Republic of the Philippines property which, according to the plan attached to expediente No.
561, appears to be
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 2869 March 25, 1907
MATEO CARIO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT, respondent-appellee.
Coudert Brothers for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Araneta for appellee.
ARELLANO, C.J.:
Mateo Cario, the appellant herein, on the 23d of February, 1904, filed his petition in the Court of
Land Registration praying that there be granted to him title to a parcel of land consisting of 40
hectares, 1 are, and 13 centares, and situated in the town of Baguio, Province of Benguet, together
with a house erected thereon and constructed of wood and roofed with rimo, and bounded as follows:
On the north, in lines running 1,048 metes and 20 decimeters with the lands of Sepa Cario, H.
Phelps Whitmarsh, and Calsi; on the east, in lines running 991 meters and 50 decimeters with the
land of Kuidno, Esteban Gonzales, and of the Civil Government; on the south, in lines of 115 meters
and 60 decimeters, with the lands of Talaca; and on the west, in lines running 982 meters and 20
decimeters, with the lands of Sisco Cario and Mayengmeng.
By order of the court the hearing of this petition, No. 561, and that of Antonio Rebollo and Vicente
Valpiedad filed under No. 834, were heard together for the reason that the latter petition claimed a
small portion of land included in the parcel set out in the former petition.
The Insular Government opposed the granting of these petitions, alleging that the whole parcel of
land is public property of the Government and that the same was never acquired in any manner or
through any title of egresion from the State.
After trial, and the hearing of documentary and oral proof, the court of Land Registration rendered
its judgment in these terms:
Therefore the court finds that Cario and his predecessors have not possessed exclusively
and adversely any part of the said property prior to the date on which Cario constructed
the house now there that is to say, for the years 1897 and 1898, and Cario held
possession for some years afterwards of but a part of the property to which he claims title.
Both petitions are dismissed and the property in question is adjudged to be public land.
(Bill of exceptions, p. 15.)
The conclusions arrived at the set forth in definite terms in the decision of the court below are the
following:
From the testimony given by Cario as well as from that of several of the witnesses for the
Government it is deduced, that in or about the year 1884 Cario erected and utilized as a
domicile a house on the property situated to the north of that property now in question,
property belonging to Donaldson Sim; that during the year 1893 Cario sold said house to
one Cristobal Ramos, who in turn sold the same to Donaldson Sim, moving to and living
on the adjoining property, which appears on the plan aforesaid to be the property of H.
Phelps Whitmarsh, a place where the father and the grandfather of his wife, that is to say,
Ortega and Minse, had lived . . ..
In or about the years 1898 Cario abandoned the property of Whitmarsh and located on
the property described in the plan attached to expediente No. 561, having constructed a
house thereon in which he now lives, and which house is situated in the center of the
property, as is indicated on the plan; and since which time he has undoubtedly occupied
some portion of the property now claimed by him. (Bill of exceptions, pp. 11 and 12.)
1. Therefore it is evident that this court can not decree the registration of all of the superficial
extension of the land described in the petition and as appears on the plan filed herein, such extension
containing 40 hectares, 1 are, and 13 centares, inasmuch as the documentary evidence accompanying
the petition is conclusive proof against the petitioners; this documentary proof consists of a
possessory information under date of March 7, 1901, and registered on the 11th day of the same
month and year; and, according to such possessory information, the land therein described contains
an extension of only 28 hectares limited by "the country road to the barrio of Pias," a road appearing
on the plan now presented and cutting the land, as might be said, in half, or running through its
center from north to south, a considerable extension of land remaining on the other side of the said
road, the west side, and which could not have been included in the possessory information
mentioned.
2. As has been shown during the trial of this case, this land, of which mention is made in said
possessory information, and upon which is situated the house now actually occupied by the
petitioner, all of which is set forth as argument as to the possession in the judgment, is "used for
pasture and sowing," and belongs to the class called public lands.
3. Under the express provisions of law, a parcel of land, being of common origin, presumptively
belonged to the State during its sovereignty, and, in order to perfect the legitimate acquisition of
such land by private persons, it was necessary that the possession of the same pass from the State.
And there is no evidence or proof of title of egresion of this land from the domain of the Spanish
Government, nor is there any possessory information equivalent to title by composicion or under
agreement. 4, The possessory information filed herein is not the title to property authorized in
substitution for that of adjustment by the royal decree of February 13, 1894, this being the last law
or legal disposition of the former sovereignty applicable to the present subject-matter of common
lands: First, for the reason that the land referred to herein is not covered nor does it come within any
one of the three conditions required by article 19 of the said royal decree, to wit, that the land has
been in an uninterrupted state of cultivation during a period of six years last past; or that the same
has been possessed without interruption during a period of twelve years and has been in a state of
cultivation up to the date of the information and during the three years immediately preceding such
information; or that such land had been possessed openly without interruption during a period of
thirty or more years, notwithstanding the land had not been cultivated; nor is it necessary to refer to
the testimony given by the two witnesses to the possessory information for the following reason:
Second, because the possessory information authorized by said royal decree or last legal disposition
of the Spanish Government, as title or for the purpose of acquiring actual proprietary right,
equivalent to that of adjustment with the Spanish Government and required and necessary at all
times until the publication of said royal decree was limited in time to one year, in accordance with
article 21, which is as follows: " A period of one year, not to be extended, is allowed to verify the
possessory informations which are referred to in articles 19 and 20. After the expiration of this period
of the right of the cultivators and persons in possession to obtain gratuitous title thereto lapses and
the land together with full possession reverts to the state, or, as the case may be, to the community,
and the said possessors and cultivators or their assigns would simply have rights under universal or
general title of average in the event that the land is sold within a period of five years immediately 1. In finding that Mateo Cario and those from whom he claims his right had not possessed
following the cancellation. The possessors not included under this chapter can only acquire by time and claimed as owners the lands in question since time immemorial;
the ownership and title to unappropriated or royal lands in accordance with common law."
2. In finding that the land in question did not belong to the petitioner, but that, on the
5. In accordance with the preceding provisions, the right that remained to Cario, if it be certain that contrary, it was the property of the Government. (Allegation 21.)
he was the true possessor of the land in question, was the right of average in case the Government or
State could have sold the same within the period of five years immediately following for example, if
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed with the costs of this instance against the
the denouncement of purchase had been carried out by Felipe Zafra or any other person, as appears
appellant. After the expiration of twenty days from the notification of this decision let judgment be
from the record of the trial of the case. Aside from this right, in such event, his possession as attested
entered in accordance herewith, and ten days thereafter let the case be remanded to the court from
in the possessory information herein could not, in accordance with common law, go to show any
whence it came for proper action. So ordered.
right of ownership until after the expiration of twenty years from the expiration of twenty years from
the verification and registry of the same in conformity with the provisions of article 393 of the
Mortgage Law and other conditions prescribe by this law. Torres, Mapa, Willard, and Tracey, JJ., concur.
Johnson, J., reserves his vote.
6. The right of possession in accordance with common law that is to say, civil law remains at all
times subordinate to the Spanish administrative law, inasmuch as it could only be of force when
pertaining to royal transferable or alienable lands, which condition and the determination thereof
is reversed to the government, which classified and designated the royal alienable lands for the
purpose of distinguishing them from those lands strictly public, and from forestry lands which could
at no time pass to private ownership nor be acquired through time even after the said royal decree
of February 13, 1894.

7. The advent of the new sovereignty necessarily brought a new method of dealing with lands and
particularly as to the classification and manner of transfer and acquisition of royal or common lands
then appropriated, which were thenceforth merely called public lands, the alienation of which was
reserved to the Government, in accordance with section 12 and 13 of the act of Congress of July 1,
1902,1 and in conformity with other laws enacted under this act of Congress by the Philippine
Commission prescribing rules for the execution thereof, one of which is Act No. 648,2 herein
mentioned by the petitioner, in connection with Act No. 627,3 which appears to be the law upon
which the petition herein is founded.

8. Section 6 of Act No. 627 admits prescription, in accordance with the provisions contained in Act
No. 190, as a basis for obtaining the right of ownership. "The petitioners claims title under the period
of prescription of ten years established by that act, as well as by reason of his occupancy and use
thereof from time immemorial." (Allegation 1.) But said act admits such prescription for the purpose
of obtaining title and ownership to lands "not exceeding more that sixteen hectares in extent." (Sec.
6 of said act.) The land claimed by Cario is 40 hectares in extent, if we take into consideration his
petition, or an extension of 28 hectares, according to the possessory information, the only thing that
can be considered. Therefore, it follows that the judgment denying the petition herein and now
appealed from was strictly in accordance with the law invoked herein.

9. And of the 28 hectares of land as set out in the possessory information, one part of same, according
to the testimony of Cario, belongs to Vicente Valpiedad, the extent of which is not determined. From
all of which it follows that the precise extent has not been determined in the trial of this case on
which judgment might be based in the event that the judgment and title be declared in favor of the
petitioner, Mateo Cario. And we should not lose sight of the fact that, considering the intention of
Congress in granting ownership and title to 16 hectares, that Mateo Cario and his children have
already exceeded such amount in various acquirements of lands, all of which is shown in different
cases decided by the said Court of Land Registration, donations or gifts of land that could only have
been made efficacious as to the conveyance thereof with the assistance of these new laws.

By reason of the findings set forth it is clearly seen that the court below did not err:
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 112567 February 7, 2000
THE DIRECTOR, LANDS MANAGEMENT BUREAU, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and AQUILINO L. CARIO, respondents.
PURISIMA, J.:
At bar is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside
the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated November 11, 1993, in CA-G.R. No. 29218, which affirmed
the Decision, dated February 5, 1990, of Branch XXIV, Regional Trial Court of Laguna, in LRC No.
B-467, ordering the registration of Lot No. 6 in the name of the private respondent.
The facts that matter are as follows:
On May 15, 1975, the private respondent, Aquilino Cario, filed with the then Branch I, Court of First
Instance of Laguna, a petition1 for registration of Lot No. 6, a sugar land with an area of forty-three
thousand six hundred fourteen (43,614) square meters, more or less, forming part of a bigger tract
of land surveyed as Psu-108952 and situated in Barrio Sala, Cabuyao, Laguna.
Private respondent declared that subject land was originally owned by his mother, Teresa
Lauchangco, who died on February 15, 1911,2 and later administered by him in behalf of his five
brothers and sisters, after the death of their father in 1934.3
In 1949, private respondent and his brother, Severino Cario, became co-owners of Lot No. 6 by
virtue of an extra-judicial partition of the land embraced in Plan Psu-108952, among the heirs of
Teresa Lauchangco. On July 26, 1963, through another deed of extrajudicial settlement, sole
ownership of Lot No. 6 was adjudicated to the private respondent.4
Pertinent report of the Land Investigator of the Bureau of Lands (now Bureau of Lands
Management), disclosed:
xxx xxx xxx
1. That the land subject for registration thru judicial confirmation of imperfect title is
situated in the barrio of Sala, municipality of Cabuyao, province of Laguna as described on
plan Psu-108952 and is identical to Lot No. 3015, Cad. 455-0, Cabuyao Cadastre; and that
the same is agricultural in nature and the improvements found thereon are sugarcane,
bamboo clumps, chico and mango trees and one house of the tenant made of light
materials;
2. That the land subject for registration is outside any civil or military reservation, riverbed,
park and watershed reservation and that same land is free from claim and conflict;
3. That said land is neither inside the relocation site earmarked for Metro Manila squatters
nor any pasture lease; it is not covered by any existing public land application and no patent
or title has been issued therefor;
4. That the herein petitioner has been in continuous, open and exclusive possession of the
land who acquired the same thru inheritance from his deceased mother, Teresa
Lauchangco as mentioned on the Extra-judicial partition dated July 26, 1963 which
applicant requested that said instrument will be presented on the hearing of this case; and
that said land is also declared for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 6359 in the
name of the petitioner;
xxx xxx x x x5
With the private respondent as lone witness for his petition, and the Director of Lands as the only
oppositor, the proceedings below ended. On February 5, 1990, on the basis of the evidence on record,
the trial court granted private respondent's petition, disposing thus:
WHEREFORE, the Count hereby orders and declares the registration and confirmation of
title to one (1) parcel of land identified as Lot 6, plan Psu-108952, identical to Cadastral
Lot No. 3015, Cad. 455-D, Cabuyao Cadastre, situated in the barrio of Sala, municipality of
Cabuyao, province of Laguna, containing an area of FORTY THREE THOUSAND SIX
HUNDRED FOURTEEN (43,614) Square Meters, more or less, in favor of applicant
AQUILINO L. CARINO, married to Francisca Alomia, of legal age, Filipino, with residence
and postal address at Bian, Laguna.
After this decision shall have become final, let an order for the issuance of decree of
registration be issued.
SO ORDERED.6
From the aforesaid decision, petitioner (as oppositor) went to the Court of Appeals, which, on
November 11, 1993, affirmed the decision appealed from.
Undaunted, petitioner found his way to this Court via the present Petition; theorizing that:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT
HAS NOT SUBMITTED PROOF OF HIS FEE SIMPLE TITLE OR PROOF OF
POSSESSION IN THE MANNER AND FOR THE LENGTH OF TIME REQUIRED BY THE
LAW TO JUSTIFY CONFIRMATION OF AN IMPERFECT TITLE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT PRIVATE
RESPONDENT HAS NOT OVERTHROWN THE PRESUMPTION THAT THE LAND IS A
PORTION OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN BELONGING TO THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES.7
The Petition is impressed with merit.
The petition for land registration8 at bar is under the Land Registration Act.9 Pursuant to said Act,
he who alleges in his petition or application, ownership in fee simple, must present muniments of
title since the Spanish times, such as a titulo real or royal grant, a concession especial or special
grant, a composicion con al estado or adjustment title, or a titulo de compra or title through
purchase; and "informacion possessoria" or "possessory information title", which would become a
"titulo gratuito" or a gratuitous title.10
In the case under consideration, the private respondents (petitioner below) has not produced a single
muniment of title substantiate his claim of ownership.11 The Court has therefore no other recourse,
but to dismiss private respondent's petition for the registration of subject land under Act 496.
Anyway, even if considered as petition for confirmation of imperfect title under the Public land Act
(CA No. 141), as amended, private respondent's petition would meet the same fate. For insufficiency
of evidence, its denial is inevitable. The evidence adduced by the private respondent is not enough
to prove his possession of subject lot in concept of owner, in the manner and for the number of years
required by law for the confirmation of imperfect title.
Sec. 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141,12 as amended R.A. No. 1942 and R.A. No. 3872, the law
prevailing at the time the Petition of private respondent was filed on May 15, 1975, provides:
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not
been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where
the land is located for confirmation of their claim and the issuance of title therefor, under
the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty
years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except
when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. (Emphasis supplied)
Possession of public lands, however long, never confers title upon the possessor, unless the occupant
can prove possession or occupation of the same under claim of ownership for the required period to
constitute a grant from the State.13
Notwithstanding absence of opposition from the government, the petitioner in land registration
cases is not relieved of the burden of proving the imperfect right or title sought to be confirmed.
In Director of Lands vs. Agustin,14 this Court stressed that:
. . . The petitioner is not necessarily entitled to have the land registered under the Torrens
system simply because no one appears to oppose his title and to oppose the registration of
his land. He must show, even though there is no opposition, to the satisfaction of the court,
that he is the absolute owner, in fee simple. Courts are not justified in registering property
under the Torrens system, simply because there is no opposition offered. Courts may, even
in the absence of any opposition, deny the registration of the land under the Torrens
system, upon the ground that the facts presented did not show that petitioner is the owner,
in fee simple, of the land which he is attempting to have registered.15
There is thus an imperative necessity of the most rigorous scrutiny before imperfect titles over public
agricultural lands may be granted judicial
recognition.16
The underlying principle is that all lands that were not acquired from the government, either by
purchase or by grant, belong to the state as part of the public domain. As enunciated in Republic
vs. Lee:17
. . . Both under the 1935 and the present Constitutions, the conservation no less than the
utilization of the natural resources is ordained. There would be a failure to abide by its
command if the judiciary does not scrutinize with care applications to private ownership
of real estate. To be granted, they must be grounded in well-nigh incontrovertible evidence.
Where, as in this case, no such proof would be forthcoming, there is no justification for
viewing such claim with favor. It is a basic assumption of our polity that lands of whatever
classification belong to the state. Unless alienated in accordance with law, it retains its right
over the same as dominus. . . .18
In order that a petition for registration of land may prosper and the petitioners may savor the benefit
resulting from the issuance of certificate of title for the land petitioned for, the burden is upon him
(petitioner) to show that he and/or his predecessor-in-interest has been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and adverse possession and occupation of the land sought for registration, for at least (30)
thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the petition for confirmation of title.19
In the case under consideration, private respondent can only trace his own possession of subject
parcel of land to the year 1949, when the same was adjudicated to him by virtue of an extra-judicial
settlement and partition. Assuming that such a partition was truly effected, the private respondent
has possessed the property thus partitioned for only twenty-six (26) years as of 1975, when he filed
his petition for the registration thereof. To bridge the gap, he proceeded to tack his possession to
what he theorized upon as possession of the same land by his parents. However, other than his
unilateral assertion, private respondent has not introduced sufficient evidence to substantiate his
allegation that his late mother possessed the land in question even prior to 1911.1wphi1.nt
Basic is the rule that the petitioner in a land registration case must prove the facts and circumstances
evidencing his alleged ownership of the land applied for. General statements, which are mere
conclusions of law and not factual proof of possession are unavailing and cannot suffice.20
From the relevant documentary evidence, it can be gleaned that the earliest tax declaration covering
Lot No. 6 was Tax Declaration No. 3214 issued in 1949 under the names of the private respondent
and his brother, Severino Cario. The same was followed by Tax Declaration No. 1921 issued in 1969
declaring an assessed value of Five Thousand Two Hundred Thirty-three (P5,233.00) Pesos and Tax
Declaration No. 6359 issued in 1974 in the name of private respondent, declaring an assessment of
Twenty-One Thousand Seven Hundred Seventy (P21,770.00) Pesos.21
It bears stressing that the Exhibit "E" referred to in the decision below as the tax declaration for
subject land under the names of the parents of herein private respondent does not appear to have
any sustainable basis. Said Exhibit "E" shows that it is Tax Declaration 1921 for Lot No. 6 in the name
of private respondent and not in the name of his parents.22
The rule that findings of fact by the trial court and the Court of Appeals are binding upon this Court
is not without exceptions. Where, as in this case, pertinent records belie the findings by the lower
courts that subject land was declared for taxation purposes in the name of private respondent's
predecessor-in-interest, such findings have to be disregarded by this Court. In Republic vs. Court of
Appeals,23 the Court ratiocinated thus:
 This case represents an instance where the findings of the lower court overlooked certain In Director of Lands vs. Datu,31 the application for confirmation of imperfect title was likewise
facts of substance and value that if considered would affect the result of the case (People v. denied on the basis of the following disquisition, to wit:
Royeras, 130 SCRA 259) and when it appears that the appellate court based its judgment
on a misapprehension of facts (Carolina Industries, Inc. v. CMS Stock Brokerage, Inc., et
We hold that applicants' nebulous evidence does not support their claim of open,
al., 97 SCRA 734; Moran, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA 88; Director of Lands v.
continuous, exclusive and notorious occupation of Lot No. 2027-B en concepto de dueo.
Funtillar, et al., G.R. No. 68533, May 3, 1986). This case therefore is an exception to the
Although they claimed that they have possessed the land since 1950, they declared it for
general rule that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are final and conclusive and
tax purposes only in 1972. It is not clear whether at the time they filed their application in
cannot be reviewed on appeal to this Court.'
1973, the lot was still cogon land or already cultivated land.

and
They did not present as witness their predecessor, Peaflor, to testify on his alleged
possession of the land. They alleged in their application that they had tenants on the land.
. . . in the interest of substantial justice this Court is not prevented from considering such Not a single tenant was presented as witness to prove that the applicants had possessed the
a pivotal factual matter that had been overlooked by the Courts below. The Supreme Court land as owners.
is clothed with ample authority to review palpable errors not assigned as such if it finds
that their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just decision.24
xxx xxx xxx

Verily, the Court of Appeals just adopted entirely the findings of the trial court. Had it examined the
On the basis of applicants' insubstantial evidence, it cannot justifiably be concluded that
original records of the case, the said court could have verified that the land involved was never
they have an imperfect title that should be confirmed or that they had performed all the
declared for taxation purposes by the parents of the respondent. Tax receipts and tax declarations
conditions essential to a Government grant of a portion of the public domain.32
are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership. They are mere indicia of claim of
ownership.25 In Director of Lands vs. Santiago.26
Neither can private respondent seek refuge under P.D. No. 1073,33 amending Section 48(b) of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 under which law a certificate of title may issue to any occupant of a
. . . if it is true that the original owner and possessor, Generosa Santiago, had been in
public land, who is a Filipino citizen, upon proof of open, continuous exclusive, and notorious
possession since 1925, why were the subject lands declared for taxation purposes for the
possession and occupation since June 12, 1945, or earlier. Failing to prove that his predecessors-in-
first time only in 1968, and in the names of Garcia and Obdin? For although tax receipts
interest occupied subject land under the conditions laid down by law, the private respondent could
and declarations of ownership for taxation purposes are not incontrovertible evidence of
only establish his possession since 1949, four years later than June 12, 1945, as set by law.
ownership, they constitute at least proof that the holder had a claim of title over the
property.27
The Court cannot apply here the juris et de jure presumption that the lot being claimed by the private
respondent ceased to be a public land and has become private property. 34 To reiterate, under the
As stressed by the Solicitor General, the contention of private respondent that his mother had been
Regalian doctrine all lands belong to the State.35 Unless alienated in accordance with law, it retains
in possession of subject land even prior to 1911 is self-serving, hearsay, and inadmissible in evidence.
its basic rights over the same as dominus.36
The phrase "adverse, continuous, open, public, and in concept of owner", by which characteristics
private respondent describes his possession and that of his parents, are mere conclusions of law
requiring evidentiary support and substantiation. The burden of proof is on the private respondent, Private respondent having failed to come forward with muniments of title to reinforce his petition
as applicant, to prove by clear, positive and convincing evidence that the alleged possession of his for registration under the Land Registration Act (Act 496), and to present convincing and positive
parents was of the nature and duration required by law. His bare allegations without more, do not proof of his open, continuous, exclusive and notorious occupation of Lot No. 6 en concepto de
amount to preponderant evidence that would shift the burden of proof to the oppositor.28 dueo for at least 30 years immediately preceding the filing of his petition, 37 the Court is of the
opinion, and so finds, that subject Lot No. 6 surveyed under Psu-108952, forms part of the public
domain not registrable in the name of private respondent.
In a case,29 this Court set aside the decisions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals for the
registration of a parcel of land in the name of the applicant, pursuant to Section 48 (b) of the Public
Land Law; holding as follows: WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED; the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated November 11,
1993, in CA-G.R. No. 29218 affirming the Decision, dated February 5, 1990, of Branch XXIV,
Regional Trial Court of Laguna in LRC No. 8-467, is SET ASIDE; and Lot No. 6, covered by and more
Based on the foregoing, it is incumbent upon private respondent to prove that the alleged
particularly described in Psu-108952, is hereby declared a public land, under the administrative
twenty year or more possession of the spouses Urbano Diaz and Bernarda Vinluan which
supervision and power of disposition of the Bureau of Lands Management. No pronouncement as to
supposedly formed part of the thirty (30) year period prior to the filing of the application,
costs.1wphi1.nt
was open, continuous, exclusive, notorious and in concept of owners. This burden, private
respondent failed to discharge to the satisfaction of the Court. The bare assertion that the
spouses Urbano Diaz and Bernarda Vinluan had been in possession of the property for SO ORDERED.
more than twenty (20) years found in private respondent's declaration is hardly the "well-
nigh incontrovertible" evidence required in cases of this nature. Private respondent should Melo, Vitug, Panganiban and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur
have presented specific facts that would have shown the nature of such possession. . . .30
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. L-64818 May 13, 1991
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
MARIA P. LEE and INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, respondents.
Pedro M. Surdilla for private respondent
FERNAN, C.J.:
In a land registration case, does the bare statement of the applicant that the land applied for has
been in the possession of her predecessors-in- interest for more than 20 years constitute the "well-
nigh incontrovertible" and "conclusive" evidence required in proceedings of this nature? This is the
issue to be resolved in the instant petition for review.
On June 29, 1976, respondent Maria P. Lee filed before the then Court of First Instance (now
Regional Trial Court) of Pangasinan, an application 1 for registration in her favor of a parcel of land
consisting of 6,843 square meters, more or less, located at Mangaldan, Pangasinan.
The Director of Lands, in representation of the Republic of the Philippines, filed an opposition,
alleging that neither the applicant nor her predecessors-in-interest have acquired the land under any
of the Spanish titles or any other recognized mode for the acquisition of title; that neither she nor
her predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of
the land in concept of owner at least thirty (30) years immediately preceding the filing of the
application; and that the land is a portion of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the
Philippines. 2
After trial, the Court of First Instance3 rendered judgment on December 29, 1976, disposing as
follows:
WHEREFORE, pursuant to the Land Registration Law, Act No. 496, as amended by
Republic Acts Nos. 1942 and 6236, the Court hereby confirms the title of the applicants
over the parcel of land described in Plan Psu-251940 and hereby adjudicates the same in
the name of the herein applicants, spouses Stephen Lee and Maria P. Lee, both of legal age,
Filipino citizens and residents of Dagupan City, Philippines, as their conjugal property.
Once this decision becomes final, let the corresponding decree and title issue therefor.
SO ORDERED. 4
The Republic of the Philippines appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of
Appeals), which however affirmed the lower court's decision in toto on July 29, 1983. 5
Hence, this petition based on the following grounds:6
The Intermediate Appellate Court erred:
A. IN NOT FINDING THAT THE RESPONDENT MARIA P. LEE HAS FAILED TO
ESTABLISH BY CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE HER FEE SIMPLE TITLE OR IMPERFECT
TITLE WHICH ENTITLES HER TO REGISTRATION EITHER UNDER ACT NO. 496, AS
AMENDED (LAND REGISTRATION ACT) OR SECTION 48 (B), C. A. NO. 141, AS
AMENDED (PUBLIC LAND ACT);
B. IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE CLEARLY INCOMPETENT, SELF-
SERVING AND UNRESPONSIVE TESTIMONY OF RESPONDENT THAT THE SPOUSES
URBANO DIAZ AND BERNARDA VINLUAN HAD BEEN IN POSSESSION OF THE
PROPERTY FOR MORE THAN 20 YEARS LEADING TO REGISTRATION, THEREBY
DEPRIVING THE STATE OF ITS PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS;
C. IN ORDERING REGISTRATION SIMPLY BECAUSE PETITIONER FAILED TO
ADDUCE EVIDENCE TO REBUT RESPONDENT'S EVIDENCE, WHICH, HOWEVER,
STANDING ALONE, DOES NOT MEET THE QUANTUM OF PROOFWHICH MUST BE
CONCLUSIVEREQUIRED FOR REGISTRATION;
D. IN NOT FINDING THAT RESPONDENT HAS MISERABLY FAILED TO OVERTHROW
THE PRESCRIPTION THAT THE LAND IS PUBLIC LAND BELONGING TO THE STATE.
Private respondent, on the other hand, contends that she was able to prove her title to the land in
question through documentary evidence consisting of Deeds of Sale and tax declarations and receipts
as well as her testimony that her predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land in
question for more than 20 years; that said testimony, which petitioner characterizes as superfluous
and uncalled for, deserves weight and credence considering its spontaneity; that in any event, the
attending fiscal should have cross-examined her on that point to test her credibility; and that, the
reason said fiscal failed to do so is that the latter is personally aware of facts showing that the land
being applied for is a private land.7
We find for petitioner Republic of the Philippines.
The evidence adduced in the trial court showed that the land in question was owned by the spouses
Urbano Diaz and Bernarda Vinluan, who on August 11, 1960, sold separate half portions thereof to
Mrs. Laureana Mataban and Mr. Sixto Espiritu. On March 18, 1963, and July 30, 1963, respectively,
Mrs. Mataban and Mr. Espiritu sold their half portions to private respondent Maria P. Lee. Private
respondent had the property recorded for taxation purposes in her name and that of her husband
Stephen Lee, paying taxes thereon on March 25, 1975 and March 9, 1976 for the same years.
At the time of the filing of the application for registration on June 29, 1976, private respondent had
been in possession of the subject area for about thirteen (13) years. She, however, sought to tack to
her possession that of her predecessors-in-interest in order to comply with the requirement of
Section 48 (b) of commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, to wit:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the
public domain. under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or
earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the applications for confirmation of title,"
except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to
a certificate of title under the provisions of this Chapter.
Private respondent's testimony on her predecessors-in-interest's possession is contained
in a one-page declaration given before a commissioner on December 22, 1976. It reads in
full as follows:8
Commissioner: Atty. Surdilla, you can now present your evidence.
Atty. Surdilla: I am presenting the applicant, your Honor.
Commissioner: Swearing under oath the applicant.
Atty. Surdilla:
Q Please state your name and other personal circumstances.
A Maria P. Lee, of legal age, Filipino citizen, married to Stephen Lee, proprietor, and
resident of Dagupan City.
Q Are you the applicant in this case now?
A Yes, sir, including that of my husband, Stephen Lee.
Q From whom did you acquire said property, subject of registration now?
A From Mr. Sixto Espiritu and Mrs. Laureana T. Mataban, sir.
Q Do you have evidence of such acquisition of yours over said property?
A Yes, sir.
Q Showing to you these documents styled as Deed of Absolute Sale dated March 18, 1963
and also Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 30, 1963, what can you say to them?
A The deed of sale dated March 18, 1963 is the conveyance to us by Mrs. Laureana T.
Mataban over the 1/2 portion of the property and the deed of sale dated July 30, 1963
likewise refers to sale of the 1/2 portion of the property by Sixto Espiritu to us, sir.
Atty. Surdilla: At this juncture, may I pray that said Deeds of Absolute Sale adverted to
above be marked as Exhibits "I" and "J", your Honor.
Commissioner: Please mark them accordingly.
Q Do you know from whom did Mr. Sixto Espiritu and Mrs. Laureana Mataban (your
vendors) acquired likewise the property sought by you to be registered?
A Yes, sir. They purchased it from the spouses Urbano Diaz and Bernarda Vinluan who
possessed the same for more than 20 years.
Q Showing to you this document styled as Deed of Absolute Sale, dated August 11, 1970, is
this the sale adverted or referred by you?
A Yes, sir.
Atty. Surdilla: At this juncture, may I pray that said deed be marked as Exhibit "H", your
Honor.
Commissioner: Please mark it.
Q Who is in possession of the property now? What is the nature thereof?
A I and my husband are in possession of the property, which possession tacked to that of
our predecessors-in-interest is adverse, continuous, open, public, peaceful and in concept
of owner, your Honor.
Q Whose name/names is the property declared for taxation purposes?
A We spouses Stephen Lee and Maria P. Lee, sir.
Atty. Surdilla: At this juncture, may I pray, sir, that Tax Declaration Nos. 22253 and 24126,
be marked as Exhibits "K" and "K-1", respectively.
Commissioner: Please mark them accordingly.
Q Who has been paying taxes over the property?
A We the spouses Stephen Lee and myself, sir.
Atty. Surdilla: At this juncture, may I pray that Official Receipts Nos. H-6048922 and G-
9581024, dated March 9, 1976 and March 25, 1975 be marked as Exhibits "L" and 'L-1",'
respectively.
Commissioner: Please mark them accordingly.
Q Is the property ever mortgaged or encumbered in the bank or private person/persons?
A No sir. It is free from liens and encumbrances.
That's all, your Honor.
The most basic rule in land registration cases is that "no person is entitled to have land registered
under the Cadastral or Torrens system unless he is the owner in fee simple of the same, even though
there is no opposition presented against such registration by third persons. . . . In order that the
petitioner for the registration of his land shag be permitted to have the same registered, and to have
the benefit resulting from the certificate of title, finally, issued, the burden is upon him to show that
he is the real and absolute owner, in fee simple."9
Equally basic is the rule that no public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant,
express or implied, from government. A grant is conclusively presumed by law when the claimant,
by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, has occupied the land openly, continuously,
exclusively, and under a claim of title since July 26, 1894 10 or prior thereto.11
The doctrine upon which these rules are based is that all lands that were not acquired from the
government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain. As enunciated in the case
of Santiago vs. de los Santos: 12
. . . Both under the 1935 and the present Constitutions, the conservation no less than the
utilization of the natural resources is ordained. There would be a failure to abide by its
command if the judiciary does not scrutinize with care applications to private ownership
of real estate. To be granted, they must be grounded in well-nigh incontrovertible evidence.
Where, as in this case, no such proof would be forthcoming, there is no justification for
viewing such claim with favor. It is a basic assumption of our polity that lands of whatever
classification belong to the state. Unless alienated in accordance with law, it retains its
rights over the same as dominus . . .
Based on the foregoing, it is incumbent upon private respondent to prove that the alleged twenty
year or more possession of the spouses Urbano Diaz and Bernarda Vinluan which supposedly formed
part of the thirty (30) year period prior to the filing of the application, was open, continuous,
exclusive, notorious and in concept of owners. This burden, private respondent failed to discharge
to the satisfaction of the Court. The bare assertion that the spouses Urbano Diaz and Bernarda
Vinluan had been in possession of the property for more than twenty (20) years found in private
respondent's declaration is hardly the "well-nigh incontrovertible" evidence required in cases of this
nature. Private respondent should have presented specific facts that would have shown the nature of
such possession. The phrase "adverse, continuous, open, public, peaceful and in concept of owner"
by which she described her own possession in relation to that of her predecessors-in-interest are
mere conclusions of law which require factual support and substantiation.
That the representing fiscal did not cross-examine her on this point does not help her cause because
the burden is upon her to prove by clear, positive and absolute evidence that her predecessors'
possession was indeed adverse, continuous, open, public, peaceful and in concept of
owner.1wphi1 Her bare allegation, without more, did not constitute such preponderant evidence
that would shift the burden of proof to the oppositor.
Neither does the supposition that the fiscal had knowledge of facts showing that the land applied for
is private land helpful to private respondent. Suffice it to say that it is not the fiscal, but the court
which should be convinced, by competent proof, of private respondent's registerable right over the
subject parcel of land.
Private respondent having failed to prove by convincing, positive proof that she has complied with
the requirements of the law for confirmation of her title to the land applied for, it was grave error on
the part of the lower court to have granted her application.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision appealed from is SET ASIDE.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
Bidin, J., took no part.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 184869 September 21, 2010
CENTRAL MINDANAO UNIVERSITY, Represented by Officer-In-Charge Dr. Rodrigo
L. Malunhao, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE
CHAIRPERSON AND COMMISSIONERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, and THE LEAD CONVENOR OF THE NATIONAL ANTI-
POVERTY COMMISSION, Respondents.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This case concerns the constitutionality of a presidential proclamation that takes property from a
state university, over its objections, for distribution to indigenous peoples and cultural communities.
The Facts and the Case
Petitioner Central Mindanao University (CMU) is a chartered educational institution owned and run
by the State.1In 1958, the President issued Presidential Proclamation 476, reserving 3,401 hectares
of lands of the public domain in Musuan, Bukidnon, as school site for CMU. Eventually, CMU
obtained title in its name over 3,080 hectares of those lands under Original Certificates of Title
(OCTs) 0-160, 0-161, and 0-162. Meanwhile, the government distributed more than 300 hectares of
the remaining untitled lands to several tribes belonging to the areas cultural communities.
Forty-five years later or on January 7, 2003 President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Presidential
Proclamation 310 that takes 670 hectares from CMUs registered lands for distribution to indigenous
peoples and cultural communities in Barangay Musuan, Maramag, Bukidnon.
On April 3, 2003, however, CMU filed a petition for prohibition against respondents Executive
Secretary, Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Chairperson and
Commissioner of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), and Lead Convenor of
the National Anti-Poverty Commission (collectively, NCIP, et al) before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Malaybalay City (Branch 9), seeking to stop the implementation of Presidential
Proclamation 310 and have it declared unconstitutional.
The NCIP, et al moved to dismiss the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the Malaybalay
RTC over the action, pointing out that since the act sought to be enjoined relates to an official act of
the Executive Department done in Manila, jurisdiction lies with the Manila RTC. The Malaybalay
RTC denied the motion, however, and proceeded to hear CMUs application for preliminary
injunction. Meanwhile, respondents NCIP, et al moved for partial reconsideration of the RTCs order
denying their motion to dismiss.
On October 27, 2003, after hearing the preliminary injunction incident, the RTC issued a resolution
granting NCIP, et als motion for partial reconsideration and dismissed CMUs action for lack of
jurisdiction. Still, the RTC ruled that Presidential Proclamation 310 was constitutional, being a valid
State act. The RTC said that the ultimate owner of the lands is the State and that CMU merely held
the same in its behalf. CMU filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution but the RTC denied
the same on April 19, 2004. This prompted CMU to appeal the RTCs dismissal order to the Court of
Appeals (CA) Mindanao Station.2
CMU raised two issues in its appeal: 1) whether or not the RTC deprived it of its right to due process
when it dismissed the action; and 2) whether or not Presidential Proclamation 310 was
constitutional.3
In a March 14, 2008 decision,4 the CA dismissed CMUs appeal for lack of jurisdiction, ruling that
CMUs recourse should have been a petition for review on certiorari filed directly with this Court,
because it raised pure questions lawbearing mainly on the constitutionality of Presidential
Proclamation 310. The CA added that whether the trial court can decide the merits of the case based
solely on the hearings of the motion to dismiss and the application for injunction is also a pure
question of law.
CMU filed a motion for reconsideration of the CAs order of dismissal but it denied the
same,5 prompting CMU to file the present petition for review.
The Issues Presented
The case presents the following issues:
1. Whether or not the CA erred in not finding that the RTC erred in dismissing its action
for prohibition against NCIP, et al for lack of jurisdiction and at the same time ruling that
Presidential Proclamation 310 is valid and constitutional;
2. Whether or not the CA correctly dismissed CMUs appeal on the ground that it raised
purely questions of law that are proper for a petition for review filed directly with this
Court; and
3. Whether or not Presidential Proclamation 310 is valid and constitutional.
The Courts Rulings
One. The RTC invoked two reasons for dismissing CMUs action. The first is that jurisdiction over
the action to declare Presidential Proclamation 310 lies with the RTC of Manila, not the RTC of
Malaybalay City, given that such action relates to official acts of the Executive done in Manila. The
second reason, presumably made on the assumption that the Malaybalay RTC had jurisdiction over
the action, Presidential Proclamation 310 was valid and constitutional since the State, as ultimate
owner of the subject lands, has the right to dispose of the same for some purpose other than CMUs
use.
There is nothing essentially wrong about a court holding on the one hand that it has no jurisdiction
over a case, and on the other, based on an assumption that it has jurisdiction, deciding the case on
its merits, both with the same results, which is the dismissal of the action. At any rate, the issue of
the propriety of the RTC using two incompatible reasons for dismissing the action is academic. The
CA from which the present petition was brought dismissed CMUs appeal on some technical ground.
Two. Section 9(3) of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 19806 vests in the CA appellate jurisdiction
over the final judgments or orders of the RTCs and quasi-judicial bodies. But where an appeal from
the RTC raises purely questions of law, recourse should be by a petition for review on certiorari filed
directly with this Court. The question in this case is whether or not CMUs appeal from the RTCs
order of dismissal raises purely questions of law.
As already stated, CMU raised two grounds for its appeal: 1) the RTC deprived it of its right to due
process when it dismissed the action; and 2) Presidential Proclamation 310 was constitutional. Did
these grounds raise factual issues that are proper for the CA to hear and adjudicate?
Regarding the first reason, CMUs action was one for injunction against the implementation of
Presidential Proclamation 310 that authorized the taking of lands from the university. The fact that
the President issued this proclamation in Manila and that it was being enforced in Malaybalay City
where the lands were located were facts that were not in issue. These were alleged in the complaint
and presumed to be true by the motion to dismiss. Consequently, the CMUs remedy for assailing
the correctness of the dismissal, involving as it did a pure question of law, indeed lies with this Court.
As to the second reason, the CMU claimed that the Malaybalay RTC deprived it of its right to due
process when it dismissed the case based on the ground that Presidential Proclamation 310, which
it challenged, was constitutional. CMU points out that the issue of the constitutionality of the
proclamation had not yet been properly raised and heard. NCIP, et al had not yet filed an answer to
join issue with CMU on that score. What NCIP, et al filed was merely a motion to dismiss on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction of the Malaybalay RTC over the injunction case. Whether the RTC in
fact prematurely decided the constitutionality of the proclamation, resulting in the denial of CMUs
right to be heard on the same, is a factual issue that was proper for the CA Mindanao Station to hear
and ascertain from the parties. Consequently, the CA erred in dismissing the action on the ground
that it raised pure questions of law.
Three. Since the main issue of the constitutionality of Presidential Proclamation 310 has been raised
and amply argued before this Court, it would serve no useful purpose to have the case remanded to
the CA Mindanao Station or to the Malaybalay RTC for further proceedings. Ultimately, the issue of
constitutionality of the Proclamation in question will come to this Court however the courts below
decide it. Consequently, the Court should, to avoid delay and multiplicity of suits, now resolve the
same.
The key question lies in the character of the lands taken from CMU. In CMU v. Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB),7 the DARAB, a national government agency
charged with taking both privately-owned and government-owned agricultural lands for distribution
to farmers-beneficiaries, ordered the segregation for this purpose of 400 hectares of CMU lands. The
Court nullified the DARAB action considering the inalienable character of such lands, being part of
the long term functions of an autonomous agricultural educational institution. Said the Court:
The construction given by the DARAB to Section 10 restricts the land area of the CMU to its present
needs or to a land area presently, actively exploited and utilized by the university in carrying out its
present educational program with its present student population and academic facility
overlooking the very significant factor of growth of the university in the years to come. By the nature
of the CMU, which is a school established to promote agriculture and industry, the need for a vast
tract of agricultural land for future programs of expansion is obvious. At the outset, the CMU was
conceived in the same manner as land grant colleges in America, a type of educational institution
which blazed the trail for the development of vast tracts of unexplored and undeveloped agricultural
lands in the Mid-West. What we now know as Michigan State University, Penn State University and ROBERTO A. ABAD
Illinois State University, started as small land grant colleges, with meager funding to support their Associate Justice
ever increasing educational programs. They were given extensive tracts of agricultural and forest
lands to be developed to support their numerous expanding activities in the fields of agricultural
CERTIFICATION
technology and scientific research. Funds for the support of the educational programs of land grant
colleges came from government appropriation, tuition and other student fees, private endowments
and gifts, and earnings from miscellaneous sources. It was in this same spirit that President Garcia Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in
issued Proclamation No. 476, withdrawing from sale or settlement and reserving for the Mindanao the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
Agricultural College (forerunner of the CMU) a land reservation of 3,080 hectares as its future the opinion of the Court.
campus. It was set up in Bukidnon, in the hinterlands of Mindanao, in order that it can have enough
resources and wide open spaces to grow as an agricultural educational institution, to develop and RENATO C. CORONA
train future farmers of Mindanao and help attract settlers to that part of the country. Chief Justice

xxxx

The education of the youth and agrarian reform are admittedly among the highest priorities in the
government socio-economic programs. In this case, neither need give way to the other. Certainly,
there must still be vast tracts of agricultural land in Mindanao outside the CMU land reservation
which can be made available to landless peasants, assuming the claimants here, or some of them,
can qualify as CARP beneficiaries. To our mind, the taking of the CMU land which had been
segregated for educational purposes for distribution to yet uncertain beneficiaries is a gross
misinterpretation of the authority and jurisdiction granted by law to the DARAB.

The decision in this case is of far-reaching significance as far as it concerns state colleges and
universities whose resources and research facilities may be gradually eroded by misconstruing the
exemptions from the CARP. These state colleges and universities are the main vehicles for our
scientific and technological advancement in the field of agriculture, so vital to the existence, growth
and development of this country.8

It did not matter that it was President Arroyo who, in this case, attempted by proclamation to
appropriate the lands for distribution to indigenous peoples and cultural communities. As already
stated, the lands by their character have become inalienable from the moment President Garcia
dedicated them for CMUs use in scientific and technological research in the field of agriculture. They
have ceased to be alienable public lands.1avvphi1

Besides, when Congress enacted the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA) or Republic Act 8371 9 in
1997, it provided in Section 56 that "property rights within the ancestral domains already existing
and/or vested" upon its effectivity "shall be recognized and respected." In this case, ownership over
the subject lands had been vested in CMU as early as 1958. Consequently, transferring the lands in
2003 to the indigenous peoples around the area is not in accord with the IPRA.

Furthermore, the land registration court considered the claims of several tribes belonging to the
areas cultural communities in the course of the proceedings for the titling of the lands in CMUs
name. Indeed, eventually, only 3,080 hectares were titled in CMUs name under OCTs 0-160, 0-161
and 0-162. More than 300 hectares were acknowledged to be in the possession of and subject to the
claims of those tribes.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition, SETS ASIDE the March 14, 2008 decision and
September 22, 2008 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP 85456, and DECLARES
Presidential Proclamation 310 as null and void for being contrary to law and public policy.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines Subsequently, petitioner and the two policemen, Morena and Quibral, were charged with the
SUPREME COURT offense of grave coercion before the Municipal Court of Daet. As already noted, the said court
Manila exonerated the two policemen, but convicted petitioner of the crime charged as principal by
inducement.
SECOND DIVISION
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed in full the judgment of the trial court. Hence, the present
recourse.
G.R. No. L-62050 November 25, 1983

Petitioner contends that the sealing off of complainant Dayaon's barbershop was done in
JOSE "PEPITO" TIMONER, petitioner,
abatement of a public nuisance and, therefore, under lawful authority.
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
IV DIVISION, respondents. We find merit in this contention. Unquestionably, the barbershop in question did constitute a
public nuisance as defined under Article Nos. 694 and 695 of the Civil Code, to wit: t.hqw
Marciano C. Dating, Jr. and Jose & Fuentebella for petitioner.
ART. 694. A nuisance is any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of
property, or anything else which:
The Solicitor General for respondents.

(1) Injures or endangers the health or safety of others; or

(2) Annoys or offends the senses; or

ESCOLIN, J.:

(3) Shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; or

Petition for review of the affirmance in toto by the Court of Appeals, now the Intermediate
Appellate Court, of the judgment of conviction handed down by the then Municipal Court of Daet,
Camarines Norte, in Criminal Case No. 4281, entitled People of the Philippines vs. Jose Timoner, (4) Obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public highway or street,
finding petitioner guilty of the crime of grave coercion, as follows: t.hqw or any body of water; or

WHEREFORE this Court finds the accused JOSE 'PEPITO' TIMONER guilty (5) Hinders or impairs the use of property.
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Grave Coercion as penalized under Art.
286 in the Revised Penal Code, and hereby sentences the said accused pursuant
ART. 695. Nuisance is either public or private. A public nuisance affects a
to the provision of Rule 64, Par. 3, to suffer SIX MONTHS OF
community or neighborhood or any considerable number of persons, although
IMPRISONMENT OF ARRESTO MAYOR IN ITS MAXIMUM PERIOD, to pay a
the extent of the annoyance, danger or damage upon individuals may be
fine of P300.00 and to pay the offended party in the amount of P5,000.00 as
unequal A private nuisance is one that is not included in the foregoing
damages, without subsidiary liability in case of insolvency. The other accused
definition.
SAMUEL MORENA and ERNESTO QUIBRAL are hereby ordered
ACQUITTED.
The barbershop occupied a portion of the sidewalk of the poblacion's main thoroughfare and had
been recommended for closure by the Municipal Health Officer. In fact, the Court of First Instance
The salient facts are not disputed. At about 10:00 in the evening of December 13, 1971, petitioner,
of Camarines Norte, in its decision in Civil Case No. 2257, declared said barbershop as a
then Mayor of Daet, Camarines Norte, accompanied by two uniformed policemen, Samuel Morena
nuisance per-se. Thus: t.hqw
and Ernesto Quibral, and six laborers, arrived in front of the stalls along Maharlika highway, the
main thoroughfare of the same town. Upon orders of petitioner, these laborers proceeded to nail
together rough lumber slabs to fence off the stalls which protruded into the sidewalk of the Under the facts of the case, as well as the law in point, there is no semblance of
Maharlika highway. Among the structures thus barricaded were the barbershop of Pascual Dayaon, any legality or right that exists in favor of the defendants to build a stall and
the complaining witness and the store belonging to one Lourdes Pia-Rebustillos. These conduct their business in a sidewalk, especially in a highway where it does not
establishments had been recommended for closure by the Municipal Health Officer, Dra. Alegre, only constitute a menace to the health of the general public passing through the
for non-compliance with certain health and sanitation requirements. street and also of the unsanitary condition that is bred therein as well as the
unsightly and ugly structures in the said place. Moreover, even if it is claimed
and pretended that there was a license, permit or toleration of the defendants'
Thereafter, petitioner filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte against
makeshift store and living quarters for a number of years does not lend legality
Lourdes Pia-Rebustillos and others for judicial abatement of their stalls. The complaint, docketed
to an act which is a nuisance per se. Such nuisance affects the community or
as Civil Case No. 2257, alleged that these stalls constituted public nuisances as well as
neighborhood or any considerable number of persons and the general public
nuisances per se. Dayaon was never able to reopen his barbershop business.
which posed a danger to the people in general passing and using that place, for
in addition, this is an annoyance to the public by the invasion of its rights the
 fact that it is in a public place and annoying to all who come within its sphere
[Baltazar vs. Carolina Midland, Ry, Co., 54 S.C. 242, 32 SB 258, cited in 11
Tolentino's Civil Code of the Philippines, p. 375; Kapisanan Lingkod ng Bayan,
Inc. vs. Lacson, CA-G.R. No. 27260R, March 25, 1964; 61 O.G. 2487].

xxx xxx xxx

... IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby declares that the
structures subject of this complaint as well as those occupied by the impleaded
defendants are nuisances per se and therefore orders the defendants to
demolish the stall and vacate the premises immediately ...

But even without this judicial pronouncement, petitioner could not have been faulted for having
fenced off said barbershop. Paragraph 3, Article 699 of the Civil Code authorizes the abatement of a
public nuisance without judicial proceedings. t.hqw

ART. 699. The remedies against a public nuisance are:

[l] A prosecution under the Penal Code or any local ordinance; or

[2] A civil action; or

[3] Abatement, without judicial proceedings.

In the case at bar, petitioner, as mayor of the town, merely implemented the aforesaid
recommendation of the Municipal Health Officer. Having then acted in good faith in the
performance of his duty, petitioner incurred no criminal liability.

Grave coercion is committed when "a person who, without authority of law, shall by means of
violence, prevent another from doing something not prohibited by law or compel to do something
against his will, either it be right or wrong." 1 The three elements of grave coercion are: [1] that any
person be prevented by another from doing something not prohibited by law, or compelled to do
something against his will, be it right or wrong; [2] that the prevention or compulsion be effected
by violence, either by material force or such display of it as would produce intimidation and control
the will of the offended party, and [3] that the person who restrained the will and liberty of another
had no right to do so, or, in other words, that the restraint was not made under authority of law or
in the exercise of a lawful right. 2

The third element being absent in the case at bar, petitioner cannot be held guilty of grave
coercion.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. No. 19534-CR, is hereby set aside
and petitioner is acquitted of the crime charged. Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Footnotes: 1 Article 286, Revised Penal Code. 2 Justice Ramon C. Aquino, The Revised Penal
Code, Book 11, 1976,p.1392.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 78447 August 17, 1989
RESTITUTO CALMA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS (FIFTH DIVISION) and PLEASANTVILLE
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.
Restituto S. Calma and Carlos S. Ayeng for petitioner.
William N. Mirano & Associates for respondents.
CORTES, J.:
Petitioner Restituto Calma, through this Petition for Review on certiorari, seeks to set aside the
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 10684 dated 26 February 1987 declaring null
and void an order of the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (hereinafter referred to as
the COMMISSION) dated 30 September 1986 calling for the issuance of a writ of execution to
enforce its decision of 22 May 1985.
The antecedents of this case are as follows:
Sometime in August 1975, the spouses Restituto and Pilar Calma purchased a lot in respondent
Pleasantville Development Corporation's (hereinafter referred to as PLEASANTVILLE) subdivision
in Bacolod City, known as City Heights Phase II. In 1976, they built a house on said lot and
established residence therein. Fabian and Nenita Ong also purchased from PLEASANTVILLE a lot
fronting that of the Calma spouses sometime in the years 1979-1980, and constructed their own
buildings where they resided and conducted their business. On 25 April 1981, petitioner Calma
wrote the president of the Association of Residents of City Heights, Inc. (ARCHI) complaining that
the compound of the Ongs was being utilized as a lumber yard and that a "loathsome noise and
nervous developing sound" emanating therefrom disturbed him and his family and caused them
and their son to suffer nervous tension and illness [Rollo, p. 58]. The president of the association,
in his reply, stated that the association's board had referred the matter to Fabian Ong who had
already taken immediate action on petitioner's complaint, i.e., by ordering the transfer of the
lumber cutting machine and by instructing his laborers not to do any carpentry or foundry works in
the early morning or afternoon and in the evening. Finding the measures taken by the association
and Fabian Ong unsatisfactory, petitioner on 17 June 1981 wrote and asked PLEASANTVILLE, as
its duty and obligation, to abate the nuisance emanating from the compound of the Ong family.
Failing to get an answer, the Calma spouses filed a complaint for damages against the Ong spouses
and PLEASANTVILLE on 28 July 1981 before the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental
docketed as Civil Case No. 16113, alleging inter alia that were it not for PLEASANTVILLE's act of
selling the lot to the Ongs and its failure to exercise its right to cause the demolition of the alleged
illegal constructions, the nuisance could not have existed and petitioner and his family would not
have sustained damage. Thus, the complaint prayed for actual, moral and exemplary damages and
attomey's fees and expenses of litigation.
Petitioner also filed with the National Housing Authority (NHA), on 31 August 1981, a complaint
for "Violation of the Provisions, Rules and Regulations of the Subdivision and Condominium
Buyers Protective Decree under Presidential Decree No. 957," claiming inter alia that were it not
for the negligent acts of PLEASANTVILLE in selling the parcel of land to the spouses Fabian and
Nenita Ong and its refusal to exercise its right to cause the demolition of the structures built by the
Ongs in violation of the contractual provision that the land shall be used only for residential
purposes, the illness of petitioner and as soon would not have happened. Petitioner prayed that
PLEASANTVILLE be ordered to abate the nuisance and/or demolish the offending structures; to
refund the amortization payments made on petitioner's lot; and to provide petitioner and his son
with medication until their recovery. He also prayed that PLEASANTVILLE be penalized under
Sec. 39 of P.D. No. 957 and that its license be revoked.
After the answer to the complaint was filed, the issues joined and the respective position papers
submitted, the COMMISSION (which had in the meantime taken over the powers of the
NHA,)*rendered its decision in HSRC No. REM-92181-0547 on 22 May 1985 dismissing the
complaint of the petitioner for lack of merit, finding that PLEASANTVILLE did not violate Sections
9(b), 19 and 23 of P.D. No. 957, but included a portion holding PLEASANTVILLE responsible for
the abatement of the alleged nuisance on the ground that it was part of its implied warranty that
its subdivision lots would be used solely and primarily for residential purpose.
Thus, the dispositive portion of the COMMISSION's decision read:
In view of the foregoing, the complaint for violation of Sections 9(f) and 23 of
P.D. 957 is hereby DISMISSED. Respondent, however is hereby ordered to take
appropriate measures for the prevention and abatement of the
activities/nuisance complained of so as to ensure complainant's peaceful and
pleasant living in the residential subdivision of respondent. In this regard,
respondent within 15 days from finality of this decision, shall submit a
timetable of the action to be taken in compliance with this directive and
thereafter, a periodic status report of the progress of compliance. [Rollo, p. 35;
Emphasis supplied.]
On 27 August 1986, respondent COMMISSION issued the order granting the issuance of a writ of
execution of its decision. Aggrieved, PLEASANTVILLE filed a petition for prohibition with
preliminary injunction with this Court assailing the portion of the COMMISSION's decision
ordering it to "take appropriate measures for the prevention and abatement of the nuisance
complained of," and its directive requiring PLEASANTVILLE to submit a timetable of the action to
be taken and a periodic status report of the progress of its compliance. PLEASANTVILLE asserted
that since the COMMISSION had found that it did not violate any provision of P.D. No. 957, the
COMMISSION exceeded its jurisdiction when it ordered PLEASANTVILLE to prevent/abate the
alleged nuisance complained of.
The Court referred the petition to the Court of Appeals which rendered judgment holding that the
COMMISSION "acted capriciously and in excess of its jurisdiction in imposing an obligation upon
the petitioner after absolving it of the complaint filed against it" [Rollo, p. 38], the relevant portion
of which decision is quoted below:
We find the petition impressed with merit. Presidential Decree No. 957 is a
regulatory decree with penal sanctions. While it absolved the petitioner of any
penal liability by dismissing the complaint against it because it has not violated
the pertinent provisions of Sections 9(f), 19 and 23, P.D. 957, yet it imposed an
obligation to perform something that was not proven in the complaint-that is
to abate the occurrence of nuisance and to submit a timetable of action and a
 periodic report of the progress of compliance. The order does not only appear
overbearing and/or arbitrary, but it is without any basis in fact. . . .
Thus, the Court of Appeals ruled:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, We find merit in the petition and the
same is hereby GRANTED, It is hereby ORDERED:
1) That order of respondent Commission dated 27 August 1986 for the issuance
of a writ of execution is SET ASIDE as null and void;
2) That should any writ relative thereto been (sic) issued, the same is
DISSOLVED or CANCELLED;
3) That portion of the dispositive portion of the decision of respondent
Commission of May 22, 1985, ordering petitioner respondent to take
appropriate measure for the prevention and abatement of activities/nuisance
complained of in said case and the submission of timetable of action and
periodic report is SET ASIDE as null and void.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. [Rollo, pp. 38-39.]
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the decision but the Court of Appeals denied his motion.
Hence, petitioner brought the instant petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the
decision of the Court of Appeals and the reinstatement of the COMMISSION'S decision.
1. The power to abate a nuisance, is not one of those enumerated under P.D. No.
957, the Subdivision and Condominium Buyers Protective Decree. However, as
pointed out by the Solicitor General before the Court of Appeals, the
COMMISSION has been specifically authorized by Executive Order No. 648
dated February 7, 1981 (otherwise known as the "Charter of the Human
Settlements Regulatory Commission"), to-
Issue orders after conducting the appropriate investigation for the cessation or
closure of any use or activity and to issue orders to vacate or demolish any
building or structure that it determines to have violated or failed to comply with
any of the laws, presidential decrees, letter of instructions, executive orders and
other presidential issuances and directives being implemented by it, either on
its own motion or upon complaint of any interested party. [Sec, 5 (p).] **
At this point the Court finds it unnecessary to go into whether or not the COMMISSION's order to
PLEASANTVILLE to take measures for the prevention and abatement of the nuisance complained
of finds solid support in this provision because, as found by the Court of Appeals, the
COMMISSION's conclusion that the activities being conducted and the structures in the property
of the Ongs constituted a nuisance was not supported by any evidence. The Solicitor General
himself, in his comment filed in the Court of Appeals, admits that the decision of the
COMMISSION did not make any finding of a nuisance [CA Rollo, p. 93]. Apparently, on the basis
of position papers, the COMMISSION assumed the existence of the nuisance, without receiving
evidence on the matter, to support its order for the prevention or abatement of the alleged
nuisance.
Moreover, the spouses Ong, were not even party to the proceedings before the COMMISSION
which culminated in the order for the prevention or abatement of the alleged nuisance. The parties
before the COMMISSION were petitioner and PLEASANTVILLE only, although the persons who
would be directly affected by a decision favorable to petitioner would be the Ong spouses.
Certainly, to declare their property or the activities being conducted therein a nuisance, and to
order prevention and abatement, without giving them an opportunity to be heard would be in
violation of their basic right to due process.
Thus, we find in this case a complete disregard of the cardinal primary rights in administrative
proceedings, which had been hornbook law since the leading case of Ang Tibay v. Court of
Industrial Relations, 69 Phil. 635 (1940).lwph1.t
Consequently, the COMMISSION gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it ordered PLEASANTVILLE to "take appropriate measure for the
prevention/abatement of the nuisance complained of."
2. Petitioner insists that the Ong spouses were not indispensable parties in the
case before the COMMISSION, hence no violation of due process was
committed, because the action was primarily based on PLEASANTVILLE's
violation of its contractual and statutory obligations to petitioner. He advances
the view that PLEASANTVILLE breached its warranty that the subdivision shall
be exclusively residential.
In testing the validity of this contention, the following provisions of the printed Contract to Sell on
Installment [Annex "E" of the Petition] between PLEASANTVILLE and petitioner, which petitioner
claims to be uniform for all lot-buyers in the subdivision (but which was not established by
evidence in the proceedings before the COMMISSION), are to be considered:
xxx xxx xxx
12. The Vendee agrees to constitute as permanent lien on the property subject-
matter of this agreement the following conditions and regulations:
a) That the land shall be used exclusively for commercial
residential purposes;
xxx xxx xxx
22. That the lot or lots subject-matter of this contract shall be used exclusively
for residential purposes and only one single family residential building will be
constructed on each lot provided that the VENDEE may construct a separate
servant's quarter;
xxx xxx xxx
[Rollo, p. 55; Emphasis supplied.]
These provisions of the contract do not unequivocally express a warranty that the subdivision lots
shall be used exclusively for residential purpose. On the contrary, the contract also explicitiy
authorizes the use of the lots for commercial or residential purposes.
Because of the confusing language of items 12 and 22 of the printed contract to sell, it is not Fernan, C.J., is on leave.
possible to read from the text alone a warranty that the subdivision shall be purely residential.
Other evidence of such warranty, including representations, if any, made by PLEASANTVILLE to
petitioner, would be needed to establish its enforceability.

Footnotes
Petitioner also made reference to a "statutory" implied warranty, but failed to cite the provision of
law imposing the warranty. It could not be the Civil Code, as the title on sales provides for only two
classes of implied warranties: in case of eviction and against hidden defects of or encumbrances * Exec. Order No. 648 dated February 7, 1981 (Charter of the Human
upon the thing sold [Arts. 1547; 1548-1560; 1561-1581]. Neither is any warranty imposed by P.D. Settlements Regulatory Commission) transferred the functions of the National
No. 957. Housing Authority to the Human Settlements Regolatory Commission (HSRC)
[79 O.G. 4335]. Subsequently, Exec. Order No. 90, dated December 17, 1986,
renamed the HSRC as the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board [83 O.G.
As the party suing on the basis of breach of warranty, petitioner would have to come up with
88].
something better than a bare assertion that there was a breach. He would have to prove first and
foremost that there is indeed a warranty that had been breached, then establish how the breach
was committed. ** It must be pointed out, however, that the powers of the COMMISSION under
E.O. No. 648 revolve around zoning and other forms of land use control, urban
renewal, and human settlements. Thus, reference is made to P.D. Nos. 399, 815,
3. A final word. There is no denying that in instituting the complaint for
933, 957, 1216, 1344, 1396, 1517 and LOT Nos. 713, 729, 833, 935, the Urban
damages before the trial court and the complaint for violation of P.D. 957 before
Land Reform Act and decrees relating to regulation of the value of land and
the COMMISSION petitioner was motivated by the twin purposes of seeking the
improvements and their rental [See Sec. 5(a) to (c)].
abatement of the alleged nuisance and recovering damages for the medical
problems purportedly caused by the nuisance. He certainly cannot be faulted
for seeking redress in all available venues for the alleged violation of his family
home's tranquility, for the defense of one's home and family is a natural
instinct. However, redress for petitioner's grievances will have to be tempered
by the guiding hand of due process. Thus, the nullification of the assailed
portion of the COMMISSION's judgment becomes inevitable if we are to adhere
to the basic tenets of law. A wrong cannot be corrected by another wrong.

Hence, no reversible error was committed by the Court of Appeals when it nullified the assailed
portion of the COMMISSION's decision, the order granting the writ of execution, and any writ of
execution issued pursuant thereto.

But all is not lost for petitioner and his family. As mentioned earlier, there is a pending civil case
(Civil Case No. 16113, Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental), instituted by petitioner, where
the alleged breach of warranty, coupled with PLEASANTVILLE's inaction, is the primary basis for
the complaint for abatement and damages. Here he can prove the existence of the warranty and
show how it was breached. It is also in this case where the determination of whether or not the
activities conducted in the property of the Ong spouses or the structures thereat constitute a
nuisance will have to be made. Also herein is the proper forum where, following another theory, it
could be determined whether the Contract to Sell (assuming that the contract between
PLEASANTVILLE and the Ongs is similar) establishes an enforceable obligation in favor of third
parties, i.e., other lot-buyers in the subdivision. In said proceeding the factual issues can be fully
threshed out and the Ong spouses, the parties who shall be directly affected by any adverse
judgment, shall be afforded the opportunity to be heard as they had been impleaded as defendants
therein together with PLEASANTVILLE.

WHEREFORE, there being no cogent reasons to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals, the
same is hereby AFFIRMED and the petition DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 185535 January 31, 2011
MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY, Petitioner,
vs.
REYNALDO (REYMUNDO1 ) AVILA, CALIXTO AGUIRRE, and SPS. ROLANDO and
ANGELITA QUILANG, Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 filed by the Manila International Airport
Authority (MIAA) seeking to reverse and set aside the June 16, 2008 Decision2 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 97536 which annulled the August 7, 20063 and the November 13,
20064 Resolutions of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 117 (RTC), in Civil Case No.
05-0399-CFM.
From the records, it appears that in June 1968, the late Tereso Tarrosa (Tarrosa) leased a 4,618
square meter parcel of land located along the MIAA Road in Pasay City from its owner, MIAA.
Before the expiration of the lease sometime in 1993, Tarrosa filed a case against MIAA to allow him
to exercise his pre-emptive right to renew the lease contract. Finding that Tarrosa violated certain
provisions of its contract with MIAA, the trial court dismissed the case. Tarrosa appealed before
the CA but to no avail. When Tarrosa passed away, he was substituted by his estate represented by
his heirs attorney-in-fact, Annie Balilo (Balilo). On June 9, 1998, the CA decision became final and
executory.5
Thereafter, MIAA sent letters of demand to the heirs asking them to vacate the subject land.
Unheeded, MIAA instituted an ejectment suit against the Estate of Tarrosa (Estate) before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 47 (MeTC), docketed as Civil Case No. 64-04-CFM.
On February 18, 2005, the MeTC rendered its decision6 ordering the Estate and all persons
claiming rights under it to vacate the premises, peacefully return possession thereof to MIAA and
pay rentals, attorneys fees and costs of suit.
The Estate, through Balilo, appealed the case to the RTC, where it was docketed as Civil Case No.
05-0399-CFM. In its July 22, 2005 Decision,7 the RTC gave due course to the appeal and affirmed
the MeTC decision in toto.
The Estate then filed a motion for reconsideration while MIAA sought the correction of a clerical
error in the MeTC decision as well as the issuance of a writ of execution. On September 20, 2005,
the RTC issued an omnibus order8 denying the Estates motion for reconsideration, granting
MIAAs motion to correct a clerical error and granting the motion for the issuance of a writ of
execution.
On the strength of the writ of execution issued by the RTC, a notice to vacate was served on the
occupants of the subject premises. The RTC Sheriff partially succeeded in evicting the Estate, Balilo
and some other occupants. Still, others remained in the premises.9
Among the remaining occupants were respondents Calixto E. Aguirre (Aguirre), Reymundo Avila
(Avila), and spouses Rolando and Angelita Quilang (Quilangs), who filed separate special
appearances with motions to quash the writ of execution.10 In essence, all of them interposed that
they were not covered by the writ of execution because they did not derive their rights from the
Estate since they entered the subject premises only after the expiration of the lease contract
between MIAA and Tarrosa. They further stated that the subject premises had already been set
aside as a government housing project by virtue of Presidential Proclamation No. 595
(Proclamation No. 595).11
On May 5, 2006, the RTC granted the motion to quash filed by the remaining occupants, including
Avila and the Quilangs.
On August 4, 2006, the RTC denied the motion to quash filed by Aguirre. In its August 4, 2006
Resolution,12 the RTC stated:
It is important to emphasize at this juncture that during the ocular inspection conducted by this
court (Thru Presiding Judge, Henrick F. Gingoyon), records reveal that the area occupied by Mr.
Calixto Aguirre, as he claimed, is more or less 1,000 square meters. Thus, citing the provision of
the law pertaining to qualified occupants or beneficiaries who can avail of the privilege, the area
alone possessed by Mr. Calixto Aguirre will not qualify as beneficiary under Republic Act 7279.
Moreover, the result of the ocular inspection revealed that the area is used by Mr. Calixto Aguirre
as business establishment and in fact some of them were even subject for lease.
Therefore, from the very nature of the utilization of the property the same is beyond doubt not
covered and the same is contrary to the letter and spirit of the aforementioned Presidential
Proclamation No. 595.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Motion to Quash Writ of Execution and Set Aside
Judgment filed by Mr. Calixto Aguirre is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED. (underscoring supplied)13
On August 7, 2006, a similar finding was made with regard to Avila and the Quilangs when the
RTC resolved MIAAs motion for reconsideration. In its August 7, 2006 Resolution, the RTC
likewise wrote:
Unfortunately, however, the result of the ocular inspection revealed that some of the 28
Oppositors, namely: Mr. REYMUNDO AVILA; SPS. ROLANDO QUILANG AND ANGELITA
QUILANG; ROMEO CAGAS; JEANETTE LOPEZ, are using the property subject to this case not as
family dwelling but rather utilized as business establishments. Thus, the said occupancy is not
covered under Republic Act 7279 in order to be considered qualified beneficiaries. Relatedly,
therefore that the Writ of Execution cannot be implemented against the afore-named persons on
the ground that they are qualified beneficiaries under Presidential Proclamation No. 595 in relation
to the provision of Republic Act 7279 is unwarranted under the circumstances.
It is important to emphasize at this juncture that during the ocular inspection conducted by this
court (Thru Presiding Judge, Henrick F. Gingoyon), records reveal that the area occupied by Mr.
REYNALDO (REYMUNDO) AVILA, is occupying more or less 500 square meters and the same
is actually use[d] as an apartment for lease/ rent; Sps. ROLANDO AND ANGELITA QUILANG; is
occupying the premises by virtue of the rights vested by their father, Calixto Aguirre, and also
utilizing the property for rent; ROMEO CAGAS AND JEANNETE LOPEZ are tenants of Calixto
Aguirre.
Thus, citing the provision of the law pertaining to qualified occupants or beneficiaries who can ISSUES:
avail of the privilege, the area alone possessed by Mr. Reynaldo (Reymundo) Avila; Sps. Rolando
and Angelita Quilang will not qualify as beneficiaries under Republic Act 7279. Moreover, the area
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT PUBLIC
as shown in the result of the ocular inspection is used by them as business establishment and in
RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK
fact some of them were even subject for lease.
OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN HE ARROGATED UPON HIMSELF THE
DETERMINATION THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ARE NOT QUALIFIED BENEFICIARIES
Therefore, from the very nature of the utilization of the property the same is beyond doubt not UNDER PROCLAMATION NO. 595
covered and the same is contrary to the letter and spirit of the aforementioned Presidential
Proclamation No. 595 in relation to Republic Act 7279.
WHETHER OR NOT A NAKED CLAIM OF POTENTIAL QUALIFIED BENEFICIARIES OF A
SOCIALIZED HOUSING PROGRAM PREVAIL OVER THE RIGHTS OF THE PERSON WITH
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Order dated May 5, 2006 is hereby MODIFIED in so far PRIOR PHYSICAL POSSESSION AND A BETTER RIGHT OVER THE DISPUTED REAL
as Oppositors REYNALDO (REYMUNDO) AVILA; Sps. ROLANDO QUILANG and ANGELITA PROPERTY18
QUILANG; ROMEO CAGAS AND JEANETTE LOPEZ are concerned. Let the corresponding Writ
of Execution against the afore-mentioned persons be issued.
The Court finds the petition meritorious.

SO ORDERED. (underscoring supplied)14

The above findings were reiterated in the assailed RTCs Joint Resolution dated November 13,
2006 which denied the separate motions for reconsideration of the respondents.
On account of this, Aguirre, Avila and the Quilangs went to the CA on certiorari questioning the
propriety of the RTCs disposition, more particularly, its finding that they were not qualified
beneficiaries under Proclamation No. 595.
On June 16, 2008, the CA rendered the subject decision annulling the RTC resolutions dated
August 7, 2006 and November 13, 2006. According to the CA, there was a grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the RTC in ruling that respondents could not invoke Proclamation No. 595 because
the mandate to determine the same rested with the National Housing Authority (NHA). Thus:
As mentioned earlier, the controversy stemmed from an ejectment suit filed by MIAA against the
Estate represented by Balilo wherein the MeTC ordered the eviction of the Estate, Balilo and all
those claiming rights under them.
The MeTC decision was affirmed by the RTC. Eventually, the Estate, Balilo and some occupants
were evicted.19Respondents Aguirre, Avila and the Quilangs, together with some other remaining
occupants, filed their separate special appearances and sought to quash the RTCs writ of
execution. They claimed that they did not derive their right to occupy the premises from the Estate
or from Balilo but rather from Proclamation No. 595 as they were potential beneficiaries of the
same. In its opposition, the MIAA submitted documents prepared and signed by Balilo showing
that the respondents were tenants of Tarrosa or Balilo.20 The RTC, through its then Presiding
Judge, the late Henrick F. Gingoyon (Judge Gingoyon), conducted an ocular inspection on the
premises.1wphi1 Judge Jesus B. Mupas, who took over from Judge Gingoyon, reproduced the
findings of the latter in his August 4, 2006 Resolution.21

X x x. As provided in said Proclamation No. 595, the National Housing Authority (NHA), under the
The same finding was reached with respect to Avila and the Quilangs in the August 7, 2006
supervision of the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC) and in
Resolution of the RTC22 and reiterated in its Joint Resolution dated November 13, 2006 which
coordination with the MIAA, shall be the agency primarily responsible for the administration and
dismissed the separate motions for reconsideration of the respondents.
disposition of the lots subject thereof in favor of the bona fide occupants therein, pursuant to the
provisions of Sections 8, 9 and 12 of Republic Act 7279 and other pertinent laws.15
Going over the RTCs findings and disposition, the Court is of the considered view that it acted well
within its jurisdiction. It is settled in ejectment suits that a defendants claim of ownership over a
In a related case, MIAA also went to the CA on certiorari questioning the RTCs grant of another
disputed property will not divest the first level courts of their summary jurisdiction. Thus, even if
motion to quash its writ of execution filed by other remaining occupants. Said occupants are not
the pleadings raise the issue of ownership, the court may still pass on the same although only for
parties in this case. The case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 96477.16 In said case, taking note that
the purpose of determining the question of possession. Any adjudication with regard to the issue of
the occupants themselves admitted that they had entered the subject premises without the
ownership is only provisional and will not bar another action between the same parties which may
permission of either the MIAA or the Estate, the CA ruled that the said occupants were mere
involve the title to the land. This doctrine is but a necessary consequence of the nature of ejectment
trespassers or squatters who had no right to possess the same. Accordingly, the writ of execution
cases where the only issue up for adjudication is the physical or material possession over the real
issued in the ejectment case could be enforced against them even though they were not named
property.23
parties in the ejectment suit. Some of the occupants/aggrieved parties therein, namely, Alejandro
Aguirre (son of Calixto Aguirre) and Norberto Aguirre (brother of Calixto Aguirre), came to this
Court via a petition for review but it was summarily denied for having been filed out of time and for Granting that their occupation of the subject premises was not derived from either Tarrosa or
their failure to show any reversible error on the part of the CA. The denial became final and Balilo, the postulation of the respondents makes them mere trespassers or squatters acquiring no
executory on July 23, 2009.17 vested right whatsoever to the subject property.24 Thus, to thwart the decision of the court, they
claim that they were potential beneficiaries of Proclamation No. 595. Certainly, this bare
anticipation on their part should not be permitted to defeat the right of possession by the owner,
Going back to the June 16, 2008 CA Decision, MIAA comes now to this Court questioning its
MIAA. Juxtaposed against the evidence adduced by the MIAA showing that respondents were once
annulment of the RTC resolutions by raising the following:
tenants of either Tarrosa or Balilo, respondents bare claim that they could be beneficiaries of
Proclamation No. 595 cannot be given any consideration.
At any rate, as earlier stated, the ruling on the inapplicability of Proclamation No. 595 is only
provisional and will certainly not bar the NHA or any other agency of the government tasked to
implement Proclamation No. 595, from making a determination of respondents qualifications as
beneficiaries,25 in another action.

In Pajuyo v. CA,26 the very case relied upon by the respondents and later cited by the CA in its
assailed decision, the Court reiterated that the determination of the rights of claimants to public
lands is distinct from the determination of who has better right of physical possession. While it was
held therein that the CA erred in making a premature determination of the rights of the parties
under Proclamation No. 137, it was emphasized that the courts should expeditiously resolve the
issue of physical possession to prevent disorder and breaches of peace.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The June 16, 2008 Decision of the CA in CA-G.R. SP
No. 97536 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another judgment entered reinstating the
August 7, 2006 and the November 13, 2006 Resolutions of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City,
Branch 117, in Civil Case No. 05-0399-CFM.

SO ORDERED.