Jose Burgos vs.

Chief of Staff

Facts: Two warrants were issued against petitioners for the search on the premises of Metropolitan Mail and We Forum
newspapers and the seizure of items alleged to have been used in subversive activities. Petitioners prayed that a writ of
preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction be issued for the return of the seized articles, and that respondents be enjoined
from using the articles thus seized as evidence against petitioner.
Petitioners questioned the warrants for the lack of probable cause and that the two warrants issued indicated only one and the
same address. In addition, the items seized subject to the warrant were real properties.

Issue: Whether or not the two warrants were valid to justify seizure of the items.

Held: The defect in the indication of the same address in the two warrants was held by the court as a typographical error and
immaterial in view of the correct determination of the place sought to be searched set forth in the application. The purpose and
intent to search two distinct premises was evident in the issuance of the two warrant.
As to the issue that the items seized were real properties, the court applied the principle in the case of Davao Sawmill Co. v.
Castillo, ruling that machinery which is movable by nature becomes immobilized when placed by the owner of the tenement,
property or plant, but not so when placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any other person having only a temporary right, unless
such person acted as the agent of the owner. In the case at bar, petitioners did not claim to be the owners of the land and/or
building on which the machineries were placed. This being the case, the machineries in question, while in fact bolted to the
ground remain movable property susceptible to seizure under a search warrant.
However, the Court declared the two warrants null and void. Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that
the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. The Court ruled that the affidavits
submitted for the application of the warrant did not satisfy the requirement of probable cause, the statements of the witnesses
having been mere generalizations. Furthermore, jurisprudence tells of the prohibition on the issuance of general warrants.
(Stanford vs. State of Texas). The description and enumeration in the warrant of the items to be searched and seized did not
indicate with specification the subversive nature of the said items.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANDRE MARTI

Facts: On August 14, 1987, the appellant and his common-law wife, Shirley Reyes went to Manila Packaging and Export
Forwarders to send packages to Zurich, Switzerland. It was received by Anita Reyes and ask if she could inspect the packages.
Shirley refused and eventually convinced Anita to seal the package making it ready for shipment. Before being sent out for
delivery, Job Reyes, husband of Anita and proprietor of the courier company, conducted an inspection of the package as part of
standard operating procedures. Upon opening the package, he noticed a suspicious odor which made him took sample of the
substance he found inside. He reported this to the NBI and invited agents to his office to inspect the package. In the presence of
the NBI agents, Job Reyes opened the suspicious package and found dried-marijuana leaves inside. A case was filed against Andre
Marti in violation of R.A. 6425 and was found guilty by the court a quo. Andre filed an appeal in the Supreme Court claiming that
his constitutional right of privacy was violated and that the evidence acquired from his package was inadmissible as evidence
against him.

Issue: Can the Constitutional Right of Privacy be enforced against private individuals?

Ruling: The Supreme Court held based on the speech of Commissioner Bernas that the Bill of Rights governs the relationship
between the individual and the state.The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as
a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. It is not meant to be
invoked against acts of private individuals. It will be recalled that Mr Job Reyes was the one who opened the box in the presence
of the NBI agents in his place of business. The mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search effected
by Mr. Reyes into a warrantless search and siezure proscribed by the constitution. Merely to observe and look at that which is in
plain sight is not a search.The judgement of conviction finding appeallant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged
was AFFIRMED.

People vs. Evaristo, GR No. 93828

Facts: Peace officers while patrol, heard burst of gunfire and proceeded to investigate in the house of appellant where they were
given permission to enter accidentally discovering the firearms in the latters possession. Accused-appellant found guilty of illegal
possession of firearms contends that the seizure of the evidence is inadmissible because it was not authorized by a valid warrant.
Issue: Whether or not the evidence obtained without warrant in an accidental discovery of the evidence is admissible.
Held: Yes, the firearms seized was valid and lawful for being incidental to a lawful arrest. An offense was committed in the
presence or within the view of an officer, within the meaning of the rule authorizing an arrest without a warrant.

People of the Philippines vs.Santiago Evaristo

FACTS: Peace officers composed of Sgt. Eladio Romeroso and CIC Edgardo Vallarta of Philippine Constabulary together with Sgt.
Daniel Maligaya and 2 other members of the Integrated National Police were on routine patrol duty in Barangay III, Mendez,
Cavite. At 5:00 in the afternoon, the officers heard a successive burst of gunfire and they came upon Barequiel Rosillo who was
firing a gun into the air.

Seeing the patrol, Rosillo ran to the nearby house of Evaristo prompting the lawmen to pursue him. Upon approaching the
immediate perimeter of the house, the patrol chanced upon Evaristo and Carillo. They inquired as to the whereabouts of Rosillo.
The police patrol members were told that he had already escaped through a window of the house. Vallarta noticed a bulge around
the waist of Carillo and upon being frisked he admitted the same to be a revolver. As the patrol was still in pursuit of Rosillo, Sgt.
Romeroso sought Evaristos permission to scour through the house which was granted. Romaroso found a number of firearms
and paraphernalia supposedly used in the repair and manufacture of firearms. Evaristo and Carillo were ound guilty of illegal
possession of firearms.

ISSUE: Whether or not the evidence obtained without warrant in accidental discovery of evidence is admissible.

RULING: According to Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution which provides:

Section 2: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purposes shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Section 3 (1)(2)Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding. It is to be noted that what the above constitutional provisions prohibit are unreasonable searches and seizures. For
a search to be reasonable under the law, there must, as a rule, be a search warrant validly issued by an appropriate judicial officer.
Yet, the rule that searches and seizures must be supported by a valid search warrant is not an absolute and inflexible rule, for
jurisprudence has recognized several exceptions to the search warrant requirement. Among these exceptions is the seizure of
evidence in plain view.

The records in this case show that Sgt. Romerosa was granted permission by the appellant Evaristo to enter his house. The officers
purpose was to apprehend Rosillo whom he saw had sought refuge therein. Therefore, it is clear that the search for firearms was
not Romerosas purpose in entering the house, thereby rendering his discovery of the subject as inadvertent and even
accidental.With respect to the firearms seized from the appellant Carillo, the Court sustains the validly of the firearms seizure
and admissibility in evidence, based on the rule on authorized warrantless arrests.
 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROSA ARUTA

FACTS:
On December 13, 1988, P/Lt. Abello was tipped off by his informant, known only as Benjie, that a certain Aling Rosa would
be arriving from Baguio City the following day, December 14, 1988, with a large volume of marijuana. Acting on said tip, P/Lt.
Abello assembled a team composed of P/Lt. Jose Domingo, Sgt. Angel Sudiacal, Sgt. Oscar Imperial, Sgt. Danilo Santiago and Sgt.
Efren Quirubin.
Having ascertained that accused-appellant was Aling Rosa, the team approached her and introduced themselves as
NARCOM agents. When P/Lt. Abello asked Aling Rosa about the contents of her bag, the latter handed it to the former. Upon
inspection, the bag was found to contain dried marijuana leaves packed in a plastic bag marked Cash Katutak. Upon
examination of the seized marijuana specimen at the PC/INP Crime Laboratory, Camp Olivas, Pampanga, P/Maj. Marlene
Salangad, a Forensic Chemist, prepared a Technical Report stating that said specimen yielded positive results for marijuana, a
prohibited drug. She was charged with violating the Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act and
sentenced her to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of twenty thousand (P20,000.00) pesos without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency.
On her defence, accused-appellant reputed the above accusations against her and said that immediately prior to her arrest,
she had just come from Choice Theater where she watched the movie Balweg. While about to cross the road, an old woman
asked her help in carrying a shoulder bag. In the middle of the road, Lt. Abello and Lt. Domingo arrested her and asked her to go
with them to the NARCOM Office. During investigation at said office, she disclaimed any knowledge as to the identity of the
woman and averred that the old woman was nowhere to be found after she was arrested. Moreover, she added that no search
warrant was shown to her by the arresting officers.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the search and seizure conducted by P/Lt. Abello and his team valid.
RULING:
Accused-appellant Aruta cannot be said to be committing a crime. Neither was she about to commit one nor had she just
committed a crime. Accused-appellant was merely crossing the street and was not acting in any manner that would engender a
reasonable ground for the NARCOM agents to suspect and conclude that she was committing a crime. It was only when the
informant pointed to accused-appellant and identified her to the agents as the carrier of the marijuana that she was singled out
as the suspect. The NARCOM agents would not have apprehended accused-appellant were it not for the furtive finger of the
informant because, as clearly illustrated by the evidence on record, there was no reason whatsoever for them to suspect that
accused-appellant was committing a crime, except for the pointing finger of the informant. This the Court could neither sanction
nor tolerate as it is a clear violation of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure. Neither was there
any semblance of any compliance with the rigid requirements of probable cause and warrantless arrests.
Consequently, there was no legal basis for the NARCOM agents to effect a warrantless search of accused-appellants bag, there
being no probable cause and the accused-appellant not having been lawfully arrested. Stated otherwise, the arrest being
incipiently illegal, it logically follows that the subsequent search was similarly illegal, it being not incidental to a lawful arrest. The
constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure must perforce operate in favor of accused-appellant. As such,
the articles seized could not be used as evidence against accused-appellant for these are fruits of a poisoned tree and, therefore,
must be rejected, pursuant to Article III, Sec. 3(2) of the Constitution.
Unreasonable searches and seizures are the menace against which the constitutional guarantees afford full protection. While
the power to search and seize may at times be necessary to the public welfare, still it may be exercised and the law enforced
without transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to
justify indifference to the basic principles of government.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 73, Olongapo City, is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. For lack of evidence to establish her guilt beyond reasonable doubt, accused-appellant ROSA ARUTA Y MENGUIN
is hereby ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED from confinement unless she is being held for some other legal grounds. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Silahis International Hotel, Inc vs Soluta

FACTS: Loida Somacera (Loida), a laundrywoman of the hotel, stayed overnight at the female locker room at the basement of

the hotel. At dawn, she heard pounding sounds outside, she saw five men in barong tagalog whom she failed to recognize but

she was sure were not employees of the hotel, forcibly opening the door of the union office. In the morning, as union officer

Soluta was trying in vain to open the door of the union office, Loida narrated to him what she had witnessed at dawn.

Soluta immediately lodged a complaint before the Security Officer. And he fetched a locksmith. At that instant, men in barong

tagalog armed with clubs arrived and started hitting Soluta and his companions. Panlilio thereupon instructed Villanueva to force

open the door, and the latter did. Once inside, Panlilio and his companions began searching the office, over the objection of

Babay who even asked them if they had a search warrant. A plastic bag was found containing marijuana flowering tops.

As a result of the discovery of the presence of marijuana in the union office and after the police conducted an investigation of

the incident, a complaint against the 13 union officers was filed before the Fiscals Office of Manila. RTC acquitted the accused.

On appeal, the CA affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court.

ISSUE: Whether respondent individual can recover damages for violation of constitutional rights.

RULING: Article 32, in relation to Article 2219(6) and (10) of the Civil Code, allows so.

ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any

manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages: x

x x x

In the present case, petitioners had, by their own claim, already received reports in late 1987 of illegal activities and Maniego

conducted surveillance. Yet, in the morning of January 11, 1988, petitioners and their companions barged into and searched the

union office without a search warrant, despite ample time for them to obtain one.

The course taken by petitioners and company stinks in illegality. Petitioners violation of individual respondents constitutional

right against unreasonable search thus furnishes the basis for the award of damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code. For

respondents, being the lawful occupants of the office had the right to raise the question of validity of the search and seizure.
Article 32 speaks of an officer or employee or person "directly or indirectly" responsible for the violation of the constitutional

rights and liberties of another. Hence, it is not the actor alone who must answer for damages under Article 32; the person

indirectly responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party. Such being the case, petitioners,

together with Maniego and Villanueva, the ones who orchestrated the illegal search, are jointly and severally liable for actual,

moral and exemplary damages to herein individual respondents in accordance with the earlier-quoted pertinent provision of

Article 32, in relation to Article 2219(6) and (10) of the Civil Code which provides:

Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases, among others, (6) Illegal search and (10) Acts

and action referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35.

Malacat v Court of Appeals

Facts: On August 29, 1990 at about 6:30 in the evening, allegedly in response to bomb threats reported seven days earlier, Rodolfo
Yu of the Western Police District, Metropolitan Police Force of the Integrated National Police, Police Station No. 3, Quiapo, Manila,
was on foot patrol with three other police officers (all of them in uniform) along Quezon Boulevard, Quiapo, Manila, near the
Mercury Drug store at Plaza Miranda. They chanced upon two groups of Muslim-looking men, with each group, comprised of
three to four men, posted at opposite sides of the corner of stop and frisk, where a warrant and seizure can be effected
without necessarily being preceded by an arrest and whose object is either to maintain the status quo momentarily while the
police officer seeks to obtain more information; and that the seizure of the grenade from Malacat was incidental to a lawful
arrest. The trial court thus found Malacat guilty of the crime of illegal possession of explosives under Section 3 of PD 1866, and
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of not less than 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of Reclusion Temporal, as minimum, and not
more than 30 years of Reclusion Perpetua, as maximum. On 18 February 1994, Malacat filed a notice of appeal indicating that he
was appealing to the Supreme Court. However, the record of the case was forwarded to the Court of Appeals (CA-GR CR 15988).
In its decision of 24 January 1996, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. Manalili filed a petition for review with the
Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether the search made on Malacat is valid, pursuant to the exception of stop and frisk.
Ruling:
The trial court ruled that the warrantless search and seizure of petitioner was akin to a stop and frisk, where a warrant and
seizure can be effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest and whose object is either to maintain the status quo
momentarily while the police officer seeks to obtain more information. Probable cause was not required as it was not certain
that a crime had been committed, however, the situation called for an investigation, hence to require probable cause would have
been premature. The RTC emphasized that Yu and his companions were confronted with an emergency, in which the delay
necessary to obtain a warrant, threatens the destruction of evidence and the officers had to act in haste, as petitioner and his
companions were acting suspiciously, considering the time, place and reported cases of bombing. Further, petitioners group
suddenly ran away in different directions as they saw the arresting officers approach, thus it is reasonable for an officer to
conduct a limited search, the purpose of which is not necessarily to discover evidence of a crime, but to allow the officer to pursue
his investigation without fear of violence. The trial court then ruled that the seizure of the grenade from petitioner was incidental
to a lawful arrest, and since petitioner later voluntarily admitted such fact to the police investigator for the purpose of bombing
the Mercury Drug Store, concluded that sufficient evidence existed to establish petitioners guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of the Seventeenth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 15988 is SET ASIDE
for lack of jurisdiction on the part of said Court and, on ground of reasonable doubt, the decision of 10 February 1994 of Branch
5 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila is REVERSED and petitioner SAMMY MALACAT y MANDAR is hereby ACQUITTED and
ORDERED immediately released from detention, unless his further detention is justified for any other lawful cause.

CASE DIGEST ON PADILLA V. CA

Where in the complaint for Grave Coercion against the mayor and policemen, they were acquitted on the ground that their guilt
has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt, such acquittal will not bar a civil case for damages arising from the demolition of
petitioner's market stalls. The acquittal on the ground that their guilt has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt refers to
the element of Grave Coercion and not to the fact of that the stalls were not demolished. Under the Rules of Court, the extinction
of penal action carries with it the extinction of civil only if there is a declaration that facts from which civil may arise did not exist.
Also, Art. 29 of the Civil Code does not state that civil liability can be recovered only in a separate civil action. The civil liability can
be recovered either in the same or a separate action. The purpose of recovering in the same action is to dispense with the filing
of another civil action where the same evidence is to be presented, and the unsettling implications of permitting reinstituttion
of a separate civil action. However, a separate civil action is warranted when (1) additional facts are to be established; (2) there
is more evidence to be adduced; (3) there is full termination of the criminal case and a separate complaint would be more
efficacious than a remand. Hence, CA did not err in awarding damages despite the acquittal.

PEOPLE VS TEE

FACTS: Appellant is a Chinese national in his forties, a businessman, and a resident of Baguio City. A raid conducted by operatives
of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and Philippine National Police Narcotics Command (PNP NARCOM) at premises
allegedly leased by appellant and at his residence yielded huge quantities of marijuana.

Appellant moved to quash the search warrant on the ground that it was too general and that the NBI had not complied with the
requirements for the issuance of a valid search warrant. The pendency of said motion, however, did not stop the filing of the
appropriate charges against appellant. In an information dated July 24, 1998, the City Prosecutor of Baguio City charged Modesto
Tee, alias Estoy Tee, with illegal possession of marijuana.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appellant's contention that the description on the serach warrant which says an undetermined
amount of marijuana, was too general and hence makes the warrant void for vagueness.

HELD: SC held that the appellants contention, has no leg to stand on. The constitutional requirement of reasonable particularity
of description of the things to be seized is primarily meant to enable the law enforcers serving the warrant to: (1) readily identify
the properties to be seized and thus prevent them from seizing the wrong items; and (2) leave said peace officers with no
discretion regarding the articles to be seized and thus prevent unreasonable searches and seizures. What the Constitution seeks
to avoid are search warrants of broad or general characterization or sweeping descriptions, which will authorize police officers
to undertake a fishing expedition to seize and confiscate any and all kinds of evidence or articles relating to an offense. However,
it is not required that technical precision of description be required, particularly, where by the nature of the goods to be seized,
their description must be rather general, since the requirement of a technical description would mean that no warrant could
issue.
PANGANDAMAN vs CASAR

Facts: The shooting incident by armed men in Lanao led to the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Petitioners assert that the

respondent Judge issued a warrant of arrest against fifty (50) John Does transgressing the Constitutional provision requiring

that such warrants should particularly describe the persons or things to be seized.

Issue: Whether said warrant is valid

Held: No.

Insofar as said warrant is issued against fifty (50) John Does not one of whom the witnesses to the complaint could or would

identify, it is of the nature of a general warrant, one of a class of writs long proscribed as unconstitutional and once

anathematized as totally subversive of the liberty of the subject.[30] Clearly violative of the constitutional injunction that

warrants of arrest should particularly describe the person or persons to be seized,[31] the warrant must, as regards its

unidentified subjects, be voided.

WHEREFORE, the warrant complained of is upheld and declared valid insofar as it orders the arrest of the petitioners. Said

warrant is voided to the extent that it is issued against fifty (50) John Does. The respondent Judge is directed to forward to the

Provincial Fiscal of Lanao del Sur the record of the preliminary investigation of the complaint in Criminal Case No. 1748 of his

court for further appropriate action.

RAMIREZ V CA

Facts: A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro Ramirez in the Quezon City RTC alleging that the private respondent,
Ester Garcia, in a confrontation in the latters office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a hostile and furious mood
and in a manner offensive to petitioners dignity and personality, contrary to morals, good customs and public policy.

In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought damages. The transcript on which the
civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by petitioner. As a result of petitioners recording
of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case
before the Pasay RTC for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled An Act to prohibit and penalize wiretapping and other related
violations of private communication, and other purposes.

Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information, which the RTC later on granted, on the ground that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense, particularly a violation of R.A. 4200. The CA declared the RTCs decision null and void and denied the
petitioners MR, hence the instant petition.

Issue: W/N the Anti-Wiretapping Act applies in recordings by one of the parties in the conversation

Held: Yes. Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of Private
Communication and Other Purposes, provides:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word,
to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such
communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-
talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described.

The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all the parties to any private
communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether
the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private
communication. The statutes intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of
the qualifier any. Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded, even a (person) privy to a communication
who records his private conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator under this
provision of R.A. 4200. A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports the respondent courts conclusion
that in enacting R.A. 4200 our lawmakers indeed contemplated to make illegal, unauthorized tape recording of private
conversations or communications taken either by the parties themselves or by third persons. The nature of the conversations is
immaterial to a violation of the statute. The substance of the same need not be specifically alleged in the information. What R.A.
4200 penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording private communications by means of the devices
enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a private communication by means of a
tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. As the Solicitor General pointed out in his
COMMENT before the respondent court: Nowhere (in the said law) is it required that before one can be regarded as a violator,
the nature of the conversation, as well as its communication to a third person should be professed.

Petitioners contention that the phrase private communication in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not include private
conversations narrows the ordinary meaning of the word communication to a point of absurdity. The word communicate
comes from the latin word communicare, meaning to share or to impart. In its ordinary signification, communication connotes
the act of sharing or imparting signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting, as in a conversation, or
signifies the process by which meanings or thoughts are shared between individuals through a common system of symbols (as
language signs or gestures)
These definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written or expressive communications of meanings or
thoughts which are likely to include the emotionally-charged exchange, on February 22, 1988, between petitioner and private
respondent, in the privacy of the latters office. Any doubts about the legislative bodys meaning of the phrase private
communication are, furthermore, put to rest by the fact that the terms conversation and communication were
interchangeably used by Senator Taada in his Explanatory Note to the Bill.

GANAAN V IAC

Facts: Complainant Atty. Tito Pintor and his client Manuel Montebon were in the living room of complainants residence
discussing the terms for the withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault which they filed with the Office of the City Fiscal of
Cebu against Leonardo Laconico. After they had decided on the proposed conditions, complainant made a telephone call to
Laconico. That same morning, Laconico telephoned appellant, who is a lawyer, to come to his office and advise him on the
settlement of the direct assault case because his regular lawyer, Atty. Leon Gonzaga, went on a business trip. When complainant
called, Laconico requested appellant to secretly listen to the telephone conversation through a telephone extension so as to hear
personally the proposed conditions for the settlement. Twenty minutes later, complainant called again to ask Laconico if he was
agreeable to the conditions. Laconico answered Yes. Complainant then told Laconico to wait for instructions on where to deliver
the money.
Complainant called again and instructed Laconico to give the money to his wife at the office of the then Department of Public
Highways. Laconico who earlier alerted his friend Colonel Zulueta of the Criminal Investigation Service of the Philippine
Constabulary, insisted that complainant himself should receive the money. When he received the money at the Igloo Restaurant,
complainant was arrested by agents of the Philippine Constabulary.

Appellant executed on the following day an affidavit stating that he heard complainant demand P8,000.00 for the withdrawal of
the case for direct assault. Laconico attached the affidavit of appellant to the complainant for robbery/extortion which he filed
against complainant. Since appellant listened to the telephone conversation without complainants consent, complainant
charged appellant and Laconico with violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Act.

The lower court found both Gaanan and Laconico guilty of violating Section 1 of Republic Act No. 4200, which prompted petitioner
to appeal. The IAC affirmed with modification hence the present petition for certiorari.

Issue: W/N an extension telephone is covered by the term device or arrangement under Rep. Act No. 4200

Held: No. The law refers to a tap of a wire or cable or the use of a device or arrangement for the purpose of secretly
overhearing, intercepting, or recording the communication. There must be either a physical interruption through a wiretap or
the deliberate installation of a device or arrangement in order to overhear, intercept, or record the spoken words.
An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph or the other devices enumerated in
Section 1 of RA No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as tapping the wire or cable of a telephone line. The telephone
extension in this case was not installed for that purpose. It just happened to be there for ordinary office use.
Zulueta vs. Court of Appeals

The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable, except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety
or order requires otherwise as prescrbied by law. Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceeding section, shall
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

FACTS: Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1962, petitioner entered the
clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a driver and private respondent's secretary,
forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet of her husband's clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private respondents
between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greeting cards, cancelled check, diaries, Dr. Martin's passport, and photographs.
The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for disqualification from the practice
of medicine which petitioner had filed against her husband.

ISSUE: Whether or not the papers and other materials obtained from forcible entrusion and from unlawful means are admissible
as evidence in court regarding marital separation and disqualification from medical practice.

HELD: Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injuction declaring "the
privacy of communication and correspondence to be inviolable" is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks
herself aggrieved by her husband's infedility) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The
only exception to the prohibition in the constitution is if there is a "lawful order from the court or which public safety or order
require otherwise, as prescribed by law." Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any
purpose in any proceeding."

The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify anyone of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other
and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infedility. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed her/his
integrity or her/his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.

The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife
may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be
examined without the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the
marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one
to share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.