REMMAN ENTERPRISES, INC.

, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and CRISPIN E. LAT, respondents.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

REMMAN ENTERPRISES, INC. (REMMAN), and CRISPIN E. LAT are adjoining landowners in
Barangay Bugtong Na Pulo, Lipa City. The land of Lat containing an area of 1.8 hectares is
agricultural and planted mostly with fruit trees while REMMAN occupies a land area of fifteen
(15) hectares six (6) hectares of which are devoted to its piggery business. REMMAN's land is
one and a half (1 1/2) meters higher in elevation than that of respondent Lat.

Sometime in July 1984 Lat noticed that REMMAN's waste disposal lagoon was already
overflowing and inundating one-fourth (1/4) of Lat's plantation. He made several representations
with REMMAN but they fell on deaf ears. On 14 March 1985, after almost one (1) hectare of
Lat's plantation was already inundated with water containing pig manure, as a result of which
the trees growing on the flooded portion started to wither and die, Lat filed a complaint for
damages with preliminary mandatory injunction against REMMAN. Lat alleged that the acidity of
the soil in his plantation increased because of the overflow of the water heavy with pig manure
from REMMAN's piggery farm.

REMMAN denied all the allegations of Lat and raised as an affirmative defense that measures
such as the construction of additional lagoons were already adopted to contain the waste water
coming from its piggery to prevent any damage to the adjoining estates.

After conducting an ocular inspection and evaluating the evidence of both parties the Regional
Trial Court found that indeed REMMANs waste disposal lagoon overflowed with the
contaminated water flooding one (1) hectare of Lat's plantation. The waste water was ankle-
deep and caused death and destruction to one (1) jackfruit tree, fifteen (15) coconut trees, one
hundred twenty-two (122) coffee trees, and an unspecified number of mango trees, bananas
and vegetables. As a consequence, the trial court ordered REMMAN to indemnify Lat
P186,975.00 for lost profits for three (3) crop years and P30,000.00 as attorney's fees. 1

The decision of the court a quo was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals.2

In this Petition for Review on Certiorari REMMAN prays that we pass upon the findings of the
trial court as well as of the appellate court. REMMAN insists that factual findings of lower courts
may be passed upon, reviewed and reversed: (a) when the conclusion is a finding grounded
entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (b) when the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible; (c) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (d) when the
judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (e) when the Court of Appeals manifestly
overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered,
would justify a different conclusion; (f) when the conclusions of the Court of Appeals are not
supported by the evidence on record; (g) when facts of substance were overlooked which, if
correctly considered, might have changed the outcome of the case; and, (h) when the findings
of the Court of Appeals are not in accord with what reasonable men would readily accept are
the correct inferences from the evidence extant in the records.3

Indeed, in the abovementioned instances, the factual milieu of a particular case may be passed
upon, reversed or modified by this Court. But examination of the record reveals that all the
above instances are unavailing. From this point of view alone the instant petition is dismissible.
Nevertheless, we shall discuss them hereunder to dispose finally of the contentions of
REMMAN.

First, REMMAN argues that its liability for the damages suffered by Lat was not clearly
established.

We disagree. During the ocular inspection conducted by the lower court where representatives
of both parties were present, it was established that the waste water containing pig manure was
continuously flowing from REMMAN's piggery farm to Lat's plantation. The water was ankle-
deep and flooded one (1) hectare of Lat's plantation. The overflow of the "acidic, malodorous
and polluted water" continued from June 1984 to March 1985 thus destroying one (1) jackfruit
tree, fifteen (15) coconut trees, one hundred an twenty-two (122) coffee trees, and an
unspecified number of mango trees, bananas and vegetables.4

In addition, the appellate court found that there was indeed negligence on the part of REMMAN
which directly caused the damage to the plantation of Lat. Thus

. . . Negligence was clearly established. It is uncontroverted that the land of appellee

was flooded on account of the overflow of acidic, malodorous and polluted water coming
from the adjacent piggery farm of appellant sometime in May 1984. This resulted in the
impairment of the productivity of appellee's land as well as the eventual destruction and
death of several fruit trees, such as coconuts, coffee, jackfruits, bananas and other
plants . . . . Appellant cannot avoid liability because their negligence was the proximate
cause of the damage. Appellee's property was practically made a catch-basin of polluted
water and other noxious substances emptying from appellant's piggery which could have
been prevented had it not been for the negligence of appellant arising from its: (a) failure
to monitor the increases in the level of water in the lagoons before, during and after the
heavy downpours which occurred during the rainy months of 1984; (b) failure to augment
the existing lagoons prior to the incident, notwithstanding the fact that at the time of the
flooding, the piggery had grown to a capacity of 11,000 heads, and considering that it
was reasonably forseeable that the existing waste disposal facilities were no longer
adequate to accomodate the increasing volume of waste matters in such a big farm; and
more importantly, (c) the repeated failure to comply with their promise to appellee.5

Second, REMMAN argues that the trial court as well as the Court of Appeals should not have
rejected its request for the production of Lat's income tax returns. According to REMMAN had
Lat's income tax returns been produced, the issue of the alleged damages suffered by Lat
would have been settled.

This argument is moot, if not trite. For this matter has been laid to rest when we affirmed the
Court of Appeals' decision in an earlier case involving the same parties. 6 In sustaining the trial
court's quashal of the subpoena duces tecum previously issued compelling Lat to produce his
income tax returns for the years 1982-1986, the appellate court explained that the production of
the income tax returns would not necessarily serve to prove the special and affirmative
defenses set up by REMMAN nor rebut Lat's testimony regarding the losses he sustained due
to the piggery. The tax returns per se could not reflect the total amount of damages suffered by
Lat, as income losses from a portion of the plantation could be offset by any profit derived from
the rest of the plantation or from other sources of income. Conversely, losses incurred from
other sources of income would be totally unrelated to the income from the particular portion of
the plantation flooded with waste matter coming from REMMAN's piggery.7

Third, REMMAN contends that the damages allegedly sustained by Lat have not been
satisfactorily established.1wphi1

We a not convinced. The factual findings of the court a quo rightly support its conclusions on
this respect

Coming now to the issue of damages, We find appellant's allegations not well-taken.
Appellant contends that actual and compensatory damages require evidentiary proof,
and there being no evidence presented as to the necessity of the award for damages, it
was erroneous for the lower court to have made such award. It must be remembered
that after the ocular inspection, the court a quo rendered an inventory of dead and rotten
trees and plants found in appellee's property. Appellee also testified on the approximate
annual harvest and fair market value thereof. Significantly, no opposition or controverting
evidence was presented by appellant on the matter. Hence, appellant is bound thereby
and cannot now be heard to complain. As correctly held by the court a quo:

An ocular inspection has been conducted by the trial court. The inventory of the
trees damaged and the itemized valuation placed therein by private respondent
after the ocular inspection which is not rebutted by the petitioner, is the more
accurate indicator of the said amount prayed for as damages. If the valuation is
indeed unreasonable, petitioner should present controverting evidence of the fair
market value of the crops involved. The trial court held that the private
respondent himself had been subjected to extensive cross and re-cross
examination by the counsel for the petitioner on the amount of damages.8

Finally, REMMAN complains that the damages, if any, were due to a fortuitous event.

Again, we cannot agree with petitioner. We defer instead to the findings opinions expressed by
the lower courts

Even assuming that the heavy rains constituted an act of God, by reason of their
negligence, the fortuitous event became humanized, rendering appellants liable for the
ensuing damages. In National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 233 SCRA 649
(1993), the Supreme Court held:

Accordingly, petitioners cannot be heard to invoke the act of God or force

majeure to escape liability for the loss or damage sustained by private
respondents since they, the petitioners, were guilty of negligence. This event
then was not occasioned exclusively by an act of God or force majeure; a human
factor negligence or imprudence had intervened. The effect then of
the force majeure in question may be deemed to have, even if only partly,
resulted from the participation of man. Thus, the whole occurrence was thereby
humanized, as it were, and removed from the rules applicable to acts of God.

As regards the alleged natural easement imposed upon the property of appellee, resort
to pertinent provisions of applicable law is imperative. Under the Civil Code, it is
provided:
 Art. 637. Lower estates are obliged to receive the waters which naturally and
without the intervention of man descend from the higher estates, as well as the
stones or earth which they carry with them.

The owner of the lower estate cannot construct works which will impede this
easement; neither can the owner of the higher estate make works which will
increase the burden.

A similar provision is found in the Water Code of the Philippines (P.D. No. 1067), which
provides:

Art. 50. Lower estates are obliged to receive the water which naturally and
without the intervention of man flow from the higher estates, as well as the stone
or earth which they carry with them.

The owner of the lower estate cannot construct works which will impede this
natural flow, unless he provides an alternative method of drainage; neither can
the owner of the higher estate make works which will increase this natural flow.

As worded, the two (2) aforecited provisions impose a natural easement upon the lower
estate to receive the waters which naturally and without the intervention of man descend
from higher states. However, where the waters which flow from a higher state are those
which are artificially collected in man-made lagoons, any damage occasioned thereby
entitles the owner of the lower or servient estate to compensation.9

On the basis of the foregoing discussion, it is crystal clear that REMMAN is directly accountable
to Lat for the damages sustained by him. The negligence of REMMAN in maintaining the level
of waste water in its lagoons has been satisfactorily established. The extent of damages
suffered by Lat remains unrebutted; in fact, has been proved.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The 19 October 1995 Decision of the Court of Appeals
affirming that of the Regional Trial Court-Br. 16, Lipa City, holding petitioner Remman
Enterprises, Inc. (REMMAN) liable to private respondent Crispin E. Lat for damages and to
indemnify the latter P186,975.00 for lost profits for three (3) crop years and P30,000.00 as
attorneys fees, is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.1wphi1.nt

SO ORDERED.

FERDINAND A. CRUZ, Petitioner,

vs.
JUDGE HENRICK F. GINGOYON, [Deceased], JUDGE JESUS B. MUPAS, Acting Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court Branch 117, Pasay City, Respondent.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

While there are remedies available to a party adjudged in contempt of court, same may only be
availed of when the procedures laid down for its availment are satisfied.
By this Petition for Certiorari,1 petitioner Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner) assails the Order2 dated
November 25, 2005 issued by the now deceased Judge Henrick F. Gingoyon (Judge Gingoyon)
of Branch 117, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City (respondent court) citing him in direct
contempt of court, the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, Ferdinand Cruz is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of DIRECT
CONTEMPT OF COURT.

Accordingly, he is hereby sentenced to suffer TWO (2) DAYS of imprisonment and to pay a fine
of 2,000.00.

SO ORDERED.3

Essentially, petitioner prays for this Court to declare the assailed Order void and that Judge
Gingoyon abused his discretion in citing him in contempt, as well as in denying his motion to fix
the amount of bond.

Antecedent Facts

This case stemmed from a Civil Complaint4 filed by petitioner against his neighbor, Benjamin
Mina, Jr. (Mina), docketed as Civil Case No. 01-0401 in the RTC of Pasay City for abatement of
nuisance. In the said case, petitioner sought redress from the court to declare as a nuisance the
"basketball goal" which was permanently attached to the second floor of Minas residence but
protrudes to the alley which serves as the publics only right of way.

Mina was declared in default5 hence petitioner presented his evidence ex-parte.

After trial, Judge Gingoyon, in his Decision6 dated October 21, 2005, declared the basketball
goal as a public nuisance but dismissed the case on the ground that petitioner lacked "locus
standi." Citing Article 701 of the Civil Code, Judge Gingoyon ruled that the action for abatement
of nuisance should be commenced by the city or municipal mayor and not by a private individual
like the petitioner.

In the same Decision, Judge Gingoyon also opined that:

Plaintiffs must learn to accept the sad reality of the kind of place they live in. x x x Their place is
bursting with people most of whom live in cramped tenements with no place to spare for
recreation, to laze around or doing their daily household chores.

Thus, residents are forced by circumstance to invade the alleys. The alleys become the grounds
where children run around and play, the venue where adults do all sorts of things to entertain
them or pass the time, their wash area or even a place to cook food in. Take in a few ambulant
vendors who display their wares in their choice spots in the alley and their customers that mill
around them, and one can only behold chaos if not madness in these alleys. But for the
residents of the places of this kind, they still find order in this madness and get out of this kind of
life unscathed. Its because they all simply live and let live. Walking through the alleys daily, the
residents of the area have become adept at [weaving] away from the playthings that children at
play throw every which way, sidestepping from the path of children chasing each other, dodging
and [ducking]from awnings or canopies or clotheslines full of dripping clothes that encroach [on]
the alleys. Plaintiffs appear to be fastidious and delicate and they cannot be faulted for such a
desirable trait. But they can only do so within their own abode. Once they step outside the doors
of their home, as it were, they cannot foist their delicacy and fastidiousness upon their
neighbors. They must accept their alleys as the jungle of people and the site of myriad of
activities that it is. They must also learn to accept the people in their place as they are; they
must live and let live. Unless they choose to live in a less blighted human settlement or better
still move to an upscale residential area, their only remaining choice is for them to live in
perpetual conflict with their neighbors all the days of their lives.7

Petitioner sought reconsideration of the Decision. In his Motion for Reconsideration, 8 he took
exception to the advice given by Judge Gingoyon thus:

The 12th and 13th paragraphs of the assailed decision, though only an advice of the court, are
off-tangent and even spouses illegality;

Since when is living in cramped tenements become a license for people to invade the alleys and
use the said alley for doing all sorts of things, i.e., as wash area or cooking food? In effect, this
court is making his own legislations and providing for exceptions in law when there are none, as
far as nuisance is concerned;

The court might not be aware that in so doing, he is giving a wrong signal to the defendants and
to the public at large that land grabbing, squatting, illegal occupation of property is all right and
justified when violators are those people who live in cramped tenements or the underprivileged
poor, as the court in a sweeping statement proclaimed that "residents are forced by
circumstance to invade the alleys;"

For the enlightenment of the court, and as was proven during the ex-parte presentation of
evidence by the plaintiff, Edang estate comprises properties which are subdivided and titled
(plaintiffs and defendants have their own titled properties and even the right of way or alley has
a separate title) and not the kind the court wrongfully perceives the place to be;

Moreover, the court has no right to impose upon the herein plaintiffs to accept their alleys as a
jungle of people and the site of myriad of activities that it is. For the information of the court,
plaintiffs have holdings in upscale residential areas and it is a misconception for the court to
consider the Pasay City residence of the plaintiffs as a blighted human settlement. Apparently
the court is very much misinformed and has no basis in his litany of eye sore descriptions;

Undersigned is at quandary what will this court do should he be similarly situated with the
plaintiffs? Will the court abandon his residence, giving way to illegality in the name of live and let
live principle?

Nonetheless, what remains bugling [sic] is the fact that the court in his unsolicited advice knows
exactly the description of the alley where the complained nuisance is located and the specific
activities that the defendants do in relation to the alley. The court should be reminded that the
undersigned plaintiff presented his evidence ex-parte and where else can the court gather these
information about the alleys aside from the logical conclusion that the court has been
communicating with the defendant, off the record, given that the latter has already been in
default.9(Emphasis supplied.)

Petitioner requested the respondent court to hear his motion for reconsideration on November
18, 2005.10
In an Order11 dated November 11, 2005, Judge Gingoyon set the motion for hearing on
November 18, 2005, a date chosen by petitioner,12 and directed him to substantiate his serious
charge or show cause on even date why he should not be punished for contempt. 13 Judge
Gingoyon also opined that:

This court, more specifically this Presiding Judge, has not seen the faintest of shadow of the
defendant or heard even an echo of his voice up to the present. Plaintiff Ferdinand Cruz is
therefore directed to substantiate his serious charge that he "has been communicating with the
defendant off the record, given that the latter has already been declared in default". He is
therefore ordered to show cause on November 18, 2005, why he should not be punished for
contempt of court for committing improper conduct tending directly or indirectly to degrade the
administration of justice.14

On November 18, 2005, petitioner, however, did not appear. Judge Gingoyon then motu
proprio issued an Order15in open court to give petitioner another 10 days to show cause. The
Order reads:

In his Motion for Reconsideration, plaintiff Ferdinand Cruz specifically prayed that he is
submitting his Motion for Resolution and Approval of this court today, Friday, November 18,
2005, at 8:30 A.M. Fridays have always been earmarked for criminal cases only. Moreover, long
before plaintiff filed his motion for reconsideration, this court no longer scheduled hearings for
November 18, 2005 because there will be no Prosecutors on this date as they will be holding
their National Convention. Nevertheless, since it is the specific prayer of the plaintiff that he will
be submitting his motion for resolution and approval by the court on said date, the court yielded
to his wish and set his motion for hearing on his preferred date.

When this case was called for hearing today, plaintiff did not appear. The court waited until 9:45
A.M. but still no appearance was entered by the plaintiff or any person who might represent
himself as an authorized representative of the plaintiff. Instead it was the defendant and his
counsel who appealed and who earlier filed an Opposition to Motion for Reconsideration.

xxxx

In view of the failure of the plaintiff to appear in todays hearing, the court considers the motion
for reconsideration submitted for resolution. As for the Order of this court for the plaintiff to show
cause why he should not be punished for contempt of court, the court [motu proprio] grants
plaintiff last ten (10) days to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt of court.
After the lapse of the said period, the court will resolve the issue of whether or not he should be
cited for contempt. x x x16

In his Compliance17 to the Show Cause Order, petitioner maintained that the alleged
contumacious remarks he made have a leg to stand on for the same were based on the
circumstances of the instant case. He even reiterated his insinuation that Judge Gingoyon
communicated with Mina by posing the query: "where then did this court gather an exact
description of the alley and the myriad of [sic] activities that the inhabitants of interior Edang do
in relation to the alley, when the defendant was held in default and absent plaintiffs evidence so
exacting as the description made by this court in paragraphs 12 and 13 of his Decision dated
October 21, 2005."18
On November 25, 2005, Judge Gingoyon issued an Order19 finding petitioner guilty of direct
contempt of court. The Order reads:

Ferdinand Cruz was ordered to substantiate with facts his serious charge that the Judge "has
been communicating with the defendant off the record". But instead of presenting proof of facts
or stating facts, Cruz simply shot back with a query: "Where then did this court gather an exact
description of the alley and the myriad activities that the inhabitants of interior Edang do in
relation to the alley, when the defendant was held in default and absent plaintiffs evidence so
exacting as the description made by this court" By this token, Cruz adamantly stood pat on his
accusation, which now appears to be wholly based on suspicion, that the Judge has been
communicating with the defendant off the record.

The suspicion of Ferdinand Cruz may be paraphrased thus: The only way for the Judge [to]
know the blight in his place in Pasay City is for the Judge to communicate with the defendant. It
is only by communicating with the defendant and by no other means may the Judge know such
blight.

Blinded by his suspicion, Cruz did not consider that as State Prosecutor, the Judge was detailed
in Pasay City in 1991 and that he has been a judge in Pasay City since 1997. The nuisance that
Cruz complained of, or the blight of his place, is not a unique feature of that particular place. It is
replicated in many other places of the city. Indeed, it is but a microcosm of what is prevalent not
only within the urban areas within Metro Manila but also in many other highly urbanized areas in
the country. Judges are no hermits that they would fail to witness this blight. Cruz did not care to
make this allowance for the benefit of preserving the dignity of the court.

Cruzs open accusation without factual basis that the judge is communicating with the defendant
is an act that brings the court into disrepute or disrespect; or offends its dignity, affront its
majesty, or challenge its authority. It constitutes contempt of court. (People vs. De Leon, L-
10236, January 31, 1958). x x x By alleging that the judge communicated with the defendant,
Cruz is in effect charging the judge of partiality. Since there is not an iota of proof that the judge
did the act complained of, the charge of partiality is uncalled for and constitutes direct contempt
(Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724; Lualhati vs. Albert, 57 Phil.86; Malolos vs. Reyes, 111
Phil. 1113).

WHEREFORE, Ferdinand Cruz is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of DIRECT
CONTEMPT OF COURT.

Accordingly, he is hereby sentenced to suffer TWO (2) DAYS of imprisonment and to pay a fine
of 2,000.00.

SO ORDERED.20

An Order of Arrest21 was issued against the petitioner on even date.

On December 1, 2005, at 10:00 A.M., petitioner filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Post Bond
and Quash Warrant of Arrest (Ex-Parte Motion)22 with the respondent court. In said Ex-Parte
Motion, petitioner averred that:

xxxx
2. To date, undersigned has already filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Supreme Court;

xxxx

The respondent court denied the Ex-Parte Motion in its Order23 dated December 1, 2005 based
on petitioners failure to attach the alleged duly filed Petition for Certiorari with the Supreme
Court. The respondent court held that unless petitioner has shown proof of filing said petition for
certiorari, he cannot avail of the remedy provided in Section 2, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.

Meanwhile, Judge Gingoyon was slain on December 31, 2005. In a Resolution 24 dated February
1, 2006, this Court directed the incumbent Judge of Branch 117, RTC of Pasay City, Judge
Jesus B. Mupas, to submit a comment on the petition "inasmuch as direct or indirect contempt
pertains to the misbehavior or disrespect committed towards the court and not to judges in their
personal capacities."25

Issues

Petitioner raises the following issues:

A.

WHETHER x x x PETITIONER [IS] GUILTY OF CONTEMPT OF COURT.

B.

WHETHER RESPONDENT COURT HAS ENOUGH FACTUAL BASIS FOR CITING

PETITIONER IN CONTEMPT.

C.

WHETHER THE RESPONDENT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING

PETITIONERS MOTION TO FIX BOND.26

The issues may be summed up as follows: whether the respondent court properly adjudged
petitioner in direct contempt of court and whether abuse of discretion was committed by
respondent court in denying the Ex-Parte Motion.

Petitioner contends that the alleged contumacious remark is merely a fair observation or
comment and a logical conclusion made based on the detailed description given by the
respondent court of what has been happening in the alley subject of the civil case. Petitioner
avers that no other conclusion can be had except that Judge Gingoyon was communicating with
the defendant off the record, since the exact description of what was happening in the alley was
not adduced in evidence during trial. Further, petitioner contends that fair and logical conclusion
founded on circumstances of the case cannot be considered contemptuous.

Petitioner likewise insists that the respondent court abused its discretion when it denied his
motion to fix bond, therefore violating due process.

Our Ruling
We find the petition unmeritorious.

A pleading containing derogatory, offensive or malicious statements submitted to the court or

judge wherein proceedings are pending is considered direct contempt.

"[C]ontemptuous statements made in pleadings filed with the court constitute direct
contempt."27 "[A] pleading x x x containing derogatory, offensive or malicious statements
submitted to the court or judge in which the proceedings are pending x x x has been held to be
equivalent to misbehavior committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to
interrupt the proceedings before the same within the meaning of Rule 71, 1 of the Rules of
Court and, therefore, constitutes direct contempt." 28

Based on the abovementioned facts and consistent with the foregoing principles set forth, we
agree with the finding of respondent court that petitioner is guilty of direct contempt of court.

The Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner with the respondent court contained a serious
allegation that Judge Gingoyon has been communicating with the defendant off the record,
which is considered as a grave offense. This allegation is unsubstantiated and totally bereft of
factual basis. In fact, when asked to adduce proof of the allegation, petitioner was not able to
give any, but repeatedly argued that it is his "fair observation or conclusion." 29

Petitioner vehemently stood by his suspicion and repeated the allegation in the Compliance to
the show-cause Order dated November 11, 2005 which he filed with the respondent court. The
allegation was repeated despite Judge Gingoyons outright denial of communicating with the
defendant and explanation in the Order30 dated November 25, 2005 that Judge Gingoyon was
familiar with the area as he was detailed in Pasay City since 1991 as State Prosecutor, and
thereafter, as judge since 1997.

Instead of showing proof of the alleged communication between Judge Gingoyon and the
defendant off the record, petitioner stubbornly insisted that there is nothing contumacious about
his allegation against the Judge as he was just giving his fair and logical observation. Clearly,
petitioner openly accused Judge Gingoyon of wrongdoing without factual basis. Suffice it to say
that this accusation is a dangerous one as it exposes Judge Gingoyon to severe reprimand and
even removal from office.

On the other hand, a careful perusal of the description as provided by Judge Gingoyon in the
Decision shows but a general description of what is normally seen and what normally happens
in places such as Edang Street, to wit: "x x x place is bursting with people most of whom live in
cramped tenements with no place to spare for recreation, to laze around or [do] their daily
household chores x x x. The alleys become the grounds where children run around and play,
the venue where adults do all sorts of things to entertain [themselves] or pass the time, their
wash area or even a place to cook food in x x x. Ambulant vendors who display their wares in
the alley and their customers that mill around them; x x x children chasing each other, dodging
and [ducking] from awnings or canopies; x x x clotheslines full of dripping clothes that encroach
[on] the alleys x x x."31

The act of petitioner in openly accusing Judge Gingoyon of communicating with the defendant
off the record, without factual basis, brings the court into disrepute. The accusation in the Motion
for Reconsideration and the Compliance submitted by the petitioner to the respondent court is
derogatory, offensive and malicious. The accusation taints the credibility and the dignity of the
court and questions its impartiality. It is a direct affront to the integrity and authority of the court,
subjecting it to loss of public respect and confidence, which ultimately affects the administration
of justice.

Furthermore, assuming that the conclusion of petitioner is justified by the facts, it is still not a
valid defense in cases of contempt. "Where the matter is abusive or insulting, evidence that the
language used was justified by the facts is not admissible as a defense. Respect for the judicial
office should always be observed and enforced." 32

Moreover, the charge of partiality is uncalled for, and there being no scintilla of proof that Judge
Gingoyon did the act complained of, petitioners act amounts to direct contempt of court. 33

Denial of the Ex-Parte Motion to Post Bond and Quash Warrant of Arrest is proper; there is no
abuse of discretion on the part of respondent court.

Petitioner avers that the respondent court abused its discretion in denying his Ex-Parte Motion.
Petitioner insists that the respondent court should have granted his Ex-Parte Motion since he
already filed a Petition for Certiorari before this Court pursuant to Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.
He further avers that respondent court violated his right to due process by fixing the bond only
on December 5, 2005 or 10 days after the Orders of contempt and arrest were issued.

Petitioners contention lacks merit.

The respondent court was well within the bounds of its authority when it
denied petitioners Ex-Parte Motion.

A person may be adjudged in direct contempt of court pursuant to Section 1, Rule 71 of the
Rules of Court34 without need of a hearing but may thereafter avail of the remedies
of certiorari or prohibition.35

Section 2, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 2. Remedy therefrom. The person adjudged in direct contempt by any court may not
appeal therefrom, but may avail himself of the remedies of certiorari or prohibition. The
execution of the judgment shall be suspended pending resolution of such petition, provided
such person files a bond fixed by the court which rendered the judgment and conditioned that
he will abide by and perform the judgment should the petition be decided against
him. (Emphasis supplied.)

In this case, we find that the respondent court properly denied petitioners Ex-Parte Motion there
being no proof that he already filed a petition for certiorari. Notably, the Ex-Parte Motion was
filed with the respondent court on December 1, 2005 at 10:00 A.M.36 and therein petitioner
stated that he already filed a Petition for Certiorari with this Court. However, perusal of the
records would show that the Petition for Certiorari was filed with the Supreme Court on the
same day but at 1:06 P.M.37 Clearly, when the motion was filed with the respondent court, it
cannot be accurately said that a petition for certiorari was already duly filed with this Court.
Significantly, the records show that respondent court was furnished a copy of the Petition
for Certiorari by registered mail and which was received only on December 5, 2005.38 It is
therefore clear that at the time that petitioner filed the Ex-Parte Motion with the respondent
court, he has not yet availed of the remedy of certiorari. In fact, it was only after filing the Ex-
ParteMotion with respondent court that petitioner filed the Petition for Certiorari with the
Supreme Court. This explained why no proof of such filing was presented by petitioner to the
respondent court thus prompting it to declare that unless petitioner has shown proof of filing said
petition for certiorari, he cannot avail of the remedy provided in Section 2, Rule 71 of the Rules
of Court.39 Petitioner thus cannot attribute abuse of discretion on the part of respondent court in
denying the Ex-Parte Motion. To reiterate, at the time the said Ex-Parte Motion was filed and
acted upon by the respondent court, petitioner was not yet entitled to the remedy prayed for.
Clearly, the respondent court did not commit error, nor did it overstep its authority in denying
petitioners Ex-Parte Motion.

All told, we take a similar stand as Judge Gingoyon and affirm the Order adjudging petitioner
guilty of direct contempt. However, as to the penalty imposed upon petitioner, we find the fine of
2,000.00 commensurate with the acts committed.

We also find the necessity to emphasize strict observance of the hierarchy of courts.1wphi1 "A
becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the
issuance of extraordinary writs against first level (inferior) courts should be filed with the [RTC],
and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals (CA). A direct invocation of the Supreme
Courts original jurisdiction to issue extraordinary writs should be allowed only when there are
special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition." 40 For the
guidance of the petitioner, "[t]his Courts original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari (as well as
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction) is not exclusive."41 Its
jurisdiction is concurrent with the CA, and with the RTC in proper cases. 42 "However, this
concurrence of jurisdiction does not grant upon a party seeking any of the extraordinary writs
the absolute freedom to file his petition with the court of his choice. This Court is a court of last
resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the
Constitution and immemorial tradition."43 Unwarranted demands upon this Courts attention
must be prevented to allow time and devotion for pressing matters within its exclusive
jurisdiction.

Adhering to the policy on judicial hierarchy of courts, "[w]here the issuance of an extraordinary
writ is also within the competence of the [CA] or a [RTC], it is in either of these courts that the
specific action for the writs procurement must be presented." 44 In consequence, the instant
petition should have been filed with the CA as there is no allegation of any special or compelling
reason to warrant direct recourse to this Court. However, to avoid further delay, we deem it
practical to resolve the controversy.

Finally, it must be pointed out that on April 28, 2010, we directed petitioner to cause the entry of
appearance of his counsel45 within 15 days from notice. Petitioner failed to comply hence we
directed him to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with in our Resolution
dated September 6, 2010.46 Still, petitioner failed to comply hence he was fined 1,000.00 in
our Resolution dated January 17, 201147 which was increased to 3,000.00 in our Resolution of
June 29, 2011. Consequently, petitioner is hereby directed to pay said fine of 3,000.00
otherwise he would be dealt with more severely.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED. The Order dated November 25, 2005
of Branch 117 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City finding petitioner Ferdinand A. Cruz
guilty of direct contempt is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner is hereby sentenced to
pay a fine of 2,000.00. In addition, petitioner is ordered to PAY a fine of 3,000.00 for his
repeated failure to heed the directives of this Court. Petitioner is sternly WARNED that a
repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

EDNA MARIS SOCORRO C. BRUAN, petitioner,

vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended, of the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 37,
finding the herein petitioner guilty of indirect contempt, and sentencing her to imprisonment of
six months and to pay a fine of 30,000.

The antecedents are as follows:

The herein petitioner, Edna Maris Socorro Bruan married Walter Andreas B. Bruan in
Lindenberg, Germany, on December 1, 1989. They have one child, Kimberly Ann Bruan,
who was born on August 21, 1993 in Talisay, Batangas.

However, the marriage failed. On December 19, 1995, the petitioner left the conjugal abode in
Talisay, Batangas, bringing Kimberly Ann with her. She filed a petition with the Regional Trial
Court of Manila against Walter for the declaration of the nullity of their marriage, docketed as
Special Proceedings No. 95-76402 raffled to Branch 37 of the court. On May 24, 1996, the
parties entered into an agreement concerning Walters visitation rights, wherein the latter shall
fetch Kimberly Ann from Ednas house every Tuesday at 8:00 p.m. and return her to Edna every
Friday at 8:00 p.m. The parties also agreed that any failure of the parties to abide by the
agreement will hold him/her liable for contempt of court.

On February 4, 1997, Walter filed a Motion to Allow Him to Travel with Kimberly Ann to
Germany for a "study vacation" for a period of four months, or until July 1997. On motion of
Walter, the trial court conducted an ocular inspection of the conjugal house of the parties in
Talisay, Batangas. Thereafter, Walter presented testimonial evidence, including the testimony of
their househelper Esterlina Tonog and the social worker of the Department of Social Welfare
and Development (DSWD) in the Batangas City Field Office. On March 7, 1997, the court
issued an order directing Edna to bring Kimberly Ann to the court on March 14, 1997. The
petitioner failed to comply with said order. Instead, she filed on March 17, 1997 a Notice of
Withdrawal of Appearance of Counsel with Motion to Dismiss the Case. On March 18, 1997,
Walter filed an ex parte motion to order the sheriff and/or the NBI to take custody of Kimberly
Ann and to deliver her to Walter.

On March 21, 1997, Walter filed his comment on the petitioners motion to dismiss the case. He
also filed an ex parte motion to break open the conjugal abode and for the pick-up of Kimberly
Ann. On the same day, the trial court issued an order granting the motion of Walter to bring
Kimberly Ann to Germany upon a bond in the amount of 100,000. The court issued a separate
order directing the sheriff of the court, the NBI or any government agency to pick up Kimberly
Ann and deliver her to the respondent, and authorizing them to break open any building or
enclosure to ensure the enforcement of the order.

On April 1, 1997, Walter filed a Motion to Order the Petitioner and Her Counsel, Atty. Orlando B.
Medrano to Explain Why They Should Not Be Cited in Contempt of Court for their failure to
comply with the Orders of the court dated March 7 and 21, 1997. On April 4, 1997, the trial court
granted the motion. On April 14, 1997, the court issued an order directing the service of its April
4, 1997 Order on the petitioner at No. 41 Guyabano Street, Project 2, Quezon City. However,
the petitioner failed to comply with the order of the court directing her to explain why she should
not be cited for contempt for her failure to comply with its March 7 and 21, 1997 Orders. On
April 22, 1997, Walter filed a Motion to Cite the Petitioner in Contempt of Court.

Walter filed a motion to set the case for hearing, serving a copy thereof on the petitioner. The
court granted the motion, and set the hearing on April 28, 1997, but was later reset to May 5,
1997, as the petitioner and her counsel were not notified of said hearing. The sheriff tried to
serve a copy of the Order of the court dated April 28, 1997 on the petitioner through Carlo
Bruan, Walters brother, but Carlo refused to receive said order for the petitioner upon the
prompting of his brother and sister not to receive any papers regarding the case as they did not
know the petitioners whereabouts. The case was then submitted for the decision of the court
upon the filing of the parties respective memorandum.

On August 4, 1997, Walter filed a petition with the RTC of Manila to cite the petitioner in
contempt of court entitled as Walter Bruan v. Edna Maris Socorro C. Bruan, docketed as Civil
Case No. 97-84420. The case was raffled to Branch 47 of the court. Walter alleged in his
petition that despite orders of the court in Special Proceedings No. 95-76402, the petitioner
failed and refused to deliver Kimberly Ann to him. The court granted Walters motion for the
consolidation of the case with Special Proceedings No. 95-76402 pending in Branch 37 of the
court. The court, thereafter, issued summons on the petitioner, directing her to file her comment
on or answer to the petition within a period of fifteen days from service thereof. The sheriff tried
to serve the summons and the petition on Edna on August 26 and 28, 1997. As per the sheriffs
return on the service of summons and the petition on the petitioner, it states:

THIS IS TO CERTIFY that on August 26 and 28, 1997, the undersigned caused the
service of Summons together with a copy of Petition upon defendant Ms. Edna Maris
Socorro C. Bruan at No. 41 Guayabano (sic) St., Project 2, Quezon City thru her sister
Ms. Gigi Bruan, a person residing thereat, of sufficient age and discretion to receive
such court process who signed to acknowledge receipt thereof.

That efforts to serve the said Summons personally upon defendant Ms. Edna Maris
Socorro C. Bruan were made on August 26 and 28, 1997, but the same were ineffectual
and unavailing for the following reasons, that as per given information by her sister Gigi,
respondent is always out of the house at the time Summons was attempted to be serve
(sic), thus, substituted service was made in accordance with Sec. 8, Rule 14 of the
Revised Rules of Court.

The original copy of the Summons is, therefore, respectfully returned DULY SERVED.2

The sheriff, likewise, served a copy of the petition on the petitioner through counsel, Atty.
Elizabeth A. Andres, as borne by the sheriffs return, viz:
 THIS IS TO CERTIFY that on August 28, 1997, the undersigned caused the service of
Summons together with a Copy of Petition and its annexes for the defendant Ms. Edna
Maris Socorro C. Bruan, c/o Atty. Elizabeth A. Andreas (sic) at G/F, EAA Building No. 6,
Rd. 3, Project 6, Quezon City, thru Miss Jessica Carpio, secretary/receiving clerk, after
instructions from Atty. Elizabeth A. Andreas (sic) to have it received and she affixed her
signature on the surface of the Original Summons to acknowledge receipt thereof.

Therefore, the Original copy of the Summons is, respectfully, returned DULY SERVED.3

On August 29, 1997, Walter filed an Urgent Motion to Set the Petition for Indirect Contempt for
Hearing at 9:00 a.m. on September 1, 1997 for the issuance of a warrant of arrest against the
petitioner. The motion was set for hearing on the same day (August 29, 1997) at 2:00 p.m.
However, a copy thereof was only served on the petitioners counsel on that day at 2:10 p.m.
During the hearing on September 1, 1997, there was no appearance for the petitioner. The trial
court issued an order denying the motion of Walter to set case for hearing, on its finding that a
copy of the petition and summons had not yet been served on the petitioner per return of the
sheriff.4

On September 18, 1997, Walter filed a Motion for An Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest against
the petitioner as provided for in Section 6, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, as amended. Walter
alleged that the petitioner violated their compromise agreement and defied the order of the court
when she failed/refused to deliver their daughter Kimberly Ann to him. He prayed that the
petitioner be declared in contempt of court under Section 9, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. The
motion was set for hearing at 2:00 p.m. on September 26, 1997. A copy of the motion was sent
to the petitioner by registered mail at No. 41 Guyabano Street, Proj. 2, Quezon City, on
September 18, 1997.

On October 1, 1997, the trial court issued an order citing the petitioner in indirect contempt of
court and sentenced her to suffer imprisonment of six months and to pay a fine of 30,000. The
court also issued a warrant for her arrest. The clerk of court issued a certificate of finality of the
order on February 20, 1998. On motion of Walter, the court issued an Alias Warrant of Arrest on
July 8, 1998.

The petitioner was arrested after a year, or on August 6, 1999. On August 12, 1999, the court
promulgated its Order declaring the petitioner in contempt of court. The petitioner, thereafter,
filed a motion informing the court that Kimberly Ann had already been turned over to Walter and
praying that she be released on recognizance of her counsel, which motion the court granted.
The petitioner later appealed the August 12, 1999 Order of the court citing her in contempt.

Before the appellate court, the petitioner posited that in finding her guilty of indirect contempt,
the trial court violated her right to due process. She argued that per return of the sheriff and of
the Order of the court dated September 1, 1997, she was not served with the formal charge for
contempt and the summons. Despite this, she was found guilty of indirect contempt.

On August 9, 2001, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment affirming the decision of the
RTC in toto.

In the instant petition, the petitioner avers that the trial courts order adjudging her guilty of
indirect contempt is illegal because it was issued in violation of her constitutional right to due
process. She contends that the trial courts Order of September 1, 1997 specifically states that
she was not served with summons and the petition for indirect contempt. She notes that there
was no hearing conducted before the trial court issued its order finding her guilty of indirect
contempt.

We do not agree with the petitioner.

Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court specifically outlines the procedural requisites before the
accused may be punished for indirect contempt: (1) a complaint in writing which may either be a
motion for contempt filed by a party or an order issued by the court requiring a person to appear
and explain his conduct; and (2) an opportunity for the person charged to appear and explain
his conduct.5 All that the law requires is that there be a charge in writing duly filed in court and
an opportunity given to the person charged to be heard by himself or counsel. What is most
essential is that the alleged contemner be granted an opportunity to meet the charges against
him and to be heard in his defenses.6 This is due process which must be observed at all times.
Criminal proceedings are not required to take any particular form so long as the substantial
rights of the accused are preserved.7

In Mutuc v. Court of Appeals,8 the Court explained what due process means in contempt
proceedings, to wit:

There is no question that the "essence of due process is a hearing before conviction and
before an impartial and disinterested tribunal" (Rollo, p. 173) but due process as a
constitutional precept does not always, and in all situations, require a trial-type
proceeding (Zaldivar vs. Gonzales, 166 SCRA 316 [1988] citing the ruling in Torres vs.
Gonzales, 152 SCRA 272 [1987]). The essence of due process is to be found in the
reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of
ones defense (Tajonera vs. Lamaroza, 110 SCRA 438 [1981] and Richards vs. Asoy,
152 SCRA 45 [1987]). "To be heard" does not only mean verbal arguments in court; or
may be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral
arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process
(Juanita Yap Say vs. IAC, G.R. No. 73451, March 28, 1988.)

It bears stressing that indirect contempt proceedings partake of the nature of a criminal
prosecution. Thus, strict rules that govern criminal prosecutions also apply to a
prosecution for criminal contempt; the accused is to be afforded many of the protections
provided in regular criminal cases; and proceedings under statutes governing them are
to be strictly construed.9

A respondent in a contempt charge must be served with a copy of the motion/petition. Unlike in
civil actions, the Court does not issue summons on the respondent. While the respondent is not
required to file a formal answer similar to that in ordinary civil actions, the court must set the
contempt charge for hearing on a fixed date and time on which the respondent must make his
appearance to answer the charge. On the date and time of the hearing, the court shall proceed
to investigate the charges and consider such answer or testimony as the respondent may make
or offer. The mode of procedure and rules of evidence therein are assimilated to criminal
prosecutions.10 If he fails to appear on that date after due notice without justifiable reason, the
court may order his arrest, just like the accused in a criminal case who fails to appear when so
required. The court does not declare the respondent in a contempt charge in default.11
In this case, the petitioner, through her sister Gigi Bruan, and through her counsel, was served
with copies of Walters petition for indirect contempt. She was notified, through her counsel, of
the hearing of the petition on September 1, 1997, but she and her counsel failed to appear for
the said hearing. She was, likewise, notified of the hearing set on September 26, 1997 by
registered mail, and still failed to appear before the trial court. The petitioner cannot, thus, claim
that she was denied her right to due process. We agree with the following disquisition of the
Court of Appeals:

From the facts of the case, it is apparent that appellant failed to comply with the Courts
Order relative to the terms and conditions of the Compromise Agreement. On several
hearings, appellant failed to appear in court despite service of notice upon her. Thus, on
April 4, 1997, on motion of the respondent, the Court directed appellant and her counsel
to explain why they should not be cited in contempt of court for their failure to comply
with the Orders dated March 7 and 21, 1997. Again, appellant did not submit any
responsive pleading relative thereto.

Thus, respondent had no other recourse but to charge appellant in writing by filing a
separate Petition for Indirect Contempt pursuant to Sec. 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.
Records show that appellant was given the opportunity to comment thereon when
Summons was served upon her by substituted service, thru her counsel, Atty. Elizabeth
Andres, and appellants sister, Gigi Bruan. The return made by the Process Server of
said Court dated August 29, 1997 states that "efforts to serve the said Summons
personally upon defendant Ms. Edna Maris Socorro C. Bruan were made on August 26
and 28, 1997, but the same were ineffectual and unavailing for the following reasons,
that as per given information by her sister, Gigi, respondent is always out of the house at
the time Summons was attempted to be serve (sic), thus, substituted service was made
in accordance with Sec. 7, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court." Hence, there is no
question that appellant was duly served with summons by substituted service, and this is
essential in order for the court to acquire jurisdiction over her person.

In the contempt case, respondent filed an "Urgent Motion to Set Case for Hearing" dated
August 29, 1997 for the issuance of a warrant of arrest against respondent, which was,
however, denied by the Court in an Order dated September 1, 1997, on the ground that
summons has not been served on appellant. On September 18, 1997, respondent filed a
"Motion for Issuance of Warrant of Arrest" alleging, among other things, that respondent
was duly served with summons by substituted service in accordance with Sec. 7 of Rule
14 of the Rules of Court, and since appellant has been in hiding with the minor child and
a hearing cannot be had, a warrant of arrest should be issued against her. Finding the
same to be meritorious, the lower court issued the assailed Order dated October 1,
1997.

Indeed, it is apparent that the questioned Order of the lower court dated October 1, 1997
citing appellant in contempt of court was not issued without the observance of
procedural due process. On the contrary, appellant was afforded all the opportunity to
appear and explain her conduct. Hence, appellants claim that her right to a hearing was
violated is unavailing considering that by her failure to appear in court since 1997 and
explain her side, she is deemed to have waived her right to adduce evidence to
controvert complainants claim.
 Clearly, appellant was given all the opportunity to defend herself against the charge of
Indirect Contempt filed against her. If she failed to do so, the fault lies on her and not
upon the court. Her actuations clearly show defiance and clear disregard of the law. As
correctly found by the trial court:

"xxx Despite the lapse of almost half a year, she had refused to share custody of
their lone child with her husband, despite the finality of the Order dated August
23, 1996, in relation to the Order (sic) May 24, 1996. While it would seem that
she initially complied with the same, she has refused obedience thereto since
March 1997. It is noteworthy that the wife began throwing to the winds obedience
to the Order when her husband sought permission to bring with him their lone
child to Germany for a study vacation. A review of the testimony of the witnesses
presented by her husband, especially Esterlina Tong (sic), would bear out the
obstinate character of the respondent in this case. However, this obstinacy
cannot be countenanced by this Court, as it cannot allow one party litigant to
frustrate the ends of justice."

By and large, appellants willful disregard and disobedience to the Courts Orders
constitute an affront to the authority and dignity of the Court. Such conduct of appellant
tends to bring the authority of the court and the administration of law into disrepute and,
likewise, impedes the due administration of justice.12

As to the penalty imposed on the petitioner, we find the same too severe under the factual
milieu of this case. The respondent (Walter) was compelled to institute the action for indirect
contempt against the petitioner for not allowing him to see their minor child on several
occasions, and to produce the child in court as required by the latter. As keenly observed by the
trial court, the petitioners obstinate conduct started when the husband sought permission to
bring their minor child to Germany for a "study vacation." Understandably, the petitioner, as a
mother, was overtaken by an instinctive fear that her daughter would be taken away and would
never be returned to her. In a Motion filed on August 18, 1999, the petitioner stated that the
minor child was already with Walter. Under such circumstance, we find that a fine of 5,000 is
just and reasonable.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals
is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. The petitioner is ORDERED to pay a fine of Five
Thousand Pesos (5,000) for being guilty of indirect contempt.

SO ORDERED.

RONALD SORIANO, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

The present petition arises out of the same set of facts as that in the case of Soriano v. Court of
Appeals,1 which the Court decided in 1999.
In a D E C I S I O N dated 7 December 1993, the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Iba,
Zambales, Branch 69,2 found petitioner Ronald Soriano ("Soriano") liable for the death of
Isidrino Dalusong ("Dalusong"), and convicted him of the crime of Homicide, Serious Physical
Injuries and Damage to Property through Reckless Imprudence. The Decision was penned by
Judge Rodolfo V. Toledano ("Hon. Toledano"), who sentenced Soriano to suffer imprisonment
of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to six (6) years of prision correccional.3

Eschewing an appeal, Soriano instead filed on 12 January 1994 an Application for probation.
The RTC granted probation for a period of three to six years in an Order dated 8 March 1994.
Among the several terms and conditions of probation was that Soriano indemnify the heirs of
Dalusong in the amount of Ninety Eight Thousand Five Hundred Sixty Pesos (98,560.00), as
ordered by the RTC.4

On 26 April 1994, Provincial State Prosecutor Benjamin A. Fadera filed a Motion to Cancel
Probation, on the ground that Soriano had failed to indemnify the heirs of Dalusong in the
amount of Ninety Eight Thousand Five Hundred Sixty Pesos (98,560.00), contrary to Condition
Number 11 of the Order of Probation. While Soriano opposed this motion, the Zambales Parole
and Probation Office filed a Comment recommending that Soriano be allowed to continue with
his probation but be required to submit a program of payment of his civil liability. The RTC, in
an Order dated 20 June 1994, denied the Motion to Cancel Probation, but ordered Soriano to
submit within ten (10) days from notice his program of payment of the civil liability.

A copy of the Order dated 20 June 1994 was received by Sorianos counsel on 23 June
1994.5 Despite such receipt, no program of payment was submitted by Soriano, prompting the
Zambales Parole and Probation Office to ask the RTC to require explanation from Soriano why
he had not complied with this latest RTC Order. On 15 August 1994, the RTC issued an Order,
directing Soriano to explain within ten (10) days why he should not be held in contempt of Court
for failure to comply with the 20 June 1994 Order, and further directing him to submit his
program of payment also within ten (10) days.

Instead of complying with this latest Order, Soriano filed a "Motion for Reconsideration", alleging
that he had not personally received a copy of the 20 June 1994 Order, despite the fact that his
counsel acknowledged its receipt on 23 June 1994. He also manifested therein that he was
unemployed, dependent on his parents for support of his family, and incapable of figuring out
any feasible program of payment.6

Unsatisfied with this explanation, the RTC issued an Order dated 4 October 1994, ordering the
detention of Soriano for ten (10) days for contempt of court, revoking the 8 March
1994 Order granting probation, and ordering that Soriano serve the sentence originally imposed.
The RTC noted that Soriano had apparently no intention of submitting a program of payment or
eventually complying with his civil obligation to the heirs of Dalusong. The RTC also took note of
the fact that Soriano was able to hire two private counsels in his behalf, belying the claim of his
financial hardship. These circumstances, according to the RTC, were indicative of Sorianos
lack of repentance or predisposition to rehabilitate or reform, the purposes which the probation
law sought to achieve.7

Soriano filed a Notice of Appeal dated 12 October 1994, specifically appealing the contempt of
court judgment" against him.8 An Order dated 17 October 1994 was promulgated by the RTC,
directing that the original records pertaining to the contempt charge be forwarded to the Court of
Appeals.9 In the same Order, the RTC noted that an order revoking the grant of probation or
modifying the terms and conditions thereof was not appealable, hence the directives revoking
probation and ordering Soriano to serve his original sentence remained unaffected.

On 26 October 1994, Soriano filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals, alleging
that Hon. Judge Toledano committed grave abuse of discretion in finding petitioner in contempt
of court and in revoking the probation order.10 The petition was docketed as C.A. S.P. No.
35550 and raffled to the Eighth Division of the Court of Appeals.

In the meantime, the appeal filed by Soriano pertaining to the contempt charge was docketed as
CA G.R. C.R. No. 17595. The appeal was raffled to the Tenth Division of the Court of Appeals.
Soriano and the Office of the Solicitor General filed their respective briefs.

On 29 October 1995, the Court of Appeals Eighth Division promulgated its decision in C.A. S.P.
No. 35550.11 It dismissed the Petition for Certiorari, ruling that Hon. Toledano did not commit
grave abuse of discretion in declaring petitioner in contempt of court and in revoking the order of
probation. Soon thereafter, Soriano timely challenged this decision before this Court, via
a Petition for Review that was docketed as G.R. No. 123936.

On 11 September 1996, the Court of Appeals Tenth Division denied the appeal in CA G.R. C.R.
No. 17595.12 In its D E C I S I O N, the Court of Appeals Tenth Division emphasized that
Soriano was declared in contempt of court not because he was not financially capable of paying
his civil liability, but because of his contumacious failure to comply with the RTC Orders dated
20 June 1994 and 15 August 1994. There was no question that counsel for Soriano had, on 23
June 1994, received a copy of the 20 June 1994 Order requiring Soriano to submit his program
of payment, and it is well settled that notice to counsel is notice to the party himself.13 Nor did
Sorianos supposed financial incapacity excuse him from not complying with the RTC Orders, as
he could have at the very least filed a manifestation with the Court that he was not yet in a
position to settle the obligation.

After Sorianos Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals,14 he filed
a Petition for Review on Certiorari before this Court. Docketed as G.R. No. 128938, this latter
petition is now the subject of this ruling. Soriano, in his present petition, argued that the RTC
committed grave abuse of discretion in finding that there was a deliberate refusal on his part to
comply with its Orders dated 20 June 1994 and 15 August 1994; and in revoking the probation
order for failure to satisfy the civil liability to the heirs of the victim.15

On 4 March 1999, this Court rendered judgment in G.R. No. 123936.16 In its D E C I S I O N, the
Court dismissed the petition, holding that the revocation of Sorianos probation was lawful and
proper. Sorianos Motion for Reconsideration was denied,17 and the judgment in G.R. No.
123936 became final on 15 June 1999.

In its 4 March 1999 D E C I S I O N in G.R. No. 123936, the Court expressly stated that the only
issue for resolution in that case was "whether or not the revocation of petitioners probation is
lawful and proper."18 It was correct of the Court to have limited the issue in that manner,
notwithstanding that Soriano also argued in his petition therein that Hon. Toledano committed
grave abuse of discretion in declaring Soriano in contempt. The revocation of probation was
properly assailed by Soriano through a special civil action of certiorari, which could not have
similarly attacked the judgment of contempt. Under Section 11, Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, Sorianos appropriate remedy from the judgment of contempt was an appeal to
the proper court, as in criminal cases, and not the special civil action of certiorari.
Soriano correctly availed of the proper remedy from the contempt judgment by filing his Notice
of Appeal on 12 October 1994. The proceedings arising from that appeal, and the rulings
rendered therein are now for resolution in this Decision. Since the Court has already disposed
of, with finality, the question of whether the RTC validly revoked Sorianos probation, the sole
question now before us is whether or not the RTC erred in declaring Soriano in contempt.

Soriano argues herein that there must be prior notice and hearing before he could be held liable
for indirect contempt, and that no hearing was conducted as to the contempt charge.19 This
contention has merit.

There are two kinds of contempt punishable by law: direct contempt and indirect
contempt.20 The contempt charged against Soriano is properly classified as indirect contempt,
as it consists of disobedience of or resistance to a lawful order of a court.21 Section 3, Rule 71 of
the Revised Rules of Court provides for the following requisites prior to conviction of indirect
contempt: (a) a charge in writing to be filed, (b) an opportunity given to the respondent to
comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court and (c) to be heard by himself
or counsel.22

The RTC did notify Soriano in writing of the charge of indirect contempt, by way of the 15
August 1994 Order. That same Order afforded Soriano the opportunity to comment on the
charge, which Soriano essentially did through his Motion for Reconsideration. However, the
third requisite laid down in Rule 71 was not complied with, as no hearing was ever conducted by
the RTC on the charge of contempt.

As the Court ruled in Balasabas v. Hon. Aquilisan:23

On the proceedings for indirect contempt against the petitioner, the grave error of the
respondent judge is manifest when, under the circumstances disclosed in the records,
petitioner was denied his right to notice of hearing, to have his day in court and present
witnesses in his behalf xxx.

xxx

Section 3, Rule 71 requires that there must be a hearing of the indirect contempt charge
after notice thereof is validly served on the person charged with indirect contempt. As
adverted to earlier, an order requiring petitioner to submit a written explanation
constitutes the written charge for indirect contempt, and at the same time serves as
notice of said charge. However, such notice cannot by all means, be considered as a
notice of hearing itself. The two notices are different, for they have distinct object and
purpose.24

With respect to constructive contempts or those which are committed without the actual
presence of the court, it is essential that a hearing be allowed and the contemner permitted, if
he so desires, to interpose a defense to the charges before punishment is imposed. 25

The proceedings for punishment of indirect contempt are criminal in nature. 26 The modes of
procedure and rules of evidence adopted in contempt proceedings are similar in nature to those
used in criminal prosecutions.27 Thus, any liberal construction of the rules governing contempt
proceedings should favor the accused. It can be argued that Soriano has essentially been
afforded the right to be heard, as he did comment on the charge of indirect contempt against
him. Yet, since an indirect contempt charge partakes the nature of a criminal charge, conviction
cannot be had merely on the basis of written pleadings. The contemner is assured of his or her
day in court. If the contemner is served a notice of hearing, but fails to appear anyway, then that
is a different matter. A hearing affords the contemner the opportunity to adduce before the court
documentary or testimonial evidence in his behalf. The hearing will also allow the court a more
thorough evaluation of the defense of the contemner, including the chance to observe the
accused present his side in open court and subject his defense to interrogation from the
complainants or the court itself.

In Sorianos case, no hearing was ever set or held. Sorianos claim was that he had no
knowledge of the Orderrequiring him to submit the program of payment. This is a defense that is
susceptible to ratification by testimonial evidence at the very least. Soriano should have been
afforded the chance to prove his side by presenting evidence in his behalf in open court.
However, the RTC denied Soriano the opportunity to adduce evidence in his behalf through a
hearing, or at least explain his side or substantiate his defense through any opportunity which
the RTC could have provided him. Instead, the RTC adjudged him guilty based on the bare
assertions contained in the pleading he filed in response to the show cause order which is the
15 August 1994 Order of the RTC. Such finding, derived as it was without any comprehensive
evaluation of the arguments or of the evidence, cannot be sanctioned by this Court and should
be overturned.

The practical effects of this ruling may seem negligible considering the relative gravity of the
ruling against Soriano in G.R. No. 123936. Yet, it is still important for this Court to reiterate that
contempt proceedings, particularly for indirect contempt, take on the character of criminal
proceedings. Judges are enjoined to extend to an alleged contemner the same rights accorded
to an accused.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted. The Order dated 4 October 1994 is set aside insofar as it
declared petitioner Ronald Soriano in contempt of court.

SO ORDERED.

ALEN ROSS RODRIGUEZ and REGIDOR TULALI, Petitioners,

vs.
The Hon. BIENVENIDO BLANCAFLOR, in his capacity as the Acting Presiding Judge of
the Regional Trial Court of Palawan, Branch 52, and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court filed
by Alen Ross Rodriguez (Rodriguez), the Provincial Prosecutor of Palawan; and Regidor
Tulali (Tulali), Prosecutor I of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Palawan, seeking to
annul and set aside the October 13, 2009 Decision 1 of respondent Judge Bienvenido
Blancaflor (Judge Blancaflor), Acting Presiding Judge of Branch 52, Regional Trial Court,
Palawan (RTC). The petition likewise seeks to prohibit Judge Blancaflor from implementing the
said decision.
In his October 13, 2009 Decision, Judge Blancaflor found petitioners Rodriguez and Tulali guilty
of direct contempt and ordered them to issue a public apology to the court. In the same
decision, Judge Blancaflor suspended them indefinitely from the practice of law. The dispositive
portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding respondents

PROVINCIAL PROSECUTORS OF PALAWAN ALEN ROSS B. RODRIGUEZ and
PROSECUTOR REGIDOR TULALI as both guilty of direct contempt and for violation of their
oath of office as member of the bar and as officer of the Court, and hereby sentence them to
suffer the penalty of INDEFINITE SUSPENSION from practice of law and for each to pay a fine
of 100,000.00.

Respondents are further directed to issue a public apology to the Court for the above grave
offenses and should they fail to do so after the finality of this Sentence, a warrant for their arrest
will be issued, and they will not be released unless they comply with the order of this Court.

Let a copy of this Order be furnished the Secretary of Justice for appropriate action.

IT IS SO ORDERED.2

The Facts

Previously pending before Judge Blancaflor was Criminal Case No. 22240 for arson (arson
case), entitled People of the Philippines v. Teksan Ami, in which Tulali was the trial prosecutor.

During the pendency of the case, Tulali was implicated in a controversy involving an alleged
bribery initiated by Randy Awayan (Awayan), the driver assigned to Judge Blancaflor under the
payroll of the Office of the Governor of Palawan, and one Ernesto Fernandez (Fernandez), to
assure the acquittal of the accused, Rolly Ami (Ami), and the dismissal of the arson case.

On June 29, 2009, a day before the scheduled promulgation of the decision in the arson case,
Tulali filed an Ex-Parte Manifestation withdrawing his appearance in the said case to prevent
any suspicion of misdemeanor and collusion. He attached to the said manifestation a copy of
the administrative complaint against Awayan filed (but eventually withdrawn) by his superior,
Rodriguez, before the Office of the Governor of Palawan.

On June 30, 2009, Judge Blancaflor rendered his decision acquitting Ami of the crime of arson.

Purportedly on the basis of the administrative complaint filed against Awayan and Rodriguez,
Judge Blancaflor summoned several witnesses including Tulali and heard their testimonies. On
July 30, 2009, he issued an order summoning Rodriguez to appear before him for the purpose
of holding an inquiry on matters pertaining to his possible involvement in Tulalis filing of the ex-
parte manifestation and the administrative complaint against Awayan, among others.

On August 7, 2009, Rodriguez filed his Motion for Clarification as to the purpose of Judge
Blancaflors continued inquiries considering that the decision in the arson case had already
been promulgated.
In an order dated August 13, 2009, Judge Blancaflor informed the petitioners that he was
proceeding against them for direct contempt and violation of their oath of office on the basis of
Tulalis Ex-Parte Manifestation.

As earlier recited, after the submission of petitioners respective position papers, Judge
Blancaflor issued the assailed October 13, 2009 Decision finding petitioners guilty of direct
contempt. The penalty of indefinite suspension from the practice of law and a fine of
100,000.00 each were imposed upon them.

The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision but it was denied in the
assailed November 6, 2009 Order.3

Hence, the petitioners interpose the present special civil action before this Court anchored on
the following

GROUNDS

(A)

RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO

LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE ASSAILED DECISION AND
ORDER CONSIDERING THAT PETITIONERS WERE DENIED THEIR RIGHT TO DUE
PROCESS.

(B)

RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO

LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE ASSAILED DECISION AND
ORDER CONSIDERING THAT HE GROSSLY VIOLATED THE RULES ON
CONTEMPT.

(C)

SINCE THE ASSAILED DECISION AND ORDER ARE VOID, A WRIT OF

PROHIBITION MUST BE ISSUED AGAINST RESPONDENT.4

Petitioners argue that the contempt proceedings are null and void for contravening their rights to
due process of law. They claim that they were denied their rights to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against them, to confront the witnesses and present their own
evidence. According to petitioners, Judge Blancaflors disregard of due process constituted
grave abuse of discretion which was further aggravated by the unlawful manner of
simultaneously conducting suspension and contempt proceedings against them.

Petitioners further argue that the penalty imposed upon them in the "direct contempt"
proceeding is clearly oppressive and without basis.

In its Manifestation in Lieu of Comment,5 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) stated that
Judge Blancaflor committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in holding petitioners guilty of direct contempt as the judgment was not based on law
and evidence.

The petition is impressed with merit.

The power to punish a person in contempt of court is inherent in all courts to preserve order in
judicial proceedings and to uphold the orderly administration of justice. However, judges are
enjoined to exercise the power judiciously and sparingly, with utmost restraint, and with the end
in view of utilizing the same for correction and preservation of the dignity of the court, and not
for retaliation or vindictiveness. It bears stressing that the power to declare a person in contempt
of court must be exercised on the preservative, not the vindictive principle; and on the
corrective, not the retaliatory, idea of punishment.6 Such power, being drastic and extraordinary
in its nature, should not be resorted to unless necessary in the interest of justice. 7

In this case, the Court cannot sustain Judge Blancaflors order penalizing petitioners for direct
contempt on the basis of Tulalis Ex-Parte Manifestation.

Direct contempt is any misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court as to obstruct or

interrupt the proceedings before the same, including disrespect toward the court, offensive
personalities toward others, or refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness, or to subscribe an
affidavit or deposition when lawfully required to do so.8

Based on the foregoing definition, the act of Tulali in filing the Ex-Parte Manifestation cannot be
construed as contumacious within the purview of direct contempt. It must be recalled that the
subject manifestation bore Tulalis voluntary withdrawal from the arson case to dispel any
suspicion of collusion between him and the accused. Its filing on the day before the
promulgation of the decision in the pending criminal case, did not in any way disrupt the
proceedings before the court. Accordingly, he should not be held accountable for his act which
was done in good faith and without malice.

Neither should Rodriguez be liable for direct contempt as he had no knowledge of, or
participation in, the preparation and filing of the subject manifestation. It was signed and filed by
Tulali alone in his capacity as the trial prosecutor in the arson case. The attached complaint
against Awayan was filed with the Office of the Palawan Governor, and not with the RTC.

Apparently, Judge Blancaflors conclusion, that the subject manifestation containing derogatory
matters was purposely filed to discredit the administration of justice in court, is unfounded and
without basis. There being no factual or legal basis for the charge of direct contempt, it is clear
that Judge Blancaflor gravely abused his discretion in finding petitioners guilty as charged.

Such grave abuse of authority is likewise manifested from the penalty imposed on the
petitioners. Under Section 1, Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court, direct contempt before the
RTC or a court of equivalent or higher rank is punishable by a fine not exceeding 2,000.00 or
imprisonment not exceeding ten (10) days, or both.

The penalty of indefinite suspension from the practice of law and to pay a fine of 100,000.00
each with the additional order to issue a public apology to the Court under pain of arrest, is
evidently unreasonable, excessive and outside the bounds of the law.
Petitioners also fault Judge Blancaflor for non-observance of due process in conducting the
contempt proceedings. It must be emphasized that direct contempt is adjudged and punished
summarily pursuant to Section 1, Rule 71 of the Rules. Hence, hearings and opportunity to
confront witnesses are absolutely unnecessary.

In the same vein, the petitioners alleged "vilification campaign" against Judge Blancaflor cannot
be regarded as direct contempt. At most, it may constitute indirect contempt, as correctly
concluded by the OSG. For indirect contempt citation to prosper, however, the requirements
under Sections 3 and 4, Rule 71 of the Rules must be satisfied, to wit:

Sec. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. After a charge in writing
has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such
period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of
any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:

xxx

(d) any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the
administration of justice;

x x x.

Sec. 4. How proceedings commenced. Proceedings for indirect contempt may be

initiated motu proprio by the court against which the contempt was committed by an order or
any other formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be punished
for contempt.

In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified petition with
supporting particulars and certified true copies of documents or papers involved therein, and
upon full compliance with the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the
court concerned. If the contempt charges arose out of or are related to a principal action
pending in the court, the petition for contempt shall allege that fact but said petition shall be
docketed, heard and decided separately, unless the court in its discretion orders the
consolidation of the contempt charge and the principal action for joint hearing and decision.

In the present case, Judge Blancaflor failed to observe the elementary procedure which requires
written charge and due hearing. There was no order issued to petitioners. Neither was there any
written or formal charge filed against them. In fact, Rodriguez only learned of the contempt
proceedings upon his receipt of the July 30, 2009 Order, requiring him to appear before the
Court in order to clarify certain matters contained in the said order. Tulali, on the other hand,
only learned of the proceedings when he was ordered to submit his compliance to explain how
he came in possession of the administrative complaint against Awayan.

The fact that petitioners were afforded the opportunity to file their appropriate pleadings is not
sufficient as the proceedings ex-parte to hear the witnesses testimonies had already been
completed.

In the course of his investigation, Judge Blancaflor showed that he no longer had the cold
impartiality expected of a magistrate. He had clearly prejudged petitioners as manifested in the
questions propounded in his July 30, 2009 Order, as follows:
 a. Your [petitioner Rodriguezs] participation, if any, in the filing of the ex-parte
manifestation by Prosecutor Tulali together with the attachment of your letter to Gov.
Joel T. Reyes dated May 8, 2009 filed on June 29, 2009 with the Clerk of Court, Branch
52, Regional Trial Court, Palawan;

b. Whether or not the letter was received and read by Gov. Joel T. Reyes, if you know,
and if so what was the official action thereon;

c. Before Randy Awayan was terminated on June 30, 2009 was he allowed to answer
the charges against him, i.e., calling him bag man and facilitator and Ernesto Fernandez,
calling him "extortionist."

Aside from the allegations of Salam Ami, any other evidentiary basis for your conclusion
that Ernesto Fernandez was an extortionist and that Awayan was a bag man and
facilitator;

What was your role in obtaining the release of accused Rolly Ami from the City Jail
without permission from the Court on June 29, 2009 at 2:00 0clock in the afternoon and
having been interviewed in the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor (c/o Prosecutor Tulali)
and how long was Rolly Ami interviewed?

d. Rolly Ami is publicly known as illiterate (cannot read or write) but he was made to sign
affidavits in the absence of his lawyer on June 29, 2009 at 2:00 oclock in the afternoon,
why?

e. Rolly Ami was fetched upon his release by SPO4 Efren Guinto, a close associate of
yours, and directly went to the Palawan Pawnshop to pawn expensive jewelry (watch
and ring), why?

What is your participation in the media coverage Re: VILIFICATION CAMPAIGN of the Judge of
Branch 52 RTC-Palawan from July 1 to 10, 2009. Do you recognize that as a member of the Bar
and as an officer of the Court, pursuant to the rules of judicial ethics and your oath of office as a
lawyer, your loyalty and fidelity is primarily to the Court? Do you still recognize this duty and
obligation?9

Indeed, Judge Blancaflor failed to conform to the standard of honesty and impartiality required
of judges as mandated under Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

As a public servant, a judge should perform his duties in accordance with the dictates of his
conscience and the light that God has given him. A judge should never allow himself to be
moved by pride, prejudice, passion, or pettiness in the performance of his duties. He should
always bear in mind that the power of the court to punish for contempt should be exercised for
purposes that are impersonal, because that power is intended as a safeguard not for the judges
as persons but for the functions that they exercise.10

Contempt and suspension proceedings are supposed to be separate and distinct. They have
different objects and purposes for which different procedures have been established. Judge
Blancaflor should have conducted separate proceedings. As held in the case of People v.
Godoy,11 thus:
A contempt proceeding for misbehavior in court is designed to vindicate the authority of the
court; on the other hand, the object of a disciplinary proceeding is to deal with the fitness of the
court's officer to continue in that office, to preserve and protect the court and the public from the
official ministrations of persons unfit or unworthy to hold such office. The principal purpose of
the exercise of the power to cite for contempt is to safeguard the functions of the court and
should thus be used sparingly on a preservative and not, on the vindictive principle. The
principal purpose of the exercise of disciplinary authority by the Supreme Court is to assure
respect for orders of such court by attorneys who, as much as judges, are responsible for the
orderly administration of justice.

x x x. It has likewise been the rule that a notice to a lawyer to show cause why he should not be
punished for contempt cannot be considered as a notice to show cause why he should not be
suspended from the practice of law, considering that they have distinct objects and for each of
them a different procedure is established. Contempt of court is governed by the procedures laid
down under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, whereas disciplinary actions in the practice of law are
governed by file 138 and 139 thereof.

Thus, it was grossly improper for Judge Blancaflor to consider his July 30, 2009 Order on the
contempt charge as the notice required in the disciplinary proceedings suspending petitioners
from the practice of law.1avvphi1

Granting that the simultaneous conduct of contempt and suspension proceedings is permitted,
the suspension of petitioners must still fail.

This Court is not unmindful of a judges power to suspend an attorney from practice for just
cause pursuant to Section 28, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court. Judge Blancaflor,
however, must be reminded that the requirements of due process must be complied with, as
mandated under Section 30, Rule 138 of the same Rules which specifically provides, viz:

Sec. 30. Attorney to be heard before removal or suspension. No attorney shall be removed or
suspended from the practice of his profession, until he has had full opportunity upon reasonable
notice to answer the charges against him, to produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to be
heard by himself or counsel. But if upon reasonable notice he fails to appear and answer the
accusation, the court may proceed to determine the matter ex parte.

Indeed, a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any misconduct showing any fault or
deficiency in his moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor. His guilt, however, cannot
be presumed. It must indicate the dubious character of the acts done, as well as the motivation
thereof. Furthermore, a disbarred lawyer must have been given full opportunity upon reasonable
notice to answer the charges against him, produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to be heard
by himself and counsel.12

In the case at bench, there was no prior and separate notice issued to petitioners setting forth
the facts constituting the misconduct and requiring them, within a specified period from receipt
thereof, to show cause why they should not be suspended from the practice of their profession.
Neither were they given full opportunity to defend themselves, to produce evidence on their
behalf and to be heard by themselves and counsel. Undoubtedly, the suspension proceedings
against petitioners are null and void, having violated their right to due process.
Likewise, Judge Blancaflors suspension order is also void as the basis for suspension is not
one of the causes that will warrant disciplinary action. Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules
enumerates the grounds for disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar from his office as
attorney, to wit: (1) deceit, (2) malpractice, (3) gross misconduct in office, (4) grossly immoral
conduct, (5) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, (6) violation of the lawyer's oath, (7)
willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, and for (8) willfully appearing as an
attorney for a party without authority to do so. Judge Blancaflor failed to show that the
suspension was for any of the foregoing grounds.

In fine, having established that Judge Blancaflor committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction, petitioners are entitled to the remedy of prohibition under
Section 2, Rule 71 of the Rules on Contempt which provides:

SEC. 2. Remedy therefrom. - The person adjudged in direct contempt by any court may not
appeal therefrom, but may avail himself of the remedies of certiorari or prohibition. The
execution of the judgment shall be suspended pending resolution of such petition, provided
such person files a bond fixed by the court which rendered the judgment and conditioned that
he will abide by and perform the judgment should the petition be decided against him.

Accordingly, an order of direct contempt is not immediately executory or enforceable. The

contemnor must be afforded a reasonable remedy to extricate or purge himself of the contempt.
Where the person adjudged in direct contempt by any court avails of the remedy of certiorari or
prohibition, the execution of the judgment shall be suspended pending resolution of such
petition provided the contemnor files a bond fixed by the court which rendered the judgment and
conditioned that he will abide by and perform the judgment should the petition be decided
against him.13

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The October 13, 2009 Decision and November 6,
2009 Order are hereby annulled and set aside. Judge Bienvenido Blancaflor is hereby
permanently enjoined from implementing the said decision and order. This injunctive order is
immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

CAPITOL HILLS GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB, INC. and PABLO B. ROMAN, JR., Petitioners,
vs.
MANUEL O. SANCHEZ, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before Us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
March 13, 2008 Decision1 and April 28, 2008 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. SP No. 100911, which affirmed the September 3, 2007 Resolution 3 of the Quezon City
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 226.

The relevant facts are as follows:

On July 1, 2002, respondent Manuel O. Sanchez (respondent), a stockholder of petitioner
Capitol Hills Golf & Country Club, Inc. (Corporation) filed a petition for the nullification of the
annual meeting of stockholders of May 21, 2002 and the special meeting of stockholders of April
23, 2002.4 Petitioners, along with their co-defendants, filed an Answer with Counterclaims 5 and,
thereafter, a Motion for Preliminary Hearing of Defendants Affirmative Defenses,6which was
denied on August 9, 20027 by Hon. Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr., then Presiding Judge of the RTC
of Quezon City, Branch 93, now a member of the Court of Appeals.

On August 12, 2002, respondent filed a Motion for Production and Inspection of Documents,
which the court granted in an Order dated September 10, 2002 directing, thus:

On motion of the plaintiff, without objection from the defendants, and pursuant to Rule 3 of the
Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies, in relation to Rule 27 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the defendants are ordered to produce and make available
for inspection and photocopying by the plaintiff the following documents:

1. The list of stockholders of record as of March 2002;

2. All proxies, whether validated or not, which have been received by the defendants;

3. The specimen signatures of all stockholders as contained in the Stock and Transfer
Book or on the stub of the stock certificate; and

4. The tape recording of the stockholders meeting on April 23, 2002 and May 21, 2002.

The production, inspection and photocopying must be undertaken in the office premises of
defendant corporation within reasonable business hours of a business day before the pre-trial
with costs to be shouldered by the plaintiff.

SO ORDERED.8

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration 9 (MR) of the August 9, 2002 Order, which denied
their motion for preliminary hearing. Subsequently, they filed a Supplement to Defendants
Motion for Reconsideration,10 attaching therewith an alleged certification issued by the National
Printing Office to support their contention of lack of cause of action on the grounds, among
others, that the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Memorandum Circular No. 5,
Series of 1996, as amended, has not been duly published in accordance with law and
jurisprudence. Pending resolution of the MR, petitioners filed on January 21, 2003 a Motion for
Deferment of Implementation of the September 10, 2002 Order.11

For his part, respondent, on October 7, 2002, filed an Omnibus Motion to immediately allow him
to inspect and photocopy the documents and to compel petitioners to deposit with the court the
documents subject of the September 10, 2002 Order.

On December 9, 2002, then Presiding Judge Bruselas issued an Order 12 denying petitioners
MR of the Order dated August 9, 2002 and considered respondents omnibus motion as a
reiteration of his earlier motion for inspection and production of documents; thus, the immediate
implementation of the September 10, 2002 Order was simultaneously ordered.
Petitioners elevated the case to the CA via a petition for certiorari assailing the Orders dated
August 9, 2002 and December 9, 2002. However, the CA denied the same in its Decision dated
June 29, 2004. Petitioners MR was likewise denied on November 3, 2004. A petition for review
was filed before this Court, but We denied it per Resolution dated January 10, 2005.

In the meantime, respondent sought to enforce the September 10, 2002 Order. The supposed
inspection on September 30, 2002 was not held per the trial courts Order dated September 27,
2002.13 The January 22, 2003 inspection also did not push through after petitioners and their co-
defendants again moved for its deferment.14 When the court eventually denied their motion on
June 16, 2003, respondent set the inspection to August 1, 2003.15 On said date, however, Atty.
Matias V. Defensor, then Corporate Secretary of the Corporation, was alleged to be out of town
and petitioner Pablo B. Roman, Jr. (Roman) purported to have shown no willingness to comply
with the directive.16 The matter was reported to the trial court, which merely noted respondents
Report and Manifestation.17On November 3, 2003, respondent moved for the issuance of an
order for immediate implementation of the September 10, 2002 Order, as reiterated in the Order
dated June 16, 2003, but the court denied the same in its May 24, 2004 Order. 18 Respondents
motion for issuance of writ of execution suffered the same fate when the trial court denied it on
February 10, 2005.19

When this Court settled petitioners challenge to the Orders dated August 9, 2002 and
December 9, 2002, respondent filed a Manifestation with Omnibus Motion for Clarification and
to Resolve Plaintiffs Pending Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Execution and to Set the Case
for Pre-Trial Conference.20 Acting thereon, Judge Ramon Paul L. Hernando, likewise now a
member of the Court of Appeals, who took over Branch 93 after the appointment of Judge
Bruselas to the CA, issued the July 10, 2006 Order,21 which directed the immediate execution of
the September 10, 2002 Order, and set the case for pre-trial.

On February 9, 2007, Judge Hernando issued an Order22 inhibiting himself from handling the
case in view of his "close friendship relation" with petitioners counsel and ordering the
transmittal of the records of the case to the Office of the Clerk of Court for re-raffle to another
sala. The case was subsequently re-raffled to RTC Branch 90 presided by Judge Reynaldo B.
Daway, who likewise voluntarily recused himself from the case per Order 23 dated July 13, 2007.
Finally, on July 30, 2007, the case was re-raffled to RTC Branch 226 presided by Judge Leah S.
Domingo Regala.24

On November 28, 2006, the parties agreed to defer the pre-trial conference until the actual
conduct of the inspection of records/documents on December 12, 2006. 25 Before said date,
however, petitioners and their co-defendants moved to hold the inspection to January 11, 2007,
which the court granted.26

During the January 11, 2007 inspection, the only document produced by the Acting Corporate
Secretary, Atty. Antonio V. Meriz, and one of the staff, Malou Santos, was the Stock and
Transfer Book of the Corporation. They alleged that they could not find from the corporate
records the copies of the proxies submitted by the stockholders, including the tape recordings
taken during the stockholders meetings, and that they needed more time to locate and find the
list of stockholders as of March 2002, which was in the bodega of the Corporation. 27 This
prompted respondent to file a Manifestation with Omnibus Motion praying that an order be
issued in accordance with Section 3, Paragraphs (a) to (d) of Rule 29 of the Rules of Court
(Rules), in relation to Section 4, Rule 3 of the Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-
Corporate Controversies under Republic Act No. 8799 (Interim Rules).
On September 3, 2007, the trial court issued a Resolution, the concluding portion of which
ordered:

In order to give both the plaintiff and defendants one last chance to comply with the order dated
September 10, 2002, this Court reiterates the said order:

"On motion of the plaintiff, without objection from the defendants, and pursuant to Rule 3 of the
Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies[,] in relation to Rule 27 of
the 1997 Rule[s] of Civil Procedure, the defendants are ordered to produce and make available
for inspection and photocopying by the plaintiff the following documents:

1. The list of stockholders of record as of March 2002;

2. All proxies, whether validated or not, which have been received by the defendants;

3. The specimen signatures of all stockholders as contained in the Stock and Transfer
Book or on the stub of the stock certificate; and

4. The tape recording of the stockholders meeting on April 23, 2002 and May 21, 2002.

The production, inspection and photocopying must be undertaken in the office premises of
defendant corporation within reasonable business hours of a business day before the pre-trial
with costs to be shouldered by the plaintiff.

SO ORDERED."

This Court orders the defendants to strictly comply with this order. Failure of the defendants to
comply with all the requirements of the order dated September 10, 2002 will result in this court
citing all the defendants in contempt of court. This Court shall order defendants solidarily to pay
a fine of 10,000.00 for every day of delay to comply with the order of September 10, 2002 until
the defendants shall have fully and completely complied with the said order.

Further sanctions shall be meted upon defendants should the Court find that defendants have
been in bad faith in complying with the order of September 10, 2002 despite the order of this
Court.

Both plaintiff and counsel, as well as defendants and counsel, are therefore ordered to meet on
November 13, 2007 at the corporate offices of defendant firm between 9:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. so
that faithful compliance with the order of September 10, 2002 may be done, otherwise, this
Court shall allow the plaintiff to present evidence to prove their prayer in their Manifestation with
Omnibus Motion filed on January 31, 2007 and issue a resolution based on the same
accordingly.

SO ORDERED.28

Petitioners questioned the aforesaid Resolution via Petition for Certiorari (With Application for
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction).29 In resolving the petition,
the CA ruled that there is no indication that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. According to the appellate court, the September 3,
2007 Resolution was issued pursuant to Section 3,30 Rule 3 of the Interim Rules, with the
suppletory application of Section 1,31 Rule 27 of the Rules. It noted that, except for the sanctions
contained therein, the assailed Resolution merely reiterated the September 10, 2002 Order of
Judge Bruselas, which petitioners did not dispute in accordance with Section 2, 32 Rule 3 of the
Interim Rules or via petition for certiorari. The CA further held that petitioners were not denied
due process as they were able to move for a reconsideration of the September 10, 2002 Order,
but not opted to file the same with respect to the September 3, 2007 Resolution.

Anent the argument against the threatened imposition of sanction for contempt of court and the
possible payment of a hefty fine, the CA opined that the case of Dee v. Securities and
Exchange Commission33 cited by petitioners is inapplicable, since the September 3, 2007
Resolution merely warned petitioners that they would be cited for contempt and be fined if they
fail to comply with the courts directive. Moreover, it said that the penalty contained in the
September 3, 2007 Resolution is in accord with Section 4,34 Rule 3 of the Interim Rules, in
relation to Section 3,35 Rule 29 of the Rules.

Petitioners moved to reconsider the CA Decision, but it was denied. 36

Before Us, petitioners contend that the "threatened imminent action" by the RTC to penalize
them sua sponte or without regard to the guideline laid down by the Court in Engr. Torcende v.
Judge Sardido37 is not proper and calls for the exercise of Our power of supervision over the
lower courts. Likewise, citing Panaligan v. Judge Ibay,38 among others, they claim that the
threatened citation for contempt is not in line with the policy that there should be wilfullness or
that the contumacious act be done deliberately in disregard of the authority of the court.

We deny.

A person guilty of disobedience of or resistance to a lawful order of a court39 or commits any

improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the
administration of justice40 may be punished for indirect contempt. In particular, Section 4, Rule 3
of the Interim Rules states that, in addition to a possible treatment of a party as non-suited or as
in default, the sanctions prescribed in the Rules for failure to avail of, or refusal to comply with,
the modes of discovery shall apply. Under Section 3, Rule 29 of the Rules, if a party or an
officer or managing agent of a party refuses to obey an order to produce any document or other
things for inspection, copying, or photographing or to permit it to be done, the court may make
such orders as are just. The enumeration of options given to the court under Section 3, Rule 29
of the Rules is not exclusive, as shown by the phrase "among others." Thus, in Republic v.
Sandiganbayan,41 We said:

To ensure that availment of the modes of discovery is otherwise untrammeled and efficacious,
the law imposes serious sanctions on the party who refuses to make discovery, such as
dismissing the action or proceeding or part thereof, or rendering judgment by default against the
disobedient party; contempt of court, or arrest of the party or agent of the party; payment of the
amount of reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining a court order to compel discovery; taking
the matters inquired into as established in accordance with the claim of the party seeking
discovery; refusal to allow the disobedient party support or oppose designated claims or
defenses; striking out pleadings or parts thereof; staying further proceedings. 42

If adjudged guilty of indirect contempt, the respondent who committed it against a Regional Trial
Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank may be punished with a fine not exceeding thirty
thousand pesos, or imprisonment not exceeding six (6) months, or both.43 In this case, the
threatened sanction of possibly ordering petitioners to solidarily pay a fine of 10,000.00 for
every day of delay in complying with the September 10, 2002 Order is well within the allowable
range of penalty.

As far as the proceedings for indirect contempt is concerned, the case of Baculi v. Judge
Belen44 is instructive:

x x x Under the Rules of Court, there are two ways of initiating indirect contempt proceedings:
(1) motu proprio by the court; or (2) by a verified petition.

In the Matter of the Contempt Orders against Lt. Gen. Jose M. Calimlim and Atty. Domingo A.
Doctor, Jr. (Calimlim) clarified the procedure prescribed for indirect contempt proceedings. We
held in that case:

In contempt proceedings, the prescribed procedure must be followed. Sections 3 and 4, Rule 71
of the Rules of Court provide the procedure to be followed in case of indirect contempt. First,
there must be an order requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be cited for
contempt. Second, the respondent must be given the opportunity to comment on the charge
against him. Third, there must be a hearing and the court must investigate the charge and
consider respondents answer. Finally, only if found guilty will respondent be punished
accordingly. (Citations omitted.)

As to the second mode of initiating indirect contempt proceedings, that is, through a verified
petition, the rule is already settled in Regalado v. Go:

In cases where the court did not initiate the contempt charge, the Rules prescribe that a verified
petition which has complied with the requirements of initiatory pleadings as outlined in the
heretofore quoted provision of second paragraph, Section 4, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, must
be filed.

The Rules itself is explicit on this point:

In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified petition with
supporting particulars and certified true copies of documents or papers involved therein, and
upon full compliance with the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the
court concerned. If the contempt charges arose out of or are related to a principal action
pending in the court, the petition for contempt shall allege that fact but said petition shall be
docketed, heard and decided separately, unless the court in its discretion orders the
consolidation of the contempt charge and the principal action for joint hearing and decision.
(Emphasis added.)

Thus, where there is a verified petition to cite someone in contempt of court, courts have the
duty to ensure that all the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings have been complied with. It
behooves them too to docket the petition, and to hear and decide it separately from the main
case, unless the presiding judge orders the consolidation of the contempt proceedings and the
main action.

But in indirect contempt proceedings initiated motu proprio by the court, the above rules, as
clarified in Regalado, do not necessarily apply. First, since the court itself motu proprio initiates
the proceedings, there can be no verified petition to speak of. Instead, the court has the duty to
inform the respondent in writing, in accordance with his or her right to due process. This formal
charge is done by the court in the form of an Order requiring the respondent to explain why he
or she should not be cited in contempt of court.

In Calimlim, the Judge issued an Order requiring the petitioners to explain their failure to bring
the accused before the RTC for his scheduled arraignment. We held in that case that such
Order was not yet sufficient to initiate the contempt proceedings because it did not yet amount
to a show-cause order directing the petitioners to explain why they should not be cited in
contempt. The formal charge has to be specific enough to inform the person, against whom
contempt proceedings are being conducted, that he or she must explain to the court; otherwise,
he or she will be cited in contempt. The Order must express this in clear and unambiguous
language.

xxxx

Second, when the court issues motu proprio a show-cause order, the duty of the court (1) to
docket and (2) to hear and decide the case separately from the main case does not arise, much
less to exercise the discretion to order the consolidation of the cases. There is no petition from
any party to be docketed, heard and decided separately from the main case precisely because it
is the show-cause order that initiated the proceedings.

What remains in any case, whether the proceedings are initiated by a verified petition or by the
court motu proprio, is the duty of the court to ensure that the proceedings are conducted
respecting the right to due process of the party being cited in contempt. In both modes of
initiating indirect contempt proceedings, if the court deems that the answer to the contempt
charge is satisfactory, the proceedings end. The court must conduct a hearing, and the court
must consider the respondents answer. Only if found guilty will the respondent be punished
accordingly.

xxxx

In contempt proceedings, the respondent must be given the right to defend himself or herself
and have a day in court a basic requirement of due process. This is especially so in indirect
contempt proceedings, as the court cannot decide them summarily pursuant to the Rules of
Court. As We have stated in Calimlim, in indirect contempt proceedings, the respondent must
be given the opportunity to comment on the charge against him or her, and there must be a
hearing, and the court must investigate the charge and consider the respondents answer. 45

In this case, the proceedings for indirect contempt have not been initiated.1wphi1 To the
Courts mind, the September 3, 2007 Resolution could be treated as a mere reiteration of the
September 10, 2002 Order. It is not yet a "judgment or final order of a court in a case of indirect
contempt" as contemplated under the Rules. The penalty mentioned therein only serves as a
reminder to caution petitioners of the consequence of possible non-observance of the long-
overdue order to produce and make available for inspection and photocopying of the requested
records/documents. In case of another failure or refusal to comply with the directive, the court or
respondent could formally initiate the indirect contempt proceedings pursuant to the mandatory
requirements of the Rules and existing jurisprudence.
Even if We are to treat the September 3, 2007 Resolution as a "judgment or final order of a
court in a case of indirect contempt," this would still not work to petitioners advantage. Section
11, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court lays down the proper remedy from a judgment in indirect
contempt proceedings. It states:

Sec. 11. Review of judgment or final order; bond for stay.The judgment or final order of a
court in a case of indirect contempt may be appealed to the proper court as in criminal cases.
But execution of the judgment or final order shall not be suspended until a bond is filed by the
person adjudged in contempt, in an amount fixed by the court from which the appeal is taken,
conditioned that if the appeal be decided against him he will abide by and perform the judgment
or final order.

The recourse provided for in the above-mentioned provision is clear enough: the person
adjudged in indirect contempt must file an appeal under Rule 41 (Appeal from the Regional Trial
Courts) and post a bond for its suspension pendente lite. 46 Obviously, these were not done in
this case. Instead, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules and did not
post the required bond, effectively making the September 3, 2007 Resolution final and
executory.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED. The March 13, 2008
Decision and April 28, 2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 100911,
which affirmed the September 3, 2007 Resolution of the Quezon City Regional Trial Court,
Branch 226, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

PROSEC. JORGE D. BACULI, COMPLAINANT,

vs.
JUDGE MEDEL ARNALDO B. BELEN, RTC, BR. 36, CALAMBA CITY,
LAGUNA, RESPONDENT.

x---------------x

A.M. NO. RTJ-10-2234 [FORMERLY A.M. OCA I.P.I. NO. 08-2879-RTJ]

PROSEC. JORGE D. BACULI, COMPLAINANT,

vs.
JUDGE MEDEL ARNALDO B. BELEN, RTC, BR. 36, CALAMBA CITY,
LAGUNA, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

VELASCO JR., J.:

These two cases stem from two separate administrative complaints filed by then State
Prosecutor II (and currently Provincial Prosecutor of Zambales) Jorge D. Baculi (Baculi) against
respondent Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen (Judge Belen) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 36 in Calamba City, Laguna. In both administrative complaints, including the
supplemental complaints he later filed, Baculi charged Judge Belen with gross ignorance of the
law, gross misconduct, violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019, as amended,
grave abuse of authority, violation of RA 6713, conduct prejudicial to the interest of the public
service, oppressive conduct, harassment, issuance of fraudulent and unjust order/s and
decisions, among other offenses.

On April 28, 2010, the Court ordered the consolidation of the two complaints pursuant to the
recommendation of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), as they involve the same
parties and raise the same issues.

The Facts

A.M. No. RTJ-09-2179

In the first complaint dated April 10, 2008 docketed as OCA I.P.I. No. 08-2873-RTJ, and later
redocketed as A.M. No. RTJ-09-2179, Baculi alleged that Judge Belen committed the above-
mentioned inculpatory acts in relation to People of the Philippines v. Azucena Capacete, 1 then
pending in RTC, Branch 36 in Calamba City, presided by Judge Belen.

The principal cause of action, as stated in the complaint, is the "unlawful, unconstitutional,
illegal, arbitrary, malicious, capricious and immoral orders" 2 issued by Judge Belen. The
adverted issuances refer to the December 18, 2006 Decision, in which Baculi was found guilty
of direct contempt, and the June 7, 2007 Decision, wherein Judge Belen declared Baculi guilty
of indirect contempt of court, for the contemptuous nature of pleadings that Baculi filed in his
sala.3

On August 9, 2005, Baculi, then stationed at the Hall of Justice of San Pablo City, Laguna, and
partially detailed with the City Prosecutors Office of Calamba City, filed an Information for
Qualified Theft against one Azucena Capacete. On August 30, 2005, Judge Belen, based on his
finding that the crime committed was not Qualified Theft but Estafa, dismissed the case. Baculi
then filed a Motion for Reconsideration4 to reverse the dismissal order, but the motion was
denied.

On February 27, 2006, Judge Belen issued an Order5 directing Baculi to explain why he should
not be cited in contempt of court for the following statement in his Motion for Reconsideration,
which, to Judge Belen, attacked the integrity of the Court and is, thus, subject to indirect
contempt proceedings:

The dismissal of the information by the court was motivated by hatred, ill-will, and prejudice
against Asst. State Prosecutor II Jorge Baculi, the Investigating Prosecutor at the Preliminary
Investigation.

In due time, Baculi filed a Comment,6 alleging that Judge Belens orders reveal his
"premeditated, vitriolic, personal attacks, resentment and vendetta" 7 against Baculi. This was
followed by several motions to postpone, among which is denominated as an "Urgent
Reiterative Motion to Dismiss and/or Hold in Abeyance the Proceedings and/or Resolution of
the Citation for Contempt with Voluntary Inhibition and Complaints for Gross Ignorance of the
Law, Grave Misconduct, Abuse of Authority and Acts Unbecoming of a Lawyer and a Member of
the Judiciary, Harassment and Oppressive Conduct" 8 dated November 17, 2006 (Reiterative
Motion). In it, Baculi alleged that the sheer unprecedented number of pending contempt cases
against him reveals Judge Belens determination to place him in contempt of court. Personal
resentment and hatred, he added, was the real reason why Judge Belen initiated contempt
cases against him. Meanwhile, Baculi also moved for the postponement of the hearings in the
contempt proceedings set for the month of December. In the Order9 of December 11, 2006,
Judge Belen moved the hearings on the contempt proceedings to February 7 and 14, 2007.

In the meantime, on December 18, 2006, Judge Belen issued a Decision, finding Baculi guilty of
direct contempt of court for violating the decency and propriety of the judicial system in using, as
he did, unethical language in his November 17, 2006 Reiterative Motion, copies of which he
furnished to various judicial and executive officers. Judge Belens December 18, 2006 Decision
dispositively reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the respondent Jorge Baculi GUILTY of direct contempt and
sentenced him to pay the fine of ONE THOUSAND (1,000.00) PESOS and suffer
imprisonment of TWELVE (12) HOURS.

The bail for the provisional liberty of the accused is fixed at 5,000.10

Therefrom, Baculi filed a Motion for Reconsideration 11 with new/additional complaints, dated
January 24, 2007.

Meanwhile, in relation to the indirect contempt proceedings, Baculi continued to file

manifestations and motions to postpone or cancel the hearings, also seeking the voluntary
inhibition of Judge Belen. Eventually, Judge Belen promulgated a Decision on June 7, 2007
finding Baculi in contempt of court, thus:

WHEREFORE, this court finds Respondent Jorge D. Baculi GUILTY of contempt of court and
sentenced him to pay the penalty of TWENTY THOUSAND (20,000.00) PESOS and suffer
imprisonment of FOUR (4) DAYS. 12

Baculi then filed on July 11, 2007 a Notice of Appeal, and a motion/manifestation praying for the
stay of execution of the judgment. On August 6, 2007, Judge Belen directed Baculi to post a
supersedeas bond in the amount of PhP 40,000 within two days from notice to stay the
execution of the two contempt decisions.13

Baculi moved to reconsider the amount of the supersedeas bond, insisting that it is arbitrary,
whimsical, punitive, prohibitive, exorbitant, confiscatory, and excessive. 14 However, in an
Order15 issued on August 29, 2007, the motion was stricken off the records of the case.

In another Order16 issued on August 20, 2007, Judge Belen directed the issuance of a writ of
execution and a warrant of arrest against Baculi, to implement the December 18, 2006 and June
7, 2007 Decisions. On March 24, 2008, Judge Belen issued two Orders, declaring both the
December 18, 2006 and June 7, 2007 Decisions, respectively, final and executory.

On April 10, 2008, Baculi filed the instant verified administrative complaint, alleging that Judge
Belens December 18, 2006 and June 7, 2007 Decisions violated his right to due process of law.
As Baculi argued, he was not formally charged, and no notice or hearing was conducted to
afford him the opportunity to air his side. He also alleged that the same decisions imposed
oppressive and excessive penalties, and that the acts of Judge Belen were whimsical and
oppressive. Judge Belen, Baculi averred, had already predetermined the outcome of the cases,
and was only perfunctorily going through the motions to give a semblance of legality to his
illegal actions.17
In a Supplemental Complaint filed on April 21, 2008, Baculi alleged that Judge Belen acted in
bad faith when he ordered on December 11, 2006 the resetting of the hearings, but cited him in
direct contempt on December 18, 2006. Hence, the December 18, 2006 Decision was rendered
without waiting for the rescheduled hearings.18

In his Comment,19 Judge Belen averred that the contempt proceedings would not have been
initiated had Baculi not filed the contemptuous pleadings. He further alleged that Baculis failure
to avail himself of any remedy with respect to the December 18, 2006 and June 7, 2007
Decisions rendered such decisions final and executory. Judge Belen added that he cannot be
held administratively liable absent a declaration from a competent tribunal that the Decisions in
question are legally infirm or have been rendered with grave abuse of discretion. He also
argued that the administrative complaint cannot be resorted to only to reverse, nullify, or modify
the orders and decisions that he issued as a judge.

A.M. No. RTJ-10-2234

The facts surrounding A.M. No. RTJ-10-2234 are substantially similar to those in A.M. No. RTJ-
09-2179. It involves the same parties, and similar direct and indirect contempt proceedings,
albeit related to a different case.

In the Complaint he filed on April 21, 2008, docketed as OCA I.P.I. No. 08-2879-RTJ, and later
redocketed as A.M. No. RTJ-10-2234, Baculi charged Judge Belen with committing acts similar
to those specified in the first complaint but this time in relation to People of the Philippines v.
Jenelyn Estacio,20 then also pending in RTC, Branch 36 in Calamba City, where Judge Belen is
the Presiding Judge. The case was prosecuted by Prosecutor Albert Josep Comilang
(Comilang).

The subject of the Complaint here relates to similar decisions of Judge Belen dated December
18, 2006 and June 7, 2007, finding Baculi guilty of direct contempt and indirect contempt,
respectively. Noticeably, these are the same dates when the Decisions subject of the first
Complaint have been issued, albeit referring to different contempt citations.

On February 24, 2005, Judge Belen issued an Order, requiring Comilang to explain why he did
not inform the court of the preliminary investigation he earlier set. In time, Comilang filed an
explanation with Motion for Reconsideration, followed by a Reiterative Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration, which became the subject of Judge Belens show-cause order dated May 30,
2005.

Comilang timely filed his Comment/Explanation, where Baculi, along with Regional State
Prosecutor Ernesto Mendoza (Mendoza), participated in the form of a "notation." In an Order
dated December 12, 2005, Judge Belen directed both Baculi and Mendoza to explain why they
should not be cited in contempt of court (indirect contempt proceedings) for their participation in
Comilangs Comment/Explanation.

As what happened in the first administrative complaint, Baculi filed several motions and
manifestations, including a similar Reiterative Motion on November 16, 2006, resulting in a
direct contempt citation on December 18, 2006, the fallo of which states:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Jorge Baculi GUILTY of direct contempt and
sentenced him to pay the fine of TWO THOUSAND (2,000) PESOS and to suffer
imprisonment of TWO (2) DAYS.

The bail for the provisional liberty of the respondent is fixed at 5,000.

In response, Baculi filed a Motion for Reconsideration with new/additional Complaints dated
January 24, 2007.

In the indirect contempt proceedings, Baculi also filed several motions to postpone/cancel the
hearings. On June 7, 2007, Judge Belen issued a Decision finding Baculi guilty of indirect
contempt of court due to his failure to file his explanation as required by the Order issued on
December 15, 2005, despite the lapse of more than one year. The decretal portion of the
Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, this Court finds Respondent Jorge D. Baculi GUILTY of contempt of court and
sentenced him to pay the penalty of TWENTY THOUSAND (20,000) PESOS and suffer
imprisonment of TWO (2) DAYS.

Baculi filed a Notice of Appeal. The court required Baculi to post a supersedeas bond in the
amount of PhP 30,000 to stay the execution of the June 7, 2007 judgment, but denied the stay
of the execution of the December 18, 2006 Decision, because the reglementary period to file a
petition for certiorari or prohibition has already lapsed. Baculi failed to pay the supersedeas
bond. Thus, Judge Belen ordered the issuance of a writ of execution and a warrant of arrest
against him, and declared the two contempt Decisions as final and executory.

On April 21, 2008, Baculi filed the present administrative complaint, predicated on substantially
similar arguments presented in A.M. No. RTJ-09-2179. Judge Belens Joint Comment dated
July 1, 2008 is a virtual substantive repeat of his Comment in the first complaint.

The Issues

The issues presented in these consolidated cases are:

Whether the respondent Judge acted beyond his authority, or in a despotic manner, in
conducting the contempt proceedings against the complainant; and

Whether the respondent Judge committed reprehensible conduct in issuing the Orders and
Decisions relating to the contempt proceedings.

The OCA Recommendation

This Court referred the consolidated cases to the OCA for investigation. The OCA, accordingly,
rendered its Report,21 finding the complaint partially meritorious. The OCA stated the
observation that the complaint infringes on the judicial prerogatives of Judge Belen, which may
only be questioned through judicial remedies under the Rules of Court, and not by way of an
administrative complaint.22 The OCA wrote:
[T]he complainant did not contest the soundness of the assailed Decisions and Orders through
the proper judicial channels. An Appeal under Rule 41 or Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court, whichever is applicable under the premises, would have been the
appropriate recourse to question the assailed decisions and orders. 23

Nonetheless, the OCA found Judge Belen liable for having "incorporated" the indirect contempt
proceeding with the main case, People vs. Capacete, when the proper procedure, as laid down
in Rule 71, Sec. 4 of the Rules of Court, is for the indirect contempt proceedings to be
"docketed, heard, and decided separately," unless the court orders the consolidation of the main
action and the contempt proceedings.

For his failure to follow the elementary rules of procedure, the OCA recommended that Judge
Belen be adjudged guilty of gross ignorance of the law, and be fined in the amount of thirty
thousand pesos (PhP 30,000), with a stern warning that a similar offense in the future shall
merit a more severe penalty.

Our Ruling

We partially uphold the findings of the OCA.

Indeed, as the OCA correctly stated, administrative complaints cannot substitute for the lost
remedies in the judgments of contempt. The OCAs determination, however, that Judge Belen
failed to follow the proper procedure in indirect contempt proceedings is erroneous. We take
exception in this finding.

Administrative complaint cannot

substitute for lost judicial remedies

The OCA correctly found that these administrative cases cannot be resorted to as substitutes
for the remedies not availed of in the contempt proceedings. The complaints, in the main,
challenge several Orders issued by Judge Belen in the respective contempt proceedings, and
the four contempt Decisions issued on December 18, 2006 and June 7, 2007. But as correctly
observed by the OCA, issuances in the exercise of judicial prerogatives may only be questioned
through judicial remedies under the Rules of Court and not by way of an administrative inquiry,
absent fraud, ill intentions, or corrupt motive.24 The institution of an administrative complaint is
not the proper remedy for correcting the action of a judge alleged to have gone beyond the
norms of propriety, where a sufficient judicial remedy exists.25

Rule 71, Secs. 2 and 11 of the Rules of Court lay down the proper remedies from a judgment in
direct and indirect contempt proceedings, respectively. For direct contempt, the Rules states:

Sec. 2. Remedy therefrom.The person adjudged in direct contempt by any court may not
appeal therefrom, but may avail himself of the remedies of certiorari or prohibition. The
execution of the judgment shall be suspended pending resolution of such petition, provided
such person files a bond fixed by the court which rendered the judgment and conditioned that
he will abide by and perform the judgment should the petition be decided against him.

In indirect contempt proceedings, the Rules states:

Sec. 11. Review of judgment or final order; bond for stay.The judgment or final order of a
court in a case of indirect contempt may be appealed to the proper court as in criminal cases.
But execution of the judgment or final order shall not be suspended until a bond is filed by the
person adjudged in contempt, in an amount fixed by the court from which the appeal is taken,
conditioned that if the appeal be decided against him he will abide by and perform the judgment
or final order.

The remedies provided for in the above-mentioned Rules are clear enough. The complainant
could have filed an appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court on the Decisions in the indirect
contempt cases. For the direct contempt citations, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 was
available to him. He failed to avail himself of both remedies. He chose instead to question the
proceedings and the judgments in the form of motions and manifestations, and administrative
complaints. Due to the failure of the complainant here to avail himself of these remedies, Judge
Belen correctly ruled that the assailed judgments have become final and executory. They
cannot anymore be reviewed by this Court.

Time and again, We have stressed that disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions brought
against a judge in relation to the performance of his or her official functions are neither
complementary nor suppletory to the appropriate judicial remedies. They are also not a
substitute to such remedies. Any party who may feel aggrieved should resort to these remedies,
and exhaust them, instead of resorting to disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions. 26

Even assuming that the Orders are infirm, they have already become final and executory, which
even this Court cannot review or disturb. Public policy demands that even at the risk of
occasional errors, judgments or orders rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction should
become final at some definite time fixed by law and that parties should not be permitted to
litigate the same issues over again.27 Quieta non movere.

Complainant failed to prove bad faith, evil motive

or corrupt intention on the part of Judge Belen

Complainant Baculi tags all the contempt proceedings against him as sham, and were taken, so
he claims, as a direct result of a prior incident between him and Judge Belen where he issued a
Resolution recommending that Judge Belen be charged for libel. He has belabored this point in
his complaint and supplemental complaints, pointing out that the judge has deep-seated hatred
for him and is bent on repeatedly citing him in contempt.

Aside from his bare allegations, the complainant, however, has not presented any credible
evidence to support his allegations against Judge Belen. The fact that Judge Belen had initiated
contempt proceedings against him, and in fact convicted him in such contempt proceedings,
does not by itself amount to ill motives on the part of Judge Belen. The initiation of the contempt
proceedings stemmed from the acts of the complainant himself. His unsupported claim that the
prior libel case he filed against Judge Belen created animosity between them is not sufficient to
prove his claim of evil motives on the part of Judge Belen.

As the proponent of these allegations, the complainant should have adduced the necessary
evidence to prove the claim of bad faith. This he failed to do. In the absence of any evidence to
the contrary, the following presumptions stand: (1) that official duty has been regularly
performed;28 and (2) that a judge, acting as such, was acting in the lawful exercise of
jurisdiction.29

Judge Belen cannot be administratively liable on the

final and executory decision, in the absence of evil

or corrupt motives or gross ignorance of the law

A judge cannot be held administratively liable at every turn for every erroneous decision. The
error must be gross and deliberate, a product of a perverted judicial mind, or a result of gross
ignorance of the law. This is as it should be, for no one tasked to determine the facts in light of
the evidence adduced or interpret and apply the law, following prescribed rules, can be
infallible.30 All that is expected from a judge is to "follow the rules prescribed to ensure a fair and
impartial hearing, assess the different factors that emerge therefrom and bear on the issues
presented, and on the basis of the conclusions he finds established, adjudicate the case
accordingly."31 As We have held in Dantes v. Caguioa:32

Not every error bespeaks ignorance of the law, for if committed in good faith, it does not warrant
administrative sanctions. To hold otherwise would be nothing short of harassment and would
make his position double unbearable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law
in the process of administering justice can be infallible in judgment.

As We have already stated, the complainant has failed to adduce evidence in support of his
claim of evil or corrupt motives on the part of the judge. That, and the fact that the subject
Decisions are already final and executory, lead Us to conclude that no administrative liability
can arise on the part of Judge Belen, if the contempt proceedings that he conducted followed
the required procedure under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.

Judge Belen followed the proper procedure

in citing complainant in contempt of court

The OCA Report found that Judge Belen failed to follow the mandatory procedure under Rule
71, because the contempt proceedings were heard and decided under the same docket or case
number. We cannot sustain this finding of the OCA. Under the Rules of Court, there are two
ways of initiating indirect contempt proceedings: (1) motu proprio by the court; or (2) by a
verified petition.

In the Matter of the Contempt Orders against Lt. Gen. Jose M. Calimlim and Atty. Domingo A.
Doctor, Jr.33 (Calimlim) clarified the procedure prescribed for indirect contempt proceedings. We
held in that case:

In contempt proceedings, the prescribed procedure must be followed. Sections 3 and 4, Rule 71
of the Rules of Court provide the procedure to be followed in case of indirect contempt. First,
there must be an order requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be cited for
contempt. Second, the respondent must be given the opportunity to comment on the charge
against him. Third, there must be a hearing and the court must investigate the charge and
consider respondents answer. Finally, only if found guilty will respondent be punished
accordingly. (Citations omitted.)
As to the second mode of initiating indirect contempt proceedings, that is, through a verified
petition, the rule is already settled in Regalado v. Go:

In cases where the court did not initiate the contempt charge, the Rules prescribe that a verified
petition which has complied with the requirements of initiatory pleadings as outlined in the
heretofore quoted provision of second paragraph, Section 4, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, must
be filed.34

The Rules itself is explicit on this point:

In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified petition with
supporting particulars and certified true copies of documents or papers involved therein, and
upon full compliance with the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the
court concerned. If the contempt charges arose out of or are related to a principal action
pending in the court, the petition for contempt shall allege that fact but said petition shall be
docketed, heard and decided separately, unless the court in its discretion orders the
consolidation of the contempt charge and the principal action for joint hearing and
decision.35 (Emphasis added.)

Thus, where there is a verified petition to cite someone in contempt of court, courts have the
duty to ensure that all the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings have been complied with. It
behooves them too to docket the petition, and to hear and decide it separately from the main
case, unless the presiding judge orders the consolidation of the contempt proceedings and the
main action.

But in indirect contempt proceedings inititated motu proprio by the court, the above rules, as
clarified in Regalado, do not necessarily apply. First, since the court itself motu proprio initiates
the proceedings, there can be no verified petition to speak of. Instead, the court has the duty to
inform the respondent in writing, in accordance with his or her right to due process. This formal
charge is done by the court in the form of an Order requiring the respondent to explain why he
or she should not be cited in contempt of court.

In Calimlim, the Judge issued an Order requiring the petitioners to explain their failure to bring
the accused before the RTC for his scheduled arraignment. We held in that case that such
Order was not yet sufficient to initiate the contempt proceedings because it did not yet amount
to a show-cause order directing the petitioners to explain why they should not be cited in
contempt.36 The formal charge has to be specific enough to inform the person, against whom
contempt proceedings are being conducted, that he or she must explain to the court; otherwise,
he or she will be cited in contempt. The Order must express this in clear and unambiguous
language.

In the case at bar, the Orders issued by Judge Belen are in the nature of a show-cause
order.1wphi1 The Orders clearly directed Baculi, as respondent, to explain within 10 days from
receipt of the Order why he should not be cited in contempt. These Orders are formal charges
sufficient to initiate the respective indirect contempt proceedings.

Second, when the court issues motu proprio a show-cause order, the duty of the court (1) to
docket and (2) to hear and decide the case separately from the main case does not arise, much
less to exercise the discretion to order the consolidation of the cases. There is no petition from
any party to be docketed, heard and decided separately from the main case precisely because it
is the show-cause order that initiated the proceedings.

What remains in any case, whether the proceedings are initiated by a verified petition or by the
court motu proprio, is the duty of the court to ensure that the proceedings are conducted
respecting the right to due process of the party being cited in contempt. In both modes of
initiating indirect contempt proceedings, if the court deems that the answer to the contempt
charge is satisfactory, the proceedings end. The court must conduct a hearing, and the court
must consider the respondents answer. Only if found guilty will the respondent be punished
accordingly.37

Complainant was afforded the opportunity

to present his defense, but he failed to do so

In contempt proceedings, the respondent must be given the right to defend himself or herself
and have a day in courta basic requirement of due process. This is especially so in indirect
contempt proceedings, as the court cannot decide them summarily pursuant to the Rules of
Court. As We have stated in Calimlim, in indirect contempt proceedings, the respondent must
be given the opportunity to comment on the charge against him or her, and there must be a
hearing, and the court must investigate the charge and consider the respondents answer.

In this case, however, complainant Baculi blatantly refused to answer the charges of indirect
contempt initiated against him. Instead, he filed numerous motions and manifestations to
postpone or cancel the hearings. In the facts surrounding both A.M. No. RTJ-09-2179 and A.M.
No. RTJ-10-2234, Judge Baculi had set a date for the hearings on the indirect contempt
proceedings in December 2006, but Baculi filed motions to postpone them. In the respective
Orders issued on December 11, 2006, Judge Baculi granted the postponement of the hearings,
moving them to February 2007.

Instead of answering the charges however, Baculi filed several motions, reiterating his argument
that Judge Belen should be subject to disciplinary proceedings. Not once in his submissions did
he controvert the charges against him, opting instead to merely harp on his contention that
Judge Belen harbored a personal resentment against him.

It cannot be said that Judge Belen did not afford Baculi the opportunity to be heard on the
contempt proceedings. Even as the respective hearings on the two indirect contempt cases set
in February 2007 did not push through due to the numerous motions filed by Baculi, Judge
Belen still waited for the former to answer the charges against him. No answer ever came,
howeveronly numerous manifestations and motions for postponement.

In all, Judge Belen cannot plausibly be blamed for the fact that the June 7, 2007 Decisions were
issued without any answer from Baculi. The fault belongs to Baculi himself, who insisted on
resolving the indirect contempt proceedings in the form of an administrative complaint against
the judge. Baculi was afforded ample time and opportunity to present his case in court, but he
squandered the opportunity.

A final note. In its Decision of June 26, 201238 in A.M. No. RTJ-10-2216, the Court adjudged
Judge Belen guilty of grave abuse of authority and gross ignorance of the law, and accordingly
dismissed Judge Belen from service. The case stemmed from his actions also involving People
v. Jenelyn Estacio. We held that the repeated infractions of Judge Belen warrant the penalty of
dismissal from service.

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES these two administrative complaints against Judge Medel
Arnaldo B. Belen for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

CONCHITO J. OCLARIT, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE MAXIMO G. W. PADERANGA, Judge, Regional Trial Court, Misamis
Orietal, respondent.

PARDO, J.:

The Case

The Case before the Court is a special civil act6ion of certiorari assailing the order 1 of responent
judge declaring petitioner guilty of direct contempt of court, sentencing him to pay a fine of
P1,000.00 and also serve one (1) day in jail.1wphi1.nt

The Facts

Petitioner is a lawyer engaged in the private practice of law principally in the City of Cagayan de
Oro and the province of Misamis Oriental.2

At times material hereto, petitioner was counsel for the plaintiffs in the case entitled, spouses
Gregorio and Pelegrina Babatido v. Elnora and Teodora Abella, et al., Civil Case No. 99-194,
Regional trial Court, Misamis Oriental, Branch 38, Cagayan de Oro City. Judge Maximo G. W.
Paderanga was the presiding judge, Regional Trial Court, Misamis Oriental Branch 38. 3

On June 1, 1999, the aforecited case was scheduled for continuation of pre-trial before the
lower court. The case was first heard on pre-trial on April 30, 1999. In that hearing, petitioner
filed a motion to approve compromise agreement entered into by the parties pointing out that
the compromise agreement was reached before a barangay captain.4 Counsel for the
defendants opposed the motion5 because the defendants were placed in a disadvantageous
condition, arguing that the case was before the court, not before the barangay. The court ruled
that the compromise agreement was not before the barangay captain but before the court. The
parties settled before the barangay captain. At this point, petitioner informed the court that the
compromise agreement was signed and was explaining further when the court told him
repeatedly to "shut up." Then petitioner requested the court to stop shouting at him. The court
rhetorically asked: "why should the court precisely not cite you for contempt for doing that," that
is, for settling the case before the barangay captain.6

Consequently, the presiding judge cited petitioner in contempt of court and imposed on him a
fine of P1,000.00. Petitioner remarked that the presiding judge was becoming very arrogant. In
reply to that, respondent judge declared: "I will put you in jail. Get a policeman." At that moment,
the court issued a verbal order holding petitioner for direct contempt of court and sentencing
petitioner to serve one (1) day in jail and to pay a fine of P1,000.00. Petitioner indicated that he
would challenge the ruling.7 Then, respondent judge issued a "detention commitment" to the Jail
Warden, City Jail, Cagayan de Oro City, committing the person of petitioner Conchito J. Oclarit
for direct contempt.8

The next day, with petitioner in jail, he received a copy of the written order declaring him in
direct contempt of court and sentencing him to pay a fine of P1,000.00 and also to serve one (1)
day in jail.9 He was released after serving one (1) day in jail. 10 apparently, he also paid the fine
of P1,000.00.11

On July 30, 1999, petitioner filed the instant petition.12

The Issues

The questions presented are (1) whether petitioner was guilty of direct contempt of court; (2) if
guilty, may the respondent judge declare him guilty by an order without stating the facts on
which it is based and imposing upon him the corresponding penalty; and finally (3) if the court
could do so, is the order finding petitioner guilty of direct contempt of court immediately
executory?

The Court's Ruling

In the first place, there was nothing contumacious in the submission to the court of a motion for
approval of compromise agreement reached before a barangay captain in a case pending
before the court. It is not required that a compromise agreement be executed before the court. It
may be executed before anyone or even among the parties themselves and then submitted to
the court for approval.

In the second place, the presiding judge must state expressly in the order the facts constituting
the contemptuous behavior of petitioner and declaring him in direct contempt of court.

In this case, the court did not state the specific cause for declaring petitioner guilty of direct
contempt of court. Indeed, it would seem that the court cited petitioner for direct contempt of
court for submitting such compromise was reached before a barangay captain. 13 As we said,
there is noting contumacious in such act. However, the impression of lawyers in the courtroom
at that time was that the presiding judge was irked because petitioner shouted back and banged
the table as petitioner charged the presiding judge with arrogance.14 This incident is not
recorded in the transcript, leaving us in doubt if it occurred. It is apparent, however, that the
presiding judge continuously ordered petitioner to "shut up."

Even then, an order of direct contempt is not immediately executory or enforceable. The
contemner must be afforded a reasonable remedy to extricate or purge himself of the contempt.
Thus, in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, the Court introduced a new provision
granting a remedy to a person adjudged in direct contempt by any court. Such person may not
appeal thereform, but may avail himself of certiorari or prohibition, In such case, the execution
of the judgment shall be suspended pending resolution of such petition provided the contemner
files a bond fixed by the court which rendered the judgment should the petition be decided
against him.15

In fact, petitioner asked the court presided over by respondent judge to fix a bail for his
temporary liberty pending the filing of a petition for certiorari.16 This written motion was filed on
the first hour the very next day. It was timely filed because the written order of contempt was
issued only the next day and given to petitioner when he was in jail.17 The respondent judge did
not act on the motion.18 By such inaction, respondent judge deprived petitioner of an effective
relief from an order of direct contempt of court. This is a violation of the Rules on contempt of
court.19Under Rule 65, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, petitioner had sixty (60)
days within which to file his petition.20

We find that respondent judge gravely abused his discretion in declaring petitioner guilty of
direct contempt of court, sentencing him to pay a fine of P1,000.00 and to serve one day in jail.
It was the respondent judge who first shouted successively at petitioner to "shut up." When
petitioner persisted in making his explanation, the court declared him in direct contempt, to the
extent of stating that the judge had "absolute power." 21 The lawyer's remarks explaining his
position in the case under consideration do not necessarily assume the level of contumely that
justifies the court to exercise the power of contempt.22 Courts must be slow to punish for direct
contempt. This drastic power must be used sparingly in cases of clearly contumacious
behavior in facie curiae.23 The salutary rule is that the power to punish for contempt must be
exercised on the preservative, not vindictive principle,24 and on the corrective and not retaliatory
idea of punishment,25 The Courts must exercise the power to punish for contempt for purposes
that are impersonal, because that power is intended as a safeguard not for the judges as
persons but for the functions that they exercise.26

The Fallo

IN VIEW WHEREFOR, the Court GRANTS the petition and renders judgment
declaring VOID the order finding petitioner guilty of direct contempt of court in Civil Case No. 99-
194, and sentencing him to pay a fine of P1,000.00 and to serve one (1) day in jail. The Court
orders respondent judge to reimburse petitioner the sum of P1,000.00, not out of the amount
paid by petitioner to the court but from his own funds. The Court regrets that petitioner had to
serve time in jail by a despotic act of respondent judge.1wphi1.nt

The Court orders the Court Administrator, Supreme Court, to file an administrative charge
against respondent Judge Maximo G. W. Paderanga, Regional Trial Judge, Regional Trial
Court, Misamis Oriental, branch 38, Cagayan de Oro City, for gross misconduct and grave
abuse of authority, within fifteen (15) days from notice.

This decision is immediately executory.

Costs against respondent Judge.

SO ORDERED.

VILMA G. ARRIOLA and ANTHONY RONALD G. ARRIOLA, petitioners,

vs.
JOHN NABOR C. ARRIOLA, respondent.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
assailing the November 30, 2006 Decision1 and April 30, 2007 Resolution2 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 93570.

The relevant facts are culled from the records.

John Nabor C. Arriola (respondent) filed Special Civil Action No. 03-0010 with the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 254, Las Pias City (RTC) against Vilma G. Arriola and Anthony Ronald G.
Arriola (petitioners) for judicial partition of the properties of decedent Fidel Arriola (the decedent
Fidel). Respondent is the son of decedent Fidel with his first wife Victoria C. Calabia, while
petitioner Anthony is the son of decedent Fidel with his second wife, petitioner Vilma.

On February 16, 2004, the RTC rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Ordering the partition of the parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
383714 (84191) left by the decedent Fidel S. Arriola by and among his heirs John Nabor
C. Arriola, Vilma G. Arriola and Anthony Ronald G. Arriola in equal shares of one-third
(1/3) each without prejudice to the rights of creditors or mortgagees thereon, if any;

2. Attorney's fees in the amount of TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS is hereby

awarded to be reimbursed by the defendants to the plaintiff;

3. Costs against the defendants.

SO ORDERED.3

The decision became final on March 15, 2004.4

As the parties failed to agree on how to partition among them the land covered by TCT No.
383714 (subject land), respondent sought its sale through public auction, and petitioners
acceded to it.5 Accordingly, the RTC ordered the public auction of the subject land. 6 The public
auction sale was scheduled on May 31, 2003 but it had to be reset when petitioners refused to
include in the auction the house (subject house) standing on the subject land. 7 This prompted
respondent to file with the RTC an Urgent Manifestation and Motion for Contempt of
Court,8 praying that petitioners be declared in contempt.

The RTC denied the motion in an Order9 dated August 30, 2005, for the reason that petitioners
were justified in refusing to have the subject house included in the auction, thus:

The defendants [petitioners] are correct in holding that the house or improvement
erected on the property should not be included in the auction sale.

A cursory reading of the aforementioned Decision and of the evidence adduced during
the ex-parte hearing clearly show that nothing was mentioned about the house existing
on the land subject matter of the case. In fact, even plaintiff's [respondent's] initiatory
Complaint likewise did not mention anything about the house. Undoubtedly therefore,
the Court did not include the house in its adjudication of the subject land because it was
 plaintiff himself who failed to allege the same. It is a well-settled rule that the court can
not give a relief to that which is not alleged and prayed for in the complaint.

To hold, as plaintiff argued, that the house is considered accessory to the land on which
it is built is in effect to add to plaintiff's [a] right which has never been considered or
passed upon during the trial on the merits.

In the absence of any other declaration, obvious or otherwise, only the land should be
partitioned in accordance to[sic] the aforementioned Decision as the house can not be
said to have been necessarily adjudicated therein. Thus, plaintiff can not be declared as
a co-owner of the same house without evidence thereof and due hearing thereon.

The Decision of the Court having attained its finality, as correctly pointed out, judgment
must stand even at the risk that it might be erroneous.

WHEREFORE, the Urgent Manifestation and Motion for Contempt of Court filed by
plaintiff is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.10

The RTC, in its Order dated January 3, 2006, denied respondent's Motion for Reconsideration. 11

Respondent filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari12 where he sought to have the RTC Orders
set aside, and prayed that he be allowed to proceed with the auction of the subject land
including the subject house.

In its November 30, 2006 Decision, the CA granted the Petition for Certiorari, to wit:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed orders dated August 30, 2005
and January 3, 2006 issued by the RTC, in Civil Case No. SCA 03-0010, are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the sheriff is ordered to proceed with the public
auction sale of the subject lot covered by TCT No. 383714, including the house
constructed thereon.

SO ORDERED.13 (Emphasis supplied.)

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the CA denied the same in its Resolution 14 of
April 30, 2007.

Hence, the present petition on the sole ground that the CA erred in holding that the RTC
committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion for contempt of court.

The assailed CA Decision and Resolution must be modified for reasons other than those
advanced by petitioners.

The contempt proceeding initiated by respondent was one for indirect contempt. Section 4, Rule
71 of the Rules of Court prescribes the procedure for the institution of proceedings for indirect
contempt, viz:
 Sec. 4. How proceedings commenced. Proceedings for indirect contempt may be
initiated motu proprio by the court against which the contempt was committed by an
order or any other formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause why he should
not be punished for contempt.

In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified
petition with supporting particulars and certified true copies of documents or
papers involved therein, and upon full compliance with the requirements for filing
initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the court concerned. If the contempt charges
arose out of or are related to a principal action pending in the court, the petition for
contempt shall allege that fact but said petition shall be docketed, heard and decided
separately, unless the court in its discretion orders the consolidation of the contempt
charge and the principal action for joint hearing and decision. (Emphases supplied.)

Under the aforecited second paragraph of the Rules, the requirements for initiating an indirect
contempt proceeding are a) that it be initiated by way of a verified petition and b) that it should
fully comply with the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions. In Regalado v.
Go,15 we held:

As explained by Justice Florenz Regalado, the filing of a verified petition that has
complied with the requirements for the filing of initiatory pleading, is mandatory x
x x:

This new provision clarifies with a regularity norm the proper procedure for
commencing contempt proceedings. While such proceeding has been classified
as special civil action under the former Rules, the heterogenous practice
tolerated by the courts, has been for any party to file a motion without paying any
docket or lawful fees therefore and without complying with the requirements for
initiatory pleadings, which is now required in the second paragraph of this
amended section.

xxxx

Henceforth, except for indirect contempt proceedings initiated motu propio by

order of or a formal charge by the offended court, all charges shall be
commenced by a verified petition with full compliance with the requirements
therefore and shall be disposed in accordance with the second paragraph of this
section.

xxxx

Even if the contempt proceedings stemmed from the main case over which
the court already acquired jurisdiction, the rules direct that the petition for
contempt be treated independently of the principal action. Consequently,
the necessary prerequisites for the filing of initiatory pleadings, such as
the filing of a verified petition, attachment of a certification on non-forum
shopping, and the payment of the necessary docket fees, must be faithfully
observed.

xxxx
 The provisions of the Rules are worded in very clear and categorical language. In case
where the indirect contempt charge is not initiated by the courts, the filing of a verified
petition which fulfills the requirements on initiatory pleadings is a prerequisite. Beyond
question now is the mandatory requirement of a verified petition in initiating an indirect
contempt proceeding. Truly, prior to the amendment of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, mere motion without complying with the requirements for initiatory pleadings
was tolerated by the courts. At the onset of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure,
however, such practice can no longer be countenanced.16 (Emphasis ours.)

The RTC erred in taking jurisdiction over the indirect contempt proceeding initiated by
respondent. The latter did not comply with any of the mandatory requirements of Section 4, Rule
71. He filed a mere Urgent Manifestation and Motion for Contempt of Court, and not a verified
petition. He likewise did not conform with the requirements for the filing of initiatory pleadings
such as the submission of a certification against forum shopping and the payment of docket
fees. Thus, his unverified motion should have been dismissed outright by the RTC.

It is noted though that, while at first the RTC overlooked the infirmities in respondent's unverified
motion for contempt, in the end, it dismissed the motion, albeit on substantive grounds. The
trouble is that, in the CA decision assailed herein, the appellate court committed the same
oversight by delving into the merits of respondent's unverified motion and granting the relief
sought therein. Thus, strictly speaking, the proper disposition of the present petition ought to be
the reversal of the CA decision and the dismissal of respondent's unverified motion for contempt
filed in the RTC for being in contravention of Section 4, Rule 71.

However, such simplistic disposition will not put an end to the dispute between the parties. A
seed of litigation has already been sown that will likely sprout into another case between them
at a later time. We refer to the question of whether the subject house should be included in the
public auction of the subject land. Until this question is finally resolved, there will be no end to
litigation between the parties. We must therefore deal with it squarely, here and now.

The RTC and the CA differed in their views on whether the public auction should include the
subject house. The RTC excluded the subject house because respondent never alleged its
existence in his complaint for partition or established his co-ownership thereof.17 On the other
hand, citing Articles 440,18 44519 and 44620 of the Civil Code, the CA held that as the deceased
owned the subject land, he also owned the subject house which is a mere accessory to the
land. Both properties form part of the estate of the deceased and are held in co-ownership by
his heirs, the parties herein. Hence, the CA concludes that any decision in the action for
partition of said estate should cover not just the subject land but also the subject house.21 The
CA further pointed out that petitioners themselves implicitly recognized the inclusion of the
subject house in the partition of the subject land when they proposed in their letter of August 5,
2004, the following swapping-arrangement:

Sir:

Thank you very much for accommodating us even if we are only poor and simple people.
We are very much pleased with the decision of Presiding Judge Manuel B. Fernandez,
Jr., RTC Br. 254, Las Pias, on the sharing of one-third (1/3) each of a land covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 383714 (84191) in Las Pias City.
 However, to preserve the sanctity of our house which is our residence for more than
twenty (20) years, we wish to request that the 1/3 share of John Nabor C. Arriola be paid
by the defendants depending on the choice of the plaintiff between item (1) or item (2),
detailed as follows:

(1) Swap with a 500-square meters [sic] lot located at Baras Rizal x x x.

(2) Cash of P205,700.00 x x x.

x x x x.22

We agree that the subject house is covered by the judgment of partition for reasons postulated
by the CA. We qualify, however, that this ruling does not necessarily countenance the
immediate and actual partition of the subject house by way of public auction in view of the
suspensive proscription imposed under Article 159 of The Family Code which will be discussed
forthwith.

It is true that the existence of the subject house was not specifically alleged in the complaint for
partition. Such omission notwithstanding, the subject house is deemed part of the judgment of
partition for two compelling reasons.

First, as correctly held by the CA, under the provisions of the Civil Code, the subject house is
deemed part of the subject land. The Court quotes with approval the ruling of the CA, to wit:

The RTC, in the assailed Order dated August 30, 2005 ratiocinated that since the house
constructed on the subject lot was not alleged in the complaint and its ownership was
not passed upon during the trial on the merits, the court cannot include the house in its
adjudication of the subject lot. The court further stated that it cannot give a relief to[sic]
which is not alleged and prayed for in the complaint.

We are not persuaded.

To follow the foregoing reasoning of the RTC will in effect render meaningless the
pertinent rule on accession. In general, the right to accession is automatic (ipso
jure), requiring no prior act on the part of the owner or the principal. So that even
if the improvements including the house were not alleged in the complaint for
partition, they are deemed included in the lot on which they stand, following the
principle of accession. Consequently, the lot subject of judicial partition in this
case includes the house which is permanently attached thereto, otherwise, it
would be absurd to divide the principal, i.e., the lot, without dividing the house
which is permanently attached thereto.23 (Emphasis supplied)

Second, respondent has repeatedly claimed that the subject house was built by the
deceased.24 Petitioners never controverted such claim. There is then no dispute that the subject
house is part of the estate of the deceased; as such, it is owned in common by the latter's heirs,
the parties herein,25 any one of whom, under Article 49426 of the Civil Code, may, at any time,
demand the partition of the subject house.27 Therefore, respondent's recourse to the partition of
the subject house cannot be hindered, least of all by the mere technical omission of said
common property from the complaint for partition.
That said notwithstanding, we must emphasize that, while we treat the subject house as
part of the co-ownership of the parties, we stop short of authorizing its actual partition by
public auction at this time. It bears emphasis that an action for partition involves two phases:
first, the declaration of the existence of a state of co-ownership; and second, the actual
termination of that state of co-ownership through the segregation of the common
property.28 What is settled thus far is only the fact that the subject house is under the co-
ownership of the parties, and therefore susceptible of partition among them.

Whether the subject house should be sold at public auction as ordered by the RTC is an entirely
different matter, depending on the exact nature of the subject house.

Respondent claims that the subject house was built by decedent Fidel on his exclusive
property.29 Petitioners add that said house has been their residence for 20 years. 30 Taken
together, these averments on record establish that the subject house is a family home within the
contemplation of the provisions of The Family Code, particularly:

Article 152. The family home, constituted jointly by the husband and the wife or by an
unmarried head of a family, is the dwelling house where they and their family reside, and
the land on which it is situated.

Article 153. The family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time
it is occupied as a family residence. From the time of its constitution and so long as any
of its beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family home continues to be such and is
exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter provided and to
the extent of the value allowed by law. (Emphasis supplied.)

One significant innovation introduced by The Family Code is the automatic constitution of the
family home from the time of its occupation as a family residence, without need anymore for the
judicial or extrajudicial processes provided under the defunct Articles 224 to 251 of the Civil
Code and Rule 106 of the Rules of Court. Furthermore, Articles 152 and 153 specifically extend
the scope of the family home not just to the dwelling structure in which the family resides but
also to the lot on which it stands. Thus, applying these concepts, the subject house as well as
the specific portion of the subject land on which it stands are deemed constituted as a family
home by the deceased and petitioner Vilma from the moment they began occupying the same
as a family residence 20 years back.31

It being settled that the subject house (and the subject lot on which it stands) is the family home
of the deceased and his heirs, the same is shielded from immediate partition under Article 159
of The Family Code, viz:

Article 159. The family home shall continue despite the death of one or both spouses or
of the unmarried head of the family for a period of ten years or for as long as there is a
minor beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the same unless the court finds
compelling reasons therefor. This rule shall apply regardless of whoever owns the
property or constituted the family home. (Emphasis supplied.)

The purpose of Article 159 is to avert the disintegration of the family unit following the death of
its head. To this end, it preserves the family home as the physical symbol of family love, security
and unity by imposing the following restrictions on its partition: first, that the heirs cannot extra-
judicially partition it for a period of 10 years from the death of one or both spouses or of the
unmarried head of the family, or for a longer period, if there is still a minor beneficiary residing
therein; and second, that the heirs cannot judicially partition it during the aforesaid periods
unless the court finds compelling reasons therefor. No compelling reason has been alleged by
the parties; nor has the RTC found any compelling reason to order the partition of the family
home, either by physical segregation or assignment to any of the heirs or through auction sale
as suggested by the parties.

More importantly, Article 159 imposes the proscription against the immediate partition of the
family home regardless of its ownership. This signifies that even if the family home has passed
by succession to the co-ownership of the heirs, or has been willed to any one of them, this fact
alone cannot transform the family home into an ordinary property, much less dispel the
protection cast upon it by the law. The rights of the individual co-owner or owner of the family
home cannot subjugate the rights granted under Article 159 to the beneficiaries of the family
home.

Set against the foregoing rules, the family home -- consisting of the subject house and lot on
which it stands -- cannot be partitioned at this time, even if it has passed to the co-ownership of
his heirs, the parties herein. Decedent Fidel died on March 10, 2003.32 Thus, for 10 years from
said date or until March 10, 2013, or for a longer period, if there is still a minor beneficiary
residing therein, the family home he constituted cannot be partitioned, much less when no
compelling reason exists for the court to otherwise set aside the restriction and order the
partition of the property.

The Court ruled in Honrado v. Court of Appeals33 that a claim for exception from execution or
forced sale under Article 153 should be set up and proved to the Sheriff before the sale of the
property at public auction. Herein petitioners timely objected to the inclusion of the subject
house although for a different reason.

To recapitulate, the evidence of record sustain the CA ruling that the subject house is part of the
judgment of co-ownership and partition. The same evidence also establishes that the subject
house and the portion of the subject land on which it is standing have been constituted as the
family home of decedent Fidel and his heirs. Consequently, its actual and immediate partition
cannot be sanctioned until the lapse of a period of 10 years from the death of Fidel Arriola, or
until March 10, 2013.

It bears emphasis, however, that in the meantime, there is no obstacle to the immediate public
auction of the portion of the subject land covered by TCT No. 383714, which falls outside the
specific area of the family home.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED and the November 30, 2006 Decision and
April 30, 2007 Resolution of the Court of Appeals are MODIFIED in that the house standing on
the land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 383714 is DECLARED part of the co-
ownership of the parties John Nabor C. Arriola, Vilma G. Arriola and Anthony Ronald G. Arriola
but EXEMPTED from partition by public auction within the period provided for in Article 159 of
the Family Code.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
LORENZO SHIPPING CORPORATION, OCEANIC CONTAINER LINES, INC., SOLID
SHIPPING LINES CORPORATION, SULPICIO LINES, INC., ET AL., Petitioners,
vs.
DISTRIBUTION MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, LORENZO CINCO,
and CORA CURAY,Respondents.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

The petitioners filed this petition to charge the respondents with indirect contempt of court for
including allegedly contemptuous statements in their so-called Sea Transport Update
concerning the Courts resolutions dated June 5, 2002 and August 12, 2002 issued in G.R. No.
152914 entitled Distribution Management Association of the Philippines, et al. v. Administrator
Oscar Sevilla, Maritime Industry Authority, et al.

Antecedents

On June 4, 2001, the Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA) issued a Letter-

Resolution,1 advising respondent Distribution Management Association of the Philippines
(DMAP) that a computation of the required freight rate adjustment by MARINA was no longer
required for freight rates officially considered or declared deregulated in accordance with
MARINA Memorandum Circular No. 153 (MC 153).

For clarity, MARINA issued MC 153 pursuant to Executive Order No. 213 (EO 213) entitled
Deregulating Domestic Shipping Rates promulgated by President Fidel V. Ramos on November
24, 1994.2

On July 2, 2001, in order to challenge the constitutionality of EO 213, MC 153, and the Letter-
Resolution dated June 4, 2001, DMAP commenced in the Court of Appeals (CA) a special civil
action for certiorari and prohibition, with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction or
temporary restraining order (CA-G.R. SP No. 65463). On November 29, 2001,3 however, the CA
dismissed the petition for certiorari and prohibition and upheld the constitutionality of EO 213,
MC 153, and the Letter-Resolution dated June 4, 2001.4 Later, on April 10, 2002, the CA denied
DMAPs motion for reconsideration.5

DMAP appealed to the Court (G.R. No. 152914), but on June 5, 2002,6 the Court denied
DMAPs petition for review on certiorari "for petitioners failure to: (a) take the appeal within the
reglementary period of fifteen (15) days in accordance with Section 2, Rule 45 in relation to
Section 5(a), Rule 56, in view of the foregoing denial of petitioners' motion for extension of time
to file the petition; and (b) pay the deposit for sheriff's fee and clerk's commission in the total
amount of 202.00 in accordance with Sections 2 and 3, Rule 45 in relation to Section [c], Rule
56 and paragraph 1 of Revised Circular No. 1-88 of this Court."

On August 12, 2002,7 the Court denied with finality DMAPs motion for reconsideration.

In October 2002, DMAP held a general membership meeting (GMM) on the occasion of which
DMAP, acting through its co-respondents Lorenzo Cinco, its President, and Cora Curay, a
consultant/adviser to Cinco, publicly circulated the Sea Transport Update,8 which is reproduced
as follows:
 SEA TRANSPORT UPDATE

Oct. 2002 GMM

20% GRI RATE INCREASE ISSUE

1. The Motion for Reconsideration filed with the Supreme Court was denied based on
technicalities and not on the legal issue DMAP presented.

Small technical matter which should not be a cause for denial (like the amount of filing fee
lacking & failure to indicate date of receipt of court resolution)

> Some technical matters that could cause denial

- Failure to file on time and to file necessary pleadings

- Failure to provide copies to respondents.

> Legal issue DMAP presented

- Public Service Act

- Regulated or Deregulated

- MC 153

- Supreme Court ruling issued in one month only, normal leadtime is at least 3 to 6
months.

WHAT TO EXPECT?

1. Liners will pressure members to pay the 20% GRI

WHAT TO DO?

1. As advised by DMAP counsel, use the following arguments:

- DMAP case was denied based on technicalities and not on merits of the case

- Court of Appeals has ruled that computation of reasonableness of freight is not under
their jurisdiction but with MARINA

- DSA's argument that DMAP's case prematurely (sic) file (sic) as there is a pending
case filed before MARINA.

- Therefore, DSA & DMAP will be going back to MARINA for resolution

2. Meantime, DMAP members enjoined not to pay until resolved by MARINA

3. However, continue collaboration with liners so shipping service may not suffer

NEXT MOVE

Another group (most likely consumers) or any party will file the same case and may be using the
same arguments. (emphasis supplied)

Thereupon, the petitioners brought this special civil action for contempt against the respondents,
insisting that the publication of the Sea Transport Update constituted indirect contempt of court
for patently, unjustly and baselessly insinuating that the petitioners were privy to some illegal
act, and, worse, that the publication unfairly debased the Supreme Court by making "scurrilous,
malicious, tasteless, and baseless innuendo" 9 to the effect that the Supreme Court had allowed
itself to be influenced by the petitioners as to lead the respondents to conclude that the
"Supreme Court ruling issued in one month only, normal lead time is at least 3 to 6
months."10 They averred that the respondents purpose, taken in the context of the entire
publication, was to "defy the decision, for it was based on technicalities, and the Supreme Court
was influenced!"11

In their comment dated January 20, 2003,12 the respondents denied any intention to malign,
discredit, or criticize the Court.13 They explained that their statement that the "Supreme Court
ruling issued in one month time only, normal lead time is at least three to six months" 14 was not
per se contemptuous, because the normal and appropriate time frame for the resolution of
petitions by the Court was either less than a month, if the petition was to be denied on
technicality, and more or less from three to six months, if the petition was to be given due
course; that what made the petitioners describe the statement as contemptuous was not the
real or actual intention of the author but rather the petitioners false, malicious, scurrilous and
tasteless insinuations and interpretation; and that the petitioners, not being themselves present
during the GMM, had no basis to assert that the DMAPs presentor, the author of the material,
or any of the speakers during the GMM had any evil intention or made any malicious
insinuations.15

The respondents further stated that the term time frame was laymans parlance to explain to
DMAP members that the petition had been dismissed due to a technicality, considering that the
appeals process in the case before the Court had taken only a month instead of the expected
three to six months;16 that the term lead time, although not the proper legal term to describe the
process that the respondents petition had undergone in the Court, was common parlance in the
business sector in which the respondents belonged; that the discussions during the presentation
focused on the legal options of DMAP with respect to the 20% increase, i.e., to go back to
MARINA for the resolution of the propriety and reasonableness of the 20% increase;17 that a
lead time was indicated in the presentation material simply to tell DMAP members that the lead
time to go back to MARINA had been cut short in view of the denial of the petition for review;
and that, on the other hand, had the Court given due course to the petition, the expected time
for the Court to resolve the appeal on the merits would have been from three to six months, a
normal expectation.18

Lastly, the respondents submitted that a serious study and analysis of the decision of the CA,
which the Court affirmed, revealed that the decision of the CA centered only on the
constitutionality of the assailed executive issuances, and did not include any determination of
the reasonableness and propriety of the 20% increase; that, accordingly, the discussion of the
recourse with respect to the 20% increase, which was to go back to MARINA for the resolution
on the matter, could not be considered as a defiance of the order of the Court because the CA
itself decreed that the propriety and reasonableness of the 20% increase should be brought to
and resolved by MARINA;19 and that considering that there was yet no entry of judgment in
relation to the denial of the petition at the time of the GMM on October 17, 2002, the
respondents were not defying any final order or writ of the Court and thereby commit any act of
indirect contempt.20

Issue

Did the statements contained in the Sea Transport Update constitute or amount to indirect
contempt of court?

Ruling

We dismiss the petition.

I
Contempt of Court: Concept and Classes

Contempt of court has been defined as a willful disregard or disobedience of a public authority.
In its broad sense, contempt is a disregard of, or disobedience to, the rules or orders of a
legislative or judicial body or an interruption of its proceedings by disorderly behavior or insolent
language in its presence or so near thereto as to disturb its proceedings or to impair the respect
due to such a body. In its restricted and more usual sense, contempt comprehends a despising
of the authority, justice, or dignity of a court.21 The phrase contempt of court is generic,
embracing within its legal signification a variety of different acts.22

The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts,23 and need not be specifically granted
by statute.24 It lies at the core of the administration of a judicial system.25 Indeed, there ought to
be no question that courts have the power by virtue of their very creation to impose silence,
respect, and decorum in their presence, submission to their lawful mandates, and to preserve
themselves and their officers from the approach and insults of pollution.26 The power to punish
for contempt essentially exists for the preservation of order in judicial proceedings and for the
enforcement of judgments, orders, and mandates of the courts, and, consequently, for the due
administration of justice.27 The reason behind the power to punish for contempt is that respect of
the courts guarantees the stability of their institution; without such guarantee, the institution of
the courts would be resting on a very shaky foundation.28

Contempt of court is of two kinds, namely: direct contempt, which is committed in the presence
of or so near the judge as to obstruct him in the administration of justice; and constructive or
indirect contempt, which consists of willful disobedience of the lawful process or order of the
court.29

The punishment for the first is generally summary and immediate, and no process or evidence
is necessary because the act is committed in facie curiae.30 The inherent power of courts to
punish contempt of court committed in the presence of the courts without further proof of facts
and without aid of a trial is not open to question, considering that this power is essential to
preserve their authority and to prevent the administration of justice from falling into disrepute;
such summary conviction and punishment accord with due process of law. 31 There is authority
for the view, however, that an act, to constitute direct contempt punishable by summary
proceeding, need not be committed in the immediate presence of the court, if it tends to obstruct
justice or to interfere with the actions of the court in the courtroom itself.32 Also, contemptuous
acts committed out of the presence of the court, if admitted by the contemnor in open court, may
be punished summarily as a direct contempt,33 although it is advisable to proceed by requiring
the person charged to appear and show cause why he should not be punished when the judge
is without personal knowledge of the misbehavior and is informed of it only by a confession of
the contemnor or by testimony under oath of other persons.34

In contrast, the second usually requires proceedings less summary than the first. The
proceedings for the punishment of the contumacious act committed outside the personal
knowledge of the judge generally need the observance of all the elements of due process of
law, that is, notice, written charges, and an opportunity to deny and to defend such charges
before guilt is adjudged and sentence imposed.35

Plainly, therefore, the word summary with respect to the punishment for contempt refers not to
the timing of the action with reference to the offense but to the procedure that dispenses with
the formality, delay, and digression that result from the issuance of process, service of
complaint and answer, holding hearings, taking evidence, listening to arguments, awaiting
briefs, submission of findings, and all that goes with a conventional court trial. 36

A distinction between in-court contempts, which disrupt court proceedings and for which a
hearing and formal presentation of evidence are dispensed with, and out-of-court contempts,
which require normal adversary procedures, is drawn for the purpose of prescribing what
procedures must attend the exercise of a courts authority to deal with contempt. The distinction
does not limit the ability of courts to initiate contempt prosecutions to the summary punishment
of in-court contempts that interfere with the judicial process.37

The court may proceed upon its own knowledge of the facts without further proof and without
issue or trial in any form to punish a contempt

committed directly under its eye or within its view.38 But there must be adequate facts to support
a summary order for contempt in the presence of the court.39 The exercise of the summary
power to imprison for contempt is a delicate one and care is needed to avoid arbitrary or
oppressive conclusions.40 The reason for the extraordinary power to punish criminal contempt in
summary proceedings is that the necessities of the administration of justice require such
summary dealing with obstructions to it, being a mode of vindicating the majesty of the law, in its
active manifestation, against obstruction and outrage.41

Proceedings for contempt are sui generis, in nature criminal, but may be resorted to in civil as
well as criminal actions, and independently of any action.42 They are of two classes, the criminal
or punitive, and the civil or remedial. A criminal contempt consists in conduct that is directed
against the authority and dignity of a court or of a judge acting judicially, as in unlawfully
assailing or discrediting the authority and dignity of the court or judge, or in doing a duly
forbidden act. A civil contempt consists in the failure to do something ordered to be done by a
court or judge in a civil case for the benefit of the opposing party therein.43 It is at times difficult
to determine whether the proceedings are civil or criminal. In general, the character of the
contempt of whether it is criminal or civil is determined by the nature of the contempt involved,
regardless of the cause in which the
contempt arose, and by the relief sought or dominant purpose.44 The proceedings are to be
regarded as criminal when the purpose is primarily punishment, and civil when the purpose is
primarily compensatory or remedial.45Where the dominant purpose is to enforce compliance
with an order of a court for the benefit of a party in whose favor the order runs, the contempt is
civil; where the dominant purpose is to vindicate the dignity and authority of the court, and to
protect the interests of the general public, the contempt is criminal.46 Indeed, the criminal
proceedings vindicate the dignity of the courts, but the civil proceedings protect, preserve, and
enforce the rights of private parties and compel obedience to orders, judgments and decrees
made to enforce such rights.47

Indirect contempt is defined by and punished under Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court,
which provides:

Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. After a charge in
writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within
such period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty
of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:

(a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his official duties or in his
official transactions;

(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of a court,

including the act of a person who, after being dispossessed or ejected from any real
property by the judgment or process of any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or
attempts or induces

another to enter into or upon such real property, for the purpose of executing acts of
ownership or possession, or in any manner disturbs the possession given to the person
adjudged to be entitled thereto;

(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or proceedings of a
court not constituting direct contempt under section 1 of this Rule;

(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade
the administration of justice;

(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such without

authority;

(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;

(g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the custody of an officer
by virtue of an order or process of a court held by him.

But nothing in this section shall be so construed as to prevent the court from issuing process to
bring the respondent into court, or from holding him in custody pending such proceedings. (3a)

Misbehavior means something more than adverse comment or disrespect. 48 There is no

question that in contempt the intent goes to the gravamen of the offense.49 Thus, the good faith,
or lack of it, of the alleged contemnor should be considered.50 Where the act complained of is
ambiguous or does not clearly show on its face that it is contempt, and is one which, if the party
is acting in good faith, is within his rights, the presence or absence of a contumacious intent is,
in some instances, held to be determinative of its character.51 A person should not be
condemned for contempt where he contends for what he believes to be right and in good faith
institutes proceedings for the purpose, however erroneous may be his conclusion as to his
rights.52 To constitute contempt, the act must be done willfully and for an illegitimate or improper
purpose.53

Unfounded accusations or allegations or words tending to embarrass the court or to bring it into
disrepute have no place in a pleading. Their employment serves no useful purpose. On the
contrary, they constitute direct contempt of court or contempt in facie curiae and, when
committed by a lawyer, a violation of the lawyers oath and a transgression of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

II.
Utterances in Sea Transport Update,
Not Contemptuous

The petitioners did not sufficiently show how the respondents publication of the Sea Transport
Update constituted any of the acts punishable as indirect contempt of court under Section 3 of
Rule 71, supra.

The petitioners mere allegation, that "said publication unfairly debases the Supreme Court
because of the scurrilous, malicious, tasteless, and baseless innuendo therein that the Court
allowed itself to be influenced by the petitioners as concocted in the evil minds of the
respondents thus leading said respondents to unjustly conclude: Supreme Court ruling issued in
one month only, normal lead time is at least 3 to 6 months,"54 was insufficient, without more, to
sustain the charge of indirect contempt.

Nor do we consider contemptuous either the phrase contained in the Sea Transport Update
stating: "The Motion for Reconsideration filed with the Supreme Court was denied based on
technicalities and not on the legal issue DMAP presented",55 or the phrase in the Sea Transport
Update reading "Supreme Court ruling issued in one month only, normal leadtime is at least 3 to
6 months." Contrary to the petitioners urging that such phrases be considered as "scurrilous,
malicious, tasteless and baseless innuendo" 56 and as indicative that "the Court allowed itself to
be influenced by the petitioners"57 or that "the point that respondents wanted to convey was
crystal clear: defy the decision, for it was based on technicalities, and the Supreme Court was
influenced!",58 we find the phrases as not critical of the Court and how fast the resolutions in
G.R. No. 152914 were issued, or as inciting DMAPs members to defy the resolutions. The
unmistakable intent behind the phrases was to inform DMAPs members of the developments in
the case, and on the taking of the next viable move of going back to MARINA on the issues, as
the ruling of the Court of Appeals instructed.1avvphi1

We have long recognized and respected the right of a lawyer, or of any other person, for that
matter, to be critical of the courts and their judges as long as the criticism is made in respectful
terms and through legitimate channels. We have no cause or reason to depart from such
recognition and respect, for the Court has long adhered to the sentiment aptly given expression
to in the leading case of In re: Almacen:59
xxx every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the actuations of public officers.
This right is not diminished by the fact that the criticism is aimed at a judicial authority, or that it
is articulated by a lawyer. Such right is especially recognized where the criticism concerns a
concluded litigation, because then the courts actuation are thrown open to public consumption.

xxx

Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. They should and expect critical evaluation of their
performance. For like the executive and the legislative branches, the judiciary is rooted in the
soil of democratic society, nourished by the periodic appraisal of the citizens whom it is
expected to serve.

Well-recognized therefore is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen,
to criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and
judges.xxx

xxx

Hence, as a citizen and as officer of the court, a lawyer is expected not only to exercise the
right, but also to consider it his duty to avail of such right. No law may abridge this right. Nor is
he "professionally answerable for a scrutiny into the official conduct of the judges, which would
not expose him to legal animadversion as a citizen." xxx

xxx

But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill
over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one
hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and
unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct that
subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action. (bold emphasis supplied)60

The test for criticizing a judges decision is, therefore, whether or not the criticism is bona fide or
done in good faith, and does not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. Viewed through
the prism of the test, the Sea Transport Update was not disrespectful, abusive, or slanderous,
and did not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. Thereby, the respondents were not
guilty of indirect contempt of court. In this regard, then, we need to remind that the power to
punish for contempt of court is exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle,
and only occasionally should a court invoke its inherent power in order to retain that respect
without which the administration of justice must falter or fail.61 As judges we ought to exercise
our power to punish contempt judiciously and sparingly, with utmost restraint, and with the end
in view of utilizing the power for the correction and preservation of the dignity of the Court, not
for retaliation or vindictiveness.62

WHEREFORE, the petition for indirect contempt is DISMISSED.

Costs of suit to be paid by the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
HEIRS OF SEVERINO LISTANA, Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a petition1 for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The petition
challenges the 30 January 2008 Decision2 and 6 May 2008 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 92701. The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the 4 August4 and 18
October5 2005 Orders of the Regional Trial Court, Judicial Region 5, Branch 51, Sorsogon City
(RTC), in Civil Case No. 2001-6803.

The Facts

Severino Listana (Listana) owned a 246.0561-hectare parcel of land in Inlagadian, Casiguran,

Sorsogon, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-20193. Listana voluntarily sold the
property to the government, through the Department of Agrarian Reform, under Republic Act
(RA) No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.

The Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) of Sorsogon commenced

summary administrative proceedings to determine the amount of just compensation for the
property. In its 14 October 1998 Decision, the DARAB set the amount at P10,956,963.25 and
ordered petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) to pay Listana the same.

On 18 June 1999, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) issued a writ of
execution ordering Land Bank Manager and Agrarian Operations Center Head Alex A. Lorayes
(Lorayes) to pay Listana 10,956,963.25. Lorayes refused. Thus, on 2 September 1999, Listana
filed with the PARAD a motion for contempt against Lorayes.

On 6 September 1999, LBP filed with the Regional Trial Court, Judicial Region 5, Branch 52,
Sorsogon City, acting as special agrarian court (SAC), a petition for judicial determination of the
amount of just compensation for the property. LBP challenged the amount set by the DARAB
and prayed that the amount be fixed at 5,871,689.03.

The PARAD granted Listanas motion for contempt. In its 20 August 2000 Order, the PARAD
cited Lorayes for indirect contempt and ordered his imprisonment until he complied with the
DARABs 14 October 1998 Decision.

In its 25 October 2000 Order, the SAC dismissed LBPs petition for judicial determination of the
amount of just compensation for the property. LBP appealed the 25 October 2000 Order.

In its 27 November 2000 Resolution, the PARAD ordered the issuance of an alias writ of
execution, ordering LBP to pay Listana 10,956,963.25. On 3 January 2001, the PARAD issued
a warrant of arrest against Lorayes.
LBP filed with the RTC a petition for injunction with application for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction enjoining PARAD from implementing the warrant of arrest against
Lorayes. In its 29 January 2001 Order, the RTC enjoined the PARAD from implementing the
warrant of arrest pending final determination of the amount of just compensation for the
property. LBP posted a 5,644,773.02 cash bond. The dispositive portion of the 29 January
2001 Order stated:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the respondent Provincial Adjudicator of the DARAB or

anyone acting in its stead is enjoined as it is hereby enjoined from enforcing its order of arrest
against Mr. Alex A. Lorayes pending the final termination of the case before RTC Branch 52,
Sorsogon upon the posting of a cash bond by the Land Bank.

SO ORDERED.6

Listana filed with the RTC a motion for reconsideration. In its 2 April 2001 Order, the RTC
denied the motion. Listana filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court. In its 11 December 2001 Decision, the Court of Appeals set aside the 29
January and 2 April 2001 Orders of the RTC.

LBP filed with the Court a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Listana, Sr.,7 the Court set aside the 11 December 2001
Decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstated the 29 January and 2 April 2001 Orders of the
RTC enjoining the PARAD from implementing the warrant of arrest pending final determination
of the amount of just compensation for the property.

The Court declared void all proceedings that stemmed from Listanas motion for contempt. The
Court held that:

Hence, the contempt proceedings initiated through an unverified "Motion for Contempt" filed by
the respondent with the PARAD were invalid for the following reasons: First, the Rules of Court
clearly require the filing of a verified petition with the Regional Trial Court, which was not
complied with in this case. The charge was not initiated by the PARAD motu proprio, rather, it
was by a motion filed by respondent. Second, neither the PARAD nor the DARAB have
jurisdiction to decide the contempt charge filed by the respondent. The issuance of a warrant of
arrest was beyond the power of the PARAD and the DARAB. Consequently, all the proceedings
that stemmed from respondents "Motion for Contempt," specifically the Orders of the PARAD
dated August 20, 2000 and January 3, 2001 for the arrest of Alex A. Lorayes, are null and void.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for review is GRANTED. The Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 65276, dated December 11, 2001,
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Order of the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, Sorsogon,
Branch 51, dated January 29, 2001, which enjoined the Provincial Adjudicator of the DARAB or
anyone acting in its stead from enforcing its order of arrest against Mr. Alex A. Lorayes pending
the final termination of the case before Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Branch 52,
is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.8

On 26 May 2004, LBP filed with the RTC a motion 9 to withdraw the 5,644,773.02 cash bond.
LBP stated that:
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, through counsel unto this Honorable Court, respectfully
avers:

1. That last February 1, 2001, LANDBANK posted cash bond covered by Official Receipt
No. 7135588 dated January 31, 2001 in the amount of 5,644,773.02. [C]opy of the
Order, Official Receipt and deposit slip are hereto attached as Annexes "A", "B", and
"C";

2. That on August 5, 2003, the Supreme Court issued a Decision in G.R[.] No. 152611
entitled "Land Bank of the Philippines versus Severino Listana", the dispositive portion is
quoted as follows:

"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for review is GRANTED. The Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 65276, dated December 11, 2001, is REVISED [sic]
and SET ASIDE. The Order of the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Branch 51,
dated January 29, 2001, which enjoined the Provincial Adjudicator of the DARAB or anyone
acting in its stead from enforcing its order or [sic] arrest against Mr. Alex A. Lorayes pending the
final termination of the case before Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Branch 52, is
REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED."

1. That on February 26, 200 [sic], an Entry of Judgment was issued by the Supreme Court
making the Decision in G.R. No. 152611 final and executory. Copy of the Entry of Judgment is
hereto attached as Annex "D".

WHEREFORE, premises considered it is most respectfully prayed that the cash bond put up by
Land Bank of the Philippines be released[.]10

The RTCs Ruling

In its 4 August 2005 Order, the RTC denied LBPs motion to withdraw the P5,644,773.02 cash
bond. The RTC held that:

The Court finds the Land Banks Motion without merit inasmuch as the arguments raised therein
are specious. Contrary to Land Banks conclusion, this Court holds otherwise that the cash bond
did not become moot and academic upon the finality of the Supreme Courts decision dated
August 5, 2003. This is so because the underlying reason for the posting of the cash bond still
remains despite the decision of the Supreme Court upholding the unconstitutionality of the order
of arrest issued by PARAD. And that reason is the distinctive fact that the cash bond was put up
in order to secure any damages that the private respondent Listana may incur by reason of the
issuance of the injunction order. The damages being referred to, that is the legal right of Mr.
Listana to be justly and promptly paid of his expropriated property was not effectively
extinguished by the mere decision of the Supreme Court declaring the illegality of the order of
arrest issued by the PARAD against Mr. Alex Lorayes. In fact, the Courts ruling did not in any
way, expressly or impliedly, ordered [sic] the release of the cash bond in Land Banks favor
despite that the latters petition was upheld with finality by the Supreme Court.

Indeed, the cash bond did not become moot and academic as clearly intentioned in the
Supreme Courts decision dated August 5, 2003. A simple reading of its dispositive portion
would crystallize to anyones mind that the final resolution of the case, including all the issues
interwoven therein, is conditioned on the final determination of the just compenstaion case filed
before Branch 52, RTC-Sorsogon and now pending before the Supreme Court. It clearly means
therefore that the release of the cash bond to either party being one of the issues necessarily
included in this case, would depend on the final termination of the main action the just
compensation case. To this date, the Supreme Court has not rendered a resolution pertaining
thereto.

In adopting this line of reasoning, this Court is merely upholding with consistency the tenor and
intent of its Order dated January 29, 2001. In issuing the injunction order against the PARAD,
the Court did not only recognize the right of Mr. Alex Lorayes against illegal arrest but at the
same time protected the inherent right of Mr. Severino Listana to be justly and promptly paid of
his expropriated property, hence it ordered the petitioner to post a cash bond in the amount of
P5,644,773.02, the almost exact amount Mr. Listana could have collected as payment from
Land Bank had it not for the injunction order. At this juncture also, the Court would not be
persuaded with Land Banks contention that the cash bond be released it [sic] its favor for the
reason that the same was drawn not from the agrarian fund but advanced from its capital fund
as part of litigation expenses. The internal operations of Land Bank is of no moment under the
instant case. When the injunctive order was issued; it was clear to Land Bank that the cash
bond posted was precisely meant to secure the unpaid balance due to Mr. Listana. To adhere to
Land Banks contention would effectively defeat the purpose of the injunction bond and to
subject again the landowner to another circuitous mode of collecting compensation for his
property in case the just compensation case be resolved in his favor. Therefore, in the interest
of social justice, the Court deems it wise to preserve the status quo with regards [sic] to the
cash bond. It shall not be dissolved at the moment and shall stay pending the final termination
of the just compensation case.11

LBP filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 18 October 2005 Order, the RTC denied the
motion. LBP filed with the Court of Appeals a petition12 for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court.

The Court of Appeals Ruling

In its 30 January 2008 Decision, the Court of Appeals dismissed LBPs petition and affirmed in
toto the RTCs 4 August and 18 October 2005 Orders. The Court of Appeals held that:

It is plain to see from the Supreme Courts decision that only the Orders of the PARAD dated 20
August 2000 and 3 January 2001 for the arrest of Lorayes were nullified.

A reading of the Supreme Courts decision will show that the nullification of the orders of the
PARAD stemmed not from the correctness of Lorayes refusal to execute the DARABs decision
nor from the entitlement of Land Bank to enjoin such execution. Rather, it is grounded on the
adoption of the improper mode of initiating the contempt proceedings, and on PARADs lack of
jurisdiction to decide the contempt charge. Hence, the absence of any pronouncement in the
Supreme Courts decision finally deciding the issue of whether or not Land Bank is permanently
entitled to enjoin the payment of P10,956,963.25 to the Heirs of Listana. In fact, the dispositive
portion unequivocally upholds and reinstates only the court a quos grant of the writ
of preliminary injunction.
It must be stressed that it is the dispositive part of the judgment that actually settles and
declares the rights and obligations of the parties, finally, definitively, and authoritatively,
notwithstanding the existence of statements in the body that may tend to confuse.

Thus, notwithstanding its pronouncement that neither the PARAD nor the DARAB had any
authority to cite Lorayes in contempt and order his arrest, the Supreme Courts decision cannot
be used as basis to release the injunction bond posted by Land Bank, inasmuch as the decision
upheld and reinstated the court a quos issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction. Without the
injunction bond, the writ of preliminary injunction would be invalid.

A preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order may be granted only when, among
others, the applicant, unless exempted by the court, files with the court where the action or
proceeding is pending, a bond executed to the party or person enjoined, in an amount to be
fixed by the court, to the effect that the applicant will pay such party or person all damages
which he may sustain by reason of the injunction or temporary restraining order if the court
should finally decide that the applicant was not entitled thereto.

xxxx

In the case at bar, the writ of preliminary injunction is directed at the PARADs orders to arrest
Lorayes for refusing to comply with the DARABs decision ordering Land Bank to pay the
amount of P10,956,963.25 as just compensation for the subject property.

As subsequently explained by the court a quo in its assailed Order, the underlying reason
behind its grant of the writ of preliminary injunction is the pendency of Land Banks action for
judicial determination of just compensation. As long as the issue of just compensation is not
settled, it would be precipitate to rule one way or the other on the propriety of executing the
DARABs decision.

Indeed, if the courts eventually uphold the DARABs valuation of the subject property, the
injunction against the execution of the DARABs Decision would give rise to the Heirs right to
collect damages, which the injunction bond would answer for. It is only when the courts finally
strike down the DARABs computation of just compensation that the injunction bond may finally
be released.

Clearly, the court a quo soundly exercised its discretion in refusing to release the injunction
bond posted by Land Bank.13

LBP filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 6 May 2008 Resolution, the Court of Appeals
denied the motion. Hence, the present petition.

Issue

LBP raises as issue that the Court of Appeals erred in not allowing the withdrawal of the
P5,644,773.02 cash bond.

The Courts Ruling

The petition is unmeritorious.

In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Listana, Sr., the Court reinstated the 29 January 2001 Order
of the RTC. The dispositive portion of the case states:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for review is GRANTED. The Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 65276, dated December 11, 2001,
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Order of the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon,
Sorsogon, Branch 51, dated January 29, 2001, which enjoined the Provincial Adjudicator
of the DARAB or anyone acting in its stead from enforcing its order of arrest against Mr.
Alex A. Lorayes pending the final termination of the case before Regional Trial Court of
Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Branch 52, is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.14 (Emphasis supplied)

The dispositive portion of the 29 January 2001 Order of the RTC states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the respondent Provincial Adjudicator of the DARAB or

anyone acting in its stead is enjoined as it is hereby enjoined from enforcing its order of arrest
against Mr. Alex A. Lorayes pending the final termination of the case before RTC Branch 52,
Sorsogon upon the posting of a cash bond by the Land Bank.

SO ORDERED.15

The dispositive portion of the 29 January 2001 Order of the RTC clearly states that "the
respondent Provincial Adjudicator of the DARAB x x x is enjoined x x x from enforcing its order
of arrest against Mr. Alex A. Lorayes pending the final termination of the case before RTC
Branch 52, Sorsogon upon the posting of a cash bond by Land Bank." Thus, LBP cannot
withdraw the bond pending final determination of the amount of just compensation for the
property.

In its 14 October 1998 Decision, the DARAB set the amount of just compensation for the
property at 10,956,963.25 and ordered LBP to pay Listana the amount. On 18 June 1999, the
PARAD issued a writ of execution ordering Lorayes to pay Listana the amount. Lorayes refused
and, later, LBP filed with the RTC a petition for injunction with application for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction.

An applicant for preliminary injunction is required to file a bond executed to the party or person
enjoined, to the effect that the applicant will pay to such party or person all damages which he
may sustain by reason of the injunction. Section 4(b), Rule 58 of the Rules of Court states:

SEC. 4. Verified application and bond for preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order.
A preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order may be granted only when:

xxxx

(b) Unless exempted by the court, the applicant files with the court where the action or
proceeding is pending, a bond executed to the party or person enjoined, in an amount to be
fixed by the court, to the effect that the applicant will pay to such party or person all damages
which he may sustain by reason of the injunction or temporary restraining order if the court
should finally decide that the applicant was not entitled thereto. Upon approval of the requisite
bond, a writ of preliminary injunction shall be issued.
As correctly ruled by the lower courts, the 5,644,773.02 bond shall answer for the damages
Listana may sustain if the courts finally uphold the 10,956,963.25 just compensation set by the
DARAB. In Republic v. Caguioa,16 the Court held that, "The purpose of the injunction bond is to
protect the defendant against loss or damage by reason of the injunction in case the court finally
decides that the plaintiff was not entitled to it, and the bond is usually conditioned accordingly." 17

The SAC has original and exclusive jurisdiction over petitions for determination of the amount of
just compensation of properties acquired under RA No. 6657. Administrative agencies have no
jurisdiction over just compensation cases. Section 57 of RA No. 6657 states that, "The Special
Agrarian Courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the
determination of just compensation to landowners." In Land Bank of the Philippines v.
Wycoco,18 citing Republic v. Court of Appeals,19 the Court held that:

In Republic v. Court of Appeals, it was held that Special Agrarian Courts are given original
and exclusive jurisdiction over two categories of cases, to wit: (1) all petitions for the
determination of just compensation; and (2) the prosecution of all criminal offenses under
R.A. No. 6657. x x x The DAR, as an administrative agency, cannot be granted jurisdiction
over cases of eminent domain and over criminal cases. The valuation of property in
eminent domain is essentially a judicial function which is vested with the Special
Agrarian Courts and cannot be lodged with administrative agencies.20 (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, as a rule, the DARABs decision setting the amount of just compensation is merely
preliminary and not executory if challenged before the SAC. Execution pending "appeal" of the
DARAB decision is allowed only on meritorious grounds.21 Even then, it is the SAC, not the
DARAB, that can grant execution pending "appeal" because the SAC has original and exclusive
jurisdiction over just compensation cases. The determination of the amount of just
compensation is a judicial function that cannot be usurped by administrative agencies. In Apo
Fruits Corporation v. Court of Appeals,22 the Court held that:

It is now settled that the valuation of property in eminent domain is essentially a judicial function
which is vested with the RTC acting as Special Agrarian Court. The same cannot be lodged with
administrative agencies and may not be usurped by any other branch or official of the
government.231avvphi1

In the present case, LBP filed with the SAC a petition for determination of the amount of just
compensation on 6 September 1999. The PARAD issued the alias writ of execution and warrant
of arrest on 27 November 2000 and 3 January 2001, respectively. The writ of execution and
warrant of arrest were invalid because the 14 October 1998 Decision of the DARAB setting the
amount at 10,956,963.25 was merely preliminary and not executory.

In any event, the Court has reinstated the 29 January 2001 Order of the RTC enjoining the
PARAD from implementing the warrant of arrest pending final determination of the amount of
just compensation for the property. Land Bank of the Philippines v. Listana, Sr. has long
become final and executory and can no longer be disturbed. Consequently, LBP cannot
withdraw the 5,644,773.02 cash bond which is a condition for the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition. The Court AFFIRMS the 30 January 2008
Decision and 6 May 2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 92701.