Social Epistemology

A Journal of Knowledge, Culture and Policy

ISSN: 0269-1728 (Print) 1464-5297 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/tsep20

Why did Feyerabend Defend Astrology? Integrity,

Virtue, and the Authority of Science

Ian James Kidd

To cite this article: Ian James Kidd (2016): Why did Feyerabend Defend Astrology?
Integrity, Virtue, and the Authority of Science, Social Epistemology, DOI:
10.1080/02691728.2015.1031851

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2015.1031851

Published online: 26 Jan 2016.

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 Social Epistemology, 2016
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2015.1031851

Why did Feyerabend Defend

Astrology? Integrity, Virtue, and the
Authority of Science
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Ian James Kidd

This paper explores the relationship between epistemic integrity, virtue, and authority
by offering a virtue epistemological reading of the defences of non-scientific beliefs,
practices, and traditions in the writings of Paul Feyerabend. I argue that there was a
robust epistemic rationale for those defences and that it can inform contemporary
reflection on the epistemic authority of the sciences. Two common explanations of the
purpose of those defences are rejected as lacking textual support. A third pluralist
reading is judged more persuasive, but found to be incomplete, owing to a failure to
accommodate Feyerabends focus upon the integrity of scientists and the authority of
science. I therefore suggest that the defences are more fully understood as defences of
the epistemic integrity of scientists that take the form of critical exposures of failures
by scientists to act with integrity. An appeal is made to contemporary virtue episte-
mology that clarifies Feyerabends implicit association of epistemic integrity and epis-
temic virtue. If so, what critics have taken to be radically anarchistic defences of
pseudoscience are, in fact, principled defences of the epistemic integrityand hence
authorityof science

Keywords: Feyerabend; Epistemic integrity; Epistemic virtue; Epistemic authority;

Polanyi

1. Introduction
This paper aims to identify the epistemic rationale for Paul Feyerabends defences
of astrology, voodoo, witchcraft, Chinese traditional medicine, and other non-
scientific beliefs, practices, and traditions. It is partly for these defences that,

Correspondence to: Ian James Kidd, University of Durham, Durham, UK. Email: i.j.kidd@durham.ac.uk

2016 Taylor & Francis

 2 I. J. Kidd
during the 1970s, Feyerabend became famousor, rather, infamousand they
contributed to his now established image as an epistemic anarchist, the worst
enemy of science. Although such claims are fun and exciting, for some people at
least, their actual content and purpose is unclear. Certainly many of the proffered
explanations ought to be appraised rather than simply accepted at face value.
The aim of this paper is to argue that there was an epistemic rationale for
those defences and that, once this is put in place, their purpose emerges as far
more conservative and far less radical than both friends and foes of Feyerabend
might expect. My claim is that those defences were, in fact, principled defences of
the epistemic integrity of science that took the form of critical challenges to fail-
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ures by members of the scientific establishment to exercise the epistemic virtues

that are definitive and constitutive of the cognitive and cultural authority of
science. If so, careful study of the defences shows Feyerabend to be less radical and
more conservative than even his admirers might expect.

2. Pseudoscience, Science, and Professionalism

It was during the 1970s that Feyerabend began to make the more provocative
claims that eventually earned him his 1987 Nature magazine nomination as the
worst enemy of science. A core piece of evidence for the prosecution were the
various defences offered of a range of beliefs, practices, and traditions that
included astrology, voodoo, witchcraft, Chinese traditional medicine, and, less fre-
quently, black magic, parapsychology, and the writings of Immanuel Velikovsky.
These are typically cited as classic examples of irrational, superstitious, prescientific
systems of thought and most often discussed by philosophers of science for that
purpose.1 Indeed, Feyerabend himself doubtless chose to defend them partly
because of their heterodox statusthough, as I argue later, this is only part of the
reason.
Unsurprisingly, these defences were typically met with three broad types of crit-
ical responses. The first is that Feyerabend was charged with defending pseudo-
science, which is perilous at the best of times, but especially dangerous during the
mid-1970s, a time of growing public interest in the occult in all its forms. The
second, related objection was that, by making those defences, Feyerabend was
guilty of being anti-science, either by directing denying or impugning its
achievements, or by asserting the epistemic equivalence of science with the very
practices and traditions with which it is often contrasted. The third objection is a
slightly different complaint. By making such defences, Feyerabend was being intel-
lectually and professionally irresponsible. It was bad form for a distinguished
philosopher of science, with a growing popular audience, to be defending pseudo-
science and denigrating science. Indeed, by the mid-1970s, Frederick Suppe
reported that Feyerabends work was losing whatever importance and influence it
once had in philosophy of science (1977, 643).
 Social Epistemology 3

These three objections converge in a familiar picture of Feyerabend as a

relativistic or postmodernist thinker, urging cheerful acceptance of a diversity of
cultural and epistemic traditions and a suspension of intrusive questions about
their truth or authority. If anything goes, then lets be eclectic, flexible, ironic. It
is actually unclear whether Feyerabend can be legitimately described as a relativist
or postmodernist, given the opacity of those terms and their complexity of his
views.2 I want simply to note two points about these defences and the image of
Feyerabend that they sustain. The first is that the defences include a mixed set of
criticisms of both Feyerabends claims and also of his character or conduct, a point
that I return to later in the paper. Naturally an anarchistic thinker can be relied
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upon to make anarchistic claims, but even they might have reasons for what they
say and do, and of course Feyerabend was generally clear that anarchism was
not a principle of caprice.3 The second point is that many of the claims that, back
in the 1970s, made Feyerabend a radical maverick are, now, forty years later,
widely accepted as received common sense within philosophy of sciencesuch as
the general view of science as pluralistic, value-laden, and complexly bound up
with socio-political concerns.4
A caveat. My purpose in this paper is not to defend every claim that
Feyerabend ever made about astrology and other such practices. It is true that he
did, very often, succumb to the lure of provocation and make wild claims, espe-
cially during live debates with interlocutorsas one might expect of a man with
dramatic tendencies and training. As such, I will take only what I think is defensi-
ble and discard the rest, thereby respecting both the principle of charity and the
fact that Feyerabend sometimes places intolerable strain upon it.5

3. Commitment and Provocation

I begin by considering and rejecting two familiar explanations for why Feyerabend
made these defences. The first is that the defences reflect a sincere commitment on
his part to the truth, efficacy, or reality of the relevant systems and practices; the
second, by contrast, is that they are unprincipled exercises in provocative polemic
that are philosophically empty and so best ignored.
The commitment explanation can be rebutted by the fact that careful atten-
tion to the content and context of Feyerabends defences shows very clearly that he
was not committed to the epistemic or practical merits of those systems and prac-
tices. In a fiery 1978 set of replies to critics, Feyerabend takes issue with a critic
who claims that science has a self-corrective character that witchcraft lacks, such
that witchcraft is an irrational practice. As Feyerabend complains, since the critic
does not specify which form of witchcraft they are referring tofor there are
many, and they are differenthe simply repeats gossip without having exam-
ined it (1978, 192). This is a defence of witchcraft, to be sure, but it is not
grounded in any commitment to its efficacy or truth.
 4 I. J. Kidd
Twenty years later, Feyerabend explained that he discussed astrology and
voodoo, not because he believes in them, but because he had found them to be
convenient examples of the limits of a scientific approach (1987, 318). Into the
1980s, Feyerabend began to use new examples provided by the development stud-
ies scholar and activist, Grazia Borrini, whom he met in 1983 and married in
1989. She provided a wealth of empirically rich, academically robust case studies
of genuine situations where the practical or epistemic merits of scientific knowl-
edge was in dispute, such as development studies and environmental management,
where Feyerabends work is, in fact, often cited and used.6
Similarly, critics often alleged that Feyerabend believed in voodoo, but that
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sits poorly with his actual remarks. In the few places where he offers sustained
remarks, it is clear that he was opposed to literal interpretations of the claims of
voodoo practitionersfor instance, to be able to magically reanimate and control
the dead. The strongest claim that he makes, in fact, is that voodoo had a firm
though still not sufficiently understood material basis, for instance in psy-
chopharmacology, which is perfectly sensible (1993, 36).
It is true that Feyerabend did make a few more assertive remarks about the
efficacy of certain non-scientific practices. During the 1970s, for instance, he
often reported that traditional Chinese medicine had offered more effective pain
relief than Western allopathic medicine (see, e.g. 1978, 137). However this is a
highly specific and personalised report of the efficacy of a specific practice
acupunctureas a form of pain relief. It was not generalised by Feyerabend into a
broader claim about the superiority of complementary and alternative medicine
over biomedicine. In fact, he judged that scientific medicine enjoys patent superi-
ority in areas such as surgery and pharmacology.7 Therefore the few direct claims
about the efficacy of non-scientific practices that Feyerabend did make still fall far
short of the grand claims that critics worry about.
The claim that the commitment explanation is untenable is strongly reflected
in the consensus on this issue in the Feyerabend scholarship. The most explicit
verdict is that of Eric Oberheim, for whom the defences of astrology, witchcraft,
and voodoo do not represent any commitment to and or serious belief in the effi-
cacy of these forms of knowledge (2006, 280). Similarly for Robert Farrell, the
defence of astrology is, at its strongest, a claim as to the possibility and as yet
unfalsified status of schemes of reality incompatible with science (2003, 128). The
strongest claim that one could take from Feyerabend is that it is possible that there
exist alternative metaphysical schemesWeltbilde, say, or worldviewsthat have,
so far, not been systematically falsified by scientific enquiry.
The commitment explanation should therefore be rejected on the grounds that
it lacks both textual evidence and scholarly support. It is clear that Feyerabend had
no principled commitment to the truth, efficacy, or reality of the non-scientific
beliefs, practices, and traditions that he defended, despite his jocular tone and
rhetoric. But, a critic might objectand this is the second explanationthis is
precisely the problem: those defences are simply provocative pyrotechnics, unre-
flective of any principled epistemic stance, and therefore ought not to be taken
 Social Epistemology 5

seriously. On this deflationary rhetorical reading, Feyerabends defences of

astrology and the like are posturings that ought to be forgotten, though also
forgiven in the light of the brilliance of his historico-philosophical analysis
(Harre 1977, 295).
My response to this provocation explanation is that the defences cease to be
mere rhetorical devices once their deeper rationale is identified. The fact that
Feyerabend was trying to provokewhich is certainly truedoes not mean that
this was all he was trying to do. Typically a person tries to provoke others for
some principled reason, such as trying to get others to take seriously a new idea,
or to rethink a deeply-held conviction. There is often a reason for the rhetoric,
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and it is charitable to look for it, especially when the philosopher in question indi-
cates, more or less clearly, what it might be. It is true that in some cases, of course,
a person might be provocative for no principled reason, other than to irritate or
enrage, and if this applies to Feyerabend, then his defences ought to be ignored.
But if a principled reason for those defences can be given, then the deflationary
rhetorical objection ceases to apply.
My aim in the rest of the paper is to show that Feyerabend did, in fact, a prin-
cipled reason or rationale for those defences. I consider two, which Ill call the
pluralism and integrity accounts, the topics of Sections 4 and 6, respectively,
pausing in Section 5 to offer a useful case study.

4. Pluralism
Feyerabend scholars invariably address the question of why he defended eccentric
beliefs, practices, and traditions. The consensus among Feyerabend scholars seems
to be that the defences are best understood in the context of his defence of
epistemic (and perhaps also cultural) pluralism.8
Consider two scholarly accounts of the relationship between pluralism and the
defences. The first is Oberheims (2006) claim that Feyerabends philosophy is best
understood as a fairly stable thoroughgoing philosophical pluralism. Central to
that pluralism is the epistemological conviction that the use of radical alterna-
tives to prevailing theories and methods enables immanent critique of
entrenched systems of thought and practice. The use of radical alternatives can
afford new and otherwise unavailable forms of empirical and theoretical critique
and so provides an essential strategy for countering conceptual conservatism
roughly, a tendency for enquirers to drift into a state of unreflective reliance upon
a fixed set of epistemic resources that, in turn, can lead into a state of inadvertent
dogmatism. On this reading, Feyerabend argues that progressive enquiry requires
active resistance to conceptually conservative tendencies through appeal to radical
alternatives to currently established systems of thought and practice.
The second account is Elisabeth Lloyds study of Feyerabends relationship to
John Stuart Mill. It is well-known that Feyerabend was enormously admiring of
Mill, although less clear just what the precise nature of the influence was. Most of
 6 I. J. Kidd
the time the sections of Mills that are cited are not from his writings on the
philosophy and methodology of science, but rather from the second chapter of On
Liberty, which is titled The Freedom of Thought and Discussion. One of its main
themes is that certain intellectual and social attitudes and values, such as tolerance,
are preconditions for the freedoms that the title of the chapter celebrates. Lloyd
argues that the defences of eccentric beliefs and traditions are best understood in
light of the ideas of that chapter, and especially in terms of Mills call for certain
persons within a community to play the role of defender of unpopular minority
opinion (1997, 396).
In brief, Lloyd argues that Feyerabend decided to perform that role for the phi-
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losophy of science, thereby fulfilling a crucial condition of free enquiry is realised.

Mill thought that there was no good substitute for being confronted by vigorous
defences of heterodox ideas mounted by a member of ones community. Such peo-
ple should be appreciated because they play a strategic role in the epistemic
dynamics of their community, thereby enabling rational exchange and optimal
human development (1997, 396).
Although their specific accounts differ, Oberheim and Lloyd agree that
Feyerabend is a pluralist and that his defences ought to be understood in that light.
Much more could be said about these accounts, their relation to one another, and
their success in offering justificatory rationales for the defences. Indeed, there is
much work to do in cashing out a systematic reading of Feyerabend as a pluralist,
especially given his curious absence from contemporary work on pluralism in the
philosophy of science.9 Fortunately, for present purposes, I need only take the point
that there is a clear scholarly consensus that Feyerabend did have an epistemic
rationale for his defences of non-scientific practices and traditions. I agree with the
pluralist rationale, but also want to argue that there is a further, neglected aspect to
Feyerabends epistemic rationaleone so far missed by commentators, even though
it is, arguably, closely related to the pluralist readings they offer.
The second rationale concerns Feyerabends concern with the epistemic integ-
rity of science, especially given its authoritative status in late modern societies. If
this sounds odd, given his status as the worst enemy of science and his dis-
turbing calls for the separation of science and the state, then I urge caution. In the
next two sections, I use Feyerabends defence of astrology as a case study to
make plausible the claim that (in that case at least) the defence of a non-scientific
practice was, in fact, a defence of the integrity of science. Feyerabend made those
defences to critically expose failures by members of the scientific establishment to
honour the epistemic values and ideals that are constitutive of the authoritative
status of science. If so, then Feyerabend should emerge as more conservative and
less radical than many might suppose.

5. The Strange Case of Astrology

The most sustained and detailed defence of a non-scientific practice or tradition in
Feyerabends corpus is the defence of astrology in part two of the 1978 book
 Social Epistemology 7

Science in a Free Society. A useful, further account is given in a dialogue written in

1976, but only published, thirteen years later, as the second of the Three Dialogues
on Knowledge.
The defence occurs in a chapter called The Strange Case of Astrology. It
was motivated by an influential article and petition that appeared in the popular
intellectual magazine The Humanist in 1975 entitled Objections to Astrology. It
consisted of a brief statement of concern about the growing contemporary popu-
larity of astrology and of its absence of scientific credibility or demonstrable prac-
tical efficacy. It was accompanied by one hundred and eighty-seven signatures by
leading scientists, including a number of Nobelists, including Sir Francis Crick,
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Owen Gingerich, Konrad Lorenz, and Sir Peter Medawar, among others.
The Statement was written by the astronomer Bart J. Bok, science writer
Lawrence Jerome, and philosopher Paul Kurtz, and warns that astrology, despite
being part of [a] magical world view, is increasingly, in this day of
widespread enlightenment, commanding public interest and enthusiasm, and con-
tributing to the growth of irrationalism and superstition (1975, 46). The
Humanist statement was wired to thousands of US news agencies and generated a
great deal of popular and academic attention, especially against the background of
the 1970s counterculture and the occult revival.10
It is unsurprising that Feyerabend was familiar with the Humanist statement.
He was well informed and widely read, with a keen sense for the wider cultural
and intellectual scene. It is equally unsurprising that he disliked it, partly for its
reliance on a crudely triumphalist account of the historical development of science,
and partly because it evinced a range of intellectual attitudes to which he was
starkly opposed. Feyerabend offered three specific objections: first, the religious
tone of the document; second, the weaknessor, in his preferred term, illiter-
acyof the arguments; and, third, the authoritarian tone and style of the state-
ment. Rather than summarise each objection in turn, which Feyerabend does
clearly enough anyway, I will focus only on those aspects germane to the theme of
epistemic integrity.
The core of Feyerabends objections is that the authors and signatories of the
Humanist statement criticise astrology by an appeal to their authority rather than
by offering a carefully informed procedurally impeccable critical analysis and
rebuttal of astrology. With characteristically imaginative flair, this objection is pre-
sented by unfavourably comparing the statement with the Roman Catholic
Churchs 1484 witch hunters manual, the Malleus Maleficarum, also known as the
Hexenhammer, or The Hammer of [the] Witches.11 This influential text is
praised by Feyerabend for its rigorous and pluralistic methodology, including its
detailed descriptions of specific cases, inclusion of heterodox (and, indeed, hereti-
cal) explanations of witchcraft phenomena, and careful critical discussion of a
diversity of views.12
Feyerabend summarises his admiration for the Malleus:
 8 I. J. Kidd
[H]eretical views are not passed over in silence, nor are they ridiculed; they are
described, examined, and removed by argument. The authors know their subject, they
know their opponents, they give a correct account of the positions of their opponents,
they argue against these positions and they use the best knowledge available at the
time in their arguments. (1978, x)

This is a fair evaluation of the Malleus. Its analysis consistently relies upon empiri-
cal evidence rather than the authority of theological canons and is strikingly natu-
ralistic. It eschews the supernatural aetiologies that were favoured by medieval
demonologists in favour of detailed, systematic, and comprehensive description of
the phenomena in terms of natural law and material explanations (Broedel 2003,
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95).
In a telling remark that follows the section just quoted, Feyerabend contrasts
the author of the Malleus with the signatories of the Humanist statement:
This cannot be said of our scientists. They neither know the subject they attack,
astrology, nor those parts of their own science that undermine their attack. (1978, x)

Much of the frustration evident here lies in the fact that Feyerabend clearly felt
there were perfectly good objections to astrology available to those scientists, if
they had but done their research. Feyerabend in fact sketches out an objection,
focusing upon the historical degeneration of astrology as a research program,
later developed by Thagard (1978). Although good objections to astrology exist,
the Humanist signatories failed to provide them, instead offering scientifically, his-
torically, and rhetorically deficient ex cathedra assertions of a sort that Feyerabend
clearly felt reflected badly on science as an epistemically and socially authoritative
institution.
The core of the objection is that the Humanist statement fails to evince a set of
epistemic virtues that are, by contrast, so evident in a fifteenth century witch-hun-
ters manual. This objection is further developed by Feyerabends exposure of the
historical, rhetorical, and scientific errors and confusions in the two articles that
accompanied the Humanist statement. The claim that astrology ought to be
rejected since it emerged historically from magical traditions, for instance, relies
upon a principle of exclusion that would also require the rejection of much of
early modern science.13
Other critics of the Humanist statement echoed Feyerabends concerns. These
included Carl Sagan, the American astronomer, charismatic celebrant of science,
and tireless foe of pseudoscienceor, in his jaunty idiom, baloney.14 In a letter
to the editor, Sagan explained his reasons. The first, echoing Feyerabend, is that
many modern scientific disciplines emerged from magical traditions, such that
having origins shrouded in superstition is not, itself, a cause for epistemic
alarm. The second is that the Humanist critics were wrong to castigate astrology
for failing to specify a mechanism. Many scientific theories lacked supporting
mechanisms when they were initially proposed, including Wegeners continental
drift theory. Sagan then went on, again echoing Feyerabend, to criticise the au-
thoritarian tone of the statement, which never convince those who are flirting
 Social Epistemology 9

with pseudoscience, and, on the contrary, confirm their impression that scien-
tists are rigid and close-minded (1976, 13).15
Sagan and Feyerabend both thought that astrology was bunk or baloney,
but refused to simply assert, ex cathedra, its falsity and absurdity. Sagan adds that
he would have been happy to sign a statement describing and refuting the princi-
pal tenets of astrological belief, (1976, 13). Feyerabend offers a similar thought:
You see, I would not at all object if the opponents of astrology were to say: we do
not like astrology, we despise it, we shall never read books about it and we certainly
shall not support it [] But our scientists, our rational and objective scientists, do
not just express their likes and dislikes, they act as if they had arguments and they use
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their considerable authority to give their dislikes force. (1991, 66, emphasis added)

The main point that Feyerabend was making in his defence was therefore that
astrology cannot fairly be confronted, and that science in general is very poorly
represented, by attacks of this kind (Grim 1982, 15).

6. Epistemic Virtues, Authority, and Integrity

The question emerging is why such episodes reflected poorly on science. Since no
reputable scientist would seriously defend astrology, why make such a fuss about
going through the motions of properly procedural critique? The earlier remarks
about pluralism offer several obvious answers. Perhaps such robust critiques are
necessary to ensure that essential social-epistemic roles like Mills defender of
minority positions are duly occupied, as Lloyd suggested. Or perhaps they expose
and interdict perceived lapses into conceptual conservatism by vigorously offer-
ing dramatic defences of radical alternatives, as Oberheim proposed.
Such answers are plausible, but I suggest that they do not fully capture
Feyerabends reasons for mounting the defence of astrology. Close attention to his
explanations and justifications of his defences makes it clear that what he was criti-
cising was the negative intellectual attitudes evident in the unfair derogation of
astrology by the authors and signatories of the Humanist statement. This criticism
could be cashed out in a variety of ways, but in his writings on astrology,
Feyerabend invariably articulates it in terms of what contemporary virtue
epistemologists call epistemic vices.
By that term, I refer to negative intellectual character traits, those opposed to
what Zagzebski (1996) famously called the virtues of the mind, or, less regally,
the epistemic (or intellectual) virtues. The core conviction of virtue epistemology
is that enquiry is an active process that can go better or worse, and that central
among the factors that determine how it goes are the characters of the enquirers
who perform it. Since enquiry is initiated and performed by epistemic agents, such
as scientists or scholars, the stable cognitive and behavioural dispositions of those
agents are surely crucial to the success of that enquiry.16
This is the briefest of sketches of a complex area, but it should, hopefully, suf-
fice for my purpose of establishing that Feyerabend was criticising the epistemic
 10 I. J. Kidd
vices of the Humanist signatories.17 My claim is not that Feyerabend was doing
virtue epistemology, but rather that, by appealing to the resources of virtue episte-
mology, we can better understand what he was doingor, perhaps, trying to do.18
Consider one of Feyerabends longer explanations of his defences of astrology.
It is taken from the 1976 dialogue, written the year Objections to Astrology was
published:
I have no special love for astrology and much that is written in this area bores me to
tears. But astrology is an excellent example of the way scientists deal with phenomena
outside their area of competence. They dont study them, they simply curse them,
insinuating that their curses are based on strong and straightforward arguments.
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(1991, 7475)

As well as underscoring Feyerabends lack of commitment to (and, indeed, lack of

interest in) astrology, this quotation clarifies the objection: certain scientists abuse
their social and epistemic authority by making confident pronouncements on
topics of which they are ignorant. Again, two years later, Feyerabend criticises the
signatories for their willingness to assert their authority even in areas in which
they have no knowledge whatsoever (1978, x).19 Indeed, he points out that when
the BBC invited several of the more distinguished signatories to debate astrology,
they declined by admitting their ignorancea fact, Feyerabend noted, that did
not prevent them from cursing it in public (1978, x).
The vice being targeted here, albeit implicitly, is most likely epistemic arrogance,
a useful account of which is given by two leading virtue epistemologists, Bob
Roberts and Jay Wood (2007, ch.9). They class arrogance alongside dogmatism as
the vices that mark out of a deficiency of the virtue of epistemic humility. In their
words, arrogance consists of a disposition to infer some illicit entitlement from
a supposition of ones superiority, and to think, act, and feel on the basis of that
claim (2007, 243). Such arrogance may also be reflected in what Philip Kitcher
calls universal punditry, which occurs when people who have (rightly) been
honored for their scientific work make pronouncements on issues about which
they know very little (2012, 34 and 36).20
Many enquirers have a well-defined area of skill, expertise, or authority that
entitles them to certain forms of privilege. If one is a world-leading astrophysicist,
one might reasonably enjoy privileges such as invitations to give keynote addresses,
report on the state-of-the-art of the field, and so on. It is true that such inferrals
of entitlement can go wrong, often for innocent reasons, but the epistemically
arrogant person is disposed to draw illicit entitlements to privilege.
I suggest that what Feyerabend was criticising in the Humanist statement was
the epistemic arrogance of the authors and, perhaps to a lesser degree, the signato-
ries. For they fail to recognise that the history, theory, and practice of astrology
falls outside their area of competence. As Feyerabend put it, they dont study
these heterodox topics, but rather simply curse them, thereby collectively abusing
their locally grounded, but publicly-recognised epistemic authority to derogate it
by fiat. Instead of offering informed, articulate arguments, such critics rely, com-
 Social Epistemology 11

plained Feyerabend, upon dogmatic assertions about matters of which they have
no knowledge whatsoever (1991, 93).
Certainly we have here all of the components of the vice of epistemic arrogance
as described by Roberts and Wood, gathering around the assumption and assertion
of epistemic authority on a topic for which one lacks grounds for reasonable confi-
dencewhich is precisely what Feyerabend was objecting to. In the 1976 dialogue,
this is made very clear:
You seeI dont just want to replace maniacs of one kind by maniacs of a different
kindJews by Christians, dogmatists by sceptics, scientists by Buddhists, I want to
put an end to all manias and to the attitudes in people that support manias and make
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it easy for their prophets to succeed. (1991, 76)

If people act in epistemically vicious ways they can gain authority that they do not
deserve and, what is worse, encourage similarly vicious attitudes in others. Later in
that dialogue, Feyerabend goes on to reiterate his concern to prevent this
happening:

A: Do you seriously want to defend astrology?

B: Why not if the attacks are incompetent?
A: Are there not more important things?
B: Nothing is more important than to prevent people from being intimidated by igno-
rant bullies (1991, 165, my emphasis).

The strong language in this passage testifies to Feyerabends deep sense of the
significance of good epistemic conduct; indeed, nothing is more important, espe-
cially when the attacks come from persons who enjoy social and epistemic
authorityin this case, the esteemed signatories of the statement. The term bully-
ing may seem hyperbolic, butto anticipate Feyerabends replythere is perhaps
no better term for a critic who is ignorant of their target, fails to engage in a fair
fight, and instead relies upon illegitimate appeals to their authority and status.
Indeed, such conduct reflects ignorance, conceit, and the wish for easy power
over minds (1978, 96).
Such bad epistemic conduct is doubly unacceptable when it comes from scien-
tists. First, they should know the proper procedures for enquiry, including basic
rules such as Always know what youre talking about! Second, scientists are, for
the public, the premiere epistemic authorities, and ought to conduct themselves
accordingly. These points are evident in Feyerabends claim, quoted earlier, that
rational and objective scientists qua epistemically authoritative persons ought to
exemplify good epistemic conductcareful, diligent, informedand not abuse
their social and epistemic authority by offering assertions in the place of
arguments.
Clearly, Feyerabend thinks that astrology can, and perhaps should, be criticised.
But if any criticism is to be made, it ought to be made in a properly procedural
manner, especially if the critics are members of an epistemically authoritative
institution. Indeed, if to conduct oneself according to the highest standards of
 12 I. J. Kidd
ones discipline is to evince integrity, then what Feyerabend was actually defending
was not astrologyor any other pseudoscientific belief, practice, or traditionbut,
rather, the epistemic integrity, and hence the authority, of science.
Indeed, this concern with epistemic integrity is closely related to the call for
pluralism. We might read Feyerabend as arguing that one thing that pluralism
surely needs is the presence of a community of enquirers with epistemic integrity
perhaps akin to Mills critically alert, reflectively tolerant, non-dogmatic citizens.
Certainly these enquirers of integrity will not conduct themselves like the Human-
ist signatoriesdogmatically derogatory, arrogantly assertive, looking for easy
kills. Instead, they will enquire before asserting, understand before criticising,
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respect the limits of their own knowledge, and, where necessary, delegate the busi-
ness of criticism to those better able to conduct it.
I now consider a potential challenge to Feyerabends claims.

7. A Polanyian Challenge
Feyerabend argued that scientists ought to respond to eccentric or pseudoscientific
beliefs and claims in a properly procedural way as a matter of epistemic integrity.
Interestingly, this claim was challenged by Michael Polanyi, who defended scien-
tists who reacted spontaneously and negatively to occultism, astrology, and other
pseudoscientific beliefs.21
In a 1967 paper, On the Growth of Science, Polanyi discusses the negative
public reaction to the scientific communitys reflexive rejection of the work of
Immanuel Velikovsky.22 His 1950 book, Worlds in Collision, was summarily dis-
missed by the scientific community, but enthusiastically received by the public,
who, Polanyi notes, much resented what they saw as the groundless, unscientific
reaction to a work which, though unorthodox, was supported by diverse body of
evidence. The public resentment of the scientists who openly dismissed Velikovsky
was rekindled a few years later, when several of his predictionsfor instance,
about the surface conditions of Venuswere confirmed by space probes.23 Such
public criticism of the scientific community invited the interest of a team of soci-
ologists, led by Alfred de Grazia, editor of the American Behavioural Scientist. Their
investigations, first published in that journal, later appeared as The Velikovsky
Affair, a book well-known to Polanyi, Feyerabend, and other contemporary
philosophers of science.24
A main claim of that book was that scientists who respond to pseudoscientific
claims ought to conform to five principles, including that those claims ought not
be rejected unread, that they ought be tested and discussed, and that their
proponents ought to be given a right of reply. Since all of these principles had
been violated during the Velikovsky affair, de Grazia concluded that judgment
must be passed upon the behaviour of scientists for, by violating those principles,
they eroded the epistemic and professional integrity of their discipline. In very
strong terms, de Grazia proposed that the scientific establishment is gravely
 Social Epistemology 13

inadequate to its professed aims [and] commits injustices as a matter of course

(1963, 3).
Polanyi agreed that the involved scientists had violated those principles, but
denied that their doing so entailed any loss of epistemic integrity. The core of his
argument is that scientific practice is not exhausted by explicit, articulable princi-
ples, of the sort offered by de Grazia, since their interpretation and exercise relies
upon a deeper tacit dimensiona core theme of Polanyis writings.25 The tacit
components of science are learned through practical engagement, cannot be explic-
itly verbally or theoretically articulated, and introduce a deeply personal aspect
into epistemic agency. It is this tacit aspect of science that Polanyi invokes in his
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response to de Grazia and, by extension, in his defence of scientists who react

spontaneously and negatively to pseudoscientific claims.26
The explicit rational principles proposed by de Grazia should not be inter-
preted literally, but must be qualified by their tacit assumptions, specifically by
what Polanyi calls a sense of plausibility (1969, 76). The possibility and efficiency of
collective scientific practice relies upon this background sense of plausibility,
including of which novel hypotheses are worth investigating, for instance. Polanyi
is emphatic that this tacit sense of plausibility is epistemically and pragmatically
justified, for it functions to prevent the adulteration of science by cranks and dab-
blers (1969, 57). Given these facts, Polanyi argued that the scientists who reflex-
ively dismissed Velikovsky, even after his predictive successes, were quite right to
do so. What seemed, to non-scientists, to be reactionary dogmatism was, in fact, a
spontaneous evaluation both generated and justified by a tacit sense of plausibility.
Polanyi concluded that since that sense is historically informed, collectively sup-
ported, and a product of practice and discipline, those scientists were right to trust
it. Indeed, to silence it, by investigating Velikovksys claims, could only seem a
culpable waste of time, expense, and effort (1969, 78).
I want to propose that Feyerabend might reply in the following way, based
mainly on a tantalisingly brief discussion of Polanyi in a 1984 paper, Democracy,
elitism, and scientific method. The paper sets up the following dilemma. The citi-
zens of democratic societies ought to be able to critically appraise the authoritative
institutions that influence their lives. Unfortunately, the predominant epistemic
authority of those societiesnamely, the scientific institutioncan only be under-
stood and appraised by those already initiated into itnamely, by scientists. If this
worry holds true, then democratic control of science is impossible, a view that
Feyerabend attributes to Polanyi.
Unfortunately, Feyerabend offers neither explanation nor evidence to explain if
or why this was the position on the authority of science that Polanyi adopted. It is
clear that Polanyi did regard science as the only uncontested epistemic authority
in modern societies, and also that the public ought to accept its authority on trust.
The title of his brief, neglected book, Science, Faith, and Society, summarises the
idea that the public is right to place its trust in the authority of science just as long
as the educational and political institutions of their society are appropriately
organised. So, for instance, the state should allow scientists the freedom to pursue
 14 I. J. Kidd
their own tacit sense of what topics are significant, rather than imposing
centralised planning of the research agenda. As Mary Jo Nye puts it, Polanyi felt
he had described science as as it works today, and that the scientific commu-
nity is a triumph of Western civilisation that should be left alone to run its own
affairs (2011, 252).
A corollary of Polanyis position is that the public ought to trust, and not to
challenge, the negative, spontaneous reactions of scientists to pseudoscience. In
effect, they ought to trust the tacit sense of plausibility that those scientists are
invoking when they react as they do, even though, by his own account, such tacit
components lie beyond their understanding and appreciation. Polanyi emphasises
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that the general public cannot participate in the intellectual milieu in which
scientific judgements are made because, to do so, they would require initiation
into the tacit dimension of science (1969, 64). If, as Polanyi says, facts and
hypotheses can only appear plausible in view of the current scientific conceptions
of the nature of things, then only scientistswho alone can fully, tacitly grasp
those conceptionscan make and, crucially, challenge judgements about the
plausibility of pseudoscience (1969, 65).
It is the claim that the public ought to accept scientific judgements even when
they cannot critically engage with them to which Feyerabend is opposed. Central
to his conception of the social authority of science is, as I have argued earlier
and at length elsewhere, the claim that scientists ought to conduct themselves
with integrity, including if not especially in their engagement with heterodox
beliefs and traditions.27 In the Velikovsky affair, as de Grazia noted, the public
directed their criticisms at the conduct of the various scientists who were
involved: the astronomers, cosmologists, and others who offered dismissals rather
than details, who invoked authority rather than argument, and so on. The resent-
ment of the public was directed, after all, mainly at the bad epistemic conduct of
those scientiststheir vicesfor that is something that the public can perceive
and respond to.
I suggest, then, that Feyerabend and Polanyi agree that public acceptance of the
authority of science cannot be taken for granted, but disagree in the role played by
the public conduct of scientists. The public cannot be persuaded by an appeal to a
tacit sensibility they cannot access or appreciate, and, if given nothing else to go
on, they will naturally seek some other grounds for their appraisal of scientists. An
obvious candidate will be the conduct of scientists in the public sphere, which is,
of course, precisely what happened during the Velikovsky affair. A scientist who
chooses to engage with heterodox, eccentric topics in the public sphere places
themselves under special obligations to evince virtues and integritycharacteristics
that the public can appreciate.28 If so, then Feyerabend and Polanyi offer usefully
contrasting views on the best ways to secure and safeguard public acceptance of
the authority of science.
 Social Epistemology 15

8. Conclusions
My aim in this paper was to argue that there is a robust epistemic rationale for
Feyerabends defences of non-scientific beliefs, practices, and traditions. Clearly
those defences did not reflect principled commitment to the truth or efficacy of
the relevant systems nor were they unprincipled polemical exercises. Oberheim and
Lloyd are surely right that the defences reflect a concern to promote pluralism, but
that ought to be located within the context of a deeper concern with the back-
ground conditions in which such pluralism can flourish. Using a close reading of
the defence of astrology, my suggestion was that Feyerabend felt that pluralism
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would become difficult, if not impossible, within a community of enquirers who

evince epistemic vices, especially arrogance and dogmatism. Such vicious conduct
is bad for pluralism, of course, but also bad for the social and epistemic authority
of science Public instances of epistemic vice, such as the dogmatic authoritarianism
of the Humanist statement, risked damaging or eroding the epistemic integrity of
scientists upon which that authority crucially depends.
There is clearly more work to do in developing Feyerabends concept of epis-
temic integrity and its relationship to the authority of science, especially in the
light of recent work on epistemic and scientific integrity.29 Certainly contemporary
philosophers of science emphasise that public resistance to the epistemic authority
of science are, very often, sustained by their perception of scientists as being epis-
temically vicious, as when climate scientists are accused of being arrogant and dog-
matic.30 There are therefore good reasons to think that integrity, virtue, and
authority do pull together in the way that Feyerabend suggests, and more work to
do along those lines.
My aim was to make plausible the claim that Feyerabends defences of astrol-
ogy, voodoo, witchcraft and other non-scientific systems of thought and practice
reflect a concern to defend to epistemic integrity of science by exposing and chal-
lenging failures by scientists to evince it.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Funding
This research was funded by an Addison Wheeler Fellowship.

Notes
[1] See, e.g. Pigliucci and Boudry (2013).
[2] The question of Feyerabends postmodernism and relativism are explored by Preston
(1998) and Kusch (forthcoming), respectively.
[3] See, for instance, Feyerabend (1993, 9, 13, 18) and, for a discussion, Tsou (2003).
 16 I. J. Kidd
[4] I see this received common sense in, inter alia, Galison and Stump (1996), Kellert, Longino,
and Waters (2006), and Kincaid, Dupre, and Wylie (2007). Feyerabends anticipation of
these contemporary themes is discussed in Williams (1998) and Kidd (2015).
[5] See Oberheim (2006, ch.1).
[6] The superiority of these case studies is proven by Feyerabends influence upon ethno-
ecologythe study of the content and authority of indigenous environmental knowledge
or folkbiology, especially in relation to scientific knowledge. On Feyerabends status as a
green hero, see Naess (1991) and, for the debates about folkbiology, see Medin and
Atran (1999).
[7] For references and a discussion, see Kidd (2013a).
[8] Pluralism is obviously central to Feyerabends philosophy, including his calls for prolifera-
tion and vigorous critique of methodological monism and Kuhns model of science. Ian
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Hacking is also surely right to connect Feyerabends philosophical calls for pluralism with
his deeper temperamental hostility to single vision and to any kind of intellectual or
ideological hegemony (2000, 28).
[9] An honourable exception is Chang (2012, 5.25.3).
[10] A classic study is Roszak (1970).
[11] A good recent edition was published in 2006, by Cambridge University Press, edited and
translated by Christopher S. Mackay.
[12] The author of the Malleus was the German clergyman and inquisitor Heinrich Kramer
(or, latinized, Henricus Institor), but in the 1970s, it was thought to have been co-au-
thored with the influential German priest, James Sprenger, a claim now largely rejected by
historians (see, e.g. Broedel 2003, 19).
[13] See, e.g. Henry (2004).
[14] See, further, Sagan (1996), 2006).
[15] Sagans worry was prescient: a Google Books search shows that his letter of protest is
almost exclusively quoted or cited by authors who are clearly pro-pseudoscience.
[16] See Baehr (2011, ch.1) and Roberts and Wood (2007, ch.1).
[17] The legitimacy of this style of critique is defended, especially against the objection that is
commits the ad hominem fallacy, by Battaly (2010) and Kidd (2016a).
[18] The modern discipline of virtue epistemology emerged in the 1980s, with the writings of
Lorraine Code, James Montmarquet, and Ernst Sosa, but there is no evidence that Feyer-
abend read their work, though he did know Aristotle, to whom we owe the distinction
between the ethical and intellectual (or epistemic) virtues. For a useful history of virtue
epistemology that makes clear Aristotles importance, see Baehr (2011, ch.1).
[19] Interestingly, Sagan disliked astrology partly because it encouraged, in his view, mind-
numbing appeals to authority (2006, xvii).
[20] I use a virtue-epistemic framework to criticise a specific group of universal pundits in
Kidd (2016b).
[21] Polanyi cites as examples popular interest in, and enthusiasm for, astrology, occultism,
and unorthodox schools of healing (1946, 66).
[22] Velikovsky (1950).
[23] For fuller accounts of these scinentific and public responses, see Bauer (1999) and Gordin
(2012).
[24] De Grazia (1966). See, e.g. Polanyi (1969, 86) and Feyerabend and Lakatos (1999, 2124
passim).
[25] The most relevant works are Personal Knowledge (1958) and The Tacit Dimension (1967).
[26] It is clear that Feyerabend knew, and admired Polanyis work on the tacit dimension of
science, which prefigured his own anarchistic image of science as a messy, complex enter-
prise that defies explicit systematic articulation. See, e.g. Feyerabend (1987, 106, 281, 1993,
x). A useful study of Feyerabend and Polanyi is Preston (1997), especially Sections 5 and 6.
 Social Epistemology 17

[27] See Kidd (2013b, forthcoming-a, forthcoming-b).

[28] I wonder if that might be what Polanyi means when he remarked that exceptional
authority is attached not so much to offices as to persons (1946, 48).
[29] Useful starting places include De Winter and Kosolosky (2013) and the recent work of
Heather Douglas, available at http://uwaterloo.academia.edu/HeatherDouglas.
[30] See, e.g. Coady and Corry (2013) and Kitcher (2012, ch.1).

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