GOOD LUCK!!! Bleeeehh!!

G.R. Nos. L-68379-8: Evelio Javier vs COMELEC & Arturo Pacificador

Due Process impartial and competent court

Javier and Pacificador, a member of the KBL under Marcos, were rivals to be members of the Batasan in May 1984
in Antique. During election, Javier complained of "massive terrorism, intimidation, duress, vote-buying, fraud,
tampering and falsification of election returns under duress, threat and intimidation, snatching of ballot boxes
perpetrated by the armed men of Pacificador." COMELEC just referred the complaints to the AFP. On the same
complaint, the 2nd Division of the Commission on Elections directed the provincial board of canvassers of Antique
to proceed with the canvass but to suspend the proclamation of the winning candidate until further orders. On June
7, 1984, the same 2nd Division ordered the board to immediately convene and to proclaim the winner without
prejudice to the outcome of the case before the Commission. On certiorari before the SC, the proclamation made by
the board of canvassers was set aside as premature, having been made before the lapse of the 5-day period of appeal,
which the Javier had seasonably made. Javier pointed out that the irregularities of the election must first be resolved
before proclaiming a winner. Further, Opinion, one of the Commissioners should inhibit himself as he was a former
law partner of Pacificador. Also, the proclamation was made by only the 2nd Division but the Constitute requires
that it be proclaimed by the COMELEC en banc. In Feb 1986, during pendency, Javier was gunned down. The
Solicitor General then moved to have the petition close it being moot and academic by virtue of Javiers death.

ISSUE: Whether or not there had been due process in the proclamation of Pacificador.

HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Javier and has overruled the Sol-Gens tenor. The SC has repeatedly and
consistently demanded "the cold neutrality of an impartial judge" as the indispensable imperative of due process. To
bolster that requirement, we have held that the judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial
as an added assurance to the parties that his decision will be just. The litigants are entitled to no less than that. They
should be sure that when their rights are violated they can go to a judge who shall give them justice. They must trust
the judge, otherwise they will not go to him at all. They must believe in his sense of fairness, otherwise they will not
seek his judgment. Without such confidence, there would be no point in invoking his action for the justice they
expect.

Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring compliance with what Justice Frankfurter calls the
rudiments of fair play. Fair play calls for equal justice. There cannot be equal justice where a suitor approaches a
court already committed to the other party and with a judgment already made and waiting only to be formalized after
the litigants shall have undergone the charade of a formal hearing. Judicial (and also extrajudicial) proceedings are
not orchestrated plays in which the parties are supposed to make the motions and reach the denouement according to
a prepared script. There is no writer to foreordain the ending. The judge will reach his conclusions only after all the
evidence is in and all the arguments are filed, on the basis of the established facts and the pertinent law.
Tanada vs. Tuvera 146 s 446

Facts:

Petitioners Lorenzo M. Tanada, et. al. invoked due process in demanding the disclosure of a number of
Presidential Decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by Law. The government argued that
while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was otherwise provided, as when the decrees
themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon approval. The court decided on April 24,
1985 in affirming the necessity for publication of some of the decrees. The court ordered the respondents to publish
in the official gazette all unpublished Presidential Issuances which are of general force and effect. The petitioners
suggest that there should be no distinction between laws of general applicability and those which are not. The
publication means complete publication, and that publication must be made in the official gazette. In a comment
required by the solicitor general, he claimed first that the motion was a request for an advisory opinion and therefore
be dismissed. And on the clause unless otherwise provided in Article 2 of the new civil code meant that the
publication required therein was not always imperative, that the publication when necessary, did not have to be
made in the official gazette.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not all laws shall be published in the official gazette.
(2) Whether or not publication in the official gazette must be in full.

Held:
(1) The court held that all statute including those of local application shall be published as condition for
their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed
by the legislature.
(2) The publication must be full or no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the
content of the laws.

Substantive Due Process

Tanada v. Tuvera, 136 S 27 (1985)

FACTS: Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in the
Constitution, as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the OG or otherwise
effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish,
and/or cause the publication in the OG of various PDs, LOIs, general orders, proclamations, EOs, letters of
implementation and administrative orders. Respondents contend, among others that publication in the OG is not
a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity
dates. It is thus submitted that since the presidential issuances in question contain special provisions as to the date
they are to take effect, publication in the OG is indispensable for their effectivity. The point stressed is anchored on
Art. 2 of NCC.

HELD: The interpretation given by respondent is in accord w/ this Court's construction of said article. In
a long line of decisions, this Court has ruled that publication in the OG is necessary in those cases where the
legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-- for then the date of publication is material for determining
its date of effectivity, w/c is the 15th day following its publication-- but not when the law itself provides for the date
when it goes into effect.
Respondent's argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws w/ the
fact of publication. Considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue at hand, the conclusion is easily
reached that said Art. 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the OG, even if the law itself provides
for the date of its effectivity.
 xxx The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is
mandated by law. The clear object of the law is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws w/c
are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. W/o such notice and publication, there would be no basis for
the application of the maxim ignorantia legis non excusat. It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise
burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of w/c he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. It is
needless to say that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is a
requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially
and specifically informed of its contents. RAM.

Due Process; Procedural vs. Substantive (1999)

No VIII A. Give examples of acts of the state which infringe the due process clause:

1. in its substantive aspect and (1%)

2. in its procedural aspect? (1%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

1.) A law violates substantive due process when it is unreasonable or unduly oppressive. For example, Presidential
Decree No. 1717, which cancelled all the mortgages and liens of a debtor, was considered unconstitutional for being
oppressive. Likewise, as stated in Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of
Manila, 20 SCRA 849, a law which is vague so that men of common intelligence must guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application violates substantive due process. As held in Tanada v. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446, due
process requires that the law be published.

2.) In State Prosecutors v. Muro, 236 SCRA 505, it was held that the dismissal of a case without the benefit of a
hearing and without any notice to the prosecution violated due process. Likewise, as held in People v. Court of
Appeals, 262 SCRA 452, the lack of impartiality of the judge who will decide a case violates procedural due
process.
Nasecore v. Energy Regulatory Commission: * Publication of Application for Rate Adjustments -- an
Indispensable Requirement of Due Process

The Facts

On June 8, 2001, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 9136, known as the Electric Power Industry Reform Act of
2001 (EPIRA). Among other reforms in the electric power industry, this law created the Energy Regulatory
Commission (ERC), which superseded the Energy Regulatory Board. Section 36[1] of the EPIRA directed all
distribution utilities to file with ERC an application for the approval of their unbundled rates. Respondent Meralco
complied with this requirement. The ERC acted on the application of respondent and, in a Decision dated March 20,
2003, approved the latters unbundled schedule of rates effective in the next billing schedule. In the same Decision,
however, the ERC directed it to do the following, among others: a) To discontinue charging the PPA [Purchased
Power Adjustment] upon effectivity of the approved unbundled rates; any change in the cost of power purchased
shall be reflected as deferred charges or credits which shall be recovered through the Generation Rate Adjustment
Mechanism (GRAM) approved by the Commission for implementation per ERC Order effective February 24,
2003;[2] In other words, Meralco was directed to recover the costs of power purchased from the National Power
Corporation (NAPOCOR) through the new Generation Rate Adjustment Mechanism (GRAM). Previously, these
costs were recovered through the Purchased Power Adjustment (PPA) mechanism. In its February 24, 2003 Order
issued in another proceeding, ERC Case No. 2003-44,[3] the ERC apparently conducted public consultations with
the distribution utilities and the consumer groups, including Petitioner National Association of Electricity
Consumers for Reforms (Nasecore). The ERC adopted the Implementing Rules for the Recovery of Fuel and
Independent Power Producer Costs [under the] Generation Rate Adjustment Mechanism (GRAM) and the
Implementing Rules for the Recovery of the Incremental Currency Exchange Rate Adjustment (ICERA). The
GRAM and ICERA were formulated by the ERC to replace the Purchased Power Adjustment (PPA) and the
Currency Exchange Rate Adjustment (CERA) -- the automatic adjustment mechanisms then in effect. In its view,
neither of these adjustment mechanisms met the goal of balancing its need to review the reasonableness and
prudence of these costs with the need of the utilities for a timely recovery of costs.[4] The effectivity clauses of the
implementing rules of the GRAM and the ICERA provided that these should take effect immediately.

Afterwards, in consonance with the above Decision and Order, Meralco filed with the ERC an amended application
entitled In the Matter of the Application for the Recovery of the Independent Power Producer Costs under the
Generation Rate Adjustment Mechanism (GRAM), docketed as ERC Case No. 2004-112. Meralco sought to
increase its generation charge of P3.1886 per kWh -- earlier allowed in the ERC Order dated January 21, 2004 -- to
P3.4664 per kWh, allegedly computed in conformity with the generation rate formula in Section 6[6] of the GRAM
implementing rules. In its June 2, 2004 Order, the ERC approved the increase in Respondent Meralcos generation
charge, albeit only from P3.1886 to P3.3213 per kWh, to take effect immediately. Consequently, Petitioners
Nasecore et al. filed with the Court a Petition for Certiorari, seeking to nullify the June 2, 2004 ERC Order. The lack
of requisite publication of Respondent Meralcos amended application allegedly deprived them of procedural due
process. They also invoked Section 4(e), Rule 3[7] of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of the EPIRA.
Respondent asserted the inapplicability of Section 4(e), Rule 3 of the IRR of the EPIRA, requiring the publication of
its application in a newspaper of general circulation and the service of a copy on the concerned local government
units. Its amended application for the increase in its generation charge was supposedly governed by the GRAM
Implementing Rules[8] adopted by the ERC in the Order dated February 24, 2003 in ERC Case No. 2003-44. Like
Meralco, the ERC asserted that the procedure prescribed under the GRAM Implementing Rules, particularly
Sections 2[9] and 5,[10] radically differed from that provided for in Section 4(e), Rule 3 of the IRR of the EPIRA.
Specifically, the GRAM Implementing Rules did not require the prior publication of the application of a distribution
utility, like Respondent Meralco, or the solicitation of comments of local government units and the consumers. The
procedure prescribed by the GRAM Implementing Rules was markedly different from that of the IRR of the EPIRA.
The GRAM was intended to be an adjustment mechanism and not an independent rate application, which was the
scheme that fell within the contemplation of the IRR of the EPIRA.

The Issue

The sole issue raised by the parties was whether the ERC had committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
Order dated June 2, 2004, in ERC Case No. 2004- 112. The Order approved the increase in Respondent Meralcos
generation charge from P3.1886 to P3.3213 per kWh, effective immediately without publication of the amended
application.

The Courts Ruling

On February 2, 2006, the Supreme Court en banc, through Mr. Justice Romeo S. Callejo Sr., promulgated its
unanimous Decision. It held that the ERC had committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed June 2,
2004 Order. The Court found that the amended application of Meralco for an increase in its generation charge had
not been published in a newspaper of general circulation, in violation of Section 4(e), Rule 3 of the IRR of EPIRA.
The Court explained that, contrary to the stance taken by respondents, the amended application of Meralco for an
increase in its generation charge was covered by Section 4(e), Rule 3 of the IRR of the EPIRA. This rule could not
have been any clearer with respect to its coverage, as it referred to any application or petition for rate adjustment or
for any relief affecting the consumers without making any distinctions. Hence, falling within the contemplation of
the rule was any application or petition that would result in an adjustment in the total price (retail rate) paid by the
end-users, whether this adjustment was occasioned by a change in the charges for generation, transmission,
distribution, supply, or some other factor. That the amended application of Meralco was nonetheless covered by the
said provision was mandated by the fact that the relief prayed for would clearly affect the consumers. The costs of
their electricity consumption would increase. The Court recalled its ruling in Freedom from Debt Coalition v. ERC,
[11] which had outlined the requirements of Section 4(e), Rule 3 of the IRR of the EPIRA, as follows: 1. The
applicant must file with the ERC a verified application/petition for rate adjustment. It must indicate that a copy
thereof was received by the legislative body of the LGU concerned. It must also include a certification of the notice
of publication thereof in a newspaper of general circulation in the same locality. 2. Within 30 days from receipt of
the application/petition or the publication thereof, any consumer affected by the proposed rate adjustment or the
LGU concerned may file its comment on the application/petition, as well as on the motion for provisional rate
adjustment. 3. If such comment is filed, the ERC must consider it in its action on the motion for provisional rate
adjustment, together with the documents submitted by the applicant in support of the application/petition. If no such
comment is filed within the 30-day period, then and only then may the ERC resolve the provisional rate adjustment
on the basis of the documents submitted by the applicant. 4. However, the ERC need not conduct a hearing on the
motion for provisional rate adjustment. It is sufficient that it consider the written comment, if there is any. 5. The
ERC must resolve the motion for provisional rate adjustment within 75 days from the filing of the
application/petition. 6. Thereafter, the ERC must conduct a full-blown hearing on the application/petition not later
than 30 days from the date of issuance of the provisional order. Effectively, this provision limits the lifetime of the
provisional order to only 12 months.[12] Introduced under the foregoing process were important requirements,
among which were the following: first, the publication of the application itself -- not merely the notice of hearing
issued by the ERC -- in a newspaper of general circulation in the locality where the applicant would operate; and,
second, the need for the ERC to consider the comments or pleadings of the customers and the LGU concerned on the
application or motion for provisional rate adjustment.[13] The new requirements under Sec. 4(e), Rule 3 of the IRR
of EPIRA, were aimed at protecting the consumers and diminishing the disparity or imbalance between them and the
utility. Indeed, the requirements addressed their right to due process and at the same time advanced the cause of
people empowerment which, along with consumer protection, was EPIRAs policy goal. The failure of Respondent
Meralco to publish its amended application for an increase in its generation charge was thus fatal. By this omission,
the consumers were deprived of the right to file their comments on the increase applied for. Consequently, without
giving them any opportunity to file their comments, in violation of Section 4(e) of Rule 3 of the IRR of the EPIRA,
the ERC issued the assailed Order dated June 2, 2004. It approved the sought increase in Meralcos generation
charge from P3.1886 to P3.3213 per kWh, effective immediately. Indeed, the basic postulate of due process
ordained that the consumers be notified of any application and apprised of its contents in order for them to determine
if their economic burden would consequently be compounded. In this case, the consumers had the right to be
informed of the bases of Respondent Meralcos amended application, so that they could effectively contest the
increase applied for, if they so desired. At this point, it should be stated that the apprehension of respondent about
being subjected to a long and tedious process with respect to the recovery of its fuel and purchased power costs was,
in fact, addressed by the power of the ERC to grant provisional rate adjustments. The ERC was not, of course,
precluded from promulgating rules, guidelines or methodology -- such as the GRAM -- for the recovery by the
distribution utilities of their fuel and purchased power costs. These issuances, however, should conform to the
requirements of pertinent laws, including Section 4(e) of Rule 3 of the IRR of the EPIRA.[14] There was another
compelling reason why the reliance by Respondent Meralco and the ERC on the GRAM Implementing Rules was
unavailing. It did not appear from the records that these rules, as set forth in the ERC Order dated February 24, 2003
(in ERC Case No. 2003-44), had been published in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation.
This omission violated the basic requirement of publication under Executive Order No. 200. Moreover, according to
the Certification dated January 11, 2006, issued by the Office of the National Administrative Register (ONAR),
neither had the GRAM Implementing Rules been filed with that office, in contravention of the Administrative Code
of 1987.[15] Failure to publish these rules violated the fundamental principle of due process, as enunciated by the
Court in the landmark case Tanada v. Tuvera; [16] hence, they must be declared ineffective.
PEOPLE v. VERA

FACTS: Unjieng was convicted by the trial court in Manila. He filed for reconsideration which was elevated to the
SC and the SC remanded the appeal to the lower court for a new trial. While awaiting new trial, he appealed for
probation alleging that the he is innocent of the crime he was convicted of. Judge Tuason of the Manila CFI directed
the appeal to the Insular Probation Office. The IPO denied the application. However, Judge Vera upon another
request by petitioner allowed the petition to be set for hearing. The City Prosecutor countered alleging that Vera has
no power to place Cu Unjieng under probation because it is in violation of Sec. 11 Act No. 4221 which provides that
the act of Legislature granting provincial boards the power to provide a system of probation to convicted person.
Nowhere in the law is stated that the law is applicable to a city like Manila because it is only indicated therein that
only provinces are covered. And even if Manila is covered by the law it is unconstitutional because Sec 1 Art 3 of
the Constitution provides equal protection of laws for the reason that its applicability is not uniform throughout the
islands. The said law provides absolute discretion to provincial boards and this also constitutes undue delegation of
power because providing probation, in effect, is granting freedom, as in pardon.

HELD: The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows: This Act shall apply only in
those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates
not lower than those now provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be appointed by the Secretary
of Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the Probation Office. This only means that only provinces that can
provide appropriation for a probation officer may have a system of probation within their locality. This would mean
to say that convicts in provinces where no probation officer is instituted may not avail of their right to probation.

There is no difference between a law which denies equal protection and a law which permits such denial. A law may
appear to be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it permits of unjust and illegal discrimination, it is
within the constitutional prohibition.
 68 Phil. 12 Political Law Constitutional Law Equal Protection Requisites of a Valid Classification Bar
from Drinking Gin

People vs. Cayat

In 1937, there exists a law (Act 1639) which bars native non-Christians from drinking gin or any other liquor outside
of their customary alcoholic drinks. Cayat, a native of the Cordillera, was caught with an A-1-1 gin in violation of
this Act. He was then charged and sentenced to pay P5.00 and to be imprisoned in case of insolvency. Cayat
admitted his guilt but he challenged the constitutionality of the said Act. He averred, among others, that it violated
his right to equal protection afforded by the constitution. He said this an attempt to treat them with discrimination or
mark them as inferior or less capable race and less entitled will meet with their instant challenge. The law sought
to distinguish and classify native non-Christians from Christians.

ISSUE: Whether or not the said Act violates the equal protection clause.

HELD: No. The SC ruled that Act 1639 is valid for it met the requisites of a reasonable classification. The SC
emphasized that it is not enough that the members of a group have the characteristics that distinguish them from
others. The classification must, as an indispensable requisite, not be arbitrary. The requisites to be complied with
are;

(1) must rest on substantial distinctions;

(2) must be germane to the purposes of the law;

(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and

(4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.

Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The classification rests on real or substantial, not merely imaginary or
whimsical, distinctions. It is not based upon accident of birth or parentage. The law, then, does not seek to mark
the non-Christian tribes as an inferior or less capable race. On the contrary, all measures thus far adopted in the
promotion of the public policy towards them rest upon a recognition of their inherent right to equality in the
enjoyment of those privileges now enjoyed by their Christian brothers. But as there can be no true equality before
the law, if there is, in fact, no equality in education, the government has endeavored, by appropriate measures, to
raise their culture and civilization and secure for them the benefits of their progress, with the ultimate end in view of
placing them with their Christian brothers on the basis of true equality.
Villegas vs. Hui Chiong Tsai Pao Ho

FACTS: This case involves an ordinance prohibiting aliens from being employed or engage or participate in any
position or occupation or business enumerated therein, whether permanent, temporary or casual, without first
securing an employment permit from the Mayor of Manila and paying the permit fee of P50.00. Private respondent
Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho who was employed in Manila, filed a petition to stop the enforcement of such ordinance as
well as to declare the same null and void. Trial court rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner, hence this case.

ISSUE: WON said Ordinance violates due process of law and equal protection rule of the Constitution.

HELD: Yes. The Ordinance The ordinance in question violates the due process of law and equal protection rule of
the Constitution. Requiring a person before he can be employed to get a permit from the City Mayor who may
withhold or refuse it at his will is tantamount to denying him the basic right of the people in the Philippines to
engage in a means of livelihood. While it is true that the Philippines as a State is not obliged to admit aliens within
its territory, once an alien is admitted, he cannot be deprived of life without due process of law. This guarantee
includes the means of livelihood. The shelter of protection under the due process and equal protection clause is
given to all persons, both aliens and citizens.
Philippine Judges Association vs. Pete Prado

FACTS: The main target of this petition is Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 as implemented by the Philippine Postal
Corporation through its Circular No. 92-28. These measures withdraw the franking privilege from the SC, CA, RTC,
MTC, MeTC and the Land Registration Commission and its Registers of Deeds, along with certain other
government offices while retaining the same for the president, VP, senators The petitioners are members of the
lower courts who feel that their official functions as judges will be prejudiced by the above-named measures.

HELD: There is violation of equal protection. All persons similarly situated should be treated alike both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed. It does not require universal application of the laws on all persons or things
without distinction. This might in fact result in unequal protection. What the law requires is equality among equals
according to valid classification. The postal service office claims that the expense from judiciary with regards frank
mails amounts to 73,574,864 as compared to 90,424, 175 total. The respondents are in effect saying that franking
privilege should be extended only to those who do not need it much at all but not to those who need it badly. The
problem is not solved by retaining it for some and withdrawing it from others especially where theres no substantial
distinction. The distinction made is superficial. It is not based on substantial distinctions that make real differences
between the judiciary and the grantees of the franking privilege.