EN BANC is your purpose in using the letterhead of another law office.
" Not
Adm. Case No. 2131 May 10, 1985
ADRIANO E. DACANAY, complainant
vs.
BAKER & MCKENZIE and JUAN G. COLLAS JR., LUIS MA.
GUERRERO, VICENTE A. TORRES, RAFAEL E.
EVANGELISTA, JR., ROMEO L. SALONGA, JOSE R.
SANDEJAS, LUCAS M. NUNAG, J. CLARO TESORO,
NATIVIDAD B. KWAN and JOSE A. CURAMMENG,
JR., respondents.
Adriano E. Dacanay for and his own behalf.
Madrid, Cacho, Angeles, Dominguez & Pecson Law Office for
respondents.
AQUINO, J.:
Lawyer Adriano E. Dacanay, admitted to the bar in 1954, in his 1980
verified complaint, sought to enjoin Juan G. Collas, Jr. and nine other
lawyers from practising law under the name of Baker & McKenzie, a
law firm organized in Illinois.
In a letter dated November 16, 1979 respondent Vicente A. Torres,
using the letterhead of Baker & McKenzie, which contains the names
of the ten lawyers, asked Rosie Clurman for the release of 87 shares of
Cathay Products International, Inc. to H.E. Gabriel, a client.
Attorney Dacanay, in his reply dated December 7, 1979, denied any
liability of Clurman to Gabriel. He requested that he be informed
whether the lawyer of Gabriel is Baker & McKenzie "and if not, what
having received any reply, he filed the instant complaint.
We hold that Baker & McKenzie, being an alien law firm, cannot
practice law in the Philippines (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Rules of Court). As
admitted by the respondents in their memorandum, Baker & McKenzie
is a professional partnership organized in 1949 in Chicago, Illinois with
members and associates in 30 cities around the world. Respondents,
aside from being members of the Philippine bar, practising under the
firm name of Guerrero & Torres, are members or associates of Baker
& Mckenzie.
As pointed out by the Solicitor General, respondents' use of the firm
name Baker & McKenzie constitutes a representation that being
associated with the firm they could "render legal services of the highest
quality to multinational business enterprises and others engaged in
foreign trade and investment" (p. 3, respondents' memo). This is
unethical because Baker & McKenzie is not authorized to practise law
here. (See Ruben E. Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1983 Ed., p. 115.)
WHEREFORE, the respondents are enjoined from practising law under
the firm name Baker & McKenzie.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, Acting CJ., Makasiar, Abad Santos, Melencio-Herrera,
Escolin, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ.,
concur.
Plana, J., took no part.
Fernando, C.J., and Concepcion, Jr., J., are on leave.
 EN BANC
A.M. No. P-03-1690 April 4, 2003
(formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 00-956-P)
JUDGE ESTRELLITA M. PAAS, petitioner,
vs.
EDGAR E. ALMARVEZ, respondent.
x-----------------------------x
A.M. No. MTJ-01-1363 April 4, 2003
EDGAR E. ALMARVEZ, petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE ESTRELLITA M. PAAS, respondent.
x-----------------------------x
A.M. No. 01-12-02-SC April 4, 2003
IN RE: USE BY ATTY. RENERIO G. PAAS AS AN OFFICE IN
HIS PRIVATE PRACTICE OF HIS PROFESSION THE OFFICE
OF HIS WIFE, PASAY CITY METC JUDGE ESTRELLITA M.
PAAS.
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Pasay City Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 44 Presiding
Judge Estrellita M. Paas administratively charged Court Aide/Utility
Worker Edgar E. Almarvez with "discourtesy, disrespect,
insubordination, neglect in performing his duties, disloyalty,
solicitation of monetary consideration and gross violation of the Civil
Service Law." The case was docketed as A.M. OCA IPI No. 00-956-P.
In her complaint, Judge Paas alleged that Almarvez is discourteous to
his co-employees, lawyers and party litigants; has failed to maintain the
cleanliness in and around the court premises despite order to do so, thus
amounting to insubordination; was, and on several instances, habitually
absent from work or made it appear that he reported for work by signing
the logbook in the morning, only to stay out of the office the whole day;
asked from detention prisoners P100.00 to P200.00 before he released
to them their Release Orders; asked for amounts in excess of what was
necessary for the purchase of stamps and pocketed the difference; once
failed to mail printed matter on July 11, 2000 and kept for his own use
the amount given to him for the purpose; and divulged confidential
information to litigants in advance of its authorized release date for a
monetary consideration, thus giving undue advantage or favor to the
paying party, in violation of Rep. Act No. 3019 (The Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act).1
Pasay City MeTC Branch 44 Clerk of Court Pedro C. Doctolero, Jr., by
his Affidavit,2 and members of the court staff,3 by a Joint Affidavit,
attested that Almarvez failed to maintain the cleanliness in and around
the court premises, and had shown discourtesy in dealing with Judge
Paas and his co-employees. Doctolero's affidavit also corroborated
Judge Paas' allegation that Almarvez would merely sign the logbook in
the morning and thereafter stay out of the office.
Pasay City Postmaster Emma Z. Espiritu, by Certification dated August
2, 2000,4 attested that the alleged printed matter intended to be mailed
on July 11, 2000 was not included in the list of registered mails posted
in the Pasay City Post Office on said date.
Jail Escort Russel S. Hernandez and Jail Officer II Rosendo
Macabasag, both assigned to the Pasay City Jail, by their respective
affidavits,5 attested that on several occasions, they saw Almarvez
receive from detention prisoners P100.00 to P200.00 in consideration
of the release of their Release Orders.
Almarvez, by Answer of September 25, 2000,6 denied Judge Paas'
charges, and alleged that the real reason why Judge Paas filed the case
against him was because she suspected him of helping her husband,
Atty. Renerio G. Paas, conceal his marital indiscretions; since she failed
to elicit any information from him, she resorted to calling him names
and other forms of harassment; on September 6, 2000, she hurled at him
the following invectives before the other employees of the court:
"Walang kuwenta, ahas ka, driver lang kita, pinaasenso kita, walang
utang na loob, pinagtatakpan mo pa ang asawa ko, ulupong;" and she
insisted that he sign a prepared resignation letter, a copy of which he
was not able to keep.
Almarvez added that he had been subjected by Judge Paas to the
following incidents of oppression and abuse of authority: On July 28,
2000, he was called by the Judge to her chambers where she berated
him as follows: "Sinungaling ka, ang dami mong alam, hindi ka
nagsasabi ng totoo sa akin, gago, tanga, pirmahan mo itong
resignation letter, kung hindi kakasuhan kita ng estafa at falsification;"
the next day, the Judge, on seeing him, told him "Bakit ka nandiyan,
mag-leave ka sa Lunes;" and on July 31, 2000, the Judge called him
again to her chambers and told him "Ang kapal ng mukha mo, pumasok
ka pa dito, gago, kaya kita ipinasok dito dahil driver kita."
Continuing, Almarvez claimed that on July 31, 2000, he reported the
foregoing incidents to Pasay City MeTC Executive Judge Maria
Cancino Erum who advised him to report the same to the Office of the
Clerk of Court; and on August 1, 2000, he executed a sworn statement-
complaint7 against Judge Paas and went to the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) to file it, but he was advised to try to talk the
matter over with her who then told him that they should forget all about
it.
On the merits of the charges, Almarvez denied ever requesting for
money in exchange for the release of court orders and alleged that both
Hernandez and Macabasag executed their respective affidavits because
Judge Paas was a principal sponsor at their respective weddings;
Hernandez was in fact indebted to the Judge for helping him cover-up
the escape of a detainee under his charge; the court's mail matters were
always sealed whenever he received them for mailing and he never
tampered with their contents; the alleged unmailed printed matter was
actually posted on June 28, 2000, not on July 11, 2000, via ordinary
instead of registered mail, because the money given to him for the
purpose was insufficient; and on the days when he was out of the office,
he was actually performing personal errands for the judge and her
husband, Atty. Paas, who treated him as their personal driver and
messenger.
As further proof of Judge Paas' oppressive behavior towards him,
Almarvez claimed that she ordered him to undergo a drug test per
Memorandum dated September 7, 2000,8 even if he had no history of
drug abuse on a periodic or continuous basis as shown by the test results
of his examination.9
The Court treated respondent's Answer as a counter-complaint against
Judge Paas and docketed it as A.M. No. MTJ-01-1363.
The two administrative cases were consolidated and referred for
evaluation to the OCA, which assigned them to Executive Judge
Vicente L. Yap of Pasay City RTC, Branch 114 for investigation.
In a separate case for inhibition of Judge Paas in a criminal case, it was
revealed that Judge Paas' husband, private practitioner Atty. Paas, was
using his wife's office as his office address in his law practice, in
support of which were submitted copies of a Notice of Appeal signed
by Atty. Paas, notices from Pasay City RTC Branch 109 and from the
Supreme Court with respect to the case of People vs. Louie Manabat,
et al. (GR Nos. 140536-37) which indicated Atty. Paas' address to be
Room 203, Hall of Justice, Pasay City,10 the office assigned to Pasay
City MeTC, Branch 44.
Pursuant to Sec. 1 of Rule 139-B11 of the Rules of Court which allows
the Supreme Court to motu proprio initiate proceedings for the
discipline of attorneys, this Court resolved to docket the matter as A.M.
No. 01-12-02-SC and to consolidate it with A.M. OCA IPI No. 00-956-
P and AM No. MTJ-01-1363.
In compliance with the December 4, 2001 Resolution12 of the Court en
banc, Judge and Atty. Paas submitted their January 16, 2002 Joint
Affidavit13 wherein they vehemently denied the charge that the latter
was using Room 203 of the Pasay City Hall of Justice as his office
address, they claiming that Atty. Paas actually holds office at 410
Natividad Building, Escolta, Manila with his partner Atty. Herenio
Martinez; Atty. Paas would visit his wife at her office only when he has
a hearing before the Pasay City courts or Prosecutor's Office, or when
he lunches with or fetches her, or when he is a guest during special
occasions such as Christmas party and her birthday which are
celebrated therein; and Judge Paas would never consent nor tolerate the
use of the court for any personal activities. Attached to the Joint
Affidavit were the separate sworn statements of Atty. Paas' law partner
Atty. Herenio E. Martinez14 and secretary Nilda L. Gatdula15 attesting
that he is holding office at the above-said address in Escolta, and the
Joint Affidavit of the Pasay City MeTC Branch 44 court
personnel16 attesting that Atty. Paas' visits to the court are neither
routine nor daily occurrences, and he never used the court in the
practice of his profession.
On January 24, 2002, Judge Paas executed a Supplemental
Affidavit17 wherein she admitted that Atty. Paas did use her office as
his return address for notices and orders in Crim. Case Nos. 98-1197 to
98-1198, "People vs. Louie Manabat y Valencia and Raymond dela
Cruz y Salita," (now docketed in this Court as G.R. Nos. 140536-37),
lodged at the Pasay City RTC, Branch 109, but only to ensure and
facilitate delivery of those notices, but after the cases were terminated,
all notices were sent to his office address in Escolta.
By Resolution of February 12, 2002,18 the Court referred the matter to
the OCA for evaluation, report and recommendation.
After the completion of his investigation of A.M. OCA IPI No. 00-956-
P and A.M. No. MTJ-01-1363, Judge Yap submitted his
Report/Recommendation dated February 28, 2002.19
On March 11, 2002, the OCA submitted its Report on A.M. No. 01-12-
02-SC dated March 1, 2002.20
I. OCA Findings and Recommendations
A. On the charges against Almarvez:
The OCA, for lack of evidence, recommended the dismissal of the
charges against Almarvez of exacting money from detainees, violating
confidentiality of official communication, absence without official
leave, discourtesy and insubordination. Given Almarvez' unsatisfactory
performance ratings for three rating periods covering January to June
2000,21 July to December 2000,22 and January to April
2001,23 however, the OCA recommended that he be duly penalized
for inefficiency in the performance of his official duties with One (1)
Month suspension without pay, instead of dismissal as warranted under
Memorandum Circular No. 12, s. 1994, his supervisor having failed to
observe the procedure thereunder for dropping of employees from the
rolls, which procedure is quoted at the later portion of this decision.
B. On the charges against Judge Paas:
With respect to the complaint of Almarvez against Judge Paas, the
OCA, for lack of supporting evidence, recommended the dismissal of
the charges of maltreatment, harassment and verbal abuse. It found,
however, that Judge Paas "had used her administrative power of
supervision and control over court personnel for her personal pride,
prejudice and pettiness"24 when she issued her September 7, 2000
Memorandum ordering Alvarez to undergo a drug test after she had
already filed an administrative case against him. It thus concluded that,
in all probability, the purpose of Judge Paas in ordering Almarvez to
undergo a drug test was to fish for evidence to support the
administrative case she had already filed against him.
Accordingly, the OCA recommended that Judge Paas be found guilty
of simple misconduct in office, and be penalized with reprimand with
a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with
more severely.
II. This Court's Findings:
A. On the charges against Almarvez:
Indeed, this Court finds that there is no sufficient evidence to support
the charge of violation of confidentiality of official
communication against Almarvez. The charge against Almarvez in
Judge Paas' complaint-affidavit which reads:
That said ALMARVEZ being in charge of the mails had
divulged informations which is confidential in nature to party
litigants in advance of its authorized release date before the
release of Court Order and Decision for consideration of a sum
of money thus giving undue advantage or favor to the paying
party detrimental to the due administration of justice.25
in fact lacks particularity. It is devoid of material details to enable
Almarvez to intelligently meet the same.
As for the charges of neglect of duty, discourtesy and
insubordination which were echoed in the affidavits of court personnel,
they are also too general to support a conviction and are contrary to
what is reflected in his performance rating that he cooperated willingly,
even wholeheartedly, with his fellow employees.
On the charge of violation of Rep. Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act): Absent any evidence to support the charge, the
affiants jail officers who claimed to have witnessed Almarvez receive
money from detention prisoners in exchange for the release of their
Release Orders not having been presented, hence, their claim remains
hearsay, Almarvez' categorical denial and counter-allegation that these
affiants executed their affidavits only out of fear of or favor to Judge
Paas gain light.
As for the charge that Almarvez would merely sign the logbook and
would thereafter leave the office, again Judge Paas failed to present the
affiant-Clerk of Court Atty. Pedro C. Doctolero, Jr. While she
submitted in evidence a copy of her October 6, 2000
memorandum26 requiring Almarvez to explain why he was not in the
office on September 8, 11, and 13, and October 5, 2000, despite his
affixing of his signature in the logbook on those dates indicating that
he reported for work, Almarvez satisfactorily explained that on
September 8, 11, and 13, 2000, he submitted himself to drug testing as
required by her in her September 7, 200027 memorandum, which
explanation is supported by the September 14, 2000 letter of Dr.
Rosendo P. Saulog, Medical Specialist II of the Dangerous Drug
Board.28 As to his whereabouts on October 5, 2000, Almarvez'
explanation that he was actually present in the morning but left in the
afternoon for the Supreme Court29 was not controverted.
On the charge of inefficiency, this Court concurs with the following
findings of the OCA that he should be faulted therefor:
The performance ratings of respondent Almarvez for three (3)
rating periods covering January to June 2000, July to December
2000 and January to April 2001 evidently shows that he failed
to perform his official duties. The fact that respondent Almarvez
never disputed the performance ratings given him is tantamount
to an implied acceptance thereof pursuant to Sec. 5 Rule IX
Book V of Executive Order No. 292, quoted as follows:
 "Sec. 5. An employee who expresses dissatisfaction with
the rating given him may appeal through the established
Grievance Procedure of the Department or Agency
within fifteen (15) days after receipt of his copy of his
performance rating. Failure to file an appeal within the
prescribed period shall be deemed a waiver of such
right."
The performance ratings of respondent for the said periods are
valid grounds to drop him from the Rolls. However, considering
that his superior/supervisor failed to comply with the
requirements set forth in Memorandum Circular No. 12, Series
of 1994 of the Civil Service Commission, which is hereunder
quoted, and that he was able to make up and cure his
inefficiency after he was given the opportunity to improve his
performance in his detail to Branch 11, MeTC, Manila, as
shown by his performance rating for the period April to June
2001 with a "very satisfactory" rating, dropping him from the
roll will no longer be appropriate30 (Emphasis and italics
supplied.)
Par. 2.2 of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 12, s. 1994 referred to in
the above-quoted findings of the OCA reads:
2.2 Unsatisfactory or Poor Performance.
(a) An official or employee who is given two (2) consecutive
unsatisfactory ratings may be dropped from the rolls after due
notice. Notice shall mean that the officer or employee concerned
is informed in writing of his unsatisfactory performance for a
semester and is sufficiently warned that a succeeding
unsatisfactory performance shall warrant his separation from the
service. Such notice shall be given not later than 30 days from
the end of the semester and shall contain sufficient information
which shall enable the employee to prepare an explanation.
(Emphasis and italics supplied.)
The suspension of Almarvez for One (1) Month without pay, as
recommended by the OCA, is thus in order.
B. On the charges against Judge Paas:
Regarding the charges of abuse of authority and oppression against
Judge Paas, Almarvez failed to substantiate the same.
Judge Paas' order for Almarvez to undergo a drug test is not an unlawful
order. Per Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 34, s.
1997, public employees are required to undergo a drug test prior to
employment to determine if they are drug-free. To be drug-free is not
merely a pre-employment prerequisite but is a continuing requirement
to ensure the highest degree of productivity of the civil service.
However, considering that the order was issued after Judge Paas filed
the administrative case against Almarvez, it elicits the suspicion that it
was only a fishing expedition against him. This is conduct unbecoming
of a member of the judiciary, for which Judge Paas should be duly
reprimanded.
C. On the charges against Judge Paas and Atty. Paas:
By Judge Paas' own admission in her January 24, 2002 Supplemental
Affidavit,31 she was aware that her husband Atty. Paas was using her
office to receive court notices and orders in a case lodged in a Pasay
court. As the OCA puts it, "[w]hile the same appears to be innocuous,
it could be interpreted as a subtle way of sending a message that Atty.
Paas is the husband of a judge in the same building and should be given
special treatment by other judges or court personnel."32
The following are instructive in the disposition of these charges against
the judge and her spouse, Atty. Paas:
SC Administrative Circular No. 01-99, "Enhancing the Dignity of
Courts as Temples of Justice and Promoting Respect for their Officials
and Employers" reads:
As courts are temples of justice, their dignity and sanctity must,
at all times be preserved and enhanced. In inspiring public
respect for the justice system, court officials and employees
must:
1. In general: (a) avoid committing any act which would
constitute grounds for disciplinary action under, as the case may
be, the Canons of Judicial Ethics, Code of Judicial Conduct; and
Section 46, Chapter 7, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the
Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292); and
(b) faithfully comply with the norms of conduct and perform the
duties prescribed in the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards
for Public Officials and Employees (R.A. No. 6713);
2. Zealously guard the public trust character of their offices;
xxx xxx xxx
6. Never use their offices as a residence or for any other
purpose than for court or judicial functions. (Emphasis and
italics supplied.)
Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides that "A judge should
avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities."
Specifically, Rule 2.03 thereof provides that:
Rule 2.03. A judge shall not allow family, social, or other
relationships to influence judicial conduct or judgment. The
prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to advance
the private interests of others, nor convey or permit others
to convey the impression that they are in a special position
to influence the judge. (Emphasis supplied.)
SC Circular No. 3-92,33 dated August 31, 1992, of this Court reads:
SUBJECT: PROHIBITION AGAINST USE OF HALLS OF
JUSTICE FOR RESIDENTIAL OR COMMERCIAL
PURPOSES
All judges and court personnel are hereby reminded that the
Halls of Justice may be used only for purposes directly related
to the functioning and operation of the courts of justice, and may
not be devoted to any other use, least of all as residential quarters
of the judges or court personnel, or for carrying on therein any
trade or profession.
Attention is drawn to A.M. No. RTJ-89-327 (Nellie Kelly
Austria vs. Judge Singuat Guerra), a case involving
unauthorized and improper use of the court's premises for
dwelling purposes by respondent and his family, in which the
Court, by Resolution dated October 17, 1991, found respondent
Judge guilty of irresponsible and improper conduct prejudicial
to the efficient administration of justice and best interest of the
service, and imposed on him the penalty of SEVERE
CENSURE, the Court declaring that such use of the court's
premises inevitably degrades the honor and dignity of the court
in addition to exposing judicial records to danger of loss or
damage. (emphasis supplied.)
By allowing her husband to use the address of her court in pleadings
before other courts, Judge Paas indeed "allowed [him] to ride on her
prestige for purposes of advancing his private interest, in violation of
the Code of Judicial Conduct"34 and of the above-stated Supreme Court
circulars, which violation is classified as a less serious charge under the
Rules of Court35 and is punishable under the same Rule.36
A judge's official conduct should indeed be free from the appearance
of impropriety; and his behavior not only in the performance of judicial
duties, but also in his everyday life should be beyond reproach. This is
premised on the truism that a Judge's official life cannot simply be
detached or separated from his personal existence and that upon a
Judge's attributes depend the public perception of the Judiciary.37
On his part, Atty. Paas was guilty of using a fraudulent, misleading, and
deceptive address that had no purpose other than to try to impress either
the court in which his cases are lodged, or his client, that he has close
ties to a member of the juiciary, in violation of the following rules of
the Code of Professional Responsibility:
CANON 3 A LAWYER IN MAKING KNOWN HIS
LEGAL SERVICES SHALL USE ONLY TRUE, HONEST,
FAIR, DIGNIFIED AND OBJECTIVE INFORMATION OR
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Rule 3.01. A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false,
fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or
unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal
services.
CANON 10 A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS
AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to
the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the
Court to be misled by any artifice.
CANON 13 A LAWYER SHALL RELY UPON THE
MERITS OF HIS CAUSE AND REFRAIN FROM ANY
IMPROPRIETY WHICH TENDS TO INFLUENCE, OR
GIVES THE APPEARANCE OF INFLUENCING THE
COURT.
CANON 15 A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR,
FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS AND
TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS.
Rule 15.06. A lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to
influence any public official, tribunal or legislative body.
The need for relying on the merits of a lawyer's case, instead of banking
on his relationship with a member of the bench which tends to influence
or gives the appearance of influencing the court, cannot be
overemphasized. It is unprofessional and dishonorable, to say the least,
to misuse a public office to enhance a lawyer's prestige. Public
confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by such reprehensible
and improper conduct.
This Court does not subscribe to the proffered excuse that expediency
and a desire to ensure receipt of court orders and notices prompted Atty.
Paas and Judge Paas to allow him to have his court notices sent to office
of Judge Paas, especially given the fact that for his other cases, Atty.
Paas used his office address but there is no showing that he failed to
receive the notices sent to that address. While a lawyer should make the
necessary arrangements to ensure that he is properly informed of any
court action, these should not violate his lawyer's oath or the Code of
Professional Responsibility, nor provide an opportunity for a member
of the judiciary to breach his or her responsibilities under Supreme
Court circulars and the Code of Judicial Conduct.
WHEREFORE, this Court finds:
(1) In A.M. OCA IPI No. 00-956-P, respondent Edgar E.
Almarvez GUILTY of inefficiency and is hereby SUSPENDED
for One (1) Month without pay;
(2) In A.M. No. MTJ-01-1363, respondent, Judge Estrellita M.
Paas GUILTY of conduct unbecoming of a member of the
 judiciary and is hereby REPRIMANDED, with warning that
repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more
severely;

(3) In A.M. No. 01-12-02-SC,

(a) Judge Paas GUILTY of violating SC Administrative

Circular No. 01-99, SC Circular No. 3-92 and Canon 2,
Rule 2.03 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and is hereby
ordered to pay a FINE of TWELVE THOUSAND
PESOS (P12,000.00), with warning that repetition of the
same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely;
and

(b) Atty. Renerio Paas GUILTY of SIMPLE

MISCONDUCT and is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of THREE (3) MONTHS,
with warning that repetition of the same or similar act
shall be dealt with more severely.

This Decision shall take effect immediately.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant,
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and appended to respondents'
personal record.

SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC
[A.C. No. 5580. June 15, 2005]
SAN JOSE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION INC., as
represented by REBECCA V. LABRADOR, complainant,
vs. ATTY. ROBERTO B. ROMANILLOS, respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This is a Petition[1] for disbarment against Atty. Roberto B.
Romanillos for allegedly representing conflicting interests and for
using the title Judge despite having been found guilty of grave and
serious misconduct in Zarate v. Judge Romanillos.[2]
The facts are as follows:
In 1985, respondent represented San Jose Homeowners
Association, Inc. (SJHAI) before the Human Settlements Regulation
Commission (HSRC) in a case[3] against Durano and Corp., Inc. (DCI)
for violation of the Subdivision and Condominium Buyers Protection
Act (P.D. No. 957). SJHAI alleged that Lot No. 224 was designated as
a school site in the subdivision plan that DCI submitted to the Bureau
of Lands in 1961 but was sold by DCI to spouses Ramon and Beatriz
Durano without disclosing it as a school site.
While still the counsel for SJHAI, respondent represented Myrna
and Antonio Montealegre in requesting for SJHAIs conformity to
construct a school building on Lot No. 224 to be purchased from
Durano.
When the request was denied, respondent applied for clearance
before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) in
behalf of Montealegre. Petitioners Board of Directors terminated
respondents services as counsel and engaged another lawyer to
represent the association.
Respondent also acted as counsel for Lydia Durano-Rodriguez who
substituted for DCI in Civil Case No. 18014 entitled San Jose
Homeowners, Inc. v. Durano and Corp., Inc. filed before the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 134. Thus, SJHAI filed a
disbarment case against respondent for representing conflicting
interests, docketed as Administrative Case No. 4783.
In her Report[4] dated August 3, 1998, Investigating Commissioner
Lydia A. Navarro of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) made the following findings:
Respondent failed to observe candor and fairness in dealing with his
clients, knowing fully well that the Montealegre case was adverse to
the Complainant wherein he had previously been not only an active
board member but its corporate secretary having access to all its
documents confidential or otherwise and its counsel in handling the
implementation of the writ of execution against its developer and
owner, Durano and Co. Inc.
Moreso, when Respondent acted as counsel for the substituted
defendant Durano and Co. Inc., Lydia Durano-Rodriguez; the conflict
of interest between the latter and the Complainant became so revealing
and yet Respondent proceeded to represent the former.
For his defense of good faith in doing so; inasmuch as the same wasnt
controverted by the Complainant which was his first offense;
Respondent must be given the benefit of the doubt to rectify his error
subject to the condition that should he commit the same in the future;
severe penalty will be imposed upon him.[5]
The Investigating Commissioner recommended dismissal of the
complaint with the admonition that respondent should observe extra
care and diligence in the practice of his profession to uphold its dignity
and integrity beyond reproach.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the report and
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, which we noted
in a resolution dated March 8, 1999.
Notwithstanding the admonition, respondent continued
representing Lydia Durano-Rodriguez before the Court of
Appeals[6] and this Court[7] and even moved for the execution of the
decision.
Thus, a second disbarment case was filed against respondent for
violation of the March 8, 1999 Resolution in A.C. No. 4783 and for his
alleged deceitful conduct in using the title Judge although he was found
guilty of grave and serious misconduct.
Respondent used the title Judge in his office letterhead,
correspondences and billboards which was erected in several areas
within the San Jose Subdivision sometime in October 2001.
[8]
In his Comment and Explanation, respondent claimed that he
continued to represent Lydia Durano-Rodriguez against petitioner
despite the March 8, 1999 Resolution because it was still pending when
the second disbarment case was filed. He maintained that the instant
petition is a rehash of the first disbarment case from which he was
exonerated. Concerning the title Judge, respondent stated that since the
filing of the instant petition he had ceased to attach the title to his name.
On July 7, 2003, the matter was referred to the IBP for
investigation, report and recommendation.[9]
Investigating Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid, Jr. reported that
respondent did not violate the admonition because it referred to future
cases only and not to cases subject of A.C. No. 4783. Besides, petitioner
never questioned the propriety of respondents continued representation
of Lydia Durano-Rodriguez on appeal until the case was terminated.
The Investigating Commissioner, however, believed that
respondent was deceitful when he used the title Judge, thus creating a
false impression that he was an incumbent.
The Investigating Commissioner recommended thus:
In view of the foregoing considerations, this Commissioner respectfully
recommends the following penalty range to be deliberated upon by the
Board for imposition on Respondent: minimum penalty of reprimand
to a maximum penalty of four (4) months suspension. It is further
recommended that in addition to the penalty to be imposed, a stern
warning be given to Respondent in that should he violate his
undertaking/promise not to handle any case in the future where the
Complainant would be the adverse party and/or should he again use the
title of Judge which would create an impression that he is still
connected to the judiciary, a more severe penalty shall be imposed on
him by the Commission.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.
The IBP Board of Governors approved with modification the report
and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED
and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-
entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex A, and,
finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record
and the applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondents
violation of Rule 1.01 and Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, Atty. Roberto Romanillos is hereby SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for six (6) months with a WARNING that
should he violate his undertaking/promise a more severe penalty shall
be imposed against him.
 Undoubtedly, respondent represented the inconsistent interests of
SJHAI, DCI as substituted by Lydia Durano-Rodriguez and the
Montealegres. Respondent was admonished yet he continued to
represent Durano-Rodriguez against SJHAI.
It is inconsequential that petitioner never questioned the propriety
of respondents continued representation of Lydia Durano-Rodriguez.
The lack of opposition does not mean tacit consent. As long as the
lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two (2) or more opposing
clients, he is guilty of violating his oath. Rule 15.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility specifically mandates that a lawyer shall
not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure. Incidentally, it is also
misleading for respondent to insist that he was exonerated in A.C. No.
4783.
We agree with the IBP that respondents continued use of the title
Judge violated Rules 1.01 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in deceitful conduct
and from using any misleading statement or claim regarding
qualifications or legal services. The quasi-judicial notice he posted in
the billboards referring to himself as a judge is deceiving. It was a clear
attempt to mislead the public into believing that the order was issued in
his capacity as a judge when he was dishonorably stripped of the
privilege.
Respondent did not honorably retire from the judiciary. He
resigned from being a judge during the pendency of Zarate v. Judge
Romanillos, where he was eventually found guilty of grave and serious
misconduct and would have been dismissed from the service had he not
resigned.
In that case, respondent was found guilty of illegal solicitation and
receipt of P10,000.00 from a party litigant. We ruled thus:
Considering the foregoing, respondent Judge Roberto B. Romanillos is
hereby found guilty of grave and serious misconduct affecting his
integrity and honesty. He deserves the supreme penalty of dismissal.
However, respondent, in an obvious attempt to escape punishment for
his misdeeds, tendered his resignation during the pendency of this case.
Consequently, we are now precluded from dismissing respondent from
the service. Nevertheless, the ruling in People v. Valenzuela (135
SCRA 712 [1985]), wherein the respondent judge likewise resigned
before the case could be resolved, finds application in this case. Therein
it was held that the rule that the resignation or retirement of a
respondent judge in an administrative case renders the case moot and
academic, is not a hard and fast rule.
ACCORDINGLY, in view of our aforestated finding that respondent
Judge Romanillos is guilty of grave and serious misconduct which
would have warranted his dismissal from the service had he not
resigned during the pendency of this case, and it appearing that
respondent has yet to apply for his retirement benefits and other
privileges if any; the Court, consistent with the penalties imposed in
Valenzuela (supra.), hereby orders the FORFEITURE of all leave and
retirement benefits and privileges to which herein respondent Judge
Romanillos may be entitled WITH PREJUDICE to reinstatement
and/or reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of government,
including government-owned or controlled agencies or corporations.
SO ORDERED.[10]
The penalty imposed upon him in said case included forfeiture of
all leave and retirement benefits and privileges to which he may be
entitled with prejudice to reinstatement and/or reemployment in any
branch or instrumentality of government, including government-owned
or controlled agencies or corporations. Certainly, the use of the title
Judge is one of such privileges.
We have previously declared that the use of titles such as Justice is
reserved to incumbent and retired members of the Supreme Court, the
Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan and may not be used by any
other official of the Republic, including those given the rank of
Justice.[11] By analogy, the title Judge should be reserved only to of his office and unworthy of the trust and confidence reposed on him
judges, incumbent and retired, and not to those who were dishonorably as an officer of the court. His disbarment is consequently warranted.
discharged from the service. As correctly pointed out by the
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Investigating Commissioner, the right to retain and use said title applies
only to the aforementioned members of the bench and no other, and SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court;
certainly not to those who were removed or dismissed from the grounds therefor. A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended
judiciary, such as respondent. from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
Membership in the legal profession is a special privilege burdened malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
with conditions.[12] It is bestowed upon individuals who are not only conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
learned in law, but also known to possess good moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
character.[13] Lawyers should act and comport themselves with honesty before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful
and integrity in a manner beyond reproach, in order to promote the order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an
publics faith in the legal profession.[14] attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of
soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
To say that lawyers must at all times uphold and respect the law is
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
to state the obvious, but such statement can never be overemphasized.
Considering that, of all classes and professions, [lawyers are] most WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Roberto B. Romanillos is
sacredly bound to uphold the law, it is imperative that they live by the DISBARRED and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll
law. Accordingly, lawyers who violate their oath and engage in of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in respondents
deceitful conduct have no place in the legal profession.[15] record as a member of the Bar, and notice of the same be served on the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court
Disbarment is the most severe form of disciplinary sanction. We
Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
are mindful that the power to disbar must always be exercised with
great caution, for only the most imperative reasons,[16] and in clear SO ORDERED.
cases of misconduct affecting the standing and moral character of the
lawyer as an officer of the court and as a member of the bar.[17]
This is not respondents first infraction as an officer of the court and
a member of the legal profession. He was stripped of his retirement
benefits and other privileges in Zarate v. Judge Romanillos.[18] In A.C.
No. 4783, he got off lightly with just an admonition. Considering his
previous infractions, respondent should have adhered to the tenets of
his profession with extra fervor and vigilance. He did not. On the
contrary, he manifested undue disrespect to our mandate and exhibited
a propensity to violate the laws. He is thus unfit to discharge the duties
 EN BANC Annex B

GUAM DIVORCE.

Bar Matter No. 553 June 17, 1993 DON PARKINSON

MAURICIO C. ULEP, petitioner, an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam

vs. Divorce through The Legal Clinic beginning Monday to
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC., respondent. Friday during office hours.

R E SO L U T I O N Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration

Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special
Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to
Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil.
REGALADO, J.: US/Foreign Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call
Marivic.
Petitioner prays this Court "to order the respondent to cease and desist
from issuing advertisements similar to or of the same tenor as that of THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave., LEGAL Ermita,
annexes "A" and "B" (of said petition) and to perpetually prohibit Manila nr. US Embassy CLINIC, INC. 1 Tel. 521-7232;
persons or entities from making advertisements pertaining to the 521-7251; 522-2041; 521-0767
exercise of the law profession other than those allowed by law."
It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above
The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as follows: reproduced are champterous, unethical, demeaning of the law
profession, and destructive of the confidence of the community in the
Annex A integrity of the members of the bar and that, as a member of the legal
profession, he is ashamed and offended by the said advertisements,
SECRET MARRIAGE? hence the reliefs sought in his petition as hereinbefore quoted.
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE. In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication
ANNULMENT. VISA. of said advertisement at its instance, but claims that it is not engaged in
the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal support services"
THE Please call: 521-0767 LEGAL 5217232, 5222041 through paralegals with the use of modern computers and electronic
CLINIC, INC. 8:30 am 6:00 pm 7-Flr. Victoria Bldg., machines. Respondent further argues that assuming that the services
UN Ave., Mla. advertised are legal services, the act of advertising these services should
be allowed supposedly
in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar
of Arizona, 2 reportedly decided by the United States Supreme Court on
June 7, 1977.
Considering the critical implications on the legal profession of the
issues raised herein, we required the (1) Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), (2) Philippine Bar Association (PBA), (3) Philippine
Lawyers' Association (PLA), (4) U.P. Womens Lawyers' Circle
(WILOCI), (5) Women Lawyers Association of the Philippines
(WLAP), and (6) Federacion International de Abogadas (FIDA) to
submit their respective position papers on the controversy and,
thereafter, their memoranda. 3 The said bar associations readily
responded and extended their valuable services and cooperation of
which this Court takes note with appreciation and gratitude.
The main issues posed for resolution before the Court are whether or
not the services offered by respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as
advertised by it constitutes practice of law and, in either case, whether
the same can properly be the subject of the advertisements herein
complained of.
Before proceeding with an in-depth analysis of the merits of this case,
we deem it proper and enlightening to present hereunder excerpts from
the respective position papers adopted by the aforementioned bar
associations and the memoranda submitted by them on the issues
involved in this bar matter.
1. Integrated Bar of the Philippines:
xxx xxx xxx
Notwithstanding the subtle manner by which respondent
endeavored to distinguish the two terms, i.e., "legal
support services" vis-a-vis "legal services", common
sense would readily dictate that the same are essentially
without substantial distinction. For who could deny that
document search, evidence gathering, assistance to
layman in need of basic institutional services from
government or non-government agencies like birth,
marriage, property, or business registration, obtaining
documents like clearance, passports, local or foreign
visas, constitutes practice of law?
xxx xxx xxx
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) does not wish
to make issue with respondent's foreign citations. Suffice
it to state that the IBP has made its position manifest, to
wit, that it strongly opposes the view espoused by
respondent (to the effect that today it is alright to
advertise one's legal services).
The IBP accordingly declares in no uncertain terms its
opposition to respondent's act of establishing a "legal
clinic" and of concomitantly advertising the same
through newspaper publications.
The IBP would therefore invoke the administrative
supervision of this Honorable Court to perpetually
restrain respondent from undertaking highly unethical
activities in the field of law practice as aforedescribed. 4
xxx xxx xxx
A. The use of the name "The Legal Clinic, Inc." gives the
impression that respondent corporation is being operated
by lawyers and that it renders legal services.
While the respondent repeatedly denies that it offers legal
services to the public, the advertisements in question give
the impression that respondent is offering legal services.
The Petition in fact simply assumes this to be so, as
earlier mentioned, apparently because this (is) the effect
that the advertisements have on the reading public.
The impression created by the advertisements in question
can be traced, first of all, to the very name being used by
respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." Such a name, it is
respectfully submitted connotes the rendering of legal
services for legal problems, just like a medical clinic
connotes medical services for medical problems. More
importantly, the term "Legal Clinic" connotes lawyers, as
the term medical clinic connotes doctors.
Furthermore, the respondent's name, as published in the
advertisements subject of the present case, appears with
(the) scale(s) of justice, which all the more reinforces the
impression that it is being operated by members of the
bar and that it offers legal services. In addition, the
advertisements in question appear with a picture and
name of a person being represented as a lawyer from
Guam, and this practically removes whatever doubt may
still remain as to the nature of the service or services
being offered.
It thus becomes irrelevant whether respondent is merely
offering "legal support services" as claimed by it, or
whether it offers legal services as any lawyer actively
engaged in law practice does. And it becomes
unnecessary to make a distinction between "legal
services" and "legal support services," as the respondent
would have it. The advertisements in question leave no
room for doubt in the minds of the reading public that
legal services are being offered by lawyers, whether true
or not.
B. The advertisements in question are meant to induce the
performance of acts contrary to law, morals, public order
and public policy.
It may be conceded that, as the respondent claims, the
advertisements in question are only meant to inform the
general public of the services being offered by it. Said
advertisements, however, emphasize to Guam divorce,
and any law student ought to know that under the Family
Code, there is only one instance when a foreign divorce
is recognized, and that is:
Article 26. . . .
Where a marriage between a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated
and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse
shall have capacity to remarry under
Philippine Law.
It must not be forgotten, too, that the Family Code
(defines) a marriage as follows:
Article 1. Marriage is special contract of
permanent union between a man and
woman entered into accordance with law
for the establishment of conjugal and
family life. It is the foundation of the family
and an inviolable social institution whose
nature, consequences, and incidents are
governed by law and not subject to
stipulation, except that marriage
settlements may fix the property relation
 during the marriage within the limits
provided by this Code.
By simply reading the questioned advertisements, it is
obvious that the message being conveyed is that Filipinos
can avoid the legal consequences of a marriage celebrated
in accordance with our law, by simply going to Guam for
a divorce. This is not only misleading, but encourages, or
serves to induce, violation of Philippine law. At the very
least, this can be considered "the dark side" of legal
practice, where certain defects in Philippine laws are
exploited for the sake of profit. At worst, this is outright
malpractice.
Rule 1.02. A lawyer shall not counsel or
abet activities aimed at defiance of the law
or at lessening confidence in the legal
system.
In addition, it may also be relevant to point out that
advertisements such as that shown in Annex "A" of the
Petition, which contains a cartoon of a motor vehicle with
the words "Just Married" on its bumper and seems to
address those planning a "secret marriage," if not
suggesting a "secret marriage," makes light of the
"special contract of permanent union," the inviolable
social institution," which is how the Family Code
describes marriage, obviously to emphasize its sanctity
and inviolability. Worse, this particular advertisement
appears to encourage marriages celebrated in secrecy,
which is suggestive of immoral publication of
applications for a marriage license.
If the article "Rx for Legal Problems" is to be reviewed,
it can readily be concluded that the above impressions
one may gather from the advertisements in question are
accurate. The Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion
example alone confirms what the advertisements suggest.
Here it can be seen that criminal acts are being
encouraged or committed
(a bigamous marriage in Hong Kong or Las Vegas) with
impunity simply because the jurisdiction of Philippine
courts does not extend to the place where the crime is
committed.
Even if it be assumed, arguendo, (that) the "legal support
services" respondent offers do not constitute legal
services as commonly understood, the advertisements in
question give the impression that respondent corporation
is being operated by lawyers and that it offers legal
services, as earlier discussed. Thus, the only logical
consequence is that, in the eyes of an ordinary newspaper
reader, members of the bar themselves are encouraging
or inducing the performance of acts which are contrary to
law, morals, good customs and the public good, thereby
destroying and demeaning the integrity of the Bar.
xxx xxx xxx
It is respectfully submitted that respondent should be
enjoined from causing the publication of the
advertisements in question, or any other advertisements
similar thereto. It is also submitted that respondent should
be prohibited from further performing or offering some
of the services it presently offers, or, at the very least,
from offering such services to the public in general.
The IBP is aware of the fact that providing computerized
legal research, electronic data gathering, storage and
retrieval, standardized legal forms, investigators for
gathering of evidence, and like services will greatly
benefit the legal profession and should not be stifled but
instead encouraged. However, when the conduct of such
business by non-members of the Bar encroaches upon the
practice of law, there can be no choice but to prohibit
such business.
Admittedly, many of the services involved in the case at
bar can be better performed by specialists in other fields,
such as computer experts, who by reason of their having
devoted time and effort exclusively to such field cannot
fulfill the exacting requirements for admission to the Bar.
To prohibit them from "encroaching" upon the legal
profession will deny the profession of the great benefits
and advantages of modern technology. Indeed, a lawyer
using a computer will be doing better than a lawyer using
a typewriter, even if both are (equal) in skill.
Both the Bench and the Bar, however, should be careful
not to allow or tolerate the illegal practice of law in any
form, not only for the protection of members of the Bar
but also, and more importantly, for the protection of the
public. Technological development in the profession may
be encouraged without tolerating, but instead ensuring
prevention of illegal practice.
There might be nothing objectionable if respondent is
allowed to perform all of its services, but only if such
services are made available exclusively to members of
the Bench and Bar. Respondent would then be offering
technical assistance, not legal services. Alternatively, the
more difficult task of carefully distinguishing between
which service may be offered to the public in general and
which should be made available exclusively to members
of the Bar may be undertaken. This, however, may
require further proceedings because of the factual
considerations involved.
It must be emphasized, however, that some of
respondent's services ought to be prohibited outright,
such as acts which tend to suggest or induce celebration
abroad of marriages which are bigamous or otherwise
illegal and void under Philippine law. While respondent
may not be prohibited from simply disseminating
information regarding such matters, it must be required
to include, in the information given, a disclaimer that it is
not authorized to practice law, that certain course of
action may be illegal under Philippine law, that it is not
authorized or capable of rendering a legal opinion, that a
lawyer should be consulted before deciding on which
course of action to take, and that it cannot recommend
any particular lawyer without subjecting itself to possible
sanctions for illegal practice of law.
If respondent is allowed to advertise, advertising should
be directed exclusively at members of the Bar, with a
clear and unmistakable disclaimer that it is not authorized
to practice law or perform legal services.
The benefits of being assisted by paralegals cannot be
ignored. But nobody should be allowed to represent
himself as a "paralegal" for profit, without such term
being clearly defined by rule or regulation, and without
any adequate and effective means of regulating his
activities. Also, law practice in a corporate form may
prove to be advantageous to the legal profession, but
before allowance of such practice may be considered, the
corporation's Article of Incorporation and By-laws must
conform to each and every provision of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and the Rules of Court. 5
2. Philippine Bar Association:
xxx xxx xxx.
Respondent asserts that it "is not engaged in the practice
of law but engaged in giving legal support services to
lawyers and laymen, through experienced paralegals,
with the use of modern computers and electronic
machines" (pars. 2 and 3, Comment). This is absurd.
Unquestionably, respondent's acts of holding out itself to
the public under the trade name "The Legal Clinic, Inc.,"
and soliciting employment for its enumerated services
fall within the realm of a practice which thus yields itself
to the regulatory powers of the Supreme Court. For
respondent to say that it is merely engaged in paralegal
work is to stretch credulity. Respondent's own
commercial advertisement which announces a
certain Atty. Don Parkinson to be handling the fields of
law belies its pretense. From all indications, respondent
"The Legal Clinic, Inc." is offering and rendering legal
services through its reserve of lawyers. It has been held
that the practice of law is not limited to the conduct of
cases in court, but includes drawing of deeds,
incorporation, rendering opinions, and advising clients
as to their legal right and then take them to an attorney
and ask the latter to look after their case in court See
Martin, Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1984 ed., p. 39).
It is apt to recall that only natural persons can engage in
the practice of law, and such limitation cannot be evaded
by a corporation employing competent lawyers to
practice for it. Obviously, this is the scheme or device by
which respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." holds out itself
to the public and solicits employment of its legal services.
It is an odious vehicle for deception, especially so when
the public cannot ventilate any grievance
for malpractice against the business conduit. Precisely,
the limitation of practice of law to persons who have been
duly admitted as members of the Bar (Sec. 1, Rule 138,
Revised Rules of Court) is to subject the members to
the discipline of the Supreme Court. Although
respondent uses its business name, the persons and the
lawyers who act for it are subject to court discipline. The
practice of law is not a profession open to all who wish
to engage in it nor can it be assigned to another (See 5
Am. Jur. 270). It is a personal right limited to persons
who have qualified themselves under the law. It follows
that not only respondent but also all the persons who are
acting for respondent are the persons engaged in
unethical law practice. 6
3. Philippine Lawyers' Association:
The Philippine Lawyers' Association's position, in
answer to the issues stated herein, are wit:
1. The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law;
2. Such practice is unauthorized;
3. The advertisements complained of are not only
unethical, but also misleading and patently immoral; and
4. The Honorable Supreme Court has the power to
supress and punish the Legal Clinic and its corporate
officers for its unauthorized practice of law and for its
unethical, misleading and immoral advertising.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent posits that is it not engaged in the practice of
law. It claims that it merely renders "legal support
services" to answers, litigants and the general public as
enunciated in the Primary Purpose Clause of its Article(s)
of Incorporation. (See pages 2 to 5 of Respondent's
Comment). But its advertised services, as enumerated
above, clearly and convincingly show that it is indeed
engaged in law practice, albeit outside of court.
As advertised, it offers the general public its advisory
services on Persons and Family Relations Law,
particularly regarding foreign divorces, annulment of
marriages, secret marriages, absence and adoption;
Immigration Laws, particularly on visa related problems,
immigration problems; the Investments Law of the
Philippines and such other related laws.
Its advertised services unmistakably require the
application of the aforesaid law, the legal principles and
procedures related thereto, the legal advices based
thereon and which activities call for legal training,
knowledge and experience.
Applying the test laid down by the Court in the aforecited
Agrava Case, the activities of respondent fall squarely
and are embraced in what lawyers and laymen equally
term as "the practice of law." 7
4. U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle:
In resolving, the issues before this Honorable Court,
paramount consideration should be given to the
protection of the general public from the danger of being
exploited by unqualified persons or entities who may be
engaged in the practice of law.
At present, becoming a lawyer requires one to take a
rigorous four-year course of study on top of a four-year
bachelor of arts or sciences course and then to take and
pass the bar examinations. Only then, is a lawyer
qualified to practice law.
While the use of a paralegal is sanctioned in many
jurisdiction as an aid to the administration of justice, there
are in those jurisdictions, courses of study and/or
standards which would qualify these paralegals to deal
with the general public as such. While it may now be the
opportune time to establish these courses of study and/or
standards, the fact remains that at present, these do not
exist in the Philippines. In the meantime, this Honorable
Court may decide to make measures to protect the general
public from being exploited by those who may be dealing
with the general public in the guise of being "paralegals"
without being qualified to do so.
In the same manner, the general public should also be
protected from the dangers which may be brought about
by advertising of legal services. While it appears that
lawyers are prohibited under the present Code of
Professional Responsibility from advertising, it appears
in the instant case that legal services are being advertised
not by lawyers but by an entity staffed by "paralegals."
Clearly, measures should be taken to protect the general
public from falling prey to those who advertise legal
services without being qualified to offer such services. 8
A perusal of the questioned advertisements of
Respondent, however, seems to give the impression that
information regarding validity of marriages, divorce,
annulment of marriage, immigration, visa extensions,
declaration of absence, adoption and foreign investment,
which are in essence, legal matters , will be given to them
if they avail of its services. The Respondent's name
The Legal Clinic, Inc. does not help matters. It gives
the impression again that Respondent will or can cure the
legal problems brought to them. Assuming that
Respondent is, as claimed, staffed purely by paralegals,
it also gives the misleading impression that there are
lawyers involved in The Legal Clinic, Inc., as there are
doctors in any medical clinic, when only "paralegals" are
involved in The Legal Clinic, Inc.
Respondent's allegations are further belied by the very
admissions of its President and majority stockholder,
Atty. Nogales, who gave an insight on the structure and
main purpose of Respondent corporation in the
aforementioned "Starweek" article." 9
5. Women Lawyer's Association of the Philippines:
Annexes "A" and "B" of the petition are clearly
advertisements to solicit cases for the purpose of gain
which, as provided for under the above cited law, (are)
illegal and against the Code of Professional
Responsibility of lawyers in this country.
Annex "A" of the petition is not only illegal in that it is
an advertisement to solicit cases, but it is illegal in that in
bold letters it announces that the Legal Clinic, Inc., could
work out/cause the celebration of a secret marriage which
is not only illegal but immoral in this country. While it is
advertised that one has to go to said agency and pay P560
for a valid marriage it is certainly fooling the public for
valid marriages in the Philippines are solemnized only by
officers authorized to do so under the law. And to employ
an agency for said purpose of contracting marriage is not
necessary.
No amount of reasoning that in the USA, Canada and
other countries the trend is towards allowing lawyers to
advertise their special skills to enable people to obtain
from qualified practitioners legal services for their
particular needs can justify the use of advertisements
such as are the subject matter of the petition, for one
(cannot) justify an illegal act even by whatever merit the
illegal act may serve. The law has yet to be amended so
that such act could become justifiable.
We submit further that these advertisements that seem to
project that secret marriages and divorce are possible in
this country for a fee, when in fact it is not so, are highly
reprehensible.
It would encourage people to consult this clinic about
how they could go about having a secret marriage here,
when it cannot nor should ever be attempted, and seek
advice on divorce, where in this country there is none,
except under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws in the
Philippines. It is also against good morals and is deceitful
because it falsely represents to the public to be able to do
that which by our laws cannot be done (and) by our Code
of Morals should not be done.
In the case (of) In re Taguda, 53 Phil. 37, the Supreme
Court held that solicitation for clients by an attorney by
circulars of advertisements, is unprofessional, and
offenses of this character justify permanent elimination
from the Bar. 10
6. Federacion Internacional de Abogados:
xxx xxx xxx
1.7 That entities admittedly not engaged in the practice
of law, such as management consultancy firms or travel
agencies, whether run by lawyers or not, perform the
services rendered by Respondent does not necessarily
lead to the conclusion that Respondent is not unlawfully
practicing law. In the same vein, however, the fact that
the business of respondent (assuming it can be engaged
in independently of the practice of law) involves
knowledge of the law does not necessarily make
respondent guilty of unlawful practice of law.
. . . . Of necessity, no one . . . . acting as a
consultant can render effective service
unless he is familiar with such statutes and
regulations. He must be careful not to
suggest a course of conduct which the law
forbids. It seems . . . .clear that (the
consultant's) knowledge of the law, and his
use of that knowledge as a factor in
determining what measures he shall
recommend, do not constitute the practice
of law . . . . It is not only presumed that all
men know the law, but it is a fact that most
men have considerable acquaintance with
broad features of the law . . . . Our
knowledge of the law accurate or
inaccurate moulds our conduct not only
when we are acting for ourselves, but when
we are serving others. Bankers, liquor
dealers and laymen generally possess
rather precise knowledge of the laws
touching their particular business or
profession. A good example is the
architect, who must be familiar with
zoning, building and fire prevention codes,
factory and tenement house statutes, and
who draws plans and specification in
harmony with the law. This is not
practicing law.
But suppose the architect, asked by his
client to omit a fire tower, replies that it is
required by the statute. Or the industrial
relations expert cites, in support of some
measure that he recommends, a decision of
the National Labor Relations Board. Are
they practicing law? In my opinion, they
are not, provided no separate fee is charged
for the legal advice or information, and the
legal question is subordinate and incidental
to a major non-legal problem.
It is largely a matter of degree and of
custom.
If it were usual for one intending to erect a
building on his land to engage a lawyer to
advise him and the architect in respect to
the building code and the like, then an
architect who performed this function
would probably be considered to be
trespassing on territory reserved for
licensed attorneys. Likewise, if the
industrial relations field had been pre-
empted by lawyers, or custom placed a
lawyer always at the elbow of the lay
personnel man. But this is not the case. The
most important body of the industrial
relations experts are the officers and
business agents of the labor unions and few
of them are lawyers. Among the larger
corporate employers, it has been the
practice for some years to delegate special
responsibility in employee matters to a
management group chosen for their
practical knowledge and skill in such
matter, and without regard to legal thinking
or lack of it. More recently, consultants like
the defendants have the same service that
the larger employers get from their own
specialized staff.
The handling of industrial relations is
growing into a recognized profession for
which appropriate courses are offered by
our leading universities. The court should
be very cautious about declaring [that] a
widespread, well-established method of
conducting business is unlawful, or that the
considerable class of men who customarily
perform a certain function have no right to
do so, or that the technical education given
by our schools cannot be used by the
graduates in their business.
In determining whether a man is practicing
law, we should consider his work for any
particular client or customer, as a whole. I
can imagine defendant being engaged
primarily to advise as to the law defining
his client's obligations to his employees, to
guide his client's obligations to his
employees, to guide his client along the
path charted by law. This, of course, would
be the practice of the law. But such is not
the fact in the case before me. Defendant's
primarily efforts are along economic and
psychological lines. The law only provides
the frame within which he must work, just
as the zoning code limits the kind of
building the limits the kind of building the
architect may plan. The incidental legal
advice or information defendant may give,
does not transform his activities into the
practice of law. Let me add that if, even as
a minor feature of his work, he performed
services which are customarily reserved to
members of the bar, he would be practicing
law. For instance, if as part of a welfare
program, he drew employees' wills.
Another branch of defendant's work is the
representations of the employer in the
adjustment of grievances and in collective
bargaining, with or without a mediator.
This is not per se the practice of law.
Anyone may use an agent for negotiations
and may select an agent particularly skilled
in the subject under discussion, and the
person appointed is free to accept the
employment whether or not he is a member
of the bar. Here, however, there may be an
exception where the business turns on a
question of law. Most real estate sales are
negotiated by brokers who are not lawyers.
But if the value of the land depends on a
disputed right-of-way and the principal role
of the negotiator is to assess the probable
outcome of the dispute and persuade the
opposite party to the same opinion, then it
may be that only a lawyer can accept the
assignment. Or if a controversy between an
employer and his men grows from differing
interpretations of a contract, or of a statute,
it is quite likely that defendant should not
handle it. But I need not reach a definite
conclusion here, since the situation is not
presented by the proofs.
Defendant also appears to represent the
employer before administrative agencies of
the federal government, especially before
trial examiners of the National Labor
Relations Board. An agency of the federal
government, acting by virtue of an
authority granted by the Congress, may
regulate the representation of parties before
such agency. The State of New Jersey is
without power to interfere with such
determination or to forbid representation
before the agency by one whom the agency
admits. The rules of the National Labor
Relations Board give to a party the right to
appear in person, or by counsel, or by other
representative. Rules and Regulations,
September 11th, 1946, S. 203.31. 'Counsel'
here means a licensed attorney, and ther
representative' one not a lawyer. In this
phase of his work, defendant may lawfully
do whatever the Labor Board allows, even
arguing questions purely legal.
(Auerbacher v. Wood, 53 A. 2d 800, cited
in Statsky, Introduction to Paralegalism
[1974], at pp. 154-156.).
1.8 From the foregoing, it can be said that a person
engaged in a lawful calling (which may involve
knowledge of the law) is not engaged in the practice of
law provided that:
(a) The legal question is subordinate and incidental to a
major non-legal problem;.
(b) The services performed are not customarily reserved
to members of the bar; .
(c) No separate fee is charged for the legal advice or
information.
All these must be considered in relation to the work for
any particular client as a whole.
1.9. If the person involved is both lawyer and non-lawyer,
the Code of Professional Responsibility succintly states
the rule of conduct:
Rule 15.08 A lawyer who is engaged in another
profession or occupation concurrently with the practice
of law shall make clear to his client whether he is acting
as a lawyer or in another capacity.
1.10. In the present case. the Legal Clinic appears to
render wedding services (See Annex "A" Petition).
Services on routine, straightforward marriages, like
securing a marriage license, and making arrangements
with a priest or a judge, may not constitute practice of
law. However, if the problem is as complicated as that
described in "Rx for Legal Problems" on the Sharon
Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion-Richard Gomez case, then
what may be involved is actually the practice of law. If a
non-lawyer, such as the Legal Clinic, renders such
services then it is engaged in the unauthorized practice of
law.
1.11. The Legal Clinic also appears to give information
on divorce, absence, annulment of marriage and visas
(See Annexes "A" and "B" Petition). Purely giving
informational materials may not constitute of law. The
business is similar to that of a bookstore where the
customer buys materials on the subject and determines on
the subject and determines by himself what courses of
action to take.
It is not entirely improbable, however, that aside from
purely giving information, the Legal Clinic's paralegals
may apply the law to the particular problem of the client,
and give legal advice. Such would constitute
unauthorized practice of law.
It cannot be claimed that the publication of
a legal text which publication of a legal text
which purports to say what the law is
amount to legal practice. And the mere fact
that the principles or rules stated in the text
may be accepted by a particular reader as a
solution to his problem does not affect this.
. . . . Apparently it is urged that the
conjoining of these two, that is, the text and
the forms, with advice as to how the forms
should be filled out, constitutes the
unlawful practice of law. But that is the
situation with many approved and accepted
texts. Dacey's book is sold to the public at
large. There is no personal contact or
relationship with a particular individual.
Nor does there exist that relation of
confidence and trust so necessary to the
status of attorney and client. THIS IS THE
ESSENTIAL OF LEGAL PRACTICE
THE REPRESENTATION AND
ADVISING OF A PARTICULAR PERSON
IN A PARTICULAR SITUATION. At most
the book assumes to offer general advice on
common problems, and does not purport to
give personal advice on a specific problem
peculiar to a designated or readily
identified person. Similarly the defendant's
publication does not purport to give
personal advice on a specific problem
peculiar to a designated or readily
identified person in a particular situation
in their publication and sale of the kits,
such publication and sale did not
constitutes the unlawful practice of law . . .
. There being no legal impediment under
the statute to the sale of the kit, there was
no proper basis for the injunction against
defendant maintaining an office for the
purpose of selling to persons seeking a
divorce, separation, annulment or
separation agreement any printed material
or writings relating to matrimonial law or
the prohibition in the memorandum of
modification of the judgment against
defendant having an interest in any
publishing house publishing his manuscript
on divorce and against his having any
 personal contact with any prospective
purchaser. The record does fully support,
however, the finding that for the change of
$75 or $100 for the kit, the defendant gave
legal advice in the course of personal
contacts concerning particular problems
which might arise in the preparation and
presentation of the purchaser's asserted
matrimonial cause of action or pursuit of
other legal remedies and assistance in the
preparation of necessary documents (The
injunction therefore sought to) enjoin
conduct constituting the practice of law,
particularly with reference to the giving of
advice and counsel by the defendant
relating to specific problems of particular
individuals in connection with a divorce,
separation, annulment of separation
agreement sought and should be affirmed.
(State v. Winder, 348, NYS 2D 270 [1973],
cited in Statsky, supra at p. 101.).
1.12. Respondent, of course, states that its services are
"strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory. "It is not
controverted, however, that if the services "involve
giving legal advice or counselling," such would
constitute practice of law (Comment, par. 6.2). It is in this
light that FIDA submits that a factual inquiry may be
necessary for the judicious disposition of this case.
xxx xxx xxx
2.10. Annex "A" may be ethically objectionable in that it
can give the impression (or perpetuate the wrong notion)
that there is a secret marriage. With all the solemnities,
formalities and other requisites of marriages (See Articles
2, et seq., Family Code), no Philippine marriage can be
secret.
2.11. Annex "B" may likewise be ethically objectionable.
The second paragraph thereof (which is not necessarily
related to the first paragraph) fails to state the limitation
that only "paralegal services?" or "legal support
services", and not legal services, are available." 11
A prefatory discussion on the meaning of the phrase "practice of law"
becomes exigent for the proper determination of the issues raised by
the petition at bar. On this score, we note that the clause "practice of
law" has long been the subject of judicial construction and
interpretation. The courts have laid down general principles and
doctrines explaining the meaning and scope of the term, some of which
we now take into account.
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires
the application of law, legal procedures, knowledge, training and
experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts
which are characteristic of the profession. Generally, to practice law is
to give advice or render any kind of service that involves legal
knowledge or skill. 12
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It
includes legal advice and counsel, and the preparation of legal
instruments and contract by which legal rights are secured, although
such matter may or may not be pending in a court. 13
In the practice of his profession, a licensed attorney at law generally
engages in three principal types of professional activity: legal advice
and instructions to clients to inform them of their rights and obligations,
preparation for clients of documents requiring knowledge of legal
principles not possessed by ordinary layman, and appearance for clients
before public tribunals which possess power and authority to determine
rights of life, liberty, and property according to law, in order to assist
in proper interpretation and enforcement of law. 14
When a person participates in the a trial and advertises himself as a
lawyer, he is in the practice of law. 15 One who confers with clients,
advises them as to their legal rights and then takes the business to an
attorney and asks the latter to look after the case in court, is also
practicing law. 16 Giving advice for compensation regarding the legal
status and rights of another and the conduct with respect thereto
constitutes a practice of law. 17 One who renders an opinion as to the
proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is, to that
extent, practicing law. 18
In the recent case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, 19 after citing the doctrines
in several cases, we laid down the test to determine whether certain acts
constitute "practice of law," thus:
Black defines "practice of law" as:
The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the
application of legal principles and technique to serve the
interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to
appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the
conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of
pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and
special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of
legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal
advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all
actions taken for them in matters connected with the law.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases on court.(Land
Title Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken , 129 Ohio St. 23, 193N. E.
650). A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when he:
. . . . for valuable consideration engages in the business
of advising person, firms, associations or corporations as
to their right under the law, or appears in a representative
capacity as an advocate in proceedings, pending or
prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee,
board, body, committee, or commission constituted by
law or authorized to settle controversies and there, in such
representative capacity, performs any act or acts for the
purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their
clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a
representative capacity, engages in the business of
advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while
so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or
outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the
practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v. C.S. Dudley
and Co., 102 S. W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852).
This Court, in the case of Philippines Lawyers Association
v. Agrava (105 Phil. 173, 176-177),stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases
or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of
pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special
proceedings, the management of such actions and
proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts,
and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to
clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected
with the law incorporation services, assessment and
condemnation services contemplating an appearance
before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage,
enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and
insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters or estate and guardianship
have been held to constitute law practice, as do the
preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the
work done involves the determination by the trained legal
mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am.
Jr. p. 262, 263).
Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no
small part of work performed outside of any court and
having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It
embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a
large variety of subjects and the preparation and
execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field
of business and trust relations and other affairs. Although
these transactions may have no direct connection with
court proceedings, they are always subject to become
involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a
high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men
and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult
and complex situations. These customary functions of an
attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to
the administration of justice by the courts. No valid
distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the
order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the
lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part
which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his
office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that
these manifold customary functions be performed by
persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of
sound moral character, and acting at all times under the
heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all
attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules o Court, Vol.
3 [1973 ed.], pp. 665-666, citing In Re Opinion of the
Justices [Mass], 194 N. E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar
Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 197 A. 139,
144).
The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities in and
out of court. Applying the aforementioned criteria to the case at bar, we
agree with the perceptive findings and observations of the aforestated
bar associations that the activities of respondent, as advertised,
constitute "practice of law."
The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services
can neither be seriously considered nor sustained. Said proposition is
belied by respondent's own description of the services it has been
offering, to wit:
Legal support services basically consists of giving ready
information by trained paralegals to laymen and lawyers,
which are strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory, through
the extensive use of computers and modern information
technology in the gathering, processing, storage,
transmission and reproduction of information and
communication, such as computerized legal research;
encoding and reproduction of documents and pleadings
prepared by laymen or lawyers; document search;
evidence gathering; locating parties or witnesses to a
case; fact finding investigations; and assistance to laymen
in need of basic institutional services from government or
non-government agencies, like birth, marriage, property,
or business registrations; educational or employment
records or certifications, obtaining documentation like
clearances, passports, local or foreign visas; giving
information about laws of other countries that they may
find useful, like foreign divorce, marriage or adoption
laws that they can avail of preparatory to emigration to
the foreign country, and other matters that do not involve
representation of clients in court; designing and installing
computer systems, programs, or software for the efficient
management of law offices, corporate legal departments,
 courts and other entities engaged in dispensing or
administering legal services. 20
While some of the services being offered by respondent corporation
merely involve mechanical and technical knowhow, such as the
installation of computer systems and programs for the efficient
management of law offices, or the computerization of research aids and
materials, these will not suffice to justify an exception to the general
rule.
What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal
information to laymen and lawyers. Its contention that such function is
non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent than real. In
providing information, for example, about foreign laws on marriage,
divorce and adoption, it strains the credulity of this Court that all the
respondent corporation will simply do is look for the law, furnish a
copy thereof to the client, and stop there as if it were merely a
bookstore. With its attorneys and so called paralegals, it will
necessarily have to explain to the client the intricacies of the law and
advise him or her on the proper course of action to be taken as may be
provided for by said law. That is what its advertisements represent and
for the which services it will consequently charge and be paid. That
activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential definition of "practice
of law." Such a conclusion will not be altered by the fact that
respondent corporation does not represent clients in court since law
practice, as the weight of authority holds, is not limited merely giving
legal advice, contract drafting and so forth.
The aforesaid conclusion is further strengthened by an article published
in the January 13, 1991 issue of the Starweek/The Sunday Magazine of
the Philippines Star, entitled "Rx for Legal Problems," where an insight
into the structure, main purpose and operations of respondent
corporation was given by its own "proprietor," Atty. Rogelio P.
Nogales:
This is the kind of business that is transacted everyday at
The Legal Clinic, with offices on the seventh floor of the
Victoria Building along U. N. Avenue in Manila. No
matter what the client's problem, and even if it is as
complicated as the Cuneta-Concepcion domestic
situation, Atty. Nogales and his staff of lawyers, who,
like doctors are "specialists" in various fields can take
care of it. The Legal Clinic, Inc. has specialists in taxation
and criminal law, medico-legal problems, labor,
litigation, and family law. These specialist are backed up
by a battery of paralegals, counsellors and attorneys.
Atty. Nogales set up The Legal Clinic in 1984. Inspired
by the trend in the medical field toward specialization, it
caters to clients who cannot afford the services of the big
law firms.
The Legal Clinic has regular and walk-in clients. "when
they come, we start by analyzing the problem. That's
what doctors do also. They ask you how you contracted
what's bothering you, they take your temperature, they
observe you for the symptoms and so on. That's how we
operate, too. And once the problem has been categorized,
then it's referred to one of our specialists.
There are cases which do not, in medical terms, require
surgery or follow-up treatment. These The Legal Clinic
disposes of in a matter of minutes. "Things like preparing
a simple deed of sale or an affidavit of loss can be taken
care of by our staff or, if this were a hospital the residents
or the interns. We can take care of these matters on a
while you wait basis. Again, kung baga sa hospital, out-
patient, hindi kailangang ma-confine. It's just like a
common cold or diarrhea," explains Atty. Nogales.
 Those cases which requires more extensive "treatment"
are dealt with accordingly. "If you had a rich relative who
died and named you her sole heir, and you stand to inherit
millions of pesos of property, we would refer you to a
specialist in taxation. There would be real estate taxes and
arrears which would need to be put in order, and your
relative is even taxed by the state for the right to transfer
her property, and only a specialist in taxation would be
properly trained to deal with the problem. Now, if there
were other heirs contesting your rich relatives will, then
you would need a litigator, who knows how to arrange
the problem for presentation in court, and gather evidence
to support the case. 21
That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its
services is not controlling. What is important is that it is engaged in the
practice of law by virtue of the nature of the services it renders which
thereby brings it within the ambit of the statutory prohibitions against
the advertisements which it has caused to be published and are now
assailed in this proceeding.
Further, as correctly and appropriately pointed out by the U.P.
WILOCI, said reported facts sufficiently establish that the main
purpose of respondent is to serve as a one-stop-shop of sorts for various
legal problems wherein a client may avail of legal services from simple
documentation to complex litigation and corporate undertakings. Most
of these services are undoubtedly beyond the domain of paralegals, but
rather, are exclusive functions of lawyers engaged in the practice of
law. 22
It should be noted that in our jurisdiction the services being offered by
private respondent which constitute practice of law cannot be
performed by paralegals. Only a person duly admitted as a member of
the bar, or hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions
of the Rules of Court, and who is in good and regular standing, is
entitled to practice law. 23
Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those
individuals found duly qualified in education and character. The
permissive right conferred on the lawyers is an individual and limited
privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards
of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the public,
the court, the client and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of
those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary
control of the court. 24
The same rule is observed in the american jurisdiction wherefrom
respondent would wish to draw support for his thesis. The doctrines
there also stress that the practice of law is limited to those who meet
the requirements for, and have been admitted to, the bar, and various
statutes or rules specifically so provide. 25 The practice of law is not a
lawful business except for members of the bar who have complied with
all the conditions required by statute and the rules of court. Only those
persons are allowed to practice law who, by reason of attainments
previously acquired through education and study, have been recognized
by the courts as possessing profound knowledge of legal science
entitling them to advise, counsel with, protect, or defend the rights
claims, or liabilities of their clients, with respect to the construction,
interpretation, operation and effect of law. 26 The justification for
excluding from the practice of law those not admitted to the bar is
found, not in the protection of the bar from competition, but in the
protection of the public from being advised and represented in legal
matters by incompetent and unreliable persons over whom the judicial
department can exercise little control. 27
We have to necessarily and definitely reject respondent's position that
the concept in the United States of paralegals as an occupation separate
from the law profession be adopted in this jurisdiction. Whatever may
be its merits, respondent cannot but be aware that this should first be a
matter for judicial rules or legislative action, and not of unilateral
adoption as it has done.
Paralegals in the United States are trained professionals. As admitted
by respondent, there are schools and universities there which offer
studies and degrees in paralegal education, while there are none in the
Philippines. 28 As the concept of the "paralegals" or "legal assistant"
evolved in the United States, standards and guidelines also evolved to
protect the general public. One of the major standards or guidelines was
developed by the American Bar Association which set up Guidelines
for the Approval of Legal Assistant Education Programs (1973).
Legislation has even been proposed to certify legal assistants. There are
also associations of paralegals in the United States with their own code
of professional ethics, such as the National Association of Legal
Assistants, Inc. and the American Paralegal Association. 29
In the Philippines, we still have a restricted concept and limited
acceptance of what may be considered as paralegal service. As pointed
out by FIDA, some persons not duly licensed to practice law are or have
been allowed limited representation in behalf of another or to render
legal services, but such allowable services are limited in scope and
extent by the law, rules or regulations granting permission therefor. 30
Accordingly, we have adopted the American judicial policy that, in the
absence of constitutional or statutory authority, a person who has not
been admitted as an attorney cannot practice law for the proper
administration of justice cannot be hindered by the unwarranted
intrusion of an unauthorized and unskilled person into the practice of
law. 31 That policy should continue to be one of encouraging persons
who are unsure of their legal rights and remedies to seek legal
assistance only from persons licensed to practice law in the state. 32
Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the
Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making
known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and
objective information or statement of facts. 33 He is not supposed to use
or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive,
undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his
qualifications or legal services. 34 Nor shall he pay or give something
of value to representatives of the mass media in anticipation of, or in
return for, publicity to attract legal business. 35 Prior to the adoption of
the code of Professional Responsibility, the Canons of Professional
Ethics had also warned that lawyers should not resort to indirect
advertisements for professional employment, such as furnishing or
inspiring newspaper comments, or procuring his photograph to be
published in connection with causes in which the lawyer has been or is
engaged or concerning the manner of their conduct, the magnitude of
the interest involved, the importance of the lawyer's position, and all
other like self-laudation. 36
The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's
advertisement of his talents. A lawyer cannot, without violating the
ethics of his profession. advertise his talents or skill as in a manner
similar to a merchant advertising his goods. 37 The prescription against
advertising of legal services or solicitation of legal business rests on the
fundamental postulate that the that the practice of law is a profession.
Thus, in the case of The Director of Religious Affairs. vs. Estanislao R.
Bayot 38 an advertisement, similar to those of respondent which are
involved in the present proceeding, 39 was held to constitute improper
advertising or solicitation.
The pertinent part of the decision therein reads:
It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a
flagrant violation by the respondent of the ethics of his
profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business from
the public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides
among other things that "the practice of soliciting cases
at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or thru
paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." It is
 highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or
skill as a merchant advertises his wares. Law is a
profession and not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself
and his profession who stoops to and adopts the practices
of mercantilism by advertising his services or offering
them to the public. As a member of the bar, he defiles the
temple of justice with mercenary activities as the money-
changers of old defiled the temple of Jehovah. "The most
worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for a
young lawyer, . . . . is the establishment of a well-merited
reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust.
This cannot be forced but must be the outcome of
character and conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.).
We repeat, the canon of the profession tell us that the best advertising
possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for professional
capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the outcome of
character and conduct. Good and efficient service to a client as well as
to the community has a way of publicizing itself and catching public
attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of effective service
which is right and proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no
artificial stimulus to generate it and to magnify his success. He easily
sees the difference between a normal by-product of able service and the
unwholesome result of propaganda. 40
Of course, not all types of advertising or solicitation are prohibited. The
canons of the profession enumerate exceptions to the rule against
advertising or solicitation and define the extent to which they may be
undertaken. The exceptions are of two broad categories, namely, those
which are expressly allowed and those which are necessarily implied
from the restrictions. 41
The first of such exceptions is the publication in reputable law lists, in
a manner consistent with the standards of conduct imposed by the
canons, of brief biographical and informative data. "Such data must not
be misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyer's name
and the names of his professional associates; addresses, telephone
numbers, cable addresses; branches of law practiced; date and place of
birth and admission to the bar; schools attended with dates of
graduation, degrees and other educational distinction; public or quasi-
public offices; posts of honor; legal authorships; legal teaching
positions; membership and offices in bar associations and committees
thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities; the fact
of listings in other reputable law lists; the names and addresses of
references; and, with their written consent, the names of clients
regularly represented." 42
The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that
purpose; it cannot be a mere supplemental feature of a paper, magazine,
trade journal or periodical which is published principally for other
purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not properly publish his brief
biographical and informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade
journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be
published in a law list the conduct, management or contents of which
are calculated or likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to
lower the dignity or standing of the profession. 43
The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The
card may contain only a statement of his name, the name of the law
firm which he is connected with, address, telephone number and special
branch of law practiced. The publication of a simple announcement of
the opening of a law firm or of changes in the partnership, associates,
firm name or office address, being for the convenience of the
profession, is not objectionable. He may likewise have his name listed
in a telephone directory but not under a designation of special branch
of law. 44
Verily, taking into consideration the nature and contents of the
advertisements for which respondent is being taken to task, which even
includes a quotation of the fees charged by said respondent corporation
for services rendered, we find and so hold that the same definitely do
not and conclusively cannot fall under any of the above-mentioned
exceptions.
The ruling in the case of Bates, et al. vs. State Bar of Arizona, 45 which
is repeatedly invoked and constitutes the justification relied upon by
respondent, is obviously not applicable to the case at bar. Foremost is
the fact that the disciplinary rule involved in said case explicitly allows
a lawyer, as an exception to the prohibition against advertisements by
lawyers, to publish a statement of legal fees for an initial consultation
or the availability upon request of a written schedule of fees or an
estimate of the fee to be charged for the specific services. No such
exception is provided for, expressly or impliedly, whether in our former
Canons of Professional Ethics or the present Code of Professional
Responsibility. Besides, even the disciplinary rule in the Bates case
contains a proviso that the exceptions stated therein are "not applicable
in any state unless and until it is implemented by such authority in that
state." 46 This goes to show that an exception to the general rule, such
as that being invoked by herein respondent, can be made only if and
when the canons expressly provide for such an exception. Otherwise,
the prohibition stands, as in the case at bar.
It bears mention that in a survey conducted by the American Bar
Association after the decision in Bates, on the attitude of the public
about lawyers after viewing television commercials, it was found that
public opinion dropped significantly 47 with respect to these
characteristics of lawyers:
Trustworthy from 71% to 14%
Professional from 71% to 14%
Honest from 65% to 14%
Dignified from 45% to 14%
Secondly, it is our firm belief that with the present situation of our legal
and judicial systems, to allow the publication of advertisements of the
kind used by respondent would only serve to aggravate what is already
a deteriorating public opinion of the legal profession whose integrity
has consistently been under attack lately by media and the community
in general. At this point in time, it is of utmost importance in the face
of such negative, even if unfair, criticisms at times, to adopt and
maintain that level of professional conduct which is beyond reproach,
and to exert all efforts to regain the high esteem formerly accorded to
the legal profession.
In sum, it is undoubtedly a misbehavior on the part of the lawyer,
subject to disciplinary action, to advertise his services except in
allowable instances 48 or to aid a layman in the unauthorized practice
of law. 49 Considering that Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales, who is the prime
incorporator, major stockholder and proprietor of The Legal Clinic, Inc.
is a member of the Philippine Bar, he is hereby reprimanded, with a
warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts which are involved
in this proceeding will be dealt with more severely.
While we deem it necessary that the question as to the legality or
illegality of the purpose/s for which the Legal Clinic, Inc. was created
should be passed upon and determined, we are constrained to refrain
from lapsing into an obiter on that aspect since it is clearly not within
the adjudicative parameters of the present proceeding which is merely
administrative in nature. It is, of course, imperative that this matter be
promptly determined, albeit in a different proceeding and forum, since,
under the present state of our law and jurisprudence, a corporation
cannot be organized for or engage in the practice of law in this country.
This interdiction, just like the rule against unethical advertising, cannot
be subverted by employing some so-called paralegals supposedly
rendering the alleged support services.
The remedy for the apparent breach of this prohibition by respondent is
the concern and province of the Solicitor General who can institute the
corresponding quo warranto action, 50 after due ascertainment of the
factual background and basis for the grant of respondent's corporate
charter, in light of the putative misuse thereof. That spin-off from the
instant bar matter is referred to the Solicitor General for such action as
may be necessary under the circumstances.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN

herein respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., from issuing or causing the
publication or dissemination of any advertisement in any form which is
of the same or similar tenor and purpose as Annexes "A" and "B" of
this petition, and from conducting, directly or indirectly, any activity,
operation or transaction proscribed by law or the Code of Professional
Ethics as indicated herein. Let copies of this resolution be furnished the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant and
the Office of the Solicitor General for appropriate action in accordance
herewith.
 EN BANC RESOLUTION NO. 24, SERIES OF 2008

RE: REQUEST OF A.M. No. 08-11-7-SC RESOLUTION OF THE IBPMISAMIS ORIENTAL

NATIONAL COMMITTEE CHAPTER FOR THE IBP NATIONAL LEGAL AID
ON LEGAL AID[1] TO EXEMPT Present: OFFICE TO REQUEST THE COURTS AND OTHER
LEGAL AID CLIENTS FROM QUASI-JUDICIAL BODIES, THE PHILIPPINE
PAYING FILING, DOCKET PUNO, C.J., MEDIATION CENTER AND PROSECUTORS
AND OTHER FEES. OFFICES TO EXEMPT LEGAL AID CLIENTS
FROM PAYING FILING, DOCKET AND OTHER
FEES INCIDENTAL TO THE FILING AND
Promulgated: LITIGATION OF ACTIONS, AS ORIGINAL
PROCEEDINGS OR ON APPEAL.
August 28, 2009
WHEREAS, Section 1, Article I of the
x-------------------------------------------------- Guidelines Governing the Establishment and Operation
-x of Legal Aid Offices in All Chapters of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (otherwise known as
[]Guideline[s] on Legal Aid[]) provides: Legal aid is not
a matter of charity. It is a means for the correction of
RESOLUTION
social imbalances that may often lead to injustice, for
CORONA, J.:
which reason, it is a public responsibility of the Bar. The
spirit of public service should therefore unde[r]ly all
legal aid offices. The same should be so administered as
On September 23, 2008 the Misamis Oriental Chapter of the
to give maximum possible assistance to indigent and
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) promulgated Resolution No. 24, deserving members of the community in all cases,
matters and situations in which legal aid may be
series of 2008.[2] The resolution requested the IBPs National
necessary to forestall injustice.
Committee on Legal Aid[3] (NCLA) to ask for the exemption from the
WHEREAS, Section 2 of the same provides: In
payment of filing, docket and other fees of clients of the legal aid
order to attain the objectives of legal aid, legal aid office
offices in the various IBP chapters. Resolution No. 24, series of 2008 should be as close as possible to those who are in need
provided:
thereof the masses. Hence, every chapter of the IBP must
establish and operate an adequate legal aid office.
WHEREAS, the Legal Aid Office of the
IBPMisamis Oriental Chapter has long been operational,
providing free legal services to numerous indigent
clients, through the chapters members who render
volunteer services in the spirit of public service;
WHEREAS, the courts, quasi-judicial bodies, the
various mediation centers and prosecutors offices are
collecting fees, be they filing, docket, motion, mediation
or other fees in cases, be they original proceedings or on
appeal;
WHEREAS, IBP Legal Aid clients are qualified
under the same indigency and merit tests used by the
Public Attorneys Office (PAO), and would have
qualified for PAO assistance, but for reasons other than
indigency, are disqualified from availing of the services
of the PAO, like the existence of a conflict of interests
or conflicting defenses, and other similar causes;
WHEREAS, PAO clients are automatically
exempt from the payment of docket and other fees for
cases, be they original proceedings or on appeal, by
virtue of the provisions of Section 16D of R.A. 9406
(PAO Law), without the need for the filing of any
petition or motion to declare them as pauper litigants;
WHEREAS, there is no similar provision in any
substantive law or procedural law giving IBP Legal Aid
clients the same benefits or privileges enjoyed by PAO
clients with respect to the payment of docket and other
fees before the courts, quasi-judicial bodies and
prosecutors offices;
WHEREAS, the collection of docket and other
fees from the IBP Legal Aid clients poses an additional
strain to their next to non-existent finances;
WHEREAS, the quarterly allowance given by the
National Legal Aid Office to the IBP Misamis Oriental
Chapter is insufficient to even cover the incidental
expenses of volunteer legal aid lawyers, much less
answer for the payment of docket and other fees
collected by the courts, quasi-judicial bodies and
prosecutors offices and mediation fees collected by the
Philippine Mediation Center;
NOW THEREFORE, on motion of the Board of
Officers of the IBPMisamis Oriental Chapter, be it
resolved as it is hereby resolved, to move the IBP
National Legal Aid Office to make the necessary
requests or representations with the Supreme Court, the
Philippine Mediation Center, the Department of Justice
and the National Prosecution Service and other quasi-
judicial agencies to effect the grant of a like exemption
from the payment of filing, docket and other fees to the
IBP Legal Aid clients as that enjoyed by PAO clients,
towards the end that IBP Legal Aid clients be
automatically exempted from the filing of the
abovementioned fees;
 RESOLVED FURTHER, that copies of this
Resolution be furnished to Supreme Court Chief Justice
Honorable Reynato S. Puno, IBP National President
Feliciano M. Bautista, the IBP Board of Governors,
Secretary of Justice Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez, the
National Supervisor of the Philippine Mediation Center,
the National Labor Relations Commission, the Civil
Service Commission and other quasi-judicial bodies and
their local offices;
RESOLVED FINALLY to move the IBP Board
of Governors and National Officers to make the
necessary representations with the National Legislature
and its members to effect the filing of a bill before the
House of Representatives and the Senate granting
exemption to IBP Legal Aid clients from the payment of
docket, filing and or other fees in cases before the courts,
quasi-judicial agencies and prosecutors offices and the
mediation centers.
Done this 23rd day of September 2008, Cagayan
De Oro City.
Unanimously approved upon motion severally
seconded.[4]
The Court noted Resolution No. 24, series of 2008 and required the
IBP, through the NCLA, to comment thereon.[5]
In a comment dated December 18, 2008,[6] the IBP, through the NCLA,
made the following comments:
(a) Under Section 16-D of RA[7] 9406, clients of the Public
Attorneys Office (PAO) are exempt from the payment of
docket and other fees incidental to the institution of
action in court and other quasi-judicial bodies. On the
other hand, clients of legal aid offices in the various IBP
chapters do not enjoy the same exemption. IBPs indigent
clients are advised to litigate as pauper litigants under
Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court;
(b) They are further advised to submit documentary evidence to
prove compliance with the requirements under Section
21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, i.e., certifications from
the barangay and the Department of Social Welfare and
Development. However, not only does the process
involve some expense which indigent clients could ill-
afford, clients also lack knowledge on how to go about
the tedious process of obtaining these documents;
(c) Although the IBP is given an annual legal aid subsidy, the
amount it receives from the government is barely enough
to cover various operating expenses;[8]
(d) While each IBP local chapter is given a quarterly allocation
(from the legal aid subsidy),[9] said allocation covers
neither the incidental expenses defrayed by legal aid
lawyers in handling legal aid cases nor the payment of
docket and other fees collected by the courts, quasi-
judicial bodies and the prosecutors office, as well as
mediation fees and
 (e) Considering the aforementioned factors, a directive may be
issued by the Supreme Court granting IBPs indigent
Access to justice by all, especially by the poor, is not simply an
clients an exemption from the payment of docket and
other fees similar to that given to PAO clients under ideal in our society. Its existence is essential in a democracy and in the
Section 16-D of RA 9406. In this connection, the
rule of law. As such, it is guaranteed by no less than the fundamental
Supreme Court previously issued a circular exempting
IBP clients from the payment of transcript of law:
stenographic notes.[10]
Sec. 11. Free access to the courts and quasi-
judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not
be denied to any person by reason of
At the outset, we laud the Misamis Oriental Chapter of the IBP poverty.[12] (emphasis supplied)
for its effort to help improve the administration of justice, particularly,
the access to justice by the poor. Its Resolution No. 24, series of 2008
The Court recognizes the right of access to justice as the most
in fact echoes one of the noteworthy recommendations during
important pillar of legal empowerment of the marginalized sectors of
the Forum on Increasing Access to Justice spearheaded by the Court
our society.[13] Among others, it has exercised its power to promulgate
last year. In promulgating Resolution No. 24, the Misamis Oriental
rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional
Chapter of the IBP has effectively performed its duty to participate in
rights[14] to open the doors of justice to the underprivileged and to allow
the development of the legal system by initiating or supporting efforts
them to step inside the courts to be heard of their plaints. In particular,
in law reform and in the administration of justice.[11]
indigent litigants are permitted under Section 21, Rule 3[15] and Section
We now move on to determine the merits of the request. 19, Rule 141[16] of the Rules of Court to bring suits in forma pauperis.
The IBP, pursuant to its general objectives to improve the
administration of justice and enable the Bar to discharge its public
ACCESS TO JUSTICE:
responsibility more effectively,[17]assists the Court in providing the
MAKING AN IDEAL A REALITY

poor access to justice. In particular, it renders free legal aid under the
supervision of the NCLA.
A NEW RULE, A NEW TOOL
FOR ACCESS TO JUSTICE
Under the IBPs Guidelines Governing the Establishment and
Operation of Legal Aid Offices in All Chapters of the IBP (Guidelines
on Legal Aid), the combined means and merit tests shall be used to
determine the eligibility of an applicant for legal aid:
ARTICLE VIII
TESTS
SEC. 19. Combined tests. The Chapter Legal Aid
Committee or the [NCLA], as the case may be, shall pass
upon the request for legal aid by the combined
application of the means test and merit test, and the
consideration of other factors adverted to in the
following sections.
SEC. 20. Means test. The means test aims at determining
whether the applicant has no visible means of support or
his income is otherwise insufficient to provide the
financial resources necessary to engage competent
private counsel owing to the demands for subsistence of
of eligibility for coverage under the legal aid program of the IBP.
his family, considering the number of his dependents
and the conditions prevailing in the locality.
The means test shall not be applicable to applicants who
fall under the Developmental Legal Aid Program such
as Overseas Filipino Workers, fishermen, farmers,
women and children and other disadvantaged groups.
SEC. 21. Merit test. The merit test seeks to ascertain
whether or not the applicants cause of action or his
defense is valid and chances of establishing the same
appear reasonable.
SEC. 22. Other factors. The effect of the Legal Aid
Service or of the failure to render the same upon the Rule
of Law, the proper administration of justice, the public
interest involved in given cases and the practice of law
in the locality shall likewise be considered.
SEC. 23. Private practice. Care shall be taken that the
Legal aid is not availed of to the detriment of the private
practice of law, or taken advantage of by anyone for
personal ends.
SEC. 24. Denial. Legal aid may be denied to an
applicant already receiving adequate assistance from
any source other than the Integrated Bar.
The means and merit tests appear to be reasonable determinants
 justice by the poor by exempting from the payment of
Nonetheless, they may be improved to ensure that any exemption from
legal fees incidental to instituting an action in court, as
the payment of legal fees that may be granted to clients of the NCLA an original proceeding or on appeal, qualified indigent
clients of the NCLA and of the legal aid offices in local
and the legal aid offices of the various IBP chapters will really further
IBP chapters nationwide.
the right of access to justice by the poor. This will guarantee that the
ARTICLE II
exemption will neither be abused nor trivialized. Towards this end, the
Definition of Terms
following shall be observed by the NCLA and the legal aid offices in
Section 1. Definition of important terms. For purposes
IBP chapters nationwide in accepting clients and handling cases for the
of this Rule and as used herein, the following terms shall
said clients: be understood to be how they are defined under this
Section:
A.M. No. 08-11-7-SC (IRR): Re: Rule on the
(a) Developmental legal aid means the rendition
Exemption From the Payment of Legal Fees of the
of legal services in public interest causes
Clients of the National Committee on Legal Aid and
involving overseas workers, fisherfolk,
of the Legal Aid Offices in the Local Chapters of the
farmers, laborers, indigenous cultural
Integrated Bar of the Philippines
communities, women, children and other
disadvantaged groups and marginalized
Rule on the Exemption From the Payment of Legal
sectors;
Fees of the Clients of the National Committee on
Legal Aid (NCLA) and of the Legal Aid Offices in the
(b) Disinterested person refers to the punong
Local Chapters of the Integrated Bar of the
barangay having jurisdiction over the
Philippines (IBP)
place where an applicant for legal aid or
ARTICLE I client of the NCLA or chapter legal aid
Purpose office resides;

Section 1. Purpose. This Rule is issued for the purpose (c) Falsity refers to any material
of enforcing the right of free access to courts by the poor misrepresentation of fact or any
guaranteed under Section 11, Article III of the fraudulent, deceitful, false, wrong or
Constitution. It is intended to increase the access to misleading statement in the application or
 affidavits submitted to support it or the
affidavit of a disinterested person required
to be submitted annually under this Rule
which may substantially affect the
determination of the qualifications of the
applicant or the client under the means and
merit tests;
(d) Legal fees refers to the legal fees imposed
under Rule 141 of the Rules of Court as a
necessary incident of instituting an action
in court either as an original proceeding or
on appeal. In particular, it includes filing
or docket fees, appeal fees, fees for
issuance of provisional remedies,
mediation fees, sheriffs fees,
stenographers fees (that is fees for
transcript of stenographic notes) and
commissioners fees;
(e) Means test refers to the set of criteria used to
determine whether the applicant is one
who has no money or property sufficient
and available for food, shelter and basic
necessities for himself and his family;
(f) Merit test refers to the ascertainment of
whether the applicants cause of action or
his defense is valid and whether the
chances of establishing the same appear
reasonable and
(g) Representative refers to the person authorized
to file an application for legal aid in behalf
of the applicant when the said applicant is
prevented by a compelling reason from
personally filing his application. As a rule,
it refers to the immediate family members
of the applicant. However, it may include
any of the applicants relatives or any
person or concerned citizen of sufficient
discretion who has first-hand knowledge
of the personal circumstances of the
applicant as well as of the facts of the
applicants case.
ARTICLE III
Coverage
Section 1. Persons qualified for exemption from
payment of legal fees. Persons who shall enjoy the
benefit of exemption from the payment of legal fees
incidental to instituting an action in court, as an original
proceeding or on appeal, granted under this Rule shall
be limited only to clients of the NCLA and the chapter
legal aid offices.
The said clients shall refer to those indigents
qualified to receive free legal aid service from the NCLA
and the chapter legal aid offices. Their qualifications
shall be determined based on the tests provided in this
Rule.
Section 2. Persons not covered by the Rule. The
following shall be disqualified from the coverage of this
Rule. Nor may they be accepted as clients by the NCLA
and the chapter legal aid offices.
(a) Juridical persons; except in cases covered by
developmental legal aid or public interest
causes involving juridical entities which
are non-stock, non-profit organizations,
non-governmental organizations and
peoples organizations whose individual
members will pass the means test provided
in this Rule;
(b) Persons who do not pass the means and merit
tests;
(c) Parties already represented by a counsel de
parte;
(d) Owners or lessors of residential lands or
buildings with respect to the filing of
collection or unlawful detainer suits
against their tenants and
(e) Persons who have been clients of the NCLA
or chapter legal aid office previously in a
case where the NCLA or chapter legal aid
office withdrew its representation because
of a falsity in the application or in any of
the affidavits supporting the said
application.
Section 3. Cases not covered by the Rule. The NCLA
and the chapter legal aid offices shall not handle the
following:
(a) Cases where conflicting interests will be
represented by the NCLA and the chapter
legal aid offices and
(b) Prosecution of criminal cases in court.
ARTICLE IV
Tests of Indigency
Section 1. Tests for determining who may be clients of
the NCLA and the legal aid offices in local IBP
chapters. The NCLA or the chapter legal aid committee,
as the case may be, shall pass upon requests for legal aid
by the combined application of the means and merit tests
and the consideration of other relevant factors provided
for in the following sections.
Section 2. Means test; exception. (a) This test shall be
based on the following criteria: (i) the applicant and that
of his immediate family must have a gross monthly
income that does not exceed an amount double the
monthly minimum wage of an employee in the place
where the applicant resides and (ii) he does not own real
property with a fair market value as stated in the current
tax declaration of more than Three Hundred Thousand
(P300,000.00) Pesos.
In this connection, the applicant shall execute an
affidavit of indigency (printed at the back of the
application form) stating that he and his immediate
family do not earn a gross income abovementioned, nor
own any real property with the fair value
aforementioned, supported by an affidavit of a
disinterested person attesting to the truth of the
applicants affidavit. The latest income tax return and/or
current tax declaration, if any, shall be attached to the
applicants affidavit.
(b) The means test shall not be applicable to applicants
who fall under the developmental legal aid program such
as overseas workers, fisherfolk, farmers, laborers,
indigenous cultural communities, women, children and
other disadvantaged groups.
Section 3. Merit test. A case shall be considered
meritorious if an assessment of the law and evidence at
hand discloses that the legal service will be in aid of
justice or in the furtherance thereof, taking into
consideration the interests of the party and those of
society. A case fails this test if, after consideration of the
law and evidence presented by the applicant, it appears
that it is intended merely to harass or injure the opposite
party or to work oppression or wrong.
Section 4. Other relevant factors that may be
considered. The effect of legal aid or of the failure to
render the same upon the rule of law, the proper
administration of justice, the public interest involved in
a given case and the practice of law in the locality shall
likewise be considered.
ARTICLE V
Acceptance and Handling of Cases
Section 1. Procedure in accepting cases. The following
procedure shall be observed in the acceptance of cases
for purposes of this Rule:
(a) Filing of application An application shall be
made personally by the applicant, unless
there is a compelling reason which
prevents him from doing so, in which case
his representative may apply for him. It
shall adhere substantially to the form made
for that purpose. It shall be prepared and
signed by the applicant or, in proper cases,
his duly authorized representative in at
least three copies.
Applications for legal aid shall be filed with the
NCLA or with the chapter legal aid
committee.
The NCLA shall, as much as possible,
concentrate on cases of paramount
importance or national impact.
Requests received by the IBP National Office
shall be referred by the NCLA to the
proper chapter legal aid committee of the
 locality where the cases have to be filed or
are pending. The chapter president and the
chairman of the chapters legal aid
committee shall be advised of such
referral.
(b) Interview The applicant shall be interviewed
by a member of the chapter legal aid
committee or any chapter member
authorized by the chapter legal aid
committee to determine the applicants
qualifications based on the means and
merit tests and other relevant factors. He
shall also be required to submit copies of
his latest income tax returns and/or current
tax declaration, if available, and execute
an affidavit of indigency printed at the
back of the application form with
the supporting affidavit of a disinterested
person attesting to the truth of the
applicants affidavit.
After the interview, the applicant shall be
informed that he can follow up the action
on his application after five (5) working
days.
(c) Action on the application The chapter legal
aid committee shall pass upon every
request for legal aid and submit its
recommendation to the chapter board of
officers within three (3) working days after
the interview of the applicant. The basis of
the recommendation shall be stated.
The chapter board of officers shall
review and act on the recommendation of
the chapter legal aid committee within two
(2) working days from receipt
thereof; Provided, however, that in urgent
matters requiring prompt or immediate
action, the chapters executive director of
legal aid or whoever performs his
functions may provisionally act on the
application, subject to review by the
chapter legal aid committee and,
thereafter, by the chapter board of officers.
The action of the chapter board of officers on the
application shall be final.
(d) Cases which may be provisionally accepted.
In the following cases, the NCLA or the
chapter legal aid office, through the
chapters executive director of legal aid or
whoever performs his functions may
accept cases provisionally pending
verification of the applicants indigency
and an evaluation of the merit of his case.
(i) Where a warrant for the arrest of the
applicant has been issued;
 (ii) Where a pleading has to be filed
immediately to avoid adverse
effects to the applicant;
(iii) Where an appeal has to be urgently
perfected or a petition for certiorari,
prohibition or mandamus filed has
to be filed immediately; and
(iv) Other similar urgent cases.
(e) Assignment of control number Upon approval
of the chapter board of officers of a
persons application and the applicant is
found to be qualified for legal assistance,
the case shall be assigned a control
number. The numbering shall be
consecutive starting from January to
December of every year. The control
number shall also indicate the region and
the chapter handling the case.
Example:
Region[18] Chapter Year Month
GM - Manila - 2009 - 03 - 099
(f) Issuance of a certification After an application
is approved and a control number duly
assigned, the chapter board of officers
shall issue a certification that the person
(that is, the successful applicant) is a client
of the NCLA or of the chapter legal aid
office. The certification shall bear the
control number of the case and shall state
the name of the client and the nature of the
judicial action subject of the legal aid of
the NCLA or the legal aid office of a local
IBP chapter.
The certification shall be issued to the successful
applicant free of charge.
Section 2. Assignment of cases. After a case is given a
control number, the chapter board of officers shall refer
it back to the chapter legal aid committee. The chapter
legal aid committee shall assign the case to any chapter
member who is willing to handle the case.
In case no chapter member has signified an
intention to handle the case voluntarily, the chapter legal
aid committee shall refer the matter to the chapter board
of officers together with the names of at least three
members who, in the chapter legal aid committees
discretion, may competently render legal aid on the
matter. The chapter board of officers shall appoint one
chapter member from among the list of names submitted
Number by the chapter legal aid committee. The chapter member
chosen may not refuse the appointment except on the
ground of conflict of interest or other equally compelling
grounds as provided in the Code of Professional
Responsibility,[19] in which case the chapter board of
officers shall appoint his replacement from among the
remaining names in the list previously submitted by the
chapter legal aid committee.
 The chapter legal aid committee and the chapter
board of officers shall take the necessary measures to
ensure that cases are well-distributed to chapter
members.
Section 3. Policies and guidelines in the acceptance and
handling of cases. The following policies and guidelines
shall be observed in the acceptance and handling of
cases:
(a) First come, first served Where both the
complainant/plaintiff/petitioner and
defendant/ respondent apply for legal aid
and both are qualified, the first to seek
assistance shall be given preference.
(b) Avoidance of conflict of interest Where
acceptance of a case will give rise to a
conflict of interest on the part of the
chapter legal aid office, the applicant shall
be duly informed and advised to seek the
services of a private counsel or another
legal aid organization.
Where handling of the case will give rise to a
conflict of interest on the part of the
chapter member assigned to the case, the
client shall be duly informed and advised
about it. The handling lawyer shall also
inform the chapter legal aid committee so
that another chapter member may be
assigned to handle the case. For purposes
of choosing the substitute handling lawyer,
the rule in the immediately preceding
section shall be observed.
(c) Legal aid is purely gratuitous and honorary No
member of the chapter or member of the
staff of the NCLA or chapter legal aid
office shall directly or indirectly demand
or request from an applicant or client any
compensation, gift or present for legal aid
services being applied for or rendered.
(d) Same standard of conduct and equal treatment
A chapter member who is tasked to handle
a case accepted by the NCLA or by the
chapter legal aid office shall observe the
same standard of conduct governing his
relations with paying clients. He shall treat
the client of the NCLA or of the chapter
legal aid office and the said clients case in
a manner that is equal and similar to his
treatment of a paying client and his case.
(e) Falsity in the application or in the affidavits
Any falsity in the application or in the
affidavit of indigency or in the affidavit of
a disinterested person shall be sufficient
cause for the NCLA or chapter legal aid
office to withdraw or terminate the legal
aid. For this purpose, the chapter board of
officers shall authorize the handling
lawyer to file the proper manifestation of
 withdrawal of appearance of the chapter
legal aid office in the case with a motion
for the dismissal of the complaint or action
of the erring client. The court, after
hearing, shall approve the withdrawal of
appearance and grant the motion, without
prejudice to whatever criminal liability
may have been incurred.
Violation of this policy shall disqualify the erring
client from availing of the benefits of this
Rule in the future.
(f) Statement in the initiatory pleading To avail of
the benefits of the Rule, the initiatory
pleading shall state as an essential
preliminary allegation that (i) the party
initiating the action is a client of the
NCLA or of the chapter legal aid office
and therefore entitled to exemption from
the payment of legal fees under this Rule
and (ii) a certified true copy of
the certification issued pursuant to Section
1(e), of this Article is attached or annexed
to the pleading.
Failure to make the statement shall be a ground
for the dismissal of the action without
prejudice to its refiling.
The same rule shall apply in case the client,
through the NCLA or chapter legal aid
office, files an appeal.
(g) Attachment of certification in initiatory
pleading A certified true copy of the
certification issued pursuant to Section
1(e), of this Article shall be attached as an
annex to the initiatory pleading.
Failure to attach a certified true
copy of the said certification shall be a
ground for the dismissal of the action
without prejudice to its refiling.
The same rule shall apply in case the client,
through the NCLA or chapter legal aid
office, files an appeal.
(h) Signing of pleadings All complaints,
petitions, answers, replies, memoranda
and other important pleadings or motions
to be filed in courts shall be signed by the
handling lawyer and co-signed by the
chairperson or a member of the chapter
legal aid committee, or in urgent cases, by
the executive director of legal aid or
whoever performs his functions.
Ordinary motions such as motions for extension
of time to file a pleading or for
postponement of hearing and
manifestations may be signed by the
handling lawyer alone.
 (i) Motions for extension of time or for
postponement The filing of motions for
extension of time to file a pleading or for
postponement of hearing shall be avoided
as much as possible as they cause delay to
the case and prolong the proceedings.
(j) Transfer of cases Transfer of cases from one
handling lawyer to another shall be
affected only upon approval of the chapter
legal aid committee.
Section 4. Decision to appeal. (a) All appeals must be
made on the request of the client himself. For this
purpose, the client shall be made to fill up a request to
appeal.
(b) Only meritorious cases shall be appealed. If
the handling lawyer, in consultation with the chapter
legal aid committee, finds that there is no merit to the
appeal, the client should be immediately informed
thereof in writing and the record of the case turned over
to him, under proper receipt. If the client insists on
appealing the case, the lawyer handling the case should
perfect the appeal before turning over the records of the
case to him.
Section 5. Protection of private practice. Utmost care
shall be taken to ensure that legal aid is neither availed
of to the detriment of the private practice of law nor
taken advantage of by anyone for purely personal ends.
ARTICLE VI
Withdrawal of Legal Aid and Termination of
Exemption
Section 1. Withdrawal of legal aid. The NCLA or the
chapter legal aid committee may, in justifiable instances
as provided in the next Section, direct the handling
lawyer to withdraw representation of a clients cause
upon approval of the IBP Board of Governors (in the
case of the NCLA) or of the chapter board of officers (in
the case of the chapter legal aid committee) and through
a proper motion filed in Court.
Section 2. Grounds for withdrawal of legal aid.
Withdrawal may be warranted in the following
situations:
(a) In a case that has been provisionally accepted,
where it is subsequently ascertained that
the client is not qualified for legal aid;
(b) Where the clients income or resources
improve and he no longer qualifies for
continued assistance based on the means
test. For this purpose, on or before January
15 every year, the client shall submit an
affidavit of a disinterested person stating
that the client and his immediate family do
not earn a gross income mentioned in
Section 2, Article V, nor own any real
 property with the fair market value
mentioned in the same Section;
(c) When it is shown or found that the client
committed a falsity in the application or in
the affidavits submitted to support the
application;
(d) When the client subsequently engages a de
parte counsel or is provided with a de
oficio counsel;
(e) When, despite proper advice from the
handling lawyer, the client cannot be
refrained from doing things which the
lawyer himself ought not do under the
ethics of the legal profession, particularly
with reference to their conduct towards
courts, judicial officers, witnesses and
litigants, or the client insists on having
control of the trial, theory of the case, or
strategy in procedure which would tend to
result in incalculable harm to the interests
of the client;
(f) When, despite notice from the handling
lawyer, the client does not cooperate or
coordinate with the handling lawyer to the
prejudice of the proper and effective
rendition of legal aid such as when the
client fails to provide documents
necessary to support his case or
unreasonably fails to attend hearings when
his presence thereat is required; and
(g) When it becomes apparent that the
representation of the clients cause will
result in a representation of conflicting
interests, as where the adverse party had
previously engaged the services of the
NCLA or of the chapter legal aid office
and the subject matter of the litigation is
directly related to the services previously
rendered to the adverse party.
Section 3. Effect of withdrawal. The court, after hearing,
shall allow the NCLA or the chapter legal aid office to
withdraw if it is satisfied that the ground for such
withdrawal exists.
Except when the withdrawal is based on paragraphs (b),
(d) and (g) of the immediately preceding Section, the
court shall also order the dismissal of the case. Such
dismissal is without prejudice to whatever criminal
liability may have been incurred if the withdrawal is
based on paragraph (c) of the immediately preceding
Section.
ARTICLE VII
Miscellaneous Provisions
Section 1. Lien on favorable judgment. The amount of
the docket and other lawful fees which the client was
exempted from paying shall be a lien on any judgment
rendered in the case favorable to the indigent, unless the
court otherwise provides.
In case, attorneys fees have been awarded to the client,
the same shall belong to the NCLA or to the chapter
legal aid office that rendered the legal aid, as the case
may be. It shall form part of a special fund which shall
be exclusively used to support the legal aid program of
the NCLA or the chapter legal aid office. In this
connection, the chapter board of officers shall report the
receipt of attorneys fees pursuant to this Section to the
NCLA within ten (10) days from receipt thereof. The
NCLA shall, in turn, include the data on attorneys fees
received by IBP chapters pursuant to this Section in its
liquidation report for the annual subsidy for legal aid.
Section 2. Duty of NCLA to prepare forms. The NCLA
shall prepare the standard forms to be used in connection
with this Rule. In particular, the NCLA shall prepare the
following standard forms: the application form, the
affidavit of indigency, the supporting affidavit of a
disinterested person, the affidavit of a disinterested
person required to be submitted annually under Section
2(b), Article VI, the certification issued by the NCLA or
the chapter board of officers under Section 1(f), Article
V and the request to appeal.
The said forms, except the certification, shall be in
Filipino. Within sixty (60) days from receipt of the
forms from the NCLA, the chapter legal aid offices shall
make translations of the said forms in the dominant
dialect used in their respective localities.
Section 3. Effect of Rule on right to bring suits in forma
pauperis. Nothing in this Rule shall be considered to
preclude those persons not covered either by this Rule
or by the exemption from the payment of legal fees
granted to clients of the Public Attorneys Office under
Section 16-D of RA 9406 to litigate in forma
pauperis under Section 21, Rule 3 and Section 19 Rule
141 of the Rules of Court.
Section 4. Compliance with Rule on Mandatory Legal
Aid Service. Legal aid service rendered by a lawyer
under this Rule either as a handling lawyer or as an
interviewer of applicants under Section 1(b), Article IV
hereof shall be credited for purposes of compliance with
the Rule on Mandatory Legal Aid Service.
The chairperson of the chapter legal aid office shall issue
the certificate similar to that issued by the Clerk of Court
in Section 5(b) of the Rule on Mandatory Legal Aid
Service.
ARTICLE VIII
Effectivity
Section 1. Effectivity. This Rule shall become effective
after fifteen days following its publication in a
newspaper of general circulation.
 The above rule, in conjunction with Section 21, Rule 3 and
Section 19, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, the Rule on Mandatory
Legal Aid Service and the Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases,
shall form a solid base of rules upon which the right of access to courts
by the poor shall be implemented. With these rules, we equip the poor
with the tools to effectively, efficiently and easily enforce their rights
in the judicial system.
A FINAL WORD
Equity will not suffer a wrong to be without a remedy. Ubi jus
ibi remedium. Where there is a right, there must be a remedy. The
remedy must not only be effective and efficient, but also readily
accessible. For a remedy that is inaccessible is no remedy at all.
The Constitution guarantees the rights of the poor to free access
to the courts and to adequate legal assistance. The legal aid service
rendered by the NCLA and legal aid offices of IBP chapters nationwide
addresses only the right to adequate legal assistance. Recipients of the
service of the NCLA and legal aid offices of IBP chapters may enjoy
free access to courts by exempting them from the payment of fees
assessed in connection with the filing of a complaint or action in court.
With these twin initiatives, the guarantee of Section 11, Article III of
Constitution is advanced and access to justice is increased by bridging
a significant gap and removing a major roadblock.
WHEREFORE, the Misamis Oriental Chapter of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines is hereby COMMENDED for helping increase
the access to justice by the poor. The request of the Misamis Oriental
Chapter for the exemption from the payment of filing, docket and other
fees of the clients of the legal aid offices of the various IBP chapters
is GRANTED. The Rule on the Exemption From the Payment of Legal
Fees of the Clients of the National Committee on Legal Aid (NCLA)
and of the Legal Aid Offices in the Local Chapters of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) (which shall be assigned the docket
number A.M. No. 08-11-7-SC [IRR] provided in this resolution is
hereby APPROVED. In this connection, the Clerk of Court
is DIRECTED to cause the publication of the said rule in a newspaper
of general circulation within five days from the promulgation of this
resolution.
The Office of the Court Administrator is hereby directed to
promptly issue a circular to inform all courts in the Philippines of the
import of this resolution.
SO ORDERED.
 THIRD DIVISION
ATTY. EVELYN J. MAGNO, A.C. No. 6296
Complainant,
ATTY. OLIVIA VELASCO-JACOBA, Promulgated:
Respondent. November 22, 2005
x----------------------------------------x
RESOLUTION
GARCIA, J.:
In her sworn complaint, as endorsed by the President of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Nueva Ecija Chapter, Atty.
Evelyn J. Magno charged Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba, a member of
the same IBP provincial chapter, with willful violation of (a) Section
415 of the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991 and (b) Canon 4 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.
This disciplinary case arose out of a disagreement that
complainant had with her uncle, Lorenzo Inos, over a landscaping
contract they had entered into. In a bid to have the stand-off between
them settled, complainant addressed a letter, styled Sumbong,[1] to
Bonifacio Alcantara, barangay captain of Brgy. San Pascual, Talavera,
Nueva Ecija. At the barangay conciliation/confrontation proceedings
conducted on January 5, 2003, respondent, on the strength of a Special
Power of Attorney signed by Lorenzo Inos, appeared for the latter,
accompanied by his son, Lorenzito. Complainants objection to
respondents appearance elicited the response that Lorenzo Inos is
entitled to be represented by a lawyer inasmuch as complainant is
herself a lawyer. And as to complainants retort that her being a lawyer
is merely coincidental, respondent countered that she is appearing as an
attorney-in-fact, not as counsel, of Lorenzo Inos.
Complainant enumerated specific instances, with supporting
documentation, tending to prove that respondent had, in the course of
the conciliation proceedings before the Punong Barangay, acted as
Inos Lorenzos counsel instead of as his attorney-in-fact. This is what
complainant said in her complaint: [2]
5. xxx Atty. Olivia Jacoba asked for an ocular
inspection of the subject matter of the complaint. A
heated argument took place because Lorencito Inos said
that [complainants brother] Melencio Magno, Jr. made
alterations in the lagoon . Afterwards Atty. Olivia Jacoba
. . . returned to the barangay hall to have the incident
recorded in the barangay blotter.... attached as Annex A
6. That on January 12, 2003, Lorenzo Inos
appeared before the hearing also with the assistance of
[respondent]. When the minutes of the proceeding (sic)
was read, [respondent] averred that the minutes is partial
in favor of the complainant because only her statements
were recorded for which reason, marginal insertions were
made to include what [respondent] wanted to be put on
record. She also signed as saksi in the minutes .
 7. xxx In a letter (answer to the "sumbong) sent
to the Punong Barangay dated December 22, 2002, she
signed representing herself as Family Legal Counsel of
Inos Family, a copy of the letter is attached as Annex C .
. . . (Words in bracket added.)
In an Order dated February 17, 2003, Atty. Victor C. Fernandez,
IBP Director for Bar Discipline, directed the respondent to submit,
within fifteen (15) days from notice, her answer to the complaint,
otherwise she will be considered as in default.[3]
The case, docketed as CBD No. 03-1061, was assigned to
Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala, who admitted
respondents answer notwithstanding her earlier order of July 15, 2003,
declaring respondent in default for failure to file an answer in due
time.[4]
In her Answer, respondent alleged that the administrative
complaint was filed with the Office of the Punong Barangay, instead
of before the Lupong Tagapamayapa, and heard by Punong
Barangay Bonifacio Alcantara alone, instead of the collegial Lupon or
a conciliation panel known as pangkat. Prescinding from this premise,
respondent submits that the prohibition against a lawyer appearing to
assist a client in katarungan pambarangay proceedings does not
apply. Further, she argued that her appearance was not as a lawyer, but
only as an attorney-in-fact.
In her report dated October 6, 2003,[5] Commissioner Maala stated
that the charge of complainant has been established by clear
preponderance of evidence and, on that basis, recommended
that respondent be suspended from the practice of her profession for a
period of six (6) months. On the other hand, the Board of Governors,
IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, while agreeing with the
inculpatory finding of the investigating commissioner, recommended
in its Resolution No. XVI-2003-235,[6] a lighter penalty, to wit:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is
hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of
the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution/Decision as Annex "A"; and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules, with
modification, and considering respondent's actuations
was in violation of Section 415 which expressly prohibits
the presence and representation by lawyers in the
Katarungan Pambarangay, Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba
is hereby ADMONISHED.
This resolution is now before us for confirmation.
Section 415 of the LGC of 1991[7], on the subject Katarungang
Pambarangay, provides:
Section 415. Appearance of Parties in Person. -
In all katarungang pambarangay proceedings, the parties
must appear in person without the assistance of the
counsel or representative, except for minors and
 incompetents who may be assisted by their next of kin
who are not lawyers.
The above-quoted provision clearly requires the personal
appearance of the parties in katarungan pambarangay conciliation
proceedings, unassisted by counsel or representative. The rationale
behind the personal appearance requirement is to enable the lupon to
secure first hand and direct information about the facts and issues,[8] the
exception being in cases where minors or incompetents are parties.
There can be no quibbling that laymen of goodwill can easily agree to
conciliate and settle their disputes between themselves without what
sometimes is the unsettling assistance of lawyers whose presence could
sometimes obfuscate and confuse issues.[9] Worse still, the
participation of lawyers with their penchant to use their analytical skills
and legal knowledge tend to prolong instead of expedite settlement of
the case.
The prohibition against the presence of a lawyer in a barangay
conciliation proceedings was not, to be sure, lost on respondent. Her
defense that the aforequoted Section 415 of the LGC does not apply
since complainant addressed her Sumbong to the barangay captain of
Brgy. San Pascual who thereafter proceeded to hear the same is
specious at best. In this regard, suffice it to state that complainant wrote
her Sumbong with the end in view of availing herself of the benefits of
barangay justice. That she addressed her Sumbong to the barangay
captain is really of little moment since the latter chairs the Lupong
Tagapamayapa.[10]
Lest it be overlooked, the prohibition in question applies to
all katarungan barangay proceedings. Section 412(a)[11] the LGC of
1991 clearly provides that, as a precondition to filing a complaint in
court, the parties shall go through the conciliation process either before
the lupon chairman or the lupon or pangkat. As what happened in this
case, the punong barangay, as chairman of the Lupon Tagapamayapa,
conducted the conciliation proceedings to resolve the disputes between
the two parties.
Given the above perspective, we join the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline in its determination that respondent transgressed the
prohibition prescribed in Section 415 of the LGC. However, its
recommended penalty of mere admonition must have to be modified.
Doubtless, respondents conduct tended to undermine the laudable
purpose of the katarungan pambarangay system. What compounded
matters was when respondent repeatedly ignored complainants
protestation against her continued appearance in the barangay
conciliation proceedings.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba is
hereby FINED in the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) for
willful violation of Section 415 of the Local Government Code of 1991
with WARNING that commission of similar acts of impropriety on her
part in the future will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC
[B.M. 850. October 2, 2001]
MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION
RESOLUTION
ADOPTING THE REVISED RULES ON THE CONTINUING
LEGAL EDUCATION FOR MEMBERS OF THE
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES
Considering the Rules on the Mandatory Continuing Legal
Education (MCLE) for members of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), recommended by the IBP, endorsed by the
Philippine Judicial Academy, and reviewed and passed upon by the
Supreme Court Committee on Legal Education, the Court hereby
resolves to approve, as it hereby approves, the following Revised Rules
for proper implementation:
Rule 1. PURPOSE
SECTION 1. Purpose of the MCLE. Continuing legal education is
required of members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) to
ensure that throughout their career, they keep abreast with law and
jurisprudence, maintain the ethics of the profession and enhance the
standards of the practice of law.
Rule 2. MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION
SECTION 1. Commencement of the MCLE. Within two (2) months
from the approval of these Rules by the Supreme Court En Banc,
the MCLE Committee shall be constituted and shall commence the
implementation of the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education
(MCLE) program in accordance with these Rules.
SEC. 2. Requirements of completion of MCLE. Members of the IBP
not exempt under Rule 7 shall complete every three (3) years at least
thirty-six (36) hours of continuing legal education activities approved
by the MCLE Committee. Of the 36 hours:
(a) At least six (6) hours shall be devoted to legal
ethics equivalent to six (6) credit units.
(b) At least four (4) hours shall be devoted to trial and pretrial
skills equivalent to four (4) credit units.
(c) At least five (5) hours shall be devoted to alternative dispute
resolution equivalent to five (5) credit units.
(d) At least nine (9) hours shall be devoted to updates on
substantive and procedural laws, and
jurisprudence equivalent to nine (9) credit units.
(e) At least four (4) hours shall be devoted to legal writing and
oral advocacy equivalent to four (4) credit units.
(f) At least two (2) hours shall be devoted to international law
and international conventions equivalent to two (2) credit
units.
(g) The remaining six (6) hours shall be devoted to such
subjects as may be prescribed by the MCLE
Committee equivalent to six (6) credit units.
Rule 3. COMPLIANCE PERIOD
SECTION 1. Initial compliance period. -- The initial compliance
period shall begin not later than three (3) months from the adoption of
these Rules. Except for the initial compliance period for members
admitted or readmitted after the establishment of the program, all
compliance periods shall be for thirty-six (36) months and shall begin
the day after the end of the previous compliance period.
SEC. 2. Compliance Groups. -- Members of the IBP not exempt
from the MCLE requirement shall be divided into three (3) compliance
groups, namely:
(a) Compliance group 1. -- Members in the National Capital
Region (NCR) or Metro Manila are assigned to Compliance
Group 1.
(b) Compliance group 2. -- Members in Luzon outside NCR
are assigned to Compliance Group 2.
(c) Compliance group 3. -- Members in Visayas and Mindanao
are assigned to Compliance Group 3.
Nevertheless, members may participate in any legal education
activity wherever it may be available to earn credit unit toward
compliance with the MCLE requirement.
SEC. 3. Compliance period of members admitted or readmitted
after establishment of the program. Members admitted or readmitted to
the Bar after the establishment of the program shall be assigned to the
appropriate Compliance Group based on their Chapter membership on
the date of admission or readmission.
The initial compliance period after admission or readmission shall
begin on the first day of the month of admission or readmission and
shall end on the same day as that of all other members in the same
Compliance Group.
(a) Where four (4) months or less remain of the initial
compliance period after admission or readmission, the
member is not required to comply with the program
requirement for the initial compliance.
(b) Where more than four (4) months remain of the initial
compliance period after admission or readmission, the
member shall be required to complete a number of hours of
approved continuing legal education activities equal to the
number of months remaining in the compliance period in
which the member is admitted or readmitted. Such member
shall be required to complete a number of hours of education
in legal ethics in proportion to the number of months
remaining in the compliance period. Fractions of hours shall
be rounded up to the next whole number.
Rule 4. COMPUTATION OF CREDIT UNITS(CU)
SECTION 1. Guidelines. - CREDIT UNITS ARE EQUIVALENT
TO CREDIT HOURS. CREDIT UNITS measure compliance with
the MCLE requirement under the Rules, based on the category of
the lawyers participation in the MCLE activity. The following are
the guidelines for computing credit units and the supporting
documents required therefor:
PROGRAMS/ACTIVITY CREDIT UNITS SUPPORTING
DOCUMENTS
1. SEMINARS, CONVENTIONS, CONFERENCES, SYMPOSIA, IN-
HOUSE EDUCATION PROGRAMS, WORKSHOPS, DIALOGUES,
ROUND TABLE DISCUSSIONS BY APPROVED PROVIDERS
UNDER RULE 7 AND OTHER RELATED RULES
1.1 PARTICIPANT/ 1 CU PER HOUR OF CERTIFICATE OF
ATTENDEE ATTENDANCE ATTENDANCE WITH NUMBER OF
HOURS
1.2 LECTURER FULL CU FOR THE PHOTOCOPY OF
RESOURCE SUBJECT PER PLAQUE OR
SPEAKER COMPLIANCE PERIOD SPONSORS
CERTIFICATION
1.3 PANELIST/REACTOR 1/2 OF CU FOR THE CERTIFICATION
COMMENTATOR/ SUBJECT PER FROM
MODERATOR/ COMPLIANCE PERIOD SPONSORING
COORDINATOR/ ORGANIZATION
FACILITATOR
2. AUTHORSHIP, EDITING AND REVIEW
2.1 LAW BOOK OF NOT FULL CU FOR THE PUBLISHED BOOK
LESS THAN 100 PAGES SUBJECT PER COMPLIANCE PERIOD
2.2 BOOK EDITOR 1/2 OF THE CU OF PUBLISHED BOOK
AUTHORSHIP CATEGORY WITH PROOF AS EDITOR
2.3 RESEARCH PAPER 1/2 OF CU FOR THE DULY
INNOVATIVE PROGRAM/ SUBJECT PER CERTIFIED/
CREATIVE PROJECT COMPLIANCE PERIOD PUBLISHED
TECHNICAL REPORT/PAPER
2.4 LEGAL ARTICLE OF AT 1/2 OF CU FOR THE PUBLISHED
ARTICLE LEAST TEN (10) PAGES SUBJECT PER
COMPLIANCE PERIOD
2.5 LEGAL NEWSLETTER/ 1 CU PER ISSUE PUBLISHED
LAW JOURNAL EDITOR NEWSLETTER/JOURNAL
2.6 PROFESSORIAL CHAIR/ FULL CU FOR THE CERTIFICATION
OF BAR REVIEW LECTURE SUBJECT PER LAW DEAN OR
LAW TEACHING/ COMPLIANCE PERIOD BAR REVIEW
DIRECTOR
Rule 5. CATEGORIES OF CREDIT UNITS
SECTION 1. Classes of Credit units. -- Credit units are either
participatory or non-participatory.
SEC. 2. Claim for participatory credit units. -- Participatory
credit units may be claimed for:
(a) Attending approved education activities like seminars,
conferences, conventions, symposia, in-house education
programs, workshops, dialogues or round table discussion.
(b) Speaking or lecturing, or acting as assigned panelist,
reactor, commentator, resource speaker, moderator,
coordinator or facilitator in approved education activities.
(c) Teaching in a law school or lecturing in a bar review class.
SEC. 3. Claim for non-participatory credit units. Non-
participatory credit units may be claimed per compliance period for:
(a) Preparing, as an author or co-author, written materials
published or accepted for publication, e.g., in the form of an
article, chapter, book, or book review which contribute to
the legal education of the author member, which were not
prepared in the ordinary course of the members practice or
employment.
(b) Editing a law book, law journal or legal newsletter.
Rule 6. COMPUTATION OF CREDIT HOURS (CH)
SECTION 1. Computation of credit hours. -- Credit hours are
computed based on actual time spent in an education activity in hours
to the nearest one-quarter hour reported in decimals.
Rule 7. EXEMPTIONS
SECTION 1. Parties exempted from the MCLE. -- The following
members of the Bar are exempt from the MCLE requirement:
(a) The President and the Vice President of the Philippines, and
the Secretaries and Undersecretaries of Executive
Departments;
(b) Senators and Members of the House of Representatives;
(c) The Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme
Court, incumbent and retired members of the judiciary,
incumbent members of the Judicial and Bar Council and
incumbent court lawyers covered by the Philippine Judicial
Academy program of continuing judicial education;
(d) The Chief State Counsel, Chief State Prosecutor and
Assistant Secretaries of the Department of Justice;
(e) The Solicitor General and the Assistant Solicitors General;
(f) The Government Corporate Counsel, Deputy and Assistant
Government Corporate Counsel;
(g) The Chairmen and Members of the Constitutional
Commissions;
(h) The Ombudsman, the Overall Deputy Ombudsman, the
Deputy Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor of the
Office of the Ombudsman;
(i) Heads of government agencies exercising quasi-judicial
functions;
(j) Incumbent deans, bar reviewers and professors of law who
have teaching experience for at least ten (10) years in
accredited law schools;
(k) The Chancellor, Vice-Chancellor and members of the
Corps of Professors and Professorial Lecturers of the
Philippine Judicial Academy; and
(l) Governors and Mayors.
SEC. 2. Other parties exempted from the MCLE. The following
Members of the Bar are likewise exempt:
(a) Those who are not in law practice, private or public.
(b) Those who have retired from law practice with the approval
of the IBP Board of Governors.
SEC. 3. Good cause for exemption from or modification of
requirement A member may file a verified request setting forth good
cause for exemption (such as physical disability, illness, post graduate
study abroad, proven expertise in law, etc.) from compliance with or
modification of any of the requirements, including an extension of time
for compliance, in accordance with a procedure to be established by the
MCLE Committee.
SEC. 4. Change of status. The compliance period shall begin on the
first day of the month in which a member ceases to be exempt under
Sections 1, 2, or 3 of this Rule and shall end on the same day as that of
all other members in the same Compliance Group.
SEC. 5. Proof of exemption. Applications for exemption from or
modification of the MCLE requirement shall be under oath and
supported by documents.
Rule 8. STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL OF
EDUCATION ACTIVITIES
SECTION 1. Approval of MCLE program. Subject to
the implementing regulations that may be adopted by the MCLE
Committee, continuing legal education program may be granted
approval in either of two (2) ways: (1) the provider of the activity is
an accredited provider and certifies that the activity meets the criteria
of Section 2 of this Rule; and (2) the provider is specifically mandated
by law to provide continuing legal education.
 SEC. 2. Standards for all education activities. All continuing legal
education activities must meet the following standards:
(a) The activity shall have significant current intellectual or
practical content.
(b) The activity shall constitute an organized program of
learning related to legal subjects and the legal profession,
including cross profession activities (e.g., accounting-tax or
medical-legal) that enhance legal skills or the ability to
practice law, as well as subjects in legal writing and oral
advocacy.
(c) The activity shall be conducted by a provider with adequate
professional experience.
(d) Where the activity is more than one (1) hour in length,
substantive written materials must be distributed to all
participants. Such materials must be distributed at or before
the time the activity is offered.
(e) In-house education activities must be scheduled at a time
and location so as to be free from interruption like telephone
calls and other distractions.
Rule 9. ACCREDITATION OF PROVIDERS
SECTION 1. Accreditation of providers. -- Accreditation of
providers shall be done by the MCLE Committee.
SEC. 2. Requirements for accreditation of providers. Any person
or group may be accredited as a provider for a term of two (2) years,
which may be renewed, upon written application. All providers of
continuing legal education activities, including in-house providers, are
eligible to be accredited providers. Application for accreditation shall:
(a) Be submitted on a form provided by the MCLE Committee;
(b) Contain all information requested in the form;
(c) Be accompanied by the appropriate approval fee.
SEC. 3. Requirements of all providers. -- All
approved accredited providers shall agree to the following:
(a) An official record verifying the attendance at the activity
shall be maintained by the provider for at least four (4) years
after the completion date. The provider shall include the
member on the official record of attendance only if the
members signature was obtained at the time of attendance at
the activity. The official record of attendance shall contain
the members name and number in the Roll of Attorneys and
shall identify the time, date, location, subject matter, and
length of the education activity. A copy of such record shall
be furnished the MCLE COMMITTEE.
(b) The provider shall certify that:
(1) This activity has been approved BY THE MCLE COMMITTEE in
the amount of ________ hours of which ______ hours will apply in
(legal ethics, etc.), as appropriate to the content of the activity;
(2) The activity conforms to the standards for approved education
activities prescribed by these Rules and such regulations as may be
prescribed by the MCLE COMMITTEE.
(c) The provider shall issue a record or certificate to all participants
identifying the time, date, location, subject matter and length of
the activity.
(d) The provider shall allow in-person observation of all approved
continuing legal education activity by THE MCLE
COMMITTEE, members of the IBP Board of Governors, or
designees of the Committee and IBP staff Board for purposes
of monitoring compliance with these Rules.
 (e) The provider shall indicate in promotional materials, the nature
of the activity, the time devoted to each topic and identity of the
instructors. The provider shall make available to each participant
a copy of THE MCLE COMMITTEE-approved Education
Activity Evaluation Form.
(f) The provider shall maintain the completed Education Activity
Evaluation Forms for a period of not less than one (1) year after
the activity, copy furnished the MCLE COMMITTEE.
(g) Any person or group who conducts an unauthorized activity
under this program or issues a spurious certificate in violation of
these Rules shall be subject to appropriate sanctions.
SEC. 4. Renewal of provider accreditation. The accreditation of a
provider may be renewed every two (2) years. It may be denied if the
provider fails to comply with any of the requirements of these Rules or
fails to provide satisfactory education activities for the preceding
period.
SEC. 5. Revocation of provider accreditation. --
the accreditation of any provider referred to in Rule 9 may be revoked
by a majority vote of the MCLE Committee, after notice and hearing
and for good cause.
Rule 10. FEE FOR APPROVAL OF ACTIVITY AND ACCREDITATION OF PROVIDER
SECTION 1. Payment of fees. Application for approval of an
education activity or accreditation as a provider requires payment of the
appropriate fee as provided in the Schedule of MCLE Fees.
Rule 11. GENERAL COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES
SECTION 1. Compliance card. -- Each member shall secure from
the MCLE Committee a Compliance Card before the end of his
compliance period. He shall complete the card by attesting under oath
that he has complied with the education requirement or that he is
exempt, specifying the nature of the exemption. Such Compliance Card
must be returned to the Committee not later than the day after the end
of the members compliance period.
SEC. 2. Member record keeping requirement. -- Each member
shall maintain sufficient record of compliance or exemption, copy
furnished the MCLE Committee. The record required to be provided to
the members by the provider pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 9 should be
a sufficient record of attendance at a participatory activity. A record of
non-participatory activity shall also be maintained by the member, as
referred to in Section 3 of Rule 5.
Rule 12. NON-COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES
SECTION 1. What constitutes non-compliance. The following
shall constitute non-compliance:
(a) Failure to complete the education requirement within the
compliance period;
(b) Failure to provide attestation of compliance or exemption;
(c) Failure to provide satisfactory evidence of compliance
(including evidence of exempt status) within the prescribed
period;
(d) Failure to satisfy the education requirement and furnish
evidence of such compliance within sixty (60) days from
receipt of non-compliance notice;
(e) Failure to pay non-compliance fee within the prescribed
period;
(f) Any other act or omission analogous to any of the foregoing
or intended to circumvent or evade compliance with the
MCLE requirements.
 SEC. 2. Non-compliance notice and 60-day period to attain
compliance. -Members failing to comply will receive a Non-
Compliance Notice stating the specific deficiency and will be given
sixty (60) days from the date of notification to file a response clarifying
the deficiency or otherwise showing compliance with the requirements.
Such notice shall contain the following language near the beginning of
the notice in capital letters:
IF YOU FAIL TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE PROOF OF
COMPLIANCE WITH THE MCLE REQUIREMENT BY
(INSERT DATE 60 DAYS FROM DATE OF NOTICE), YOU
SHALL BE LISTED AS A DELINQUENT MEMBER AND
SHALL NOT BE PERMITTED TO PRACTICE LAW UNTIL
SUCH TIME AS ADEQUATE PROOF OF COMPLIANCE IS
RECEIVED BY THE MCLE COMMITTEE.
Members given sixty (60) days to respond to a Non-Compliance
Notice may use this period to attain the adequate number of
credit units for compliance. Credit units earned during this period
may only be counted toward compliance with the prior compliance
period requirement unless units in excess of the requirement are
earned, in which case the excess may be counted toward meeting
the current compliance period requirement.
Rule 13. CONSEQUENCES OF NON-COMPLIANCE
SECTION 1. Non-compliance fee. -- A member who, for whatever
reason, is in non-compliance at the end of the compliance period shall
pay a non-compliance fee.
SEC. 2. Listing as delinquent member. -- A member who fails to
comply with the requirements after the sixty (60) day period for
compliance has expired, shall be listed as a delinquent member of the
IBP upon the recommendation of the MCLE Committee. The
investigation of a member for non-compliance shall be conducted by
the IBPs Commission on Bar Discipline as a fact-finding arm of the
MCLE Committee.
SEC. 3. Accrual of membership fee. -- Membership fees shall
continue to accrue at the active rate against a member during the period
he/she is listed as a delinquent member.
Rule 14. REINSTATEMENT
SECTION 1. Process. -- The involuntary listing as a delinquent
member shall be terminated when the member provides proof of
compliance with the MCLE requirement, including payment of non-
compliance fee. A member may attain the necessary credit units to
meet the requirement for the period of non-compliance during the
period the member is on inactive status. These credit units may not be
counted toward meeting the current compliance period requirement.
Credit units earned during the period of non-compliance in excess of
the number needed to satisfy the prior compliance period requirement
may be counted toward meeting the current compliance period
requirement.
SEC. 2. Termination of delinquent listing is an administrative
process. The termination of listing as a delinquent member is
administrative in nature AND it shall be made by the MCLE
Committee.
Rule. 15. COMMITTEE ON MANDATORY CONTINUING
LEGAL EDUCATION
SECTION 1. Composition. The MCLE Committee shall be
composed of five (5) members, namely, a retired Justice of the Supreme
Court as Chair, and four (4) members respectively nominated by the
IBP, the Philippine Judicial Academy, a law center designated by the
Supreme Court and associations of law schools and/or law professors.
 The members of the Committee shall be of proven probity and
integrity. They shall be appointed by the Supreme Court for a term of
three (3) years and shall receive such compensation as may be
determined by the Court.
SEC. 2. Duty of committee. The MCLE Committee shall
administer and adopt such implementing rules as may be necessary
subject to the approval of the Supreme Court. It shall, in consultation
with the IBP Board of Governors, prescribe a schedule of MCLE fees
with the approval of the Supreme Court.
SEC. 3. Staff of the MCLE Committee. Subject to approval by
the Supreme Court, the MCLE Committee shall employ such staff as
may be necessary to perform the record-keeping, auditing, reporting,
approval and other necessary functions.
D. Lawyer and Society
SEC. 4. Submission of annual budget. The MCLE Committee
shall submit to the Supreme Court for approval, an annual budget [for a. CANON 3
a subsidy] to establish, operate and maintain the MCLE Program.
This resolution shall take effect on the fifteenth of September 2000,
following its publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation
in the Philippines.
Adopted this 22nd day of August, 2000, as amended on 02 October
2001.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza,
Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon,
Jr., and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
Kapunan, J., on official leave.
D. Lawyer and Society D. Lawyer and Society
a. CANON 4 a. CANON 5
 En Banc Resolution Extending MCLE First Compliance Period to
December 31, 2004
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
Gentlemen:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of the Court En
Banc dated
8 June 2004
"Bar Matter No. 850. Re: Proposed Rules on Mandatory
Continuing Legal Education for Active Members of the IBP. - The Court
Resolved to NOTE the 2003 Annual Report of the Mandatory Continuing
Legal Education Governing Board on the operations and activities of the
Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Office of the period of 1 January
2003 to 31 December 2003, submitted by Justice Carolina C. Grio-
Aquino, Chairperson, MCLE Governing Board.
Acting on Resolution No. XVI-2004-188 of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP), and upon the recommendation of the Committee
on legal Education and Bar Matters, the Court Resolved to APPROVE
the request of the IBP for an extension of the MCLE compliance period
until 31 December 2004."
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) LUZVIMINDA D. PUNO
Clerk of Court
EN BANC SUPREME COURT RESOLUTION AMENDING
BAR MATTER NO. 850.
MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION (MCLE)
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
EN BANC
Gentlemen:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of the Court
En Banc dated
13 July 2004
Bar Matter No. 850. Re: Proposed Rules on Mandatory
Continuing Legal Education for Active Members of the IBP. Acting
on the Letter dated 18 June 2003 of Chairperson Carolina C. Grio-
Aquino, Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Committee (MCLE),
requesting for the exemption of incumbent members of the MCLE
Office from complying with the MCLE requirements and the payment
of the exemption fee, as well as the approval and publication of the
amendments to Bar Matter No. 850 and its Implementing Regulations,
the Court Resolved, upon the recommendation of the Committee on
Legal Education, to
(a) APPROVE the proposed amendments to Bar Matter No. 850 and
its Implementing Regulations, thus:
1.) Rule 7, Section 1, Bar Matter No. 850
Rule 7. EXEMPTIONS
SECTION 1. Parties exempted from the MCLE.
- The following members of the Bar are exempt from the MCLE
requirements:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
a) xxx;
b) xxx;
c) The Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court,
incumbent and retired members of the judiciary, incumbent members
of Judicial Bar Council, incumbent members of the Mandatory
Continuing Legal Education Committee, incumbent court lawyers recommendation of the MCLE Committee, in which case Rule 139-B
who have availed of the Philippine Judicial Academy programs of of the Court shall apply.
continuing judicial education
(b) APPROVE the proposed MCLE Forms for the effective
l) xxx; Implementation of the MCLE program, to
2) Section 5, MCLE Implementing Regulations wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Section 5. Exemptions 1. MCLE Form No. 08 - Certificate of Exemption
2. MCLE Form No. 09 - Application for Exemption
The following are exempted from the MCLE 3. MCLE Form No. 10 Application for Credit Unit/s for
requirements:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Participating in MCLE Activity/Program as Lecturer/ Resource
a. The Executive Speaker or Panelist/ Reactor/ Commentator/ Moderator/
b. xxx.cralaw Coordinator/Facilitator
c. The Judiciary 4. MCLE Form No. 11 Application for Credit Unit/s for
The Chief Justice and Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, Teaching at an Accredited Law School
Incumbent and retired members of the Judiciary, incumbent members 5. MCLE Form No. 12 Application for Credit Unit/s for
of the Judicial and Bar Council incumbent members of the Mandatory Publication of a Legal Article or Book
Continuing Legal Education Committee, incumbent court lawyers 6. MCLE Form No. 13 Certificate of Compliance
who have availed of the Philippine Judicial Academy programs of and
continuing judicial education. (c) direct the Office of the Clerk of Court to cause the publication of
the aforecited provisions of Bar Matter No. 850 and its Implementing
d. xxx Regulations and the MCLE Forms for two (2) consecutive weeks in a
e. xxx newspaper of general circulation.
f. xxx
g. xxx.cralaw Very truly yours,
3) Section 12, MCLE Implementing Regulations
Section 12. Compliance Procedures LUZVIMINDA D. PUNO
a. xxx, Clerk of Court
b. xxx,
c. xxx, By:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
d. xxx,
MA. LUISA D. VILLARAMA
e. A member who is in non-compliance at the end of the compliance Assistant Clerk of Court
period shall pay a non-compliance fee of P1,000.00 and shall be listed
as a delinquent member of IBP Board of Governors upon the
B.M. No. 1922 June 3, 2008 to REQUIRE practicing members of the bar
RE. NUMBER AND DATE OF MCLE to INDICATE in all pleadings filed before the courts or
CERTIFICATE OF quasi-judicial bodies, the number and date of issue of their
COMPLETION/EXEMPTION REQUIRED MCLE Certificate of Compliance or Certificate of Exemption,
IN ALL PLEADINGS/MOTIONS as may be applicable, for the immediately preceding
compliance period. Failure to disclose the required
information would cause the dismissal of the case and the
Republic of the Philippines expunction of the pleadings from the records.
SUPREME COURT
Manila The New Rule shall take effect sixty (60) days after its
publication in a newspaper of general circulation." Caprio-
B.M. No. 1922 June 3, 2008 Morales Velasco, Jr., Nachura, JJ., on official leave.
(adv216a)
RE. NUMBER AND DATE OF MCLE CERTIFICATE
OF COMPLETION/EXEMPTION REQUIRED IN ALL Very truly yours,
PLEADINGS/MOTIONS.
MA. LUISA D. VILLARAMA(sgd)
Sirs/Mesdames: Clerk of Court

Quoted hereunder, for your information is a resolution of the

Court En Banc dated June 3, 2008

"Bar Matter No. 1922. Re: Recommendation of the

Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) Board to
Indicate in All Pleadings Filed with the Courts the Counsels
MCLE Certificate of Compliance or Certificate of Exemption.
The Court Resolved to NOTE the Letter, dated May 2,
2008, of Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura,
Chairperson, Committee on Legal Education and Bar Matters,
informing the Court of the diminishing interest of the
members of the Bar in the MCLE requirement program.

The Court further Resolved, upon the recommendation of the

Committee on Legal Education and Bar Matters,
 EN BANC PERALTA, JJ.
RASAD G. BALINDONG,
EDNA S.V. OGKA BENITO, A.M. No. RTJ-08-2103
Presiding Judge, Regional
Complainant, (Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 07-2664RTJ)
Trial Court, Malabang,
Present:
Lanao del Sur, Branch 12,
Respondent. Promulgated:
PUNO, C.J.,
February 23, 2009
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-
x--------------------------------------------------
SANTIAGO,*
-x
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
RESOLUTION
CORONA,
CORONA, J.:
CARPIO MORALES,
- v e r s u s - TINGA,**
CHICO-NAZARIO,

VELASCO, JR.,* In a complaint dated April 30, 2007, complainant Dr. Edna
NACHURA, S.V. Ogka Benito, then acting mayor of the Municipality of

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, Balabagan, Lanao del Sur, charged respondent Judge Rasad G.
Balindong of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Malabang, Lanao del
BRION and
Sur, Branch 12, with gross ignorance of the law.
 In compliance with the decision of the Ombudsman, the Regional
Complainant alleged that on May 3, 2005, she filed
Secretary of the DILG-ARMM issued Department Order (D.O.) No.
administrative and criminal complaints against Mamarinta G.
2006-38 dated September 1, 2006 implementing said
Macabato, then municipal treasurer of Balabagan, Lanao del Sur,
decision.[4] Due to the suspension of Mayor Sampiano,
for grave misconduct in the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao
complainant was sworn in as acting mayor.[5]
(Ombudsman) docketed as OMB-M-A-05-175-E. On September
15, 2005, the Ombudsman impleaded then Mayor Hadji Amer R.
Sampiano as co-respondent. Complainant claimed that these Meanwhile, on September 4, 2006, respondents in OMB-M-A-05-
respondents refused to pay her salary as vice mayor since July 1, 175-E filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition[6] in the RTC of
2004 despite repeated demands.[1] Malabang, Lanao del Sur, Branch 12. The petition was raffled to
the sala of herein respondent and docketed as Special Civil Action
(SCA) No. 12-181. Their prayer was to annul and set aside D.O.
On May 16, 2006, the Ombudsman rendered a decision in
No. 2006-38 of the DILG-ARMM and prohibit its
that case finding respondents therein guilty of conduct
implementation.[7]
prejudicial to the best interest of the service and imposing on
them the penalty of suspension from office without pay for a
period of nine months. It further directed the Regional On the same date, respondent issued an order granting a
Secretary[2] of the Department of the Interior and Local temporary restraining order (TRO) effective for 72 hours
Government, Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (DILG- directing the Regional Secretary of the DILG-ARMM to cease,
ARMM) in Cotabato City to immediately implement the desist and refrain from implementing the D.O.[8]
decision.[3]
 In an order dated September 6, 2006, respondent
extended the TRO for a period of 20 days.[9]
On September 25, 2006, respondent issued another order
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction directing the
Regional Secretary to cease, desist and refrain from
implementing D.O. No. 2006-38.
On October 5, 2006, respondent rendered an
order/decision annulling D.O. No. 2006-38.[10] This decision and
the writ of preliminary injunction were annulled by the Court of
Appeals (CA) in its February 8, 2007 decision.[11] The CA held that
the RTC had no jurisdiction over the petition filed by the
respondents in OMB-M-A-05-175-E pursuant to Sections 14 and
27 of Republic Act No. (RA) 6770[12] (Ombudsman Act of 1989)
and Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the
Ombudsman, as amended by Administrative Order No. 17-03.
Complainant asserted that, despite the clear provisions of
the law and procedure, respondent took cognizance of SCA No.
12-181 and issued the TROs, writ of preliminary injunction and
October 5, 2006 decision. Hence, she submitted that respondent
should be administratively disciplined because of his gross
ignorance of the law which prejudiced the rights of her
constituents in Balabagan, Lanao del Sur. [13]
Respondent countered that he issued the orders in good
faith. He was not moved by corrupt motives or improper
considerations. This could be shown by the fact that complainant
filed this complaint only after eight months from the resolution
of SCA No. 12-181. Considering that complainant failed to
establish bad faith or malevolence on his part, the complaint
against him should be dismissed.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), in its evaluation
dated September 24, 2007, found that the pertinent provisions
of the law were clear. It stated that:
the issuance of a TRO and writ of preliminary
injunction is not a mere deficiency in prudence, or
lapse of judgment by respondent judge but is a blatant
disregard of basic rules constitutive of gross ignorance
of the law. In the first place, respondent Judge should
 have refrained from taking cognizance of the said
ARMM and prohibit its implementation.Since D.O. No. 2006-38
special civil action when it was raffled to his court, he
ought to know this, yet he did otherwise. was issued merely to implement the decision of the Ombudsman,
respondents in OMB-M-A-05-175-E were actually questioning
this decision and seeking to enjoin its implementation by filing a
It recommended that respondent be held administratively liable
petition for certiorari and prohibition in the RTC.
[14]
for gross ignorance of the law and fined P21,000.

We agree with the findings and evaluation of the OCA but we

This is not allowed under the law, rules and
modify the penalty.
jurisprudence. Under Sections 14 and 27 of RA 6770, no court
A patent disregard of simple, elementary and well-known
shall hear any appeal or application for a remedy against the
[15]
rules constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Judges are
decision or findings of the Ombudsman, except the Supreme
expected to exhibit more than just cursory acquaintance with
Court, on a pure question of law.
[16]
laws and procedural rules. They must know the law and apply
it properly in good faith.[17] They are likewise expected to keep
Section 14. Restrictions. No writ of injunction
abreast of prevailing jurisprudence.[18] For a judge who is plainly shall be issued by any court to delay an investigation
ignorant of the law taints the noble office and great privilege being conducted by the Ombudsman under this Act,
vested in him. Respondents gross ignorance of the law unless there is a prima facie evidence that the subject
matter of the investigation is outside the jurisd7iction
constituted inexcusable incompetence which was anathema to of the Office of the Ombudsman.
the effective dispensation of justice.
No court shall hear any appeal or application
for remedy against the decision or findings of the
Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on [a] pure
In SCA No. 12-181, respondents in OMB-M-A-05-175-E question of law.
sought to annul and set aside D.O. No. 2006-38 of the DILG-
 xxx xxx xxx
Section 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions.
(1) All provisionary orders of the Office of the
Ombudsman are immediately effective and executory.
A motion for reconsideration of any order, directive or
decision of the Office of the Ombudsman must be filed
within five (5) days after receipt of written notice and
shall be entertained only on any of the following
grounds:
xxx xxx xxx
Findings of fact by the Office of the
Ombudsman when supported by substantial evidence
are conclusive. Any order, directive or decision
imposing the penalty of public censure or reprimand,
suspension of not more than one (1) month's salary
shall be final and unappealable.
In all administrative disciplinary cases,
orders, directives, or decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court
by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days
from receipt of the written notice of the order,
directive or decision or denial of the motion for
reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court.
The above rules may be amended or modified
by the Office of the Ombudsman as the interest of
justice may require.
However, in Fabian v. Desierto,[19] we enunciated the rule
that appeals from the decisions of the Ombudsman in
administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the
CA. Following our ruling in Fabian, the Ombudsman issued
Administrative Order No. 17[20] amending Section 7, Rule III[21] of
Administrative Order No. 07:[22]
Section 7. Finality and execution of decision.
Where the respondent is absolved of the charge, and
in case of conviction where the penalty imposed is
public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more
than one month, or a fine not equivalent to one month
salary, the decision shall be final, executory and
unappealable. In all other cases, the decision may be
appealed to the Court of Appeals on a verified
petition for review under the requirements and
conditions set forth in Rule 43 of the Rules of Court,
within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the written
Notice of the Decision or Order denying the Motion
for Reconsideration.
 An appeal shall not stop the decision from being
Respondents defense of good faith has no merit. Indeed,
executory. In case the penalty is suspension or
removal and the respondent wins such appeal, he shall good faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper
be considered as having been under preventive considerations, are sufficient defenses in which a judge charged
suspension and shall be paid the salary and such other
with ignorance of the law can find refuge.[24] However
emoluments that he did not receive by reason of the
suspension or removal.
good faith in situations of fallible discretion
inheres only within the parameters of tolerable
A decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in
judgment and does not apply where the issues are so
administrative cases shall be executed as a matter of
simple and the applicable legal principles evident and
course. The Office of the Ombudsman shall ensure
basic as to be beyond possible margins of error.[25]
that the decision shall be strictly enforced and
properly implemented. The refusal or failure by any
officer without just cause to comply with an order of
the Office of the Ombudsman to remove, suspend, If ordinary people are presumed to know the law,[26] judges are
demote, fine, or censure shall be a ground for
duty-bound to actually know and understand it. A contrary rule
disciplinary action against said officer. (Emphasis
supplied) will not only lessen the faith of the people in the courts but will
also defeat the fundamental role of the judiciary to render justice
and promote the rule of law.

These provisions clearly show that respondent had no

jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition and to issue his Gross ignorance of the law or procedure is a serious charge

subsequent orders. He proceeded against settled doctrine, an act under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by

constituting gross ignorance of the law or procedure.[23] A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC,[27]punishable by either dismissal from
service, suspension or a fine of more than P20,000 but not
exceeding P40,000.[28] Since this is respondents first offense, we
deem it proper to impose upon him a fine of P30,000.
Members of the bench are enjoined to behave at all times
in a way that promotes public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary.[29]Respondent's act of taking
cognizance of a case which was plainly not within his courts
jurisdiction failed to meet the high standards of judicial conduct.
ethics of the judicial office tends to diminish the peoples respect
for the law and legal processes.[32] He also fails to observe and
maintain the esteem due to the courts and to judicial
officers.[33] Thus, respondent violated Canons 1 and 11 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR):
Canon 1. A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey
the laws of the land and promote respect for law and
legal processes.

xxx xxx xxx

Pursuant to A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC,[30] this administrative
case against respondent as a judge, based on grounds which are
also grounds for disciplinary action against members of the Bar,
shall be considered as disciplinary proceedings against such judge
as a member of the Bar.[31]
Canon 11. A lawyer shall observe and maintain the
respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and
should insist on similar conduct by others. (Emphasis
supplied)

When respondent entertained SCA No. 12-181, issued a

TRO and writ of preliminary injunction and subsequently granted
Respondents gross ignorance of the law also runs counter
the petition, he acted contrary to law, rules and jurisprudence. In
to Canons 5 and 6 of the CPR:
doing so, he consented to the filing of an unlawful suit, in
violation of the Lawyers Oath. A judge who falls short of the
 Canon 5. A lawyer shall keep abreast of legal
WHEREFORE, Rasad G. Balindong, Presiding Judge of the
developments, participate in continuing legal
education programs, support efforts to achieve high Regional Trial Court, Malabang, Lanao del Sur, Branch 12 is
standards in law schools as well as in the practical hereby found GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law. He
training of law students and assist in disseminating
is FINED P30,000.
information regarding the law and jurisprudence.

Respondent is further hereby FINED P10,000 for his

Canon 6. These Canons shall apply to lawyers violation of the Lawyers Oath and Canons 1, 5, 6 and 11 of the
in government service in the discharge of their Code of Professional Responsibility.
official tasks. (Emphasis supplied)

He is STERNLY WARNED that the commission of the same

Judges should be well-informed of existing laws, recent or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
amendments and current jurisprudence, in keeping with their
sworn duty as members of the bar (and bench) to keep abreast
Let this resolution be attached to the personal files of
of legal developments.
respondent in the Office of the Court Administrator and the
Office of the Bar Confidant.
For such violation of the Lawyers Oath and Canons 1, 5, 6
and 11 of the CPR, respondent is fined in the amount
SO ORDERED.
of P10,000.[34]
 FIRST DIVISION contained in the Joint Complaint-Affidavit for Disbarment[1] filed
by the spouses David W. Williams and Marisa B. Williams.

SPOUSES DAVID and A.C. No. 6353

MARISA WILLIAMS, It appears that respondent is the counsel of record of the
Complainants,
plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 13443[2] pending before the Regional
Present:
Trial Court, Branch 33, DumagueteCity where complainants are
PANGANIBAN, C.J., Chairperson,
YNARES-SANTIAGO, the defendants. According to the complainant-spouses, Marisa
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, Williams bought the lot subject of the controversy. A Transfer
CALLEJO, SR., and Certificate of Title (TCT) was then issued in her favor, stating that
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ. she is Filipino, married to David W. Williams, an American
citizen.[3] On January 8, 2004, respondent charged her with
ATTY. RUDY T. ENRIQUEZ, Promulgated: falsification of public documents before the Office of the City
Respondent. Prosecutor of Dumaguete City. The complaint was docketed as
February 27, 2006
I.S. No. 2004-34.[4]
x--------------------------------------------
------x
RESOLUTION The spouses Williams further alleged, thus:

CALLEJO, SR., J.: 21. That, in malicious violation of the rules

Atty. Rudy T. Enriquez stands charged with unlawful,
dishonest, immoral and deceitful acts in violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and the Canons of Professional Ethics,
and with conduct unbecoming an attorney. The charges are
governing the practice of law, Attorney Rudy T.
Enriquez cited outdated material in his complaint-
affidavit (Annex A-1) and in his comments to counter-
affidavit (Annex A-2). He then knowingly applied this
stale law in a perverse fashion to argue that Marisa
Batacan Williams automatically lost her Filipino
citizenship when she married an American, and was
thus prohibited to own land in the Philippines,
 thereby making her guilty of falsification in the Deed
she executed to buy property in Negros Oriental.
2.2. That in paragraph #1 of her counter-
affidavit (Annex A-2) Marisa cites Article IV, Section 4
of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that she
would not lose her citizenship when she married an
American unless she renounced it in a specific act.
2.3 That, in reply, Attorney Enriquez, quotes
more outdated law, declaring that her act of marrying
her husband was equivalent to renouncing her
citizenship. He also doggedly attempts to show that
the 1987 Constitution supports his position, not
Marisas (Annex A-4).[5]
Complainants pointed out that the respondent is a retired
judge, who knows that the false charge (that Marisa Williams is
an American) will not prevail in the end.[6]
In his Comments by Way of Motion to
Dismiss,[7] respondent enumerated matters which to his mind
were evidence of the acts of falsification of complainant Marisa
Williams. He insisted that the complaint for disbarment was a
mere tactic to divert attention from the criminal charges against
the complainants, and that the charges against him were bereft
of any factual basis.
On December 1, 2004, the case was referred to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report
and recommendation.[8] Forthwith, the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline scheduled the case for mandatory conference/hearing.
However, only the respondent appeared. The parties were then
directed to submit their verified position papers.
In their Position Paper, complainants claimed that
respondent had maliciously and knowingly filed fabricated cases
against them and that his acts were forms of attempted
extortion. They also adopted their joint complaint-affidavit by
way of incorporation, along with their other pleadings.
For his part, respondent maintained that complainant
Marisa Williams was no longer a citizen of the Republic of
the Philippines as a result of her marriage to David Williams.
In her Report and Recommendation dated June 10, 1995,
Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala ruled that respondent
was guilty of gross ignorance of the law and should be suspended
for six (6) months. The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline adopted
the foregoing recommendation in its Resolution No. XVII-2005-
114 dated October 22, 2005, with the modification that
respondent be reprimanded, with a warning and advice to study
each and every opinion he may give to his clients.
The Court agrees that respondent is administratively liable
for his actuations. As found by the Investigating Commissioner:
There is no evidence shown by respondent that
complainant Marisa Bacatan-Williams has renounced
her Filipino citizenship except her Certificate of
Marriage, which does not show that she has
automatically acquired her husbands citizenship upon
her marriage to him. The cases cited by respondent are
not applicable in this case as it is clear that they refer
to aliens acquiring lands in the Philippines.
The Bar has been integrated for the attainment
of the following objectives: (a) elevate the standards
of the legal profession, (b) improve the administration
of justice, and (c) to enable the bar to discharge its
public responsibility more effectively (In re:
Integration of the Bar of the Philippines, 49 SCRA 22).
In line with these objectives of the Integrated
Bar, lawyers must keep themselves abreast of legal
developments. To do this, the lawyer must walk with
the dynamic movements of the law and
jurisprudence. He must acquaint himself at least with
the newly promulgated laws, the recent decisions of
the Supreme Court and of the significant decisions of
the Court of Appeals. There are other executive
orders, administrative circulars, regulations and other
rules promulgated by other competent authorities
engaged in the administration of justice. The lawyers
life is one of continuous and laborious study,
otherwise, his skill and knowledge of the law and
related disciplines will lag behind and become obscure
due to obsoleteness (Canon 5, Code of Professional
Responsibility.)[9]
As pointed out by the Investigating Commissioner, Canon
5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires that a lawyer
be updated in the latest laws and jurisprudence.[10] Indeed, when
the law is so elementary, not to know it or to act as if one does
not know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.[11] As a retired
judge, respondent should have known that it is his duty to keep
himself well-informed of the latest rulings of the Court on the
issues and legal problems confronting a client.[12] In this case, the
law he apparently misconstrued is no less than the
Constitution,[13] the most basic law of the land.[14] Implicit in a
lawyers mandate to protect a clients interest to the best of
his/her ability and with utmost diligence is the duty to keep
abreast of the law and legal developments, and participate in
continuing legal education programs.[15] Thus, in championing
WHEREFORE, for gross ignorance of the law, Atty. Rudy T.
the interest of clients and defending cases, a lawyer must not
Enriquez is REPRIMANDED and ADVISED to carefully study the
only be guided by the strict standards imposed by the lawyers
opinions he may give to his clients. He is STERNLY WARNED that
oath, but should likewise espouse legally sound arguments for
a repetition of a similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
clients, lest the latters cause be dismissed on a technical
ground.[16] Ignorance encompasses both substantive and SO ORDERED.
procedural laws.[17]

We find too harsh the recommended penalty of the ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Investigating Commissioner. It must be stressed that the power
to disbar or suspend must be exercised with great caution. Only Associate Justice
in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing
and character of a lawyer as an officer of the Court and member
of the bar will disbarment or suspension be imposed as a
penalty.[18] Pursuant to the IBP Commission on Bar Disciplines
Guidelines for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions,[19] and considering
further that this is respondents first infraction, we find that the WE CONCUR:
penalty of reprimand as recommended by the IBP Commission on
Bar Discipline, will suffice.

We likewise note that in their pleadings in this case, the

parties repeatedly invoked their arguments in their pending ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
cases below. Thus, we find it unnecessary to rule over such Chief Justice
arguments, which have yet to be determined on the merits in the Chairperson
courts a quo.