G.R. No. 196853, July 13, 2015 24 018157 December 07, 1993 Php600,000.

00
25 018161 December 06, 1993 Php 12,000.00
ROBERT CHUA, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. 26 018160 December 05, 1993 Php 12,000.00
27 018033 November 09, 1993 Php 3,096.00
DECISION 28 018032 November 08, 1993 Php 12,000.00
29 018071 November 06, 1993 Php150,000.00
DEL CASTILLO, J.: 30 018070 November 06, 1993 Php150,000.00
31 006210 October 21, 1993 Php100,000.00
Petitioner Robert Chua (Chua) was charged with 54 counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (BP 32 006251 October 18, 1993 Php200,000.00
22) for issuing checks which were dishonored for either being drawn against insufficient funds or closed 33 006250 October 18, 1993 Php200,000.00
account.
34 017971 October 13, 1993 Php400,000.00
Factual Antecedents 35 017972 October 12, 1993 Php335,450.00
36 017973 October 11, 1993 Php464,550.00
Chua and private complainant Philip See (See) were long-time friends and neighbors. On different dates 37 006433 September 24, 1993 Php520,000.00
from 1992 until 1993, Chua issued several postdated PSBank checks of varying amounts to See pursuant 38 006213 August 30, 1993 Php100,000.00
to their rediscounting arrangement at a 3% rate, to wit: 39 017976 December 13, 1993 Php100,000.00
40 018139 December 13, 1993 Php125,000.00
PSBANK CHECK NO. DATED AMOUNT 41 018141 December 13, 1993 Php175,000.00
1 018062 December 25, 1993 Php300,000.00 42 018143 December 13, 1993 Php300,000.00
2 018061 December 23, 1993 Php350,000.00 43 018121 December 10, 1993 Php166,934.00
3 017996 December 16, 1993 Php100,000.00 44 018063 November 12, 1993 Php 12,000.00
4 017992 December 14, 1993 Php200,000.00 45 018035 November 11, 1993 Php 7,789.00
5 017993 December 14, 1993 Php200,000.00 46 017970 November 11, 1993 Php600,000.00
6 018138 November 22,1993 Php 6,000.00 47 018068 November 18, 1993 Php 7,800.00
7 018122 November 19, 1993 Php 13,000.00 48 017956 November 10, 1993 Php800,000.00
8 018120 November 18, 1993 Php 6,000.00 49 018034 November 10, 1993 Php 7,116.00
9 018162 November 22, 1993 Php 10,800.00 50 017907 December 1, 1993 Php200,000.00
10 018069 November 17, 1993 Php 9,744.25 51 018152 November 30, 1993 Php 6,000.00
11 018117 November 17, 1993 Php 8,000.00 52 018067 November 30, 1993 Php 7,800.00
12 018149 November 28, 1993 Php 6,000.00 53 006490 November 29, 1993 Php100,000.00
13 018146 November 27, 1993 Php 7,000.00 54 018150 November 29, 1993 Php 6,000.001
14 006478 November 26, 1993 Php200,000.00 However, See claimed that when he deposited the checks, they were dishonored either due to insufficient
15 018148 November 26, 1993 Php300,000.00 funds or closed account. Despite demands, Chua failed to make good the checks. Hence, See filed on
16 018145 November 26, 1993 Php 7,000.00 December 23, 1993 a Complaint2 for violations of BP 22 before the Office of the City Prosecutor of
17 018137 December 10, 1993 Php150,000.00 Quezon City. He attached thereto a demand letter3 dated December 10, 1993.
18 017991 December 10, 1993 Php150,000.00
19 018151 December 10, 1993 Php150,000.00 In a Resolution4 dated April 25, 1994, the prosecutor found probable cause and recommended the filing
20 017962 December 08, 1993 Php150,000.00 of charges against Chua. Accordingly, 54 counts of violation of BP 22 were filed against him before the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City.
21 018165 December 08, 1993 Php 14,000.00
22 018154 December 07, 1993 Php100,000.00
23 018164 December 07, 1993 Php 14,000.00
Proceedings before the Metropolitan Trial Court The prosecution had proved also that private complainant personally sen[t] a written notice of dishonor
of the subject check to the accused and that the latter personally received the same. In fact, the defense
During the course of the trial, the prosecution formally offered as its evidence 5 the demand letter dated stipulated in open court the existence of the said demand letter and the signature of the accused as
December 10, 1993 marked as Exhibit "B." 6 Chua, however, objected7 to its admissibility on the grounds reflected in the face of the demand letter, x x x In view of that stipulation, the defense is now estopped
that it is a mere photocopy and that it does not bear any proof that he actually received it. In view of [from] denying its receipt thereof. Although there was no date when accused received the demand letter x
these, Chua filed on April 14, 1999 a Motion to Submit Demurrer to Evidence. 8 Per Chua's allegation, x x the demand letter was dated, thus it is presumed that the accused received the said demand letter on
however, the MeTC failed to act on his motion since the judge of said court vacated his post. the date reflected on it. It has been said that "admission verbal or written made by the party in the course
of the proceedings in the same case does not require proof." x xx
Several years later, the prosecution filed a Motion to Re-Open Presentation of Prosecution's Evidence
and Motion to Allow Prosecution to Submit Additional Formal Offer of Evidence9 dated March 28, 2003. [In spite of] receipt thereof, the accused failed to pay the amount of the checks or make arrangement for
It averred that while See was still trying to locate a demand letter dated November 30, 1993 (which it its payment [w]ithin five (5) banking days after receiving notice that the said checks have not been paid
alleged to Irave been personally served upon Chua), the prosecution nevertheless decided to rest its case by the drawee bank. As a result, the presumption of knowledge as provided for in Section 2 of Batas
on February 24, 1999 so as not to further delay the proceedings. However, sometime in February 2002, Pambansa Bilang 22 which was the basis of reckoning the crucial five (5) day period was established. 19
See decided to have his house rented out such that he emptied it with all his belongings and had it Hence, the dispositive portion of the MeTC Decision:
cleaned. It was during this time that he found the demand letter dated November 30, 1993.10 The
prosecution thus prayed that it be allowed to submit a supplemental offer of evidence to include said WHEREFORE, premises considered, this court finds accused Robert Chua GUILTY, beyond reasonable
demand letter dated November 30, 1993 as part of its evidence. Again, the records of the case bear no doubt, of fifty four (54) counts of Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 and hereby sentence[s] him to
copy of an MeTC Order or Resolution granting the aforesaid motion of the prosecution. Nevertheless, suffer the penalty of six (6) months imprisonment for each case and to restitute to the private complainant
extant on records is a Formal Offer of Evidence 11 filed by the private prosecutor submitting the demand the total amount of the face value of all the subject checks in these cases with legal interest of 12% per
letter dated November 30, 1993 as additional evidence. In his objection thereto, 12 Chua averred that the annum reckoned from the filing of the informations until the full amount is fully paid and to pay the costs
papers on which the demand letter dated November 30, 1993 are written were given to him as blank of suit.
papers. He affixed his signature thereon purportedly to give See the authority to retrieve a car which was
supposed to serve as payment for Chua's obligation to See. In an Order13 dated November 18, 2005, the SO ORDERED.20
MeTC refused to take cognizance of the supplemental formal offer on the ground that the same was filed Ruling of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
by the private prosecutor without the conformity of the public prosecutor. Be that as it may, the demand
letter dated November 30, 1993 eventually found its way into the records of this case as Exhibit Aggrieved, Chua appealed to the RTC where he argued that: (1) the complaint was prematurely filed
"SSS."14redarclaw since the demand letter dated December 10, 1993 had not yet been sent to him at the time of filing of the
Complaint; (2) the demand letter dated November 30, 1993 has no probative value since it lacked proof
Later, the defense, with leave of court, filed a Demurrer to Evidence. 15 It again pointed out that the of the date when Chua received the same; and, (3) since Chua was acquitted in two other BP 22 cases
demand letter dated December 10, 1993 attached to See's affidavit-complaint is a mere photocopy and involving the same parties, facts and issues, he should likewise be acquitted in the present case based on
not accompanied with a Post Office Registry Receipt and Registry Return Receipt. Most importantly, it the principle of stare decisis.
does not contain Chua's signature that would serve as proof of his actual receipt thereof. In view of these,
the defense surmised that the prosecution fabricated the demand letter dated November 30, 1993 to In a Decision21 dated July 1, 2009, the RTC likewise found all the elements of BP 22 to have been
remedy the lack of a proper notice of dishonor upon Chua. At any rate, it argued that while the November sufficiently established by the prosecution, to wit:
30, 1993 demand letter contains Chua's signature, the same should not be given any probative value since
it does not contain the date when he allegedly received the same. Hence, there is simply no way of (1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value;
reckoning the crucial five-day period that the law affords an issuer to make good the check from the date
of his notice of its dishonor. (2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient
funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment;
In an Order16 dated January 12, 2007, the MeTC denied the defense's Demurrer to Evidence. The Motion
for Reconsideration thereto was likewise denied in an Order 17 dated May 23, 2007. Hence, the trial of the (3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficient funds or credit or dishonor
case proceeded. for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause ordered the bank to stop payment.

In a Consolidated Decision18 dated May 12, 2008, the MeTC convicted Chua of 54 counts of violation of As to first element, the RTC held that the evidence shows that Chua issued the checks in question. Next,
BP 22 after it found all the elements of the offense obtaining in the case. Anent Chua's receipt of the on the basis of the demand letter dated November 30, 1993 bearing Chua's signature as proof of receipt
notice of dishonor, it ratiocinated, viz.: x x x x thereof, it was likewise established that he had knowledge of the insufficiency of his funds with the
drawee bank at the time he issued the checks, thus, satisfying the second element. It expounded:
Thus, in order to create the prima facie presumption that the issuer knew of the insufficiency of funds, it
must be shown that he or she received a notice of dishonor and, within five banking days thereafter,
failed to satisfy the amount of the check or make arrangement for its payment, x x x
In the present case, a demand letter (Exh. "SSS") was sent to accused-appellant informing him of the
dishonor of the check and demanding he make good of the checks. The prosecution offered this in
evidence, and the accused's signature thereon evidences his receipt of the said demand letter. Accused-
appellant argues that there is no proof that he received the same considering that there is no date on his
signature appearing on the document. But as borne out by the records of the proceedings, the defense
even stipulated in open court the existence of the demand letter, x x x
Thus, considering that the demand letter was dated November 30, 1993, the reckoning of the crucial five
day period was established. Accused failed to make arrangement for the payment of the amount of check
within five-day period from notice of the checks' dishonor.22
Finally, the RTC ruled that the prosecution was able to prove the existence of the third element when it
presented a bank employee who testified that the subject checks were dishonored due to insufficiency of
funds or closed account.
prosecution into stipulating on the admissibility of the demand letter is without basis. Once validly
entered into, stipulations will not be set aside unless for good cause. They should be enforced especially
when they are not false, unreasonable or against good morals and sound public policy. When made
before the court, they are conclusive. And the party who validly made them can be relieved therefrom
only upon a showing of collusion, duress, fraud, misrepresentation as to facts, and undue influence; or
upon a showing of sufficient cause on such terms as will serve justice in a particular case. Moreover, the
power to relieve a party from a stipulation validly made lies in the court's sound discretion which, unless
exercised with grave abuse, will not be disturbed on appeal.25
And just like the MeTC and the RTC, the CA concluded that the prosecution clearly established all the
elements of the offense of violation of BP 22. Ultimately, it ruled as follows:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed decision dated July
1, 2009 and order dated October 30, 2009 of the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 219, are hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.26
Chua filed a Motion for Reconsideration,27 but the same was denied in a Resolution28 dated May 4, 2011.
Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.

Anent the defense's invocation of the principle of stare decisis, the RTC found the same inapplicable Issues
since there is a distinction between the present case and the other cases where Chua was acquitted. In the
instant case, the prosecution, as mentioned, was able to establish the second element of the offense by I
way of the demand letter dated November 30, 1993 duly received by Chua. Whereas in the other cases
where Chua was acquitted, there was no proof that he received a demand letter. THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT UPHELD THE RULINGS OF THE
TRIAL COURTS THAT THE ACCUSED AT THE TIME OF THE ISSUANCE OF THE
Hence, the dispositive portion of the RTC Decision: DISHONORED CHECKS HAD KNOWLEDGE OF THE INSUFFICIENCY OF FUNDS FOR THE
PAYMENT OF THE CHECKS UPON THEIR PRESENTMENT, BASED MERELY ON THE
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision dated May 12, 2008 is hereby AFFIRMED. PRESUMPTION THAT THE DATE OF THE PREPARATION OF THE LETTER IS THE DATE OF
RECEIPT BY THE ADDRESSEE.
SO ORDERED.23
Ruling of the Court of Appeals (CA) II

Before the CA, Chua argued against the probative value of the demand letter dated November 30, 1993 THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT CONSIDERED THE DEMAND
by pointing out that: (1) for more than 10 years from the time the case was filed, the prosecution never LETTER DATED 30 NOVEMBER 1993 AS A NEWLY-DISCOVERED EVIDENCE.29
adverted to its existence. He thus surmised that this was because the document was not really missing but The Parties y Arguments
in fact inexistent - a mere afterthought as to make it appear that the second element of the offense is
obtaining in the case; (2) the subject demand letter is not a newly discovered evidence as it could have Chua asserts that the second element of the offense charged, i.e., knowledge of the maker, drawer, or
been discovered earlier through the exercise of due diligence; and, (3) his counsel's admission of the issuer that at the time of issue there are no sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the
physical existence of the subject demand letter and Chua's signature thereon does not carry with it the payment of such check in full upon its presentment, was not proved by the prosecution. He argues that
admission of its contents and his receipt of the same. the presumption that the issuer had knowledge of the insufficiency of funds only arises after it is proved
that the issuer actually received a notice of dishonor and within five days from receipt thereof failed to
Unpersuaded, the CA, in its November 11, 2010 Decision24 brushed aside Chua's arguments in this wise: pay the amount of the check or make arrangement for its payment. Here, the date when Chua allegedly
received the demand letter dated November 30, 1993 was not established by the prosecution.
x x x [A]s aptly pointed out by the Solicitor General, See could not have waited for a decade just to Citing Danao v. Court of Appeals,30 he thus contends that since there is no date of receipt from which to
fabricate an evidence against petitioner. The contention that petitioner's counsel was tricked by the reckon the aforementioned five-day period, the presumption that he has knowledge of the insufficiency
of funds at the time of the issuance of the checks did not arise. refers to a question of law. Similarly, the second issue is one concerning a question of law because it
requires the application of the provision of the Rules of Court concerning a newly discovered
In any case, Chua argues that the demand letter dated November 30, 1993 is not a newly discovered evidence.32redarclaw
evidence. He points out that a newly discovered evidence is one which could not have been discovered
even in the exercise of due diligence in locating the same. In this case, See claims that he only found the Nevertheless, assuming that the questions posed before this Court are indeed factual, the rule that factual
letter after having his house cleaned. This means that he could have found it early on had he exercised findings of the lower courts are not proper subject of certiorari petition admits of exceptions. One of
due diligence, which, however, was neither shown by the prosecution. these exceptions is when the lower courts failed to appreciate certain facts and circumstances which, if
taken into account, would materially affect the result of the case. The Court finds the said exception
On the other hand, respondent People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General applicable in the instant case. Clearly, the petition deserves the consideration of this Court.
(OSG), avers that Chua's contention that there is no proof of the date when he actually received the
demand letter dated November 30, 1993 involves a factual issue which is not within the province of The prosecution failed to prove all the elements of the offenses charged.
a certiorari petition. As to the matter of whether the subject demand letter is a newly discovered
evidence, the OSG calls attention to the fact that the MeTC, RTC and the CA all considered the said In order to successfully hold an accused liable for violation of BP 22, the following essential elements
document as a newly discovered evidence. Hence, such fir ding deserves full faith and credence. Besides, must be present: "(1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value;
Chua was correctly convicted for violation of BP 22 since all the elements of the offense were (2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient
sufficiently proven by the prosecution. funds in br credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and (3)
the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor
Our Ruling for the same reason had not the drawer, witjhout any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop
payment."33 "Of the three (3) elements, the second element is the hardest to prove as it involves a state of
The Petition is impressed with merit. mind. Thus, Section 2 of BP 22 creates a presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds, which,
however, arises only after it is proved that the issuer had received a written notice of dishonor and that
The issues raised by Chua involve questions of law. within five days from receipt thereof, he failed to pay the amount of the check or to make arrangements
for its payment.34redarclaw
The OSG argues that the issues raised by Chua involve questions of fact which are not within the
province of the present petition for review on certiorari. The Court, however, upon perusal of the In the instant case, what is in dispute is the existence of the second element. Chua asserts that the absence
petition, finds that the issues raised and the arguments advanced by Chua in support thereof, concern of the date of his actual receipt on the face of the demand letter dated November 30, 1993 prevented the
questions of law. "Jurisprudence dictates that there is a 'question of law' when the doubt or difference legal presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds from arising. On the other hand, the MeTC
arises as to what the law is on a certain set of facts or circumstances; on the other hand, there is a opined that while the date of Chua's actual receipt of the subject demand letter is not affixed thereon, it is
'question of fact' when the issue raised on appeal pertains to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. The presumed that he received the same on the date of the demand letter (November 30, 1993). Moreover, the
test for determining whether the supposed error was one of 'law' or 'fact' is not the appellation given by lower courts banked on the stimulation entered into by Chua's counsel as to the existence of the demand
the parties raising the same; rather, it is whether the reviewing court can resolve the issues raised without letter anki of Chua's signature thereon. By reason of such stipulation, they all held that Cljiua could no
evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise, it is one of fact. In other words, longer impugn the said demand letter.
where there is no dispute as to the facts, the question of whether or not the conclusions drawn from these
facts are correct is a question of law. However, if the question posed requires a re-evaluation of the In Danao v. Court of Appeals,35 the Court discussed the importance of proving the date of actual receipt
credibility of witnesses, or the existence or relevance of surrounding circumstances and their relationship of the notice of dishonor, viz.:
to each other, the issue is factual." 31redarclaw
In King vs. People, this Court, through Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, held: "To hold a person liable
Chua raises two issues in this petition, to wit: (1) whether the MeTC, RTC and the CA correctly applied under B.P. Blg. 22, it is not enough to establish that a check issued was subsequently dishonored. It must
the legal presumption that Chua has knowledge of the insufficiency of funds at the time he issued the be shown further that the person who issued the check knew 'at the time of issue that he does not have
check based on his alleged receipt of the demand letter dated November 30, 1993 and his failure to make sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its
good the checks five days from such receipt; and (2) whether the said courts correctly considered the presentment.' Because this element involves a state of mind which is difficult to establish, Section 2 of
demand letter dated November 30, 1993 as newly discovered evidence. As to the first issue, it is not the law creates a prima facie presumption of such knowledge, as follows:
disputed that the subject demand letter, while bearing the signature of Chua, does not indicate any date as
to his receipt thereof. There being no disagreement as to this fact, the propriety of the conclusion drawn 'SEC 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds - The making, drawing and issuance of a check
from the same by the courts below, that is, the date of the said letter is considered as the date when Chua payment of which is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank,
received the same for the purpose of reckoning the five-day period to make good the checks, clearly when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of
knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof As earlier mentioned, this ruling of the MeTC was affirmed by both the RTC and the CA.
the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check within
five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee. The Court, however, disagrees with the lower courts. It is plain that the stipulation only refers to the
Thus, this Court further ruled in King, "in order to create the prima facie presumption that the issuer existence of the demand letter and of Chua's signature thereon. In no way can an admission of Chua's
knew of the insufficiency of funds, it must be shown that he or she received a notice of dishonor and, receipt of the demand letter be inferred therefrom. Hence, Chua cannot be considered estopped from
within five banking days thereafter, failed to satisfy the amount of the check or make arrangement for its claiming non-receipt. Also, the Court observes that Chua's admission with respect to his signature on the
payment." demand letter is consistent with his claim that See made him sign blank papers where the contents of the
demand letter dated November 30, 1993 were later intercalated.
Indeed, the prima facie presumption in Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 "gives the accused an opportunity to
satisfy the amount indicated in the check and thus avert prosecution. This opportunity, as this Court In view of the above discussion, the Court rules that the prosecution was not able to sufficiently prove the
stated in Lozano vs. Martinez, serves to mitigate the harshness of the law in its application. existence of the second element of BP 22.

In other words, if such notice of non-payment by the drawee bank is not sent to the maker or drawer of
the bum check, or if there is no proof as to when such notice was received by the drawer, then the
presumption or prima facie evidence as provided in Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 cannot arise, since
there would simply be no way of reckoning the crucial 5-day period."36 (Italics in the original,
emphasis supplied)
Similarly in the present case, there is no way to ascertain when the five-day period under Section 22 of
BP 22 would start and end since there is no showing when Chua actually received the demand letter
dated November 30, 1993. The MeTC cannot simply presume that the date of the demand letter was
likewise the date of Chua's receipt thereof. There is simply no such presumption provided in our rules on
evidence. In addition, from the inception of this case Chua has consistently denied having received
subject demand letter. He maintains that the paper used for the purported demand letter was still blank
when presented to him for signature and that he signed the same for another purpose. Given Chua's
denial, it behooved upon the prosecution to present proof of his actual receipt of the November 30, 1993
demand letter. However, all that the prosecution did was to present it without, however, adducing any
evidence as to the date of Chua's actual receipt thereof. It must be stressed that [t]he prosecution must
also prove actual receipt of [the notice of dishonor] because the fact of service provided for in the law is
reckoned from receipt of such notice of dishonor by the accused. 37 "The burden of proving notice rests
upon the party asserting its existence. Ordinarily, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to prove notice.
In criminal cases, however, the quantum of proof required is proof beyond reasonable doubt. Hence, for
B.P. Blg. 22 cases, there should be clear proof of notice" 38 which the Court finds wanting in this case.
Anent the stipulation entered into by Chua's counsel, the MeTC stated:
In the course of the said proceedings, the defense counsel manifested that he is willing to stipulate as to
the existence of the demand letter and the signature of the accused as reflected on the face of the demand
letter, x x x particular piece of evidence may be properly regarded as newly discovered to justify new trial, what is
x x x x
The prosecution had proved also that private complainant personally sent a written notice of dishonor of
the subject checks to the accused and that the latter personally received the same. In fact, the defense
stipulated in open court the existence of the said demand letter and the signature of the accused as
reflected in the face of the demand letter, x x x. In view of that stipulation, the defense is now estopped in
denying its receipt thereof.39
At any rate, the demand letter dated November 30, 1993 deserves no weight and credence not only
because it does not qualify as a newly discovered evidence within the purview of the law but also because
of its doubtful character.
As may be recalled, the prosecution had already long rested its case when it filed a Motion to Re-Open
Presentation of Prosecution's Evidence and Motion To Allow Prosecution To Submit Additional Formal
Offer of Evidence dated March 28, 2003. Intending to introduce the demand letter dated November 30,
1993 as a newly discovered evidence, See attached to the said motion an affidavit 40 of even date where
he stated the circumstances surrounding the fact of his location of the same, viz.:
2. When we initially presented our evidence in support of these criminal complaints, I was already
looking for a copy of the demand letter personally served by the affiant (See) and duly received by
[Chua];
3. That despite diligent efforts to locate the demand letter x x x dated November 30, 1993, the same was
not located until sometime in February 2002 when I was having our old house/office located at C-5
Christian Street, Grace Village, Quezon City, cleaned and ready to be rented out;
4. x x x [upon] showing the same to the new handling public prosecutor, he advised the affiant to have it
presented in Court.41
In Ybiernas v. Tanco-Gabaldon,42 the Court held that:
x x x The question of whether evidence is newly discovered has two aspects: a temporal one, i.e., when
was the evidence discovered, and a predictive one, i.e., when should or could it have been discovered. It
is to the latter that the requirement of due diligence has relevance. We have held that in order that a
essential is not so much the time when the evidence offered first sprang into existence nor the time when
it first came to the knowledge of the party now submitting it; what is essential is that the offering party
had exercised reasonable diligence in seeking to locate such evidence before or during trial but had
nonetheless failed to secure it.
The Rules do not give an exact definition of due diligence, and whether the movant has exercised due
diligence depends upon the particular circumstances of each case. Nonetheless, it has been observed that
the phrase is often equated with "reasonable promptness to avoid prejudice to the defendant." In other
words, the concept of due diligence has both a time component and a good faith component. The movant the time the said checks became due and demandable up to June 30, 2013 and 6% per annum from July
for a new trial must not only act in a timely fashion in gathering evidence in support of the motion; he 1, 2013 until fully paid.48redarclaw
must act reasonably and in good faith as well. Due diligence contemplates that the defendant acts
reasonably and in good faith to obtain the evidence, in light of the totality of the circumstances and the WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Petition. The assailed Decision dated November 11, 2010 of
facts known to him.43 the Court of Appeals in CA-GR. CR No. 33079 which affirmed the Decisions of the Metropolitan Trial
"Under the Rules of Court, the requisites for newly discovered evidence are: (a) the evidence was Court of Quezon City, Branch 36 and the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 219 finding
discovered after trial; (b) such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial with petitioner Robert Chua guilty beyond reasonable doubt of 54 counts of Violation of Batas Pambansa
reasonable diligence; and (c) it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching, and is of Blg. 22 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Robert Chua is hereby ACQUITTED on the ground
such weight that, if admitted, will probably change the judgment." 44redarclaw that his guilt has not been established beyond reasonable doubt and ordered RELEASED immediately
unless he is detained for some other legal cause. He is ordered, however, to indemnify the private
In this case, the Court holds that the demand letter dated November 30, 1993 does not qualify as a newly complainant Philip See the total value of the 54 checks subject of this case plus legal interest of 12% per
discovered evidence within the purview of the law. Per See's statements in his affidavit, the said evidence annum from the time the said sum became due and demandable until June 30, 2013 and 6% per
was already known to him at the time he filed his complaint against Chua. It was also apparently annum from July 1, 2013 until fully paid.
available considering that it was just kept in his house. Undeniably, had See exercised reasonable
diligence, he could have promptly located the said demand letter and presented it during trial. However, SO ORDERED.
the circumstances suggest otherwise.

Curiously, while See claims that the demand letter dated November 30, 1993 was already existing at the
time he filed the complaint, the same was not mentioned therein. Only the demand letter dated December
10, 1993 was referred to in the complaint, which per See's own allegations, was also not actually received
by Chua. In addition, the prosecution failed to present the original copy of the demand letter dated
December 10, 1993 during trial. Clearly on the basis of the demand letter dated December 10, 1993
alone, the prosecution cannot possibly establish the existence of the second element of the offense.
Indeed, the surrounding circumstances and the doubtful character of the demand letter dated November
30, 1993 make it susceptible to the conclusion that its introduction was a mere afterthought - a belated
attempt to fill in a missing component necessary for the existence of the second element of BP 22.

It may not be amiss to add at this point that out of the 54 cases for violation of BP 22 filed against Chua,
22 involve checks issued on November 30, 1993 or thereafter. Hence, the lower courts grievously erred
in convicting Chua for those 22 cases on the basis of a purported demand letter written and sent to Chua
prior to the issuance of said 22 checks. Checks can only be dishonored after they have been issued and
presented for payment. Before that, dishonor cannot take place. Thus, a demand letter that precedes the
issuance of checks cannot constitute as sufficient notice of dishonor within the contemplation of BP 22. It
is likewise significant to note that aside from the absence of a date, the signature of Chua appearing on
the questioned November 30, 1993 demand letter is not accompanied by any word or phrase indicating
that he affixed his signature thereon to signify his receipt thereof. Indeed, "conviction must rest upon the
strength of the evidence of the prosecution and not on the weakness of the evidence for the defense." 45In
view of the foregoing, the Court cannot accord the demand letter dated November 30, 1993 any weight
and credence. Consequently, it cannot be used to support Chua's guilt of the offenses charged.

All told, the Court cannot convict Chua for violation of BP 22 with moral certainty.

Chua's acquittal, however, does not entail the extinguishment of his civil liability for the dishonored
checks.46 "An acquittal based on lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt does not preclude the award of
civil damages."47 For this reason, Chua must be directed to restitute See the total amount of the face
value of all the checks subject of the case with legal interest at the rate of 12% per annum reckoned from
G.R. No. 187401 September 17, 2014 138619 January 15, 1996 3,333.33
MA. ROSARIO P. CAMPOS, Petitioner, 138620 January 31, 1996 3,333.33
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and FIRST WOMEN'S CREDIT 138621 February 15, 1996 3,333.33
CORPORATION, Respondents.
138622 February28, 1996 3,333.33
RESOLUTION

REYES, J.: 46,666.62

This resolves the petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Ma. Rosario P. Campos (Campos) to
assail the Decision1 dated July 21, 2008 and Resolution2 dated February 16, 2009 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 31468, which affirmed the conviction of Campos for fourteen (14) counts of
violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. 22), otherwise known as The Bouncing Checks Law.
The checks were declared by the drawee bank to be drawn against a "closed account." 4
After Campos failed to satisfy her outstanding obligation with FWCC despite demand, she was charged
before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Pasay City, Branch 48, with violations of B.P. 22.
Campos was tried in absentia, as she failed to attend court proceedings after being arraigned. 5

On March 17, 1995, Campos obtained a loan, payable on installments, from respondent First Women's
Credit Corporation (FWCC) in the amount of 50,000.00. She issued several postdated checks in favor
of FWCC to cover the agreed installment payments.3 Fourteen of these checks drawn against her Current
Account No. 6005-05449-92 withBPI Family Bank-Head Office, however, were dishonored when
presented for payment, particularly:
On December 7, 1999, the MeTC rendered its decision with dispositive portion that reads:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the accused is hereby CONVICTED of fourteen (14) counts
of violations of BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 22. She is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of six (6)
months imprisonment for each violation and to indemnify the complainant the sum of 46,666.62
representing the total value of the checks, plus legal interest from date of default until full payment.

Check No. Date Amount With costs.

138609 August 15, 1995 3,333.33 SO ORDERED.6

138610 August 30, 1995 3,333.33 Feeling aggrieved, Campos appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC). On July 30, 2007, the RTC of
Pasay City, Branch108 rendered its decision upholding Campos conviction. A motion for
138611 September 15, 1995 3,333.33 reconsideration filed by Campos was denied for lack of merit. 7
138612 September 30, 1995 3,333.33 Unyielding, Campos appealed the RTC decision to the CA, which rendered on July 21, 2008 its
138613 October 15, 1995 3,333.33 decision8 affirming the ruling of the RTC. Campos moved to reconsider, but her motion was denied via a
Resolution9 dated February 16, 2009. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari which cites the
138614 October 30, 1995 3,333.33 following issues:

138615 November15, 1995 3,333.33 1. WHETHER OR NOT A DEMAND LETTER THAT WAS SENT THROUGH REGISTERED
MAILIS SUFFICIENT TO SATISFY THE REQUIREMENTS OF [B.P. 22] AS TO KNOWLEDGE OF
138616 November30, 1995 3,333.33 THE FACT OF THE DISHONOR OF THE SUBJECT CHECKS.
138617 December15, 1995 3,333.33
2. WHETHER OR NOT [CAMPOS] WANT OF INFORMATION OF THE FACT OF THE CHECKS
138618 December31, 1995 3,333.33 DISHONOR AND HER SUBSEQUENT ARRANGEMENTS FOR THEIR PAYMENT [ARE]
TANTAMOUNT TO GOOD FAITH SO AS TO PERSUADE THIS HONORABLE SUPREME
COURT TO EXERCISE ITS EQUITY POWERS AND TO LEND SUCCOR TO [CAMPOS] CASE. 10
Campos argues that the crimes element requiring her knowledge at the time of the checks issuance that
she did not have sufficient funds with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon
presentment was not established by the prosecution. She denies having received a notice of dishonor
from FWCC. Insisting on an acquittal, Campos discredits the MeTCs reliance on a supposed notice of
dishonor that was sent to her by FWCC through registered mail. She also invokes good faith as she
allegedly made arrangements with FWCC for the payment of her obligation after the subject checks were
dishonored.
The petition lacks merit.
To be liable for violation of B.P. 22, the following essential elements must be present: (1) the making,
drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value; (2) the knowledge of the maker,
drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee
bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and (3) the subsequent dishonor of the
check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or creditor dishonor for the same reason had not the
drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment. 11
The presence of the first and third elements is undisputed. An issue being advanced by Campos through
the present petition concerns her alleged failure to receive a written demand letter from FWCC, the entity
in whose favor the dishonored checks were issued. In a line of cases, the Court has emphasized the
importance of proof of receipt of such notice of dishonor, 12 although not as an element of the offense, but
as a means to establish that the issuer of a check was aware of insufficiency of funds when he issued the
check and the bank dishonored it, in relation to the second element of the offense and Section 2 of B.P.
22. Considering that the second element involves a state of mind which is difficult to establish, Section 2
of B.P. 22 creates a presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds, 13 as it reads:
Sec. 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. The making, drawing, and issuance of a check
payment of which is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank,
when presented within ninety days from the date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of
knowledge of such insufficiency of fundsor credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof
the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check within
five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee.
In the instant case, both the RTC and the CA affirmed the MeTCs finding that the required notice of
dishonor from FWCC was received by Campos. Campos, nonetheless, still maintains that her personal
receipt of the notice was not sufficiently established, considering that only a written copy of the letter and
the registry return receipt covering it were presented by the prosecution. The Court has in truth
repeatedly held that the mere presentation of registry return receipts that cover registered mail was not
sufficient to establish that written notices of dishonor had been sent to or served on issuers of
checks.1wphi1 The authentication by affidavit of the mailers was necessary in order for service by
registered mail to be regarded as clear proof of the giving of notices of dishonor and to predicate the
existence of the second element of the offense.14
In still finding no merit in the present petition, the Court, however, considers Campos' defense that she
exerted efforts to reach an amicable settlement with her creditor after the checks which she issued were
dishonored by the drawee bank, BPI Family Bank. Campos categorically declared in her petition that,
"[she] has in her favor evidence to show that she was in good faith and indeed made arrangements for the
payment of her obligations subsequently after the dishonor of the checks." 15 Clearly, this statement was a
confirmation that she actually received the required notice of dishonor from FWCC. The evidence
referred to in her statement were receipts16 dated January 13, 1996, February 29, 1996, April 22, 1998
and May 26, 1998 issued by FWCC to Campos for payments in various amounts ranging from 2,500.00
to 15,700.00. Campos would not have entered into the alleged arrangements beginning January 1996
until May 1998 if she had. not received a notice of dishonor from her creditor, and had no knowledge of
the insufficiency of her funds with the bank and the dishonor of her checks.
Campos could have avoided prosecution by paying the amounts due on the checks or making
arrangements for payment in full within five ( 5) days after receiving notice. Unfortunately for Campos,
these circumstances were not established in the instant case. She failed to sufficiently disclose the terms
of her alleged arrangement with FWCC, and to establish that the same had been fully complied with so as
to completely satisfy the amounts covered by the subject checks. Moreover, documents to prove such fact
should have been presented before the MeTC during the trial, yet Campos opted to be tried in absentia,
and thus waived her right to present evidence. While Campos blamed her former counsel for alleged
negligence that led to her failure to be present during the trial, 17 it is settled that the negligence of counsel
binds his or her client. Given the circumstances, the Court finds no cogent reason to reverse the ruling of
the CA which affirmed the conviction of Campos.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated July 21, 2008 and Resolution dated
February 16, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 31468 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 198270, December 09, 2015 Criminal Case No. 337902

ARMILYN MORILLO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND RICHARD That on or about the 20th day of October 2003, or prior thereto, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila,
NATIVIDAD, Respondent. Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make out, draw and issue to AMASEA GENERAL
DECISION
MERCHANDIZE AND CONSTRUCTION SUPPLIES herein represented by ARMILYN MORILLO to
PERALTA, J.: apply on account or for value the check described below:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to Check No. : 2960203217
reverse and set aside the Decision1 dated January 18, 2011 and Resolution2 dated August 9, 2011 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 32723 which reversed and set aside the Decision3 dated
February 23, 2009 and Order4 dated July 13, 2009, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Criminal Case Drawn
: Metrobank
Nos. 08-1876-77, which, in turn, affirmed the Joint Decision5 dated September 3, 2008 of the Against
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) in Criminal Case Nos. 337902-03.

In the :
The antecedent facts are as follows:
amount Php434,430.00
Sometime in July 2003, respondent Richard Natividad, Milo Malong and Bing Nanquil, introducing
themselves as contractors doing business in Pampanga City under the name and style of RB Custodio
Construction, purchased construction materials for their project inside the Subic Freeport Zone from Postdated / : October 20,
petitioner Armilyn Morillo, owner of Amasea General Merchandize and Construction Supplies. The Dated 2003
parties agreed that twenty percent (20%) of the purchases shall be paid within seven (7) days after the
first delivery and the remaining eighty percent (80%) to be paid within thirty-five (35) days after the last
delivery, all of which shall be via postdated checks.6 Payable to : AMASEA GENERAL MERCHANDIZE AND CONSTRUCTION SUPPLIES

Pursuant to the agreement, petitioner delivered construction materials amounting to a total of
P500,054.00 at the construction site where respondent and his partners were undertaking their project.
After the last delivery, respondent paid P20,000.00 in cash and issued two (2) post-dated checks, drawn
from Metrobank, Pampanga branch, in the amounts of P393,000.00 and P87,054.00. Upon maturity,
petitioner attempted to deposit the checks in her savings account at Equitable PCI Bank, San Lorenzo,
Makati City. They were, however, dishonored by the drawee bank. Immediately thereafter, petitioner
communicated the dishonor to respondent and his partners and demanded for payment. Again,
respondent issued two (2) post-dated Metrobank checks and assured petitioner that they will be honored
upon maturity. Upon deposit in her savings account at Equitable PCI Bank, Makati Branch, the checks
were once again dishonored for the reason that the account from which they were drawn was already a
closed account. Consequently, petitioner made several demands from respondent and his partners, but to
no avail, prompting her to file a complaint with the City Prosecution Office, Makati City. 7 Thus, on
August 12, 2004, two (2) Informations were filed against respondent and Milo Malong, the accusatory
portions of which read:
said accused well knowing that at the time of issue thereof, said accused did not have sufficient funds in
or credit with the drawee bank for the payment in full of the face amount of such check upon its
presentment which check when presented for payment within ninety (90) days from the date thereof, was
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason "Account Closed" and despite receipt of
notice of such dishonor, the said accused failed lo pay said payee the face amount of said check or to
make arrangement for full payment thereof within five (5) banking days after receiving notice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Criminal Case No. 337903
That on or about the 20th day of October 2003, or prior thereto, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila,
Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously make out, draw and issue to AMASEA GENERAL
MERCHANDIZE AND CONSTRUCTION SUPPLIES herein represented by ARMILYN MORILLO to
apply on account or for value the check described below:
 invoices, reckoned from the date of receipt of the demand on February 28, 2004, until the amount is fully
Check No. : 2960203218
paid, plus the costs of suit.
Drawn
: Metrobank All other claims are DISMISSED for lack of evidence.
Against

In the SO ORDERED.9
: Php13,032.00
amount
Respondent appealed the decision of the MeTC to the RTC arguing that the MeTC of Makati City had no
Postdated / : October 20, jurisdiction over the case. He asserted that since the subject checks were issued, drawn, and delivered to
Dated 2003 petitioner in Subic, the venue of the action was improperly laid for none of the elements of the offense
actually transpired in Makati City. Respondent also pointed out that during the retaking of petitioner's
Payable to : AMASEA GENERAL MERCHANDIZE AND CONSTRUCTION SUPPLIES testimony on March 14, 2008, the records of the case did not show that the public prosecutor manifested
his presence in court and that he delegated the prosecution of the case to the private prosecutor. Thus,
since there was no appearance for the public prosecutor, nor was there a proper delegation of authority,
said accused well knowing that at the time of issue thereof, said accused did not have sufficient funds in
the proceedings should be declared null and void.10
or credit with the drawee bank for the payment in full of the face amount of such check upon its
presentment which check when presented for payment within ninety (90) days from the date thereof, was
On February 23, 2009, the RTC affirmed the MeTC ruling in the following wise:
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason "Account Closed" and despite receipt of
notice of such dishonor, the said accused failed to pay said payee the face amount of said check or to Since accused Natividad failed to raise before the court [a quo] the issue of authority of the private
make arrangement for full payment thereof within five (5) banking days after receiving notice. prosecutor to present witness Morillo in the absence of the public prosecutor during the March 14, 2008
proceeding, and only did so after obtaining an adverse judgment, it would be an injustice if all the
CONTRARY TO LAW.8 proceedings had in the case would be set aside.

On September 15, 2004, the Assistant City Prosecutor issued a Resolution recommending that respondent
The second issue raised on appeal also holds no ground. A violation of BP 22 is a continuing or
and his partners be charged in court with the crime of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the
transitory offense, which is oft-repeated in our jurisprudence. Under this doctrine, jurisdiction may be
Revised Penal Code as well as for Violation of Batas Pambansa No. 22 (BP 22), which was later
had in several places where one of the acts material to the crime occurred.
docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 337902-03.

Accused Natividad postulates that since the checks were presented suid dishonored in Makati City,
On September 3, 2008, the MeTC rendered its Joint Decision, finding that the prosecution had proven all
which is not the place where it was issued and delivered, the court [a quo] lacks jurisdiction. This
the elements of violation of BP 22 as against respondent, the dispositive portion of which reads:
argument is, at best, specious. The fact remains that the bank where it was presented lor payment
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in Criminal Cases Nos. 337902-03 finding the accused, RICHARD is in Makati City. These checks passed through this bank for clearance, confirmation, and or
NATIVIDAD, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 validation processes. Moreover, the eventual dishonour indeed took place or was completed at the
and is sentenced to pay a fine equivalent to Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php200,000.00), for Check end of the collecting bank in Makati City, where the private complainant maintains her account
No. 2960203217 and Thirteen Thousand Thirty-Two Pesos for Check No. 2960203218 or a total penalty over which the court [a quo] has jurisdiction.
of Two Hundred Thousand Thirteen Thousand Thirty Two Pesos (Php213,032.00), with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency. However, accused MILO MALONG, is ACQUITTED on the WHEREFORE, finding no merit on accused-appellant Natividad's appeal, the same is hereby dismissed.
ground of reasonable doubt. Both accused Malong and Natividad are ordered to jointly pay the private Accordingly, the appealed decision of the court [a quo] is hereby AFFIRMED in full.
complainant the total sum of Four Hundred Forty-Seven Thousand Four Hundred Sixty-Two Pesos
(Php447,462.00) which are the face value of the two (2) checks issued, subject of these cases, with SO ORDERED.11
interest at twelve percent (12%) per annum and three percent (3%) penalty per month as stipulated in the
On appeal, however, the Court of Appeals, in its January 18, 2011 Decision, reversed the lower courts'
rulings and dismissed the case without prejudice to its refiling in the proper venue, the pertinent portions
of said Decision state:
In this case, records will reveal that the first element of the offense happened in Pampanga. It was
indisputably established that the subject checks were issued to private complainant at petitioner's office
in Pampanga. Said checks were drawn from petitioner's account in Metrobank, Pampanga branch.
The second element of the offense or the knowledge of dishonor of the checks by the maker also
transpired in Pampanga. After private complainant was informed of the dishonor of the checks, she
immediately proceeded to petitioner's office in Pampanga, personally informed him and his companions
of the dishonor of the checks and tendered a demand letter for the payment of the construction materials.
Finally, the third element or dishonor of the checks by the drawee bank also happened in
Pampanga. Upon maturity of the subject checks, private complainant deposited the same in her
savings account at Equitable PCI Bank, Makati Branch. Subsequently, she was informed by the
latter bank that the subject checks were dishonored by the drawee bank, Metrobank, Pampanga
branch.
Clearly, all the essential elements of the offense happened in Pampanga. Consequently, the case
can only be filed in said place. Unfortunately, private complainant filed the case in Makati City,
under the erroneous assumption that since she deposited the subject checks in Equitable PCI
Bank, Makati City, and was informed of lite dishonor of the checks by the same bank, the case may
be filed in Makati City. However, as correctly argued by the OSG, the act of depositing the check is
not an essential element of BP 22. Likewise, the fact that private complainant was informed of the
dishonor of the checks at her bank in Makuti City did not vest the MeTC, Makati City with
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case. To reiterate, a transitory crime can only be tiled in any
of the places where its constitutive elements actually transpired. And, knowledge of the payee of
the dishonor of the checks is not an element of BP 22. The law speaks only of the subsequent
dishonor of the checks by the drawee bank and the knowledge of the fact of dishonor by the maker.
Consequently, none of the elements of the offense can be considered to have transpired in Makati
City. Thus, the venue of the instant case was improperly laid. 12
Aggrieved, petitioner filed the instant action invoking the following argument:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT THE METROPOLITAN
TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI CITY DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE DESPITE
A CLEAR SHOWING THAT THE OFFENSE WAS COMMITTED WITHIN THE JURISDICTION
OF SAID COURT.13
Petitioner maintains that the MeTC of Makati City, the place where the dishonored checks were
deposited, had jurisdiction over the instant case. In support of her contention, petitioner cites the ruling
in Nieva, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,14 wherein it was held that since the check drawn in violation of BP 22
was deposited and presented for encashment with the Angeles City Branch of the Bank of the Philippine
Islands, the RTC of Pam.pa.nga clearly had jurisdiction over the crime of which accused therein was
charged.15 Thus, petitioner asserts that the appellate court erred in ruling that the Makati MeTC did not
have jurisdiction to try the instant case. That none of the essential elements of the crime of violation of
BP 22 occurred in the City of Makati is belied by the Nieva doctrine recognizing the jurisdiction of the
court of the place where the check was deposited and/or presented for encashment.
Petitioner went on lo state that all the elements of violation of BP 22 were duly proven beyond
reasonable doubt. First, the prosecution sufficiently established that the respondent issued the subject
checks as shown by the documentary evidence submitted. They were issued for value, as payment for the
construction supplies and materials which petitioner delivered to the accused.
As to the second and third elements, petitioner posits that it was clearly shown that respondent had
knowledge of the insufficiency of funds in or credit with the drawee bank, which subsequently
dishonored the subject checks. Section 2 of BP 22 provides that "the dishonor of a check when presented
within ninety (90) days from the date of the check shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of
insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due
thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check within five (5) banking
days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee." In this case, petitioner states
that the prosecution was able to sufficiently show that the subject checks were presented within the time
period required by law. In fact, written demand relaying the fact that the drawee bank dishonored the
subject checks was even personally delivered by petitioner to respondent as evidenced by the demand
letter signed by respondent. Thus, respondent cannot deny that he had knowledge of the insufficiency of
funds in his account with the drawee bank and that the subject checks were subsequently dishonored for
the reason that the account from which they were drawn was already a closed account.
For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing the State, is in line with the appellate
court's and respondent's stance that the MeTC had no jurisdiction over the instant case. According to the
OSG, the act of depositing the check is not an essential element of the offense under the Bouncing
Checks Law. Citing the ruling in Rigor v. People,16 the OSG posited that the place of deposit and the
place of dishonor are distinct from each other and that the place where the check was issued, delivered,
and dishonored is the proper venue, not the place where the check was deposited, viz.:
The evidence clearly shows that the undated check was issued and delivered at the Rural Bank of San
Juan, Metro Manila. x x x The check was deposited with PS Bank, San Juan Branch, Metro Manila. x x x
The information at bar effectively charges San Juan as the place of drawing and issuing. The jurisdiction
of courts in criminal cases is determined by the allegations of the complaint or information. Although the
check was dishonored by the drawee, Associated Bank, in its Tarlac Branch, appellant has drawn, issued
and delivered it at RBSJ, San Juan. The place of issue and delivery was San Juan and knowledge, as an
essential part of the offense, was also overtly manifested in San Juan. There is no question that crimes
committed in San Juan are triable by the RTC stationed in Pasig.17
On the basis of the pronouncement in Rigor, the OSG thus claimed that the MeTC of Makati City did not
have jurisdiction over the instant case for none of the essential elements of violation of BP 22 occurred
therein.
The contention is untenable.
It is well settled that violations of BP 22 cases are categorized as transitory or continuing crimes,
meaning that some acts material and essential thereto and requisite in their consummation occur in one
municipality or territory, while some occur in another. In such cases, the court wherein any of the crime's
essential and material acts have been committed maintains jurisdiction to try the case; it being understood
that the first court taking cognizance of the same excludes the other. Thus, a person charged with a
continuing or transitory crime may be validly tried in any municipality or territory where the offense was
in part committed.18
The OSG, relying on our ruling in Rigor v. People, concluded that "the Supreme Court regarded the place
of deposit and the place of dishonor as distinct from one another and considered the place where the
check was issued, delivered and dishonored, and not where the check was deposited, as the proper venue
for the filing of a B.P. Blg. 22 case." The Court, however, cannot sustain such conclusion.
In said case, She accused therein obtained a loan from the Rural Bank of San Juan, Metro Manila, and in
payment thereof, he issued a check drawn against Associated Bank of Tarlac. Thereafter, Rural Bank
deposited the check at PS Bank, San Juan, but the same was returned for the reason that it had been
dishonored by Associated Bank of Tarlac. When all other efforts to demand the repayment of the loan
proved futile, Rural Bank filed an action against the accused for violation of BP 22 at the RTC of Pasig
City, wherein crimes committed in. San Juan are triable. The accused, however, contends that the RTC of
Pasig had no jurisdiction thereon since no proof had been offered to show that his check was issued,
delivered, dishonored or that knowledge of insufficiency of funds occurred in the Municipality of San
Juan. The Court, however, disagreed and held that while the check was dishonored by the drawee.
Associated Bank, in its Tarlac Branch, evidence clearly showed that the accused had drawn, issued and
delivered it at Rural Bank, San Juan, viz.:
Lastly, positioner contends that the Regional Trial Court of Pasig has no jurisdiction over this case since
no proof has been offered that his check was issued, delivered, dishonored or that knowledge of
insufficiency of funds occurred in the Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila.
The contention is untenable.
x x x x.
The evidence clearly shows that the undated check was issued and delivered at the Rural Bank of San
Juan, Metro Manila on November 16, 1989, and subsequently the check was dated February 16, 1990
thereat. On May 25, 1990, the check was deposited with PS Bank, San Juan Branch, Metro Manila. Thus,
the Court of Appeals correctly ruled:
Violations of B.P. 22 are categorized as transitory or continuing crimes. A suit on the check can be filed
in any of the places where any of the elements of the offense occurred, that is, where the check is drawn,
issued, delivered or dishonored. x x x
The information at bar effectively charges San Jisars as the place of drawing and issuing. The
jurisdiction of courts in criminal cases is determined by the allegations of the complaint or
information. Although, the check was dishonored by the drawee, Associated Baisk, sit its Tariac
Branch, appellant has drawn, issued and delivered it at RBSJ, San Juan. The place of issue airul
delivery was San Juan and knowledge, as an essential part of she offense, was also overtly
manifested in San Juan. There is no question that crimes committed in November, 1989 in San
Juan arc triable by the RTC stationed in Pasig. In short both allegation and proof in this case
sufficiently vest jurisdiction upon the RTC in Pasig City.19
The bone of contention in Rigor, therefore, was whether the prosecution had offered sufficient proof that
the check drawn in violation of BP 22 was issued, delivered, dishonored or that knowledge of
insufficiency of funds occurred in the Municipality of San Juan, thereby vesting jurisdiction upon the
RTC of Pasig City. Nowhere in the cited case, however, was it held, cither expressly or impliedly, that
the place where the check was deposited is not the proper venue for actions involving violations of BP
22, it is true that the Court, in Rigor, acknowledged the feet that the check was issued and delivered at the
Rural Bank of San Juan, while the same was deposited wilts the PS Bank of San Juan. But such
differentiation cannot be taken as basis sufficient enough to conclude that the court of the place of
deposit cannot exercise jurisdiction over violations of BP 22. In the absence, therefore, of any ground,
jurisprudential or otherwise, to sustain the OSG's arguments, the Court cannot take cognizance of a
doctrine that is simply inapplicable to the issue at hand.
In contrast, the ruling in Nieva, Jr. v. Court of Appeals20 cited by petitioner is more squarely on point
with the instant case. In Nieva, the accused delivered to Ramon Joven a post-dated check drawn against
the Commercial Bank of Manila as payment for Joven's dump truck. Said check was deposited in the
Angeles City Branch of the Bank of Philippine Islands, Joven was advised, however, that the
Commercial Bank of Manila returned the check for the reason that the account against which the check
was drawn is a "closed account." Consequently, the accused was charged with violation of BP 22 before
the RTC of Pampanga. On the contention of the accused that said court had no jurisdiction to try the case,
the Court categorically ruled:
As to petitioner's contention that the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga has no jurisdiction to try instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter
the cases charged herein as none of the essential elements thereof took place in Pampanga, suffice it requiring the services of lawyers. Specifically, it shall represent the Government in all criminal
to say that such contention has no basis. The evidence discloses that the check was deposited and/or proceedings before the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. 24 Thus, as a general rule, if a criminal
presented for encashment with the Angeles City Branch of the Bank of the Philippine Islands. This case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, the appeal on the criminal aspect of the case
fact clearly confers jurisdiction upon the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga over the crimes of must be instituted by the Solicitor General on behalf of the State. 25red
which petitioner is charged. It must be noted that violations of B.P. Blg. 22 are categorized as transitory
or continuing crimes and so is the crime of estafa. The rule is that a person charged with a transitory There have been instances, however, where the Court permitted an offended party to file an appeal
crime may be validly tried in any municipality or territory where the offense was in part committed.21 without the intervention of the OSG, such as when the offended party questions the civil aspect of a
decision of a lower court,26 when there is denial of due process of law to the prosecution and the State or
In fact, in the more recent Yalong v. People, 22 wherein the modes of appeal and rules of procedure were its agents refuse to act on the case to the prejudice of the State and the private offended party, 27 when
the issues at hand, the Court similarly inferred: there is grave error committed by the judge, or when the interest of substantial justice so requires. 28

Besides, even discounting the above-discussed considerations, Yalong's appeal still remains dismissible
Corollary, a judgment of acquittal may be assailed through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
on the ground that, inter alia, the MTCC had properly acquired jurisdiction over Criminal Case No.
Rules of Court showing that the lower court, in acquitting the accused, committed not merely reversible
45414. It is well-settled that violation of BP 22 cases is categorized as transitory or continuing crimes,
errors of judgment, but also exercised grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
which means that the acts material and essential thereto occur in one municipality or territory, while
jurisdiction, or a denial of due process, thereby rendering the assailed judgment null and void. If there is
some occur in another. Accordingly, the court wherein any of the crime's essential and material acts have
grave abuse of discretion, granting the aggrieved party's prayer is not tantamount to putting the accused
been committed maintains jurisdiction to try the case; it being understood that the first court taking
in double jeopardy,29 in violation of the general rule that the prosecution cannot appeal or bring error
cognizance of the same excludes the other. Stated differently, a person charged with a continuing or
proceedings from a judgment rendered in favor of the defendant in a criminal case. This is because a
transitory crime may be validly tried in any municipality or territory where the offense was in part
judgment of acquittal is immediately final and executory, and the prosecution is barred from appealing
committed. Applying these principles, a criminal case for violation of BP 22 may be tiled in any of the
lest the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy be violated. 30
places where any of its elements occurred - in particular, the place where the check is drawn, issued,
delivered, or dishonored.
Thus, it may be argued that since the instant petition is one for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, not under Rule 65, and was not filed by the OSG representing the interest of the
In this case, while it is undisputed that the subject check was drawn, issued, and delivered in
Republic, the same should be summarily dismissed. The unique and special circumstances attendants in
Manila, records reveal that Ylagan presented the same for deposit and encashment at the LBC
the instant petition, however, justify an adjudication by the Court on the merits and not solely on
Bank in Batangas City where she learned of its dishonor. As such, the MTCC [of Batangas City]
technical grounds.
correctly took cognizance of Criminal Case No. 45414 as It had the territorial jurisdiction to try
and resolve the same. In this light, the denial of the present petition remains warranted.23
First of all, the Court stresses that the appellate court's dismissal of the case is not an acquittal of
Guided by the foregoing pronouncements, there is no denying, therefore, that the court of the place where respondent. Basic is the rule that a dismissal of a case is different from an acquittal of the accused
the check was deposited or presented for encashment; can be vested with jurisdiction to try cases therein. Except in a dismissal based on a Demurrer to Evidence filed by the accused, or for violation of
involving violations of BP 22. Thus, the fact that the check subject of the instant case was drawn, issued, the right of the accused to a speedy trial, the dismissal of a criminal case against the accused will not
and delivered in Pampanga does not strip off the Makati MeTC of its jurisdiction over the instant case for result in his acquittal.31 In the oft-cited People v. Salico,32 the Court explained:
it is undisputed that the subject check was deposited and presented for encashment at the Makati Branch
This argument or reasoning is predicated on a confusion of the legal concepts of dismissal and
of Equitable PCI Bank. The MeTC of Makati, therefore, correctly took cognizance of the instant case and
acquittal. Acquittal is always based on the merits, that is, the defendant is acquitted because the
rendered its decision in the proper exercise of its jurisdiction.
evidence does not show that defendant's guilt is beyond a reasonable doubt; but dismissal does tint
decide the case on the merits or that the defendant is not guilty. Dismissal terminates the
It may be argued, however, that the instant petition ought to be dismissed outright due to certain
proceeding, either because the court is not a court of competent jurisdiction, or the evidence does
procedural infirmities. Section 35 (1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code
not show that the offense was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, or the
provides that the OSG shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and
complaint or information is not valid or sufficient in form and substance, etc. The only case in
which the word dismissal is commonly but not correctly used, instead of the proper term acquittal, is
when, after the prosecution has presented all its: evidence, the defendant moves for me dismissal and the
court dismisses the ease on the ground that the evidence tails to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant is guilty; for in such case the dismissal is in reality an acquittal because the case is decided on
the merits. If the prosecution fails to prove that the offense was committed within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court and the case is dismissed, the dismissal is not an acquittal, inasmuch as if it
were so the defendant could not be again prosecuted before the court of competent jurisdiction;
and it is elemental that in such case, the defendant may again be prosecuted for the same offense
before a court of competent jurisdiction.33
Thus, when the appellate court herein dismissed the instant case on the ground that the MeTC lacked
jurisdiction over the offense charged, it did not decide the same on the merits, let alone resolve the issue
of respondent's guilt or innocence based on the evidence proffered by the prosecution. 34 The appellate
court merely dismissed the case on the erroneous reasoning that none of the elements of BP 22 was
committed within the lower court's jurisdiction, and not because of any finding that the evidence failed to
show respondent's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Clearly, therefore, such dismissal did not operate as an
acquittal, which, as previously discussed, may be repudiated only by a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court, showing a grave abuse of discretion.
Thus, petitioner's resort to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court cannot be struck down as improper. In a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45, the parties raise only questions of law because the Court, in its
exercise of its power of review, is not a trier of facts. There is a question of law when the doubt or
difference arises as to what the law is on certain state of facts and which does not call for an existence of
the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties-litigants.35 In De Vera v. Spouses Santiago,
36
the Court categorically ruled that the issue of whether the appellate court erred in annulling the RTC
Decision for lack of jurisdiction is a question of law, to wit:
Undeniably, the issue whether the CA erred in annulling the RTC Decision for lack of jurisdiction
is a question of law. The resolution of such issue rests solely on what the law [B.P. Blg. 129, as
amended] provides on the given set of circumstances as alleged in petitioners' complaint for
reconveyance of ownership and possession with damages.37
In the instant case; the lone issue invoked by petitioner is precisely "whether the Court of Appeals erred
when it ruled that the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City did not have jurisdiction over the case
despite clear showing that the offense was committed within the jurisdiction of said court." Evidently,
therefore, the instant petition was filed within the bounds of our procedural rules for the issue herein rests
solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances insofar as the commission of the crime
of BP 22 is concerned. In criminal cases, the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the averments of
the complaint or Information, in relation to the law prevailing at the time of the filing of the complaint or
Information, and the penalty provided by law for the crime charged at the time of its commission. 38 Thus,
when a case involves a proper interpretation of the rules and jurisprudence with respect to the jurisdiction
of courts to entertain complaints filed therewith, it deals with a question of law that can be properly
brought to this Court under Rule 45.39
More importantly, moreover, since the dismissal of the instant case cannot be considered as an acquittal
of respondent herein, he cannot likewise claim that his constitutional right to protection against double
jeopardy will be violated. In Paulin v. Hon. Gimenez,40 the Court held:
Jurisprudence on double jeopardy as well as the exceptions thereto which finds application to the case at
bar has been laid down by this Court as follows:
. . . However, an appeal by the prosecution from the order of dismissal (of the criminal case) by the
trial court shall not constitute double jeopardy if (1) the dismissal is made upon motion, or with the
express consent of the defendant; (2) the dismissal is not an acquittal or based upon consideration
of the evidence or of the merits of the case; and (3) the question to be passed upon by the appellate
court is purely legal so that should the dismissal he found incorrect, the case would have to be
remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings, to determine the guilt or innocence of the
defendant.41
A cursory review of the records would readily reveal the presence of the foregoing requisites. First, as
early as the stage of respondent's appeal of the MeTC's decision to the RTC, respondent had already been
moving for the dismissal of the case alleging the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Accordingly, the CA's
dismissal on said ground can rightly be considered to have been with respondent's express
consent. Second, as earlier mentioned the dismissal herein is not an acquittal or based upon a
consideration of the merits. Third, the question raised in this case is based purely on a question of law. In
view therefore of the presence of all three requisites, the Court finds that petitioner's appeal of the
appellate court's dismissal cannot be barred by double jeopardy.
As to the issue of petitioner's legal standing to file the instant petition in the absence of the OSG's
participation, the circumstances herein warrant the Court's consideration. In Narciso v. Sta. Romana-
Cruz, 42 the Court gave due regard to the ends of substantial justice by giving due course to a petition
filed before it by the private offended party, viz.:
Citing the "ends of substantial justice," People v. Calo, however, provided an exception to the above
doctrines in this manner:
While the rule is, as held by the Court of Appeals, only the Solicitor General may bring or defend actions
on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, or represent the People or the State in criminal proceedings
pending in this Court and the Court of Appeals (Republic vs. Partisala, 118 SCRA 320 [1982]), the ends
of substantial justice would be better served, and the issues in this action could be determined in a
more just, speedy and inexpensive manner, by entertaining the petition at bar. As an offended
party in a criminal case, private petitioner has sufficient personality and a valid grievance against
Judge Adao's order granting bail to the alleged murderers of his (private petitioner's) father. Thus, when there exists meritorious grounds to overlook strict procedural matters, the Court cannot turn a
blind eye thereto lest the administration of justice be derailed by an overly stringent application of the
x x x x rules.45 Rules of procedure are meant to be tools to facilitate a fair and orderly conduct of proceedings.
Strict adherence thereto must not get in the way of achieving substantial justice. As long as their purpose
The ends of substantial justice indeed require the affirmation of the appellate court's ruling on this is sufficiently met and no violation of due process and fair play takes place, the rules should be liberally
point. Clearly, the assailed Order of Judge Santiago was issued in grave abuse of discretion construed.46 Dismissal of appeals purely on technical grounds is frowned upon where the policy of the
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. A void order is no order at all. It cannot confer any right or be the court is to encourage hearings of appeals on their merits and the rules of procedure ought not to be
source of any relief. This Court is not merely a court of law; it is likewise a court of justice. applied in a very rigid, technical sense; rules of procedure are used only to help secure, not override
substantial justice. It is a far better and more prudent course of action for the court to excuse a technical
To rule otherwise would leave the private respondent without any recourse to rectify the public lapse and afford the parties a review of the case on appeal to attain the ends of justice rather than dispose
injustice brought about by the trial court's Order, leaving her with only the standing to file of the case on technicality and cause a grave injustice to the parties, giving a false impression of speedy
administrative charges for ignorance of the law against the judge and the prosecutor. A party disposal of cases while actually resulting in more delay, if not a miscarriage of justice. 47
cannot be left without recourse to address a substantive issue in law. 43
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated January
In a similar manner, the Court finds that in the interest of substantial justice, it must give due course to
18, 2011 and Resolution dated August 9, 2011 of the Court Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 32723
the instant petition and consequently rule on the merits of the same. The circumstances surrounding this
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated February 23, 2009 and Order dated July 13,
case left petitioner with no other suitable recourse but to appeal the case herself. Not only was there an
2009, of the Regional Trial Court in Criminal Case Nos. 08-1876-77, which affirmed the Joint Decision
absence of support from the OSG, said government office also took a position in contrast to the rights
dated September 3, 2008 of the Metropolitan Trial Court in Criminal Case Nos. 337902-03 are
and interests of petitioner. Moreover, as discussed above, the arguments which ran counter to petitioner's
hereby REINSTATED.
interest as well as the grounds used to support them were simply inapplicable to the issue at hand. In fact,
these erroneous contentions were adopted by the appellate court in their entirety, dismissing the instant SO ORDERED.
case in a manner not in accord with law and applicable jurisprudence. For the Court, now, to apply
procedural rules in their strict and literal sense by similarly dismissing, as the CA had, petitioner's action
poses serious consequences tantamount to a miscarriage of justice. To rule that the accused can postpone
criminal prosecution and delay the administration of justice at petitioner's expense on the erroneous
ground of lack of jurisdiction would create a hazardous precedent and open loopholes in our criminal
justice system.44

Indeed, the unique and exceptional circumstances in the instant case demand that the Court forego a rigid
application of the technicalities under

the law so as to prevent petitioner from suffering a grave injustice. As disclosed by the records, petitioner
had already fulfilled her end of the agreement in giving respondent, as early as in the year 2003,
construction materials amounting to half a million pesos and yet up until now, she has not been paid
therefor. In feet, after having sufficiently proven to the satisfaction of both the MeTC and the RTC her
right allegedly violated by respondent, the CA simply dismissed, albeit without prejudice to the re-filing
of the case with the appropriate court, her action for the incorrect ground of wrong venue. On the
mistaken reasoning that the MeTC of Makati City did not have jurisdiction over the instant case, the CA,
without providing any legal or jurisprudential basis, would have petitioner start from the very beginning
and refile her complaint before the same court which already had jurisdiction in the first place.
G. R. No. 119178 June 20, 1997 "For the two cases the accused is ordered to pay the cost of suit.

LINA LIM LAO, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, "The cash bond put up by the accused for her provisional liberty in Criminal Case No. 84-26969 where
Respondents. she is declared acquitted is hereby ordered cancelled (sic).

DECISION "With reference to the accused Teodulo Asprec who has remained at large, in order that the cases as
against him may not remain pending in the docket for an indefinite period, let the same be archived
PANGANIBAN, J.: without prejudice to its subsequent prosecution as soon as said accused is finally apprehended.

May an employee who, as part of her regular duties, signs blank corporate checks with the name of the "Let a warrant issue for the arrest of the accused Teodulo Asprec which warrant need not be returned to
payee and the amount drawn to be filled later by another signatory and, therefore, does so without actual this Court until the accused is finally arrested.
knowledge of whether such checks are funded, be held criminally liable for violation of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22 [B. P. 22], when checks so signed are dishonored due to insufficiency of funds? Does a notice "SO ORDERED."
of dishonor sent to the main office of the corporation constitute a valid notice to the said employee who
holds office in a separate branch and who had no actual knowledge thereof? In other words, is The Facts
constructive knowledge of the corporation, but not of the signatory-employee, sufficient?
Version of the Prosecution
These are the questions raised in the petition filed on March 21, 1995 assailing the Decision [1] of
The facts are not disputed. We thus lift them from the assailed Decision, as follows:
Respondent Court of Appeals [2] promulgated on December 9, 1994 in CA-G. R. CR No. 14240
dismissing the appeal of petitioner and affirming the decision dated September 26, 1990 in Criminal Appellant [and now Petitioner Lina Lim Lao] was a junior officer of Premiere Investment House
Cases Nos. 84-26967 to 84-26969 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 33. The dispositive [Premiere] in its Binondo Branch. As such officer, she was authorized to sign checks for and in behalf of
portion of the said RTC decision affirmed by the respondent appellate court reads: [3] the corporation [TSN, August 16, 1990, p. 6]. In the course of the business, she met complainant Father
Artelijo Pelijo, the provincial treasurer of the Society of the Divine Word through Mrs. Rosemarie
"WHEREFORE, after a careful consideration of the evidence presented by the prosecution and that of the
Lachenal, a trader for Premiere. Father Palijo was authorized to invest donations to the society and had
defense, the Court renders judgment as follows:
been investing the society's money with Premiere [TSN, June 23, 1987, pp. 5, 9-10]. Father Palijo had
"In Criminal Case No. 84-26969 where no evidence was presented by the prosecution notwithstanding invested a total of P514,484.04, as evidenced by the Confirmation of Sale No. 82-6994 [Exh "A"] dated
the fact that there was an agreement that the cases be tried jointly and also the fact that the accused Lina July 8, 1993. Father Palijo was also issued Traders Royal Bank [TRB] checks in payment of interest, as
Lim Lao was already arraigned, for failure of the prosecution to adduce evidence against the accused, follows:
the Court hereby declares her innocent of the crime charged and she is hereby acquitted with cost de
Check Date Amount
oficio.
299961 Oct. 7, 1993 (sic) P 150,000.00 [Exh. "B"]
"For Criminal Case No. 84-26967, the Court finds the accused Lina Lim Lao guilty beyond reasonable
299962 Oct. 7, 1983 P 150,000.00 [Exh. "C"]
doubt of the crime charged and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of ONE (1) YEAR 323835 Oct. 7, 1983 P 26,010.73
imprisonment and to pay a fine of P150,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. All the checks were issued in favor of Artelijo A. Palijo and signed by appellant (herein petitioner) and
Teodulo Asprec, who was the head of operations. Further evidence of the transaction was the
acknowledgment of postdated checks dated July 8, 1983 [Exh. "D"] and the cash disbursement voucher
[Exh. "F", TSN, supra, at pp. 11-16].
For Criminal Case No. 84-26968, the Court finds the accused Lina Lim Lao guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of ONE (1) YEAR When Father Palijo presented the checks for encashment, the same were dishonored for the reason
imprisonment and to pay a fine of P150,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of of (sic) "Drawn Against Insufficient Funds" [DAIF]. Father Palijo immediately made demands on premiere to
insolvency. pay him the necessary amounts. He first went to the Binondo Branch but was referred to the Cubao Main
Branch where he was able to talk with the President, Mr. Cario. For his efforts, he was paid P5,000.00.
Since no other payments followed, Father Palijo wrote Premiere a formal letter of demand Subsequently,
Premiere was placed under receivership (TSN, supra, at pp. 16-19). [4]
Thereafter, on January 24, 1984, Private Complainant Palijo filed an affidavit-complaint against
Petitioner Lina Lim Lao and Teodulo Asprec for violation of B.P. 22. After preliminary investigation, [5]
three Informations charging Lao and Asprec with the offense defined in the first paragraph of Section 1,
B.P. 22 were filed by Assistant Fiscal Felix S. Caballes before the trial court on May 11, 1984, [6]
worded as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 84-26967:
That on or about October 7, 1983 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there
wilfully and unlawfully draw and issue to Artelijo A. Palijo to apply on account or for value a Traders
Royal Bank Check No. 299962 for P150,000.00 payable to Fr. Artelijo A. Palijo dated October 7, 1983
well knowing that at the time of issue he/she did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee
bank for full payment of the said check upon its presentment as in fact the said check, when presented
within ninety (90) days from the date thereof, was dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason:
"Insufficient Funds"; that despite notice of such dishonor, said accused failed to pay said Artelijo A.
Palijo the amount of the said check or to make arrangement for full payment of the same within five (5)
banking days from receipt of said notice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
2. In Criminal Case No. 84-26968:
That on or about October 7, 1983 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there
wilfully and unlawfully draw and issue to Artelijo A. Palijo to apply on account or for value a Traders
Royal Bank Check No. 299961 for P150,000.00 payable to Fr. Artelijo A. Palijo dated October 7, '83
well knowing that at the time of issue he/she did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee
bank for full payment of the said check upon its presentment as in fact the said check, when presented
within ninety (90) days from the date thereof, was dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason:
"Insufficient Funds"; that despite notice of such dishonor, said accused failed to pay said Artelijo A.
Palijo the amount of the said check or to make arrangement for full payment of the same within five (5)
banking days from receipt of said notice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
3. And finally in Criminal Case No. 84-26969:
That on or about July 8, 1983 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there
wilfully and unlawfully draw and issue to Artelijo A. Palijo to apply on account for value a Traders
Royal Bank Check No. 323835 for P26,010.03 payable to Fr. Artelijo A. Palijo dated October 7, 1983
well knowing that at the time of issue he/she did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee
bank for full payment of the said check upon its presentment as in fact the said check, when presented
within ninety (90) days from the date thereof, was dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason:
"Insufficient Funds"; that despite notice of such dishonor, said accused failed to pay said Artelijo A.
Palijo the amount of the said check or to make arrangement for full payment of the same within five (5)
banking days from receipt of said notice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon being arraigned, petitioner assisted by counsel pleaded "not guilty." Asprec was not arrested; he
has remained at large since the trial, and even now on appeal.
After due trial, the Regional Trial Court convicted Petitioner Lina Lim Lao in Criminal Cases Nos. 84-
26967 and 84-26968 but acquitted her in Criminal Case No. 84-26969. [7] On appeal, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Version of the Defense
Petitioner aptly summarized her version of the facts of the case thus:
Petitioner Lina Lim Lao was, in 1983, an employee of Premiere Financing Corporation [hereinafter
referred to as the "Corporation"], a corporation engaged in investment management, with principal
business office at Miami, Cubao, Quezon City. She was a junior officer at the corporation who was,
however, assigned not at its main branch but at the corporation's extension office in [Binondo] Manila.
[Ocampo, T S N, 16 August 1990, p. 14]
In the regular course of her duties as a junior officer, she was required to co-sign checks drawn against
the account of the corporation. The other co-signor was her head of office, Mr. Teodulo Asprec. Since
part of her duties required her to be mostly in the field and out of the office, it was normal procedure for
her to sign the checks in blank, that is, without the names of the payees, the amounts and the dates of
maturity. It was likewise Mr. Asprec, as head of office, who alone decided to whom the checks were to
be ultimately issued and delivered. [Lao, TSN, 28 September 1989, pp. 9-11, 17, 19].
In signing the checks as part of her duties as junior officer of the corporation, petitioner had no
knowledge of the actual funds available in the corporate account. [Lao, TSN, 28 September 1989, p. 21].
The power, duty and responsibility of monitoring and assessing the balances against the checks issued,
and funding the checks thus issued, devolved on the corporation's Treasury Department in its main office
in Cubao, Quezon City, headed then by the Treasurer, Ms. Veronilyn Ocampo. (Ocampo, T SN, 19 July
1990, p. 4; Lao, TSN, 28 September 1989, pp. 21-23) All bank statements regarding the corporate
checking account were likewise sent to the main branch in Cubao, Quezon City, and not in Binondo,
Manila, where petitioner was holding office. (Ocampo, TSN, 19 July 1990, p. 24; Marqueses, TSN, 22
November 1988, p. 8).
The foregoing circumstances attended the issuance of the checks subject of the instant prosecution.
The checks were issued to guarantee payment of investments placed by private complainant Palijo with
Premiere Financing Corporation. In his transactions with the corporation, private complainant dealt
exclusively with one Rosemarie Lachenal, a trader connected with the corporation, and he never knew
nor in any way dealt with petitioner Lina Lim Lao at any time before or during the issuance of the
delivery of the checks. (Palijo, TSN, 23 June 1987, pp. 28-29, 32-34; Lao, TSN, 15 May 1990, p. 6;
Ocampo, TSN, p. 5) Petitioner Lina Lim Lao was not in any way involved in the transaction which led to
the issuance of the checks.
When the checks were co-signed by petitioner, they were signed in advance and in blank, delivered to the
Head of Operations, Mr. Teodulo Asprec, who subsequently filled in the names of the payee, the
amounts and the corresponding dates of maturity. After Mr. Asprec signed the checks, they were
delivered to private complainant Palijo. (Lao, TSN, 28 September 1989, pp. 8-11, 17, 19; note also that
the trial court in its decision fully accepted the testimony of petitioner [Decision of the Regional Trial
Court, p. 12], and that the Court of Appeals affirmed said decision in toto)
Petitioner Lina Lim Lao was not in any way involved in the completion, and the subsequent delivery of
the check to private complainant Palijo. At the time petitioner signed the checks, she had no knowledge
of the sufficiency or insufficiency of the funds of the corporate account. (Lao, TSN, 28 September 1989,
p. 21). It was not within her powers, duties or responsibilities to monitor and assess the balances against
the issuance; much less was it within her (duties and responsibilities) to make sure that the checks were
funded. Premiere Financing Corporation had a Treasury Department headed by a Treasurer, Ms.
Veronilyn Ocampo, which alone had access to information as to account balances and which alone was
responsible for funding the issued checks. (Ocampo, TSN, 19 July 1990, p. 4; Lao, TSN, 28 September
1990, p. 23) All statements of account were sent to the Treasury Department located at the main office in
Cubao, Quezon City. Petitioner was holding office at the extension in Binondo Manila. (Lao, TSN, 28
September 1989, p. 24-25) Petitioner Lina Lim Lao did not have knowledge of the insufficiency of the
funds in the corporate account against which the checks were drawn.
When the checks were subsequently dishonored, private complainant sent a notice of said dishonor to
Premier Financing Corporation at its head office in Cubao, Quezon City. (Please refer to Exh. "E";
Palijo, TSN, 23 June 1987, p. 51) Private complainant did not send notice of dishonor to petitioner.
(Palijo, TSN, 24 July 1987, p. 10) He did not follow up his investment with petitioner. (Id.) Private
complainant never contacted, never informed, and never talked with, petitioner after the checks had
bounced. (Id., at p. 29) Petitioner never had notice of the dishonor of the checks subject of the instant
prosecution.
The Treasurer of Premiere Financing Corporation, Ms. Veronilyn Ocampo testified that it was the head
office in Cubao, Quezon City, which received notice of dishonor of the bounced checks. (Ocampo, TSN,
19 July 1990 pp. 7-8) The dishonor of the check came in the wake of the assassination of the late Sen.
Benigno Aquino, as a consequence of which event a majority of the corporation's clients pre-terminated
their investments. A period of extreme illiquidity and financial distress followed, which ultimately led to
the corporation's being placed under receivership by the Securities and Exchange Commission. (Ocampo,
TSN, 16 August 1990, p. 8, 19; Lao, TSN, 28 September 1989, pp. 25-26; Please refer also to Exhibit
"1", the order of receivership issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission) Despite the Treasury
Department's and (Ms. Ocampo's) knowledge of the dishonor of the checks, however, the main office in
Cubao, Quezon City never informed petitioner Lina Lim Lao or anybody in the Binondo office for that
matter. (Ocampo, TSN, 16 August 1990, pp. 9-10) In her testimony, she justified her omission by saying
that the checks were actually the responsibility of the main office (Ocampo, TSN, 19 July 1990, p. 6) and
that, at that time of panic withdrawals and massive pre-termination of clients' investments, it was futile to
inform the Binondo office since the main office was strapped for cash and in deep financial distress. (Id.,
at pp. 7-9) Moreover, the confusion which came in the wake of the Aquino assassination and the
consequent panic withdrawals caused them to lose direct communication with the Binondo office.
(Ocampo, TSN, 16 August 1990, p. 9-10)
As a result of the financial crisis and distress, the Securities and Exchange Commission placed Premier
Financing Corporation under receivership, appointing a rehabilitation receiver for the purpose of settling
claims against the corporation. (Exh. "1") As he himself admits, private complainant filed a claim for the
payment of the bounced check before and even after the corporation had been placed under receivership.
(Palijo, TSN, 24 July 1987, p. 10-17) A check was prepared by the receiver in favor of the private
complainant but the same was not claimed by him. (Lao, TSN, 15 May 1990, p. 18)
Private complainant then filed the instant criminal action. On 26 September 1990, the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 33, rendered a decision convicting petitioner, and sentencing the latter to suffer
the aggregate penalty of two (2) years and to pay a fine in the total amount of P300,000.00. On appeal,
the Court of Appeals affirmed said decision. Hence, this petition for review. [8]
The Issue
In the main, petitioner contends that the public respondent committed a reversible error in concluding
that lack of actual knowledge of insufficiency of funds was not a defense in a prosecution for violation of
B.P. 22. Additionally, the petitioner argues that the notice of dishonor sent to the main office of the
corporation, and not to petitioner herself who holds office in that corporation's branch office, does not
constitute the notice mandated in Section 2 of BP 22; thus, there can be no prima facie presumption that
she had knowledge of the insufficiency of funds.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
Strict Interpretation of Penal Statutes
It is well-settled in this jurisdiction that penal statutes are strictly construed against the state and liberally
for the accused, so much so that the scope of a penal statute cannot be extended by good intention,
implication, or even equity consideration. Thus, for Petitioner Lina Lim Lao's acts to be penalized under
the Bouncing Checks Law or B.P. 22, "they must come clearly within both the spirit and the letter of the
statute." [9]
The salient portions of B.P. 22 read:
"Sec. 1. Checks without sufficient funds. Any person who makes or draws and issues any check to apply
on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit
with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check is
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been
dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop
payment, shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not more than one (1) year or
by a fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of the check which fine shall in no case
exceed Two hundred thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court.
"The same penalty shall be imposed upon any person who having sufficient funds in or credit with the
drawee bank when he makes or draws and issues a check, shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to
maintain a credit or to cover the full amount of the check if presented within a period of ninety (90) days
from the date appearing thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank.
Where the check is drawn by a corporation, company or entity, the person or persons who actually signed
the check in behalf of such drawer shall be liable under this Act.
"Sec. 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. The making, drawing and issuance of a check
payment of which is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank,
when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of
knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof
the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check within
five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee."
This Court listed the elements of the offense penalized under B.P. 22, as follows: "(1) the making,
drawing and issuance of any check to apply to account or for value; (2) the knowledge of the maker,
drawer or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee
bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and (3) subsequent dishonor of the
check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the
drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment." [10]
Justice Luis B. Reyes, an eminent authority in criminal law, also enumerated the elements of the offense
defined in the first paragraph of Section 1 of B.P. 22, thus:
1. That a person makes or draws and issues any check.
2. That the check is made or drawn and issued to apply on account or for value.
3. That the person who makes or draws and issues the check knows at the time of issue that he does not
have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its
presentment.
4. That the check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit, or
would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered
the bank to stop payment. [11]
Crux of the Petition
Petitioner raised as defense before the Court of Appeals her lack of actual knowledge of the insufficiency
of funds at the time of the issuance of the checks, and lack of personal notice of dishonor to her. The
respondent appellate court, however, affirmed the RTC decision, reasoning that "the maker's knowledge
of the insufficiency of funds is legally presumed from the dishonor of his checks for insufficiency of
funds. (People vs. Laggui, 171 SCRA 305; Nieras vs. Hon. Auxencio C. Dacuycuy, 181 SCRA 1)" [12]
The Court of Appeals also stated that "her alleged lack of knowledge or intent to issue a bum check
would not exculpate her from any responsibility under B.P. Blg. 22, since the act of making and issuing a
worthless check is a malum prohibitum." [13] In the words of the Solicitor General, "(s)uch alleged lack
of knowledge is not material for petitioner's liability under B.P. Blg. 22." [14]
Lack of Actual Knowledge of Insufficiency of Funds
Knowledge of insufficiency of funds or credit in the drawee bank forthe payment of a check upon its
presentment is an essential element of the offense. [15] There is a prima facie presumption of the
existence of this element from the fact of drawing, issuing or making a check, the payment of which was
subsequently refused for insufficiency of funds. It is important to stress, however, that this is not a
conclusive presumption that forecloses or precludes the presentation of evidence to the contrary.
In the present case, the fact alone that petitioner was a signatory to the checks that were subsequently
dishonored merely engenders the prima facie presumption that she knew of the insufficiency of funds,
but it does not render her automatically guilty under B.P. 22. The prosecution has a duty to prove all the
elements of the crime, including the acts that give rise to the prima facie presumption; petitioner, on the
other hand, has a right to rebut the prima facie presumption. [16] Therefore, if such knowledge of
insufficiency of funds is proven to be actually absent or non-existent, the accused should not be held That is quiet (sic) unusual. That is why I am asking that last question if that is a practice of your office.
liable for the offense defined under the first paragraph of Section 1 of B.P. 22. Although the offense "A. As a co-signer, I sign first, sir.
charged is a malum prohibitum, the prosecution is not thereby excused from its responsibility of proving "Q. So the check cannot be encashed without your signature, co-signature?
beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of the offense, one of which is knowledge of the insufficiency "A. Yes, sir.
of funds. "Atty. Gonzales
(to witness)
After a thorough review of the case at bar, the Court finds that Petitioner Lina Lim Lao did not have "Q. Now, you said that you sign first, after you sign, who signs the check?
actual knowledge of the insufficiency of funds in the corporate accounts at the time she affixed her "A. Mr. Teodoro Asprec, sir.
signature to the checks involved in this case, at the time the same were issued, and even at the time the "Q. Is this Teodoro Asprec the same Teodoro Asprec, one of the accused in all these cases?
checks were subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank. "A. Yes, sir.
"Q. Now, in the distribution or issuance of checks which according to you, as a co-signee, you sign. Who
The scope of petitioner's duties and responsibilities did not encompass the funding of the corporation's
determines to whom to issue or to whom to pay the check after Teodoro Asprec signs the check?
checks; her duties were limited to the marketing department of the Binondo branch. [17] Under the
"Witness
organizational structure of Premiere Financing Corporation, funding of checks was the sole responsibility
A. He is the one.
of the Treasury Department. Veronilyn Ocampo, former Treasurer of Premiere, testified thus:
"Atty. Gonzales
"Q. Will you please tell us whose (sic) responsible for the funding of checks in Premiere? "Q. Mr. Asprec is the one in-charge in.are you telling the Honorable Court that it was Teodoro Asprec
who determines to whom to issue the check? Does he do that all the time?
"A. The one in charge is the Treasury Division up to the Treasury Disbursement and then they give it "Court
directly to Jose Cabacan, President of Premiere." [18] "Q. Does he all the time?

Furthermore, the Regional Trial Court itself found that, since Petitioner Lina Lim Lao was often out in "(to witness)
the field taking charge of the marketing department of the Binondo branch, she signed the checks in "A. Yes, Your Honor.
blank as to name of the payee and the amount to be drawn, and without knowledge of the transaction for "Q. So the check can be negotiated? So, the check can be good only upon his signing? Without his
which they were issued. [19] As a matter of company practice, her signature was required in addition to signing or signature the check cannot be good?
that of Teodulo Asprec, who alone placed the name of the payee and the amount to be drawn thereon. "A. Yes, Your Honor.
This is clear from her testimony: "Atty. Gonzales
(to witness)
"Q. Will you please or will you be able to tell us the condition of this check when you signed this or "Q. You made reference to a transaction which according to you, you signed this check in order to
when you first saw this check? facilitate the transaction.I withdraw that question. I will reform.
Witness "COURT
"A. I signed the check in blank. There were no payee. No amount, no date, sir. "(for clarification to witness)
"Q. Why did you sign this check in blank when there was no payee, no amount and no date? "Witness may answer.
"A. It is in order to facilitate the transaction, sir. "Q. Only to facilitate your business transaction, so you signed the other checks?
"xxx xxx xxx "Witness
"COURT "A. Yes, Your Honor.
(to witness) "Q. So that when ever there is a transaction all is needed.all that is needed is for the other co-signee to
"Q. Is that your practice? sign?
Witness "A. Yes, Your Honor.
"A. Procedure, Your Honor. "COURT
"COURT (To counsel)
"Proceed. Since Petitioner Lina Lim Lao signed the checks without knowledge of the insufficiency of funds,
"Atty. Gonzales knowledge she was not expected or obliged to possess under the organizational structure of the
(to witness) corporation, she may not be held liable under B.P. 22. For in the final analysis, penal statutes such as
"Q. Why is it necessary for you to sign? B.P. 22 "must be construed with such strictness as to carefully safeguard the rights of the defendant."
"A. Because most of the time I am out in the field in the afternoon, so, in order to facilitate the [22] The element of knowledge of insufficiency of funds having been proven to be absent, petitioner is
transaction I sign so if I am not around they can issue the check." [20] therefore entitled to an acquittal.
Petitioner did not have any knowledge either of the identity of the payee or the transaction which gave
rise to the issuance of the checks. It was her co-signatory, Teodulo Asprec, who alone filled in the This position finds support in Dingle vs. Intermediate Appellate Court [23] where we stressed that
blanks, completed and issued the checks. That Petitioner Lina Lim Lao did not have any knowledge or knowledge of insufficiency of funds at the time of the issuance of the check was an essential requisite for
connection with the checks' payee, Artelijo Palijo, is clearly evident even from the latter's testimony, viz.: the offense penalized under B.P. 22. In that case, the spouses Paz and Nestor Dingle owned a family
"ATTY. GONZALES: business known as "PMD Enterprises." Nestor transacted the sale of 400 tons of silica sand to the buyer
"Q. When did you come to know the accused Lina Lim Lao? Ernesto Ang who paid for the same. Nestor failed to deliver. Thus, he issued to Ernesto two checks,
"A. I cannot remember the exact date because in their office Binondo, signed by him and his wife as authorized signatories for PMD Enterprises, to represent the value of the
"COURT: (before witness could finish) undelivered silica sand. These checks were dishonored for having been "drawn against insufficient
"Q. More or less? funds." Nestor thereafter issued to Ernesto another check, signed by him and his wife Paz, which was
"A. It must have been late 1983. likewise subsequently dishonored. No payment was ever made; hence, the spouses were charged with a
"ATTY. GONZALES: violation of B.P. 22 before the trial court which found them both guilty. Paz appealed the judgment to the
"Q. And that must or that was after the transactions involving alleged checks marked in evidence as then Intermediate Appellate Court which modified the same by reducing the penalty of imprisonment to
Exhibits B and C? thirty days. Not satisfied, Paz filed an appeal to this Court "insisting on her innocence" and "contending
"A. After the transactions. that she did not incur any criminal liability under B.P. 22 because she had no knowledge of the dishonor
"Q. And that was also before the transaction involving that confirmation of sale marked in evidence as of the checks issued by her husband and, for that matter, even the transaction of her husband with Ang."
Exhibit A?
The Court ruled in Dingle as follows:
"A. It was also.
"Q. And so you came to know the accused Lina Lim Lao when all those transactions were already The Solicitor General in his Memorandum recommended that petitioner be acquitted of the instant charge
consummated? because from the testimony of the sole prosecution witness Ernesto Ang, it was established that he dealt
"A. Yes, sir. exclusively with Nestor Dingle. Nowhere in his testimony is the name of Paz Dingle ever mentioned in
"Q. And there has never been any occasion where you transacted with accused Lina Lim Lao, is that connection with the transaction and with the issuance of the check. In fact, Ang categorically stated that
correct? it was Nestor Dingle who received his two (2) letters of demand. This lends credence to the testimony of
"A. None, sir, there was no occasion. Paz Dingle that she signed the questioned checks in blank together with her husband without any
"Q. And your coming to know Lina Lim Lao the accused in these cases was by chance when you knowledge of its issuance, much less of the transaction and the fact of dishonor.
happened to drop by in the office at Binondo of the Premier Finance Corporation, is that what you mean?
"A. Yes, sir. In the case of Florentino Lozano vs. Hon. Martinez, promulgated December 18, 1986, it was held that an
"Q. You indicated to the Court that you were introduced to the accused Lina Lim Lao, is that correct? essential element of the offense is knowledge on the part of the maker or drawer of the check of the
"A. I was introduced. insufficiency of his funds.
"xxx xxx xxx
"Q. After that plain introduction there was nothing which transpired between you and the accused Lina WHEREFORE, on reasonable doubt, the assailed decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court (now the
Lim Lao? Court of Appeals) is hereby SET ASIDE and a new one is hereby rendered ACQUITTING petitioner on
"A. There was none." [21] reasonable doubt. [24]
In rejecting the defense of herein petitioner and ruling that knowledge of the insufficiency of funds is
legally presumed from the dishonor of the checks for insufficiency of funds, Respondent Court of
Appeals cited People vs. Laggui [25] and Nierras vs. Dacuycuy. [26] These, however, are inapplicable
here. The accused in both cases issued personal not corporate checks and did not aver lack of
knowledge of insufficiency of funds or absence of personal notice of the check's dishonor. Furthermore,
in People vs. Laggui [27] the Court ruled mainly on the adequacy of an information which alleged lack of
knowledge of insufficiency of funds at the time the check was issued and not at the time of its
presentment. On the other hand, the Court in Nierras vs. Dacuycuy [28] held mainly that an accused may
be charged under B.P. 22 and Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code for the same act of issuing a
bouncing check.
The statement in the two cases that mere issuance of a dishonored check gives rise to the presumption of
knowledge on the part of the drawer that he issued the same without funds does not support the CA
Decision. As observed earlier, there is here only a prima facie presumption which does not preclude the
presentation of contrary evidence. On the contrary, People vs. Laggui clearly spells out as an element of
the offense the fact that the drawer must have knowledge of the insufficiency of funds in, or of credit
with, the drawee bank for the payment of the same in full on presentment; hence, it even supports the
petitioner's position.
Lack of Adequate Notice of Dishonor
There is another equally cogent reason for the acquittal of the accused. There can be no prima facie
evidence of knowledge of insufficiency of funds in the instant case because no notice of dishonor was
actually sent to or received by the petitioner. The notice of dishonor may be sent by the offended party
or the drawee bank. The trial court itself found absent a personal notice of dishonor to Petitioner Lina
Lim Lao by the drawee bank based on the unrebutted testimony of Ocampo "(t)hat the checks bounced
when presented with the drawee bank but she did not inform anymore the Binondo branch and Lina Lim
Lao as there was no need to inform them as the corporation was in distress." [29] The Court of Appeals
affirmed this factual finding. Pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence, this finding is binding on this Court.
[30]
Indeed, this factual matter is borne by the records. The records show that the notice of dishonor was
addressed to Premiere Financing Corporation and sent to its main office in Cubao, Quezon City.
Furthermore, the same had not been transmitted to Premiere's Binondo Office where petitioner had been
holding office. Likewise no notice of dishonor from the offended party was actually sent to or received
by Petitioner Lao. Her testimony on this point is as follows:
"Atty. Gonzales
"Q. Will you please tell us if Father Artelejo Palejo (sic) ever notified you of the bouncing of the check
or the two (2) checks marked as Exhibit "B" or "C" for the prosecution?
"Witness
"A. No, sir.
"Q. What do you mean no, sir?
"A. I was never given a notice. I was never given notice from Father Palejo (sic).
"COURT
(to witness)
"Q. Notice of what?
"A. Of the bouncing check, Your Honor." [31]
Because no notice of dishonor was actually sent to and received by the petitioner, the prima facie
presumption that she knew about the insufficiency of funds cannot apply. Section 2 of B.P. 22 clearly
provides that this presumption arises not from the mere fact of drawing, making and issuing a bum
check; there must also be a showing that, within five banking days from receipt of the notice of dishonor,
such maker or drawer failed to pay the holder of the check the amount due thereon or to make
arrangement for its payment in full by the drawee of such check.
It has been observed that the State, under this statute, actually offers the violator "a compromise by
allowing him to perform some act which operates to preempt the criminal action, and if he opts to
perform it the action is abated." This was also compared "to certain laws [32] allowing illegal possessors
of firearms a certain period of time to surrender the illegally possessed firearms to the Government,
without incurring any criminal liability." [33] In this light, the full payment of the amount appearing in
the check within five banking days from notice of dishonor is a "complete defense." [34] The absence of
a notice of dishonor necessarily deprives an accused an opportunity to preclude a criminal prosecution.
Accordingly, procedural due process clearly enjoins that a notice of dishonor be actually served on
petitioner. Petitioner has a right to demand and the basic postulates of fairness require that the notice of
dishonor be actually sent to and received by her to afford her the opportunity to avert prosecution under
B.P. 22.
In this light, the postulate of Respondent Court of Appeals that "(d)emand on the Corporation constitutes
demand on appellant (herein petitioner)," [35] is erroneous. Premiere has no obligation to forward the
notice addressed to it to the employee concerned, especially because the corporation itself incurs no
criminal liability under B.P. 22 for the issuance of a bouncing check. Responsibility under B.P. 22 is
personal to the accused; hence, personal knowledge of the notice of dishonor is necessary. Consequently,
constructive notice to the corporation is not enough to satisfy due process. Moreover, it is petitioner, as
an officer of the corporation, who is the latter's agent for purposes of receiving notices and other
documents, and not the other way around. It is but axiomatic that notice to the corporation, which has a
personality distinct and separate from the petitioner, does not constitute notice to the latter.
Epilogue

In granting this appeal, the Court is not unaware of B.P. 22's intent to inculcate public respect for and
trust in checks which, although not legal tender, are deemed convenient substitutes for currency. B.P. 22
was intended by the legislature to enhance commercial and financial transactions in the Philippines by
penalizing makers and issuers of worthless checks. The public interest behind B.P. 22 is thus clearly
palpable from its intended purpose. [36]

At the same time, this Court deeply cherishes and is in fact bound by duty to protect our people's
constitutional rights to due process and to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proven. [37] These
rights must be read into any interpretation and application of B.P. 22. Verily, the public policy to uphold
civil liberties embodied in the Bill of Rights necessarily outweighs the public policy to build confidence
in the issuance of checks. The first is a basic human right while the second is only proprietary in nature.
[38] Important to remember also is B.P. 22's requirements that the check issuer must know "at the time of
issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank" and that he must receive
"notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee." Hence, B.P. 22 must not be applied in a
manner which contravenes an accused's constitutional and statutory rights.

There is also a social justice dimension in this case. Lina Lim Lao is only a minor employee who had
nothing to do with the issuance, funding and delivery of checks. Why she was required by her employer
to countersign checks escapes us. Her signature is completely unnecessary for it serves no fathomable
purpose at all in protecting the employer from unauthorized disbursements. Because of the pendency of
this case, Lina Lim Lao stood in jeopardy for over a decade of losing her liberty and suffering the
wrenching pain and loneliness of imprisonment, not to mention the stigma of prosecution on her career
and family life as a young mother, as well as the expenses, effort and aches in defending her innocence.
Upon the other hand, the senior official Teodulo Asprec who appears responsible for the issuance,
funding and delivery of the worthless checks has escaped criminal prosecution simply because he could
not be located by the authorities. The case against him has been archived while the awesome prosecutory
might of the government and the knuckled ire of the private complainant were all focused on poor
petitioner. Thus, this Court exhorts the prosecutors and the police authorities concerned to exert their best
to arrest and prosecute Asprec so that justice in its pristine essence can be achieved in all fairness to the
complainant, Fr. Artelijo Palijo, and the People of the Philippines. By this Decision, the Court enjoins the
Secretary of Justice and the Secretary of Interior and Local Government to see that essential justice is
done and the real culprit[s] duly-prosecuted and punished.

WHEREFORE, the questioned Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the Regional Trial
Court, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Lina Lim Lao is ACQUITTED. The Clerk of
Court is hereby ORDERED to furnish the Secretary of Justice and the Secretary of Interior and Local
Government with copies of this Decision. No costs.

SO ORDERED.