Beyond Theology: Toward an Anthropology of "Fundamentalism"

Author(s): Judith Nagata

Source: American Anthropologist, New Series, Vol. 103, No. 2 (Jun., 2001), pp. 481-498
Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of the American Anthropological Association
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JUDITHNAGATA
Departmentof Anthropology
YorkUniversity
Toronto,OntarioM3J1P3
Canada

BeyondTheology:Towardan Anthropologyof "Fundamentalism"

Onceconsidered exclusivelya matterof religion,theology,or scripturalcorrectness,useof thetermfundamentalism has
recentlyundergonemetaphorical expansionintootherdomainsand,dependingon whosevoice is beingheard,may
be appliedto extremeformsof nationalism, certainsocioreligious(especiallyIslamist)movements, andotherformsof ex-
tremistideologicalexpression. An anthropological approach seeks thecommon elements amid theseapparentlydiverse
casesand,takingintoaccountthehermeneutical of
problems exegesisby multiple constituencies,proposesthatmost"fun-
damentalisms" involvespecialformsof identitypolitics,meaning,andlabeling,characterized a for
by quest certainty,
exclusiveness,andunambiguous boundaries, wherethe"Other" is theenemydemonized. It alsoreflectsa mind-setun-
compromising andantirelativist,
asoneresponseto theopennessanduncertainties of a cosmopolitanworld,andto charta
morally black and white path out of the grayzones of intimidatingcultural
and religiouscomplexity.[fundamentalism,
religion,hermeneutics,Islam]

Introduction: Problematique criminateapplicationto broaderzones of politicalmove-

Overthe pasttwo decades,a wordwith apocalypticim-
plicationshas invadedboththe scholarlylexiconandpopu-
lar imagination.Fundamentalismis fast becoming the
metaphorof choicein a questto assignmeaningto an ever-
wideningrangeof ideas andbehaviors,andit has recently
migratedfromits originalnarrowreligiousreferenceband
to otherdomains.However,the meaningand uses of the
term vary substantiallyin differentconstituencies,while
anthropologistsmay add their own exegeses. In fact, the
expandinghermeneuticalrangeof the word is partof the
problem.Historically,for some constituencies,fundamen-
talismconnotesan attachmentto a set of irreduciblebeliefs
or a theology that forestalls furtherquestions. For any
of course,this is exactlywherethe
thinkinganthropologist,
questioning shouldbegin. It is a questionof attemptingto
understand, only the substanceand contentof beliefs,
not
but also theircontext,source,andapplication.
One irony here is that few anthropologists(and few
other scholarsor media trendsettersfor that matter),are
themselves self-declared"fundamentalists," yet these are
the people with the greatestopportunityandpowerto de-
fine and propagatedefinitions and worldviews. For the
most part,fundamentalists are talkedabout;rarelydo they
speakforthemselves.It is evidentthatseverallevels of dis-
course are occurringsimultaneouslybut rarelyengaging
with one anotherin direct dialogue. The hermeneutical
field is furthercomplicatedby the fact thatthe fundamen-
talistlabel has undergoneinflationin its sometimesindis-
mentsandotherideologies,to the pointwhereit runsa risk
of spinningout of controland losing specificity and ex-
planatorypower.Thishasbeenthe fate of suchconceptsas
"culture"and "diaspora." Now thatthe fundamentalistge-
nie is out of the bottleandinto the publicdomain,the task
remains,first,to traceits genealogyacrossdisciplines,and
thento attemptto tease out some commonthemesandthe
logic underlyingits metaphoricaluse and emotionalap-
peal.
In an effortto drawtogether,or at leastjuxtapose,some
of the differentapproachesto the topic of fundamentalism,
I shuttlebetweenscholarly,popular,believer,and anthro-
pologicalconstituencies.Comparativeand criticalreviews
of existingstudiesof fundamentalism aresupplementedby
illustrationsfrom field materialand experience,focusing
on problemsof managingthe differing voices of field-
worker,other local observers,outside media commenta-
tors,andthe rhetoricof demagogues,in contrastwiththose
of the insidersthemselves.Field encountershelp to estab-
lish in whose minds the quest for fundamentalslies-
whose problem?-and how these problemsare communi-
cated.Later,I tracksome of the moreexpansiveandcava-
lier uses of fundamentalist imageryandreflecton how far
these revealor addto ourunderstanding of a generic"fun-
damentalist"mind-set,or whethersuch semanticexcur-
sions stretchthe termbeyondany utility.Finally,is there,
as some broadband thinkersarebeginningto suggest,some
more general human concern for ultimate values and

AmericanAnthropologist103(2):481-498. Copyright? 2001, AmericanAnthropologicalAssociation

482 ANTHROPOLOGIST
AMERICAN * VOL. 103, No. 2 * JUNE2001
meaningsin a fast-changingworld, whetherwithin con-
ventionalreligionsor beyondthem?It may be no coinci-
dencethatfundamentalism hasbeen addedto the academic
and public lexicon at a time when the global (dis)order,
with its attendanttransnationalism, cosmopolitanism,plu-
ralisms, relativisms,and movementof people and ideas
across the world has contributedto an obsessive concern
with identity,authenticity,andultimatevalues-the funda-
mentals of existence. These conditions,characterizedby
paradox,creolizations,crossingof once forbiddenbounda-
ries in the face of bewilderingchoice, it may be argued,
precipitatea renewed quest for guiding principles,for
greaterideologicalcertainty.For those with low tolerance
for ambiguity,the attractionsof a prescriptivefundamen-
talist solutionare evident.In a sense, the one set of proc-
esses feeds on the other,in a kindof dialectic.
A Genealogy of Fundamentalism
Takinginspirationfrom a Foucauldiannotionof "gene-
alogy," as turned,for example,to the historyof "capital"
(Pasquino1991:105ff.), I highlightthe principalepisodes
in the rise and uses of the termfundamentalismover the
past century.This approachis paraphrased by Bartelson:
"how to write a history of something lacking a stable
meaningand reference,and which does not exist, except
by being known,"a "historyof an unthoughtpartof our
own ... understanding,"which must be a "historyof
epistemicdiscontinuities"(1995). Thusthe idea of funda-
mentalismmaybe presentedin the formof a seriesof "epi-
sodes,"as examplesof momentsfromthe past,ratherthan
as a narrativehistory(of the past as) a linearsequenceof
events.
From its originalroots in a particularstyle of turn-of-
the-centuryAmericanChristianity("themotherof all fun-
damentalisms"?), to its inductiveapplicationin otherrelig-
ions and situations,and partlythroughthe indiscriminate
images of the contemporarymedia, fundamentalismhas
undergoneseveral reincarnations.Nevertheless,its resid-
ual Christianbaggagelingerson in manypopularimages.
Retrospectively,those who write aboutearly Christian
fundamentalismssituatethem in the "ideologicalvacuum
of modernity"(cf. Van Vucht Tijssen et al. 1995:16), a
statecharacterizedby its distancefromthe totalisticrelig-
ious worldviewof medieval Christendom.Underthe ef-
fects of post-Enlightenmentmodernity,as epitomizedin
Voltaire's "6crasezl'inf~ime,"both religion and meaning
were crushedsimultaneously,andideas of progressgravi-
tated from the spiritualto the material.Centralto the
"modernity"crisis lies a basic problemover the natureof
secularism.Since the Enlightenment,the sacred is sup-
posed to have been detachedfrom the rest of life, putting
scientists(and social scientists)in chargeof fundamental
explanationsand life paradigms.One consequenceis that
religionhasbeendemotedfromits foundationalpositionas
the ultimaterepositoryof meaning,answeringthe ques-
tions of why as well as how, which the sciences have not
been entirelyableto fill. To Westernscholars,the assertion
that "religionis a way of life" (leavinglittle space for the
secular),is intuitivelyacceptablefrom a field informant
from a "tribal"or "ancestral"type of religion, or from
membersof otherfaiths(eg., mostMuslims),butforWest-
ern Christianity,this is largelyexpectedonly from a mar-
ginal minority,who are thereby "othered,"(cf. Harding
1991).
Until the past few decades, moreover,the questionof
studyingbelieving Christiansor Christianmillenariansat
home has been delicate(althoughnot always consciously
acknowledged),while an ambivalenceover measuringab-
solutetruthsandthe sacredwith seculartools may reflecta
lingeringsense of the sacrednessof the topic itself and a
concessionto morepublicsensitivities.
The earliest scholarly representationsof Protestant
Christianfundamentalism wereby sociologistsandhistori-
ans, who addressed themselves squarelyto the social and
materialconditionsof modernity.The rootsof this funda-
mentalismare situatedin the self-righteouslymoralistic,
revivaliststrainsbrewingamongassortedProtestantsin the
social,economic,andexistentialturmoilof industrializing,
urbanizing,immigrantAmerica, evolving in the second
half of the nineteenthcentury.The uncertaintiesandexpe-
riences of alienation,as chronicledby Marsden(1980),
have much in common with what are today presentedas
the conditionsof multiculturalismand modernity,in an
earlyform of globalization.Out of these emergeda series
of religiousrevivals,characterizedby intenseexperiential
expressionsof faith and renewedevangelism,the "Great
Awakening."The emphasisby these revivalistson being
the "chosen"defendersof spiritualboundariesand of the
authentic,originalChristianityof the apostlesin a cosmic
struggleagainstthe satanicOther,led them to reject"lib-
eral"mainlineChristianswho allegedlytreatedtheirscrip-
turesas historicaltextsratherthanthe Wordof God.These
movementsled to a series of publicationsaffirmingthe
"fundamentals" of the faithas a guideto thosewho hadlost
their way. Althoughthere was never total consensuson
these, at minimum,they includedfive basic beliefs in the
virginbirth,the divinityof Christ,the physicalresurrection
of the body, substitutionary atonement,and the inerrancy
of the scriptures.'It is this last item, and a preoccupation
with texts, thathas createdsome of the greatestobfusca-
tionsin dealingwithfundamentalisms in general.
For many Christianscaught in this ferment,salvation
was framedin a millenarianisminspiredby the Book of
Revelationand a belief in the inevitableSecond Coming,
with its defeat of false religions,prophets,and the pope.
Postmillennialistsbelievedthey wereenteringthe last mil-
lenniumin the presentera, after which would follow the
reignof Christ(cf. Marsden1980:49ff.). Beginningin the
1870s, a variantform of premillennialismconcentrated

more on the spiritualdetails of the original "primitive"
Christianityand on preparationfor a more imminentful-
fillment of the prophecies.The sourcesand keys to these
ends wereto be foundin a literalinterpretationof the scrip-
tures,as the Wordof God,immuneto reinterpretation.
Some heirsto Protestantpremillenarianism still flourish
in an assortmentof radicalreligiousmovementsin North
Americatoday, includingthe "Christianidentity"family
(Kaplan1997), and the B'nai Noah and Churchof Israel,
respectively,for whomtheJewishcovenantandgenealogy
provideessential millennialingredients.Here, the funda-
mentalshinge on the ineluctablerootednessof Christianity
in Judaismand on the eventualapocalypsewhose epicen-
ter will be Jerusalem(Kaplan1997).These movementsre-
ject the general trend toward secularism,whereby most
churchesseemedto be accommodatingtoo enthusiastically
to the "world,"as well as all forms of civil religion.For
millennialiststoo, extendingthe social gospel to the spiri-
tually unpreparedwas seen as too indiscriminatelyinclu-
sivist.
In the firsttwo decadesof the twentiethcentury,Protes-
tant fundamentalismtook on a more political mission,
turningAmericansecularnationalismin the directionof a
moralcrusade,an exemplarof Christianleadershipin the
world. This type of "spiritualwarfare"(Diamond 1990)
has continuedin variousmoralrearmament andmoralma-
jority movements,throughthe candidacyof Pat Buchanan
for the U.S. presidency,markinga contestedintrusionof
religionintothe politicallife of a countrywhereit is consti-
tutionallya privatematter,from schools to politics. The
God in whom most Americanstrustis a nondenomina-
tional/inclusivedeity, far removed from the more judg-
mental,wrathfulJudgeof the (self-defined)elect.
The Protestantversion of fundamentalismwas most
memorablyepitomized in the 1925 Scopes ("Monkey")
trial, which pitted fundamentalistChristiansagainst the
scientific and intellectualestablishment.The defendant,
J. T. Scopes, was a Tennesseebiology teacher,broughtto
courtby fundamentalistsfor teachingthe theoryof evolu-
tion and therebycontraveningbiblicalauthority.The pro-
file was sharpenedwhen U.S. DemocratWilliamJennings
Bryanttook the fundamentalistside, while the other was
representedby lawyerClarenceDarrowanda sympathetic
news reporter,H. L. Mencken.One outcomeof this highly
dramatizedcase, which the fundamentaliststechnically
won, turnedout to be a Pyrrhicvictory.It left an indelible
image in the public mind of fundamentalistChristiansas
anachronistic,anti-intellectualand antiscience,one that
has been widely extrapolatedas a generic featureof so-
labeledfundamentalisms everywhere.Whenpairedwiththe
obsessive scripturalliteralismand antihermeneuticquali-
ties mentioned,the caricatureas a yardstickfor measuring
fundamentalismsacrossthe worldwas established.Never-
NAGATA / BEYOND THEOLOGY 483
theless,by andlarge,it is only a minorityof Christianswho
wearthe fundamentalist badgewithpride.
A more panopticview reveals that a term that can be
tracedto a specificProtestantChristianprototypehas pro-
gressively shed its religiousclothingand insinuateditself
into forms of nationalismand otherpowerfulideologies.
Fundamentalism has also shiftedits emphasisfrom scrip-
tures and textualcasuistryto associationwith social and
political movements to particularstyles of Othering.It
leadsto questsforcertainty,anda mind-setimmuneto dia-
logue or alternatives,a denial of relativism.Given this
volatility,it is essentialto clarify who uses the term,and
with whatintent.Scenariosof sucheventsas the bombings
of New York'sWorldTradeCenterandof the government
buildingsin OklahomaCity evoke the witch-hunting,de-
monizing, stereotyping,and uncompromisingmind-set
seekingthe certaintyandsatisfactionof emotionalclosure,
and provide testimony to the power of fundamentalist
ways of labelingandknowing.
Fundamentalisms in Other Faiths:
A Metaphor Whose Time Has Come
As the fundamentalistgaze moves beyondChristianity,
its referentshave also shifted,to new scenes andgoals. In-
itially,the generalizationof fundamentalism to otherscrip-
turalfaiths,principallythosewitha strongtextualtradition,
was in the hands and heads of scholarswith a Western,
usuallyJudeo-Christian, background.Forthemthe central
issue was credalor doctrinal,where the measurewas the
contentof belief and its apparentfaithfulnessto a specific
sacredcanon or originalWord. In the case of a Catholic
variant,intigrisme,launchedat the beginningof the twen-
tiethcenturyby a Vaticanofficial,Msgr.Bernini,as a form
of counterattack againstthe growingmodernism,intellec-
tualism, and liberalismof the Church,the fundamentalsto
be defendedwere sacramentalandpapalratherthanbibli-
cal infallibility(Coleman1992). On this level, fundamen-
talismremaineda theologicalproblem,best left to theolo-
gians, although some social scientists, too, still see the
relationshipbetweenadherenceto a sacredtext andpraxis
as its mostdistinctivefeature(cf. Lawrence1995;Bhikkhu
Parekh 1994). In Gellner's hands (cf. 1992), the textual
measureled to similarconclusions,thoughby a different
route.For Gellner,the hegemony of the (written)divine
word is inherentlyantirational,anti-Enlightenment, and
leads inevitablyto categoricalor formulaicthinking,"re-
pudiatingmodernism."It is a developmenthe observesin
some Islams,anddoes not shrinkfromexcoriating(1992:
2). Gellner'sanalysisof the belief anddiscourseof the fun-
damentalismof the Otheris criticalandjudgmental,from
which he distanceshimself, as an outsiderfor whom ra-
tionality is the supremevirtue. In a personaland ironic
twist to the argument,Gellner commits himself to the
school of "rationalistfundamentalism,"far from the
484 AMERICAN * VOL. 103, No. 2
ANTHROPOLOGIST * JUNE2001
"substantiveabsolutizationof... post-Axialworld relig-
ions, [instead]prostratinghimselfbeforethe universalpro-
ceduralprinciplesof knowledge,"(1992:80), namely the
scientific method.But in so doing, Gellnerimplicitlyand
ironicallyacknowledgesthe potencyof the fundamentalist
label, in his own totalizingcommitmentto an absolute
(scholastic)value,as a distinctivemind-setandworldview
in its own right.I returnto this questionbelow.
The above argumentsapply principallyto those scrip-
tural faiths where preoccupationwith doctrineand creed
have historicallytakenthe formof debates,commentaries,
interpretations,andcasuistry,namelythe Abrahamicrelig-
ions, as opposedto Buddhismand Hinduism,althoughas
will be seen, Sikhism may be an intermediatecase here.
Such is the contextof the JewishTalmudiccommentaries
and of Qur'anicexegeses by Muslim ulama (scholars).
Thusamidthe diversityof Jewishscripturalinterpretations
of the Haredim(literally,"thosewho tremblebefore the
Lord,"in Isaiah'sinjunction),the devotionto the Talmud
andMishnah(code of Jewishlaw), makesthe secularstate
of Israel an "abomination," a denial of trustin messianic
deliverance without human political intervention (cf.
MartyandAppleby1992:95).
In the case of Islam,particularlysince the 1979 Iranian
revolution,some scholars,includinganthropologists,have
zeroed in on the problems of Qur'anic interpretation
amongthe ulamaandtheirimplicationsfor life in different
historical,social, and culturalconditions(cf. Kuran1993;
Nash 1991; Roff 1987; Watt 1988). Using two opposing
approachesto textualexegesis, ijtihadandtaqlid,as meas-
ures of fundamentalisttendencies,such scholarswere, if
unconsciously,bringingto bearcertainassumptionsfrom
the Christianmodel.Whereasulamasubscribingto the ijti-
had school are theologicallyopen to constantreinterpreta-
tion (tafsiran)of the Qur'an,in consultationwith sources
from the Hadithaccordingto changingtimes and needs,2
followers of the taqlidtradition,by contrast,are less flex-
ible andattemptto staycloserto theirvision of the original,
textual-inspired(Arab)lifestyle andmorality,as it hadbe-
come establishedby the eleventh centuryof the present
era.
Although the Christian-informed instinct would be to
the
designate taqlidstyle as more "fundamentalist," from
the Muslimperspective,however,parallelswiththe Chris-
tian experiencemay not be appropriate,and Muslimsdis-
tancethemselvesfromthisperceivedChristianbias.In dis-
cussion,the positiontakenis thatno Muslimquestionsthe
revealed,unchanging(fundamental)statusof the Qur'an,
hence sees no reasonto differentiatesome partsas more
fundamentalthanothers.To the extentthatscripturalfun-
damentals(usul) are a given-central to the study of Is-
lamic jurisprudence(usuliyyah)-scripturalliteralnessis
not an issue here.Modernistsandtraditionalists equallyac-
cept textualauthority,and in this sense they declare,"we
are all fundamentalists." But there is a finer point to be
madehere.The infallibilityor sacrednessof the Qur'anlies
in the mode and mediumof its transmissionas the unal-
tered,inimitableWordof God madetext, revealedto the
Prophetin one place at one time andunyieldingto histori-
cal evidence of alternateversions of Qur'anictexts (cf.
Lester 1999). This precludestreatingthe Qur'anas a his-
torical or literarytext,3or even its translationinto lan-
guagesotherthanthe originalArabic.Debatesover mean-
ing or interpretationmay thus be engaged without
challenging the foundationsor sanctity of the revealed
scripturein itself.
In the Muslim experience,as most would insist, there-
fore,the fundamentalsremain:thereis no needto justify or
rediscoverthem,andno needfor the misleadingterm"fun-
damentalism."The MalaysianMuslim scholar, Chandra
Muzaffar,would rejecteven such labels as "revivalism,"
for its implicationsof a worldviewthatis lost or antiquated
(1987:2-3). Chandraandfollowersof local Islamistmove-
mentspreferto drawattentionto the past gloriesof Islam,
for which the appropriatecontemporaryresponseshould
be a "resurgence." To non-MuslimEnglishspeakers,these
may appear casuistryor semantictrivia:the sensitive
as
anthropologist, however,wouldrecognizeit as a statement
of identityin relationto the religiousOther,includingob-
servinganthropologists. All of these statementsare exam-
ples of verbaljousting, partof the greatgame of self-
as
distancing from followersof otherfaiths.
In the Islamic scholarlycommunity,therefore,funda-
mentalismis not spontaneouslyclaimednormuchdebated
internally.However, for purposesof interreligious/inter-
culturalcommunication,or when straitjacketed by a world
"masterlanguage,"some variantof the Englishtermmay
be used, and this questionhas been introspectivelyexam-
ined by some Malay Muslims when confrontedwith the
need to translatebetween English and anotherlanguage,
such as Malay (e.g., W. Said Al-Mehdi 1992:14-16).
When the Englishtermis used, however,it may be in the
manner of a reverse orientalism,turned as a weapon
againstotherreligiousenemies,for example,"Zionisfun-
damentalis"or "NasranilKristen fundamentalis,"or even
"KuasaBuddhafundamentalis"(fundamentalistBuddhist
power), used by Malay Muslims in verbalretaliationfor
the allegedpersecutionby the Burmesegovernmentin the
early1990s of its MuslimRohingyaminority.
The influenceof religiousculturalcrossingsin promot-
ing the circulationideas aboutfundamentalismis evident
from the experimentationamong some (usuallyWestern-
educatedor exposed) intellectualswith a defiantlyinde-
pendent approachto scholarship.Rejection of Western
academicparadigms,epistemologies,and themes has in-
spired attemptsto develop alternateschools of (Islamic)
socialscienceandeconomics,basedon classicIslamicsources
and values, of which the most popularamong Muslim
studentsacross the world is that of the Pakistanithinker,
Sayyid Maulana Abdul A'la Maududi. Such projects

highlightthe constanttension,in an interconnected,trans-
parentworld,between ideas of a universalisticscience as
diffusedthroughWesternlanguagesandeducation,on the
one hand,and culturallyappropriate(non-Western)alter-
natives,on the other.Such ventures,whichWesternschol-
ars often label fundamentalist(cf. Kuran1993), obviously
reflectin parta widerpoliticalvision andagenda,a bias on
bothsides.In fact,bothsides arelockedin the ironcages of
theirown respectiveworldviews,withlittle will to seek an
areaof compromise.
One renownedWesternscholarof Islam,Montgomery
Watt,acknowledgesthe inappropriateness of fundamental-
ism as a referentin the Muslimcontextbutconfesses,"be-
cause of popularjournalisticusage, it has been thought
convenientto retainthe term'fundamentalist' in the title of
this book [IslamicFundamentalismand Modernity],even
though it is incorrect"(emphasisadded)(Watt 1988:2).
For Watt,following the lead of the anthropologicallyin-
clined Algerianscholar,MohdArkoun,truefundamental-
ism lies in the inabilityto imagine or penetratethe "un-
thinkable"(impensable)or "unthought"(impensd),or to
ventureinto unchartedideologicalterritory.In effect, it is
an attitudeof mindas muchas the contentof a specificthe-
ology. By this measure,to approachthe Qur'anas a his-
toricaltext ratherthan a sacredcanon would be not only
nonfundamentalist butalso non-Islamic.As yet, asidefrom
a small minorityincludingArkoun,thereare few Islamic
equivalentsto Mary Douglas's deconstructionof Jewish
and Old Testamentworldviewsandreligiousdietarylaws
in the Books of DeuteronomyandLeviticus(1966). Schol-
ars (such as Arkoun)who attemptto purveythe fine dis-
tinctionbetweenthe sacrednessof the scripturalWordand
the possibility of contextualizedinterpretationof that
WordmakelittleheadwayamongmostMuslims.
Insofaras fundamentalismis perceivedto be a product
of scripturalreligions, whetherAbrahamicor other, the
questionof textualhermeneuticsand casuistrydominates
even the morecomprehensiveeffortsto arriveat a theory
of fundamentalism. Probablythe supremeeffortin thatdi-
rectionis the five-volume magnumopus editedby Marty
and Applebybetween 1990 and 1994, arisingout of their
extensive "fundamentalismproject"at the Universityof
Chicago.In theirown commentaries,the editorsprovidea
prescriptivechecklist of features ("the fundamentalsof
fundamentalism")that has lengthenedas new cases are
addedto theircollection,such thatno single case is likely
to meetall the requirements.Some studiesin the collection
leave the impressionof being writtento a mandate,so as to
meet the procrusteanmodels createdby the editors,(e.g.,
Swearer1991 on TheravadaBuddhisms).Throughout there
is confusion between normativeand descriptivecharac-
teristics of fundamentalism.The fundamentalistcharac-
teristicslisted by Marty and Appleby include some that
seem gratuitous,such as the qualityof "scandalousness,"
NAGATA / BEYOND THEOLOGY 485
while thatof "militancy"may only applyin cases of certain
politicalmovements.Otherfeaturescommonlyassociated
with fundamentalism, againdirectlytraceableto its Chris-
tian source(andnotablythe Scopes trial),relateto alleged
antiscientism.However,even Martyand Appleby recog-
nize, as do many of their contributorsand also Caplan
(1987), thatmost of those they designateas fundamental-
ists are far from being the proverbialLudditesbut rather
turnscience andtechnologyto theirown chosenends.Fa-
cility with computers,databases,and all forms of media,
includingtelevangelism,and use of all modem forms of
transportand even weaponry, is the norm. In today's
world,mediaeval-robed Islamistsoperatingcomputersand
saffron-robedswamis and monks jet-setting aroundthe
worldarebecomingan increasinglyfamiliarsight.
The importanceof the Martyand Applebyopus lies in
its ambitiousandcomprehensivescope,in movingbeyond
the scripturalto social and political issues. Among the
morecontentiousnontextualfundamentalist characteristics
raisedby Martyand Appleby is that of "anti-modernity."
This rests on an understandingof "modernity,"which
raisesas manyquestionsas the (fundamentalist) antithesis
whichrestson it, or worse,runsthe riskof generatinglittle
more than tautologies.Nonmaterialaspects of modernity
are hardlymeasurableand run the gamutfrom Gellner's
concernwith rationalityto involvementwith marketsand
globalization.However, the attributionof "anti-moder-
nity"may reflecta more generalcritiqueof modernityas
paradigmor fact,evidenceof the limitsof a universalproc-
ess. The existenceof the fundamentalist, backwardcultural
Otherhelps to secure the hegemonic "modem"point of
view, whichis relegatedto the marginswith otherminori-
ties (cf. Harding1991).
A parallelquestionarisesover the recentpreoccupation
with indigenousnessandother"authentic" local traditions,
as representatives of a new genreof movementsin questof
moreultimatefundamentalsof cultureandidentity(cf. van
Vucht Tijssen 1995). It may be more productiveto see
these as alternativeformsof modernityratherthanas anti-
modem, and as centralto identitypolitics.Each such case
has its own fundamentalsor sacredcanons, whetherland
(for JewishGushEmunimdefendersof the WestBank)or
the unbreachablegenealogical ideal of Ultra-Orthodox
Jews in theirresistanceto conversion(MartyandAppleby
1992). In fact, as MartyandApplebyandtheirfellow con-
tributorsthemselvesshow by theirexamples,the ultimate
fundamentalvaluesthatseem to animatepeople to action
andrhetoricoftenhaveless to do with scripturesor moder-
nity perse thanotherissues of identity.Emergingfromthe
Martyand Applebyenterpriseis a recognitionof the "in-
ventiveness"(1992:18), of the diversity of the ultimate
goals of fundamentalists.In these contributions,many
from anthropologists,we hearfew voices of fundamental-
ists themselves,since the issues that are claimedto move
486 * VOL. 103, No. 2
AMERICANANTHROPOLOGIST * JUNE2001
them are recordedand editedfor the reader.Probablythe
majorweaknessof manyof the contributionsto the Marty
and Appleby volumes is their taking for grantedwhat
shouldhave been demonstrated,and failing to clarifythe
distinctionbetweenthe views of subjectsandauthors.This
subtle shift of intellectualgears, from descriptive/ethno-
graphicto interpretativeand analytical,courtsthe danger
of confusingthe voices. Who is speakingon behalfof the
Other,andcan the Otherspeakback?At thisjuncture,pre-
occupationwith scriptures,theologies,and values moves
intothezoneof powersof representation andidentitypolitics.
From Texts to "Terrorists":
Fundamentalisms as Political Movements
Now that the termfundamentalismhas become indis-
pensableto the descriptiverepertoireand explanatoryar-
mamentariumof the mediaand of manypoliticalpundits,
and with the turnof internationalevents, it has entereda
new cycle. The focus has shiftedfrom textualexegesis to
politicalactivismand even violence, as in Martyand Ap-
pleby's axiomthat"fundamentalists fightback"(1992:17).
This has most popularlybeen identifiedwith Islam.More
narrowly,it has fostereda publicvisionof all Islamas mili-
tant, perpetuallyengaged in jihad (holy war), and politi-
cally regressive.
The a prioriequationof fundamentalismwith terrorism
and violence is the theme of an entire volume by Mark
Juergensmeyer(2000), which covers a selection of the
moreoutstanding(andmedia-seductive)eventsthathelp to
entrenchthis idea in the world'smind.Underthe title,Ter-
ror in the Mind of God, he describeswith dramaticeffect
the assassinationof Jewishleaders,Sikh violence,andthe
bombingsin NorthernIreland,on the Tokyo subway,and
of the WorldTradeCenterandabortionclinics,as variants
of a single theme.His sensationalpresentationonly serves
to reinforcepublic stereotypesbut that does little to ad-
vance understandingof fundamentalismas a social phe-
nomenonor the nuancesof fundamentalist wordgames.
Since 1979 (the year of the Iranianrevolution),aca-
demic, political,andpublicattentionhas turnedtowardIs-
lam, where most examples of fundamentalismare of so-
ciopoliticalmovements,usuallyrepresentingchallengesto
the elites and regimes in their home states. This view is
generallyacceptedalso by Islamic scholars(e.g., Ashgar
Ali Engineer1990; Abdel SidahmedandEhteshani1996;
Tibi 1998). Even when couched in theologicallanguage,
throughthe invocationof ijtihadby such late-nineteenth-
centurymodernistsand "reformists"as Egypt's Jamalal-
AfghaniandMuhdAbduh,4in theirquestto accommodate
Islamto Westernmodernity,the agendahas been as much
politicalas religious.Such views andcriseshavecontinued
in politicalform into today's postcolonialstates,inspiring
assortedmovementsfrom West Africato SoutheastAsia.
Commonthemesin most countrieswhereIslamistsplay a
public role revolve around the legitimacy of political
authority,ofteninstigatedby a new class of educated,tech-
nologicallyliterateyoungpeople with substantialWestern
exposure and experience,yet few prospectsfor upward
mobility or political power of their own (cf. Arjomand
1995). Modes of contestationrangefrom violentattempts
to seize poweror effect revolutionarydestabilization,as in
Egypt, Afghanistan,and Algeria,to more subtleformsof
counterhegemonicstrategyto co-opt or influencegovern-
ments by moralandethicalsuasion,the choice of most of
Malaysia's dakwah movements (see note 9) (Chandra
1987; Hussin 1990; Jomo and ShaberyCheek 1992; Na-
gata 1980, 1984, 1994a, 1997, 1999). Construing"moder-
nity" in political terms, in opposing the secular nation-
state, these movements would probably fit Marty and
Appleby's characterizationof "anti-modernity." In fact,
these activistsare engagedin a bid for powerin theirown
right,usinghigh technologywherenecessary,as a version
of alternatemodernity.
Of the few alternateideologies capableof challenging
and transcendingprevailingnationalisms,Islampossesses
a repertoireof powerfulsymbolsandorganizational modes
readilyadaptableto politicalaction(cf. RudolphandPisca-
tori 1997). As Sidahmedand Ehteshani(1996:3) observe,
however, the theological credentialsand textual knowl-
edge of mostpopulistIslamistleaderslabelledby outsiders
as "fundamentalist" are often ratherthin, in comparison
with the traditionalreligious ulama. In place of detailed
scripturalexegeses, they make maximumrhetoricalmile-
age out of a limitednumberof carefullyselected,crowd-
pleasinganecdotesand quotations,often from the Hadith
(see note 2), to rally their followers. For urban,literate
Muslims, many of these highly condensedbut evocative
themes are propagatedin the floods of popularpamphlets
and paperbacks(the Frenchlivres de chevet)in the kiosks
of cities in bothMuslimcountriesandthe West, whichare
read as avidly as pulp fiction (cf. Carr61985; Eickelman
1992).
Much is heardamongIslamiststodayaboutthe Islamic
state. This is often elaboratedon by statementsaffirming
the "inseparability of religion and politics in Islam."It is
hardto find consensuson this on the basis of writingson
classical Islam alone (cf. Carr6 1985), but an emerging
sense todayamongsuch scholarsas Arkounis thattheidea
of the Islamicstateis in largepartone responseto the na-
tion-state,supportedby retrospectivemyths selectedfrom
classicalandOttomanperiods.The argumentcouldthusbe
advancedthat the ideas of the Islamic state representyet
anothervision of modernity,a view also sharedby Euben
(1999).
Finally,returningcircuitouslyto the originalProtestant
fundamentalists, they too have shiftedinto higherpolitical
gear. Since World War II, not only has evangelist Pat
Buchananmade at least two bids for the Americanpresi-
dencybutthe politicalventuresof some of theseevangelical

activists such as Pat Robertson'sOperationBlessing in
CentralAmerica(eg., Diamond 1990), have become leg-
endary.In theirpolitical form, such overseasmovements
are as muchinspiredby a particularbrandof Americanna-
tionalism,a spiritualarmamentarium againstcommunism,
and a vision of the role of the United Statesas an exem-
plary moral and political force in the world. This world
was polarized between friends such as President Rios
Monttof Guatemala,a memberof the evangelistareligious
community,andits enemies,suchas the NicaraguanSand-
inistas, demonizedas the great Satan.While it is recog-
nized thatnot all Pentecostalistsregardthemselvesas fun-
damentalists,in the fickle and unstableworld of label-
mongering,they areoftenpopularlyso labelled.
The argumentthat political militancyhas superseded
concernovertextsin the publicandmediaportrayalof fun-
damentalismis supportedby the identificationof funda-
mentalisms in non-Abrahamicreligion zones, such as
South Asia. Into this range fall the Sikhs (Oberoi 1993;
Van der Veer 1995); the HinduRashtriyaSwayamsevak
Sangh (RSS) and its political wing, the BharatiyaJanata
Party(BJP) (Frykenberg1993; Van der Veer 1994); and
the militantSinhalesemonksof Sri Lanka(Swearer1991).
Close to the surfacein all these cases lie transparently
po-
liticalagendas,whose appealto religioustexts is minimal,
or subordinatedto particularinterestgroups,even within
the so-calledreligiouscommunity.Whilethe BJPandRSS
have madethe defense of a templeto the HinduGod Ram
at the sacredsite of Ayodhya as theirprincipalcause, the
BJP's electoralsuccess5revealsits politicalambitions.The
religiousideologicalpartof the BJP programincludesthe
rewritingof Hindu-centeredschool historytexts and em-
bodies a strongstreakof anti-Muslimandanti-Sikhexclu-
sivism.As withmanyIslamistmovements,the RSS appeals
to youthwho feel deprivedof powerandotheropportuni-
fromthe uppercastes,who resentpre-BJP
ties, particularly
policies of affirmativeaction favoringthe lower castes.
Here theremay be parallelswith politicallymarginalized
andunemployedyouthin Islamistmovementselsewhere.
On the situationin Sri Lanka,Swearer,like some other
contributorsto the MartyandApplebyenterprise,valiantly
attemptsto fit the politically active Sinhalese Buddhist
monks in theirresistanceto non-BuddhistTamils into an
externalmodelof fundamentalism. A contrastinginsiders'
view, however, indicatesthat the term is not used locally
and that this is more of an ethnic or nationalistconflict,
with roots going back to an earlierprotonationalist, anti-
Christian movement in the colonial era (Obeyesekere
[1966]1975).These contradictoryinterpretations are fully
exposed in a locally edited volume on the topic, where
Westerners'characterization of the monks' movementas
fundamentalistdoes not resonatewith those of local com-
munities,for whom the issue is one of minorityidentities
(BatholomeuzandDe Silva 1998).This leaves Sri Lankan
NAGATA / BEYOND THEOLOGY 487
scholarspoiseduncertainlybetweenoutsiders'andindige-
nousimages.
Recent developmentsamong the Sikhs since the early
1980shave seen an intensificationof moves for an autono-
mousstate(Khalistan),andfor the recognitionof the Sikhs
as an ethnonationas well as a religiouscommunity.In this
case, it is one segmentof the largercommunitythathas
taken the initiative and, in engaging in militancy, has
drawnfrom the writingsof its Gurusone particulartradi-
tion, previouslynot so centralto Sikh practice(Dietrich
1987). This is consummatedin the highly politicizedDal
Khalsamovementthatcame to life following Indianinde-
pendenceand led the oppositionagainst Sikhs who sup-
portedthe CongressParty,and Hindugovernmentforces.
Todaythe Khalsahas become an integralpartof Sikh life,
with its militarycorpsof males preparedfor offensiveand
defensive action, the group that gives some Sikhs their
"fundamentalist" charactertoday. While Oberoi (1993)
notes use of a recent neologism, mulvad,purportingto
translatethe idea of fundamentalisminto Punjabi,this is
acknowledgedwithinthe Sikhcommunityto be a response
to dialogue with outsiders.When characterizinginternal
differencesin religious and political commitment,Sikhs
themselves merely see "differences"6(Dusenbery1988:
337). Once they have migratedto Westernsites such as
Vancouver,Canada,however, these "differences,"under
the influenceof prevailingterminologies(especiallyof the
media),adoptthe "fundamentalist" code.
As the fundamentalistfocus has shiftedto politicalter-
rain,the intrusionof differentvoices appearsto multiply,
along with the interestsand investmentsof involved and
observingparties.As a result,the fundamentalistidea un-
dergoesinflationandrisksbothbeing confusedanddeval-
ued,as it is cavalierlyappliedto a growingmotleyof high-
profile political and ethnic movements where religion
appearsas butone prominentingredient.
The Fundamentalist as "Other":
The Tyranny of Labels
The propensityin both academicand popularcirclesto
locatefundamentalisms in Islamicpoliticalmovementshas
the characterof a latter-dayvariantof orientalism,whereby
concernsandlabelsof a non-MuslimWesternconstituency
are projectedonto Other populations.Inevitably,funda-
mentalismis shapedby discursivepracticesthatportrayre-
sponsesto the worldin a form of culturalcritiquecontrol-
led by those with the greatestopportunityand power to
imposetheirworldviews.The powerto defineandcontrol
situationsthroughlabelingwas mostegregiouslyshownin
the conclusions"spontaneously" reachedover the perpe-
tratorsof bombingson U.S. publicbuildingsat home and
in embassiesabroadin the late 1990s. In these events, a
distinct demonizing or witch-hunting mentality was
crudelyapparent.As notedabove, Muslimsrarelyassume
488 AMERICAN * VOL. 103, No. 2 * JUNE2001
ANTHROPOLOGIST
the fundamentalistlabel themselves, althoughthey may
use it in crosslinguisticdialogueto facilitatecommunica-
tion, or else reserveit for theirown enemies,such as Zion-
ists, in a reverseorientalistbacklash.Muslim scholars,in
discussingIslamistmovements,will allow the termabso-
lutism (as used by Said), or even extremism(cf. Ashgar
1990), to avoid capitulationto the tyrannyof being classi-
fied by theirOthers.
EdwardSaid, a PalestinianChristian,has askedrhetori-
cally (cf. Ashgar 1990:62), "Why was it that political
events seemed reduciblein so pavloviana way, to the pe-
culiaritiesof Islam?"He concludes:"mainlybecausethe
news media, as well as governmentaland academicex-
perts, seemed to have agreed implicitlynot to recognize
politicaldevelopmentsas political,butto representthemas
a cosmic dramapittingthe civilizedas we like it againstthe
uncivilized 'barbaric.'" Jurgensmeyer(1993:1) calls it a
"new cold war"but on balanceprefersthe term"religious
nationalism,"for many are cases (cf. also Haynes 1994)
where the issues are those of oppressedconstituencies,or
nascentreligiouscivil society movementsagainstthe state
(Rudolphand Piscatori1997). In othercases, entirestates
engagein religiousrhetoricandintensificationas partof an
anti-Westernagenda.
A "dialogic"model of interpretation is one developed
most effectively by Euben(1999), who locatesfundamen-
talistdiscursivelanguageandpracticesas hermeneuticre-
sponses to "different-lifeworlds."She takes for granted
thatall interpretation is a "fusionof horizons"andmay as-
sume an agonisticcharacter(1999:36-37). Euben'sfocus
is exclusively on Islam, througha meticulousscrutinyof
the ideas of "modernists"such as Syed Qutb and "refor-
mist"Afghani,as they triedto come to termswith an en-
croachingWesternworldfuelledby Enlightenmentprinci-
ples. Their views are presentedas part of a responseto
Enlightenmentvalues,in whichthey see (the darkside of)
individualism,secularity,and moralrelativismsas central
to the crises of modernity.In this hermeneutic,theirviews
can be representedas no less rationalas those of the En-
lightenmentthey reject(Euben 1999:140-141) and, more
daringly,no less rationalthan the civilizationalclashes
prophesied by Samuel Huntington,(Euben 1999:165).
Ratherthanparticipatingin or addingto the war of words,
Euben serves as nonjudgmental/nonoppositional porte-
paroleor mediator.
It is hardly novel to propose that the fundamentalist
Otherthen tendsto coincide with the enemy dujour.This
is one reason why the fundamentalistfocus has shifted
across geographicaland religiousdomainsover time. To-
day, such shifts are just as likely to be situational.This
helps to explain how the Afghan mujahiddin,locked in
combat with the Soviet enemy in the 1980s, could be
praisedas "freedomfighters"by theirAmericanbackersat
the time, while the presentTaliban,viewed, amongother
things, as protectors of American enemy Osama bin
Laden,are unequivocally"fundamentalist." Even the past
Presidentof Indonesia,AbdurrahmanWahid, otherwise
known as a pluralist,moderateMuslim, was reportedin
late 1999 to have chastisedthe dissidentAcehneseminor-
ity as fundamentalistto make a politicalpoint.This point
canbe illustratedfurtherby two anecdotesthatrevealsome
of the intricaciesand casuistryof the Otheringprocess.
Both events occurredat local universitiesin a largeCana-
diancity, the firstat a studentpoliticalmeeting,the second
at a multicultural Women'sDay celebration.
In one event, the "fundamentalist" label shifted refer-
ence severaltimes withinthe space of an hour.At a 1998
studentmeeting of CanadianYoung Socialists,the topic
was billed to explorethe questionas to why "thewestern
capitalistestablishmentand their governments"so irre-
sponsiblyuse the fundamentalistword in connectionwith
Muslimseverywhere,(with the obvioussubagendaof dis-
paragingthe "capitalist"bias in name-calling).This event
had been well advertisedin the universitywhere it was
held and at least half the audienceconsisted of curious
Muslims,who werenotcard-carrying socialists.The open-
ing statementby one of the young socialists,followingthe
de rigueurdenouncementof the capitalistagendain princi-
ple, led up to the advertisedargumentof the day.This con-
cernedthe subordinationof oppressednon-Westernpeo-
ples underglobalcapitalism,includingespeciallyMuslims
and otherminorities,as an exploitedclass in the Marxian
sense.In this respect,wentthe argument,third-worldMus-
lims sharethe same fate andsufferthe same disempower-
ment as workingclasses everywhereandhence shouldbe
preparedto makecommoncause witheach otherandunite
againstthe oppressor.In this exegesis, the fundamentalist
termwas glossed as a classic form of linguisticmystifica-
tion or false consciousnessto preventtheirrecognitionof
sharedinterestsor cooperationon the same front.The ex-
ploitationrhetoricobviously resonatedwith some of the
young Muslims,until they heardthat one of the require-
mentsof makingcommoncause with the socialistswas to
keep religionout of the picture.They learnedthatthereis
no roomfor God in socialistworkeractivism.This stimu-
lated a heateddiscussion,in which the Muslimswere ac-
cused by the socialistsof being overdependenton religion
and sufferingfrom "false consciousness,"while they in
turnrefusedto compromisetheirreligiousidentityor com-
mitment.This createdan ideological impasse,when one
exasperatedyoung socialist declared:"well, you are fun-
damentalistsafterall!"
A comparableexchange occurredon the occasion of
International Women'sDay at a local college in Marchof
1998. Among the assortedbooths was one markedby the
banner"PositiveImagesof Womenin Islam,"occupiedby
a pairof women in voluminousgowns andhead scarves.
In due course, they were approachedby a couple of local
non-Muslim women who ratherabrasively asked what
Islam had to offer at such an event and suggested that

fundamentalism hadno place in a celebrationof feminism.
Then followed some uncomplimentarycomments about
the oppressiveand fundamentalistnatureof Islamin gen-
eral,which causedthe Muslimwomen to respondby ask-
ing whetherit was they or the "radicalfeminists"harassing
themwho werethe morefundamentalist.
In these two episodes,"fundamentalist" is an epithetfor
the Other,invariablynegative,the archenemy,one whose
positionis to be dismissedor vilified, and the goal is de-
monization,regardlessof ideological, political,religious,
or moralsubstance.The inherentlyoppositionalcharacter
of fundamentalismthus takesthe form of a "projectionof
hostility, a weapon of ideological conquest"(Barr 1981:
341). In this spirit,it has been pressedinto serviceinterna-
tionallyas verbalammunitionin a growingnumberof con-
texts, but it must be remembered,the labellingis usually
engagedin a one-way direction,the effect of intercultural
exchangethatis basedon a Westernunderstanding of oth-
ers (cf. Abaza and Stauth1990:223).It is this "epistemo-
logical privilege" (Paine 1995:59) that allows Western
scholarsand public to identify fundamentalismswithout
full appreciationof local sensibilities.As Paine also re-
minds us (1995:59), "inasmuchas the authorialauthority
of explorer/missionary/anthropologist acrossthe centuries
... is that of the eye-witness, [it] will be true to the ob-
server,whetheror not it is to the observed."Or, as Sax
(1998) puts it, the questionof labellingis a "hallof mir-
rors,"one of negotiatingcredibilities,a stand-offbetween
sameness and openness. In this sense, the selections in
Martyand Appleby's volumes all take advantageof this
epistemologicalprivilegeand authorialauthorityin decid-
ing what is or is not fundamentalist,and none of the con-
tributorsadmittedto being fundamentalistthemselvesor
declareda personalposition on the issue. This courtsthe
dangerof introducinga teleologicalcharacterto selections
and definitions,and takes no accountof the fact thatsuch
movementsas Sikhs,Sinhalesemonks,andtheBJPdo not,
in their own vernaculars,define themselves or their re-
gionalenemiesas fundamentalists.
Islam in Malaysia:
Is Fundamentalismthe Issue?
Applying the fundamentalistlens to a specific set of
movements,experiments,anddiscoursesin Malaysiasince
1970 providesan aperguof the changinguses of religious
epithetsboth aboutand by Muslims,in changingpolitical
and social circumstances,and the responsesto these by
non-Muslims.Fromcolonialtimes untilthe late 1960s, Is-
lam was principallyjust one culturalmarkerof Malayeth-
nic identity and a vehicle throughwhich other (Indian,
Arab, or Indonesian)immigrantscould acquire Malay
status(cf. Nagata1979, 1984, 1999). The politicsof Islam
began after independence when a constitutionallyen-
shrinedMalay statusbecame the basis for special rights
NAGATA / BEYOND THEOLOGY 489
vis-a-vis the othermajor(non-Muslim)ethnic communi-
ties.' However,the Malay populationwas also internally
divided. One majorwing formed the foundationof what
was to becometheprincipalethnicsecularpoliticalpartyto
the present(UMNO),while the otherused Islamas a way
of reinforcingand mobilizing a Malay religious ethnic
chauvinismandconsummatedin a religiouspoliticalparty,
eventuallyknown as PAS. The latterwas commonlyde-
scribedas religiously"conservative"in orientation,in its
endorsementof a rural,smallcommunity,religiousschool-
centeredway of life, andin its discouragementof women's
participationin publiclife andmodestdress(thoughnever
requiringfull veilingor hijab).In the Malaystateof Kelan-
tan,wherePAS has locallybeenin powersince 1990,it has
long promotedthe implementationof full Shari'ah(Is-
lamic)law, bothpersonal/civilandcriminal(hudud)codes
buthas beenoverriddenby the secularfederalconstitution8
(Nagata1994a).
Nowherebeforethe mid-1980s,however,was the "fun-
damentalist"epithetheard,save in international,English-
languageexchanges(cf. Chandra1987).Instead,opposing
(UMNO and PAS) partysupportersmutuallyexcoriated
each other,eitheras kafir(unbelievers-a termalso widely
usedfornon-Muslim"infidels"),as haram(religiouslyfor-
bidden),or even as murtad(apostates).Historically,nu-
merous (Naqsybandiyah)Sufi movementshave cropped
up regularlyin Malay ruralcommunities,leaving local
authoritiesapprehensiveof such displaysof alternativere-
ligious power. The epithets used by way of official re-
sponse usually alternatedbetween "deviationist"(song-
sang, menyeleweng) and "Shi'ah." The latter reflects
official Malaysianapprehensionover Iranian(Shi'ite) Is-
lam,or ratherover Iran'sallegedradicalpoliticalinfluence
on young Malays following the Iranianrevolution.The
termfundamentalismhadto waitfor the eventsfollowinga
politicalcrisis and the rise of a new politicalformationin
Malaysia,describedbelow.
Duringthe 1970sand1980s,partlyin responseto events
in Iran,and fueled by contactsthroughrapidlyexpanding
overseasstudentnetworks,a numberof new Islamic(dak-
wah)9movementsarosein Malaysia.Groundedin a more
cosmopolitan,international Muslim worldview,MalayIs-
lam was able to transcendits ethnic base. In the process,
the newly energized dakwah followers, many of whom had
received secular education, suddenly discovered a need to
upgrade their knowledge of Arabic and the Qur'an, and to
reassess the quality of Islam as it was popularly practiced
locally (cf. Chandra 1987; Hussin 1990; Nagata 1984; Zai-
nah 1987). Viewing their country in terms of a new relig-
ious ethic led to a questioning of some of its foundational
national assumptions, notably the alleged secularism and
materialism promoted by government development poli-
cies and the effects of market globalization. Among the ge-
neric dakwah goals was an attemptto find alternatives to the
490 AMERICAN * VOL. 103, No. 2 * JUNE2001
ANTHROPOLOGIST
extremesof such development,and its role in entrenching
elite powerandprivilege.
One such groupwas ABIM (an acronymfor the Islamic
Youth League of Malaysia),foundedin 1970 by Anwar
Ibrahim,a studentleaderat the Universityof Malaya.In-
itially concernedwith Malay languagerightsandidentity,
the emphasissoon shiftedto religionbut was orientedas
much towardsissues of ruralpovertyand socialjustice in
all ethnic groups.Anwarwas rapidlyrecognizedas a for-
midable leader, a force to be contained.Prime Minister
Mahthir'ssolutionwas to co-opt Anwar directlyinto the
UMNO cabinetin 1984, bothto offer a religiouslycorrect
face to the partyandgovernmentandits developmentpoli-
cies, andto recapturethe electoralsupportof conservative
ruralMalaysfromPAS ranks.Anwar'srisingpoliticalstar
culminatedas deputyprime minister,when in 1998, dis-
putes over the economic crisis and corruption,led to his
humiliatingsacking,imprisonment,and trial.The drama
surroundingthis clash of these politicaltitansdid not end
with Anwar'simprisonment.Fromjail, a seriesof "prison
notebooks"-stylelettersissued by Anwar began the con-
structionof the image of a moralhero, ethicaland unsul-
lied by businesscronyismor corruption,whichhe had al-
legedly soughtto resistandexpose, only to lose finally to
his corruptandvengefulmaster.
Duringhis latercareer,Anwarhad attemptedto create
an image of a moregenerouslyinclusiveIslam,transcend-
ing Malay chauvinism,and findingcommon groundwith
the most progressiveideasin Christianity,Buddhism,Hin-
duism, and Confucianism,as a basis for a more unitary
Malaysianidentity(cf. Anwar1996). In partthis was a de-
liberateriposteto the publicationof Huntington'sprovoca-
tive "Clashof Civilizations?"(1993), when Anwarpicked
up the gauntletandtriedto proveHuntington'spredictions
baseless.As in so manyothercases, ABIM andits succes-
sor were as muchconcernedwith identityandpoliticalpo-
sitioningin a changingsociety. Throughoutthe saga, the
publicdiscourseremainedone of politics and ethics, with
surprisingly littleattentionto scriptural
referenceorexegesis.
The mostcontroversial andvisiblydistinctof the dakwah
movementswas Al (originallyDarul)Arqam.Foundedin
1967 by a traditionalreligious teacher, Ustaz Asha'ari,
with Sufi mysticaltendencies,it drewmostof its members,
like the otherdakwahgroups,froma geographically,edu-
cationally,and professionallymobile constituencyof Ma-
lay university and technical students.Arqam's lifestyle
was an attemptto combine modem professionalcareers
with a communallife, basedon a form of Islamicdemoc-
racy sustainedby consultativecommittees(syura)and re-
distributionof resourcesaccordingto need (ma'ash).Insti-
tutionally,Arqam provideda comprehensivealternative
economy and society, with its own schools, clinics, pub-
lishinghouses,andpettycommoditymanufacturing of ha-
lal foods and otheritems, in the spiritof (Arqam'simage
of) a seventhcenturyArabianmoral-religiouscommunity.
Arqam's commitmentto state-of-the-arttechnology, in-
cluding computer graphics and video production,was
epitomizedthroughimages of mediaeval-robed,bearded
men operatingthe latesthardware,who were certainlynot
the Ludditesof olderChristianfundamentalist stereotypes.
Community life revolved around a polygynous family,
whereeach memberhad theirassignedroles and even as-
signed spouses, whose women assumedthe full purdah
(face-veil) attireand submissionto male authority.Many
of these women had high educationalqualificationsand
professionsbutturnedtheseto the goals of the mission,de-
scribingit as ajihad"'(struggle),not for war,butfor peace.
The ultimategoal of the Arqamexperimentwas to serveas
a living moralcritique,highlightingthe allegedlyunprinci-
pled characterof secularnationaldevelopmentpolicy, and
as anexemplarof a moreethicalalternative.
Eventually, Arqam made itself politically vulnerable
throughthe impliedclaimsof UstazAsha'arito be an east-
ern mahdi (messianicfigure),"enhancedby his mystical
connectionsto deceasedreligiousleadersand even to the
ProphetMohammedhimself.Inevitablytheserumorswere
construedby the UMNO authoritiesas signs of danger-
ous political aspirations(Nagata 1999). Among his own
followers,Asha'ari'spersonalauthorityand religiouscre-
dentialslay less in doctrinalor scripturalexegesis thanin
his Sufi-likecapacityto inspirehis followersthroughcom-
munityretreatsandchantingrituals(zikir),andthroughhis
personalleadership.Arqamwas as mucha socialas a relig-
ious movement.Intractable to governmentco-optation,un-
like ABIM's Anwar,Arqamwas finally bannedin 1994,
forcingAsha'arito recant(bertaubat)on publictelevision.
In theirway, all the Malayreligiousanddakwahmove-
ments representedattemptsby the first postcolonialgen-
erationof young Malayleadersto charta paththroughthe
uncertaintiesof cosmopolitanismandglobalization,andto
managethe contradictionof roles for which they had no
role model.They also raiseda significantformof political
andethicalcritique,offeringanalternativevisionof society.
Given the generally lightweight characterof textual
analysisby dakwahleaders,it is instructiveto note the case
of Malay Muslim women's movement,Sisters in Islam.
This groupof highly qualified61iteprofessionaland aca-
demicwomenareattemptingto havetheirindependentand
cosmopolitanlifestyle, freedom of appearancein public
life, recognized as impeccably Islamic to satisfy social
opinion.To this end, the Sistershave invitedto Malaysia
externalreligiousconsultants,expertsin Qur'anicexege-
sis, in classicalArabicandIslamiclaw. One of these is the
internationally knownSudaneselegal specialist,Abdullahi
An-Naim, and another,a Black AmericanMuslim, Chi-
cago-trainedlinguist,andreligiousscholar,AminaWadud
Muhsin, whose ability to navigatearcaneArabic gender
pronouns12 enablesher to detectevidence of male bias in
scholarly commentaries about women's legal and social
statusandrightsfromthe Qur'an.Paradoxically,wherethe

Sisters'way of life wouldhardlyqualifyas fundamentalist
by most popularmeasures,theirmeticulous,obsessiveat-
tentionto the minutiae(usul) of the scriptureswould ap-
pearfundamentalist by the standardsof the originalChris-
tian model, albeit with very different social goals. The
comparisonof the Sisters with Arqamthus suggeststhat
textual literalismmay be directedtowarddifferentends.
Alone, it does not predictother featuresoften associated
with fundamentalism. WhatArqamandthe Sistershave in
commonis theirrespectfor the sacrednessof the text, but
theiruses andinterpretations clearlydiverge.
Whetherthe fundamentalistlabel is appropriateto any
of the MalayMuslimdakwahmovementsdependsless on
the actualcontentof local practiceor style of Islam,as de-
scribed,thanon the currencyof labelsavailableandthe in-
ternalpolitics of the era. It is also influencedby the lan-
guageof communication,to whatextenta foreignaudience
is also intended,and whetheror not externalscholarsor
media are involved.Whereaslocal Muslimslong rejected
fundamentalismin favor of "resurgence"(cf. Chandra
1987, noted above), or sometimes "revivalism"(Zainah
1987), andas long as othertermsof vilification,suchas ex-
tremism,fanaticism,kafir,haram,shi'ah, andmurtadsuf-
ficed, the word was redundant.In certainearlierpolitical
contextstoo, Islamwas sometimesnegativelyidentifiedon
a parwithCommunism'3 as an enemy of the state.Untilre-
cently, fundamentalismwas reservedlargelyfor otherre-
ligions, for example, Zionists, or for convenience when
participatingin an internationaldiscoursein English.It is
only since the end of the 1990s, and the recenthostilities
betweenthe followersof primeMinisterMahathirandAn-
war Ibrahim,thatissues of corruptionanddemocracyand
reformhave escalatedto a degree where fundamentalism
was broughtin to reinforcethe verbalarmamentarium. It
has also been used intermittentlyby outsiders,such as
Nash (1991), albeitsomewhatequivocally,in his contribu-
tion to the MartyandApplebyseries(whose wideragenda
mighthaveprejudgedthe issue somewhat).
The decline or demise of most of the originaldakwah
movements,alongwiththeirassociatedpoliticalthreat,left
PAS as the majorembodimentof a combinedreligiousop-
position. Since it is the partymost frequentlyassignedto
the fundamentalistcategory, at least by outsiders,it is
worth examining more closely its record following the
ousterof AnwarIbrahimin 1998. Since thatdate,PAS has
shown several, not always consistent, faces to different
audiences,as well as exhibitinginternaldifferencesof its
own, leavingopenthe questionas to which is the real/fun-
damentalistPAS?
Taking advantageof the outrageamong many Malay-
sians over the humiliatingand unprincipledtreatmentof
Anwar,14and over the egregiousconditionsof patronage,
nepotism, and corruptionin high places thatthe sacking
revealed,PAS in 1998joined a newly createdmultiethnic,
NAGATA / BEYOND THEOLOGY 491
multireligious "justice" political coalition and party
(Keadilan),whose othercommongoal is oppositionto the
Mahathirestablishment.Keadilansubsequentlyjoined a
full-fledgedpoliticalmultipartycoalition,BarisanAlterna-
tif (BA), as a counterpointto the rulingAlliance coalition
of establishmentparties, Barisan Nasional (BN). The
membersof the BA thuscame to includea previouslyuni-
maginedunion of ethnicChineseand Malays, of socialist
and business interests,of religiousand secularelements,
and of Muslimsand non-Muslims,in additionto assorted
intellectuals,humanrights,andNGO activistsof all faiths.
PAS's membershipin this coalitionhas forcedthe party
to pick an ideological path between its historic Malay-
Muslim constituencyandthe moreuniversalisticideals of
the BA, often articulatedin the form of humanrights,re-
form,andjustice.As a BA partner,PAS has playedon val-
ues of ethnicandreligiousharmony,of its recordof clean
and noncorruptrule at the state level. Its concessions to
Chinese business,cultural,and religious needs in matters
of Chinesemediumschools,temple,and churchlands(cf.
Harakah,January31, 2000) even convincedthe secretary-
generalof the Chineseleftish party(DAP) to engage in a
bilateralprocessof religiousandculturalbridgebuildingto
improve the historicallypoor relationshipbetween these
two solitudes.In these,PAS sometimesreplacesreferences
to the Islamicstate with the less threatening,"Islamicso-
cial order"(penyusunanpemerentahanIslam).As a politi-
cal party,however,PAS is in a serious quest for power,
and to its principallocal voting constituencyin the Malay
heartlandof the east coast states of Kelantanand Treng-
ganu, it continuesto play the issues of an Islamic state.
These includeregulationsover women's dressand restric-
tions on their public roles at work or in politics; curtail-
ments of touristculturalperformances;and even gender-
separatesupermarket check-outcounters.In thislocalcontext,
most of PAS's referencesare to Qur'anictexts, Islamic
identity,andvaluesand relateto local Malayinterests,the
platformwhichoutsidersoftenlabelfundamentalist.
As of mid-2000,PAS is clearlya partywith a splitideo-
logical personalitybuta moresingle-mindedpoliticalgoal.
One consequenceis that its ancient political enemy, the
Malayseniorparty(UMNO)in the rulingBN alliance,has
putits own spinon theirrivalry.Now UMNO is raisingthe
Islamicstakesandforcefullydrivingthe publicrhetoricin
a religiousdirection.Giventhatbothpartiesarecompeting
for the votes of the ethnicMalays,the most fertilezone of
symbol-mongeringanddifferentiationlies in claims to re-
ligiouscorrectnesson bothsides.PAS promotesthe goal of
the implementationof religious(Shari'ah)law and the Is-
lamic state, assertingthat the relationshipbetween Islam
andpoliticsis as inseparableas thatbetweensweetnessand
sugar("kemanisandan gula tidakboleh dipisahkan")(cf.
Exclusif March27-April 2, 2000). UMNO, however,in-
sists thatthe oppositionis fraudulentlyusing mosquesfor
492 * VOL. 103, No. 2
ANTHROPOLOGIST
AMERICAN * JUNE2001
political messages, where they provocatively refer to
UMNOMalaysas Quraisy(infidels),a referenceto the op-
ponents of the Prophet Mohammedin seventh-century
Medina(Star,April 12, 2000).
UMNO MuslimsfurtherportrayPAS' Islamas largely
ritualistic,citing,as examples,obsessiveattentionto minute
detailsof women'shead-covering,men's beards,mixingof
the sexes in shops,use of prayerat all publicandpolitical
meetings,separationof proceedsfrom alcohol sales from
state revenues,and even questionsover use of chopsticks
for eating.Simultaneously,UMNO countersPAS' accusa-
tions of secularismby showcasingits own Islamiccreden-
tials in the domains of religious schools and programs,
mosque building.Meanwhile,it continuesto implement
"anti-deviationist" laws on restive local Malay-Muslim
movements.By with PAS, UMNO's Islamis pre-
contrast
sentedas modemandcompassionate,nonfanatical,nonre-
gressive,sensitiveto women's rights,and,of course,non-
fundamentalist.Political competition has finally led
UMNO to shoot the fundamentalistbulletto demonizeits
politicalrival and enemy. Reciprocally,one of PAS' im-
ages of the prime ministeris as a clone of Ataturk,the
secularfatherof the defiantlynonreligiousstateof modem
Turkey,portrayedas an enemyof Islam.(Harakah,March
16-31, 2000). Another popular PAS caricatureis of
UMNO as a relic of a feudalage, while PAS embodiesthe
politicalmodel of the FourRighteousCaliphs,exemplary
religiousrulersfollowingthe deathof theProphet.Thetwo
partiescontinuethe perennialkafir-mengafirwarof words
and mutualvilificationin terms of religious observance,
whichtendsto deflectpublicattentionaway fromotheris-
sues, such as those of cronyismand corruptionamongthe
ruling elites. Each party also recruitsits own team of
ulama, who issue religious rulings (fatwa) in supportof
theirpoliticalpatrons(cf. Exclusif February14-20, 2000),
and each plays "holier-than-thou" games over prayersand
aid for theirChechenbrothersin Islam.
It is in this climatethat words likefundamentalismare
played for their emotive and narrowlypolitical impact
ratherthanfor any correspondenceto a consistentbody of
theologicalor social issues. Duringthe 1999 federalelec-
tions, markedby the contestbetweenthe BN andthe new
BA, use of the wordfundamentalismwas addedfor effect,
largelyby UMNO leaders,as a supplementto the earlier
kafir/murtadname-calling,described above. It was re-
sortedto by the primeministerand sometimespickedup
rhetoricallyby PAS Islamistsin the spiritand heat of the
debate.Knowingthe resonanceof the termin the West,the
prime ministerraised issues of fundamentalism,fanati-
cism, andthe Islamicstatebeforean international audience
at the September1999New YorkForeignRelationsTribu-
nal as a meansof firingup Westernemotionsandenlisting
empathyand supportfor his own political agendain the
(then)forthcomingelectionsat home. PAS' own response
was thatUMNOis the morefundamentalist, in its stubborn
defenseof its seculardevelopmentpolicies.
Extrapolating fromthe aboveeventsanddiscourses,it is
evidentthatin Malaysia,fundamentalismis not an indige-
nous concept,and has little culturalresonancelocally. In
fact, there were indigenousterms to do the same job in
theirown way. Even the idea of the Islamicstateseems to
be a recentresponseto the intrusivepower of the nation-
state. Until the crisis surroundingthe prime ministerand
Anwar,fundamentalismwas largely limitedto communi-
cationswithEnglish-speaking foreigners,or in referenceto
foreigndemons, such as Zionists.It is sometimesusedcal-
culatedly as a means to bring to bear overseaspressureson
domestic politics, an example of a growing repertoireof
"global"ideas replacingindigenoustermsandintroducing
standardsfrom offshore.If thereis any commonthemein
its use, it is essentiallypolitical,determinedby partystrat-
egy, whetherto vilify the immediatecompetition,or used
situationally,accordingto audience. Yet even assuming
some consensusas to whatfundamentalism"is,"the char-
acterof PAS is hardto pin down, given its chameleon-like
behaviorand rhetoricin differentcircumstances,particu-
larlyfollowingits membershipin the BA. Likethe dakwah
groups,PAS employs"space-agetechnology[theInternet]
to delivera mediaevalpoliticalmessage"(Harakah,March
16-31, 2000), althoughin fact, it may not be quiteas "me-
diaeval"as its visual and ritualisticimage suggests--con-
traryto the originalstereotypescreatedby andaboutChris-
tianfundamentalists. Ultimately,PAS is propelledas much
by political goals theology, to which the latteroften
as
seem to be accommodated.The discoursemay be relig-
ious, butthe stakesarepurelypolitical.
An Anthropological Approach to
Fundamentalism?
It may be timely to set the fundamentalistquestionin a
broaderdebateover the transferability of culturallyloaded
concepts and keywords,usually from Westernsources,to
othertraditions,whatHefner(1998) calls their"cross-cul-
turalpossibilities."Withglobalization,the tendencyto ap-
ply whatareoftenpassedoff as universalvaluesandideas
has escalated,largelyon the backs of transnationalvolun-
tary,humanitarian, educational,and aid organizations,re-
inforcedby the United Nations and other covenantsand
charters.The use of convergingterminologieshas the ef-
fect of displacingindigenousconcepts and of introducing
exogenousculturalbaggageandjudgmentsfromoffshore.
While such universalideals may appearself-evidentand
not requirejustificationfor many intellectualsand activ-
ists, less is known abouthow these are perceivedin non-
Westernsettings and how new meanings are locally as-
signed. In fact, state authorities in some countries,
includingMalaysia,regardsuchideas as formsof Western
interferenceand hegemonyand challengetheirrelevance

to local needs. On the otherhand,differentconstituencies
in the samecountrymay adaptsuchideasto differentends,
as in mattersof civil and humanrights (or fundamental-
ism). The alienoriginof suchtermsis apparentwhentrans-
latedinto local languages,againas is evidentin the case of
"fundamentalism." As a cautionarytale, the etymological
fate of "civil society"in certainAsian and East European
languageshas been chronicledby Weller(1998).
In contrast with approachesin other disciplines and
sometimes at odds with global activistsand ethicists,an-
thropology'scomparativeperspective,with its attentionto
local discourseand action, may temperuncriticalaccep-
tance of such apparentuniversaltrends. Inevitablythis
pushesthe anthropologistin a morepluralistdirectionand
towardsan appreciationof the polysemicqualitiesof most
popularlyembracedof symbolsandideas.The most pow-
erfullyevocativetermshavesome meaningfor almosteve-
ryone but on closer inspection,turnout to mean substan-
tially different things to different people, varying by
contextandaudience.This is simultaneouslytheirstrength
and theirweakness.Meaningthus unfoldsthroughaction
and debateand hence should not be expectedto be com-
pletelyconsistent,to conformto an easy "definition"or set
of prescriptions,eitherwithinor acrosscultures.
I have attemptedto describethese problems,of contex-
tuality,of multivocality,of translation,of mixed local re-
ception,of the gradualdisplacementof existingindigenous
conceptsby this global label, in the case of fundamental-
ism. Perhapsit is a specialcase of a moregeneralproblem,
of the globalizationof values, and a continuationof the
perennialdebatesoverrelativismsandpluralisms.
Beyond Religion:
Widening the Fundamentalist Net
As noted, the necessity of maintainingthe distinction
between the voice of observerand observedis centralto
the ethnographicmethod,andalso partof authorialrespon-
sibility. But anthropologistsplay many roles simultane-
ously, andto pushan analysisfurther,especiallyin a com-
parativediscipline such as anthropology,they may step
backandoffer a morepanopticview, in which it is the an-
thropologist-as-author who is speculating.Puttingon the
hat of the creativecomparativist,it is suggestedthat we
abandonthe assumptionthat fundamentalismmust ulti-
mately be religious-based,that it may be sighted in do-
mainssuch as ultranationalisms, extremeor genocidaleth-
nic chauvinisms,certainpoliticalideologies, in obsessive
questsfor linguisticandculturalpurityor authenticity.The
termhas in fact been associatedmetaphoricallywith South
Asian nationalisms(Caplan 1987), including Sinhalese
andTamilnationalismsin Sri Lanka(Kapferer1988;Tay-
lor 1987). RecentTurkishnationalismhas also been char-
acterizedas fundamentalist,but not in an Islamic sense.
The resolutelysecularrepublicannationalismfoundedon
NAGATA / BEYOND THEOLOGY 493
the authorityand sayings of the post-Ottomanleader,Ke-
mal Ataturk,are interpretedby TapperandTapper(1987)
as equallyuncompromising,exclusivistand fundamental-
ist. Many aspectsof Islamist,Sikh, Hindu,and Sinhalese
movementsareas muchnationalistas religious.Theethno-
cidal hypernationalismsof the Nazis, Serbs, Hutus, and
Tutsis,who createabsolute,exclusivistboundariesagainst
theirenemies, and who frequentlytry to boundtheirlan-
guagesandculturesto match,wouldalso probablyqualify.
In effect, the nation is being sacralized(cf. Merkl and
Smart 1983), with languageand identitythe focus of the
"dailysacrament"of nationalism.In this formulation,the
thin line between religious and political (fundamentalist)
movementsbecomes even thinner.More recentcommen-
taryindicatesthe attractionof the fundamentalist metaphor
for the all-consumingethnic and nationalist"tribalisms"
(re)surfacingin a supposedlytransnational andmoreseam-
less world,as used ratherabrasivelyby Schlesingerin his
Disunitingof America(1992), and by EdwardSaid on the
topic of tribalismin his 1993 Reith lectureson "Repre-
sentationsof the Intellectual"(1996).
In the same comparativespirit, an argumentcan be
made for linguisticfundamentalisms.These would apply
to some of the moredraconianpolicies of the Qu6becOf-
fice de la LangueFrangaise,which forbidsHebrewkosher
or Chineselabelson importedfoods as offensesagainstthe
linguisticsacredcanon.The originalAcad6mieFrangaise
in Parisof coursehas long been notedfor its defensiveness
againstalien etymologicalimportsfrom other languages.
Of latetoo, "culture"in some circumstancescan be saidto
have takenon a fundamentalisttinge. This appearsin ef-
fortsto exercisea possessivecontrol,to defineandmanage
"authenticity"or "aboriginality,"and to prevent Others
fromappropriating these,as partof a bid to takebackiden-
tity and to limit the ravagesof uncontrolledpluralismsand
multiculturalisms.
Certainpowerful ideologies, including Marxismsand
Maoisms, also may move into a fundamentalistmode,
when sacralizedto the pointof recognizingno alternative,
of marginalizingand raisingboundariesagainsta demon-
ized Other.Some of these,like the ChineseCulturalRevo-
lution,showa Protestant fundamentalist-like zeal in defend-
ing the inerranciesof their dogmas, with inquisition-like
consequencesfor dissenters.Ecological activismand dis-
coursenow has a positionfor "eco-fundamentalists." The
socialist and women's day anecdotesabove also convey
somethingof this flavorandmind-set.
Finally,to completethe extendedmetaphor,it mightbe
hazardedfrom some usages, that the slavish ideological
commitmentto theprinciplesandorthodoxiesof the global
capitalistmarkethasfundamentalist qualities.JohnMcMurtry
(1998) likensthe propagationof "markettheoryandprac-
tice as universalabsolutes"(pp. 35-36) to "a valuesystem
withtheunderpinnings of a fundamentalisttheology"(p. 70),
494 * VOL. 103, No. 2
AMERICANANTHROPOLOGIST * JUNE2001
and claims how devotedly the "marketof fundamental-
ists ... exhibitundiminishedfaithin marketlaws"(p. 99).
Whenthe systemfalters,suggestionsas to thepossiblefal-
libility of its foundationsconvey overtones of heresy.
Rather remarkabletheological-likecasuistryand secon-
daryelaborationsare invokedto avoid havingto abandon
the basic doctrine,while slippingwith ease into the satis-
factionof vilifyingthe opposition.Suchwouldbe the diag-
nosis of thosewho defiantlysupportthe rightnessof patch-
ing up collapsedRussianmarkets,underthe doctrineof the
infallibilityof capitalism,when a similarcollapse of the
precedingcommunismwas sufficientto demonstrateits in-
herentwrongness.These events may yet, in the wordsof
Hobsbawm(citedin TheEconomist,October24, 1998:60),
bringanendto "market fundamentalism."
Quest for Certainty in an Uncertain World
Opening the metaphoricaldoor of fundamentalismto
cover sacredcanonsotherthan religionalertsus to paral-
lels which are intuitivelypersuasive.Whatthese parallels
are, however,remainto be revealed.For this, it is neces-
sary to pick up the theme of the simultaneousinterestin
globalizationand fundamentalism,where they may be
seen as two ends of a continuum,wherethe one is antidote
to the otheranddependson its dialecticaloppositefor sus-
tenance.An icon of extremecosmopolitannesswould be
SalmanRushdie,the archetypicalcelebrantof ambiguity
andhybridity,the manfor all seasons,places,andcultures.
Such cavaliercelebrationof uncertaintieso- id.utity and
destiny,however,arebeyondthe capacityof mostpeople,
most of the time. At the otherextremeare those who seek
the comfort of the known, the familiar,a ready answer
even before the question is raised, a catechismfor life,
whichmaypushthemin a fundamentalist direction.An ex-
cess of opennessandchoice may generateits antithesisand
result in closure. Per contra,out of the bonds of closed
communitiesburstfreerspiritsseekingwiderhorizonsand
opportunities.Fundamentalisms-religious, ethnic, na-
tionalistic,or other--close off the ideologicalmarketplace
and reduce what McNeill calls "the normalpartof a ca-
cophony that arises from the diversity of the civilised"
(1992). Or, as Robertsonputs it: "fundamentalism, in the
widest reach of the term, constitutesways of finding a
place in the world ... which frequently involves attempts
to enhancethe powerof the groupsconcerned"(1995:239)
It simplifiescomplexissues, makesblackandwhiteout of
grey zones and attemptsto restore certainty(cf. James
1995;Nagata1994b).It is worthrememberingthatamong
the Islamists, most of the movers and shakersare geo-
graphicallyandsociallymobile,oftenculturallydislocated
youth, educatedin foreign institutions,returningto sys-
tems wherethey have no clear role models, are subjectto
high demandsbuthavelimitedcontrol.Fromthe inventory
of culturaland politicaloptionsto which they have been
exposed,theirchoice is ideologythatoffersnot only a pre-
scriptiveworldviewbut the means to create a distinctive
identityanda ready-madeset of principlesby whichto de-
sign their own lives and to mobilize others and harness
themto theircauses.
These canons set their own boundaries,of people and
ideas. Fromthe above, it could be argued(by the anthro-
pologist)thatthe fundamentalistmind-setis shown in re-
fusal to find common ground or compromise, seeking
differencesratherthansharedinterestswith others.A fun-
damentalistresponseto a quest for codes or covenantsof
universalhumanrights is typified by that of the Iranian
Ayatollahswho declinedto participatein existing interna-
tionalhumanrightscodes on groundsthatthey have their
own "universal"Islamiccodes of behavior.In a different
context,a similarspiritunderliesthe Protestantfundamen-
talists' distastefor the social gospel or any concessionby
outreachto those who reject their religious worldview.
This kind of fundamentalism is a negationof relativismin
a pluralisticworld(cf. Geertz1984) anda retreatfromecu-
menismanddialogue.In similarspirit,a resistanceto shar-
ing even common academicgroundwith those from the
wrong side of the boundaryexhibits a fundamentalist
mind-setin this sense. This propelsthe cultivation,for ex-
ample,of schools of "Islamiceconomics"and Islamicso-
cial science, politics, law, medicine, and so on, such as
those proposed by Pakistani teacher, Maulana A'la
Maududi,in the 1980s.Some of thesebecameverypopular
amongIslamistyouthin Egypt,Malaysia,andeven North
America,as well as in Maududi'sPakistan,as one guide
throughthatculturalandcognitive "cacophony"of which
McNeill writes.
Centralto the questfor certaintyis the kind of mind-set
thatrefusesto dialogue,or is "antihermeneutic" in Marty
and Appleby'sterms.In the wordsof Mohd Arkoun,it is
exemplifiedin the inabilityto contemplatethe impensable
andthe impens6,the fearof liminality,a reluctanceto en-
tertainalternatives.Withoutusingthe termfundamentalist,
Paine (1995:51) seems to be coveringthe same existential
territoryin his distinctionbetween "referential"and "ca-
nonical"forms of knowing.The formeradmitsthe possi-
bility of "manytruths"or of cognitivepluralism,while the
latterremains"impregnable to the possibilityof critique."
Further,citing Overing(1995:58), Paine twists the screw
and exposes anthropologyas a discipline, with its own
categoricaltypologies,receivedwisdoms,andepistemolo-
gies amongits disciples,as a sacredcanon(with,one might
add,some parallelsto otherfundamentalisms).
As a postscript,it is worthnotingthatthe sponsorshipof
Martyand Appleby's ambitiousfundamentalismsproject
beginningin the late 1980s at the Universityof Chicago,
by the McArthurFoundation,itself was an indicatorof the
climateof the times. This was the period,at the end of the
cold war,when olderideologicaltitans(andenemies)such
as communism, were collapsing, and as yet unknown

dangersof Islamismwere on the rise. One of the interests
of the McArthurFoundationlay in understanding how uni-
versal was the dominanceand need for powerfulideolo-
gies and religiousbeliefs and, more specifically,what to
expect of these in the future.These concernsthemselves
expresseduncertaintiesfor which morecertainknowledge
was required.A few yearslater,in 1993, anotherscholar,
Huntington,came up with his own answer,whichhad the
worldrealignedinto mutuallyexclusive sets of fundamen-
talist-style(althoughhe did not use the wordfundamental-
ist) culturalandcivilizationalcamps.
Conclusions: Much Ado about Very Little?
An exegesis of the idea of fundamentalism(as muchas
the substantiveideasfundamentalists allegedlypromoteor
defend) reveals the many-layeredmeaningsthe term has
acquiredon its uneven trajectoryacross cultures,interest
groups, and disciplines.It is evident that, as a label, the
termis used for differentpurposesand effect by different
constituencies,from outsiderto insider ("truebeliever"),
enemy to sympathizer,"detached"scholarto sensational
public or media.Over the past two decades, when it first
entered anthropological(and public) discourse, it has
moved from inductive applicationsfrom its Protestant
source and content,beyond textual hermeneutics,out of
the narrowband of religion, and into political activism,
identitypolitics, nationalistmovements,and otherideolo-
gies. These havebecomethe new sacredcanonsandortho-
doxies, identifiedby theirdefensivemind-sets,theirantire-
lativism, their unwillingnessto dialogue or compromise,
boundby categoricalthinkingand "referential" modes of
knowing.Thefundamentalistepithetis oftena formof ver-
bal ammunitionagainstideologicaland politicalenemies
and "Others,"recallingold orientalisms,and usually im-
posedunilaterally,whetherby academics,popularopinion,
or the media.Thesefrequentlycross,contradict,oremulate
one anotherin unexpectedways, as the changingcourseof
Malaysianreligiouspoliticsandidentitiesshows.
This convenientlypolysemicterm lends itself to meta-
phoricalexpansion,hencethe currentobsessionwithlocat-
ing new fundamentalisms everywhere. All this unfolds in a
global context of unprecedentedchanges and uncertainties,
where alternative solutions offer a prescriptive new world-
view and models by which to think and live, with which
some Malay Muslims have been experimenting. Funda-
mentalism is an expanding metaphor, for an expanding ar-
ray of circumstances, from the marketto politics to linguis-
tic purity.Givenall thesepossiblefacilitatingconditions,it
is to be expected that a proliferation of other global key-
words will follow the fate of fundamentalism, and that they
will each continue to mutate and be creatively accommo-
dated to new circumstances indefinitely.
NAGATA / BEYOND THEOLOGY 495
Notes
1. The first of several pronouncementson a returnto fun-
damentals,mostly of a doctrinalvariety, was originally made
at a conference in Niagara in 1895. More widely publicized
were a series of tracts, appropriatelyknown as "The Funda-
mentals,"appearingfrom 1909 on, from the pens of a number
of prominent (mostly Presbyterianand Baptist) evangelical
leaders. Eventually, most of the Protestantchurches in the
United States were fracturedinto "fundamentalist" and "mod-
ernist" wings, which have persisted until the present. Sub-
sequent elaborations, in the form of personal testimonies,
speaking in tongues, and other manifestations of the Holy
Spirit,often associatedwith Pentecostalism,gatheredmomen-
tum in America and Europe in the first half of the twentieth
century. For some fundamentalists,the Pentecostalistsprivi-
leged emotion over text and hence were not fully accepted,al-
thoughthis was not universal.
2. The Hadith is a collection of compilationsof the deeds
and sayings of the life, family, and companionsof the Prophet
Muhammad,in the form of stories, anecdotes,etc., which are
commonly invoked by Muslims everywhereas a guide to in-
terpretationsand decisions, as a supplementto the Qur'anand
clarificationof difficult or obscurepassages.
3. One egregious case of a dissentingMuslim, voraciously
seized upon by Western media eager to "prove"a case, was
that of the Egyptian professor, Abu Zaid, who in 1995 pro-
posed that the Qur'anmay be studied as a historicaltext, for
which he was brandedas an apostate, or non-Muslim, and
even forced to divorce his wife. Whatever the judgment of
Abu Zaid's actions and fate, the logic was impeccable in
maintainingthe congruencebetween respect for the text and
being a trueMuslim.
4. During the nineteenth century, the impact of various
Europeancolonialisms on Muslim societies in North Africa
and the Middle East stimulateddebates and dilemmas, both
ideological and practical,over the choices between Western
secularism, scientism, democracy, and economic "progress,"
on the one hand,and local ethical, moral,and religious values
and authority,on the other.At the time, a numberof Muslim
scholars,often with Westerneducationand experiencein both
systems, attemptedto creativelyinterpretthe Scripturesin ac-
cordancewith theirperceptionof the needs of modernsociety,
so that the lattercould play a crediblerole in world affairs.In
the case of Turkey,the unilateraldecision of KemalAtaturkto
abandonthe public role of Islam and to create a secular "na-
tion-state"representsone extreme, althoughlately this is be-
ing contestedby Islamistsfrom below.
5. In the three most recent Indian national elections, in
1996, 1998, and 1999, the BJP astoundedIndia and the world
by winning a technicalmajority(only about26% on two occa-
sions) but requiringcomplex and delicate alliances with other
parties to form a viable government.In the first two cases,
these soon unraveled,hence the short interval between elec-
tions. Since the early 1990s, the BJPhad been primingits con-
stituencies politically, in a series of highly abrasive public
marches from Bombay to the Ayodhya site in UttarPradesh,
in which symbols, slogans, and rhetoric all conveyed un-
abashed eulogizing of Hindutva (Hindu-ness) and equally
strong denigrationof Muslims and followers of other faiths.
496 AMERICAN * VOL.103, No. 2 * JUNE2001
ANTHROPOLOGIST

Partof the dramaof the Ayodhya case revolves aroundthe al- of (then) Malaya. To place Islam in the same category as
leged destructionof the Ram temple duringMoghul times and Communismwas thereforethe strongestpossible form of vili-
its replacementby a mosque, the BabriMasjid. Most of the re- fication.
ligious content of this movement thereforeis couched in con- 14. It is generally agreedthatAnwar's ousterwas as much
tested invented histories, while the textual foundation, in an act of vindictive political rivalry and revenge, following
termsof eitherevents or dates,remainsmurkyat best (cf. Basu publicly aired disagreementsover the financialcrisis and po-
1996; Van der Veer 1996). litical power aspirations,between Prime Minister Mahathir
6. On this point, Oberoiraises the termmulvad,commonly and his deputy, as a question of criminalacts allegedly com-
used in internationalcommunicationand by the media for mitted by Anwar duringhis tenure.The revelationsof police
what others call "fundamentalism," but admitsthatthe termis
brutality,infringementof propercourtprocedures,and politi-
"of recent coinage" and arises from "the need to have a Pun- cal interference in the entire legal process during Anwar's
jabi equivalentto fundamentalism"(1993:257). trial, convinced most observers,within and outside Malaysia,
7. Following Independencein 1957, a series of debates thatjustice, freedom of the judiciary, and humanrights were
swirled over ethnic definitions and their rights-first in the
all compromisedin this case.
Constitutionand subsequentlyas the basis for a NationalEco-
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