revealing." (p.12) According to Ihde
(1979), "techn reveals or brings to presence something which is possible." Furthermore,
"technology is a mode of revealing [and] revealing is a coming to presence within a
framework." (p.108) There are (at least) two points to note in connection with this
statement: First, to the extent that techn is the bringing-forth of the possible, it must be
grounded in physis since the latter, on its originary (Heraclitean-Anaximanderian)
interpretation, refers to Being as such or pure possibility (section 6.5.4). Given the link
between Being and becoming, and hence, between originary physis and poisis, it
follows, as Heidegger asserts, that "techn belongs to bringing-forth, to poisis; it is
something poietic." (p.13) Thus, physis encompasses techn; it is only in its derivative,
ontical form of physis as autopoisis (section 6.6.2) that techn can be set in opposition
to this concept. To the extent that physis can be identified with naturality and techn with
artificiality (as artifactuality) it follows that naturality encompasses - and yet is not
encompassable by - artificiality; secondly, as stated in section 6.5.7, techn is a mode of
aletheia (unconcealment). According to Heidegger (1977a),
techn is a mode of aletheuein. It reveals whatever does not bring itself forth and does not yet lie here
before us [as the given], whatever can look and turn out now one way and now another. (p.13)
Thus, the essence (Being) of techn lies in its way of revealing Being as such (Seyn) and,
in contrast to physis as self-coming-forth (or autopoisis), can be characterized as other-
bringing-forth (or allopoisis). As stated previously, while Heidegger rejects the
ontological interpretation of techn as other-production (or other-making), he does not
deny its ontical validity. Furthermore, it is important to appreciate that the existential
analysis of techn presented in The Question Concerning Technology (1977a)
commences with an interpretation of this concept in productive terms, specifically, in
terms of the Aristotelian doctrine of causality (section 6.6.1). For this reason, it is
worthwhile briefly examining Aristotle's views on the artificial (as artifactual).
In Book II, ch.I of the Physics, Aristotle maintains that "just as that which is in
accordance with art and artificial is called art, so that which is in accordance with nature
and natural is called nature." The defining characteristic (or essence) of artifacts is
identified as follows:
They none of them have in themselves the source of their making, but in some cases, such as that of
a house or anything else made by human hands, the source is in something else and external, whilst
in others the source is in the thing, but not in the thing of itself, i.e. when the thing comes to be a
cause to itself by virtue of concurrence [that is, incidentally].
This position is supported by Heidegger (1939) who maintains that "in those cases where
the appearance merely shows up, and in showing up only guides a know-how in the
producing of it and plays an accompanying role rather than actually performing the
Chapter 6 Poisis
production - there production is a making." (p.221) On this basis, a distinction can be

drawn between proper-artifacts (artifactuals, artifactuality) which are exo-allopoitic and
pseudo-artifacts which are endo-allopoitic: In the former, the Being of beings (artifacts)
is extrinsically-defined from without while in the latter, the Being of beings is
extrinsically-defined from within. Endo-allopoisis appears incoherent because it
synthesizes externality (allo, extrinsicality) with topological internality (endo, within-
ness); however, to the extent that poisis refers to the becoming - and, thereby, the Being
(Sein) - of a being (Seiende), it follows that any being that is endo-allopoitic has aspects
of its Being that are self-generated and yet inessential (since not autopoitic). According
to Maturana and Varela (1980), man-made machines (or artifacts) such as cars are not
autopoietic (that is, self-organizing) since
[although] there is an organization given in terms of a concatenation of processes, yet, these processes
are not processes of production of the components which specify the car as a unity since the
components of a car are produced by other processes which are independent of the organization of
the car and its operation. (p.79)
It is interesting to consider whether all artifacts (man-made machines) are allopoietic.

For example, machines capable of universal construction and self-replication (chapter
4) such as certain CA-structures embedded within UCAs (chapter 5) must be viewed as
autopoietic since such processual structures are, apparently, self-organizing. If analysis
remains confined to the level of the emergent phenomenon (product) and the question
of substrate (substratum) ontology is ignored, this position is correct, viz. UCAs can be
held to support what McMullin and Varela (1997) refer to as computational-autopoiesis.
However, Maturana and Varela (1980) themselves go on to state that
man made machines are all made with some purpose, practical or not, but with some aim (even if
it is only to amuse) that man specifies. This aim usually appears expressed in the product of the
operation of the machine, but not necessarily so [emphasis added]. (p.78)
In this connection, it is significant that on their view, "autocatalytic processes do not

constitute autopoietic systems because among other things, they do not determine their
topology. Their topology is determined by a container that is part of the specification of
the system, but which is independent of the operation of the autocatalysis." (p.94) Since
UCA (substrate) ontology - initial state, state-transition function and boundary conditions
- can be defined independently of whether or not a self-reproducing (and hence,
autopoietic) system emerges, it follows that UCAs are themselves non-autopoietic
`containers'. Viewed from this perspective, computationally-autopoietic systems can be
reinterpreted as autocatalytic and hence, non-autopoietic since the topologies of
emergents are, in fact, determined at the level of the substrate (substratum) and because
UCAs are deterministic systems. Furthermore, Maturana and Varela hold that "the
observer [or interpreter] puts the machine either conceptually or concretely to some use,
and thus defines a set of circumstances that lead the machine to change, following a
certain path of variations in its output." (pp.85-86) This point is critical since it endorses
the position (developed in this section) that emergent-artifactuality - specifically CEA -
Chapter 6 Poisis
is correctly characterized as equipmentality and hence, has Being relative to the

anthropic component as artificer-interpreter (chapter 7); hence, the extension of Dreyfus'
Heideggerian critique of "strong" artificiality (section 6.3.3) to emergent-artificiality, that
is, epistemically and ontically a posteriori artifactuals.
In chapter 7, a distinction is made between "hard" (or pure) artifacts and "soft" (or
impure) artifacts which reflects the Aristotelian distinction between what has here been
referred to as proper and pseudo artifacts respectively. In terms of the framework
described in section 6.4.2.4 and anticipating the discussion in chapter 7, it is maintained
that "hard" (pure, proper) artifacts (products) are incapable of emergence since their
possibilities for Being (Sein) are totally-circumscribed (closed) relative to Being as such
(Seyn) by the artificer (productant) at the level of the substrate (substratum)273: As
Aristotle states, in Book II, ch.I of the Physics, "in the case .. of artifacts we make the
matter [that is, substrate] for the work to be done, whilst in the case of natural objects
it is there already [emphasis added]." Hence, only "soft" (impure, pseudo) artifacts are
capable of emergence because their possibilities for Being (Sein) are partially-
circumscribed (open) relative to Being as such (Seyn). According to Heidegger (1939),
"in the case of every [proper] artifact .. the origin of the making is òutside' the thing
made. Viewed from the perspective of the artifact, the arch [that is, origin and ordering]
always and only appears as something ìn addition'." (p.195) Significantly, on the
Aristotelian view, the movedness (or kinesis) associated with techn "has another arch
and .. beings that are moved in this way are related to their arch in a different manner
[than those beings whose arch is associated with physis]." (p.192) On this basis, a
poitic difference (section 6.6.4), that is a difference in coming-forth (or bringing-forth)
must exist between natural and artificial (as artifactual) beings. This follows from the
fact that, as stated in section 6.6.2, arch refers both to origin and to ordering, the
implication being that a difference in origin manifests throughout the becoming and the
Being (Sein) of the being in question.
It is appropriate at this point in the discussion to consider Heidegger's interpretation of

the essence (Being) of (post-)modern274 technology. However, before this is attempted,
it is worthwhile briefly responding to a criticism of his position made by Feenberg
(1997), viz.
273
According to Heidegger (1939), "unlike techn, physis does not first require a supervening poisis that takes
just something lying around (e.g., wood) and brings it into the appearance of `table'. Such a product is never,
of and by itself, on-the-way and never can be on-the-way to a table." (p.228) This distinction, since it interprets
artifacts in terms of the imposition of form (made) on matter (given), applies to "soft" artifacts. However, as
will be shown in chapter 7, the distinction applies a fortiori to "hard" artifacts since both form and matter are
made (artificed), the poisis involving a circumscriptive (closing, `cutting', Enframing) movement from Being
as physis (pure possibility) to artifactual beings (pure necessity).
274
Depending on whether the Cartesian duality between subject and object is interpreted as classical or modern,
Enframing (Gestellen) is either modern or post-modern.
Chapter 6 Poisis
Heidegger represents modern technology as radically different from the one other model of technical
action he recognizes, premodern craft. He emphasizes the reduction of the object of modern
technology to a decontextualized, fungible matter cut off from its own history .. Perhaps because of
this ontologizing approach, Heidegger seems to allow no room for a future evolution of the basic form
of modern technology which remains fixed in its eternal essence whatever happens next in history.
Not technology itself but `technological thinking' will be transcended in a further stage in the history
of being that we can only await passively. This essentializing tendency cancels the historical
dimension of his theory. (p.6)
There are (at least) three problems with the above statement: First, contrary to Feenberg's
assertions, Heidegger does hold technology to be historical. Dreyfus (1997) lists six
epochs of technological Being in Heideggerian thought, viz. (1) physis -`wild nature',
autopoisis or coming-forth; (2) techn - `nurturing, tending', allopoisis or bringing-
forth; (3) art - beings as static, finished works; (4) creationism - beings as `creatures
produced by a creator God'; (5) objectivity - beings as standing-over-against Cartesian
subjects; (6) Enframing - simulation, objectification of the subjective and subjectification
of the objective275. It should be clear from the above list that while (2)-(6) can be
grouped together in opposition to (1) by virtue of the fact that they constitute those
epochs in which technological human being has emerged to stand in opposition to the
natural (or `given') as mediator of the òther', viz. the artifactual (or `made'), the
individual epochs in (2)-(6) are distinct, thereby establishing that the essence of
technology is historical276. For Heidegger (1977b), the nihilism that is characteristic of
technological modernity "is a historical movement, and not just any view or doctrine
advocated by someone or other. Nihilism moves history after the manner of a
fundamental ongoing event that is scarcely recognized in the destining of Western
peoples .. Nihilism, thought in its essence, is, rather, the fundamental movement of the
history of the West." (p.62) It is significant that Heidegger refers to such a movement as
an unfolding: While the essence (Being) of technology is historical, it is not identical to
a series of discrete (or discontinuous) and contingent technological events; according to
Ihde (1979), "modern technology allows the secret grounds of technology to emerge
more clearly, allows what was long latent and originary to be made more explicit."
(p.110) This position is supported by Heidegger himself, viz. "with the beginning of the
struggle for dominion over the earth, the age of subjectness is driving toward its
consummation." (p.67) This subject-object (or self-other) interpretation of technology
(or artifactuality) and its relation to nature (or naturality) is, therefore, primordial or
incipiently-ontological and applies even in Heidegger's sixth epoch, viz. when
subjectivity and objectivity conflate into each other and, thereby, into that which is
275
This corresponds to Baudrillard's (1983) characterization of postmodernity as marked by the `precession of
simulacra' and the `liquidation of the referential'.
276
A distinction must be drawn between technological existentiells (that is, historically-contingent instances of
technology) and the technological existential (that is, the historical structure of technology as such.)
Chapter 6 Poisis
posterior to both277; second, and consistent with the above defense of Heidegger's
historical approach to the Being of technology, it must be appreciated that the essence
of Dasein is its èxistence' or, more precisely, its ek-sistence, its standing-out (beyond
itself), viz. transcendence. Since Dasein is pro-jectively world-disclosing (or world-
forming), techn - which is relative to Dasein - is also pro-jective. Hence, both Dasein
and technology (or artifactuality) are both existentially and existentielly historical.
(However, this does not preclude either of them from having an existential structure that
can be articulated); third, in postulating constructivism as an alternative to Heidegger's
(alleged) essentialism, Feenberg fails to appreciate that constructivism, as a distinct
philosophical position, has an essence278 , and is, thereby, essentialistic in some sense.
For Heidegger (1977a), modern technology "is a revealing"; however, as he goes on to

state, "the revealing that holds sway throughout modern technology does not unfold into
a bringing-forth in the sense of poisis [as originarily understood by the Greeks]. The
revealing that rules in modern technology is a challenging, which puts to nature the
unreasonable demand that it supply energy that can be extracted and stored as such
[emphasis added]." (p.14) Consistent with this position, Lovitt (1977) maintains that
"modern technology in its essence is a `challenging revealing'. It involves a contending
with everything that is. For it `sets upon' everything, imposing upon it a demand that
seizes it and requisitions it for use. Under the dominion of this challenging revealing,
nothing is allowed to appear as it is in itself" (p.xxix); rather, "all that is and man himself
are gripped in a structuring that exhibits a mere skeleton of their Being, of the way in
which they intrinsically are. In all this the essence of technology rules [emphasis added]."
(p.xxx) According to Heidegger (1977a), "that challenging claim which gathers man
thither to order the self-revealing as standing reserve is] `Ge-stell' [Enframing]." (p.19)
He goes on to state that "Enframing means the gathering together of that setting-upon
which sets upon man, i.e., challenges him forth, to reveal the real, in the mode of
ordering, as standing-reserve." (p.20) Yet, "the word stellen [to set upon] in the name
Ge-stell [Enframing] not only means challenging. At the same time it should preserve
the suggestion of another Stellen from which it stems, namely, that producing and
presenting which, in the sense of poisis, lets what presences come forth into
unconcealment." (p.21) Crucially, Heidegger holds that
the revealing that rules throughout modern technology has the character of a setting-upon; in the sense
of a challenging-forth. That challenging happens in that the energy concealed in nature in unlocked,
what is unlocked is transformed, what is transformed is stored up, what is stored up is, in turn,
distributed, and what is distributed is switched about ever new. Unlocking, transforming, storing,
distributing, and switching about are ways of revealing. But the revealing never simply comes to an
277
As stated previously, this morphization of the subjective into the objective and visa versa finds its ultimate
nihilistic manifestation in the liquidation of the referential and the precession of the simulacrum (Baudrillard,
83).
278
The essence of constructivism is, as the name suggests, grounded in ontical poisis as making (section 6.4.2.4).
Chapter 6 Poisis
end. Neither does it run off into the indeterminate. The revealing reveals to itself its own interlocking
paths, through regulating their course. This regulating itself is, for its part, everywhere secured.
Regulating and securing even become the chief characteristics of the challenging revealing [emphasis
added]. (p.16)
From the above statements, it follows that the essential (that is, ontological)
characteristics of techn-Enframing (Gestellen) are the following: (i) unlocking
(extracting), (ii) transforming (transducing), (iii) storing, (iv) distributing, (v) processing
(switching), (vi) regulating (controlling) and (vii) securing (maintaining). Significantly,
these characteristics can be placed in correspondence with those definitive of (that is,
essential to) the Being of computational poisis (section 6.4.3) on CA-
computationalism279 (chapter 5) as shown in the following table:
Techn-Enframing Computational poisis

(Gestellen) (CA-computationalism)
Unlocking (extracting) Unlocking (specification of CA)
Transforming (transducing) Transforming (implementation of CA specification)
Storing Storing (global CA state, local FSM state)
Distributing Distributing (CA as lattice of FSMs)
Processing (switching) Processing (FSM state-transition functionality)
Regulating (controlling) Regulating (CA state constrains FSM state)
Securing (necessitating) Securing (FSM determinismY CA determinism)
Table 6.7 Comparison of Techne-Enframing (Gestellen) and Computational poisis Characteristics.
However, while such isomorphisms can be established, it is crucial to appreciate with

Heidegger (1977a) that Enframing "is nothing technological; nothing on the order of a
machine. It is the way in which the real reveals itself as standing-reserve [Bestand]."
(p.23) According to Steiner (1978), in techn-Enframing (Gestellen), "things, with their
intimate, collaborative affinity with creation, have been demeaned into objects .. We
may, on the levels of utility and abstraction, have made ourselves lords of creation. But
the elements of the natural world have [thereby come to] stand against us." (pp.132-133)
On this basis, he is led to assert that "our technologies mask Being instead of bringing
it to light." (p.133) There are (at least) two points to note in connection with these
statements: First, the notion that technology `masks' or conceals Being is supported by
Heidegger (1977e), viz. "the essence of Enframing is that setting-upon into itself which
entraps the truth of its own coming to presence with oblivion." (p.36) Although this
279
The characteristics of Techn-Enframing (Gestellen) can also be placed in direct correspondence with those
of evolutionary robotic devices of the kind described in (Cariani,89). The implication is that the ontological -
or existential - essence (Being) of the artificial (as artifactual) holds sway throughout the various ontical - or
existentiell - existents (beings) such as CAs and adaptive robotic devices. However, while this is indeed the
case, there are differences between such systems: As will be seen in chapter 7, the former are "hard" (or pure)
artifacts while the latter are "soft" (or impure) artifacts.
Chapter 6 Poisis
oblivion can be interpreted positively, following Heidegger, in terms of concealment

(letheia) - which is a necessary condition for unconcealment (a-letheia) - it is important
to appreciate that concealment renders possible what Baudrillard (1983) has called the
`liquidation of referentiality', that is, the representation, masked-distortion, masked-
absence and ultimate non-representation of reality in the emergence of the simulacrum280.
However, the `masking' or concealment of Being that follows from `challenging
revealing' or `setting upon', viz. Enframing (Gestellen), must not, according to
Heidegger, be interpreted as something subjective or anthropocentric since, as Lovitt
states,
Enframing is a mode of revealing, a destining of Being. Yet precisely under its dominion nothing
whatever, including man himself, appears as it intrinsically is; the truth of its Being remains
concealed. Everything exists and appears as though it were of man's making. (p.xxxiv)
Secondly, while Steiner is correct in holding that techn-Enframing (Gestellen) - as the

word implies - sets a limit to the possibilities of beings (Seiendes) by severing (`cutting',
closing) the existential relation to Being as such (Seyn)281, it is important to appreciate,
contrary to Steiner, that, for Heidegger (1977a), "whatever stands by in the sense of
standing-reserve no longer stands over against us as object [emphasis added]." (p.17)
The distinction between objects (Gegenstand) and standing-reserve (Bestand) can be
traced to the way in which each stands: Objects stand over against subjects; standing-
reserve, by contrast, stands-forth as available for use. However, it is crucial to appreciate
that the elimination of the object does not entail the elimination of the subject, only its
reinterpretation; in short, in the transition from techn as epistem to techn as
Enframing (Gestellen), the knowing subject is transformed into what is referred to as the
historically-embedded anthropic-component (artificer-interpreter). As Lovitt (1977)
states,
the rule of such a way of revealing [as techn-Enframing (Gestellen)] is seen when man becomes
subject, when from out of his consciousness he assumes dominion over everything outside himself,
when he represents and objectifies and, in objectifying, begins to take control over everything. It
comes to its fulfilment when, as increasingly the case in our time, things are not even regarded as
objects, because their only important quality has become their readiness for use. Today all things are
being swept together into a vast network in which their only meaning lies in their being available to
serve some end that will itself also be directed toward getting everything under control. (p.xxix)
Consistent with this view, Gould (1986) maintains that, for Heidegger, "techn is the
mode of human irrupting into the physis. So we can see techn as art, but as a broad
conception of art, as a human capacity to bring forth." Furthermore, "this irrupting,
280
The referent in this case being Being itself (Seyn) which is first hypostatized (distortion) and then replaced
(absence) by an ontical reification (that is, a being), viz. computation (pure simulacrum).
281
It is maintained herein that techn (artificiality or allopoisis) is closed to emergence (physis as poisis) while
physis (naturality or autopoisis) is open to emergence (physis as poisis).
Chapter 6 Poisis
technical perspective imposes an enormous responsibility, for it determines what is

brought forth in opposition to that which resides in itself, to that which is [given]. That
human irruption means something else is brought forth." (p.7) In the case of "hard" (or
pure) artifacts (chapter 7), in which techn manifests as Enframing (Gestellen), the
direction of irruption is, as Gould rightly points out, from human being (Dasein) to
Being as such (Seyn): Man is summoned forth by Being as such in order to challenge-
forth (or set-upon) the latter. Thus, Being as such is gathered into beings and as the
orderable. With the change in the Being of (classical) Greek Dasein to (modern) subject,
revealing (that is, unconcealment or presencing) changes (inverts) from a summoning-
forth of man by Being to a challenging-setting-upon - or Enframing (Gestellen) - of
Being by man. As stated previously, this change (inversion) is significant since, as
Heidegger (1977a) states, "Enframing conceals that revealing which, in the [original
Greek] sense of poisis, lets what presences come forth into appearance." (p.27) This is
consistent with his identification of (originary) techn with epistem (knowing). As he
goes on to state, "there was a time when it was not technology alone that bore the name
techn. Once that revealing that brings forth truth into the splendor of radiant appearing
also was called techn." (p.34) However, according to Lovitt (1977),
the philosopher sought to grasp and consider reality, to discover what might be permanent within it,
so as to know what it truly was. But precisely in so doing he distanced himself from Being, which
was manifesting itself in the presencing of all particular beings. For in his seeking, he reached out not
simply to receive with openness, but also to control. Here, to Heidegger's thinking, lies the real origin
of the modern technological age. Techn was a skilled and thorough knowing that disclosed, that was,
as such, a mode of bringing forth into presencing, a mode of revealing. Philosophy, as a thinking that
considered reality and therewith made it manifest in its Being, was techn also in its own way. In the
Western tradition, the metaphysical thinking born of that philosophy carried forward the expression
of techn into modern times. (p.xxv)
The opposition between permanence (eidos, essence, stasis) and techn (allopoisis) on
the one hand, and enduring presencing (physis, essencing, dynamism) and physis
(autopoisis) on the other is significant because of the former's connection with
kategoria (categories) and the latter with logos (collecting, gathering). According to
Heidegger (1959), "with the change of physis [the emerging power] to eidos [the form
or idea] and of logos [the gathering together] to kategoria [the categories] the original
disclosure of the Being of the essent [the thing] ceased." (p.188) As he goes on to state,
properties, magnitude, relations are determinations of being. Because as modes of being-said [that
is, of logos interpreted - under the identification of Being with idea - as statement], they are derived
from logos - and because to state is katgorein - the determinations of the being of the essent are
called katgoriai, categories. Thus the doctrine of being and of the determinations of the essent as
such becomes a discipline which searches for the categories and their order. The goal of all ontology
is a doctrine of categories. It has long been taken for granted that the essential characteristics of being
are categories. But fundamentally it is strange and becomes comprehensible only if we understand
not only how the logos as statement broke away from physis but how it set itself up in opposition to
physis as the decisive domain, the source of all determinations of being [viz. the categorial]. (p.187)
Chapter 6 Poisis
To the extent that metaphysical systems are categorial systems (section 6.5.6), they
involve `cutting' (chapter 1). But what is `cutting' ? A hint as to its meaning is provided
in the first of the above statements, viz. the ceasing of the disclosure of the Being (Sein)
of beings (Seiendes). In this context, `ceasing' is synonymous with circumscription,
`closing-off', sealing; thus, `cutting' refers to the closing (circumscribing, `sealing-off')
of beings from Being as such (Seyn). `Cutting' hypostatizes Being (Seyn) by identifying
the latter with the Being (Sein) of `cut' beings (Seiendes): The (dynamic) logos of Being
becomes the (static) kategoria of beings which are taken to be ontologically-primitive
or atomic282. According to Gerard (1969), "making categories is man's great intellectual
strength and weakness: strength, since only by dividing the world into categories can he
reason with it; weakness, since he then takes the categories seriously." (p.216) In this
connection, it is interesting to note, following Heidegger (1977d), that
the Romans translate therein [to theorise] by contemplari, theria [theory] by contemplatio ..
Contemplari means: to partition something off into a separate sector and enclose it therein. Templum
is the Greek temenos, which has its origin in an entirely different experience from that out of which
therein originates. Temnein means: to cut, to divide. The uncuttable is the atmton, a-tomon, atom.
(p.165)
Furthermore, "in theoria transformed into contemplatio there comes to the fore the
impulse, already prepared in Greek thinking, of a looking-at that sunders and
compartmentalizes." (p.166) This `looking-at' - which is a way of Being - is techn-
Enframing (Gestellen). As Heidegger (1977b) states,
[the presencing of being as physis] that is steadily constant .. is transformed into the fixedly constant,
i.e., becomes that which stand steadily at something's disposal, only in being brought to a stand
through a setting in place [that is, an enframing]. (p.84)
In closing-off beings from Being as such (that is, from possibility283), `cutting' atomizes,
decontextualizes or `de-worlds' beings into the `steadily constant' (or permanent), that
is, the atomistic. As Feenberg (1997) states,
to reconstitute natural objects as technical objects, they must be `de-worlded', artificially separated
from the context in which they are originally found so as to be integrated to a technical system. Once
isolated they can be analyzed in terms of the utility of their various parts, and the technical schemas
these contain can then be released for general application. For example, inventions such as the knife
or the wheel take qualities such as the sharpness or roundness of some natural thing, such as a rock
or a tree trunk, and releases them as technical properties from the role they play in nature. Technology
282
However, as Sokolowski (1988) points out "[the] dawning of distinctions, is at the origin of the categories that
make up our common knowledge. It is prior to the axioms from which our inferences are derived [emphasis
added]" (p.60); hence, the need to ground the categories - further, categorial-ness - in incipience, that is,
ontological poisis or Being as such (Seyn).
283
The `cutting' into Being (Sein) of a deterministic space circumscribes a necessity which manifests as a
movement from potentiality through actuality.
Chapter 6 Poisis
is constructed from such fragments of nature that, after being abstracted from all specific contexts,
appear in a technically useful form [emphasis added]. (pp.11-12)
It is important to appreciate that the `de-worlding' schema applied is particular (or

specific) to the extent that it is grounded relative to a set of concerns and practices;
furthermore, this schema de-limits (or bounds) a priori the possibilities of technical
systems. Hence, the link between `cutting', artificing and abstraction introduced in
chapter 1. (Significantly, there are, broadly-speaking, two kinds of cutting-abstraction,
viz. (1) epistemological, as exemplified in the Cartesian `cut' between mind (res
cogitans) and body (res extensa) (Atmanspacher,94)284, and (2) ontological, as
exemplified in the challenging-setting-upon (Enframing) that extracts (`cuts', severs)
beings from Being.) However, it is crucial to note from the above statement that techn-
Enframing (Gestellen) is both `cutting' (abstraction) and `joining' (construction) and, in
this sense, preserves a connection to originary logos as collecting-collectedness; yet,
what emerges from this `joining' is not ontological Being as such (Seyn) but the `Being'
(or being-ness) of categorial (atomistic) metaphysics (section 6.5.6).
It is appropriate at this point in the discussion to consider the link between techn-
Enframing (Gestellen) and computationalism - more precisely, CA-computationalism -
preparatory to considering the relation between Enframing and artificiality (as
artifactuality) - specifically, CEA (chapter 5). According to Heidegger (1977c),
Ta mathmata means for the Greeks that which man knows in advance in his observation of whatever
is and in his intercourse with things: the corporeality of bodies, the vegetable character of plants, the
animality of animals, the humanness of man. Alongside these, belonging also to that which is already-
known, i.e., to the mathematical, are numbers. If we come upon three apples on the table, we
recognize that there are three of them. But the number three, threeness, we already know. This means
that number is something mathematical. Only because numbers represent, as it were, the most striking
of always-already-knowns, and thus offer the most familiar instance of the mathematical, is
`mathematical' promptly reserved as a name for the numerical. In no way, however, is the essence of
the mathematical defined by numberness. (pp.118-119)
Heidegger (1967) maintains that "the mathmata are things insofar as we take cognizance
of them as what we already know them to be in advance [and that] this genuine learning
is therefore an extremely peculiar taking, a taking where he who takes takes what he
basically already has [emphasis added]." (p.251) Ta mathmata (the mathematical) can
be characterized in terms of three concepts: (i) knowledge (epistem), (ii) limit or end
(telos) and (iii) making or artificing (techn). To the extent that the deterministic
functionality (telos) of the FSMs in a CA is circumscribed a priori (epistem) by an
external artificer (techn), CA-computationalism is ta mathmata. However, a more
precise interpretation of ta mathmata identifies it with the categorially a priori. In this
connection, it is significant to note, with Heidegger (1927), that
284
Bunge (1977b) points to another instance of epistemological cutting-abstraction in asserting that
"generalization, whether existential or universal, is strictly a conceptual operation [emphasis added]." (p.13)
Chapter 6 Poisis
in the mathematical projection of Nature .. what is decisive is not primarily the mathematical as such;
what is decisive is that this projection discloses something that is a priori .. The scientific projection
of any entities which we have somehow encountered already lets their kind of Being be understood
explicitly and in such a manner that it thus becomes manifest what ways are possible for the pure
discovery of entities within-the-world [emphasis added]. (p.414)
There are (at least) two points to note in connection with this statement: First, it is as
mathematical - that is, as mathematically-interpreted - that Nature is disclosable (that is,
can be disclosed); second, this disclosing projection sets limits to the Being (Sein) of
Nature such that pure possibility (or possibility as such) is circumscribed into potentiality
(or relative possibility) and actuality. As Heidegger (1977d) states, "mathematics is the
reckoning that, everywhere by means of equations, has set up as the goal of its
expectation the harmonizing of all relations of order, and that therefore `reckons' in
advance [that is, epistemically a priori] with one fundamental equation for all merely
possibly ordering [emphasis added]." (p.170) The culmination (end, telos) of this
reckoning-Enframing (Gestellen) is what Baudrillard (1983) refers to as the `liquidation
of referentiality' and the `precession of the simulacrum', viz. the severing of the
referential (specifically, semiotic) relation between natural reality (poisis as such) and
artifactual (mathematical, computational) representation (techn, allopoisis) such that
the latter self-grounds into hyperreality. Heidegger (1967) anticipated this event
(ereignis) in explicating the essence (Being) of technology, viz. "the mathematical wills
to ground itself in the sense of its own inner requirements." (p.275) It is crucial to
appreciate that the possibility of self-grounding with respect to artificiality (as
artifactuality) - specifically, CEA - becomes possible with the hypostatization of poitic
Being (enduring, presencing) into extantness: This is because it becomes possible to
encapsulate (seal, enclose, `cut') reality mathematically, which means functionally.
Given the links between functionality, functionalism, computationalism and multiple-
realizability, the liquidation of naturality in the self-grounding of "strong" CEA follows
almost of necessity. As Heidegger (1927) states "by reason of their Being-just-present-at-
hand-and-no-more .. entities can have their `properties' defined mathematically in
`functional concepts'. Ontologically, such concepts are possible only in relation to
entities whose Being has the character of pure substantiality [that is, hypostatized
permanence]. Functional concepts are never possible except as formalized substantial
concepts." (p.122) For this reason, Heidegger (1949a) insists that
modern science neither serves the purpose originally entrusted to it, nor does it seek truth in itself.
As a method of objectivising what-is by calculation it is a condition, imposed by the will to will [that
is, the controlling attitude which first manifests in the will-to-power], through which the will to will
secures its own sovereignty. But because all objectivisation of what-is ends in the provision and
safeguarding of what-is and thus provides itself with the possibility of further advance [that is,
continued preoccupation with the essent as the objective], the objectivisation gets stuck in what-is
and regards this as nothing less than Being (Sein). (p.381)
As he goes on to state, "calculative thought places itself under compulsion to master

everything in the logical terms of its procedure. [Yet] it has no notion that in calculation
everything calculable is already a whole before it starts working out its sums and
Chapter 6 Poisis
products, a whole whose unity naturally belongs to the incalculable which, with its
mystery, ever eludes the clutches of calculation." (p.388) In support of this position,
Brock (1949) maintains that "òbjectification' of a sphere of Being - [for example,]
matter, approached mathematically - which, keen on progress within its own setting, does
not analyse its presuppositions, is then too often, mistakenly identified with `Being'
itself." However,
`Being' is not an existing quality to be found in .. things. `Being' cannot be objectivated, neither in
thought nor by being produced like a machine. It forms an absolute contrast to, and is fundamentally
different from, all that is. It is as different from the things that are as is, in its way, `nothingness'
[emphasis added]. (pp.242-243)
Before concluding this discussion of the link between Being, techn-Enframing

(Gestellen) and CA-computationalism, it is worthwhile briefly considering Alexander's
(1920) views on the subject since his metaphysical framework anticipates CEA (chapter
5). On his view,
the occupation of any space-time, that is, self-identity, in distinction from any other space-time is
existence or determinate being .. Being is the occupation of space-time which excludes other
occupancy of space-time. (Vol. I, p.194-195)
On CA-computationalism, the periodic state vector (pattern, configuration) associated

with a finite set of cells (FSMs) in the CA lattice defines existence. There are a number
of points to note in connection with the above statement in the context of this study:
Firstly, it might be argued that conceiving Being (Sein) in terms of the self-other relation
is problematic since in the event that a space-time complex (that is, a determinate being)
assumes such proportions so as to become identical with Space-Time itself, which has
no òther' (than void), the space-time complex will itself have no òther'. Yet, for
Alexander, difference (distinction from òther') is equiprimordial with identity (`self')
and constitutive of being. The implication, on this scenario, is that a being (a space-time
complex) is not a being (since it is identical to Space-Time), which contradicts the law
of the excluded middle, viz. a thing cannot be both A and not-A simultaneously.
However, as stated in chapter 5, Alexanderian Space-Time is infinite in which case an
identity between a (finite yet expanding) space-time complex and Space-Time itself is
impossible, thereby ensuring that the law of the excluded middle is upheld. There are (at
least) two related problems with this position: (1) Such arguments notwithstanding, it
remains the case that a space-time complex can be postulated which is both a concrete
(actual) determinate being and identical to Space-Time (which is not a determinate
being). This space-time complex is the infinite set of all points in Space-Time and its
òther' is the empty set; hence, the possibility of logical contradiction (violation of the
law of the excluded middle) in the context of infinites; (2) to the extent that infinite
Space-Time is real (as opposed to ideal), it must be actual (on Alexander's scheme).
However, Aristotle maintains that actual infinites cannot exist. Hence, either Space-Time
is ideal or potential (Brettschneider,64) or/and it is finite in which case, the possibility
of logical contradiction again arises. It is crucial to appreciate that in identifying the
Chapter 6 Poisis
Being (Sein) of beings (Seiendes) with the occupation of space-time, Alexander places
himself firmly within the metaphysical tradition which focuses on beings to the exclusion
of Being as such: In short, Alexander - like Aristotle - addresses beings qua beings since
on his scheme, it is space-time which is the ground and Being is always the Being of
beings. On his view, "existence [is identical to] determinate being, or being itself (for ..
there is no being but determinate being) .." (Vol.I, p.197) However, this does not address
the question concerning the Being (Sein) of Space-Time itself. While beings can be
interpreted as determinate (finite, bounded) occupations of space-time - and thereby,
proximally-grounded in the latter - Space-Time itself requires grounding in that which
is itself ungrounded: To the extent that Space-Time is, it partakes of Being as such
(Seyn). As Heidegger (1993c) states, "everything spatial and all space-time occur
essentially in the dimensionality that Being itself is" (p.237), a position which follows
from appreciation of the ontological difference between beings and Being as such
(section 6.5.4)285; secondly, Alexander goes on to state that "the existent is nothing but
motion (that is Space-Time) [emphasis added]." (Vol.I, p.204) Heidegger's (1939)
ontological analysis of the Aristotelian concept of motion was briefly examined in
section 6.6.2 in connection with an investigation of the relation between physis and
poisis. As he states,
today, with the predominance of the mechanistic thinking of the modern natural sciences, we are
inclined both to hold that the basic form of movement is movedness in the sense of motion from one
position in space to another; and then to èxplain' everything that is moved in terms of it. That kind
of movedness - kinesis kata topon, movedness in terms of place or location - is for Aristotle only one
kind of movedness among others, but it in no way counts as movement pure and simple.
[Furthermore,] what Aristotle means by `change of place' is something different from the modern
conception of the change of location of some mass in space. I`B@H is the B@, the place where a
specific body belongs .. For us today space is not determined by way of place; rather, all places, as
constellations of points, are determined by infinite space that is everwhere homogeneous and nowhere
distinctive. (p.190)
Crucially, Heidegger maintains that "defining the essence of being is impossible without
an essential insight into movedness as such. Of course, this is not at all to say that being
is understood às movement' (or as rest), for such thinking would be foreign to the
Greeks and, in fact, absolutely unphilosophical (inasmuch as movedness is not `nothing',
and only being, in essence, rules over the nothing and over beings and over their
modes)." (p.187) To the extent that computation, specifically computation as realized in
CAs (chapter 2 and 5), viz. CA-computationalism, is a kind of kinesis, that is, motion (or
Alexanderian Space-Time), it follows that computation is of necessity - on account of the
285
Alexander (1920) rejects the notion of `neutral' (that is, indeterminate) Being on the grounds that the copula
ìs' "is appropriate only to certain propositions, those, namely, in which the terms are in the relation of subject
and attribute." (Vol.I, p.200) However, both "the rose (subject) is red (attribute)" and "the rose is" are
meaningful propositions and yet, the latter is not readily interpreted in subject-attribute terms. As shown in
section 6.5.4, is-ness or Being (Sein) does not behave like a universal predicate; it is particular to beings and
hence, manifold (Many) while remaining a unitary concept (One).
Chapter 6 Poisis
ontological difference between Being and beings (section 6.5.4) - grounded in Being as
such (Seyn): Being as such cannot be (Sein) computation because the latter is an
existential modality (Sein) of Being as such. This point is critical since it points to the
derivative nature of spatio-temporality, thereby undermining the categorial primordiality
of Space-Time in Alexanderian metaphysics and CA-computationalism (chapter 5). As
Krell (1978) states, "even when new discoveries require a change in its design the [space-
time] grid remains a transparency laminated on .. things [emphasis added]." (p.245)
As stated previously, on Heidegger's (1977a) view, both physis and techn are modes of
revealing, that is, altheuein. Crucially, however,
whoever builds a house or a ship or forges a sacrificial chalice reveals what is to be brought forth,
according to the perspectives of the four modes of occasioning [or causation]. This revealing gathers
together in advance the aspect and the matter of the ship or house, with a view to the finished thing
envisioned as completed, and from this gathering determines the manner of its construction
There are (at least) two points to note in connection with the above statement: First, that
the revealing associated with techn `gathers together in advance .. with a view to the
finished thing envisioned as completed' entails that a defining characteristic of the
artifactual is epistemic a priority (chapter 7) with respect to circumscription of end
(telos), thereby supporting the link between techn and epistem stated previously.
However, the expression ènvisioned as completed' also appears to undermine the
interpretation of emergent-artificiality - specifically, CEA - as artifactual (techn,
allopoitic) because the end (telos) - `finished thing' or emergent (product) - is not
known (ènvisioned') a priori. Yet under computationalism, the end is indeed envisioned
as completed since computational systems - such as CAs (chapters 2 and 5) - are
bounded with respect to the possibilities for causation associated with their state-
transition functions (substrata); such systems are incapable of transcending their a priori
specification because they are ontologically-closed. In such systems, ex nihilo nihil fit
(nothing comes from nothing) applies. It is significant that the ontological (or categorial)
closure of computationalism allows this maxim to be rendered as ex ens ens fit
(something comes from something) or, more precisely, ex computo computo fit, viz. from
computation comes computation; second, that `this gathering determines the mode of
construction' of the artifact is consistent with both top-down and bottom-up (chapter 3)
artificing follows from the fact that causation on CA-computationalism is necessary
(deterministic); hence, irrespective of which implementation methodology is adopted,
ontologically-speaking, artifacts will be identical: This follows from the fact that their
categorial essence (Being) is the same, viz. computation, and is a consequence of
ontological closure.
It is appropriate at this point in the discussion to briefly examine the link between the
product of techn-Enframing (Gestellen), viz. functional equipment, and CA-
computationalism, preparatory to the presentation in chapter 7 of a framework for
Chapter 6 Poisis
distinguishing naturality from artificiality on the basis of ontic and epistemic relations
to the anthropic component (artificer-interpreter). According to Heidegger (1995),
the machine is a piece of equipment and as such it serves some purpose. All equipment is a product
in some sense. The production of machines is described as machine construction .. The construction
proceeds according to a plan, and not merely as construction but as the whole productive process ..
Now in the production of equipment the plan is determined in advance by the serviceability of the
equipment. This serviceability is regulated by anticipating what purpose the piece of equipment or
indeed the machine are to serve [emphasis added]. (p.215)
In the context of this study - which is concerned with evaluating the sufficiency of
computationalism, specifically, CA-computationalism (chapter 5), as a metaphysics for
emergent artificiality - and while accepting their status as machines, it might be asked
to what extent cellular automata or CAs (chapter 2) are `pieces of equipment': What
purpose does a universal cellular automaton (or UCA) serve ? Can CAs be interpreted
as equipment ? Prior to addressing these issues it is worthwhile briefly examining what
Heidegger means by a `plan' in the context of machine construction (artificing).
However, before this can be attempted, it is necessary to clarify the relation between
equipment, instruments and machines. According to Heidegger, "not every piece of
equipment is an instrument, and even less is it the case that every instrument and every
piece of equipment is a machine .. [Furthermore,] every machine is a piece of equipment
although not every piece of equipment is a machine .. Yet if every machine is a piece of
equipment, that does not mean in turn that every machine is an instrument. Thus a
machine is not identical with an instrument, nor is an instrument identical with a piece
of equipment. Consequently it is already impossible to understand the machine as a
complex of instruments or as a complicated kind of instrument." (p.214) These relations
are summarized in the following table:
Equipment Instrumental Non-Instrumental
Mechanistic (1) (2)
Non-Mechanistic (3) (4)
Table 6.8 Relations between Equipment, Instruments and Machines.
we generally employ the term `plan' in the sense of the projection of a complex context. The
construction plan of a machine already contains the articulated and ordered structure in which the
individual components of the functioning machine move in concert with one another. Does this mean
that the machine is a complicated piece of equipment ? It is not the complexity of the structure which
is decisive for the machine-like character of a piece of equipment, but rather the autonomous
functioning of a structure designed for specific dynamic operations. The possibility of a particular
mechanical power-source belongs to the autonomous functioning of the structure. The specifically
structured processes are brought together into a single functional nexus, and the unity of this nexus
is prescribed by the purpose which the machine-like equipment is meant to perform [emphasis added].
Chapter 6 Poisis
(p.215)
However, Heidegger (1977a) insists that "the machine is completely unautonomous, for
it has its standing only from the ordering of the orderable." (p.17) These apparently
conflicting positions can be reconciled under hermeneutic realism (section 6.5.4): On the
one hand, the machine is unautonomous since its poisis (becoming, coming-forth,
bringing-forth) is grounded in the anthropic component as artificer while its (ontological)
Being is grounded in the anthropic component as interpreter (chapter 7). This follows
from the fact that machines, as instances of techn-Enframing (Gestellen), are ordered
for use - hence, the hermeneutic aspect; on the other hand, the machine is autonomous
since it is extant (that is, present-at-hand) and causal (ontical) - hence, the realism. With
respect to the issue of `design for specific dynamic operationality', this clearly applies
to CA-computationalism as the substrate of CEA since at this primordial ontological286
level, CA state-transition functionality is completely specified (by the artificer), and
hence, artifactually-given or made. Crucially, Heidegger maintains that
a ready-made piece of equipment is subject to some implicit or explicit prescription with respect to
its possible use. This prescription is not given by the readiness of the equipment, but is always
derived from the plan which has already determined the production of the equipment and its specific
equipmental character. (p.228)
This position may be re-stated in the context of the distinction between the substrate
(substratum) and emergent (product) levels in a CA as follows:
the possibility for dynamical evolution in CEA as grounded in CA-computationalism is explicitly

determined by the local state-transition function and initial local state associated with cells (FSMs)
in the CA lattice - that is, at the level of the substrate - and implicitly determined by the global state-
transition function and initial global state associated with the CA itself - that is, at the level of the
emergent. This determination is derived from the specification (of the CA parameters) which are
given by the artificer (who is external to the system, that is, allopoietically-exosystemic).
If CA-computationalism is to be interpreted equipmentally, it must be shown that CAs

serve (or perform) purposes. It is clearly the case that specific (or particular) CAs serve
specific purposes; for example, simulating ("weak" interpretation), emulating or realizing
("strong" interpretation) natural phenomena such as matter, life and mind (chapter 5).
However, what purposes (if any) do universal CAs - that is, UCAs (chapters 2 and 5) -
serve ? The answer to this question lies in appreciation of the ontological Being (essence)
of UCAs, viz. capacity for universal simulation, that is, the simulation of all possible
machines (chapter 4), which, under the "strong" or ontological interpretation of the
Church-Turing thesis (chapter 2) means the realization of all possible beings: In short,
UCAs are media (substrata) in which logically possible formal (or computational)
worlds can be realized. As substrates within which to implement artifactual analogues
286
Here, ontological is used in its conventional, that is, metaphysical sense, as opposed to its specific,
Heideggerian phenomenological meaning.
Chapter 6 Poisis
of specific natural phenomena, UCAs support the instantiation of phenomenal

isomorphisms - that is, correspondences - between naturals and artifactuals. However,
the implementation capacity of UCAs is not limited to supporting isomorphisms with
actuality but extends to the possible (that is, potentiality relative to actuality). As
Baudrillard (1983) argues, on computationalism
simulation is no longer that of a territory, a referential being or substance. It is the generation by

models of a real without origin or reality: a hyperreal. The territory no longer precedes the map, nor
survives it. Henceforth it is the map that precedes the territory - PRECESSION of SIMULACRA
Given this identification of the purpose of UCAs - as virtual realities (chapter 4) or

simulacra - it follows that UCAs can be interpreted equipmentally; specifically, as
instances of universal machine-like equipment supporting what Heidegger (1995) refers
to as world-formation287. This latter point is extremely important since, as shown in
section 6.5.3, it is Dasein that is world-forming, the implication being that the artificing
Dasein is essential to the Being of virtual worlds288. Yet, according to Baudrillard, man
is `liquidated' (absorbed, subsumed) in the simulacrum. This position may be contested
by appealing to Heidegger (1977a) who maintains that in techn-Enframing (Gestellen) -
which has been seen to involve something similar to the `liquidation of referentiality' in
reinterpreting objects in terms of standing-reserve (Bestand) - the `liquidator', viz. human
being (or Dasein), while clearly being transformed in the process of virtual world
construction, is not itself liquidated. As he states, "precisely because man is challenged
more originally than are the energies of nature [or the forms of artifacts], i.e., into the
process of ordering, he never is transformed into mere standing-reserve [that is, a
technical resource]. Since man drives technology forward, he takes part in ordering as
a way of revealing [emphasis added]." (p.18) The anthropocentricity of UCAs as virtual
realities is examined further in chapter 7 in connection with a framework describing the
ontic and epistemic relations between artificer-interpreters, naturality and artificiality (as
artifactuality).
It is appropriate at this point in the presentation to briefly reexamine the link between
techn and production in the context of the previous discussion of the relation between
artifactuality and equipmental use or praxis. Kovacs (1990) holds that
287
According to Heidegger (1929), "`Dasein transcends' [section 6.5.3] means: in the essence of its being it is
world-forming, `forming' in the multiple sense that it lets worlds occur, and through the world gives itself an
original view (form) that is not explicitly grasped, yet functions precisely as a paradigmatic form [that is, what
Polanyi (1966) refers to as a tacit gestalt] for [disclosing the Being (Sein) of] all manifest beings, among which
each respective Dasein itself belongs." (p.123)
288
According to Heidegger (1959), "world is always world of the spirit. The animal has no world nor any
environment." (p.45) However, to appreciate this point it is necessary to understand what is meant by `spirit'
in this (phenomenological) context, viz. "a fundamental, knowing resolve toward the essence of being" (p.49),
in other words, Dasein.
Chapter 6 Poisis
according to Heidegger, production is a way of relating to beings that need to be produced, made,
brought forth [by another], created. The origin of the idea of production is rooted in the production
(producing, productive) comportment of human existence (Dasein). The productive activity of human
existence indicates that production always makes use of a material that is already given and not the
result of productive activity. [Thus, production is consistent with the maxim ex nihilo nihil fit].
Production is always the production of something out of something; it is not an accidental mode; it
is guided by the essence of production. Thus the ontological concepts `material' and `matter' come
from here. These two concepts play a fundamental role in ancient philosophy, according to
Heidegger, not because the Greeks were materialists, but because matter is a basic ontological
concept that comes about necessarily when beings are interpreted according to the production
attitude in comprehending Being. Being as such is viewed in the light of this attitude of production
that underlies (in viewing and in producing) the relationship of human existence to beings; all beings
are viewed as produced (as made) or as in need of being produced. This way of thinking leads to an
ontology of thinghood [emphasis added]. (p.227)
Hence, "the state of being-produced is the very structure of the Being of beings; the
activity of production functions as an ontological explanation and structure." (p.228) On
the basis of the above statement, it might be argued that only "soft" (or impure) artifacts
constitute instances of techn since matter is given in this case whereas in "hard" (or
pure) artifacts, both form and matter are made, that is, artificed (chapter 7). However,
that this is not, in fact, the case is readily established by considering the possibility of
supernatural creation of the natural ex nihilo (section 6.4.2.3). According to Kovacs
(1990),
even though creation out of nothing (by God) is not identical with production of something out of a
preexisting material (human creativity), nevertheless the activity of (divine) creation does have the
general ontological character of production. God is not produced by any other being; he is the ens
increatum (uncreated being), the causa prima (first cause) of all beings. (p.227)
To the extent that the matter of "hard" artifacts is itself artificial (as artifactual) and
hence, made not given, it follows that this matter is nothing in some sense289. If
supernatural creatio ex nihilo constitutes a form of production (artificing), it follows that
anthropocentric `creatio ex nihilo' must a fortiori constitute a form of artificing; thus,
"hard" artifacts are indeed instances of techn. It is crucial to appreciate, as Kovacs
points out, that "the notion of God as the uncreated creator functions .. as the ontological
explanation of reality as a whole. This explanation regards beings as made (created,
produced) or as unmade (uncreated, not in need of being produced); it ultimately
understands Being (the structure of `to-be') as Createdness, as Production, and thus it
grasps beings as the result of production." (p.228) Yet, he is led to ask the following
question:
What is the essence of the production-based ontological perspective ? It is the conviction that in
producing (creating, making) something (a being) lies the primary and basic relation to the Being of
a being; the Being of a being, then, means nothing else than Createdness, the state of being produced.
289
In fact, the matter of "hard" artifacts is not nothing but partakes of Being as such (Seyn) as an abstract type (or
kind) of Being (Sein), viz. the imaginary or ideal.
Chapter 6 Poisis
The author (creator) of a being, as Kant claims, knows this being in its Being. Only the originator of
being(s) is capable of knowing authentic Being, of perceiving a being in its Being, of genuine
ontological knowledge. Finite beings are only in part creators and originators; they do not produce
themselves (out of nothing); rather, they are produced (by the highest being, ultimately). Finiteness
is a relationship of dependency, of receptivity; it is the impossibility of being the origin and producer
of another being and of one's self. Thus, finite beings know only what they partially create and to the
extent that they can create it; the Being of any being cannot be created (produced) by another finite
being. The Being of finite beings (of things and persons), therefore, is grasped a priori under the
horizon of producedness, of being-produced [emphasis added]. (p.229)
However, while naturality can be interpreted productively - for example, in terms of

ontical autopoiesis (sections 6.4.2.2 and 6.4.2.4) - this interpretation becomes highly
problematic when naturality is identified with physis and the latter with Being as such
(Seyn) since Being is not a being and hence, the causal (or productive) relation does not -
cannot - apply. Thus, interpreting Being as Createdness - a metaphysical or
ontotheological position - is problematic because the ontological difference between
beings (including God as Creator) and Being (section 6.5.4) is ignored. In order to
address this problem, it is necessary to transcend the horizon of production with respect
to the interpretation of naturality (as physis). It is maintained herein that this
transcendent horizon, involving a relation between Being and beings - and hence,
necessarily grounded in the ontological difference - is poitic yet non-causal, viz.
ontological poisis as historical-incipience. The originary290 Being of artificiality (as
artifactuality), by contrast, is given by techn, that is, production. For this reason, the
ontology of the artifactual is ontical291 (causal, productive); it is only derivatively, via
concealment of Being, that the artifactual can be reinterpreted existentially
(hermeneutically) and by that being capable of failing to sustain the poitic difference
(section 6.6.4) between naturality and artificiality (as artifactuality) on account of
`fallenness' (preoccupation with beings), viz. Dasein (section 6.5.3). The ontological -
and hence, poitic - difference between naturality and artificiality (as artifactuality) can
be described in terms of movements between ontical existence or extantness (present-to-
hand) and ontological equipmentality or availability (ready-to-hand) and summarized in
the following table:
Naturality physis (autopoisis) ready-to-hand

(Breakdown) 6 (ontological) 6
techn (allopoisis) present-at-
hand (ontical)
290
The non-incipient Being (Sein) of artifactuals is hermeneutic and correctly characterized as equipmentality
(chapter 1).
291
By contrast, Dasein's ontical Being is ontological (section 6.5.3).
Chapter 6 Poisis
Artificiality techn (allopoisis) present-at-

(Fallenness) 6 hand (ontical)
physis (autopoisis) 6 ready-to-
hand
(ontological)
Table 6.9 Existential Movement in Naturality and Artificiality.
Heidegger's pre-Kehre project attempts to understand the meaning of the ontological

difference between beings and Being (section 6.5.4) by interpreting Being in non-
productive (that is, non-causal) terms under the horizon of use (functionality, praxis),
viz. concernful being-in-the-world (chapter 1). However, it is crucial to appreciate the
following: (1) On this basis, the poitic difference (section 6.6.4) - that is, the difference
in becoming (coming-forth, bringing-forth) associated with naturals and artifactuals - is
obscured, which is problematic because Being and becoming are essentially related
(section 6.5.8); and (2) the horizon of production is not, in fact, transcended in the move
to a praxical or equipmental interpretation of Being since, as Heidegger (1995) points
out, "all equipment is a product in some sense." (p.215) Thus, the praxis (or use)
interpretation of equipment retains links to the concept of production and ontical poisis
(becoming, coming-forth, bringing-forth). This is significant since the ontological
difference, in conjunction with the link between praxis and ontical poisis, points to an
ontological poisis which is grounding relative to the latter. As stated previously, it is
maintained that this ontological poisis is originary physis, that is, historical-incipience.
However, the validity of Heidegger's post-praxical reflections (section 6.5.3) on the
question of Being and poisis (as physis and techn) have been disputed. For example,
Hickman (1996) contests the value of Heidegger's post-Kehre thinking on the problem
of technology maintaining that its `romanticist', supposedly anti-technological slant is
grounded in Heidegger's disastrous political and ethical failures292 . This charge of
romanticism is supported by Margolis (1983) who identifies Heidegger's proposal that
man "turn .. to the `call' of Being itself, that is, to the very source of [his] prodigal but
dangerous ontologies" with the adoption of a "transcendent rather than transcendental
philosophy." (p.294) Contesting what he perceives to be the èxtravagance' of this
position, Margolis maintains that while
there is no escape from the historical condition, .. the recognition of that fact itself is the profoundly
simple result of transcendental reflection within the very condition of history - which obviates,
therefore, the inescapability of Heidegger's various (transcendental) pessimisms and the need for his
extravagant (transcendent) optimism. (p.306)
Although Dreyfus (1991, 1997) makes a case for a positive interpretation of Heidegger
vis-a-vis (post-modern) technology, it is important to appreciate that he, like others
before him such as Margolis and Ihde (1979), attempts to subsume the post-Kehre
292
Specifically, his early support for National Socialism and `silence' regarding the Holocaust.
Chapter 6 Poisis
meditations on Being into the pre-Kehre reflections on Dasein interpreted as a

phenomenology of praxis or pragmatics. However, interpreting the pre-Kehre project in
pragmatist terms is highly questionable since Heidegger's ultimate concern is with
(phenomenological) ontology, that is, with the question of Being as such itself and not
praxis in the sense of the technological Being (Sein) of a specific being, viz. Dasein. As
shown in section 6.5.3, the analytic of Dasein must be considered preparatory with
respect to the question concerning Being as such. Furthermore, and contrary to Margolis'
assertions, the Being of Dasein revealed via phenomenological inquiry is not
technological (or transcendental) but transcendent: Dasein is ek-sistence, projection, ek-
stasis and because Being as such (Seyn) is its transcendent ground. Schirmacher (1983)
supports this position in asserting - against Ihde (1979), Margolis (1983) and Dreyfus
(1991) - "being-in-the-world as precondition of theory and praxis." (p.277) Thus,
transcendent (or transcending) Dasein is the ground of technological man; the former is
an ontological-existential (concrete universal) while the latter is an ontical-existentiell
(concrete particular) and this notwithstanding the interpretation of the Being of Dasein
relative to the horizon of production (in which beings are understood in equipmental -
that is, intentionalistically -functional - terms.) The distinction between this study -
which is concerned with a critique of "strong" CEA (chapter 5) grounded in post-Kehre
Heideggerian thought - and the technological project of philosophers of technology
grounded in a pragmatist interpretation of pre-Kehre Heideggerian thought can be
summarized as follows: Ihde (1974) is concerned with "a preliminary phenomenology
of human-machine relations" by which is meant "the experienced use [or praxis] of
machines" as opposed to "the conception of, invention of, building of, or other possible
human-machine relations [emphasis added]." (p.6) By contrast, this study is concerned
with establishing a phenomenology of natural-artificial relations, that is, with
determining (disclosing, unconcealing) the Being (Sein) or existential essence of the
poitic difference (section 6.6.4) between naturality and artifactuality. Rather than being
concerned with issues of praxis (ùse', interpretation), this study is concerned with issues
relating to poisis (becoming, coming-forth, bringing-forth) and incipience (`conception',
ìnvention', `building', production). To the extent that the pragmatist position, in focusing
on the praxical Being (Sein) of Dasein, fails to address the question concerning the
meaning and truth of Being as such (Seyn) - and hence, the question concerning the
meaning and truth of poisis and the poitic difference - it follows that it does not
constitute a refutation of the thinking of the post-Kehre period; rather, it provides
negative evidence in support of the latter.
In chapter 7, a phenomenological framework is described which enables naturals to be

distinguished from artifactuals in terms of the ontical and epistemical relationality of
such phenomena to what is identified as the historically-embedded anthropic component
(artificer-interpreter). Anticipating that discussion, naturality can be identified with the
given and artificiality (as artifactuality) with the made. As Heidegger (1959) states
"techn is the initial and persistent looking out beyond what is given at any time .. this
transcendence effects what gives the datum its relative justification, its potential
Chapter 6 Poisis
determinateness, and hence its limit [emphasis added]." (p.159) To the extent that the
artifactual or made is characterized by other-production (techn as allopoisis), it follows
that the natural or given must be characterized by self-production (physis as autopoisis).
However, this interpretation of the given remains ontical - that is, concerned with beings
and defined with reference to the self-other duality - and does not address its ontological
ground, viz. givenness as such (that is, physis as ontological poisis). Consistent with
what has been stated previously in connection with the link between `cutting', closure
and techn-Enframing (Gestellen), it must be appreciated that it is the made-ness of
artificials (as artifactuals) that entails their closure. This assertion is suported by
Heidegger (1977a) who maintains that
the challenging revealing [that is, Enframing] has its origin as a destining in bringing-forth. But at the
same time Enframing, in a way characteristic of a destining, blocks poisis. (pp.29-30)
From this statement, it follows that techn is emergent from physis (as poisis) and in
such a way as to prevent the possibility of further emergence - which necessitates a
movement from techn back to physis - in the artifact. As stated in section 6.6.2, this
latter movement - what Heidegger (1993b) refers to as elusion, evading - is
characteristic of the essence of ontologically-incipient emergence and possible only for
physis as autopoisis since the latter remains - unlike techn - open to physis as poisis.
Importantly, this closure or completeness of artificials (as artifactuals) - in the existential
sense of wholeness rather than the logical sense associated with formal systems (chapter
2) - entails the possibility of their equipmentality, that is, their being appropriated as
ready-to-hand. As Heidegger (1995) states, "equipment is ready insofar as it is finished.
But this finished state consists precisely in its being ready. And `ready' here also implies
that it has a certain readiness which makes it suitable and usable for something [that is,]
readiness for the specific manner and way in which equipment can be serviceable."
(p.220) Crucially, he goes on to assert that
to say that a finished product is ready not only means that it is (1.) completed, and (2.) serviceable
for..., but also means that it is (3.) incapable of getting any further in its specific being as such
(equipmental being). It is now completed, that is, it is and remains something that can be called upon
and used precisely as something produced and only as such. In its equipmental being it indeed enables
and prescribes a particular application in each case. But with regard to this application, and how it
takes place or whether it takes place or not, the equipment not only has no part to play, but
equipmental being shows no intrinsic urge toward such application. The equipment is simply
serviceable and with that its being is complete [emphasis added]. (p.226)
Hence, a defining characteristic of the artifactual is closure to ontological emergence:

Although both naturals and artifactuals achieve their limit (end, telos) as finite beings,
it must be appreciated that the limit associated with naturals is not imposed
(allopoietically) by another ontical - and hence, limited or finite - being as is the case for
Chapter 6 Poisis
artifactuals293, but rather emerges from ontological - and hence, unlimited or in-finite
(section 6.5.2) - Being as such. To this extent, ontically-closed naturals are ontologically-
open to emergence whereas artificials (as artifactuals) are ontologically-closed. As stated
previously, there are (at least) two reasons for this openness of ontical physis
(autopoisis) and closure of ontical techn (allopoisis): (1) the continuity between (post-
Socratic) ontical physis and (pre-Socratic) ontological physis, that is, between natural
ontical and ontological poisis; and (2) the discontinuity between artifactual ontical
poisis (allopoisis or techn) and ontological poisis as such (physis) which follows
from the fact that the Being (Sein) of artifactuals is ontical, viz. artifacts are
ontologically-ontical294.
In concluding this section, it is worthwhile briefly reemphasizing that in this study,

naturality is not identical to Heidegger's nature or `nature', that is, with the occurrent or
ontical (section 6.4.5). Rather, naturality is herein equated with physis and stands in
opposition to the artifactual which is equated with techn-Enframing (Gestellen).
According to Lovitt (1977),
reality as `nature' is represented as a manifold of cause and effect coherences. So represented, nature
becomes amenable to experiment. But this does not happen simply because nature intrinsically is of
this character; rather it happens, Heidegger avers, specifically because man himself represents nature
as of this character and then grasps and investigates it according to methods that, not surprisingly, fit
perfectly the reality so conceived. (p.xxvii)
It is important to appreciate that `nature' in the above statement refers to an interpretation

of the natural (or given), viz. as the ontical (causal, productive). On Heidegger's view,
the intrinsic Being (Sein) of naturality - or Being as such (Seyn) - as physis is not
accessed on this hermeneutical projection, the implication being that naturality
transcends `nature'295. Crucially, artificiality as the analogue of `nature' can be shown to
manifest the ontical (causal, productive) Being associated with the latter more completely
than does naturality. This follows from the fact that (causal) `nature' is an artifactual
293
This òther' being the finite (human) artificer.
294
As stated in section 6.5.3, Dasein is ontically-ontologically: Its factical èxistence' (ek-sistence) as being-in-the-
world is characterized by transcendence or the appreciation of the Being (Sein) of beings (Seiendes) and,
ultimately, of Being as such (Seyn). Artifacts, by contrast, are - at least primordially, incipiently - ontologically-
ontical: Their Being (Sein) is characterized by their createdness, their producedness. To the extent that
production is a causal relation between beings, the Being of artifacts is characterized in terms of the self-other
or subject-object relation. Given that this relation is itself ontical, it follows that the Being of artifacts is,
thereby, ontical; hence, ontologically-ontical. However, to the extent that artifacts are produced by an artificer
for a purpose, they can be defined equipmentally which means hermeneutically or ontologically. In this
derivative, hermeneutic sense, artifactuals are ontically-ontological (with Dasein).
295
According to Heidegger (1929), the ontical (or `natural') sciences merely indicate "the originary [that is,
incipiently-given] ontological constitution of .. nature." (p.105)
Chapter 6 Poisis
projection onto naturality and thereby partakes of artificiality (as artifactuality); in short,
artificiality corresponds to `nature' more closely than does naturality because both the
former are artifactual. However, this critique extends beyond the ontical-productive -
beings as products - to the ontological-hermeneutic - beings as equipment - for, as Parkes
(1987b) states, "whereas to deal with manufactured [or artifactual] things as to-hand [that
is, as equipment] is to disclose them as they are in themselves (an sich), to relate to
natural things only as on/to-hand [that is, as the equipmental] is not to discover `nature
in an original sense', is to fail to appreciate the `power of nature'." On this basis he is led
to entertain the view that
presumably the third possible attitude toward nature [in Heidegger's thought], being neither practical
nor theoretical, is primarily aesthetic. (p.116)
It is maintained herein that such attitudes constitute existential modalities - that is,
epochal ways (or modes) of Being (Sein) - incipiently-grounded in Being as such (Seyn).
6.6.4. The Poitic Difference
whatever range has been attributed to the word `nature' in the various ages of Western history, in each
case the word contains an interpretation of beings as a whole, even when `nature' seems to be meant
as only one term in a dichotomy. In all such dichotomies, `nature' is not just one of two equal terms
but èssentially' holds the position of priority, inasmuch as the other terms are always and primarily
differentiated by contrast with - and therefore are determined by - nature. (p.184)
Consistent with this dualistic position, Bunge (1979b) asks "in what does the ontology
of artifacts differ from that of natural objects ? [emphasis added]" (p.263) This statement
is significant since in explicitly questioning concerning the nature (essence, what-ness)
of the difference between naturality and artificiality (as artifactuality), it is implicitly
assumed that there is a difference between naturals and artificials (as artifactuals);
specifically, an ontological distinction or difference296 in the Being (Sein) of natural and
artificial beings (Seiendes). In support of the latter assertion, Ferr (1988) maintains that
"defining technology so that there is no difference left between the natural and the
artificial .. defeats all clarity on the subject." (p.18) Collingwood (1945), in the context
of a discussion of the foundational assumptions underlying Greek cosmology, is led to
the following contrast between naturality and artificiality (as artifactuality), viz.
among the things with which we are acquainted some, no doubt, are àrtificial', that is are the products
of `skill' on the part of human or other animals, but others are `natural', the contradictory of àrtificial',
296
In what follows, it will be shown that naturals and artificials (as artifactuals) are ontologically distinct because
of (1) differences in their respective modes of poisis (coming-forth, bringing-forth, becoming), (2) the unitary
relatedness of poisis and Being and the ontological difference between beings and Being
(section 6.5.4).
Chapter 6 Poisis
things that happen or exist of themselves and not because someone has made them or produced them.
(pp.29-30)
The significant issues are (i) involvement of skill on the part of the artificer, (ii) that
artificers are not necessarily human, and (iii) that natural things are not the product of
artificers. It is important to appreciate that (ii) engenders a distinction between zoo-
artifactuality and anthropo-artifactuality which, thereby, become types (or kinds) of
artifactuality under the genus bio-artifactuality297. However, the extension of artificing
capacity beyond human beings to animals can be shown to be highly problematic when
viewed from an ontological (that is, phenomenological) perspective since, according to
Heidegger (1995), animals are `poor in world' whereas man is `world-forming'. This
follows from the fact that the formation of worlds - which are ontological (existential,
hermeneutic) as opposed to ontical (occurrent, causal) structures - necessitates
appreciation of as-ness, that is, the existential as-structure: While animals appear capable
of artificing, only Daseins298 can really be artificers since only Daseins can appreciate
artificing as artificing. However, implied in the ontological assertion that the animal is
`poor in world' is Heidegger's recognition that the animal has world although the
formation (that is, historically-incipient coming-forth) of worlds as worlds is exclusive
to Dasein and because it constitutes the defining characteristic of Dasein, viz.
transcendence (section 6.5.3)299. As Heidegger states,
when we say that the lizard is lying on the rock, we ought to cross out the word `rock' in order to
indicate that whatever the lizard is lying on is certainly given in some way for the lizard, and yet is
not known to the lizard as a rock. If we cross out the word we do not simply mean to imply that
something else is in question here or is taken as something else. Rather we imply that whatever it is
is not accessible to it as a being. (p.198)
Collingwood's position is problematic because, on Heidegger's view, the Being (Sein)

of beings (Seiendes) is structurally discontinuous (section 6.5.4), that is, there are many
ways to-be. Hence, beings cannot be defined in terms of universal concepts of essence
(what-ness) and existence (that-ness). This point is critical because it provides a basis for
distinguishing humans (Being as `world forming') from animals (Being as `poor in
world') and naturality from artificiality (as artifactuality): According to Heidegger
(1982), every being has an essence (what-ness) and an existence (that-ness) particular
297
For the sake of completeness, bio-artificiality must be extended to include - as a taxonomic possibility - phyto-
artifactuality, that is, skilful making by plants.
298
The implication is that human beings are Daseins and animals are not. However, whether the class of Daseins
and humans beings is coextensive remains unresolved since there remains the possibility that other non-animal
beings exist that are capable of transcendence, viz. appreciating the ontological difference between beings and
Being as such (section 6.5.4) and, thereby, the existentiality of artificing as artificing.
299
This statement is an oversimplification since the transcendence of Dasein associated with world-formation is
proximal relative to its distal transcendence to Being as such.
Chapter 6 Poisis
to its way (or mode) of Being (Sein). However, it is crucial to appreciate that these
aspects of the Being (Sein) of a being (Seiende) are temporally (that is, historically)
related; specifically, what-ness (or quiddity) describes the end (telos) or static aspect
(presence) of a being while that-ness (or `quoditty') - which must be identified with
how-ness (section 6.5.4) - describes the origin and ordering (arch) or dynamic aspect
(presencing) of a being. This is consistent with Whitehead's (1978) assertion that "how
an actual entity becomes constitutes what that actual entity is .. Its `being' is constituted
by its `becoming'." (p.23) Given the historicity of the Being of beings and, thereby, the
unitary relatedness of Being and becoming, it follows that beings must be distinguishable
on the basis of their respective modalities of poisis (coming-forth, bringing-forth,
becoming). As will be seen in what follows, naturals and artificials (as artifactuals) are
distinct because their modes of poisis, viz. physis (or autopoisis) and techn (or
allopoisis) respectively, are ontologically distinct.
In support of the Heideggerian position described above, Vickers (1981) identifies the
essence of artifacts (that is, artificiality as artifactuality) with "skillful making by human
minds of designs for ordering or explaining some aspect of what we experience as
reality", asserting further that "few would deny that all such designing involves the
creation, imposition and recognition of form." Crucially, he maintains that
the regularities to be found in the àrtificial' world are different in origin, kind, and reliability from
those to be found in the natural world. (p.144)
This statement is significant since it supports arguments postulating a poitic difference

between naturals and artificials (as artifactuals). However, while Vickers distinguishes
three separate terms in the distinction, viz. (i) origin, (ii) kind and (iii) reliability, it is
important to appreciate that, ontologically-speaking, these terms stand in unitary relation
under the concept of Being: (1) Origin refers to the incipient and dynamic aspect of the
Being (Sein) of beings (Seiendes), viz. the presencing of origination and ordering
(arch); (2) kind refers to the non-incipient and static aspect of the Being of beings, viz.
presence or the stable, enduring persisting of that which has achieved its limit or end
(telos); (3) reliability refers to the relation between origin and kind: In naturals, this
relation is open since naturals are ontically-closed (finite) and ontologically-open
(categorially-dynamic)300. This openness follows from the link between physis as (finite)
autopoisis and physis as (in-finite) poisis; in artificials (as artifactuals), this relation
is closed since artifactuals are both ontically-closed (finite) and ontologically-closed
(categorially-static)301. This closure follows from the fact that techn-Enframing
300
This description of the Being of natural beings is similar to the definition of an open system given in chapter
3, viz. OS[1].
301
This description of the Being of natural beings is similar to the definition of a closed system given in chapter
3, viz. CS[1].
Chapter 6 Poisis
(Gestellen) is ontologically-ontical (section 6.6.3). The difference between naturals

(specifically, Dasein) and artificials - specifically, "hard" (or pure) artifactuals (section
6.6.3 and chapter 7) - can be clarified in terms of the structure of historicity (or
temporality) associated with each kind (Being) of being as shown in the following table:
Past Present Future
Naturals given- openness possibility

ness
Artificials made-ness closure necessity
Table 6.10 Historicity Structure in Naturals and Artificials (as Artifactuals).
It is important to understand that the openness of naturals ultimately makes them un-
reliable because their Being is characterized by (bounded) possibility; the closure of
artifactuals, by contrast, makes them the standard of reliability because their Being is
characterized by an a priori circumscribed necessity and, thereby, repeatability.
Crucially, only that which has been hypostatized - that is, rendered static, eternal or
ahistorical as opposed to historically-stable - is repeatable and it is repeatability which
allows for the postulation of abstract (or ideal) essences associated with beings; hence,
the link between techn, functionalism, multiple-realizability and "strong" CEA.
At this point in the presentation, it is worthwhile briefly considering a possible criticism

of the above argument. In the context of a discussion of the distinction between what
Searle (1992, 1995) has referred to as genuine302 (or originary) and as-if (or derived)
intentionality, Dennett (1995) is led to assert that there is no ontological distinction
between naturals and artificials (as artifactuals): This follows from the fact that the latter
are derived from the former which are, in turn, derived from Mother Nature or naturality
as such; in short, there is an ontological continuum (section 6.4.4) between naturality and
artificiality. According to Dennett (1996), Searle holds that
representational artifacts (such as written descriptions and sketches) possess derived intentionality,
by virtue of the role they play in the actiivitie of their creators. A shopping list written down on a
piece of paper has only the derived intentionality it gets from the intentions of the agent who made
it. Well, so does a shopping list held by the same agent in memory! Its intentionality is exactly as
derived as that of the external list, and for the same reasons .. [T]he brain is an artifact, and it gets
whatever intentionality its parts have from their role in the ongoing economy of the larger system of
which it is a part - or, in other words, from the intentions of its creator, Mother Nature (otherwise
known as the process of evolution by natural selection). (pp.52-53)
On his view, that "derived intentionality can be derived from derived intentionality"
302
Dennett (1996) asks "what boon would intrinsic intentionality (whatever that is) provide for us that could not
as well have been bequeathed to us, as evolution-designed artifacts ?" (p.55) According to Griffin (1998),
intrinsic intentionality makes volition (will), self-determining freedom and creativity possible.
Chapter 6 Poisis
(p.54) holds both for artifacts and humans since humans are artifacts. Dennett (1995)
goes further to state that
if you still want to insist on .. client centrism [that is, the view that artifacts canot exhibit anything but
derived intentionality since they are created to serve their creator's purposes], then you should be
ready to draw the further conclusion that you yourself never enjoy any states with original
intentionality, since you are just a survival machine designed, originally, for the purpose of preserving
your genes until they can replicate. Our intentionality is derived, after all, from the intentionality of
our selfish genes. They are the Unmeant Meaners, not us! (p.425)
Thus, "intentionality doesn't come from on high; it percolates up from below, from the
initially mindless and pointless algorithmic processes that gradually acquire meaning and
intelligence as they develop." (p.205) There are (at least) two problems with this
position: First, it does not solve the category problem (chapter 7), viz. the problem of
explaining how ontological subjectivity can emerge from an ontologically-objective
substrate. As Griffin (1998) states "even if the miracle [of the emergence of
intentionality from blind mechanism] occurs long before the rise of human
consciousness, it is no less a miracle (unless, of course, Dennett is giving a purely
externalist, and thereby wholly inadequate, account of a `point of view')." (p.70)303;
secondly, interpreting human intentionality in artifactual terms is based on (i) the
assumption that the relation between artifacts and humans is genetically-isomorphic with
that between humans and `Mother Nature' and (ii) conflation of the artificial-real (or as-
if-genuine) duality with the artifactual-natural duality. With respect to (ii), it is important
to appreciate that the former duality is epistemological (interpretative, semiotic) while
the latter is ontological (productive, poitic). Given that the artificial-real (or appearance-
reality) distinction is grounded in the artificial-natural distinction (section 6.5.7), it
follows that a difference in poisis (coming-forth, bringing-forth, becoming) between
artificials (as artifactuals) and naturals has negative implications for the possibility of
establishing non-genetic isomorphisms (functional, behavioural) between artificiality and
naturality and hence, for "strong" CEA. With respect to (i), and assuming, for the sake
of argument, the validity of Darwinian evolution (section 6.4.2.1), it simply does not
follow that since both humans (and other organisms) and artifacts are, ontically-speaking,
products of some process from which they derive their intentionality, that therefore the
nature (Being) of the intentionality in both instances is identical: While it is legitimate
to maintain that both human intentionality and artifact intentionality are derivative, the
sources from which they are respectively derived are not the same. Given the ontological
difference between beings and Being (section 6.5.4), the unitary relatedness of Being and
becoming (section 6.5.8), and the relation between finite natural beings (physis as
autopoisis) and in-finite naturality or Being as such (physis as poisis) (section 6.6.2),
it follows that the relation between artifacts and humans is not - cannot - be genetically-
isomorphic - and hence, ontologically-isomorphic - with that between humans and
303
In section 6.7, a non-miraculous emergentist solution to the category problem grounded in Heideggerian
ontology is outlined.
Chapter 6 Poisis
`Mother' Nature. Attempting to establish an isomorphism between incipient

Being6beingnatural poisis and causal beingnatural6beingartificial poisis is problematic since
the concept of isomorphism is grounded in morph or form (section 6.6.2) which is, in
turn, grounded in Being; in short, it is impossible to transcendently establish
isomorphisms involving Being because Being as such (Seyn) transcendently grounds
isomorphism.
It should be clear from the above that Dennett's position is grounded in two assumptions:
(1) that the Being (Sein) of beings (Seiendes) is universal, viz. ontological monism; and
(2) that Being and becoming are separable and hence, inessentially-related. However, as
shown in sections 6.5.4 and 6.5.8, both these assumptions are questionable. Following
Heidegger, it is maintained that Being as such (Seyn), while monistic in itself, incipiently
manifests (unconceals) pluralistically as the Being (Sein) of beings (Seiendes): Both
beings (Seiendes) and the Being (Sein) of beings - which is specific or particular to each
type or kind of being - constitute pluralities, the former ontical and the latter ontological.
Furthermore, the Being (Sein) of beings is continuous with the poisis - that is,
incipience (origination) and becoming (ordering) - of beings. This position is readily
established once it is appreciated that Being (as physis) means presencing, thereby
implying that existence is essentially historical (temporal)304. Thus, contrary to Dennett,
who is representative of the tradition305, Being and becoming are essentially-related. This
point is critical since it implies that a difference in becoming, that is, mode of coming-
forth, entails a difference in Being, thereby undermining functionalism, multiple-
realizability and the possibility of "strong" CEA. The metaphysical assumptions
underlying functionalism, multiple-realizability and, thereby, "strong" CEA are
contrasted with those underlying the anti-functionalist Heideggerian position presented
herein in the following table (overleaf):
304
Although Dennett appears to endorse a historical view of existence (Being) in postulating Darwinian evolution
via natural selection (section 6.4.2.1) as the principal mechanism of ontical poisis, this is, in fact, not the case
since, on his view, evolution is algorithmic and hence, essentially functional. According to Heidegger,
functionality is the mathematical form of substance (section 6.6.3) and to the extent that the latter is static (since
permanent), it follows that functionality must be ahistorical since atemporal. In short, while Darwinian
evolution is a process, it is static as the process that it is similar to the way in which autopoietic organizations
(Maturana,80) are static processes (sections 6.4.2.2 and 6.4.2.4).
305
Consistent with Dennett, Levin (1979) and McGinn (1987) maintain that genesis is irrelevant to existence.
According to Palmer (1996), however, "once we discover the genesis of the thing in its temporal gestalt is
important then we see that the essence is no longer static. Now we have to speak of the thing essencing forth
as it unfolds into existence." (p.10)
Chapter 6 Poisis
Functionalism Anti-Functionalism
Being (Sein) discontinuous with becoming Being (Sein) continuous with becoming
Being (Sein) universal to beings (monism) Being (Sein) particular to beings (pluralism)
Essence (form) as static, abstract functionality Essence (what-ness) as stable, concrete presence
Existence (matter) as physicality Existence (how-ness) as presencing
Essence and existence contingently-related Essence and existence necessarily-related
Table 6.11 Comparison of Metaphysical Assumptions in Functionalism and Anti-Functionalism.
It is crucial to appreciate, as Kovacs (1990) points out, that ontical poisis (section 6.4)
does not - and cannot - provide a basis upon which to question concerning Being as such
(Seyn). This follows from the fact that ontical poisis (becoming) is a relation of
production (or genetic causation) between beings. As he states,
can we obtain genuine ontological concepts, can we reach Being, if our search and endeavour are
governed by the attitude of production, by the assumption that the way things (beings) are made tells
us something about their Being ? Heidegger's way of thinking remains skeptical about the ontological
reliability of the horizon (divine or human) of production (creation). (p.226)
Kovacs goes on to state that
Heidegger's main contention consists in claiming that the production-based (creation-oriented)

ontological explanation distracts from the phenomenon of the ìs', from the fact `that beings are and
not nothing', by remaining attached to the causal derivation and connection of beings, by explaining
them as owing their being in Being (their reality) to a first (highest) being. (p.229)
This study is concerned with determining whether or not computationalism is sufficient

as a metaphysical basis for a unifying framework of computationally emergent
artificiality or CEA (chapter 5). While it is clear that ontical poisis cannot inform on the
question concerning the meaning and truth of Being as such because ontical poisis does
not address the ontological difference between beings and Being (section 6.5.4), it does
not thereby follow that the ontological difference cannot inform on the question of
ontical poisis; in fact, this must be the case since Being as such (Seyn) grounds beings
and while the former is existentially-necessary for the latter, the latter is existentially-
contingent relative to the former306. Given that Being is essentially related307 to becoming
(section 6.5.8) and given that Being (Sein) is grounding relative to beings (Seiendes)
(section 6.5.4), it follows that a difference in ontological poisis (coming-forth, bringing-
306
Although there can be no Being (Sein) without beings (Seiendes) and visa versa, this does not apply to the
incipient `source' of both, viz. Being as such (Seyn).
307
Being as enduring presencing stands in unitary relation with becoming, the latter constituting the dynamic
aspect of the former (while appearance constitutes its static or stable aspect).
Chapter 6 Poisis
forth, becoming) entails a difference in the Being of ontical beings; in short, naturals and
artificials (as artifactuals) are ontologically distinct because poitically distinct. In
sections 6.6.2 and 6.6.3, two modes of ontological poisis, viz. physis (or autopoisis)
and techn (or allopoisis), were examined and the nature (Being) of their respective
groundings in (or relations to) originary physis (or poisis as such) was established. It
was shown that physis as autopoisis is continuous with originary physis as poisis and
that therein lies the source of the categorial-openness308 of naturality: Nature is
categorially-open because naturals are grounded in Being as such (Seyn) which is
nothing (no-thing) and the incipient source of beings (including the categories)309. By
contrast, it was also shown that techn as allopoisis is discontinuous with originary
physis as poisis since mediated by Dasein or the anthropic component in its role as
artificer-interpreter (chapter 7). To the extent that the artificing Dasein is finite (since
a being), its artifacts are, of necessity, finite in the sense of circumscribed and therein lies
the source of the categorial-closure310 of artificiality (as artifactuality).
In summary, it is maintained (i) that there is an ontical difference in the Being (Sein) of
natural and artificial (as artifactual) beings (Seiendes); (ii) that this distinction follows
from a difference in their respective becomings (sections 6.6.2 and 6.6.3), that is, from
a poitic difference; and (iii) that this latter distinction is grounded in the ontological
difference between beings and Being as such (section 6.5.4). The relation between the
ontological and poitic differences is shown in Fig 6.7 (overleaf).
The ontological difference, OD, (section 6.5.4) can be formally defined as
OD : B{bN,bA}, (6.1)
where B denotes Being, bN denotes naturals, b A denotes artifactuals and denotes

existential distinction311. The (originary, primary) ontological poisis of naturals (physis
as poisis), PN1, can be formally defined as
308
That is, the possibility of ontological emergence.
309
The relation between Being and nothing is described in sections 6.5.2 and 6.5.5. Ontological emergence or
creatio ex nihilo is possible since, as Heidegger (1993b) states, "Being is the emptiest and at the same time a
surplus .. Being is the most worn-out and at the same time the origin." (p.52) Furthermore, Being is the in-finite
(apeiron).
310
That is, the impossibility of ontological emergence.
311
Existential distinction refers to the difference between beings (Seiendes) and Being as such (Seyn). Existential
distinctions are not the same as logical distinctions - or `cuts' - which are made within logical space (Spencer-
Brown,69); rather, existential distinctions are grounding relative to logical distinctions since physis grounds
logos (section 6.5.6).
Chapter 6 Poisis
(allopoisis)
Techn
(bA )
(Poisis)
Physis POI TIC DIFFERENCE
(B)
(bN)
Physis
(autopoisis)
Fig 6.7 Relation between ontological and poitic differences.
PN1 : B6bN (6.2)
while the (derivative, secondary) ontical poisis of naturals (physis as autopoisis), PN2,
can be formally defined as
PN2 : bN6bN (6.3)
where the relation 6 denotes poisis (coming-forth, bringing-forth) and is defined

relative to the Being (Sein) of the relata. The (originary, primary) ontological poisis of
artificials, PA1, is identical to the (derivative, secondary) ontical poisis of artificials
(techn as allopoisis), PA2, which is formally defined as
PA2 : bN6bA (PA1/PA2) (6.4)
The poitic difference, PD, can be formally defined as follows:
PD : PNPA (6.5)
Crucially, the ontological difference grounds the poitic difference312, viz.
ODY(PN1PA1)YPD (6.6)
312
This position is supported by Levinas (1996) who maintains that originary transcendence "conditions the
transcendence of the subject to object - a derived phenomenon from which the theory of knowledge issues"
(p.22) and, in addition, from which the techn-Enframing (Gestellen) grounded in theoria (Heidegger,77) and
which is characteristic of artificiality (as artifactuality) emerges.
Chapter 6 Poisis
6.6.5. Poisis and Autopoiesis: A Comparison
As stated in section 6.4.2.4, Maturana and Varela (1980) broadly distinguish two
concepts of ontical poisis, viz. autopoiesis (self-production) and allopoiesis (other-
production). According to Mingers (1995), this classification and conceptualization of
poiesis was anticipated by Heidegger in The Question Concerning Technology (1977a)
when he differentiated between physis and techn as follows:
Not only handcraft manufacture, not only artistic and poetical bringing into appearance and concrete
imagery, is a bringing-forth, poisis. Physis also, the arising of something from out of itself, is a
bringing-forth, poisis. Physis is indeed poisis in the highest sense. For what presences by means
of physis has the bursting open belonging to bringing-forth, e.g. the bursting of a blossom into bloom,
in itself (en heauti). In contrast, what is brought forth by the artisan or the artist, e.g. the silver
chalice, has the bursting open belonging to bringing-forth not in itself, but in another (en alli), in the
craftsman or artist. (pp.10-11)
However, the identification of autopoisis (poisis en heauti or physis) and allopoisis

(poisis en alli or techn) with autopoiesis and allopoiesis is highly problematic as will
be seen in what follows. Yet before this can be shown, it is necessary to briefly
reexamine the concept of autopoiesis. Maturana and Varela (1980) define an autopoietic
system as
a network of processes of production (transformation and destruction) of components that produces

the components that: (i) through their interactions and transformations continuously regenerate the
network of processes (relations) that produced them; and (ii) constitute it (the machine) as a concrete
unity in the space in which they (the components) exist by specifying the topological domain of its
realization as such a network. (p.79)
From the above statement, it should be readily apparent that autopoiesis is a mechanistic
concept; this point is affirmed explicitly in their stating "our approach will be
mechanistic" (p.75) and that they want "to adhere to the scientific tradition of
explanation in terms of deterministic physical systems" (p.40). Thus, while adopting a
processualist (chapter 2) position with respect to living beings, viz. "our interest will not
be in properties of components, but in processes and relations between processes realized
through components [emphasis added]", it is important to appreciate that on their
scheme, processuality is grounded in substantiality. That this is, in fact, the case follows
from their adoption of atomistic mechanism and a reductive, Ionian approach to
questioning concerning nature, viz. What is nature ? as What are things made of ?313
(section 6.6.2). As they state,
an explanation is always a reformulation of a phenomenon showing how its components generate it

through their interactions and relations [emphasis added]. (p.75)
313
In this hermeneutic (interpretative) move between questions, Being (ìs') is identified with producedness
(`made') and in reductive terms (`beings', òf').
Chapter 6 Poisis
However, in addition to being committed to mechanism and reductionism, Maturana and

Varela also adopt a variant of functionalism (chapters 2 and 4), viz. "it is our assumption
that there is an organization that is common to all living systems whichever the nature
of their components [emphasis added]." (p.76) As they go on to state,
the actual nature of the components [in a machine], and the particular properties that these may
possess other than those participating in the interactions and transformations which constitute the
system, are irrelevant and can be any [emphasis added]. (p.77)
However, it is important to appreciate that an autopoietic property, that is, a property

which contributes to the constitution of an autopoietic system, is specific to the historical
(particular, contingent) situation (environment, context) in which the system is
embedded. This is significant because it entails that properties which were previously
non-autopoietic may become autopoietic in a different context. If the essence (Being) of
a system (being) is determined by historical existence (as in Heidegger) rather than
causal closure (as in Maturana and Varela) then since all properties of an existent may
be autopoietic in some context, it follows that all properties must be viewed as
autopoietic with respect to the system. On this view, the `nature (or properties) of
components' is critical since components with different properties will generate different
histories and hence, different essences; functionalism, multiple-realizability and "strong"
CEA thereby become impossible. In this connection, it is significant that, according to
Heidegger (1959), history314 "for the Greeks was part of the originally broader concept
of physis." (p.16) However, Maturana and Varela define autopoietic systems in
essentially ahistorical (although processual) terms maintaining that
although history cannot contribute to explain any phenomenon, it can permit an observer to account
for the origin of a phenomenon as a present state in a changing network [emphasis added]. (p.103)
This position is problematic since it fails to address the issue of incipience: Although an
autopoietic system is - on their view - a causally-closed self-(re)generating network of
processes, the origin of such a network is not explicated on this scheme. Given their
adoption of mechanistic determinism, there are two possibilities: On the one hand, if the
physical medium (space) in which the autopoietic system is realized is reversible then
autopoietic systems cannot self-organize in which case such systems must be designed
or created; on the other hand, if the medium is irreversible then the autopoietic system
can self-organize. However, in both instances the question concerning the origin of initial
(and boundary) conditions and physical laws arises, this line of reasoning ultimately
leading to the fundamental question, viz. Why is there something rather than nothing ?
(section 6.5.2) and Heidegger's existentialist solution in the ontological difference
(section 6.5.4), viz. Being and Nothing as the `same'. Hence, the necessity of grounding
(ontical) autopoiesis in poisis as such (section 6.6.2).
314
That is, ontological history or historicity.
Chapter 6 Poisis
Palmer (1996) defines autopoiesis as "existential biology" (p.4) on the grounds that the
relation between existence (prior) and essence (posterior) within existentialism is
isomorphic with that between individuals (prior) and species (posterior) within biology.
However, as stated previously, the autopoietic individual315 (or system) is essentially
ahistorical: This follows from the fact that Maturana and Varela (1980) (i) distinguish
between organization (potential, abstract, component-property-general) and structure
(actual, concrete, component-property-specific) and (ii) adopt a kind of `process-
relational Platonism' in which Platonic objects (or ideas) are not static components but
dynamic processes. As they state,
an autopoietic system is an homeostatic (or rather relations-static) system which has its own
organization (defining network of relations) as the fundamental variable which it maintains constant
Furthermore, "the organization of the individual is autopoietic and upon this fact rests
all its significance: it becomes defined through its existing, and its existing is
autopoietic." (p.118) On this view, it might be argued that Dasein (section 6.5.3) must
be self-producing (or organizationally-homeostatic). However, Palmer (1996) maintains
that "Varela has warned us against applying autopoietic theory to the social. He
distinguishes autopoietic systems from autonomous systems." (p.27) Yet on this latter
position, the Being (Sein) of Dasein remains systemic (albeit non-autopoietic). While it
might be argued that the autopoietic organization is an existential structure and its
instantiation in different physical structures constitute existentiells (section 6.5.4), it is
crucial to appreciate that for Heidegger, Dasein is defined not by the cybernetic
maintenance of self (autopoiesis), but by transcendence to the òther' (world) and,
ultimately, to that which is beyond the ontical self-other distinction, viz. Being as such
(section 6.5.3). In short, autopoiesis defines an ontical (causal, productive) relation
between beings while transcendence is an ontological (existential, hermeneutic) relation
between a particular being, viz. Dasein, and Being itself.
According to Palmer (1996), "what we desperately desire is to have organisms be only

machines. But what [the theory of autopoiesis] takes in return is the fact that it imposes
the existentialist view of biology that concentrates on the individual existing organism
instead of the abstract species." (p.4) On this basis, he maintains that
[the] opposite [to autopoiesis] would decide that an organism was more than a machine and then we
could forget the individual and continue to think of the individual as merely an exemplar of the
species (p.5)
315
In maintaining that autopoietic systems have no inputs or outputs, Maturana and Varela (1980) implicitly assert
a structuralist variant of Cartesianism, viz. self-sufficiency with respect to organization (abstract). However,
it is important to appreciate that context-dependency arises with respect to structure (concrete) since
constitutional requirements act to delimit possible realizing substrates (media).
Chapter 6 Poisis
However, this position is problematic since permutation of logical opposites (individual

and species, mechanism and non-mechanism) generates four possibilities as shown in the
following table:
Mechanism Non-Mechanism
Individual Autopoiesis Organicism
Species Darwinism Animism
Table 6.12 Permutation of Individual-Species and Mechanism-Non-Mechanism Dualities.
Significantly, Palmer asserts that "if organisms are just machines then there is something
lacking, i.e. an explanation of their emergent properties. But if they are more than
machines then we have created some non-reducible substance such as the lan vital of
Bergson which is mystical and inexplicable." (p.7) However, is it necessarily the case
that in order to explain emergence recourse must be made to the creation of a substance
which is `mystical' and ìnexplicable' ? While this appears to follow from the above
framework, viz. organicism and animism as alternatives to mechanistic autopoiesis and
Darwinism, it must be appreciated that such approaches are ontical and grounded in the
assumed validity of the maxim ex nihilo nihil fit (section 6.4.4). In section 6.7, a new
framework for emergence reconciling ontical ex nihilo nihil fit with ontological creatio
ex nihilo is described which attempts to resolve the problem of emergence without
postulating the creation of (ontical) substances.
It is appropriate at this point in the discussion to briefly consider the question of systemic
grounding in autopoietic systems theory. Heidegger's (1959) grammatical and
etymological analysis of the Greek concept of Being leads him to identify the latter with
the following three notions: "[1] to live, [2] to emerge [into presence or unconcealment
from absence or concealment], [3] to linger or endure." (p.72) The first is associated with
physis in the sense of "that which from out of itself stands and which moves and rests in
itself" (p.71); this is in turn connected to the second, viz. emergence, in that the Greek
phu is "to emerge, to be powerful, of itself to come to stand and remain standing."
(p.71) It might be argued that the association of physis with life is consistent with
Maturana and Varela's characterization of the autopoietic organization as the
organization of the living. However, it must be appreciated that for Heidegger, Being as
physis is primordial; it is "the universal concept" and "an ultimate" (p.40). As stated
previously, on the theory of autopoiesis, by contrast, the autopoietic organization is held
to supervene on (that is, be grounded in) physical space; hence, autopoietic systems are
not ontologically primitive. Maturana and Varela maintain that "an autopoietic system
is defined as a unity by its autopoietic organization. The realization of this organization
in a physical system requires components which are defined by their role in the
autopoiesis and which can only be described in relation to this." Crucially, "these
Chapter 6 Poisis
components [of the autopoietic system] can only be realized by material elements
[emphasis added]" (p.88) which, on their view, are atomistic, deterministic and
externally-related. On their view,
the physical space is defined by components that can be determined by operations that characterize
them in terms of properties such as masses, forces, accelerations, distances, fields, etc. Furthermore,
such properties themselves are defined by the interactions of the components that they characterize
However, these interactions must be defined either by the structural (or functional)
properties of the components entailing ontological circularity (that is, paradox) or by
properties at a lower phenomenal level. The latter position gives rise to two further
possibilities, viz. vicious infinite regress or allopoietic grounding, that is, grounding in
a First or Necessary cause. Given the problems associated with both these positions, viz.
undermining of the transitivity of causation, inability to address the Being of causation
and failure to appreciate the ontological difference (section 6.5.4), it follows that
Maturana and Varela's physical space is not primordially grounding; rather it is
primordially grounded in Being as such (Seyn). It is crucial to appreciate that the
supervenience relation between autopoietic systems (products) and physical space
(substrata) entails that the former are discontinuous with respect to the latter; hence, the
possibility of functionalism and multiple-realizability with respect to autopoietic
systems316. However, in section 6.6.2, it was shown that physis as autopoisis is
continuous with physis as poisis; although there is a distinction between the two, there
is no duality which follows from the fact that physis has both dynamic (presencing) and
static (presence) aspects, viz. the becoming (arch, incipience) associated with the
poisis of a being and the being (telos, end) itself respectively. Whereas Maturana and
Varela are explicit in their adoption of mechanism as a grounding substrate for
autopoiesis in living - which on their framework means cognizing - systems, Heidegger
makes no such metaphysical (ontical) commitment317 ; in fact, to argue for such a
grounding would be to undermine the Heideggerian project which is concerned with
thinking beyond the metaphysical (causal, ontical) to the latter's ontological (existential,
incipient) ground. In short, ontological poisis is not grounded in anything more
primitive because it is the primitive ground, that is, Being as such (Seyn), the groundless
ground or abyss (section 6.5.5). According to Palmer (1996).
Maturana and Varela suffered from the same problem of most scientific theorists in that they did not
realize the effects of their ontological suppositions on the interpretation and understanding of their
theory. (p.1)
316
As stated previously, the abstract, dynamic, processual organization associated with autopoietic systems can
be realized in various physical structures.
317
According to Lovitt (1977), although "interrelations always involve some intricate unity" - which is consistent
with the notion of an autopoietic system as a unity in physical space - "where Heidegger moves, reality does
not appear as composed of discrete elements or aspects that are linked by cause and effect relations." (p.xxiii)
Chapter 6 Poisis
Adopting mechanism, determinism and physicalism (materialism) as ontological

assumptions entails interpreting poisis in productive (causal) terms; hence, Maturana
and Varela's definition of autopoiesis as "self-production" (p.101). In this connection, it
is critical to note that Heidegger (1939) holds the interpretation of "NF4H [physis or
autopoisis] as a kind of self-producing" to be a "misunderstanding" (p.195). As he goes
on to state,
is not NF4H then misunderstood as some sort of self-making artifact ? Or is this not a
misunderstanding at all but the only possible interpretation of NF4H, namely, as a kind of JXP<0
[techn] ? That almost seems to the case, because modern metaphysics, in the impressive terms of,
for example, Kant, conceives of `nature' as a `technique' such that this `technique' that constitutes the
essence of nature provides the metaphysical ground for the possibility, or even the necessity, of
subjecting and mastering nature through machine technology. (p.220)
Again
the act of self-unfolding emergence is inherently a going-back into itself. This kind of becoming
present is NF4H. But it must not be thought of as a kind of built-in `motor' that drives something, nor
as an òrganizer' on hand somewhere, directing the thing. Nonetheless, we might be tempted to fall
back on the notion that NbF,4-determined beings could be a kind that make themselves. So easily and
spontaneously does this idea suggest itself that it has become normative for the interpretation of living
nature in particular, as is shown by the fact that ever since modern thinking became dominant, a living
being has been understood as an òrganism'. No doubt a good deal of time has yet to pass before we
learn to see that the idea of òrganism' and of the òrganic' is a purely modern, mechanistic-
technological concept, according to which `growing things' are interpreted as artifacts that make
themselves [emphasis added]. (p.195)
Thus, Mingers' assertion that autopoiesis and allopoiesis are equivalent to Heideggerian
autopoisis and allopoisis respectively is incorrect: In presenting definitions of physis
and techn in terms that resemble those presented by Maturana and Varela, Heidegger
(1977a) was, in fact, attempting to show how the original notion of poisis had been
systematically undermined by Aristotle and the Western metaphysical tradition;
Heidegger's (1993b) concept of poisis is, itself, radically non-Aristotelian318. As stated
previously, Maturana and Varela ground autopoiesis and allopoiesis in mechanism,
thereby interpreting poisis ontically as causation (or production). Heidegger, by
contrast, grounds the distinction between autopoisis (that is, poisis en heauti) and
allopoisis (that is, poisis en alli) - which is a difference in presencing, disclosure,
coming-forth319 - in poisis as originary Heraclitean-Anaximanderian physis, viz. the
incipient repelling of limits (arch apeiron), Being as such (Seyn) as emerging-evading
(section 6.6.2). In focusing on two ontical modes of poisis, viz. autopoiesis and
318
For this reason, and as shown in section 6.6.2, Heidegger's essay On the Essence and Concept of MF4H in
Aristotle's Physics B, I (1939) must be viewed as preparatory to his later Heraclitean-Anaximanderian
interpretation of the concept of physis.
319
As stated in section 6.6.2, bringing-forth is, for Heidegger, the ground of causation (production).
Chapter 6 Poisis
allopoiesis, Maturana and Varela ignore the question of ontological poisis as such. This
is similar to how, in focusing on being(s) qua being(s), Aristotle ignored the question of
Being as such. In this connection, it is interesting to note that Palmer (1996) maintains
that "[with autopoietic systems such as biological systems] we have systems that are
ordering themselves which is the equivalent in a special science like biology of the self-
grounding of Being in ontology [emphasis added]." (p.25) Clearly, this assertion is
problematic since it ignores the ontological difference between beings (systems) and
Being as such (which is neither a system nor a not-system but the ontological ground of
both). It is of crucial significance to appreciate the grounding of ontical autopoesis and
allopoiesis (and heteropoiesis320) in ontological poisis since it is necessary to explain
what the `self' (auto) and òther' (allo) kinds of poisis are grounded in given the facticity
of the self-other distinction321.
In concluding this comparison of Heideggerian poisis and the theory of autopoiesis as

presented by Maturana and Varela (1980), it is worthwhile briefly examining the Being
(Sein) of the theory of autopoiesis. According to Searle (1995), autopoiesis is essentially
a relativistic theory of knowledge. In support of this position, Winograd and Flores
(1986) maintain that an autopoietic system is a living system which means a cognitive
system; furthermore, "the cognitive domain deals with the relevance of the changing
structure of the system to behaviour that is effective for its survival [emphasis added]."
(p.47) On this view, the theory of autopoiesis is consistent with pragmatism or
instrumentalism, both of which entail relativistic epistemology. Perhaps the most
accurate classification is that due to Mingers (1995) who identifies the theory of
autopoiesis as a variant of radical constructivism. However, whether the theory is
ontological or epistemological remains unclear, particularly given the following
statement of Maturana and Varela:
The nature of a unity and the domain in which it exists are specified by the process of its distinction
and determination; this is so regardless of whether this process is conceptual (as when a unity is
defined by an observer through an operation of distinction in his domain of discourse and
description), or whether this process is physical (as when a unity becomes established through the
actual working of its defining properties that assert its distinction from a background through their
actual operation in the physical space) [emphasis added]. (p.96)
It is precisely because of this epistemological-ontological ambiguity that Scheper and

Scheper (1996) consider the theory of autopoeisis problematic. As they state, "the core
320
Heteropoietic systems are both autopoietic (self-producing) and allopoietic (other-producing). However,
heteropoiesis is not equivalent to poisis as such since the latter is the ontological ground of autopoiesis and
allopoiesis - which constitute its ontical modalities - and heteropoiesis merely denotes the ontical conjunction
of these modalities. In short, heteropoiesis is defined relative to the horizon of production whereas poisis as
such is the ground of this horizon.
321
To the extent that auto- and allopoiesis can be set in opposition (distinction), they must constitute an originary
unitary relatedness (in the Heraclitean sense of a polemos or gathering of conflicting opposites).
Chapter 6 Poisis
concepts of this theory, such as autopoiesis, unity, and self-reference have both a
theoretical and empirical denotation; these concepts are at the same time theoretical
constructs and empirical, yet unobservable phenomena!" (p.10) This critique is valid
since, according to Mingers (1995), Maturana's constructivism is ontological, viz. reality
is not observer-independent but observer-constructed. However, this position is
incoherent because it entails commitment to incommensurable metaphysical positions,
viz. (i) a structuralist variant of solipsism (idealism) and (ii) the postulation of an
inaccessible physical background (realism). Furthermore, Mingers maintains that
in denying the existence of independent entities on the basis of theories about the observer, Maturana
is reducing ontological questions to epistemological ones (the epistemic fallacy), that is, trying to
answer questions about what exists purely in terms of our knowledge of or about what exists. While
it is true that our knowledge limits what we can know to exist, it does not follow that it can limit what
actually does exist. The causality, for at least some objects, must be the other way around - observers
can know because they exist; they do not exist because they know. To thus reduce ontology to
epistemology is to mistakenly make human beings and their experiences the measure of all things.
(pp.115-116)
On this basis, he argues for reinterpreting the theory of autopoiesis as epistemologically

constructivist and consistent with critical realism. This position is consistent with that of
Heidegger, viz. hermeneutic realism (section 6.5.4). It should be noted that on the latter's
view, man is the measure of all things since there is no Being (Sein) independent of
Dasein although beings (Seiendes) can exist in the absence of Dasein. As Heidegger
(1977c) states "man .. is metron (measure) in that he accepts restriction to the horizon of
unconcealment that is limited after the manner of the I." (p.146) However,
it is one thing to preserve the horizon of unconcealment that is limited at any given time through the
apprehending of what presences (man as metron). It is another to proceed into the unlimited sphere
of possible objectification, through the reckoning up of the representable that is accessible to every
man and binding for all. (p.147)
6.7. Towards A Pluralistic Emergentism
In this final section, the foundations of a new framework for emergence grounded in
Heideggerian ontology are laid. A full explication of this scheme is not attempted in the
present work since it is beyond the aim and scope of this study, necessitating a separate
(yet related) research endeavour in itself (chapter 8). However, it is important to
appreciate the necessity and validity of such a framework. In an attempt at establishing
the latter, three emergentist frameworks (structuralist, physicalist and pragmatist) are
briefly, yet critically, examined in order to determine the essential characteristics of a
framework for pluralistic emergentism.
6.7.1. Structuralist-Emergentism
Baas and Emmeche (1997) present an epistemological framework for understanding and
Chapter 6 Poisis
explaining emergence in structuralist terms. A distinguishing feature of their semiotic

scheme is the requirement that "observation mechanisms [be] considered within [that is,
as part of] the general framework [for explaining emergence]." (p.1) Baas (1993)
formally defines emergence as follows:
S2 = R(S1i, Obs1, Int1)i0j, emergent(P) iff P0Obs2(S2) v PObs2(S1i)i
where {Si1} is a set of first-order structures and i 0 J (some index set, finite or infinite);
Obs1 (Si1) denotes the properties of structure Si1 registered by the observational
mechanism Obs1 which may be internal or external to the system; Int1 is the set of
interactions between the elements of {Si1} allowed by Obs1(S 1); i R is the result of
2
interactions between primitives; S is a second-order structure. However, this scheme is
problematic for (at least) five reasons:
First, it appears from the above statements that Obs is epistemically-necessary and
ontically-contingent for emergence; in short, Obs has a non-causal (or non-
organizational) role in emergence. This position is supported by Emmeche (1991) who
maintains that, "emergent properties must be observable, but they appear because of the
system of interactions among the lower-level objects (and not because of observation)
[emphasis added]." (p.93) In this connection, it is important to appreciate that according
to Emmeche et al. (1997),
a level is constituted by the interplay between a set of elementary entities and processes acting on a
level below (the initiating conditions), constrained by specific boundary conditions (that may have
an environmental origin relative to the emerging entities) that determines the `shape' or `form' of the
entities at the emerging level. (p.19)
This position is consistent with Baas' (1993) Darwinian (that is, selectionist) account of
the origin of boundary conditions, viz. environment as observer. As Emmeche (1991)
states, "the environment acts as an observer that `sees' and àcts upon' higher-level
properties, thereby establishing recurrent interactions between different levels." (p.93)
Clearly, on this view, Obs is both causal and necessary for emergence. However, as
stated above, Emmeche maintains that Obs is non-causal322 and ontically-contingent
which entails a logical contradiction.
Second, while observation (Obs) is epistemically-necessary for emergence, this does not
entail a requirement for consciousness since, on their scheme, observation and
consciousness are only contingently-related: For example, and as stated above, the
environment can assume the role of the observer under Darwinian evolution by natural
selection. Baas and Emmeche (1997) maintain that "consciousness may be seen as a
hyperstructure of mental representations embodied in the central nervous system and
322
Additionally, it is interesting to note that Emmeche (1992) also holds that Darwinian evolution is unable to
provide "any satisfying account of the nature of developmental and evolutionary constraints." (p.467)
Chapter 6 Poisis
capable of self-observation and interaction." (p.6). On their view, "in certain living
systems with mind, at a high level new phenomena such as consciousness emerge as a
construction process, in which Int and Obs occur at several levels, and in which (at least
some) observation mechanisms are intrinsic to the system." (p.13) Thus,
consciousness is not a property of individual neurones, it is a natural emergent property of the

interactions of neurons in nervous systems of the body in an environment. It makes a structure that
is related to lower level interactions as well as higher level thoughts, and it represents a new
observational mechanism of the entire system. (p.4)
It is important to appreciate that both Obs{S1}, that is, the properties of structure S1
registered by Obs, and Int are ontically objective: This follows from the fact that
Obs1{S1i} stands as object over against Obs as subject (even if Obs itself is not ontically-
subjective) and hence, the only properties registerable by Obs are those that are
externalistic (third-person, ontically-objective). Similarly, the only interactions allowed
by Obs are those that are externalistic since only these interactions are accessible to - and
hence, allowable by - Obs (as subject). However, if it is only ontologically-objective
structural properties and interactions that are allowed to be considered, the category
problem (chapter 7), viz. how to generate ontological subjectivity from an ontologically-
objective substrate, immediately arises. Baas and Emmeche's scheme is problematic
because while accepting that "not all of reality is objective; some of it is subjective and
conscious (though still a completely natural phenomenon)" (p.13), they attempt to
explain the categorial (or ontological) emergence of ontological subjectivity in
ontologically-objective (specifically, structuralist) terms.
Third, {Int} denotes the set of interactions between the elements of {Si} allowed by
Obs(Si), implying, thereby, that such elements can interact in ways which are not allowed
by Obs(Si). Clearly, such interactions are epistemologically unobservable or hidden323
relative to Obs; however, the ontology of such interactions - or relations - is extremely
significant: For example, if {Int} is held to coincide with the set of actual interactions,
it follows that (i) actuality must be defined relative to Obs, which entails a form of
observational-relativism (chapter 3), and (ii) hidden interactions must be potential. With
respect to (i), it is important to appreciate with Searle (1995) that observational or
epistemological relativism is consistent with ontological realism. Significantly, this
position - suitably reinterpreted in ontological as opposed to ontical terms - can be shown
to be commensurate with Heidegger's hermeneutic realism (section 6.5.4), viz. man as
historically-contingent measurer (discloser) of reality (Being) (section 6.6.3). With
respect to (ii), it is important to note that according to Aristotle, actuality is prior to
potentiality324. On the basis of this position, it follows that potentials must be defined
323
As will be shown in what follows, Elstob (1988) refers to such interactions as latent or passive relations.
Aristotle, in Book ) , ch.XI of the Metaphysics maintains that "that which exceeds in power, i.e. the more
324
powerful, is prior." However, in Book 1 , ch.VIII, he maintains that actuality is prior to potency, power and
Chapter 6 Poisis
relative to actuals, as non-beings relative to beings; thus, hidden interactions can be

viewed as nothing relative to Obs. This point is extremely significant since if hidden
interactions are involved in emergence, it follows that emergence involves (relativistic)
creatio ex nihilo (sections 6.4.2.3 and 6.4.4). However, this scheme is problematic for
(at least) two reasons: (1) the ontology of potential interactions remains ambiguous, viz.
it is unclear whether such interactions are ontologically-subjective (first-person) or
ontologically-objective (third-person). Adoption of the former does not solve the
category problem (chapter 7) unless the elements of {Si} are also ontologically-
subjective. However, in the context of this scheme, this is clearly not the case since Obs
relates to {Si} as a subject to objects; (2) the grounding of actuality and potentiality in
possibility325, and hence, the grounding of logical opposites (Seiendes) in Being as such
(Seyn)326 is not addressed on this framework; yet, given the validity of the ontological
difference (section 6.5.4), it cannot be ignored. For this reason, it is maintained herein
that actual interactions in conjunction with potential interactions are insufficient as a
basis for ontological (or open) emergence; this necessitates a movement between actuals
and potentials considered as a whole, viz. beings-as-a-whole (Heidegger,93b), and their
ground, viz. Being as such. Clearly, such a movement is not - cannot - be causal but
must be incipient, the historically-contingent òpening-up' of actuality and potentiality
in an ontologically poitic movement between Being and beings (section 6.6.2). To the
extent that Being is the `same' as nothing327, it follows that such a movement corresponds
to absolute creatio ex nihilo.
Fourth, consistent with Crutchfield (1994), Baas (1993) distinguishes intrinsic emergence
from extrinsic emergence on the basis of epistemic (observational, interpretative)
considerations, that is, location of the observer (Obs) with respect to the emergent
(system). However, an orthogonal distinction on the basis of ontic (organizational,
productive) considerations is possible and, in the context of this study, is of defining
significance with respect to the question concerning "strong" CEA since it is framed in
terms of modality of poisis (coming-forth, bringing-forth, becoming). The four
possibilities for emergence which are permutations of the intrinsic (or endosemiotic)-
potentiality, defining potency as "a principle of motion or change in something other than the thing changed,
or in it qua other." (Book ) , ch.XII)
325
Demos (1926) maintains that, "you may object that possibility is an abstraction, floating away into nothing
unless attached to something concrete like the mind. But what is the actual if not an abstraction also, the
fictitious moment of immobility before the head of the wave breaks into foam?" (p.236)
326
However, it is important to re-emphasize that Being as such (Seyn) transcends even possibility since logical
impossibles such as square circles which are not necessary, contingent, actual, potential or possible nonetheless
partake of Being as impossibles.
327
According to Demos (1926), "we remain unable to grasp negation [rather, nothing] so long as we confine
ourselves to the field of the actual or its opposite [that is, potentiality]." (p.235)
Chapter 6 Poisis
extrinsic (or exosemiotic) and natural (or autopoitic)-artifactual (or allopoitic)

distinctions are shown in the following table:
Endosemiosis Exosemiosis
S = R(Int, Si , Obs) S = R(Int, Si , Obs)
Autopoiesis observer
self-organizing self-observing self-organizing

activities activities activities observing
phenomenon phenomenon activities
S = R(Int, Si , Obs) S = R(Int, Si , Obs)

Allopoiesis
organizer organizer observer
self-observing
organizing organizing observing
activities
activities activities activities
phenomenon phenomenon
Table 6.13 Four Possibilities for Emergence.
In this connection, it is important to appreciate that Baas and Emmeche are, in presenting
a structuralist framework for emergence grounded in a duality of structures and
properties, implicitly affirming the validity of the Aristotelian claim for contingent,
inessential connection between subjects and predicates. This is important since, as shown
in section 6.5, the Aristotelian separation of subject (that-ness) from predicate (what-
ness) supports functionalism, multiple-realizability and, thereby, the possibility of
"strong" CEA. In attempting to address this problem, it is necessary to question
concerning the primordiality and hence, metaphysical sufficiency of an ontology of
structures, observations, properties and relations of interaction. Clearly, all such beings
are beings in which case they partake of and yet, are non-identical with Being as such;
to this extent, the primitives (àtoms') in the above framework are not primordial
(grounding) but require (necessitate) grounding in that which is prior and encompassing,
Chapter 6 Poisis
viz. Being which - as shown in section 6.5.5 - is not a being and hence, the `same' as
nothing. Given that Baas and Emmeche's scheme describes emergence in terms of a
movement between beings, it must be grounded in the maxim ex nihilo nihil fit (nothing
comes from nothing or something comes from something); however, the necessity of
grounding the primitives of this framework in nothing entails the adoption of creatio ex
nihilo (creation from nothing) or, more appropriately, ex nihilo omne ens qua ens fit
(from nothing every thing as thing comes to be).
Finally, Emmeche et al. (1997) maintain that
levels are not metaphysically distinct in a sense so that for instance physics is more metaphysically
prominent than the sciences presupposing it. Physics as we know it is only basic insofar that it is
presupposed by others, it is not basic in any first-philosophy use of the word - in that respect,
sociology or semiotics are as `basic' as physics, because they are all parts of one and the same
universe. (p.10)
In postulating the existence of òne and the same universe' within which factical sciences
(such as physics, semiotics, sociology etc) are embedded, the above position is consistent
with ontological pluralism as defined by Bunge (chapter 5). However, as Heidegger has
shown (section 6.5.2), the factical (ontical, existentiell) sciences must be grounded in the
foundational (ontological, existential) sciences since it is only the latter which disclose
the grounding assumptions underlying the former328. Thus, contrary to Baas and
Emmeche, it must be the case that at least two irreducible ùniverses' exist (that is,
partake of Being), viz. the ontical (factical, causal, productive) and the ontological
(foundational, existential, hermeneutic), which entails support for pluralistic realism
(section 6.5.4); consequently, following Heidegger, it is maintained that the above
scheme constitutes an argument for ontical-pluralism and ontological-monism. The
irreducibility of the ontical (causal) to the ontological (hermeneutic) and visa versa is
important for the following reason: According to Heidegger, beings (Seiendes) existed
(factically) prior to the incipient-emergence of Dasein from, by and for Being as such
(Seyn); however, such beings were without Being (Sein). This is consistent with his
assertion that the ontical constrains the ontological (section 6.5.4) while the latter renders
the former intelligible, that is, gives Being (Sein) to beings (Seinedes) via Dasein329. In
this connection, it is interesting to note that, for Heidegger (1929), "Dasein is a being-in-
the-world not because, or only because, it factically exists, but the converse: it can be as
[factically] existing, i.e. as Dasein, only because its essential constitution lies in being-in-
the-world." (pp.110-111) As stated above, it must be appreciated that in the (ontical)
order of beings, Dasein is historically posterior to living and non-living beings. From
these statements, it follows that the ontological (Dasein) is a necessary condition for
328
Crucially, the foundational sciences stand in the same relation to the factical sciences as Being (Sein) stands
in relation to beings (Seiendes).
329
Thus, Dasein constitutes a necessary condition for the Being (Sein) of beings (Seiendes).
Chapter 6 Poisis
hermeneutic emergence of the ontical from the ontological while the ontical is a
necessary condition for causal emergence of the ontological (Dasein) from the ontical.
However, in both cases, neither is sufficient for the other; hence, the irreducibility and
the emergent status of each relative to the other. To the extent that ontological (or
hermeneutic) emergence and ontical (or causal) emergence can be set in opposition, it
follows that they must be grounded in that which is prior to both, viz. incipient
emergence, the poitic (coming-forth, bringing-forth, becoming) aspect of Being as such
(Seyn). The relations between the ontical and the ontological and the three kinds of
emergence are shown in Fig 6.8:
incipient emergence
Being as such
ONTOLOGICAL
causal
emergence
hermeneutic
emergence
ONTICAL
Fig 6.8 Emergent Relationality.
6.7.2. Physicalist-Emergentism
Elstob (1984, 1986, 1988, 1991) presents a physicalist framework of emergence in which
it is maintained that emergent properties come into existence as a result of interactions
between components. Although his scheme is similar to that of Baas and Emmeche, it
contrasts with the latter in (at least) three respects: First, it is grounded in systemic-
realism as opposed to observational-relativism. Consequently, the observer is not
considered epistemically-necessary for emergence on this framework; second, it is non-
cumulationistic (chapter 5) in positing meta-active (or retroactive) causation as
phenomenally real. As Elstob (1984) states,
the emergent level, which evolves from the component level but which has a causality that is
relatively independent of the component level, can create conditions that give rise to component level
interactions that would not occur in the absence of the emergent level. (p.87)
In support of Polanyi (1966), Elstob (1986) rejects the epiphenomenalist interpretation

of downwards (meta-active, retroactive) causation in terms of global (top-down)
constraint since, on this view, the latter is held to be completely determined by local
Chapter 6 Poisis
(bottom-up) causation and initial (boundary) conditions (chapter 3), thereby entailing
a commitment to universal determinism (chapter 2). According to Polanyi, boundary
conditions must be specified at every phenomenal level and no level can gain control
over - and thereby determine or specify - its own boundary conditions; for this reason,
emergent levels must be characterized as phenomenal rather than epiphenomenal (as is
the case in computational systems such as CAs330 ); third, the role of potential, latent or
passive relations plays a constitutive (that is, causal) role in emergence. As Elstob (1988)
states,
the idea of latent relation is that there are in existence an indefinitely large number of relations that
have potential influence, and therefore potential existence, but which within current existence do not
exert any influence. However, with a change to what is in existence there may come into being
existences that can be influenced by the latent relations and can therefore give these latent relations
existence. (p.97)
He goes on to maintain that
the idea of latent relations is important since it suggests that there are many relationships in existence
that have no current influence but which are potential contributors to emergent existence. The
important point is that we cannot specify such relations because they only become apparent when
they become influential. But, even with this restriction, it is wise to acknowledge that such latent
relations constitute an aspect of nature, and that we are likely to have an impoverished view of nature
if we deny them. (p.98)
This position is problematic for the following reasons: According to Elstob (1984),
something exists if it makes a difference; however, in the above statement, it is asserted
that relations exist which are non-causal. This problem is not overcome by distinguishing
relations from relata and classifying the former as subsistent and the latter as existent
since this move does not address the distinction between actual and potential relations;
furthermore, from an ontological perspective, the distinction between existence and
subsistence is merely terminological since to the extent that both relations and relata
partake of Being, both exist in some sense of the term. These problems can be overcome
by holding the relationship between existence and causation to be contingent rather than
necessary and distinguishing actual from potential existence: On this basis, four
possibilities for the relation between causation and existence can be distinguished as
shown in the following table (overleaf).
330
An extension of the standard CA formalism which attempts to incorporate Polanyi's pluralistic position with
respect to boundary conditions is described in (Ali,98a).
Chapter 6 Poisis
Existence
Actual Potential
Causal (I) (II)

Causation
Non-Causal (III) (IV)
Table 6.14 Possible Existence-Causation Relations.
On this scheme, latent relations can be classified under (IV) according to the metaphysics
presented in (Elstob,84) and under (III) according to the metaphysics presented in
(Elstob,88). In a later work (Elstob,91), the contradiction between these positions is
reconciled by defining existence in contextually-relativistic terms, viz. "if a property
does not make itself manifest and cannot do so within the context it is in, then the
property does not exist within that context [emphasis added]." On this basis Elstob holds
that "therefore we are not assuming that the properties of a thing are somehow pre-
ordained, rather that properties belong not to a thing in isolation but to the relationship
between a thing and other things or context [emphasis added]." (p.166) However, this
position is problematic since it does not follow from the fact that properties are
contextually-relativistic with respect to manifestation that such properties are not pre-
ordained: For example, if potential contexts are considered (in addition to actual
contexts) then properties can be both contextual and pre-determined. This position
appears to be supported by Elstob himself, viz. "creational change involves the linking
up of latent relationships and unexploited potentials to produce consequences that
become significant simply because they are placed in a context or network of existents
that give them significance [emphasis added]." (p.170) Yet, Elstob (1988) insists that
latent relations cannot be modelled by the machine formulation since the latent relations are exactly
that - they are hidden and therefore unknown before they come into existence. If we were to model
them we should need to know about them and we would only know about them if they were either
pre-figured in some other aspect of existence or had already made their existence felt, and in either
case they would not be hidden existences [emphasis added]. (p.98)
Again, it does not follow from the fact that latent relations are hidden (or concealed) that
such relations do not exist; clearly, they can exist as potentialities and, ironically, this is
exactly how Elstob conceives them, viz. latent relations as passive relations as potential
relations. For this reason, it is possible to model latent relations mechanistically but only
after the event of emergence when such relations have become manifest (causally-
actualized). In this sense, it is possible to reinterpret Elstob's ontological emergentism
in epistemological terms consistent with Cariani's (1989, 1991) notion of emergence-
relative-to-a-model, viz. emergence-relative-to-a-machine-description. This reduction
is possible because of (i) conflation of ontology (the existence of existents) with
epistemology (the knowledge of such existents) and (ii) failure to appreciate that in
asserting that latent relations are hidden, the latter must exist in some sense since they
Chapter 6 Poisis
partake of Being as the hidden (concealed, potential). For this reason, it is consistent to
hold, epistemically, that relative to a particular machine description, a set of latent
relations are non-mechanistic while maintaining, ontically, that there exists some
machine specification in which latent relations are incorporated (as actual)331.
In order to prevent the collapse of ontological emergentism into epistemological

emergentism, it is necessary to examine the metaphysical assumptions underlying
Elstob's (1988) framework. For example, it is highly significant that on his view, "a
latent relation requires some other relationship or existence to bring it into influential
existence [emphasis added]" (p.98); hence, the classification of passive relations under
either (III) or (IV). Clearly, this position is grounded in tacit adoption of Aristotle's
assertion of the priority of the actual over the potential and the contingent association of
causality with the former. In this connection, it is significant that Elstob (1991)
distinguishes three kinds of change as follows:
Type 1 is the change shown by the natures that existents have whilst still remaining the existents they
are. Type 2 is change involving regular transformation of existents. Type 3 is change involving the
creation of [novel] existents. (p.166)
Clearly, each type of change is ontical since it involves a movement between beings
(existents). As Elstob states, "what we are not saying [in asserting that type 3 change
produces novel or unexpected existents, that is, existents that are not a consequence of
the existents and interactions current prior to the onset of the change] is that the eventual
results of the creational change come out of nothing [emphasis added]." (p.168) It is
important to appreciate that this position is grounded in an absolutist interpretation of the
maxim, ex nihilo nihil fit (nothing comes from nothing) which is equivalent to ex ens ens
fit (something comes from something). To the extent that ontical existence is defined in
terms of causation, it follows that a necessary condition for emergent change (type 3) is
the existence of at least two existents (beings)332. Consequently, a basic presupposition
of Elstob's (1988) framework is the notion of mutual (that is, reciprocal or symbiotic)
existence:
The idea is that certain existences can only exert an influence and thereby gain existence, through one
or more other existences which in turn, either directly or indirectly, require the first existence for the
expression of their own influences in order that they too may gain existence. Thus we have a set of
mutually supportive entities that only exist because they exist as a set - a typical chicken and egg
situation. (pp.98-99)
331
As stated in chapter 3, this position is maintained by Crutchfield (1994).
332
As stated previously, the notion of self-organization is highly problematic since the concept of `self' is only
meaningful in opposition to that of òther': If a self is identical to its other then there is no distinction between
them in which case there is no causation; if there is causation then self and other are not identical in which case
there is no self-organization.
Chapter 6 Poisis
However, as he goes on to state, "this is a clearly circular arrangement and we cannot

imagine how such a realm of existence could come into un-aided being. One solution to
this puzzle is to propose the intervention of some constructor or designer who provides
the necessary templates and supports to set the arrangement up. Another solution is to
envisage some developmental process involving a series of meso-forms that act as
stepping stones to the final mutually supportive and stable result." (p.99) The first
scheme is consistent with an enlightened creationism grounded in Behe's notion of
irreducible complexity (section 6.4.2.3) and the second with an evolutionism (section
6.4.2.1) grounded in Cairns-Smith's (1985) concept of genetic takeover333. The former
is problematic since it is (in principle) always possible to historically reduce an
irreducibly complex system using bottom-up `scaffolding' and `cranes' as opposed to top-
down `skyhooks' in order to explain the gradualistic construction of àrches', viz. the
causal closure or existential circularity of systems (Dennett,95). The latter is problematic
since in the absence of templates (transcendent forms, essences), it becomes impossible
to explain the persistence and stability of structures: Appealing to the existence of
universal laws constitutes a non-solution since this undermines the universality of
evolutionism. However, according to Mercer (1917), such a move is necessary. On his
view,
[the laws of nature] are not evolved - they simply declare themselves and are the conditions of the
[evolutionary] process, not its products. The properties of things are what they are because it is in
their nature to be such. They may be arranged in new groups of relations, and so reveal new qualities;
but the potentialities are there from the first. Process consists in bringing these potentialities into new
relations, and so actualizing them. Here, then we have to recognize further limitations to the principle
of evolution. The inherent powers of things are `given'; they are prior to the process in which they
manifest themselves. Evolution, therefore, can never explain them, and their implications must be
studied in and for themselves in their relation to the Ground which originates and sustains them
Hence, there is an a priori limit (closure) to the possibilities for ontological emergence
in systems with fixed laws334. However, this does not constitute a limit to the possibilities
for ontological emergence as such since, as Mercer states, there remains the question
concerning the relation between the given and its ground. Clearly, this relation cannot
be ontical (causal) since causation is a productive - artificing or making - relation
between beings and does not - cannot - thereby address the ontological difference
between beings and Being as such (section 6.5.4); hence, this relation must be
333
Cairns-Smith describes genetic takeover as follows: "a line of organisms with genes made of one material
might change gradually into a line of organisms based on a quite different genetic material, i.e. through a
genetic takeover." (p.62)
334
This point is significant in the context of a general critique of artificiality and of computationally emergent
artificiality (or CEA) in particular since, as will be shown in chapter 7, the notion of givenness is readily set
against that of made-ness, thereby mirroring a corresponding opposition between naturality (physis) and
artificiality (techn-Enframing).
Chapter 6 Poisis
characterized as incipient or originative and a grounding movement between Being and

beings. As Demos (1926) states,
some construe the emergence of the possible into actuality as the blossoming forth of what is already
contained in the seed, as the unfolding of the implicit [as in Bohm's implicate order philosophy]. So
to conceive emergence is to rob it of creativeness, it is to think of it as merely the removal of the veil
from what is eternally there. (p.237)
However, it is not necessarily the case that emergence and creativity stand in opposition
to the eternal: Consistent with Heidegger's (1959) unification of the static and dynamic
aspects associated with beings and becoming in Being as such (section 6.5.4), and
following Rescher (1996), it might be argued that what is eternal (changeless) is
creativeness (change). Thus, Demos' statement only applies in the context of the ontical
(that is, beings); Being as such is eternal and creative because creativeness (change) is
eternal (unchanging).
Given that such problems arise in connection with an absolutist interpretation of ex nihilo
nihil fit, it follows that a solution must lie in the adoption of an absolutist interpretation
of creatio ex nihilo, more precisely, in the maxim ex nihilo omne ens qua ens fit, viz.
from nothing every thing as thing comes to be. This position is supported by Palmer
(1996) who distinguishes three types of emergence:
1. Artificial emergence which is when things that already exist are recombined to yield something new.
2. Chiasmic emergence which is when a combination occurs that is unexpected between things that
already exist and that this is combined with random events in such a way that something
unprecedented is created that goes beyond the pre-existent ingredients.
3. Genuine emergence which is a spontaneous generation of something that has never existed before out
of nothing [that is, creatio ex nihilo]. It may be based on [that is, ontically-supervenient on] the
existence of things that already exist but moves beyond everything that exists by opening up a new
dimension of novelty that is orthogonal to everything that exists prior to the radical emergent event
Both (1) and (2) involve movements between beings while (3) clearly involves a
movement between beings and nothing (Being) with the latter interpreted ontologically
in dynamical - although non-causal - terms (section 6.5.5). Such a move is readily shown
to be both valid and necessary once the ontological difference (section 6.5.4) between
beings (Seiendes) - whether the latter are relations or relata - and Being as such (Seyn)
is appreciated. Consistent with the framework presented at the end of section 6.7.1, the
relation between Being as such on the one hand, and (ontical) relations and relata on the
other, is held to take the form of a grounding of causal emergence (that is, movements
between beings) in incipient emergence (that is, movements between Being and beings).
On this scheme, potentiality and actuality - which are ontical - are viewed as relative to
(pure) possibility - which is incipient - and only the latter is unbounded (or open) in the
absolute sense. Thus, ontological (or open) emergence is possible but not at the level of
Chapter 6 Poisis
existents: Being6being movements are ontologically-open - since inter-categorial - and

characterized by the historical-incipience of new existential modalities (ways of Being
or Sein). Crucially, such modalities provide the basis for explaining the stability of
existents; being6being movements, by contrast, are ontologically-closed - since intra-
categorial - and characterized by the actualization of potentiality. Significantly, this
framework supports epistemological emergence, viz. Cariani's (1989, 1991) emergence-
relative-to-a-model, at the ontical level. These distinctions are summarized in Table 6.15:
Incipient Emergence (Being6being) Causal Emergence (being6being)
Ontological openness Ontological closure

Ontological emergence Epistemological emergence
Table 6.15 Comparison of Incipient and Causal Emergence.
According to Jaspers (1971), "order is rooted in what has once broken out of order; the
destructive exception becomes source of new authority" (p.48); hence, "truth is not one,
because the exception breaks out of it, and because authority realizes truth only in
historical form." (pp.54-55) However, as Sikka (1997) states, that which is prior to and
the absolute ground of order is not chaos - since this is defined relative to order - but
pure possibility which generates necessity historically and relative to the emergence of
the existential modalities335. Thus, the structure of ontical emergence is characterized by
a historical movement between causality and incipience, closure and openness336.
6.7.3. Pragmatist-Emergentism
Mead (1932) presents a pragmatist interpretation of emergence which anticipates

Cariani's (1989, 1991) concept of emergence-relative-to-a-model (chapter 3). On this
scheme, emergence is defined as
335
Demos (1926) maintains that "as long as we limit ourselves to the world of actuality, we can do either of two
things: either we can regard the given as controlling what is not given, or we can regard it as not controlling
the future at all. In the first case we have rigid determinism, in the second we have sheer indeterminism and
chaos. To obtain genuine spontaneity, we must pass beyond the category of actuality and grasp possibility,
which involves spontaneity in its very character as contrasted with necessity. The view suggests itself that the
order of nature is not an antecedent fact but an emergent from possibility, that the universe is in travail, and
that law and system are being born and reared laboriously amidst all the hazards of existence. Spontaneity
does not disappear; it gets regulated. gradually losing its arbitrary character. By the very process of
realization, possibilities become restricted; the already actual enters as an additional causal factor, creating
precedents, habits, making for greater determinateness. Thus possibility, in its march toward actuality, is
confronted with an environment, favourable or unfavourable, which controls its realization. The past cooperates
with the possible in the emergence of the future; for the past survives in the present, through the fact that it is
continuous with it [emphasis added]." (pp.237-238)
336
The structure of ontological (or hermeneutic) emergence and its relation to ontical and incipient emergence was
briefly addressed in section 6.7.1.
Chapter 6 Poisis
the presence of [a thing] in two or more different systems, in such a fashion that its presence in a later
system changes its character in the earlier system or systems to which it belongs. (p.69)
From this statement, it might appear that Mead's concept of emergence endorses some
form of retroactive or downwards causation and this interpretation is (at least) partially
correct since, as Murphy (1959) states,
before the emergent has occurred, and at the moment of its occurrence, it does not follow from the
past. That past relative to which it was novel cannot be made to contain it. But after it has occurred
we endeavour to reconstruct experience in terms of it, we alter our interpretation and try to conceive
a past from which the recalcitrant element does follow and thus to eliminate the discontinuous aspect
of its present status. Its abruptness is then removed by a new standpoint, a new set of laws, from
which the conditions of our new present can be understood. These laws could not have been a part
of any previous past, for in the presents with relation to which those pasts existed there was no such
emergent element. To assume a single determinate past to which every present must wholly conform
is to deny emergence altogether. But at the same time, to treat the emergent as a permanently alien
and irrational element is to leave it a sheer mystery. It can be rationalized after the fact, in a new
present, and in the past of that present it follows from antecedent conditions, where previously it did
not follow at all. As the condition of the present, the past, then, will vary as the present varies, and
new pasts will àrise behind us' in the course of evolution as each present `marks out and in a sense
selects what has made its own peculiarity possible' [emphasis added]. (pp.xvii-xviii)
There are (at least) three related points to note in connection with the above statement:
Firstly, anticipating Cariani's scheme in which the emergence of an emergent
phenomenon is explained in terms of a changed set of observational primitives and laws
governing their interaction, Mead maintains that emergence can be explained in terms
of an altered "interpretation" of "experience" and "a new set of laws"; secondly, for Mead
- and Cariani - emergence must be viewed as an epistemological phenomenon.
According to Mead,
given an emergent event, its relations to antecedent processes become conditions or causes. Such a
situation is a present. It marks out and in a sense selects what has made its peculiarity possible. It
creates with its uniqueness a past and a future. As soon as we view it, it becomes a history and a
prophecy. [Thus,] the past as it appears with the present and future, is the relation of the emergent
event to the situation out of which it arose, and it is the event that defines that situation. (p.23)
Interestingly, the above statement is equivalent to an extension of the ek-static temporal

structure of the Dasein (section 6.5.3) - which is characterized as a temporal gestalt or
unity in diversity (as past, present and future) - beyond the latter to beings in general
(Seiendes); thirdly, in the attempt at eliminating "the discontinuous aspect" of the
emergent phenomenon relative to its past (substrate), an implicit commitment is made
to existential continuity, viz. Being as monistic. This point is highly significant since it
appears to take emergence out of the domain of the (merely) epistemological and into
that of the ontological, thereby undermining the pragmatist claim to have transcended337
337
Here transcendence is to be understood in the positivistic sense of abandonment as opposed to the
Heideggerian hermeneutic sense of reappropriation.
Chapter 6 Poisis
metaphysics. As Mead states,
it is the task of the philosophy of today to bring into congruence with each other [the] universality of
determination which is the text of modern science, and the emergence of the novel which belongs not
only to the experience of human social organisms, but is found also in a nature which science and the
philosophy that has followed it have separated from human nature [emphasis added]. (p.14)
It is important to appreciate that on his view, the past "[when] looked at from the
standpoint of the emergent [phenomenon], becomes a different past. The emergent when
it appears is found to follow from the past, but before it appears it does not, by
definition, follow from the past." (p.2) Consequently, Murphy (1959) maintains that, for
Mead, "determinism holds of the past implied in the present [and] emergence in the
relation of one such present, with its past, to another." (p.xviii) This position is similar
to that of Elstob (1986) who rejects forwards-determinism while accepting backwards-
determinism: On the former, the present is held to be determined (necessitated) by the
past and hence, closed; on the latter, the present is held to be open and it is only after the
event of emergence that substrate (past) and emergent (present) can be placed in causal
relation with each other. However, there is a crucial difference in their respective
schemes: For Elstob, the relation between past and present is grounded in an
indeterministic metaphysics whereas for Mead, this relation is grounded in determinism,
that is, ontological necessity. As he states,
there is and always will be a necessary relation of the past and the present but that the present in
which the emergent appears accepts that which is novel as an essential part of the universe, and from
that standpoint rewrites its past. The emergent then ceases to be an emergent and follows from the
past which has replaced the former past. We speak of life and consciousness as emergents but our
rationalistic natures will never be satisfied until we have conceived a universe within which they arise
inevitably out of that which preceded them [emphasis added]. (p.11)
Consistent with this position, Ross (1985) maintains that "when the èntry' conditions are
satisfied, [emergent] realization is necessary." (p.236) However, Mead holds that "these
conditions while necessary do not determine in its full reality that which emerges
[emphasis added]" (p.16); hence, "rigorous thinking does not necessarily imply that
conditioning of the present by the past carries with it the complete determination of the
present by the past." (p.17) In order to avoid contradiction with his previous statement,
Mead's latter remarks must be viewed as bearing on the question concerning
epistemological determinism (knowing) as opposed to ontological determinism (Being);
for this reason, his assertion that "emergent life changes the character of the world just
as emergent velocities change the character of masses [emphasis added]" (p.65) must be
interpreted as a movement from hidden (or concealed) potentiality to disclosed (or
unconcealed) actuality. This latter point is highly significant since, as will be seen in
what follows, it undermines the possibility of ontological emergence. However, the latter
assertion is important for another reason, viz. category error: In maintaining that life and
consciousness change the character of the world `just as', that is, in the same way as,
velocities change the character of masses, Mead fails to appreciate the fact that velocities
Chapter 6 Poisis
and masses are ontologically-objective (or third-person) phenomena whereas

consciousness is an ontologically-subjective (or first-person) phenomenon; consequently,
consciousness cannot be emergent in the same way that velocity is emergent. Thus, the
category problem (chapter 7), viz. the problem of explaining how ontological-
subjectivity emerges from an ontologically-objective substrate, is not resolved on this
emergentist framework. In this connection, it is interesting to note that Chalmers (1990)
rejects radical (or ontological) emergentism on the grounds (1) that it is "ìnexplicable'
and `magical'" and (2) that "there is not the slightest evidence for it". However, it is
highly significant that with respect to the latter statement, he adds the caveat "(except,
perhaps, in the difficult case of consciousness)", the latter phenomenon of which he
elects to "put aside" in formulating a definition of emergence. On his view, "emergence
is the phenomenon wherein a system is designed according to certain principles, but
interesting properties arise that are not included in the goals of the designer". Clearly,
emergence is, on this definition, epistemic since it is designer or artificer-relativistic and
thereby338 interpreter or observer-relativistic (chapter 3). Chalmers points to this latter
fact explicitly, viz. "emergence is a psychological property. It is not a metaphysical
absolute." However, it is important to appreciate that ontological (or metaphysical)
emergence is rejected on his scheme because of a tacit a priori commitment to the
maxim ex nihilo nihil fit (nothing comes from nothing) and a metaphysics in which the
universe is held to be causally-closed. For this reason, Chalmers rejects the possibility
of an emergentist solution to the `hard' or category problem (chapter 7), viz. the problem
of explaining how ontical subjectivity can arise from an ontologically-objective
substrate, postulating informational panpsychism (chapter 1) as an alternative.
Given Mead's epistemological emergentism and ontological determinism, it follows that

emergence must be defined in terms of a movement from potentiality to actuality, the
unfolding or explication of that which is enfolded or implicate (Bohm,80). Yet, this
position appears to be contested by Murphy (1959) who maintains that
to interpret the world exclusively in terms of the conditioning of objects which a given period has
isolated as the permanent background of becoming is to relegate novelty to a merely subjective
experience [emphasis added]. (p.xix)
However, close examination of this statement reveals that it is not ontological

determinism and movement between potentiality and actuality as such that is contested;
rather it is a determinism defined in terms of specific (or particular) actuals and potentials
(for example, matter, life, computation etc). Hence, it is legitimate to assert - as does
Heidegger in the context of hermeneutic emergence (that is, the emergence of the Being
(Sein) of beings (Seiendes) relative to Dasein) - (i) that beings (phenomena) are given
and yet remain to be disclosed and (ii) that such disclosure (or discovery) is not `merely'
subjective but a historically-ontological phenomenon in itself. However, this does not -
338
The necessary connection between artificing and knowing in design was introduced in section 6.6.3 and will
be examined more explicitly in chapter 7.
Chapter 6 Poisis
cannot - constitute a complete solution to the problem of emergence since, as stated

previously, it does not address the ontological difference between beings and Being as
such (section 6.5.4) and hence, the question concerning ontological emergence.
Significantly, Mead maintains, consistent with Murphy's above statement, that
it is idle to insist upon universal or eternal characters by which past events may be identified
irrespective of any emergent, for these are either beyond our formulation or they become so empty
that they serve no purpose in identification. The import of the infinite in ancient and modern
mathematical thought illustrates this impotence [emphasis added]. (p.2)
There are (at least) two points to note in connection with the above statement in the
context of this study: First, while it is indeed consistent with Heideggerian
phenomenology to maintain - as does Mead - that the structure of Being as such (Seyn)
can only be disclosed emergently, that is, historically as the structure of Being (Sein) or
the existential modalities, it does not thereby follow that all questioning concerning the
meaning of Being as such (Seyn) is impossible, empty and purposeless: To the extent that
Dasein, beings (Seiendes) and the Being (Sein) of beings fail to exhaust the meaning and
truth of Being as such, it follows that determining the nature (Being) of the relation
between the former and the latter constitutes a legitimate project and one which remains
to be undertaken. A preliminary attempt at addressing this question was made in sections
6.5 and 6.6.2 in connection with an inquiry into the meaning of ontological poisis
(coming-forth, bringing-forth, becoming) and in section 6.7.2, the grounding of causal
and hermeneutic emergence in incipient (or originary) emergence was established;
second, it is interesting to note that Mead's criticism of infinity is supported by Cariani
(1989) who, in the context of a discussion of the computational capacities of devices
such as cellular automata and Turing machines (chapter 2), maintains that
excluding potential and actual infinities [has] the beneficial effect of removing indefinite entities from
the discourse, which often serve as a refuge for confusion and, occasionally, outright mysticism .. It
promotes conceptual hygiene. (p.179)
There are (at least) two problems with this position: First, the rejection of potential and
actual infinities constitutes an aesthetic judgement grounded in a metaphysical position,
viz. finitist-constructivism. Given the ontological difference between beings and Being
(section 6.5.4) and the grounding provided by the latter with respect to the phenomenon
of emergence (poisis), it is highly debatable whether removing infinities from the
discourse on emergence in naturals and artifactuals is possible let alone beneficial (since
anti-mystical and therefore conceptually hygenic339); second, while rejecting infinities,
339
In this connection it is interesting to note that another radical constructivist, von Glaserfeld (1994), holds that
"poetic metaphors are not compatible with scientific discourse, and [that] the discourse of poets and mystics
cannot be translated into the language of the sciences." (p.3) This is because "scientific theories and models
concern the rationally segmented world of human observations and experience, not the unitary world of the
mystic's revelation [emphasis added]." (p.4) On this basis, he goes on to state that "the most urgent task seems
to be to develop a way of thinking and living that gives proper due to both [emphasis added]." (p.5) It is
Chapter 6 Poisis
Cariani (1991) appeals to the notion of the continuum in order to support the possibility
of open-ended (that is, potentially-infinite) emergence. On his view,
the functional closure of computer simulations is due to the stability properties of the physical
substrates on whose motions they depend. Digital computers are closed-state devices because of the
finite number and stable nature of the discrete attractors they utilize for their state spaces. As
functional objects, they are defined by this discrete, stable organization. Biological organisms and
mixed digital-analog devices, in contrast, as open-state devices can continue to proliferate new
discrete attractors (new symbol primitives) because of the continuous, contingently stable nature of
their energy landscapes. New distinctions can then arise out of the continuum, in a constant interplay
between the differentiated and the undifferentiated, the symbolic and the indefinite. (p.792)
However, this strategy is itself problematic for (at least) two reasons: (1) If the
continuum allows for infinitely many different measurements, that is, if the set of
measurements is infinite - which would seem to be a necessary condition for open
emergence by definition - then an actual (or potential) infinite is re-introduced into the
ontology in which case Cariani's position becomes self-refuting (inconsistent); (2) it is
conceivable, as computationalists such as Steinhart (1998) maintain, that the analog
continuum is itself an epistemic emergent (chapter 3) grounded in a discrete ontical
substrate, viz.
analog phenomena (idealized decriptions of which appear in analog laws like differential equations)
are regularities of emergent powers and properties of patterns supervening on digital populations. The
analog behaviour is a macroscopic statistical feature resulting from the averaging or blurring of
microscopic digital transitions. (p.123)
Since it is (metaphysically) possible to argue that (i) a finer grain computational substrate
will be able to generate the appearance of a phenomenon hitherto considered ontically-
continuous (that is, analog) and (ii) there may be a yet undiscovered limit to the
possibilities for measurement as a consequence of the ultimate discreteness of the ontical
substrate of reality, it follows that Cariani's argument against infinity ultimately reduces
to metaphysics. However, this reductio does not entail a stalemate between
computationalists (Steinhart) and anti-computationalists (Cariani): Given that the
problem is metaphysical, it is reasonable to hold that its solution might lie in an
òvercoming' of metaphysics, perhaps of the kind envisioned by Heidegger; in short, by
embracing the ontological difference, it becomes possible to mount a case against
computationalism grounded in an appeal to a conception of the in-finite (apeiron) that
is at once both coherent and impregnable to computationalist critique340.
maintained herein that pluralistic emergentism as grounded in Heideggerian pluralistic realism (that is,
hermeneutic realism and ontological pluralism) provides such a `way'.
340
This follows from the fact that computation is a kind of Being (Sein) and hence, ontical, whereas Being as such
(Seyn) is no-thing and the ground of beings.
Chapter 6 Poisis
6.7.4. Heideggerian-Emergentism
According to Dreyfus (1991), in his pre-Kehre work, "Heidegger is not interested in

giving the necessary and sufficient conditions for existing in his sense. He is only
interested in the de facto structure of this way of being." (p.15) Even in the post-Kehre
period, Heiddeger is not explicit regarding the necessity and sufficiency of conditions
for the emergence of particular (existentiell) structures; rather, his concern lies with the
existential truth of the phenomenon of emergence as such, that is, originary poisis
(section 6.6.2). However, to the extent that the ontical (causal, productive) and
ontological (existential, hermeneutic) constitute modes of Being as such (Seyn), they
must be related in some way. In section 6.7.1, this relation was briefly characterized in
terms of the grounding of causal and hermeneutic emergence in incipient emergence.
However, it is possible to further clarify this relation by questioning concerning the
relation between ontological Dasein and ontical objectivity and subjectivity. For
example, Heidegger's solution to the category problem (chapter 7), that is, the problem
of explaining how ontological subjectivity arises from an ontologically-objective
substrate, involves rejecting the premise that subjectivity emerges from objectivity on
the grounds that subjects and objects are ontically-equiprimordial: Ontical subjectivity
(`mind') does not - cannot - emerge from ontical objectivity (`matter') because there are
no objects without subjects nor subjects without objects; rather subjects and objects are
incipiently-emergent from the ontological gestalt being-in-the-world, itself an incipient-
emergent from Being as such (Seyn). As Grimsley (1967) states,
transcendence involves .. both the Dasein and the world - a fact which is scarcely surprising in view
of the essential unity of being-in-the-world. In other words, transcendence is important as the
foundation or ground which makes possible the emergence of all particular existents both human and
non-human. It thus reaches back to a level which is far more radical than the usual questions
concerning the `subject' and òbject', for it is a necessary presupposition for the appearence of both.
(p.82)
This position is supported by Macquarrie 1973) who maintains that
if we begin with the two separate and incommensurable `things', we shall never be able to make a
unity out of them. We must begin with the unity of being-in-the-world, and this means man as a
psychosomatic unity. (p.93)
On this basis, it might be argued that Being must be ontically panexperiential (chapter
1) or panpsychic (de Quincey,94) viz. ontical nature as psychosomatic all the way down,
since to posit otherwise would undermine ontological monism, viz. the principle of
continuity. As stated previously (section 6.4.4), Griffin (1998) insists that "in
evolutionary reconstruction, as elsewhere, we must avoid implying, as well as saying,
ànd then a miracle occurs'." (p.31) This position is consistent with Chalmer's
identification of ontological emergentism with `magic' (section 6.7.3). However, ontical
Being is not necessarily panpsychic for two reasons: First, the structure of Being is not
monistic (section 6.5.4). Thus, the mind-body duality - which is emergent from unitary
Chapter 6 Poisis
being-in-the-world - does not necessarily extend to beings other than Dasein; second,
ontological emergence is no more miraculous, magical or `mysterious' than the originary
givenness (chapter 7) of natural beings, viz. why there is something rather than nothing
(section 6.5.2). In fact, once the ontological difference between beings and Being
(section 6.5.4) is appreciated, it becomes possible to understand - and thereby remove
some of the mystery associated with - ex nihilo emergence by appeal to the concept of
incipience (section 6.6.2); in this sense, pluralistic emergentism is, in fact, more coherent
than panpsychism since it addresses the grounding of beings which the latter takes for
granted (since given). Heidegger (1993a) endorses a synthesis of the maxims ex nihilo
nihil fit (from nothing comes nothing) and creatio ex nihilo (creation from nothing), viz.
ex nihilo omne ens qua ens fit (from nothing every thing as thing comes to be). However,
given that Being and nothing are the `same' (section 6.5.5) and, consistent with his
interpretation of Being as aletheia-physis, that is, presencing forth into unconcealment,
it follows that incipient emergence (poisis) must mean
the unconcealing coming-forth of definite (finite) beings (actuals and potentials)

from concealed indefinite (in-finite) Being or nothing (pure possibility)341.
According to Heidegger (1929), "whatever, in accordance with its essence, casts

something like the `for-the-sake-of' projectively before it, rather than simply producing
it as an occasional and additional accomplishment, is that which we call freedom."
(p.126) To the extent that both Dasein and world are characterized by the existential for-
the-sake-of structure (section 6.5.3), it follows that both must be free. This is extremely
significant because although the world is ontological (existential, hermeneutic) while the
factical universe is ontical (causal, productive), the latter constrains the possibilities of
the former (sections 6.5.4 and 6.7.1): If the universe was ontically deterministic -
assuming mechanism or computationalism (chapter 5) - it would, by definition, be
governed by necessity in which case freedom would be merely epistemic. Yet Heidegger
(1977a) insists that freedom is ontological and ontological freedom is possible only
where ontological possibility is possible. Hence, the causality associated with the ontical
universe must be historically-contingent, its nomological structuredness (or order) a
consequence of its ontological Being (Sein) as physis, that is, as a stability (end, telos)
which endures as a presencing from Being as such (Seyn) of, for and by the latter
(section 6.5.4)342. The grounding of natural causation in physis (section 6.6.2) - as
contrasted with the grounding of artifactual causation in techn (section 6.6.3) - supports
freedom because ontological physis is characterized by openness which means both
emergence (coming-forth) and elusion-evasion (going-back), that is, a necessary
341
According to Heidegger (1959), "from the standpoint of physis, emergence, what was always-there is the
proteron, the earlier, the a priori." (p.193) Clearly, this a priori is concealed Being as such (Seyn).
342
To paraphrase Gould (1986), a metaphysics (of the ontical) which allows, forbids but does not require
(necessitate).
Chapter 6 Poisis
transcending of the fixed or stable (beings). As Heidegger states, "the selfhood of that
self that already lies at the grounds of all spontaneity .. lies in transcendence."
Furthermore, "only because transcendence consists in freedom can freedom make itself
known as a distinctive kind of causality in existing Dasein." (p.127) 343 Heidegger
provides implicit support for ontical (or causal) pluralism - a position supported by
Bunge (1959) and Elstob (1984, 1986) - by grounding the latter in ontological pluralism
(that is, pluralistic realism). This point is readily established as follows: Dasein, unlike
all other beings (Seiendes), is ontically-ontological (section 6.5.3) and hence,
characterized by transcendence (openness). However, since Dasein is ontically-
ontological and because the ontical constrains the ontological, the former must be
pluralistic (causally-open) as opposed to monistic (causally-closed).
343
Although Heidegger (1929) appears to undermine the latter position in a footnote to this article in which he
maintains that "freedom has nothing in common with grounding or with ground, just as little with cause or
causation or any kind of `substance' or `making'" (p.135) it is important to appreciate that this move is made
only to prevent possible conflations of the ontological with the ontical.
Chapter 7 Critique
Chapter 7
It was when intelligence and knowledge appeared
That the Great Artifice began.
Lao Tzu, The Tao Te Ching
Critique
7.1 Overview
In this chapter the folk-psychological view that artifacts are made whereas naturals are
given1 (or found) and that therein lies their essential difference is defended as a basis
upon which to mount a phenomenological critique of computationally emergent
artificiality or CEA (chapter 5). In the previous chapter, it was shown, following
Heidegger, that historicity (which includes both origin and unfolding) is constitutive of
the Being of a being: Given the essential, unitary relatedness of Being and becoming, it
is impossible to separate what-ness (essence) from that-ness (existence) (which, in fact,
means how-ness), thereby undermining the possibility of multiple-realizability,
functionalism and hence, "strong" CEA. On this basis, a poitic difference was
established between physis (naturality) and techn (artificiality). The aims of this chapter
are threefold: First, clarify the nature (Being) of this difference via a phenomenological
framework of ontic (productive, organizational) and epistemic (interpretative,
observational) relations between phenomena (naturals and artificials) and what is referred
to as the anthropic component, that is, the human artificer-interpreter; second, use this
framework (i) to distinguish between "hard" (or pure) and "soft" (or impure) artifactual
1
According to Macquarrie (1973), "to say that anything èxists' is simply to point to the fact `that it is'. Existence
is characterized by concreteness and particularity and also by a sheer givenness [emphasis added]." (p.61)
Chapter 7 Critique
types, identifying computationalism as the defining exemplar of the former, and (ii) to
establish the fact that, ontologically-speaking, there is no difference between designed
and emergent "hard" artifacts with respect to their distinction from naturals2 ; third,
undermine the possibility of "strong" CEA by showing how (1) the ontological
objectivity (externality, third-personhood) and (2) categorial-closure of "hard" artifacts
prevents ontological emergence, thereby rendering CEA incapable of solving the
category problem3. Since CEA is a unified framework (chapter 5), a single case where
it fails to realize (that is, instantiate) a natural phenomenon suffices to undermine the
validity of computationalism. Clearly, this fact has implications that transcend the
immediate debate over the possibility of "strong" AI or "strong" consciousness: For
example, if pluralistic emergentism of the radical Heideggerian type described in chapter
6 is rejected - and such a rejection is necessary given that computationalism is a
metaphysics4 - some form of dual-aspect metaphysics such as panexperientialism
(chapter 1) appears to become ontologically necessary. To the extent that computational
A-Life (chapter 4) defines life in ontologically-objective (or externalistic) terms, it
follows that computational A-Lifeforms are incapable of giving rise to consciousness.
Yet on panexperientialism, consciousness (mind) is held to arise from the brain (life)
which is, itself, an experiential phenomenon of lower order5. In short, computationalism
cannot instantiate panexperientialism since it is ontologically encompassed by the latter;
categorially-closed externalistic (that is, ontologically-objective) accounts of biology and
physics must, therefore, be incomplete. Of course, this does not entail holding that
phenomenal life and matter are incomplete since life (phenomenon) is not biology
(description) and matter (phenomenon) is not physics (description). This follows from
the fact that matter and life, as naturals, are givens and hence, epistemology (description)
and ontology (phenomenon) are only contingently (or a posteriori) related from the
perspective of the anthropic component (human artificier-interpreter). In A-Physics and
A-Life, by contrast, epistemology (description) and ontology (phenomenon) are
necessarily (or a priori) related; as will be seen in what follows, artifacts manifest
embedded intentionality which is expressed in ontologically-objective form in the
artificing movement from possibility (in the artificer) to actuality-potentiality (in the
artifact).
2
In short, the poitic difference applies to both designed (or top-down) and emergent (or bottom-up) artificiality.
3
That is, the problem of explaining how ontological-subjectivity can arise from an ontologically-objective
substrate.
4
On computationalism or `digital metaphysics' (Steinhart,98) - which is a monism - Being is computation. On
Heidegger's pluralistic view, by contrast, computation is a mode of Being and hence, grounded in the latter.
5
Order here implies difference of degree and not of kind and follows from the panexperientialist commitment
to the ontological continuity of phenomena (chapter 6).
Chapter 7 Critique
7.2. Phenomenological Framework
In this section, the ontology of the anthropic component and its ontic (productive,
organizational) and epistemic (interpretative, observational) relations to phenomena
(natural and artificial) are described.
7.2.1. The Anthropic Component
In this section, the ontology of the anthropic component, that is, the human being in its
capacity as artificer (or organizer) and interpreter (or observer) is briefly described. It
is crucial to appreciate at the outset that the presentation is concerned only with
explicating the Being of the human artificer-interpreter from a poitic perspective, that
is, from the perspective of its historical relation to the becoming of natural and artificial
(as artifactual) phenomena; hence, issues relating to functionality, praxis (or use) and
interpretation (semantics, meaning) are not considered in this study6. Although the Being
of the anthropic component as anthropic component cannot be defined independently of
its relation to such phenomena (section 7.2.2), the question concerning the Being of the
relation - which is a distinction - between the anthropic component and its primordial
ontological ground, viz. Dasein (chapter 6), must be addressed and it is this relation
(distinction) which is examined in what follows.
Margolis (1989) presents an interpretation of Dasein grounded in the following

assumptions which he takes to be doctrines upon which philosophy is converging, viz.
"(a) the rejection of all forms of cognitive transparency and privilege; (b) the indissoluble
unity of realist and idealist elements in any plausible theory of the sciences; (c) the
conceptual symbiosis of cognizing self and cognized world; (d) the matched historicity
of self, science, and world." (p.1) On this basis, he is led to conclude that "the human self
is itself technologically and praxically constituted" (p.4) and that "the theory of the
technologized self is, primarily, a theory of the contingently constituted, societally
formed, historicized, diachronically alterable practices of actual human communities."
(p.5) Crucially, he maintains that
it follows instantly from the theory of the praxical or technical constitution of the self that all would-
be findings of invariances, natural necessities, nomic universals, essences, closed systems,
indubitability, self-evidence and the like must be no more than idealized posits made within the
indefinable limits of the competence and horizon of contingently formed and focused selves. (pp.4-5)
There are (at least) two points to note in connection with the above statement: First,
epistemological relativism (that is, historical-situatedness and finitude of the cognizing
6
Searle (1992, 1995) presents an extended realist analysis of the distinction in functional Being between artifacts
- or ìnstitutional facts' - and naturals grounded in the as-structure (chapter 6), viz. X counts as Y in context C,
from the perspective of the human subject as a conscious, thematic intentional agent. Heidegger (1995), by
contrast, presents an interpretation of this structure in non-thematic terms.
Chapter 7 Critique
self) does not entail ontological (or metaphysical) relativism (or constructivism); and
second, metaphysical relativism is ultimately self-defeating since as Nagel (1997) states,
the claim Èverything is subjective [or relative]' must be nonsense, for it would itself have to be either
subjective or objective [that is, absolute]. But it can't be objective, since in that case it would be false
if true. And it can't be subjective, because then it would not rule out any objective claim, including
the claim that it is objectively false. (p.15)
For this reason, Mingers (1995), while endorsing the epistemological insights of
constructivists such as Maturana - which are broadly consistent with those of Margolis -
is led to adopt a critical realist7 position with respect to ontology (chapter 6). It is
important to appreciate that Margolis' constructivist interpretation of self and other
(world) is grounded in his insistence that essentialism is false and that "the world is a
flux, reconstituted again and again through powers internal to its own contingent order,
centred in local interventions at particular cognizing nodes." (p.6) However, according
to Heidegger (chapter 6), it is possible - and, on Rescher's (1996) view, necessary - to
reconcile the contingency of existence with the universality of essence: If the world is
(a) flux then flux is its essence; in short, the Being (Sein) of the world is to-be-changing
and this is fundamental (essential)8. Furthermore, Margolis' technologically-deterministic
interpretation of Dasein is òvercome' (or transcended) in the thought of the post-Kehre
Heidegger which recontextualizes the pre-Kehre praxical interpretation of Dasein relative
to the question concerning Being as such (Seyn): For Heidegger, techn is a mode (or
way) of unconcealing Being9; hence, the technological or praxical interpretation of
Dasein, is an existentiell - and not an existential - structure10. While some
technologically-minded interpreters have, somewhat polemically and for rhetorical
purposes, regarded Heidegger's later thinking as `nostalgic' and `romantic' (chapter 6),
it is consistent with both the pre- and post-Kehre projects to interpret Dasein as
transcendence simpliciter, that is, projective self-interpretation, and reject the
technologically-deterministic interpretation of human being: This follows from the fact
that what man transcends are not epochs (interpretations) of technology but epochs of
7
Critical realism is consistent with Heideggerian pluralistic-realism (chapter 6).
8
To paraphrase Rescher, that which is fixed (essential, unchanging) is change itself.
9
It is crucial to appreciate that Heidegger is an ontologist, not a technologist: On his view, technology is a
modality of Being whose essence is nothing technological (Heidegger,77a).
10
According to Margolis (1989), technology is "the biological aptitude of the human species for constituting, by
alternative forms of equilibration, a world suited to a society of emergent selves or a society of such surviving
selves adjusted, diachronically, to such a world. We understand one another for the same reason we survive
as a species. Technology is the flowering of our biological endowment and is incarnate in it." (p.9) However,
it is crucial to appreciate that since biology is a factical or ontical science, it leads to an ontical (or existentiell)
interpretation of human being and hence, does not - cannot - correctly characterize man's existential essence,
viz. èxistence' or ek-sistence (that is, transcendence to Being as such).
Chapter 7 Critique
Being; thus, technology, whose essence is techn as a way of Being (culminating in

Enframing or Gestellen), is itself an epoch of Being. Interestingly, Margolis (1989)
appears to endorse a similar position himself in maintaining that "we have not yet
explained what the sense is in which the technologized self or its world are constructed
and yet not merely constructed." (p.13) On this basis, Caws (1979) is led to maintain that
"it is, I think, pure irreponsibility to claim that technology has made an essential
difference in the condition of man as knower and agent [emphasis added]" (p.234) since
"our basic relation to the world .. is constant." (p.231) Clearly, this position is consistent
with the Heideggerian view that the existential (or concrete-universal11) structures of the
human being (or Dasein) are existentially-fixed while its existentiell (or concrete-
particular) manifestations are historically-variable (chapter 6). However, as stated above,
it is crucial to appreciate that, for Heidegger (1993c), man as agent-knower (or artificer-
interpreter) is not primordial (essential or `basic') but derivative of human being as
Dasein, that is, transcendence (èxistence' or ek-sistence). This follows from the fact that,
on his view, man as agentive and knowing subject is emergent from man as unreflective,
non-thematic being-in-the-world. As he states,
man is never first and foremost man on the hither side of the world, as a `subject', whether this is
taken as Ì' or `We'. Nor is he ever simply a mere subject which always simultaneously is related to
objects, so that his essence lies in the subject-object relation. Rather, before all this, man in his
essence is ek-sistent into the openness of Being, into the open region that clears the `between' within
which a `relation' of subject to object can `be' [emphasis added]. (p.252)
However, although man as subject is indeed emergent from man as ek-sistence, it does
not follow thereby that the concept of a subject is by definition (that is, essentially or of
necessity) anthropocentric. According to Heidegger (1967),
until Descartes every thing at hand for itself was a `subject'; but now the Ì' becomes the special
subject, that with regard to which all the remaining things first determine themselves as such. Because
- mathematically - they first receive their thingness only through the founding relation to the highest
principle and its `subject' (I), they are essentially such as stand as something else in relation to the
`subject', which lie over against it as objectum. The things themselves become òbjects'. [However,]
the word objectum now passes through a corresponding change of meaning. For up to then the word
objectum denoted what one cast before himself in mere fantasy: I imagine a golden mountain. This
thus-represented - an objectum in the language of the Middle Ages - is, according to the usage of
language today, merely something `subjective'; for a `golden mountain' does not exist òbjectively'
in the meaning of the changed linguistic use. This reversal of the meanings of the words subjectum
and objectum is no mere affair of usage; it is a radical change of Dasein, that is to say, of the lighting
of the Being of beings on the basis of the predominance of the mathematical. (p.280)
Thus, for Heidegger (1977c), with the philosophy of Descartes, "the very essence of man
itself changes, in that man becomes subject. We must understand this word subiectum,
however, as the translation of the Greek hypokeimenon. The word names that-which-lies-
11
Hence, the distinction between Heideggerian essences and abstract - that is, worldless - Platonic essences
(ideas, forms).
Chapter 7 Critique
before, which, as ground, gathers everything onto itself" and, as stated above, "this
metaphysical meaning of the concept of subject has first of all no special relationship to
man and none at all to the I." (p.128) According to Heidegger (1977b), with Descartes
"the ousia (beingness) of the subiectum changes into the subjectness of self-assertive
self-consciousness, which [in Nietzsche] manifests its essence as the will to will." (pp.79-
80) As he goes on to state, "inasmuch as Descartes seeks [the] subiectum along the path
previously marked out by metaphysics, he, thinking truth as certainty, finds the ego
cogito to be that which presences as fixed and constant. In this way, the ego sum is
transformed into the subiectum, i.e., the subject becomes self-consciousness. The
subjectness of the subject is determined out of the sureness, the certainty, of that
consciousness." (p.83) Crucially,
all that is, is now either what is real as the object or what works the real, as the objectifying within
which the objectivity of the object takes shape. Objectifying, in representing, in setting before,
delivers up the object to the ego cogito. In that delivering up, the ego proves to be that which
underlies its own activity (the delivering up that sets before), i.e., proves to be the subiectum. The
subject is subject for itself. The essence of consciousness is self-consciousness. Everything that is,
is therefore either the object of the subject or the subject of the subject. Everywhere the Being of
whatever is lies in setting-itself-before-itself and thus in setting-itself-up. Man, within the subjectness
belonging to whatever is, rises up into the subjectivity of his essence. Man enters into insurrection.
The world changes into object. In this revolutionary objectifying of everything that is, the earth, that
which first of all must be put at the disposal of representing and setting forth, moves into the midst
of human positing and analyzing. The earth itself can show itself only as the object of assault, an
assault that, in human willing, establishes itself as unconditional objectification. Nature appears
everywhere - because willed from out of the essence of Being - as the object of technology. (p.100)
This position is supported by Lovitt (1977) who maintains that "what is, is no longer free
to show itself directly in itself. It is, rather, either as subject or as object, always at the
disposal of assertive self-consciousness, and hence of that mode of Being, the will to
power, ruling in the latter." (p.106) As Heidegger states,
man has risen up into the I-ness of the ego cogito. Through this uprising, all that is, is transformed
into object. That which is, as the objective, is swallowed up into the immanence of subjectivity. The
horizon no longer emits light of itself. It is now nothing but the point-of-view posited in the value-
positing of the will to power .. The uprising of man into subjectivity transforms that which is into
object. But that which is objective is that which is brought to a stand through representing [emphasis
added]. (p.107)
According to Heidegger (1977c), "to represent means to bring what is present at hand
before oneself as standing over against, to relate it to oneself, to the one representing it,
and to force it back into this relationship to oneself as the normative realm." (p.131)
Hence, "the original naming power of the worn-out word and concept `to represent': to
set out before oneself and so set forth in relation to oneself. Through this, whatever is
comes to a stand as object and in that way alone receives the seal of Being [emphasis
added]." (p.132) Thus, with Descartes, representation comes to mean
of oneself to set something before oneself and to make secure what has been set in place, as
Chapter 7 Critique
something set in place. This making secure must be a calculating, for calculability alone guarantees
being certain in advance, and firmly and constantly, of that which is to be represented. Representing
is no longer the apprehending of that which presences, within whose unconcealment apprehending
itself belongs, belongs indeed as a unique kind of presencing toward that which presences that is
unconcealed. Representing is no longer a self-unconcealing for ..., but is a laying hold and grasping
of ... What presences does not hold sway, but rather assault rules. Representing is now, in keeping
with the new freedom, a going forth - from out of itself - into the sphere, first to be made secure, of
what is made secure. That which is, is no longer that which presences; it is that which, in
representing, is first set over against, that which stands fixedly over against, which has the character
of object. Representing is making-stand-over-against, an objectifying that goes forward and masters.
In this way representing drives everything together into the unity of that which is thus given the
character of object. Representing is coagitatio [emphasis added]. (pp.149-150)
On this basis, Heidegger is led to conclude that "the fundamental event of the modern
age is the conquest of the world as picture. The word `picture' now means the structured
image that is the creature of man's producing which represents and sets before. In such
producing, man contends for the position in which he can be that particular being who
gives the measure and draws up the guidelines for everything that is [emphasis added]."
(p.134) In short, "when man becomes the primary and only real subiectum, that means:
Man becomes that being upon which all that is, is grounded as regards the manner of its
Being and its truth. Man becomes the relational center of that which is as such." (p.128)
Thus, "what is, in its entirety, is now taken in such a way that it first is in being and only
is in being to the extent that it is set up [or Enframed] by man, who represents and sets
forth .. The Being of whatever is, is sought and found in the representedness of the latter
[emphasis added]." (pp.129-130)
In summary, the relation between man (Dasein) and other phenomena (beings) can be
shown to be marked by the following movement: From (i) man as gathered by subject
(phenomenon) to (ii) object (phenomenon) standing over against man as (knowing)
subject to (iii) product (phenomenon) as Enframed by man as (artificing) subject. The
change in the interpretation of nature from self-limiting (or self-Enframing) subject to
other-limited (or other-Enframed) object is of critical importance since it allows for the
establishment of essentialistic (that is, ahistorical) correspondence relations (or
isomorphisms) between naturality and artificiality, the latter of which, by virtue of being
artifactual, is other-limited (or Enframed). This follows from the fact that on such an
interpretation both naturals and artificials are viewed as finite and closed (chapter 6)
from the perspective of an observing subject, viz. the human being. Crucially, this
subject-object relation is ahistorical since, as Jaspers (1965) maintains, Cartesian
philosophy "claims to be detached from all historical reality: aiming at timeless truth in
a world without tradition, it loses sight of history in order to become the existential void
of this abstraction, the thinking individual as such [emphasis added]." (p.156) This
position is supported by Levinas (1996) who maintains that
in the indifference to time which the `subject-object' relation manifests there is something like a
negation of the existential nature of knowledge. (p.13)
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According to Heidegger (1971), "`Thing-in-itself', thought in a rigorously Kantian way,

means an object that is no object for us, because it is supposed to stand, stay put, without
a possible before: for the human representational act that encounters it [emphasis
added]." (p.177) As a consequence of the ahistoricity of the subject-object relation, the
poitic difference (chapter 6) between naturals and artificials (as artifactuals), that is, the
distinction in the way that naturals and artificials come-forth (become), is displaced
(obscured) by the question concerning the nature (Being) - appearance (simulation) or
reality (emulation, realization) - of the possible (functional, behavioural) isomorphism(s)
between naturals and artificials, thereby rendering "strong" CEA possible.
It is appropriate at this point in the discussion to briefly consider the relation of subjects
and objects to artificing (production). According to Risan (1996), "the possibility of
producing [or artificing] .. objectivity, of creating distance [that is, separation] between
the observer [or subject] and the observed [or object], is .. one of the central elements in
all technoscience [emphasis added]." (p.17) In the context of artificiality as the sciences
of the artificial (chapter 4) - specifically, artificial life (or A-Life) - "this separation is
based on the construction of particular machines, the experimental apparatus. These
machines presumably provide the necessary distance between the one who studies and
the thing studied." (p.18) Significantly, he goes on to state that "when one focuses upon
how a thing is to be constructed to be `subject-independent' (i.e. objective) one also, by
necessity, explains the process by which the observer becomes òbject-independent' (i.e.
subjective)." (p.20) On his view,
technoscience [that is, technological science], by means of certain machines (the experimental
apparatus), the juridical idea of the trustworthy witness, and the separation of the subjects (of society)
and the objects (of nature) constructs phenomena that appear as `pregiven' [since ontically
autonomous]. These phenomena are fabricated in technical and social contexts that also establish
distance between the researcher and an object of inquiry that thus appears to be ùntouched by human
hands'. (p.41)
Again, "when ALife researchers relate to their simulations they both reproduce and
challenge the technoscientific distance. They reproduce the distance between the
researcher and a scientific nature that (as all nature) appear to us as pregiven, despite the
fact that they construct every single digital bit that they put into the experiment." (p.104)
In this connection, it is significant to note that Risan follows Latour in positing the
Society-Nature - that is, Culture-Nature or artificiality-naturality - distinction as "a
central element of modernity." (p.63) However, as shown in chapter 6, the classical (that
is, pre-modern) Greeks distinguished two kinds of poisis (coming-forth, bringing-forth)
associated with Being, viz. physis (autopoisis, self-coming-forth) or the coming-forth
of naturals and and techn (allopoisis, other-bringing-forth) or the bringing-forth of
artifacts; hence, with respect to the question concerning poisis (as opposed to that
concerning noesis), the distinction between naturals and artificials, nature and society (or
culture) is, in fact, pre-modern. Given that this distinction has existed in all epochs, it
might appear to constitute a basic, that is, existential, structure of Dasein. However, this
is not the case since, as stated previously, Dasein as the anthropic component, that is,
Chapter 7 Critique
artificer-interpreter, is emergent from being-in-the-world. Crucially, this latter position

appears to be contested by Risan (1996) who maintains that "in the actual process of
making objective quasi-subjects, the boundary between the maker (the subject) and the
made (the object) is .. blurred." (p.69) On this view, the artificer as artificer is a being-in-
the-world. For example, in constructing computational ecologies12, "an interface, then,
a `face between', may be said to lie `between' the human body and the object to be
perceived and acted on, but it does not lie between self and alterity [that is, òther']; it is
part of the self .. When the interface has become part of the acting and perceiving self,
then the simulation is alterity, it is the object to which the Ì' relates." (p.81) This
interpretation is consistent with Polanyi's (1966) notion of interiorization, viz.
whenever we use certain things for attending from them to other things, in the way in which we use
our own body, these things change their appearance. They appear to us now in terms of the entities
to which we are attending from them, just as we feel our own body in terms of the things outside to
which we are attending from our body. In this sense we can say that when we make a thing function
as the proximal term of tacit knowing, we incorporate it into our body - or extend our body to include
it - so that we come to dwell in it. (p.16)
The transformation from tool (or interface) regarded as distal (or òther') to prosthesis
(or medium) regarded as proximal (or `self') is shown in Fig 7.1:
Proximal Term Proximal Term

Distal Term Distal Term
BODY TOOL BODY - TOOL
Pre-indwelling Post-indwelling
Fig 7.1 Tool6Prosthesis Transformation via Interiorization (Indwelling).
Risan goes on to state that "the boundary between the interface and the program `behind'
the interface is fluid and dependent on the user. [Furthermore,] the interface of [a]
simulation [is] often an integrated part of the simulation itself." Hence,
12
Briefly, A-Lifeforms embedded in virtual environments, worlds, realities (chapter 4).
Chapter 7 Critique
when an [artificial world] is in the making [that is, when the artificer is involved in artifact-
construction] the boundary between self and alterity can only be `subjectively' defined. The boundary
is the actor's experienced and fluid action and perception front. Thus we cannot draw a clear-cut,
òbjective' boundary between self and alterity, as, for example, the skin of our bodies. There is no
subjective-objective distinction [emphasis added]. (p.81)
[However,] as the simulation becomes a ready-made product something important happens .. It seems
that its objectivity becomes clearer. In the same movement, the subjectivity of the observer is
stabilised. The fluid condition disappears as the skill-dependent interface-in-use becomes redundant.
[Thus,] during the process of making [a] simulation .. there is no clear distinction between subjects
and objects; neither is stable. However, the result of the process is, or I should rather say may be, a
stable Nature (of objects) and a stable Society (of subjects). (p.84)
On this basis, Risan (1997) concludes that
the objectivity of an ALifer observing a simulation is limited to the period during which the
simulation is up and running. If we take a broader perspective, including a larger context and a longer
time span, we see that, in the periods between the runs, the researcher is tweaking the parameters and
rewriting code. Hence, a picture more like co-evolution - rather than that of an objective observer
witnessing worlds behind screens - emerges. (p.6)
Consistent with this position, Okrent (1996) maintains that "the paradigmatic modes of
being-in [that is, of concernful yet non-reflective coping] are working on something or
producing something." (p.7) On such a view, technology is held to emerge socially
through non-thematic processes, specifically via the `technological unconscious'
(Feenberg,97) associated with `collective intentionality' (Searle,95).
There are (at least) three problems with the above position: First, it assumes that the
subject-object relation is essentially ahistorical and merely epistemic (interpretative).
This position is contested in section 7.2.2 on the grounds that poitic relationality is ontic
(productive) and historical yet correctly defined in subject-object terms; second, it
ignores that phase of the artificing activity in which subjects and objects are `clear-cut',
viz. the incipience associated with design and the (conscious) intentionalistic choice to
construct an artificial world. As Dreyfus (1991) states, "deliberate attention and thus
thematic intentional consciousness can .. be present .. in designing and testing new
equipment [emphasis added]." (p.70) In support of this position, Caws (1979) maintains
that "a technology [is] a planned, purposive, relatively complex, probably collaborative,
structured sequence of praxes [emphasis added]." (p.235) Ferr (1988) goes somewhat
further in postulating thematic (or cognitive) intentionality as a necessary condition for
the Being of artificials (as artifactuals), viz. "whenever human beings intervene
deliberately in the world of nature, they introduce artificiality [emphasis added]." (p.19)
In clarification of this position he goes on to state that "an artifact is something made or
used with àrt' or intelligence [emphasis added]" (p.27), whereby ìntelligence' is
understood the `capacity for self-disciplined mental activity'; third, in focusing on issues
of epistemology from an essentially ahistorical perspective, the question concerning the
Being of artifacts, the unitary relation between Being and becoming (poisis) and the
Chapter 7 Critique
poitic difference (chapter 6) between naturals and artificials (as artifactuals) is obscured,
thereby providing tacit support for the possibility of "strong" CEA. Furthermore, it is
crucial to appreciate that although computational artificiality appears to co-evolve
symbiotically with the human artificer, this co-evolutionary symbiosis is ontical (that is,
existentiell): The basic ontological structures of "hard" (or pure) artifacts (chapter 6 and
section 7.3), of which CEA will be shown to be an instance, and Dasein are fixed, viz.
the former as ontologically-ontical and the latter as ontically-ontological. This distinction
is critical since it entails that post-artificing - that is, post-symbiosis, when they have
become (stable) autonomous objects - artifacts are closed systems (chapter 3), incapable
of ontological emergence and operationally necessary (deterministic); naturals (such as
human beings), by contrast, are intrinsically open and hence, capable of ontological
emergence. In this connection, the following distinction between instrumentality, that is,
Heideggerian functionality, and functionality proper due to Schirmacher (1983) is
significant. On his view,
machine technology is functional, not instrumental. From our standpoint this appears to be the same
thing, but there is in fact a fundamental difference. To fufill a function means to be oriented from
within, to be defined by itself and its possibilities. To be an instrument means, on the other hand, to
be employed from without, to be employed for a purpose which has only a coincidental relation to
the characteristic quality of the phenomenon itself [emphasis added]. (p.278)
Furthermore, "machine technology .. exhibits the characteristics of an indisputable

autonomy; its functioning obeys an intrinsic law, is clearly automatic. This in no way
makes technology the subject; it means technology is apparently no longer adequately
describable within the customary subject-object relationship [emphasis added]." (p.279)
The problem with this position is that the functionality of machines, while ontically
autonomous and automatic (deterministic), is incipiently other-defined (that is,
allopoietic) as opposed to self-defined (or autopoietic); in short, machines as artifacts are
oriented from without13 and their possibilities are in fact circumscribed potentialities.
Artifact functionality reflects the embedding of artificer intentionality, viz. design
(chapter 6). Thus, while Schirmacher is correct in maintaining that the conventional
(ahistorical, atemporal) Cartesian subject-object relation is inadequate for describing
technology, this is not because technology is autonomous - that is, self-organizing or
autopoietic - but because the Cartesian subject-object relation is statically-essentialist and
hence, incapable of describing the essentially-historical poitic relations between the
anthropic component (artificer-interpreter), naturals and artificials (as artifactuals).
In concluding this section, it is worthwhile briefly responding to the view that in the
movement from (i) man as gathered by subject (phenomenon) to (ii) object
(phenomenon) standing over against man as (knowing) subject to (iii) product
(phenomenon) as Enframed by man as (artificing) subject, the latter (that is, the subject)
ultimately transforms itself into product, standing-reserve (Bestand). According to
13
Here `from without' implies `by other' and not topological externality.
Chapter 7 Critique
Margolis (1983), "Heidegger's thesis maintains, in part, that technological thinking leads
to the result that man himself comes to be viewed reflexively as no more than a technical
resource." (p.292) This position appears to be supported by Heidegger's (1977d)
assertion that in modern physics, "the subject-object relation as pure relation .. takes
precedence over the object and the subject, to become secured as standing-reserve"
(p.173). Consistent with this position, Feenberg (1997) maintains that for Heidegger, "an
òbjectless' heap of functions replaces a world of `things' treated with respect for their
own sake as the gathering places of our manifold engagements with `being'." (pp.2-3)
He goes on to state that
the craftsman brings out the `truth' of his materials through the symbolically charged reworking of
matter by form. The modern technologist obliterates the inner potential of his materials, `de-worlds'
them, and `summons' nature to fit into his plan. Ultimately, it is not man, but pure instrumentality that
holds sway in this ènframing' (Ge-stell); it is no merely human purpose, but a specific way in which
being hides and reveals itself through human purpose. (p.3)
This position is summarized by Ihde (1979) who maintains that, in techn-Enframing

(Gestellen), "man is taken into the process of ordering." (p.109) This `taking-into'
ultimately leads to what Baudrillard (1983) refers to as the `liquidation of referentiality',
the referential in this case being the artificing subject. However, according to Adorno
(1970),
the fact that in [calculating] machines the mathematical correctness of the results and the causal-
mechanical conditions of their functioning seem to have nothing to do with each other is due solely
to a disregard for the construction [that is, poisis] of the machine. That construction demands some
sort of connection between arithmetical propositions and the physical possibility of operating
according to them. Without such a connection the machine would not produce correct answers,
though that is the point [or purpose] of constructing it. The synthesis of the two is brought about not
by the machine but certainly by the consciousness of the constructor. The machine becomes a `thing'
[being] through the definitive establishment of the relation between logic and mechanics. But that
relation disappears in individual operations. The work of the constructor is hardened in the machine
[that is, machine-construction is characterized by a movement from contingency, possibility and
openness to necessity, determinism, and closure]. The subject, which synchronized causal-mechanical
procedure [that is, production] with states-of-affairs [that is, interpretation], abstracts itself from the
machine like the God of the Deists from his creation. [Crucially, this] unmediated dualism of reality
[mechanism] and mathematics [interpretation] come about historically through a forgetting, viz. the
withdrawal of the subject [emphasis added]. (pp.62-63)
Consistent with this statement and contrary to the above interpretations of his position,
Heidegger (1977a) maintains that "precisely because man is challenged more originally
than are the energies of nature, i.e., into the process of ordering, he never is transformed
into mere standing-reserve [that is, a technical resource]. Since man drives technology
forward, he takes part in ordering as a way of revealing [emphasis added]." (p.18) This
point is of crucial significance since it undermines post-modern interpretations of his
position - such as that due to Risan (1996) - which attempt to classify it as ontologically-
eliminative with respect to subjectivity: For Heidegger, techn-Enframing (Gestellen)
does not entail elimination of the subject but its redefinition in terms of organization and
Chapter 7 Critique
control as opposed to observation and perception. In what follows, a temporal-historical

framework is described in which the phenomenological subject (anthropic component)
is defined in terms of ontic (productive, organizational) and epistemic (interpretative,
observational) relations to beings.
7.2.2. Ontic and Epistemic Relationality
In chapter 6, a poitic difference14 was established between physis (naturality) and techn
(artificiality) and it was shown that the way in which Being as such (physis as poisis)
stands to naturals (physis as autopoisis) is not isomorphic with the way in which Dasein
stands to artificials (techn or allopoisis). In section 7.2.1, it was maintained that at
critical points in artificing - specifically, during artifact-incipience or design - Dasein
becomes the anthropic component or human artificer-interpreter whose ontology was
shown to be both historical and thematic (reflective, conscious). However, the existential
structure of the anthropic component cannot be disclosed without describing its
phenomenological relationality, that is, the way in which it ontically (productively) and
epistemically (interpretatively) relates to phenomena (naturals and artificials); this
follows from the fact that the anthropic component emerges in poisis (coming-forth,
bringing-forth) as techn (artificing)15 and poisis is a relational concept (chapter 6). The
aims of this section are threefold: First, to briefly clarify the concept of a relation and
its two basic ontological (as opposed to various ontical) kinds; second, to examine the
link between ontical a priority, Being and Temporality by way of a consideration of the
notion of `givenness'; finally, to present a framework of poitically-historical (prior,
posterior) ontic (productive, organizational) and epistemic (interpretative, observational)
relations between phenomena (naturals and artificials) and the anthropic component.
The Oxford Companion to Philosophy (1995) defines relations as "ways in which things
can stand with regard to one another" and distinguishes between the two ontological
kinds, viz. internal and external, as follows:
If one item, x, stands in some relation, R, to another item, y, but neither its identity nor its nature
depends on this being the case, x is externally related to y. If x could not be the same item, or an item
14
That is, a difference in becoming (coming-forth, bringing-forth) entailing a difference in Being since (i) Being
and becoming stand in essential unitary relation and (ii) the poitic difference is grounded in the ontological
difference between beings and Being as such.
15
Following Dreyfus (1991), it is argued that Dasein becomes the Cartesian subject (or ego) in poisis (coming-
forth, bringing-forth) as physis (science). However, the Cartesian subject is not a historical being; for this
reason, it is necessary to adopt some form of hermeneutic Cartesianism. In this study, the notion of the
hermeneutic Cartesian subject has been subsumed by the concept of the anthropic component via the scheme
of ontic and epistemic relations described herein.
Chapter 7 Critique
of the same kind without standing in relation R to y, the relation is internal.
There are (at least) three points to note in connection with the above definition: First, it
is ontical (metaphysical) in that it defines relations in terms of the various ways in which
things, that is beings (Seiendes), stand with regard to one another. Hence, the way in
which beings stand with Being as such (Seyn) is not addressed on this definition16;
second, the internality (or internal-ness) of an internal relation is defined in terms of
contextuality (situatedness) and constitutedness: While this is consistent with the
concrete, historical existentiality of ontological Dasein, viz. being-in-the-world (chapter
6), the question of relata ontology - for example, ontically-subjective (first-person,
experiential) or ontically-objective (third-person, non-experiential) - remains open in an
ontical context. On this basis, the following table of oppositions can be constructed:
Relationality
Internal External
(Constitutive) (Non-Constitutive)
Experiential
Relata (Ontically-Subjective)
Ontology
Non-Experiential
(Ontically-Objective)
Table 7.1 Relationality and Relata-Ontology Permutations.
It is important to appreciate that external-relationality and non-experientiality of relata

are traditionally associated with metaphysical realism while internal-relationality and
experientiality of relata are associated with idealism. In chapter 6, Heidegger's position
was described as pluralistically-realist: On his view, Dasein is internally-related yet
neither experiential (ontically-subjective) nor non-experiential (ontically-objective) while
the derivative or emergent Cartesian ego is externally-related and experiential (ontically-
subjective)17; third, according to Harris (1965),
a relation is the way in which one term stands to another; but they cannot stand to each other in any
relation unless there is some matrix, some context, some `respect' in which they are related.
Moreover, they must be part of this common matrix or context. (p.459)
16
This is consistent with Heidegger's insistence that the (metaphysical) tradition does not regard Being as such
(Seyn) as a meaningful concept (chapter 6).
17
This position contrasts with that of panexperientialists such as Whitehead (1978) and Griffin (1998) who
present a monism in which the relationality of experiential events (or actual occasions) historically (that is,
temporally) alternates between internal and external forms.
Chapter 7 Critique
Since ontological contexts cannot be constructed atomistically18 (chapter 6), relations

cannot be constructed and hence, must emerge as gestalts from Being as such (Seyn).
This position is supported by St.John (1974) who, in an ontical context, raises the
following important question, viz.
why is the [scientific] method operated on the assumption of the ultimate facts being particulate, that
a thing's parts are ultimate and more real than the thing itself ? This is a pure assumption. (p.76)
Following Whitehead, he identifies this position with the fallacy of misplaced

concreteness, viz. "the habit of abstracting a part and ascribing to it the sort of reality that
belongs to the whole. In this case the measurable and physically observable is taken to
be the only reality objectively speaking, so that values become purely subjective."
(p.83)19 However, it is crucial to appreciate that ontical contextualism fails to address the
question concerning the historicity of relations, that is, the way in which one term comes-
to-stand to another; in short, the poisis (coming-forth) of relationality as such is ignored
on such schemes20.
In the preceding discussion, it has been argued that Dasein as being-in-the-world is

internally-related while the Cartesian subject (or ego) is externally-related and ontically-
subjective. However, as stated previously, the anthropic component or human artificer-
interpreter is historical and thematic. Thus, the anthropic component of techn
18
In Tractatus Logico-Philososophicus (1921), Wittgenstein defines the world in terms of a set of atomic facts
which can be expressed in logically independent (that is, acontextual) propositions. However, the attempt at
constructing contexts using such atomic primitives gives rise to the Frame Problem which Dreyfus (1992)
describes as the problem of determining "(1) how to restrict the class of possibly relevant facts while preserving
generality, and (2) how to choose among possibly relevant facts those which are actually relevant." (p.259) According
to Dreyfus (1998), "what counts as relevant depends on the current context. But how we classify the current context itself
depends on the relevant information. This circularity does not seem to be a problem amenable to successive
approximations since the problem is how to get started at all." (p.209) For example, "(1) if in disambiguation the number
of possibly relevant facts is in some sense infinite so that selection criteria must be applied before interpretation can
begin, the number of facts that might be relevant to recognizing a context is infinite too. How is the computer to consider
all the features such as how many people are present, the temperature, the pressure, the day of the week, and so forth,
any one of which may be a defining feature of some context ? (2) Even if the program provides rules for determining
relevant facts, these facts would be ambiguous, that is, capable of defining several different contexts, until they were
interpreted." (Dreyfus,92;p.220) Crucially, "since facts are not relevant or irrelevant in a fixed way, but only in terms
of human purposes, all facts are possibly relevant in some situation." (p.257) However, "since a computer is not in a
situation .. it must treat all facts as possibly relevant at all times." (p.258) The end result is a "a regress of more and more
specific rules for applying rules of more and more general contexts for recognizing contexts." (p.226)
19
In fact, a commitment to atomism - and hence, a metaphysics of external relations - transcends the
subjectification of values: on this view, "values are impossible .. for particulate facts lose all the contextual
significance required for evaluation [emphasis added]." (p.76)
20
Heidegger (1959) has investigated the notion of relational `standing' in some detail and, as shown in chapter
6, maintains that it is marked by two distinct yet intimately connected phases, viz. (1) `dynamic' (coming-to-
stand, emerging) and (2) `static' (standing, enduring presencing).
Chapter 7 Critique
(artificing) stands somewhat in between the Dasein of praxis (technology)21 and the
Cartesian subject of theoria (science) as shown in the following table of comparisons:
Being-in-the-world Anthropic Component Cartesian Subject
Praxis (Technology) Techn (Artificing) Theoria (Science)
Internally-related Internally-Related Externally-related

Historical Historical Ahistorical
Ontological Ontically-Subjective Ontically-Subjective
Table 7.2 Comparison of Dasein, Anthropic Component and Cartesian Subject
In this context, it is important to appreciate that the identification of the human artificer-
interpreter as anthropic component implies a systemic (chapter 3) conception of human
being which is supported by the following facts: First, according to Heidegger, Dasein
is unique among beings (Seiendes) in that it has the understanding of Being (Sein) as its
essence (chapter 6). Dasein is the `clearing' (`site', Da) within which beings come to
presence and are interpreted irrespective of whether they come forth in the mode of
physis (natural, autopoitic) or techn (artificial as artifactual, allopoitic). Identifying
the human artificer-interpreter as a (systemic) component emphasizes the ontological
necessity of Dasein relative to beings (natural and artificial) with respect to the question
concerning their poisis (that is, becoming or poitic Being). It is crucial to appreciate,
however, that this does not entail support for ontological constructivism since, as will be
seen in what follows, the systemic relations between the anthropic component and
phenomena (naturals and artificials) are essentially (that is, ontologically-existentially)
historical and only contingently (that is, ontically-existentielly) causal. The historical
relationality of the anthropic component contextualizes, that is, provides a background
for understanding, organization-production (ontic) and observation-interpretation
(epistemic) relations and is consistent with Heidegger's (1982) assertion that Time
(Temporality, historicity) is the `horizon' (or contextual background) of Being; second,
the existence of a component entails (that is, necessitates) the existence of (1) other
21
The association of technology with praxis rather than techn is consistent with Heidegger's (1977a) assertion
that "the essence of technology is by no means anything technological." (p.4) As shown in chapter 6, this
essence is epistem (knowing) in the mode of circumscription or teleological a priority, that is, design and
determinism; hence, the essence - which here means incipience since Being and becoming (or poisis) stand
in essential, unitary relation - of technology lies in closure and not in instrumentality (or functionality), that is,
praxis. However, (non-incipient) technology is correctly linked to praxis since the latter can be associated with
the contextual, equipmental coping of being-in-the-world. (As stated in section 6, this connection is not
necessary since Dasein is not primordially defined in praxical terms but in terms of ek-sistence, that is,
transcendence to Being as such.) Thus, in this study, techn is associated with that which lies between
occurrent theoretical activity (science) on the one hand, and involved practical activity (technology) on the
other, viz. artificing.
Chapter 7 Critique
components22 and (2) a part-whole relation23 which, if interpreted historically, provides

a basis upon which to examine the ontic and epistemic relations between parts (substrata)
and wholes (products) as mediated by artificer-interpreters (productant-interpretants24).
This is significant because it enables natural emergence to be distinguished from artificial
(as artifactual) emergence: Systemic phenomena are wholes whose parts interact either
(i) in-order-to perform some function (teleologically a priori, necessary or artifactually-
designed systemicity) or (ii) thereby performing some function (teleonomically a
posteriori, contingent or naturally-emergent systemicity).
In chapter 6, the artificial (as artifactual) was briefly identified as the ontically a
posteriori (or `made') relative to the anthropic component and in what follows a
framework of ontic and epistemic relations is defined in terms of poitic priority and
posteriority, that is, productive (organizational) and interpretative (observational)
historicity. Preparatory to the presentation of that framework, it is worthwhile briefly
examining the connections between the notion of ontical a priority (or `givenness'),
Being and Temporality. The Oxford Companion to Philosophy (1995) defines `the given'
in epistemological terms as "what is immediately presented to consciousness." However,
Whitehead (1978) maintains that
for rationalistic thought, the notion of `givenness' carries with it a reference beyond the mere data in
question. It refers to a `decision' whereby what is `given' is separated off from what for that occasion
is `not given'. This element of `givenness' in things implies some activity procuring limitation. The
word `decision' does not here imply conscious judgement, though in some `decisions' consciousness
will be a factor. The word is used in its root sense of a `cutting off'. (pp.42-43)
He goes on to state that "where there is no decision involving exclusion, there is no

givenness. For example, the total multiplicity of Platonic forms is not `given'." (p.43)
This position is problematic because there is an ontological difference (chapter 6)
between beings-as-a-whole - which includes both existents (actual occasions) and
subsistents (Platonic forms) - and Being as such (Seyn). According to Whitehead,
an actual entity [that is, being or potentiality for process] arises from decisions for it, and by its very
existence provides decisions for other actual entities which supersede it .. The real internal
22
This follows from the fact that a distinction between systems and components is only meaningful (and possible)
if the relation between them is one-many. Additionally, it is not necessary - and, following Heidegger, is not
the case - that the ontology of components is universal.
23
If emergent ontological pluralism is true, as is argued in this thesis (chapter 6), then part-whole relations must
hold vertically, that is, between levels in a hierarchy (chapter 3); hence, the association of parts with substrata
(level m) and wholes with products (level n, where n>m). However, if ontological monism is true then part-
whole relations must hold horizontally.
24
The concept of an interpretant is here taken to be synonymous with that of an interpreter; the technical meaning
of this term in Peircean semiotics, viz. as a "proper significate effect" (Cobley,97; p.23), is not intended.
Chapter 7 Critique
constitution of an actual entity progressively constitutes a decision conditioning the creativity which
transcends that actuality. (p.43)
However, this characterization of "synthetic `givenness'"25 (p.44) is problematic since it

only addresses ontical-givenness, that is, the givenness of beings (Seiendes); the
ontological-givenness associated with the existential movement between Being as such
(Seyn) and beings is ignored. Crucially, on Whitehead's view, "`potentiality' is the
correlative of `givenness'. The meaning of `givenness' is that what is `given' might not
have been `given'; and that what is not `given' might have been `given'." (p.44) This
position is supported by Elstob (1997) who maintains that
the universe had a start - the Big Bang say. Or the universe has always existed and always will. In
either case, there is a given [viz. the ontical universe], and this givenness implies [the possibility of]
a condition of non-givenness when the given was not given. On this view there has definitely been
one occasion [or event] of givenness. The question is, if there has been one occasion of givenness,
why not more than one26? (p.1)
However, Whitehead (and Elstob27) holds that "the ontological principle declares that
every decision is referable to one or more actual entities [or beings], because in
separation from actual entities there is nothing, merely nonentity - `The rest is silence'."
(p.43) Clearly, on his view, nothing is static (void). Yet, this position is readily shown
to be problematic once (i) the ontological difference between beings and Being and (ii)
the unitary relatedness of Being and becoming is acknowledged: Since Being is not a
being, it must, in some sense, be the `same' as nothing and to the extent that Being has
both static and dynamic aspects, nothing must also have such aspects, thereby entailing
a dynamic interpretation of the nothing.
It is crucial to appreciate that what is given is, that is, partakes of Being. Furthermore,
to the extent that idealism is false and (some variant of) realism true, the given is not
25
It is interesting to note in passing that to the extent that the given is the ontically a priori, it follows that
synthetic givenness denotes ontically synthetic a priority which contrasts with Kant's epistemic synthetic a
priori.
26
Silberstein (1998) makes a similar point in connection with the possibility of emergentism, viz. "if quantum
mechanics shows that emergence within physics is a coherent position, then it is also coherent to postulate the
existence of other emergent properties, such as those useful for explaining consciousness and cognition."
(p.475) Again, "it would be strange indeed if the universe only exhibits emergence at the `level' of quantum
phenomena and consciousness respectively, while the rest of the universe remains pretty much as
conceptualized by classical physics. It is more likely that emergence is ubiquitous and that the universe is far
more intertwined and complex than the standard division of the sciences would lead us to believe." (p.480)
27
The justification for establishing a link between the thought of Elstob and that of Whitehead derives from
reference to the published writings associated with the former. In more recent unpublished writings, Elstob has
distanced himself somewhat from his original position, particularly with respect to the interpretation of nothing
and appreciation of the ontological difference between beings and Being as such.
Chapter 7 Critique
given (to self) by the Cartesian subject (or ego). The existential facticity of a given that
is not artifactual therefore implies a natural given-ness and hence, a link between the
given as an ontical being (Seiende) and Being as such (Seyn) as (primordial) giver28. In
this connection, it is significant to note that, for Heidegger (1993c), "`gives' names the
essence of Being that is giving, granting its truth. The self-giving into the open, along
with the open region itself [viz. the clearing or Da that is Dasein], is Being itself."
(p.238) However, Ihde (1979) maintains that
beings as such are never simply given: they appear or come to presence in some definite way which
is dependent upon the total field of revealing in which they are situated. Preliminarily it is important
to note that the field or opening in which things are `gathered' is, in a sense, given. It is given
historically as an epoch of being. (p.105)
These epochs are ways in which the existential structure being-in-the-world (that is, the
gestalt structure of Dasein, involvement and World) is existentielly instantiated and it
is relative to these gestalts that the appearance (that is, emergence) of beings occurs. The
grounding of ontical givens (beings, Seinedes) relative to epochal ontological givens
(Being, Sein) establishes a connection between ontical a priority, Being and Temporality.
This position is supported by Hofstadter (1982) who maintains that "if being is
understood by us, then being has to be given in some way to us. If understanding-of-
being is possible, then the givenness-of-being must be possible; and if we are to
understand the former possibility, then we must gain insight into the latter possibility
[emphasis added]." In this connection it is crucial to appreciate that "all that is given is
given only as projected upon a horizon." (p.xxiv) Furthermore,
being is itself the horizon for beings: they are encountered and understood only as they are projected
upon their own being as horizon. But being itself requires another horizon to be projected upon if it
is to be understood as being [and] it is time which is this horizon upon which being itself is projected.
[Crucially,] being can be given only as projected upon this fundamental horizon, the transcendental
horizon. Temporality. Therefore, being is understandable only by way of time. If we are to think being
and speak of being, and do it properly without confusing being with any beings, then we have to think
and speak of it in temporal concepts and terms. (p.xxv)
Hence, as Kovacs (1990) states, for Heidegger, "Temporality is considered as the

meaning of Being itself. Time was viewed as the `designer' of the regions of Being
(temporal and atemporal)." (p.52) Yet, Heidegger's assertion that the horizon of
Temporality - which he identifies with the existential care structure of Dasein (chapter
6) - is an ultimate is problematic since, as stated previously, Dasein is not the giver of
ontical Being (that is, existence) to beings; in short, ontical nature exists - without
ontological Being - independently of Dasein. Additionally, the possibility of a natural
28
It might be argued that, as ultimate concept, that is, groundless ground or abyss (chapter 6), Being as such
(Seyn) is itself `given'. Although this is correct, the character (or essence) of the `givenness' of Being as such
is radically distinct from all other kinds of `givenness'. This follows from the fact that the `givenness' of Being
as such is a `givenness' from, of, by and for Being as such (chapter 6); in short, Seyn is both given and giver.
Chapter 7 Critique
time which, according to Dreyfus (1991), "need not be occurrent, yet [be] some sort of
pure sequential ordering of events" (p.259), undermines the claim for anthropocentric
Temporality as the (interpretative) horizon for Being29. However, while (anthropocentric)
Temporality may be invalid as an existentially analytical horizon in the distal context of
the ontological difference between beings and Being as such, it remains valid in the
proximal context of the poitic difference between natural and artificial (as artifactual)
beings: This follows from the fact that Dasein as anthropic component historically
mediates the distinction in becoming (coming-forth, bringing-forth) between physis or
naturality and techn or artificiality (chapter 6).
It is appropriate at this point in the discussion to present the framework of poitically-

historical (prior, posterior) ontic (productive, organizational) and epistemic
(interpretative, observational) relations between phenomena (naturals and artificials) and
the anthropic component (artificer-interpreter). The philosophical notion of priority (and
posteriority) is well established in Western metaphysics. Perhaps its most famous
conceptualization is due to Kant who followed Leibniz in distinguishing rational (or a
priori) truths from empirical-factual (or a posteriori) truths. Angeles (1981) describes
the Kantian distinction as follows: a priori refers to "that which precedes .. independent
of sense experience" while a posteriori denotes "that which follows after", specifically,
"from [or out of] sense experience". Crucially, Hamlyn (1967) maintains that "the
distinction between the a posteriori and the a priori comes to be a distinction between
what is derived from experience and what is not, whether or not the notion of the a priori
also has the notion of demonstration in terms of cause or reason associated with it
[emphasis added]." (p.140) For Kant, that which determines priority and posteriority is
experience, which means perception; hence, as Heidegger has argued, Kant remains
firmly embedded within the Cartesian subjectivist tradition (chapter 6). A list of Kantian
oppositions between a priority and a posteriority is shown in Table 7.3:
A Priori A Posteriori
Necessary Contingent
Certain Probable
Definitional Empirical
Deductive Inductive
Innate Experienced
Intuitive Observed
29
In fact, it is unclear whether Heidegger is justified in maintaining that Temporality is the (final) horizon of
Being given the problem of eternity. According to Kovacs (1990), "the problem of the eternity of God .. is not
elaborated by Heidegger. He prescinds from the religious, theological meaning of eternity and of time (as well
as of resolve). [Being and Time (1927)] elaborates the nature of the temporality of There-being; it does not
consider, in this context, the notion of eternity as atemporality (timelessness). The existential analysis .. leaves
open the possibility of a philosophical reflection regarding the eternity of God. Heidegger says that the
philosophical `construction' of the eternity of God could be understood as a more original and èndless'
temporality [emphasis added]." (p.111)
Chapter 7 Critique
Table 7.3 Kantian Oppositions Between A Priority and A Posteriority (Angeles,81).
On the basis of the above statements, it might appear, as Hamlyn maintains, that "the
distinction between the a priori and the a posteriori has always been an epistemological
one; that is to say, it has always had something to do with knowledge [emphasis added]."
(p.140) However, that this is not necessarily the case is readily established by
considering Aristotle's classification in the Categories (350 BC) of the different kinds
of priority, viz. (1) temporal (based on historical relation), (2) sequential (based on
existential relation), (3) ordered (based on axiomatic relation), (4) honorific, and (5)
causal (based on genetic relation). If, as Heidegger maintains, Being and Time (or
Temporality) are essentially and unitarily related then (1) must be ontological.
Furthermore, and in an ontical context, (5) is clearly ontological30. Interestingly, Hamlyn
implicitly concedes this point in maintaining that "according to Aristotle, A is prior to
B in nature [that is, Being] if and only if B could not exist without A [existing]; A is prior
to B in knowledge if and only if we cannot know B without knowing A [emphasis
added]." He goes on to state that
it is possible for these two senses of `prior' [viz. epistemic and ontic] to have an application in
common; substance, for example, is prior to other things in both of these senses and in others. It
follows that to know something from what is prior is to know what is, in some sense, its cause
The above statement is of crucial significance in the context of this study: According to
Heidegger, function - and hence, functionalism, computationalism and CEA - is
grounded in substance (chapter 6); consequently, substance is to attribute as function is
to property. To the extent that attributes do not arbitrarily attach to substances but are,
in some sense, relative-to-substance-kind, it follows that functional properties do not
arbitrarily attach to functions but are, in some sense, relative-to-function-type. There are
(at least) two corollaries of this fact: (1) functional properties (posterior) could not exist
nor be known without the existence and knowledge of function (prior); (2) the ontology
of functional properties is circumscribed (categorially-closed, bounded) by the ontology
of functions since the latter are causal relative to the former. The implication is that
substrate (substratum) ontology determines emergent (product) ontology in the case of
artificials (as artifactuals). In section 7.3, it is argued that this entails bounded (closed)
epistemological emergence (chapter 3) in finite computational systems (Cariani,89)
(Cariani,91), unbounded (open) epistemological emergence in infinite computational
systems (Ali,98a), and categorial-closure to ontological emergence in both finite and
infinite computational systems. This latter fact is of critical significance since ontological
30
This position is supported by Aquinas who, in Summa Theologica (Part I, Question 2, Article 2), maintains that
"demonstration can be made in two ways: One is through the cause, and is called à priori' and this is to argue
from what is prior absolutely. The other is through the effect, and is called a demonstration à posteriori'; this
is to argue from what is prior relatively only to us."
Chapter 7 Critique
emergence is necessary if CEA is to solve the category problem (section 7.4): Since
ontological emergence is impossible in CEA, the latter cannot solve the category
problem in which case "strong" CEA is impossible.
As stated in section 7.2.1, the framework of ontic (productive, organizational) and

epistemic (interpretative, observational) relations between phenomena (naturals and
artificials) and the anthropic component (human artificer-interpreter) is essentially
poitic. This follows from the fact that such relations are (1) historical and (2) concerned
with the way (mode) in which naturals and artificials (as artifactuals) become, that is,
come-forth or are brought-forth; hence, a historical - and, thereby, ontological -
conception of priority and posteriority grounded in Aristotelian metaphysics as
interpreted by Heidegger (chapter 6) is adopted in this study. The framework is shown
in Table 7.4:
Ontical Relationality of
Phenomenon with respect to
Anthropic Component
A Priori A Posteriori
Epistemic Relationality A Priori (1) (2)

of Phenomenon with
respect to A Posteriori (3) (4)
Anthropic Component
Table 7.4 Historically-defined ontic and epistemic subject-object relations.
Ontical a priority denotes givenness (to the anthropic component), ontical a posteriority
denotes made-ness (by the anthropic component); epistemical a priority denotes
specification (by the anthropic component), epistemical a posteriority denotes
interpretation (by the anthropic component). Naturality can be poitically-differentiated
from artificiality (as artifactuality) by applying the phenomenological framework
described above to the triadic making relation (productant-substratum-product) defined
in chapter 6. On this basis, the following classification of naturals and "hard" (or pure)31
artifactuals emerges:
Naturality Artificiality
Substratum Product Substratum Product
(3) (3) (2) (4)
Table 7.5 Natural-Artificial Classification.
31
The meaning of this term is defined in section 7.3.
Chapter 7 Critique
There are (at least) three possible objections to the above scheme: First, it might be
argued that it tacitly assumes ontical and epistemical relations to be analytically
separable, a position apparently undermined by Heidegger's endorsement of the
Parmindean-Heraclitean maxim concerning the essential, unitary relatedness of physis
and logos (chapter 6), viz. Being is knowing and knowing is Being (chapter 1)32. If this
criticism is valid then to observe or interpret is to organize or produce and visa versa, in
which case epistemic and ontic relations become interchangeable. However, it is crucial
to appreciate that Heidegger's position, while correct, is formulated in a specific context,
viz. Dasein as involved, coping, non-thematic being-in-the-world; when the unity of
being-in-the-world becomes a duality of subject (artificer-interpreter) and object
(phenomenon), the ontical-epistemical duality emerges. Hence, the above criticism is not
valid since it applies in an ontological context prior or posterior to when the human
being (or Dasein) is the anthropic component.
Second, throughout this study epistemic relationality has been defined as observational-
interpretative, thereby implying a received-ness. While this is consistent with the notion
of epistemic a posteriority, defining epistemic a priority in such terms appears incorrect
and this position is supported by the explicit characterization of epistemic a priority as
specification in the above statement. In response to this semantic criticism, it is argued
that although epistemic relationality, posterior and prior, is observational or
interpretative, the concept of observation in which it is grounded differs markedly from
the conventional notion associated with perception33 . In order to both understand and
justify the concept of observation as presented herein, it is necessary to briefly examine
its etymology. The Oxford English Dictionary, Second Edition (1989) provides the
following definition of the word observe and the prefix ob-, viz.
observe: L. observ~re, to watch, look towards, look to, attend to, pay attention to, guard, keep. "To
say by way of remark, to remark or mention in speech or writing." "To keep, preserve; to retain."
ob-, pref. The Lat. prep. ob ìn the direction of, towards, against, in the way of, in front of, in view
of, on account of.'
On the basis of the above definitions, and in the context of this study, it is maintained
that a priori observation must be understood in terms of (1) intentionality (aboutness,
directedness, teleology) and (2) circumscription (closure, containment, preservation).
This follows from the fact that preservation in writing (that is, some form of inscription)
32
According to Sikka (1997), "in order to conceive, Dasein must receive, so there is a given, but the givenness
of that given lies in the inwardness of Dasein which is also the inwardness of all things. It lies in the unity, the
essential belonging together, of being and thinking, a unity that occurs in the being of Dasein. This is the unity
of being itself, bestowing being (presence) at the same time as it opens the space of Dasein." (p.158)
33
Runes (1960) defines observation as "the act of becoming aware of objects through the sense organs and of
interpreting them by means of concepts."
Chapter 7 Critique
points to the original meaning of logos (discourse) as `gatheredness' or `collecting

collectedness' (chapter 6). However, it must be noted that under techn-Enframing
(Gestellen), logos becomes kategoria and hence, inscription becomes circumscription.
This shift in meaning is supported by the fact that the epistemic is the epistemological,
that is, the logos in the epistem: To the extent that the essence of techn can be
identified with epistem, and the latter with teleological a priority (chapter 6), it follows
that epistemic (or epistemological) relationality - in the context of the phenomenological-
ontology of the anthropic component - means design, that is, a movement from
possibility to mechanistic (deterministic, necessary, closed) potentiality-actuality. In this
sense, epistemic relationality has ontological significance.
Third, it might be argued that artificially (as artifactually) emergent phenomena

(products) should be characterized as (3), that is, epistemically a posteriori and ontically
a priori, since the epistemological emergence (epistemic a posteriority) of artificials
entails a phenomenal givenness to the anthropic component. However, this inference is
incorrect for (at least) three reasons: First, it conflates Kantian epistemic givenness with
Heideggerian ontological givenness; second, epistemology does not entail ontology. If
anything, and following Heidegger, the reverse must be the case; finally, as will be seen
in section 7.3, closure to ontological emergence in "hard" (or pure) artificials is entailed
by the fact that such phenomena are artifactual, that is, ontically a posteriori relative to
the anthropic component.
7.3. The Phenomenology of Artificiality
The presentation in this section has the following aims: (1) clarify the distinction
between "hard" (or pure) and "soft" (or impure) artificials (as artifactuals) using the
phenomenological framework described in section 7.2; (2) identify the ontology of
computers (and CEA) as the paradigmatic instance of "hard" artificiality; (3) show that
the poitic difference between naturals and artificials holds for both designed (or top-
down) and emergent (or bottom-up) "hard" artificiality; and (4) critically examine the
phenomenon of computational emergence (chapter 3) with a view to determining
whether ontological emergence is possible in CEA.
7.3.1. "Hard" and "Soft" Artificiality
In this section, the distinction between "hard" and "soft" artifacts introduced in chapter
6 is clarified in terms of the phenomenological framework of ontic (productive) and
epistemic (interpretative) relations described in section 7.2. It is crucial to appreciate at
the outset that the distinction between "hard" and "soft" artificials (as artifactuals) does
not reproduce (that is, is not identical to) the distinction between hardware and software
in computer science; in fact, the former distinction stands in inverse relation to the
Chapter 7 Critique
latter34: The hardware-software duality is a duality of matter (physics) and form (logic,
function) and hence, defined in terms of substantiality. The "hard"-"soft" artifact
distinction, by contrast, is defined in terms of the poitic Being of form and matter in
"hard" and "soft" artifacts respectively. As will be seen in what follows, "hard" artifacts
are pure artifacts because both matter and form are artifactual (made), whereas "soft"
artifacts are impure artifacts since either matter or form are natural (given); hence, the
"hard"-"soft" distinction is defined in terms of artifactuality. However, in order to
establish this distinction, it is necessary to re-examine the matter-form relation.
if we bring to mind the productive comportment in its full structure we see that it always makes use
of what we call material, for instance, material for building a house. On its part this material is in the
end not in turn produced but is already there. It is met with as a being that does not need to be
produced. In production and its understanding of being, I thus comport myself toward a being that is
not in need of being produced. I comport myself toward such a being not by accident but
corresponding to the sense and essential nature of production, so far as this production is always the
producing of something from something [that is, ex nihilo nihil fit]. What is not in need of being
produced can really be understood and discovered only within the understanding of being that goes
with production. In other words, it is first of all in the understanding of being that belongs to
productive comportment and thus in the understanding of what does not need to be produced that
there can grow the understanding of being which is extant in itself before all production and for all
further production. It is this understanding of what does not need to be produced, possible only in
production, which understands the being of what already lies at the ground of and precedes everything
to be produced and thus is all the more already extant in itself.
In the course of producing and using beings we come up against the actuality of what is already there
before all producing, products, and producibles [that is, the ontically a priori or given], or of what
offers resistance to the formative process that produces things. The concepts of matter and material
have their origin in an understanding of being that is oriented to production. Otherwise, the idea of
material as that from which something is produced would remain hidden. The concepts of matter and
material, hyle, the counter-concepts to morphe, form, play a fundamental role in ancient philosophy
not because the Greeks were materialists but because matter is a basic ontological concept that arises
necessarily when a being - whether produced or is not in need of being produced - is interpreted in
the horizon of the understanding of being which lies as such in productive comportment. (p.116)
There are (at least) three points to note in connection with the above statement: First,
matter as the ontically a priori (that is, given) is held to be essentially-related to
production (that is, techn); second, in stating that this relation holds insofar as
production refers to ontical causation, the possibility of a non-causal production35 arises
in which matter can be redefined in non-material terms, for example, as itself artificed,
viz. matter as ontically a posteriori (that is, made); third, that matter is recalcitrant and
34
I am grateful to Mike Elstob for this point.
35
As stated in chapter 6, Plotinus defines idealistic poisis as a non-causal mode of production which stands in
opposition to causal praxis.
Chapter 7 Critique
"offers resistance to the formative process that produces things" points to a critical
feature of those artifacts in which the substrate is material: To the extent that a substrate
is not artificed (made) by an external òther' (and hence, is not allopoitic), it must be
autopoitic. This is significant since, as shown in chapter 6, there is a connection
between physis as autopoisis and physis as poisis (or Being as such) and it is the latter
which is the originary or incipient source of existential modalities, that is, categories of
Being (Sein) and, thereby, of the possibility of ontological emergence.
In Book II, ch.I of the Physics, Aristotle maintains that "the art of using .. involves
knowledge of the form, whilst the art .. of making involves knowledge of the matter
[emphasis added]." Given that artificing (productive poisis) stands in essential relation
to knowledge of matter (epistem of hyle), it might appear that form (morph) is only
contingently-related to artificing. However, this is not the case since, as shown in chapter
6, artificiality as epistem denotes teleological a priority, that is, design, intentionality
or epistemic a priority relative to the anthropic component (section 7.2.2), and, as
Heidegger (1977a) has shown, design involves the imposition of form, viz. techn is a
mode of revealing (altheuein) which "gathers together in advance the aspect and the
matter of the [artifact] with a view to the finished thing envisioned as completed, and
from this gathering determines the manner of its construction [emphasis added]." (p.13)
It might be argued that while this is certainly true for epistemically a priori or designed
artifactuals, it does not hold for epistemically a posteriori or emergent artifactuals since
the latter are teleonomic (or telic) as opposed to teleological and hence, merely appear
to have been designed36. However, this position is problematic for the following reason:
In the context of a discussion of emergence in computational systems, Risan (1996)
maintains that "making a controllable [emergent] simulation is geared towards producing
results37 [emphasis added]." (p.72) Hence, emergent artifacts are, in some sense,
teleologically a prior; that is, design is embedded at some ontological level in an artifact.
In section 7.3.3, it will be argued that as a consequence of the ontology (Being) of
computational poisis, which was identified in chapter 6 as (i) ontically-objective or
externalistic, (ii) causally-efficient, and (iii) operationally-necessary or deterministic,
ontology - and hence, teleological a posteriority - of emergent is circumscribed by
teleological a priority - and hence, ontology - of substrate. However, it is crucial to
appreciate that this relation is defined in the context of a specific substrate ontology, viz.
computationalism (chapter 2). In order to determine whether this relation is universal,
it is necessary to re-examine the ontology (Being) of computation and the relation
between computers and "hard" (or pure) artificiality (section 7.3.2). However, before this
is attempted, it is necessary to clarify the relation between form and matter in "hard" (or
36
The intentionality of such artifactuals is as-if (Dennett,95).
37
Such results are intended to support hypotheses concerning possible relations - specifically, (behavioural,
functional etc) isomorphisms - between the simulation and its referent, which, in the case of ALife, is natural
life.
Chapter 7 Critique
pure) and "soft" (or impure) artifacts.
In Physics B (Book I, chapter IV), Aristotle maintains that
a couch (bedstead) and a robe and any other kind (of such things) that there is insofar as it is cited
and grasped according to a given way of addressing it (e.g., as a robe) and inasmuch as it comes from
a productive know-how, (such a thing) has absolutely no impulse to change arising from itself.
However, insofar as it also pertains to such things (in a given instance) to be made of stone or of earth
or of a mixture of the two, they do have in themselves an impulse to change, but they have it only to
this extent.
From the above statement, it follows that the artifactuality of an artifact and hence, its
grounding in the other (that is, the artificer) with respect to its possibilities for change
(poisis) lies in the form of the artifact (product) which is made (artificial)38; in short, as
artifactuals, the poisis associated with artifacts is allopoitic. By contrast, the
possibilities for self-change (autopoisis) in artifacts lies in the extent to which they
supervene on material substrates which are given (natural) and hence, is grounded in the
naturality of an artifact. Such artifacts, in which form is artifactual (made) and matter
is natural (given) can be classified as "soft" (or impure) artifacts.
Given the hybrid natural-artificial (given-made) Being of "soft" (or impure) artifacts, it
might appear that the poitic difference (chapter 6) between naturality and artificiality
(as artifactuality) cannot be upheld. For example, according to Miller (1995),
life-forms that result from artificial selection by human breeders or genetic engineering .. blur the
distinction between realization and simulation. If one makes a strong division between Nature and
Culture [that is, Artifact], such life-forms are experimental simulations of what would happen if a
lineage were subjected to some selective pressure or mutation in Nature; from a more integrated
perspective, such life-forms are simply the outcome of a thoroughly Natural process that happens to
include humans as selective forces. Likewise, experimental biology research that records animal
behaviour in unnatural laboratory conditions could be viewed either as `realizations of behaviour in
extremis', or `simulations of natural behaviour'. (pp.21-22)
Consistent with this position, Ferr (1988) maintains that those who interpret
artifactuality as naturality (such as Dennett) hold that "since technology is firmly rooted
in the laws of nature, using the raw materials of nature, and since it springs out of human
nature [which is itself natural], it must be wholly natural." (p.19) However, he cautions
against this line of inference:
Taken too far, this line of reasoning would lose the concept of the artificial and would in the process
obscure the striking differences between nature when left alone and nature when manipulated by
intelligence for human ends. Perhaps human intelligence is `natural' in one sense; but in another it has
brought about much that would never be found in nature without its intervention. There are now
38
As will be shown in section 7.3.3, the form of computational "hard" (or pure) artifacts is processually-
deterministic.
Chapter 7 Critique
literally new elements and materials that exist in the world only because of the intervention of
physical and chemical technologies. There are not only new species of domesticated plants and
animals but also wholly new lifeforms, thanks to biological technologies. The word àrtificial' as
antonym to`natural' may be too clumsy. A new variety of `black' tulip carefully developed for utmost
darkness of hue, is the product of artifice (skill, intelligence, etc) but is not àrtificial' in the way that
a silk tulip is artificial. Still, though living, the black tulip is not completely `natural' either. (pp.19-20)
This position is supported in a Heideggerian context by Parkes (1987b) who maintains

that
the question is at what point the use of a natural thing as Zeug [that is, equipment] in such a way as
to realize its possibilities with respect to human concerns begins to impinge overly on the unfolding
of its possibilities when left to itself. Clearly the deforestation of an area of beautiful trees in order
ro mass-produce ugly furniture is something even the most social-utility-minded Heideggerian would
not condone. At the other extreme there is no doubt that Heidegger would applaud a woodworker who
himself seeks and finds the perfect tree for the chair he has in mind, and then proceeds to fashion it
with thoughtful hands that respond to the uniqueness of the wood, so that its hidden beauty may shine
forth to the fullest. One is tempted to say not just that the woodworker has helped the tree to become
more fully itself, but has actually helped it to become more than itself. (p.130)
From the above statements, it appears that although there is a distinction between
naturals and artifactuals, this distinction is essentially `fuzzy'; in short, no clear
distinction can be made between artificiality and naturality, thereby undermining claims
for a postulated poitic difference entailing an ontical difference (that is, a difference in
the Being of beings) between such phenomena (chapter 6). However, that this is not
necessarily the case, viz. the distinction between naturals and artifactuals is not fuzzy by
definition (or universally), is readily shown by considering the possibility of artifacts in
which the substrate (matter) is resolvable (or reducible) into a product (form) that is
made (artificed)39: In such "hard" (or pure) artifacts both product and substratum are
artifactual. Hence, there appears to be a distinction between "soft" (or impure) and "hard"
(or pure) artifacts: In the former, only the form is made, the matter is given; in the latter,
both form and matter are made. It might be argued that "hard"40 artifacts do not exist,
that everything artifactual (made) must ultimately supervene on something natural
(given), in which case "soft" (or impure) artifactuality delimits artifactuality as such.
This position derives support in a computationalist context from Eldred (1996), viz.
human beings see the outline of beings; they can recall them and they can also project them into the
future. This is the temporality of human being as Da-sein, there-being. In particular, the faculty of
humans to fore-see beings in their being-limits, their òntological delineation', is the basis of techn,
39
It is crucial to appreciate that form does not entail artifactuality: The forms associated with naturals are given
not made.
40
It is worthwhile briefly contrasting the "strong" vs. "weak" artificiality distinction with the "hard" (or pure)
artificiality vs. "soft" (or impure) artificiality distinction: On the former, ontology is statically-grounded in
epistemology (Kantian idealism); on the latter, ontology is dynamically-grounded in technology (Heideggerian
realism).
Chapter 7 Critique
technics, technology. So, it is not just the case that human beings are susceptible receivers for the
outline of beings as such, but they are also transmitters of outlines of beings into the future in
technological (forward-throwing) pro-jects.
Human beings are differentiated, that is, they are open and susceptible to the difference of the limiting
outline which brings beings as such to stand in presencing. This can be seen most plainly today with
the advent of the information technologies, which do nothing other than in-form media, i.e. inscribe
a form, a de-limiting outline, in matter. Humans can discern [epistemically a posteriori] the difference
thus in-formed [as a consequence of the ontically a posteriori and epistemically a priori being of
artifactuals] and so become and are [epistemically] in-formed beings. In-formation is the ultimate
mode of pro-duction of beings, because beings are reduced thereby to the naked skeleton [that is,
`whatness'] of in-scribed matter reminiscent of Aristotle's conception of the work (ergon), especially
the artwork, as matter (hyle) given a form (morphe) [emphasis added]. (p12)
On this basis, Eldred concludes that "to say that being is computation (computari est
esse) means that everything that is is translatable into a digital form. Being in-formed
and im-pressed [in the sense of gathered] by binary code is the ultimate metaphysical
destiny of Western humankind." (p.13)41 According to Feenberg (1997), "technical action
autonomizes the subject through dissipating or deferring feedback from the object of
action to the actor." However, "the technical subject does not modify the basic `law' of
its objects, but rather uses that law to advantage." (p.12) This position is supported by
Rocha (1998), viz. "at their core, [artificial systems] are rule-based, although they have
to interact with whatever the laws are of the environments in which they are embedded."
(p.5) Ferr (1988) maintains that "the totally naked human body, interacting face-to-face
with the environment, unmediated by any artifact, contrivance, invention, or tool, would
seem to stand as a paradigm case of the non-technological." (p.23) On this basis, he goes
on to list four characteristics as definitive of technology, viz.
1. Technology is implemented, not èmpty handed'

2. Technology is practical, not `for its own sake'
3. Technology is embodied, not ìn the head' alone
4. Technology is intelligent, not `blind' (pp.23-25)
(3) is significant in the context of the present discussion since it appears to undermine
the possibility of "hard" (or pure) artifacts in which matter (èmbodiment') is ultimately
reduced to form (ìn the head'). However, Ferr undermines his own position in asserting
that "matter may or may not be essential to technology; intelligence clearly is [emphasis
added]." (p.16) Furthermore, "depending on the degree to which intelligence has
determined the nature of the thing, we can meaningfully speak of something as more or
less artificial." (p.28) On this view, a pure or "hard" artifact is one in which intelligence
has completely determined the nature (Being) of the thing (being). In section 7.3.2, and
consistent with Baudrillard's (1983) concept of the simulacrum as a non-referential
41
It is important to appreciate that this im-pression (of form on matter) is a pro-duction and, crucially, one which
brings about a re-duction of Being; in short, as stated in chapter 6, Being conceals itself under the techn-
Enframing (Gestellen) associated with computationalism (chapter 2).
Chapter 7 Critique
virtuality (chapter 6), it is maintained (1) that computation (and hence,

computationalism) is an instance - in fact, the defining exemplar - of the class of "hard"
(or pure) artifacts and (2) that the ontology of this class is intentionalistically-ideal (that
is, Platonic or mental-ideational). The distinction between "soft" (or impure) and "hard"
(or pure) artifacts can be described in terms of the triadic relation between productant,
substratum and product (chapter 6) as shown in Fig 7.2:
PRODUCT PRODUCT
Fi
PRODUCTANT M PRODUCTANT
E, Fo M, E, Fo, Fi
SUBSTRATUM SUBSTRATUM
(a) "soft" artifacts (b) "hard" artifacts
M=material, E=efficient, Fo=formal, Fi=final causation
Figure 7.2 Triadic Relationality in "Hard" and "Soft" Artifactuality.
The distinction between "soft" (or impure) and "hard" (or pure) artifacts can also be
defined in terms of the phenomenological framework of ontic (productive,
organizational) and epistemic (interpretative, observational) relations to the anthropic
component (artificer-interpreter) described in section 7.2:
Form (essentia)
Given Made
(ontically a priori) (ontically a posteriori)
(epistemically a posteriori) (epistemically a priori)
Given (1) Hard Naturals (2) Soft Artifactuals

(ontically a priori)
Matter (epistemically a posteriori)
(Existentia)
Made (3) Soft Naturals (4) Hard Artifactuals
(ontically a posteriori)
(epistemically a priori)
Chapter 7 Critique
Table 7.2 Phenomenological Classification of "Hard" and "Soft" Artifactuals.
7.3.2. Computers and "Hard" Artificiality
In chapter 2 the ontology of computation was defined in terms of formalism, mechanism,

determinism and atomism and in chapter 6, the ontology of computational poisis
(coming-forth, bringing-forth, becoming) was defined in terms of externality (ontical-
objectivity, third-personhood), efficient causation and operational necessity
(determinism). In this section, the ontology of computers is examined in relation to the
definition of "hard" (or pure) artifactuality in section 7.3.1.
According to Bijl (1995), "we do not know just what it is we are (despite efforts by
philosophers), nor exactly how computers are different, which is why we ought to be
cautious about the kind of role we give to them." (p.189) This is because
no technologist can tell us, objectively and definitely, what a computer is. Only through the collective
efforts of all players can we expect to develop a notion of what computers can be, and in time
computers will become something other than what they presently seem to be [emphasis added].
(p.204)
Bijl attempts to justify this position by appealing to Heideggerian pluralistic realism, viz.
ontological equipmental Being (Sein) as irreducible to ontical causal Being (chapter 6).
Crucially, on his view
we do not know the reality of things we see as machines, as things-in-themselves, but know them as
expressions from knowledge in ourselves, like literature and music and paintings [emphasis added].
(p.210)
This position is problematic since computers are ontologically-ontical, that is, their
Being (Sein) is characterized by their serviceability (usability, utility, functionality)
which is, in turn, dependent on their reliability, itself determined by the determinism or
logical necessity of their operation (chapter 6). In short, beyond their ontological use-
properties - which is a way of Being in-itself (an sich) that happens to be interpreter-
relative - and their ontical cause-properties - which is a way of Being in-itself (an sich)
that happens to be producer-relative - there are no other properties of "hard" (or pure)
artifacts. Thus, Bijl's position is ultimately untenable, a consequence of failing to
appreciate the unitary relation between Being and becoming and hence, the significance
of the poitic difference (chapter 6) in distinguishing humans from computers. In support
of this latter position, Kelly (1993) maintains that
the identification of computer and person through the enumeration of a list of properties faces a fatal
objection right at the very beginning. A computer is a constructed artefact; a human being is a natural
kind. Coy though we may occasionally be about our creative role, we must face the fact that we
determine and assemble the characteristics of a computer. The unity it possesses is a unity intended
Chapter 7 Critique
by us. If it has properties reminiscent of ours, they are derived properties. Its being is derived. By
contrast, our being is found; it is basic (with a due allowance for a Sartrean making of ourselves). We
are in our unity, not as assembled lists or structures. [Yet] is [the ontological] identity of design, of
structure, of use, of intention [in computers] not in itself an authentic identity ? Of course ! And is it
not the same with man ? Do we not come to identity through structure, through behaviour, through
use ? No ! The situations are reversed. Man's identity is first. Our discovery, our interpretation, our
knowledge of design and structure is derived and secondary. But we do not discover a computer. We
make it. Its design is first; its identity is derived and secondary. (p.145)
In terms of the phenomenological framework and artifact classification scheme described

in sections 7.2 and 7.3.1 respectively, it follows that computers are "hard" (pure)
artifactuals whereas persons (that is, human beings) are "hard" (pure) naturals.
In section 7.3.1, it was maintained that "hard" (or pure) artifactuals are ideational and
that computation constitutes the defining exemplar of this class of phenomena. This
position is supported by Searle (1992), Tallis (1994) and Lanier (1995b) who maintain
(1) that computation is an extrinsic or observationally-relativistic (chapter 3) feature of
the world and (2) that the observer must be conscious since extrinsicality implies
intentionality and consciousness, on their view, is a necessary condition for
intentionality. According to Searle (1992), "the aim of natural science is to discover and
characterize features that are intrinsic to the natural world. By its own definitions of
computation and cognition, there is no way that computational cognitive science could
ever be a natural science, because computation is not an intrinsic feature of the world.
It is assigned relative to observers." (p.212) This position is supported by Miller (1995),
viz. "the phenomena studied by natural science predate the science itself, whereas the
phenomenon studied by computer science (e.g. `computation') depend on the science for
their very existence. Computer science is more similar in nature and spirit to architecture
and aeronautical engineering than it is to physics or biology." (pp.4-5) On Searle's view,
"the characterization of a process as computational is a characterization of a physical
system from outside; and the identification of the process as computational does not
identify an intrinsic feature of the physics; it is essentially an observer-relative
characterization." (pp.210-211) In short, "there is no way you could discover that
something is intrinsically a digital computer because the characterization of it as a digital
computer is always relative to an observer who assigns a syntactical interpretation to the
purely physical features in the system." (p.210) Thus, "notions such as computation,
algorithm, and program do not name intrinsic physical features of systems.
Computational states are not discovered within the physics, they are assigned to the
physics." (p.210) On his view, "for any object there is some description of that object
such that under that description the object is a digital computer" (p.208) which is
problematic since if "everything is a digital computer" then the computationalist assertion
that the brain is a digital computer becomes trivially correct (and thereby meaningless).
Searle maintains that "a more realistic definition of computation will emphasize such
features as the causal relation among program states, programmability and controllability
of the mechanism, and situatedness in the real world." (p.209) However,
Chapter 7 Critique
the 0's and 1's [of a computation] as such have no causal powers because they do not even exist
except in the eyes of the beholder. The implemented program has no causal powers other than those
of the implementing medium because the program has no real existence, no ontology, beyond that of
the implementing medium. Physically speaking, there is no such thing as a separate `program level
[emphasis added].' (p.215)
There are (at least) four points to note in connection with this position: First, Searle fails
to adequately clarify the distinction between (i) the assignment of a computational status
to a given phenomenon42, viz. (epistemically) a posteriori interpretation of a
phenomenon as a computation and (ii) computation as an artifact, that is, as a made or
(epistemically) a priori designed (circumscribed, closed) phenomenon; in the former,
observation-interpretation is sufficient for computation while in the latter organization-
production is necessary. Although in "soft" (or impure) artifacts - that is, artifacts in
which the substrate (matter) is given rather than made (and hence, physical as opposed
to ideational) - computation supervenes (chapter 3) on physics, it does so in such a way
as to constrain the possibility for expression of the latter. This is a necessary condition
for correct (that is, functional) computational operation in physical systems43. In this
sense, construction of physical computers involves the circumsciption (or closure) of
possibility into potentiality-actuality (chapter 6).
Second, to the extent that computation as computation can be defined in abstract, formal
and purely artifactual terms, ultimately there is no matter (givenness) to consider44.
According to Searle (1992), "the multiple realizability [of computers] is a consequence
not of the fact that the same physical effect can be achieved in different physical
substances, but that the relevant properties are purely syntactical. The physics is
irrelevant except insofar as it admits of the assignment of 0's and 1's and of state
transitions between them [emphasis added]." (p.207) As stated previously, on his view
"syntax is not intrinsic to physics. The ascription of syntactical properties is always
relative to an agent or observer who treats certain physical phenomena as syntactical
[emphasis added]." (p.208) However, although computation as a "hard" (or pure) artifact
is syntactical and syntax is not intrinsic to physics, this is because either (i) physics is
itself syntactical (computational), in which case form supervenes on matter which is
itself formal, this formal-matter in turn supervening (as matter) on form in a potentially
42
Irrespective of whether this given is `true' (natural) or `false' (artifactual).
43
Computation is ontologically-deterministic which implies necessity which, in turn, implies elimination of
contingency and hence, preservation of constraint.
44
On this view, the physical constraints associated with the implementation of computation (chapter 5) are held
to be either irrelevant or reducible to formal constraints.
Chapter 7 Critique
infinite formal hierarchy45 (Fig 7.3) or (ii) syntax is ideational (mental). In "hard" (or
pure) artifactuality, knowing (epistemology) and Being (ontology) coincide. This
position is supported by Bunge (1959) who maintains that "ideal objects, which lack self-
movement [are not] altogether, self-sufficient, since for their very existence they depend
on some mind." (p.196)
Formn+1
HARD ARTIFACT n
Mattern = Form
n HARD ARTIFACT n-1
SOFT ARTIFACTn
Matter = Form
n-1 n-1
SOFT ARTIFACTn-1
Matter
n-2
SOFT ARTIFACTn-2
Fig 7.3 Matter-Form Hierarchy in "Soft" and "Hard" Artifacts.
Third, assuming a continuum physics, the emergence of discrete structures capable of

symbolic interaction46 appears to occasion new forms of causality (Cariani,89). It
appears, therefore, that a program-implementing medium has new (or at least different)
causal powers to a non-implementing medium and, crucially, as a consequence (that is,
45
However, as Hilton (1991) points out, "there has to be an agent of transformation to turn any mere
representation into an active and independent creation. That agent is the imagination." (p.60) A variant of this
position, viz. panexperientialism (chapter 1), was proposed as a solution to the problem of how to `cut' (that
is, actualize) phenomenal levels in a bidirectionally-infinite potentiality hierarchy (Ali,98a). However, rather
than postulating some variant of idealism, it might be argued that matter can assume - and traditionally has
assumed - this role. Yet this position is problematic given the dissolution to void suffered when physical
entities are analysed in order to determine what constitutes their `similarity in difference' (chapter 2). Given
the stasis of formal systems (chapter 2), it follows that the counterconcept to form is not matter but movement
(kinesis). This latter point is extremely important since (i) according to Heidegger, the arch (incipient origin)
of kinesis (movement) is not in the artifact but in the artificer (section 7.3.3) and (ii) the dissolution of matter
to void and the requirement for dynamism (movement) can be satisfied by the postulation of a dynamic
interpretation of nothing (chapter 6).
46
Pattee (1989) identifies the emergence associated with discrete, rate-independent, symbolic interaction as
semantic emergence (chapter 3).
Chapter 7 Critique
effect) of the existence of the supervening program. On this basis, it follows that the
implemented program must, contrary to Searle's assertion, have (additional) causal
powers. However, this position is problematic since causation is defined relative to a set
of observables, viz. emergence-relative-to-a-model (chapter 3), such that a change in the
set of observables entails a change in causal relationality. On this view, both causality
and changes in causality are epistemological. This is significant because it means that the
causality of computational systems might, in fact, be ontologically-reducible (chapter 3)
to the causality of the non-implementing medium under constraint (that is,
circumscription) as Searle maintains.
Fourth, Searle fails to consider the computationalist possibility that physics is itself
intrinsically computational47. This possibility appears to be excluded given his assertion
that computation is ontologically extrinsic, that is, observationally-relativistic. However,
Searle appears to undermine this position in maintaining that in a human computer,
"there really is a program level intrinsic to the system, and it is functioning causally at
that level to convert input to output. This is because the human is consciously following
the rules for doing a certain computation, and this causally explains his performance. But
when we program the mechanical computer to perform the same computation, the
assignment of a computational interpretation is now relative to us, the outside homunculi.
There is no intentional causation intrinsic to the system [emphasis added]." (p.216) The
problem with this position is that, on his view, intentional states are macroscopic features
associated with certain microscopic neurophysiological processes; hence, causation is
bottom-up from brain to mind. The implication, Searle's arguments to the contrary
notwithstanding, is that intentionality is either non-causal or (what amounts to the same
thing) causally-epiphenomenal48. However, if the intentional aspect associated with
computation is not defined in causal - that is, ontical - terms then it must be defined in
observational - that is, epistemic - terms.
7.3.3. "Hard" Emergent Artifacts and The Poitic Difference
The aim of this section is to establish that there is no difference between designed and
emergent "hard" (or pure) artifacts with respect to their distinction from naturals; in
short, that the poitic difference (chapter 6) between naturals and "hard" artificials (as
artifactuals) applies in both instances. In this connection, it is important to appreciate at
the outset that computation, which constitutes the defining exemplar of "hard" (or pure)
artificiality, is wholly abstract in the sense that it is completely encapsulated (defined)
47
On this view, while all phenomena are computational, they are not necessarily instances of the same program
(Turing machine): On the unified framework of computationally emergent artificiality described in chapter 5,
phenomena are hierarchically-embedded as virtual machines.
48
It is crucial to appreciate that this argument undermines the causality associated with Searlian intentionality
and not the ontological reality of intentionality as such.
Chapter 7 Critique
in terms of logically necessary (that is, deterministically-circumscribed epistemically a

priori) movements between forms49. For those beings (Seiendes) whose Being (Sein) is
determined by form (or essence), what they are is determined by their form. In the case
of artifacts, this form is given by the artificer (and hence, made). For "hard" (or pure)
artifacts, there is nothing but form (sections 7.3.1 and 7.3.2); that is, matter (the given)
itself resolves into form (the made): In terms of the triadic relation described in chapter
6, both substratum and product are formally-defined. Furthermore, because the
substratum (or matter) of the artifact is formally-defined, its Being is circumscribed
epistemically a priori, and because in formal systems (chapter 2) theorems (products)
follow from - that is, are determined (or delimited in their Being) by - axioms (substrata),
product ontology follows substratum ontology.
According to Elstob (1988),
the notion of a specification implies something that is bounded and determined and which always
remains within what is implied and allowed by the specification. If a thing is specified then, by
definition, it cannot transcend its specification without being something other than what was specified
That which is ìmplied and allowed' constitutes the potentiality of the thing and, by
definition, is circumscribed a priori. Such things are, therefore, epistemically a priori
with respect to potentiality (design) and epistemically a posteriori with respect to
actuality (emergence). However, as specified, such things are ontically a posteriori
relative to the artificer. Elstob goes on to assert that
since a machine cannot transcend its specification and still be regarded as a machine in the precise
sense, it is clear that such a notion is unsuitable for modelling transcendent processes [emphasis
added]. (p.95)
According to the above statement, the designation of something as a machine is (tacitly)

an epistemic issue, viz. how something is regarded (viewed, interpreted). According to
the position adopted in this study, the concept of a transcendent machine, that is,
something which transcends its specification, is an ontological impossibility50 since to-
be-a-machine is to be specified, determined (that is, essence and existence of
machinehood consists in determinism which entails closure to self-transcendence). Only
naturals, which are ontically a priori (given), can be transcendent and yet interpreted
(epistemically a posteriori) as-if machines. According to Levin (1979),
that somebody intended [machine] B' to act the way it does has nothing to do with what B' does or
how to describe it. If B' had come into existence by blind natural processes, we could not say that B'
49
In a formal system, movement is between forms; in a computational realization of a formal system (such as
a CA), this movement is deterministic (functionally-surjective, injective or bijective).
50
An instance of the Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness (Whitehead,26).
Chapter 7 Critique
is uncreative because it was acting in ways it could have been instructed in. (p.215)
It is crucial to appreciate that Levin assumes a discontinuity between Being and

becoming (chapter 1) which is readily contested following Heidegger (and the
processualists). As shown in chapter 6, a distinction in becoming entails a distinction in
Being because of the essential unitary relatedness of Being and becoming. The poitic
difference between naturals and artificials (as artifactuals) has implications for the ontical
difference between "soft" (or impure) and "hard" (or pure) artifacts because the former
are natural at the level of the substratum (hence, the impurity) whereas the latter are
artifactual at all levels (that is, substratum and product). Thus, while the above argument
applies in the context of "soft" (or impure) artifacts - which are, in principle, capable of
autopoisis and hence, of overriding embedded intentionality - it does not hold for "hard"
(or pure) artifacts in which the intentionality of the artificer (which is contingent) is
embedded in the artifactual substrate thereby defining the causal (or functional) essence
(what-ness) of the artifactual being (which is necessary). In short, "hard" (or pure)
artifactuals are ontically a posteriori (made) and specified (epistemically a priori) and
hence, closed to transcendence51.
Rieu (1995) maintains that "artifacts are no longer objects; they require being known
from the inside, by distinguishing their structure and its virtualities, the medium
expressing it and, most of all, the functions they satisfy. Objects have become artifacts
[emphasis added]." Crucially, on his view, "the [human] subject is within the artifact at
the connection between the function and the structure." (p.10) In a "hard" (or pure)
artifact, the medium (matter) is itself structural (formal) and reflects an embedded
functionality (artificer-intentionality). Given (i) the link between embedded intentionality
and teleological a priority (chapter 6 and section 7.2), (ii) the link between teleology and
form, and (iii) the determinism of formal-computational systems, it follows that "hard"
artifacts, whose substrates are circumscribed epistemically a priori - and hence, are
ontically a posteriori - have products that are epistemically a posteriori and yet
teleologically a priori in the sense of closed, circumscribed. This position is supported
by Heidegger (1939), viz.
the telos the antecedently envisioned appearance [of the artifact] is what is known by the person with
the know-how, and it exists in that person. Only in this way is it the origin of the idea of the thing and
the ordering of its manufacture. The eidos [or form] in itself is not the arch of the artifact. Rather,
the eidos proaireton i.e., the proairesis [that is, the propositional or proposed which means imposed],
i.e., the techn, is the arch of the artifact. (p.193)
On this basis, he concludes that "in the case of artifacts, therefore, the arch [or origin]
of their movedness - and thus of the rest that characterizes their being-completed [that
is, closure] and being-made [that is, artificiality as artifactuality] - is not in the artifacts
51
Necessary and sufficient conditions for transcendence and non-transcendence (mechanism) are epistemic a
posteriority, ontic a priority and epistemic a priority, ontic a posteriority of substrate respectively.
Chapter 7 Critique
themselves but in something else, in the architecton the one who controls the techn as
arch." (p.193) In linking telos (end) with arch (origin), it is maintained that it is
possible to ignore the intermediate - and epistemically a posteriori - stages in the
unconcealment of the Being of an artifact from an ontological perspective: In short, what
is significant is the incipience (origin) and the presencing (end) of the artifact and these
are ontologically-circumscribed epistemically a priori by the artificer, the ontological
becoming of the artifactual being bounded (contained) by these limits. The implication
is that Aristotle's conception of techn - as interpreted following Heidegger (chapter 6) -
is broad enough to cover both conventional (designed) artifacts and emergent
artifactuality.
According to Elstob (1991), it is possible that "entities that have the capacity for
creational change" might be constructed (that is, artificed) or "perhaps more
appropriately", have their growth initiated by human artificers. Furthermore, he
maintains that it is quite possible that "guidelines" and "understanding" of "the conditions
likely to initiate and support creational change" (p.165) can be established. This position
derives support from Eames (1977) assertion that
there is [a] kind of reductionism which the pragmatic naturalists reject. One explanatory technique
frequently adopted is that of analyzing complex forms and functions by reducing them to their
historical origins. The explanation of emergent and transformed qualities and functions in terms of
their origins is called the genetic fallacy .. This explanation of [a natural phenomenon's] emergent
qualities and their interactions ignores the transformations the [phenomenon] has undergone in its
developmental history. (p.21)
While Eames' statement appears to undermine the significance of incipience (arch or

origination) with respect to the question concerning emergence, in fact, this is not the
case. As shown in chapter 6, for Heidegger (1993b), the Being (Sein) of a being is
historical, viz. "what is past is always a no-longer-being, but what has been is being that
still presences but is concealed in its incipience" (p.73), and this position is supported by
the pragmatic naturalists52. However, while the importance of (ontical) developmental
transformations cannot be denied, according to Heidegger (1959, 1993b), incipience
(origination) is critical in demarcating potentiality since it coincides with the originary
52
According to Mead (1932), "the organization of any individual thing carries with it the relation of this thing
to processes that occurred before this organization set in. In this sense the past of that thing is `given' in the
passing present of the thing, and our histories of things are elaborations of what is implicit in this situation."
(p.18) However, as Lemmen (1997) states, "science can only capture the body insofar as it is already
constituted, it can only capture the cognizer as naturata, but not as naturans. Since the living body is its own
(sedimentary) product, a formalization of it necessarily leaves out something crucial. This is closely related to
the fact that formalizations are necessarily post hoc and also to the fact that cognitive science has tremendous
problems accounting for creativity." (p.2) In Heideggerian terms, science can only access Being as ousia, that
is, as the stable, enduring appearance that is the end point (telos) of the dynamic appearing (presencing) that
is physis. However, while this is true of physis (ontically a priori relative to the anthropic component) this does
not hold for techn (ontically a posteriori relative to the anthropic component).
Chapter 7 Critique
givenness of Being (Sein) to beings (Seiendes); ontological consideration of origins is

important because ontological (existential) incipience is prior to the ontical (causal)
relationality of beings to beings and thus, to developmental transformation as manifested
in causal becoming (from being to being)53. If Heidegger is correct and the poisis
(coming-forth, bringing-forth) associated with Being is multiply-moded then historical
difference in coming-to-be - which includes difference in incipience or origin - means
difference in Being thereby providing support for a critique of the possibility of
emergence in "hard" (or pure) artificial systems. In this connection, it is crucial to
appreciate that the pragmatist criticisms of the genetic fallacy are formulated in a
naturalistic context; hence, while these arguments may apply to "soft" (or impure)
artifacts54, they do not apply to "hard" (or pure) artifacts since the latter are, by definition,
ontically-closed (circumscribed) and operationally-mechanistic (that is, deterministic)
relative to their Enframing (specification) by the artificer55.
In the context of a discussion of computational artificial life (or A-Life) (chapter 4),
Bedau (1998) differentiates between top-down serial specified systems as associated with
"Good Old-Fashioned AI" and bottom-up parallel specified systems associated with A-
Life and connectionism. From the perspective of this study, what is interesting is that
apart from systemicity, both approaches (top-down and bottom-up) involve specification
(closure and determinism) at some level. The type of emergence in computationally
emergent systems (chapter 3) is `weak', which Bedau defines as follows:
A system's macrostate is weakly emergent .. just in case it can be derived from the system's external
conditions (including its initial conditions) and its micro-level dynamical process but only through
the process of simulation [emphasis added]. (p.140)
Crucially, weak emergence entails holding that emergents (that is, emergent phenomena)
are completely determined by causal processes operating at the substrate level. The
ontology of the substrate is specified (that is, determined) by the artificer who opens-up,
via `cutting', a potentiality-actuality state-space which is traversed by a logically
necessary (that is, deterministic) state-transition function. Since that which is
53
Ontological emergence necessitates a movement from beings to Being (nothing) followed by a movement from
Being (nothing) to beings since movements between beings are categorially-closed (chapter 6).
54
"Soft" artifacts are impure to the extent that they contain components which are natural (given) as opposed to
artifactual (made). Artificiality (as artifactuality) can be defined in terms of techn-Enframing (Gestellen) -
which is characterized by closure from without (other) (allopoisis) - and contrasted with naturality as physis -
which, by association with Being as such (Seyn) as the in-finite (apeiron) (chapter 6), is characterized by
openness from within (self) (autopoisis). In short, `soft' artifacts have the possibility for emergence because
of their partially-natural character and not because of their partially-artifactual character.
55
According to Silberstein (1998), "matter conceived la classical physics cannot possibly yield a naturalistic
[and emergentist] explanation of consciousness." (p.477) However, it is crucial to appreciate that indeterminism
(or non-determinism), while necessary, is not sufficient for ontological emergence.
Chapter 7 Critique
epistemically a posteriori (emergent macrostate) is derivable (via simulation) from that

which is epistemically a priori (substrate microstate) then, with respect to poitic
relationality, designed and emergent computational artificialities are identical. This is
important because Being and becoming (poisis) stand in essential, unitary relation
(chapter 6) which means that designed and "hard" emergent artificialities are
ontologically identical. Bedau provides implicit support for this position in drawing
attention to the problems associated with attempts at simulating the evolutionary process
in order to establish whether it is directional or otherwise. As he states,
we can finally discern the global pattern (if any) inherent in the process of open-ended evolution only
by creating and empirically observing the relevant emergent thought experiments. [Unfortunately,]
it is not obvious how to do the experiment[s] because it is unclear how to design a system that
exhibits the kind of open-ended evolution characteristic of our biosphere [emphasis added]. (p.147)
According to the position argued herein, this is logically impossible since "hard" (or
pure) artifactual design entails closure56. As Turing (1948) states,
one may also sometimes speak of a machine modifying itself, or of a machine changing its own
instructions. This is really a nonsensical form of phraseology, but is convenient. Of course, according
to our conventions the `machine' is completely described by the relation between its possible
configurations at consecutive moments. It is an abstraction which by the form of its definition cannot
change in time. (p.9)
7.3.4. Computational and Ontological Emergence
In this section, the concept of computational emergence (chapter 3) is briefly re-

examined in preparation for determining whether or not CA-computationalism (chapter
5) can support ontological emergence and thereby solve the category problem (section
7.4), viz. the problem of how ontological subjectivity can emerge from an ontologically-
objective substrate.
Risan (1996) maintains that
evolution [within ALife simulations] produces so-called emergent properties, properties that could
not have been predicted beforehand. If there had been no emergent properties in the system, then the
researcher would not have been able to read more out of the system than he himself had programmed
into it. His or her science would thus have been tautological. (p.86)
This position is problematic for (at least) three reasons: First, as will be seen in what
follows, it is unclear whether there are emergent properties in the system; second, and
relatedly, it is unclear whether such properties are ontic or epistemic; third, and relatedly,
it is unclear whether or not artificial science is tautologous. According to Toffoli and
Margolus (1987),
56
The openness in "hard" (or pure) artifactuals is bounded (and hence, relative), viz. potentiality.
Chapter 7 Critique
it is often too easy to arrive at models that display the expected phenomenology just because the
outward symptoms themselves, rather than some deeper internal reasons, have been directly
programmed in .. We want models that talk back to us, models that have a mind of their own. We
want to get out of our models more than we have put in [emphasis added]. (p.142)
In chapter 3, while it was maintained that causality in computational systems such as

CAs is bottom-up from the local (or microstate) level to the global (or macrostate) level,
it was also maintained that CAs support a form of `downwards causation', viz. global
constraint (that is, contextual-bounding of FSM state-transition rule activation).
However, this position is incorrect since the global context is, in fact, epiphenomenal
(that is, non-causal): Given a CA specification57 (local FSM state-transition rule, initial
CA state), global state unfolds preformationalistically (deterministically), that is,
becomes explicit (actual or explicate) having been implicit (potential or implicate). As
a consequence of the functional closure of (1) the components (FSMs) and (2) the
component interconnection topology (local neighbourhood), local (microstate) behaviour
is sufficient to determine the evolution of both local (microstate) and global (macrostate)
behaviour; hence, with respect to causality, the global level of the system is simply
irrelevant and hence, epiphenomenal (or non-causal). This position is supported by
Cariani (1991) who maintains that "as observer-programmers [that is, artificer-
interpreters] we can always find a frame which will make our simulation appear
nonemergent." (p.789) As he goes on to state,
for the purposes of judging whether an emergent event has occurred, we need to be careful not to shift
frames of reference .. from talking in terms of microstates .. before and `higher level' features
afterwards. If we start to observe [a phenomenon] in terms of individual [microstates], we must
continue to do so in these terms throughout. (p.790)
In short, and consistent with his concept of emergence-relative-to-a-model (chapter 3),

Cariani maintains that a necessary condition for emergence is the deviation of a system's
behaviour from a model describing that behaviour, thereby necessitating the construction
of a new model incorporating the new behavioural features. In computational systems
such as CAs, FSM functionality (behaviour) is deterministic (surjective, injective or
bijective) and epistemically a priori circumscribed (that is, closed by design); hence, it
is impossible for the FSM to deviate in its functionality (behaviour). Given this fact,
model construction is unnecessary which implies that (epistemological) emergence does
not occur58.
57
Functional connectivity (topology) and functionality of FSMs are assumed to be homogeneous.
58
Further support for the view that causality is bottom-up and that the global (macrostate) level is epiphenomenal
is provided by Faith (1998) who, in the context of a discussion of the Game of Life (chapters 2, 4 and 5),
maintains that "the rules governing the fate of a cell are written in lower level terms such as à cell will not
survive into the next generation if it has no neighbours'. In practice the fate of a particular cell will be
instrumentally dependent on its context, but this dependence is derived from the more fundamental dependence
expressed in formal atomistic terms [that is, at the level of the substrate]. In other words, the fate of a particular
Chapter 7 Critique
In this connection, it is interesting to note in passing the position of Maturana (1997)

who not only asserts that the top-down relation between the global (macrostate) level and
the local (microstate) level is non-causal (epiphenomenal) but that there are no causal
relations between these levels at all. In the context of a discussion of the autopoietic
organization of biological systems (chapter 6), he maintains that
living systems exist in two operational domains, namely: the domain of their composition that is
where their autopoiesis exists and in fact operates as a closed network of molecular productions, and
the domain or medium where they arise and exist as totalities in recursive interactions. The first
domain is where the observer sees them in their anatomy and physiology, the second domain is where
the observer distinguishes them as organism or living systems. These two domains do not intersect,
and cannot be deduced one from the other, although the composition of the living system as an
autopoietic system by constituting it as a bounded or singular totality, makes possible the other as the
domain in which it operates as such totality or discrete entity. That is, as the two domains of existence
of living systems (or of composite entities in general) do not intersect, there is no causal relation, or
what an observer could call causal relations, between them; all that there is are reciprocal generative
relations that the observer may see as he or she distinguishes dynamic correlations between the
operations, phenomena or processes that take place in them [emphasis added]. (p.3)
However this position is incoherent since on the one hand, Maturana maintains that
"there is no causal relation" between "the two domains of existence", while on the other
hand asserting that the compositional (or microstate) domain "makes possible" via
"reciprocal generative relations" the holistic (or macrostate) domain. Clearly, making-
possible and generation are causal and genetic concepts. The validity of this scheme is
further undermined by the fact that such domains are, on Maturana's view,
epistemological (that is, observationally-relativistic)59 which implies that the generative
(causal) relation holds between descriptions. In this connection, Maturana's position is
similar to that of Searle (1992) who maintains that consciousness is a causally-emergent
higher-level biological property of neurophysiological processes: On both views, an
attempt is made at applying causation - an ontic relation (chapter 6) - between epistemic
constructs, viz. descriptions of the same phenomenon at different levels60.
In concluding this section, it is worthwhile briefly restating the facts regarding the
ontology of computation in relation to the question concerning emergence. According
to Cariani (1989),
the functionality of computation is the transition from an initial state to a final state by virtue of only
cell will be dependent on its position within a glider or a blinker, but only because the future state of a cell is
a function of the number of neighbours that it has, and gliders and blinkers are made from different
arrangements of cells. The future of a cell is not affected by its position within a glider qua glider." (p.4)
59
According to Mingers (1995), Maturana is a radical constructivist (or ontological relativist).
60
As Tallis (1994) states, on this view, "an entity or stuff can causally interact with itself in virtue of being seen
at two levels! [emphasis added]" (p.39)
Chapter 7 Critique
the type [or formal] property of the initial state .. This implies that the transitions of symbolic states
to other symbolic states is unique, that one symbol state will give rise to one and only one final
symbol state, because the initial state has one and only one type [or formal] designation and the
transition depends only upon type [or formal] designation. (pp.79-80)
It is crucial to appreciate that the ontology of such symbolic types (or forms) is objective
(that is, externalistic or third-person) since, as Cariani goes on to state, "compositions or
couplings of computations produce other computations .. As long as each step is
deterministic, i.e. as long as each input-output relation is a function, then the total input-
output relation will be a function [emphasis added]." (p.81) In short, computation is
ontologically-transitive (or categorially-closed) which means that computationalism is
incapable of ontological emergence61. As Cariani states, "computer simulations of any
sort .. will not create properties which were not encoded in the simulation from the very
start [emphasis added]." (p.157) However, it is crucial to appreciate that the only kind
of properties than can be encoded in computer simulations are those which are
ontologically-computational, that is, externalistic (or behavioural), operationally-
necessary (or deterministic) and efficiently-causal. On Cariani's view, the higher-level
patterns which emerge during the course of a computer simulation "are patterns which
must be recognized by the human observer. No new rules [or state-transition
functionality] come into play which were not in some sense [that is, at some ontological
level] prespecified. No behaviour arises which is not a logical consequence of the
simulation rules and the initial state." (pp.157-158) There are (at least) two points to note
in regard to the previous statement: First, emergence of higher-level patterns is relative
to an observer (chapter 3); and second, it is patterns, that is, ontologically-objective
(externalistic, third-person) macroscopic behaviours or structures (whether static or
dynamic) that emerge through the ontologically-objective (externalistic, third-person)
operation of state-transition rules defined in terms of ontologically-objective
(externalistic, third-person) microstates (patterns). Thus, computational emergence is
categorially-closed and hence, incapable of ontological emergence. According to Cariani,
we can have emergent devices [which are "soft" artifacts] if we give up the deterministic, symbolic
nature of the devices, and we can have well-behaved computer simulations [which are "hard"
artifacts] as long as we give up the hope of making them emergent, but we cannot have both at the
same time. (p.160)
Although his framework establishes the conditions under which epistemological
61
According to Cariani (1989), "chaotic computational processes do raise the apparent complexity of the
simulation's behaviour, in terms of the complexity of the algorithm needed to replicate it, but this really has
nothing to do with emergence relative to a designer who has complete knowledge of the initial state and the
state transition rules. Even if the only effective means of predicting exactly what will happen is to run the
simulation itself, that does not mean that new categories have been formed. The behaviour of the system is still
circumscribable, still expressible in the original notation of possible outcomes [emphasis added]." (pp.189-190)
Thus, "the best one can do is to generate unexpected combinations of existing primitives, unanticipated
behaviour within completely anticipated categories." (p.184)
Chapter 7 Critique
emergence is held to occur, it is important to appreciate that it does not address the issue
of ontological emergence, specifically, the emergence of ontological subjectivity from
an (assumed) ontologically-objective substrate (section 7.4). In fact, the above
framework cannot address this problem since it is defined in essentially (that is,
necessarily) behaviouristic (ontologically-objective, externalistic) terms, viz. publically-
accessible observables62.
7.4. Computationalism and The Category Problem

In this section, the category problem, that is, the problem of explaining how ontological
subjectivity can arise in an ontologically-objective substrate, is examined in connection
with the assumption of metaphysical computationalism.
7.4.1. Ontological Subjectivity
The concept of ontological subjectivity (first-personhood, internality, experiential-

awareness63) is closely linked to that of consciousness. According to Nagel (1979), "an
organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something that it is like to be
that organism - something it is like for the organism." (p.166) Furthermore, and
anticipating formal statement of the category problem, Nagel asserts that "one cannot
derive a pour soi [or for-itself] from an en soi [or in-itself]." (p.188) Griffin (1998)
clarifies this position as follows:
an en soi has only an òutside', having no features beyond those that are perceivable in principle by
others and describable in externalistic language; it is hence nothing but an object (for others). A pour
soi, by contrast, has an ìnside', having features that are not externally perceivable by others and
describable in externalistic terms; it is thus a subject (for itself). A subject or a pour soi, in other
words, is something about which we can intelligibly ask, `What is it like to be one of those ?' (p.64)
In this connection, it is interesting to note with Margolis (1989) that "the question of
whether selves and persons may be eliminated by some ontological maneuver may be
safely set aside: there is no known argument that actually effects that economy once we
concede the reality of psychological experience (in however narrow or broad a sense we
favour) or once we concede cognizing activities or actions informed by experience."
(p.4) In short, the phenomenon of consciousness (experience, first-personhood) is
62
This fact is implicit in Cariani's (1991) assertion that "if we wish to include complex [higher level] patterns,
they need to be in our state descriptions from the start, or they will remain in the realm of tacit, private
observation, unrecognized by our public model [emphasis added]." (p.790)
63
Chalmers (1996) presents the following non-exhaustive "catalog of conscious experiences", viz. visual
experiences, auditory experiences, tactile experiences, olfactory experiences, taste experiences, experiences
of hot and cold, pain, other bodily sensations, mental imagery, conceptual thought, emotions, and sense of self
(pp.6-11).
Chapter 7 Critique
ontological64 as opposed to merely epistemological; hence, as Griffin (1998) - following

Searle (1992, 1997) - points out, "with regard to the what-it's-like-ness of experience
itself, there is no basis for a distinction between appearance and reality." (p.105) For this
reason, consciousness (experience, first-personhood) belongs to a distinct ontological
category which is referred to herein as ontological subjectivity.
7.4.2. The Category Problem
Griffin (1998) distinguishes the following variants of the mind-body problem (chapter
4), viz.
1. How could experience (whether conscious or not) arise out of, and perhaps act back on,
nonexperiencing things (or events, or processes) ?
2. How could a unified experience arise out of, perhaps act back on, a brain ?
3. How could conscious experience arise out of, and perhaps act back on, a brain ?
4. How could self-conscious experience arise out of, and perhaps act back on, a brain ?
5. How could conscious animal experience have arisen in the evolutionary process out of nonconscious
animal experience ?
6. How could self-conscious experience have arisen in the evolutionary process out of merely conscious
animal experience ? (p.9)
In the context of the present study, what is significant is that experience, consciousness
and self-consciousness belong to the same ontological category, viz. ontological
subjectivity. It is important to appreciate that the question of downwards causation
(chapter 3) is explicitly incorporated in four of the above descriptions of the mind-body
problem. However, in contemporary discussions of the problem, it is largely (and tacitly)
assumed that top-down causation (from mind to body) must be epiphenomenal (that is,
non-causal) since, as Chalmers (1996) states, "the best evidence of contemporary science
tells us that the physical world is more or less causally closed: for every physical event,
there is a sufficient cause." (p.125) On this basis, Harnad (1998) maintains that
consciousness must be caused by the brain because to assert otherwise - for example, to
adopt a variant of causal dualism (interactionism) - would be to undermine "all of
physics and its conservation laws." (p.3) Chalmers (1996) thereby reduces the mind-body
problem into the "hard" problem, viz. "why is all this processing [in the brain]
accompanied by an experienced inner life ?" (p.xii) and "[how] could [consciousness]
64
In defending the classification of the mind-body problem (chapter 4 and section 7.4.2) as an ontological
problem, De Quincey (1996) asks "how can that which [eliminativists claim] has no real existence [viz.
epiphenomenal consciousness] construct the story in which its own existence is denied ?" since "it was
precisely this subjective `fiction' which has somehow managed to construct that objective world picture in the
first place." (p.15)
Chapter 7 Critique
possibility arise from lumpy gray matter ?" (p.3) There are (at least) two problems with
this position: First, it is crucial to appreciate that the brain (`lumpy gray matter') is a
"hard" (or pure) natural (section 7.3.1), that is, ontically a priori (or given) and
epistemically a posteriori (or interpreted); hence, it is unclear whether the brain is, as is
implied in Chalmers' statement, a nonexperiential entity. As Griffin (1998) states,
it is one thing to say that we know that it is possible for conscious states to arise out of a brain,
because it actually occurs. It is something entirely different to say that we know that it is possible for
conscious states to arise out of a brain composed of neurons that are individually insentient, because
it has actually happened. This we do not know; it is pure supposition. (p.74)
Second, Harnad's position is a non sequitur since, as Marres (1989) has argued, physics
and its conservation laws describe only the external (or behavioural) interactions of
phenomena: This holds equally whether physics is conceived in Newtonian (particular)
or post-Newtonian (energetic) terms since the ontological interpretation of the
phenomena in question is objectivistic (that is, externalistic); in short, `matter' is held to
be `vacuous' (Griffin,98). On Marres interactionist scheme,
the chain of physical causes and effects does not need to have gaps. On this view when the mental
acts on the physical, the physical cause is not sufficient. So the continuity and causal activity of the
physical world are preserved, although that world is not regarded as a causally closed system
Causation is a relation between beings (section 6.4.1.3). In order for the causal relation
to be observable, the component relata (beings) must themselves be observable. In being
observable, a thing (being) stands over against as an object (known, observed) in relation
to a subject (knower, observer) (section 7.2.1); consequently, the beings in an observable
causal relation are conceptualized as externalistic (that is, ontologically-objective) and
as externalistically-related. However, other-observability (that is, observability-by-other)
does not constitute a necessary condition for causation; hence, the possibility of
unobservable, internalistic (that is, ontologically-subjective) causation. On this view, the
physical universe can be both externalistically-closed and internalistically-open, thereby
undermining the logical necessity of Harnad's argument.
On the basis of the above arguments, it follows that the reduction of the mind-body
problem (with its experiential and causal aspects) to the "hard" problem (defined purely
in terms of the question concerning experience) constitutes an eliminativist move, the
validity of which is highly questionable. For the purposes of this study, however, this
maneuver will be taken to be valid subject to the following condition, viz. that a solution
to the "hard" problem must be emergentist in nature. This restriction on the "hard"
problem leads to what has been refered to throughout this study as the category problem,
that is, the problem of explaining how ontological subjectivity (internality, first-
personhood) can emerge from an ontologically-objective (externalistic, third-person)
substrate.
Chapter 7 Critique
According to Waterhouse (1981), "it is part of the corruption of the tradition that feelings
and affects, instead of being treated as basic, have sunk to the level of àccompanying
phenomena'." (p.86) Furthermore, "we can see now that this neglect was motivated by
the common human desire to avoid the real questions of self." (p.138) However, it is
important to appreciate that the category problem associated with ontological subjectivity
is not identical to the problem of qualia (that is, secondary qualities (chapter 2) or
private, inner mental objects). In this connection, consider the following argument due
to Jackson (1982) which attempts to establish the falsity of physicalism with respect to
the problem of qualia:
Mary is a brilliant scientist who is, for whatever reason, forced to investigate the world from a black
and white room via a black and white television monitor. She specializes in the neurophysiology of
vision and acquires, let us suppose, all the physical information there is to obtain about what goes on
when we see ripe tomatoes, or the sky, and use terms like `red', `blue', and so on. She discovers, for
example, just which wavelength combinations from the sky stimulate the retina, and exactly how this
produces via the central nervous system the contraction of the vocal cords and expulsion of air from
the lungs that results in the uttering of the sentence `The sky is blue'. (It can hardly be denied that it
is in principle possible to obtain all this physical information from black and white television,
otherwise the Open University would of necessity need to use color television.) What will happen
when Mary is released from her black and white room or is given a color television monitor ? Will
she learn anything or not ? It seems just obvious that she will learn something about the world and
our visual experience of it. But then it is inescapable that her previous knowledge was incomplete.
But she had all the physical information. Ergo there is more to have than that, and Physicalism is
false. Clearly the same style of Knowledge argument could be deployed for taste, hearing, the bodily
sensations and generally speaking for the various mental states which are said to have (as it is
variously put) raw feels, phenomenal features or qualia. (pp.471-472)
Rudd (1998), while accepting the validity of the "hard" problem, maintains that such
arguments as the above are problematic in that framing the problem "in terms of qualia,
inner mental objects, is to objectivize the subjective [the what-is-is-likeness of
experience], to treat it as though it were a realm of mind-independent objects." (p.2) On
his view,
the fundamental problem for physicalism is not that some of the objects of experience may be non-
physical, but that the notion of experience itself is not a physical one .. One can deny mental objects,
qualia or whatever, or remain agnostic about them, but this does nothing to help the physicalist. What
the physicalist has to show is that my consciousness, my awareness - whether of tables or colours,
after-images or mountains - is something physical. (p.5)
Consistent with Griffin's (1998) position as described previously, Rudd maintains that
"phenomenology just is the way things seem to us, so there is no room for an
appearance/reality distinction [in the case of consciousness]" (p.3); in short, and as Searle
(1992) states, "we can't make [an] appearance-reality distinction for consciousness
because consciousness consists in the appearances themselves. Where appearance is
concerned we cannot make the appearance reality distinction because the appearance
is the reality." (p.122) Rudd is, thereby, led to maintain that "what is crucial is the issue
of what it is like, not that of what is known." (p.5) It is significant to note that his
Chapter 7 Critique
Wittgensteinian approach to solving the category problem is similar to that described

herein, viz. emergently grounding ontical subjects and objects in ontological being-in-
the-world (chapter 6). As he states,
Wittgenstein attempts to dissolve the classic problems of mind and body and of our knowledge of
other minds, by starting, not from the first [ontologically-subjective] or third [ontologically-objective]
but from the second person. That is, neither from the introspection of the isolated subject, nor from
the objectivity of scientific observation, but from ordinary human interaction. (p.6)
On this basis, he insists that "we should reject the philosophical project of taking science
as metaphysics [that is, as ontologically primordial]" since "we can only integrate mind
and body if we understand the body as we do in everyday life, and not as we do in
science." Thus, "we need to think more about what can be called the body-body [or,
more precisely, person-body] problem - the problem of relating our ordinary self-
understanding as embodied agents to scientific accounts of the human body." (p.8)
Clearly, this position corresponds to the Heideggerian project described herein, viz.
explaining the pluralistically-emergent (or incipiently-poitic) relation between the
ontical (causal, productive) and the ontological (existential, hermeneutic) (chapter 6). A
Heideggerian solution to the other-minds problem is outlined in section 7.4.5. However,
it is appropriate at this point in the presentation to briefly examine the possibility of a
non-Heideggerian emergentist - specifically, computationally-emergentist (chapter 3) -
solution to the category problem.
7.4.3. Computationalism, Emergence and the Category Problem
Perhaps the most incisive critique of the conventional emergentist (or emergent-
materialist) position - in which it is argued that ontological subjectivity (or experience)
emerges from an ontologically-objective (or non-experiential) substrate - is that
presented by Griffin (1988b), who maintains that
materialists, in referring to perceptions, feelings, volitions, and conscious thoughts as emergent

properties, claim that these inner properties are simply further examples of a long line of new
properties which have emerged throughout the evolutionary process, such as bones, scales, and
feathers. But this claim obscures the difference in kind involved. All those other characteristics are
externalistic properties, knowable to sensory experience. But experience itself does not belong in this
category. It is what an organism is for itself, not something that is observed through the eyes, ears or
hands of another organism. We know what we mean by experience and hence can attribute it
meaningfully to others only because of our own immediate experience. To put experience itself in the
same class as those properties that are the objects of experience is a category mistake of the most
eggregious kind. [Yet] it is only through this confusion that the materialist can claim to be different
from the dualist. (p.147)
Moody (1993) defines a `category mistake' as "the result of grouping something in a

category with other things that are logically dissimilar." (p.31) For example, Ryle (1949)
contests the validity of Cartesian substance dualism on the grounds that
Chapter 7 Critique
the belief that there is a polar opposition between Mind and Matter is the belief that they are terms
of the same logical type. (p.23)
On his view, the mind is not a substance, but a property or attribute of matter; hence to
oppose mind to matter is to oppose substance to attribute which constitutes an instance
of category error. However, while it is incorrect to maintain a polar opposition between
mind and matter on the basis of identity of logical type, ontological subjectivity and
ontological objectivity can legitimately be placed in polar opposition since they are
instances of the same logical type, viz. perspective or view (Nagel,86).
In a later work, Griffin (1993) maintains that
it is impossible to understand how experiencing things and nonexperiencing things [can] interact ..
The evolutionary picture of the world creates a new form of [the mind-body] problem: how could
experience have evolved out of things wholly devoid of experience ? It is often said that this is
unproblematic, being simply one more example of emergence: just as wetness emerges out of a
combination of hydrogen and oxygen, neither of which is wet, so could experience emerge out of
things which were wholly devoid of experience. This argument, however, involves a category
mistake. Wetness is a quality of things as they are for others. We do not suppose that the water
molecules feel wet to themselves. Experience, however, is what something is for itself. To say that
experience arose out of a constellation of things without experience, therefore that things that exist
for themselves arose out of things that were nothing for themselves, existing only for others, is to
postulate an absolutely unique type of emergence with no analogues. (p.193)
Finally, and in the specific context of the category problem, that is, the question of how
ontological subjectivity can emerge from an ontologically-objective substrate, Griffin
the alleged emergence of subjectivity out of pure objectivity has been said to be analogous to
examples of emergence that are different in kind. All of the unproblematic forms of emergence refer
to externalistic features, features of things as perceived from without, features of objects for subjects.
But the alleged emergence of experience is not simply one more example of such emergence. It
involves instead the alleged emergence of an ìnside' from things that have only outsides. It does not
involve the emergence of one more objective property for subjectivity to view, but the alleged
emergence of subjectivity itself. Liquidity, solidity, and transparency are properties of things as
experienced through our sensory organs, hence properties for others. Experience is not what we are
for others but what we are for ourselves. Experience cannot be listed as one more `property' in a
property polyism. It is in a category by itself. To suggest any analogy between experience itself and
properties of other things as known through sensory experience is a category mistake of the most
egregious kind. (pp.64-65)
This position is supported by Searle (1997), viz. "consciousness has a first-person or

subjective ontology and so cannot be reduced to anything that has a third-person or
objective ontology." (p.212) On this basis, Nagel (1979) maintains that "there are no
truly [that is, ontically] emergent properties of complex systems. All properties of a
complex system that are not relations between it and something else derive from the
properties of its constituents and their effects on each other when so combined.
Emergence is an epistemological condition: it means that an observed feature of the
Chapter 7 Critique
system cannot be derived from the properties currently attributed to its constituents65. But
this is a reason to conclude that either the system has further constituents of which we
are not yet aware, or the constituents of which we are aware have further properties that
we have not yet discovered." (p.182) Thus,
unless we are prepared to accept the alternative that the appearance of mental properties in complex
systems has no causal explanation at all, we must take the current epistemological emergence of the
mental as a reason to believe that the constituents have properties of which we are not aware, and
which do necessitate these results. (p.187)
Crucially, on his view, "it is conceivable in the abstract that if mental phenomena derive
from the properties of matter at all, those may be identical at some level with
nonphysical properties from which physical phenomena also derive." (p.184) In short,
the ground of mind and matter is that which is prior to both. For Whitehead (1978), this
ground is the actual occasion, the experiential event which has both ontologically-
subjective and ontologically-objective (or superjective) aspects that disclose temporally.
The problem with this scheme is that it fails to address the ontological difference
between beings (actual occasions and compound individuals66) and Being as such; in
short, it does not explain why there is something rather than nothing (chapter 6). In order
to resolve this problem, Whiteheadian panexperientialism must be grounded in Being
which, as shown in chapter 6, is, in some sense, the `same' as nothing, thereby entailing
an incipient poitic movement from Being to beings (subject-superjects), that is,
ontological creatio ex nihilo. Thus, it appears that some form of radical emergence must,
in fact, be correct. As stated above, Nagel posits some form of neutral monism67 as the
ground of both mental and physical phenomena. However, in order to prevent such a
ground from undermining the transitivity of causation (by postulating it as a First or
Necessary cause), it must be interpreted as a non-causal groundless ground or abyss and,
as shown in chapter 6, this is precisely the meaning of incipient nothing or Being as such
(Seyn).
The above endorsement of a radical emergentist solution to the category problem appears
to support the possibility of "strong" computationally emergent artificiality or CEA
(chapter 5). However, that this is not the case is readily established: The radical
65
This position is consistent with Cariani's concept of emergence-relative-to-a-model (chapter 3) and Mead's
pragmatist interpretation of emergence (chapter 6).
66
According to Griffin (1988b), in panexperientialism, "a clear distinction is made between aggregates and
genuine individuals, with the insistence that only the latter have (or are) experiences. Accordingly, sticks and
stones and stars are not thought to have experience as wholes. The pan in panexperientialism thereby means
that all actual things either are experiences or are composed of individuals that are experiences. This point
distinguishes this position from most other ànimistic' positions." (p.152)
67
According to Mercer (1917), "in the Cosmos there is not only existence, but conscious existence; and
consciousness must therefore be posited as an attribute or property of the Ground." (p.197)
Chapter 7 Critique
emergentist solution to the category problem is not an ontical (that is, causal) solution
but an ontological (that is, incipient) solution. On pluralistic emergentism, ontological
subjectivity does not emerge from an ontologically-objective substrate but from that
which is prior to such ontical categories, viz. non-categorial being-in-the-world (chapter
6); hence, the radical (or pluralistic) emergentist solution to the category problem
involves transcendence of the categorial to its ground, viz. Being as such68. However,
as shown in chapters 2 and 6 and again in sections 7.3.2 and 7.3.4, computation is "hard"
(or pure) artifactual and its ontology is externalistic (objective, third-person) and
deterministic (operationally-necessary). As a consequence of the ontological - that is,
categorial - closure of computation, viz. computation gives rise to computation, it is
impossible for computation to generate ontological subjectivity in which case
computational emergence cannot solve the category problem. In this sense,
computationalism is the metaphysics that is most vulnerable to Griffin's incisive
criticisms of emergentist-materialism and precisely because it is completely non-
materialist: Griffin's critique is directed at materialism interpreted (epistemically a
posteriori) as-if externalistic. However, this interpretation is contingent since matter is
ontically a priori (or given). Computation, by contrast, is designed (epistemically a
priori) as externalistic and this design is necessary since computation is formally-
specified (circumscribed) and ontically a posteriori (or made). It is important to
appreciate that it is not simply the fact that computations are incapable of semantic
initiative, that is, creating new symbolic primitives (Cariani,89), that renders them
incapable of solving the category problem since on this view, categories are merely
epistemological and ontologically-objective. As argued in 7.3.4, computation is
incapable of incipient poisis, that is, emergence of existential modalities (or ontological
categories, specifically of the category of ontological subjectivity).
7.4.4. Techn-Enframing (Gestellen) and The Category Problem
In the previous section, it has been shown that computationalism is incapable of solving
the category problem which implies that both the computational theory of mind or CTMi
(chapter 4) and "strong" AI must be impossible69. It is worthwhile briefly investigating
the implications of this fact for the possibility of other "strong" artificialities such as A-
Life. According to Keeley (1993),
one of the things that makes psychology such a difficult endeavour is that in addition to the
straightforward behavioural, third-person phenomena which stand in need of explanation, in the case
of humans at least, there seem to be additional experiential, first-person phenomena. Part of the
burden of psychology is to explain (or explain away) phenomena related to the prima facie claim that
psychological systems exhibit attention, intentionality, consciousness, self-consciousness, a `point
68
To the extent that ontological categories are, they necessarily partake of Being as such (chapter 6).
69
The implications of this fact for computationally emergent artificiality or CEA and metaphysical
computationalism are briefly examined in chapter 8.
Chapter 7 Critique
of view', or the property of being `something-it-is-like-to-be' that entity, qualia, or any other of the
constellation of concepts relating to the subjective nature of the psychological. (p.584)
He goes on to state that "there is no analogous concern in biology" since "biological

phenomena, unlike their psychological counterparts, seem to be exclusively of the
behavioural, third-person variety. There is no worry that, after describing all the physical
parameters of the system, there still will be `something else'." (p.584) However, if, as
Searle (1992) and Nunez (1995) maintain, consciousness is a biologically-emergent
property and if, as is implied by Keeley's above statement, biology can be defined in
ontologically-objective terms70, the category problem again arises and this time in a
biological context. For this reason, Birch (1988) maintains that "the postmodern
challenge to biology is to recognize a second set of causes in addition to exernal [or
ontologically-objective] relations. This second set is internal71 relations." (p.70)
However, according to Farleigh (1996),
the primary function of a machine can be described in terms of the external relations of the parts
which are assumed to be `simply located'. One set of external relations is as good as any other, and
hence the function of one machine can be modeled on another. The function of an organism on the
other hand is constituted by both the internal and the external relations between events. Each event
is not simply located, is unique to its history and is hence, highly context-dependent. The procedure,
then, of attempting to map an organism onto a machine can only be a process of abstraction and hence
such a mapping would be done with a loss of information and the two would not be functionally
equivalent. The adherents of `strong AI' and `strong AL' commit the simple, but major, fallacy of
confusing the abstract with the concrete." (p.17)
Birch maintains that "evolution, according to the ecological or organic model, is the
evolution not of substances but of subjects. The critical thing that happens in evolution
is change in internal relations of subjects." (pp.71-72) To the extent that Heidegger's
identification of functionality with substantiality (chapter 6) and the metaphysical
interpretation of the former in ontologically-objective terms (section 7.3) is correct, it
follows that A-Life evolution is substantialist and hence, according to Birch's position,
non-evolutionary (that is, non-emergent).
However, McGinn (1987) insists that "a non-living thing might .. in principle qualify for
the ascription of consciousness, so long as it behaved like a living conscious thing, for
example ourselves. Only such an entity could invite the ascription of consciousness."
(p.283) This is only possible because McGinn holds that
the intrinsic nature of an object is logically independent of the manner of its genesis (p.281) ,
70
That is, if a behavioural explanation of a biological phenomenon is sufficient.
71
Here, internality is experiential (or first-person) and constitutive (section 7.2.2) as opposed to merely
topological (or geometrical).
Chapter 7 Critique
a position that is supported by Levin (1979). As he goes on to state, "if we know that an
entity a has the same physical nature as a conscious being b, then we know that a is
conscious in the same way as b, quite independently of whether a and b came into
existence in the same way .. Hence whether something is an artifact is irrelevant to the
question whether it is conscious [emphasis added]." (p.281) Hence, "all intelligence
needs to do to create conscious beings is to recapitulate what natural selection did
mindlessly. There is thus no problem in principle about an artifact being conscious."
(p.281) However, according to Birch this position is problematic since if natural
selection is responsible for the emergence of consciousness, it cannot be an
ontologically-objective (or `mindless') process; hence, his postulation of the causal role
of internal relations in evolution. Yet Birch (1994) does not exclude the possibility of
experiential artifact construction, merely that "to attempt to make [an experiential
artifact] by building up a hierarchy of compound entities that think and feel would be to
attempt to repeat evolution from scratch [emphasis added]." (p.8) The problem with this
position is that it fails to appreciate the ontological implications of the poitic difference
(chapter 6) between techn-Enframing (Gestellen) or artificing - which involves a
productant (artificer-interpreter) relating to substratum (matter) and product (form) as
an ontological subject to ontological objects - and physis or evolution - which Birch
identifies as internalistically-relational; in short, artificing is relationally-externalistic
whereas evolution is relationally-internalistic. Hence, artifacts cannot replicate
evolutionary processes72 . According to de Quincey (1994),
compared with a `compound individual', an aggregate society of experiential events - such as a rock,
a pool of water, a chair or a computer - has no dominant monad of experience. The rock, chair or
computer is a non-holistic aggregate of constituent molecules, atoms and subatomic particles. Now,
according to panexperientialism, each of these constituent lower-level òrganisms' is an individual
with its own low-level form of experience and capacity for self-action. However, in aggregates the
self-motions of the innumerable individual organism cancel each other out. Consequently the rock,
pool, chair or computer does not possess experience or self-motion of its own (just as we see in the
world, and just as normal physics predicts). Therefore, in compound individuals and aggregates there
is no fundamental conflict between panexperientialism and modern physics regarding constituent
`particles'." (p.223)
The problem with this position is that in identifying rocks ("hard" naturals), pools
(naturals or "soft" artifacts), chairs ("soft" artifacts) and computers ("hard" artifacts) as
aggregates, de Quincey fails to appreciate the implications of the poitic difference
(chapter 6) and hence, the distinction between "soft" (or impure) and "hard" (or pure)
artifacts with respect to the possibility for transformation into compound individuals. As
72
Farleigh (1997) commits the same mistake in asking "can we artificially build an entity that is conscious ?" and
going on to state that "I believe we can because consciousness is not some special stuff we have to add to a
system. But what I don't believe is that it can be done on a machine - that is by an aggregate of individuals (the
individuals being the molecules). If we could create a conscious entity I believe it would inevitably be
indistinguishable from an organism - in other words it would have to be a compound individual of some sort.
And of course it would be easier to grow such an entity than to put one together molecule by molecule
[emphasis added]." (p.6)
Chapter 7 Critique
Whitehead (1926) states,
suppose for the moment and for the sake of simplicity, we assume, without any evidence, that
electrons and hydrogen nuclei are .. basic organisms. Then the atoms, and the molecules, are
organisms of a higher type, which also represent a compact definite organic unity. But when we come
to the larger aggregations of matter, the organic unity fades into the background. It appears to be but
faint and elementary. It is there, but the pattern is vague and indecisive. It is a mere aggregation of
effects. When we come to living beings, the definiteness of pattern is recovered, and the organic
character again rises into prominence. Accordingly, the characteristic laws of inorganic matter are
mainly the statistical averages resulting from confused aggregates. So far are they from throwing light
on the ultimate nature of things, that they blur and obliterate the individual characters of the individual
organisms. If we wish to throw light upon the facts relating to organisms, we must study either the
individual molecules and electrons, or the individual living beings. In between we find comparative
confusion [emphasis added].(p.133)
7.4.5. A Heiddegerian Solution to the Other-Minds Problem
Goswami (1993), assuming an idealistic interpretation of quantum theory, argues that the
other-minds problem73 (chapter 4) is not a problem for human beings since, unlike
machines, their consciousness is connected non-locally:
The reason that I do not live in a solipsistic (only I am real) universe is not that others like me
logically convince me of their humanness, but that I have an inner connection with them. I could
never have this connection with an android [or zombie]. I submit that the sense we have of an inner
connection with other humans is due to a real connection of the spirit. I believe that classical
computers can never be conscious like us because they lack this spiritual connection. Etymologically,
the word consciousness derives from the words scire (to know) and cum (with). Consciousness is `to
know with'. To me, this term implies nonlocal knowing; we cannot know with somebody without
sharing a nonlocal connection with that person. (p.23)
Consistent with this position, Midgley (1995) maintains that the other-minds problem
dissolves once the essentially social nature of human beings is recognized; on her view,
the problem can only arise for philosophers who are prone to committing "Cartesian
philosophic suicide" (p.352). This position is similar to that argued by Heidegger who
asserts the ontological primordiality of human being as being-in-the-world over the
73
The Oxford Companion to The Mind (1987) defines the other-minds problem as "the classical problem of why
we believe that other people (and perhaps at least the higher animals) have sensations, thoughts, and so on,
essentially similar to our own. It seems that we draw a widespread analogy from our own behaviour, and related
internal affective states, to the internal states of other people (and sometimes animals), especially when their
behaviour is similar to ours." However, the logical possibility of zombies (chapter 1) undermines the validity
of this behaviouristic argument for the ascription of mentality. Furthermore, this position, in its refined form,
assumes the validity of functionalism and multiple realizability, viz. that the genesis of a thing is irrelevant to
the question of whether it has a mind. However, if Heidegger is correct in maintaining that becoming and Being
stand in essential, unitary relation, then a difference in poisis (coming-forth, bringing-forth, becoming)
between beings entails a difference in Being (ontology) between beings, viz. an ontical difference. On this
basis, it is possible to argue that a thing does not have a mind on the grounds that its poitic-historicity is
essentially distinct from that of a mental thing.
Chapter 7 Critique
Cartesian ego (chapter 1). According to Grimsley (1967),
strictly speaking, we cannot `prove' the existence of other selves any more than we can prove the
existence of the external world. It is simply unthinkable, however, that there should exist an isolated
self without others. (p.50)
This clearly follows from the fact that the very notion of self is meaningless without that
of other: Following Heidegger's (1959) assertion to the effect that that which is in
opposition (polemos) must constitute an originary unity, it is maintained that the duality
of self and other points to a prior composite, viz. self-other. Furthermore, if the
primordial way (or mode) of Being is being-in-the-world, of which being-with-others
is a component existential structure (chapter 6), then the other-minds problem is not a
primordial but rather a derivative problem. According to Kovacs (1990),
the phenomenon of `with-being' and the phenomenon of `There-being-with-others' [such òthers'

being, of necessity, There-beings themselves] reveal a fundamental (ontological) structure of There-
being, and they show this structure as being equally original with the to-be-in-the-World. This
structure is the existential called `with-being' (`to-be-with'). The `with-being' structure of There-being
is the foundation of human community and of interpersonal relationships; it is not the product of
social or cultural integration. (p.72)
However, why should (must) this other be a self ? Is solipsism impossible ? For
Heidegger, solipsism is a possibility posterior to the emergence of the Cartesian ego
(subject, self) from Dasein (or being-in-the-world). To the extent that a basic existential
structure of Dasein is being-with-others, other-Daseins necessarily exist. In this sense,
other selves are; however, these selves are not Cartesian egos. Yet to the extent that there
are a plurality of Daseins and given that every Dasein has the possibility of becoming
a Cartesian ego, it follows that there must be a plurality of minds. In considering four
arguments against "strong" AI, viz. consciousness, autonomy, intentionality and unity,
Hauser (1993) is led to maintain that
if consciousness were our basis for deciding whether any intelligent seeming thing was really a
thinking subject, then one should have skeptical doubts about other minds. So, if we don't, and
shouldn't, seriously entertain such doubts, this seems to show that we don't (or shouldn't) appeal to
consciousness to decide what is and isn't thinking. (p.2)
This position is significant since it establishes how the possibility of "strong" AI arises,
viz. from the assumption of Cartesian subjectivity as primordial. Far from being anything
other than an ultimately solipsistic argument against "strong" AI, Cartesianism supports
"strong" AI because Cartesianism is the context in which the other-minds problem makes
sense. On Heidegger's view, it is being-in-the-world which is primordial and neither
ontologically-subjective nor ontologically-objective since prior to this Cartesian duality
(which is emergent relative to originary Dasein). But is it not possible that "strong" AI
can instantiate being-in-the-world ? The answer to this question is grounded in the link
between the latter and Being as such: Being-in-the-world is an emergent gestalt from
Being which comes-forth in the poitic mode of physis (chapter 6). Hence, the issue turns
Chapter 7 Critique
on the whether the poisis in artifacts and naturals is identical. If the Being of a being is
continuous with its becoming then beings can be differentiated on the basis of their
respective modes (or ways) of becoming. To the extent that there is a poitic difference
between naturals and artifactuals, the Being of each is distinct. Furthermore, given that
the Cartesian subject is emergent relative to being-in-the-world in the case of naturals,
while the artificing subject (productant) and its objects (substrata) are prior to èmergent'
`being-in-the-world' (product) in the case of artifactuals, it follows that the becoming -
and hence, Being - of being-in-the-world and `being-in-the-world' are not identical.
Chapter 8 Conclusions
Chapter 8
If metaphysics be turned out of the door, it will come in at the
window.
J.E.Mercer, The Problem of Creation
Conclusions
8.1 Overview
The aim of this study was to establish the thesis that computationalism is insufficient as
a metaphysical basis for a unifying framework of "strong" emergent artificiality. The
method adopted (chapter 1) involved the following: (1) Detailed examination of the
concepts of computationalism (chapter 2), emergence (chapter 3) and artificiality
(chapter 4) with a view to establishing a philosophical basis for their unification; (2)
development of a unified framework of computationally emergent artificiality or CEA
realized in a cellular automaton substrate based on a computational interpretation of
Alexanderian metaphysics (chapter 5); (3) investigation of the distinction between ontical
(causal, productive) and ontological (existential, incipient) concepts of poisis
(becoming, coming-forth, bringing-forth) with a view to defining a poitic difference
between naturals and artificials grounded in Heidegger's ontological difference between
beings and Being as such (chapter 6); (4) explication of the poitic difference via a
phenomenological framework for evaluating designed and emergent artificiality based
on ontic (productive, organizational) and epistemic (interpretative, observational)
relations between phenomena (naturals and artificials) and the anthropic component
(human artificer-interpreter). Application of this framework in differentiating "hard" (or
pure) from "soft" (or impure) artificiality (as artifactuality) and classification of
computationalism as an instance of the former. Confirmation of the thesis via
demonstration of the failure of computationalism to solve the category problem, viz. the
problem of explaining how ontological subjectivity can emerge from an ontologically-
objective substrate (chapter 7).
In this chapter, it is shown that the thesis objective has been achieved: First, the
Heideggerian poitic critique of computationally emergent artificiality presented in this
dissertation is summarized. Second, the main contributions of this study are briefly
outlined. Third, a number of shortcomings associated with the presentation are identified.
Finally, the principal conclusions to be drawn from this investigation and some
recommendations for future work are briefly described.
8.2. Summary
The aim of this study was to establish the thesis that computationalism is insufficient as
a metaphysical basis for a unifying framework of "strong" emergent artificiality.
Computationalism (chapter 2) is the metaphysical view that phenomena such as matter,

life and mind are computationally-grounded, that is, computational in essence (being,
ontology). Computation is an abstract process which is formalistic (externalistic,
ontologically-objective) and mechanistic (deterministic, operationally-necessary) and can
be formally defined in terms of the syntactic symbol-processing associated with Turing
machines realized in cellular automata (CAs).
Emergence (chapter 3) refers to the appearance of new properties in a systemic complex

that were not present in any of its components considered in isolation or in other
complexes. The concept of emergence can be interpreted epistemologically (non-
predictability of system properties from component properties) and ontologically (non-
generability of system properties from component properties).
Artificiality (chapter 4) denotes the class of artifactual (man-made, synthetic) analogues

of natural phenomena. "Strong" computationally emergent artificiality (CEA) denotes
that sub-class of artificiality which is emergent, isomorphic (functionally, behaviourally,
structurally) with naturality (nature), and grounded in a computational substrate. A CA-
computationalist interpretation of Alexander's Space-Time event ontology can be shown
to provide a suitable emergentist framework within which to unify CEA: CA
implementations of artificialities (such as AI, A-Life and A-Physics) can be unified
because non-reversible computation universal CAs (NRUCAs) support the self-
organizing construction of embedded virtual machine hierarchies (chapter 5). This is
significant since to the extent that Alexanderian emergentism is successful in unifying
naturality, it follows that CA-computationalism must be capable of supporting "strong"
artificiality.
Two interpretations of artificiality can be distinguished: (1) artificiality as appearance

(contrasted with reality), and (2) artificiality as artifactuality (contrasted with naturality).
The former (Kantian) distinction is epistemological and can be shown to support the
possibility of "strong" CEA: The postulated discrete decoupling of appearance
(existence) from reality (essence) allows for multiple-instantiation of the latter and a shift
in focus from the relation between appearance and reality to the relations
(correspondences, isomorphisms) between natural and artificial phenomena (existents)
as instantiations of some underlying abstract noumenal (essential) form. The latter
(Heideggerian) distinction, by contrast, is ontological and grounded in a postulated
continuous coupling (or unitary relatedness) of appearance and appearing which denote
the `static' (or stable) and `dynamic' (or unstable) aspects of Being respectively (chapter
1). Given this unitary coupling relation (of Being and becoming) and the discrete (that
is, pluralistic) structure of Being, naturals can be distinguished from artificials (as
artifactuals) on the basis of a difference in their respective modes of poisis (becoming):
In short, a poitic difference entails an ontical difference, that is, a difference in the
Being of beings (chapter 6).
Poisis (becoming, coming-forth, bringing-forth) can be identified as the unitary

ontological concept underlying the unified framework of CEA: Computationalism is
isomorphic with universal mechanistic (externalistic, deterministic) causation and to the
extent that the latter is a genetic relation and hence, a relation of becoming, it follows
that computationalism is poitic; emergence implies some form of coming-forth and
hence, poisis; finally, artificiality as artifactuality implies making which is a kind of
poisis.
Two concepts of poisis (chapter 6) can be distinguished using Heideggerian

phenomenology: (1) ontical (causal, productive) and (2) ontological (existential,
incipient). Ontical poisis can be differentiated into four kinds: (i) evolution, (ii) self-
organization, (iii) creation and (iv) making. Artificing (or making) can be interpreted in
terms of a triadic relation between three components: productant (artificer), substratum
(material) and product (artifact). This relation can be analysed in terms of Aristotelian
(material, formal, final, efficient) causality. To the extent that ontical poisis can be
characterized in terms of externality (ontological-objectivity) and determinism
(operational-necessity), CA-computationalism (chapter 5) can be shown to support
ontical poisis.
Ontical poisis is problematic for (at least) three reasons: (1) It is tacitly grounded in an
absolutist interpretation of the maxim ex nihilo nihil fit (from nothing comes nothing)
and thereby incapable of supporting ontological (category) emergence: This follows from
the fact that the latter involves absolute creatio ex nihilo (creation from nothing) which
is ontically-incommensurable with ex nihilo nihil fit. However, it is important to
appreciate that absolute creatio ex nihilo cannot be ontical since on this view, nothing
is static (void) and hence, non-generative. Given that ontical poisis is externalistic
(ontologically-objective) and incapable of ontological emergence, it follows that it

cannot solve the category problem (chapter 7), that is, the problem of explaining how
ontological-subjectivity can emerge from an ontologically-objective substrate; (2) ontical
poisis (which is a relation between beings) implies either (i) a finite chain of causation
and the postulation of a First (or Necessary) cause which undermines the transitivity of
the causal principle, (ii) an infinite chain of causation which Aristotle has shown to be
impossible as an actuality (existent), or (iii) a circular chain of causation which
engenders paradox; (3) ontical poisis, as a genetically-causal relation between beings,
fails to address why there is causation (rather than nothing): To the extent that the causal
relation is a relation, it partakes of Being and hence, cannot be ontologically primitive.
Meditation on the question concerning Being can inform on the question concerning the
possibility of "strong" CEA by laying a foundation for clarifying the distinction between
ontical (causal) and ontological (incipient) poisis. Heideggerian phenomenology (that
is, post-metaphysical ontology) can be used to clarify the meaning (structural-
intelligibility) and truth (unconcealing-incipience) of Being: According to Heidegger,
Being is neither a being nor an abstraction from beings nor the cause of beings; rather,
it is the necessary existential condition for there being beings rather than nothing (void).
Being is that which enables beings to be and be appreciated as beings; hence, a
distinction can be made between beings (Seiendes), the Being (Sein) of beings, and Being
as such (Seyn). Heidegger refers to the distinction between beings and Being as the
ontological difference.
To the extent that Being is not a being, it follows that it must, in some sense, be the
`same' as nothing. Heidegger follows the Greeks in understanding Being as aletheia-
physis, that is, the self-emerging power of unconcealment. Primary truth as
unconcealment (poisis) can be shown to be grounding relative to secondary truth as
correspondence (noesis); hence, the poitic artifactual-natural distinction is grounding
relative to the Kantian noetic appearance-reality distinction. On Heidegger's view, Being
means presencing which has two aspects: `static' (stable appearance) and `dynamic'
(unstable appearing); hence, the unitary relatedness of Being and becoming. Given the
dynamic aspect of Being and its `sameness' with nothing (as groundless ground or abyss),
it follows that nothing must also have a dynamic aspect. This allows for an ontological
interpretation of absolute creatio ex nihilo, which can be rendered commensurable with
ex nihilo nihil fit in the maxim ex nihilo omne ens qua ens fit (from nothing every thing
as thing comes to be), and renders ontological emergence possible.
The structure of Being (Sein) can be shown to be discrete (discontinuous, pluralistic):

Interpreting Being universally as existence (brute facticity, actuality, extantness) fails to
characterize the Being of (i) imaginaries (such as centaurs), (ii) impossibles (such as
square circles), thereby indicating the inadequacy of modal logic, (iii) abstracts (such as
numbers), and (iv) persons (Daseins or beings-in-the-world which are characterized by
who-ness rather than what-ness). Dasein is that `site' (or `clearing') within Being as such
(Seyn) at which the Being (Sein) of beings unconceals and is thereby a necessary
condition for meaning (intelligibility). Dasein is ontically-ontological in that it
transcends from beings to Being as such. To the extent that the latter can be
characterized as the apeiron or in-finite repelling of limits (since finitude or limitation
is characteristic of beings), it can be shown that Being as such is openness and hence,
Dasein as transcendence to Being is ontologically-open.
Using Heideggerian phenomenology (ontology), the four kinds of ontical poisis can be
ontologically classified into two types, both of which are defined in terms of movements
between beings: (1) derivative physis (finite self-becoming, autopoisis) and (2) techn
(finite other-becoming, allopoisis). The concept of autopoiesis as proposed by Maturana
and Varela is not the same as derivative physis (autopoisis): The former is ontical
(causal) and superveniently-grounded in mechanism thereby allowing for multiple-
instantiation of the autopoietic organization; the latter, by contrast, is ontological
(existential) and stands in essential, unitary relation to originary physis which, as Being,
is the groundless ground (or abyss). Given the ontological difference, the two ontological
types of ontical poisis must be grounded in ontological poisis as originary in-finite
physis, an incipient (creative) movement between Being and beings. Derivative physis
stands in continuous (unmediated) poitic relation to originary physis whereas techn
stands in discontinuous (mediated) poitic relation to originary physis: For this reason,
derivative physis (naturality) is capable of ontological emergence and characterized by
categorial-openness whereas techn (artificiality as artifactuality) is categorially-closed
(circumscribed). Naturals and artificials are ontically distinct because a poitic
isomorphism cannot be established between them: In short, the ontological difference
(between beings and Being) grounds a poitic difference (between naturals and
artificials) which entails an ontical difference (in the respective Being of naturals and
artificials).
Three types of emergentism can be distinguished: structuralist, physicalist and

pragmatist. Each can be shown to be incapable of supporting ontological emergence for
two reasons: (1) ontological-objectivity of conception and tacit commitment to ontical
ex nihilo nihil fit entailing categorial closure and hence, inability to resolve the category
problem (chapter 7); (2) failure to appreciate the ontological difference and the necessity
of grounding causal beings in incipient Being. The category problem can be solved on
a pluralistic emergentism grounded in Heideggerian phenomenology: The ontological
priority of ontological objectivity over ontological subjectivity is rejected and both are
held to be simultaneously emergent from primordial being-in-the-world. This type of
ontological emergence is of the same order as the ontological emergence of beings from
nothing (Being). Three types of emergence can be distinguished on Heideggerian
pluralistic emergentism: Causal (ontical6ontological), hermeneutic (ontological6ontical)
and incipient (grounding6ontical, grounding6ontological).
The poitic difference can be explicated via a phenomenological framework (chapter 7)

for comparing designed and emergent artificiality based on historical (a priori and a
posteriori) ontic (productive, organizational) and epistemic (interpretative, observational)
relations between phenomena (naturals and artificials) and the historically-thematic
anthropic component (human artificer-interpreter).
"Hard" (or pure) and "soft" (or impure) naturals and artificials can be differentiated on
the basis of distinctions in the poitic phenomenology of matter and form in such
phenomena. Computation is identified as the defining exemplar of "hard" artificiality.
Given this fact, computationalism can be shown to be an abstract or idealist metaphysics.
There is no distinction between designed and emergent "hard" artifacts with respect to
their poitic and hence, ontical difference from naturals: This follows from the fact that
the poitic phenomenology of form can be shown to follow that of matter with respect
to ontical relationality in "hard" artifacts because the latter are ontologically-objective
(externalistic) and operationally-necessary (deterministic). Teleology cannot be
eliminated from the concept of artificiality because the epistemic a priority (design,
specification) of the matter in "hard" artifacts entails determinism: In short, in "hard"
artifacts epistemology defines teleology and epistemic circumscription entails closure to
ontological (category) emergence.
Computationalism, being an instance of "hard" artificiality is incapable of ontological

emergence (since categorially-closed) and hence, cannot solve the category problem, that
is, the problem of explaining how ontological subjectivity can emerge from an
ontologically-objective substrate.
8.3. Contributions
The main contributions of this study are as follows:
1. The concept of the poitic difference (chapter 6), that is, the distinction in
becoming (coming-forth, bringing-forth) between naturals and artificials (as artifactuals).
Although precedents certainly exist for such a difference in the phenomenological
ontology of Heidegger and the theoretical cybernetics of Maturana and Varela, until now
the poitic difference has not been explicitly formulated as a difference. Furthermore,
such precedents have (1) either failed to address (Maturana) or only implied (Heidegger)
the grounding of this difference in the ontological difference (between beings and
Being). This fact is of critical significance in the context of the debate over the
possibility of "strong" CEA since the grounding of the poitic difference in the
ontological difference has ontical implications, that is, implications for the Being of
natural and artificial (as artifactual) beings.
2. Phenomenological demonstration of the grounding of the Kantian appearance-

reality distinction in the poitic artifactuality-naturality distinction effecting a
recontextualization of the problem of "strong" artificiality (chapter 6).
3. The concept of pluralistic emergentism as grounded in Heideggerian

phenomenology. The relation between ontical (causal) and ontological (hermeneutic)
emergence and their grounding in incipient (originary) emergence (chapter 6).
4. A phenomenological framework for explicating the poitic difference in terms

of historical (a priori and a posteriori) ontic (productive, organizational) and epistemic
(interpretative, observational) relations between phenomena (naturals and artificials) and
the anthropic component (human artificer-interpreter) (chapter 7).
5. The distinction between "soft" (or impure) and "hard" (or pure) artifacts and the
identification of computation as the defining exemplar of the latter (chapter 7).
6. The unification of artificialities (that is, artifactual analogues of natural

phenomena) under a CA-computationalist interpretation of the emergentist Space-Time
event ontology of Alexander (chapter 5).
7. The identification of computationalism as an eclectic (synthetic, postulational)

metaphysics using Pepper's root metaphor method (chapter 2).
8.4. Shortcomings
Potential shortcomings associated with this study include the following:
1. The interpretation of "soft" (or impure) naturality as materially-made (ontically

a posteriori, epistemically a priori) and formally-given (ontically a priori, epistemically
a posteriori) is problematic since it appears to collapse onto "hard" (or pure)
artifactuality. This follows from the fact that ontological circumscription (bounding,
closure) of the substratum (matter) in artificing (at least partially) determines the
ontology of the product (form). In the limit when the substratum (object) is completely
circumscribed by the productant (subject), matter itself becomes artifactually-formal
(ideal) and the relation between substratum (matter) and product (form) becomes
operationally-necessary and ontologically-objective, that is, computational.
2. Although it is explicitly maintained that the anthropic component is emergent

from Dasein and the latter has being-with (other Daseins) as a fundamental existential
structure, the social ontology of the anthropic component (human artificer-interpreter)
as such has not been addressed in this study.
3. The epistemic relationality between the anthropic component (artificer-

interpreter) and phenomena (naturals and artificials) has been defined in terms of the
binary opposition between specification (epistemically a priori) and interpretation
(epistemically a posteriori). While the former has been examined in some detail in
connection with phenomenological analysis of the link between techn (artificing), arch
(incipience, origination), telos (end) and epistem (knowing), the latter has been treated
superficially. In defending this position appeal is made to the fact that this study is
concerned with establishing the impossibility of "strong" CEA on the basis of the poitic
difference between naturals and artificials (as artifactuals); in short, the focus of concern
is anthropic production and not use1.
4. The concept of pluralistic-emergentism as grounded in Heideggerian

phenomenology remains somewhat speculative and imprecisely-formulated.
It might be argued that the validity of the entire critique rests on the metaphysical
assumption of the reality and primordiality of the concept of Being. However, this
position is problematic for the following reasons: (1) The existence of ontologically-
irreducible phenomena such as matter, life and mind which cannot be explained on
conventional (metaphysical) emergentist schemes; (2) the existential fact that there is
something rather than nothing indicating thereby an underlying givenness; (3) the
metaphysical problems associated with finite, infinite and circular causation and the need
to ground the causal relation in that which transcends causation; (4) most importantly,
the fact that all concepts necessarily partake of Being and yet the latter is not a mere
fundamental concept but rather the existential condition for conceptualization as such.
On this basis, it is maintained - following Heidegger - that Being is neither an
assumption nor a proviso: It is simply the groundless ground. As Heidegger states "It is
It Itself."
8.5. Conclusions and Recommendations
The principal conclusions to be drawn from this study are as follows:
1. Computationalism is insufficient as a metaphysical basis for a unified framework

of "strong" emergent artificiality. This follows from the fact that computationalism is an
ontologically-objective, deterministic and categorially-closed metaphysics and hence, is
incapable of solving the category problem, that is, the problem of explaining how
ontological-subjectivity can emerge from an ontologically-objective substrate. "Strong"
CEA is impossible because the latter is a unified concept and partial ontological-
incompleteness, that is, failure to realize an artifactual analogue of a natural phenomenon
(in this case ontological subjectivity), entails totalistic ontological-incompleteness.
2. Computationalism is categorially-closed because it is the defining exemplar of

"hard" (or pure) artificiality which is grounded in the categorially-closed poitic modality
1
On Heideggerian phenomenology, interpretation (hermeneutics) is a mode of Being (intelligibility)
characterized by praxical coping in-the-world (chapter 1).
of techn (that is, artificing). For this reason, computational-naturalism or

computationally emergent naturality (CEN) is ontologically incoherent.
3. Given that naturality (that is, nature) has, apparently, `solved' the category
problem and given the ontological incoherence of computational-naturalism on poitic
grounds, it follows that naturality cannot be ontologically-computational. This fact
motivates consideration of (i) post-computationalist metaphysical systems and (ii) post-
metaphysical ontologies as means by which to understand naturality.
4. Designed and emergent computational artifacts can be shown to be ontologically

equivalent because of the categorial closure to ontological emergence and operational
necessity (determinism) of "hard" (or pure) artifacts.
5. The Being of objects is ontologically-objective, that is, externalistic and

externally-related. However, given the existence of experiential entities (humans and
possibly other higher-order entities), it follows that there are (at least some) beings
whose Being is (at least partially) ontologically-subjective, that is, internalistic and
internally-related. Since objects cannot give rise to subjects, any mode of poisis
involving purely objective (external) relations between beings and an artificing subject
can only lead to the production of objects. Modern techn-Enframing (Gestellen) is a
mode of poisis which takes beings as objective, that is, encounters them as externalistic
vacuous actualities2, and orders them by placing them into external relations with each
other according to some plan (top-down or bottom-up). The implication is that techn
(artificing), a triadic causal relation between a productant (subjective artificer),
substratum (objective material) and product (objective artifact), is a categorially-closed
mode of poisis. On this basis, it can be concluded that to the extent that an artifact is
artifactual, that is, circumscribed in its Being by an artificing òther', it cannot be
experiential: "Hard" (or pure) artifacts define the standard of artifactuality as
artifactuality and, as has been shown, are non-experiential. To the extent that "soft" (or
impure) artifacts are capable of experience, it follows that this must be on account of
their substrata being natural, thereby allowing for the possibility of `break out' from the
externally-imposed form (structure) defining their artifactuality.
Recommendations for future work include the following:
1. Given (i) the existential facticity of the "hard" problem of consciousness

(ontological-subjectivity, first-personhood, experiential-awareness), (ii) the failure of
structuralist, physicalist, and pragmatist emergentisms to solve this problem, and (iii) the
assumption that an emergentist solution to this problem remains possible, it is maintained
that Heideggerian pluralistic emergentism constitutes an appropriate ontological
2
Whitehead (1933) defines vacuous actualities as beings "`devoid of any individual enjoyment arising from the
mere fact of realization in that context'." (p.212)
framework within which to address this problem. In order to clarify the nature of this
scheme, it is necessary to phenomenologically investigate (i) the concept of nothing, (ii)
the ontology of incipience (that is, the movement between Being and beings) and (iii) the
relation between incipience and other kinds of emergence in greater detail.
2. Given (i) the existential facticity of the "hard" problem of consciousness

(ontological-subjectivity, first-personhood, experiential-awareness) and (ii) the
assumption that an emergentist solution to this problem is impossible, it appears that
some variant of Whiteheadian panexperientialism (chapter 1) offers the most promising
alternative to computationalism as a metaphysics for naturality. However, given that
panexperientialism as a metaphysics fails to address the ontological difference (between
beings and Being), it is maintained that the former must incorporate certain elements
from Heideggerian phenomenology, specifically, the concept of Being as such and the
notion of incipient (or originary) emergence.
3. The adoption of some variant of Whiteheadian panexperientialism has

implications both for the philosophy of technology and for post-computationalist
technology itself. It is maintained that cellular automata - which are "hard" (or pure)
artifacts - should be replaced by hybrid multi-agent systems with natural substrates3 -
which are "soft" (or impure) artifacts - as the standard approach for investigating
complex systems. As Gould (1986) states,
we must allow our thinking to move out of the deterministic-probabilistic dichotomy towards
structures that allow, forbid, but do not require. This, it seems to me, allows the most fundamental
aspect of being human, namely an acknowledgement of consciousness itself, and its self-reflective
capacity, to enter our structural descriptions. (p.10)
3
In this connection, Cariani's (1989, 1991) evolutionary robotic devices (adaptive syntax and semantics)
constitute a suitable primitive for an agent. However, hybrid multi-agent systems can incorporate other agentive
kinds such as human artificer-interpreters.
Glossary
Mapping
A function with domain P and range Q is called a mapping or map from P to Q, written
*:P6Q; if, for example, for all p 0 P the function maps p onto p2, this can be specified
by using the notation *:pp2.
Injection (one-one, injective function)

An injection from a set P to a set Q is a one-to-one function whose domain is P and
whose range is PART of Q. For example, if P = {3,6} and Q = {9,36,150}, then *:pp2
is an injection.
Surjection (onto, surjective function)

A surjection from a set P to a set Q is a function whose domain is P and whose range is
the WHOLE of Q. For example, if P = {2, -2, 3} and Q = {4, 9}, then *:pp2 is a
surjection.
Bijection (one-one and onto, bijective function)
A mapping *:P6Q, where P,Q are sets satisfying the properties
(1) if p,q 0 X and *(p) = *(q) then p = q

(2) if q 0 Q then q = *(p) for some p 0 P.
Any bijection has an inverse mapping *-1 such that *(*-1(q)) = q and *(*-1(p)) = p for all
p 0 P and q 0 Q; conversely any mapping * having such an inverse must be a bijection.
A bijection from a set P to a set Q is a function that is both an injection and a surjection.
q p
p 1 1 q
1 q p 1
p 2 2 q
2 q p 2
p 3 3 q
3 q p 3
4 4
(a) (b)
p q
1 1
p q
2 2
p q
3 3
p q
(c) 4 4
(a) Injective, (b) surjective and (c) bijective functions.

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The Concept of Poisis and Its Application

in a Heideggerian Critique of Computationally

A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Department of Electrical & Electronic Engineering, Brunel University

Why should such a critique be necessary ?

What precedents exist in support of such a study ?

What approach is to be adopted and why is it different from others ?

What are the implications ?

Personal development of the problem

I was motivated by the goal of facilitating unambiguous communication between

I had been working on integrating the various artificial disciplines using a

I attempted to identify what I believed to be the main contributions of existentialist

Cariani addressed the problem of semantic emergence from the perspective of a

Additionally, there is a contradiction in the idea of a "designed emergence" if the

John Kelly, Artificial Intelligence - A Modern Myth

1.2. Schrdinger's Musings

Further statements indicate his support for a mechanistic biology, viz.

In its place, a non-Cartesian2 conception of the mind-matter relation similar to the

Further inquiry reveals the inspirational source of Schrdinger's concept of mind to be

A naive definition of science might be "the explanation and prediction of phenomena

observations/facts 6 hypothesis 6 experiment 6 laws 6 theory.

A more sophisticated version of the above scheme incorporating `feedback' between

Fig 1.1 Feedback between theory and experiment (Casti,92).

However, as Chalmers (1982) has argued, observations are theory-dependent3, thereby

1.3. A Brief Introduction to Metaphysics

1.3.1. A Brief History of Metaphysics

P nature is no longer mechanical

P substance [and structure] is resolvable into function

P functionality is defined in terms of minimum space and minimum time (pp.13-24)

Collingwood's metaphysics was inspired by the development of evolutionary thinking

1.3.2. What is Metaphysics ?

It is important to appreciate at the outset, as Flew maintains, that "any attempt at

1.4. Metaphysics and Metaphor

computationalism, is described in chapter 5.

1.4.1. The `Root Metaphor' Theory

1. via analogy (similarity) or

World Hypothesis Root Metaphor

Table 1.1 World Hypotheses and corresponding root metaphors.

Relatively adequate Inadequate

Formism Mechanism Contextualism Organicism Mysticism Animism

Fig 1.2 Pepper's `Root' World Hypotheses.

1.4.2. The `Root Metaphor' Method

Pepper upholds the following as maxims, viz.

I A world hypothesis is determined by its root metaphor.

II Each world hypothesis is autonomous.

III Eclecticism (that is, the combination of hypotheses) is confusing.

worldview or ontology is established:

1. In attempting to understand the world, search for a clue to its comprehension.

3. The selected domain becomes the basic analogy or root metaphor.

4. Attempt to describe the characteristics of this domain by discriminating its structure.

7. Attempt to interpret all facts in terms of the categories.

1.4.3. Problems with Metaphors

computationalism presented in this study (chapters 6 and 7) and briefly introduced in

1.5.1. What is Computationalism ?

The essence of the computationalist worldview is succinctly captured in an observation

at some epoch in history, computationalism determines (1) what questions can

In the remainder of this section, links between computationalism, artificiality (chapter

1.5.2. Computationalism and Artificiality

Artifactuality Replica of Original painting

Naturality `Mona Lisa' Mona Lisa

Table 1.2 Orthogonal Appearance-Reality and Artifactuality-Naturality Distinctions.

It is crucial to appreciate at the outset that the appearance-reality distinction is concerned

Functionalism is a development of the mentalistic aspect of Cartesian dualism, viz. mind