People v. Alconga, 1947
Bracamonte turned Alconga over to the soldier who in turn took him to the
Facts:
On the night of May 27, 1943, in the house of Mauricio Jepes in San Dionisio,
several people were playing prohibited games. The deceased Silverio Barion was the
banker in the game of black jack, and Maria de Raposo, a witness for the prosecution,
was one of the players. Upon the invitation of Maria, the accused Dioscoro Alconga
joined her as a partner. Maria played the game while the accused stood behind the
deceased, acting as a spotter of the cards of the latter and communicating by signs to
his partner.
The deceased suffered losses in the game because of the team work between
Maria and the accused. Upon discovering what the accused did, Silverio became
indignant. He had an exchange of words with the accused and they would have
started hitting each other if it werent for the intervention of the maintainer of the
games. In a fit of anger, the Silverio left the house but not before telling the accused
that tomorrow morning I will give you a breakfast which signified an intent to inflict
bodily harm when uttered under such circumstances.
SIlverio and the accused met again in the morning of May 29, 1943, when the
latter was in the guardhouse located in the barrio of Santol, performing his duties as
home guard. While the accused was sitting on a bench in the guardhouse, Silverio
came along and told the accused, Coroy, this is your breakfast. It was immediately
followed by a swing of his pingahan. The accused avoided the blow by falling to the
ground under the bench with the intention to crawl out of the guardhouse. The
second blow failed to hit the accused and instead hit the bench. The accused manage
to go out of the guardhouse by crawling on his abdomen. While Silverio was trying to
deliver the third blow, the accused while still in a crawling position fired at him with
his revolver, causing him to stagger and fall to the ground. Rising to his feet, Silverio
drew forth his dagger and tried to hit the accused who managed to avoid it by using
his bolo. They then engaged in a hand-to-hand fight. Having sustained several
wounds, Silverio ran away but was followed by the accused.
After running about 200 meters, Silverio was overtaken and another fight
ensued during which, the mortal bolo blow (one which slashed the cranium. Shet)
was delivered. This caused the deceased to fall to the ground face down. At this
instant, the other accused, Adolfo Bracamonte, arrived and being the leader of the
home guards, placed under his custody the accused Alconga with a view of turning
him over to the proper authorities.
On their way to San Dionisio, the two were stopped by a guerrilla soldier.
headquarters. Later that day, the soldier turned him over to a municipal policeman
together with the weapons used in the fight (revolver, bolo, and dagger).
Issue:
W/N after the cessation of the aggression the provocation still persisted and to
a degree sufficient to extenuate appellants criminal responsibility for his acts during
the second stage of the fight.
Held:
There were two stages in the fight between Alconga and Silverio. The first stage
commenced when Silverio assaulted the accused without sufficient provocation on
the part of the latter. The second stage was when he pursued Silverio.
During the first stage, the Court held that the accused acted in self-defense.
Silverio was the unlawful aggressor and the accused had not given sufficient
provocation. Furthermore, when Silverio was about to deliver the third blow, the
accused was still in a crawling position and could not have effectively wielded his bolo
and therefore had to use his revolver, his only remaining weapon.
During the second stage, however, he was no longer acting in self-defense
because there was no more aggression to defend against. The aggression ceased
from the moment Silverio started running.
The burden of proof was on the accused to prove whether or not his pursuit and
killing of Silverio was a continuation of the self-defense he alleges.
From the very start, the accused was the holder of the stronger and more
deadly weapons. In actual performance, from the very beginning, he has also
demonstrated his superior fighting ability. The accused failed to prove that even after
causing severe injuries to Silverio in the first stage, he still did not feel secured from
danger.
US v. Mack, 1907 advance upon him from a distance of about 9 to 12 feet, brandishing a formidable
looking bolo. Under the circumstances, the accused did not have reasonable grounds
to believe that he could safely make his escape.
Facts:
Even if it were true that had he made his escape, he could have dodged the
The accused Anderson Mack filed an appeal from the judgment convicting him attack from the deceased, the Court believed that it would have been too much to
of homicide. ask from someone who is in imminent peril of felonious and murderous attack.

On the night of May 4, 1906, the accused, an African-American soldier, shot and
killed a municipal policeman named Estanislao Indic.
Just before the shooting, Mack was sitting on a bench a few feet from the street,
in Tacloban, in an open space some 3 or 4 feet wide, between the tienda owned by
Olimpia and another building. The deceased, with another policeman, approached
the place and directed Olimpia to close her tienda, and later ordered Mack and
another soldier who was standing nearby to go to their quarters.
Mack did not obey the order. The deceased, who was standing some 10 or 12
feet from Mack, cursing and abusing him for his failure to obey the order, became
really angry and freed himself from his companion, who was trying to restrain him
and take him away, and started toward Mack and at the same time drawing his bolo
and brandishing it in a threatening manner. Mack then got up and drew his revolver,
and the deceased having then approached within the distance of around 3 to 6 feet
from Mack, the accused fired three shots, one of which hit the left breast of the
deceased, just above the nipple, and another in the back of his head.
Furthermore, that the accused was physically superior to the deceased is no
protection to an unarmed man as against an assailant armed with a large bolo. And if
it was true that the deceased was intoxicated when he made the attack, his
intoxication probably rendered him the more dangerous unless he was so drunk as to
be physically helpless which is not the case here.
Nor does the fact that after the occurrence, the blade of the bolo was found to
be excessively blunt justify the conclusion that there was no reasonable necessity for
the defendants use of the only weapon at hand to resist the attack. Lying on the desk
in the trial court, in the broad light of day, that bolo was a formidable looking
weapon, with a blade of fourteen and a half inches in length. The accused in
apparent and imminent danger could not reasonably be expected to take the chance
that mere ordinary force would be used in striking, or that the blow would be given
upon some protected part of his body, or that the cutting edge of the blade was not
keen enough to give him his death blow.

Issue:

W/N the accused was acting in self-defense.

Held:

Yes. The Court held that it affirmatively appears from the evidence that there
was an unprovoked illegal aggression on the part of the deceased and that there was
reasonable necessity for the use of the means employed by the accused to defend
himself from the unlawful aggression.

The Court didnt think that taking refuge in flight would have been in the best
interest of the accused given the circumstances and the area where the killing
happened. Mach was sitting in a narrow alleyway when the deceased started to
People v. Sumicad, 1932 shoulder of the deceased. Upon the blow, the deceased should have been
admonished that further aggression on his part would be met by determined
resistance and that any further advance would be at grave peril to himself. Instead of
Facts: acting upon this warning, the deceased pressed forward in the attempt to take the
bolo which was the only means of the accused to defend himself.
This is an appeal to reverse the judgment finding the appellant, Julian Sumicad,
guilty of homicide. The accused was justified in pursuing Cubol for it would have been an act of
suicide to permit Cubol to take hold of the bolo. Furthermore, it has been shown that
On February 23, 1931, the accused was engaged in the hauling of logs for the Cubol has a reputation for violence and it tends to show that when the fatal blows
construction of a chapel in the barrio of Buenavoluntad. At about 5:30 pm on the were struck, the accused had reasonable grounds for believing that he ws in grave
same day, when the laborers where resting, Sugndo Cubol passed by the place where peril to life or limb.
the accused was sitting. Prior to this, the accused has rendered 5 and a half days of
service to Cubol and as Cubol passed, Sumicad asked him to pay for the services It was not incumbent on the accused in this case, when assailed by a bully of
rendered through an exclamation which was followed by an insulting expression. At known violent disposition, who was larger and stronger than himself, to take the risk
the same time, Cubol struck the accused with his fist. The accused rose from the log of losing possession of his bolo and of having it turned upon him with probable fatal
upon which he was sitting and moved backward, trying to escape. Cubol, however, results to himself.
pursued him and continued striking him with his fists. The accused found himself
It is also noteworthy that the deceased admitted that he was the aggressor and
cornered by a pile of logs, the wings of each extended out on either side, preventing
that he used no word to placing the blame upon the accused.
any further retreat. As Cubol pressed upon him, the accused drew his bolo and
delivered a blow on Cubols right shoulder. Cubol then lunged at the accused with the
intention of taking the bolo. To prevent this, the accused struck again twice with the
bolo, inflicting two deep cuts on Cubols forehead above the left eye. One of the
blows struck through the cranium. The other made a cut extending from the left
eyebrow to the nose and upper lip. Cubol then gave down and crawled away, finding
a seat on a log nearby. A witness then came and asked Cubol whether he had struck
the accused. Cubol said yes. The witness then asked the accused to go to the
poblacion. The accused did and surrendered himself to the authorities.

Cubol died from the wounds.

Issue:

W/N there was reasonably necessity for the means employed by the accused to
prevent or repel the aggression to which he was subjected.

Held:

Yes. When the aggression began, the accused retreated until he was cornered in
the angle of a pile of logs. Further retreat became impossible. In response to the
blows from the deceased, the accused delivered a blow with his bolo on the right
People v. Genosa, 2004 c) At the time of the killing, the batterer must have posed probable--not
necessarily immediate and actual--grave harm to the accused, based on the
history of violence perpetrated by the former against the latter.
Facts:

Marivic Genosa was convicted of Parricide for killing his legitimate husband Ben
(2) The SC ruled out treachery as an aggravating circumstance because the
Genosa and with the aggravating circumstance of treachery, she was meted the
quarrel or argument that preceded the killing must have forewarned the victim of
penalty of death. The case was elevated to the SC for automatic review. Appellant
the assailant's aggression.
subsequently filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion praying for her examination by expert
psychologists and psychiatrist and the reception of latter's reports to prove her claim
of self-defense on the theory of battered woman syndrome. The SC remanded the
case to the trial court for the reception of expert psychological/psychiatric opinion on
the plea of battered woman syndrome. Marivic Genosa was examined by Dra.
Natividad A. Dayan, a clinical psychologist, who testified that Marivic "fits the profile
of a battered woman" and by Dr. Alfredo Parajillo, a psychiatrist, who "explained that
with 'neurotic anxiety', the victim relieves the beating or trauma as if it were real,
although she is not actually beaten at that time" and that at the time Marivic killed
her husband, her "mental condition was that she was "re-experiencing the trauma.'
That the "re-experiencing of the trauma is not controlled by Marivic. It will just come
in flashes x x x."

Issues:

(1) Whether or not appelant acted in self-defense.

(2) Whether or not treachery attended the killing.

Held:

(1) The SC held that the defense failed to establish all the elements of
self-defense arising from battered woman syndrome, to wit:

a) Each of the phases of the cycle of violence must be proven to have

characterized at least two battering episodes between the appellant and her
intimate partner.

b) The final acute battering episode preceding the killing of the batterer
must have produced in the battered person's mind an actual fear of an
imminent harm from her batterer and an honest belief that she needed to
use force in order to save her life.
People v. Luague, 1935 disgraceful and cowardly of the husband to thrust its execution upon the wife at the
hazard of her life and liberty to shield his own in the event of a prosecution. The
natural thing would be for him to take matters into his own hands without the help of
Facts: the wife.

This is an appeal to reverse the judgment convicting Wenceslao Alcansare and

Natividad Laugue of homicide.

In the morning of February 18, 1935, while Natividad was in her house with only
her children of tender age for company, her husband and coaccused Wenceslao
having gone to grind corn several kilometers away, Paulino Disuasido came and
began to make love to her. As Natividad cannot could not make him go away, she
went to the kitchen where Paulino followed her, notwithstanding her insistence that
she could not do what Paulino wants her to do. Paulino drew a knife and threatening
to kill her, began to embrace Natividad and touched her breasts. In preparing to lie
with her, Paulino had to leave the knife on the floor and Natividad, taking advantage
of the situation, picked up the weapon and stabbed him in the abdomen. Paulino,
feeling himself wounded, ran away jumping through the window and falling on some
stones, while Natividad immediately went to the poblacion to surrender herself to
the authorities and report the incident.

Issue:

W/N Natividads actions constitute self-defense.

Held:

Yes. A womans honor is a right as precious, if not more, than her very existence.
Rape, unlike ordinary slander by word or deed susceptible of judicial redress is an
outrage which impresses an indelible blot on the victim.

Furthermore, the theory presented by the prosecution that Wenceslao,

suspecting Paulino to having committed unchaste advances towards his wife, out of
jealousy decided to get rid of him holds no weight.

Were it true that Wenceslao, prompted by jealousy, designed to do away with

Paulino, it would have been because he observed that his wife somehow returned
Paulinos attentions. It is quite incomprehensible, however, why the wife would take
upon herself the execution of the plan and the husband would just let her. The
observation would be the same if the two had plotted against Paulino for it would be
People v. De La Cruz, 1935 jealous of the other girl is not sustained by the evidence. The accused stabbed the
deceased only once even though she retained the possession of the knife and could
have inflicted other wounds on him if she desired. In other words, she desisted as
Facts: soon as he released her.

This is an appeal from the decision of the CFI of Nueve Ecija finding Remedios De
La Cruz guilty of homicide.
On the evening of February 18, 1934, Francisco Ramos and his wife, Brigida
Visada, his sister, Baltazara Ramos, and a woman named Consuelo or Natividad
Santoyo called at the house of the defendant and asked her to go with them to the
wake of Sion, who died in the house of Maria Inguit.
That the accused is an illiterate barrio girl and scarcely 18 leads the Court to
believe that her story isnt a fabrication. And it is noteworthy that almost
immediately after the incident, she said she stabbed Rivera because he embraced her.
It is not improbable that she was reluctant to relate in the presence of all the people
in the house of Maria Inguit the details of the incident.

At about 9 pm, the accused and her friends started home. They were followed
five minutes later by the deceased, Francisco Rivera, who had been playing cards in
the house where the wake was held. With him was Enrique Bautista. They overtook
the defendants party, Upon reaching a narrow port of the path, Rivera went ahead
of Bautista. At that time, the party of the accused was walking in a single file.
Baltazara was in the lead and the accused was the hindmost. She was about two
brazas (1 braza = 167 cm) from the person immediately ahead of her. Francisco
Ramos testified that he heard someone cry out, Aruy, Dios mio. He went back and
found that Rivera had been stabbed under the right breast.

Rivera was taken to the hospital but died the next day.

Ramos testified that it took him two minutes to go back to the place where
Rivera was. He found Enrique Bautista with the wounded man and that the accused
has went back to the house of mourning. Ramos overtook her. She had a knife in her
hand. When they reached the house of mourning, the accused stuck the knife into a
table and said that she stabbed Rivera because he embraced her.

Issue:

W/N the accused acted in self-defense.

Held:

Yes. It appears from the evidence that Rivera had been making love to the
accused, and also to another girl but the finding of the trial court that Rivera and the
defendant were engaged and that she was madly in love with him and was extremely
People v. Jaurigue, 1946 4 and half inches deep, which was necessarily mortal. Nicolas saw Amado bleeding
and staggering towards the altar, and upon seeing his daughter still holding the
bloody knife, he asked her why she did it. Avelina replied that she could not endure it
Facts: anymore. Amado died a few minutes later.

This is an appeal from the judgment of the CFI of Tayabas convicting Avelina Nicolas and Avelina then went home and locked themselves up following the
Jaurigue and acquitting Nicolas Jaurigue of murder. instructions of Lozada and waited for the arrival of the authorities.

Avelina and the deceased Amado Capia lived in the same barrio. Amado has
been courting Avelina in vain. On one occasion, Amado snatched a handkerchief
belonging to her, bearing her nickname Aveling, while it was being washed by her
cousin, Josefa Tapay. Issue:

On September 13, 1942, while Avelina was feeding a dog under her house,
Amado approached her and spoke to her of his love, which she flatly refused, and he
thereupon suddenly embraced and kissed her and touched her breast. Avelina, a
resolute and quick-tempered girl, slapped Amado, gave him fist blows and kicked him.
She kept the matter to herself, until the next morning when she told her mother
about it. Since then, she armed herself with a long fan knife.
On September 15, 1942, around midnight, Amado climbed up the house of the
accused and surreptitiously entered the room where she was sleeping. He touched
her forehead with the intention of abusing her. She immediately screamed for help
and her parents rushed to her side. He asked for forgiveness and Nicolas Jaurigue said
that Amado probably did not know what he was doing.
In the morning og September 20, 1942, Avelina received information that
Amado had been falsely boasting in the neighborhood of having sex with her and that
she even asked him to elope with her and that she would poison herself if he didnt
marry her. Avelina again received information of the boasting at around 5 pm of the
same day. At around 8 pm of the same day, Nicolas went to the chapel just across the
provincial road from his house, to attend mass, and sat on the front bench facing the
altar with the other officials of the organization and Casimiro Lozada. It was bright
inside the chapel.
W/N Avelina acted in legitimate defense of her honor absolving her from any
criminal liability.
Held:
No. The chapel was well lit and there were already several people inside,
including her own father, the barrio lieutenant, and other dignitaries of the
organization. Under the circumstances, there was and there could be no possibility of
her being raped. And the means employed by her in the defense of her honor was
excessive. Under the circumstances, she cannot be legally declared completely
exempt fro criminal liability.
But the fact that she immediately surrendered and admitted stabbing Amado as
well as the fact that she acted in the immediate vindication of a grave offense
committed against her and her lack of criminal intent were considered mitigating
circumstances.

Avelina entered the chapel shortly after her father arrived for the same purpose
and sat on the bench next to the last one nearest the door. Amado was seated on the
other side of the chapel. Seeing Avelina, Amado went and sat next to Avelina and,
without saying a word, placed his hand on the upper part of her right thigh. Avelina
then and there pulled out with her right hand her fan knife which she had in a pocket
of her dress, with the intention of punishing Amados offending hand. Amado then
seized Avelinas right hand but she quickly grabbed the knife with her left hand and
stabbed Amado once at the base of the left side of the neck, inflicting a wound about
People v. Narvaez, 1983
Facts:
Mamerto Narvaez has been convicted of murder (qualified by treachery) of David
Fleischer and Flaviano Rubia. On August 22, 1968, Narvaez shot Fleischer and Rubia
during the time the two were constructing a fence that would prevent Narvaez from
getting into his house and rice mill. The defendant was taking a nap when he heard
sounds of construction and found fence being made. He addressed the group and
asked them to stop destroying his house and asking if they could talk things over.
Fleischer responded with No, gadamit, proceed, go ahead. Defendant lost his
equilibrium, and shot Fleisher with his shotgun. He also shot Rubia who was
running towards the jeep where the deceaseds gun was placed. Prior to the shooting,
Fleischer and Co. (the company of Fleischers family) was involved in a legal battle
with the defendant and other land settlers of Cotabato over certain pieces of
property. At the time of the shooting, the civil case was still pending for annulment
(settlers wanted granting of property to Fleisher and Co. to be annulled). At time of
the shooting, defendant had leased his property from Fleisher (though case pending
and ownership uncertain) to avoid trouble. On June 25, defendant received letter
terminating contract because he allegedly didnt pay rent. He was given 6 months to
remove his house from the land. Shooting was barely 2 months after letter.
Defendant claims he killed in defense of his person and property. CFI ruled that
Narvaez was guilty. Aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation offset by the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. For both murders, CFI sentenced him
to reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs, and to pay for moral damages.
Issues:
1. WON CFI erred in convicting defendant-appellant despite the fact that he
acted in defense of his person.
2. WON the court erred in convicting defendant-appellant although he acted in
defence of his rights.
3. WON he should be liable for subsidiary imprisonment since he is unable to
pay the civil indemnity due to the offended party.
Held:
1. No. The courts concurred that the fencing and chiselling of the walls of the house
of the defendant was indeed a form of aggression on the part of the victim.
However, this aggression was not done on the person of the victim but rather on
his rights to property. On the first issue, the courts did not err. However, in
consideration of the violation of property rights, the courts referred to Art. 30 of
the civil code recognizing the right of owners to close and fence their land.
Although is not in dispute, the victim was not in the position to subscribe to the
article because his ownership of the land being awarded by the government was
still pending, therefore putting ownership into question. Its accepted that victim
was the original aggressor.
2. Yes. However, the argument of the justifying circumstance of self-defense is
applicable only if the 3 requirements are fulfilled. Art. 11(1) RPC enumerates
these requisites:
a) Unlawful aggression. In the case at bar, there was unlawful aggression
towards appellants property rights. Fleisher had given Narvaez 6 months
and he should have left him in peace before time was up, instead of chiseling
Narvaezs house and putting up fence. A536 of the CC also provides that
possession may not be acquired through force or intimidation; while Art. 539
provides that every possessor has the right to be respected in his possession
b) Reasonable necessity of means employed to prevent or repel attack. In case,
killing was disproportionate to attack.
c) Lack of sufficient provocation on part of person defending himself. Here,
there was no provocation at all since he was asleep
Since not all requisites present, defendant is credited w/ the special mitigating
circumstance of incomplete defense, pursuant to A13(6) RPC. These mitigating
circumstances are: voluntary surrender & passion & obfuscation (read p. 405
explanation)
Crime is homicide (2 counts) not murder because treachery is not applicable on
account of provocation by the deceased. Also, assault wasnt deliberately chosen
with view to kill since slayer acted instantaneously. There was also no direct
evidence of planning or preparation to kill.
Art. 249 RPC: Penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal. However, due to
mitigating circumstances and incomplete defense, it can be lowered 3 degrees
(Art. 64) to arresto mayor.
3. No. He isnt liable to be subsidiarily imprisoned for non-payment of civil
indemnity. RA 5465 made the provisions of A39 applicable to fines only & not to
 reparation of damage caused, indemnification of consequential damages & costs
of proceedings. Although it was enacted only after its commission, considering
that RA 5465 is favorable to the accused who is not a habitual delinquent, it may
be given retroactive effect pursuant to RPC A22.

Judgment: Defendant guilty of homicide but w/ mitigating circumstances and

extenuating circumstance of incomplete self defense. Penalty is 4 mos. arresto mayor
& to indemnify each group of heirs 4K w/o subsidiary imprisonment & w/o award for
moral damages. Appellant has already been detained 14 yrs so his immediate release
is ordered.

Gutierrez, dissenting. Defense of property can only be invoked when coupled with
form of attack on person defending property. In the case at bar, this was not so.
Appellant should then be sentenced to prision mayor. However, since he has served
more than that, he should be released.
People v. Pelayo, 1966
Facts:
This is an appeal from the judgment convicting the accused of light oral
defamation.
On November 15, 1956, in the office of Atty. Clapano, the accused told the latter,
within the hearing of Francisco Baez, Rafael Mascarias, and Prisco Parmisano, that
while investigating the existence of gambling in the community, a Chinese operator
named Lim Peng told him that then Governor (Senator during the pendency of the
case) Almendras used to receive from the Chinese P500 protection money. He added
that Almendras was not satisfied with P500 so he asked for P1000 but because the
Chinese could not afford that amount, Almendras raided his place.
On the following day, the accused delivered a privilege speech during the
regular session of the City Council of Davao City, wherein, although without directly
mentioning the governor as receving tongs, the reference to the latter after a series
of interpellation and answers during the speech became obvious.
The accused admits having said those things but claims that (1) he uttered those
words in confidence to Clapano and that they are covered by the rule on privileged
communication, (2) that since the crime as charged which is for serious slander is
different from, and not included in, the crime as proved which is intriguing against
honor, the conviction is illegal, (3) that he uttered those words and phrases in
self-defense to what then Gov. Almendras in the latters speech had stated of him in
another place a few days before, and (4) that the award for nominal damages should
have been what he was also entitled to as a result of the slander made to him by
Almedras.
Issue:
W/N the claim of the accused that he acted in self-defense is valid.
Held:
No. On his first contention, in the first place, his contention of confidence is
inconsistent with his other contention of self-defense. If the communication was for
the purpose of self-defense, it should no have been made in confidence as he alleged.
In the second place, the records also show that on the following day, he delivered a
speech at the session of the City Council, wherein although he did not mention
names, he made it obvious that he was referring to Almendras. In the third place,
there were others who heard the remarks when he was talking to Clapano. Thus, he
could not have given the communication in confidence.
On his second contention, the facts do not constitute intriguing against honor
because the information given by the accused to Clapano within the hearing of others
allegedly came from a definite source. Where the source of the information can be
pin-pointed and definitely determined and adopting the information as his own,
passes the same to another for the purpose of causing dishonor to the complainants
reputation, the act is not intriguing against honor but clearly one of slander.
On his contention of self-defense, fot it to exist in instances such as this, the
defender should not go beyond explaining what was previously said of him for the
purpose of repairing or minimizing if not entirely removing the effect of the damage
caused to him. The principle does not license him to utter blow-for-blow scurrilous
language in return for what he received.
Where the the goes beyond mere explaining his side, or repairing, minimizing,
or removing the effect of the damage by hitting back, his retaliation becomes an
entirely independent act of his own of which he may stand to answer the
consequences.
In the case at bar, if it is true that on a previous occasion Almendras had
imputed to the accused, that he, the latter, was receiving money from gambling
operators, the accused was not licensed to make the same imputation or accusation
because to do that is not an act of defense but an aggression itself.
People v. Norma Hernandez, 1959 No. Malice, one of the essential requisites of slander, has not been proven.
Norma was merely exercising her right to not give her consent to the marriage. Since
no marriage can be solemnized unless the consent of both parties are freely given, to
Facts: penalize Norma for not continuing with the proposed marriage would make the State
practically instrumental in in compelling an unwilling party to enter into marriage. If a
The accused were charged with serious slander by deed. party to an agreement to marry can be who backs out should be held liable for the
crime of slander by deed, then that would be an inherent way of compelling said
The complainant, Vivencio Lascano, 19, started courting the accused Maria
party to go into a marriage without his or her free consent.
Norma Hernandez sometime in August 1954,. After months of courtship, Norma
finally accepted Vivencio on January 6, 1955. On the same day, they talked about
their marriage, Norma telling Vivencio to bring his parents to her house so that they
could talk about their marriage. On February 6, 1955, Vivencios parents together
with his 12 (HAHAHAHAHAHA) aunts, bringing along 30 chickens and 3 goats, went to
Normas house to ask for her hand in marriage. The parents of both agreed to the
marriage. They set March 19, 1955 as the wedding date. They likewise agreed that
Vivencios parents would buy a wedding dress, two vestidos, a pair of shoes for the
bride, to advance P20 for fetching the sponsors in the wedding and to repair the roof
of Normas uncle.

The family of Vivencio prepared everything that was needed for the wedding.
While the celebration was going on, however, Norma could be found nowhere.
Vivencio and his parents waited until 12 midnight of March 19 but Norma never
showed up, causing them shame and humiliation.

Norma testified that she was never in love with Vivencio and only said yes to the
marriage because her parents wanted her to. As the date of the marriage was
approaching, she felt a sense of torture because she wasnt in love with Vivencio. She
then decided to leave her home as a last recourse to prevent the marriage. She went
to Mindoro and stayed with her cousin at Calapan where she remained until April of
1956 when she was fetched by her cousin because she was under arrest for the
present case.

Appellee recommends reversal of the appealed judgment because what Norma

did does not constitute the crime of slander by deed.

Issue:

W/N the actions of the accused constitute slander by deed.

Held:
Regina v. Dudley, 1884

Facts:

Dudley and Stephens along with Brooks and Parker(victim) were cast away at sea without
weeks of food and water except for some turnips and a turtle. After twenty days, Dudley and
Stephens proposed one person sacrifice himself in order to save the rest. Brooks dissented
while Dudley and Stephens decided to kill Parker since he was the weakest and youngest. On
the 25th of July, seeing no rescue in sight, the two men killed Parker and the three men feasted
on his body. Four days later a vessel rescued them and Dudley and Stephens were charged
with murder.

Issue:

Whether the killing of Parker was murder considering the circumstances of this case.

Held:

Yes it is murder. Stephens and Dudley to be sentenced to death.

The necessity of hunger does not justify larceny, let alone murder. Stephens and Dudley chose
the weakest and youngest to kill and it was not more necessary to kill him than any of the
other grown men.

Stephens and Dudley were tempted to kill Parker but temptation itself is not an excuse
for murdering him. Their unfortunate circumstances also do not lend leniency to the legal
definition of murder.

Discussion:

As necessary the circumstances seemed where sacrificing ones life would save the rest,
that itself does not justify murder. The fact that Dudley and Stephens chose the weakest
person to be the victim also does not justify that Parker could not have survived. Instead, by
killing him, it is only making certain that he had no chance of survival.
Ty v. People, 2004 Ty has also failed to convince the Court that she was left with no choice but to commit a
crime. She did not take advantage of the many opportunities available to her to avoid
Facts: committing one. By her very own words, she admitted that the collateral or security the
hospital required prior to the discharge of her mother may be in the form of postdated checks
Ty's mother and sister was confined at the Manila Doctors Hospital. The total hospital
or jewelry. And if indeed she was coerced to open an account with the bank and issue the
bills amounted to P1 million. After signing a contract of responsibility with the hospital, Ty
checks, she had all the opportunity to leave the scene to avoid involvement.
issued 7 checks to cover the said expenses, all of which were dishonored for being drawn
against a closed a account. Manila Doctors Hospital sued Ty for violation of BP 22. In her Avoidance of a greater evil or injury
defense, Ty alleged that she issued the checks because of an "uncontrollable fear of a greater
injury". She averred that her mother threatened to commit suicide due to the inhumane The law prescribes the presence of three requisites to exempt the actor from liability
treatment she allegedly suffered while confined in the hospital. Ty was found guilty by the trial under this paragraph: (1) that the evil sought to be avoided actually exists; (2) that the injury
court of 7 counts of violation of BP 22. Ty appealed wherein she reiterated her defense that feared be greater than the one done to avoid it; (3) that there be no other practical and less
she issued the checks under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of a greater injury or in harmful means of preventing it.
avoidance of a greater evil or injury. In the instant case, the evil sought to be avoided is merely expected or anticipated. If the
evil sought to be avoided is merely expected or anticipated or may happen in the future, this
defense is not applicable. Ty could have taken advantage of an available option to avoid
Issue: committing a crime. By her own admission, she had the choice to give jewelry or other forms of
security instead of postdated checks to secure her obligation.
Is the defense of uncontrollable fear or avoidance of a greater evil or injury tenable to
warrant Ty's exemption from criminal liability? Moreover, for the defense of state of necessity to be availing, the greater injury feared
should not have been brought about by the negligence or imprudence, more so, the willful
inaction of the actor. In this case, the issuance of the bounced checks was brought about by
Held: Tys own failure to pay her mothers hospital bills.
Uncontrollable fear
For this exempting circumstance to be invoked successfully, the following requisites must
concur: (1) existence of an uncontrollable fear; (2) the fear must be real and imminent; and (3)
the fear of an injury is greater than or at least equal to that committed.
It must appear that the threat that caused the uncontrollable fear is of such gravity and
imminence that the ordinary man would have succumbed to it. It should be based on a real,
imminent or reasonable fear for ones life or limb. A mere threat of a future injury is not
enough. It should not be speculative, fanciful, or remote. A person invoking uncontrollable fear
must show therefore that the compulsion was such that it reduced him to a mere instrument
acting not only without will but against his will as well. It must be of such character as to leave
no opportunity to the accused for escape.
In this case, far from it, the fear, if any, harbored by Ty was not real and imminent. Ty
claims that she was compelled to issue the checks a condition the hospital allegedly demanded
of her before her mother could be discharged for fear that her mothers health might
deteriorate further due to the inhumane treatment of the hospital or worse, her mother might
commit suicide. This is speculative fear; it is not the uncontrollable fear contemplated by law.
To begin with, there was no showing that the mothers illness was so life-threatening such
that her continued stay in the hospital suffering all its alleged unethical treatment would
induce a well-grounded apprehension of her death. Secondly, it is not the laws intent to say
that any fear exempts one from criminal liability much less petitioners flimsy fear that her
mother might commit suicide. In other words, the fear she invokes was not impending or
insuperable as to deprive her of all volition and to make her a mere instrument without will,
moved exclusively by the hospitals threats or demands.
People v. Belbes, 2000
FACTS (SUMMARIZED VERSION):
Patrolman Domingo Belbes was assigned to maintain peace and order at the prom
night of Pili Barangay High School. During the event, he responded to a report by two
female students that someone was making trouble at one of the schools temporary
building. He and Patrolman Jose Pabon found Fernando Bataller, drunk, with his two
companions, and it appeared that Fernando was breaking the bamboo walls of the
temporary building. Belbes, armed with an armalite, fired at Bataller, who was hit
at several different parts of his body, and died. Whether or not there was a
confrontation is disputed (appellee says there was none, appellant (Belbes) says
there was).
Trial court held Belbes guilty for murder. In his appeal, Belbes said he fired the shots
at Bataller out of self-defense and that he was performing his official functions when
he did so.
FACTS (DETAILED VERSION):
APPELLEEs VERSION:
On the evening of February 16, 1990, Patrolan Domingo Belbes (appellant)
and Pat. Jose Pabon were assigned to maintain peace and order at the Junior
and Senior Prom of Pili Barangay High School, Pili, Bacacay, Albay.
9:00 PM: Two female students approached Teacher-in-charge Mila Ulanca
and said that somebody was making trouble. Belbes (armed with an armalite
rifle), and Pabon (armed with a .38 caliber revolver) responded to the scene.
Meanwhile, Fernando Bataller, who was drunk, was with his cousin Carlito
Bataller, and friend Rosalio Belista. While vomiting and holding on to the
bamboo wall of the schools temporary building, the bamboo splits broke.
The policemen then arrived.
Moments (six seconds according to Mrs. Mila Ulanca) after, bursts of gunfire
Rat-tat-tat-tat-tat were heard. Without warning, Belbes had fired his gun
at Fernando Bataller, who was hit on different parts of the body and died.
APPELLANTs (BELBESs) VERSION:
He and Pabon found Fernando Bataller making trouble and destroying the
wall of the temporary building. Fernando was drunk or a little tipsy, and was
not vomiting.
The two approached Fernando and identified themselves as policemen, but
the former ignored them. Pabon was in front of Fernando (one meter away
from each other). Fernando lunged with a knife at Pabon, but the latter
avoided it.
Fernando then stabbed Belbes, hitting the latters left shoulder.
Belbes filed a warning shot. Fernandos companions (Carlito and Rosalio)
became aggressive. Fernando grabbed the armalite.
While Belbes and Fernando were struggling, the gun went off once, hitting
Fernando. He cannot recall how many more shots were fired after the gun
was semi-automatic.
TRIAL COURT: Found Belbes GUILTY of MURDER and sentenced him to reclusion
perpetua.
APPEAL: Belbes admits to firing the gunshots that killed Bataller. But he claims that
he did so in self-defense, and that that he was only performing his official functions
when he responded in the course of police duties to the information that somebody
was making trouble and disturbing the peace.
Issue:
W/N the Trial Court was correct in holding the accused guilty for murder.
Held:
No. Appellant offers no material evidence to sufficiently support his claim of
self-defense on the face of mortal danger while on police duty. Where the accused
admits to killing the victim in self defense, the burden of evidence shifts to him.
However, the evidence reveals an incomplete justifying circumstance defined in
Article 11, paragraph number 5 of the Revised Penal Code. For a person not to incur
criminal liability when he acts in the fulfillment of a duty, 2 requisites must concur: (1)
that the offender acted in the performance of a duty; (2) that the injury or offense
committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of such right or
office.
 Although Belbes did act in the performance of his duty (first requisite), the
second requisite is lacking, for the killing need not be a necessary consequence of the
performance of his duty.

CONCLUSION:

Trial court decision MODIFIED. Appellant is guilty only of homicide, mitigated by the
incomplete justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty. Sentence: indeterminate
penalty of eight (8) years of prision mayor minimum, as minimum, to fourteen (14)
years of reclusion temporal minimum, as maximum.
People v. Beronilla, 1955
Facts:
Manuel Beronilla, Policarpio Paculdo, Filipino Velasco and Jacinto Adriatico file
an appeal from the judgement of the Abra CFI, which convicted them of murder for
the execution of Arsenio Borjal, the elected mayor of La, Paz, Abra (at the outbreak of
war), which was found to be aiding the enemy.
Borjal moved to Bangued because of death threats was succeeded by Military
Mayor Manuel Beronilla, who was appointed by Lt. Col. Arbold, regimental
commander of the 15th Infantry of the Phil. Army, operating as guerilla unit in Abra.
Simultaneously upon his appointment, Beronilla received a memorandum which
authorized him to appoint a jury of 12 bolo men to try persons accused of treason,
espionage and aiding or abetting the enemy.
Upon the return of Borjal and his family to Abra, to escape bombing in Bangued,
he was placed under custody and tried and sentenced to death by the jury based on
various complaints made by the residents. Beronilla reported this to Col. Arnold who
replied, saying I can only compliment you for your impartial but independent way
of handling the whole case.
Two years thereafter, Beronilla, along with the executioner, digger and jury,
were indicted for the murder of Borjal. Soon after, President Manuel Roxas issued
Executive Proclamation 8, which granted amnesty to persons who committed acts in
furtherance of the resistance to the enemy against persons aiding in the war efforts
of the enemy.
The rest of defendants applied and were granted amnesty, but Beronilla and
others were convicted on the grounds that the crime was made on purely personal
motives and that the crime was committed after the expiration of time limit for
amnesty proclamation.
Issue:
W/N the defendant-appellants actions are covered by justifying circumstances
for obedience to lawful order of superior.
Held:
Yes. The accused acted upon orders of their superior officers, which as military
subordinates, they could not question and obeyed in good faith without the being
aware of its illegality.
The evidence is sufficient to sustain the claim of the defense that arrest,
prosecution and trial of Borjal was done in pursuant to express orders of superiors.
Additionally, it could not be established that Beronilla received the radiogram from
Colonel Volckmann, overall area commander, which called attention to the illegality
of Borjals conviction and sentence. Had Beronilla known the violation, he would not
have dared to report it to Arnold. The conduct of the accused also does not show
malice on their part because of the conduct of the trial, defense through counsel
given to Borjal, suspension of trial based on doubts of illegality and death sentence
review sent to the superior officers.
Criminal intent then could not be established. The maxim here is actus non facit
reum, nisi mens rea (Crime is not committed if the mind of the person performing the
act complained of to be innocent).
Additionally, the lower court should not have denied their claim to the benefits
of the Guerilla Amnesty Proclamation No. 8 inspite of contradictory dates of
liberation of La Paz, Abra. Even if the dates were contradictory, the court should have
found for the Beronila, et al because if there are any reasonable doubt as to
whether a given case falls within the (amnesty) proclamation should be resolved in
favor of the accused.
Judgement reversed, appellants acquitted.