No. L-71370. July 7, 1986.

*
SLOBODAN BOBANOVIC and DIANNE ELIZABETH CUNNINGHAM BOBANOVIC, petitioners, vs. HON. SYLVIA P.
MONTES, (in her capacity as MINISTER OF SOCIAL SERVICES and DEVELOPMENT), respondent.

Facts: As gleaned from the pleadings of the parties, it appears that on November 28, 1984, a petition to adopt the
minor Adam Christopher Sales was filed by spouses Slobodan Bobanovic and Dianne Elizabeth Cunningham
Bobanovic, both Australian citizens with established residence at 3 Rethel Close Keilor Downs, Melbourne,
Victoria, Australia but who then were temporarily residing at No. 8 Aries, Bel-Air, Makati, Metro Manila.

From the case records, it is disclosed that at the initial hearing of the petition on December 27, 1984, the
MSSD failed to comply with the stated Order of November 28, 1984. No case study was conducted by the
Ministry regarding the aforesaid minor and his natural and adopting parents. Neither did the MSSD submit
any report or recommendation. It did not intervene in the case. Due to such inaction, a Social Worker
assigned to the aforementioned Regional Trial Court, by the name of Alma Algenico, RIC Staff Assistant
V, conducted the requisite case study. She submitted the corresponding report to the court a quo,
recommending favorable action on the petition for adoption.
On January 4, 1985, judgment was rendered granting the adoption of the minor Adam Christopher Sales by the
petitioners herein.

Said certification also stated that the order of adoption not having been amended nor modified and
without any appeal taken therefrom, the adoption order became final and executory.
Subsequently, petitioners as the adoptive parents, applied for a travel clearance with the Ministry of Social
Services and Development in order that their adopted son, Adam Christopher Bobanovic, may travel to
Australia.

It was averred that the writ of mandamus prayed for in this instance should not be issued because there was no
neglect of duty on the part of respondent Minister inasmuch as the issuance of a travel clearance by her office is
not a ministerial duty but a matter necessarily involving the exercise of her judgment and discretion.

Petitioners contend that because it is an admitted fact that the decree of adoption dated January 4, 1985, had
been served on and was received by the MSSD and as the said decree of adoption ultimately became final and
executory, the respondent Minister can no longer properly question and negate its effects and subsequent
implementation by denying the issuance of the requested certificate of clearance to travel.

Issue: Whether or not MSSD can render a court judgment in adoption cases inoperative by refusing to grant travel
clearance certificate to adopted child.

Held: No. In refusing to grant the travel clearance certificate, respondent MSSD discounts and negates the effects
of a valid and final judgment of the court, regarding which no appeal had even been taken from. Respondent MSSD
should have realized that it would be incongruous to accept said judgment from which no appeal was made and
yet render the same judgment ineffective by barring the implementation of the same. It is rather paradoxical that
this particular Ministry should be overly concerned over its claimed exclusive prerogative to conduct the case
study work instead of placing more importance on the possible prejudicial affects of its refusal on the welfare of
the child.

As a judgment is not confined to what appears on the face of the decision but also to those necessarily included
therein or is necessary thereto (Unson vs. Lacson, 25 SCRA 86) it follows, therefore, as a logical effect of the decree
of adoption, that the adopted minor should be allowed to travel to Australia to join his adoptive parents.
 No. L-22523. September 29, 1967.
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF THE MINOR,EDWIN VILLA Y MENDOZA.LUIS E.
SANTOS,JR.and EDIPOLA V. SANTOS, petitioners-appellants vs. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellee.
Facts:
It was established that the petitioners are both 32 years of age, Filipinos, residing in the City of
Manila. They were married in 1957 and have maintained a conjugal home of their own. They do not
have a child of their own blood. Neither spouse has any legitimate, legitimated, illegitimate,
acknowledged natural child, or natural child by legal fiction, nor has any one of them been
convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. Edwin Villa y Mendoza, 4 years old, is a child of
Francisco Villa and Florencia Mendoza who are the common parents of the petitioner-wife Edipola
Villa Santos and the minor. Luis E. Santos, Jr., is a lawyer, with business interests in a textile
development enterprise and the IBA electric plant, and is the general manager of Medry, Inc. and
the secretary-treasurer of Bearen Enterprises. His income is approximately P600.00 a month. His co-
petitioner-wife is a nurse by profession, with an average monthly earning of about P300.00.

The natural parents of the minor testified that they have voluntarily given their consent to the
adoption of their son by the petitioners, and submitted their written consent and conformity to the
adoption, and that they fully understand the legal consequences of the adoption of their child by
the petitioners.
A critical consideration in this case is the fact that the parents of the minor to be adopted are also the
parents of the petitioner-wife. The minor, therefore, is the latters legitimate brother

Issue: The issue before Us is, whether or not an elder sister may adopt a younger brother.

Held: The lower court granted the petition of McGee to adopt his two minor step-children. On
appeal by the State. We reversed the decision. We said:
The purpose of adoption is to establish a relationship of paternity and filiation where none existed
before. Where therefore the relationship of parent and child already exists whether by blood or by
affinity as in the case of illegitimate and stepchildren, it would be unnecessary and superfluous to
establish and superimpose another relationship of parent and child through adoption

It would seem that in those states originally influenced by the civil law countries where adoption
originated, the rules are liberally construed, while in other states where common law principles
predominate, adoption laws are more strictly applied because they are regarded to be in
derogation of the common law.

To say that adoption should not be allowed when the adopter and the adopted are related to each
other, except in these cases enumerated in Article 338, is to preclude adoption among relatives no
matter how far removed or in whatever degree that relationship might be, which in our opinion is
not the policy of the law. The interest and welfare of the child to be adopted should be of
paramount consideration.
G.R. Nos. 175279-80. June 5, 2013.*
SUSAN LIM-LUA, petitioner, vs. DANILO Y. LUA, respondent
Facts: On September 3, 2003,3petitioner Susan Lim-Lua filed an action for the declaration of
nullity of her marriage with respondent Danilo Y. Lua, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-29346 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 14.
In her prayer for support pendente lite for herself and her two children, petitioner sought the
amount of P500,000.00 as monthly support, citing respondents huge earnings from salaries
and dividends in several companies and businesses here and abroad.4
After due hearing, Judge Raphael B. Yrastorza, Sr. issued an Order5 dated March 31, 2004
granting support pendente lite.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration,7asserting that petitioner is not entitled to spousal
support considering that she does not maintain for herself a separate dwelling from their children
and respondent has continued to support the family for their sustenance and well-being in
accordance with familys social and financial standing.

On April 12, 2005, the CA rendered its Decision,9finding merit in respondents contention that the
trial court gravely abused its discretion in granting P250,000.00 monthly support to petitioner
without evidence to prove his actual income.

Issue: Whether or not the amount of support which those related by marriage and family relationship
is obliged to give each other shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and to the
needs of the recipient.

Held:
Yes. As a matter of law, the amount of support which those related by marriage and family
relationship is generally obliged to give each other shall be in proportion to the resources or means
of the giver and to the needs of the recipient. Such support comprises everything indispensable for
sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with
the financial capacity of the family.
 G.R. No. 164948. June 27, 2006. *

DIWATA RAMOS LANDINGIN, petitioner, vs.REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

respondent.

Facts: On February 4, 2002, Diwata Ramos Landingin, a citizen of the United States of
America (USA), of Filipino parentage and a resident of Guam, USA, filed a petition for 3

the adoption of minors Elaine Dizon Ramos who was born on August 31, 1986; Elma 4

Dizon Ramos, who was born on September 7, 1987; The minors are
5 and Eugene Dizon Ramos who was born on August 5, 1989.6

the natural children of Manuel Ramos, petitioners brother, and Amelia Ramos.
Landingin, as petitioner, alleged in her petition that when Manuel died on May 19,
1990, the children were left to their paternal grandmother, Maria Taruc Ramos; their
7

biological mother, Amelia, went to Italy, re-married there and now has two children by
her second marriage and no longer communicated with her children by Manuel Ramos
nor with her inlaws from the time she left up to the institution of the adoption; the
minors are being financially supported by the petitioner and her children, and relatives
abroad; as Maria passed away on November 23, 2000, petitioner desires to adopt the
children; the minors have given their written consent to the adoption; she is qualified to
8

adopt as shown by the fact that she is a 57-year-old widow, has children of her own who
are already married, gainfully employed and have their respective families; she lives
alone in her own home in Guam, USA, where she acquired citizenship, and works as a
restaurant server.
Petitioner, nonetheless, argues that the written consent of the biological mother is no longer
necessary because when Amelias husband died in 1990, she left for Italy and never came back.

Issue: Whether or not permitting the child to remain for a time undisturbed in the care of others
constitutes an abandonment

Held:
No. Ordinarily, abandonment by a parent to justify the adoption of his child without his consent, is a
conduct which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental duties. Merely permitting the child
33

to remain for a time undisturbed in the care of others is not such an abandonment. 35
 G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005. *

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA, HONORATO B.

CATINDIG, petitioner.

Facts: On April 20, 2001, petitioner filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration praying
5

that Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname of her natural mother (GARCIA) as her middle
name.

Petitioner submits that the trial court erred in depriving Stephanie of a middle name as a
consequence of adoption because: (1) there is no law prohibiting an adopted child from having a
middle name in case there is only one adopting parent; (2) it is customary for every Filipino to have
as middle name the surname of the mother; (3) the middle name or initial is a part of the name of a
person; (4) adoption is for the benefit and best interest of the adopted child, hence, her right to
bear a proper name should not be violated; (5) permitting Stephanie to use the middle name
Garcia (her mothers surname) avoids the stigma of her illegitimacy; and; (6) her continued use of
Garcia as her middle name is not opposed by either the Catindig or Garcia families.

Issue: May an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the surname of her
natural mother as her middle name?

Held: We find merit in the petition. For all practical and legal purposes, a man's name is the
designation by which he is known and called in the community in which he lives and is best known.
It is defined as the word or combination of words by which a person is distinguished from other
individuals and, also, as the label or appellation which he bears for the convenience of the world at
large addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing with him. It is both of personal as well as public
8

interest that every person must have a name.

It is both of personal as well as public interest that every person must have a name.For all
practical and legal purposes, a mans name is the designation by which he is known and called in
the community in which he lives and is best known. It is defined as the word or combination of
words by which a person is distinguished from other individuals and, also, as the label or
appellation which he bears for the convenience of the world at large addressing him, or in speaking
of or dealing with him. It is both of personal as well as public interest that every person must have a
name.
 G.R. No. 143989. July 14, 2003. *

ISABELITA S. LAHOM, petitioner, vs. JOSE MELVIN SIBULO (previously referred to as DR.
MELVIN S. LAHOM), respondent.
Facts: At the tender age of two, Jose Melvin enjoyed the warmth, love and support of the couple
who treated the child like their own. Indeed, for years, Dr. and Mrs. Lahom fancied on legally
adopting Jose Melvin. Finally, in 1971, the couple decided to file a petition for adoption. On 05
May 1972, an order granting the petition was issued that made all the more intense than before
the feeling of affection of the spouses for Melvin. In keeping with the court order, the Civil
Registrar of Naga City changed the name Jose Melvin Sibulo to Jose Melvin Lahom.
A sad turn of events came many years later. Eventually, in December of 1999, Mrs. Lahom
commenced a petition to rescind the decree of adoption before the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 22, of Naga City.
Issue:
Whether or not an adopter can withdrew has right to rescind the adoption decree, and give to the
adopted child the sole right to sever the legal ties created by adoption

Held:
Yes. The Philippines, a State Party to the Convention of the Rights of the Child accepted the principle
that adoption was impressed with social and moral responsibility, and that its underlying
intent was geared to favor the adopted child; Republic Act No. 8552 affirmed the legitimate status
of the adopted child not only in his new family but also in the society as well; The new law withdrew
the right of an adopter to rescind the adoption decree and gave to the adopted child the sole right to
sever the legal ties created by adoption.In the early part of the century just passed, the rights of
children invited universal attention; the Geneva Declaration of Rights of the Child of 1924 and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, followed by the United Nations Declarations of the
Rights of the Child, were written instruments that would also protect and safeguard the rights of
adopted children. The Civil Code of the Philippines of 1950 on adoption, later modified by the Child
and Youth Welfare Code and then by the Family Code of the Philippines, gave immediate statutory
acknowledgment to the rights of the adopted. In 1989, the United Nations initiated the Convention
of the Rights of the Child. The Philippines, a State Party to the Convention, accepted the principle
that adoption was impressed with social and moral responsibility, and that its underlying intent
was geared to favor the adopted child. R.A. No. 8552 secured these rights and privileges for the
adopted. Most importantly, it affirmed the legitimate status of the adopted child, not only in his new
family but also in the society as well.

The Philippines, a State Party to the Convention of the Rights of the Child accepted the principle that
adoption was impressed with social and moral responsibility, and that its underlying intent
was geared to favor the adopted child; Republic Act No. 8552 affirmed the legitimate status of the
adopted child not only in his new family but also in the society as well; The new law withdrew the right
of an adopter to rescind the adoption decree and gave to the adopted child the sole right to sever the
legal ties created by adoption.In the early part of the century just passed, the rights of children
invited universal attention; the Geneva Declaration of Rights of the Child of 1924 and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, followed by the United Nations Declarations of the Rights of
the Child, were written instruments that would also protect and safeguard the rights of adopted
children. The Civil Code of the Philippines of 1950 on adoption, later modified by the Child and
Youth Welfare Code and then by the Family Code of the Philippines, gave immediate statutory
acknowledgment to the rights of the adopted. In 1989, the United Nations initiated the Convention
of the Rights of the Child. The Philippines, a State Party to the Convention, accepted the principle
that adoption was impressed with social and moral responsibility, and that its underlying intent
was geared to favor the adopted child. R.A. No. 8552 secured these rights and privileges for the
adopted. Most importantly, it affirmed the legitimate status of the adopted child, not only in his new
family but also in the society as well.
G.R. No. 117209. February 9, 1996. *

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. JOSE R. HERNANDEZ, in his capacity as
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 158, Pasig City and SPOUSES VAN MUNSON y
NAVARRO and REGINA MUNSON y ANDRADE, respondents.
Facts: The facts are undisputed. On March 10, 1994, herein private respondent spouses, Van
Munson y Navarro and Regina Munson y Andrade, filed a petition to adopt the minor Kevin Earl
2

Bartolome Moran, duly alleging therein the jurisdictional facts required by Rule 99 of the Rules of
Court for adoption, their qualifications as and fitness to be adoptive parents, as well as the
circumstances under and by reason of which the adoption of the aforenamed minor was sought. In
the very same petition, private respondents prayed for the change of the first name of said minor
adoptee to Aaron Joseph, the same being the name with which he was baptized in keeping with
religious tradition, and by which he has been called by his adoptive family, relatives and friends
since May 6, 1993 when he arrived at private respondents residence.

Issue: Whether or not the joinder can be invoked in the case at bar.

Held: Turning now to the present petition, while it is true that there is no express prohibition
against the joinder of a petition for adoption and for change of name, we do not believe that there
is any relation between these two petitions, nor are they of the same nature or character, much
less do they present any common question of fact or law, which conjointly would warrant their
joinder. In short, these petitions do not rightly meet the underlying test of conceptual unity
demanded to sanction their joinder under our Rules.

The situation presented in this case does not warrant exception from the Rules under the policy of
liberal construction thereof in general, and for change of name in particular, as proposed by private
respondents and adopted by respondent judge. Liberal construction of the Rules may be invoked in
situations wherein there may be some excusable formal deficiency or error in a pleading, provided
that the same does not subvert the essence of the proceeding and connotes at least a reasonable
attempt at compliance with the Rules. Utter disregard of the Rules cannot justly be rationalized by
harking on the policy of liberal construction.

WHEREFORE, on the foregoing premises, the assailed order of respondent judge is hereby
MODIFIED. The legally adopted child of private respondents shall henceforth be officially known as
Kevin Earl Munson y Andrade unless a change thereof is hereafter effected in accordance with law.
In all other respects, the order is AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. 111180. November 16, 1995. *

DAISIE T. DAVID, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, RAMON R. VILLAR, respondents

Facts: Petitioner Daisie T. David worked as secretary of private respondent Ramon R. Villar, a
businessman in Angeles City. Private respondent is a married man and the father of four
children, all grown-up. After a while, the relationship between petitioner and private
respondent developed into an intimate one, as a result of which a son, Christopher J., was born
on March 9, 1985 to them. Christopher J. was followed by two more children, both girls, namely
Christine, born on June 9, 1986, and Cathy Mae on April 24, 1988.
The relationship became known to private respondents wife when Daisie took Christopher J. to
Villars house at Villa Teresa in Angeles City sometime in 1986 and introduced him to Villars
legal wife.
After this, the children of Daisie were freely brought by Villar to his house as they were
eventually accepted by his legal family.
In the summer of 1991, Villar asked Daisie to allow Christopher J., then six years of age, to go
with his family to Boracay. Daisie agreed, but after the trip, Villar refused to give back the child.
Villar said he had enrolled Christopher J. at the Holy Family Academy for the next school year.
Issue: Whether or not habeas corpus can be invoked by Daisy David.
Held: Yes. In the case at bar, Christopher J. is an illegitimate child since at the time of his
conception, his father, private respondent Ramon R. Villar, was married to another woman other
than the childs mother. As such, pursuant to Art. 176 of the Family Code, Christopher J. is under
the parental authority of his mother, the herein petitioner, who, as a consequence of such
authority, is entitled to have custody of him. Since, admittedly, petitioner has been deprived of
2

her rightful custody of her child by private respondent, she is entitled to issuance of the writ of
habeas corpus.

Daisie and her children may not be enjoying a life of affluence that private respondent promises if
the child lives with him. It is enough, however, that petitioner is earning a decent living and is able
to support her children according to her means

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and private respondent is ORDERED
to deliver the minor Christopher J. T. David to the custody of his mother, the herein petitioner, and
to give him temporary support in the amount of P3,000.00, pending the fixing of the amount of
support in an appropriate action.
 G.R. No. 100835. October 26, 1993. *

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and the
spouses JAMES ANTHONY HUGHES and LENITA MABUNAY HUGHES, respondents.
Facts:
James Anthony Hughes, a natural born citizen of the United States of America, married Lenita
Mabunay Hughes, a Filipino citizen, who herself was later naturalized as a citizen of that
country. On 29 June 1990, the spouses jointly filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of
Angeles City, Branch 60, to adopt Ma. Cecilia, Neil and Mario, all surnamed Mabunay, minor
niece and nephews of Lenita, who had been living with the couple even prior
to the filing of the petition. The minors, as well as their parents, gave consent to the
adoption.
On 29 November 1990, the Regional Trial Court rendered a decision granting the petition. A
petition for Review on Certiorari was filed with this Court, assailing the trial courts decision.
This Court referred the case to the Court of Appeals which, on 09 July 1991, affirmed the trial
courts decision.
Hence, the present petition. The petitioner assigned a lone error on the part of the respondent
court, thus
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF SPOUSES JAMES
ANTHONY HUGHES AND LENITA MABUNAY HUGHES BECAUSE THEY ARE NOT QUALIFIED TO
ADOPT UNDER PHILIPPINE LAW.
Issue: Whether or not it is mandatory for both the spouses to jointly adopt.

Held: Yes. While James Anthony unquestionably is not permitted to adopt under any of the
exceptional cases enumerated in paragraph (3) of the aforequoted article, Lenita, however, can
qualify pursuant to paragraph (3)(a). The problem in her case lies, instead, with Article 185 of
Executive Order No. 209, expressing, as follows:
Art. 185. Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in the following cases:
1. (1)When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; or
2. (2)When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other.

Lenita may not thus adopt alone since Article 185 requires a joint adoption by the
husband and the wife, a condition that must be read along together with Article 184.
Adoption creates a status that is closely assimilated to legitimate paternity and filiation with
corresponding rights and duties that necessarily flow from adoption, such as, but not necessarily
confined to, the exercise of parental authority, use of surname of the adopter by the adopted, as
well as support and successional rights. These are matters that obviously cannot be considered
inconsequential to the parties.

Executive Order 91 made it mandatory for both the spouses to jointly adopt when one of them
was an alien.As amended by Executive Order 91, Presidential Decree No. 603, had thus
made it mandatory for both the spouses to jointly adopt when one of them was an alien. The
law was silent when both spouses were of the same nationality.