STUDENT HANDOUT SH 3-77

NOVEMBER 1984

MANSCEN ACADB\IIIC LIBRARY

597 Engineer Loop, Ste 200, Bldg 3202
Fort Leonard Wood, MO 6547389~8

US ARMY CHEMICA L CORPS HISTORICAL STUDIES

GAS WARFARE IN WORLD WAR I
THE 1st DIVISION AT CANTIGNY
MAY 1918

US ARMY CHEMICAL SCHOOL

Management/Logistics Division
Command and Staff Training Department
Fort McClellan, Alabama

!Study Number 11
 The 1st &.i.V1sion at Cantieny
May 1918

by

Rexn,ond C. Cochrane

GAS WARFARE IN 1'IORLD WAH I

Stuciy Number 11

U.S. ARUY OH.ta.!I:C,\L CORPS

JIIS'J'(JRICAL ::m,m;:;:;

u.s.Arm::/ Chemical Corps Historical Office

Office of the Chief Cher.Ii.cal Officer
Arm;,r Chomi.oa1 Contor, ~yl.:t.nd

1958
 The 1st .Qi.vision at Cantigll;Y
May 19l8

Prepared by

Re:xmond C. Cochrane, Pb. D.

Under contract IlA.-18-lOcl-CWL-6214

witb
U.S. AnDy Chemical Corps

This is an accepted draft study on gas warfare in World War I

S, E. BAKJ!:k
Colonel, QuC
Actg Asst CCmlO for Planning le Doctrine
 Foreword

This is a tentative study of the gas experience of

the l.8t Division at Cantigny during World \1ar I. This study
is !!21 presented as a definitive and official history, but is
reproduced for current reference use tr.I.thin the !.11.lit.'.lry Establish-
ment pending the publication of an approved history.
The author was assisted in his research by Mr. Gey F,
Goodfellow and Mrs. Charlotte J.t. Bolin.

Hgte bo fl.e rld9r; Oa;;aoni;,o and ;:,u.s;gcoiiiono rolo.td.vo 'bo

accuracy and adequacy of treatment are invited, and may be
transmitted to the Chief, U.S. t.:rmy Chemical Corps Historical
Office, t.:rmy Chemical Center, Maryland.

1
 THE 1st mVIsION AT CANTIGNY
I.lay 1918

Nan:atixe
Ansauville to Cantif!lXY 2

The Gas Attack of 3 - 4 May 9

The Small Box Respirator 17
Interim 23
!'reparation for the Cantigny Attack Z7
rne capture or <;anugny 36
The German Version , 48
The Cost of Cantigny I 5)
The Long Month
: 56
Analysis
Battle Casualties. '
Oas Casualty Report 70

Azumunition Report 77
Casualty Statistics 79

On Balance 8)

Map No. l The V/estern Front, Spring 1918, 4

Map No, 2 Artillery Disposition lfap, 28 April 6

Map No, 3 Station Map, 19 .llay 7

Map No, 4 Oas Attack on Villers-Tournelle, 3 - 4 .llay ll
Map No. 5 Preliminary lli.spositions for the Cantigny Attack. 37
Map No, 6 Situation 1/ap, 271st Iles Regt, 27 - 28 IJay 39
 Maps {continued)
Liap No. ? Situation lhp, 82nd Res Div, 0500, 28 l&cy- 40

Afap No. 8 Plan of Organization of Conquered Position 46

Map No. 9 Dispositions after Reorganization of Sector 57

Map No. 10 German Gas Preparation of 9 June 6o

Map No. ll Battery Positions, 1st Div, 17 June 6J

Tables .

Table No. l Field Hospital Admission U..ta ?2

Table No. l Continued 73

1
 TflE ls t DIV1SION AT CANTIGNY
May 1918

'l'he capture of Cantigny by the 1st Division ,ras a prestige operation,

AS originally conceived, it was to be part of a combined French and
American counter-offensive to recapture Llontdidier, lost to the Qerman

armies in the offensive or 21 March, When rumors of a new German offensive

on that front necessitated abandoning all thought of such a large-scale
operation, Pershing seems to have urged that at least the assignment or
tbe lnt Di vision, t.o retake Cantigny, be carried out,
American troops had been training in France since January, They had
yet to prove themselves in combat on an active front, It ,ras up to the

1st Division to demonstrate that American troops could fight, that the
outsize American division was a self-contained and irresistible force, and
that what the Americans took from the enemy they could hold against any
odds,
In the attack on 27 May the 1st Division recaptured Cantigny, ano

what had been a slight salient in the French lines became a thorny salient
in the German lines, The only feature in the area under attack that might
have been of some military value, a height above the village, could not
be held, But despite murderous HS and gas fire, the division held on to
Cantigny itself, Interestingly enough, the attack on Frapelle by the
5th Division two months later (Study No,?) was to duplicate in many re-
spects the feat of the 1st Division, Its execution, hm,ever, ,ras a simple
matter of divisional prestige, rather than vindication of the American
Army.

- 1 -
 The present study chronicles the gas experience of the 1st Division

in its seventy-two days in the Cantigny sector, during which almost half

of the total casualties suffered were the result o! gas. rhere is no

question about the effect of gas on the attack on Cantigny, The operation

was originally assigned to the 18th Infantry, but that regiment was so

badly gassed on the night of 3 - 4 May the t three weeks later 1 t was

incapable of making the attack. rhe operation had to be put off for

three days while the 28th Infantry, which had suffered least from gas,
prepared for 1 t, And the near failure of the 28th Infantry to hold

Canti.g ny after taking 1 t may have been owing as much to prolonged gassing

and gas mask fatigue as to conventional battle fatigue.

Confronted w1 th a seeming Allied disaster on 25 March, four days after

the opening of the first and most successful of the German spring offen-

sives, Pershing put all his available forces at the disposal of the Fr~nch,

With the hostile tide threatening .Amiens, at the junction of the British

and French armies, the 1st Division, under llaj, Gen, Robert Lee &llard,

was ordered from Lorraine to the battle front in Picar<iy.

.
It was 3 April before the 26th Division completed the relief of the

1st !>ivision at Ansauville . Five days later division beadquarters open-

ed at Chaumont-en-Vexin, about 75 kilometers from Montdidier, where the

d8$pe&t penetration. a, the end of the first week in April the military
situation had brightened and the line had been partially stabilized.

- 2 -

'I
 '

Then on 9 April, in the second spring drive, twenty-seven German divisions

attampted to break the British lines north and south of Armentieres. Al-
though an initial gain of ten llliles was made on a 24-mile front, tbe Germans
failed to capture Hazebroucke and this offensive too came to a stop (Map
No. 1) .

In the Chaumont area, where General Micheler was forming a new

reserve army of the French, the 1st Diviaion, its trench warfare instru-

ction at Ansauville over, began training in open warfare tactics, follow-

1
ing doctrine recently established by GHQ AEF and GHQ French Army, On

17 April the division completed its training and set out on foot for the
Cantigny-Montdidier sector, held by Debeneys First French Army which had
contained the German drive south after being hurriedly transferred there
from Lorraine the month before.
The sector extended from north of Cantigny to south of lolesnil-St.

Georges, at the point of the enemy salient just above Montdidier. It was
a sensitive sector since "The enemy at Montdidier and near Ji.miens was in a
very advantageous position to pueh his advance west toward the English
' 2
Channel along the south bank of the Somme River."

Memo for brig comdrs, 1st Div, 2 Apr, sub, Attack fonnetions; Instru
14, 16 Apr, sub, Open Warfare {World War Records, First Division, 28 Mar
1928, vol. 1, Hereafter cited as Records),
2
Robert L. Bullard, Personalities and Reminiscences of the War ( New
York, 1925), pp. 178 - 179.

- J -

I
 >-
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r
er

t
t-
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ct
t- % l>

... er:
J ,,.
Q. V

"' ............-,
:
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...
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1'
 The front line towards which the division advanced was little more
than a succession of shell boles, held by the 45th French and 162nd
Colonial Divisions of VI French Corps, On the night of 24 - 25 April these
division:, side-slipped almost four kilometers to ad.mit the 1st Brigad.e
o! 1st Division, co,r.maoded by Bri.g, Gen, George B. Dwican, into the line
J
(Maps No , 2 and No . J) . ?he 18th Infantry entered the line on the left,
with headquarters at Villers-Tournelle, the 16th on the right, based at
.Br<>yes, In reserve at Maisoncelle and Froissy, almo.st t'llllnty kilometers
back of the front, were the 28th and 26th Regiments of the 2nd Brigade,
under Brig. Oen, Beaumont B. Buck, Supporting the 1st Brigade was the
division artillery reenforced by two French battalions of 75's and a
4
large number of old model f ortress howitzers ,

Ocoupying Cantl.gny and the adjacent ground was the 30th Division,
to go into reserve when replaced by the 82nd Reserve Division on 16 ~ay,
and to its left the 25th Reserve Division, all of Corps Watter(~

Reserve Corps), on the left of von Hutiers Eighteenth Army, It was

von Hutier who had niade the greatest penetration in the assault of

FO lJ and 11,, 1st Div, 20, 2J Apr (Records l); ltr, Maj, Robt. H.
Lell'is, VI Corps LO, to Col, Fox C~nner, G-J GHQ~. 5 May, subs Liaison
Rpt (suppl to DOR, 4 - 5 ~ay, Records 12); V.S. Hist Sketch of the 1st
Div during the World War , compiled by 1st Div Society, n,d,, pp, 55 - 56
(1st Div Box 11, 11.4) . Hereafter cited as Hist Sketch,

The 45th Fr Div was relieved by the 152nd Fr Div on JO Apr; the 162nd
Col Div was relieved by the 6oth Fr Div on 6 May when Vandenberg 's X
Corps replaced ITI Corps (G-J memo, let Div for brig sod regtl comdrs,
ti :U~:,~ (U.S. Army in t.hn Worlrl Wa.r {Wa.:,hi.utS,l..vu, D. c. , 1 94-a), Operat.10ns,
p. 265]).

4
Hist Slo.,tch; pp. 70 - ?l.

- 5-
 -
~.,...

.AATII.UQV OlSl'oSrtlOOI ..,.,

%1 A.fJ:l\L l'l\l

1 ...*U < f..lo'"- l\ 0,,.1, UIA.fl':(~ Ill)

MAP NO. 2

6
 STATION MAP
1, M4't tit

-
~ - - . : .:....:~....:."_:_'- ~ - l

MA~ NO. 5

7
21 March, taking Cantigny and Montdidier before the armies or von der

l!arwitz and von B9low to the north 118re checked and von Hutier had bee n
5
ordered to halt ,
! he only prominent feature in the sector was the village of Cantigny

itself, on a slight rise of ground northeast or Villers-Tournelle, Con-

stanUy bombarded and on fire since its capture, the village was said to

be untenable and had been partially evacuated. Only its church tower still

stood as the 1st Division arrived, and since it was believed to be an

6
enemy OP, the division artillery finally demolished it two 118eks ~-ater.

the mission assigned to 1st Division was to hold fast 0.1 its front,

for the Allied High ColllJ!land expected the enemy to make another drive in

the direction of Aroiens, aod to organize the sector in successive lines

of resistance. Under constant fire from more than 90 German batteries,

the French had found it impossible to dig t renches or put up wire, Never-

theless, working at night, the division began the construction of a 6,000-

meter communication trench between the front line and the Boi6 de Villers,
7
completing it the night of lJ llay.
The active front that General Bullard had had to create for the

division at Ansauville less than three months earlier was ready made for

See rpt on 82nd Res Div in append to SOI 19, 15 - 16 May, and SOI
JO, 26 - Z7 Kay (Records 4).
6
Extract from Interr of German Prisoners, n.d. (append 1,0 5U1 1,
26 - Z7 Apr); SOI 11, 7 - 8 May; append to SOI 19, 15 - 16 llay.

7
Kist Sketch, p. 58; ltr, CO 1st Eng to C Bng Off tu:F, l Jun, subs
Rpt of Opns (1st Div Box llJ., JJ .l) .

- 8 -
 him at Cantigny. Hostile artillery fire seldom went below 2,000 shells

each day and ranged betlleen 4,000 and 6,000 at least once a week. On

28 - 29 April, G-2 reported 2,760 rounds falling in the sect or, including
552 HB and gas shells in tho Bois de l'onta1ne . Gas was also included in

the heavy shelling o! Villers-Tournelle on the morning of 30 April, and

that afternoon approximately 700 gas shells, including 50 yellow cross,

fell on Coullemelle and the area east of that village tihere a group of
1st Division 75 1 s were sited.

Following a bombardment including some gas resembling chlorine

on Villers-Tournelle and the line south of t he Bois de Fontaine during

the night or l - 2 llay, at 0530 on 2 May the enemy projected liquid gas

contained i n glass bottles on the front line of Kenii'l'a Quarter, call3ing

nausea, sneezing and coughing. Field hospit al lists sho,r that Jl gas
and 73 wound casualties were admitted to the hospitals between JO April
8
and J llay, With these warnings of t he gas activity to be expected on
this front, on the night of J - 4 May the troop-filled town of Viller~

Tournelle was deluged with mus tard gas ,

The Gas Attack of 3 - 4 llay

It seems possi ble t hat the gas att ack on Villers-Tournelle was
prompted as much by the increas i ngly heavy arti llery fire put down on
the German lines , which began as soon as the 1st FA Brigade had i te guns

SOI 2 - 6 , 28 Apr - J llay; FIi admission dat a 1n Analysi s, p, 72.

- 9 -
in position, as by the discovered presence of .American forces on that
front. Where the French artillery had been averaging 2,000 rounds daily

in reply to enemy shelling, the brigade opened up with over 5,000 shells,

increased its fire to more than 8,000 rounds, and on 2 - 3 Uuy lacerated

German positions with over 12,000 rounds of high explosives, As a con-

sequence, the enemy seems to have expected an attack, for G-2 reported

that on the ni&ht of the gas attack the German troops had appeared to be

a little nervous as shown by the increase in rifle fire and nares dur-
9
ing t he night."

In its report of the gas attack, G-3 said that in the late evening

55 gas and shrapnel rounds had fallen on the Casablanca front, 408 on
tetorian, and 1,700 gas shells on support and rear lines. fhen, over a
three-hour period beginning at 2030, almost 15,000 mustard gas shells

~ar~ said to have poured into Villers-Tournelle and qicinity where the

1st Battalion, 18th Infantry, and a company of Engineers were stationed.

Klements of the 16th Infantry, of the 1st Brigade machine gun battalion,

and some ambulance companies were also in the area (J.lap No, 4) .

0-J reported 12,000 gas shells on Villers-Tournelle at the rate of

50 to 100 per minute, followed by an intense EIR bombardment. As the gas

bombardment began, the division artillery attempted to silence the

enemy batteries, firing 14,000 HE rounds that night and the next day,

including a token 300 gas rounds -- probably No. 5 phosgene shell -- on

DOR, 26 Apr - J May; S01 7, J - 4 !fay.

- 10 -
 / .. 8 o ; ' .;
- d~ s ;,
. ~s Gt~lld
. .\I,,,
. de ..s

f~ . .-~ ~'"$::

GA\ AlTIICI< Ol'I

VILL(R$ TOURNflU:
J 4 M""f ,,,a

M ... P NO, +

11
 10
enemy gun positions in the 9)is de 'Framicourt.
German records of the bombardment show that the gassing of Villers-
Tournelle and nearby battery posit.ions with yellow cross was to have been
carried out in a two-hour shoot by three batteries of field guns firing
J,600 rounds, two ~atteries of field howitzer firing l,200 rounds, and
two batteries of heavy howitzers firing 600 rounds, for a total of 5,400
rounds of yellow cross. the follow-up bombardment, an hour later, was
to comprise 2,700 rounds, or 8,100 yellow cross shells altogether
.1.Ctually, says Hanslian, only 4,800...or little more than half the planned
. 11
number of yellow cross shells were fired. The G-2 estimate of 15,000
shells would therefore seem excessive,
Coming up from division headquarters at Froissy, the Divisio'n Gas
Officer, Capt. Louis S, Davis, accompanied by Maj. Wheeler (1st Brig
.-d.i) and the Assistant Division Gas Officer, Lt, Stewart, visited the
town at 4..ul) a.m., taking in chloride of lilr.e and gas masks called for
at midnight," At that time they were told there had been ti.enty-two
casualties, Although the odor of mustard gas was very strong everywhere
in the town, men were nevertheless seen going about without their
12
maske,

io
DOR and SOI, J - 4 May.
11
Arko JO, JOth Div Order JO, 27 Apr, and other data cited in Hanslian,
11
Ca.04.0SrlE0 o.n dor .Amo1....ilm:ioohon Prortt" (M.S :in CULUO), pp. ?I:> - ?9.

12
Ltr, DCO 1st Div to I Corps Gas Officer, 5 uay, sub, Gas Attack
{GAF-1st Div) . Lt. Stewart is quoted in ltr, Gilchrist, Med Dir OC of
Gas Serv to C Gas Serv, 15 May, sub: Investigation of bombardment of 18th
Inf (GAF-1.s t Div).

12 -
 luring the morning of 4 May, according to G-3, approximately ]30
muatard gas casualties were evacuated from the Villers-Tournelle area,

B,y early afternoon the casualt ies totaled 3.30; that evening the ntu:lber
13
had grown to ~ . By the morning of 5 llday, 622 ca:,ualties had been

br<lUght out, inclndine 470 fraD the 18th Infantry, 46 fran the 16th
Infantry, 4l medics, and 33 frcm the Jl\8chine gun units of the brigade.
O,layed ca:raal ties evacuated over the next seven days, according to
daily G-3 reports, were 77, for a total of 699 eas casualties, I t ,ras,
14
said General Bullard, "a tremendous inflic;:t~
"In order to understand the heavy casuaJ.ties, said Col, Frank
Parker, caumander of the 18th Infantry, it was necessary to remember
that

the attack occurred on a very aark, cloudy night, llaey of the night
details had already started for their work . The ration carts were comine
up ....l'lhen sent out into the darkness to bring in the wounded or perform
oth~r duties , , , the[menJ repeatedly removed the face part of the S.B,R,
so as to see what they were doing or 1'1here they were goinc .... Others,
straining at the heavy loads of bringinj! in casualties found the mask
painfully oppressive and removed it. LOnlyJ one who has been under such
a night bombardment can realize tbe difficul ties attending the super-
vision and control of gas discipline during such a t ime,15

Tbe subsequent recanmendation of the .Medical Director of the Gae Service,

in his report on the Vill.ers-TournelJ.e gas attack, that the AE,F needed

13
IDR, 4 - 5 May; Fil Parker CO 18th Inf to 00 1st Brig, 2330,
4 May (Records l5),

14
OOR, J - 13 l<ay; memo, Bullard for 4th Bur First FR !Jrm, 4 May,
ouu, 30I u.r ""''l!J.Y i.;-ali a~J< (rtecox'\ls l.Z); t.eJ.g, llUll.ar<I t.o cori:s CrH\I AJSr,
n, d, (Records 12}, The relief of .llaj . Gen. luncan, let Brig candr, by
Brig. Gen, J ohn L, Hines, 16th I nf, was reported in OO!t,. 4 - 5 May,

l5
Ltr, CO 18th Inf to CG 1st Iliv, 7 !lay, sub: Gas Attack (1st Iliv
Box ?6, 33.6) ,

- 13 -
more realiet.ic gas training, and that part of the t.raining should consist

of eimulat.ed gas attacks carried out in night exercises, does not appear

to have been carried out eit her in the 1st Di vision or in any other
16
division.
The Division Oas Officer, Captain Davis, in bis report of the attack,

said there were 650 casual ties by the evening of 5 llay, as the res\tt of
between 4,000 and 10,000 gas shells, The evacuated were mostly slight
cases and likely a large number Co!] malingerers, Nevertheless the
number of casualti es i s excessi vel y higll and due to poor gas discipline,

!lo evidence was found that the casual ties bad been caught by surprise,

aince the charac teri etio burst of the shells and the smell or mustard gas

had been recognized at once. Nor was there any evidence that the senee of
smell had subsequently bec01ll8 paralyzed by the gas, though mustard gas
wt.o said (erroneoiu,ly) to do this. In the hours after the attack the

-
troops simply failed t.o &PP"""i.at e the effec,t lveness of the agent in low
concentration,
On tbe morning of the 5th, Captain Davis said,

The French ordered the town evacuated and after consultation with the
Division Gae Officer, the order was issued by the Commanding General
The night of llay 4 - 5 the Chief of Staff asked if the Regimental l!C
might not be retained and the Oi'fiaion.Gas Officer reported it might
be done, but some eye eases must be expected, ... The French (10th Corpe
Annie) Gas Officer visited the Met.or today and advised that the town

16
Ltr, Med n1.r ex; or uas ::;erv, .1.:, 11ay, above, A "gas at.t.acK exercise
at night for troops was atchd to l tr, Actg C or Def Div, Oas Serv to
Officer of Def Div, 14 May, sub, tng in Oas Def (GHQ G-5 Box 1727, fol
P). See also memo, Conner G-3 GHQ m for Cors AEF, 5 Jun, eub1 Pno-
cautiona against Oas Attacks (AKF GHQ G-3 Rpts Box 3192, fol 1567).

- 14 -
be evacuated. It he.a rained every night since and will cause the gas to
stay around longer than it oroinarily would.17

Although the gassed area WM ordered evacuated, with the exception of

necessary limon personnel at the collllllllld post in Villers-rounelle, the
next day, 6 May, amid rain, mud, and gas, staff officers found the CP

atatf of the support battalion and an entire company of men in the town,

ae well as a large number of troops still occupying contaminated trenches

. 18
on the edge of the town. All were ordered out i0111ediately,
Despite its lorig training in gas defense and its gas experience at
Am:n,uvJ.lltt, . W:w l.is t ar.i.gaue 11acs aciect l1K:e rookl.es 1.n vuiers-:;rourne.u.e.
On 7 May, prompted by X Corps , the division began complete retraining in

gas discipline. "t'he well known gas instruction and warning heretofore
given t.hie Division will be taken up anew in all organisations, commencing
19
o.t. on.;.o, &"ld <Gonti.l'l\l.i.-'lg W tho 0111.J vr t.hit: wvuu1!i

On 9 llay, in a final report to the Chief of the Oas Service, Captain

Davia said that as of that date the attack had result<!d in a total of 693
gas casualties, including 4 gas deaths, principally owing to the failure

Ltr, DGO to COO I Corps, 5 llay, above. The report of this attack in
Spencer 's Ristroy of Oas Attacks Upon the AKF," 15 Feb 1928, I, 40 - 57
(llS in CIIIJIO), adds litUe to the account given here ,
18
0-3 l!emo for CO 1st Brig, 4 May, subs Preventive measures against
gas in the vie of Villers-Tournelle (Records 1); G:-) llemo for CO let Brig,
5 lilay, subt Villers-Tolll'nelle (Records 1), Ltr, CG .lat Div to COX Corps,
20 llay, subs l!lvac of gas infected zones (Records l), said that his memo
of 4 May had been complied with,
19
G-.3 Memo, 7 May, subs Oas Instruction (Records 1). Thia long memo
was repeated exactly as G-3 Inetru .32, 19 ltay (Records 20) . Note,
Records l, 6, 8, and 10 have a large number of memos, orders, and imrtruc-
tions resulting from the gM attack on Villers-folll'nelle,

15 -

-
 20
to evacuate t.he area immediately for one week, as he had recommended.

Al t.ho'Ugh tbi's total agrees closely with that found in the hos pi ta1 admiss-

ion lists f or the period, 1 s t Division histories and those quoting t he

histories were to insist that the enemy gassed 800 of us, or even that

"900 casualties including 50 killed" occurred at Villera-fourne+le that

21
night. Some basis for these figures appears in a 1st Division medical
report that Ambulance Company No. 12 evacuated 704 gas cases and JO
other men up to midnight on 4 May, and that Field Hospital No. 13 alone
!l!l
received a total of 762 gas cases as a result of the attack.

From the enemy's point of view the success of the attack was un-
questionable. Har,Olian, on the basis of Captain Davis's final count,

said the attack might 11 serve as a downright classic example of the

overwhelming effect which may be exerted by a gas attack carried out

,nder favorable conditions upon a body of men having litUe gas experience,"

So far as Hanslian knew, gas protection was amply available, but the
attack fell upon troop3 which "had not yet been exposed to any considu.-

able Yellen, Cross bombardment," and the ca$ualties had resulted from their

20
telg, DGO to C Gas Serv at Tours, 8104 P.t.!. , 9 May; ltr, DGO to
COO I Corps, 12 May, sub, Weekly Rpt (GAF-1st Div).
21
Bullard, Personalitiea, p, 19.3; G-3 Rpt on Opns in sector west of
Montdidier, JO Nov (Records lJ); MS History of the First Div, ed. Col
J . N, Greely, CofS, 1st D1v, n.d . (1st Div &>x 12, 11.4); Medi cal Dept
of the US ,Army in the World War (Washington, 1925), VIII, 296, !f.ien
c~yt.. Dtt.v.i.::s ita.'-'::-1 cu,LJ \.ln,n, n::u:t::1 uvtt1 600 ..,;c1,.:sui:ll.\.lv::s 0 :k,t;t l.tr, D8V15
DGO 92nd Div to CGO II Corps, 29 Dec, subs Gas Attacks on First Div
(92nd Div Box 81, fol 20).
22
MS, Hist of Lied Dept, 1st Div, 14 Jan 1920, p. 5 ( Me d Dept &>x
J398, fol 1).

- 16 -
 23
failure to protect themselves atainst a gas concentration.
On 11 llay the 2nd Brigade was ordered to begin the relief ot ths
lat' Brigade in the line, but it was the night of 22 - 23 1/ay before the

28th Infantry replaced the badly gassed 18th. Tbree ofricer11 and 280

men had come in as repiacements in eight of the worst-hit companier, ot

the 18th Infantry more than a week earlier, and with the daily pounding

by enelllY artillery the whole regiment was now greatly in need ot rest
24

the &nall Box Respirator

AB a result of his four-day investigation into the high oaaualtiea

resulting from the gas bombardment of J - 4 1/ay, Lt. Col, H. L, GU.Christ,
Medical Director of the Gas Service, reported that the casualties had

been caused by 1) lack of gas discipl~, 2) lack of gas trench stores

-
-----
on the scene,
/ -- ----
and protected dugouts, and 3) direct di sobedience of gas orders by
... ~

Visiting 646 gas patients, including 26 officers, at the

four field hospitals at Froissy, Breteuil, Neuville, and llonviller", and

officers

the two French base hospi tals at Beauvais, he found "a fairly large

nwnber with severe respiratory symptoms, the worst caHs those who had

been gassed in dUiouts, He agreed with the Division Gae Ortioer and the

gas officers of the brigade that the majority of cases had resulted when

the men changed rem the 1!_itish Sl'll to the French M-2 mask during t.be

2J
Hanslian, p, 77.
24
FO 16, 1st Div, 11 Uay; 1/emo for CG lat Brig, subs Replaoementa
for 18th Inf; C-J Memo for CO 18th Inf Rapl Det, 11 1/ay (Records l),

- 17 -
bombardment, after the SER became intolerable.

The Small !bx Respirator (SBR), designed by the British in 1916,

to protect against the new German gases, chlorpicrin and superpalite

{ diphosgene), was the standard mask supplied to American troops upon

their arrival in France. In the heavy bag-like facepiece of the SIR

was a noseolip, to prevent nasal breathing, and a tube, held in the

mouth, through which air was breathed after its noxious content had

been removed in the canister. The mask was effective for over twenty
hours in a gas atmosphere but because of the difficulty of breathing

toleration for the average soldier was said

i n the mask, the limit of ..__

to be six to eight hours.

The French lh2 mask, issued to troops for use when they could no

longer tolerate the SBR, was little more than a filter. It had no

noseclip or 1110uthpiece, could be worn for fairly long periods of time,

but lost its protective power in a few hours. Worse still, it was

fragile and easily damaged, and moisture of any kind quickly impaired

the effectiveness of i ts gas-filtering components.

On the theory that infantrymen could be moved out of gassed areas

and the M-2 was therefore sufficient for them, while artilh'fr)'lll&n had
to st.and by their guns, the French had d'!veloped the Tissot. mask for

them, an expensive but effective mask without. the noseclip and mouth-

piece of the Britiah mask. Early in 1918 the French developed still
another effective mask, the ARS (Appareil Respiratoire Speciale),

modeled on the German snout mask, also expensive and therefore pro-

duced in mnall quantities, for issue to special troops , and occasionally

- 18 -
 25
available to American officers,

During the Villers-Tournelle attack, many of the men had taken their

SIi! ma.ska off within half an hour after the bombardment, either when so
ordered by officers or because they saw officers going about without

mask.,. Colonel Gilchrist also learned that during the bombardment the
regimental commander, the regimental gas officer and other officers o!

-
the 18th In!antry had all changed eventually to ARS masks, which were
unauthorized and wiavailable to the enlisted men. Two days afU!r the

attack the odor or mustard gas was still strong thro~out the eassed
area, but no one there wore hie mask. To Gilchrist this was clearly

erldence of lack of gas training and of extremely bad gas mask

26
discipline. To 2nd Lt, Robert A. Hall, the re~imental gas officer,

the failure to keep gas masks on meant only that the SIR and rt-2 were
unwearable ,

In several outspoken letters, Lieutenant Hall described the

hazards of t he SEil and the virtues of the recently designed AllS. Al-

though he insisted that the troops had worn their S!Rs for from 17 to

18 hours, they bad oomplained that perspiration from the forehead,

impregnated with gas, seeped under the mask band and in that way had

affected their eyes and faces. The nose-clip became saturated and

wouldn t remain in place. Prolonged wearing became painful and led the

25
Fries and West, Chemical Warfare (New- York, 1921), pp. 203 - 05.
26
Ltr, lied Dir OC of Ga-s Serv, 15 May, above, The charge appears
also in the Gas Serv Weekly SU!ffllary of Information (hereafter Cl!S WSI)
tor 15 May (WD Hist Box 289).

- 19 -
men to change to their French M-2 masks . He, as well as surgeons,
stretcher bearers, and runners, had found it impossible to carry on in
the SIii because the arrangement of the eyepieces and the togging of
the lenses impaired vision, And because he had had to patrol the

streets of V11lers-Tournelle, to see that mask$ 11'8re being worn and

that shelters were safe for occupancy, he had changed to the ARS,

The ARS, he argued, eave absolute protection, allowed complete vision,

and in every respect was more satisfactory to wear than either the
:t.7
SBR or M-2. He recommended its immediate adoption by the AEF,
Lieutenant Hall might have added that the M-2 was deficient be-

cause it did not f i lter out diphenylchlorarsine and broke down under

continued exposure to mustard gas flD!les, It was also highly vulnerable

to moisture and even rain tended to spoil it. Tbis latter point was
'Jle subject of a memo in mid-January that said the M-2 ~as no longer
to be carried during practice marches or maneuvers, since so many of
28
them became uselese as a result of getting "8t in the field.

Ltr, RGO 18tb In! to CO 18th Inf, 5 May, subs Gas situation; ltr,
RGO 18th Inf to C Gae Serv, 6 May, subs Rpt of Gae Attack (Records lJ
and GAF-1st Div). See also J.lemo, Lt Col John w. N. Schulz, Gae Serv LO
with 0-4 OHQ, for Secy GS AEF', 21 May, subs Gas Attack on 18th Int, .
(GAF-1st Div).
28
Bulletin de Renseignemente de 1 1 Artillerie, Apr - ~lay (AEF GHQ
G-J Rpte Box Jl92, fol 1575); Misc memo 2, 1st Div, lJ Jan, aubs
French Gas Masks (Records 6); Study No, 9. "The 1st Division at
Ansauville," p. 6, For other co1m11ent on the l!-2 see ltr, DGO J2nd
Div to B'.lOs, ca. Mar 1918, sub: Gas Tn,i (32nd Div Box 14, 55).

- 20 -
 The eaiwa.nding o!fieer of the 18th Infantry, Col, Frank Parker,
joined Hall in his eond81l1Mtion o! the SBll, Unable to see with the
mask and finding 1 t "pain.fulzy oppressive, 11 he had removed the faoe-

p1.ece as soon as the attack was over but continued to wear the nose-

clip and mouthpiece for sa:1e time before changing to the 11.-.2 and
t hen to the ARS. He found the latter excellent so far as ruion and
oo:i!'ort 11'8re concerned and evon less fatiguing to wear than the M-2,
The regimental surgeon and regimental gas officers joined him, he
said, in requesting the ARS for the 18th Infantry and in urging that
an official canparison of masks be made and reported by the .A.EF,

"Unless our men are provided with .2!l! single m IIIUk [ with good
vision, good respiration, fair canfort, and permitting speeoi} we
shall never be able to avoid casualties from gas."
Oeneral Bullard forwarded Colonel Parker's letter to X Corpe
29
With the request that it be sent to .Pershing for pi.3 information,
The Oas Service appnrentzy heard of the canplaints or of the letter

before it reached Pershing and on 8 ~ spoke out against the

"pernicious eff ect of thoughtless criticism":

There aeema to be sane talk among members o! the Oas Service relative
to defects in respirators now issued, The British and klerican
llespirators represent the best type o! individual protective appliance
that has been developed.... Aey man 'llbo is responsible !or stat8Qents
'llbich could be construed as a reflection on our gas defense measures
or equipnent now in use, and wlu.ch could thus tend to destrcy con-
fidence or to create dissatisfaction, is do1.ng incalculable ham to the

i9
Ltr, 00 18th Inf to CG 1st Ul.v, 7 May, sub: Gas Attack, and
1st I nd, 10 llay (Records l3).

- 21-
 JO
defense service and rendering eubstant1al aid to the &Jl8111,
Ilespi.te the disocatort ot' wearing it, the S8R unquest.iooab~

ottered the maxl mnm or gas protect1on ot an;r usk at the time, and ita
rugged oolUJtruotion made it superior to 11117 French mask tor the
0<111bat soldier. But becauee of the element ot di11oc:a.ton., tbe A
31
had at first author1zed the 1seue at both the SBB and the~.
The fact that off'1cea:c, wre ablll to obta1n the W maeke and that
inoreaeing llll!llbere wore t i -1 to the prejudice o! aaa d1aoipl1De among

the trooP11, at last llld to an order on J June N1ill8 that ~ the

)2
SBR and lol-2 were to be '!IOll'l1 in the AD,
Mare aer1oua wu the growing 1no1denoe 1n the IJl:il ot h!-!th 11a11
oasualtiee direct~ attributable to the freque11C7 with llhioh t:'oopa
changed fr<III the Sl!R to the K-2 during 11ae bombarQll&nte, On 7 June a
new order trcm GHQ W' said that the 1''r8nch ~ malllt wa no J.onger
33
authorized tor American troops and all wre to be tll1'Dld 1n at cnae,

CWS \tsI, 8 1ia7,

)l
The American SBR, said to have been 11ieB11ed to ,ome ot our t:'oopo
in April, wa:i eimila.r to the British mask .except that it bad a larger .
canister and sbatter-proot' eyepieces (CV/S llSI, 24 J.pr), Both SBRe had
the recent'.q incorporated eulfite paper to screen out d1i;tle!V'lohlor-
ars1ne, Thie further 1naraased resistance to breathillg so that it wa,
JX1711ically ilapoeaible to nar the SBR more than 6 - 8 hours (Fries and
West, cw, cal 1'ar!ar1t, p. 411),

)2
IH.ec ~ 81, 3 Jun, aub I tearing or gas maw (Becorda 6), A
source of I.RS masks m;q have been tbe t'rench artillery .llbich:na nar-
mal.l;y "'i".l.l'r""l -..ub 1.i.- ....- w.l.1>h l>ho 'liooot
Cantig!V', VIII Gp, l7?th Fr Trench Art7, 2 Jun (Recqrda 14),
-oi.. S. Rpt on op,. o.t

)J
CTS WSI, 5 Jun; 0-1 memo, 1st lll.v, ? Jun, subJ lit.ska authorized
for A,E..F. (Records 6) , The reoClCllmendation was 1.ret made in ltr C ct
Oas Serv to C-1.n.-C, 8 May, sub. Amendment: o!"GO (ARP OliQ 0-4 Box 4455,
470,6) .

- 22 -
 l'he troops were to \fear the SBR only until a new American mask could
be developed and produced f ill' thenl ,
CriticiSlll of the SBR continued, naturally, becan1ng the subject of
a 1st Ilivieion memo on 19 June. General Bullard said he had heard that
sCID8 of the office1s were openl,y criticising the mask in the presence
of enlisted men, talking about the "inconvenience and difficulty of

wearing it," He ordered his <1fficers to minilldze rather than aggravate

)4
the difficulties of the mask, Privately, General Bullard h1mself had
a low, not to aay fearful, opinion of the SBR:
Gas was such a deadly and insidious thing that gas training for the
protection of the men was carried out almost continuousl,y, It was about
the hardest thine for our people to learn. I myself was never able to
.fullill the qualifications of a successful wearer of the gas mask. It
seemed to me in all my t rials and efforts that I should be SlllOtherod if
I remained longer th3ll three minutes in that gas mask, And it never mac 1
much difference what its improvements were,
Under our instruction [however] it becaroe quite COOllllon for our men not
onl,y to remain long periods of time, but to do heavy work, in the gas
mask, and at last our gaa school ,~quired a test of a baseball game in
gas masks. And it was f'uli'illed. )

;tnterim

In retaliation for the gas attack on 3 - 4 M:,,y, three battalions

of the 1st FA Brigade on 5 llay fired 50 rounds of j'.lhosgene per battery

34
ltlsc memo 86, 19 Jun, sub: British Box Respirator {Records 6).

3.5
Bullard, Personalities, p. 159; also pp. 193 - 194. In Sept.ember,
the 1st lliv, as the one "longest in enemy gas, requested it be the
first to be equipped with the oew American Tissot mask. Ltr s;irnopais,
000 l.::st.. Dl.v l..v C Oc1~ Ili.:i..C /J.EP, 2 Orop (OIi~ .AEP Dox 44!:iJ, Gaoc:i: J - 4,
fol 89).

- 23 -
into the Boie de Framioourt. To caopensate for i t s shortage of gas

shells, the brigade hurled bet1Teen 10,000 and 20,000 rounds of H&
daily into the German lines durine the week that followed, and each
day the brigade ma.chine guns fired between 20,000 and 50,000 rounds

into the enemy's works .

Ae General Bullard said, "The enemy had us on one thing - gas,
On tbis we were short and he loag. 11 Ylith approxiclately 600 nonperois-
t ent gas shells allotted per day, the division artillery fired all it
could lay its hands on that week, 4,4b4 75-mm and 1;2 155...- No . 4 and
36
No. 5 shells, p.itting most of it on enBmy batteries. But .!.t was not
en0118h, and the continued extravagant and furious use of flE subsided only
'J7
when the French expressed alarm at the state of their supply. But it
brought the division no inorease in gas shell allotlllent,
Ene,n:y fire after the drenching of Villera-Tournell.e continued at

its customary rate of approxi.mately 2,000 rounds each day, but little
gas was fired 11ntU the night of 14 - 15 .1/ay, when 1,500 yellow cross

sllelle reportedly fell in the Casablanca qu&rter during a violent bomb-

ardment with almost 6,000 :,hells. The relief of l..8th by 28th Infantry

36
Bullard, PerS;onalities, p. 193; IXlR, 5 - 12 lla;r; Lt. A. B, Butler
(lAter AIX: to Gen. &umnerall), Journal of Operations, 5 .1/ay' (Racords ll).
Hereafter cited as All: Jnl Opns.

'J7 Alamo, CXl X Corps for 1st Ill.v, 19 ll3y" (1st Ill.v Box 92, 10. 2 ol. 4),
said the div baCI Urea 4,)64 Slll'&pnel. ancl 9:1.,,90 llll 1;,ct-woon (I - l.7 11,q,
and deplored particularly the failure to keep shrapnel to one-eighth the
total consumption.

- 24 -
troopa wa.,, in progress in the adjacent quarter at the time, but re-
markabl,y enough, despite this weight of gas shell, no gas ca111111ltiea
were reported in either quarter. No German record of this gas fire haa
been found, and hospital records show onl,y 9 gas cases in these two
38
regiments in the period 15 - 17 lfay.
On the afternoon of 19 llay, eneaiy batteries in the Bois de
Framicourt banbarded Coulleme'l.le and vicinity, llhere a battalion o!
the 6th FA and at least one French battery were located, with approx-
:!Jllatel,y 2,500 105.-i mustard gas shells. It was thought to be tire
of retaliation following acme o! our gas concentrations. The next day,

beginning at noon, said G-2, another 1,542 mustard gas shells canplated
39
the drencb:l,n& of the area. The bc:mbardment was carried out by the

long-range guns o! the lst Reserve Division, 1'hich had been allotted
9,660 yellow cross :,hells for the taission. The actual ba:ibarclment, in
two p!lases, appears to have ccmprised 1,000 yellow cross rounds fired
by the heaVY field howitzers, 5,150 rounde by the 10-cm gune, and 175

mortar rounds, for a total of 6,325 yellow cross shells on the village
and nearby bat teries. The bombardment was to have been conducted as

three surprise shoots (Gasuberfallen), at l6oo on 19 !lay, 0400 on 20 May,

and 0430 on 22 May, but Hanslian indicates that the series ended with

38
SOI 18, 14 - 15 May; IOR, 14 - 15 May, Anal,ysis, p, 72.

39
SOI 23 and 24, 19 - 21 leY. Contusing this attack With that on
Villers-1'ournelle earlier, a First ~ bulletin said that abetween
10,000 and 15,000 Yperite shell.a fell in the Bois de Coullemelle on
19 May (quoted in suppl to SOI IIJ, 5 - 6 Jun, and repeated in Hist
Sketch, p. 59, and History 01
the Fi)st Division (Society o! the let
Division, Philadolphia, 1922 , p. 74

- 25 -
 40
the second ahoot. Unless Coullemelle contained French troop con,..
centrations (of which there is no record), as 1'811 as Ft-ench and
American batter:, posi tio M, it was a tremendous weight of shell with
relativel,y minor consequences canpared to the Villers-Tournelle attack,
G-J reported J gas casualties in the artillery in the French zone

as a result of the tvro banbardments. But the 6th FA gas officer,

estimating that 4,000 77 and 105-mn mustard gas shells had f'allen in
and around the village on the afternoon of 19 May and intermittent
shell., thereafter Ulltil noon on 20 ay, said that l6 artillerymen had
been evacuated, 4 of them with serious burns fran splashes. The

French battery in the same area was gassed equall,y as IDllch - all

evacuated. Contradicting G-J and 6th FA estilDates are hospital and

corps reports tbat indicate more than e hundred gas casualties in the

division during that period.

The battery positions of the 6th FA l'fere evacuated at the end of'

tbe first banbardment and for several nights thereafter a single man
per piece, cl.ad in gas mask and gas clothing, remained in each pos-
41
1t1on and was relieved at frequent intervala. The battalion was

for the time being thorou.ghl,y neutralized.

40
Arko 71 Order 2129/18, 1st Res Div, 17 lilay, cited in Hanalian,
pp. 00 - 82,
41
IX,R, 19 - 20 May; CO 6th FA to CG 1st FA Brig, 19 May, subs Gae
attack on Coullemelle (lat Div Box 101, 3J.6); Rpt on Gas Atk, JlOO
6th FA, n.d . (GAF-1st Div); AIXl Jnl Opns, 19 May; Spencer, I, 59 - 60,
says there were 20 casualties, but see Anal,yais, P 72.

- 26 -
 Preparations !or the Cantignv Attack
ill. during April First French Army had expected a reSW12ption or

the attack 1n the .IJontdidier area . When it did not come, and intell-
igence indicated a more likel,y renewal of the offensive at Amiens, the

Allied High Caumand began planning a counter-offensive on the Montdid-

ier front. In preparation for the attack, the 1st Di.vision was to
capture Cantigny, t o straighten the line and afford a good jUlllping-
off position. The object of the counter-offensive itscl.t' was the
recapture of Framicourt and liontdidier by the French units to the
ri&ht 01' the .I.st JJ:LV1.s1on. JS.Xcept ror tne 1,;ant1gny operation, tne p.Lan

was abandoned as rUJ11ors grew that the next German offensive would be

launched somewhere on that front. On 2'/ ~ the expected enemy

attack was launched from the Chemin des lames (see Map No. l} .
:t:he 1111t1a1 n.e.1.a oraer ror tne .I.St D1v1s1on operat1on sua lts

purpose was "to capture the plateaux of Cantigny and llesnil-St. Georges,
and to bring up the artillery to the line Cantigny-Fontaine-.llesnil
St. Georges," for better fire on the plateau north and northeast of
lolontdidier. Or, from the point of view of the enemy opposite, the
Allied intention was 11 to take p,,ssession of Height No . 104, in order
t:).
11
to gain a view of the b-streain valley aM toward llontdidier

t:).
Hist Sketch, pp. 61 - 62; FO 15, 1st lliv, 10 May (Recordttl);
USA in the IVY/, III, 2tr, - 269; XXVI Res Corps WD, 31 May (Wor _ ~
Records First Division, German Documents., ,Cantigny Sector, vol I.
Unless otherwise noted, all references to Oennan docUJ11ents are to
'bh.i.o vol.v.mo

- 27 -
 The division history was also to suc:gest that the operation was to
deprive the ~nemy- of t his salient, which facilitated his observation and

the el.feet of his .fire upon the 5ector, 11 Dut .fran _General fershing I s point
of view, the real reason for tho Cantigny attack was that at this manent

the mrale of the Allies r,,quircd that American troops make their appear-

ance in batt le. A successful attack "ould also demonstrate that we

could best help the Allies oy u~ing our troops in lar&er units instead
of adopting their plan of b1il.diog up their force:.i" by bre>.k.:.ne up and
43

Cantigey, a sprawling and largely denolished village on a rise of

ground in the center of the slight salient west of 14ontdidier, was at

this t iJ:le, despite earlier evidence of its lieht llarrison, belie!ed to be

had ~eady been twice captured and lost by the French prior to the
arrival of the 1st DI.vision and the enemy was said to have orders to bold

it at acy cost. It could bo captu.red, but "desperate fighting to hold

it wouJ.d surely follow," and t hio wno the chief arud.ety in the prel.:iJni.nary
44
plans of the operation.
The capture of Cantigr,y was orieinally pl.allJled as an 18th Infantry
operation, to take place on 25 L.~y, but General Bullard had to assign it
to the 28th Infantry because the 18th had not recovered from the Villor1>-
.I
43
Por.:shi:nr; 1 Yr Expori_opcioo in tho \'l9rl.d \\f4.r (N91T York, 1.931), .II.,. 551
I
J. C. llise, The Turn of the 'l'ide (New York, 1920), pp. 33 - 34, I
44 I
Hist Sketch, p, 63,
I
I
- 28 -
I
I

 Tournelle gas attack . With the chanee of plans he asked that the oper-
45
ation be deferred until 28 May'. On that day, the three battalions of
the 28th Infantry, lTith l2 tanks and a platoon of Frenoh flallle throwers
1.6 '
1,ere to converi:;e on Cantigny fran the south, west, ai ,d north.

On 23 - 2.5 Aiay the 28th Infantry, u.nder Col. Hanson E. Ely, was
withdrawu i'rall tha line and replaced by the 18th Infantry. Back at the
drill ground east of Aai.3oncelle, the troops i:Je1:an to train for the
attaolc an a near replica of Lhe objective, 1,ith units down t o platoons

<i.rillod for their parts, ~rticularl,y in ope1atine with tank assistance

and pl.,ru, observation. Artillery reenforcements brought into the sector
f!AVC the planned operation 132 75-mn guns, J6 155-mlll guns, 178 heavy cims

and hmtit.zers, and 40 trench mortars, a total of 386 gun:i, with 129,620

rcuncs o! HE, 1,200 smoke shell,i (to protect the tanks), and l0,000
gas shells, All 64 machine (lUtlS in the rei;iment, ,nth more than 100,000

rounc!s, .were moved into forward positions where they were to maintain a
47
ba.rrai:e throughout the assatlt in advance of the artillery barrage. The
hour for the attack was fixed !or 0545, 28 lloy.
Two days before the attack on Cantigny the ene111Y artillery began

deJnoll8tration !ires to mask the third German otfensive. In that attack,

45
kr, Lewis to Conner, 17 May, sub: Liaison Rpt (append to lXlR, 17 -
18 11.ly, Records 12).

fO 15, 10 lilay; FO 18, 17 May, revised 20 lllay.

47
ALC Jnl Opns, 2? llay'; Hist Sketch, p. 65; Opns Memo 1.6, 1st FA Brig,
20 .tlay, sub: Ammo necessary for the Cantillll.Y operation (Records 9) .
Col. Ely's Rpt of Capture of Cantigny (quoted in AOC Jnl Opns, 12 Jun,
and in RQ.s.,ords 13) reports 250 cuns, not J86,

- 29 -
 launchud from the Chemin des !liunes on Z'/ i.ta.y follol'ling a gas banb-

nrdment whose effects were felt almost fifteen kilaueters back of the

front lines, thirty German divisions overran tbe seven French and

British divisions resting on the quiet front above the Aisne. Not until

t,he entire r'rench reselves in the 1lust, ,:omprising 35 infantry and 6

cavalry divisions, hlld been thrown into the b1each were the German armies

halted. On 3 June, the drive was stopped at the l!arne, forty miles from
48
f>r.ris.

ln tne ctanonstrations 1or the orrensi ve on tt,e Cantigny front, the

_\$?Jig and 25th Reserve Diyi;;ions gassed battery posHions and troop areas
1>f the 1st Division on successive nights, following the second gas attack

with tYto raids in fo,ca, simultaneous With the great offensive . Report-
1ng tne nrs, lluntia:euz gas ai;i;acK ( l. .e,, llll.Xea oiue cross LJUpnen;vl.-

e.hlorarsine] and ereen cross finosgene J gas shell.:,} on the morning of

;,6 May, tbe 82nd Reserve Division said;

We gassed tbe low ground west of Bois St. Eloi with 1200 rounds, the
Bois St. Eloi Wit.h 6oo, the Bois des Glands with 580, the low ground
northeast of Villers-Tournelle ,nth 6o0 rowids, the village of Villers-
rournell.e Ylith 150, /jnd two nests or batteries lith 710 round~, The
25th Reserve Division at the sli\:~ tiJlle gassed the Fontaine woo s .... 'fbe
batteries gassed did not reply.

48
Pershing, 1ty Experienceo, ll, 61; Lt. Col. X. e. Price, "The Ger-
man Offensive of .llay Z'/, 1918" (AEF OH~ G- J Rpts Box Jl59, fol U,38},

49
82nd Res Div rro, 26 Ua,y. 82nd Res Div Order 715, 25 laY (item 86,
la.co Doo1:, oourco a.), sbu~s e,n1y t.,n~e;A+.~, W'tt.h nait.her t.he amounts nor
kinds of gas. No arty order has been found,
It is doubtful ?lhethar more tban a token of the follOll'ing order was
fl.red: "M.G. wc,ods (Bois de Fontaine) will be gassed with 5000 rounds
of Yellow Cross from 2-5:00 a.m. during night of 25/26 llay if the weather
is favorable (Add, to 25th Res Div Order 2J6, 6:00 p.m., 24 .llay (item 100,
Lli.sc the, source a]) ,

- JO -
 'l'he total of 3,900 gas shells here is higher than the 2,760 repor~ed b;y

llanslian, !Ibo seys that the targets were battery positions in the hollows
and woods near Villers-Tournelle, and that 940 blue cross and 1,820

green cross shells were firod in a Schwadenschiesgen or cloud shoot last-

50
ing from 0400 - 0450.
The eas attack '1as reported by the 1st Division as occurring be-

tween 0250 - 0510 on the 26th when about 3,000 yperite and sneeze gas

shells were said to have !all.en in the Bois St, Eloi, Bois de Cantigny,

and Bois de Fontaine, while a battery position west of the Bois de

Villers \'las hit with 100 HE and ;yperite shells. No casualties were

reporkd at 1000, five hours later . 0-3 estimated the shelling at 2,160
51
rounds but had no casualties to report .

A company com:iander of Engineers worki~ near the Bois de Cantign;y

saic! nineteen of his men were evacuated that day, seven of them with

severe e,e and hlng injuries. The ?th FA battery commander, Tlhose unit

was on the edj:e of the Bois de Villers, reported two mustard gas

casualties among a 11Umber of his men taking refuge in a dugout. He

esti<,ated that 400 cas shells had fallen around his position, and said
52
that the odor of gas was still strong two days later. These are the
only accounts of the first attack,

50
Hanslian, pp. 83 - 81,.

51
SOI 29. 25 - 26 May: OOR, 25 - 26 lofay,

52
Rpt on Gas Atk, CO Co F l.:lt Eng, 26 May; Rpt on Oas At& of 26
lkiy, CO Bty A ?th FA (GA.F-lst Div).

- 31 -
 The 82nd Reserve Division artillery order for the second gas

attack, on t:,be .corning of Z7 May- - the immediate demonstration for the

Chemin des Dames offensive - said that all ba~teries exce~ the light
field howitzers, vmich 'IT8re short of blue and areen cross shells, llould
" participate in the cas bombardment. , . We must forego the prescribed gas

cloud shoot and contrary to tactical irinciples use more Yellow Cross,
especially on the targets for which thel'e is a limited quantity of Blue
5J
and Green Cross avail.able . "
Thin second gao bombardment was to begin at OJ45 with several
salvos of blue cross, then e blue cross concentration tor fi," lllinutes,

green cross for eight minutes, followed by drenching with yello,r cross.

Shortly before 0500 there were to be bursts of blue and green cross and
ai'ter that hour four batteries were to continue the neutralization With
,ellow cross until completed. Beginning at 0345, a total of 1,56o blue
cross shells, 1,946 green cross , and 1,700 yellow cross shells were to be
fired. For completion of the mission after 0500, 300 blue cro3s, 450
;;reen cross, and 2,500 yellow cross were allot ted. Jhring the shoot,

1.00 roun~ of HE. were to be mixed >nth t he gas shelle, anci from 0500

to 0700, just be.fore the raiding parties advanced, the mole 1st
Uivision front was to be banbarded with C!igh explosive. 'i:he 25th Ke-

serve Iliyision that same morning was t o use blue cross shells only on

53
XXVI lies Corps copy o:r Arico l:S2 oraer 4:i.z/ia (1u Ota:m;.:u1 Fl..1.) Oox
130, fol I, p. 5) has been used instead of German Documents translation,
l:n. below.

- 32 -
 54
battery positions on its front .

llanslian does not report this gas attaok on the mcrning of 27 Ma,
nor do available Ger.man records confirm the actual amount of gas fired.
The 25th Reserve Division was to sa;y on],y that 11 the enemy artillery was
not com)Jle,;ely silenced by our gas b<Jllbardment on account of unfavorable
55
weather conditions. u

No estimate of the total number of shells was made by the 1st

Division. G-2 said that earl,y on 2? Ma, as the 28th Infantry moved back

l.nLo the line, tho eneey ~t do1m a furious fire of high explosive and

sr.rapnel shells and strong concentratio,.s of gas along the entire front
line and rear areas. Fran 0230 to 0500 an yperite and phosgene bcmb-

ard~cnt fell in Villern-Tournelle, Bois Avance, Bois de Villers, and

llroyes, and fr001 0345 to 0600 a similar baiibardluent filled the Bois de
Fontaine, Bois des Glando, and Bois St. lil.oi with gas . Immediately follow-
ing t he ~as shelling, strong eneQY raiding parties attempted to penetrate
the lines of the 28th and 26th Infantry at Casablanca, Bois de Fontair 0

and Belle A3sise and riere reilsed. The bolnbal'dments and raids ,rore
56
mistaken],y C:escribed as II just a glorified coup de main , 11

54
Arko 8.! Order 412/18, 24 .llay (ite"' 91, Misc Ibo I source a); Arko 12?
(25th Res Div) Ordor for Tannenber~, J78/l2, 24 llaY litem 11?). &g.
Ms Iliy to Ilq XXVI Corps, 2:45 p.m., 25 May (item 1021, requested 11,J:35_

HE and .l,500 blue cross shells for the Tannenberg raids.

55
25th Rea Div Opris Rpt 4831. . Tannenberg, 28 .llay (item 89 - 91, lili.sc
Doc, source b). 25th Ras Div rm, '27 llay (source j), said the gassing "did
not have the desi~ea rosuits. Ammo expenaea tnat aay oy the Z5tn ~es Dl.y
was reported as 16,604 rounds.

56
SOI JO, 26 .. '27 I.fay; ltr, Lewis to Conner, 11:JO AM, '27 1&3y, sub;
L.aison l\pt (suppl to !Olt, 26 - '27 May, llecords 12).

- 'JJ -
 The 5th FA gas officer reported 60o yperite shells near one of his
batteries (at Rocquencourt?). Oas fUllles bloWing across the position
resulted in lp casualties with eye injuries. The ?th FA gas officer

estimated between 1,200 and 1,800 yperite shells on the crossroads, battery
positions, and towns in the vicinity of the Bois de Villers, but the ll
men gassed and l killed (hit by a gas shell) were said ~o have been all

nemen, working on t he wire in the area, The eleven men were evacuated
57
m.th burns vrhare the gas penetrated their clothing,

There is no re port available f or the 26th Infantry, lfhose lat

Battalion in Broyes and the Bois de Villers was hardest hit in this

attack, except that a week later ten lllen were evacuat ed 1'bo we.:e be-
58
lieved to be delayed casualties of that banbardment. Without estl.Juating
the nUJllber of shells in the attack, the Division Oas Officer repo~ted
171 gas casualties, princiill;y in the 26th Infantry, as a result of the
59
chlorpicrin, .r,hosgene, and yperite fired in the Z, 1/ay attack. Since
no report by Captain Le.vis has been found for the attack on 26 Mily, this
60
total may include both banbardlnents.

57
Rpt on Gas Attack, EIGO 5th FA, ROO 7th FA, Z, I.lay (OAF-1st Div),
58
See SOI, 26th Inf, Z, 11.ay (Records 1.3); memo, BGO 26th Inf to Brig
Adj, 7 Jun, sub; Investigation of ten gas cases, Company I (Records 13).
59
TeJ.e, mo to C Gas Defense SOS, Tours, Z, - 28 May- (GAF-1st Div).

60
u-J mace no estimate or shells on 2:/ llay but reported l.04 gas casual,..
ties, including 7 officers of the 26th Inf. Only 4 of the gassed were
;yperite cases. On 28 May another JJ gas cases were reported, all from the
26th Inf, and 28 cases from t he 18th and 26th Inf on 29 May, 5 of the latter
yperite oases. Total casualties recorded by 0-J for the two attacks is
therefore 165 (IX)H, 26 - 29 .May).
Extract of Opns Rpt, Lst Div, JO llov (USA in the vnv, IV, J3l - 332),
said the gas attack and raids on Z, Atay resulted in 8 killed, 86 wounded,
and 97 gassed. This is apparent ly the source of J. C. 1/ise's account
in The Turn of the Tide, p. 20.
-34 -
 A post.war report on the gas at tacks of 26 - Z7 .llaY, in which a

third of the shells were said to have been mustard gas, the remainder
phosgene, indicate that a total of 333 gas casualties resulted. The
division hospital a<*nis~ion lista also show more than J-00 gas casual,..
ties for the period, but the coincidence of gas eases attributed to
61
the Cantigny operation makes separation of delayed cases impossible.
Although Hanslian has no record of it, a follow-up of a portion
of the yellow cross fire on Z7 ,.llay was executed on the early morning
of 28 May. AB Arko 82 reported, "'i'be battery nests near ltoequenoourt
woo.ch had been bombarded with gas yesterday were fired on With 600
n2
10-= yellow cross shells and the gas concentration was rene,,ed. 11

't he only report that can be identified With this attack is one from

the camnanding officer of French batteries at Roequencourt who de-

scribed the new disposition he had made of bis guns .t'olloWin& the
"violent gassing r/1.tb IperHe bet'W88n ll Jlll - 3 811111 on the night of
6J
Z7 - 28 . .llay. No mention was made of casualties.
I1' German reports indicated some disappointment >Tith this hea-vy-
gas fire when their raids failed and blamed it on the weather, 1st

Division hospital records reveal once again that gas .fire intended for
the artillery bad severelY i.nished the infantry. The three aleepleas

nights of gas fire ffl!re to have their effect on the Cantigcy attack.

61
Ltr, mo 1st. ll!.v to C CVIS, Z7 Jan 1919, sub: Rpt on Circ Ltr No.
89 (Gil'-lst Div); AnalYs1.s, p. 72.
62
Arko 12 to 1.11v Hq, 110rD1ng .Kpt, :t!l Ma::, (.Annexes -r.o l(D, i<l8ill Hes f'U.).

63
Rpt, Capt l.!alpot, comdg &ib-Gpg to Army, 28 May, n,,i. (Records 14) .

- 35 -
 The Capture of Cantif!l)Y

Amid the confusion of the banbardment and raids on the night of Z, -

28 May1 the ~8th Infant ry took up its positions for the attack on
Catttii,ny. The )rd Batt alion came up to the line just northeast of Bois

St. Eloi, the 2nd Battalion directly west of Cantigey, and the 1st

Batt alion to t he west edge of the Bois de Cantigny (lllap No, 5), A

company of t he 26t h Infantry under Maj, Theodore Roosevelt, Jr , was in

regimental reserve behind the 28th, and ~wo companies of the 18th l n-
fantry were in reserve north of Villers-Tournelle , As the troops

assemtiiea, .ne r-rencn vanl<s ana vne tlavacnmenv 01. r.rencn !lame vnrowers
64
j oined them for the assault, "The preparation, 11 X French ;orps said,
was to "be limited to a veey power!ul general neutralization of the

enemy artillery by tOXic shell during the night of (Z, - 28 ~ ] and

of t he t rench artillery, holl'it zers, and the field artillery on the

65
objectives."
At 0545 on 28 .May all guns on the ls_t ll!.vision .front opened up
wit h not less than t wo heavy guns [pounding) each ene,ey- battery position

with gas and high expl osive shell." "Areas occupied by hostile support-

ing troops were [also] heavily gassed, 11 and the Cantigny area was

Hist Sketch, p, 66.

6.5
Ltr, Vandenbere t o CO First French Army, l2 aiay, n. s. (USA in the
mt. lfae, ?Zatb Res tteet to 82nd Inf Rr1 a, ~ l4Ay (A.nna.m~ to
IV, 2'".10) _
WD, 82nd Res Div), reported a "1;as bombardment on J.lalpart , ~ethenbuacb,
Narrenbusch and ifolfsscblucht" tsee .llap No. 6).

- 36 -
 +
\..~
LI-
. '.
801,
dh c1.n4,
dV.11

-~~ '
;

c:r _._
+
~'--~------- PRtllMINAIN D1s,o51110Ns, 11 IIOOCl
~) ah .l! wt1"1 Af\~ ,, fO \I . ,,. Dw
,... , . ' ,,, lh-~ ... 8'1

M'IP NO. 5

37
quickly converted "into a volcano of bursting shell and flame and
66
smoke. tt Special neutralization of enemy batteries at H-5 minutes
was carried out by French corps and arm)' artillery with 700 No. 4
and No. 5 gas shells, and it is assumed that tbe 2,400 gas shells
allotted to 6otb }'rench DI.vision artillery were fired in other counter-
1:iattery missions. German records show that Daubachtal (Dom stream valley],
the depression from Gratibus down betneeo Fontaine and Courtemanche, was
"strongly gassed [about 6:00 A,M. and again] before 8:45 A,M.,K and was
heavily banbarded once more at 4:00 PM, The "west eoge of Ziethenbusch

[.Bu.ls Uu. VJ.cvmt." J n~ [a.1:,iu J :dJol.'lod l. """'- 7 t,.., 0 v 'cl.ock Ydbh G.bou'b
. 67
100 rourxls of gas (Liaps No , 6 and 7).
At o645, under a rolling barrage and accanpanied by tanks, the

infantry advanced in three waves, and at 0720 the object! ve line was
ro6ohod 1 500 mot9ro nor~h 0 C4.nl:.~g,:,;y ond o~rv:a.ns b~ck ovor ~ two.-
68
kilometer front. 't he entire garrison in t;antigey was promptly overcome

66
Hist Sketch, p, 67, The 1st l'li Brig fired 1200 No. J smoke shells
at H-5 minutes, and 33,JlJ 75-mm and 4,192 155-llWI HE shells that day,
J.lemo, BAil, 27 Feb 1919, sub: Ammo Expended by 1st FA Brie (Records 14),
added that 29,932 75-am and 2,916 155-mm shells we,e fired on 29 I.ray.
See rpt,, Special Shells fired by 1st l'A Brig, n.d. (Records 14); G-J rpt,
Cantig.t\Y Operation, 18 Ole (Records l,J).

67
Above rn. and Firing Order 254/0, 6oth Div arty, 27 May, (Records
9); 25th Res Diy Vf.D, 28 llay (.lti.sc Doc, source j); 271st Res Regt, Noon
rpt;, J:00 P.M., 28 May (Annexes to IID, Sind Res Di.y),
68
Wise, The Turn of the Tide, p, :n, says the objective was "a line
one kilometer beyond the village of Cantigr\)", extending .f'rcm the rejlion
of St. Aignan along the forward ect,;;e or the wood nor.neas1. or 1.ne
village to point 104 overlooking Courtemanche and the ravine leading
along the eastern face of the plateau. 11

- JS -
 "'"' p 1{0 6

39
 /
/
/

""' p >{0. 7

40
 and made prisoners." In all, 5 officers and 225 men were captured that
morning.

The artillery at once enolosed the captured area in a great box

barrage, as patrols and autanatic rifle posts were established in shell

holes to cover the consolidation nf tbe new line. The second line of

troops began digging trenches and stri11&i.ng wire behind the outpost
line, while the third wave began organizing three strong points, east

of tbe chateau at Cantigr,y, in the r1oods at the north edge of Cantigny,

69
and at the cemetery north of Cantigrv. On1J' a handful of men re-
70
tiained in the ruins of the village it sell".
As a result of the German drive launched from the Che-min des Omtes

the day before, the 28th Infantry was no sooner on the objective than

the French began to withdraw their counter-battery artillery, sending

it to oppose the Geman advance. As these heavies ceased firing, the

hostile batteries back of Cantigny opened up, pounding the troops in

their exposed positions above the village . '!'he heavy h01'1tzers of the
division had neither the range nor nUlllbers to counter the enemy fire

(tbe fortress howitzers left behind reached onl,y to the enelJIY front

line), and by noon enemy artillery and machine gun fire upon the salient
71
reached a crescendo that. was to be maintained for 48 hours.

69
Hist Sketch, p. 68; AIX: Jnl Opns, 28 - 29 May, reproduces the
complete brigade l'C journal of the opn.

70
Ltr, Lewis to Conner, 9 A.ll., 29 May, sub: Liaison Rpt (suppl
to DOR, 28 - 29 May, Records 12).
?l
Hist Sketch, pp; 68 - 69.

- 41 -
 At l.JJO, the 82nd Reserve Division issued a new order: "The woods
and depressions, support trenches, communication trenches and villages
fran Plessi~rs to !Jelle As~ise l,'enoe will be lJanbarded with cas t o
72
begin at once. 11 E><ecution of the order seems to have been delayed, G-2

reported that the Genaan.s fireri at least 6, 000 rounds of RE, all calibers,

+nto Cam,igey beti,een 1000 - (JJOO on 28 - 29 !lay. Anotper 1 1 500 HE rounds

fell on 26th Infant,r'J front lines 11nd in the Broyes are<\ dqfing 29 lilay,

and that day the Gassing began ,men 11 the Villers-Tournelle sector was

bombarded 1ntermitl;eutly with 5,000 shells of aoall, medi1ll!l and large

7)
caliber, includJ.ne sneezing gas , Pnosgene, Yperito and high explosive, "

But it was the enemy ruachine gurl!l east of Cantigny and in Fo:itaine, said

General llu llard, that caused the heavie5-t casualties during the consoli-

dation, before the men coul d get under ~round , By noon on 28 lJay, over

half of the companies above Cantigny had r eported a third or ~heir men
74
killed or wounded and were calli.nc for reenforceraents or relief.

72
Div Order 1992 82nd Res Diy, hJO P, M,, 28 Llay ( item 66, AnnexP
1
to VID, 82nd Res Dix;.

73
SOI J2, 28 - 29 1by. ml Hes Corps Order 2067, JO lJay ( item 149,
26th Res Corp Gp Orders) , reported that III Corps arty supported 82nd
Res Div arty in this cassing , and that .MY! and IX Corps arty also took
part in gas missions from Villers to bfront, There we~ no details
of the gas fire.

74
Ltr, CG 1st Ui.v to CO X Corps, 28 llay, sub: Prelim rpt on Opn
against Cantigny (Record 12) ; Rpt on Opns at Ca.nticcy, 28th Inf
{RecordB lJ). Ltr, Gra nt Wat 1st Div to Conner, 10 A.ll. , JO lJay,
u . ~. (1~ ... Q1d:1 ~ ) , o,o.i.d t.ho hi.ub oo,ouo..l.ti.$C w,oro U1A.re;~<>1y li,. t_,:::i t.n A
German nachine gun "hich caui;ht them aL nork before they could get
under ground,"

- 42 -
 The first counterattack reportedly came at O?JO from the direction

of the Bois de Framicourt, ten minutes after tbe objective was

reached, It was followed by another attack at 0900 and two more that
75
afternoon, at 1710 and 17:30, Both the 1st and Jrd Battallons fell

back a short distance about 1745 as a result of the intense artillery

and machine 1,-un fire as well as the countef'attacks, and Colonel lily said

it woulci be necessary to withdraw fran the entire front unless he could

get heavy artillery support. Bull.ird r-,plied: The position must be

held, The Commander in Chief expeots it. " Pershing, tho had witnessed
the first hours of the assault and t hen left the sector, bad almost at
once dispatched "an astonishing letter" to Bulla.rd, impressing upon him

"iri most earnest, emphatic terms his order to hold the position that "e
76
had taken, and under no conditions, under no pressure, to quit it,"

1'o silence the ruachine gun:i in the Bois de Fontaine that were
hammering .l!.]3's forces, four batterits 01 J..55 's u.rea ror more than an

hour, b!lt 11 on).Y by resorting to gas shells were they finally driven
77
QUt. 11 D.iring the night of 28 - 29 l.ay, 1'1hile the ene,ny artillery

75
Hist Sketch, p. 69. Ltr, Bull.a:rd to 00 X Corps, 28 .lfay, above,
rptd counterattacks at O?JO, 1710, 1845, and 1950. Ltr, lewis to Conner,
9 A.M., 29 May, said there were four counterattacks during the day and
three the night of 28 May, at least three of which were made in
battalion strellllth.

76
llsgs, CO 28th Inf to Hq 2nd Brig, 5:45 PM, 6:40 PM, 28 May; .lbg,
Bullard to Buck 00 2nd Brig, 7:35 P.M., 28 I.lay (Records 15) ; Bullard,
Personalities, p. 198.

77
Ori.t;. Con .. u. i.t., U1,1:b::1.ov, 1qt. FA Br:Ls , llpt on Opnc .o.g.::1.5.~ct Co.nt-ig~,
n.d. (Records 14).

- 43 -
"shelled and gassed Canti,;ny alruost continually," an<i HE and gaa

shells fell in Coullelllalle at the rate of l'i ve per minute, the two

c0111panies of. th.e 18th Infantry and one of the 26th went in to reen-

force the line, and Compaey D, lat J::ngine01s, was brought up as

78
reen1'orc8Clent south of Cantigey. As further protection for the

forces iIJ C4ntigny, at 0)00 on 29 May the artillery was ordered to

put counter-preparation fire and gas concentrations on the Bois de

Framicourt ano the ravine to the north, on Fontaine and it~ ravine,
79
and on the Chateau de Jenlis rark.
Iii th every intention 01 retaKl.ng i.;a.m,igny, i;ne enemy rerra1m,<1

fran us1n& mustard gas in his ear1y banba.rdmenh of the sali ,nt, but

at 0400 on 29 ll'ay the artillery of the 25th Reserve Division put 620
yellow cross shells on battery positions in the hollolfs southeast of
tlroyes and 1n ,:,ne 001s uu l!'on\oai,~. rt,ic ucAil i.u,..(nd.l'JG tho cc.~ cx:i.b

of Villers-rournelle Y/SS e:assed vrlth yellow cross . G-J report ed

24 men evacuated b'om the sector with burns on 29 May and 9 the

78
Hist Sketch, p. 69; ALC Jnl Opns, 28 16ay, '.l'el1;:, Bullard to G- .J
GHQ AEI'', l0:06 P.1.1., 29 llay (Records 12). Pershing, .lty xperiences , II,
60, says the 28th Inf was reenforced by a battalion each rem the 18th
and 26th Inf.

79
0-J memo for 00 1st FA Brig, 28 May, sub: /lXty fire <.luring night
of 28th - 29th (kieeords 14). Rpt, Special Shells fired by 1st FA Brig,
sh01'fs 300 ?5-mm gas shells .fired by the brigade on 28 Alay, none on
29 Ila:,, ].30 on :30 lia.y, and 54 on Jl "'1y, but records are admittedly
inc0111plete. See Analysis, pp.77 rr.

- 44 -
 00
next day.
The afternoon and evening of 29 Ma.)<" was the crucial period of the

Cantigny operation. 1inall counterattacks had been made at 0600 and

0700 that morning, followed by a lull in enemy activity, Then at

1745 the enemy made an attack in atrenzth that forced the left side of
81
the line back several hundred meters (MD.p No, 8). 'fhe heavy shelling

With gas and HE in the Bois de Cantigey nas continuous from 1740 to

0215, 29 - .30 May, said the Comre.ny E (18th Infantry) commander, and

the strain 11as great as we were compelled to wear our respirators the
greater part of the tiem At J;OO P.M. I was under the necessity of
placing under arrest 16 men o f _ Co. who had broken and run from
the front llne{j during a count.EX at.1.ac1<, Ten ot.ners were 061.<l l.ll ow
front line by a platoon leade~. The officer ca:imandi.ng this detach-
,:,ent followed ~h!lliif shortzy and I gave him the option of either re-
turning under arr~t ,or returning to his former position in the
front line, taking with him his men. He returned to the front line 1
having been 1Tarned that we \tould shoot to kill ii' any of his men stop..
ped enroute, 82

aotual}J' occurred between 1700 - 1000 on 29 n.ay men D Company, lat

Battalion (AJ on liap No. 8), was reported to have vacated its sector,

80
Hanslian, pp, 85 - 86; 26th Res Corps Wllt 29 ll]ay; Arko 82, Noon rpt,
JO IOay (item 148, Annexes to HD, 82nd Res Div J; OOR, .29 - 31 May.
Rpt on Gas Atk, RGO ?th FA, C Bty, 29 lolay (GAF-1,rt. Div), reported
40 - 50 yperite shells on the battery, a shell hit killing one man,
"ith 11 others in a deep dugout gassed 1.2 - J6 hours later as a result
of remaining in a low concentration.

81
Hist Sketch, p, 69; SOI 32, 2il - 29 lolay.

82
11.emo, Campbell CO Co E 18th Inf for CO 2nd Dn 18th Inf, 5 Jul,
sub: Events ...during Battle of Cantilll'lY (Records 13).

- 45 -
 ~-
. . ... .

.":: ,, .;

+ .

,, :~:...
'' _. Bois <h

+
PlAtl Of OituMll!"IOtl

'-----~,,..-,,
Of c:ONQUfRtO l>OS1T10li

S01,1ro 1 ,.,~ Q'? , 11 k

1, 'Ou . .... 14,11 f ,,- v, IAt
t.~ - - .,~,

MAP "10 B

46
A hal. hour before that, K and L Ccupanies of the Jrd Battalion (C2

and C.3), at the t op of the salient, were said to be falling back to

the jump-off line, u probably due to artillery fire." It is clear,
h0'118V8r, that along with the gas, it was the machine guns on the
edge of Lalval woods that had panicked the 3rd Battalion, and the
28th Infantry was later to say that it "should have gohe on in the
advance on the previous morning until the troops had commanded the

val ley,"
K Company was headed off by Colonel Cullison, .3rd Battalion

camnander, Who sent it back to form on the riuht of M Comany (Cl),

line and Y1as replaced by I Ccmi:e,ny ( C4), while a company of the

18th Infantry was sent in to occupy CJ, only to find that an enemy

machine gun unit had taken over that position,

back, but an hour later had been moved up again and all elements were
again on the i:eri.meter above Cantigey, al though L Ccmpsey of the .3rd

Battalion (C.3) continued to call repeatedly for relief, having lost

between 60 and 70 percent of its men . At 2055, Colonel Ely reported

to the brigade that his Front line ["as] pounded to hell and gone,
and entire front line must be relieved tomorro., night [ or] he would
8J
not be responsible," The regiment was again. ordered to hold fast,

and it hung on through a final counterattack made from the Bois de

83
1,ise, Ely to Buck, 8:55 P,M., 29 May (llecords 15),

- 47 -
 Lalval at 0530, JO llay. The relief by the 16th Infantry was begun
84
that night.

'!'he Gerr.ian Vcrsic.n

The series of counterattacks described by 1st Division are not

entirely confirmed in the German records. , /Idle the adjacent regiments

of the 82nd Reserve Division undoubtedly oade repeated efforts to

contain the advance above Cantigny, only t "o counterattacks were
actually planned, and the second one, on J June, was called off.

~it:hteenth Army why Gantigny ,,au lost. The village in the ~alient Ytas
by its very location difficult to defend and 11a~ therefore lightly

garrisoned. '!'he attack bad ca.,e as a surprise shortly after completion

nf +.hA .,..,, i Af nf t.h<! hllt.t.Ali.ons in t he line durill! t he niC?ht of Z'l -
28 IJay. Taking refuge in the cellars fran the intense barrage, the

troopo in the village bad not observed the advancing Americans, and
when they emerged, stunned by the banbardment, they had been thrown
85
into confusion by the tallks leading the attack,

84
Jnl of Cantigny Opn, 1st 'A llrig {Hecordq 14); l\pt on Opns against
Cantigey, 28th Inf (ilecords 13); lily, Rpt of Capture of Cantigny, 2 Jun
(Records 13).

85
opn Rpt 2137, XXVI. Res Corps to oo 1atn ArJilY, ll:Jo PL!, 2 Jun (B
Res Corps selected Documents; also in append to :;;QI 52, 17 - 18 Jun,
and extracted in USA in the TM, Iv, 341 - 342).
NO'l'E: At least i91U'-fift hs of the 1st Division vo.Lwne or uerman Docu-
ments is concerned With the Cantigny operation and confined to records
between 'Z7 Uoy - 6 Jun. Supplemental records in the Ger;iian Files,
National Archives, are equally meager outside the period, since the
Army War Collei;e, like the 1st Div Assn, lTas princii:ally concerned 11i.th
the Cantigny operation.

- 48 -

' -
 The attack came at CTl45, said corps, and by 0900 on 28 )lay the
capture of Cantigey 11as acknowledged canplete, with the Americans en-

trenching on Heieht 104. llVI Corps reported also that the Dom
stream valley had been under gas attack since o6oo, and that in re-
taliation 1st Reserve Division (III Corps). ar~illery assisted .lBl!!!
Reserve Division in the gassing of American batteries and troop
areas, Both Ill Corps and IX Corps, on either side of XXVI Corps,
86
had been called on for help. '
At 0950, as the 25th Reserve Division and 2nd Di.vision (IX Corps)
artillery began firing on assembly positions, batter/ groups, and
troop concc.ntrations in ~ontainewald and the Cantii;ny approaches,

aupport elements of the and 272nd Infantry advanced from the

north and south on Cantigny. By noon they had retaken Height 104,

and thou&h they were to repulse two efforts of the Americans to re-
take the height on 29 lifay, they could not dislodge them fran their
e,
positions elsewhere ringing the village. Shortly after noon of
28 May plans were made for a fulJ,.scale counterattack on Cantign;y.
The preparation was to begin at 1710 and an hour later the reserve

86
Msgs, 00 XXVI Res Corps to Hq 18tb Army, 9:20 a.m., 9:JO a.m,,
28 May (26th Res Corps Oi:n Docs).

e,
25th Rea Ulv WD, 28 /,lay (misc 4.ocs, source j); msgs, 26th Res
Corl? to 18th ArmY, 10:15 a.m., 10:45 a,m., l2;JO p,m., 28 May;
msg, 82nd Res Div to III Corps, 1315, 28 llay; 26}h Res Corps Opor &
Tact Rpt 2Cfl2, Jl May (26th Res Corps' Opn Doc 88 See also Rpt on
Caabat Strength, 82nd Res Div, 29 May (item 'J?, Selected Docs, ~
J?t,19 r.n,..pq).

- 49 -
battalion o the 82nd, brought down from tbe west bank of t he Dan, was

to retake Cantigny, supported by elements of t h e ~ a n d ~

88
Infantry (See .llap .No. 7).
The counterattack battalion, reliovod in the line only the night
before, bad beon gassed in 'Che Dom valley that r.iorning and was in poor
shape. COIDlJlll down to Cantii;r\Y by ,1ay of L.iathenbusch ~ois du VicomtJ

and MareS111onthiers, it was delayed by enemy fire and en0111Y air att acks,
and at 1845 was still not in position for the attack, Delay and con-
fusion in the orders to its support units resulted in a hi~hly uncoor-
dinated attack. ~ support the 25th ltoserve artillery m1gnt nave gl. ven

was nullified when its positions in the hollow betne<ln Font~ '18 and
89
Gourtemanche came under gas attack shortly after 1700.
The counterattack that evenine was t hrown back. Six hours }.ater,

at 03JO, 29 liay, elel!lents or the q.1.st ttese!:'vo zru:am,cy agaJ.n a1,tac1u,.i

t he line and continued to fight until 0930 before itith<irawing, 'here-
after, until l June, the 82nd Reserve Division turned the fight over
90
to it:i artillery while it reor(lanized and rested its forces.
Losses in the 82nd Reserve llivision on 28 my riere reported as
4 killed, 51 wounded, and 17 missin,,. 'the losses for tho period

88
Mag, 26th ltes Corps to HI and IX Corps, 1600, 28 !.lay.

89
llsg, 25th Res Div to 26th Res Corps, 1720, 28 May; Opns Rpt 2137 ,
26th Res Cor~ to CG 18th Army, above; Oper & Tact !!pt 2142, 26th Res
Corps, 5 Jun 26th Iles Corps Opn Doc 77).
90
271st Res Hegt 1ro, 28 - Jl i.iay.

- 50 -
29 - 31 lay, which undoubtedly included adjusted figures for 28 May,

were reported as 192 killed, 656 wounded, and 488 missing - a total

of 1,408 in the operation. 'rhe 25th Reserve Ill.vision reported its

91
losses 'llhi.le assisting in the counterattacks as) officers and 256 men.

No confirmation has been found for the l:'Ulllor in the 1st Division that

"the German reaimental camnanders [were) ' limoged' [i.e ., broken] on

92
account of the loss of Cantigny 11
With the failure of the counterattack on 28 !lay, corps ordered
the 82nd to irepare a new attack to retake Cantigny. 'l'he attack was
to be made at (Tt:30 an 3 June. The artillery of four divisions, the
1st Reserve, 82nd Reserve, 25th Reserve, and 2nd Divisions, wou1d begin
the preparation on the night of 1 - 2 June with a tm,-hour concentration

of yellow cross on battery positions at Ainval, Esclainvillers,

Coullemelle, and Droyos.
peated the next night just before the attack.
~,
The yellow cross bombardment was to be re-

Tlie next day this order was revised. Nonpersistent gas only would
be used on the enemy batteries and it would all be fired immediately

91
Rpt on Losses, 28 - .31 li.ay, 26th Res Corps t o 18th Arucy;, n.d.
(item )8, 26th Rea Corps Opn Docs); 25th Kes Div wo, 28 - 29 May. Cf.
Rpt, CG 82nd Res Di.v to ro 26th Res Corps, l Jun (26th Res Corps Iaily
Rpts), shord.ng 202 killed, 7JO wounded, 505 missine. Cf' . Append . to
SOI J4, 30 - Jl Lby (Records 4).

92
AIX: Jnl Opns, 19 Jun.

9.3
.Msg, Corps orders to 82nd Res ntv, 25th Res Di.v, 30th Div, 1000,
:!? ~ I Ili.v Ord<>r o:2021. 1 6,45 p.m., JO 11,,;ir ( H.P.rn 158, Annexes to 'l!Il.
82nd Res Ill.v).

- 51 -
prior to the attack. At the same time the 11hole of the north portion
0 the Bois de Caotigay was to bo blinded With smoke. The assault
forces, by a surprise attack, ,rere to retrieve "in one dash" t he
former line of resistance on the we st and south edges of Cantigny, thus
94
restoring the salient.
'.l"ne plan may havo been abandoned owing to the depletiop in t he

ranks of the $2nd lleserve Division, or, more likely, to new orders
received by Eighteenth Ar,ny concerning the coming fourth offensive

tha~ spring. On the morning of l Juoo, Eiehteenth AnljY said the

counterattack would not take place, and inquired Whether the 30th
Division, then in support of the~, could be released for service
95
elsewhere. Caotigny was abandoned to the Americans, but they 1Tere to

get no coau'ort from it.

An effort to estimate tbe volUt1e o.f Gen;ian artillery fire on the
1st Division sector during the Cantigny operation m.s iroved .fruitless.
G- 2 daily reports shorr that , exclusive o.f gas shells, 22,500 rounds

o.f HE .fell in the sector between 28 - ;n 1lay, But sirce the War Jliarv
o.f the 25th Reserve Division alone sho\Ts an expenditure of 23,389 ,.;uncls
.for the three days, 28 - 30 !Jay, the fire o.f the four divisions, as
well as the corps and army artillery , must have been several tiJnes the

G-2 .figure.

94
!raft of OPflD O 2090, 26th Ros CorPS, 31 Way (item 50, 26th lies

-
Coros Opns Doc),
COlllbat strength o.f the 82nd Res Div
effectives in tbe 2'70th llegt, 660 in the
271st Re1:t -- a total of 2,539 (Opns Rpt
!:5[, 31 llay (item 52/53, 26th Res Corps
wa3 rptd on Jl /Jay as 1,296
272nd R.egt., and 583 in the
2090, 26th Iles Corps to 18th
Opns Doc).

95
'tele msg, (,Q 18~h Army to CO 26th Hes (;orps, l Jun (item 49, 26th
j<es Corps Opn Doc),

- 52 -
 '!'he heavy fire it bed ma.i ntained throughout the operation made

deep inroads on 82nd Reserve Division stocks, and when an annihilation

.tire was put do'lll1 scmetime on 31 llay, "to see if the eneJJzy" artillery

11:1s on the alert," the division commander spoke sharply, and Witb sOlll8
irony:
By such pointless fire, the entire front is unnecessarily disturbed
and this fire (annihilation fire last s three minutes) represents an
un~arranted expenditure of ammunition and depreciation of materiel
In vielf of the state of ~ a!Jll!IUnition supply, we can not afford to
indulge in such a luxury.

The Cost of Cantigey

On the night of JO - 31 Jo;ay, Bamford ' s lbth Iru'antry relieved the
badly depleted 28th Infarrtry and the three companies of the lllth and
26th Infantry in the Canti,;ey salient . Over the .rour days since tbe
attack, the division estimated the cost of Cantigny at lJ officers
and .Ltso men 1<1.11.eo., Jl. orr1cers ano 6Zl. men flounaea, 2.0;> men gassuu,
and l officer and 15 men missillj! - a total of 45 c.fficera and 1,025
97
men, against aclmiUed German loaaea of 1,667. But "coming at a

96
Div Order 02024, 31 llay (item 190/191, Annexes to l!D, 82nd Res Div) .

97
FO 20, 1st Div, JO May; Hist l;ketch, P 70.
Ltr, Bullard to 00 X Corps, 28 May, estimatod losses of 28 officers and
375 men killed and wounded, against German losses of 350 killed and 250
captured, 'felg, Bullard to 0-3 GH-1 .IBF, 4;47 P.!.!., JO .wiy (Records 12),
estimated losses up to that time as 250 killed and 900 wounded.
Ltr, Bullard to ca X Corps, 2 Jun, sub: Casualties, in 28th Inf
(Records 12), said losses >Tore 25 killed and 50 1tounded in the attack,
whi.1o tho wbol.o opo,"ati.on h::i.ti coat t ho ro3i.mont !Uld i.-to aachi.n.A 61-'n
Callpanies 14 officers and 203 men killed, 22 officers and 561 men
1rounclec!, and 2 officers and 1J9 men missin;;, for a total of 941, Ltr,
CO 28th Inf to Co1'S Afil', 7 Jun, n.s. (1st Div Box 83, 12,Jl, said the
total of 862 casualties in the regt cc.n]lt'ised 60 percent of the company
officers and )2 percent of the men.

- 53 -
 mO!llent when the enemy's forces were gaining ground in a new offensive
and when the remainder of the Allied front was struggling to hold, [ the
Cantigny operation] produced a psychological effect of far-reaching
98
consequences 11

As a topographical conquest, Cantigny was aamittedzy worthless.

1i'hat had been a salient 1n the French lines was noW a salient in the
German lines. Canmand o! the Dan valley, r,hich had some mlitary value
but would have necessitated hol ding Hei{;ht 104, had not been achieved.
The ruins of Cantigny itself bad no milital"J vaiue Tlhatever, as a

"Cantign,y is ahsolutel,y impractical as a location for a reserve platoon

or a c!wnp regardless of hoYI uie map looks . 11 1'here was no possible
protection for troops in the salient and communication with the village
99
was impossible by daylight.
Considering the gas casualties in Villcrs-'fournelle early in 11.ay,
sh month-long battering on that front, and the Cantign,y operation, it
0

is hard to 8aJ' bow readJ, for another fight t he division was at this
t ime , General Bullard mir:ht have but did not coo,ment on this point
saying that not long after the captu,e of Cantigny

the rumor reached me that my division was to be relieved in its sector

before 11::,ntdidier by the 2nd (American} Di.vision, and we viere t o be sent
to t he J4arne to face the Gerr.ians there . [But the Boche] suddenly be-
came so active and threatening in the bulldog nose (the point of the
Chateau Thierry salient) that the 2nd Di.yision [at Beauvais] on its wa;:r

98
Hist Sketch, p. 70.

99
Rpt of Recon, CO Co A 28th Inf, n.d. (Records lJ}.

- 54 -
to relieve us had to be deflected to Chateau Thierry for immediate
help to the French there . 100
The German advance in the direction of Paris, begun on 27 May,
required the French to take divisions frQJJ all alon& less active fronts,
in an effort to slow down and stop the drive, On the nights of l - 2
and 2 - 3 June, the 152nd French Division llithdrew frCIIII the lei't !laJllc
of lat Division, At the order of I Corps, the di'lisional. artillery
fired 26,000 rounds of HE that day to cover the withdrav,al, e.s all
three battalions of the 18th Infant)';' moved up through the departiJ:la
Irench and the division extended its sector to Griveanea, on a new
front of 5! kilometers. Ooposite Griveene wa the lt Renm:xe Div-
101
i,ng_J!.
Though it slsckened through temporary ammunition exhauetion,

t he fire exchange on both sides continued, with greater uee of gas

shells than usual, The 82nd Reseue Diyisiop reparted ;he low e;round
east of Fontaino gassed on 4 June, and on the night of 5 June, strong
gas concentrations on Drutz Wald [Bois de Le.lval], !.!al.part, and
teibhenbusch . The next day, tbe 6th, the area froa Fontaine to the
left sector limit came under heavy gns fire. The lat Division art-
102
iller:,r fired a t otal of 827 gas shells on those days,

100
Bullard, Personalities, p. 208, AU:: Jnl Opns, l Jun, said that
on :3.1 .way vhe Germans had reacheo the llarne and cut the Paria..Oondro-
court railr0<1d near Chateau Thierry,
101
IXlR, 31 May - 2 Jun, See rpt on 1st Res Div 1n append to soi
38, 3 - 4 Jun.
102
82nd Res Div WO, 4 - 6 Jun; 272nd Res Rel!t UD, 5 Jun; 270th Res
Regt liD, 5 Jun; rpt, Special Shells fired by 1st A llrig.

- 55 -
 In its noon report on 4 June, Arko 82 said that eneiny troops

observed advancine frOIII Rocquencourt and Serevillers appeared to be

reliefs and it had at once p.it JOO g;reen cross and 200 blue cross

shells in surprise banbardznents on tbom in the hollows between the

CantienY-Le Plessier road and the Cantigey-Viller&-Tournelle road,

T'nere are no lat Division gas reports for the period but hospital

lists sbow an average of 10 gas casualties each da,y through tbe first
lOJ
week of June.

Tbe Long Month

On 5 June tbe di vision learned that a ne11 German offensive nould

probably fall on the .Montdidier-lfoyon front in the next da,y or two,

With the 1st Division getting the backlneh of the attack, To support
the 1st Division in case the expected offensive spread northward, the
French pit three regiments of Chasseurs Alpins (tbe fsmous Blue Devils)
with three groups of 75 's behind tbe division. And for the first ti.me

the 1st Division front was organized into brigade sectors, the regiments
in line in col.w:lns of battalions, with the 18th, 16th, 28th, and 26tt,

Infantry in the Esclninvillel's, Coullemell.e, Villers-Tournelle, and

104
Broyes zones, r espectively (Map No. 9).

lOJ
Arko 82 to CG 82nd Res Div; Noon rpt, 4 Jun; Combat rpt, J - 4
Jun (Annexes to WD, 82nd Res Di.y); 82nd Res Diy WD, J Jun: Enemy
assembly positions west and northwest or Cantigny were gassed; u
26th Res Corps WD, 4 Jun.

" 104
ADO Jnl. Op,.o, 4, 6 1 ? Jun, FO ~l, l.ct Div, 1 Jun; ro 23, h ,Jnn;
FO 24, 7 Jun; Ltr, Lewis to Conner, 5 Jun.
Heferring to the new aligrment of the di vision, simplifyirig canmand,

- 56 -
 Ainva.1

---

t~t 01'1 ISIOM

O, l1hSt-t,ons a.ft., Qo.-g&nla-t,0'1
of Sc:;to.. - 4 Ju.~ ,,1.
'-~---'---...L--..J-

l'I\AP NO. '}

5'1
 The German attack on th" morr1ing of 9 June Ytas to the right of

t he 1st Division, .falllne on the center of the 60th French Di vision

east to Noyon. The 1st Division at Canti1,1V, w.rltine for the main
blow, suffered only J'rooi the imnense d81.1onstration put on by the
German divillions on eith~r r,be of tho attack front. G-2 reported that
the banb~dme{l't lasted frv1J, 2JS0 to 0.300, 8 - 9 June and fell

principally
east of the line Plainvillc.,JJNyes-1!:sclainvillers, lfith gas and high
explosive, sane shrapnel ... .'r,,e 1,as used 1vas Chlorine Arsenic and
Br<X:line Arsenic and a small pcrcentaee of musta.rcl gas, [with the
gas shells coming in] at t ime~. , .as high as 2.5 por minute. }ieutrali-
za1aon nre on t>at L~ .r1tHi t) or Lh~ Ut.11, E v~ i..11c Jtihl E a11.d F o t.ho
7th [FA] with Fhosgene and YporHe shells. Interait.t.,nt shelllne on
our front positions 11ith i,as and ll. E. [.this morning).

'he next day G-2 added that "five battery positions in the region of
J
Brcyes [wer';J heavily gas3c,d 11i1.h Yperite on 9 June.
105
Neit.be1 G-2
nor G-1 made any estimate of the !lU!llber of r.as or HE shells fired into
the sector, but the Di vision Gus Officer thought approximately 1, 1.00

'rl-llllD, 400 105-am, and 400 150-mm gas shells had been .fired in the

bombardment, most of them mustard gas,

Hanslian reported a total of 14,350 gas shells fired by the
artillery of the 25th and 82,:,d lteserve Divisions and two batteries

of the 1st Resarvo Division over a t wo-hour period beginning at 0020,

104 ( continued)
communications, and supply, Lt Col.G. C. r.arsholl Jr, GS GH~ AU',
said: "I am convinced Lhat this is the best way to handle our large
divisions effectively (and] had we bcon arranged in tbis fashion the
entire time the troops would have bean in JO per cent better shape
than they no,r are" (Ltr to Col B'assett, 6 Jul, llocorcls 12).
105
SOI 4J and 44, 8 - 10 Jun. Lt Butler (Jnl Opns, 9 Jun) said Btys
E and F, 5th FA, and B, C, E, and F, 7th FA, were gassed in the
bombardaent,

- 58 -
9 June. Of the total, 10,850 shells were yellow cross, 1,670 were
106
blue cross, and 1 1 830 were green cross.
Probably only a fraction of this gas fell in the 1st llivision sector

since the artillery of those German divisions covered a much inder

front than five kilaneters (!Cap No. 10).

The 18th Infantry at Esclainvillers, i;iost distant frQill the

center of the gas attack, was to report but 10 casualties. In the

16th and 28th Infantry sectors in the center, reliefs were boing
carried out when the gas shells began falling, A battalion cClllllllander
of the 28th Infantry described the resulting con.fusion:
Relief was effected with i;reat difficulty, We were heavily shelled
with ll. E. and gas, Gae ai.scipline in the Battalion was good [and]
therefore no losses. HOl'(ever [inJ one sec~lon of !.l. G. 's 14 men were
knocked dOl!D, They received a shower of gas shells, And in the mi.Xup
all t he mule drivers were woonded and all the men gassed, Two mul.e3
were wounded and two are missing. Lt, Henderson is also missing , 107
The final report of the Di vision Gas Officer on 14 June said the
attack resulted in l.O gas cases in the 18th Infantry, 58 in the 16th
Infantv:r, 34 (else.,here he reported 80) in the 28th Infantry and 203
ln the 16th Infantry. The field artillery had 61 casualties and other
108
elements 23, for a total of 389 gas casualties.

lo6
l:lanslian, pp. ~ - 89; Ltr, mo to CG 1st Div, 14 Jun, sub; Ga3
Attack of June 9, 1918 (GAF-lat Div).
107
1.1:Jb, CO 2nd Bn 28th Inf t o CO 28th Inf, 10 Jun (1st Div Box 85,
32.16); IXlRi 28t~ Inf , 9 - 10 Jun (Records 13).

108
Ltr, mo to CG 1st Div, 14 Jun, above, The totai agrees
approximately with the count in hospital adl!Jission lists, Analysis,
P .,,. oon, 9 - l~ Jv.n, -,howod on~ :'!08 QO.C c,u.o.

- 59 -
 >
"i
l
;; f

r
hi
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..
7
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~

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e.,
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C,

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g
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p
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(J
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.:,

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i "
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11

6o
 In the hours or uncertainty on 9 June, under the rain or gas

and HE shells, division headquarters alerted all units to be ready

to put into ef!'ect the plans ordered by corps for the evacuation or
the sector should it becane necessary. A division historian, over-

looking the elaborate p-eparationa for ciepartllle, was later to say

that
there was a general feeling of disappointment that the division bad
had not stood sq,uarecy in the path or the latest German ofrensi ve
The morale could not have been better, and the di vision was pre-
pared to die east or the Paris-Ami.ens railroad, All the forces of
the division were available for the emergency. The military police
forming the r~ar cordon of the fighting troops of the division were
3tationed along the r;i.ilro:1d, and :111 dispositicns were taken for
Lhe expected ccmbat .109
Probabcy in retaliation for its <iaicy concentrations in the
period 7 - 16 June, nhen the 1st Fil. Bricade fired more than a
110
thousand g:1s shells each day on enemy targets, on the mornings of
17, 18, and 19 June the division sui'fered successive yellow cross

order on 13 June saying that 1,5)0 yellow cross shells had been
allotted for gassi.n/! the batteries around Coullemelle, and would be
fired in equal lots of 510 each at 0400 and 05)0 on 15 June and at
0)45 on 16 June. Hansllan said that just one gas banbardment
(Verseuchungsschiessen) was fired, at 0400 on 18 June, but 1st Div-
ision records indicate that although delayed all three missions were

109
l.:S. Hist of F:i.rst Div, f)d. Gteecy, cb. IV, p. 10 (1st Div Box
l2, l l.4).
110
Rpt, Special Shells fired by the 1st FA Brig, above, shows a total
of l2,053 No. 4 hydrogen cyanide and No. 5 phos~ene shells expend"d in
Lhose ten days.

- 61 -
 lll
fired.
The Division Gas Oi'ficer reported that the first attack occurred

on the early morning of 17 June when between 500 and 1,000 105-<IID and
210-<lllll yellow cross shells fell around 6th FA batteries near
Coullemelle and the ,..uiry-Coullemelle road, and the second attack the
pext morning "\'ten another 500 yellow cross shells hit Coullemelle,
!'est and s outh of Coulleme lle, between Coullemello and ~1ry le Sec,
around PC lilarguerit e, and in the valley on the edge oi' the Bois de
Coull.emelle, north of PC Uarguerite (lllap No. ll). Each attack lfaa

to the belief 11 that t he enemy is at least still interested in this

ll2
sector.
Up t o noon on 17 June, said captain Iavis, DJ-O, there were no

casualties to report i'rom the first attack, but at moo on 18 June

a total of 41 casualties had been evacuated, 2J of them from the
llJ
infantry, the rest among t he artillery. On the morning of 19 June,
the 16th Infantry RGO and Captain Davis reported a third attack made on
Coullemelle when between 500 and 600 yellow cross ohells fell in th~
area drenched by the previous bombardments, Direct hits on :the trenches
and dugouta in the area "caused some confusion" and as a result there

lll
Arko ?l Order 2BJ8/1J, quoted in Hanslian, pp. 90 - 92.

ll2
IDR, 28th Inf, 17 - 18 Jun (llecords 13); Ltrs, mo to CO 1st Div,
17 and 18 Jun, sub: Oas attack, Coullemelle (OAF-1st Div); Joomo BOO
to CO 1st Srig, 18 Jun, sub: Oas Attacks, Nights of June 16 - 17,
"J:7 - 18. ~I 5l. an\l ,z, J.s~ IU.v, J.6 - J.G J ..n, oud. l.000 G"'O oholl.,
,rare i'ired in each attack.

llJ
Rpt on Gas Atk, BOO 16th Inf, 18 Jun; Ltrs, mo to 00 1st Div,
17 and 18 Jun, above .

- 62 -

II
 I
I
I
~-- 1"'
r R.
I
I
.__.. .. ---"-' ..---- ,,...,... ,,,,,.. ......,....
.,,;
I
I
I
I
... I
I
~
.....,.CJ
~
____ :-_ \ I
I
I
I
I
():=;...
I
I
I
I
I
SATTEQY l'OSITION I
~ s
JUN 1'9lS
I
~,., "Oc ~
~of ..~~ h I
MAP 1'10. 11 I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
 were 70 cas caouuUies. A 1'lnal count ol' casualties for the three

attacks, said Ca;,tain Cb.vis llltor that day, revealed 138 gas cases, but
hospital admission lists indicai;e a total ol' 187 for 17 - 19 June, with
114
'17 in i;he 16th I nfantr; alone and 35 in the artillery.
T:1e n:arked in~reas..i in """lllY a rtille ry !'ire over the ,reek of 14 -
21 Ju11e anci Lb~ ye ,.lo-.i cn,ss attacks of l'./ - 19 June, with accompa.ny-

iug drWL fire on u~ntigny, seamed to indicate that the enemy still
smarted ran the loss cl' t he ::;ali.Gnt. In a memo on 21 June, Colonel
Ely ol' 1,tlo 2atb li.1'w1t ,7 Jai:l tlir.t a cou1it~1attack at Canticey appeared
to be building ui;, and addc<J t J,at i f the Vl.lJ.a;;e snou.UI oo car,turoa i;nc
problem or raLaking it ,,-.,.ld ve the a.imo 1g un 28 J.:ay. l'na division
would wait until ths> enGr..;/ hu.c ,,-;, , bctra,m hig propond~rance of artillery

and then two battalions or a re;;iJJ,cm, or mote m;uld be necessary to

ll5

seem 1,0 have agreed to an undoclarcd 1;ruce !.n the la~t ten days of
Ju.ne. '!'heir artillo.:ry fire subsided and raids ceased v1hile each side
cut the Lall 11i\6at in front of the trenches, in orcl~r to improve their
116
fields of !'ire.

114
hpt on Oas Al..i<. lo~il Inf lluv, l'J Jun; 1'cli;, U..vis to c.;DD Oas Serv,
19 Jun (Gu'. lst iliv); Atsilysis, p. ?J, WR, 1st Div, 16 - 21 Jun, show
only 82 casualties in tb3.t i:e!'iod, all in the 16th Inf,

115
Opns men,o, 28th Inf, 21 Jun, sub: Counter-attack at Cantie!\Y
(Record5 10), A.LC Jnl Upns, 19 - 20 Juno

ll6
O- :, .&rlt:JUV vJ; D, .:..t cJui..scll.- ;, J 2:~ c.nd ~"i' Jun 1 0.1.\u i:hg:1,t Cu tti.ng
(Records 2). Noi;e: This truce" coincidod ,a.th the worldwide
epidemic of in.t'luenza t h,.t broke out in rod-June, J.ast,ed thrwgh Ju),
and recurred in October l <i18,

,.. 6,'I, ...,

.... _
 The division had had hopes of being relieved on that front after

its consolidation of Cantieey and the sector, but July came and it
was still there, The troops were tiring under the daily ra.in of be-
tween 2,000 and J,000 HE shells and the periodic gas attacks, and reliefs
Ylere frequent. But l'tord was at last received that they were to be
relieved, immediately after the 4th of July.
To celebrate that day, said the division history,
48 salvos of 155--mn shell (were] fired into the most sensitive parts
of the enemy I s posit ions. In lieu ct the U3Ual fireworks of which
there was alW,)Ys an abundance alon;; the front lines, the 75-<llll regi-
ments fired at night t he first 6000 rounus of French .cwstard gas
issued to the Americans, as concintrations upon the enemy's trenches,
l<i t.rhAnA And h:.tt.P.r-.;/ fl().~'i t. 1 nn~ _l 7

The }rench had first used their new No. 20 yperite shells in quantity
t o blunt the enemy offensive of 9 June. Not long after, the division
learned that the neiebboring 60th Division was using the shells, but
118
its requests for yperite were denied, Now it had its first allotment.
On the 4th, a noon salute tdth hieh explosive Vias fired by all 48 guns
of tho. division, 'fho 6,000 rounds of yperite were saved for a concen-
trntion on the Bois de Lalval at 2)30 ttuit night. The precise total
fired was 5,648, after which the woods were ringed Yd.th HE fire, to
119
keep the Germans immobilized in the gassed area. A division history

117
flist Sketch, p, 7 5.
118
AOC Jnl Opr,s, l2 Jun,

ll9
Firine Schedule 66, 4 - 5 Jul (Records 9); IXlR, 4 - 5 Jul, Rpt
Spec 5hells i'ired by 1st r'A Brig (Records 1.4), shows 243 155-rom No. 5
shells ana 5 ,t,40 75-llllll No. :lQ sheHs !'irea on :; Jul,

- 65 -
 said of the salute:

It was a peculiar pleasure to the artillery men to retaliate with the

very effective ~'rench mustard gas. lhring the occupation of the sector
' they had suffered as much as the infantry frolll the enemy's gas con-
centrations,:i.,5tably so in the 6th Artillery in the vicinity of
Coullemelle

According t o 1.ts l'/ar Diary entry of 4 July, t he 1st Reserve Div-

~ missed UH !,<>int of t he salute;
1/ol.i:sschlucht aud !<art-en Farm were heavily gassed Witb Yperite {new
~'rench yellow cl'OsJ), 'fhe 6 Co,, 1st Reserve Infantry RegiJllent 1mich
'll'as located thete suffered gas casualties (.3 off. 68 men). Division
ordered an almt, . ,as an eneiny attack was expected Enemy infantry
,, has not yet shwon ltself, also the Art . fire has diminished consider-
ably,
The re~iment concerned reported that the attack occurred between 10.:30
and 1.3.:30, as a rci;ult of ,mich "4 off. and Ji men (6th Co. ..."ld minen-
werfer detachment) are sick from the gas."
There ,ias a "violent reaction after our 'Yankee gas' concentration,"

our fire on the Uo1s Lalval with Yperite earlY last ni8ht by firing
heavily on our front line from llois Fontaine to Pare de Griveanes, 11
i.!ore than 3,000 rounds o! HE fell in the principal villages in the
'22
sector over a period of an hour or two, and 11 wounded ,,ere report.e:u.

120
LIS, Histo1;r of nrst Div, ed, Greely, ch, IV, p. 10.

Ul
1st Res Div illl 4 Jul (~sc Docs, source h); 1st Res Regt WD, 5 Jul
(Misc Docs, swce p). An earlier use of
yperite by the Fxlench was
reported by III Corps. A battalion had lost 117 men to yperite on l Jul,
and corps ordered trainin~ in yperite defense at once (lil Corps Order
l.347, 4 Jul, Misc Docs, source 1),
l.ZZ
AIC Jnl Opns, 4 Jul; SOI 69, 4 - 5 Jul.

' . - 66 -

..
 On 5 - 8 July, "before the enraged eneDJ,Y could devise some form
of retaliation for the gas attack," the 1st Di.vision was relieved at
123
Cantign,y by the 152nd and 166th French Divisions. Plans to send the
division to I Corps reserve, near Chateau Tl)ierry, were abandoned on
11 July when t he division \fas ordered to join the 2nd Division and

lat Moroccan Di.vision northeast of Paris. The German offensive south

of the Marne, launched on 15 July, was stopped two days later. On
the evening of 17 July, the 1st lei.vision was in place for the French
counterattack southwest of Soissons. The next morning the Aisne-lllarne
campaign began.

ANALYSIS
Bat tle Casualties
On 20 June, in support of a plea "that if this di vision i5 to be
prooorvod ;1.c, $l sood divi.cion .... .i't chou1d bo roUovod "'o ooon o.o poooi.ble, 0
124
casualty data 11ere listed for the peri<Xl 23 Apr - 16 June as follows:
liien

Killed by small arms or arty fire 'YI 72;

Killed by gas 1 3
\'founded by small arms or arty fire 75 1789
Evacuated for gas 43 1733
.lti.ssing l _J.I.

[lecte;
158
15?}
~icJ 4294

123
Wise, The Turn of tho Tide, p. 3.3.
124
Ltr, Lewis t o Conner, 20 Jun (Records 12), memo, Conner for CofS
OH~ AEF, 22 Jun, sub: Mamo fran C-inC of June 21 ( USA in the VIII, III,
.324).

- ff7 -


The J:Ublished history of the di vision has three sets of casualty

125
figures for the 72 days in the Cantign,y sector (24 April - 5 Ju:cy):
Officers /!en 1'0TAL
! w Al .K w M Off Men
(Ai
(B
64
56
88
84
0
0
958
958
3809
3614
9
11
l52
J.40
4776
4583
(C 58 178 2 983 4578 32 2.38 5593
Other total casualty figures, With the wounded distinguished as

HE or gas casualties, appear in a G-3 report on the Cantigoy operation

126
and in a medical history of the di vision:
Officers .I/en 1'0TAL
K w G K i'i G .OU. Men
CG-3) 49 sI s1 001. 2182 217.n HIS 5195
(Med) 49 81 53 802 2192 2149 183 5143
An operations history !urther distinguishes HE and gas casualties by
separating the casualties resulting fran the attack on Cantigny froct
127
those suffered in sector operations:
Officers lolen TOTAL
.K !! Q l! K Ji G M Qli li!}Jl
(Sector Opns) 36 50 53 l 6To 1571 1946 48 J.40 4183
( CantiBny Opn) 12 .ll
81
_Q ..., .JJlQ ....@. _2Q.Q .li ...1.2 ~
49 5.3 2 804 2192 2146 63 185 5205

125
History, pp, 97, 3')?, 346, The probable immediate source of the
history figures are the earlier liist Sketch and MS. History of the
First Division, ed. Col. Gree:cy,
126
G-3 Rpt on Opns ...in Sector I/est of llontdidier, Apr 25th - Jul ?th,
30 Nov (Record{ 13 and USA in t,he W1i, IV, 334); MS, Hist of !Jed Dept,
1st Div, p. 7 Med .Dspt Box 3398, fol 1), Cf, ltr, Capt A. JI. Bengs,
mo 1st Div to C CWS, 'Z"/ Jan 1919, sub; Rpt in Circ Ltr No. 89 (G.U'-
lst Div), which shows 53 oi'ficers and 2,148 men gassed at Gantigey.
l:>'7
llemo, Brief History o.f Opns of 1st Div, 21 .Dsc (lst Il!.v Box ll,
11,4, fol 2 and Records 13),

- 68 -

.,
 1'he highest t otal of casualties for the Cantigny period are those
report~d in a compilation from Sureeon General records after the war,
us
where figures in parentheses represent late returns:
Killed Gunshot Gas rorAL
in action ,iounded wounded CASUALTIES
602 2194 15!lJ 4')79
25 Apr - 8 Jun
309 416 760
9 - lJ Jun 35
6~8 1!42
20
14 Jun - 7 Jul
687 (U) 2~& (162} 2647 {61) 6284 (2.35)

As usual, no compa1ison of these casualty f:l.eurea 1dth those reported

daily by G-3 (which total 282 killed, 1, lf,4 rroundcd, and 1,279 gassed)
U9
is possible.
Tho strength of the division on 30 Januar:y 1918 was 1,290 officers

and 24, 940 e1on. The loss of approxim..itel.y 185 officers and 5,205 men

in the Co.nti~ny sector, as rej.lOl"ted by the division, therefore represent-

ed over 14 percent of officer strength and over 20 perc~nt of enlisted
J.;)0
str eneth. Continuous replacements did little more than keep the
divi~fon at this same loss level, fop on l2 Ju.ne the ntrength o! the
division as a 11hole nas reported as at 92 percent of its officer
~tro11j;th, '57 percent of its enlisiect strength, vdth the infantry at '57

128
Battle Losses, 1st Div, 14 !lac 1921 (1st Div Box 15, 12,3). 1st
Dtv SUll\ of 0.P.!JS (Battle l;ol'IU!ilents COJ:lfflission, 1944), p. 17, shows 5230
r.asualties for ;,h<> period 19 Apr - 13 Jul, w1 th almost half of them
occurring before the attack on '2:"/ Uay.
U9
Cor.ipi.led from rem, 1st lli v, 26 Apr - 7 Jul.

lJO
Ltr, CG 1st Div to 00 X Corps, 2 Jun, bUb: G.'.lsualties 28th Inf
(H.ecgY>ct:3 12), 1ra11cat.uo t,ll.at.. a~ ul' z J'wJ, de::,pit.c n~1~Mccmcn.t.;3, t.hooo
t "rcnnt.. 1r;cs held t rue of the 28th Inf.

- 69 -
 l31
and 81 percent, respectively,
But it vras the large numbers of replacements, not the casualties
or vacancies or the wearine3s of the division as a whole, that worried
the staff. "There are so many ne1Y men, received as replacements,"
said the Division Adjutant, "th1rt the men do not know each other and
132
cCDpanies have ceased to be llanogeneous units. 11 'i'he di vision was
long overdue relie.t and needed unit training, It 1Yas to be given
less than a week .o catch up.

In the previous section the total gas casualties at Cantigny,

including officers and men, were variously reported as 2,199, 2,202,
and according to Surgeon General records, 2,708 (including 61 in
delaYed reports), In each case the summaries indicate that the
number of gassed and wounded w.1s apl4'oximately the same during the
'-.mpaign - an inter~sting comparison since the r1eight of HE shell
used against the division was probably seven times that of gas
shell, But considerably more than hali the wounded were not enemy
artillery casualties but had became casualties during raids and as
a result of sniping and machl.ne gun fire, particularly tho heavy

131
Strength Rpt, 12 Jun (Records 12).

132
lilemo, 11:ij, H. K. Loughxy, Div Adj for CofS 1st Div, 2 Jul
(Records 12)

70 -
 machine gun fire of the Cantigny attack.

Almost complete hospital admission lists are available for the

Cantigf\Y period. The tables that follow represent a count of the
gas casualties admitted to the four di vision hospitals in May, June,
and July, 'llhen, despite the normal specialization of division field
hospitals, the lar~e numbers of gas casualties necessitated use of
all four prior to the transfer of the severely gassed to the French
133
'oase hospitals at Beauvais.

The daily gas casualties reported by the Division Gas Officer

and recorded in the Monthly Corps Gas Casualty report are included
in the tables for purposes of comparison.

It is difficult to account for the total o 2,118 gas cases

counted in the lists, as caopared to the 2,?08 reported in Surgeon

General records, unless a number of gas patients were received at
at the hospitals of the French divisions (for 'llhich there are no

record~) on either side of the 1st Division, or arrived at the base

hospitals Without being recorded at any of the division hospitals.

The "failure" oi' the admission lists to account for all gas cas-
ualties is pointed up in the last column of the tables, where the
daily hospit.al count of shell and gun-shot wounded is recorded. This

lJ3
The count is based on the lists of FIi 2 at la Neuville (Med
Dept Box 3402); Fl! 3 at Froissy, moved to Paill.art on 6 .fun to
handle gas casualties frao the left flank of the division (Med Dept
Box 3405); FH 12 at Bonvillers (!.led Dept Box J<\07); and FH 13, the
principal gas hospital, at Breteuil (Med Dept Box 3409),

- ?l -
 I
I
I
Table No, l I
Field Hospital Admission lb.ta I
H(!SP Corps Hosp I
lb 18 l>G 26 28 Id} FA Gas Gas HE
I
Inf Inf Bn Inf In Bn BriB Other TO'AL TOTAL TOTAL
JO Apr 14 l 2 17 14 I
1 1/ay
2 l,lay
5
-l - J
l
8
-f, 5
7
l
19
18
22 I
3llay 4
4 "'11 J? 254 18 l 2 17 329 17 33
5 I.lay 6 .263 18 20 Ja, 6]4 18 I
6 J.!ay l 21 11 l 2 J6 33 4J
7 11.ay 1 6 4 2 1 14 17 l5 I
8 I.lay 9 l 10 4 .28
9 lazy 3 3 6 24 I
lO Ma:, '/ l. 0 2 ;'12
11 !Jay 2 2 24 I
12 Ila:, 3 l 4 1 .28
l3 Ila:, l 6 l
l
8
6
7
1
18
8
I
l4 .IL,.y 4 l
15 Llay 7 2 2 2 l3 6
l
28
25
I
lb !Jay l l l 3
17 I.lay 2 l 2 5 J 19
l.'l
I
l.6 I.Ci>.Y 2 :'l l. ll 4
19
20
I.la:,
!Jay l
'
1
3
1
4 2
2
10
3
6
22
9
I
.21 !.!av 6 1 4 5 5 21 l3 33 I
22 llay l 4 1 3 B l 18 20 13
23 Llay 32 2
2
l 35
ll
40
2
12
26
I
24 Vay 8 l
25 May l 4 3 2 10 3
2
20
25
I
26 May l 5 J 9
27 J.lay 8 10 l 121 3 10
26
Z7 100
103
171 50
152
I
28 I.lay 2 ll 54 3 7 2.3~
29 lay 12 7 l 23 9 3 l3 8 76
115
99
58
263
198
I
JO Atay 3 26 5 34 15 29 3
Jl May -- -1 ...J,. _:J_ -1 ~
123
-l.OJ ...l2
l395
_.J{l
1429
~
JJJ?
I
78 ?22 77 242 47 J
~17 I
a Includes gas casualties for 171st Fr Regt,
I
Includes gas casualties for 35th Fr Div.
b I
Uas aeat.hs. l'io,;e: llle co,v::; g,;4!)j l,;d:,1.1.c:1,ll.>;r t.v1.a~ or ~ 4n.Q. Juno ...roo rem
C
the Corps ldonthzy Gas Casualty Reports (GAF-I Corps), The Di.vision Alonthzy I
Gas Casualty Reports for lay and June (in GAF-1st Div) show the same totals
as the corps reports The division report for April reveals 11 gas casual,.. I
ties and 1 gas death between 27 - .30 April, which should be added to t.he
1429 and 17, I
- 72 - I
I
I
 I
I
Table No. 1 (cont'd) I
nel d Hospital Adaission lata I
Hosp <.;orps Hosp I
lb 18 1'G 26 28 J,!J FA Gas Gas HE
Int'. Ill.C ilD 111.C lo! llD ~ti& Qtll!!i.: 1'0TAL '.l:Ql:ilJ. IQ'.fii1 I
l Jun 3 J 4 l 4 l lb 8 43
2 Jun 7 l 2 J 2 J 18 10 29 I
3 Jun l l 2 2 6
4 Jun l 2 l 4 6 l.O I
5 Jun 3 4 2 9 7 14
6 Jun l 8 l l 11 9 14
lO
I
7 Jun 7 l 8 7
8 Jun l 2 2 2 l 2 10 5 20
69
I
9 Jun 55 2 119 34 11 72 l 294 48
10 Jun 7 2 47 l 8 65 2JJ 29 I
11 Jun
12 Jun
- 6
6
l
l
3
3
l
1
ll
11
50
43
8
18 I
l J l )(\ ? 10
13 Jun !l 3
14 Jun 6 2
2 2
6
l
14
5
8
l
13
18
I
15 Jun
16
17
Jun
Jun
-
16 3
-
6
5
J 14 15
5
57
6
6
l?
25
I
18 Jun 38 4
l
4
1
4
1 1
19
l
1.3 82
46
41
97
8
3
I
19 Jun 43
20 Jun 5 2 1 8 18
..,8 I
:ll. J\.\n
22 Jun
J
1 ' 1
-2 4
5 J
3 2 I
23 Jun l l 2 2
24 Jun 4
l
4
l 4
3
e I
25 Jun
26 Jun 4 2
2
l
2
7
8 7
4
l
I
27 Jun 4
28 Jun
l l
'J
l
14 I
29 Jun 9 '
JO Jun _J
185
-33 -21 -231 -47 -l2 -
150
-41 _..l
720
~
643
+ le
-422 I
I
1
l Jul
2 Jul l
l l
l 2 I
9
3 Jul
1. Jul
7 I
11
5 Jul
6 Jul
I
? Jul
l
..J,
l - - - - 1 - ..J,
J
- ~
32 I
I
GRAND
TOTALS 264 756 98 473 94 15 274 144 2l.ia 2072 l?9l I
+ol8c
'
I
- 73 -
I
I
I
 ,

total of 1,791 hospital llOUlld cases is at even greater variance with the
totals of 2,263, 2,2?3, and 2,950 (plus 162) wounded, reported in the
previous section, than is the gas total.

A breakdown of the 2,118 gas casualties in the hospital admission

lists shows that in lilay, 1,352 men ,rere adlllitted silnply as "gassed, 2 as
"yperite, 11 and 41 with "gas sequelae. 11 In June, 70 were diagnosed as
"gassed, 66 as "yperite,u 18 as "yperite surface burns," 253 as 11 yperite

inhalation, 304 as 11yperite and/or phosgene inhalation," and 9 as 11 gas

sequelae, 11 '!'he 3 gas casualties in July were all 11 yperite surface wrns,
The classification of gas casualties in the hospital lists would
seem to be contradicted by the medical director of FH J, although his was
not the principal gas hospital and his experience may have been unique,
in the Cantigny area, he said,
nearly one-half of all the battle casualties from April 27th to July ?th
were gas cases. Practically all the gas c'asualties were from 'mustard
gas', The gas discipline in the Divi.sion nas only fair, as the men had not
yet reached the state of mind 'llhen their respect for gas and or95f per-
taining thereto equalled their aversion to wearing the gas mask.
The 1st Division was not to achieve that state of mind, nor was any other
division in the AEF, when caught in a gas baubardment or when subjected to

daily gas concentrations that contaminated large areas of their fighting

sectors. In its seven days in the Soissons operation, the 1st Division was
to take over 275 gas casualties, and in its eleven days in the Meuse-

lJ4
Lt. Col, W. M. Phelps, Rpt, Medical Bistory of the 1st Div, n,d.
(~d Dept Box 3398, foll).

- 74 -
 135
Argonne in October, more tha.n 1,425 gas casualties.

The :il;iplication in Colonel Phelps's report that cas casualties

were a voidable, as hieh explosive casualt ios "ere not, appem-s also in the
report o! !.!ajor Lewis to Fox Conner concerning the initial 460 casualties
as a result of tho J - 4 May gas attack. Of these CaSl.ialties, he said:

A good many {ar;:j only slightly {gasseciJ, but enough to i:ut them out of
business for some t:ill\e. Many ca':!es are burned about the eyes without
havir,G any lung trouble, as a result of illln1;1 dol'lll the upper i:art of
the mask in order to be able to see more clearly. The people at 6th
Corps Headquarters were quite worked up about this matter as they aay
that the number of gassed cases is entirely too high to be the result
o! 11 sim,.le bombardment. They express doubts as to the quality of tho
gas discipline in the division
SovorA1 o~eO~# oP oxpor~oneo and good c9nco f'i..n tho Jrd Guroo.v.l to1d mo
that it was not the real danger of death frOlll !perite that made 1.t so
effective but the fnct that a lillln had a good chance of recoverini:. In this
ll'ay it offers a very subtle tecptation to the man mio is tired and worn
out to get slightly gassed and have a good three <:fI' four weeks rest in the
hospital. They all said that they had had to take especially stringent
measures with regard to their gas discipline against it on this account,136
Both Colonel fhelps and l,lajor Lewis sought an511ers to a cilitary
problem -..ho).ly strange to their training and experience, and complicated
by the rapid change in methods of gas warfare" in 1917 - 1918 that made
it impossible, even if it were advisable, to lay down arf/( precise course
137
for (gas defense] training." If often frustrated by the difficulties
of determining tbe nature and degree of casualties to be expected from gas

135
Ltr, mo to c CYIS, z-, Jan 1919, sub: Rpt on Circ Ltr llo. 89.
136
Ltr, Lewis to Conner, 5 llay, sub: Liaison Rpt (suppl to I:OR, 4 - 5
llay, Records 12).

137
Ltr, ActR Chief Def Div, Gas Serv to officers of De! Div, 14 t.a::y. sub:
Training in Gas Defense (~ GHl.j G-5 Schools Box 17Z7, fol P, item 6).

- 75 -
 attacks, .the .AEF could only agree with the French, that "If it is impossible,
because o the changing methods of the enemy, to avoid all surprises, it

is nevertheless true that vigorous enf'orc8lllent of the rules for protection

l.38
is capable of considerabl,y lessening the number of casualties.

Particularl,y intereuting in .Major Levds 's liaison report is bis

unexpected definition of Uslightly gassed. Lille, staff, and medical

officers in the months to cane were to make a sharp distinction betiteen

the "severely" and the slightly" gassed, and it is therefore illlportant

to know that men slightly gassed were, accordine to Major LeTlis, p.it
out of business ror sane tillle," '\.hat 1s, a good three or four weeks.

Concerning the element of gas neurosis hinted at in Major Le-i~'s

report, a study by the 1st DiVision Psychiatrist of "1718 cases tagged

as 'gassed that passed through FH 3 duriog the !leuse-Argonne operation

1n earl.y oo.oller, 1s or some in.er""'~ - )Ja.rUcul.arl.y as 1u 1s me olllJ'

division psychiatrist report that has been found so far in World War I

records. On the basis of rather slight evidence, he suggested "that

roughl,y one hal.f of [these l,7l!Ll 'gassed' cases could legit:lmatel,y be

139
classed as neuropsychiatric . " Wound cases, except for the self-inflicted,

presented no hazards or problems like gas casualties, and gas casualties

could be as insidious, apparently, as the agents themselves,

138
lilemo for the Armies, Op of Armies of the East, 4th Bur, 23 Apr, n.e.
(in 26th nLv Box 249, fol 4).

139
T.t,., Tllv P..,~M ..+:ri.<t. t.o Ch Commltan't. in Neuro-Psycbiatry AKE', 1 Nov,
:.Jub: Rpt for .llonth of October (lied Dept Box 3398, fol 9). This recently
recovered ltr was not used in Study No. 3 ,' "The 1st Division in the leuse-
Argonne. '

- 76 ~
J

,)

I
 Ammunition Report
G-2 estimates o! dally enemy artillery fire in the period 26 April -
140
31 May total 11to1e ~han 130,000 rounds. Det,reen l June and JO June _
'
when the estimates riere rei;ularly preceded by the words "at least" _
there was a reported total of ?5,820 HE shells, with a marked let-up
in the nre towards the end oi' the month. During the la st days at

Cantigny, 1 - 6 July, an estilllatcd 9,152 HE shells fell into the

sector, Gas shells over the same April - !Jay period were est1mated at
28,500, includinc tho over-estimate of 15,000 mustard gas shells in
tbe 3 - 4 J/ay gas attack, For the June - July period gas shells seem
1.41
~o 11av~ Otaiea no more .nan b,JJO, accordin~ to the daily G-2 reports.

In its ?2 days in the Canticny sector, the 1st Division had thus been
subjocted to a probable minimum of 215 ,ooo HE shells and a maximum of
1,,2
34,800 gas shells. In aprox.i.matcly the same period, the lat Division
u, V.i.ll.\.:.iJ', J.\;\;V.1ill.ug 1.,v o-, uat.a, .ri.reu over 59.:,,uoo snells lnt.o 1;ne

60E!Jl\Y lines, including 22,730 gas shells. Post-171U' reports, however,

indicate that tho artillery fired a total of 658,183 shells, including
31,4?5 gas shells during the operation or more than twice as much HE
143
as the enemy and at least as much gas.

140
a;, ,246 rounds by count, ,nth adjustments for missing data on
26 - 2?, 2? - 28 and 29 - JO Moy - days of intense fire,
141
Ltr mo 1st Div to C CHS, 2? Jun 1919, sub; Rpt on Circ Ltr
!lo, 89 (GAF-1~-t Div), was to estim.1te J,600 gas shells fired by the
enemy in June, 90 percent of them mustard cas ,

comp11ea rrom .;01 J. - 11, i4 .A.pr - 7 JuJ.,

1.43
Uen10, lllitl l:it fA !Jrig for U-1 Lt iliv, 6 l'cb 1919 (Records 14),
said 566 536 75-llllll and 91,647 155--r.wi shells uere ex,nded between
25 Apr a~ 6 Jul, Rpt, Special Shells fl.red by the 1st FA Brig (Records
11,), sholfs the daily gas shells fired,

- ??
 Iff\PI'essive as this 1st Division gas shell total seems, almost

6,000 rounds represented the yperite fired in the 4 July salute and
probabJ,y more than half of the remaining total was No. 4 cyanogen, a
virtualJ,y worthless agent in the field. Aloreover, while the complete
allotment of 600 No. 4 and No . 5 shells permitted the 1st Division
was fired each day, so far as can bo determined it was invariably
fired during daylight hours, when the enei.iy was best able to protect
h:iJDself against it. No single target seems e\er to have been hit
IYitb more than 200 rounus on any given d,,;,, and usually with much less.
1nis amount. wouJ.<1 hav1; oeon orroc'tive nao it. been yperite, but Yd.th
cyanogen chloride and pho3gen0 it would have nuisance value o!l]J'.
In August, while in the Saizorais sector, the brigade came to
realize the wastefulness of scattering nonpersistent gas shells thinly

ture of H.E. has already been far in excess o the nor=l allowance,
,merea~ that of shrapnel and special {stieif} has been negligible As
regards the use of spocial shells, the firir.g of a few rounds at a
ti.mo is ineffectual. Concentrations of sufficient density to give ai,
144
effective cloud only will be undertaken."
The 1st Division, like the other American divisions, had to learn
the use of gas ir offem.ive as well as defensive operations. General
Summerall, in carunand of the 1st FA Brigade at Canti~n,y, was the new
division c011111ander (with the departure of General Bullard to III Corps)

l44
lilmo, Actg Adj 1st FA Drig for COs 6th and ?th FA, i1 Aug
(Records 9}.

- ?8 -
 in late Jllly wben he received the CirClllar l6tter of the Chief of
the Chemical, Warfare Service asking for his opinion as to the
)
proportion or gas shell which he believed his di vision artillery should
have, li'bile military tradition and prejlldice still preclllded any idea
of using gas in open warfare or in af'fonaive operations, Summerall
had already cane to believe

that in stabilized sectors tbe proportion of gas shells to high

explosive lllight \'/ell be greate.r than 50-50; I should say 60-40.
In the proportion of 90 percent mustard gas and 10 percent D,A,
fdiphenylchlorarsineJ and chlorpicrin.
In the months to cane the 1st Division was to spend little time in
.ct~bi.llo-ocl oootor-o . It. l.oar-n.od t.o cQU..n'bG;i;o &ao vd:bh goo .Ln the cr,bl,4,1.1.;h.,
145
and before the war was over fired almost (:J'J,<XJO gas sbells,

Casualty Statistics
The total reported llOllnded by artillery shell fragments in the
hospital lists for the period JO April - 7 Jllly is 925 (based on
actual . coont). To this figure 200 may be arbitrarily added as those
killed by artillery shells, or l, 125 altogether. On the basis of a

probable minimum of 215,000 HE shells fired into the division sector

at Cantigny, the enemy artillery therefore prodllced a casualty for
everv 190 shells, If it is assumed that all HE casualties reported
in post-war records were the result of artillery fire (3,125 vs. l,791
foond in the hospital lists, above., p. 7'.l), the t otal of 3,125

145
1st Ind, 1st Div to C Cws, 28 Jul, to ltr, C ens (ll)l.ssing} (1st
Div Box 173, Corresp file #9946); Stlldy No, '.l, ."The 1st Division in
the Mellse..Argonne," p. 58.

- 79 -
'

represents f casualty for eVf!lry 68 shells.

The ext,reme of the gas casualty totals in the i;eriod, 2,118
reported in the ,hospital lists and 2,647 plus 61 reported from later
Surgeon General records, were the result of a maximw:i of 34,800 gas
shells fired by the enemy. Accepting these ficures, gas casualties
were produced at the rate of scmewhere between 12 and 16 gas shells
for each casualty.

In individual gas attack, estimates of the total gas shells

fired in the drenching of Villers-Tournelle on the night of J- 4
Nay range b!ltween 4,uuu ana i.,,wv Wltn 1:.ne oerman recor<1 ot: 4,&;Jv
shells in fair agreement with the Division Gas Officer's est!"1ate of
4,000 or more (narrative, p. 14 ) The 700 gas casualties resulting

fi"a11 this attack (it may have been nearer to 800, according to J;he

gas shells fired in the attack.

'l'he t wo enemy gas dl!monstrations for the 27 l,!ay offensive, during
-which an approxim..te t ot al of 7,000 blue and green cross and 4,200
yell.ow cross shells were said to have been fired (narrative, pp. 30 - 31
32 - 33 ) , produced over 300 gas oasualt iea. The unusual proportion
between gas shells and gas casualties in this instance is nullified
to a degree by the questionable report that no more than 1D of the JOO
casualties were oaused by mustard gas. Furthermore, sinoe a post-war
report said that yperite constituted no more than a third of the gas
shell:s, it may be that that portion or the gas shoot was not completed.
Finally, it does not seem probable that a two-day attack with between

- 00 -


? ,000 and ll,000 gas shells could ever have been descriood, as it was,

as part of "a glorified coup de .main, 11 The assumption that both

missions, on 26 and 2? l!ay, were carried out almost entirely with non.-
persistent agents is bolstered by the enemy admission that the gas
banbardinent was not successful "on account of unfavorable weather
conditions 11 In that case, whether it was l'lind or rain that dis-
sipated the ar,ents, the nUJaber of casualties seems excessively high,
In the enormous gas preparation for the German offensive on
9 June, some part of a total of l.4,350 gas shells, including 10,850
yellow cross shells, fired by the German artillery opposite 1st
Division, fell on the division sector. The Division Gas Officer es-
timated a total of no more than 1,900 gas shells in the division
sector, most of theia mustard gas, Contrarily, 0-2 said mustard gas
shells were only a small percentage of the total eos shells, 'l'hese
are the only estimates available,
Total gas casualties in the division as a result of this gas
preparation mare all:lost 400 (narrative, p. 59 }, Even doubling the
D:lO estimate of 1,900 gas shells results in no more than a casualty

for every 9 shells,

A final statistic r.iay be noted. As a result of the 5,648 ?5-111111
yperite shells fired into the Bois de Lalval on 4 July by the let FA
Brigade, the elements of the German division occupying that ,1ood
reported ?3 gas casualties (narrative, p. 66 ). Even making allow-
ances for the, dubious character of Geroan reports of their gas
casualties, as ,ren as the paucity of forces likely to be stationeei

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J
 that near the front, the ratio of one gas casualty for every 78
yperite shells suggests that the mission was a geature, a celebration,

rather than an effective retaliation.

In t he me lee of the Cantigny at tack on 2!/ Nay, it is impossible

to distinguish the enemy gas shells that i;roduced over 200 gas
146
casualties among the defenders o the captured village. The effect
of that gas on the troops seems clear fran the narrative, It certainl,y
was a factor in the panic that overtook several of the canpanies, H""'

much of that panic was orints to the current experience and hoir much to
accumulated apprehensions concerning gas and to gas fatigue as a result
of the weeks of gas alarms and gas attaeks on that front carnot be said.
The effect of gas on the cantigny operation as a ,mole is perhaps
best represented in the table of hospital admissions. Although later

it reveals that gas casualties were admitted to the division hospit als

on 70 of the 72 days in the sector , Gennan gas tacticians had not yet
devised the practice, so effective later, of keeping large areas under
mustard gas harassment wit h a relatively few gas shells fired each ,' .
llany of the daily gas casualties i .n the chart t herefore doubtless

represent delayed casualties or casualties from rauidual contamination.

Yet the constant procession of casualties reveals that gas never ceased
to be a hazard in the sector, and gas mask fatif!Ue c.innot be ruled out

' \~
as an element affecting the operation.

1.46
Ltr, Bengs IDO 1st Div to C CWS, ';!"/ Jan 1919, sub: Rpt on Ciro
Ltr No, 89 (GAF-lat Div), was to say there were approximatelY 250 gas
casualties on 28 - JO May, "caused by troops advancing over ground that
had been i:reviously gassed." This must refer to the approaches to
Cantigey.

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 On Balance
In their eciuisis on the psychological effect of the capture

of Cantigtzy" on Allied.morale, rather than on the military vallle of

the operation, the historians have correctly assessed t he worth of
that at tack. Pershing himself' suggested that the inmediate purpose
of the attack was to raise Allied morale at a ti.Dle o.f general despair
and to prove the oaJ)Elcity of the Alllerican division as a fighting
unit (oarl'ative, p. 28) . Kis strong letter to Bullard (narrative, p.43)

leaves no doubt of the importance of the operation to hiJD..

TheN is indeed little to be said for the operation as a
military feat . None of the military objectives announced for the
attack - to straighten the line, to aeprive the enemy of his ad-

vantage of observation, to advance the artillery for better fire on

the enemy in the J.lontdidier area - were realized. The Germ=
thought, logically, that an unsuccessful at tempt had been mad.e to
take ~eight 104, overlooking the llcDt valley. But the planning maps
of the operation show that Heieht 104 was not even considered, that
it was well beyond the final objective line set for the attack . Only
the ccnmander of the 28th Infantry expressed his awarenons, as his men
held griJaly to the line above the town, that they "should have gone
on until [they] cacmanded the valley" (narrative, pp. 47, 54)
In terms of men and material expended on the action, the oost of
Cantigny was i;robably not excessive. l''ar more had been spent elsewhere
during the war on even less valuable pieces of war-torn real estate,
I
Tn J.I"'i.1 191?, fnr A'lLJu11ple, t.he F,,ench i n t heir attack between Soisson&
I
I
I
- 83 -
I
I
I
I
I


and Reims were said to have lost over 100,000 men in three days, and
in Augu3t le llort Homme Hill and Hill 304, west of the Meuse, were
captured a,fter four days' contiruous bombardment, "the amount of
artillery acmunition eXpended exceeding that of any previous engage-
14?
!llen-t. u

Ip the four days that it took to capture and coni,olidate

pantig!ly', the division lost apprOld..mately 1,055 officers and men, the
enemy about 600 more than that. In the other sixty-e1';ht days on that
front, in a i;urely defensive posture, the division lost appro.x:iJnately

alone. It was a hif!hly sen.s itive front, and With their artillery .!'ire
and raids the 1st D.i.vision offered constant provocation to the enemy,
as well as frequent ,iigns of impending attack. The gas attacks of
the enemy would have continued whether Cantig!ly' had beeo taken or not.
There is co question of the effectiveness of the enemy eas,
i.lthougb no acknowledaement of it has been found either in divisional
records or in the histories. The 2blished history of the 1st
Di.vision does not hesitate to admit that the division was gassed often
and thoroughly, nor to admit that almost half of its casualties at
Cantigny were the result of gas. But nowhere does it suggest that it
was gas, as much as HE, that Yrore dorm the troops, or that the enemy
use of gas had any effect on the taking of Cantigny. The fight for
II Cantigny might well have been more aggressive except for the fear that

Pershing, My Experiences, I, 69 - ?0, 140.

- 84 -

_....
overwhelming amounts of gas might at any maJ1ent be put on Cantigny

as they had been on Villers-Tournelle.

However euggerated it may appear to be, the re port of the
Division Psychiatrist (analysis, p. 76) that roughl,y oll1-half of
the gas cases in October~ in a division with long experience of
gas~ might be classified as neuropsychiatric, su~gests at the
very least the enormous psychological strain of fighting under gas
warfare condHions. Thie is not to minimize the effect of the German
machine guns which certainly produced most of the casualties in
the Cantigny salient. But in theory at least, there was always some
defense possible against machine guns, either by getting under
ground, by calling the artillery down on them, or by attacking them.
l>xcept for the gas mask, or flight, there was no defense against
gas, and as has been shown, the 1st Division tended to lack
confidence in its gas ciask.

- 85 -