Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-35156 November 20, 1981

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
FLORO RODIL defendant-appellant.

MAKASIAR, J.:

Accused Floro Rodil was found guilty, beyond reasonable doubt, of the crime of murder by the Circuit Criminal Court of
Pasig, Rizal, for the death of Lt. Guillermo Masana of the Philippine Constabulary. Accordingly, he was sentenced to
death, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P12,000.00, to pay the amount of P10,000.00 as moral
damages and another P10,000.00 as exemplary damages, and to pay the costs.

The information alleges:

That on or about April 24, 1971, in the Municipality of Indang, Province of Cavite, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a double-bladed dagger,
with evident premeditation and treachery, and with intent to kill, did, then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously, attack and stab PC Lt. Guillermo Masana while the latter was in the
performance of his official duties, inflicting upon him stab wounds on the different parts of his body
which directly caused his death.

Contrary to law

From the evidence adduced by the prosecution, We glean the following facts:

At about 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon of April 24, 1971, the deceased, PC Lt. Guillermo Masana together with PC soldier
Virgilio Fidel, Philippine Coast Guard serviceman Ricardo Ligsa and Patrolman Felix Mojica of Indang, Cavite, was
having lunch inside a restaurant in front of the Indang market (pp. 2,3, t.s.n., Oct. 30, 1971; pp. 10, 19, t.s.n., Nov. 22, 1971;
p. 21, t.s.n., Jan. 20, 1972). While they were eating, they saw, through the glass panel of the restaurant, appellant outside
the restaurant blowing his whistle. Their attention having been drawn to what appellant was doing, Lt. Masana then in
civilian clothing, accompanied by PC soldier Virgilio Fidel, went out of the restaurant, approached appellant and asked
the latter, after Identifying himself as a PC officer, whether the gun that was tucked in his waist had a license. Instead of
answering the question of Lt. Masana appellant moved one step backward and attempted to draw his gun. PC soldier
Virgilio Fidel immediately grabbed appellant's gun from appellant's waist and gave it to Lt. Masana After that, Lt.
Masana told the appellant to go inside the restaurant. PC soldier Virgilio Fidel followed. Lt. Masana and the appellant
occupied a separate table about one and one-half (1 1/2) meters from the table of Lt. Masana's three companions Fidel,
Ligsa and Mojica (p. 10, t.s.n., Nov. 22, 1971). After the two were already seated, Lt. Masana placed appellant's gun on the
table. After that Lt. Masana pulled out a piece of coupon bond paper from his pocket and wrote thereon the receipt for the
gun, and after signing it, he asked appellant to countersign the same, but appellant refused to do so. Instead, he asked Lt.
Masana to return the gun to him. Lt. Masana rejected appellant's plea, telling, the latter that they would talk the matter
over in the municipal building of Indang, Cavite. When Lt. Masana was about to stand up, appellant suddenly pulled out
a double-bladed dagger and with it he stabbed Lt. Masana several times, on the chest and stomach causing his death
several hours thereafter (pp. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, t.s.n., Oct. 30, 1971; pp. 10, 11, 12, t.s.n., Nov. 22, 1971).

1
While the stabbing incident was taking place, the three companions of Lt. Masana PC soldier Virgilio Fidel, Coast
Guard Ricardo Ligsa and policeman Felix Mojica who were all seated at a separate table about one and one-half (1 1/2)
meters away from that occupied by the accused and Lt. Masana stood up to assist Lt. Masana but Chief of Police Primo
Panaligan of Indang, Cavite, who happened to be taking his lunch in the same restaurant, was quicker than any of them
in going near the combatants and embraced and/or grabbed the accused from behind, and thereafter wrested the dagger
from the accused-appellant. Immediately thereafter, the Chief of Police brought the accused to the municipal building of
Indang, Cavite (p. 8, t.s.n., Oct. 30, 1971; pp. 19-20, t.s.n., Nov. 22, 1971; pp. 26, 28, t.s.n., Jan. 20, 1972), while the
companions of Lt. Masana brought the latter to the V. Luna Hospital in Quezon City where he expired several hours later
as a result of the stab wounds inflicted by the accused (pp. 21, 22, t.s.n., Nov. 22, 1971). Dr. Felicisimo del Rosario, Medico-
Legal Officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, conducted an autopsy of the cadaver of Lt. Masana and made the
following findings, which are embodied in his Report, Exhibits "D" and "D-1 " (pp. 88-89, rec.), and which reads as
follows:

Postmortem findings.

General:

Fairly developed and nourished male subject in rigor mortis with postmortem lividity over the
dependent portions of the body. Pupils are dilated. Finger and toe tips are pale. There is an exploratory
laparotomy incision at the abdomen, measuring 21 cm. long, 3 cm. left of the anterior midline, with
eighteen (18) stitches applied. There are surgical incisions at the left and right abdomen, measuring 2 cm.
long, 9 cm. from the anterior midline and 2 cm. long, 6.5 cm. from the anterior midline with two (2)
stitches applied and a rubber drain sticking out of each, respectively.

TRUNK:

(1) Stab wound, left chest, measuring 0.9 by 0.4 cm., 5 cm. from the anterior midline, 128 cm. above the
heel, 1 cm. deep, directed posterior wards and slightly upwards, passing superficially between muscles
and tissues.

(2) Stab wound, left chest, measuring 1.2 by 0.4 cm., 9 cm. from the anterior midline, 121 cm. above the
heel, 5.5. cm. deep, directed posterior wards, downwards and to the left, lacerating the muscles at the 4th
intercostal space.

(3) Stab wound, abdomen, measuring 0.9 by 0.2 cm. just left of the anterior midline, 96 cm. above the heel
11 cm. deep, directed posterior wards, upwards and to the left, perforating the greater curvature of the
stomach and the gastric vessels, grazing the liver, perforating the diaphragm and infero-medial border of
the lower lobe of the right lung.

(4) Impact abrasion, right scapular region, measuring 2 by 0.2 cm., 12 cm. from the posterior midline, 127
cm. above the heel.

UPPER EXTREMITIES:

(5) Incised wound, anterior aspect of the distal third of the left arm, measuring 3 by 0.5 cm., just medial to
its anterior midline.

(6) Incised wound, posterior aspect of the proximal phalange of the right index finger, measuring 1 by 0.2
cm., just medial to its posterior midline.

Five hundred (500) cc. blood and blood clots accumulated in the thoracic cavity.

There are four (4) sutures applied at a lacerated wound at the greater curvature of the stomach.

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 There is nothing remarkable in the unaffected organs internally.

REMARKS:

Cause of death is cardio-respiratory arrest due to severe shock and intrathoracic hemorrhage as a result
of multiple stab wounds of the body, perforating the stomach, gastric vessels, liver, diaphragm and lower
lobe of the right lung.

Claiming self-defense, the accused, on the other hand, maintains and relies on the following facts:

At about 1: 00 o'clock in the afternoon of April 24, 1971, the accused and his wife were in a restaurant near the market
place of Indang, Cavite, in order to take their lunch. They had just come from Mandaluyong, Rizal where they reside (pp.
21, 22, t.s.n., Dec. 10, 1971). Inside the restaurant, the accused saw three persons to his right, eating, while to his left he
saw a person whom he later learned to be Lt. Guillermo Masana drinking beer alone. While the accused and his wife were
waiting for the food to be served, Lt. Masana approached him and asked him whether he was Floro Rodil and whether he
was a member of the Anti- Smuggling Unit. After receiving an affirmative answer, Lt. Masana invited the accused to join
him in his table. The accused accepted the invitation so the two moved over to the officer's table where the deceased
offered beer to the accused who, however, refused saying he was still hungry. In the course of their conversation, Lt.
Masana told the accused not to report any matter about smuggling to the PC. The accused informed the officer that he
had not reported any smuggling activity to the authorities. Lt. Masana then asked the accused for his identification card
as a member of the Anti-Smuggling Unit, which the latter did by showing his ID card, Exhibit " 1 ", bearing his picture
and indicating that he was an officer of the Anti-Communist League of the Philippines (pp. 62-68, t.s.n., Dec. 7, 1971).

Thereupon, Lt. Masana told the accused that the latter's ID was fake, and after the accused insisted that it was genuine, Lt.
Masana tried to take it away from the accused when the latter was about to put it back in his pocket. Because of his refusal
to give his Id card to Lt. Masana the latter got mad and, in an angry tone of voice, demanded: "Will you give it to me or
not?" (P. 7 1, Ibid). Still the accused refused to surrender his ID to Lt. Masana Thereupon, the latter pulled a gun from his
waist and hit the accused on the head with its handle two (2) time Immediately, blood gushed from his head and face.
When Lt. Masana was about to hit the accused for the third time, the latter parried the right hand of the officer, pulled his
"pangsaksak" and stabbed the officer two or three times and then pushed him away from him and ran out of the
restaurant (pp. 74,75,79, Ibid).

The accused went in the direction of the municipal building of Indang, Cavite, where he intended to surrender to the
authorities. But on his way, he met Primo Panaligan, the Chief of Police of Indang, Cavite. The Chief of Police asked him
why his head and face were bloody and he answered that he was hit by Lt. Masana on the head with a gun (pp. 86, 89,
t.s.n., Ibid). If here upon, the Chief of Police asked somebody to accompany the accused to the municipal building.
Arriving there, one Victor, a policeman of Indang, Cavite, accompanied him to Dr. Ruben Ochoa, whose clinic was just
across the street where the municipal building is located (p. 9, t.s.n., Ibid; p. 4, t.s.n., Dec. 15, 1971). After he was given first
aid treatment, he was brought back by the Indang policeman to the municipal, building where he was detained for two
days before he was picked up by the Philippine Constabulary operatives and transferred to the 121th PC Headquarters in
Tagaytay City (pp. 90-91, t.s.n., Ibid; pp. 4, 39, 40, t.s.n., Dec. 10, 1971; p. 6, t.s.n., Dec. 15, 1971; p. 5, t.s.n., Jan. 20, 1972).

After due trial, the court a quo rendered a decision sentencing the accused as heretofore stated.

Self-defense is an affirmative allegation that must be proven by clear, sufficient, satisfactory and convincing evidence
(People vs. Libed 14 SCRA 410, 413; People vs. Mendoza, 13 SCRA 11, 17; People vs. Solaa, 6 SCRA 60, 65-66; People vs.
Davis, 1 SCRA 473; 477; People vs. Paras, 80 Phil. 149; 152; People vs. Berio 59 Phil. 533; 536; People vs. Gimena, 59 Phil.
509, 514). Moreover, to prove justification, the accused must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the
weakness of that of the prosecution, for even if it were weak, it could not be disbelieved after the accused had admitted
the killing (People vs. Llamera, 51 SCRA 48, 57; People vs. Talaboc, 30 SCRA 87; People vs. Navarro, 25 SCRA 491; 496;
People vs. Solaa, 6 SCRA 60, 65-66; People vs. Espenilla, 62 Phil. 264, 270; People vs. Apolinario, 58 Phil 586-588; People
vs. Ansoyon, 65 Phil. 7 7 2). The rationale for this jurisprudence is that, having admitted the wounding or killing of the

3
victim, the accused must be held criminally liable for the crime unless he establishes to the satisfaction of the court the fact
of legitimate self-defense.

In the case at bar, the accused contends that it was the deceased, Lt. Guillermo Masana who committed unlawful
aggression when the latter hit him on his head with the handle of his gun after he refused to surrender his (accused's) ID
to him.

This claim does not merit belief.

The accused claims that after he refused to give his ID to the deceased because the same was his and he also spent money
for it, the latter hit him with the handle of his (deceased's) gun. WE cannot perceive how this refusal of the accused could
have provoked or enraged the deceased to the extent of initiating the aggression by drawing his pistol and hitting the
accused with its butt, knowing that the accused was no longer armed after the latter's gun had earlier been taken away
from him. Besides, an agent of authority, like the deceased, ordinarily is not authorized to use force, except in an extreme
case when he is attacked, or subject to active resistance, and finds no other way to comply with his duty or cause himself
to be obeyed by the offender. Furthermore, the records reveal an unrebutted fact to the effect that the deceased was
unarmed when the incident happened, he being then on leave. As a matter of fact, he was then in civilian clothing (pp. 29-
30, t.s.n., Jan. 20, 1972). WE are, therefore, inclined to believe that it was the accused who had every reason to be resentful
of the deceased and to be enraged after the deceased refused to heed his plea that his gun be returned him; because he
might be prosecuted for illegal possession of firearms. Accordingly, We are constrained to draw the inescapable
conclusion that it was the accused, not the deceased, who initiated the aggression which ended in the fatal wounding of
the deceased resulting in his death.

The accused further claims that he was hit twice by the deceased before he parried the third blow. This claim is belied by
the record. During the trial, the court a quo asked the accused to show the scar produced by the injuries inflicted by the
deceased when he refused to give his ID thus

Court

Q Where is that scar?

(Witness showing his right side of the head to the Court)"

[pp. 86,88, t.s.n., Dec. 7, 1971].

Dr. Ruben Ochoa who treated the injuries of the accused corroborated the foregoing testimony in his medical findings,
Exhibit "3", which reads:

Injuries:

(1) lacerated wound 1/2 inch, parietal region.

(2) lacerated wound, 1 1/2 inches, rt ear lobe

(3) contusion, right mastoid area [Exh. "3"; p. 116, rec] .

The record reveals that the deceased was a right-handed person (pp. 76-77, t.s.n., Dec. 7, 1971). It also shows that before
the stabbing incident took place, the deceased and the accused were facing each other. If that was the case, and
considering that the deceased was, according to the accused, holding the gun with his right hand, why was the accused
hit on the right side of his head and and on his right ear lobe WE find that this particular claim of the accused that it was
the deceased who first hit him twice with the handle of his gun before parrying the third blow and then stabbing the latter
is definitely belied not only by the location of the scar but also by the medical finding of Dr. Ochoa aforequoted. Indeed, if
the protagonists were facing each other, and it appearing that they were both right- handed (p. 13, t.s.n., Nov. 22, 1971),
the blow given by one, if not parried by the other, would perforce land on the left, and not on the right, side of the body of
4
the recipient of the blow. WE, therefore, reject such claim for being improbable, the same being contrary to the natural
course of human behavior.

The fact of the matter, however, as testified to by state witness PC soldier Virgilio Fidel, is that the victim parried with
both hands the thrust of the appellant with such force that appellant bumped his head on the edge of the table causing
blood to ooze from the resulting injury on his head.

When the accused allegedly met the Chief of Police of Indang, Cavite, on his way to the municipal building from the
scene of the stabbing incident purportedly to surrender to the authorities, he claims that he told the Chief of Police that Lt.
Masana hit him on his head with the handle of his (Masana's) gun. On his return from the clinic of Dr. Ochoa where his
injuries were treated, he was detained in the municipal building of Indang, Cavite for two days before he was transferred
to the Tagaytay PC Headquarters. During all this time, he did not give any written statement, much less inform any PC or
other police agency that he stabbed Lt. Masana in self-defense. It was only on July 8, 1971. after the lapse of more than two
and one-half (2 1/2) months that he claimed self-defense during the preliminary investigation of the case before the
municipal judge of Indang, Cavite (pp. 44, t.s.n., Dec. 10, 1971). If the accused had really acted in self-defense, he would
surely have so informed the Chief of Police at the first opportunity. He only allegedly told the Chief of Police, who
allegedly asked him why his head and face were bloody, that Lt. Masana hit him with a gun. He did not tell the Police
Chief that he was surrendering for stabbing the deceased in self-defense. This claim of the accused made before the
municipal judge of Indang, Cavite, on July 8, 1971 aforesaid constitutes an exculpatory statement made so long after the
crime was committed on April 24, 1971. Such claim does not deserve credence since the same is obviously an
afterthought, which cannot overthrow the straightforward testimony of prosecution witnesses PC soldier Virgilio Fidel
and Coast Guard serviceman Ricardo Ligsa both disinterested and unbiased witnesses, whose testimony as peace officers,
in the absence of any showing as to any motive that would impel them to distort the truth, must be afforded full faith and
credit as a whole.

The fact that the chief of police detained the accused that same day after he was treated by Dr. Ochoa, confirms the
testimony of the state witnesses that the police was present during the incident between the appellant and the victim and
that the police chief embraced appellant and grabbed the knife from appellant, whom he thereafter brought to the
municipal building.

II

Was the crime committed murder or homicide merely or murder or homicide complexed with assault upon an agent of
authority?

According to the Solicitor General, the crime committed was murder because "it was established by the prosecution that
during the stabbing incident, appellant suddenly and without giving the victim a chance to defend himself, stabbed the
latter several times with a dagger, inflicting upon mortal wounds on the chest and stomach. ...Needless to say, such a
sudden and unexpected attack with a deadly weapon on an unarmed and unsuspecting victim, which made it impossible
for the latter to flee or defend himself before the fatal blow is delivered, is alevosia or treachery" (p. 14, Appellee's brief).

In support of his contention, the Solicitor General cited the cases of U.S. vs. Cornejo (28 Phil. 475); People vs. Palomo (43 O.G.
No. 10, 4190).

WE do not agree with the Solicitor General. Alevosia or treachery is belied by the following testimony of Virgilio Fidel, star
witness for the prosecution:

COURT

Q What is the truth?

A The truth is that when I saw that Floro Rodil stabbed Lt. Guillermo Masana, Masana
parried him and his head (Rodil's head) bumped on the edge of a table; that is why he

5
 sustained an injury and blood oozed from his head (pp. 8-9, t.s.n., Jan. 20, 1972; emphasis
supplied).

Then, on cross-examination, the same witness testified:

ATTY. MUOZ

Q You said that Floro Rodil's head was bumped on the edge of a table and you saw blood
oozing from his head, is that correct?

A Yes, sir.

Q Who bumped the head of Rodil on the table?

A When Masana parried his stab with his hands he accidentally bumped his head on the
table.

Q Is it not a fact that Floro Rodil is much bigger than Lt. Masana

A Yes, sir.

Q You mean, by simple parrying, Floro Rodil was pushed to the extent that he bumped
his head on the table?

A The force of Lt. Masana might have been strong in parrying.

xxx xxx xxx

Q When the head of Rodil bumped on the table, was Lt. Masana already stabbed?

A It could be that he was already stabbed or he was not yet stabbed.

pp 30-31, 33, t.s.n., Jan. 20, 1972; emphasis supplied].

After a thorough analysis of the aforequoted portions of the testimony of Virgilio Fidel, one of the prosecution witnesses,
WE can only conclude that the assailant and the victim were indeed face to face when the stabbing took place. As such the
attack was not treacherous because the victim was able to ward off the same with his hand. As a matter of fact, the force
he used in warding off the attack was so strong that the accused bumped his head on a table nearby, causing injuries to
him which necessitated medical treatment. In short, the attack on the victim was made on the spur of the moment. The
suddenness of the attack does not by itself suffice to support a finding of treachery (People vs. Torejas, et al., 43 SCRA 158,
167). Besides, the record failed to show that the accused made any preparation to kill his victim so as to insure the
commission of the crime, making it at the same time possible or hard for the victim to defend himself or retaliate (People
vs. Saez, 1 11 Phil. 546, 553, citing the case of People vs. Tumaob, 83 Phil. 738). Neither does it show that the accused
employed means directly and specially tending to insure the killing without risk to himself. On the contrary, it shows that
the accused was easily within striking distance of his three companions, two of whom were police officers. Furthermore,
there was an altercation between the accused and the victim about the confiscation by the latter of the gun belonging to
the former, and at the moment when the victim was about to stand up, the accused drew a knife from his pocket and with
it stabbed the victim in the chest. Clearly, therefore, the impelling motive for the attack by appellant on his victim was the
latter's performance of official duty, which the former resented. This kind of evidence does not clearly show the presence
of treachery in the commission of the crime. Alevosia is not to be presumed, but must be proved as conclusively as the act
which it qualifies (People vs. Abril, 51 Phil. 670, 675). This is so because in the explicit language of the Revised Penal
Code, alevosia or treachery exists when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means,

6
methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to
himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make [Art. 14, par. 16, Revised Penal Code].

While the evidence definitely demonstrated that appellant knew because the victim, who was in civilian clothing, told
him that he was an agent of a person in authority; he cannot be convicted of the complex crime of homicide with assault
upon an agent of a person in authority, for the simple reason that the information does not allege the fact that the accused
then knew that, before or at the time of the assault, the victim was an agent of a person in authority. The information
simply alleges that appellant did attack and stab PC Lt. Guillermo Masana while the latter was in the performance of his
official duties, ..." Such an allegation cannot be an adequate substitute for the essential averment to justify a conviction of
the complex crime, which necessarily requires the imposition of the maximum period of the penalty prescribed for the
graver offense. Like a qualifying circumstance, such knowledge must be expressly and specifically averred in the
information; otherwise, in the absence of such allegation, the required knowledge, like a qualifying circumstance,
although proven, would only be appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance. Applying this principle, the attack on
the victim, who was known to the appellant as a peace officer, could be considered only as aggravating, being "in
contempt or with insult to the public authorities" (Par. 1, Art. XIV of the Revised Penal Code), or as an "insult or in
disregard of the respect due the offended party on account of his rank, ..." (par. 3, Art. XIV, Revised Penal Code).

It is essential that the accused must have knowledge that the person attacked was a person in authority or his agent in the
exercise of his duties, because the accused must have the intention to offend, injure, or assault the offended party as a
person in authority or agent of a person in authority (People vs. Villaseor 35 SCRA 460 [19701, People vs. Rellin 72 Phil.
1038 [1947]; US vs. Alvear et al., 35 Phil. 626 [1916]).

In the case of People vs. Balbar (21 SCRA 1119, Nov. 29, 1967), it was held that failure to expressly alleged in the
information that the accused had knowledge that the person attacked was a person in authority does not render the
information defective so long as there are facts alleged therein from which it can be implied that the accused knew that
the person attacked was a person in authority. Thus, the information for Direct Assault upon a person in authority reads
as follows:

The undersigned Assistant Provincial Fiscal accuses Tiburcio Balbar of the crime of Assault upon a
Person in Authority, committed as follows:

That on or about the 29th day of August, 1960, in Barrio Cumba, Municipality of Lian, Province of
Batangas, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault Miss Ester Gonzales, a public school teacher
in the school bonding of Lian, duly qualified and appointed as such and while in the performance of her
official duties or on the occasion therefor, by then and there pulling his dagger, embraced and kissed. and
repeatedly trying to embrace and kiss the said teacher, Miss Ester Gonzales. That the crime was
committed with the aggravating circumstances of having committed it inside the school building and
during school classes.

Contrary to law.

And the ruling of the Court was:

Direct assault is committed 'by any person or persons who, without a public uprising, ... shall attack,
employ force, or seriously intimidate or resist any person in authority or any of his agents, while engaged
in the performance of official duties, or on occasion of such performance' (See Art. 148, Revised Penal
Code).

By express provision of law (Com. Act No. 578, now part of Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 1978), "teachers, professors, and persons charged with the supervision of
public or duly recognized private schools, colleges and universities shall be deemed persons in authority,
in applying the provisions of article 148." This special classification is obviously intended to give teachers
protection, dignity, and respect while in the performance of their official duties. The lower court,

7
 however, dismissed the information on the ground that there is no express allegation in the information
that the accused had knowledge that the person attacked was a person in authority. This is clearly
erroneous.

Complainant was a teacher. The information sufficiently alleges that the accused knew that fact, since she
was in her classroom and engaged in the performance of her duties. He therefore knew that she was a
person in authority, as she was so by specific provision of law. It matters not that such knowledge on his
part is not expressly alleged, complainant's status as a person in authority being a matter of law and not
of fact, ignorance thereof could not excuse non- compliance on his part (Article 3, Civil Code). This article
applies to all kinds of domestic laws, whether civil or penal (De Luna vs. Linatoc, 74 Phil 15) and whether
substantive or remedial (Zulueta vs. Zulueta, 1 Phil. 254) for reasons of expediency, policy and necessity.

But, in the case of People vs. CFI of Quezon, Branch V (68 SCRA 305, Nov. 28, 1975), the information for Direct Assault
reads:

That on or about the 17th day of January, 1974, at Barrio Languyin, Municipality of Potillo, Province of
Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
Ernesto Busto, Paulo Coralde, Dony Grande and Jose Astjada each of whom was armed with a piece of
wood, except Paulo Coraide conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, box and strike with said pieces of
wood one Rufino Camonias a councilman of barrio Languyin of said municipality, duly elected and
qualified as such while said councilman was engaged in the actual performance of his duties.

The trial court dismissed the same on the ground that:

Of importance in this case is the lack of allegation in the complaint or in the information that the offended
party was an agent of a person in authority and that such fact was known to the accused. The absence of
such allegation is fatal in this case."

The People appealed to this Court through a petition for review on certiorari.

This Court held that the fiscal's proper course of action is not a petition for review on certiorari but the refiling of a valid
information against the accused, for the following considerations:

The Solicitor General in his comment of November 4, 1975 duly observed that '(I)t is patent that the
acquittal of the accused herein is not on the merits. There is want of factual finding upon which their
conviction or acquittal could have been based.'

It need only be observed that contrary to the fiscal's contention, the information was deficient in that it did
not allege an essential element of the crime of direct assault that the accused had knowledge of or knew the position
of authority held by the person attacked, viz. that of a barrio councilman (and hence the agent of a person in
authority under Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 1978) [See U.S.
vs. Alvear 35 Phil. 626; People vs. Rellin 77 Phil. 1038; Vol. 11, Padilla's Revised Penal Code, 10th Ed., p.
225].

What was held in People vs. Balbar 21 SCRA, 119,1123, cited by the fiscal is that it is sufficient that the
information alleged that the accused knew the position of authority, held by the offended party, in that case
a public school teacher, then engaged in the performance of her official duties, and that it is not necessary
to allege further that the accused also knew that such position was that of a person in authority, since 'this
is a matter of law' thus:

Complainant was a teacher. The information sufficiently alleges that the accused knew
that fact, since she was in her classroom and engaged in the performance of her duties.
He therefore knew that she was a person in authority, as she was so by specific provision
8
 of law. It matters not that such knowledge on `his part is not expressly alleged,
complainant's status as a person in authority being a matter of law and not of fact,
ignorance whereof could not excuse non-compliance on his part (Article 3, Civil Code).
This article applies to all kinds of domestic laws, whether civil or penal (De Luna vs.
Linatoc, 74 Phil. 15) and whether substantive or remedial (Zulueta vs. Zulueta, 1 Phil,
254) for reasons of expediency, policy and necessity.

Since the 'decision' of acquittal was really a mere dismissal of the information for failure to charge an
offense and was not a decision on the merits with factual findings as per the trial judge's own disavowal
it is patent that the fiscal's proper course is not the present petition but the refiling of a valid information
against respondents-accused, as herein indicated.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is dismissed without prejudice to the refiling of a valid information against
respondents-accused as hereinabove indicated (emphasis supplied).

The ruling in the aforementioned case of People vs. CFI of Quezon, etc., supra, applies to the instant case; because the
information in the former is strikingly similar to the information in the latter and does not allege facts from which
inference can be deduced that the accused knew that the person assaulted is a person, or an agent of a person, in
authority.

The aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank should be appreciated because it is obvious that the victim, PC. Lt.
Masana Identified himself as a PC officer to the accused who is merely a member of the Anti-Smuggling Unit and
therefore inferior both in rank and social status to the victim.

The term "rank" should be given its plain, ordinary meaning, and as such, refers to a high social position or standing as a
grade in the armed forces (Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged, p. 1881);
or to a graded official standing or social position or station (75 CJS 458); or to the order or place in which said officers are
placed in the army and navy in relation to others (Encyclopedic Law Dictionary, Third Edition, Walter A. Shumaker and
George Foster Longsdorf, p. 90); or to the designation or title of distinction conferred upon an officer in order to fix his
relative position in reference to other officers in matters of privileges, precedence, and sometimes of command or by
which to determine his pay and emoluments as in the case of army staff officers (Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Third Edition,
p. 2804); or to a grade or official standing, relative position in civil or social life, or in any scale of comparison, status,
grade, including its grade, status or scale of comparison within a position (Vol. 36, Words and Phrases, Permanent
Edition, p. 100).

Thus, rank aggravated the killing of a staff sergeant by his corporal (People vs. Mil 92 SCRA 89, 105-106, July 30, 1979),
the killing of the Assistant Chief of Personnel Transaction of the Civil Service Commission by a clerk therein (People vs.
Benito, 62 SCRA 351, 357-358, Feb. 13, 1975), the murder by a pupil of his teacher (U.S. vs. Cabling, 7 Phil. 469. 474; People
vs. Aragon & Lopez, 107 Phil. 706, 709), the murder of a municipal mayor (People vs. Lopez de Leon, et al., 69 Phil. 298),
the murder -of a city chief of police by the chief of the secret service division (People vs. Hollero 88 Phil. 167), assault
upon a 66-year old District Judge of the Court of First Instance by a justice of the peace (People vs. Torrecarreori CA 52
OG 7644), the killing of a Spanish consul by his subordinate a mere chancellor (People vs. Godinez, 106 Phil. 597,
606607), and the killing of an army general (People vs. Torres, et al., L-4642, May 29, 1953).

As explained by Mr. Justice Mariano Albert, then of the Court of Appeals, those "generally considered of high station in
life, on account of their rank (as well as age or sex), deserve to be respected. Therefore, whenever there is a difference in
social condition between the offender and the offended party, this aggravating circumstance sometimes is present"
(Albert M.A. The Revised Penal Code Annotated, 1946 Ed., p. 109).

The difference in official or social status between a P.C. lieutenant and a mere member of an anti-smuggling unit, is
patent.

If the accused herein were charged with the complex crime of murder with assault against an agent of a person in
authority, and not merely murder, then the aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank or contempt of or insult to

9
public authority cannot be appreciated as aggravating because either circumstance is inherent in the charge of assault
against a person in authority or an agent of a person in authority. But in the case at bar, the appellant is accused of
murder only. Consequently, either aggravating circumstance should be considered in the imposition of the penalty.

Thus, in the following cases where the charge was merely murder or frustrated murder, the aggravating circumstance of
disregard of rank was appreciated:

(1) People vs. Benito, supra the appellant, a clerk in the Civil Service Commission, was charged with and convicted of the
murder of the assistant chief of the personnel transaction of the said Commission;

(2) People vs. Torres, et al., supra the appellants were charged with and convicted of murder for the death of Army Col.
Valentin Salgado and attempted murder for the injuries inflicted on Army Gen. Mariano Castaneda;

(3) People vs. Valeriano, et al. appellants were accused and convicted of robbery with homicide for the killing of District
Judge Bautista of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga [90 Phil. 15, 34-35]; and

(4) People vs. Hollero supra where the accused chief of the Secret Division of the Bacolod City Police Department was
convicted of murder for the killing of the chief of police.

The aggravating circumstance of contempt of, or insult to, public authority under paragraph 2 of Article 14 of the Revised
Penal Code can likewise be appreciated in the case at bar.

The evidence of the prosecution clearly established that Chief of Police Primo Panaligan of Indang was present as he was
taking his lunch in the same restaurant when the incident occurred.

As a matter of fact, the said chief of police was the one who embraced or grabbed the accused from behind, wrested the
dagger from him and thereafter brought him to the municipal building of Indang. And appellant admittedly knew him
even then as the town chief of police, although he now claims that he went to the municipal building to surrender to the
chief of police who was not allegedly in the restaurant during the incident.

While it is true that in the cases of U.S. vs. Rodriguez, et al. (19 Phil. 150, 157-158), People vs. Siojo (61 Phil. 307, 317),
and People vs. Verzo (21 SCRA 1403), this Court ruled that the term public authority refers to a person in authority and that
a PC lieutenant or town chief of police is not a public authority but merely an agent of a person in authority; there is need of
re-examining such a ruling since it is not justified by the employment of the term public authority in aforesaid paragraph 2
of Article 14 instead of the term person in authority which is specifically used in Articles 148 and 152 of the Revised Penal
Code. There is no extended reasoning of the doctrine enunciated in the aforesaid three (3) cases why the phrase public
authority should comprehend only persons in authority. The lawmaker could have easily utilized the term "persons in
authority" in the aforesaid paragraph 2 of Article 14 in much the same way that it employed the said phrase in Articles
148 and 1452. The lawmaker must have intended a different meaning for the term public authority, which may however
include, but not limited to persons in authority.

Under the decided cases, a municipal mayor, barrio captain, barrio lieutenant or barangay captain is a person in authority
or a public authority. Even a public school teacher is now considered a person in authority under CA 578 amending
Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code (Sarcepudes vs. People, 90 Phil 228). So is the town municipal health officer (People
vs. Quebral et al., 73 Phil 640), as well as a nurse, a municipal councilor or an agent of the Bureau of Internal Revenue
(People vs. Yosoya, CA-GR No. 8522-R, May 26, 1955; People vs. Reyes, et al O.G.S. 11 p. 24).

The chief of police should therefore be considered a public authority or a person in authority; for he is vested with
jurisdiction or authority to maintain peace and order and is specifically duty bound to prosecute and to apprehend
violators of the laws and municipal ordinances, more than the aforementioned officials who cannot prosecute and who
are not even enjoined to arrest malefactors although specifically mentioned as persons in authority by the decided cases
and by Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A. 1978 of June 22, 1957. The town chief of police heads
and supervises the entire police force in the municipality as well as exercises his authority over the entire territory of the

10
municipality, which is patently greater than and includes the school premises or the town clinic or barrio, to which small
area the authority or jurisdiction of the teacher, nurse, or barrio lieutenant, respectively, is limited.

With two aggravating circumstances and no mitigating circumstance, the appellant should therefore be condemned to
suffer the maximum period of reclusion temporal the penalty prescribed for homicide.

WHEREFORE, HAVING BEEN FOUND GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF HOMICIDE AGGRAVATED BY
CONTEMPT FOR OR INSULT TO A PUBLIC AUTHORITY OR DISREGARD OF THE RESPECT DUE THE OFFENDED
PARTY ON ACCOUNT OF HIS RANK, APPELLANT FLORO RODIL IS HEREBY SENTENCED TO SUFFER AN
INDETERMINATE TERM OF IMPRISONMENT RANGING FROM 12 YEARS OF RECLUSION TEMPORAL AS
MAXIMUM.

THUS MODIFIED, THE JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM IS HEREBY AFFIRMED IN ALL OTHER RESPECTS.

Aquino, Concepcion Jr., Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.

Fernando, C.J., concur in the result.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-40330 November 20, 1978

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
AMADO DANIEL alias "AMADO ATO", accused-appellant.

Eraulio D. Yaranon for appellant.

Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar, Assistant Solicitor General Antonio G. Ibarra and Solicitor Rosalio A. de Leon for appellee.

MUOZ PALMA, J:

This case originated from the Court of First Instance of Baguio City by virtue of a complaint filed by 13-year old Margarita
Paleng accusing Amado Daniel alias "Amado Ato" of rape alleged to have been committed as follows:

That on or about the 20th day of September, 1965, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the herein accused, armed with a sharp instrument and by means of
force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of
the undersignedcomplaint, against her will, and in her own room situated at No. 25 Interior, Pinsao,
Guisad, Baguio City.

That in the commission of the crime, the aggravating circumstance that it was committed in the dwelling
of the offended party, the latter not having givenprovocation for it, is present. (p. 1, CFI record)

The trial court, presided then by Hon. Feliciano Belmonte, after due trial rendered its decision on May 30, 1966, finding
the accused guilty and sentencing him to suffer "not more than TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion
temporal and not less than SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor, and to pay the costs." 1

11
His motion for reconsideration and new trial having been denied, accused filed a notice of appeal; forthwith the case was
forwarded to the Court of Appeals.

On September 23, 1974, the Court of Appeals through its Tenth Division rendered a decision the dispositive portion of
which follows:

PREMISES CONSIDERED, We find that the guilt of the accused Amado Daniel has been proven beyond
reasonable doubt, and he should accordingly suffer the penalty for the crime herein charged.

We find, however, that the sentence imposed the accused in the judgment appealed from is not in
accordance with law.

Republic Act No. 4111, which took effect on June 20, 1964, amended Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code, providing that

The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.

Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or
more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.

Under Section 17 of Chapter 11 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 (Republic Act No. 296, as amended)

The Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on
appeal, as the law or rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts as herein
provided, in

(1) All criminal cases involving offenses for which the penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment; ...

WHEREFORE, We hereby certify this case to the Supreme Court for appropriate further proceedings
pursuant to law. 2

By virtue of the foregoing decision of the Court of Appeals the case was certified to this Court and in a Resolution of
March 6, 1975, the same was ordered docketed. 3

Preliminary question

The certification of the case to Us poses a preliminary question which strikes at the very root of a long standing practice
and procedure evoked for the last forty years or so since the creation of the Court of Appeals. 4

Is the Supreme Court with jurisdiction to act on an appeal in a criminal case where the offense is punishable by reclusion
perpetua or death certified to it by the Court of Appeals with findings of facts and of the guilt of the accused, but without
imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua or death on the appellant pursuant to Rule 124, Section 12, paragraph 2, of the
Rules of Court?5

Mr. Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, joined by other ,Justices, expresses the view that for this Court to acquire jurisdiction
over the appeal, the decision before Us must have imposed on the appellant the penalty either of reclusion perpetua or
death as the facts warranted.

The rest of the Justices together with the writer of this Opinion, believe otherwise and hold the view that the dispositive
portion of the decision as written and rendered is in accordance with the Constitution and the law, and vests jurisdiction
on the Court to act on the appeal.

12
A. In People v. Ramos, decided on November 28, 1947, 6 a case was certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals without
findings of facts and simply on the ground that it was "on the opinion that the penalty that should be imposed ill this case
is reclusion perpetua, as recommended by the Solicitor-General, and not reclusion temporal, as imposed by tile lower court."
The question arose as to the proper procedure to be followed by the appellate court in certifying cases to this Court under
Section 145-K of the Revised Administrative Code as amended by Republic Act No. 52 which read:

Whenever in any criminal cases submitted to a division the said division should be of the opinion that the
penalty of death or life imprisonment should be imposed, the said Court shall refrain from entering
judgment thereon and shall forthwith certify the case to the Supreme Court for final determination, as if
the case had been brought before it on appeal.

In disposing of the issue several matters came up which evoked different, and We may say, strong reactions from the
Justices then composing the Court, but for brevity we shall not dwell on them. Simply stated, it is was ruled that the
Court of Appeals was duty bound to make its findings of facts to support its opinion that the penalty to the imposed
upon the appellant was either life imprisonment or death so as to bring the case within the jurisdiction of this Court.

From the Resolution written for the Court by then Mr. Chief Justice Manuel V. Moran, We quoted the following pertinent
portions:

The jurisdiction of this Court predicated upon the opinion of the Court of Appeals, as provided in the
above-quoted provisions of the law, must of necessity defend upon the correctness of that opi nion There
is nothing in the law precluding this Court from exercising ing its authority to pass upon such question
which concerns its own jurisdiction. And in order that this Court may exercise its power of review the Court of
appeals is bound to make in its order f certification such findings of facts as are necessary to support its conclusion
that either life imprisonment or death is the penalty to be imposed. This is indeed covered by Rule 52, section 3,
which provides th where a court to which an appeal has been taken has no appellate jurisdiction over lic
case and it certifies the same to the proper court, it must do so "with a specific and clear statement of
grounds therefor." the requirement of with and specific grounds is precisely a device to prevent
erroneous transmissions of jurisdiction from a lower to a superior court.

Furthermore, the words "shall refrain from entering judgment thereon" appearing in the provision above
quoted, are sufficient indication that the Court of Appeals, at the time of certifying the case to this Court,
had already examined the evidence and was ready to render judgment on the merits, but having found
from the facts established by proof that the penalty to be imposed is either death or life imprisonment,
instead of entering judgment thereon , it certifies the case to the Supreme Court for final determination.
Since the Certification is the only ground for determining our jurisdiction, it must contain not only
conclusions of law but also findings of fact, the latter being more important than the former for they
supply the real basis for determining jurisdiction ...

The instant case cannot be compared with cases coming directly from a Court of First Instance wherein
either life imprisonment or death penalty is imposed, for in such cases, if we assume jurisdiction even
where the judgment appears to be erroneous on its face, it is because the Court of First Instance has already
exhausted its jurisdiction by rendering judgment on the merits containing both findings of fact and
conclusions of law, and under such circumstance it is more practical for the administration of the law that
this Court should exercise its appellate jurisdiction by examining the evidence and correcting all errors
both of fact and of law that might have been committed by the trial court. But here, the Court of Appeals
is refraining from rendering judgment on the merits and is refusing to complete the exercise of appellate
jurisdiction because it believes that such jurisdiction belongs to the Supreme Court and thus, it proceeds
to transfer the case to this Court. lt is in that transfer that we believe we may intervene in order to prevent
an erroneous transfer,

xxx xxx xxx

13
 Section 145-K of the Administrative Code is merely a method designed to make effective the appellate
jurisdiction of both the Court of Appeals and this Court, as defined by law. According to the law of
jurisdiction (section 138, Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Commonwealth Acts Nos. 3 and
259), offenses, for which the penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment, including offenses arising
from the same occurrence or committed on the same occasion, come within the appellate jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court, and the remaining offenses fall within the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals ...

We are of the opinion and so hold, therefore, that in a case like this, the Court of Appeals, in certifying it
to this Court, must state its findings of fact necessary to support its conclusion that the penalty to be
imposed is either life imprisonment or death. While this Court will not review the findings of fact, it will
pass upon the correctness of the legal conclusions derived therefrom. And if this Court finds the
conclusions to be correct, it will assume jurisdiction. If it finds them to be wrong, the case will be returned
to the Court of Appeals. (pp. 613-616, supra, emphasis supplied)

In Ramos, the case was accepted because the Court considered that there was substantial compliance with the law as the
order of certification made reference to the opinion and recommendation of the Solicitor General whose brief contained
sufficient findings of fact to warrant the conclusion that life imprisonment should be imposed upon the appellant. Justices
Paras, Feria, Pablo, Hilado and Briones concurred in the Resolution.

Justice Gregorio Perfecto in a separate opinion concurred with the principle that the Court of Appeals is bound to make
its findings of fact and study the evidence so as to determine whether the appellant is guilty or not, but dissented from
that portion of the Resolution which accepted the case as he was of the opinion that the case should have been remanded
to the Court of Appeals.7

Justice Pedro Tuason wrote a separate opinion and dissented from the majority insofar as it held that it was necessary for
the Court of Appeals or a division thereof to state the reasons for its opinion that death penalty or life imprisonment
should be imposed. He particularly dissented from statements that if this Court found the conclusions of the Court of
Appeals to be wrong, the case should be returned to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings. According to Justice
Tuason when a case is certified to this Court it is placed, by force of the Court of Appeals' opinion, within the jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court for the latter to decide the appeal on the merits; findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are neither
essential nor necessary. Justice Tuason was joined in his dissent by Justice Cesar Bengzon who later became Chief Justice
of this Court and Justice Sabino Padilla.8

B. The theory is now advanced that We go one step further than that ruled in Ramos that is, for the Court of Appeals
not only to make its findings of fact and finding of guilt, but also to impose the penalty either of reclusion perpetua or death
as the facts warrant in order that We may exercise Our appellate jurisdiction.

We believe that such a judicial ruling will be violence to the letter and spirit of the law which confers on the Supreme
Court the exclusive prerogative to review on appeal and impose the corresponding penalty in criminal cases where the
offense is punishable by reclusion perpetua or death.

Both the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions vest upon the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction, in "(A)ll criminal cases in
which the penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment."9 This jurisdiction is constitutional: the Supreme Court ma not
be deprived thereof by, Congress then, now the National Assembly. 10

Section 17 of the Judiciary Act 1948 as amended in turn provides that the foregoing appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court is exclusive.

Basically therefore, the objection to this new theory is one of jurisdiction - the lack of jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals
to impose the penalty of reclusion perpetua or death.

The present controversy springs from the construction given to the second paragraph of Sec. 12, Rule 124, Rules of
Court 11 more particularly to the use of the phrases "should be imposed" and "shall refrain from entering judgment", viz:

14
 xxx xxx xxx

Whenever in any criminal case submitted to a division the said division should be of the opinion that the
penalty of death or life imprisonment should be imposed, the said court shall refrain from entering
judgment thereon and shall forthwith certify the case to the Supreme Court for final determination, as if
the case had been brought before it on appeal. (Emphasis supplied)

As we construe it, the Rule cited does not charge the appellate court with the duty of imposing the
penalty of reclusion perpetua or death. All that the Rule requires is that should the Court of Appeals be of
the opinion that death or life imprisonment should be imposed, it "shall refrain from entering judgment
thereon ...

The clause "entering judgment" means "rendering judgment". Thus, the Court of Appeals shall refrain from rendering
judgment if and when it is of the opinion that reclusion perpetua or death is the proper penalty for the crime committed.
This can be the only logical interpretation considering that the Court of Appeals is without jurisdiction to impose the
penalties concerned. The phrase "entering judgment" is not to be equated with an "entry of judgment" as the latter is
understood in Rule 36 in relation to Section 8, Rule 121 and Section 16, Rule 124, Rules of Court. "Entry of judgment"
presupposes a final judgment final in the sense that no appeal was taken from the decision of the trial or appellate
court within the reglementary period. A judgment in a criminal case becomes final after the lapse of the period for
perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or the defendant has expressly
waived in writing his right to appeal.12 It is only then that there is a judgment which is to be entered or recorded in the
book of entries of judgments. 13

It would be incongruous or absurd to state that Section 12, second paragraph, Rule 124 enjoins the Court of Appeals from
entering judgment" when there is no judgment to be entered .

But then the argument is advanced what is there to be reviewed by the Supreme Court when the decision being
certified contains no penalty or sentence, as distinguished from appeals from the Court of First Instance where there is a
complete judgment to be passed upon. The answer is simple. Section 12 itself states that the case is for final determination
by the Supreme Court as if the case had been brought before it on appeal. Hence, based on the findings of facts of the appellate
court which as a rule are conclusive and binding on Us, this Court "will pass upon the correctness of the legal conclusions
derived therefrom" (People v. Ramos, supra) and impose the correct penalty for the offense committed.

We realize that had Section 12, Rule 124 used the phrase shall refrain from rendering judgment " there would be no cause
for any ambiguity. We can only assume that the intent of the Rule was so clear to the Court when it drafted the Revised
Rules of Court that it did not envision a possible contrary or adverse interpretation or ambiguity in its implementation
under the phraseology used. It is incumbent upon Us to construe the Rule in the spirit and intent it was conceived and in
harmony with pertinent laws and jurisprudence.

On the merits of the appeal

1. Generally in a case of this nature, the evidence of the prosecution consists solely of the testimony of the offended party.
Here We have the declaration of the victim, who at the time of the incident was a little less than 13 years of age, on the
basis of which the trial court found the charge of rape duly established. The happenings are briefly summarized in the
People's brief as follows:

The offended party in this case is Margarita Paleng who was born on November 20, 1952 (p. 3, t.s.n.,
Manipon). She is a native of Balangabang Tublay, Mountain Province (pp. 3, 12, Id.) At the time of the
incident in question on September 20, 1965, complainant was temporarily boarding at a house located at
Pinsao Guisad Baguio City, as she was then a first year high school student at the Baguio Eastern High
School (pp. 3, 12, 20, Id.; p. 36, Estigoy).

On September 20, 1965, at about three o'clock in the afternoon, she had just arrived in the City from
Tublay in a Dangwa bus (p. 3, Manipon). Because it was then raining and the bus was parked several

15
 meters away from the bus station, she waited inside the bus (pp. 3, 22, Id.). After about three minutes of
waiting, the accused came and started molesting her by inquiring her name and getting hold of her bag
(pp. 4, 22-24, Id.). But she did not allow him to hold her bag (p. 24, Id.). She called the attention of the bus
driver and the conductor about the actuation of the accused, but it seemed that the former were also
afraid of him (pp. 24-25, Id.).

Despite the rain, she left the bus and went to ride in a jeep parked some 100 meters away (pp. 4, 25, Id.).
The accused closely followed her (p. 4, Id.). When the jeep started to go, the accused also rode and sat
beside her (p. 5, Id.).

When the jeep reached Guisad, she alighted on the road but she still had to negotiate a distance of ten
meters (p. 5, Id.). The accused also alighted and again he tried to carry her bag (p. 5, Id.). Although he was
not allowed to carry her bag, her was adamant in following her (p. 5, Id.).

Reaching her boarding house, she opened the door and was about to close it when the accused dashed in
and closed the door behind him (pp. 31-32, Id.). When she entered her room, the accused went in (p.
7, Id.). He pulled a dagger eight inches long and threatened her: "If you will talk, 1 will kill you". (p.
7, Id.). Margarita was stunned into silence because of her fear (p. i Id.). Thereupon, the accused held her
hair with his left hand and forced her Lo lie down in bed (p. 7, Id.) He also placed his left hand with a
handkerchief in Margarita's mouth, at the same time holding the dagger and her neck with his right hand
(pp. 7-8, Id.). She was forcibly made to the down and, at this moment, the accused removed the buttons of
his pants (p. 8, Id.). He then put down the dagger on tile bed (p. 8, Id.). Her attempts to extricate herself
from the accused was to no avail assile was only 4 ft. and 8 inches tall and weighed about 95 to 100
pounds (p. 35, Id.) while the accused was 5 ft. and 7 inches tall and weighed about 126 pounds (pp. 8,
59, Id.). He then held his penis (pp. 8. 36, Id.), used his thigh to separate the legs of Margarita (p. 38, Id.).
tried, but failed. to remove her panty (p. 36, Id.). He nonetheless guided his penis and inserted it inside
the vagina of the complainant after prying open the part of her panty covering her private parts (pp. 9,
36, Id.). Then he succeeded in having carnal knowledge of the offended party (p. 9, Id.). Margarita lost
consciousness. When she recovered, he was already gone (p. 9, Id.).

The following morning, her father came to visit her. She confided to him the terrible misfortune which
befell her (pp. 9-10, Id.). She was immediately brought to the Baguio General Hospital where she was
examined (p. 10, Id.). Then they proceeded to the Police Department. The Chief of Police accompanied
them to the Health Center where she was again examined by Dr. Perfecto O. Micu who thereafter
submitted his medical report (Exh. C; p. 3, rec.; pp. 11, 14-16, Id.). Margarita and her father gave their
respective statements before the police authorities (Exh. B, pp, 5-6, rec.; p. 11, t.s.n.). She signed her
criminal complaint prepared by the Fiscal's Office of Baguio (Exh. A; p. 1, rec.; p. 11, t.s.n. (pp. 2-4, Brief at
p. 83, rollo

The City Medico-Legal Officer, Dr. Perfecto Micu was called to the witness stand and he testified on the physical
examination conducted on the person of Margarita Paleng on September 23, 1965 and his findings as contained in the
report were as follows:

1. Hymen-circular-stellate type with healing lacerations at 6:00, 8:00, 9:00 and 11:00 o'clock positions in
the face of a clock.

2. Contusions at the base of the hymen at 3:00 & 9:00 o'clock regions.

3. Vaginal Orifice - tight and hardly admits 2 fingers.

4. Vaginal wall tight and vaginal folds are prominent.

5. Vaginal smear negative for spermatozoa and for gram negative intra or extra-cellular diplococci.
(Exh. "C", p. 3, CFI record)

16
Dr. Micu concluded that "defloration was recent". He further declared that the condition of the hymen revealed that
Margarita Paleng was a virgin before the incident complained of, and that the number of lacerations and contusions at the
base of the hymen indicated the degree of force exerted to effect the sexual act. 14

For his defense, appellant claimed that he and Margarita were acquainted with each other since 1963, and there were
occasions when they rode together in a bus; that the incident of September 20, 1965 inside the room of Margarita was with
the latter's consent, and in fact it was the second time he had carnal knowledge with her, the first time having occurred
inside a shack; that he promised Margarita that he would marry her, but to his surprise, she filed the instant complaint
against him. 15

2. The issue being one of credibility, We find no cogent reasons for discarding the findings of facts of the trial court which
were sustained by the Court of Appeals after the latter had examined the evidence as a result of which it certified the case
to this Court.

Appellant assails the veracity of the testimony of the complainant. But what possible motive could a thirteen-year old girl
barely in her teens have in fabricating a story that could only bring down on her and her family shame and humiliation
and make her an object of gossip and curiosity among her classmates and the people of her hometown. It cannot be
denied that a public trial involving a crime of this nature subjects the victim to what can be a harrowing experience of
submitting to a physical examination of her body, an investigation by police authorities, appearance in court for the
hearing where she has to unravel lewd and hideous details of a painful event which she would prefer to forget and leave
it unknown to others. If Margarita did forego all these and preferred to face the cruel realities of the situation it was due
to her simple and natural instincts of speaking out the truth.

The insinuation that this complaint was filed because appellant had not married the girl although he promised to marry
her, is preposterous. On September 20, 1965, Margarita was only twelve years and ten months old and was not of
marriageable age, hence, marriage was a legal impossibility. And as regards appellant's testimony that the complaint was
instigated by the Chief of Police of Tublay who was Margarita's uncle, the trial court did not give credit to such a
declaration.

Counsel for appellant stresses that notwithstanding that Margarita had the opportunity to ask for help or attract the
attention of other people before she reached her boarding house, she failed to do so. According to counsel there were
people at the Dangwa station, in the busy streets, in the market place, in the jeepney parking place where the girl took a
jeep to proceed to the boarding house, and in the neighboring houses the closest of which was about 5 meters away, but
no attempt was ever made by complainant to seek help so as to prevent appellant from molesting her. 16

Appellant's contention presupposes that Margarita was well aware all the time from the moment she saw the appellate
inside the bus that the latter had intentions of abusing or raping her. All that the appellant did inside the bus was to hold
her bag and she caged the attention of the driver and the conductor to the impertinence of appellant but the two did not
do anything about it. 17 And when Margarita walked from the bus to the jeepney station, although she saw appellant
walking behind her she did not suspect that he was following her. To a question propounded by His Honor whether she
suspected that appellant was following her, Margarita answered: "No sir, I did not suspect." 18 All along Margarita could
not call the attention of the people in the street or shout for help inasmuch as at that particular moment the appellant was
not doing anything against her. And when Margarita reached the boarding house there were no persons around 19 and in
fact she went straight to her room and it was at that particular moment when appellant barged into the room before she
could close the door. In short, the Poor girl was simply taken by surprise by the forced entrance of appellant who
immediately took out an 8-inch long dagger and said "If you will talk I will kill you."

Persons can have different reactions to a situation like that some may manifest an aggressive or violent attitude of
confronting a molesting or impertinent fellow while others, like 12-year old Margarita, may assume a silent. fearful
attitude.

Appellant's counsel also claims that Margarita did not offer any resistance to the acts of the accused at the time the latter
was allegedly forcing himself on her as shown by the medical findings that there were no signs of extra-genital injuries on
the girl's body, and no blood stains on her dress and underwear.

17
The foregoing arguments are inadequate to weaken and destroy the veracity of Margarita's straightforward and positive
declaration as to how appellant, a 22-year old farmer in the prime of his manhood, weighing 126 lbs and five feet 21 and
six inches tall,20 overpowered her and succeeded in accomplishing the sexual act despite her resistance. Margarita was
less than 13 years of age, was 4' 8 " in height, and weighed around 95 lbs. 21

In a crime of rape, force need not be irresistible; "it need but be present, and so long as it brings about the desired result,
all consideration of whether it was more or less irresistible, is beside the point. 22

All that is necessary is that the force used by the accused is sufficient for him to consummate his evil purpose. In U.S. v.
Villarosa, 1905, there was a similar situation. A 12 year old girl was sexually abused in the woods by a man of superior
physical strength. In holding the accused Villarosa guilty of rape the Court held:

It is a doctrine well established by the courts that in order to consider the existence of the crime of rape it
is not necessary that the force employed in accomplishing it be so great or of such character as could not
be resisted; it is only necessary that the force used by the guilty party be sufficient to consummate the
purpose which he had in view. (4 Phil. 434, 437 citing Judgment May 14, 1878, Supreme Court of Spain.
The Villarosa doctrine has been followed in numerous cases involving the crime of rape and one of the
latest is People v. Equec, 1977, per Justice Enrique Fernando, 70 SCRA 665.)

And as stated in People v. Savellano, per Justice Ramon Aquino, the force or violence necessary in rape is naturally a
relative term, depending on the age, size, and strength of the parties and their relation to each other. 23

Rape is likewise committed when intimidation is used on the victim and the latter submits herself against her will because
of fear for her life and personal safety. In this case of Margarita Paleng, appellant was armed with a dagger and with it
threatened to kill the girl if she would talk or scream for help. Her fear naturally weakened whatever resistance Margarita
could muster at the time and as a result appellant was able to consummate his coitus on the victim. 24

One last point raised by the able counsel of appellant, Atty. Braulio D. Yaranon, who at the time of the trial in 1965 was
the Vice-Mayor of Baguio City, was that appellant voluntarily submitted to a lie detector test with the National Bureau of
Investigation and the report of the lie detector examiner is in appellant's favor, that is, the latter was telling the truth on
the questions propounded to him one of which was whether he forced Margarita Paleng into having sexual intercourse
with him and the reply was "No". 25

On this matter We find the trial Judge's observations and conclusions meritorious and We quote from his decision the
following:

As to the N.B.I. lie detector test report, the Court does not put much faith and credit on it. It is well
known that the same is not conclusive. Its efficacy depends upon the time, place and circumstances when
taken and the nature of the subject. If subject is hard and the circumstances, as in this instant, were not
conducive to affect the subject emotionally, the test will fail. The subject had nothing more to fear because
the trial was over. He was not confronted by the victim or other persons whom he had a reason to fear.
Naturally, his reaction to the questions propounded was normal and unaffected and the apparatus could
not detect it. (pp. 172-173, CFI record)

To conclude, the crime committed by the appellant is rape with the use of a deadly weapon with the aggravating
circumstance of having been committed in the dwelling of the offended party. Although Margarita was merely renting a
bedspace in a boarding house, her room constituted for all intents and purposes a "dwelling" as the term is used in Article
14(3), Revised Penal Code. It is not necessary, under the law, that the victim owns the place where he lives or dwells. Be
he a lessee, a boarder, or a bed-spacer, the place is his home the sanctity of which the law seeks to protect and uphold.

Hence, the correct penalty for the crime committed is death pursuant to Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended.
However, for lack of the necessary number of votes, the penalty next lower in degree is to be applied.

18
PREMISES CONSIDERED, We affirm the judgment of conviction of Amado Daniel for the crime of rape as charged, and
We sentence him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and order him to indemnify Margarita Paleng by way of moral
damages in the amount of Twelve Thousand Pesos (P12,000.00) and pay the costs.

Decision Modified.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, J., concurs.

Barredo, Antonio, Concepcion, Jr. and Santos, JJ., concur in the result on the merits.

Castro, C.J., Makasiar, Fernando and Fernandez, JJ., took no part.

Guerrero, J., is on leave.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 120420. April 21, 1999]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RUFINO MIRANDILLA BERMAS,accused-appellant.

DECISION
VITUG, J.:

In convicting an accused, it is not enough that proof beyond reasonable doubt has been adduced; it is also essential
that the accused has been duly afforded his fundamental rights.
Rufino Mirandilla Bermas pleaded not guilty before the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque, Branch 274, Metro Manila,
to the crime of rape under a criminal complaint, which read:

COMPLAINT

The undersigned complainant as assisted by her mother accuses Rufino Mirandilla Bermas, of the crime of Rape,
committed as follows:

"That on or about the 3rd day of August 1994, in the Municipality of Paraaque, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, while armed with a knife and by means of force and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the undersigned
complainant against her will.

CONTRARY TO LAW

Paraaque, Metro Manila

August 8, 1994

(SGD) MANUEL P. BERMAS

19
Complainant

Assisted by:

(SGD) ROSITA BERMAS

Mother[1]

Evidence was adduced during trial by the parties at the conclusion of which the lower court, presided over by Hon.
Amelita G. Tolentino, rendered its decision, dated 02 May 1995, finding the accused guilty of the offense charged and
sentencing him to suffer the extreme penalty of death.
The death penalty having been imposed, the case has reached this Court by way of automatic review pursuant to
Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 22 of Republic Act No. 7659 (otherwise known as An Act To
Impose Death Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes, Amending For That Purpose The Revised Penal Code, as amended,
Other Special Penal Laws, and For Other Purposes, which took effect on 31 December 1993).
The prosecution, through the Office of the Solicitor General, gave an account, rather briefly, of the evidence
submitted by the prosecution.

"On August 3, 1994, complainant Manuela Bermas, 15 years old, was raped by her own father, appellant Rufino Bermas,
while she was lying down on a wooden bed inside their house at Creek Drive II, San Antonio Valley 8, Paraaque, Metro
Manila (pp. 6-7, TSN, Oct. 19, 1994). Armed with a knife, appellant removed the victim's shorts and panty, placed himself
above her, inserted his penis in her vagina and conducted coital movements (pp. 7-8, ibid.). After the appellant satisfied
his lustful desire, he threatened the victim with death if she reports the incident to anyone. (p. 9, ibid.)

"On August 9, 1994, complainant was medically examined at the NBI, which yielded the following findings:

"The findings concluded: 1. No evident sign of extragenital physical injuries noted on the body of the subject at the time of
examination; 2. Hymen, intact but distensible and its orifice wide (2.7 cm. In diameter) as to allow complete penetration
by an average sized, adult, Filipino male organ in full erection without producing any hymenal laceration." [2]

The defense proffered the testimony of the accused, who denied the charge, and that of his married daughter,
Luzviminda Mendez, who attributed the accusation made by her younger sister to a mere resentment by the latter.The
trial court gave a summary of the testimony given by the accused and his daughter Luzviminda; viz:

The accused vehemently denied that he has ever committed the crime of rape on her daughter, the complainant. He told
the Court that he could not do such a thing because he loves so much his daughter and his other children. In fact, he said
that he even performed the dual role of a father and a mother to his children since the time of his separation from his
wife. The accused further told the Court that in charging him of the crime of rape, the complainant might have been
motivated by ill-will or revenge in view of the numerous scoldings that she has received from him on account of her
frequent coming home late at night. The accused stressed that he knew of no other reason as to why his daughter, the
complainant, would ever charge him of the crime of rape except probably in retaliation for being admonished by him
whenever she comes home late in the night.

The married daughter of the accused, who testified in his behalf, denied that the complainant was raped by the
accused. She said that the complainant did not come home in the night of August 3, 1994, and that, she is a liar. She told
the Court that the concoction by the complainant of the rape story is probably due to the resentment by the latter of the
frequent scoldings that she has been receiving from the accused. She further added that she was told by the previous
household employer of the complainant that the latter is a liar. She went on to testify further that she does not believe that
the accused, who is her father, raped the complainant, who is her younger sister. [3]

The trial court, in its decision of 02 May 1995, found the case of the prosecution against the accused as having been
duly established and so ruled out the defense theory of denial and supposed ill-will on the part of private complainant
that allegedly had motivated the filing of the complaint against her father. The court adjudged:
20
"WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and hereby sentences
him to suffer the DEATH PENALTY, to indemnify the complainant in the amount of P75,000.00, Philippine Currency, and
to pay the costs.

"SO ORDERED."[4]

In their 61-page brief, defense counsel Fernandez & Kasilag-Villanueva (in collaboration with the Anti-Death Penalty
Task Force), detailed several errors allegedly committed by the court a quo; thus:

I. THE ACCUSED WAS DEPRIVED OF DUE PROCESS.

A. THE ACCUSED WAS DENIED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE AND VIGILANT COUNSEL

1. The trial court did not observe the correct selection process in appointing the accused's counsel de officio;
2. The Public Attorney could not give justice to the accused;

a. Negligent in not moving to quash the information on the ground of illegal arrest;

b. Negligent in not moving to quash the information on the ground of invalid filing of the information;

c. Negligent in not moving for a preliminary investigation;

d. Negligent in not pointing out the unexplained change in the case number;

e. Negligent in not moving to inhibit the judge;

f. Negligent in her conduct at the initial trial.

3. The Vanishing Second Counsel de Officio

a. He was not dedicated nor devoted to the accused;

b. His work was shoddy;

4. The Reluctant Third Counsel de Officio

5. The performance of all three counsels de officio was ineffective and prejudicial to the accused.

B. THE ACCUSED WAS DENIED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE TRIED BY AN IMPARTIAL JUDGE AND TO
BE PRESUMED INNOCENT.

C. THE ACCUSED WAS DENIED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE HEARD AND FOR WITNESSES TO TESTIFY
IN HIS BEHALF.

D. THE ARRAIGNMENT OF THE ACCUSED WAS INVALID.

E. THE ACCUSED WAS DENIED THE EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW.

II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT `SCRUTINIZE WITH EXTREME CAUTION THE PROSECUTION'S EVIDENCE,
MISAPPRECIATED THE FACTS AND THEREFORE ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY OF RAPE BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT."[5]

21
 The Court, after a painstaking review of the records, finds merit in the appeal enough to warrant a remand of the
case for new trial.
It would appear that on 08 August 1994 Manuela P. Bermas, then 15 years of age, assisted by her mother Rosita
Bermas, executed a sworn statement before SPO1 Dominador Nipas, Jr., of the Paraaque Police Station, stating, in sum,
that she had been raped by accused Rufino Mirandilla Bermas, her own father, in 1991 and 1993, as well as on 03 August
1994, particularly the subject matter of the complaint, hereinbefore quoted, duly signed and filed conformably with
Section 7, Rule 112, of the Rules of Court. The Second Assistant Prosecutor, issued a certification to the effect that the
accused had waived his right to a preliminary investigation.
On the day scheduled for his arraignment on 03 October 1994, the accused was brought before the trial court without
counsel. The court thereupon assigned Atty. Rosa Elmira C. Villamin of the Public Attorney's Office to be the counsel de
officio. Accused forthwith pleaded not guilty. The pre-trial was waived.
The initial reception of evidence was held on 19 October 1994. The prosecution placed complainant Manuela Bermas
at the witness stand. She testified on direct examination with hardly any participation by defense counsel who,
inexplicably, later waived the cross-examination and then asked the court to be relieved of her duty as counsel de officio.
"ATTY. VILLARIN:
And I am requesting if this Honorable Court would allow me and my paero besides me, would accede to my request
that I be relieved as counsel de officio because I could not also give justice to the accused because as a lady lawyer
. . . if my paero here and if this Honorable Court will accede to my request.
"COURT:
It is your sworn duty to defend the helpless and the defenseless. That is your sworn duty, Mrs. Counsel de Officio. Are
you retracting?
"ATTY. VILLARIN:
That is why I am asking this Honorable Court."[6]
Counsel's request was granted, and Atty. Roberto Gomez was appointed the new counsel de officio. While Atty. Gomez
was ultimately allowed to cross-examine the complainant, it should be quite evident, however, that he barely had time, to
prepare therefor. On this score, defense counsel Fernandez & Kasilag-Villanueva in the instant appeal would later point
out:

To substitute for her, the Public Attorney recommended Atty. Roberto Gomez to be appointed as defense counsel de
oficio. And so the trial court appointed him.

Atty. Gomez asked for a ten minute recess before he began his cross examination, presumably to prepare. But a ten
minute preparation to cross examine the complainant upon whose testimony largely rests the verdict on the accused who
stands to be meted the death penalty if found guilty, is far too inadequate. He could not possibly have familiarized
himself with the records and surrounding circumstances of the case, read the complaint, the statement of the complainant,
the medico-legal report, memos of the police, transcripts and other relevant documents and confer with the accused and
his witnesses, all in ten minutes.[7]

The prosecution abruptly rested its case after the medico-legal officer had testified.
The reception of the defense evidence was scheduled for 12 December 1994; it was later reset to 09 January
1995. When the case was called on 09 January 1995, the following transpired:
COURT:
Where is the counsel for the accused?
COURT:
Did he file his withdrawal in this case? It is supposed to be the turn of the defense to present its evidence.
PROSECUTOR GARCIA:
22
 Yes, Your Honor. The prosecution had already rested its case.
COURT:
Last time he asked for the continuance of this case and considering that the accused is under detention ... it seems he
cannot comply with his obligation.
COURT:
(To the accused) Nasaan ang abogado mo?
ACCUSED R. BERMAS:
Wala po.
COURT:
It is already the turn of the defense to present its evidence in this case. In view of the fact that the defense counsel is
not interested anymore in defending the accused because last time he moved for the continuance of the hearing of
this case and since this time he did not appear, he is unduly delaying the proceedings of this case and considering
the accused here is under detention, I think it would be better if the Court appoints another lawyer. He should file
his withdrawal if he is not interested anymore.
In view of the fact that the counsel de officio has repeatedly failed to appear in this Court to defend his client-accused,
the Court is hereby constrained to appoint another counsel de officio to handle the defense of the accused. For
this purpose, Atty. Nicanor Lonzame is hereby appointed as the counsel de officio for accused Rufino Mirandilla
Bermas.[8]
The hearing scheduled for that day was reset to 16 January 1995 upon the request of Atty. Lonzame. On even date, Atty.
Lonzame himself asked to be relieved as counsel de officio but later, albeit reluctantly, retracted; thus:
COURT:
Where is the accused? Where is the counsel de officio?
ATTY. NICANOR LONZAME:
As counsel de officio, Your Honor. The lawyer from the PAO is here, may I be allowed to give her my responsibility as
counsel de officio considering that the lawyer from the PAO ...
COURT:
What about?
ATTY. LONZAME:
I was appointed because the PAO lawyer was not around. If the Court will allow us to be relieved from our
responsibility as appointed counsel de officio of the accused ...
COURT:
You want to be relieved of your responsibility as appointed counsel de officio? As an officer of the Court you don't
want to handle the defense of the accused in this case?
ATTY. LONZAME:
I will be withdrawing my previous manifestation that I be relieved of my responsibility as counsel de officio.
COURT:
So, therefore, counsel, are you now ready?
ATTY. LONZAME:
Yes, Your Honor.[9]

23
Trial proceeded with the accused being the first to be put at the witness stand. He denied the accusation against him. The
next witness to be presented was his married daughter who corroborated her fathers claim of innocence.
The defense counsel in the instant appeal took over from Atty. Lonzame who himself, for one reason or another, had
ceased to appear for and in behalf of accused-appellant.
This Court finds and must hold, most regrettably, that accused-appellant has not properly and effectively been
accorded the right to counsel. So important is the right to counsel that it has been enshrined in our fundamental law and
its precursor laws. Indeed, even prior to the advent of the 1935 Constitution, the right to counsel of an accused has
already been recognized under General Order No. 58, dated 23 April 1900, stating that a defendant in all criminal
prosecutions is entitled to counsel at every stage of the proceedings, [10] and that if he is unable to employ counsel, the
court must assign one to defend him.[11] The 1935 Constitution has no less been expressive in declaring, in Article III,
Section 17, thereof, that -

(17) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed to be innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall
enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him,
to have a speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the
attendance of witnesses in his behalf.

Except for a proviso allowing trial in absentia, the right to counsel under the 1973 Constitution, essentially, has remained
unchanged. Under the 1987 Constitution, a worthwhile innovation that has been introduced is the provision from which
prevailing jurisprudence on the availability of the right to counsel as early as the stage of custodial interrogation can be
deemed to be predicated. The rule, found in Sections 12 and 14, Article III, of the 1987 Constitution, states -

Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his
right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot
afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel.

xxxxxxxxx

Sec. 14. x x x x x x x x x

(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the
right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a
speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the
attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is
unjustifiable.

The constitutional mandate is reflected in the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedures which declares in Section 1, Rule
115, thereof, that it is a right of the accused at the trial to be present in person and by counsel at every stage of the
proceedings from the arraignment to the promulgation of the judgment.
The presence and participation of counsel in the defense of an accused in criminal proceedings should never be taken
lightly.[12] Chief Justice Moran in People vs. Holgado,[13] explained:

"In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given an opportunity to be heard by counsel.The
right to be heard would be of little avail if it does not include the right to be heard by counsel. Even the most intelligent or
educated man may have no skill in the science of the law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and, without counsel, he
may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his innocence. And this can
happen more easily to persons who are ignorant or uneducated. It is for this reason that the right to be assisted by counsel
is deemed so important that it has become a constitutional right and it so implemented that under our rules of procedure
it is not enough for the Court to apprise an accused of his right to have an attorney, it is not enough to ask him whether he
desires the aid of an attorney, but it is essential that the court should assign one de oficio for him if he so desires and he is
poor or grant him a reasonable time to procure an attorney of his own." [14]
24
 In William vs. Kaiser,[15] the United States Supreme Court, through the late Justice Douglas, has rightly observed that
the accused needs the aid of counsel lest he be the victim of overzealous prosecutors, of the laws complexity or of his own
ignorance or bewilderment. An accused must be given the right to be represented by counsel for, unless so represented,
there is great danger that any defense presented in his behalf will be as inadequate considering the legal perquisites and
skills needed in the court proceedings.[16] The right to counsel proceeds from the fundamental principle of due process
which basically means that a person must be heard before being condemned. The due process requirement is a part of a
persons basic rights; it is not a mere formality that may be dispensed with or performed perfunctorily.
The right to counsel must be more than just the presence of a lawyer in the courtroom or the mere propounding of
standard questions and objections. The right to counsel means that the accused is amply accorded legal assistance
extended by a counsel who commits himself to the cause for the defense and acts accordingly. The right assumes an active
involvement by the lawyer in the proceedings, particularly at the trial of the case, his bearing constantly in mind of the
basic rights of the accused, his being well-versed on the case, and his knowing the fundamental procedures, essential laws
and existing jurisprudence. The right of an accused to counsel finds substance in the performance by the lawyer of his
sworn duty of fidelity to his client. Tersely put, it means an efficient and truly decisive legal assistance and not a simple
perfunctory representation.[17]
It is never enough that accused be simply informed of his right to counsel; he should also be asked whether he wants
to avail himself of one and should be told that he can hire a counsel of his own choice if he so desires or that one can be
provided to him at his request.[18] Section 7, Rule 116, of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

Sec. 7. Appointment of counsel de oficio. - The court, considering the gravity of the offense and the difficulty of the
questions that may arise, shall appoint as counsel de oficio only such members of the bar in good standing who, by reason
of their experience and ability may adequately defend the accused. But in localities where such members of the bar are
not available, the court may appoint any person, resident of the province and of good repute for probity and ability, to
defend the accused.

A counsel de oficio is expected to do his utmost.[19] A mere pro-forma appointment of de oficio counsel who fails to
genuinely protect the interests of the accused merits disapprobation. [20] The exacting demands expected of a lawyer
should be no less than stringent when one is a counsel de officio. He must take the case not as a burden but as an
opportunity to assist in the proper dispensation of justice. No lawyer is to be excused from this responsibility except only
for the most compelling and cogent reasons.[21]
Just weeks ago, in People vs. Sevilleno, G.R. No. 129058, promulgated on 29 March 1999, this Court has said:

We cannot right finis to this discussion without making known our displeasure over the manner by which the PAO
lawyers dispensed with their duties. All three (3) of them displayed manifest disinterest on the plight of their client.

xxxxxxxxx

Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires every lawyer to serve his client with utmost dedication,
competence and diligence. He must not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in this regard renders
him administratively liable. Obviously, in the instant case, the aforenamed defense lawyers did not protect, much less
uphold, the fundamental rights of the accused. Instead, they haphazardly performed their function as counsel de oficio to
the detriment and prejudice of the accused Sevilleno, however guilty he might have been found to be after
trial. Inevitably, this Court must advise Attys. Agravante, Pabalinas and Saldavia to adhere closely and faithfully to the
tenets espoused in the Code of Professional Responsibility; otherwise, commission of any similar act in the future will be
severely sanctioned.

The Court sees no other choice than to direct the remand of the case to the court a quo for new trial.
WHEREFORE, let this case be REMANDED to the court a quo for trial on the basis of the complaint, aforequoted,
under which he was arraigned. Atty. Ricardo A. Fernandez, Jr. of the Anti-Death Penalty Task Force is hereby appointed
counsel de officio for the appellant.

25
 Attys. Rosa Elmina Villamin of the Public Attorney's Office, Paraaque, Roberto Gomez and Nicanor Lonzame are
hereby ADMONISHED for having fallen much too short of their responsibility as officers of the court and as members of
the Bar and are warned that any similar infraction shall be dealt with most severely.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena,
Gonzaga-Reyes and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. L-No. 5292 August 28, 1909

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff,

vs.
THE MORO MANALINDE, defendant.

Office of the Solicitor-General Harvey for plaintiff.

Ramon Diokno for defendant.

TORRES, J.:

Between 2 and 3 o'clock on the afternoon of the 19th of January, 1909, while Juan Igual, a Spaniard, was seated on a chair
in the doorway of Sousa's store in Cotabato, Moro Province, he suddenly received a wound on the head delivered from
behind and inflicted with a kris. Ricardo Doroteo, a clerk in the said store, who was standing behind the counter, upon
hearing the noise and the cry of the wounded man, ran to his assistance and found him lying on the ground. Meanwhile
the aggressor, the Moro Manalinde, approached a Chinaman named Choa, who was passing along the street, and just as
the latter was putting down his load in front of the door of a store and was about to enter, attacked him with the same
weapon, inflicting a severe wound in the left shoulder, on account of which he fell to the ground. The Moro, who came
from the rancheria of Dupit and had entered the town carrying his weapon wrapped up in banana leaves, in the
meantime escaped by running away from the town. Both wounded men, the Chinaman and the Spaniard, were taken to
the hospital, where the former died within an hour, the record not stating the result of the wound inflicted on the
Spaniard Juan Igual.

In view of the above a complaint was filed by the provincial fiscal with the district court charging Manalinde with the
crime of murder, and proceedings having been instituted, the trial judge, in view of the evidence adduced, rendered
judgment on the 5th of February of said year, sentencing the accused to the penalty of death, to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased in the sum of P1,000, and to pay the costs. The case has been submitted to this court for review.

From the above facts fully substantiated in this case, it appears beyond doubt that the crime of murder, defined and
punished by article 403 of the Penal Code, was committed on the person of the Chinaman Choa, in that the deceased was
unexpectedly and suddenly attacked, receiving a deep cut on the left shoulder at the moment when he had just put down
the load that he was carrying and was about to start for the door of the store in front of which he stopped for the purpose
of entering therein. As a result of the tremendous wound inflicted upon him by the heavy and unexpected blow, he was
unable, not only to defend himself, apart from the fact that he was unarmed, but even to flee from the danger, and falling
to the ground, died in an hour's time. It is unquestionable that by the means and form employed in the attack the violent
death of the said Chinaman was consummated with deceit and treachery (alevosia), one of the five qualifying
circumstances enumerated in the aforesaid article as calling for the greatest punishment.

26
When Manalinde was arrested he pleaded guilty and confessed that he had perpetrated the crime herein mentioned,
stating that his wife had died about one hundred days before and that he had come from his home in Catumaldu by order
of the Datto Rajamudah Mupuck, who had directed him to go juramentado in Cotabato in order to kill somebody, because
the said Mupuck had certain grievances to avenge against a lieutenant and a sergeant, the said datto further stating that if
he, Manalinde, was successful in the matter, he would give him a pretty woman on his return, but that in case he was
captured he was to say that he performed the killing by order of Maticayo, Datto Piang, Tambal and Inug. In order to
carry out his intention to kill two persons in the town of Cotabato he provided himself with a kris, which he concealed in
banana leaves, and, traveling for a day and a night from his home, upon reaching the town, attacked from behind a
Spaniard who was seated in front of a store and, wounding him, immediately after attacked a Chinaman, who was close
by, just as the latter was placing a tin that he was carrying on the ground and he was about to enter a store near by,
cutting him on the left shoulder and fleeing at once; he further stated that he had no quarrel with the assaulted persons.

From the statements made by the accused his culpability as the sole-confessed and self-convicted author of the crime in
question has been unquestionably established, nor can his allegation that he acted by order of Datto Mupuck and that
therefore he was not responsible exculpate him, because it was not a matter of proper obedience. The excuse that he
went juramentado by order of the said datto and on that account killed only two persons, whereas if he had taken the oath
of his own volition he would have killed many more, because it is the barbarous and savage custom of a juramentado to
kill anyone without any motive or reason whatever, can not under any consideration be accepted or considered under the
laws of civilized nations; such exhibitions of ferocity and savagery must be restrained, especially as the very people who
up to the present time have been practicing such acts are well aware that the established authorities in this country can
never allow them to go unpunished, and as has happened a number of times in towns where juramentados are in the habit
of appearing, the punishment of the author has followed every crime so committed.

In the commission of the crime of murder the presence of aggravating circumstances 3 and 7 of article 10 of the Penal
Code should be taken into consideration in that promise of reward and premeditation are present, which in the present
case are held to be generic, since the crime has already been qualified as committed with the treachery, because the
accused confessed that he voluntarily obeyed the order given him by Datto Mupuck to go juramentadoand kill some one in
the town of Cotabato, with the promise that if he escaped punishment he would be rewarded with a pretty woman. Upon
complying with the order the accused undoubtedly acted of his own volition and with the knowledge that he would
inflict irreparable injury on some of his fellow-beings, depriving them of life without any reason whatever, well knowing
that he was about to commit a most serious deed which the laws in force in this country and the constituted authorities
could by no means permit. Datto Mupuck, who ordered and induced him to commit the crimes, as well as the accused
knew perfectly well that he might be caught and punished in the act of committing them.

As to the other circumstance it is also unquestionable that the accused, upon accepting the order and undertaking the
journey in order to comply therewith, deliberately considered and carefully and thoughtfully meditated over the nature
and the consequences of the acts which, under orders received from the said datto, he was about to carry out, and to that
end provided himself with a weapon, concealing it by wrapping it up, and started on a journey of a day and a night for
the sole purpose of taking the life of two unfortunate persons whom he did not know, and with whom he had never had
any trouble; nor did there exist any reason which, to a certain extent, might warrant his perverse deed. The fact that the
arrangement between the instigator and the tool considered the killing of unknown persons, the first encountered, does
not bar the consideration of the circumstance of premeditation. The nature and the circumstances which characterize the
crime, the perversity of the culprit, and the material and moral injury are the same, and the fact that the victim was not
predetermined does not affect nor alter the nature of the crime. The person having been deprived of his life by deeds
executed with deliberate intent, the crime is considered a premeditated one as the firm and persistent intention of the
accused from the moment, before said death, when he received the order until the crime was committed in manifestly
evident. Even though in a crime committed upon offer of money, reward or promise, premeditation is sometimes present,
the latter not being inherent in the former, and there existing no incompatibility between the two, premeditation can not
necessarily be considered as included merely because an offer of money, reward or promise was made, for the latter
might have existed without the former, the one being independent of the other. In the present case there can be no doubt
that after the crime was agreed upon by means of a promise of reward, the criminal by his subsequent conduct showed a
persistency and firm intent in his plan to carry out the crime which he intentionally agreed to execute, it being immaterial
whether Datto Mupuck did or did not conceive the crime, once Manalinde obeyed the inducement and voluntarily
executed it.

27
The facts in this case are quite different from those in the proceedings instituted by the United States vs. Caranto et al.,
wherein the decision on page 256 of Volume IV of the Philippine Reports was rendered, as may be seen from the mere
perusal of the statement of facts. It is also different from the case where a criminal who has made up his mind to kill a
certain individual kills a person other than the object of his criminal intent. On going to Cotabato the Moro Manalinde
intended to and did kill the first two persons he encountered, and the fact that the victim was not predetermined does not
alter the nature, conditions, or circumstances of the crime, for the reason that to cause the violent death of a human being
without any reasonable motive is always punishable with a more or less grave penalty according to the nature of the
concurrent circumstances.

For the above reasons and in view of the fact that no mitigating circumstance is present to neutralize the effects of the
aggravating ones, it is our opinion that the judgment appealed from should be affirmed with costs provided however,
that the penalty imposed on the culprit shall be executed in accordance with the provisions of Acts. Nos. 451 and 1577,
and that in the event of a pardon being granted he shall likewise be sentenced to suffer the accessory penalties imposed
by article 53 of the Penal Code. So ordered.

Arellano, C. J., Johnson, Carson, and Moreland, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-32914 August 30, 1974

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
LAUREANO SANGALANG, accused-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Assistant Solicitor General Octavio R. Ramirez and Solicitor Ma. Rosario Quetulio
Losa for plaintiff-appellee.

Narciso V. Cruz, Jr. for accused-appellant.

AQUINO, J.:p

This is a murder case. The testimonies of the two prosecution eyewitnesses disclose that at around six o'clock in the
morning of June 9, 1968 Ricardo Cortez left his nipa hut located at Sitio Adlas, Barrio Biluso, Silang, Cavite to gather tuba
from a coconut tree nearby. Flora Sarno, his wife, was left inside the hut. While he was on top of the tree gathering tuba,
he was struck by a volley of shots. He fell to the ground at the base of the coconut tree.

His wife Flora heard three successive shot coming south of the hut. She went outside the hut. From a distance of about
twenty-five meters, she saw five men, each armed with a long firearm, firing at her husband. He was already wounded
and was lying on the ground at the foot of the coconut tree. His assailants were about five meters away from him.

She recognized Laureano Sangalang as one of the five armed men who were firing at her husband. She and her brother
Ricardo had known Sangalang since their childhood. She also recognized Conrado Gonzales, Irineo Canuel, Perino
Canuel and Eleuterio Cuyom as the other malefactors.

Flora ran towards the place where her husband had fallen. She shouted, "Bakit ninyo pinagbabaril ang aking asawa". The
five persons fired at her. She was then about twenty meters away from them. She retreated to the hut for cover. She heard

28
some more shots. After the lapse of about five minutes, Laureano Sangalang and his companions left the place. When
Flora returned to the spot where her husband was prostrate, he was already dead.

On the occasion already described, Ricardo Sarno, twenty-seven years old, a brother of Flora, was inside his own nipa hut
which was about ten meters away from Flora's hut. He was drinking coffee. His wife and children were eating breakfast.
He heard several shots. He came out of his hut. He saw his brother-in-law being shot by Laureano Sangalang, Eleuterio
Cuyom, Perino Canuel, Irineo Canuel and Conrado Gonzales. He saw Sangalang using a Garand carbine in shooting his
brother-in-law. The latter fell from the top of the coconut tree after he was shot (10 tsn). His sister Flora was trying to
approach her husband but she had to flee to her hut when Sangalang and his companions fired at her. He wanted to join
her but he was likewise fired upon by the five men. So, he retired and took refuge in his own hut.

Later, Sarno saw his sister Flora, sitting inside her hut. He followed her after she left the hut and went to see her dead
husband, who was lying on the ground, face up, at the base of the coconut tree. When he noticed that his brother-in-law
was already dead, he gathered his children and brought them to Sitio Biga, which was more or less thirty meters away
from his hut in Sitio Adlas. Ricardo reported the killing to the chief of police who went to the scene of the crime with
some policemen and Constabularymen.

The necropsy report shows that the twenty-five-year-old Cortez sustained twenty-three gunshot wounds on the different
parts of the body, fourteen of which were entrance-wounds, and nine were exit-wounds (Exh. A and B). He died due to
the multiple gunshot wounds (Exh. C).

On June 10, 1968 or on the day following the killing, Flora and Ricardo were interrogated by the Silang police. They
executed sworn statements before the Municipal Judge pointing to Laureano Sangalang, Conrado Gonzales, Irineo
Canuel, Perino Canuel and Eleuterio Cuyom as the assassins of Ricardo Cortez. Flora said in her statement that she knew
those persons because from time to time they used to pass by her place. They resided at Barrio Capitula, Dasmarias,
which is near Barrio Adlas. On the basis of those statements, the police filed on June 10 in the Municipal Court a
complaint for murder against the five aforenamed persons. Sangalang was arrested. He posted bail in the sum of P50,000
on June 13. He waived the second stage of the preliminary investigation. The other accused have not been apprehended.
On August 8, 1968 the Provincial Fiscal filed an information for murder against Sangalang.

After trial, the Court of First Instance of Cavite, Tagaytay City Branch, rendered a judgment convicting Sangalang of
murder, sentencing him to reclusion perpetua and ordering him to pay the heirs of Ricardo Cortez an indemnity of twelve
thousand pesos and to pay his widow moral damages in the sum of ten thousand pesos (Criminal Case No. TG-162).
Sangalang appealed.

The appellant, a fifty-six-year old farmer, admitted that he knew Cortez and that he knows his wife, Flora Sarno. He
pleaded an alibi. He declared that in the afternoon of June 8, 1968 he and Crispulo Mendoza went to the house of Julian
Gatdula at Dapitan Street, Sampaloc, Manila. He arrived at Gatdula's place at six o'clock. He wanted to borrow money
from Gatdula to defray the matriculation fees of his children.

As Gatdula had no money at that time, he advised Sangalang to wait until morning. He would try to raise the sum of two
hundred pesos which Sangalang desired to borrow. Sangalang and Mendoza agreed. They allegedly slept in Gatdula's
house on the night of June 8th. The next morning, they breakfasted in that house. At about ten o'clock on June 9, Gatdula
delivered the two hundred pesos to Sangalang. He and Mendoza then went to the Central Market in Manila and then to
Quiapo. They returned to Cavite and arrived at seven o'clock in the evening of June 9 in Barrio Capdula. Gatdula and
Mendoza corroborated Sangalang's alibi.

In this appeal Sangalang insists on his alibi and impugns the credibility of the prosecution eyewitnesses, Mrs. Cortez and
the victim's brother-in-law, Ricardo Sarno. The basic issue is whether their eyewitness-testimony that they saw appellant
Sangalang as one of the five armed persons, who riddled Cortez with fourteen gunshot wounds of entry, is sufficient to
overcome his alibi. In essence, the case projects the ever recurring conflict in criminal jurisprudence between positive
identification and alibi.

29
The trial court rejected appellant's alibi. It noted that although his witnesses, Mendoza and Gatdula, learned of his arrest,
and Mendoza even visited him in the municipal jail, Sangalang and his witnesses did not interpose the defense of alibi
when he was investigated by the police and when he was summoned at the preliminary investigation.

Sangalang points to certain discrepancies in the declarations of Mrs. Cortez and her brother Ricardo Sarno. Those
inconsistencies, which are not glaring, strengthen their credibility and show that their testimonies were not coached nor
rehearsed. The discrepancies may be attributed to deficiencies in observation and recollection, or misapprehension of the
misleading and confusing questions during cross-examination, or to the defective translation of the questions and
answers but they do not necessarily indicate a wilful attempt to commit falsehood (People vs. Selfaison, 110 Phil. 839;
People vs. Resayaga, L-23234, December 26, 1973, 54 SCRA 350).

The controlling fact is that Mrs. Cortez and Sarno clearly and consistently testified that they saw Sangalang, a person
already well-known to them, among the five armed persons who shot Ricardo Cortez. That unwavering identification
negates appellant's alibi.

The prosecution did not prove the motive for the killing. On the other hand, Sangalang did not show that Mrs. Cortez and
Sarno were impelled by a malicious desire to falsely incriminate him. .

Counsel de oficio meticulously examined the contradictions and deficiencies in the evidence for the prosecution. He made
a spirited defense of the appellant. However, his efforts failed to cast any reasonable doubt on Sangalang's complicity in
the killing.

The victim was shot while he was gathering tuba on top of a coconut tree. He was unarmed and defenseless. He was not
expecting to be assaulted. He did not give any immediate provocation. The deliberate, surprise attack shows that
Sangalang and his companions employed a mode of execution which insured the killing without any risk to them arising
from any defense which the victim could have made. The qualifying circumstance of treachery (alevosia), which was
alleged in the information, was duly established (See art. 14[16], Revised Penal Code). Hence, the killing can be
categorized as murder (See People vs. Sedenio, 94 Phil. 1046). Treachery absorbs the aggravating circumstance of band(U.
S. vs. Abelinde, 1 Phil. 568). Evident premeditation, which was alleged in the information, was not proven.

The trial court correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua on Sangalang (Arts. 64[1] and 248, Revised Penal Code).

Finding no error in its judgment, the same is affirmed with costs against the appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Zaldivar (Chairman), Fernando, Barredo and Fernandez, JJ., concur.

Antonio, J., took no take part.

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 115431. April 18, 1996]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOSE TORREFIEL, accused-appellant.

SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; ALIBI; CANNOT PREVAIL OVER POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION OF THE
ACCUSED AND ABSENT PHYSICAL IMPOSSIBILITY TO BE AT THE SCENE OF THE CRIME. - It is well-
settled that the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused. Furthermore, for alibi to

30
 prosper, the accused must establish not only that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed but that it
was also physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission.
2. ID.; ID.; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESS; UPHELD ABSENT IMPROPER MOTIVE. - It is significant to note that no
improper motive can be imputed to Realidad Mangilog as would make her testify falsely against accused-appellant,
hence her testimony is worthy of full faith and credit.
3. ID.; ID.; FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS CONCLUSIVE AND OUGHT NOT TO BE
DISTURBED; EXCEPTION. - The Court of Appeals appreciated abuse of superior strength, aid of armed men and
evident premeditation as aggravating circumstances. These findings are factual and the rule is that findings of the
Court of Appeals upon factual questions are conclusive and ought not to be disturbed unless shown to be contrary to
the evidence on record, and, in this case, there is no such showing.
4. CRIMINAL LAW; CONSPIRACY; MAY BE INFERRED FROM THE ACTS OF THE ACCUSED WHICH
INDICATE THEIR COMMON INTENTION TO COMMIT THE CRIME. This contention we also find untenable,
conspiracy being clearly manifest in this case as was correctly found by the Court of Appeals. For collective
responsibility to be established, it is not necessary that conspiracy be proved by direct evidence of a prior agreement
to commit the crime as only rarely would such an agreement be demonstrable since in the nature of things criminal
undertakings are rarely documented by agreement in writing. Conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the
accused immediately prior to, during and right after the shooting of the victim which indicate their common
intention to commit the crime. The record shows that: (1) all the accused which include accused-appellant arrived
together at the scene of the killings; (2) they were all fully armed; (3) three of them simultaneously shot to death
Leopoldo Mangilog, while an undetermined number shot and stabbed to death Reynaldo Mangilog; (4) the attack on
the two victims was executed simultaneously; and (5) the accuseds statement to the effect that the victims were
responsible for the fact that the military men were running after them. This tends to establish a motive on their part
to kill the victims. All these indubitably indicate a concerted effort on the part of the accused on a common design to
kill the victims.
5. ID.; ID.; THE ACT OF ONE CONSPIRATOR IS THE ACT OF ALL. - Conspiracy having been adequately shown, all
the accused are answerable as co-principals regardless of the degree of their participation. In fact, it is not necessary
to ascertain the individual participation in the final liquidation of the victims or to ascertain the precise modality or
extent of participation of each individual conspirator as the applicable rule is that the act of one conspirator is the act
of all of them. It hardly matters, therefore, that accused-appellant did not actually participate in the killing of
Reynaldo Mangilog or of Leopoldo Mangilog.
6. ID.; QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE; TREACHERY; PRESENT WHEN VICTIMS WERE CLEARLY NOT IN ANY
POSITION TO DEFEND THEMSELVES; CASE AT BAR. - As alleged in the informations and as correctly
observed by the Solicitor General, the killing of the victims was qualified by treachery. Leopoldo Mangilog was shot
while he was serving the accused coffee or shortly thereafter. Reynaldo Mangilog, on the other hand, was shot and
stabbed to death while he was taking a bath. It may be added that the victims were naturally unarmed at that time
and their execution was done so early in the morning, that is, when they had practically just awakened. Under the
circumstances, the victims were clearly not in any position to defend themselves from the sudden and unexpected
attack of the accused. These circumstances are manifestly indicative of the presence of the conditions under which
treachery may be appreciated, i.e., the employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked no
opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate, and that said means of execution was deliberately or consciously
adopted.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ABSORBS THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF ABUSE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH AND AID OF ARMED
MEN. - However, we believe, and so hold, that treachery absorbs the circumstances of abuse of superior strength
and aid of armed men, as it appears that the accused saw to it that they were armed and far outnumbered the victims
precisely to ensure the accomplishment of their criminal objective.
8. ID.; MURDER; PROPER IMPOSABLE PENALTY. - Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the prescribed
penalty for murder is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. Since we find accused-appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder qualified by treachery in Criminal Cases Nos. 2909 and 2910 and
that the generic aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation was also attendant, the penalty of reclusion
perpetua should be imposed in each case, applying Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code and considering the
proscription against the imposition of the death penalty at the time the crimes were committed.

31
 APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Cyril A. Tangle for accused-appellants.

DECISION
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:

Accused-appellant Jose Torrefiel; Hilario Masgong alias Mark; Casiano Masgong alias Manny; Saturnino Suyod alias
Ka Eddie; Jerry Delicano alias Ka Cocoy; Luciano Solanoy, Jr., alias Ka Balot; Noel Semira alias Ka Nido; Ricky David
alias Ka Macky; and Alex Francisco alias Ka Jing, were charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 2909 and 2910 for Murder and in
Criminal Case No. 2911 for Robbery before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, Kalibo, Alklan. These cases were, upon
agreement of the parties, jointly tried, since they arose from the same incident and involved the same parties. The trial
proceeded as against the accused-appellant Jose Torrefiel only, the rest of the accused having remained at large.
After trial, the court a quo convicted accused-appellant1 in each of the cases, the dispositive portions of which are
quoted hereinbelow:
In Criminal Case No. 2909 for Murder:

WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused, Jose Torrefiel, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and
hereby sentences the accused to a penalty of imprisonment of Seventeen (17) years, Four (4) months and One (1) day to
Eighteen (18) years and Eight (8) months.

The accused is hereby ordered also to indemnify the family of the victim the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P50,000.00) by way of damages. x x x2

In Criminal Case No. 2910 for Murder:

WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused, Jose Torrefiel, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and
hereby sentences the accused to a penalty of imprisonment of Seventeen (17) years, Four (4) months and One (1) day to
Eighteen (18) years and Eight (8) months.

The accused is hereby ordered also to indemnify the family of the victim the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P50,000.00) by way of damages. x x x3

In Criminal Case No. 2911 for Robbery:

WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused Jose Torrefiel guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery and
sentences the accused to suffer the penalty of Twelve (12) years and One (1) day to Fourteen (14) years and Eight (8)
months. x x x.4

Accused-appellant Jose Torrefiel, appealed to the Court of Appeals. After considering the evidence and the law
involved, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction in all the cases but refrained from entering judgment
in Criminal Cases Nos. 2909 and 2910 for murder, having ascertained that the proper imposable penalty for each of said
crimes is reclusion perpetua, and instead, certified these two (2) cases to us for final determination pursuant to Section 13 of
Rule 124 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.
The facts as correctly summarized by the prosecution in its Brief are as follows: 5

On May 26, 1989 at about 5:00 oclock in the morning at Barangay Naligusan, Ibajay, Aklan, Realidad Mangilog woke up
early to prepare their breakfast. Her husband Leopoldo Mangilog and her son Reynaldo were about to join her
downstairs, when someone knocked at the kitchen backdoor (TSN, March 21, 1990, pp. 3-4).

32
It was Leonardo who opened the door. When the door was opened appellant Jose Torrefiel armed with a bolo and a hand
gun entered the house first followed by Masiano Masgong, Hilario Masgong, Alex Francisco, Saturnino Suyod and Noel
alias Nido in that order, who were all armed with long firearms. (TSN, Ibid., p. 5)

The group greeted Leopoldo as How are you Tay? to which the latter answered as usual. Leopoldo even served the
newcomers with coffee, but because the coffee was not sufficient for them, Realidad asked Hermogenes Calizo, who was
then the errand boy of the Mangilog (sic), to buy coffee from the store. (TSN, Id., pp. 5-6).

The group of appellant Torrefiel did not even touch or taste the coffee served them by Leopoldo. Instead, appellant,
Casiano Masgong and Satur Suyod aimed their guns at Leopoldo and started shooting him to death (TSN, Id., p.
6).6 Simultaneous to the shooting of Leopoldo inside the house by the group of appellant was the shooting and stabbing of
Reynaldo who was then taking a bath inside the bathroom located outside of the house by the other members of the
group who did not enter the house. (TSN. id., p. 7)

After the killing of Leopoldo and Reynaldo, the accused ransacked the house and took P500.00 cash, wrist watch, kitchen
wares, grocery items, chickens and guitar. (TSN, Id., p. 10)

Before the accused left the house of the victims, they even fired their guns at random. They were blaming the victims to
be responsible to the incident why the military was running after them. They were also telling the people along the road
that the fish is okey and could be ready to be butchered (Id., p. 11).

Accused-appellant invoked the defense of alibi, claiming that at about 7:00 oclock in the morning of May 26, 1989, he
was at the house of Barangay Captain Benedicto Puod in Barangay Agbalogo, Makato, Aklan, which can be reached in an
hour and a half( 1 1/2) from Barangay Naligusan, Ibajay, Aklan, the scene of the incident. He had gone on vacation to
Barangay Agbalogo on May 22, 1989 and attended the fiesta on May 25, 1989. He had remained in the said barangay since
then upon the advice of his wife not to return to Barangay Naligusan, Ibajay, Aklan, appellants place of residence, as the
situation there was somewhat hot.7 Benedicto Puod confirmed appellants claim as to his whereabouts in the morning
of May 26, 1989, recounting that he and appellant were, indeed, together drinking alcoholic drinks from 7:00 to 11:00
oclock in the morning on the occasion of the birthday of his child. 8 In addition, Pedro Tosio as a witness testified as to the
presence of appellant at his house in Barangay Agbalogo in the morning until about 5:00 oclock in the afternoon
of May 25, 1989, the day of the fiesta, declaring further that he also saw appellant pass by his house on May 26, 1989.9
In his appeal, accused-appellant interposed the following assignment of errors:
I

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF MURDER IN
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 2909.

II

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF MURDER IN
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 2910.

III

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF ROBBERY IN
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 2911.10

On the first and third assignment of errors, accused-appellant maintains his defense of alibi, stressing that, not being
around at the time and place of the incident as he was at Barangay Agbalogo, Makato, Aklan, he could not have
murdered Leopoldo Mangilog and robbed the Mangillogs of their personal belongings.
We are not persuaded.

33
 It is well-settled that the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused. 11Furthermore,
for alibi to prosper, the accused must establish not only that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed but
that it was also physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. 12
That accused-appellant had been positively identified as one of the culprits by prosecution witness Realidad
Mangilog cannot be doubted. The Mangilogs and the accused-appellant had known each other for years as neighbors.
Accused-appellant whose parents reside in Barangay Agbalogo, Makato, Aklan, established residence in Barangay
Naligusan, Ibajay, Aklan when he got married to a resident there. Since his house is only about one hundred and fifty
(150) meters away from that of the Mangilogs, there were occasions when accused-appellant would visit the Mangilogs,
usually for coffee, and that Leopoldo Mangilog would also go to the accused-appellants house. Indeed, eyewitness
Realidad Mangilog knows the accused-appellant so well that she could not have been mistaken in identifying appellant as
one of those armed men responsible for the death of her husband and son on that fateful morning of May 26, 1989. She
testified thus:
Q. When your husband open (sic) the door, was there somebody who got inside?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Where were you at that time?
A. I am (sic) at that time at the door dividing the sala and the dining room.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Were you able to recognized (sic) those persons who entered your house?
A. I can recognized (sic) Jose Torrefiel leading the group and Masiano Masgong alias Manny, Alex Francisco
followed by Satur or Saturnino Suyod and the other one was Noel Semira alias Nido. 13
Moreover, the two other prosecution witnesses, Coreto Maguirang and Hermogenes Calizo, confirmed the presence
of accused-appellant in Barangay Naligusan, Ibajay, Aklan at the time of the incident in question. Maquirang testified that
while he watched over his carabao which was grazing on May 26, 1989 at around 5:00 oclock in the morning, he saw the
appellant and his group as they passed by him from a distance of about ten (10) meters heading towards the direction of
the house of Leopoldo Mangilog in Barangay Naligusan, Ibajay, Aklan. 14 He could not be mistaken as to appellants
identity since he had on several occasions seen appellant together with the same group of armed men.15 Calizo, on the
other hand, claimed that he had seen appellant face to face in the house of the Mangilogs that same morning of May 26,
1989 shortly before the subject incident occurred since at that time he was living in said house. He only happened to be
sent out by Realidad Mangilog to buy coffee so he did not get to see the actual killing of Leopoldo and Reynaldo
Mangilog.16
It is significant to note that no improper motive can be imputed to Realidad Mangilog as would make her testify
falsely against accused-appellant; hence her testimony is worthy of full faith and credit. 17
Evidently complementing the positive identification of accused-appellant as one of the perpetrators of the crimes
charged is his failure to prove that it was physically impossible for him to be at Barangay Naligusan, Ibajay, Aklan at the
time of the incident, assuming that his claim that he went to the house of Barangay Captain Puod at 7:00 oclock in the
morning of May 26, 1989 was true. As testified to by appellant himself, it would take just one and a half (1 ) hours to reach
Barangay Naligusan, Ibajay, Aklan from Barangay Agbalogo, Makato, Aklan. Needless to state, it would not at all be
impossible for appellant to be at Barangay Agbalogo at 7:00 oclock in the morning or some two hours after the crimes
were committed at Barangay Naligusan.
In his second assignment of error, accused-appellant contends that he had nothing to do with the killing of the victim
Reynaldo Mangilog, obviously relying on the testimony of Realidad Mangilog to the effect that Reynaldo Mangilog was
shot and stabbed to death by the members of appellants group who stationed themselves outside the house.
This contention we also find untenable, conspiracy being clearly manifest in this case as was correctly found by the
Court of Appeals. For collective responsibility to be established, it is not necessary that conspiracy be proved by direct
evidence of a prior agreement to commit the crime18 as only rarely would such an agreement be demonstrable since in the
nature of things criminal undertakings are rarely documented by agreement in writing.19 Conspiracy may be inferred
from the acts of the accused immediately prior to, during and right after the shooting of the victim which indicate their
common intention to commit the crime.20
34
 The record shows that: (1) all the accused which include accused-appellant arrived together at the scene of the
killings; (2) they were all fully armed; (3) three of them simultaneously shot to death Leopoldo Mangilog, while an
undetermined number shot and stabbed to death Reynaldo Mangilog; (4) the attack on the two victims was executed
simultaneously; and (5) the accuseds statement to the effect that the victims were responsible for the fact that the military
men were running after them. This tends to establish a motive on their part to kill the victims. All these indubitably
indicate a concerted effort on the part of the accused on a common design to kill the victims.
Conspiracy having been adequately shown, all the accused are answerable as co-principals regardless of the degree
of their participation.21 In fact, it is not necessary to ascertain the individual participation in the final liquidation of the
victims22 or to ascertain the precise modality or extent of participation of each individual conspirator as the applicable
rule is that the act of one conspirator is the act of all of them. 23 It hardly matters, therefore, that accused-appellant did not
actually participate in the killing of Reynaldo Mangilog or of Leopoldo Mangilog.
As alleged in the informations and as correctly observed by the Solicitor General, the killing of the victims was
qualified by treachery. Leopoldo Mangilog was shot while he was serving the accused coffee or shortly thereafter.
Reynaldo Mangilog, on the other hand, was shot and stabbed to death while he was taking a bath. It may be added that
the victims were naturally unarmed at that time and their execution was done so early in the morning, that is, when they
had practically just awakened. Under the circumstances, the victims were clearly not in any position to defend themselves
from the sudden and unexpected attack of the accused.24 These circumstances are
manifestly indicative of the presence of the conditions under which treachery may be appreciated, i.e., the
employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate, and
that said means of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted. 25
The Court of Appeals appreciated abuse of superior strength, aid of armed men and evident premeditation as
aggravating circumstances. These findings are factual and the rule is that findings of the Court of Appeals upon factual
questions are conclusive and ought not to be disturbed unless shown to be contrary to the evidence on record, 26 and, in
this case, there is no such showing. However, we believe, and so hold, that treachery absorbs the circumstances of abuse
of superior strength and aid of armed men, as it appears that the accused saw to it that they were armed and far
outnumbered the victims precisely to ensure the accomplishment of their criminal objective.27
Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the prescribed penalty for murder is reclusion temporal in its maximum
period to death. Since we find accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder qualified by
treachery in Criminal Cases Nos. 2909 and 2910 and that the generic aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation
was also attendant, the penalty of reclusion perpetua should be imposed in each case, applying Article 63 of the Revised
Penal Code and considering the proscription against the imposition of the death penalty at the time the crimes were
committed.
WHEREFORE, the decisions of the trial court are hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the accused-
appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each case of murder (Criminal Cases Nos. 2909 and
2910).
SO ORDERED.
Padilla (Chairman), Bellosillo, Vitug, and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 125633. December 9, 1999]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROLANDO ALFANTA y ALO, accused-appellant.

DECISION

35
VITUG, J.:

Before this Court, by way of automatic review, is the decision, dated 29 July 1996, of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City, Branch 82, convicting[1] accused-appellant Rolando Alfanta y Alo of rape with two aggravating
circumstances and sentencing him to suffer the extreme penalty of death.
Rolando Alfanta was charged with the crime of rape in an information that simply read:

That on or about the 26th day of August, 1995, in the City of Makati, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously have carnal knowledge upon the person of one NITA FERNANDEZ y JOSEFA against her will and
consent.[2]

When arraigned on 27 September 1995, accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty to the crime charged. Trial
thereupon ensued.
The evidence of the parties has been recited in good detail by the trial court in its decision under review, thus:

The first prosecution witness was Dr. Noel Minay, Medico Legal Officer of the National Bureau of Investigation who
testified that on August 27, 1995 at around 5:45 in the afternoon, he performed a physical examination and medico genital
examination on one Nita Fernandez for alleged rape. Upon physical examination he found mark swelling on the left
lower jaw or on the mandibular area left portion; and, upon examination of the hymen, he found that the labia majora and
minora gaping, similar to the appearance of a woman who had just given birth; or a normal appearance as a result of
several sexual intercourses that had been performed. He submitted a report on his findings (Exhibit A).

The next witness was Nita Fernandez, the offended party alleged in the information who testified that on August 26, 1995
at around 12:00 o'clock midnight, while asleep in the residence of a friend at AFOVAI Fort Bonifacio, Makati city, a man
whom she had not seen before suddenly entered the house where she was sleeping, pulled her, boxed her jaw and put his
hand on her mouth, and told her that if she will not obey him, he will kill her. She resisted, but could not do
anything. Thereafter, she was forced to climb a fence.Because of fear, as the man was holding a bolo, she followed. After
climbing the fence, the man instructed her to go to a vacant house. She followed, as instructed. While at the vacant house,
she was told to undress, she did because of fear, as the man was holding a bolo. Thereafter, the man embraced and kissed
her. Then she was told to lie down and told to separate her legs. The man inserted his penis into her vagina. After
inserting the mans penis to her vagina, she was told to lie face down. She complied, thereafter, the man inserted his penis
into her anus. After inserting the mans penis into her anus, she was told to turn around face up.All these acts of the man
hurt her. After turning around face up, the man inserted his fingers in and out into her private part. After the man had
finished inserting his fingers in and out of her private part, she was told to go near him and lie beside him, and not to
dress up as he was going to take a rest and at the same time telling her not to tell what happened to others saying
that lahat ng nirape ko ay pinatay ko dahil sa ayokong may magsumbong. All the time the man was inserting his penis and
fingers into her private part and into her anus, she was shouting: tulungan po ninyo ako,' but nobody responded. Noticing
that the man was already sleeping, she suddenly got the knife at waist of the man and stab the man on his chest. The knife
broke. She suddenly grabbed the bolo and hack the man several times. Thereafter, she put on her dress, got hold of the
bolo and ran to the signal office of soldiers. When she arrived at the signal office of soldiers, she told the persons she met
that she killed a man. The bolo was taken from her by the soldiers. With, soldiers, they went to the place where she was
raped. They found the man lying down still alive. The man was brought to the hospital. The man turned out to be accused
Rolando Alfanta y Alo. Thereafter, she executed an affidavit (Exh. C), narrating what happened to her to the police; and
was brought to the NBI Medico-Legal Officer for examination.

On cross examination she testified that, from Valle Verde, Pasig City, where she worked as housemaid, she went to her
friends house named Patrick because she brought mongo and because she and Patricks wife Inday, are friends, arriving in
the house of Patrick at 6:30 in the evening of August 26, 1995. She was not able to go back to her place of work at Valle
Verde, Pasig because it was already late at night and was told to sleep at Patricks house. Earlier that evening, at 9:00, she
saw accused passed by in front of the house. Aside from her two (2) other persons slept in the house of Patrick, Inday and
son. She slept in the sala, while Inday and her son in a room. The door of the house was closed, but was not locked. In
entering the house were she slept, one has to reach the sala first. When awakened, she shouted, but nobody heard her

36
because they were sleeping and at the same time the accused placed his hand on her mouth. She was really afraid because
she was boxed on her chest and accused was holding a bolo. While outside the house she was boxed. At the garage, which
was not lighted, she was told to undress. She followed, because of fear. Accused also undressed himself. While accused
was on top of her, holding a bolo, she cried. Accused is not her sweetheart. She even said, why will I hack him if he is my
sweetheart.

The last witness for prosecution was Lilia Hogar of the Womens Desk Unit, Makati Police Station who testified that she
came into the possession of the bolo, Exh. D, because Nita Fernandez was brought to Sub-Station A. The bolo, which was
brought by Nita Fernandez to the Military Signal Village, was in turn given to the Central Police Desk wherein she is the
Investigator. After the bolo was handed to her by the soldiers of the Signal Village, she conducted an investigation. Based
on her investigation, she learned from Nita Fernandez that when Nita Fernandez woke up at 12:00 midnight on August
26, 1995, Nita Fernandez saw a man standing beside her. Nita was punched on the left portion of the face and ordered her
to go outside, instructed to climb over a fence on the other side of the house. After climbing the fence, Nita Fernandez was
told to undress, was boxed on her breast and was told to lie down in a vacant house owned by Captain Pascua, where
suspect raped Nita Fernandez. On their way to the hospital on board the Makati Police car, she asked accused why he
rape Nita Fernandez. Accused answered that Fernandez was not telling the truth because they were sweethearts.

Defense presented the accused. Accused testified that on August 26, 1995, while at AFOVAI Village, Municipality of
Makati, fixing the fence of the house of General Renato Icarma together with many other laborers, somebody told him
that his wife was waiting for him in the house of Captain Pascua. At 10:00 oclock that evening, he went to the house of
Captain Pascua; and upon reaching the house, he knocked, and called Patrick Augusto Ablon, the caretaker of Captain
Pascua. Belinda Ablon, the cousin of Patrick Augusto Ablon, opened the door. After opening the door, Nita Fernandez,
his live-in partner for almost a year came out, in an angry mood, because she has been waiting for him for long, and asked
him why he was late. He explained that he did not expect her to come, as his understanding with Nita Fernandez was, he
will call her by phone or write her before she comes. Then Nita Fernandez told him that they talk outside as she was
ashamed with the neighbor, and they will disturb the child who was sleeping. After half hour talking, he invited Nita to
sleep. He and Nita went to a vacant house, owned by a Colonel passing a fence. When they arrived in the vacant house, it
was closed, so they slept in the terrace. He denied doing what Nita Fernandez claimed he did. He claimed that, he was
surprised why Fernandez hacked him, for he knows of no reason why Nita Fernandez will hack him. He believes that
Nita Fernandez concocted the story of rape because of fear that he will file a case against Nita Fernandez for hacking him.

On cross-examination, accused testified that, he has been staying in the house of General Romeo Icarma (the house where
he and 15 other workers were constructing a fence), since 1990. His livelihood was, as a Mason, since 1993. In February
1995, the daughter of Nita Fernandez named, Lucia who is married to Lito introduced him to Nita. He and Nita became
sweethearts in February 1995.They have not live together because Nita was working at Valle Verde. They only meet
during Nitas day off. He has been at Nitas place of work, but he used to call then at her telephone numbers which are
6326062 and 6356060. They used to see each other at Gen. Icarmas place where he lived. On August 26, 1995, when the
incident in questioned happened, Lucia and Lito were no longer residing at Gen. Icarmas place because they were told to
leave in April 1993. On August 26, 1995, while in the squatters area, just 100 meters away from the house of Gen. Icarma,
Nita came, looking for him. Because Nita does not know the workers in Gen. Icarmas house, Nita left and went to the
house of Captain Pascua, just at the back of the house of Gen. Icarma. While at the squatters area, Melchor Rudy Abella
told him that Nita was looking for him. He went to the house of Captain Pascua. At Captain Pascuas place, he met
Nita. Present in the house of Captain Pascua were Augusto Ablon, his wife Rubylin, Belinda, a cousin and a small child
who were all awake, except the child. Although Ablon was very much willing to accommodate him in Ablons house, he
brought Nita to the house of the Air Force Colonel because if it rains, there is a roof to protect them and ashamed to stay
at Ablons house. Even Nita does not like to sleep in Ablons place, saying that instead of sleeping at Ablons place, she
prefers to go back at Valle Verde. He did not allow Nita to go back at Valle Verde because it was already late at night and
if anything happens to her, her daughter who knows his relationship with Nita will blame him. He did not bring Nita to
Gen. Icarmas house because it is crowded and the Colonels house is just 20 meters from Captain Pascuas house. They
went to the Colonels house, climbing the fence. When they climbed the wall, he was carrying banig, pillow and blanket,
and did not notice that Nita was carrying a knife. Nobody live in the Colonels house and was closed. They slept in the
terrace of the house on a cement flooring. While he was sleeping Nita hacked him with a kitchen knife. When hacked, he
just said aray. The bolo was not used in hacking him. After stabbing him, Nita left and went to the Military Police leaving
the kitchen knife. When the Military Police arrived, he was no longer at the Colonels house because he went to another
house, where he slept. After he was stabbed, he asked the assistance of Ablon. Ablon was the one who called for the
37
Military Police. He did not leave the colonels house. He just stayed in the premises. Despite his wounds, he was able to
sleep and woke up at 5:00 in the morning. When asked why Nita stabbed him, he said that it was because he hurt Nita by
holding Nita's hand and pushing her on her chest when Nita insisted in leaving for Valle Verde; and because he hurt
Nita, he did not file a complaint against Nita for hacking him. [3]

In the decretal portion of the decision, the court a quo has pronounced judgment, thus:

WHEREFORE, this court finds accused Rolando Alfanta y Alo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape,
penalized by Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, with aggravating circumstances of nighttime and
ignominy, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the maximum penalty of death, and indemnify complainant Nita Fernandez
the sum of P50,000.00, plus the costs of the suit.[4]

Now before the Court, accused-appellant seeks the reversal of the conviction and the imposition of the death penalty
decreed by the trial court; he contends that -

I. THE TRIAL COURT [HAS] ERRED IN FINDING AND CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME
OF RAPE.

II. THE TRIAL COURT [HAS] ERRED IN TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES
OF NIGHTTIME AND IGNOMINY.[5]

The case can be described as not really being too far from the typical rape cases that have been previously reviewed
by the Court. It is a case, like the instances before it, of two people, each testifying on the same incident but making a
clearly discordant testimony. Since only the participants could directly testify on the sexual congress, here conceded to
have taken place, extreme care is observed in evaluating the respective declarations of the complainant and the
accused. The doctrinally accepted rule is to accord great respect over the assessment of the trial court on the credibility of
the witnesses and, in the usual words of similar import employed by the Court, it would be best not to disturb the
findings of the court which has heard the evidence except only when a material or substantial fact has truly been
overlooked or misappreciated which if properly taken into account can alter the outcome of the case. [6] Regrettably for
accused-appellant, no such exceptive instances of possible oversight are perceived or evident in this case.
Complainant gave a thorough narrative account, so found to be credible by the trial court and by this Court as well,
of what had transpired during the late hour of the night in question.
Prosecutor Manola:
Q Mrs. Witness will you kindly tell the Honorable Court where you were on August 26, 1995 at around 12:00 oclock
midnight?
A At Fort Bonifacio.
Q What city or municipality?
A I do not know but it must be here sir.
Q Meaning Makati City?
A Yes sir.
Q Why were you there on that date and time Mrs. Witness?
A I was sleeping in my friends residence.
Court:
Q What is the address of that friends residence at Fort Bonifacio?
A At AFOVAI Fort Bonifacio Makati sir.
Q Why were you there at that time?

38
A Because I always go there and my sons residence is beside the house of my friend sir.
Court: Proceed fiscal:
Pros. Manola:
Q Now, while you were there on that date and time at the house of your friend in AFOVAI Fort Bonifacio Makati City
do you recall of any unusual incident that happened?
A There was sir.
Q Will you kindly tell what that incident was?
A During that time while I was sleeping in the residence of my friend suddenly there was a man who entered the
house where I was sleeping.
Q So when you saw that man entered the house what did he do if any?
A I stood up because he was pulling me and then he put his hand in my mouth sir.
Q What else happened after that?
A When I was resisting he boxed me and at that time he was holding a bolo and he said if I will not obey him he will
be going to kill me sir.
Q After that what transpired next Mr. Witness?
A He forced me to climb the fence and then I saw he was holding a bolo.
Q Did you climb over the fence?
A I climb sir because he forced me to climb the fence.
Q Were you able to go over the fence?
A When I was over the fence already he told me to go to a vacant house.
Q How about the accused where was he when he ordered you to climb over the fence?
A He was at my back and he told me to go first and then he followed.
Q So after you went or cross over the fence what happened next Madam witness?
A He told me to go to the vacant house and there he himself told me to undress and I took off my clothes he embraced
me and kissed me sir.
Q Now when this man told you to go to the vacant house did you obey him?
A I was told to go to the vacant house there he told me to undress.
Q Did you obey him?
A He told me to undress and he was holding a bolo.
Court:
Q The question of the prosecutor to you was did you obey the instruction of the accused for you to undress?
A Yes sir.
Prosecutor Manola:
Q Tell the Honorable Court why you do followed the instruction of that Man to go to that vacant house and to undress
why did you follow this instruction?
A I was afraid that he might kill me sir.
Q Why do you say that he might kill you?

39
A He like to rape me sir.
Court:
Q You did not answer the question of the prosecutor why were you afraid?
A Because he was holding a bolo and he was at the same time boxing me sir.
Prosecutor Manola:
Q So what happened after according to you you were instructed to undress?
A He embraced me and kissed me and told me to lie down.
Q And did you lie down as instructed by this Man?
A He forced me to lie down and then he forced me to separate my legs sir.
Q And what happened when you were forced to open your legs?
A He told me not to shout because if I will shout he will kill me and the he inserted his penis to my vagina sir.
Q After this Man inserted his penis in your vagina or private part what happened next Mrs. Witness?
A He told me to lie front my face down and he inserted his penis to my anus sir.
Q After that what happened next Mrs. Witness?
A Then he told me again to lie down and at the same time he inserted his fingers to my private parts going it and out
sir.
Q After that what happened next Mrs. Witness?
A He lie down because he was already tired of molesting.
Q How about you what were you doing at that time when the accused this person according to you lie down after he
put his fingers inside your private part?
A He asked me to go near him and lie down beside him.
Q Did you follow his instruction for you to lie near him?
A Yes sir because he was holding a bolo sir.
Q So what happened after you lie down beside this person?
A He told me to put on my dress and at the same time he also told me that he does not want me to tell it to anybody
because he have raped many.
Q Now if this person whom according to you raped you inside the court room would you be able to recognize him?
A Yes sir I could recognize him.
Q Will you kindly look around the court room if you could recognize this person if he is inside?
Note: Witness pointed to a man who was pointed as the man who raped him and when asked his name answered as
Rolando Alfanta.
Q Now after this person whom you just pointed to who answered by the name of Rolando Alfanta uttered the words
lahat nang ni rape ko ay pinapatay ko dahil sa ayokong may magsumbong what happened next Mrs. Witness?
A I pleaded to him and he said not to put on my dress because he is going to take a rest.
Q After that what happened next if any Mrs. Witness?
A I saw him that he was sleeping already and then I suddenly got the knife and stab him in the chest sir.
Q After you stabbed him on his chest what happened next Mrs. Witness?

40
A The knife broke and then I suddenly grabbed the bolo and hack and hack him sir.
Q After you hacked this person who raped you what happened next Mrs. Witness?
A I immediately put on my shirt and I got hold of the bolo and I run to the signal where the soldiers were.
Q Did you reach this place signal where there are soldiers according to you?
A Yes sir.
Q And what did you do when then when you arrived there?
A I told him that I killed a person therein and give them the bolo.
Q What happened after that when you informed the solders at signal that according to you you have killed a person
what happened next?
A We went to the person who raped me sir.
Q And did you see him there?
A Yes sir.
Q Who were with you when you went back to the place where you were allegedly raped?
A The soldiers sir.
Q Did you find this person who raped you?
A Yes sir.
Q What was he doing?
A He was lying down sir.
Q What happened after that?
A When we arrived there he was still alive and he was brought to the hospital.
Q Who brought him to the hospital?
A The ambulance of the soldier.
Q Now do you remember having given a statement to the Makati Police in connection with what you have just
narrated or told or testified to this afternoon?
A I could remember.
Q If that statement is shown to you would you be able to recognize it?
A Yes sir.
Q Now showing you a statement attached to the records of the prosecutors office consisting of two pages kindly go
over it and tell us if you recognize this statement?
A Yes sir I could recognize this.
Q Is that your statement
A Yes sir.
xxx xxx xxx.
Q Now this bolo which according to you surrendered to the soldier at the signal if you see this bolo again would you
be able to recognize it again?
A Yes sir.
Prosecutor Manola:
41
We would like to make reservation for this witness to identify this bolo when this bolo is presented by the policeman
who is in custody of this bolo.
Court:
Q How about the knife which according to you was seen by you at the waist line of the accused did you bring it also?
A I did not bring it sir because it was broken sir it was only the bolo that I brought.
Q Now while you were being raped did you shout for help?
A Yes sir.
Q How did you ask for help?
A I asked for help but they were sleeping they did not hear me sir.
Q The question to you was how did you ask for help?
A I cried and I said tulungan po ninyo ako.
Q Did anybody respond to your cries for help?
A None sir.
Q Now how did you feel while the accused was inserting his private part to your private part?
A It hurt sir my vagina and my anus, my mouth that he boxed me sir.
Q Now why did you say that the accused was able to insert his penis into your vagina?
A He forced that to insert it.
Q Forced it to where?
A He forced it to enter my vagina sir.
Q Did you feel when the private part of the accused entered to your vagina?
A Yes sir I feel it sir.
Q By the way do you know the accused prior to the date that you were awakened?
A I do not know him.
Q In short he is a complete stranger to you when he entered the room?
A I saw him around 7:00 oclock in the evening that he was passing thru the front of the house of my friends where I
was sleeping.
Q At that time that you were awaken by the accused with whom were you sleeping?
A Only me sir.
Prosecutor Manola:
Q Now you said that while you and the accused were lying down first you stab him with the knife how many times
have you stabbed him with the knife?
A I was not able to count because I was afraid of him.
Q You said that after stabbing him with the knife which you broke you got hold of the bolo you hacked him how
many times have you hacked him?
A I failed to count how many times. I hacked him because I was afraid of him he might kill me.
Prosecutor Manola: That will be all for the witness.
Court: Cross-examination.
42
Atty. Manalo: With the permission of the Honorable Court.
Court: Proceed.
Atty. Manalo:
Q Now who were with you at the time when you were sleeping at the house of your friend at AFOVAI Fort Bonifacio?
A One of their children so there were three and I was one.
Q Were you sleeping in one room?
A I was sleeping in the sala sir.
Q Now before you sleep in that house at the sala did you close the door of that house?
A It was closed but it was not locked.
xxx xxx xxx.
Q Now when why were you interested in sleeping in the house of your friend when you could already at the house of
your employer?
A Because I was bringing mongo to my friend because I am indebted to them sir.
Q Now why did you not return to your employer after giving or handing that mongo to your friend?
A They told me to sleep there because it was already late at night.
Q By the way what time did you go there?
A Around 6:00 to 6:30 in the evening.
Q And what time did you reach your friend at AFOVAI?
A 6:30 sir.
Q And Valle Verde is just in Pasig isnt?
A Yes sir.
Q It is near where you are employed and it will take you one ride only to reach that place isnt?
A Three rides sir.
Q Now which is first to be reached from the front door of the house where you were sleeping at the time the place
where you were sleeping or the place of the room where the owner of the house were sleeping?
A First it is the sala where he passed.
Q Now you said that the door was not locked was there any other improvised locked placed in that door like a wood?
A They did not lock the door because they are in confident.
Q Now what is the name of the owner of the house where you slept at that time?
A Patrick sir.
Q And how are you related to Patrick?
A His wife is my friend sir.
Q What is the name of his wife?
A Inday sir.
Q Now when you were awaken while you were sleeping in the sala of the house of your friend Inday did you not
shout when you saw a person pulling you holding a bolo?

43
A I shouted but they did not hear me because they were sleeping and at the same time he placed his hands on my
mouth sir.
Q Now you said that you were boxed on the chest by the accused how many times were you boxed by the accused on
the chest?
A I do not know how many times I was boxed sir because I was really afraid of him.
Q But you were sure that you were boxed at the chest?
A Yes sir.
Note: Witness demonstrating with her hands first pointing on her chest and also on her mouth.
Q Was it strong?
A Yes sir it was strong because the following day it has marked.
Note: Witness holding on his left chin.
Q How about on the chest?
Note: Witness demonstrating it was pointed on her chest.
A It was not too strong sir.
Q Did you fall down on your knee when you were hit by the blow?
A Yes sir.
Q Where?
A I fell on the ground down.
Q Where were you boxed by the accused?
A Outside sir of the house.
Q Now you said that you were ordered to undress and to lie down on the ground is that correct?
A Yes sir.
Q And you followed him?
A He told me to undress in the garage and he also undressed himself and because I was afraid because he was holding
a bolo sir.
Q When he undressed himself was he still holding a bolo?
A Yes sir one hand was holding the bolo the other one hand he was undressing himself.
Q Was it lighted the place?
A None sir.
Q How far were you when the accused was undressing himself?
A Near sir.
Q Did you see his private part when he undressed himself?
A Yes sir.
Q How big?
Prosecutor Manola: Immaterial your honor.
Atty. Manalo: To test the credibility, your honor.

44
 Court: Answer
A It was dark and I was able to see and I do not know because I was afraid.
Atty. Manalo:
Q And then you lie down?
A He told me to lie down and he placed himself on top of me.
Q Was he still holding the bolo?
A Yes sir he was holding the bolo on his one hand.
Q How did you see him?
A When he was holding the bolo with his one hand while I he was on top of me I cried and he was holding the bolo.
Note: Witness demonstrating the accused holding the bolo upward.
A When I cried he was on top of me sir.
Q What was he doing when he was on top of you?
A He was molesting me sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Now what time did you see him passed by the house of your friend according to you?
A 9:00 oclock in the evening sir.
Q Why were you sure that he was the one who passed by the house of your friend?
A I saw him that he was passing.
Q Where were you at the time?
A I was seating by the window sir.[7]
The testimony of the complainant about the incident is straightforward categorical, and relatively free from any
serious flaw.No compelling reason is advanced to sufficiently persuade the Court to conclude that the trial court has
erred in giving due weight and credence to the testimony of the complainant. Neither is evidence adduced to show that
the complainant has had any ulterior motive to prevaricate and enmesh accused-appellant in a fabricated charge. The
Court repeats the familiar doctrine that when a woman claims that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is
necessary to show such a fact so long as her testimony can meet the test of credibility, [8] for it is said that no woman in her
right mind will cry rape, allow examination of her private parts, or subject herself and her family to the humiliation
concomitant to the prosecution of the case, unless the story were true. [9]
Testifying in his defense, accused-appellant claimed that he and the complainant had been lived-in partner for
almost a year, and that while they did sleep together on 26 August 1995 at the porch of the house of a certain Air Force
officer, accused-appellant denied any carnal knowledge of the victim that evening. In his appeal brief, accused-appellant
sought to negate any possible or likely use of violence or intimidation, considering that: (a) in the house where the victim
was sleeping on the night of 26 August 1995, there were at least three persons (the caretaker of the house Patrick Augusto
Ablon, his wife Rubylin and the couples son) who could have responded to any shout for help from the victim; (b) the
door of the house was purposely left unlocked in order to enable accused-appellant to come into the house, and (c) when
the victim was made to climb a fence followed by the accused, she could have escaped but did not.
The sweetheart theory of accused-appellant would appear to be another worn out strategy, often resorted to as a last
ditch effort, to exculpate oneself from criminal liability. No documentary evidence of any sort, like a letter or a
photograph or any piece of memento, was presented to confirm a romantic liaison between accused-appellant and the
complainant. The latter testified:
Q Is it not a fact that you and the accused were sweethearts?

45
 A No sir.
Q And that you went to that place AFOVAI just to meet him in that place?
A No sir he is not my sweetheart. Why will I hack him if he is my sweetheart?
Q You hacked him with the bolo because of you are too much jealousy is concerned because your sweetheart was then
womanizing?
Prosecutor Manola: Misleading your honor.
Atty. Manalo: I am on cross-examination your Honor.
Court: Answer.
A Why will I get jealous I have nothing to do with him. I do not know him sir.
Atty. Manalo:
Q Really?
A I do not know him. I really do not know him sir.[10]
It would be rather strange an occurrence for a love-partner, if true, to stab her beloved for petty reasons. The trial
court was not out of line when it made this evaluation; viz:

This Court cannot accept the claim of accused that he and complainant Nita Fernandez were sweethearts, for such a claim
defies rationality, let alone common sense, because if they were sweethearts, she will not hack him. Not only that, the
manner on which she stabbed and hacked him, first with a knife, then with a bolo, shows a complete anger to vindicate
the outrage on her. If they were sweethearts, she would not have acted in the manner she did in stabbing and hacking
him. At least, if they have some relationship, she would not show anger the way she did.[11]

Neither would the presence of at least three persons on the night of 26 August 1995 in the house where victim was
sleeping necessarily disprove the sexual assault. It was already close to midnight when the incident occurred, and the
other occupants of the house were by then apparently all sound asleep. The evidence is to the effect that accused-
appellant immediately after getting into the house hit her on the jaw, put his hand on her mouth and threatened to kill
her if she dared refuse to yield to his demands.Understandably, the victim was shocked, gripped by fear and then cowed
into submission. Intimidation should be viewed in the light of the perception and judgment of the victim at the time of the
commission of the offense and not by any kind of hard and fast rule. It would be unreasonable to expect the victim to act
with equanimity of disposition and to have the courage and intelligence to disregard the threat made by accused-
appellant.[12]
The claim that the unlocked door of the house was a sign that the complainant wanted accused-appellant to have a
chance to see her during the late evening indeed should deserve scant consideration. The so-called love angle was
properly ruled out by the trial court for lack of concrete evidence to establish any such relationship.
Anent the failure of the complainant to escape when accused-appellant ordered her to climb a fence, it should be
enough to state she did not appear to have had any real opportunity to flee from the clutches of the intruder who was, in
fact, just behind her. After scaling the fence and while inside the abandoned and enclosed house, she could not have done
any much better since she was all the time within striking distance of the bolo-wielding malefactor.
And now on the propriety of an appreciation of the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and ignominy.
Nighttime is said to be that period of darkness beginning at the end of dusk and ending at dawn. [13] The law defines
nights as being from sunset to sunrise.[14] By and of itself, nighttime would not be an aggravating circumstance unless it is
specially sought by the offender, or it is specially taken advantage of by him, or it facilitates the commission of the crime
by insuring the offenders immunity from capture.[15] As an ordinary aggravating circumstance, nighttime can be so
considered provided it is duly proved although not alleged in the information. [16] The Court entertains no doubt that
appellant has specially taken advantage of the cover of darkness to facilitate the commission of the crime without being
recognized. Accused-appellant has abducted his victim, brought her to an abandoned and unlit house and then unleashed
his carnal desire on her, assured of the stillness of a sleeping world.[17] The Court has long held that this aggravating

46
circumstance can be considered when an accused takes advantage of the silence and darkness of the night to ensure
impunity from his illegal act.[18]
With respect to ignominy, the victim testified that after appellant had inserted his penis into her vagina, appellant
ordered her to lie face down and while in that position had his penis into her anus. Thereafter, he ordered her to lie down
again and this time he inserted his finger inside her. The Solicitor General correctly invoked the case of People vs.
Saylan,[19] where this Court said:

The trial court held that there was ignominy because the appellant used not only the missionary position, i.e. male
superior, female inferior, but also the same position as dogs do i.e., entry from behind. The appellant claims there was no
ignominy because The studies of many experts in the matter have shown that this position is not novel and has repeatedly
and often been resorted to by couples in the act of copulation. (Brief, p. 24.) This may well be if the sexual act is performed
by consenting partners but not otherwise.[20]

Article 14, paragraph 17, of the Revised Penal Code considers to be an aggravating circumstance any means
employed or circumstance brought about which add ignominy to the natural effects of the act. The circumstance, it is
said,[21] "pertains to the moral order [and] adds disagree and obloquy to the material injury caused by the crime.
The crime of rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:

1. By using force or intimidation;

2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and

3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.

The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.

Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall
be reclusion perpetua to death.[22]

In the case at bar, it remained uncontroverted that accused-appellant was armed with a bolo to realize his criminal
objective.Nonetheless, the use of a deadly weapon could not be considered as a qualifying circumstance in the crime of
rape[23] for not having been correspondingly alleged in the information as to make the offense fall under the
jurisprudentially referred qualified rape punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. In People vs. Garcia,[24] the Court
declared:

One further observation. Article 335 originally provided only for simple rape punishable by reclusion perpetua, but
Republic Act No. 4111 introduced amendments thereto by providing for qualified forms of rape carrying the death
penalty, that is, when committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, when by reason or on the
occasion of the rape the victim becomes insane, or, under the same circumstances, a homicide is committed. The homicide
in the last two instances in effect created a special complex crime of rape with homicide. The first two attendant
circumstances are considered as equivalent to qualifying circumstances since they increase the penalties by degrees,
and not merely as aggravating circumstances which affect only the period of the penalty but do not increase it to a
higher degree. The original provisions of Article 335 and the amendments of Republic Act No. 4111 are still maintained.

xxx xxx xxx.

Now, it has long been the rule that qualifying circumstances must be properly pleaded in the indictment. If the same
are not pleaded but proved, they shall be considered only as aggravating circumstances, (People vs. Collado, 60 Phil.
610 [1934]; People vs. Jovellano, et al., L-32421, March 27, 1974, 56 SCRA 156; People vs. Fuertes, G.R. No. 104067, January
17, 1994, 229 SCRA 289; People vs. Rodico, et al., G.R. No. 107101, October 16, 1995, 249 SCRA 309.) since the latter admit
of proof even if not pleaded. (U.S. vs. Campo, 23 Phil. 368 [1912]; People vs. Domondon, 60 Phil. 729 [1934]; People vs. De
Guzman, G.R. No. 73464, August 1988, 164 SCRA 215.) Indeed, it would be a denial of the right of the accused to be
informed of the charges against him and, consequently, a denial of due process, if he is charged with simple rape and be
47
convicted of its qualified form punishable with death, although the attendant circumstance qualifying the offense and
resulting in capital punishment was not alleged in the indictment on which he was arraigned. [25]

Simple rape is punishable by a single indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua. Thus, even if there were aggravating
circumstances of nighttime and ignominy in attendance the appropriate penalty would still be reclusion perpetua under the
law.Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code provides that in all cases in which the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty,
it shall be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have attended the
commission of the deed.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court finding accused-appellant Rolando Alfanta guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of rape is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION by hereby lowering the penalty therein imposed from
death to reclusion perpetua. An award of P50,000.00 for moral damages is likewise ordered to be paid by accused-appellant
Rolando Alfanta to the victim Nita Hernandez in addition to the sum of P50,000.00 by way of indemnity ex delictu granted
by the trial court.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-
Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

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