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Philosophy & Principal of Protection

1.1. Introduction:
We usually think of an electric power system in terms of its more impressive partsthe
big generating stations, transformers, high-voltage lines, etc. While these are some of
the basic elements, there are many other necessary and fascinating components.
Protective relaying is one of these.
The role of protective relaying in electric-power-system design and operation is
explained by a brief examination of the over-all background. There are three aspects
of a power system that will serve the purposes of this examination. These aspects are
as follows:
1. Normal operation
2. Prevention of electrical failure.
3. Mitigation of the effects of electrical failure.
The term normal operation assumes no failures of equipment, no mistakes of
personnel, nor any natural calamity. It involves the minimum requirements for
supplying the existing load and a certain amount of anticipated future load.
In addition to normal operation there must be adequate provision in the system to
carry on with minimum possible interruption in case of normal operation disrupts.
Further there must be additional provisions to minimize damage to equipment and
interruptions to the service when failures occur.
To meet the above requirement, two options are:
1. Incorporate features of design aimed at preventing failures, and
2. Include provisions for mitigating the effects of failure when it occurs.

Modern power-system design employs varying degrees of both recourses, as dictated

by the economics of any particular situation. Notable advances continue to be made
toward greater reliability. But also, increasingly greater reliance is being placed on
electric power. Consequently, even though the probability of failure is decreased, the
tolerance of the possible harm to the service is also decreased. But it is futile-or at
least not economically justifiable-to try to prevent failures completely. Sooner or later
the law of diminishing returns makes itself felt. Where this occurs will vary between
systems and between parts of a system, but, when this point is reached, further
expenditure for failure prevention is discouraged. It is much more profitable, then, to
let some failures occur and to provide for mitigating their effects.
The type of electrical failure that causes greatest concern is the short circuit, or fault
as it is usually called, but there are other abnormal operating conditions peculiar to
certain elements of the system that also require attention but in this chapter we are
going to limited ourselves to a scenario wherein only fault shall be considered except
an operating condition which may lead to fault in allowed to persist.
Protective relaying is one of the several features of system design concerned with
minimizing damage to equipment and interruptions to service when electrical failures
occur. When we say that relays protect, we mean that, together with other
equipment, the relays help to minimize damage and improve service. It will be evident
that all the mitigation features are dependent on one another for successfully
minimizing the effects of failure. Therefore, the capabilities and the application
requirements of protective-relaying equipments should be considered concurrently
with the other features.

1.2. Function Of Protective Relaying:

The function of protective relaying is to cause the prompt removal from service of any
element of a power system when it suffers a short circuit, or when it starts to operate
in any abnormal manner that might cause damage or otherwise interfere with the
effective operation of the rest of the system.

1.3. Fundamental Principles Of Protective Relaying

Let us consider for the moment only the relaying equipment for the protection against
short circuits. There are two groups of such equipmentone which we shall call
primary relaying, and the other back-up relaying. Primary relaying is the first line of
defense, whereas back-up relaying functions only when primary relaying fails.

1.3.1. Primary Relaying

Figure 1 illustrates primary relaying. The first observation is that circuit breakers are
located in the connections to each power element. This provision makes it possible to
disconnect only a faulty element. Occasionally, a breaker between two adjacent
elements may be omitted, in which event both elements must be disconnected for a
failure in either one.

Fig. 1. One-line diagram of a portion of an electric power system illustrating
primary relaying.

The second observation is that, without at this time knowing how it is accomplished, a
separate zone of protection is established around each system element. The
significance of this is that any failure occurring within a given zone will cause the
tripping (i.e., opening) of all circuit breakers within that zone, and only those
It will become evident that, for failures within the region where two adjacent protective
zones overlap, more breakers will be tripped than the minimum necessary to
disconnect the faulty element. But, if there were no overlap, a failure in a region
between zones would not lie in either zone, and therefore no breakers would be
tripped. The overlap is the lesser of the two evils. The extent of the overlap is
relatively small, and the probability of failure in this region is low; consequently, the
tripping of too many breakers will be quite infrequent.
Finally, it will be observed that adjacent protective zones of Fig. 1 overlap around a
circuit breaker. This is the preferred practice because, for failures anywhere except in
the overlap region, the minimum number of circuit breakers need to be tripped. When
it becomes desirable for economic or space-saving reasons to overlap on one side of
a breaker, as is frequently true in metal-clad switchgear the relaying equipment of the
zone that overlaps the breaker must be arranged to trip not only the breakers within
its zone but also one or more breakers of the adjacent zone, in order to completely
disconnect certain faults. This is illustrated in Fig. 2, where it can be seen that, for a

short circuit at X, the circuit breakers of zone B, including breaker C, will be tripped;
but, since the short circuit is outside zone A, the relaying equipment of zone B must
also trip certain breakers in zone A if that is necessary to interrupt the flow of short
circuit current from zone A to the fault. This is not a disadvantage for a fault at X, but
the same breakers in zone A will be tripped unnecessarily for other faults in zone B to
the right of breaker C. Whether this unnecessary tripping is objectionable will depend
on the particular application.

Fig. 2. Overlapping adjacent protective zones on one side of a circuit breaker.

1.3.2. Back-Up Relaying

Back-up relaying is employed only for protection against short circuits. Because short
circuits are the preponderant type of power failure, there are more opportunities for
failure in short primary relaying. Experience has shown that back-up relaying for other
than short circuits is not economically justifiable.
A clear understanding of the possible causes of primary-relaying failure is necessary
for a better appreciation of the practices involved in back-up relaying. When we say
that primary relaying may fail, we mean that any of several things may happen to
prevent primary relaying from causing the disconnection of a power-system fault.
Primary relaying may fail because of failure in any of the following:
(a) Current or voltage supply to the relays.
(b) DC tripping-voltage supply.
(c) Protective relays.
(d) Tripping circuit or breaker mechanism.
(e) Circuit breaker.
It is highly desirable that back-up relaying be arranged so that anything that might
cause primary relaying to fail will not also cause failure of back-up relaying. It will be
evident that this requirement is completely satisfied only if the back-up relays are
located so that they do not employ or control anything in common with the primary
relays that are to be backed up. Consider, for example, the back-up relaying for the
transmission line section EF of Fig. 3. The back-up relays for this line section are
normally arranged to trip breakers A, B, I, and J. Should breaker E fail to trip for a
fault on the line section EF, breakers A and B are tripped; breakers A and B and their
associated back-up equipment, being physically apart from the equipment that has

failed, are not likely to be simultaneously affected as might be the case if breakers C
and D were chosen instead.

Fig. 3. Illustration for back-up protection of transmission line section EF.

The back-up relays at locations A, B, and F provide back-up protection if bus faults
occur at station K. Also, the back-up relays at A and F provide back-up protection for
faults in the line DB. In other words, the zone of protection of back-up relaying
extends in one direction from the location of any back-up relay and at least overlaps
each adjacent system element. Where adjacent line sections are of different length,
the back-up relays must overreach some line sections more than others in order to
provide back-up protection for the longest line.
A given set of back-up relays will provide incidental back-up protection of sorts for
faults in the circuit whose breaker the back-up relays control. For example, the back-
up relays that trip breaker A of Fig. 3 may also act as back-up for faults in the line
section AC. However, this duplication of protection is only an incidental benefit and is
not to be relied on to the exclusion of a conventional back-up arrangement when such
arrangement is possible; to differentiate between the two, this type might be called
duplicate primary relaying.
A second function of back-up relaying is often to provide primary protection when the
primary-relaying equipment is out of service for maintenance or repair.
It is perhaps evident that, when back-up relaying functions, a larger part of the system
is disconnected than when primary relaying operates correctly. This is inevitable if
back-up relaying is to be made independent of those factors that might cause primary
relaying to fail. However, it emphasizes the importance of the second requirement of
back-up relaying, that it must operate with sufficient time delay so that primary
relaying will be given enough time to function if it is able to. In other words, when a
short circuit occurs, both primary relaying and back-up relaying will normally start to
operate, but primary relaying is expected to trip the necessary breakers to remove the
short-circuited element from the system, and back-up relaying will then reset without
having had time to complete its function. When a given set of relays provides back-up
protection for several adjacent system elements, the slowest primary relaying of any
of those adjacent elements will determine the necessary time delay of the given back-

up relays.
For many applications, it is impossible to abide by the principle of complete
segregation of the back-up relays. Then one tries to supply the back-up relays from
sources other than those that supply the primary relays of the system element in
question, and to trip other breakers. This can usually be accomplished; however, the
same tripping battery may be employed in common, to save money and because it is
considered only a minor risk. This subject will be treated in more detail in Chapter 14.
In extreme cases, it may even be impossible to provide any back-up protection; in
such cases, greater emphasis is placed on the need for better maintenance. In fact,
even with complete back-up relaying, there is still much to be gained by proper
maintenance. When primary relaying fails, even though back-up relaying functions
properly, the service will generally suffer more or less. Consequently, back-up relaying
is not a proper substitute for good maintenance.

1.3.3. Requirement Of Protection System:


The protection system provided required to be highly reliable for maximum utilization
of system. Todays systems are very huge and in such a huge system, the risk of
occurring of fault can not be ignored. The protection system must operate to isolate
the fault reliably is utmost importance. Any non operation may lead to catastrophic
consequence for power system and may lead to multiple failure. Thus protection
system must be reliable. SELECTIVITY:

The protection is generally arranged in zones which should cover the power system
completely, leaving no part unprotected. When a fault occurs the protection is
required to select and trip only the nearest circuit breakers to affect minimum possible
outage. This property of selectivity is also called discrimination and is achieved by two
general methods:

This term applied to protection as distinct from the power system, refers to the ability
of this protection system to remain inert to all load conditions and fault external
(through fault) to the relevant zone. The system must remain stable in case of faults
occurring outside the protected zone and should not trip. SPEED:
The function of protection is to isolate faults from the power system in minimum
possible time to limit the damage to power system equipment that may be generators,
transmission lines, reactors, transformer, bus bars etc. The object is to safeguard
continuity of supply by removing each disturbance before it leads to widespread affect
in the power system causing multiple outages. SENSITIVITY:

Sensitivity is a term frequently used when referring to the minimum operating quantity
that may be current, voltage of a complete protection system. The protection system
must be able to sense the fault in minimum possible voltage/current to successfully
identify the fault and isolate the same.

1.3.4. Principal of Operation of Relays:

Present day relaying system is pre-dominantly numerical and most of the main relays
we are procuring are numerical relays only. But POWERGRID started with
Electromechnical relays. The relays based on operating principal can be divided in
following categories:

a) Electromechnical Relays
b) Static Relays
c) Numerical Relays. Electro-Mechanical Relays:

Electromagnetic attraction relays operate by virtue of a plunger being drawn into a

solenoid, or an armature being attracted to the poles of an electromagnet. Such

relays may be actuated by d-c or by a-c quantities. Electromagnetic-induction relays
use the principle of the induction motor whereby torque is developed by induction in a
rotor; this operating principle applies only to relays actuated by alternating current,
and in dealing with those relays we shall call them simply "induction-type" relays.

The example of electromechanical relays used in POWERGRID networks apart from

auxiliary relays are as under:
a) Distance Protection : YTG 31 & 33 Relays for M/S AREVA
b) Transformer differential Relays : CAG 34 & CAG 14 Relays from M/S AREVA Static Relays:

As the name suggests, in case of static relays, there is no electro magnetic parts in
the relays for operation of relays. An static relay is also known as Solid state relay. A
solid state relay (SSR) is a solid state electronic component that provides a similar
function to an electromechanical relay but does not have any moving components,
increasing long-term reliability. Static relays which essentially consist of electronic
circuitry to develop all those characteristics which are achieved by moving parts in an
electro-magnetic relay.

For example, in an induction type relay, the operating time can be adjusted by
adjusting the distance travelled by the disc whereas in a static relay it can be
achieved by adjusting the value of the resistance in the R-C time delay circuit. In
other words static relays are capable of performing the same functions with the use of
electronic circuit control as an electro-magnetic relay performs with the use of moving
parts or elements.

Static relays are superior to electro-magnetic relays in the following aspects:

1. The moving parts and the contacts are largely eliminated. The only moving
element in a static relay is the final tripping contact.
2. C.T.s and P.T.s employed are of lesser VA rating as static relays require a very
little volt-ampere for their operation.

3. More precise and high speed operation.

The example of Static relays are as under:

a) Distance Protection : Micromho, quadramho, from

b) Transformer differential Relays : RADHD, RADHA from M/S ABB Numerical Relays:

The numeric relay refers to a protective relay that uses an advanced microprocessor
to analyze power system voltages and currents for the purpose of detection of faults
in an electric power system. There are gray areas on what constitutes a numeric
relay, but most engineers will recognize the design as having the majority of these

The relay applies A/D (analog/digital) conversion processes to the incoming

voltages and currents.
The relay analyzes the A/D converter output to extract, as a minimum,
magnitude of the incoming quantity, most commonly using Fourier transform
concepts (RMS and some form of averaging are used in basic products.

The relay is capable of applying advanced logic. It is capable of analyzing

whether the relay should trip or restrain from tripping based on current and/or
voltage magnitude (and angle in some applications), complex parameters set
by the user, relay contact inputs, and in some applications, the timing and
order of event sequences.

The logic is user-configurable at a level well beyond simply changing front

panel switches or moving of jumpers on a circuit board.

The relay has some form of advanced event recording. The event recording
would include some means for the user to see the timing of key logic
decisions, relay I/O (input/output) changes, and see in an oscillographic
fashion at least the fundamental frequency component of the incoming AC

The relay has an extensive collection of settings, beyond what can be entered
via front panel knobs and dials, and these settings are transferred to the relay
via an interface with a PC (personal computer), and this same PC interface is
used to collect event reports from the relay.

The more modern versions of the numerical relay will contain advanced
metering and communication protocol ports, allowing the relay to become a
focal point in a SCADA system.

As a point of comparison, an electromechanical relay converts the voltages and

currents to magnetic and electric forces and torques that press against spring
tensions in the relay. The tension of the spring and taps on the electromagnetic coils
in the relay are the main processes by which a user sets such a relay. In a solid state
relay, the incoming voltage and current waveforms stay within analog circuits that use
transformers, resistor, capacitors, inductors, transistors, op amps, comparators, etc.

The incoming waveform is not recorded or sent into an A/D circuit. The analog values
are compared to settings made by the user via potentiometers in the relay, and in
some case, taps on transformers.

Presently all the major suppliers to POWERGRID are supplying the numerical
protection relays. These suppliers include ABB, AREVA, SIEMENS, SEL & GE.

The components to be protected in electrical power system can be divided in

following categories:

a) Power Transformer
b) Shunt Reactors

c) Transmission Line Protection

d) Bus Bars

e) Capacitor banks etc.

In subsequent chapters we shall be discussing in details all of the above protections

and associated schemes in details except for Capacitor protection.


21 Distance relay
24 Volts/hertz relay
25 Synchronizing relay
27 Under voltage relay
30 Annunciator relay
32 Directional power relay
37 Under current relay
40 Field failure relay
46N Negative sequence over current
49 Machine or transformer thermal relay
50 Instantaneous over current
51 A.C time over current relay
52a Circuit breaker auxiliary switch (normally open)
52b Circuit breaker auxiliary switch (normally closed)
67 Directional over current
55 Power factor relay
59 Over voltage relay
60 Voltage or current balance relay
64 Earth fault protective relay
67N Ground directional over current
68 Blocking relay
74 Alarm relay
76 D.C Over current relay
79 Auto-reclose relay
81 Frequency relay
85 Carrier relay
86 Lock out relay
87 Differential relay
94 Tripping relay

Transformer Protection
2.1. Introduction :

A power transformer is an important and expensive part of a power network. High

availability of the power transformer is therefore very important in order to prevent
disturbances in the power networks transfer of power.
A high quality power transformer, correctly designed and with suitable protection
relays and supervision is very reliable. Less than one fault per 100 transformer and
year can be expected.
When a fault occurs in a power transformer this will normally cause severe damage.
The power transformer has to be transported to a workshop for reparation, which
takes considerable time. Operation of a power network, when the power transformer
is out of service is always difficult. A power transformer fault therefore often is a more
severe disturbance for the network, than an overhead line fault which usually can be
repaired rather quickly.

Insulation breakdown
Insulation breakdown of the windings will cause short-circuits and/or earth-faults.
These faults causes severe damage on the windings and the transformer core. In
addition to that an overpressure may develop damaging the transformer tank.

Insulation breakdown, between windings or between winding and

core can be caused by:

Ageing of insulation due to over temperature during a long time.

Contaminated oil.
Corona discharges in the insulation.
Transient overvoltages, due to lightning or switching, in the network.
Current forces on the windings due to high currents at external faults or the
inrush currents when a transformer is energized.


2.3.1. GENERAL

When a fault occurs in a power transformer, the damage will be proportional to the
fault clearance time. The power transformer therefore must be disconnected, as
quickly as possible. It is of outmost importance that quick and reliable protection
relays are used to detect faults and initiate tripping. Monitors at the power

transformer can also be used for detecting of abnormal conditions which may develop
into a fault.
The power transformers size and voltage level influences the extent the choice of
monitors and the protection relays used to limit the damage at a possible fault. The
cost for these is small compared both to the total cost of the power transformer and
the cost due to a transformer fault.
There are often different opinions about the extent of transformer protection.
However, transformers with oil conservators usually are equipped with the following
protection and monitoring:

Pressure guard (Buchholz-relay).

Overload protection (normally winding temperature supervision within the
Overcurrent protection.
Earth fault protection.
Differential protection.
Pressure relay for tap changer compartment.
Oil level monitor.


A differential protection compares the currents flowing into and out from the
transformer. Auxiliary current transformer aux. CTs, for adjusting the phase angle
and ratio are necessary. Ratio correction is normally calculated for tap changer at
middle position. In new numerical protection relays aux. CTs are not necessary.

Phase shift, voltage levels and CT-ratios are then programmed into the protection and
compensated for at differential current measurement. Further zero sequence current
filtering is also made in software whereas in older static relays this was made by
including delta windings in the auxiliary current transformers. A differential protection
must operate quickly, when the differential current exceeds the settings of the relay
and only operate for a fault within its zone. The protection therefore must be stable

Inrush currents.
Through fault currents.
Overfluxing of the transformer.

This must be ensured, even with a tap-changer in the end position.

Inrush current
Inrush current develop, when the transformer is connected to thenetwork. The
magnitude and duration are dependent on:
Transformer size and design.
Source impedance.
Remanence of the core.
Point of the sinus wave at which the transformer is switched on.

Inrush currents can develop in all phases and in an earthed neutral. Currents of
magnitude 5-10 times the transformers rated current can be obtained. Inrush current
can have the shape shown in fig. 4. Maximum inrush is achieved when the
transformer is switched in at zero voltage and the magnetic flux, from the inrush
current, have the same direction as the remanence flux of the core. The two fluxes
are added and the core can saturate. When the transformer core saturates the inrush
current is only limited by the network source impedance and transformer residual

Figure 4. Recorded inrush current for a 60MVA transformer 140/40/6,6kV,

connected YNyd

When the new flux at the switching in have the opposite direction of the remenence
flux, no saturation of the core will be obtained and the inrush current will be
comparatively small. The size of the inrush current therefore is dependent of where
on the wave the transformer is switched in.
The inrush current also has a large DC-component and is rich of harmonics. The
fundamental frequency and the second harmonic are dominating. Damping of the
inrush current is dependent on the total resistance of the feeding network. Duration
can vary from less than 1 second, up to minutes in extreme cases, when a
transformer is switched in, in parallel with another, already energized, transformer. In
order to prevent unwanted functions at switching in the trans-former the differential
protection is supplied with a second harmonic restraint measuring the content of
second harmonic compared with the fundamental frequency. The second harmonic
restraint will block unwanted tripping by increasing the stabilization if the second
harmonic content is large. A normal content is >13-20% depending on the
manufacture and type. For modern numerical relays the stabilization level can be set
for each application.

Normal service
At normal service there will be a small differential (unbalanced) current ow due to
mismatch of ratio (aux. ct:s normally have a limited number of taps and will not get
exact adjustment), power transformer magnetizing current and the position of the tap-
changer. The position of the tap changer is the factor that gives the dominating
differential current.

External faults
The normal differential current in service increases at an exter-nal fault. A through
fault of 10 times the rated current (with a tap changer at end position) can cause a
differential current of 1-2 times the power transformer rated current.

In order not to mal-operate under these conditions the differential protection is

provided with a percentage, through fault, restraint circuit. The percentage restraint
ensures that the function only is obtained if the differential current reaches a certain
percentage of the total through fault current (see g. 5). The current (I 1+I2)/2 is the
measured through fault current and the differential current required for operation will
increase with increasing through fault current and a stabilization for the differential
current achieved due to tap changer in offset position is then achieved .

Figure 5. :Through fault restraint gives an increased required differential current when
the through fault current is increasing.

2.3.3. Overexcitation

Overexcitation of a transformer means that the magnetic ux in the core is increased

above the normal design level. This will cause an increase of the magnetizing current
and the transform-er can be damaged if this situation isnt taken care of.

Over-excitation of transformers in transmission and distribution networks is caused by

overvoltages in the network. For step-up transformers connected to generators during
start-up, over-excitation can occur since the ux is dependent of the factor
voltage/frequency. This means that the voltage must be gradually increased, with
increasing frequency, in order not to overexcite the transformer.

The over-excitation is not an internal transformer fault, although can lead to one. The
differential protection must therefore be stabilized under these conditions as tripping
of transformers and thus load will only mean that the overvoltage condition in the net-
work is becoming worse.
The current during over-excitation has a lot of fifth harmonic, see g. 6. This fact is
utilized in modern transformer protection to stabilize the transformer against
unwanted functions during these kind of conditions.

Figure 6. Magnetizing current at Over excitation where I is the fundamental


frequency current, I is the fifth harmonic current, I is the total magnetizing current
5 m

and I is the nominal current.


If over excitation of the transformer due to overvoltage or under-frequency is likely to
happen, a separate over-excitation protection should be supplied. This protection has
inverse characteristics according to the transformers capability to re-strain over-
excitation V/Hz. This protection must be connected to a transformer winding with
fixed number of turns. If the transform-er is supplied with tap changer the protection
must be connected to a side without tap changer. The side with the tap changer can
withstand different voltages depending on the tap changer position and is therefore
not suitable for over-excitation protection.

2.3.4. Restricted Earth Fault Protection:

For solidly earthed systems a restricted earth fault protection is often provided as a
complement to the normal transformer differential relay. The advantage with the
restricted earth fault relays is their high sensitivity. Sensitivities of 2-8% can be
achieved. The level is dependent of the current transformers magnetizing cur-rents
whereas the normal differential relay will have sensitivities of 20-40%.

Restricted earth fault relays are also very quick due to the simple measuring principle
and the measurement of one winding only. The differential relay requires percentage
through fault and second harmonic inrush stabilization which always will limit the
minimum operating time.

The connection of a restricted earth fault relay is shown in Figure 7. It is connected

across each transformer winding in the gure 8.

Figure 7. A restricted earth fault relay for an YNdyn transformer.

The common principle for Restricted earth fault relays is the high impedance
principle, see gure 8.

Secondary current and voltage with no voltage limiter.

Figure 8.: The high impedance principle.

The relay provides high impedance to the current. The current will, for through loads
and through faults, circulate in the current transformer circuits, not go through the
relay. For a through fault one current transformer might saturate when the other still
will feed current. For such a case a voltage can be achieved across the relay. The
calculations are made with the worst situations in mind and an operating voltage UR
is calculated:
UR IFmax(Rct + RI)

IFmax is the maximum through fault current at the secondary side, Rct is the current
transformer secondary resistance and
Rl is the loop resistance of the circuit.
The maximum operating voltage have to be calculated (both neutral loop and phase
loop must be checked) and the relay set high-er than the highest achieved value.

For an internal fault the circulation is not possible and due to the high impedance the
current transformers will immediately saturate and a rms voltage with the size of
current transformer saturation voltage will be achieved across the relay. Due to the
fast saturation very high top voltages can be achieved. To prevent the risk of
ashover in the circuit, a voltage limiter must be included. The voltage limiter can be
either of type surge arrester or voltage dependent resistor.

The relay sensitivity is decided by the total current in the circuit according to the

Ip n(I R + Ires + Imag)

where n is the CT ratio, IR is the current through the relay, Ires is the current
through the voltage limiter and Imag is the sum of the magnetizing currents from all
CTs in the circuit (normally 4).

It should be remembered that the vectorial sum of the currents must be used. The
current measurement has to be DC insensitive to allow a use of AC components of
the fault current in the calculations.


A transformer is always supplied with a number of back-up protection relays, e.g.

back-up for short circuits or earth faults in the low side system. These protection
relays are definite or inverse time delayed and connected to high- and low voltage
side as well as on the neutral side/sides for the earth fault functions. They will provide
system back-up rather than being back-up for internal system faults, e. g. the short
circuit protection on the HV side of the transformer provides back-up to the short
circuit protection on the outgoing feeders when these fails to clear the fault.

2.3.6. Mechanical Protection:

To safeguard the transformer from slow and incipient faults, some mechanical
protections are also provided. These are as under :

a) Buchloz Relay
b) Sudden Pressure Relay
c) Pressure Relief Device
d) Winding temperature Protection
e) Oil Temperature Protection

The location of these protections are shown in Fig. 9.

Figure 9: Location of Buchholz, top oil thermometer and winding temperature

indication Buchloz Relay

At a fault in an oil immersed transformer the arc will cause the oil to decompose and
gas will be released. The gas will pass through the pipe between the main tank and
the conservator and can be detected by a gas detector relay which is known as
Buchloz Relay.

The Buchloz Relay has an alarm unit collecting the gas, and one unit for tripping
responding to the high ow of gas at a serious internal fault.

The collected gas can be analyzed and give information about what caused the gas.

It should be noted that the trip signal from the Buchholz some-times can be very short
at a serious internal fault due to that the relay will be destroyed (blown away).
Receiving of this signal in the relay system therefore must have a seal-in feature to
ensure that a sufficient length of the tripping signal is given to the CB and to indication
relays. Sudden Pressure Relay :

The sudden pressure relays are normally operates based on the rate of change of
pressure. These relays are normally mounted on large transformers and operate very

20 Pressure Relief Device:

This type of device basically works of pressure of transformer tank. If the pressure on
Transformer tanks exceeds a preset value, the device initiates a trip signal. Normally
the oil inside a transformer tank remains on certain pressure, but when there is some
faults inside the transformer, the pressure inside the transformer tanks increases and
thus causes pressure relief device to operate. In case of large transformers the
number of devices may be more than one. Temperature Monitoring:

A too high temperature in a transformer can be caused by over-loading or by

problems in the cooling equipment. Overuxing can also cause a temperature raise.
Oil immersed transformers are supervised with thermometers. These are included in
the power transformer standard equipment. There are two types to choose between,
oil-, or winding temperature measuring devices and both are normally supplied on
transformers bigger than a few MVA.
Both types are overloading sensors for the transformer. There is normally one alarm
and one trip level at each type of measuring devices.

Reactor Protection

3. Introduction
Reactor protection is more or less is same as transformer protection. However only
differences are on account of two protections. The differences are that normally in
POWERGRID, we do not provide back up over current and earth fault protection for
reactor as the reactor can not feed through fault being a shunt device. However, in
case of reactor we do provide one additional protection known as Back up impedance
protection. The protections provided for a Shunt Reactor are as under:

a) Reactor Differential Protection

b) Reactor Restricted Earth Fault Protection

c) Reactor Back-up Protection

d) Mechanical Protections such as Buchloz Relay, Oil Temperature and Winding

Temperature protection and Pressure Relief Device.

In this chapter we shall be discussing only Back up Impedance protection of the shunt
Reactor. Rest of other protection basically works on same principal as of Transformer.

3.1. Back Up Impedance Protection:

To cover the inter turn fault, it is practice of POWERGRID to provide back up

Impedance protection for the reactor. Some utilities also provide back over current
protection in place of back up impedance. Usually the back up impedance covers only
60% of winding and not complete winding due to limitation of protective relays. The
relay is simply a distance relay with only one zone preferably. The characteristics
desired are Mho characteristics. This protection is normally provided with a time delay
and act as a back up protection instead of main protection of the reactor.

Transmission Line Protection


The transmission lines are the most widely spread part of the power system and the
overhead lines are the, from environmental influences, least protected part of the
system. The number of line faults will thus be very high compared with the total
number of faults in the whole power system. Therefore the line protection are one of
the most important protection systems in the whole power system.

Another aspect is that the power lines are the part of the system that is most likely to
cause injuries to people and also to cause damages to equipment and structures not
part of the power system. Therefore the line fault clearing is subject to authority

In the voltage range above 170 kV, practically all systems are solidly earthed. In the
range 50-170 kV some systems are earthed over Petersn reactors. These systems
are seldom equipped with earth fault protection relays. Earth faults are then cleared
manually or with special transient measuring protection relays. The clearing of multi-
phase faults will basically not be different in these systems than in solidly earthed
systems. Systems with Pe-tersn reactors will therefore not be discussed separately.

Overhead lines in the voltage range of 170 kV will have a length from a few up to
approximately 400 km. Some lines are mixed and consist of both cable and overhead
lines. Cable and overhead lines have different phase angles and Z0/Z1 ratio. These
differences complicates the impedance diagram for the mixed lines where the cable
impedance cant be ignored in relation to the overhead line impedance. Mostly the
cable is short and the mixed line can be handled, from protection point of view, as an
overhead line.


The probability of line faults, caused by lightnings, are 0,2-3 faults per 100 km and
year. To this have to be added faults caused by pollution, salt spray, swinging
conductors, lifting devices touching the conductors. In most cases lightning faults are
much dominating.

About 80% of the line faults are single phase to earth, 10% are two phase to earth
faults, 5% are isolated two phase faults and 5% are three phase faults. At lower
voltages the multi phase fault will be more common due to the lower basic insulation

level. The number of faults also increases due to the lower distances.

Figure 10. Faults occurring on a transmission line tower are of different types.


Transient faults are common on transmission lines. They will disappear after a short
dead interval and self distinguish. Lightning is the most common reason for transient
faults. The lightning induced over voltages will cause flash-over in an insulator chain.

The fault must be cleared to clear the arc. After a short interval, to allow deionisation,
the voltage can be restored without causing a new fault.

Transient faults can also, further to lightnings, be caused by factors such as swinging
lines, falling trees and birds.

Approximately 80-85% of faults at HV lines are transient. The gures appearing at

lower voltages are less.

Persistent faults can be caused by a broken conductor, a falling tree, a mechanically

damaged insulator etc. These faults must be localized and the damage repaired
before the normal service can be reestablished. The system is during the reparation
in an ab-normal but safe condition.


In double circuit lines (two lines at the same tower) simultaneous-and inter-line
faults can occur.

Simultaneous fault are most likely to be two single phase to earth faults that will
occur on different phases on the two lines on the same transmission line tower. Both
faults will though then be in the same tower. The common footing resistance will
complicate the detection of this type of fault.

The Inter-line fault is a connection between two phases of the parallel lines on the
same transmission line tower with the arc. The probability for simultaneous fault and
interline fault is low.

The fault resistance at a multi-phase fault consists only of arc resistance and can
practically be ignored. At cross country faults, an earth resistance is added to the arc
resistance and the fault resistance will then be significant. The probability for this type
of fault is very small in a solidly earthed system and is mostly ignored

The fault resistance cant be ignored in case of an earth fault. When the fault occurs
at a tower the footing resistance is added to the arc resistance. The footing resistance
depends on the line design and is almost always less than ten ohms but the
resistance can be tens of ohms in extreme cases. When earth faults between the
towers, called mid-span faults, occurs the footing resistance is beyond control and
can in extreme cases be up to tens of kiloohms. Mid-span faults can be caused by
growing trees, bush re or objects touching the phase conductors.


The choice of protection relays for a specific application, depends on the network
configuration, type of line (single or parallel, long or short, series compensated or
not), load current level, and expected tower foot resistances etc. A choice must be
done individually for each application and the future expansion of the network must
be kept in mind.

The most important features of the line protection relays are:

4.5.1. Speed

Speed i. e. short operating time for severe faults. As mentioned above a very short
clearance time is required for severe faults, sometimes down to a few milliseconds.
One example is a three-phase fault in a 400 kV system having 20 kA in short-circuit
current and 13000 MVA in short circuit power. The thermal and mechanical stresses
at such a fault are very high.

Speed is thus important to:

Limit the damages on the high voltage apparatus as well as limit the thermal and
mechanical stresses.
Limit the ionization at the fault which will increase the chances of a successful Auto
reclosing and thus shorten the dead interval.
Increase the power transmission capability of the network without de-creasing the
safety margin for the network stability.


The maximum fault clearance time is important i. e. including the back-up protection
function and the possibility of a breaker failure. The network must be stable under
maximal conditions.

4.5.2. Sensitivity

Sensitivity means the capability to detect all types of fault.

It is important to detect all faults even if the fault current is smaller than the load
current. Equipment damages due to induction in low voltage equipment, or person
injuries due to rise in earth potential, can occur also for low magnitude faults. High
resistive earth faults are quite likely to occur at long transmission lines and the relay
system must be able to detect such faults before the faults develops further or people
will get seriously injured. Sensitivity is therefore the second important aspect in the
performance of line protection relays.


The requirement on the line protection systems sensitivity at earth faults is often
discussed and varies between utilities. The mid-span fault often requires higher
sensitivity than what can be achieved by the primary protection relay used. A
maximum sensitivity of approximately RF<50 can be achieved by the primary

An acceptable sensitivity can only be achieved utilizing zero sequence components in

overcurrent, directional overcurrent or directional comparison schemes. These relays
can only detect earth faults.

4.5.3. Selectivity

Selectivity i. e. the capability to determine the fault location and only disconnect the
faulty object.

The consequences of a fault must be limited and the power supply to the consumers
secured. The protection system must therefore be capable of distinguish between an
external and an internal faults also for low magnitude faults on a heavy loaded object,
or for parallel objects where close to similar parameters exist for both healthy and
faulty object.

Requirement on selectivity

In order to fulfill these requirements the protection relays has to be able to distinguish
between the normal operating condition of the protected object and an electrical fault
i.e. give a reliable fault detection unaffected by normal operating conditions such as
load, inrush currents etc. In some cases it is also required that the protection relay
must be able to detect also other abnormal operating conditions such as
overexcitation, overload, broken conductor etc. These arent electrical faults but may
still damage the protected object or other apparatus in the network. Since power
apparatus in many applications have to operate near their rated limits it is important
that this part of the protection system exactly can distinguish between permissible
and none permissible operating conditions.

Electrical faults are normally required to be cleared instantaneously. Other abnormal

operating conditions can be accepted to result in time delayed action.

Dependability and security are contradictory to each other but have to be evaluated
together due to the linking of the two qualities. In redundant protection schemes the
whole scheme has to be evaluated not only the individual relays.

To achieve maximum dependability combined with maximum security the

communication demands shall be at minimum. Wide band transmission is not only
expensive it will also be more exposed to interference. The latter is apparent when
power line carrier is used. The communication demand is therefore linked with
dependability and security.


The basic type of measuring principles can be used for line protection relays.
One, or combinations, of the measuring principles below can be used to create
the total line protection scheme.

Overcurrent protection relays are undirectional, or directional, current

measuring relays with a back-up feature due to the current measuring principle.
These types of relays are predominantly used in distribution network. These
relays are simple and normally feeding radial loads.

Pilot wire, line differential and phase comparison measuring principles

gives exclusive unit protection without any back-up feature. New types of Optical
line differential relays with Distance back-up functions do now exist on the market
which solves the back-up function problem. The problem of these type of relays
are that they can not be used on very long lines. The length of line is major
constraints of these type of relays. In POWERGRI, we have used Phase
comparison relay (P-10 or P-4)) in our earlier network but now we do not use
these relays. Further we have already replaced most of the phase comparison
relays which were existing in the network with distance protection type relays.

Distance measuring principles is the principle which is widely used in

POWERGRID for line protection.

Travelling Wave protection is a unit protection where the two line ends are
communicating through a fast channel in a permissive or blocking scheme. This
is very fast protection. This type of protection was supplied by ABB and the relay
used were RALZB. But due to spare constraints etc. this protection is also being
phased out in POWERGRID.

But in this chapter we are going to discuss basically distance protection schemes,
their principle of operation, basic scheme and their feature, some of additional
features, add on options etc. in details.
4.7.1. Principle design

Distance protection relays are the most common relays on transmission lines.
The reason for this is the simple measuring principle, the built-in back-up and the
low requirement on communication with remote end.

The Distance protection relay is a directional under-impedance relay. Normally

two to five measuring zones are available in most modern relays.

Basically the Distance protection relays measures the quotient U/I, considering
also the phase angle between the voltage U and the current I. The measured
U/I is then compared with the set value. The relay will trip when the measured
value is less than the value set. The vector ZL in gure 11 shows the location of
a metallic fault on a power line in the impedance plane. Power lines normally
have impedances of 0,3-0,4 /km at 50 Hz and the angle normally is 80-85.

Figure 11. The principle of a Distance protection relay

However, metallic faults are relatively rare. Most faults are caused by a flashover
between phase and earth or between phases.

A small arc resistance Rf exists in the fault. The arc resistance

Rarc can according to Warrington be calculated as:

Rarc = 28700 * a / I1.4

where: a is the length of the arc in m i. e. the length of the insulator for earth fault and
the phase distance at phase faults. I is the fault current through the fault resistance in

During earth faults, the tower foot resistance also will occur in the fault loop. The
Distance protection relays must therefore cover an area of the line impedance, plus
the fault resistance as indicated in the gure13. Tower foot resistances should
normally be kept below 10 . Top lines connecting towers together will give parallel
path and lower the tower foot resistance. In some areas as high values as 50 can
exist and special pre-cautions to protect against earth faults can then be necessary.

The vector Zb shows the location of the load impedance. Normally the load
impedance is close to cos =1. The Distance protection relays must be able to
distinguish between fault and load conditions even if the impedances are of the same

The detection of the forward direction is an important function for a Distance

protection. The directional sensitivity must be absolute and serve down to zero

The back-up function is simply achieved, by an extension of the
impedance reach with time steps (see figure 13).

For normal lines with a distance longer than approximately 15 km the first step of
impedance, is under reaching the line end with absolute selectivity covering about
80% of the line. The 80% reach is selected due to errors in distance measurement
due to Current and Voltage transformer errors, relay accuracy and influence from the
system as described further below. A fault at F1 will be tripped instantaneously from
both protection A and B. Normal operating time in modern Distance protection
relays is 15-30ms. Operating time will be dependent on source to impedance ratio,
setting, fault resistance, fault position, CVT filter and the point of wave at which the
fault occurs.

A fault at F2 is tripped instantaneously by relay B and by relay A, after the time


A fault at F3 is normally tripped instantaneously by relay C and D. If the relay at

C or the breaker fails, relay A will trip.

Figure 12. The principle of line protection, with Distance protection relays at both line ends.

4.7.2. Distance protection relay -Design

The design of a Distance protection is much dependent of the technic used. Today
there are products of electromechanical and static, as well as numerical, design.
However the numerical schemes have clearly started to take over.

The two main types of Distance protection relays are switched scheme and full
scheme. The switched scheme relays consists of a start relay selecting the correct
measuring loop to the single measuring relay. The start relays are in their simplest
form current relays at all three phases and in the neutral. In more expensive
solutions, the start relays are under impedance relays.

A full scheme relay has a measuring element for each measuring loop and for each
zone. All measuring elements then does the measuring in parallel which this leads to
shorter operating times.

The cost advantages with a switched scheme compared to a full scheme have been
minimized with the introduction of numerical relays where all calculations are made by
a processor. The design of a numerical distance protection is shown in Figure 13.
Input transformers provides the disturbance barrier and transforms the analogue
signals into a suitable voltage, for the electronic circuits. Passive analogue lters
prevents anti-aliazing. The analogue values for all voltages and currents are in an A/D
con-verter transformed into digital values and are after a digital ltering sent in series
to the measuring unit.

Figure 13. The design of a Numerical distance protection relay.

In the measuring unit a Fourier analysis and an impedance calculation are performed.
A Directional check also is made. The directional check includes a positive sequence
memory polarizing to secure correct function even with a completely collapsed
voltage at a close-up fault.

Impedance and direction criteria are checked in logic and together with the time
elements the full scheme protection relay is built up.

4.7.3. Impedance measurement

The measure impedance at a certain fault position must not be dependent of the fault
type. The correct voltages and currents must therefore be measured for each fault
loop and the evaluation of loop impedance and the phase impedance to the fault must
be done. The Distance protection relays settings are always based on the phase
impedance to the fault. The measuring loops for different fault types are shown in




Figure 14: The impedance measuring Loop for Various Faults

For two and three phase faults the phase voltage and the difference between line
currents are used. With this principle the measured impedance is equal to the positive
sequence impedance at the fault location.

The earth fault measurement is more complicated. Using of phase currents and
phase voltages gives impedance as a function of the positive and the zero sequence

The current used is the phase current plus the neutral current times a factor KN. The
zero sequence compensation factor is KN =(Z0-Z1)/3Z1.

The factor KN is a transmission line constant and Z0/Z1 is presumed to be identical

throughout the whole line length.

The total loop impedance for the earth fault loop can be de-scribed (1+KN)Z1.

4.7.4. Measuring principle

Modern static Distance protection relays can be made with Amplitude- or Phase angle
comparators. Both principles gives identical result.

An Amplitude comparison |IxZK|>|U| gives in a R-X diagram a circular characteristic

which is the simplest principle for a Distance protection. ZK is the model impedance
of the relay i.e. the set impedance. I and U are the measured voltages and cur-
rents. The relay will give operation when the measured impedance |Z|<|ZK|.

The same characteristic is achieved by comparing the signals IxZK-U, and

IxZK+U, with operation for -/2 < <-/2 .

The comparators can be instantaneous, integrating or a combination of both.

The selected principle is decided by factors like circuit costs, speed requirements,
immunity to disturbances etc. Integration will make the relay slower but more resistant
against disturbances. However, in modern numerical and static relays the immunity is
achieved by an improved ltering technic. Instantaneous comparators can therefore
be used with improved operating times as a result.

In numerical Distance protection relays the impedance is calculated for each

measuring loop and is then compared with the set impedance.

DIRECTIONAL MEASUREMENT: At fault close to the relay location the voltage

can drop to a value, where directional measurement cannot be performed. Modern
Distance protection relays will in-stead use a cross-polarization where the healthy
voltage e. g. for a R fault the voltage UL2L3 = U2-U3 with a 90 phase shift compared
to UL1N. Different degrees of cross-polarization between the healthy and faulty
phases exist in different products.

For three-phase faults the cross polarization does not enable measurement as all
phases are low. A voltage memory circuit is then used to secure correct directional
discrimination even at close-up faults with zero voltage in all three phases.

In new relays the memory is based on the positive sequence volt-age. The memory is
held for about 100 ms after the voltage drop. After 100 ms the most common principle
is to seal-in the direction measured until the current disappears.

INSTRUMENT TRANSFORMERS: The measurement of impedance and direction

is done by signals from the current- and voltage transformers. Conventional current
transformers may saturate due to the DC component in the short-circuit current. The
best solution is to do the measurement before the CT-saturation. This requires a high
speed performance of the relay.

For distance measurement another solution is to measure the zero crossings. Even
during a transient saturation of a CT core one zero crossing per cycle will be
correctly reproduced.

CVT-transient is a big problem for the directional measurement in relays of Distance

relay type. For these relays the CVT- transient has to be ltered out. The CVT
transient is defined in IEC 186 and the transient voltage shall at a solid fault with zero
voltage be <10% after one cycle. It is obvious that quick operating relays will be much
disturbed by a CVT transient.

If the change in voltage is used instead of the voltage itself, the problem can be
completely avoided.

4.7.5. Different Zones of protection:

Normally distance protection relays are required to have at least 3 forward looking
zones and one reverse looking zone. Some distance protection relays in early time
only having three forward looking zones. The different zone of protection and their
main characteristics are as under: Zone-I Characteristics

Zone I reach is required to cover 80 % of the protected line, to prevent the possibility
of relays tripping instantaneously for faults in the next line due to relay errors and
voltage and current transformer errors and inaccuracy in line data. Normally zone 1 is
forward looking instantaneous tripping zone with maximum coverage and with
additional resistance coverage. Normally this is the zone which is giving single pole
tripping and single phase auto reclosing is also taking in the zone. Further, in normal
application, we do not provide any time delay fro operation of zone-1. This zone
covers maximum impedance without overreaching. This zone is normally set to 80%
of line length (protected section). Zone-II Characteristics:

Zone II The purpose of zone II is to cover the end zone of 20 %, which is not, covered
by zone-I and to provide back up protection for faults on the remote line bus bars. The
zone-II normally covers full length of protected line plus additional lengths for adjacent
sections. Normally the zone-II reaches are decided based on following

a) If line is single circuit line, normally Zone-II setting is 120% of protected


b) If line is double circuit line, Zone-II setting shall be 150% of protected portion
to offset the effect of mutual coupling. However under no circumstances, the
zone-II reach should reach the next lower voltage level.
c) Zone-II is basically a back up zone thus is normally provided with a time delay
of 300 to 500 millisecond.
d) In case long line followed by a short line, to safe guard against racing,
normally time grading is used.
e) Further in case of long line followed by a short line, the zone-II setting is
normally increased for shorter line beyond the zone III setting of longer line
of previous section for avoiding multiple tripping of different sections.
f) All the communication added tripping schemes (shall be discussed later in the
chapter) are meant to bypass the zone-II timer and normally termed as
accelerated tripping scheme. Zone-III Characteristics:

This zone also works as remote back up zone. The setting of this zone normally
covers principal section +120% of next longest section. While setting this zone, it
should be ensured that the reach should not cross the next voltage level. This zone is
normally associated with a time delay of 0.8 sec to 1.5 second. Zone-IV Characteristics(Reverse Looking Zone):

This zone is not mandatory in POWERGRID however most of the present relay
provides this zone. This is normally set to 20% to 30% of protected section and must
cover upto the bus bars at least. This is again a back up zone and normally provided
with a time delay equal to Zone-II time delay of slightly higher than zone-III time delay.

4.7.6. Characteristics of Distance Protection:

In earlier time the distance protection relays employed by the system are with
predominantly Mho/circular characteristics. This type of characteristics were very
much suitable for long lines as the characteristics normally give reasonably good
coverage for phase-phase and Phase-earth fault. But in case of shorter line, the
coverage for earth fault was not good. Over the period of time various characteristics
were tried and employed by distance protection relays. These are normally circular or
mho characteristics, lenticular characteristics and quadrilateral characteristics. These
are shown in following figures:

Figure 15: Circular/Mho Chractertics

Figure 16: Lenticular Chracteristics

Figure 17: Quadrilateral Characteristics of a Distance Protection Relay

Figure 18: Characteristic of One Zone of Present Day Numerical Relay

4.7.7. Tele-Protection Scheme:

Basically in POWERGRID network we are using three types of tele-protection

schemes and their adoption is basically depends upon the specific application such
as long line, short line, security requirement, line with series application etc. The
entire tele-protection schemes are basically designed to bypass the zone-II timer.
These schemes are as under: Permissive under Reach Scheme:

As the name suggests in this scheme the carrier sending zone is normally under
reaching zone i.e. Zone-I. In case there is a fault in Zone-I, the protection relay trips
the local end instantaneously and sends a inter trip commend to remote end. If the
fault from remote end is also seen as a fault in zone-I, the remote end also
instantaneously tripped and send a inter trip commend. But if at remote end sees the
fault in zone-II, it starts Zone-II timer and waits for its time to lapse. In the mean time if
an inter trip comment is received from remote end, it bypasses the zone-II timer and
issues a trip command. As in this scheme as the inter trip command is send through
under reaching zone, the scheme is named as permissive under Reach scheme. A
typical block diagram of scheme is indicated in Figure 19.

Figure 19: Simplified Permissive Under Reach Scheme Block Diagram Permissive Over Reach Scheme:

As the name suggests in this scheme the carrier sending zone is normally over
reaching zone i.e. Zone-II. In case there is a fault in Zone-II, the protection relay
sends a inter trip commend to remote end. If the fault from remote end is also seen as
a fault in Zone-II, the remote end also sends a inter trip commend. The relay will not
trip in Zone-II until the time set is over or receives an intertrip signal from remote end.
In case the fault is beyond the protected section, the remote end will see the fault as
backward fault and zone-II will not picks up, thus it will ensure a correct and in section
tripping thus avoiding mal operation. In this scheme a relay set to reach beyond the
far end of protected line is used to send the inter rip signal to the remote end. In this
case it is essential that the receive relay contact is monitored by directional relay
contact to ensure that tripping does not take place unless the fault is with in the
protected section. This scheme requires duplex signaling channels. i.e. one frequency
for each direction of signaling . This type of scheme is very much popular in case of
very short lines, lines in the vicinity of series capacitor wherein due to series
capacitance, normally reach and directionality are mixed up and relay may tend to
mal operate. A typical block diagram of scheme is indicated in Figure 20.

Figure 20: Typical Block Diagram of Permissive Over Reach Scheme. Blocking Scheme:

In this scheme, normally the Zone III element is reverse looking. In case any fault is
detected external to section, a blocking signal is sent to remote end informing the
relay the fault is beyond the section and it does not require a trip from remote end to
isolate the fault. The remote end relay normally waist for a pre determined time which
may be typically 30- 60 millisecond, and if a blocking signal is not received, the relay
issues a trip command. The signaling is initiated for only external fault and signaling
transmission takes place only on healthy line section. Fast fault clearance occurs
when no signal is received and the over reaching zone II measuring element
operates. The signaling channel is keyed by reverse looking zone III element.

4.8. Additional Requirement of Line Protection:

In case of line protection in some cases following features are also provided:

4.8.1. Over Voltage Protection:

400kV and above voltage levels, normally we provide two stage over voltage
protection to the transmission lines. The first stage is normally 110% with a time delay
of 5 second while the second stage is normally 150% with a time delay of 100 msec.
In case of double circuit transmission line normally time of voltage grading is provided
to avoid simultaneous outage of lines.

4.8.2. Stub Protection:

In one and half breaker scheme when the feeder is not charged condition, the T
portion of main and tie bay is normally provided with a stub protection. Under this
protection over current relay with suitable time delay is provided. This protection gets
activated only when the line isolator is in open condition.

4.8.3. Back up Earth fault protection:

Normally high resistance faults are difficult to be detected by Distance Protection.

Undetected earth fault may create chaos in the system and thus high resistance faults
are required to be cleared at the earliest. To detect the high resistance faults in the
system, normally we provide directional earth fault relays to all transmission lines
above 132kV and above voltage levels.

4.8.4. Switch On to Fault Protection

The switch on to fault system detection is activated by using an external breaker

closing signal. The breaker close signal is used in applications where the voltage
transformers are placed on the bus side of the line circuit breaker. When activated the
switch on to fault protection will stay activated for some fixed duration (say from 200
msec to 5.0 sec). Faults occurring during this period will be tripped instantaneously.
Faults occurring after this fixed time period will be measured in the normal way. This
protection is basically provided to avoid the delay in clearing the faults which may be
created due to earthing of transmission line during maintenance and does not remove
after maintenance from the line.

In POWERGRID network, normally for all transmission line of 220kV and above two
main distance relays designated as Main-I distance and Main-II distance relays are
provided. As per specification both the relays can not be from the same manufacturer
and has to be from a different manufacturer.

Chapter 5: Auto Reclose

5.1. Introduction:

As we see in case of transmission lines, majority of our faults are transient fault and
they are cleared very rapidly. After clearing of fault, the line can again be taken into
service. This is the basic concept which is used for auto reclosing of the line.

5.2. Principle of Auto Reclosing:

Normally under auto reclosing, the auto reclose relay gets start from the main
distance protection relay which simultaneously trips the circuit breaker also. As auto
reclose relay receives the start signal it start a dead timer which basically describes
how much time the circuit breaker will remain in trip/open condition, after dead time
which is typically in POWERGRID network is 1.0 second, auto reclose relay issues a
command to circuit breaker to close. If the fault is cleared, normally circuit breaker is
closed and normal operation of line is continued. However in case the fault is
persisted, the line again tripped and goes for lock out.

Further if line auto reclosed successfully, a reclaim timer of 25 second is started. In

case and fault again appears within this reclaim time of 25 second, the line will not
auto reclose and instead it will trip and goes under lockout condition.

Auto Reclose mode may be as under:

5.2.1. Single Phase Mode: Under this mode, in case of single phase to ground fault,
only faulted phase breaker opens and after lapse of dead time, auto
reclose relays gives a closing pulse to the circuit breaker and if the fault is
cleared, circuit breaker will successfully reclosed. However if the fault is
persisted in that case the auto reclose relay goes into lock out condition
and remaining poles of circuit breaker also trips. In case of phase to phase
faults, the line goes for three phase tripping and no auto reclose attempt
takes place.

5.2.2. Three Phase Mode: Under this mode irrespective of type of fault, the line
goes for a three phase trip and after lapse of dead time, all three poles

5.2.3. Single Phase/Three Phase: under this mode of operation, if single phase
faults takes place only single phase opening of circuit breaker takes place
and in case of multi phase fault, three pole opening takes place.

5.2.4. Non-Auto Mode: under this mode of operation, no auto reclose attempt takes
place and for all sorts of faults, three phase Auto Reclose relay normally
gets start from Main-I and Main-II distance protection. Further the auto
reclose must block for certain condition/operation of protections. These are
as under:

CB Not Ready
Zone-2 and Zone-3 Operation (delayed trip)
Communication Fail
Bus Bar Protection Trip
Over Voltage Protection
Reactor Protection
Directional Earth Fault Protection
Local Breaker Back up Protection
Manual Trip
Pole Discrepancy of Circuit Breaker.

5.3. References:

The Art & Science of Protective Relaying By C Russel Mason

Protection Application Handbook by ABB
Protection Application Guide from AREVA
POWERGRID Specifications and practices

Chapter 6: Bus bar Protection and Local Breaker Back
up (LBB/BFR) Protection

6.1. Introduction:

Bus bar is the most important part of sub-station. And to protect the bus bar is more
important as any un-cleared fault on bus bar may create havoc and simultaneously
any mal operation of bus bar protection is equally hazardous. Thus for a protection
engineer to design and implement correct bus bar protection is an uphill task.

Earlier seeing the criticality of application most of the utilities did not provide the bus
bar protection at all for 220kV and below system voltage. But as good engineering
practice all utilities provide bus bar protection for all the station of 400kV and above
voltage class. But as per practice POWERGRID provides the bus bar protection for all
its sub-station of 132kV and above voltage class. Further as per latest CBIP guide
lines also, utilities are required to provide bus bar protection for sub-station of 220kV
and above voltage class.

6.1.1. Operating Principle of Bus Bar Protection:

Principle wise Bus bar protection is one of the most simple protection. It basically
works of very simple Kirchoffs Currents law which states that the sum of current at
any node is equal to zero. Thus in any sub-station, we have to sum all the CTs with
correct polarity and if there is no fault on Bus bar, there shall not be any current and
sum of all incoming and out going currents are equal to zero. But if there is a fault on
Bus bar there bound to be some current and thus the bus bar protection shall

There are basically two type of Bus Bar Protection Schemes High Impedance Bus bar protection.

The High-impedance protection scheme, on the other hand, is a good Solution for
single busbar arrangements, 1 breaker systems or ring Busbars, providing that
appropriate dedicated CT cores are available for this use alone.
The high Impedance Bus bar protection is sensitive, stable and fast protection for
single busbar arrangements and 1 breaker systems. The system has limits when
used in complex Busbar configurations.However, special CT requirements, additional
high voltage device protection, demanding maintenance, etc put restrictions in its
application. Requirements on the CT used for High-impedance Protection

be dedicated to the High-impedance Busbar Protection Scheme (i.e. cannot
be shared with other protection relays)
Must have identical turns-ratio (CT Ratio) (Aux.CT for ratio corrections
Have a low resistance of the secondary windings
Have a minimum knee-point voltage of approx. 300-500V.
Should have a low magnetising current (few milliamps)

Fig. 21 : High Impedance Bus Bar protection: Condition of Stability during

External faults

Figure 22: High Impedance Bus Bar Protection During Internal Faults

6.1.2. Low Impedance Bus Bar protection

The most suitable protection scheme for Double and multiple busbar Systems (with or
without transfer bus) with feeders being switched Between sections of the busbar,
which operates with full selectivity For all possible busbar configurations. ADVANTAGES OF PERCENTAGE BIASED BUS DIFFERENTIAL RELAY

Free of any need for matched ct characteristic or ratios, low leakage reactance
or resistance.
Other protective relays can be included in the same circuit.
Stable for infinite fault level.
Insensitive to ct saturation.
Detects faults within 1-2ms and initiates tripping within 5-7ms.

Figure 23 : General Circuit Diagram of a Typical Low impedance Bus ar


In Low impedance Bus Bar Protection :

Operating current for external fault varies as through fault current does,
unlike in high impedance relay.
Slope S is purely function of certain circuit parameters.

Maximum permissible ct loop resistance is much higher than conventional
No restriction placed on max. Fault current.

Figure -24: Characteristics applying for a slope of 0.8 for external and Internal

6.1.3. Merits of Percentage Biased Bus Differential Protection

Over High Impedance Protection
Following are the main advantages of Low impedance over the high Impedance
bus bar protection:

In case of High impedance differential protection, it is necessary that

magnetizing Impedance and turns ratios of all the CTs exactly match.
Otherwise, for an external fault differential voltage gets developed across
the relay and the magnitude of this might be sufficient to cause relay
operation for a heavy external fault. There have been instances where
even minor turns ratio have resulted in mal-operation of high Impedance
differential relay for an external faults.

Any inclusion of auxiliary CT in one or more of the CT circuits means

different magnetizing impedances of such composite CTs and also this
might introduce turns ratio errors however small.

In Percent biased relay, the required voltage to operate, increases the

restraint voltage increases in proportion to the severity of external fault. In
addition percent bias relayhas following advantages.

Basic operating time of Low Impedance Relays are 1-2m secs, and total

time including trip relays Is 5-7m secs. in comparison the operating time of
High impedance differential relay (including trip relay) is 20-25m secs.

Low Impedance Protection is stable against through fault currents even for
infinite fault MVA. The growing fault MVA levels does not affect the stability
of the relay and only CTs with moderate knee-point voltage (500V) need to
be connected.

In case of High impedance relay an increase of fault MVA results in an

increase of the setting, which can only be taken to a maximum of Vk/2
where Vk is CT Knee-point voltage. Thus, if fault levels increase, the CTs
may need to be replaced with those of higher knee-point voltage.

6.1.4. Numerical Bus Bar protection:

Now a days we have introduced the concepts of Numerical Bus Bar protection
particularly in the sub-station wherein we have going to adopt Sub-station Automation
System. In numerical Bus bar protection, the operating time may be lightly more than
the low impedance protection due to processing time but the flexibility of protection is
enormous. In numerical Bus bar protection basically there are two types of protection
topologies are there:

One is Centralized Bus bar protection wherein a centralized unit of Bus bar
protection is employed and all the bays are connected to this unit. Normally
this type of protection is having dedicated bay modules and bays are normally
connected to these modules. The scheme supplied under this category are
REB 670 from ABB, B-60 from GE. Etc.

The Second category is distributed Bus bar protection. Under this category
bay nits are distributed in respective bays and are normally connected to
central unit through optical fibers. The bay units can perform some of the basic
functions even without the connection to central unit such as Local Breaker
Brea-up etc. The schemes being supplied under this category are REB 500
from ABB, Micom 740/742 from Areva, 7SS522 from Siemens.

6.2. Local Breaker back up Protection

A Protection which is designed to clear a system fault by initiating tripping other

circuit-breaker(s) in the case of failure to trip of the appropriate circuit-breaker is
normally termed as Local Breaker Back up protection. This protection is normally
provide for the circuit breaker. Under normal circumstance, if there is a system
fault, the circuit breaker associated or controlling the system is required to trip. But
due to one reason or other if the breaker is failed to clear the fault, LBB protection
comes into the picture to clear the fault.

Figure 25: Local Breaker Back up

Local Back up can be divided in two categories:

Relay Back up:

Normally each zone is covered with two protections such as Main-I, Main-II Distance
protection, Transformer/Reactor Differential and REF protection, Backup Over current
and Back up Impedance protection. Further each circuit breaker is normally supplied
with two trip coils working on independent DCs.

Breaker Back up

In case of breaker back up, as the cost of breaker prohibits to use duplicate breaker, it
is required to isolate the faults by tripping all the breakers which are connected to
faults. In case of above example, if breakers are not failed, fault can be removed by
tripping only breaker 2 & 6 but now breaker at 1, 3, 4 & 6 are required to clear the
fault if breaker 2 fails to clear the fault.

6.3. References:

The Art & Science of Protective Relaying By C Russel Mason

Protection Application Handbook by ABB
Protection Application Guide from AREVA
POWERGRID Specifications and practices