China-Taiwan Relations

Introduction
Taiwan, home to twenty-three million people, is an island off the southern coast of China that has been governed independently from mainland
China since 1949. The Peoples Republic of China (PRC) views the island as a province, while in Taiwana territory with its own
democratically elected governmentleading political voices have differing views on the islands status and relations with the mainland. Some
observe the principle that there is one China comprising the island and the mainland, but in their eyes this is the Republic of China (ROC)
based in Taipei; others advocate for a de jure independent Taiwan. China and Taiwan maintain a fragile relationship, which has improved during
the past seven years but is periodically tested.

One China Principle

Beijing and Taipei sharply disagree on the islands status. The PRC asserts that there is only one China and that Taiwan is an inalienable part
of it. Beijing says Taiwan is bound by an understanding reached in 1992 between representatives of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the
Kuomintang (KMT) political party then ruling Taiwan. Referred to as the 1992 Consensus, it states that there is only one China, but with
differing interpretations, allowing both Beijing and Taipei to agree that Taiwan belongs to China, while the two still disagree on which is
Chinas legitimate governing body. The tacit agreement underlying the 1992 Consensus is that Taiwan will not seek independence. Taiwans
KMT accepts the consensus as a starting point for future negotiations with the CCP. However, the islands president, Tsai Ing-wen, leader of the
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), has refused to reference the 1992 Consensus when speaking about cross-strait relations. Tsai has
emphasized that she seeks to build trust with the mainland through various channels of communication to ensure stability in cross-strait relations.
Other leading voices of the governing DPP have rejected the very existence of the consensus, leaving open the option of a future independent
Taiwan.

In 1979, the United States established formal diplomatic relations with Beijing by concluding a joint communiqu stating that the United States
of America acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China. At that time, U.S. President Jimmy
Carter terminated diplomatic relations with the ROC government in Taiwan. But soon after, the U.S. Congress passed the Taiwan Relations
Act (TRA), affirming important unofficial ties with the island. The new legislation replaced the previous bilateral defense treaty, offering a
qualified commitment to the islands security and providing for the supply of necessary defense articles and services.
U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, totaling more than $46 billion [PDF] since 1990, have led to U.S.-China friction and an upsurge in bellicose rhetoric
across the strait. Political transitions can also prompt tension between Beijing and Washington over Taiwan. For example, in December 2016,
Taiwans Tsai spoke with President-Elect Donald J. Trump by telephone, the first between leaders of the two sides since 1979. Tsai later said the
call did not signal a policy shift for Taiwan.

Rise of an Island
Ethnic Han Chinese settlers, primarily merchants, began to arrive in Taiwan in the seventeenth century. The island, now inhabited by a Han
Chinese majority, many of whom identify as distinctly Taiwanese, is also home to indigenous peoples who account for around 2 percent of the
population. Taiwan has a messy history of invasion, occupation, colonization, refuge, and intermarriage, writes University of Sydney
Professor Salvatore Babones. Annexed by the Qing dynasty in the late 1600s, Taiwan was later ceded to Japan in 1895 by imperial China in
accordance with a treaty that concluded the Sino-Japanese War. Japan governed it as a colony until 1945, when Japanese forces on the island
were required to surrender to Chiang Kai-sheks ROC military forces.

The ROC, which had governed China for decades, fled to Taiwan after losing the civil war to the Communists in 1949. But Chiang insisted his
government continued to represent all Chinese people both on the island and the mainland. Washington and most Western powers affirmed the
KMTs stance by long refusing to recognize the Communist government in Beijing, a position most countries later reversed.

Washingtons position began to shift under the Nixon administration. Back-channel diplomacy resulted in Washingtons formal recognition of
the PRC in 1979. The ROC lost its seat representing China at the United Nations in 1971 to Beijing.

Taiwan has a messy history of invasion, occupation, colonization, refuge, and intermarriage.
Salvatore Babones, University of Sydney

The KMT governed the island from 1949 to 1987 under martial law. Political dissent was harshly repressed and Taiwanese who had long
inhabited the island before 1945 faced discrimination. Taiwan held its first free legislative elections in 1992 and presidential elections in 1996.
The KMT and coalition partners have historically viewed Taiwan as a part of One China and do not support the islands independence. After
2000, the KMT often found itself in opposition to parties representing Taiwanese who had been on the island before 1949 and their descendants.
Although riven with its own factionalism, the KMT retains deep ties to the islands business leaders and consistently calls for closer ties with
Beijing. The party lost its majority in Taiwans legislative body for the first time in the 2016 elections.

The KMTs chief rival, the DPP, was founded in 1986 and became legal in 1989 after a ban on opposition parties was dropped. The DPP has
traditionally called for a de jure independent Taiwan as a separate political entity from China, and has become an outlet for the expression of
Taiwanese identity. Chen Shui-bian was the first non-KMT politician to serve as president (20002008) and pushed for Taiwanese sovereignty.
Shortly after his term, Chen was convicted and imprisoned on charges of embezzlement and accepting bribes (he is now on medical parole).

Beijing closely observes the islands elections. It has favored a steady deepening of ties with Taiwan, forging economic linkages that could
ultimately become too costly for the island to sever, thus nudging it closer to unification. However, since the PRCs own leadership transition in
2012, President Xi Jinping has embraced a tougher, nationalistic stance toward all of the special regions it claims, including Hong Kong, Tibet,
Xinjiang, and Taiwan alike. Taiwans election of Tsai has brought closer scrutiny of cross-strait ties from Beijing and Xi has shown a
willingness to use pressure to try to limit Tsais ability to reset the islands relations with the mainland. For example, Beijing suspended a cross-
strait communication mechanism with the main Taiwan liaison office in June 2016 because of Tsais reluctance to adhere to the 1992
Consensus.

Meanwhile, Taiwanese leaders consider the reestablishment of formal diplomatic relations with major powers and international organizations
essential if Taiwan is to survive separately from the Communist mainland. Only twenty-two countries maintain diplomatic ties with the island.

Military Situation
China has deployed missiles along the Taiwan Strait and continues to modernize the bulk of its military capabilities. Preparing for potential
conflict in the Taiwan Strait remains the focus and primary driver of Chinas military investment, says a 2015 U.S. Defense Department report
[PDF]. Although Beijing continues to seek progress with Taipei through the discussion of economic issues and high-level people-to-people
exchanges, it has refused to renounce the use of force to resolve the dispute over the islands status. The PRCs introduction of the 2005 Anti-
Secession Law, intended to strengthen Beijings approach to peaceful national reunification, included language stating that in the event
secessionist forces seek independence, Beijing would employ non-peaceful means to protect its national sovereignty.

In response, Taiwan continues to purchase weapons, primarily from the United States. In December 2015, the United States announced a $1.83
billion arms sale to Taiwanthe first in four years. Between 1979 and 2014, Taiwan ranked as the ninth largest recipient of arms globally.
During the same period, the United States supplied more than three-quarters of Taiwans imported weapons, according to the Stockholm
International Peace Research Institutes arms transfers database.
Preparing for potential conflict in the Taiwan strait remains the primary driver of Chinas military investment.
U.S. Defense Department,

Taiwans strategic security rests heavily on guarantees offered by the United States under the Taiwan Relations Act. Yet in recent years, security
analysts have cited concern over the emerging military imbalance between Beijing and Taipei. Given the pace of PLA(N) [Peoples Liberation
Army Navy] modernization, the gap in military capability [PDF] between the mainland and Taiwan will continue to widen in Chinas favor over
the coming years, writes the Congressional Research Services naval affairs specialist Ronald ORourke. When former President Ma Ying-
jeous KMT government came to power in 2008, the ROC government committed to boosting military spending to 3 percent of GDP, up from
2.2 percent. However, Taiwans $10.4 billion defense budget [PDF] in 2014 was a mere 2 percent of GDP and represented 16.2 percent of the
total budget, compared to 1994 levels of 3.8 percent and 24.3 percent, respectively.

Economic Rapprochement
Taiwan began investing in China after reform policies were implemented by PRC leader Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s. Despite intermittent
friction, the cross-strait economic relationship has blossomed. China entered the World Trade Organization in 2001 and, within a month, Taiwan
entered as Chinese Taipei. The island holds member, observer, or other status in more than forty organizations [PDF], such as the Asian
Development Bank, APEC, OECD committees, the International Civil Aviation Organization, and regional fishery organizations. Beijing said in
November 2015 that it would welcome Taiwans membership in the Chinese-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank under the appropriate
name.

Bilateral trade between China and Taiwan in 2014 reached $198.31 billion, up from $8 billion in 1991. China is Taiwans largest trading partner,
accounting for almost 30 percent of the islands total trade (including the mainland, Hong Kong, and Macao), according to Taiwans bureau of
foreign trade. Likewise, Taiwan ranked seventh among Chinas top ten trading partners in 2015. Over ninety-three thousand Taiwanese
businesses have invested in the mainland since 1988. Reciprocal mainland investment in Taiwan is on the rise but increasing at a slower rate.
China and Taiwan have also agreed to allow banks, insurers, and other financial service providers to work in both markets. In 2015, the number
of direct flights between China and Taiwan hit just under nine hundred per week, up from 270 in 2009. More than 9.4 million people traveled
across the strait in 2014, and in September 2015 Taiwan upped its daily quota of mainland visitors from four thousand to five thousand.
President Ma (20082016) signed more than twenty pacts with the PRC, including the 2010 Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement
(ECFA) [PDF], a cross-strait agreement to lift barriers to trade. Large Taiwanese corporations reap the majority of the benefits from stronger
commercial ties with the mainland while average Taiwan residents concerns over economic security mount. (Taiwans economy grew only 0.85
percent and youth unemployment was almost 13 percent in 2015, and property prices are soaring.) Many residents also believe that Ma brought
Taipei closer to Beijing without transparency and against the will of the Taiwanese people. Ma attended a historic meeting with Chinas Xi in
November 2015, the first between cross-strait political leaders, but Mas approval ratings hovered near record lows in his last two years in
power. KMT electoral losses in November 2014 and 2016 were widely interpreted as dissatisfaction with Mas China warming policies.

Economically, Taiwan has sought to diversify its commercial partnerships to avoid outright dependence on the mainland. In addition to ECFA,
Taiwan has signed a handful of other free-trade pacts, including a deal with New Zealand in 2013Taiwans first with a developed economy.
The government in Taipei will likely further expand other economic partnerships: investments by Taiwanese firms in Southeast Asias six
largest economies have doubled over the past five years, reaching more than $13 billion between 2011 and 2015.

Rise of Taiwanese Identity

The backlash against the ruling KMT in exit polls after the 2016 elections raises further questions about societal views over ties with Beijing.
Scholars cite the 228 Incident, a Taiwanese uprising against the KMT-led ROC that was violently suppressed in 1947, as the root of a strong
ethnic Taiwanese identity that sowed the seeds for democratization.

Generations of democratic practices [PDF] seem to have bound together the Taiwanese people and polity. Though most people across the
Taiwan Strait speak Mandarin as their first language, more than a century of separation has led a growing number of Taiwanese to feel they
deserve the right to continue a separate existence. Nearly 60 percent of the islands residents regard themselves as exclusively Taiwanese,
according to a 2015 survey conducted by the National Chengchi University. Comparatively, 33.7 percent identify as both Taiwanese and
Chinese, down from 47.7 percent in 2004, while only 4.1 percent consider themselves only Chinese, a figure that has dwindled since its peak at
26.2 percent in 1994.
 Quartz

The political awakening of youth in Taiwan was driven as much by practical frustrations as by political ideals, wrote freelance writer Anna
Beth Keim in a January 2016 post for the Asia Society. Frustrations over financial insecurity and economic inequality, as well as dissatisfaction
with Taiwans political factions, have given birth to a groundswell of domestic political activitylargely referred to as Taiwans third force.
Meanwhile, Chinas Xi has emphasized the need for Taiwan to adhere to the One China principle. He referred to Taiwans independence
forces as being the biggest hindrance for the peaceful development of the cross-strait ties [and the] biggest threat of the cross-strait stability.
China-based experts say that the election of pro-independence leaders in Taiwan may shift Beijings top security concern from territorial
disputes in the East and South China Seas to defending territorial integrity across the Taiwan Strait. In March 2016, after Tsais election, Xi
reiterated that China will resolutely contain the separatist path of any form of Taiwan independence.

Though Taiwans main political parties diverge on how best to manage the islands relationship with Beijing, experts caution that both Beijing
and Taipei must both take responsibility for avoiding a crisis. A peaceful cross-strait relationship [PDF] is central to the stability and prosperity
of the Asia-Pacific region and therefore is of vital importance to the United States, said Bonnie S. Glaser, senior advisor for Asia at the Center
for Strategic and International Studies, in a February 2016 statement before a subcommittee of the U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee. Amid
uncertainty surrounding the incoming U.S. administrations policy priorities in Asia, any recalibration of Washingtons position vis--vis Taipei
could trigger tensions across the delicate triangle of ties between the United States, China, and Taiwan.

Donald Trump is No Friend of Taiwan

When President Tsai Ing-wen of Taiwan called then-President-elect Donald Trump, it should have been the beginning of a beautiful friendship.

The presidents elected in Taiwan and in the U.S. in 2016 both were committed to building friendly relations between their countries. They put
their promises into action with a widely-publicized phone call on December 2, midway through the Trump transition.

Yet, today, barely a month and a half into Trumps presidency, Taiwan is as isolated as ever, and the pressure from Beijing is intensifying.

How did the promise of a new era in U.S.-Taiwan relations go so wrong?

Looking for a Restart

Under Tsai and Trumps predecessors, Ma Ying-jeou and Barack Obama, U.S.-Taiwan relations were cordial but distant. Ma believed he could
maximize stability in the Taiwan Strait by focusing his attention on Beijing, and the Obama administration was content to let that approach play
out. As long as relations in the Taiwan Strait were stable and positive, Washington had little incentive to interfere.

Nonetheless, many in Taiwan and in the U.S. viewed this trend with alarm; they feared that Americans were losing interest in Taiwan and that
the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) was gaining leverage and momentum it could use to force Taiwan into an unwelcome political deal.

Among the voices calling most urgently for closer U.S.-Taiwan ties were several Asia policy hands from the George W. Bush administration. As
the U.S. presidential campaign unfolded, they made it clear that they believed the next president should do more to confront actions by China
that challenged U.S. interests and take a more favorable position toward Taiwan.

Advocates of an upgrade in U.S.-Taiwan relations were especially keen to improve communication between leaders in the U.S. and Taiwan.

In March 2016, George Washington University hosted a panel discussion that included high-ranking officials from the U.S. and Taiwan. A third
panelist was Randall Schriver, a Bush-era State department official with a long history of advocating for closer U.S.-Taiwan ties. Schriver called
for better communication between Taipei and Washington: One of my pet issues for a long time has been the need to improve communications
at the highest levels. . . . I wish our presidents could talk to each other. I think presidents and elected officials are different creatures and different
characters and they think differently and they talk differently and having people at that level talk to each other is important.

In July, Peter Navarro, who later would be tapped to head Trumps National Trade Council, criticized Obama and his predecessors for
accommodating China too readily, at Taiwans expense. He, too, called for better official communication between Washington and Taipei,
specifically higher-level visits between U.S. and Taiwanese officials.

Support for upgrading U.S.-Taiwan relations among Republican foreign policy voices also was evident in the GOPs 2016 platform. The
platform lauded Taiwans political and economic values and system and called for its full participation in international organizations. It also
advocated enhanced arms sales to the island and included a promise to defend Taiwan in the event of a military confrontation. As June Dreyer
pointed out in her January 17, 2016 FPRI E-Note, that promise went well beyond the U.S.s existing commitment to the island. As Dreyer put it,
it was clear that the Republican Party envisioned changes in American policy toward Taiwan.

According to Stephen Yates, another former Bush administration official with strong links to Taiwan, Donald Trump himself fully supported the
platform. Yates told the Washington Post that Trump had made clear at the time that he wanted recalibrate relationships around the world and
that the U.S. posture toward China was a personal priority.
After the election, as the Trump transition team came together, reports named several key advocates for upgrading U.S.-Taiwan relations as
advisors and potential appointees: Schriver and Yates, as well as Mark Stokes, Peter Navarro, Alexander Gray, Dan Blumenthal, and Edward
Feulner.

The Call Heard round the World

The first concrete sign that these ambitions would be put into action came a less than a month after the election. On December 2, the Trump
transition announced that the president-elect had spoken by telephone with Tsai Ing-wen, accepting her congratulations, offering his own
congratulations on her election, and noting the close economic, political, and security ties between Taiwan and the U.S.

News outlets quickly picked up the story, usually with the context that no U.S. president or president-elect had spoken directly to a Taiwanese
leader since the U.S. switched its diplomatic recognition to Beijing in 1979. The Washington Post called the incident a major departure from
decades of U.S. policy in Asia and a breach of diplomatic protocol with ramifications for the incoming presidents relations with China.

Advisors to the transition swung into action to defend the phone call. In a New York Times article published on December 5, Schriver returned to
the theme of the March panel discussion mentioned above: Its absurd that we talk about going to war with China to defend Taiwan, and our
presidents cant talk to each other. . . . The Chinese understand this. They dont want to see their efforts to isolate Taiwan rolled back, but they
also dont want a bad relationship with the U.S. Jon Huntsman, Jr., Obamas ambassador to China and Trumps pick for ambassador to Russia,
applauded Trumps willingness to look fresh at the cross-strait relationship. He predicted, Taiwan is about to become a more prominent
feature of the overall U.S.-China relationship.

Blumenthal and Schriver offered a lengthy defense of the phone call in a December 5 piece in The National Interest. They wrote, It is the height
of cynicism to view U.S. relations with Taiwan and China in zero-sum terms. We can have good relations with both sides of the strait. The good
news is that the Sino-American relationship has matured and has a solid foundation. Ironically, the people who seem willing to take the Tsai-
Trump call in stride are Chinese Communist Party leaders. It appears that China is prepared for the United States to return to strenuous advocacy
on behalf of its interests and values. China will doubtless do the same. The work of diplomacy will be managing our differences, including on
Taiwan, in ways that do not lead to conflict.

The Best Laid Plans

Trumps advisors were quick to defend the call, but not quick enough to stop Trump himself from undercutting their efforts to portray the phone
call as a sensible, measured move aimed at recalibrating the relationship.
As criticism mounted in the hours after the phone call was announced, Trump fired back on Twitter. His first tweet, sent a few hours after the
phone call, read, The President of Taiwan CALLED ME today to wish me congratulations on winning the Presidency. Thank you! An hour
later, Trump tweeted: Interesting how the U.S. sells Taiwan billions of dollars of military equipment but I should not accept a congratulatory
call.

Two days later, Trump continued the tweet storm, writing, Did China ask us if it was OK to devalue their currency (making it hard for our
companies to compete), heavily tax our products going into their country (the U.S. doesnt tax them) or to build a massive military complex in
the middle of the South China Sea? I dont think so!

The effect of Trumps tweets could not have been more distant from his advisors intentions in arranging the call. The swaggering she
CALLED ME threw the responsibility for the incident onto Tsai and touched off a days-long media effort to determine which side had
initiated the call (in fact, officials on both sides have confirmed that the call was planned long in advance).

The Tsai administration was unprepared for the massive publicity unleashed when the transition team publicized the call; it was their
understanding that the call would be private. Tsais government was thrust into the limelight, pressured from all sides for an explanation. In the
end, the Taiwan side said as little as possible. Tsai tried to calm the situation in a statement to reporters that one phone call does not mean a
policy shift and I do not foresee major policy shifts in the near future because we all see the value of stability in the region.

Despite Tsais efforts to calm the waters, Beijing seized on the she CALLED ME narrative to justify blaming Tsai for the incident a move
which allowed China to avoid a rupture with the incoming U.S. administration. On December 3, the Chinese foreign minister said Tsai had
fooled Trump with a petty trick.

Trumps tweets about currency, trade, and the South China Sea prompted some in the media to wonder whether Trump and his advisors had
intended the phone call to happen at all a question that both reflected and reinforced widespread doubts about organization, preparation, and
leadership within the Trump transition.

Trumps advisors pushed back against the idea that the call was somehow unintended or poorly thought-out. Yates told the Washington Post that
Tsai had been on a list of foreign leaders slated for calls since the day after the election. Said Yates, Once the call was scheduled, I was told that
there was a briefing for President-elect Trump. They knew that there would be reaction and potential blowback.
Republican pollster Frank Luntz put a political spin on the call in a statement to the Washington Post: He campaigned on an America first
platform Calls like this may upset the diplomats, but they communicate to Americans that hes not going to play by the same rules and isnt
just talking differently but will act differently.

While transition officials, Trump advisors, and other Republican stalwarts strongly defended the phone call, when it came to the president-elects
tweeting, those same voices were uncharacteristically silent.

Bargaining Over One China

The furor from the phone call had barely subsided when Trump took to the airwaves to double down on the idea that U.S.-Taiwan relations
might be on the verge of a major change. In a December 11 interview with Fox News, the president-elect undercut much of what his advisors
had been saying about the call. Invited to confirm their claim that it had been planned for weeks, the president-elect replied, Oh, its all wrong.
No, no. Its all wrong. Not weeks. I took a call. I heard the call was coming probably an hour or two before.

The rest of his answer was even more revealing and controversial:

I fully understand the One-China policy. But I dont know why we have to be bound by a One-China policy unless we make a deal with China
having to do with other things, including trade. I mean, look, were being hurt very badly by China with devaluation, with taxing us heavy at the
borders when we dont tax them, with building a massive fortress in the middle of the South China Sea, which they shouldnt be doing. And,
frankly, theyre not helping us at all with North Korea. You have North Korea, you have nuclear weapons, and China could solve that problem.
And theyre not helping us at all.

So, I dont want China dictating to me. And this was a call put into me. I didnt make the call. And it was a call, very short call, saying,
Congratulations, sir, on the victory. It was a very nice call. Short. And why should some other nation be able to say, I cant take a call? I think
it would have been very disrespectful, to be honest with you, not taking it.

In less than 200 words, Trump managed to shake the foundations of U.S.-China relations and cast Taiwans future into doubt. Even for a devotee
of short-form writing like master-tweeter Donald Trump, this was an achievement.

The one China policy is a U.S. policy statement first articulated in the 1970s that has allowed the U.S. to pursue economic and political ties with
Beijing while maintaining robust unofficial relations with Taipei. Every administration since Richard Nixons has affirmed the policy.
Suggesting it might be open to revision cast the very basis even the possibility of economic and diplomatic interactions between the U.S. and
China into serious doubt.

Realizing it could no longer avoid a confrontation with Trump, Beijing reacted strongly to the interview. PRC foreign ministry spokesman Lu
Kang said, the one-China policy was non-negotiable. Chinese media chose more colorful language, describing Trump as a rookie,
despicable, and risible, and accusing him of playing with fire.

The Fox News interview was only slightly more welcome in Taiwan. A long-standing fear among islanders is that the U.S. might be willing to
trade away their interests in order to gain concessions from the PRC; many read Trumps suggestion that aspects of Taiwan policy might change
in response to a deal with China as an admission that he might do just that. Trumps economic advisor Navarro had explicitly rejected the idea
of using Taiwan as a bargaining chip in a July National Interest article, but the president-elect ignored this advice. Lest anyone wonder whether
Trump misspoke in the Fox News interview, he reiterated his position two days later in a Wall Street Journal interview, saying Everything is
under negotiation, including one China.

Everything was under negotiation, including one China, until suddenly it was not.

On February 9, with little warning, Trump reversed himself, telling Xi Jinping, the President of the PRC, in a telephone call that he would
honor our One China policy. Chinese media provided the most detailed description of the call, saying Trump stressed that he fully understood
the great importance for the U.S. government to respect the One China policy, and that Trump and Xi accepted the necessity and urgency of
strengthening cooperation between China and the United States. As far as we know, Trump was not offered any deals on other issues in
exchange for his capitulation.

Whither Taiwan Policy?

Just a few months ago, the incoming Trump administration seemed poised to be the most pro-Taiwan White House in decades. Today, it is
impossible to say whether U.S. policy in the next few years will leave Taiwan better or worse off. We know that the one China policy will be the
foundation, but beyond that, its anyones guess.

For Taiwan, uncertainty may be even more damaging than the Obama administrations approach, which was cooler, but workmanlike and
predictable. If we take into account the ways in which Trumps actions have ratcheted up tensions between Taipei and Beijing, there is little
doubt that Taiwan is worse off under Trump than Obama.
The worst case scenario for Taiwan is for the U.S. to withdraw its support for the islands continued self-determination (including by ending
military sales) in order to secure concessions from Beijing. The idea that Trump would mention Taiwan policy in the form of one China in
the context of deal-making with Beijing was profoundly worrying to many in Taiwan. Two days before the inauguration, Taiwans top official in
the U.S., Stanley Kao, expressed that concern politely. He said Taipei anticipated good relations with the new administration, but that the
relationship should be based on its merit and not used . . . as some kind of bargaining chip.

The absence of a clear explanation as to what went wrong between Trumps phone calls with Tsai on December 2 and Xi on February 9 also
causes anxiety for Taiwanese. If the call with Tsai was part of a strategy created by Taiwans friends in Washington, why did the president-elect
go so far off script? And why didnt his advisors prevent him from saying, not once but twice, that the one China policy could be a bargaining
chip? Confusing messages from within the Trump camp (such as Vice President-elect Mike Pence saying not to read too much into the phone
call at the same time others in the transition were saying it was an intentional policy shift) only exacerbated this anxiety.

Another source of concern is the absence, to date, of people with Taiwan expertise or even expertise in Asia more broadly in the Trump
White House. According to some reports, Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin and Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross have ties to China;
meanwhile, with the exception of Chief of Staff Reince Priebus, whose policy influence is unclear, and Navarro, none of the Taiwan experts who
had been mentioned as possible appointees Yates, Schriver, Blumenthal, Stokes, Feulner have been tapped for positions. Matt Pottinger, the
National Security Senior Director for Asia, studied in Taiwan, but his views are not well known. In general, the dearth of senior personnel in
foreign policy positions makes it hard to see how the administration could do much of anything with regard to Taiwan in the next several
months, even if it wanted to.

Yet another question troubling Taiwan (and Beijing) is what Trump has in mind by the one China policy. He did not define it, and whether he
fully understands the history and context, as he assured Fox News, is uncertain. In other words, his promise to honor the policy does not settle
the matter for either side.

With these questions standing open, Taiwan cannot help but keep the Trump administration at arms length. Hopes for a warm relationship with
a White House staffed by familiar faces have faded. The simple act of speaking to Trump on the phone did far more harm than good to Taiwan,
and to Tsai herself. Surely she will be much more careful before accepting any offer from this administration. Similarly, China has what it
wants a promise to honor the one-China policy but only after a long and terrifying trip through terrain PRC leaders surely thought they
would never have to visit. Beijing will not easily trust the Trump White House, no matter how many rounds of golf Trump and Xi play.

Taiwans leaders should also worry about the Trump administrations overall approach to foreign policy an approach that seems to abandon
Americas long-standing commitment to democracy around the world. Trumps speeches rarely mention democracy or human rights, and his
proposed budget slashes funding for all sorts of values-oriented programs. For Taiwan, this is a very bad sign. As Chinas political, military, and
economic power increase, making a utilitarian argument as to why the U.S. should support Taiwan gets harder, leaving democracy as Taiwans
signal virtue. When Navarro used the phrase in his July 2016 article, describing Taiwan as a beacon of democracy was a tired clich. Today, it
feels like an important moral statement.

One bright spot for Taiwan is the possibility of an arms sale soon after Trump meets with Xi Jinping, probably in April (although the
administration has not made a formal announcement of the sale). The U.S. has other tools to help Taiwan as well applying diplomatic pressure
on Beijing to allow Taiwan to participate in international organizations, or even going back to the playbook Trumps advisors were using early
on, and allowing higher-level visits and the administration may yet use some of those.

Yet another opportunity to improve U.S.-Taiwan relations would be by enhancing economic ties. The U.S. and Taiwan have been going round
and round for years in trade negotiations, with the ultimate goal of signing a bilateral investment agreement or even a free trade agreement.

Yet, it is on the economic front that Trump delivered to Taiwan the most devastating blow of all. By abandoning the Trans-Pacific Partnership
(TPP), Trump shut the door on Taiwans best chance to avoid economic marginalization and reduce its political isolation. Although Taiwan was
not part of the original group of 12 nations that negotiated the TPP, its leaders had strong hopes that they would be able to enter the agreement in
a second round. Being incorporated into a powerful multilateral trade bloc would have had strong economic benefits for Taiwan, and it would
have allowed the island to do an end-run around Beijings efforts to exclude it from international organizations.

In the absence of the TPP, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) is likely to become the basis of economic cooperation in
Asia. Taiwan has little to no chance of participating in that China-centered organization.

In sum, after a promising start and with the eager participation of many strong supporters of Taiwan in the transition, the Trump White House
has managed to comprehensively botch its Taiwan policy, leaving Taiwan more vulnerable than ever to Beijings increasing pressure.

Ironically, one of Donald Trumps close advisors, Peter Navarro, warned against precisely this kind of disastrous rollout of Taiwan policy. In his
July 2016 essay in The National Interest entitled America Cant Dump Taiwan, Navarro wrote, It is critical there be no missteps in American
policy towards Taiwan that might, on the one hand, inflame China or, on the other hand, throw Taiwan once again under Beijings bus.

5 thoughts on Donald Trump is No Friend of Taiwan

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Taiwan and China: A New Set of Interesting Times

In examining China, a perennial site of focus is that of relations between mainland China, known as the Peoples Republic of China (PRC), and
Taiwan, known as the Republic of China (ROC). With the key relationship between the United States and Taiwan and the recent elections of
Donald Trump and of Tsai Ing-wen () respectively, a refocusing on Taiwan has occurred. Although relations between Taiwan and
mainland China have generally remained tense but calm, recent issues have placed weight on the prospect of a deterioration of relations. Taiwan
became a de-facto separate entity in 1949 when Chiang Kai Shek () and the Kuomintang (KMT) Party left mainland for Taiwan, pushed
out by the Communist Party of China. From 1949 to 1987, Taiwan was placed under martial law, mirroring the intensity of KMTs relations with
mainland and the indigenous inhabitants of Taiwan. Given the unprecedented power of the military over local administration, the KMT gained a
strong, authoritarian hold over the island through the White Terror.[1] The White Terror included the jailing of political dissidents and
suppression of popular dissent, and it continues to bring the KMT criticisms today.

By the mid-1970s, relations between Taiwan and the Mainland began to thaw. Chiangs death in 1975 allowed opposition and dissidents to issue
greater demands to his successor and son, Chiang Ching Kuo (). Due to US adoption of the One China Policy in 1979, which shifted
their recognition of China from Taiwan to the PRC, Taiwan lost its main foreign supporter, which furthered its isolated position. Although
Taiwan adopted the Three Noes policy of no contact, no compromise, and no negotiation [2] with China in 1979, this position of political
isolationism diminished by 1987, when the hijacking of a China Airlines Flight forced Taiwanese officials to re-establish dialogue with the PRC.
Marking the first of many meetings and dialogues between the two parties, the negotiations in 1987 culminated in the unofficial 1992
Consensus. The PRC and ROC both agreed on a mutual understanding of the existence of One China, but with different interpretations of the
term.[3]

The 1992 Consensus formed one of the key dividing factors between the KMT and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), the main opposition
party in Taiwan formed in 1986-87 during the end of Martial Law. The DPP, as a party with political leaning towards Taiwanese independence,
rejects the 1992 Consensus. The DPP states that there was no One China Consensus during that meeting, while the KMT believes the
Consensus does exist. This crucial difference between the two parties has generally defined the ebb of mainland and Taiwan relations. Chen Shui
Bian (), the DPP President from 2000-2008, was perceived as a supporter of Taiwanese independence. His presidency led to a
deterioration in Mainland-Taiwan relations.[4] The following KMT President, Ma Ying Jeou (), maintained the rhetoric of a sovereign
Taiwan but generally supported policies that strengthened ties to the Mainland.[5]

In 2016, Taiwan is possibly entering a new state of relations with mainland. Firstly, Taiwan elected the second DPP and first female President,
Tsai Ing Wen, in May 2016. Unlike the largely populist Chen, Tsais academic background and political experience shapes her technocratic
approach Mainland-Taiwanese relations.[6] Quoted as being a seasoned negotiator following her experience in the Taiwans Ministry of
Economic Affairs and Mainland Affairs Council, her experience pointedly places her in a position to understand and utilize notions of
independence beyond simply garnering greater political support.[7] In addition, her unprecedented popularity during the 2016 elections
demonstrated a public identification with the DPPs position for an independent Taiwan, rather than the other trends such as the populist notions
of opposition against KMT policies. With the development of domestic movements such as the Sunflower movement that demand greater
suzerainty and independence for Taiwan, the large support for Tsai among young people demonstrates greater support for the DPPs cause.[8]
Secondly, the election of Trump in the US has also led to a divergence from traditional American foreign policy viewpoints. He may take an
alternative view of American-Taiwanese relations in his coming term beginning in 2017.

These two factors largely came into focus in the recent diplomatic row concerning Trumps direct call with Tsai. On December 2, 2016, Trump
became the first President in over four decades to have official, direct contact with a Taiwanese leader. They discussed Taiwanese-American
relations for the future and issued mutual congratulations on their recent electoral victories. This direct call between Trump and Tsai violated the
unspoken diplomatic rule of no (direct) contact.[9] Although the incident clearly undermines Americas policy of a One China
understanding in regards to Sino-American relations, the impact of the incident was largely handled through a sense of moderation by both
Chinese and American officials. The Chinese Foreign Minister stated that the call was a petty action by the Taiwan side.[10] However, it was
also toned down through Trumps general and explicit ignorance of certain traditional protocol regarding international relations.[11]

In line with an increasing sense of instability permeating, especially concerning Trumps often unpredictable nature, China has increasingly
asserted its position in forcing Taiwan to toe in line with the 1992 Consensus. The recent seizure of Singaporean Armoured Vehicles in the Port
of Hong Kong by Chinese Customs is illustrative of this. En route from regular military exercises in Taiwan, nine Singaporean Armoured
Vehicles were seized by Customs in a routine inspection.[12] Although largely claimed to be a surprise inspection by the Chinese, the logistics
in mounting this seizure clearly emphasized Chinas motives in isolating Taiwan and enforcing its view of the One China Principle.
Combined, with the recent lodging of a diplomatic complaint with Singapore in concern to its cooperation with Taiwan, the mutual
understanding in regards to the diplomatic purpose of this action is apparent.

Chinese-Taiwanese relations will undoubtedly be a site of tension in the near future. Although the relations will most likely continue on the
current path of an uneasy peace. China will continue to contain its actions to an increasing assimilation of Taiwan through increasing diplomatic
and economic pressures while Taiwan continues to rebut such efforts. The true propensity for change lies not domestically in Taiwanese
movements, but in American involvement.

Trumps call to Tsai Ing Wen made news headlines across the globe as a possible shift in American foreign policy. The comparative lack of
global coverage caused by domestic Taiwanese movements such as the Sunflower Movement demonstrates the lack of external influence exerted
by such groups. Although definitely not lacking in domestic power, such groups play a key part in creating a domestic notion of an independent
Taiwan that is limited in the international sphere. Bridging this gap requires additional nation-state relations and recognition. Apart from the US,
many other nations are generally unwilling or incapable of addressing this gap in the face of Chinese power. Although Trumps actions have
hinted at signs of pro-Taiwanese policies, they are far from re-establishing any significant American ties or official recognition of the nation.
However, Trumps general propensity to go beyond diplomatic norms and freewheel a risqu foreign policy, seen in his numerous contacts
with other foreign leaders and criticism of Obamas policies, could possibly further undermine the existing Sino-American understanding
regarding the One China policy.[13]

The content of this article does not represent the positions, research methods, or opinions of the Synergy Editorial Committee. We are
solely responsible for reviewing and editing submissions. Please address all scholarly concerns directly to the contributor(s) of the
article.

Timothy Law is a 4th Year student studying International Relations and Peace, Conflict and Justice Studies at the University of Toronto,
Victoria College. Currently, Timothy serves as an event correspondent and editor for Synergy: The Journal of Contemporary Asian Studies.

[1] Sui, Cindy. Taiwan Kuomintang: Revisiting the White Terror years. BBC News. BBC, 13 Mar. 2016. Web. 30 Dec. 2016.

[2] Safire, William. The 2 1/2 Nos. The New York Times. The New York Times, 11 Nov. 1987. Web. 30 Dec. 2016.
[3] Chen, Yu-Hua, Paula J. Dobriansky, Matthew Rojansky, and Salvatore Babones. Taiwan Is Barely Clinging to the 1992 Consensus. The
National Interest. The National Interest, 2 June 2016. Web. 30 Dec. 2016.

[4] Copper, John . Tsai different from Chen Shui-bian. Taipei Times. Taipei Times, 21 May 2016. Web. 30 Dec. 2016.

[5] Chen, Yu-Hua, Paula J. Dobriansky, Matthew Rojansky, and Salvatore Babones. Taiwan Is Barely Clinging to the 1992 Consensus. The
National Interest. The National Interest, 2 June 2016. Web. 30 Dec. 2016.

[6] Copper, John . Tsai different from Chen Shui-bian. Taipei Times. Taipei Times, 21 May 2016. Web. 30 Dec. 2016.

[7] Chung, Lawrence. Tsai Ing-wen is an experienced negotiator in cross-strait and international affairs, say academics and diplomats. South
China Morning Post. South China Morning Post, 16 Jan. 2016. Web. 18 Jan. 2017. <http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-
politics/article/1901729/tsai-ing-wen-experienced-negotiator-cross-strait-and>.

[8] Hoon, Shim Jae. Taiwan post-election look: Youth power dumps KMT rule. Asia Times. Asia Times, 30 May 2016. Web. 30 Dec. 2016.

[9] Landler, Mark, and David E. Sanger. Trump Speaks With Taiwans Leader, an Affront to China. The New York Times. The New York
Times, 02 Dec. 2016. Web. 30 Dec. 2016.

[10] Blanchard, Ben . China labels Trump call petty action by Taiwan: Phoenix TV. Reuters. Ed. Nick Macfie. Thomson Reuters, 02 Dec.
2016. Web. 30 Dec. 2016.

[11] Fisher, Max, and Josh Keller. How Trumps Calls to World Leaders Are Upsetting Decades of Diplomacy. The New York Times. The
New York Times, 02 Dec. 2016. Web. 30 Dec. 2016.

[12] Chan, Minnie. HOW SINGAPORES MILITARY VEHICLES BECAME BEIJINGS DIPLOMATIC WEAPON. South China Morning
Post. South China Morning Post, 3 Dec. 2016. Web. 30 Dec. 2016.

[13] Fisher, Max, and Josh Keller. How Trumps Calls to World Leaders Are Upsetting Decades of Diplomacy. The New York Times. The
New York Times, 02 Dec. 2016. Web. 30 Dec. 2016.
TAIWAN (overview)

Taiwan, officially the Republic of China (ROC; Chinese: ; pinyin: Zhnghu Mngu), is a country in East Asia. It is the nationalist
government of China since its settlement in 1949. It is called the Republic of China (ROC) (also called Taiwan) which is a special region
comprising the island of Taiwan and nearby islands (Pescadores islands and parts of Fujian). The Chinese Nationalist government (Kuomintang
abbreviated as KMT) moved to Taiwan after the Communist army took over the capital of Beijing. Currently, the Chinese Nationalist
government governs Taipei, the capital of Taiwan. Taiwan is southeast of the China mainland, south of Japan, and north of the Philippines.

Taiwan has also been called Formosa, a Portuguese name which means "beautiful" in Portuguese.

The largest cities in Taiwan are the capital of Taipei and the port city of Kaohsiung.

Most people living in Taiwan (sometimes called Taiwanese) are Han. Taiwan has three large Han groups. They speak different dialects of
Chinese and their ancestors came from different places: the Southern Fujianese (from China's Fujian Province), the Hakka (from China), and
Mainlanders (from Mainland China after 1948).

There are also Taiwanese Aborigines who have lived in Taiwan before the Han came to live there.

Background:
First inhabited by Austronesian people, Taiwan became home to Han immigrants beginning in the late Ming Dynasty (17th century). In 1895,
military defeat forced China's Qing Dynasty to cede Taiwan to Japan, which governed Taiwan for 50 years. Taiwan came under Chinese
Nationalist control after World War II. In the four years leading to the communist victory on the mainland in 1949, 2 million Nationalists fled to
Taiwan and established a government under the 1947 constitution drawn up for all of China. The Nationalist government established
authoritarian rule under martial law in 1948. Beginning in the late 1970s, the ruling authorities gradually democratized and incorporated the local
population within the governing structure. This process expanded rapidly in the 1980s, with the founding of the first opposition party (the
Democratic Progressive Party or DPP) in 1986 and the lifting of martial law in 1987. Taiwan held its first direct presidential election in 1996. In
2000, Taiwan underwent its first peaceful transfer of power from the Nationalist Party (Kuomintang or KMT) to the DPP. Throughout this
period, the island prospered and became one of East Asia's economic "Tigers." The dominant political issues continue to be management of
sensitive relations between Taiwan and China - specifically the question of Taiwan's sovereignty - as well as domestic priorities for economic
reform and growth.

Geography :: TAIWAN
Panel - Expanded
Location:
Eastern Asia, islands bordering the East China Sea, Philippine Sea, South China Sea, and Taiwan Strait, north of the Philippines, off the
southeastern coast of China
Geographic coordinates:
23 30 N, 121 00 E
Map references:
Southeast Asia
Area:
total: 35,980 sq km
land: 32,260 sq km
water: 3,720 sq km
note: includes the Pescadores, Matsu, and Quemoy islands
country comparison to the world: 139
Area - comparative:
slightly smaller than Maryland and Delaware combined
Land boundaries:
0 km
Coastline:
1,566.3 km
Maritime claims:
territorial sea: 12 nm
exclusive economic zone: 200 nm
Climate:
tropical; marine; rainy season during southwest monsoon (June to August); persistent and extensive cloudiness all year
Terrain:
eastern two-thirds mostly rugged mountains; flat to gently rolling plains in west
Elevation:
mean elevation: 1,150 m
elevation extremes: lowest point: South China Sea 0 m
highest point: Yu Shan 3,952 m
Natural resources:
small deposits of coal, natural gas, limestone, marble, asbestos, arable land
Land use:
agricultural land: 22.7%
arable land 16.9%; permanent crops 5.8%; permanent pasture NA
forest: NA
other: 77.3% (2011 est.)
Irrigated land:
3,820 sq km (2012)
Population - distribution:
distribution exhibits a peripheral coastal settlement pattern, with the largest populations on the north and west coasts
Natural hazards:
earthquakes; typhoons
volcanism: Kueishantao Island (elev. 401 m), east of Taiwan, is its only historically active volcano, although it has not erupted in centuries
Environment - current issues:
air pollution; water pollution from industrial emissions, raw sewage; contamination of drinking water supplies; trade in endangered species; low-
level radioactive waste disposal
Environment - international agreements:
party to: none of the selected agreements because of Taiwan's international status
Geography - note:
strategic location adjacent to both the Taiwan Strait and the Luzon Strait

History
In 1517, A discovery ship of Portuguese saw this island and names it "Ilha Formosa", or "Beautiful Island" in Portuguese.

17th century: From 1624 until 1661 Dutch colonize the southern part of Formosa and established a colonial administration in Fort
Zeelandia, and the Spanish colonize the north and established a colonial administration in Fuerte Santo Domingo or Fort Santo Domingo.
The Dutch eventually defeated the Spaniards and took full control of Formosa. A Chinese general named Koxinga, defeated the Dutch at
the Siege of Fort Zeelandia.
1860: Taiwan becomes a treaty port following the Treaty of Tientsin, opening the island to contact with the world.
 1874: Japan invaded southern Taiwan, seemingly to "punish" the aborigines there for the murder of ship-wrecked Okinawan fishermen in
1871, but actually to establish a colony. Japanese forced withdraw later in the year after the Meiji and Qing empires nearly went to war.
1884-1885: Taiwan is blockaded by French navy during the Sino-Franco War.
1895: Qing China lost the First Sino-Japanese War and gave Taiwan to Japan permanently.
1945: Japan lost in World War II to USA and gave up Taiwan permanently.
1946: USA accepts millions refugees and soldiers from China to Taiwan and USA President installs The Republic of China to govern
Taiwan and to fight China and communism.
1947: Taiwanese widely protest governmental corruption under the Nationalists. Chiang Kai-shek sends in the army to restore order,
killing tens of thousands. Some Taiwanese began the Taiwan independence movement.
1949:
o Chinese Civil War between the Kuomintang (KMT) party and the Communist Party of China (CCP).
o The Nationalists (KMT) lose the war, and escape to the island of Taiwan. They set up Taipei as the temporary capital of China
(ROC).
o The Communist Party of China (CCP) establishes Beijing as the capital of The People's Republic of China (PRC).
1951: Japan signs the Treaty of San Francisco (1951) with USA.
1979: The KMT government jails many democracy activists who opposed it (Kaohsiung Incident).
1986: The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) is formed; it is the first party to form in the ROC other than the KMT. It remains illegal
for several years, but the KMT government does not try to ban it.
1987: The KMT government lifts the martial law after almost 40 years.
2000: Chen Shui-bian (DPP) becomes president.
2004: Chen Shui-bian is re-elected after a controversial assassination attempt, in which many KMT-supporters believed, was staged by
Chen. However, after unwillingness to cooperate about his medical records the investigation was inconclusive.
2008: Former president Chen Sui-bian and his wife are arrested for corruption and money laundering.
2008: Ma Ying-jeou was elected as the president of the Republic of China and thus creating a change of political parties for the second
time.
2009: Kaohsiung hosts the 2009 World Games.
2016: Tsai Ing-wen was elected as the first female president of Taiwan.

Prehistoric Taiwan

Main article: Prehistory of Taiwan

A young Tsou man

Taiwan was joined to the mainland in the Late Pleistocene, until sea levels rose about 10,000 years ago. Fragmentary human remains dated 20,000 to
30,000 years ago have been found on the island, as well as later artefacts of a Paleolithic culture.[37][38][39]

Around 6,000 years ago, Taiwan was settled by farmers, most likely from mainland China.[40] They are believed to be the ancestors of today's Taiwanese
aborigines, whose languages belong to the Austronesian language family, but show much greater diversity than the rest of the family, which spans a huge
area from Maritime Southeast Asia west to Madagascar and east as far as New Zealand, Hawaii and Easter Island. This has led linguists to propose Taiwan as
the urheimat of the family, from which seafaring peoples dispersed across Southeast Asia and the Pacific and Indian Oceans.[41][42]

Han Chinese fishermen began settling in the Penghu islands in the 13th century, but Taiwan's hostile tribes and its lack of valuable trade products meant
that few outsiders visited the island until the 16th century, when visits to the coast by fishermen from Fujian and Chinese and Japanese pirates became
more frequent.[43]

Opening in the 17th century

Main articles: Dutch Formosa, Spanish Formosa, and Kingdom of Tungning

Fort Zeelandia, the Governor's residence in Dutch Formosa

The Dutch East India Company attempted to establish a trading outpost on the Penghu Islands (Pescadores) in 1622, but were militarily defeated and driven
off by the Ming authorities.[44]

In 1624, the company established a stronghold called Fort Zeelandia on the coastal islet of Tayouan, which is now part of the main island at Anping,
Tainan.[28] David Wright, a Scottish agent of the company who lived on the island in the 1650s, described the lowland areas of the island as being divided
among 11 chiefdoms ranging in size from two settlements to 72. Some of these fell under Dutch control, while others remained independent.[28][45] The
Company began to import labourers from Fujian and Penghu (Pescadores), many of whom settled.[44]

In 1626, the Spanish Empire landed on and occupied northern Taiwan, at the ports of Keelung and Tamsui, as a base to extend their trading. This colonial
period lasted 16 years until 1642, when the last Spanish fortress fell to Dutch forces.

Following the fall of the Ming dynasty, Koxinga (Zheng Chenggong), a self-styled Ming loyalist, arrived on the island and captured Fort Zeelandia in 1662,
expelling the Dutch Empire and military from the island. Koxinga established the Kingdom of Tungning (16621683), with his capital at Tainan. He and his
heirs, Zheng Jing, who ruled from 1662 to 1682, and Zheng Keshuang, who ruled less than a year, continued to launch raids on the southeast coast of
mainland China well into the Qing dynasty era.[44]

Qing rule

Main article: Taiwan under Qing Dynasty rule

Hunting deer, painted in 1746

In 1683, following the defeat of Koxinga's grandson by an armada led by Admiral Shi Lang of southern Fujian, the Qing dynasty formally annexed Taiwan,
placing it under the jurisdiction of Fujian province. The Qing imperial government tried to reduce piracy and vagrancy in the area, issuing a series of edicts
to manage immigration and respect aboriginal land rights. Immigrants mostly from southern Fujian continued to enter Taiwan. The border between
taxpaying lands and "savage" lands shifted eastward, with some aborigines becoming sinicized while others retreated into the mountains. During this time,
there were a number of conflicts between groups of Han Chinese from different regions of southern Fujian, particularly between those from Quanzhou and
Zhangzhou, and between southern Fujian Chinese and aborigines.
Northern Taiwan and the Penghu Islands were the scene of subsidiary campaigns in the Sino-French War (August 1884 to April 1885). The French occupied
Keelung on 1 October 1884, but were repulsed from Tamsui a few days later. The French won some tactical victories but were unable to exploit them, and
the Keelung Campaign ended in stalemate. The Pescadores Campaign, beginning on 31 March 1885, was a French victory, but had no long-term
consequences. The French evacuated both Keelung and the Penghu archipelago after the end of the war.

In 1887, the Qing upgraded the island's administration from Taiwan Prefecture of Fujian to Fujian-Taiwan-Province (), the twentieth in the
empire, with its capital at Taipei. This was accompanied by a modernization drive that included building China's first railroad.[46]

Japanese rule

Main articles: Taiwan under Japanese rule and Republic of Formosa

Japanese colonial soldiers march Taiwanese captured after the Tapani Incident from the Tainan jail to court, 1915.

As the Qing dynasty was defeated in the First Sino-Japanese War (18941895), Taiwan, along with Penghu and Liaodong Peninsula, were ceded in full
sovereignty to the Empire of Japan by the Treaty of Shimonoseki. Inhabitants on Taiwan and Penghu wishing to remain Qing subjects were given a two-year
grace period to sell their property and move to mainland China. Very few Taiwanese saw this as feasible.[47] On 25 May 1895, a group of pro-Qing high
officials proclaimed the Republic of Formosa to resist impending Japanese rule. Japanese forces entered the capital at Tainan and quelled this resistance on
21 October 1895.[48] Guerrilla fighting continued periodically until about 1902 and ultimately took the lives of 14,000 Taiwanese, or 0.5% of the
population.[49] Several subsequent rebellions against the Japanese (the Beipu uprising of 1907, the Tapani incident of 1915, and the Musha incident of
1930) were all unsuccessful but demonstrated opposition to Japanese colonial rule.

Japanese colonial rule was instrumental in the industrialization of the island, extending the railroads and other transportation networks, building an
extensive sanitation system, and establishing a formal education system.[50] Japanese rule ended the practice of headhunting.[51] During this period the
human and natural resources of Taiwan were used to aid the development of Japan and the production of cash crops such as rice and sugar greatly
increased. By 1939, Taiwan was the seventh greatest sugar producer in the world.[52] Still, the Taiwanese and aborigines were classified as second- and
third-class citizens. After suppressing Chinese guerrillas in the first decade of their rule, Japanese authorities engaged in a series of bloody campaigns
against the mountain aboriginals, culminating in the Musha Incident of 1930.[53] Also, those intellectual and labours who participated in left-wing
movement of Taiwan were arrested and massacred (e.g. Tsinn U-Su(), masanosuke watanabe()).[54]

Around 1935, the Japanese began an island-wide assimilation project to bind the island more firmly to the Japanese Empire and people were taught to see
themselves as Japanese under the Kominka Movement, during which time Taiwanese culture and religion were outlawed and the citizens were encouraged
to adopt Japanese surnames.[55] The "South Strike Group" was based at the Taihoku Imperial University in Taipei. During World War II, tens of thousands
of Taiwanese served in the Japanese military.[56] For example, former ROC President Lee Teng-hui's elder brother served in the Japanese navy and was
killed in action in the Philippines in February 1945. The Imperial Japanese Navy operated heavily out of Taiwanese ports. In October 1944, the Formosa Air
Battle was fought between American carriers and Japanese forces based in Taiwan. Important Japanese military bases and industrial centres throughout
Taiwan, like Kaohsiung, were targets of heavy American bombings.[57] Also during this time, over 2,000 women were forced into sexual slavery for Imperial
Japanese troops, now euphemistically called "comfort women."[58]

In 1938, there were 309,000 Japanese settlers in Taiwan.[59] After World War II, most of the Japanese were expelled and sent to Japan.[60]

After World War II

Main article: Taiwan after World War II

General Chen Yi (right) accepting the receipt of General Order No. 1 from Rikichi And (left), the last Japanese Governor-General of Taiwan, in Taipei City
Hall

On 25 October 1945, the US Navy ferried ROC troops to Taiwan in order to accept the formal surrender of Japanese military forces in Taipei on behalf of the
Allied Powers, as part of General Order No. 1 for temporary military occupation. General Rikichi And, governor-general of Taiwan and commander-in-chief
of all Japanese forces on the island, signed the receipt and handed it over to General Chen Yi of the ROC military to complete the official turnover. Chen Yi
proclaimed that day to be "Taiwan Retrocession Day", but the Allies considered Taiwan and the Penghu Islands to be under military occupation and still
under Japanese sovereignty until 1952, when the Treaty of San Francisco took effect.[61][62] Although the 1943 Cairo Declaration had envisaged returning
these territories to China, in the Treaty of San Francisco and Treaty of Taipei Japan has renounced all claim to them without specifying to what country they
were to be surrendered. This introduced the problem of the legal status of Taiwan.

The ROC administration of Taiwan under Chen Yi was strained by increasing tensions between Taiwanese-born people and newly arrived mainlanders,
which were compounded by economic woes, such as hyperinflation. Furthermore, cultural and linguistic conflicts between the two groups quickly led to the
loss of popular support for the new government, while the mass movement led by the working committee of the communist also aimed to bring down the
Kuomintang government.[63][64] The shooting of a civilian on 28 February 1947 triggered island-wide unrest, which was suppressed with military force in
what is now called the February 28 Incident. Mainstream estimates of the number killed range from 18,000 to 30,000. Those killed were mainly members of
the Taiwanese elite.[65][66]

Chinese Nationalist one-party rule

Main articles: Chinese Civil War, Chinese Communist Revolution, and History of the Republic of China Republic of China on Taiwan (1949present)

For the history of Republic of China before 1949, see Republic of China (191249).

The Nationalists' retreat to Taipei: after the Nationalists lost Nanjing (Nanking) they next moved to Guangzhou (Canton), then to Chongqing (Chungking),
Chengdu (Chengtu) and Xichang (Sichang) before arriving in Taipei.

After the end of World War II, the Chinese Civil War resumed between the Chinese Nationalists (Kuomintang), led by Chiang Kai-shek, and the Communist
Party of China, led by Mao Zedong. Throughout the months of 1949, a series of Chinese Communist offensives led to the capture of its capital Nanjing on 23
April and the subsequent defeat of the Nationalist army on the mainland, and the Communists founded the People's Republic of China on 1 October.[67]

On 7 December 1949, after the loss of four capitals, Chiang evacuated his Nationalist government to Taiwan and made Taipei the temporary capital of the
ROC (also called the "wartime capital" by Chiang Kai-shek).[68] Some 2 million people, consisting mainly of soldiers, members of the ruling Kuomintang and
intellectual and business elites, were evacuated from mainland China to Taiwan at that time, adding to the earlier population of approximately six million.
In addition, the ROC government took to Taipei many national treasures and much of China's gold reserves and foreign currency reserves.[69][70][71]

After losing most of the mainland, the Kuomintang held remaining control of Tibet, the portions of Qinghai, Xinjiang, and Yunnan provinces along with the
Hainan Island until 1951 before the Communists subsequently captured both territories. From this point onwards, the Kuomintang's territory was reduced
to Taiwan, Penghu, the portions of the Fujian province (Kinmen and Matsu Islands), and two major islands of Dongsha Islands and Nansha Islands. The
Kuomintang continued to claim sovereignty over all "China", which it defined to include mainland China, Taiwan, Outer Mongolia and other areas. On
mainland China, the victorious Communists claimed they ruled the sole and only China (which they claimed included Taiwan) and that the Republic of China
no longer existed.[72]

A Chinese man in military uniform, smiling and looking towards the left. He holds a sword in his left hand and has a medal in shape of a sun on his chest.

Chiang Kai-shek, leader of the Kuomintang from 1925 until his death in 1975

Martial law, declared on Taiwan in May 1949,[73] continued to be in effect after the central government relocated to Taiwan. It was not repealed until
1987,[73] and was used as a way to suppress the political opposition in the intervening years.[74] During the White Terror, as the period is known, 140,000
people were imprisoned or executed for being perceived as anti-KMT or pro-Communist.[75] Many citizens were arrested, tortured, imprisoned and
executed for their real or perceived link to the Communists. Since these people were mainly from the intellectual and social elite, an entire generation of
political and social leaders was decimated. In 1998 law was passed to create the "Compensation Foundation for Improper Verdicts" which oversaw
compensation to White Terror victims and families. President Ma Ying-jeou made an official apology in 2008, expressing hope that there will never be a
tragedy similar to White Terror.[76]

Initially, the United States abandoned the KMT and expected that Taiwan would fall to the Communists. However, in 1950 the conflict between North Korea
and South Korea, which had been ongoing since the Japanese withdrawal in 1945, escalated into full-blown war, and in the context of the Cold War, US
President Harry S. Truman intervened again and dispatched the US Navy's 7th Fleet into the Taiwan Strait to prevent hostilities between Taiwan and
mainland China.[77] In the Treaty of San Francisco and the Treaty of Taipei, which came into force respectively on 28 April 1952 and 5 August 1952, Japan
formally renounced all right, claim and title to Taiwan and Penghu, and renounced all treaties signed with China before 1942. Neither treaty specified to
whom sovereignty over the islands should be transferred, because the United States and the United Kingdom disagreed on whether the ROC or the PRC was
the legitimate government of China.[78] Continuing conflict of the Chinese Civil War through the 1950s, and intervention by the United States notably
resulted in legislation such as the Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty and the Formosa Resolution of 1955.

With President Chiang Kai-shek, the US President Dwight D. Eisenhower waved to crowds during his visit to Taipei in June 1960.

As the Chinese Civil War continued without truce, the government built up military fortifications throughout Taiwan. Within this effort, KMT veterans built
the now famous Central Cross-Island Highway through the Taroko Gorge in the 1950s. The two sides would continue to engage in sporadic military clashes
with seldom publicized details well into the 1960s on the China coastal islands with an unknown number of night raids. During the Second Taiwan Strait
Crisis in September 1958, Taiwan's landscape saw Nike-Hercules missile batteries added, with the formation of the 1st Missile Battalion Chinese Army that
would not be deactivated until 1997. Newer generations of missile batteries have since replaced the Nike Hercules systems throughout the island.

During the 1960s and 1970s, the ROC maintained an authoritarian, single-party government while its economy became industrialized and technology
oriented. This rapid economic growth, known as the Taiwan Miracle, was the result of a fiscal regime independent from mainland China and backed up,
among others, by the support of US funds and demand for Taiwanese products.[79][80] In the 1970s, Taiwan was economically the second fastest growing
state in Asia after Japan.[81] Taiwan, along with Hong Kong, South Korea and Singapore, became known as one of the Four Asian Tigers. Because of the Cold
War, most Western nations and the United Nations regarded the ROC as the sole legitimate government of China until the 1970s. Later, especially after the
termination of the Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty, most nations switched diplomatic recognition to the PRC (see United Nations General Assembly
Resolution 2758).

Up until the 1970s, the government was regarded by Western critics as undemocratic for upholding martial law, for severely repressing any political
opposition and for controlling media. The KMT did not allow the creation of new parties and those that existed did not seriously compete with the KMT.
Thus, competitive democratic elections did not exist.[82][83][84][85][86] From the late 1970s to the 1990s, however, Taiwan went through reforms and
social changes that transformed it from an authoritarian state to a democracy. In 1979, a pro-democracy protest known as the Kaohsiung Incident took
place in Kaohsiung to celebrate Human Rights Day. Although the protest was rapidly crushed by the authorities, it is today considered as the main event
that united Taiwan's opposition.[87]

Democratization

Main articles: Democratic reforms of Taiwan and Elections in Taiwan

Chiang Ching-kuo, Chiang Kai-shek's son and successor as the president, began to liberalize the political system in the mid-1980s. In 1984, the younger
Chiang selected Lee Teng-hui, a Taiwanese-born, US-educated technocrat, to be his vice-president. In 1986, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) was
formed and inaugurated as the first opposition party in the ROC to counter the KMT. A year later, Chiang Ching-kuo lifted martial law on the main island of
Taiwan (martial law was lifted on Penghu in 1979, Matsu island in 1992 and Kinmen island in 1993). With the advent of democratization, the issue of the
political status of Taiwan gradually resurfaced as a controversial issue where, previously, the discussion of anything other than unification under the ROC
was taboo.

After the death of Chiang Ching-kuo in January 1988, Lee Teng-hui succeeded him as president. Lee continued to democratize the government and decrease
the concentration of government authority in the hands of mainland Chinese. Under Lee, Taiwan underwent a process of localization in which Taiwanese
culture and history were promoted over a pan-China viewpoint in contrast to earlier KMT policies which had promoted a Chinese identity. Lee's reforms
included printing banknotes from the Central Bank rather than the Provincial Bank of Taiwan, and streamlining the Taiwan Provincial Government with
most of its functions transferred to the Executive Yuan. Under Lee, the original members of the Legislative Yuan and National Assembly(a former supreme
legislative body defunct in 2005,[88] elected in 1947 to represent mainland Chinese constituencies and having held the seats without re-election for
more than four decades, were forced to resign in 1991. The previously nominal representation in the Legislative Yuan was brought to an end, reflecting the
reality that the ROC had no jurisdiction over mainland China, and vice versa. Restrictions on the use of Taiwanese Hokkien in the broadcast media and in
schools were also lifted.[citation needed]

US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Taiwan's special envoy to the APEC summit, Lien Chan, November 2011
Democratic reforms continued in the 1990s, with Lee Teng-hui re-elected in 1996, in the first direct presidential election in the history of the ROC.[89]
During the later years of Lee's administration, he was involved in corruption controversies relating to government release of land and weapons purchase,
although no legal proceedings commenced. In 1997,"To meet the requisites of the nation prior to national unification",[90] the Additional Articles of the
Constitution of the Republic of China was passed and then the former "constitution of five powers" turns to be more tripartite. In 2000, Chen Shui-bian of
the Democratic Progressive Party was elected as the first non-Kuomintang (KMT) President and was re-elected to serve his second and last term since 2004.
Polarized politics has emerged in Taiwan with the formation of the Pan-Blue Coalition of parties led by the KMT, favouring eventual Chinese reunification,
and the Pan-Green Coalition of parties led by the DPP, favouring an eventual and official declaration of Taiwanese independence.[91][clarification needed]
In early 2006, President Chen Shui-bian remarked: The National Unification Council will cease to function. No budget will be ear-marked for it and its
personnel must return to their original posts...The National Unification Guidelines will cease to apply."[92]

The ruling DPP has traditionally leaned in favour of Taiwan independence and rejects the so-called "One-China policy".

On 30 September 2007, the ruling DPP approved a resolution asserting a separate identity from China and called for the enactment of a new constitution
for a "normal country". It also called for general use of "Taiwan" as the country's name, without abolishing its formal name, the Republic of China.[93] The
Chen administration also pushed for referendums on national defence and UN entry in the 2004 and 2008 elections, which failed due to voter turnout
below the required legal threshold of 50% of all registered voters.[94] The Chen administration was dogged by public concerns over reduced economic
growth, legislative gridlock due to a pan-blue, opposition-controlled Legislative Yuan and corruption involving the First Family as well as government
officials.[95][96]

The KMT increased its majority in the Legislative Yuan in the January 2008 legislative elections, while its nominee Ma Ying-jeou went on to win the
presidency in March of the same year, campaigning on a platform of increased economic growth and better ties with the PRC under a policy of "mutual
nondenial".[94] Ma took office on 20 May 2008, the same day that President Chen Shui-bian stepped down and was notified by prosecutors of possible
corruption charges. Part of the rationale for campaigning for closer economic ties with the PRC stems from the strong economic growth China attained
since joining the World Trade Organization. However, some analysts say that despite the election of Ma Ying-jeou, the diplomatic and military tensions with
the PRC have not been reduced.[97]