ChinaPakistan Economic Corridor

ChinaPakistan Economic Corridor (Chinese: -; Urdu:

China Pakistan Economic
- ;also known by the acronym CPEC) is a collection of
Corridor
infrastructure projects that are currently under construction throughout
Pakistan.[2] Originally valued at $46 billion, the value of CPEC projects is now
worth $62 billion.[3][4][5] CPEC is intended to rapidly modernize Pakistani
infrastructure and strengthen its economy by the construction of modern
transportation networks, numerous energy projects, and special economic
zones.[6][7][4][5] On 13 November 2016, CPEC became partly operational when
Chinese cargo was transported overland to Gwadar Port for onward maritime
shipment to Africa and West Asia.[8]

A vast network of highways and railways are to be built under the aegis of
CPEC that will span the length and breadth of Pakistan. Inefficiencies
stemming from Pakistan's mostly dilapidated transportation network are
estimated by the government to cause a loss of 3.5% of the country's annual
Road network CPEC
gross domestic product.[9] Modern transportation networks built under CPEC
will link seaports in Gwadar and Karachi with northern Pakistan, as well as
Type of Economic corridor
points further north in western China and Central Asia.[10] A 1,100 kilometre
project
long motorway will be built between the cities of Karachi and Lahore as part of Products Roadways, railways,
CPEC,[11] while the Karakoram Highway between Rawalpindi and the Chinese Special Economic
border will be completely reconstructed and overhauled.[12] The Karachi Zones, energy
Peshawar main railway line will also be upgraded to allow for train travel at up production, mass
to 160 km per hour by December 2019.[13][14] Pakistan's railway network will transit
also be extended to eventually connect to China's Southern Xinjiang Railway in Location Pakistan:
Kashgar.[15] The estimated $11 billion required to modernise transportation Baluchistan, Gilgit-
networks will be financed by subsidized concessionary loans.[16] Baltistan, Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa,
Over $33 billion worth of energy infrastructure are to be constructed by private
Punjab, Sindh
consortia to help alleviate Pakistan's chronic energy shortages,[17] which
China: Xinjiang
regularly amount to over 4,500MW,[18] and have shed an estimated 22.5% off
Pakistan's annual gross domestic product.[19] Over 10,400MW of energy Owner Public and private
generating capacity is to be brought online by the end of 2018, with the sector
majority developed as part of CPEC's fast-tracked "Early Harvest" projects.[20] Country People's Republic of
A network of pipelines to transport liquefied natural gas and oil will also be China
laid as part of the project, including a $2.5 billion pipeline between Gwadar Pakistan
and Nawabshah to eventually transport gas from Iran.[21] Electricity from these Key people Nawaz Sharif
projects will primarily be generated from fossil fuels, though hydroelectric and Hu Jintao
wind-power projects are also included, as is the construction of one of the Xi Jinping
world's largest solar farms.[22] Li Keqiang

CPEC's potential impact on Pakistan has been likened to that of the Marshall Established 22 May 2013
Plan undertaken by the United States in post-war Europe.[23][24][25][26] Budget $62 billion USD[1]
Pakistani officials predict that CPEC will result in the creation of upwards of
2.3 million jobs between 20152030, and add 2 to 2.5 percentage points to the Status Partly operational
country's annual economic growth.[27] Website cpec.gov.pk (http://cp
ec.gov.pk)
Were the initial $46 billion worth of projects to be implemented, the value of
those projects would be roughly equivalent to all foreign direct investment in
External video
Pakistan since 1970,[12] and would be equal to 17% of Pakistan's 2015 gross
China Reaches Out to Pakistan
domestic product.[28] CPEC is seen as the main plank of Chinese President Xi
With Massive Economic Plan. (htt
Jinping's Belt and Road Initiative.[29]
p://www.voanews.com/content/china
-reaches-out-to-pakistan-with-massi
ve-economic-plan/2723729.html)

Contents
1 History
1.1 Background
1.2 Announcement of CPEC
1.3 Subsequent developments
2 Projects in Gwadar Port and City
2.1 Gwadar Port Complex
2.2 Projects in Gwadar city
3 Roadway projects
3.1 Karakoram Highway
3.2 Eastern Alignment
3.3 Western Alignment
3.4 Associated roadway projects
3.4.1 ADB funded projects
3.4.2 Future Central Alignment

4 Railway projects
4.1 Main Line 1
4.2 Main Line 2
4.3 Main Line 3
4.4 Lahore Metro
4.5 Khunjerab Railway
5 Energy sector projects
5.1 Renewable-energy
5.2 Coal
5.2.1 Balochistan
5.2.2 Punjab
5.2.3 Sindh
5.3 Liquified natural gas
5.4 "Early Harvest" projects
5.4.1 Table of projects

6 Other areas of cooperation

6.1 Agriculture
6.2 Science and technology
6.3 Other fields
7 Finance
7.1 Concessionary loans
7.2 Interest-free loans
7.3 Private consortia
 7.4 ADB assistance
8 Impact
8.1 Pakistani economy
8.2 CPEC and the "Malacca Dilemma"
8.3 Access to western China
8.4 Route to circumvent Afghanistan
8.5 Alternate route to Central Asia
8.6 Comparison to Chabahar Port
8.6.1 Security Issues

9 Security
9.1 Security Forces
9.2 Baloch militants
9.3 Islamist militants
9.4 Indian Subversion Attempts
10 Criticism and miscellaneous issues
10.1 KPK Provincial Assembly
10.2 Finances
10.3 Trade imbalance
10.4 Baloch Nationalists
10.5 Gwadar residents' concerns
10.6 Indian objections
10.6.1 Sovereignty claims
10.6.2 Encirclement fears

11 List of major projects

12 See also
13 References
13.1 Notes
13.2 Citations
14 External links

History

Background
Plans for a corridor stretching from the Chinese border to Pakistan's deep
water ports on the Arabian Sea date back to the 1950s, and motivated
construction of the Karakoram Highway beginning in 1959.[30] Chinese interest
in Pakistan's deep-water harbour at Gwadar had been rekindled by 1998 and in
2002 China began construction at Gwadar port which was completed in 2006.
Expansion of Gwadar Port then ceased thereafter owing to political instability
in Pakistan following the fall of General Pervez Musharraf and subsequent
conflict between the Pakistani state and Taliban militants.[31]
Zardari, Li and Khoso on 22 May
A blockade of the Strait of Malacca by the United States and its allies would cut
2013 in Islamabad
China off from Middle East oil supplies and from its "Second Continent"
Africa. That's why China is shoring up Sri Lanka's major ports and working
feverishly with Pakistan to build an alternative route to Middle East and Africa: the ChinaPakistan Economic
Corridor.[32]

The current form of the project was first proposed by Pakistan Peoples Party. Asif Ali Zardari invited heads of all the
political parties to a Luncheon in honour of the Chinese Premier Li Keqiang at the Aiwan-e-Sadr on 22 May 2013.[33]
Chinese Premier Li Keqiang and the Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari have agreed to build an economic corridor
between the two countries.

Both sides have decided to further enhance mutual connectivity and both sides are connected to develop the long term
plan for a China-Pakistan economic corridor.[33]

President Asif Ali Zardari and Chinese Premier Li Keqiang witnessed the
signing ceremony as the representatives of the two countries inked the
documents at a ceremony held at the Aiwan-e-Sadr. The visit of Chinese
Premier Li Keqiang marked the signing of important documents aimed at long-
term cooperation between the two countries in multiple areas.

The MoU on Maritime Cooperation between the two governments, an

Agreement on Boundary Management System between China's Xinjiang and President Asif Ali Zardari and
Gilgit-Baltistan area, and another Agreement on Border Ports and their Chinese Premier Li Keqiang
witnessed the signing ceremon of
Management System was signed by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and
CPEC
Pakistan's Foreign Secretary Jalil Abbas Jilani.

The MoU on cooperation for long-term plan on ChinaPakistan Economic

Corridor between the two governments was inked by Xu Shao Shi, Chairman National Development and Reform
Commission, China and Shahid Amjad Chaudhry, Advisor to the Prime Minister.[34]

In February 2014, Pakistani President Mamnoon Hussain visited China to discuss the plans for an economic corridor in
Pakistan.[35] Two months later, Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif met with Premier Li Kequiang in China to discuss
further plans,[36] resulting in the full scope of the project to be devised under Sharif's tenure.[37] In November 2014,
Chinese government announced its intention to finance Chinese companies as part of its $45.6 billion energy and
infrastructure projects in Pakistan as part of CPEC.

Announcement of CPEC
During the state visit of Xi Jinping to Pakistan in April 2015, he wrote in an CPEC will be a
open editorial stating: "This will be my first trip to Pakistan, but I feel as if I
am going to visit the home of my own brother." On 20 April 2015, Pakistan strategic
gamechanger in the
region, which would
and China signed an agreement to commence work on the $46 billion
go a long way in
agreement, which is roughly 20% of Pakistan's annual GDP,[39] with
making Pakistan a
approximately $28 billion worth of fast-tracked "Early Harvest" projects to be

richer and stronger
developed by the end of 2018.[40] As a gesture of friendship, the Pakistani entity than ever
capital at that time was dotted with slogans and signboards such as "Pakistan- before.
China friendship is higher than the mountains, deeper than the oceans,
Firstpost (India) April 22, 2015[38]
sweeter than honey, and stronger than steel"[41] an oft repeated phrase
coined by the Chinese to describe their deep ties to Pakistan.

Subsequent developments
On 12 August 2015 in the city of Karamay, China and Pakistan signed 20 more agreements worth $1.6 billion to further
augment the scale and scope of CPEC.[42] Details of the plan are opaque,[43] but are said to mainly focus on increasing
energy generation capacity.[44] As part of the agreement, Pakistan and China have agreed to co-operate in the field of space
research.[45]

In September and October 2015, the government of the United Kingdom announced two separate grants to the
Government of Pakistan for construction of roadways that are complementary to CPEC.[46][47] In November 2015, China
included the CPEC into its 13th five-year development plan,[48] while in December 2015, China and Pakistan agreed on a
further $1.5 billion investment to set up an information and technology park as part of the CPEC project.[49] On 8 April
2016, during the visit of Xinjiang's Communist Party chief Zhang Chunxian companies from Xinjiang with their Pakistan
counterparts signed $2 billion of additional agreements covering infrastructure, solar power and logistics.[50]

The first convoy from China, carrying almost 250 containers meant for export to ports in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, the UAE
and the EU arrived in Gwadar on November 13, 2016, thereby formalizing operation of CPEC.[51] On December 2, 2016,
the first cargo train, launching the direct rail route and sea freight service between China and Pakistan, departed from
Yunnan. A cargo train loaded with 500 tonnes of commodities left Kunming for the port city of Guangzhou from where the
cargo will be loaded on ships and transported to Karachi, marking the opening of the new route.[52] The new rail, sea
freight will cut logistics cost, including that of transport, by 50 per cent.[53]

In November 2016, China announced an additional $8.5 billion investment in Pakistan with $4.5 billion allocated to
upgrade Pakistan's main railway line from Karachi to Peshawar including tracks, speed and signalling, and $4 billion
toward an LNG terminal and transmission lines to help alleviate energy shortages.[54] In February 2017, the Egyptian
Ambassador to Pakistan expressed interested in CPEC cooperation.[55] In January 2017, the Chief Minister Pervez Khattak
of Khyber Pakthunkhwha stated that he had received assurances from Chinese investment companies that they would
invest up to $20 billion for projects.[56] In March 2017, an agreement was signed for the projects which include: a $1.5 bn
oil refinery, irrigation projects worth $2 billion, a $2 billion motorway between Chitral and DI Khan, and $7 billion worth
of hydro-electric projects. From the initial value of $46-billion, China is going to invest $33.79 billion in energy sector of
Pakistan to curb the energy short-fall in the country which has now become one of the main reasons of economic descent.
$11.19 billion would be spent in transport sector including 1,240 km Karachi-Lahore motorway which is a six lane high
speed corridor and orchestrating upgrades to public transportation, including metro and bus service, in six cities,
including Lahore Karachi and Rawalpindi. Modernizing the Karakoram Highway, which runs 1,300 km from Kashgar, the
ancient Silk Road crossing in Sinkiang, all the way into the heart of Punjab, Pakistan's biggest province, will also prove
critical. $44 million fiber optics will be installed linking Sinkiang and Rawalpindi. $0.66 billion will be spent on the up-
gradation of Gawadar port to be fully operational for CPEC. In 2016, China's aid exceeded the American spending, which
has total $31 billion since 2002. CPEC is crucial for both, Pakistan and China, countries. According to Pakistan Economic
Survey 201415, the trade between Pakistan and China has increased to $16-billion which has increased 10% from fiscal
year 200910 to 201415. CPEC is 3,218 km lengthy route that will be completed in the first phase of this mega project,
embodied by highways, railways and pipelines. The much advertised $46-billion economic route goes through the
stunning Gilgit-Baltistan Province in north of the country which connects Kashgar in China's Western Province Sinkiang
to the rest of the world through the Chinese operated Gwadar Port in South. The mega project has kept the hopes alive of
elevating the economy and eliminating Pakistan's energy crisis. It can be said that if CPEC is materialized according to the
plan, it would exceed all the foreign direct investment in Pakistan since 1970 and would be equivalent to the 17-percent of
2015's gross direct product. It is further estimated that CPEC would produce 700,000 direct jobs to the youth of Pakistan
in different projects during the period of 2015 30 and add up to 2.5 percent points to the country's growth rate. CPEC
will provide the opportunity of immense economic ascend not only for Pakistan but will link China to the markets of Asia,
Europe and Africa. Eighty percent of China's oil comes from Persian Gulf, through Strait of Malacca, to Shanghai. It takes
23 months to cover the distance of more than 16,000 km. If Gwadar becomes operational, it would reduce the distance to
5,000 km. All is going well on its track since its inception in 2013, Chashma-I, Chashma-ll nuclear power plants in
Karachi, Karot hydropower project of 720 megawatt will be generated on Jhehlum River in Rawalpindi. Out of 21
agreements of energy including coal, gas and solar power plants 14 will be able to produce 10,400 megawatts of energy
by March 2018. It is worth mentioning that Pakistan's chronic energy short-fall is of 4,500 mega-watts which is shedding
22.5% of GDP annually. So it would bolster the energy sector by more than double of short-fall.[57]

As of September 2017, more than $14 billion has been spent on the project so far.[29]

Projects in Gwadar Port and City

Gwadar forms the crux of the CPEC project, as it is envisaged to be the link
between China's ambitious One Belt, One Road project, and its Maritime Silk
Road project.[58] In total, more than $1 billion worth of projects are to be
developed around the port of Gwadar by December 2017.

Gwadar Port Complex

Initial infrastructure works at Gwadar Port commenced in 2002 and were
completed in 2007,[31] however plans to upgrade and expand Gwadar's port
Gwadar Port has been operational
stalled. Under CPEC agreement, Gwadar Port will initially be expanded and
since 2007.
upgraded to allow for docking of larger ships with deadweight tonnage of up to
70,000.[59] Improvement plans also include construction of a $130 million
breakwater around the port,[60] as well as the construction of a floating
liquefied natural gas facility that will have a capacity of 500 million cubic feet
of liquefied natural gas per day and will be connected to the Gwadar-
Nawabshah segment of the IranPakistan gas pipeline.[61]

The expanded port is located near a 2,282-acre free trade area in Gwadar
which is being modelled on the lines of the Special Economic Zones of
China.[62] The swathe of land was handed to the China Overseas Port Holding
A view of the Gwadar Promontory
Company in November 2015 as part of a 43-year lease.[63] The site will include
and isthmus.
manufacturing zones, logistics hubs, warehouses, and display centres.[64]
Businesses located in the zone would be exempt from customs authorities as
well as many provincial and federal taxes.[59] Business established in the special economic zone will be exempt from
Pakistani income, sales, and federal excise taxes for 23 years.[65] Contractors and subcontractors associated with China
Overseas Port Holding Company will be exempted from such taxes for 20 years,[66] while a 40-year tax holiday will be
granted for imports of equipment, materials, plant/machinery, appliances and accessories that are to be for construction
of Gwadar Port and special economic zone.[67]

The special economic zone will be completed in three phases. By 2025, it is envisaged that manufacturing and processing
industries will be developed, while further expansion of the zone is intended to be complete by 2030.[31] On 10 April 2016,
Zhang Baozhong, chairman of China Overseas Port Holding Company said in a conversation with The Washington Post
that his company planned to spend $4.5 billion on roads, power, hotels and other infrastructure for the industrial zone as
well as other projects in Gwadar city.[27]

Projects in Gwadar city

China will grant Pakistan $230 million to construct a new international airport in Gwadar which is to be operational by
December 2017.[68] The provincial government of Balochistan has set aside 4000 acres for the construction of the new
$230 million Gwadar International Airport which will require an estimated 30 months for construction,[69] the costs of
which are to be fully funded by grants from the Chinese government which Pakistan will not be obliged to repay.[70]

The city of Gwadar is further being developed by the construction of a 300MW coal power plant, a desalinisation plant,
and a new 300 bed hospital.[71] Plans for Gwadar city also include construction of the East Bay Expressway a 19
kilometre controlled-access road that will connect Gwadar Port to the Makran Coastal Highway.[72] These additional
projects are estimated to cost $800 million, and are to be financed by 0% interest loans extended by the Exim Bank of
China to Pakistan.[71]

In addition to the aforementioned infrastructure works, the Pakistani government announced in September 2015 its
intention to establish a training institute named Pak-China Technical and Vocational Institute at Gwadar,[31] which is to
be developed by the Gwadar Port Authority.[73] The institute is to be completed by March 2016 at the cost of 943 million
rupees,[31] and is designed to impart to local residents the skills required to operate and work at the expanded Gwadar
Port.[31]

Roadway projects
The CPEC project envisages major upgrades and overhauls to Pakistan's
transportation infrastructure. Under the CPEC project, China has
announced financing for $10.63 billion worth of transportation
infrastructure so far; $6.1 billion have been allocated for constructing
"Early Harvest" roadway projects at an interest rate of 1.6 percent.[74] The
remainder of funds will be allocated when the Pakistani government
awards contracts for construction of road segments which are still in the
planning phase.

Three corridors have been identified for cargo transport: the Eastern
Alignment though the heavily populated provinces of Sindh and Punjab A map of the CPEC roadway network.
where most industries are located, the Western Alignment through the
less developed and more sparsely populated provinces of Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan, and the future Central Alignment which will pass through Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Punjab,
and Balochistan.[75]

Karakoram Highway
The CPEC projects call for reconstruction and upgrade works on National Highway 35 (N-35), which forms the Pakistani
portion of the Karakoram Highway (KKH). The KKH spans the 887 kilometre long distance between the China-Pakistan
border and the town of Burhan, near Hasan Abdal. At Burhan, the existing M1 motorway will intersect the N-35 at the
Shah Maqsood Interchange. From there, access onwards to Islamabad and Lahore continues as part of the existing M1 and
M2 motorways. Burhan will also be at intersection of the Eastern Alignment, and Western Alignment.

Upgrades to the 487 kilometer long section between Burhan and Raikot of the Karakoram Highway are officially referred
to in Pakistan as the Karakoram Highway Phase 2 project. At the southern end of the N-35, works are already underway to
construct a 59-kilometer-long, 4-lane controlled-access highway between Burhan and Havelian which upon completion
will be officially referred to as the E-35 expressway.[76] North of Havelian,
the next 66 kilometres of road will be upgraded to a 4-lane dual
carriageway between Havelian and Shinkiari,[77] Groundbreaking on this
portion commenced in April 2016.[78]

The entire 354 kilometres of roadway north of Shinkiari and ending in

Raikot, near Chilas will be constructed as a 2-lane highway.[78]
Construction on the first section between Shinkiari and Thakot
commenced in April 2016 jointly with construction of the Havelian to
Shinkiari 4-lane dual carriageway further south.[79] Construction on both
these sections is expected to be completed with 42 months at a cost of Highlighted in red is the route of National
approximately $1.26 billion with 90% of funding to come from China's Highway 35, which is to be completely
EXIM bank in the form of low interest rate concessional loans.[79][80][81] rebuilt and upgraded under the CPEC
agreement. Highlighted in blue is the 175
Between Thakot and Raikot spans an area in which the government of kilometre road between Gilgit and Skardu
which is to be upgraded to a 4-lane
Pakistan is currently either planning or actively constructing several
highway.
hydropower projects, most notably the Diamer-Bhasha Dam and Dasu
Dam. Sections of the N-35 around these projects will be completely
rebuilt in tandem with dam construction.[82] In the interim, this section of
the N-35 is currently being upgraded from its current state until dam
construction commences in full force at a later date. Improvement
projects on this section are expected to be completed by January 2017 at a
cost of approximately $72 million.[83][84] The next 335 kilometres of
roadway connect Raikot to the China-Pakistan border. Reconstruction
works on this section of roadway preceded the CPEC, and were initiated
after severe damage to roadways in the area following the 2010 Pakistan
floods. Most of this section of roadway was completed in September 2012
China and Pakistan already conduct
at a cost of $510 million.[85] trade via the Karakoram Highway.

A large earthquake rocked the region nearest to the China-Pakistan

border in 2010, triggering massive landslides which dammed the Indus River, resulting in the formation of the Attabad
Lake. Portions of the Karakoram Highway were submerged in the lake, forcing all vehicular traffic onto barges to traverse
the new reservoir. Construction on a 24 kilometre series of bridges and tunnels to Attabad Lake began in 2012 and
required 36 months for completion. The bypass consists of 2 large bridges and 5 kilometres worth of tunnels that were
inaugurated for public use on 14 September 2015 at a cost of $275 million.[86][87] The 175 kilometre road between Gilgit
and Skardu will be upgraded to a 4-lane road at a cost of $475 million to provide direct access to Skardu from the N-
35.[88][89]

In December 2017, China suspended funding for portion of Karakorum Highway (KKH) from Raikot to Thakot[90] on
allegations of corruptions in the project.

Eastern Alignment
The term Eastern Alignment of CPEC refers to roadway projects located in Sindh and Punjab provinces some of which
were first envisioned in 1991.[91] As part of the Eastern Alignment, a 1,152 km long motorway will connect Pakistan's two
largest cities, Karachi and Lahore with 4 to 6-lane controlled access highway designed for travel speeds up to 120
kilometres per hour.[92] The entire project will cost approximately $6.6 billion, with the bulk of financing to be distributed
by various Chinese state-owned banks.[93]
The entire Eastern Alignment motorway project is divided into four sections: a 136 kilometre long section between Karachi
and Hyderabad also known as the M9 motorway, a 296 kilometre long section between Hyderabad and Sukkur, a 387
kilometre long section between Sukkur and Multan, and a 333 kilometre section between Multan and Lahore via the town
of Abdul Hakeem.[94]

The first section of the project will provide high speed road access from the Port of Karachi to the city of Hyderabad and
interior Sindh. Upgrade and construction works on this section currently known as Super Highway between Karachi and
Hyderabad began in March 2015, and will convert the road into the 4-lane controlled access M9 Motorway which will be
completed in an estimated 30 months.[95] In February 2017, a completed 75 kilometre stretch of the motorway was opened
for public use by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif.[96]

At the terminus of the M9 motorway in Hyderabad, the Karachi-Lahore Motorway will continue onwards to Sukkur as a
six lane controlled-access motorway known also as M6 motorway that will be 296 kilometers long,[97] The planned cost for
this project is $1.7 billion,[98] and will provide high speed road access to interior Sindh especially near the towns of
Matiari, Nawabshah, and Khairpur. The project will require the construction of seven interchanges, and 25 bridges on the
Indus river and irrigation canals.[97] The planned route of the motorway runs roughly parallel to the existing National
Highway and Indus Highway at various portions. In July 2016, the Pakistani government announced that the project
would be open to international bidders on a build-operate-transfer basis, with Chinese and South Korean companies
expressing interest in the project.[98]

The 392 kilometre Sukkur to Multan section of the motorway is estimated to cost $2.89 billion,[92] with construction
works inaugurated on this section of roadway on May 6, 2016.[99] The road will be a six lane wide controlled access
highway,[100] with 11 planned interchanges, 10 rest facilities, 492 underpasses, and 54 bridges along its route.[99] The
Pakistani government in January 2016 awarded the contact to build this section to China State Construction
Engineering,[92] but final approvals required for disbursement of funds were not granted by the Government of the
People's Republic of China until May 2016.[81][92] 90% of the project's cost is to be financed by concessionary loans from
China, with the remaining 10% to be financed by the government of Pakistan.[101] Construction on this segment is
expected to last 36 months.[92]

Construction of the portion between Multan and Lahore costing approximately $1.5 billion[102] was launched in November
2015[103] as a joint venture between the China Railway Construction Corporation Limited and Pakistan's Zahir Khan and
Brothers Engineers[104] The total length of this motorway section is 333 kilometres; however, the first 102 kilometres of
the road between Khanewal and Abdul Hakeem is designed as part of the M4 Motorway, and is being funded by the Asian
Development Bank.[105][106] The portion of motorway between Abdul Hakeem and Lahore that is under construction as
part of CPEC will consist of the remaining 231 kilometers.[107]

Western Alignment
The CPEC project envisages an expanded and upgraded road network in the Pakistani provinces of Balochistan, Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa, and western Punjab Province as part of the Western Alignment. The Western Alignment project will result
in the upgrading of several hundred kilometres worth of road into 2 and 4-lane divided highways by mid-2018, with land
acquisition sufficient for upgrading parts of the road to a 6-lane motorway in the future.[108] In total, the CPEC project
envisages re-construction of 870 kilometres of road in Balochistan province alone as part of the Western Alignment. Of
those 870 kilometres of road, 620 kilometres have already been rebuilt as of January 2016.[109]

The Western Alignment roadway network will begin at the Barahma Bahtar Interchange on the M1 Motorway near the
towns of Burhan and Hasan Abdal in northern Punjab province.[110] The newly reconstructed Karakoram Highway will
connect to the Western Alignment at Burhan, near where the new 285-kilometre-long controlled-access Brahma Bahtar-
Yarik Motorway will commence.[111] The motorway will terminate near
the town of Yarik, just north of Dera Ismail Khan.[112] Groundbreaking for
the project took place on May 17, 2016.[113] The motorway will traverse
the Sindh Sagar Doab region, and cross the Indus River at Mianwali
before entering into Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. It will consist of 11
interchanges, 74 culverts, and 3 major bridges spanning the Indus, Soan,
and Kurram Rivers.[114] Total costs for the project are expected to be
$1.05 billion.[115]

At the southern terminus of the new Brahma Bahtar-Yarik motorway, the

N50 National Highway will also be upgraded between Dera Ismail Khan
in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Zhob in neighbouring Balochistan province,
with eventual reconstruction between Zhob and Quetta.[116] The upgraded
The Western Alignment of CPEC is
roadway will consist of a 4 lane dual-carriageway spanning the 205
depicted by the red line. The 1,153-
kilometre distance between the two cities.[117] The first portion of the N50 kilometer route will link the Brahma
to be upgraded will be the 81 kilometre portion of the N50 between Zhob Bahtar Interchange of the M1 Motorway
and Mughal Kot, with construction works having begun in January with the city of Gwadar in Balochistan
2016.[118] Construction on this portion is expected to be completed by province. The portion depicted by the
orange line between Basima and
2018 at a cost of $86 million.[116] While the project is considered a vital
Shahdadkot is sometimes regarded as
link in the CPEC's Western Alignment,[118] the project's cost will not be
part of the Western Alignment.
financed by Chinese state-owned banks, but instead by Asian
Development Bank under a 2014 agreement which preceded
CPEC,[119][120] as well as by a grant provided by the United Kingdom's Department for International Development.[121]

Heading south from Quetta, the Western Alignment of the CPEC will continue to the town of Surab in central Balochistan
as the N25 National Highway. From Surab, a 470 kilometre long route known as the N85 National Highway will connect
central Balochistan with the town of Hoshab in southwestern Balochistan province near the city of Turbat. The stretch of
road between these cities was completed in December 2016,[122] as per schedule.[123]

Along the Western Alignment route, the towns of Hoshab and Gwadar are connected by a newly-built 193 kilometre long
portion of the M8 Motorway the Hoshab to Gwadar portion of the motorway was completed and inaugurated in
February 2016 by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif.[124] The Western Alignment will be flanked by special economic zones
along its route,[125] with at least seven special economic zones planned to be established in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.[108]

Associated roadway projects

ADB funded projects

The 184 kilometre long M-4 Motorway between Faisalabad and Multan does not fall under the scope of CPEC projects, but
is nevertheless considered vital to the CPEC transportation project. It will instead be financed by the Asian Development
Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank,[105] and will be the first project jointly financed by those banks.[126]
Further funding comes from an additional $90.7 million grant announced in October 2015 by the government of the
United Kingdom towards the construction of portion of the M4 Motorway project.[127]

The Karakoram Highway south of the city of Mansehra will also be upgrade into a controlled-access highway to officially
be known as the E-35 expressway. While it is considered to be a crucial part of the route between Gwadar and China, the
E35 will not be financed by CPEC funds. The project will instead be financed by the Asian Development Bank[128] with a
$121.6 million grant from the United Kingdom towards the project.[129] Once completed, the E35 Expressway, the M4
Motorway, and Karachi-Lahore Motorway will provide continuous high-speed road travel on controlled-access motorways
from Mansehra to Karachi 1,550 kilometres away.

Approximately halfway between Zhob and Quetta, the town of Qilla Saifullah in Balochistan lies at the intersection of the
N50 National Highway and the N70 National Highway. The two roads form the 447 kilometre route between Quetta and
Multan in southern Punjab. While the N70 project is not officially a part of CPEC, it will connect the CPEC's Western
Alignment to the Karachi-Lahore Motorway at Multan. Reconstruction works on the 126 kilometre portion of the N70
between Qilla Saifullah and Wagum are slated for completion by 2018,[130] and are financed as part of a $195 million
package by the Asian Development Bank,[120] and by a $72.4 million grant from the United Kingdom's Department for
International Development.[121]

Future Central Alignment

Long-term plans for a "Central Alignment" of the CPEC consist of a network of roads which will commence in Gwadar and
travel upcountry via the cities of Basima, Khuzdar, Sukkur, Rajanpur, Layyah, Muzaffargarh, and terminating in Dera
Ismail Khan, with onward connections to Karakoram Highway via the Brahma BahtarYarik Motorway.[131]

Railway projects
The CPEC project emphasises major upgrades to Pakistan's ageing
railway system, including rebuilding of the entire Main Line 1 railway
between Karachi and Peshawar by 2020;[132] this single railway currently
handles 70% of Pakistan Railways traffic.[133] In addition to the Main Line
1 railway, upgrades and expansions are slated for the Main Line 2 railway,
Main Line 3 railway. The CPEC plan also calls for completion of a rail link
over the 4,693-meter high Khunjerab Pass. The railway will provide direct
access for Chinese and East Asian goods to Pakistani seaports at Karachi
and Gwadar by 2030.[133]

Procurement of an initial 250 new passenger coaches, and reconstruction

Phase 1 of the ML-1 overhaul and
of 21 train stations are also planned as part of the first phase of the project reconstruction is highlighted black
bringing the total investment in Pakistan's railway system to between Peshawar and Lahore.
approximately $5 billion by the end of 2019.[134] 180 of the coaches are to Overhauling and reconstruction of the
be built at the Pakistan Railways Carriage Factory near Islamabad,[135] line will allow trains to travel at up to 160
kilometres per hour.
while the Government of Pakistan intends to procure an additional 800
coaches at a later date, with the intention of building 595 of those coaches
in Pakistan.[135]

Main Line 1
The CPEC "Early Harvest" plan includes a complete overhaul of the 1,687 kilometre long Main Line 1 railway (ML-1)
between Karachi and Peshawar at a cost of $3.65 billion for the first phase of the project,[74] with the first phase expected
to be completed by December 2017.[136] In June 2016, China and Pakistan unveiled plans for the second phase of the
project, with a total cost of $8.2 billion for both phases of the project.[137] The second phase of the ML-1 overhaul project
is expected to be completed in 2021.[137]
Upgrading of the railway line will permit train travel at speeds of 160
kilometres per hour, versus the average 60 to 105 km per hour speed
currently possible on existing track,[138] and is expected to increase
Pakistan Railways' annual revenues by approximately
$480 million.[133][139] The upgrades are also expected to cut transit times
from Karachi to Peshawar by half.[140] Pakistani railways currently
account for 4% of freight traffic in the country, and upon completion of
CPEC, Pakistani railways are expected to transport 20% of the country's
freight traffic by 2025.[141]

The first part of the expedited first phase of the project will focus on Phase 2 of the ML-1 overhaul between
upgrading the Multan to Peshawar section, which will then be followed by Multan and Hyderabad is marked in
the Hyderabad to Multan section, and finally by the Hyderabad to Karachi orange. Phase 3 of the project is
indicated by the green line between
section.[142]
Hyderabad and Karachi.
At the time of CPEC's announcement, the ML-1 consisted of mostly dual
track railway between Karachi, and the Lahore suburb of Shahdara, with
long stretches of single track. From Shahdara, the track mainly consisted of a single track until the city Peshawar.
Construction works to dualize the entire track between Karachi to Shahdara were completed and inaugurated in January
2016.[143] As part of the first phase of the CPEC railway project, the remaining stretch of track between Shahdara and
Peshawar is to upgraded to a dual track railway.[144]

The 676 kilometer portion between Lalamusa, north of Lahore, and Peshawar will require complete reconstruction with
the addition of tunnels, culverts, and bridges, while over 900 kilometers south of Lalamusa towards Karachi will be
upgraded to handle cars with a 25-ton axle load capacity.[145] A spur from Taxila to Havelian will also be constructed, with
a dry port to be established near the city of Havelian.[146] Further, the entire length of track will have computerised signal
systems, with stretches of track in urban areas to also be fenced off to prevent pedestrians and vehicles from crossing
tracks in unauthorised areas.[147]

Main Line 2
In addition to upgrading the ML-1, the CPEC project also calls for similar
major upgrade on the 1,254 kilometre long Main Line 2 (ML-2) railway
between Kotri in Sindh province, and Attock in northern Punjab province
via the cities of Larkana and Dera Ghazi Khan.[148] The route towards
northern Pakistan roughly parallels the Indus River, as opposed to the
ML-1 which takes a more eastward course towards Lahore. The project
also includes a plan to connect Gwadar, to the town of Jacobabad,
Sindh[149] which lies at the intersection of the ML-2 and ML-3 railways.

Main Line 3
ML-2 of Pakistan Railways is marked in
Medium term plans for the Main Line 3 (ML-3) railway line will also
purple, while ML-3 is marked in orange.
include construction of a 560 kilometer long railway line between Bostan
Other lines are in blue.
near Quetta, to Kotla Jam in Bhakkar District near the city of Dera Ismail
Khan,[150] which will provide access to southern Afghanistan. The railway route will pass through the city of Quetta and
Zhob before terminating in Kotla Jam, and is expected to be constructed by 2025.[133]

Lahore Metro
The $1.6 billion Orange Line of the Lahore Metro is under construction and is regarded as a commercial project under
CPEC.[151] Construction on the line has already begun, with planned completion by Winter 2017.[152][153] The line will be
27.1-kilometre (16.8 mi) long, of which 25.4 kilometres (15.8 mi) will be elevated, with the remaining portion to be
underground between Jain Mandir and Lakshmi Chowk.[154] When complete, the project will have the capacity to
transport 250,000 commuters per day, with plans to increase capacity to 500,000 commuters per day by 2025.[155]

Khunjerab Railway
Longer term projects under CPEC also call for construction of the 682
kilometre long Khunjerab Railway line between the city of Havelian, to the
Khunjerab Pass on the Chinese border,[150] with extension to China's Lanxin
Railway in Kashgar, Xinjiang. The railway will roughly parallel the Karakoram
Highway, and is expected to be complete in 2030.[133]

The cost of the entire project is estimated to be approximately $12 billion, and
will require 5 years for completion. A 300 million rupee study to establish final The proposed route of the
feasibility of constructing the rail line between Havelian and the Chinese Khunjerab Railway is indicated by
border is already underway.[156] A preliminary feasibility study was completed the brown line.
in 2008 by the Austrian engineering firm TBAC.[157]

Energy sector projects

Pakistan's current energy generating capacity is 24,830 MW,[158] though the country currently faces energy shortfalls of
over 4,500MW on a regular basis[18] with routine power cuts of up to 5 hours per day,[19] which has shed an estimated 2
2.5% off its annual GDP.[19] Energy generation will be a major focus of the CPEC project, with approximately $33 billion
expected to be invested in this sector.[17] As part of the "Early Harvest" scheme of the CPEC, an estimated 10,400 MW of
electricity are slated for generation by March 2018 as part of CPEC's "Early Harvest" projects.[20]

The energy projects under CPEC will be constructed by private Independent Power Producers, rather than by the
governments of either China or Pakistan.[159] The Exim Bank of China will finance these private investments at 56%
interest rates, while the government of Pakistan will be contractually obliged to purchase electricity from those firms at
pre-negotiated rates.[160]

Renewable-energy
Pakistan aims to produce 25% of its electricity requirements by renewable energy resources by 2030.[161] China's Zonergy
company will complete construction on the world's largest solar power plant the 6,500 acre Quaid-e-Azam Solar Park
near the city of Bahawalpur with an estimated capacity of 1000MW is expected to be completed in December
2016.[162][163] The first phase of the project has been completed by Xinjiang SunOasis, and has a generating capacity of
100 MW.[164] The remaining 900 MW capacity will be installed by Zonergy under CPEC.[164]
The Jhimpir Wind Power Plant, built by the Turkish company Zorlu Enerji has already begun to sell 56.4 MW of electricity
to the government of Pakistan,[165] though under CPEC, another 250MW of electricity are to be produced by the Chinese-
Pakistan consortium United Energy Pakistan and others at a cost of $659 million.[166][167] Another wind farm, the Dawood
wind power project is under development by HydroChina (http://www.hydrochina.com.cn) at a cost of $115 million, and
will generate 50 MW of electricity by August 2016.[168]

SK Hydro Consortium is constructing the 870 MW Suki Kinari Hydropower Project in the Kaghan Valley of Pakistan's
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province at a cost of $1.8 billion,[169] SK Hydro will construct the project with financing by China's
EXIM bank.[170]

The $1.6 billion 720 MW Karot Dam which is under construction is part of the CPEC plan, but is to be financed separately
by China's Silk Road Fund.[171]

Pakistan and China have also discussed the inclusion of the 4,500MW $14 billion Diamer-Bhasha Dam as part of the
CPEC project,[172] though as of December 2015, no firm decision has been made though Pakistani officials remain
optimistic at its eventual inclusion.[173] On 14 November 2017, Pakistan dropped its bid to have Diamer-Bhasha Dam
financed under the CPEC framework.[174]

The $2.4 billion, 1,100 MW Kohala Hydropower Project being constructed by China's Three Gorges Corporation predates
the announcement of CPEC, though funding for the project will now come from CPEC fund.[175]

Coal
Despite several renewable energy projects, the bulk of new energy generation capacity under CPEC will be coal-based
plants, with $5.8 billion worth of coal power projects expected to be completed by early 2019 as part of the CPEC's "Early
Harvest" projects.

Balochistan
In Balochistan province, a $970 million coal power plant at Hub, near Karachi, with a capacity of 660MW to be built by a
joint consortium of China's China Power Investment Corporation and the Pakistani firm Hub Power Company as part of a
larger $2 billion project to produce 1,320MW from coal.[176]

A 300MW coal power plant is also being developed in the city of Gwadar, and is being financed by a 0% interest loan.[71]

Punjab
The $1.8 billion Sahiwal Coal Power Project, in full operation since 3 July 2017,[177] is a project in central Punjab that has
a capacity of 1,320MW. It was built by a joint venture of two Chinese firms: the Huaneng Shandong company and
Shandong Ruyi Science & Technology Group, who will jointly own and operate the plant.[178] Pakistan will purchase
electricity from the consortium at a tariff of 8.36 US cents/kWh.[179]

The $589 million project to establish a coal mine and a relatively small 300MW coal power plant to be built in the town of
Pind Dadan Khan by China Machinery Engineering Corporation in Punjab's Salt Range.[180] Pakistan's NEPRA has been
criticized for considering a relatively high tariff of 11.57 US cents/kWH proposed by the Chinese firm,[181] which had been
initially agreed at 8.25 US cents/kWH in 2014.[182] The Chinese firm argued that coal transportation costs had greatly
increased due to the nonavailability of coal from nearby mines which had initially been regarded as the primary coal
source for the project. The company argued that coal would instead have to be transported from distant Sindh province,
which along with inefficiencies in mining procedures, increased the cost of fuel by 30.5%.[183]
Sindh
The Shanghai Electric company of China will construct two 660MW power plants as part of the "Thar-I" project in the
Thar coalfield of Sindh province, while "Thar-ll" will be developed by a separate consortium.[184][185] The facility will be
powered by locally sourced coal,[186] and is expected to be put into commercial use in 2018.[187] Pakistan's National
Electric Power Regulatory Authority (NEPRA) has agreed to purchase electricity from both Thar-l and Thar-ll at a tariff of
8.50 US cents/kWh for the first 330 MW of electricity, 8.33 US cents/kWh for the next 660 MW, and 7.99 US cents/kWh
for the next 1,099 MW as further phases are developed.[188][189]

Near the Thar-I Project, the China Machinery Engineering Corporation in conjunction with Pakistan's Engro Corporation
will construct two 330MW power plants as part of the "Thar-ll Project" (having initially proposed the simultaneous
construction of two 660MW power plants) as well as developing a coal mine capable of producing up to 3.8 million tons of
coal per year as part of the first phase of the project."[190] The first phase is expected to be complete by early 2019,[191] at a
cost of $1.95 billion.[192] Subsequent phases will eventually generate an additional 3,960MW of electricity over the course
of ten years.[185] As part of infrastructure required for electricity distribution from the Thar l and ll Projects, the
$2.1 billion Matiari to Lahore Transmission Line, and $1.5 billion in Matiari to Faisalabad transmission line are also to be
built as part of the CPEC project.[20]

The 1,320MW $2.08 billion Pakistan Port Qasim Power Project near Port Qasim will be a joint venture of Al-Mirqab
Capital from Qatar, and China's Power Construction Corporation a subsidiary of Sinohydro Resources Limited.[193][194]
Pakistan's NEPRA and SinoHydro agreed to set the levelized tariff for electricity purchased from the consortium at 8.12
US cents/kWh.[195]

Liquified natural gas

Liquefied natural gas power LNG projects are also considered vital to CPEC. The Chinese government has announced its
intention to build a $2.5 billion 711 kilometre gas pipeline from Gwadar to Nawabshah in province as part of CPEC.[196]
The pipeline is designed to be a part of the 2,775 kilometre long IranPakistan gas pipeline, with the 80 kilometre portion
between Gwadar and the Iranian border to be connected when sanctions against Tehran are eased; Iran has already
completed a 900 kilometre long portion of the pipeline on its side of the border.[21]

The Pakistani portion of the pipeline is to be constructed by the state-owned China Petroleum Pipeline Bureau.[197] It will
be 42 inches in diameter, and have the capacity to transport 1 billion cubic feet of liquified natural gas every day, with an
additional 500 million cubic feet of additional capacity when the planned off-shore LNG terminal is also completed[198]
The project will not only provide gas exporters with access to the Pakistani market, but will also allow China to secure a
route for its own imports.[199]

The project should not be confused with the $2 billion 1,100 kilometre North-South Pipeline liquified natural gas pipeline
which is to be constructed with Russian assistance between Karachi and Lahore with anticipated completion by 2018.[200]
Nor should it be confused with the planned $7.5 billion TAPI Pipeline which is a planned project involving Turkmenistan,
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India.

Other LNG projects are currently under construction with Chinese assistance and financing that will augment the scope of
CPEC, but are neither funded by nor officially considered a part of CPEC. The 1,223MW Balloki Power Plant is currently
under construction near Kasur, and is being constructed by China's Harbin Electric Company with financing from the
China's EXIM bank, is one such example. In October 2015, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif also inaugurated construction of
the 1,180MW Bhikhi Power Plant near Sheikhupura,[201] which is to be jointly constructed by China's Harbin Electric
Company and General Electric from the United States.[202] It is expected to be Pakistan's most efficient power plant, and
will provide enough power for an estimated 6 million homes.[202]
"Early Harvest" projects
As part of the "Early Harvest" scheme of the CPEC, over 10,000 megawatts of electricity-generating capacity is to be
developed between 2018 and 2020.[20] While some "Early Harvest" projects will not be complete until 2020, the
government of Pakistan plans to add approximately 10,000 MW of energy-generating capacity to Pakistan's electric grid
by 2018 through the completion of projects which complement CPEC. Although not officially under the scope of CPEC, the
1,223 MW Balloki Power Plant, and the 1,180 MW Bhakki powerplants are also under construction,[201][203] which along
with the under-construction 969 MW NeelumJhelum Hydropower Plant and 1,410 MW Tarbela IV Extension Project will
result in an additional 10,000 MW being added to Pakistan's electricity grid by 2018 by a combination of CPEC and non-
CPEC projects.[204] A further 1,000 MW of electricity will be imported to Pakistan from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan as part
of the CASA-1000 project, which is expected to be completed in late 2018.[205]

Table of projects

"Early Harvest" Energy Project[206] Capacity Location

Pakistan Port Qasim Power Project. 1,320 MW (2 x 660 MW plants) Sindh
Thar-l Project 1,320 MW (4 x 330 MW plants) Sindh
Thar-ll Project and coal mine 1,320 MW (2 x 660 MW plants) Sindh
Sahiwal Coal Power Project 1,320 MW (2 x 660 MW plants) Punjab
Rahimyar Khan coal power project 1,320 MW (2 x 660 MW plants) Punjab
Quaid-e-Azam Solar Park 1,000 MW Punjab

Suki Kinari Hydropower Project 870 MW (expected completion in 2020)[207] Khyber Pakhtunkhwa

Karot Hydropower Project 720 MW (expected completion in 2020)[208] Punjab

China Power Hub Generation Company 2X660 MW Balochistan

Thar Engro Coal Power Project 660 MW (2 x 330 MW plants) Sindh
Gwadar coal power project 300 MW Balochistan
UEP Windfarm 100 MW Sindh
Dawood wind power project 50 MW Sindh
Sachal Windfarm 50 MW Sindh
Sunnec Windfarm 50 MW Sindh
Matiari to Faisalabad transmission line 660 kilovolt Sindh and Punjab
Matiari to Lahore Transmission Line 660 kilovolt Sindh and Punjab

Other areas of cooperation

The CPEC announcement encompassed not only infrastructure works, but also addressed areas of co-operation between
China and Pakistan.

Agriculture
CPEC includes provisions for cooperation in management of water resources, livestock, and other fields of agriculture.
Under the plan, agricultural information project, storage and distribution of agricultural equipment and construction
project, agricultural mechanisation, demonstration and machinery leasing project and fertiliser production project for
producing 800,000 tons of fertiliser and 100,000 tons of bio-organic fertiliser will be implemented.[209][210]

Science and technology

As part of CPEC, the two countries signed an Economic and Technical Cooperation Agreement,[211] as well as pledged to
"China-Pakistan Joint Cotton Bio-Tech Laboratory"[211] The two countries also pledged to establish the "China-Pakistan
Joint Marine Research Center" with State Oceanic Administration and Pakistan's Ministry of Science and Technology[211]
Also as part of the CPEC agreement, Pakistan and China have agreed to co-operate in the field of space research.[45]

In February 2016, the two countries agreed to establish the "Pak-China Science, Technology, Commerce and Logistic
Park" near Islamabad at an estimated cost of $1.5 billion.[212] The park will be situated on 500 hectares, which will be
provided by Pakistan to China's Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps, with all investments expected to come from
the Chinese side over the course of ten years.[212]

In May 2016, construction began on the $44 million 820 kilometer long Pakistan-China Fiber Optic Project, an optical
fiber cable that will enhance telecommunication in the Gilgit-Baltistan region, while offering Pakistan a fifth route by
which to transmit telecommunication traffic.[213]

Other fields
The two nations also pledged co-operation in field ranging from anti-narcotic efforts,[211] to co-operation in an effort to
reduce climate change.[211] The two nations also agreed to increase co-operating between the banking sectors of the two
countries, as well as to establish closer ties between China Central Television and the Pakistan Television Corporation.[211]

Finance

Concessionary loans
Approximately $11 billion worth of infrastructure projects being developed by the Pakistani government will be financed
at an interest rate of 1.6%,[214] after Pakistan successfully lobbied the Chinese government to reduce interest rates from an
initial 3%.[215] Loans will be dispersed by the Exim Bank of China, China Development Bank, and the ICBC.[216] For
comparison, loans for previous Pakistani infrastructure projects financed by the World Bank carried an interest rate
between 5% and 8.5%,[217] while interest rates on market loans approach 12%.[218]

The loan money would be used to finance projects which are planned and executed by the Pakistani government. Portions
of the approximately $6.6 billion[93] KarachiLahore Motorway are already under construction.[219] The $2.9 billion phase
which will connect the city of Multan to the city of Sukkur over a distance of 392 kilometres has also been approved,[220]
with 90% of costs to be financed by the Chinese government at concessionary interest rates, while the remaining 10% is to
be financed by the Public Sector Development Programme of the Pakistani government.[221] In May 2016, the $2.9 billion
loan were given final approvals required prior to disbursement of the funds were given by the Government of the People's
Republic of China on May 4, 2016, and will be concessionary loans with an interest rate of 2.0%.[81] The National Highway
Authority of Pakistan reported that contractors arrived on site soon after the loan received final approval.[81]
The China Development Bank will finance the $920 million towards the cost of reconstruction of the 487 kilometer
portion of the Karakoram Highway between Burhan and Raikot.[222][223] An addition $1.26 billion will be lent by the China
Exim Bank for the construction of the Havelian to Thakot portion of this 487 kilometer stretch of roadway,[79][80] to be
dispersed as low-interest rate concessionary loans.[81]

$7 billion of the planned $8.2 billion overhaul of the Main Line 1 railway is to be financed by concessionary loans, which
extended by China's state owned banks.[224]

The long-planned 27.1 km long $1.6 billion Orange Line of the Lahore Metro is regarded as a commercial project,[211] and
does not qualify for the Exim Bank's 1.6% interest rate. It will instead by financed at a 2.4% interest rate[152] after China
agreed to reduce interest rates from an originally planned rate of 3.4%.[225]

The $44 million Pakistan-China Fiber Optic Project, a 820 km long fibre optic wire connecting Pakistan and China, will be
constructed using concessionary loans at an interest rate of 2%, rather than the 1.6% rate applied to other projects.[226]

Interest-free loans
The government of China in August 2015 announced that concessionary loans for several projects in Gwadar totalling
$757 million would be converted 0% interest loans.[214] The projects which are now to financed by the 0% interest loans
include: the construction of the $140 million East Bay Expressway project, installation of breakwaters in Gwadar which
will cost $130 million, a $360 million coal power plant in Gwadar, a $27 million project to dredge berths in Gwadar
harbour, and a $100 million 300-bed hospital in Gwadar.[214] Pakistan will only repay the principle on these loans.

In September 2015, the government of China also announced that the $230 million Gwadar International Airport project
would no longer be financed by loans, but would instead be constructed by grants which the government of Pakistan will
not be required to repay.[215]

Private consortia
$15.5 billion worth of energy projects are to be constructed by joint Chinese-Pakistani firms, rather than by the
governments of either China or Pakistan. The Exim Bank of China will finance those investments at 56% interest rates,
while the government of Pakistan will be contractually obliged to purchase electricity from those firms at pre-negotiated
rates.[160]

As an example, the 1,223MW Balloki Power Plant does not fall under the concessionary loan rate of 1.6%, as the project is
not being developed by the Pakistani government. Instead, it is considered to be a private sector investment as its
construction will be undertaken by a consortium of Habhbrbin Electric and Habib Rafiq Limited after they successfully
bid against international competitors.[227] Chinese state-owned banks will provide loans to the consortium that are
subsidised by the Chinese government. In the case of the Balloki Power Plant, state-owned banks will finance the project
at an interest rate of 5%,[228] while the Pakistani government will purchase electricity at the lowest bid rate of 7.973 cents
per unit.[227]

ADB assistance
While the E-35 expressway is considered to be a crucial part of the route between Gwadar and China, the E35 will not be
financed by CPEC funds. The project will instead be financed by the Asian Development Bank.[128]
The N70 project is not officially a part of CPEC but will connect the CPEC's Western Alignment to the Karachi-Lahore
Motorway at Multan. The project will be financed as part of a $195 million package by the Asian Development Bank
announced in May 2015 to upgrade the N70 National Highway and N50 National Highway.[120] In January 2016, The
United Kingdom's Department for International Development announced a $72.4 million grant to Pakistan for roadway
improvements in the province of Balochistan, thereby reducing the total Asian Development Bank loan from $195 million
to $122.6 million.[121]

The M-4 Motorway between Faisalabad and Multan is not to be financed by the Chinese government as part of CPEC, but
will instead be the first infrastructure project partially financed by the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and will be
co-financed along with the Asian Development Bank for a total of approximately $275 million.[105] Portions of the project
will also be funded by a $90.7 million grant announced in October 2015 by the government of the United Kingdom
towards the construction of the Gojra-Shorkot section of the M4 Motorway project.[127]

Impact
The importance of CPEC to China is reflected by its inclusion as part of China's 13th five-year development plan.[229][230]
CPEC projects will provide China with an alternate route for energy supplies, as well as a new route by which Western
China can conduct trade. Pakistan stands to gain due to upgrade of infrastructure and introduction of a reliable energy
supply.[231][232]

On January 8, 2017, Forbes claimed that CPEC is part of China's vision to write the rules of the next era of globalization
and help its export and investment engines run for years to come.[233] Writing in January 2017, Arun Mohan Sukumar of
India's Observer Research Foundation claimed that "CPEC is an important enough project whose economic and strategic
consequences require methodical assessment", adding that "CPEC may be a bilateral endeavour, but New Delhi cannot
ignore its spillover effects on regional governance" and concluding that "India would be ill-advised to rely on the false
comfort that profits alone will drive China's business with Pakistan".[234]

According to China's prime minister, Li Keqiang, Pakistan's development through the project might "wean the populace
from fundamentalism".[29]

Pakistani economy
The CPEC is a landmark project in the annals of history of Pakistan. It is the largest investment Pakistan has attracted
since independence and largest by China in any foreign country.[235] CPEC is considered economically vital to Pakistan in
helping it drive economic growth.[236] The Pakistani media and government have called CPEC investments a "game and
fate changer" for the region,[237][238] while both China and Pakistan intend that the massive investment plan will
transform Pakistan into a regional economic hub and further boost the deepening ties between the two countries.[239]
Approximately 1 year after the announcement of CPEC, Zhang Baozhong, chairman of China Overseas Port Holding
Company told The Washington Post that his company planned to spend an additional $4.5 billion on roads, power, hotels
and other infrastructure for Gwadar's industrial zone,[27] which would be one of the largest ever sums of foreign direct
investment into Pakistan.

Pakistan currently faces energy shortfalls of over 4,500MW on a regular basis[18] with routine power cuts of up to 12 hours
per day,[19] which has shed an estimated 22.5% off its annual GDP.[19] The Financial Times notes that Pakistan's
electricity shortages are a major hindrance to foreign investment, and that Chinese investments in Pakistani infrastructure
and power projects will lead to a "virtuous cycle" that will make the country more attractive for foreign investment in a
variety of sectors.[240] Poor availability of electricity is considered by the World Bank to be a main constraint to both
economic growth and investment in Pakistan. Constructing China Pakistan Economic Corridor will bring regional
harmony and better economic ties. It will provide China a shorter, cheaper and more secured route to interact with West
and South Asia, Arabian Peninsula and Africa through Pakistan. As president Mamnoon Hussain already termed CPEC
"Framework of Regional Connectivity" which would bolster the activities of trade and business in the whole region. It is an
extraordinary project of shared dreams, goals, destiny, harmony and collective development through the extension of
geographical links. CPEC is basically initiation the Maritime Silk Road that will link 3-billion people of Europe, Asia and
Africa.[241]

Pakistan's large textile industry has also been negatively affected by several-hour long power cuts, with almost 20% of
textile factories in the city of Faisalabad shutting down on account of power shortages.[242] The CPEC's "Early Harvest"
projects are expected to resolve shortages in power generation by 2018 by increasing Pakistan's power generation capacity
by over 10,000 megawatts.[20] As a result of improved infrastructure and energy supplies, the Pakistani government
expects that economic growth rates will reach 7% by 2018.[243]

Former Pakistan Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz also stated in May 2016 that predicted economic growth from CPEC
projects would result in stabilization of Pakistan's security situation,[244] which has also been cited by the World Bank as
hindrance to sustained economic growth in Pakistan.[245]

According to Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying, the corridor will "serve as a driver for connectivity
between South Asia and East Asia." Mushahid Hussain, chairman of the Pakistan-China Institute, told China Daily that
the economic corridor "will play a crucial role in regional integration of the 'Greater South Asia', which includes China,
Iran, Afghanistan, and stretches all the way to Myanmar."[35] When fully built, the corridor is expected to generate
significant revenue from transit fees levied on Chinese goods to the tune of several billion dollars per annum.[246]
According to The Guardian, "The Chinese are not just offering to build much-needed infrastructure but also make
Pakistan a key partner in its grand economic and strategic ambitions."[247]

Moody's Investors Service has described the project as a "credit positive" for Pakistan. In 2015, the agency acknowledged
that much of the project's key benefits would not materialise until 2017, but stated that it believes at least some of the
benefits from the economic corridor would likely begin accruing even before then.[248] The Asian Development Bank
stated "CPEC will connect economic agents along a defined geography. It will provide connection between economic nodes
or hubs, centered on urban landscapes, in which large amount of economic resources and actors are concentrated. They
link the supply and demand sides of markets."[249] On November 14, 2016, Hyatt Hotels Corporation announced plan's to
open four properties in Pakistan, in partnership with Bahria Town Group, citing the investment of CPEC as the reason
behind the $600 million investment.[250]

On March 12, 2017, a consortium of Pakistani broker houses reported that Pakistan will end up paying $90 billion to
China over a span of 30 years with annual average repayments of $34 billion per year post fiscal year 2020. The report
further said that CPEC-related transportation would earn $400500 million per annum to Pakistan, and would grow
Pakistani exports by 4.5% a year till fiscal year 2025.[251]

CPEC and the "Malacca Dilemma"

The Straits of Malacca provide China with its shortest maritime access to Europe, Africa, and the Middle East.[252]
Approximately 80% of its Middle Eastern energy imports also pass through the Straits of Malacca.[253] As the world's
biggest oil importer,[39] energy security is a key concern for China while current sea routes used to import Middle Eastern
oil are frequently patrolled by the United States' Navy.[254]
In the event that China were to face hostile actions from a state or non-
state actor, energy imports through the Straits of Malacca could be halted,
which in turn would paralyse the Chinese economy in a scenario that is
frequently referred to as the "Malacca Dilemma".[253] In addition to
vulnerabilities faced in the Straits of Malacca region, China is heavily
dependent upon sea-routes that pass through the South China Sea, near
the disputed Spratly Islands and Paracel Islands, which are currently a
source of tension between China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, and
the United States.[255] The CPEC project will allow Chinese energy
imports to circumvent these contentious areas and find a new artery in
the west, and thereby decrease the possibility of confrontation between
the United States and China.[256]

In addition to potential weaknesses in regards to the United States' Navy,

the Indian Navy has recently increased maritime surveillance of the
Straits of Malacca region from its base on Great Nicobar Island.[257] India
has expressed fears of a Chinese "String of Pearls" encircling it.[258][259] Map showing territorial claims in South
China Sea. A high percentage of Chinese
Were conflict to erupt, India could potentially impede Chinese imports
energy imports pass through this
through the straits.[260] Indian maritime surveillance in the Andaman Sea disputed region, rendering much of
could possibly enhance Chinese interest in Pakistan's Gwadar Port the China's energy imports vulnerable to
Kyaukpyu Port, which is currently being developed in Myanmar by the conflict.
Chinese government as another alternate route around the Straits of
Malacca, will likely be vulnerable to similar advances by the Indian Navy.
The proposed Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Corridor (BCIM) would also be vulnerable to Indian advances against
China in the event of conflict, thereby potentially limiting the BCIM Corridor's usefulness to China's energy security, and
thereby increasing Chinese interest in CPEC.

China's stake in Gwadar will also allow it to expand its influence in the Indian
Ocean, a vital route for oil transportation between the Atlantic and the Pacific.
Another advantage to China is that it will be able to bypass the Strait of Malacca.
As of now, 60 percent of China's imported oil comes from the Middle East, and
80 percent of that is transported to China through this strait, the dangerous,
piracy-rife maritime route through the South China, East China, and Yellow
Seas.
Council on Foreign Relations[261]

Access to western China

The CPEC Alignments will improve connectivity to restive Xinjiang, thereby increasing the region's potential to attract
public and private investment.[252] CPEC is considered central to ChinaPakistan relations; its central importance is
reflected by China's inclusion of the project as part of its 13th five-year development plan.[229][230] The CPEC projects will
also complement China's Western Development plan, which includes not only Xinjiang, but also the neighbouring regions
of Tibet and Qinghai.[262]

In addition to its significance to reduce Chinese dependence on the Sea of Malacca and South China Sea routes, CPEC will
provide China an alternative and shorter route for energy imports from the Middle East, thereby reducing shipping costs
and transit times. The currently available sea-route to China is roughly 12,000 kilometres long, while the distance from
Gwadar Port to Xinjiang province is approximately 3,000 kilometres, with another 3,500 kilometres from Xinjiang to
China's eastern coast.[253] As a result of CPEC, Chinese imports and exports to the Middle East, Africa, and Europe would
require much shorter shipment times and distances.

Route to circumvent Afghanistan

Negotiations to provide an alternate route to the Central Asian republics by way of China predate the announcement of
CPEC. The AfghanistanPakistan Transit Trade Agreement of 2010 provided Pakistan access to Central Asia via
Afghanistan; however, the full agreement has yet to be fully implemented. The "Quadrilateral Agreement on Traffic in
Transit" (QATT) was first devised in 1995, and signed in 2004 by the governments of China, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, and
Kyrgyzstan to facilitate transit trade between the various countries, with no inclusion of Afghanistan.[263] Despite signing
of the QATT, the agreement's full potential was never realised, largely on account of poor infrastructure links between the
four countries prior to the announcement of CPEC.

During the visit of Afghan President Ashraf Ghani to India in April 2015, he stated "We will not provide equal transit
access to Central Asia for Pakistani trucks" unless the Pakistani government included India as part of the 2010
AfghanistanPakistan Transit Trade Agreement.[264] The current Transit Trade Agreement provides Afghanistan access to
the Port of Karachi to conduct export trade with India, and allows Afghan goods to be transited up to any border of
Pakistan, but does not guarantee Afghan trucks the right to traverse the Wagah Border, nor does the agreement permit
Indian goods to be exported to Afghanistan via Pakistan.[265] Owing to continued tensions between India and Pakistan, the
Pakistani government expressed reluctance to include India in any trade negotiations with Afghanistan, and as a result,
little progress was made between the Afghan and Pakistani sides.

In February 2016, the Pakistani government signalled its intention to completely bypass Afghanistan in its quest to access
Central Asia by announcing its intent to revive the QATT so that Central Asian states could access Pakistani ports via
Kashgar instead of Afghanistan,[266] thereby allowing the Central Asian republics to access Pakistan's deep water ports
without having to rely on a politically unstable Afghanistan as a transit corridor. In early March 2016, the Afghan
government reportedly acquiesced to Pakistani requests to use Afghanistan as a corridor to Tajikistan, after having
dropped demands from reciprocal access to India via Pakistan.[267]

Alternate route to Central Asia

The heads of various Central Asian republics have expressed their desire to connect their infrastructure networks to the
CPEC project via China. During the August 2015 visit of Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to Kazakhstan, the Kazakh
Prime Minister Karim Massimov, conveyed Kazakhstan's desire to link its road network to the CPEC project.[268] During
the November 2015 visit of Tajikistan President Emomali Rahmon to Pakistan, the Tajik premier also expressed his
government's desire to join the Quadrilateral Agreement on Traffic in Transit to use CPEC as a conduit for imports and
exports to Tajikistan by circumventing Afghanistan;[269] the request received political backing by the Pakistani Prime
Minister.[269]

China expects that the economic corridor will make it capable enough to suck oil and gas from Central Asian countries
with the help of pipelines through Baluchistan into Sinkiang. Chinese goods would have much more compatible, nimble
and fast route to global markets than the Strait of Malacca, which China presumes is at the mercy of America. China and
America have tense relation with each other in the South China Sea. China has dispute with some other countries such as
Vietnam and Philippines, the American allies over the Spratly and Paracel Islands. China apprehends American
hegemonic intentions in the region in the vicinity of Malacca Strait. In the conflict of two, Chinas trade and supply may be
blocked. Chinas economy would be jeopardized. Thus, China needs an alternative route and such route is Gawadar
developed by Pakistan and China in 2007 and to make Gawadar fully operational, CPEC is imperative. Furthermore,
China also wants to cope with the insurgency in Sinkiang. In order to do so, it needs to develop the region which is its
largest province and is Muslin-dominated. Development, China hopes, would help to quell the movement. Further, if
Pakistans economy prospers economically, terrorism in Pakistan would dwindle and this would have positive impact on
Sinkiang. Thus, China likes to invest in Pakistan for all these benefits, even though risk still prevails. With the advent of
CPEC-related infrastructure projects, transit times between Kashgar and Pakistan's coast will be greatly reduced, which in
turn will also reduce transit times to the Kyrgyzstan and hydrocarbon-rich Kazakhstan through already existing overland
routes. The Chinese government has already upgraded the road linking Kashgar to Osh in Kyrgyzstan via the Kyrgyz town
of Erkeshtam while a railway between Urumqi, China and Almaty, Kazakhstan has also been completed as part of China's
One Belt One Road initiative.[270] Numerous land crossings already exist between Kazakhstan and China as well.
Additionally, the Chinese government has announced plans to lay railway track from Tashkent, Uzbekistan, towards
Kyrgyzstan with onwards connections to China and Pakistan.[271] Further, the Pamir Highway already provides Tajikistan
access to Kashgar via the Kulma Pass. These crossings complement the CPEC project to provide Central Asian states
access to Pakistan's deepwater ports by completely bypassing Afghanistan a country which has been ravaged by civil war
and political instability since the late 1970s.

Comparison to Chabahar Port

In May 2016, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his counterpart, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, signed a
series of twelve agreements in Tehran, in which India offered to refurbish one of Chabahar's ten existing berths, and
reconstruct another berth the Port of Chabahar,[272] in order to allow Indian goods to be exported to Iran, with the
possibility of onward connections to Afghanistan and Central Asia.[273] As of February 2017, the project remains delayed
while the governments of Iran and India blame one another for delays.[274]

A section of the Indian media described it as "a counter to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor",[275] although the total
monetary value of projects has been noted to be significantly less than that of CPEC.[276]

As part of the twelve memorandums of understanding signed by Indian and Iranian delegations as per text released by
India's Ministry of External Affairs, India will offer a $150 million line of credit extended by the Exim Bank of India,[277]
while India Ports Global also signed a contract with Iran's Aria Banader (http://www.abiports.com/index.php?lang=en) to
develop berths at the port,[278] at a cost of $85 million[279] over the course of 18 months.[280]

Under the agreement, India Ports Global will refurbish a 640 meter long container handling facility, and reconstruct a 600
meter long berth at the port.[272] India further agreed to extend a $400 million line of credit to be used for the import of
steel for the construction of a rail link between Chabahar and Zahedan,[281] while India's IRCON (http://www.ircon.org/)
and Iran's Construction, Development of Transport and Infrastructure Company (http://www.cdtic.ir/) signed a
memorandum of understanding regarding the construction and finance of the Chabahar to Zahedan rail line at a cost of
$1.6 billion.[282]

India's Highways and Shipping Minister, Nitin Gadkari suggested that the free trade zone in Chabahar had the potential to
attract upwards of $15 billion worth of investment in the future,[283] although he stated that such investments are
predicated upon Iran offering India natural gas at a rate of $1.50 per million British Thermal Units,[284] which is
substantially lower than the rate of $2.95 per million British Thermal Units offered by Iran.[285] The two countries also
signed a memorandum of understanding to explore the possibility of setting up an aluminum smelter at a cost of $2
billion,[286] as well as establishing a urea processing facility in Chahbahar,[287] although these investments are also
contingent upon Iran supplying low-cost natural gas for operation of those facilities.[288]
India, Iran, and Afghanistan also signed an agreement with the intention of simplifying transit procedures between the
three countries.[279] Despite the expressed desire to circumvent Pakistan in order to augment Iranian and Indian
economic ties, Indian goods destined for Iran currently do not require transit through Pakistan, as those goods can be
exported to Iran via Bandar Abbas, where India also currently maintains a diplomatic mission.[289] Bandar Abbas is also
consider a key node on the NorthSouth Transport Corridor, backed by India and Russia since 2002.[290][291] Indian
goods also can be imported and transited across Iran upon arrival at Bandar-e Emam Khomeyni near the Iraqi border.

As per the AfghanistanPakistan Transit Trade Agreement, Afghan goods can be transited across Pakistan for export to
India as well, though Indian goods cannot be exported to Afghanistan via Pakistan.[292] Upon completion of Chabahar,
Indian exporters will benefit from the potential ability to export goods to Afghanistan, a country with an annual gross
domestic product estimated at $60.6 billion.[293]

After signing the agreement, Iran's ambassador to Pakistan, Mehdi Honerdoost, stated that the agreement was "not
finished", and that Iran would welcome the inclusion of both Pakistan and China in the project.[294] While clarifying that
Chabahar Port would not be a rival or enemy to Pakistan's Gwadar Port,[295] he further stated that Pakistan and China had
both been invited to contribute to the project before India, but neither China nor Pakistan had expressed interest in
joining.[296][297]

However, eventually, Iranian ambassador made it clear that Iran doesn't consider Chahbahar to be a project which could
feasibly rival CPEC as he said "Iran is eager to join CPEC with its full capabilities, possibilities and abilities".[298]

Security Issues
While agreements have specifically cited improvements for Afghan connectivity to the world as a benefit of Indian
investment in the region,[299] Afghanistan's politically instability could limit the potential usefulness of transit corridors to
population centers near Kabul or Kandahar,[300] as those routes traverse southern and eastern Afghanistan, where the
Taliban is most active.[301] The Chabahar plan relies upon connections to the Afghan Ring Road.[302] By August 2016, the
Taliban was noted to have captured large swathes of land in Helmand Province, and threatened to capture the provincial
capital of Lashkar Gah,[303] which lies on the portion of the Afghan Ring Road connecting Chabahar to Kandahar and
Kabul. As a result, portions of the Afghan Ring Road were closed due to Taliban insurgent activity.[304] Also in August
2016, the Taliban claimed responsibility for an attack which left twelve foreign tourists dead as they were traveling on an
alternative route to the Afghan Ring Road, between Kabul and Herat.[305] In September 2016, Iran's president Hassan
Rouhani expressed his country's interest in joining CPEC during a meeting with Nawaz Sharif.[306]

Security

Security Forces
Pakistan Navy and Chinese Navy ships are to jointly guard the safety and security of the trade corridor, as Pakistan seeks
to expand the role of its maritime forces.[307] From December 2016, Pakistan's Navy established a special taskforce "TF-
88" to ensure there is maritime security for trade.[308][309] Chairman Parliamentary Committee on CPEC confirmed that
Sindh province will dispatch 2000 police officers, while Punjab will dispatch 5000 police officers for the project, while the
Pakistani Army will deploy 12,000 troops to safeguard the route.[310] China plans to transfer 4 ships to the Maritime
Security Agency with two ships called PMSS Hingol and PMSS Basol.[311] For territorial security, Pakistan has formed the
Special Security Division.[312] Pakistan plans to train 12,000 security personnel to protect Chinese workers on the
corridor.[313][314][315] As of August 2015, 8,000 Pakistani security officials were deployed for the protection of over 8,100
Chinese workers in Pakistan.[316] As part of CPEC, Pakistan has boosted its international engagement in terms of foreign
policy with China, Iran, USA, Turkey and Malaysia are to be engaged for the maritime economy related to CPEC.[317]
Iranian President Rouhani revealed his intentions to Pakistan to join CPEC in a meeting at the UN[318] Russia has also
expressed support for CPEC.[319][320]

Baloch militants
Baluchistan province has been site of nationalist and separatist insurgencies,[321] which Pakistan alleges are supported by
Indian intelligence services, as provided evidence to the United Nations on alleged Indian spy Kulbhushan Yadav caught
on Pakistan soil of Baluchistan province on 3 March 2016.[322] Exiled Baloch nationalist Hyrbyair Marri in 2016 warned
the safety of Chinese nationals working on the project could not be guaranteed,[323] though violence in the region peaked
in 2013 before sharply declining.[324][A]

The Pakistani government reported that over 800 Baloch militants surrendered to security forces in 2016 after the launch
of a reconciliation programme,[326] including over 200 at a single ceremony in November 2016.[327] Balakh Sher Badini, a
senior militant commander of the Balochistan Liberation Army, surrendered to Pakistani forces in January 2017.[328]
Another 21 militants from another militant group, the Balochistan Republican Army, surrendered shortly thereafter along
with 3 militant commanders.[329] A few days later, high-ranking militant commander Lal Din Bugti surrendered to
Pakistani security forces, along with 6 other commanders.[330] Separatist violence had decreased in the province so much
by 2017, that such groups had become much less of a threat compared to Islamist militants.[331]

Islamist militants
Pakistan faced Taliban insurgent violence that largely began in 2008 during the rule of General Pervez Musharraf. The
outlawed terrorist organisation Tehrik-i-Taliban has claimed responsibility for past attacks on some Chinese
nationals,[332] and Chinese commentators have raised concerns that the safety of construction workers could be under
threat.[333] China reportedly also expressed concern that militant groups in Xinjiang could collaborate with Tehrik-i-
Taliban militants in Pakistan.[39][334] In 2014, Pakistan launched Operation Zarb-e-Azb to eradicate Tehrik-i-Taliban
militants from Pakistani territory, following an attack on Karachi's airport, and the 2014 Peshawar school massacre in
which terrorists from Tehrik-i-Taliban killed 148 school children.

Following the launch of Operation Zarb-e-Azb, violence in Pakistan has drastically declined.[335] 2016 saw the lowest
number of deaths from acts of violence since the current wave of violence began in 2007,[336] with total fatalities dropping
nearly 66% compared to 2014.[336] Acts of terrorist violence fell 75% between 2014 and 2016.[337] According to the South
Asia Terrorism Portal (http://www.satp.org/), civilian fatalities from terrorist attacks in 2013 stood at 3,001, while the
number had declined to 612 by 2016[338] the lowest number since 2005.

Though terrorism-related deaths declined in Pakistan as a whole in 2016, the toll rose slightly in Baluchistan,[335] where
Tehrik-i-Taliban militants maintain a degree of subversive capability. In August 2016, Quetta was struck by a terrorist
suicide bombing which killed 70 people,[339] while sectarian militants still frequently target Baluchistan's Shia
Hazaras.[337]

Indian Subversion Attempts

CPEC passes though the disputed region of Kashmir where Indian and Pakistani border guards have occasionally
exchanged fire across the Line of Control,[340][341] though no CPEC project is located near the line. Chinese intelligence
agencies have also reportedly shared information with Pakistani authorities regarding alleged efforts by the India's
Research and Analysis Wing to subvert CPEC.[342][342] In March 2016, Pakistan Reported that it had arrested a suspected
terrorist spy from India's Research and Analysis Wing, Kulbhushan Yadav, who Pakistan believe he has entered Pakistan
from Iran specifically to destabilize regions in Pakistan's Baluchistan province along with terrorist organization Tehrik-i-
Taliban and Baloch liberation army (B.L.A) in order to hinder implementation of CPEC projects.[343] Former Chief of
Army Staff General Raheel Sharif in April 2016 accused India's Research and Analysis Wing of destabilizing Pakistan in an
attempt to disrupt and stymie implementation of various CPEC projects.[344] Pakistan's Secretary of Defense Lieutenant
General Alam Khattak stated in April 2016 that the arrest of Kulbhushan Yadav indicated Indian interference in CPEC,
and further alleged that India's Research and Analysis Wing, in collusion with Afghanistan's National Directorate of
Security, had set up a dedicated espionage unit with express intent to sabotage CPEC.[345]

Criticism and miscellaneous issues

CPEC is viewed by many critics as a neo-imperialist exercise.[29]

KPK Provincial Assembly

Some planning aspects and technicalities associated with the route have been criticised in political forums and by the
media.[346] The Provincial Assembly of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province adopted a resolution against the alleged decision of
the central government to change the multibillion route of the proposed project by diverting it away from Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa province.[347] The supposed change in CPEC routing was noted in an article published by China's Global
Times newspaper,[348] two years before the official announcement of CPEC when levels of violence were much higher in
that province, which he acknowledged could factor into any decision to re-route the corridor from KPK.[348]

The federal Minister of Planning Development and Reform Ahsan Iqbal formally denied any change in the
alignment.[37][349][350] As a rebuttal to this argument, Wu Zhaoli, an assistant research fellow at the National Institute of
International Strategy, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, in his article also published in Global Times, stated that
"security concerns are a critical cause which helps to determine the path of this corridor",[333] implying that security
concerns, rather than political bias, would be responsible for any route changes. According to Dr Ahmad Rashid Malik,
senior research fellow at the Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad (ISSi), the route controversy is "baseless and an
unfounded reality...".[351] As a result of objections to CPEC, the Chinese government in 2015 issued a statement urging
Pakistani political parties to resolve their differences over the project.[352]

Finances
In addition to the aforementioned issues, some sources have suggested that the interest rate for CPEC related loans would
be high, with India's Daily News and Analysis paper suggesting that Pakistan had unwittingly accepted loans that would
"be offered at very high rates of interest",[353] although the actual interest rates were negotiated prior to acceptance, and
for most projects will be 1.6%.[60]

Several articles in Pakistan have criticised the project's finances as being shrouded in mystery, while one article suggested
that "there is far too much secrecy and far too little transparency".[354] The Private Power and Infrastructure Board has
also been accused of irregularities in the approval process for coal power plants and the tariffs at which Pakistan is
contractually obliged to purchase electricity from those plants,[355] with special concern regarding potential irregularities
in the tariff approved for the 300MW coal power plant to be built in Pind Dadan Khan by China Machinery Engineering
Corporation.[356]

Trade imbalance
Chinese exports through the Karakoram Highway have entered the domestic Pakistani market, and are cheaper due to the
relatively higher cost of production in Pakistan.[357] It has also been speculated that the CPEC will replace Pakistani
exports by Chinese ones in external markets.[357]

Baloch Nationalists
Some Baloch nationalists have opposed the large-scale development projects envisioned by CPEC, fearing that such
developments in the province would eventually result in local residents "losing control" over natural resources.[358] Others
have alleged that CPEC is a "conspiracy" meant to stimulate the settlement of migrants from other regions of Pakistan in
order to render ethnic Baloch a minority in the province.[359]

In accordance to the Pakistani Government's announcement of its intent to issue resident cards to the city's inhabitants as
a security measure to prevent the movement of firearms into the city,[360] former Chief Minister of Balochistan province,
Akhtar Mengal, suggested at a political rally in November 2015, that execution of CPEC projects and the resident card
policy would eventually result in ethnic Baloch being denied entry into the city.[361] The resident cards measure would
require any non-resident visitor to the city to register at designated security checkpoints prior to entering the city by
road,[360] without any reference to ethnicity. The former Chief Minister did, however, clarify that he would not oppose
development projects in the province that he believed would uplift the plight of local residents.[361] Shortly thereafter, the
Pakistani government announced its intention to establish a training institute named Pak-China Technical and Vocational
Institute at Gwadar which is to be completed at the cost of 943 million rupees to impart skills to local residents to train
them to operate machinery at the port.[31]

Athar Hussain, the director of the Asia Research Centre at London School of Economics, has expressed concerns that the
CPEC is "likely to bring more development to regions that are already developed, instead of poor areas such as
Balochistan."[362] Burzine Waghmar, a senior teaching fellow and member of the Centre for the Study of Pakistan, SOAS,
University of London, suggested that CPEC projects are not targeted towards benefiting the indigenous Baloch population,
and will accelerate human rights violations in the province.[362]

Gwadar residents' concerns

While nationalists openly oppose CPEC, some local leaders and residents of Gwadar city have also expressed concern in
regards to the project the head of Gwadar's local fisherman association stated in an interview with NBC News that
"Development is good, China is our great friend, this CPEC thing sounds amazing, but don't forget that this is our land,
first."[363] Other residents doubt they will see any of the benefits promised by CPEC, while others fear they will be evicted
from their homes in order to make way for infrastructure works.[364]

In response to concerns of local residents, Lt. General Amer Riaz who heads security operations in the province, stated
that locals would not be deprived of benefits, and that local Gwadar residents would have "the first right to
everything."[365] Pakistan's Minister of Planning, National Reforms, and Development, Ahsan Iqbal, further stated in May
2016 that Gwadar residents would be regarded as "main stakeholders" in the city's master plan, and that fishermen
specifically would also be accommodated by the plan.[366] The developer of Gwadar Port, COPHC, has also announced that
it will assist Gwadar's fishermen to help boost the region's seafood industry by developing programmes to improve the
quality of local seafoods.[367]

Indian objections
Sovereignty claims
The Government of India, which shares tense relations with Pakistan, objects to the CPEC project as upgrade works to the
Karakoram Highway are taking place in Gilgit Baltistan; territory that India claims as its own. During the visit of Indian
Prime Minister Narendra Modi to China in 2015, the Indian Foreign Minister, Sushma Swaraj reportedly told Chinese
Premier Xi Jinping that projects passing through Gilgit-Baltistan are "unacceptable" as they require construction in the
claimed territory.[368][369] India's Foreign Secretary Subrahmanyam Jaishankar also confirmed that the issue had been
raised with the Chinese government on the trip.[370] Swaraj reiterated this stance during a meeting in August 2016 with
Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi, stating India would "resolutely oppose" the corridor in Kashmir.[371]

India did not object to Chinese construction of the Karakoram Highway,[372] which was built between 1959 and 1979. India
further did not initially object to major Chinese-sponsored upgrade works to the Karakoram Highway after a 2010
earthquake, though it did object the presence of Chinese troops in the region that were sent to guard Chinese workers.[373]

India further did not object to construction of the Mangla Dam, undertaken with World Bank funding and British
technical assistance in southern Azad Kashmir a region which India claims as its own territory. India even maintained
that the Wullar Barrage project in Indian-administered Kashmir, which Pakistan regards as a violation of the Indus Water
Treaty, would ultimately be beneficial for the Mangla Dam.[374] India further did not object to construction works at the
Azad Kashmir's NeelumJhelum Hydropower Plant, under construction with Chinese assistance since 2008. India in 1991
agreed to allow the Neelum-Jhelum project to move forward,[375] despite the project's location in territory which India
legally considers as its own.

Following the 2005 Kashmir earthquake, large-scale reconstruction work of infrastructure took place across northern
Azad Kashmir with the assistance of South Korean, Turkish, and Saudi firms.[376] Chinese companies took part in 14 post-
earthquake reconstruction projects in the disputed region, worth $6 billion.[377] India did not object to these works,
despite the fact that infrastructure near the militarily sensitive Line of Control were upgraded.

Indian objection to Chinese construction works in the Gilgit-Baltistan arose in 2011 in response to a Chinese complaint
regarding a joint Indian-Vietnamese oil exploration project in the disputed South China Sea.[378] The influential Institute
for Defence Studies and Analyses, a think tank funded by the Indian Ministry of Defence,[379] in 2011 called for India to
begin raising objection to Chinese projects in the region at the "international level."[380]

Encirclement fears
Former Indian ambassador, Phunchok Stobdan, alleged that China and Pakistan intended to develop the corridor not just
for its economic benefits, but also is motivated by the "strategic intent of besieging India", though he also stated that India
can do little to scuttle CPEC, and that avoiding China's One Road One Belt project altogether would be to the detriment of
India.[381]

The Indian Ministry of External Affairs in May 2015 also summoned the Chinese envoy in New Delhi to lodge India's
opposition to the project.[382] The Chinese Premier dismissed the concerns, describing CPEC as a "commercial
project"[383] that would not target any third party.[384]

In May 2016, India's Minister of State and External Affairs, Vijay Kumar Singh raised concerns regarding CPEC.[385]
Despite Indian objections, China and Pakistan initiated works on the $44 million Pakistan-China Fiber Optic Project on
May 19, 2016 which will require passage through Gilgit-Baltistan; the same region for which India expressed concerns to
China.[386] Former Indian National Security Advisor M. K. Narayanan also in May 2016 stated "CPEC must be viewed as a
major threat. Both countries [China and Pakistan] have a common intention to undermine India`s position in the
region."[385]
Despite objections, segments of the Indian public, as exemplified by former Indian Ambassador Melkulangara
Bhadrakumar, regard the project as in India's interest vis--vis Central Asia, and warn that India might "lose heavily" were
India to remain opposed and isolated from the project.[387]

On August 28, the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations suggested that China will have "to get
involved" if India disrupts CPEC.[388] Indian National Congress leader Manish Tewari said that if ultimately the CPEC is
going to threaten India, then it should be opposed.[389]

List of major projects

 Project
Gwadar Port
Gwadar-Ratodero Motorway (M-8)
Dawood wind power project
E-35 Expressway (Hazara Motorway)
IranPakistan gas pipeline
Reconstruction of the Karakoram Highway
Multan-Sukkur Motorway (M-5)
Karot Hydropower Project
Orange Line (Lahore Metro)
Pakistan Port Qasim Power Project
Quaid-e-Azam Solar Park
Sahiwal Coal Power Project
Western Alignment projects in Balochistan province.
HaklaDera Ismail Khan Motorway (M-13)
Pakistan-China Fiber Optic Project
Economic Corridor Support Force
Main-Line 1 railway overhaul between Karachi and
Peshawar
Havelian Abbottabad Dry Port
China-Pakistan Joint Cotton Bio-Tech Laboratory
Mansehra Muzaffarabad Mirpur Expressway
China-Pakistan Join</ref> t Marine Research Center
Hubco coal power plant project
Gwadar East Bay Expressway
Notes
Phase 1 complete. Phase 2 under construction.[390][391]
Under construction. 193 km out of 892 km operational[124]
Fully operational.[392]
Under construction[211] Funded by the Asian
Development Bank,[76] but is considered vital to the
Karakoram Highway Reconstruction project.
Under construction. Iranian portion completed.[211]
Gwadar to Nawabshah portion is to be funded by CPEC
agreements, while the Gwadar Iran border portion will
be funded by the Pakistani government.
Under construction. Portion between Raikot and Chinese
border had been under construction prior to CPEC
announcement, and was completed in 2012.[85] The 24
kilometre long Karakorum Highway Realignment around
Attabad Lake was also completed in 2015.[87]
Under construction[393][394]
Under construction.[395] Financed by China's Silk Road
Fund.[171]
Under construction[151]
First unit of 660 MW has been completed as of November
2017[396]
Under construction[162] First phase complete, generating
400 MW of electricity.[164]
In operation.[177]
Under construction. Of the 870 kilometres of road in
Balochistan province to be constructed/reconstructed as
part of CPEC's Western Alignment, 620 kilometres have
already been rebuilt as of January 2016.[109] Surab to
Gwadar portion is funded by the Asian Development
Bank, but is considered vital for completion of CPEC's
Western Alignment.
Under construction[113]
Under construction[397]
Recruitment in progress[398]
Planning studies underway[132]
Planning studies underway
Approved[211]
Approved[399]
Approved[211]
Approved[211]
Approved[211]
 Project Notes

Gwadar Hospital Approved[211]

Gwadar International Airport Approved[211]

Gwadar-Nawabshah LNG terminal and pipeline project Approved[211]

Jhimpir wind power project Approved[211]

Main Line 2 and 3 railway overhaul Approved[211]

Matiari to Faisalabad transmission line Approved[211]

Matiari to Lahore Transmission Line Approved[211]

Salt Range coal power project Approved[211]

Suki Kinari Hydropower Project Approved[211]

Thar Engro Coal Power Project Approved[211]

Thar Block II coal power project Approved[211]

Khunjerab Railway Feasibility studies underway[211]

China Pakistan Economic Corridor Businessman Under Growing - Membership Open for business
Networking (https://www.cpecb.com) community

See also
Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor
ChinaPakistan relations
Gwadar Port
Maritime Silk Road
One Belt, One Road

References

Notes
A. Which Pakistan alleges are supported by Indian intelligence services.[322] Between 2014 and 2015, acts of terrorism
decreased by 50% in the province, while sharp decreases were also noted in deaths, kidnappings, and sectarian
killings.[325]

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External links
Official website (http://www.cpecinfo.com/)
Official government website (http://cpec.gov.pk/)
CPECBulletin- Your Ultimate Guide to CPEC (http://cpecbulletin.com/)
Husain, Khurram (15 May 2017). "Exclusive: CPEC master plan revealed" (https://www.dawn.com/news/1333101/excl
usive-cpec-master-plan-revealed). Dawn. Retrieved 15 May 2017.

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