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Abstract
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The 46-m high Estrocho de Rientes dam in Spain breached in April 1802 following first
filling of the reservoir. The town of Lorca was inundated and approximately 600 people
lost their lives.
On May 31, 1889, the 22-m high South Fork dam in Pennsylvania initially overtopped
and, within three hours, fully breached. The flood damage included 2209 fatalities.
On October 9, 1963, an overtopping event of the 266 m high Vaiont Dam in Italy
occurred as a result of a reservoir landslide. The resulting landslide induced wave
passed over the dam roughly 250 m above the crest and swept down more than 500 m
into the valley below killing about 2500 people in the villages of Longarone, Pirago,
Villanova, Rivalta and Fae. The actual dam structure was essentially undamaged by
the overtopping event.
Conventional dams continue to be constructed to greater heights with greater
storage volumes. However, the safety record of conventional dams has been steadily
improving over the past 40 years to the point that the probability of a conventional dam
failure in any given year is roughly 1 in 10,000. As will be shown in this paper, this safety
trend is not the case for mine tailings dams which appear to be failing at a rate at least ten
times higher than that for conventional dams. Some make a different argument (e.g.
Bruce et al., 1997), implying that tailings dams are equally "safe" as conventional dams
and that both are being built to at least the same "state-of-the-art" practice. This latter
interpretation of the statistical database is common and worrisome as it can lead to a
complacent attitude. It also does not appear to account for the fact that tailings dams can
undergo environmental failures while maintaining physical integrity - an issue not readily
associated with conventional dams.
The authors support efforts to show the mining industry in a good light with respect
to the tailings dam performance history. Recent trends and initiatives in tailings dam
stewardship, spearheaded by the mining industry, are extremely positive and encouraging
(Martin and Davies, 2000), though these initiatives tend to get ignored by a relatively
biased news media. However, an objective evaluation of the tailings dam failure database
illustrates that many tailings dams are not being designed, constructed and/or operated to
adequate standards. Moreover, the safety record of tailings dams cannot be considered
acceptable given the tremendous damage to the overall mining industry that every new
failure provides.
Tailings dams currently have a higher profile in the mining process than at any
previous period. There has been a dramatic increase over the past ten years in the
number of regulatory agencies involved in setting prescriptive and/or rigid guidelines. The
number of mining companies with internal programs aimed specifically at assessing
current and planned tailings dams likely outnumbers those who do not have such
programs; at least for medium to large sized organizations. An increasing number of
undergraduate programs offer at least some form of training in the basics of tailings dam
design and the number of graduate theses published on tailings dams has roughly
doubled over the past decade. Design professionals have an increasing number of
technical forums to update their skills and compare design competency with their peers.
So why do failures of tailings dams continue to occur? The failures are not just of
older facilities constructed without formal designs, but include facilities designed and
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commissioned in the past 5 to 20 years - supposedly the "modern age" of tailings dam
engineering.
The first step in evaluating the reasons for continued tailings dam failures comes
from recognizing the uniqueness of mine tailings dams. The unique attributes include:
Tailings impoundments are among the largest manmade structures with several
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approaching 1 x 10 tonnes of stored slurried tailings;
Tailings dams are built on a continuous basis by mine operators; and
Tailings dams are a cost to the mining process - they do not generate a revenue
stream akin to a hydroelectric dam.
Mining companies typically do not have in-house geotechnical expertise, instead there is
reliance on periodic design and perhaps construction monitoring from consulting
engineers. Most large-scale water supply and/or hydroelectric agencies more often than
not have very capable dam designers and surveillance engineers/technicians in-house.
Owners of large conventional dams also typically retain an independent board of eminent
consultants to provide expert third-party review. This is not a typical practice in mining at
this time.
Are the unique features of tailings dams the reason for the failure trends? The
authors suggest that a combination of factors including a lack of input from appropriate
external consultants and/or the reliance on third-party consultants without adequate review
of their work are highly contributory to the failure trends. As noted by Davies and Martin
(2000), there are basic requirements for a designer working in tailings dam engineering
and these requirements need to be followed.
This paper examines the phenomenon of tailings dam failure, or, when things go
wrong." The paper is not geared at assigning blame for dam failures but takes the
approach that most, if not all, of the failures that have occurred fit into a very consistent
set of trends. This consistency is emphasized with the clear premise that if one becomes
familiar enough with these trends, future failure events will not arise from an ignorance of
the lessons offered by the failure database. If the mining industry collectively embraces
the lessons from these trends, the current profile surrounding tailings dams can perhaps
wane considerably as the safety record for tailings dams improves to the standard
demanded by those who are so quick to criticize the industry.
Definition of Failure
When tailings dams go wrong, it is to say that they have failed. Websters'
dictionary offers the following for defining failure: falling short, weakening, breakdown in
operation, neglect, not succeeding, becoming bankrupt. All of these have some
appropriateness with tailings dam incidents. Leonards (1982) in his Terzaghi lecture
defines failure as "an unacceptable difference between expected and observed
performance".
The authors suggest the terminology offered by Leonards (1982) captures what
failure means in the context of tailings dams. Failures need not be catastrophic flow
failures for those who wish to learn the most from the errors of others. In fact, there are
dramatically more "mundane" failures to learn from (e.g. compare the USEPA "failure"
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case histories, USEPA, 1997, with the USCOLD, 1994, "failure incident" summary
document). While the more catastrophic failures gather the most attention and certainly
dominate the typical failure databases that get developed, the same trends and lessons
are available from the lesser failures (also called "upsets" by many in the industry). As the
lesser failures tend to get very little publicity, and almost never any technical publication,
practitioners of tailings dam design should keep their own database developed from
observations obtained from reviews, audits and the like.
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Public Perception and Tailings Dam Failures
The public has high expectations for the mining industry in stewarding mine tailings.
There are "fringe" groups who appear opposed to mining of any sort that have either not
thought out their position with any real effort or advocate a return to a Paleolithic lifestyle.
Given that society, at least implicitly by consumption patterns, places a high value on
mined products, public perception of the industry should be commensurate with the value
of the industry. Tailings dams, particularly the well-publicized failure events, are lightening
rods for public scrutiny of the industry. However, as summarized below, this is not as new
a public sentiment as many would believe:
The strongest argument of the detractors of mining is that the fields are
devastated by mining operationsfurther, when the ores are washed, the water
used poisons the brooks and streams, and either destroys the fish or drives them
awaythus it is said, it is clear to all that there is greater detriment from mining
than the values of the metals which the mining produces
Agricola - 1556
The public now has instantaneous access to tailings dam events (see discussion on
the recent Baia Mare event later in this paper). Given the relatively constant frequency of
tailings dam failures over the past thirty years, the public perception is that such events
are on the rise due to the increase in publicity each successive event receives. The
influence public sentiment can have on the viability of a proposed or existing mining
project has never been higher. Public, and some regulatory, perception considerations
are now largely driving project design decisions, as opposed to appropriate experience
and technical logic.
Failures of tailings dams tend to get viewed as events caused by the collective
mining industry. It is nave to assume that an individual corporation or regulatory
jurisdiction is not affected by the dam failures of others. Whether the industry deserves
the situation, each failure incident "raises the bar" with both the public and regulatory
bodies for the "next" project.
Tailings dam failures can have any or all of the following impacts:
Extended production interruption
Loss of life
Environmental damage
Damage to company and industry image
Economic consequences company, and even industry, wide
Legal responsibility for company officers
For the mining company, the most tangible impact after ensuring public safety is the
immediate and longer-term financial impact. Table 1 presents some approximate costs of
recent tailings impoundment failures (note that Marcopper was not a dam incident).
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Table 1 - Approximate Costs Associated with Tailings Impoundment Failures1
(all costs x 106 US Currency)
Category/ Omai Golden Cross Marcopper Los Frailes
Tailings Facility
Direct Expenses ~$14 >$10 ~$80 $34
Deferred Cash Flow $16 N/A N/A ~$10
Loss of Asset Value - $53 N/A N/A
Drop in Share Price 25% N/A $43 impact in 1996 ~50%
1
Data partially from Vick, 1997.
Tailings dam failures have also resulted in loss of life during extreme events.
Table 2 presents a list of the case histories involving fatalities. There are several other
incidents, several in the former Soviet Union, where fatalities have occurred but the details
of the event and/or the actual number of fatalities are difficult to ascertain.
Finally, as society becomes more litigious, there are increasing legal ramifications
for company owners and, in some recent cases, their design consultants. These legal
considerations can be more than purely financial as criminal charges were considered in
at least two tailings dam failures in the past fifteen years (e.g. involuntary manslaughter).
There is no reason to expect this litigious trend to subside in at least the foreseeable
future.
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Tailings Dam Failure Modes - Example Case Histories
To better illustrate the nature of tailings dam failures, and hence their impacts, a
few examples are briefly introduced. In each case, the likely cause of the failure is
suggested along with information indicating factual versus perceived impact and lessons
that can be learned from the event.
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(Esmeralda Exploration WebSite) - Director resigns to pursue other opportunities,
February 11, 2000.
The authors are not fully aware of all of the facts of this case history that occurred
literally during final edits to this paper. Experience would tend to indicate that the
environmental impacts have been overstated and cyanide degradation will be rapid with
little, if any, long-term impact to receiving waters. However, the nature of the news reports
indicates the climate in which the mining industry finds itself. Any failure, anywhere in the
world, can cause immediate and devastating damage to the mining company and its
shareholders. The failure also serves to graphically illustrate the need to maintain
adequate flood storage volume in tailings impoundments - storage that is based upon
appropriate design criteria.
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and 90,000 m of water were released. The slurry traveled about 2 km covering nearly
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500,000 m . Given the downstream population, it is fortunate that not more than 17
people lost their lives in this tragedy.
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The failure was likely the first incident with worldwide outrage. However, the
technical debate that was part of the aftermath of this failure was as unique as the degree
of public outcry in comparison with the actual damage to the environment. Following
extensive post-failure investigations, representatives of the original design consultant and
the post-incident Dam Review Team strongly disagreed on relatively basic engineering
issues involved in both the original design and the ultimate failure mechanism(s) (Haile,
1997 and Vick, 1997, respectively).
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Table 3 - Examples of Tailings Dam Failure Causes
Tailings Dam Failure Axiom - Tailings dam failures are a result of design and/or
construction/operation management flaws - not "acts of god".
As a positive corollary to the axiom, if the reasons for tailings dam failures are
readily identifiable, there is the potential to essentially eliminate such events with an
industry-wide commitment to correct design and stewardship practices. The necessary
knowledge exists; there just has to be used.
Concluding Remarks
Figure 1 presents a summary of sufficiently well documented "significant" tailings
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dam failures over the 20 century. From the summarized information in Figure 1, two
possible trends are shown and are labeled A and B. Using Figure 1 as a barometer, what
is the likely future for tailings dam performance? Is the trend to be like A; either remaining
at roughly 2 or more significant failures per year with a gradual increase and perhaps also
having the occasional particularly "bad" decade (like the 1970's)? Alternatively, will the
trend of an apparent decrease in failures since the 1970's suggested by line B continue
into this new century?
An optimistic response, e.g. a B trend, is possible with a commitment from the
entire industry to an adherence to fundamentally sound design and operating concepts;
the authors are cautiously optimistic, as this commitment appears to be growing. The
optimism would be further increased if those in the industry who believe there has not
been a significant problem from tailings dam failures would take the time to review and
acknowledge the less than perfect history. These individuals should also understand that
the current scrutiny under which the industry currently finds itself is largely a result of this
history.
This conference is a unique event with the representation of owners, designers and
regulators. The authors suggest some minimum expectations for each of the four main
participants in the tailings dam life cycle to provide the best opportunity for an
improvement in the tailings dam performance record. These participants are:
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1. Owners
2. Designers
3. Regulators
4. Public individuals or collectives
50 B
Dam Failures
40
?
30
20 A
10 ?
0
1909 1929 1949 1969 1989 2009
Date
Owners only retain design assistance from reputable designers with track records
that can be verified. Have submitted designs checked by independent professionals.
Give serious consideration to retaining third-party review as part of a periodic audit
process. During operations, have a qualified person charged with tailings dam
stewardship and provide that individual with the authority to retain professional assistance
as deemed necessary. For older operations, be diligent in assessing the history of the
operation - look for forgotten "incidents" involving tailings dam management.
Designers do not work out of your area of competence and/or experience. This
includes not using off the shelf designs that may have been successful for you in the
past but are possibly woefully inappropriate for the climatic/tectonic/foundation conditions
for the project at hand. Welcome independent review - do not view such as an attack on
your design and/or competency but a benefit to you as much as your client.
Regulators - establish/maintain a database on all tailings dams, operating and
otherwise, within your jurisdiction. Maintain candid assessments of the performance
records of owners and designers and share such details with other regulators as
appropriate. Facilitate developments where the owner presents an independently
reviewed design that is consistent with standard design criteria. Work to repeal
regulations that are incompatible with common sense.
Public Participants - continue to expect responsible stewardship of the environment
by this necessary industry. However, acknowledge that the vast majority of mining
industry operators and operations deserve praise for their efforts. Concentrate on factual
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accounts of incidents to develop and maintain credibility. Avoid supporting non-
government organizations that endorse actions against corporations committed to a high
degree of environmental stewardship and who operate their mines accordingly.
References
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1. Agricola, G. (1556). De Re Metallica. 1 Edition.
2. Bruce. I., C. Louge and L. Wichek (1997). "Trends in Tailings Dam Safety".
Proceedings to CIM Annual General Meeting, Vancouver.
3. Davies, M.P. and T.E. Martin (2000). "Upstream Constructed Tailings Dams - A
Review of the Basics". In proceedings of Tailings and Mine Waste '00, Fort Collins,
January, Balkema Publishers, pp. 3-15.
4. Davies, M.P., B.B. Dawson and B.G. Chin (1998). Static Liquefaction Slump of Mine
Tailings A Case History, Proceeding of 51st Canadian Geotechnical Conference,
Edmonton.
5. Haile, J.P. (1997). "Discussion on the Failure of the Omai Tailings Dam". Geotechnical
News, Volume 15, No. 1, March, pp. 44-49.
6. Leonards, G.A. (1982). "Investigation of Failures". Sixteenth Terzaghi Lecture. ASCE
Journal of Geotechnical Engineering, Volume 108, Number GT2, February, pp. 224-
283.
7. Martin, T.E. and M.P. Davies (2000). "Trends in the Stewardship of Tailings Dams", In
proceedings of Tailings and Mine Waste '00, Fort Collins, January, Balkema Publishers,
pp. 393-407.
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in proceedings of ICME/UNEP Workshop on Risk Assessment and Contingency
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9. United Nations Environment Programme (1996). " Environmental and Safety
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1996", Industry and Environment. Paris, 1996, 129 pages.
10. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, (1997). "Damage Cases and Environmental
Releases from Mines and Mineral Processing Sites", Office of Solid Waste,
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11. USCOLD (1994). Tailings Dam Incidents, a report prepared by the USCOLD
Committee on Tailings Dams, November.
12. Vick, S.G. (1997). "Failure of the Omai Tailings Dam: Closure". Geotechnical News,
Volume 15, No. 1, March, pp. 49-55.
13. Vick, S.G. (1997). . Proceedings to CIM Annual General Meeting, Vancouver.
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