10. PATRICIO TAN, FELIX FERRER, JUAN M.

HAGAD, SERGIO HILADO, VIRGILIO AUTHOR: ACIDO

GASTON, CONCHITA MINAYA, TERESITA ESTACIO, DESIDERIO DEFERIA, ROMEO NOTES: Case for Prohibition.
GAMBOA, ALBERTO LACSON, FE HOFILENA, EMILY JISON, NIEVES LOPEZ AND
CECILIA MAGSAYSAY v. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and THE PROVINCIAL
TREASURER OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL BP 885 just in case:
SECTION 1. The Cities of Silay, Cadiz, and San Carlos and the municipalities of
G.R. No. 73155, July 11, 1986 Calatrava, Taboso, Escalante, Sagay, Manapla, Victorias, E.R. Magalona; and Salvador
Benedicto, all in the northern portion of the Island of Negros, are hereby separated
from the province to be known as the Province of Negros del Norte.
TOPIC: Alteration and Dissolution of Municipal Corporations Plebiscite SEC. 2. The boundaries of the new province shall be the southern limits of the City of
Requirements Silay, the Municipality of Salvador Benedicto and the City of San Carlos on the south
and the territorial limits of the northern portion to the Island of Negros on the west,
PONENTE: Alampay, J. north and east, comprising a territory of 4,019.95 square kilometers more or less.
SEC. 3. The seat of government of the new province shall be the City of Cadiz.
SEC. 4. A plebiscite shall be conducted in the proposed new province which are the
areas affected within a period of one hundred and twenty days from the approval of
this Act. After the ratification of the creation of the Province of Negros del Norte by a
majority of the votes cast in such plebiscite, the President of the Philippines shall
appoint the first officials of the province.
SEC. 5. The Commission on Elections shall conduct and supervise the plebiscite herein
provided, the expenses for which shall be charged to local funds.
SEC. 6. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
Article XI, Sec. 3 makes it imperative that there be first obtained "the approval of a majority of votes in the plebiscite in the unit or units affected" whenever a province is
created, divided, or merged and there is substantial alteration of the boundaries.
FACTS:
Batas Pambansa Blg. 885-An Act Creating a New Province in the Island of Negros to be known as the Province of Negros del Norte was enacted and took effect on
December 3, 1985.
December 23, 1985: Petitioners, who are residents of Negros Occidental, filed a case for Prohibition with the Supreme Court to stop respondents Commission on
Elections from conducting the plebiscite which, pursuant to and in implementation of the aforesaid law, was scheduled for January 3, 1986. They claim that BP 885 is
unconstitutional and does not conform to the requirements of the Local Government Code. Reasons:
o [Constitution] Article XI, Sec. 3. No province, city, municipality or barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered,
except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in
the unit or units affected. COMELEC excluded the voters of the Province of Negros Occidental, other than those living within the territory of the new
province of Negros del Norte, saying they do not fall within the meaning and scope of the term "unit or units affected". Hence, petitioners say it is
unconstitutional.
o [LGC] SEC. 197. Requisites for Creation. A province may be created if it has a territory of at least three thousand five hundred square kilometers xxx -
Petitioners insist that the area which would comprise the new province of Negros del Norte would only be about 2,856.56 square kilometers, which
evidently would be < minimum area of 3,500 sq. km prescribed by the governing statute. COMELEC points to Section 2 of BP 885.
COMELEC also argues that the petition for prohibition has been rendered moot and academic because the plebiscite was conducted as scheduled. Out of 195,134 total
votes cast in said plebiscite, 164,734 were in favor of the creation of Negros del Norte and 30,400 were against it. It says because "the affirmative votes cast represented
a majority of the total votes cast in said plebiscite, the Chairman of the Board of Canvassers proclaimed the new province which shall be known as "Negros del Norte";
the creation of the new province is now a "fait accompli."
o [SPEC CIV vibes] COMELEC also cites Paredes v. Executive Secretary to support exclusion of the voters belonging to an existing political unit from which the
new political unit will be derived, from participating in the plebiscite conducted for the purpose of determining the formation of another new political unit.
When there are indications that the inhabitants of several barangays are inclined to separate from a parent municipality they should be allowed to do so.
ISSUE: Whether or not the plebiscite is valid, despite the exclusion of the voters from Negros Occidental.

HELD: No. BP 885 is unconstitutional. The proclamation of the new province of Negros del Norte, as well as the appointment of the officials thereof are also declared null and
void.

RATIO:
Not moot and academic, even if the plebiscite had been held and a new province proclaimed and its officials appointed, because the legality of the plebiscite itself
is challenged for non-compliance with constitutional requisites.
Parliamentary Bill No. 3644: SEC. 4. A plebiscite shall be conducted in the areas affected within a period of one hundred and twenty days xxx; in BP 885, it became
SEC. 4. A plebiscite shall be conducted in the proposed new province which are the areas affected xxx. It is this legislative determination limiting the plebiscite
exclusively to the cities and towns which would comprise the new province that is assailed by the petitioners as violative of the provisions of the Constitution.
Article XI, Sec. 3 makes it imperative that there be first obtained "the approval of a majority of votes in the plebiscite in the unit or units affected" whenever a
province is created, divided or merged and there is substantial alteration of the boundaries. The boundaries of the existing province of Negros Occidental would
necessarily be substantially altered by the division of its existing boundaries in order that there can be created the proposed new province of Negros del Norte.
Plain and simple logic will demonstrate that two political units would be affected. The first would be the parent province of Negros Occidental because its
boundaries would be substantially altered. The other affected entity would be composed of those in the area subtracted from the mother province to constitute
the proposed province of Negros del Norte. No amount of rhetorical flourishes can justify exclusion of the parent province in the plebiscite because of an alleged
intent on the part of the authors and implementors of the challenged statute to carry out what is claimed to be a mandate to guarantee and promote autonomy
of local government units.
In the case at bar, creation of a new province relates to the largest political unit contemplated in Section 3, Art. XI of the Constitution. To form the new province of
Negros del Norte no less than three cities and eight municipalities will be subtracted from the parent province of Negros Occidental. This will result in the removal
of approximately 2,768.4 square kilometers from the land area of an existing province whose boundaries will be consequently substantially altered. It becomes
easy to realize that the consequent effects of the division of the parent province necessarily will affect all the people living in the separate areas of Negros
Occidental and the proposed province of Negros del Norte. The economy of the parent province as well as that of the new province will be inevitably affected,
either for the better or for the worse. Whatever be the case, either or both of these political groups will be affected and they are, therefore, the unit or units
referred to in Section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution which must be included in the plebiscite contemplated therein.
 o Negros Occidental would lose 4,019.95 square kilometers in area and seven of fifteen sugar mills which contribute to the economic progress and welfare
of the whole province.
In the case of Negros what was involved was a division, a separation; and consequently, as Sec. 3 of Article XI of the Constitution anticipates, a substantial alteration
of boundary.
The said plebiscite held on January 3, 1986 is null and void and violative of the provisions of Sec. 3, Article XI of the Constitution.
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
Teehankee, CJ., concurring: To limit the plebiscite to only the voters of the areas to be partitioned and seceded from the province is as absurd and illogical as allowing only
the secessionists to vote for the secession that they demanded against the wishes of the majority and to nullify the basic principle of majority rule.
"With indecent haste, the plebiscite was held; Negros del Norte was set up and proclaimed by President Marcos as in existence; a new set of government officials headed
by Governor Armando Gustilo was appointed; and, by the time the elections were held on February 7, 1986, the political machinery was in place to deliver the 'solid North' to
ex-President Marcos. The rest is history. What happened in Negros del Norte during the elections-the unashamed use of naked power and resources contributed in no small
way to arousing 'people's power' and steel the ordinary citizen to perform deeds of courage and patriotism that makes one proud to be a Filipino today.

09. HON. ROY A. PADILLA, JR., In his capacity as Governor of the Province of AUTHOR: HABLADO, UNA KA NEXT WEEK SA INSURANCE
Camarines Norte vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS NOTES: Doctrine indicated is in my own words :p
G.R. No. 103328
TOPIC: Alteration and Dissolution of Municipal Corporations Plebiscite
Requirements
PONENTE: ROMERO, J.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
A plebiscite for the purpose of creating a Municipality must be conducted in the barangays included in the proposed Municipality as well as those other barangas that are still
part of the parent Municipality
FACTS:
Pursuant to RA 7155, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2312:
The proposed municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa be the subject of a plebiscite on December 15, 1991, that will be held in barangays of both the proposed Municipality of Tulay-
Na-Lupa and the other remaining areas within the Municipality of Labor, Camarines Norte
Plebiscite results: Rejected; 2,890 votes in favor, 3,439 against

Petitioner, as Governor of Camarines Norte, files a special civil action of certiorari seeking to set aside the plebiscite
Reason: that the plebiscite was a complete failure and that the results obtained were invalid and illegal because the plebiscite, as mandated by COMELEC Resolution No. 2312
should have been conducted only in the political unit or units affected (12 barangays comprising the new Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa namely Tulay-Na-Lupa, Lugui, San
Antonio, Mabilo I, Napaod, Benit, Bayan-Bayan, Matanlang, Pag-Asa, Maot, and Calabasa) and not including the other remaining areas
In support of its claim:
Paredes v. Executive Secretary (that superseded Tan v Comelec) held that where a local unit is to be segregated from a parent unit, only the voters of the unit to
be segrated should be included in the plebiscite
deletion of the word unit in Section 10 of Article X of the 1987 Constitution, compared to Section 3 of Article XI of the 1973 Constitution changed the Tan v
Comelec ruling (which held that other remaining areas are included)
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Resolution No. 2312 and, consequently
Whether or not the plebiscite conducted in the areas comprising the proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa and the remaining areas of the mother Municipality of Labo is
valid
HELD: NO, plebiscite is valid; the instant petition is DISMISSED
RATIO:
Associate Justice Hilario Davide, during the debates in the 1986 Constitutional Commission said that: I precisely asked for the deletion of the words "unit or"
because in the plebiscite to be conducted, it must involve all the units affected. If it is the creation of a barangay plebiscite because it is affected. It would mean a
loss of a territory
When the law states that the plebiscite shall be conducted "in the political units directly affected," it means that residents of the political entity who would be
economically dislocated by the separation of a portion thereof have a right to vote in said plebiscite
"political units directly affected" = plurality of political units which would participate in the plebiscite
Included in such political areas are the inhabitants of the 12 barangays of the proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa as well as those living in the parent Municipality of Labo,
Camarines Norte
11. MIRANDA V. AGUIRRE AUTHOR: Adre
[G.R. No. 133064. September 16, 1999] NOTES: Nature of the case: Petition for a writ of prohibition with prayer for preliminary
TOPIC: Alteration and Dissolution of Municipal Corporations Plebiscite injunction assailing the constitutionality of RA 8528 (converting the city of Santiago,
Requirements Isabela from independent component city to a component city.
PONENTE: Puno, J.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution imposes two conditions -first, the creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundary
of a local government unit must meet the criteria fixed by the Local Government Code on income, population and land area and second, the law must be approved by the
people by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.

In accord with Section 10, Article IX of the Constitution, Sections 7, 8, and 9 of the Local Government Code fixed the required criteria and they involve requirements on income,
population and land area. These requirements, however, are imposed to help assure the economic viability of the local government unit concerned. They were not imposed to
determine the necessity for a plebiscite of the people. Indeed, the Local Government Code does not state that there will be no more plebiscite after its requirements on income,
population and land area have been satisfied. On the contrary, Section 10, Chapter 2 of the Code provides for the necessity of a plebiscite. Said plebiscite shall be conducted
by the COMELEC within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of the effectivity of the law or ordinance effecting such action, unless said law or ordinance fixes another
date.
Emergency Recit:
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA No. 8528 for the lack of provision to submit the law for the approval of the people of Santiago in a proper plebiscite. Respondents
defended the constitutionality of RA No. 8528 saying that the said act merely reclassified the City of Santiago from an independent component city into a component city. It
allegedly did not involve any creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units, therefore, a plebiscite of the people of
Santiago is unnecessary. The Court ruled that when an amendment of the law involves creation, merger, division, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of local
government units, a plebiscite in the political units directly affected is mandatory. Petitioners are directly affected in the implementation of RA No. 8528. Miranda was the
mayor of Santiago City, Afiado was the President of the Sangguniang Liga, together with 3 other petitioners were all residents and voters in the City of Santiago. It is their right
to be heard in the conversion of their city through a plebiscite to be conducted by the COMELEC. Thus, denial of their right in RA No. 8528 gives them proper standing to strike
down the law as unconstitutional.
FACTS:
Petitioners:
Miranda-- MAYOR, filed the petition as mayor
AfiadoPresident of the Liga ng mga Barangay sa Santiago City
Dirige, Babaran and Cabuyadaoresidents and voters of the city of Santiago
Respondents: AguirreExecutive Secretary; VelascoSecretary of Local Government; EnriquezSecretary of Budget; COA; Comelec; DyGovernor of Isabela; Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Isabela; PicioProvincial Admin; ChuaProvincial Treasurer
BACKGROUND:
May 5, 1994: Republic Act No. 7720 which converted the municipality of Santiago, Isabela into an independent component city was signed into law.
On July 4, 1994, the people of Santiago ratified R.A. No. 7720 in a plebiscite
On February 14, 1998, Republic Act No. 8528 was enacted.
o It amended R.A. No. 7720. Among others, it changed the status of Santiago from an independent component city to a component city.
o section 4 effectivitythis act shall take effect upon its approval (no plebiscite indicated)
The case:
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8528:
They alleged as ground the lack of provision in R.A. No. 8528 submitting the law for ratification by the people of Santiago City in a proper plebiscite.
Petitioner Miranda was the mayor of Santiago at the time of the filing of the petition at bar.
Petitioner Afiado is the President of the Liga ng mga Barangay ng Santiago City.
Petitioners Dirige, Cabuyadao and Babaran are residents of Santiago City.
Comments from respondents:
1. Respondent provincial officials of Isabela defended the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8528.
o They assailed the standing of petitioners to file the petition at bar.
o They also contend that the petition raises a political question over which Court lacks jurisdiction.
2. Another Comment was filed by the Solicitor General for the respondent public officials:
Contends that petitioners are not real parties in interest.
R.A. No. 8528 merely reclassified Santiago City from an independent component city to a component city.
It did not involve any creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units, hence, a plebiscite
of the people of Santiago is unnecessary.
3. Third Comment similar in tone was submitted by intervenor Giorgidi B. Aggabao (a member of the provincial board of Isabela):
Both the Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991 do not require a plebiscite to approve a law that merely allowed qualified voters
of a city to vote in provincial elections.
The rules implementing the Local Government Code cannot require a plebiscite. He also urged that petitioners lacked locus standi.
Petitioners filed a Reply to meet the arguments of the respondents and the intervenor. They defended their standing. They also stressed the changes that would visit the city
of Santiago as a result of its reclassification.
ISSUE(S):
WON PLEBISCITE IS REQUIRED (MAIN ISSUE NA RELATED SA TOPIC) YES.
WON R.A. 8528 is constitutional. NO. It was declared unconstitutional. (related sa plebiscite requirement)
Re locus standi: Yes they have since:
o Petitioner Miranda was mayor of Santiago City when he filed the petitionthe change of status of Santiago City from independent to component city
will affect his powers as mayor
o Residents and voters of the cityhave the right to be heard in the conversion of their city thru a plebiscite; denial of this right RA 8528 gives them
proper standing to strike the law unconstitutional.
RATIO:
R.A. No. 8528 is unconstitutional. RA 7720- required plebiscite; should not RA 8528 also require plebiscitethe rule covers all conversions upward or downward
in character.
The conversion of the city of Santiago from an independent component city to a component city should be submitted to its people in a proper plebiscite.
Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides:
o No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, or divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance
with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units
directly affected.
A close analysis of the said constitutional provision will reveal that the creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of local
government units involve a common denominator - material change in the political and economic rights of the local government units directly affected as well
as the people therein.
o It is precisely for this reason that the Constitution requires the approval of the people in the political units directly affected.
 Section 10, Article X addressed the undesirable practice in the past whereby local government units were created, abolished, merged or divided on the basis of the
vagaries of politics and not of the welfare of the people.
o Thus, the consent of the people of the local government unit directly affected was required to serve as a checking mechanism to any exercise of
legislative power creating, dividing, abolishing, merging or altering the boundaries of local government units.
It is one instance where the people in their sovereign capacity decide on a matter that affects them - direct democracy of the people as opposed to democracy
thru peoples representatives.
This plebiscite requirement is also in accord with the philosophy of the Constitution granting more autonomy to local government units.
The changes that will result from the downgrading of the city of Santiago from an independent component city to a component city are many and cannot be
characterized as insubstantial. (as cited in the case: the independence of the city as a political unit will be diminished. The registered voters of Santiago City will
vote for and can be voted as provincial officials. The city mayor will be placed under the administrative supervision of the provincial governor. The resolutions and
ordinances of the city council of Santiago will have to be reviewed by the Provincial Board of Isabela. Taxes that will be collected by the city will now have to be
shared with the province.)
o Section 10, Chapter 2 of the Local Government Code and Rule II, Article 6, paragraph (f) (1) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Local
Government Code is in accord with the Constitution.
o The rules therein cover all conversions, whether upward or downward in character, so long as they result in a material change in the local
government unit directly affected, especially a change in the political and economic rights of its people.
ADDITIONAL NOTES:
1. PROVISIONS OF R.A. 8528
AN ACT AMENDING CERTAIN SECTIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED 7720 AN ACT CONVERTING THE MUNICIPALITY OF SANTIAGO INTO AN INDEPENDENT
COMPONENT CITY TO BE KNOWN AS THE CITY OF SANTIAGO.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:
SECTION 1. Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7720 is hereby amended by deleting the words an independent thereon so that said Section will read
as follows:
SEC. 2. The City of Santiago. The Municipality of Santiago shall be converted into a component city to be known as the City of Santiago,
hereinafter referred to as the City, which shall comprise of the present territory of the Municipality of Santiago, Isabela. The territorial jurisdiction of
the City shall be within the present metes and bounds of the Municipality of Santiago.
Sec. 2. Section 51 of Republic Act No. 7720 is hereby amended deleting the entire section and in its stead substitute the following:
SEC. 51. Election of Provincial Governor, Vice-Governor, Sangguniang Panlalawigan Members, and any Elective Provincial Position for the
Province of Isabela.- The voters of the City of Santiago shall be qualified to vote in the elections of the Provincial Governor, Vice-Governor,
Sangguniang Panlalawigan members and other elective provincial positions of the Province of Isabela, and any such qualified voter can be a candidate
for such provincial positions and any elective provincial office.
Sec. 3. Repealing Clause.- All existing laws or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
Sec. 4. Effectivity.- This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

12. Tobias v. Abalos AUTHOR: De Castro

[G.R. No. 114783. December 8, 1994] NOTES: Petition to render Republic Act No. 7675 unconstitutional
TOPIC: Alteration and Dissolution of Municipal Corporations Plebiscite Petitioners: Robert Tobias, Ramon Guzman, Terry Lim, Gregorio Gabriel, and Roberto
Requirements R. Tobias, Jr.,
PONENTE: Bidin, J. Respondents: Hon. City Mayor Benjamin Abalos, City Treasurer William Marcelino,
and the Sangguniang Panlungsod, all of the City of Mandaluyong, Metro Manila
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
A plebiscite should include the political unit or units directly affected by the conversion. In this case, the inhabitants of San Juan, which used to be part of the congressional
district together with Mandaluyong, were properly excluded from the plebiscite on the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city since the matter of separate
district representation was only ancillary to it.
FACTS:
Invoking their rights as taxpayers and as residents of Mandaluyong, petitioners assail the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7675 known as An Act Converting the
Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be Known as the City of Mandaluyong.
Prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 7675, the municipalities of Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only one legislative district.
Hon. Ronaldo Zamora, the incumbent congressional representative of this legislative district, sponsored the bill which eventually became R.A. No. 7675.
Feb. 9, 1994: R.A. No. 7675 was signed into law by President Ramos.
April 10, 1994: Pursuant to the Local Government Code of 1991, a plebiscite was held wherein the people of Mandaluyong were asked whether they approved of the
conversion of the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city, as provided under R.A. No. 7675.
The turnout at the plebiscite was only 14.41% of the voting population. [18,621 voted yes whereas 7,911 voted no]
By virtue of these results, R.A. No. 7675 was deemed ratified and in effect.
Assailed provision: Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675: As a highly-urbanized city, the City of Mandaluyong shall have its own legislative district with the first representative
to be elected in the next national elections after the passage of this Act. The remainder of the former legislative district of San Juan/Mandaluyong shall become the new
legislative district of San Juan with its first representative to be elected at the same election.
Petitioners contention: R.A. No. 7675, specifically Article VIII, Section 49, is unconstitutional for being violative of three specific provisions [Art. VI, Sec. 26(1), Art. VI, Sections
5 (1) and (4)] of the Constitution. [Please check the Consti provisions]
o Art. VI, Sec. 26 (1) - Section 49 violates the one subject-one bill rule because it embraced two principal subjects, namely: (1) the conversion of Mandaluyong into
a highly urbanized city; and (2) the division of the congressional district of San Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate districts.
o Art. VI, Sec. 5 (1) The division of San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate congressional districts under Section 49 has resulted in an increase in the composition
of the House of Representatives beyond that provided in Article VI, Sec. 5 (1) of the Constitution. Furthermore, the division was not made pursuant to any census
showing that the subject municipalities have attained the minimum population requirements.
o Art. VI, Sec. 5 (4) - Section 49 has the effect of preempting the right of Congress to reapportion legislative districts pursuant to Sec. 5 (4).
Contention relevant to our topic: Aside from the Constitutional objections to R.A. No. 7675, petitioners contend that the people of San Juan should have been made to
participate in the plebiscite on R.A. No. 7675 as the same involved a change in their legislative district. Also, the subject law has resulted in gerrymandering, which is the
practice of creating legislative districts to favor a particular candidate or party.

ISSUE(S):
Whether petitioners are correct in arguing that the people of San Juan should have been made to participate in the plebiscite on R.A. No. 7675
Whether R.A. No. 7675 is unconstitutional
HELD: No/No
RATIO:
Plebiscite
The contention that the people of San Juan should have been made to participate in the plebiscite on R.A. No. 7675 as the same involved a change in their legislative district is
bereft of merit since the principal subject involved in the plebiscite was the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city. The matter of separate district
representation was only ancillary to it. Thus, the inhabitants of San Juan were properly excluded from the said plebiscite as they had nothing to do with the change of status
of neighboring Mandaluyong.

Constitutionality of R.A. No. 7675

The creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized
city but is a natural and logical consequence of its conversion into a highly urbanized city. Verily, the title of R.A. No. 7675, An Act Converting the Municipality of
Mandaluyong Into a Highly Urbanized City of Mandaluyong necessarily includes and contemplates the subject treated under Section 49 regarding the creation of
a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong. Moreover, a liberal construction of the one title-one subject rule has been invariably adopted by this court so
as not to cripple or impede legislation. The constitutional requirement should be given a practical rather than a technical construction. It should be sufficient
compliance with such requirement if the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane to that general subject.

As to the contention that the assailed law violates the present limit on the number of representatives as set forth in the Constitution, a reading of the applicable
provision, Article VI, Section 5 (1) shows that the present limit of 250 members is not absolute. The Constitution clearly provides that the House of Representatives
shall be composed of not more than 250 members, unless otherwise provided by law. The inescapable import of the latter clause is that the present composition
of Congress may be increased, if Congress itself so mandates through a legislative enactment. Therefore, the increase in congressional representation mandated
by R.A. No. 7675 is not unconstitutional.

As to the contention that Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 in effect preempts the right of Congress to reapportion legislative districts, the said argument borders on the
absurd since petitioners overlook the glaring fact that it was Congress itself which drafted, deliberated upon and enacted the assailed law, including Section 49 of
it. Congress cannot possibly preempt itself on a right which pertains to itself.

01 Frivaldo v. COMELEC AUTHOR: Garcia

[G.R. No. 87193 June 23, 1989] NOTES:
TOPIC: Qualifications
PONENTE: Cruz, J.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during
the officers entire tenure.
The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate was
qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict application when the deficiency is lack of citizenship.
FACTS:
January 22, 1988 Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon.
October 27, 1988 League of Municipalities, represented by its President Salvador Estuye, who was also suing in his personal capacity, filed with the Commission on
Elections a petition for the annulment of Frivaldos election and proclamation on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United
States on January 20, 1983.
Frivaldo:
o He had sought American citizenship only to protect himself against President Marcos.
o He was a citizen of the Philippines because his naturalization as an American citizen was not impressed with voluntariness
o He could not have repatriated himself before 1988 elections because the Special Committee on Naturalization created for the purpose by LOI No. 270 had
not yet been organized then.
o The challenge to his title should be dismissed, being a quo warranto petition that should have been filed within 10 days in accordance with Omnibus
Election Code.
o The League was not a proper party because it was not a voter
ISSUE(S): Whether or not Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election on January 18, 1988, as provincial governor of Sorsogon
HELD: No

RATIO:
The evidence shows that he was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1983 per the certification from the United States District Court, Northern District of
California, as duly authenticated by Vice Consul Amado P. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco, California, U.S.A.
The Court sees no reason not to believe that the petitioner was one of the enemies of the Marcos dictatorship. Even so, it cannot agree that as a consequence
thereof he was coerced into embracing American citizenship. His feeble suggestion that his naturalization was not the result of his own free and voluntary choice
is totally unacceptable and must be rejected outright. There were many other Filipinos in the US similarly situated as Frivaldo, and some of them subject to greater
risk than he, who did not find it necessary nor do they claim to have been coerced to abandon their cherished status as Filipinos.
He claims that by actively participating in the elections in this country, he automatically forfeited American citizenship under the laws of the US. Such laws do not
concern us here. The alleged forfeiture did not and could not have the effect of automatically restoring his citizenship in the Philippines that he had earlier
renounced. At best, what might have happened as a result of the loss of his naturalized citizenship was that he became a stateless individual.
 Frivaldos contention that he could not have repatriated himself under LOI 270 because the Special Committee provided for therein had not yet been constituted
seems to suggest that the lack of that body rendered his repatriation unnecessary. That is farfetched if not specious. Such a conclusion would open the floodgates,
as it were. It would allow all Filipinos who have been renounced this country to claim back their abandoned citizenship without formally rejecting their adopted
state and reaffirming their allegiance to the Philippines.
The argument that the petition filed with the COMELEC should be dismissed for tardiness is not well-taken. The herein private respondents are seeking to prevent
Frivaldo from continuing to discharge his office of governor because he is disqualified from doing so as a foreigner.
This Court will not permit the anomaly of a person sitting as provincial governor in this country while owing exclusive allegiance to another country.

Juan G. Frivaldo v. COMELEC and Raul R. Lee AUTHOR: HABLADO

G.R. No. 120295, June 28, 1996 NOTE: This is a case on who should be the rightful governor of Sorsogon:
PONENTE: PANGANIBAN, J. 1) Petitioner Frivaldo - earned the highest votes in 3 successive elections but was
twice declared disqualified due to alien citizenship;

TOPIC: Elective Local Officials, Secs. 39 - Qualifications 2) Respondent Lee 2nd placer; or
3) Deri Vice Governor?
CASE LAW/DOCTRINE:
1. Under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code, "(a)n elective local official must be:
a citizen of the Philippines;
a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province . . . where he intends to be elected;
a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election;
able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.
In addition, "candidates for the position of governor . . . must be at least be 23 years of age on election day.
2. Since Frivaldo re-assumed his citizenship on June 30, 1995 -- the very day the term of office of governor (and other elective officials) began -- he was therefore already qualified
to be proclaimed, to hold such office and to discharge the functions and responsibilities thereof as of said date. This is the liberal interpretation that should give spirit, life and
meaning to our law on qualifications consistent with the purpose for which such law was enacted.
FACTS: A special civil action under Rules 65 and 58 of the Rules of Court for certiorari and preliminary injunction to review and annul the COMELEC resolution*
Petition to DQ Frivaldo (by Lee)
3 days after Frivaldo filed for his certificate of candidacy, Lee filed a petition with Comelec for the DQ of Frivaldo by reason of not being a citizen of the Ph.
Comelec granted the petition.
MR of Frivaldo was unacted, so his candidacy continued and was voted on May 1995 elections.
Vote results: 1st - Frivaldo (73k); 2nd - Lee (53k); 3rd - Escudero (51k); 4th Ocampo (1.9k)
Petition to Proclaim Lee as Governor (by Lee)
June 1995: Lee filed a petition for his proclamation as duly-elected governor
8pm of June 30, 1995: Lee was proclaimed governor
Petition to annul Proclamation of Lee (by Frivaldo)
Frivaldo filed a new petition: annulment of June 30 proclamation because at 2pm of June 30, he took his oath of allegiance as a citizen of the Philippines after his
petition for repatriation under P.D. 725 and filed with the Special Committee on Naturalization in September 1994 had been granted
Dec 1995: Comelec granted the petition and annulled the proclamation of Lee (*this is the assailed resolution in this case)
Lee filed an MR denied
There are 5 consolidated issues in this case.
1st ISSUE
Was the repatriation of Frivaldo valid and legal? If so, did it seasonably cure his lack of citizenship as to qualify him to be proclaimed and to hold the Office of Governor?
If not, may it be given retroactive effect? If so, from when?
YES; he is qualified; his repatriation took retroactive effect from the date of his application
Sec. 39 of LGC
Frivaldo alleges that through PD 725, he reacquired citizenship by repatriation
o PD 725 (June 5, 1975): provided a new remedy and a new right in favor of "natural born Filipinos who (had) lost their Philippine citizenship but now desire to re-
acquire Philippine citizenship" under a the simplified procedure of repatriation
o Date of application: August 17, 1994
o SC the repatriation granted to Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 can and should be made to take effect as of date of his application
Lee argues:
1. PD 725 has been expressly repealed by Pres. Aquinos Memorandum of March 1987 to cease and desist all proceedings of Special Committee on Naturalization
SC: this Memorandum cannot be construed as a law sanctioning or authorizing a repeal
1. serious congenital irregularities flawed the repatriation proceedings when the repatriation proceeding was done in just one day through the sudden
reconstitution of the Special Committee on Naturalization
SC: 10 other persons were similarly accommodated by the SolGen no favoritism
2. assuming repatriation is valid, it only took effect on June 30, 1995, when under the LGC, PH Citizenship must exist on the date of his election, if not when the
certificate of candidacy is filed
SC: Sec. 39 does not specify any particular date or time when the candidate must possess citizenship, unlike that for residence and age
Since Frivaldo re-assumed his citizenship on June 30, 1995 -- the very day the term of office of governor (and other elective officials) began -- he was therefore
already qualified to be proclaimed, to hold such office and to discharge the functions and responsibilities thereof as of said date. This is the liberal interpretation
that should give spirit, life and meaning to our law on qualifications consistent with the purpose for which such law was enacted.
o So too, even from a literal (as distinguished from liberal) construction, it should be noted that Section 39 LGC speaks of "Qualifications" of "ELECTIVE
OFFICIALS", not of candidates.
o Paraphrasing this Court's ruling in Vasquez vs. Giap and Li Seng Giap & Sons, if the purpose of the citizenship requirement is to ensure that our people and
country do not end up being governed by aliens, i.e., persons owing allegiance to another nation, that aim or purpose would not be thwarted but instead
achieved by construing the citizenship qualification as applying to the time of proclamation of the elected official and at the start of his term.
But must the citizenship qualification be possessed at the time the candidate (or for that matter the elected official) registered as a voter? (NO) The answer to this
problem again lies in discerning the purpose of the requirement. If the law intended the citizenship qualification to be possessed prior to election consistent with the
requirement of being a registered voter, then it would not have made citizenship a SEPARATE qualification.
o Nevertheless, Frivaldo has been allowed to vote since. He is a registered voter in Sorsogon.
 Being a former Filipino who has served the people repeatedly, Frivaldo deserves a liberal interpretation of Philippine laws and whatever defects there were in his
nationality should now be deemed mooted by his repatriation.
o Frivaldo has lost his foreign nationality long before the elections of 1995 have not been effectively rebutted by Lee

2nd ISSUE
Is Frivaldo's "judicially declared" disqualification for lack of Filipino citizenship a continuing bar to his eligibility to run for, be elected to or hold the governorship of
Sorsogon?
NO; Decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship cannot govern a person's future status with finality. This is because a person may subsequently reacquire, or
for that matter lose, his citizenship under any of the modes recognized by law for the purpose.

3rd ISSUE
Did the respondent Comelec have jurisdiction over the initiatory petition in SPC No. 95-317 considering that said petition is not "a pre-proclamation case, an election
protest or a quo warranto case"?
YES; Comelec has ample power to "exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of all elective . . . provincial . . .
officials."

4th ISSUE
Was the proclamation of Lee, a runner-up in the election, valid and legal in light of existing jurisprudence?
NO; the fact remains that he (Lee) was not the choice of the sovereign will

5th ISSUE
Did the respondent Commission on Elections exceed its jurisdiction in promulgating the assailed Resolutions, all of which prevented Frivaldo from assuming the
governorship of Sorsogon, considering that they were not rendered within the period referred to in Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, viz., "not later than fifteen
days before the elections"?
Issue is now moot and academic; deemed superseded by the subsequent ones issued by the Commission

HELD: DISMISSED; Frivaldo is the rightful governor of Sorsogon

DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. (as discussed by the SC):
submits that Section 39 LGC refers to the qualifications of elective local officials, i.e., candidates, and not elected officials, and that the citizenship qualification
must be possessed by candidates, not merely at the commencement of the term, but by election day at the latest.
o SC If the qualifications under par. (a) were intended to apply to "candidates" and not elected officials, the legislature would have said so, instead
of differentiating par. (a) from the rest of the paragraphs. Secondly, if Congress had meant that the citizenship qualification should be possessed at
election day or prior thereto, it would have specifically stated such detail, the same way it did in pars. (b) to (f) far other qualifications of candidates
for governor, mayor, etc.
questions the giving of retroactive effect to Frivaldo's repatriation on the ground, among others, that the law specifically provides that it is only after taking the
oath of allegiance that applicants shall be deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship
o SC the provision should be understood thus: that after taking the oath of allegiance the applicant is deemed to have reacquired Philippine
citizenship, which reacquisition (or repatriation) is deemed for all purposes and intents to have retroacted to the date of his application therefor.

SC At balance, the question really boils down to a choice of philosophy and perception of how to interpret and apply laws relating to elections: literal or liberal; the letter
or the spirit, the naked provision or its ultimate purpose; legal syllogism or substantial justice; in isolation or in the context of social conditions; harshly against or gently in
favor of the voters' obvious choice. In applying election laws, it would be far better to err in favor of popular sovereignty than to be right in complex but little understood
legalisms. Indeed, to inflict a thrice rejected candidate upon the electorate of Sorsogon would constitute unmitigated judicial tyranny and an unacceptable assault upon this
Court's conscience.

Labo vs. COMELEC, Lardizabal AUTHOR: Tristan

[G.R. No. 86564, August 1, 1989] NOTES: Issue on citizenship of an elected mayor of Baguio City. The issue was actually
TOPIC: Elective Local Officials - Qualifications PONENTE: Cruz only procedural (petition for quo warranto not filed on time), but the court deemed it
necessary to resolve the petitioners citizenship issue as well to finally lay the case to
rest and since it is a more important question affecting public interest.

CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:

The electorate had no power to permit a foreigner owing his total allegiance to the Queen of Australia, or at least a stateless individual owing no allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines, to preside over them as mayor of their city. Only citizens of the Philippines have that privilege over their countrymen.
These qualifications (provided in Sec. 42 of LGC) are continuing requirements; once any of them is lost during incumbency, title to the office itself is deemed forfeited.

FACTS:
Petitioner Labo was proclaimed mayor-elect of Baguio City, on January 20, 1988. The petition for quo warranto was filed by the private respondent Lardizabal (2nd place
in the elections) because Labo was allegedly a foreigner on January 26, 1988, but no filing fee was paid on that date. This fee was finally paid on February 10, 1988, or
twenty-one days after his proclamation.
Labos contention: As the petition by itself alone was ineffectual without the filing fee, it should be deemed filed only when the fee was paid. This was done beyond
the reglementary period provided for under Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code which requires that any voter contesting the election of of a Member of the
Batasang Pambansa, regional, provincial, or city officer on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines shall file a sworn petition for quo
 warranto with the Commission within ten days after the proclamation of the result of the election.
Respondent: Denies that the filing fee was paid out of time. In fact he says, it was flied ahead of time. His point is that when he filed his petition for Quo Warranto on
January 26, 1988, the COMELEC treated it only as a pre- proclamation controversy wherein no docket fee was collected although he offered it. It was only on February
8, 1988, that the COMELEC decided to treat his petition as solely for quo warranto and he immediately paid the filing fee on that date.
Facts regarding Labos citizenship: Labo was married before to an Australian citizen. As the spouse of an Australian citizen, he was granted Australian citizenship. He
swore an oath of allegiance which carries a renunciation of "all other allegiance to the Queen of Australia. The marriage was eventually declared void in the Australian
Federal Court on the ground that the marriage had been bigamous but he still remained an Australian citizen per the consul of Australia.
There were two administrative decisions on the question of the petitioner's citizenship. The first was rendered by COMELEC - found the petitioner to be a citizen of the
Philippines. The second was rendered by the Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID) - held that the petitioner was not a citizen of the Philippines.

**Court resolved the issue regarding the filing fees as well as the issue on citizenship (SEE NOTE above).
ISSUE(S): WoN the petition for quo warranto was filed on time. YES
Won petitioner Labo is a Filipino citizen qualified to be elected as Mayor of Baguio City - NO
HELD: Petition denied. Labo lost.
RATIO:
RE: Quo Warranto filing:
The petition for quo warranto was filed on time. We agree with the respondents that the fee was paid during the ten-day period as extended by the pendency of the petition
when it was treated by the COMELEC as a pre-proclamation proceeding which did not require the payment of a filing fee. What is important is that the filing fee was paid, and
whatever delay there may have been is not imputable to the private respondent's fault or neglect.
RE: Citizenship of petitioner:
The decision of the COMELEC quaintly dismisses all these acts of Labo as "mistakes" that did not divest the petitioner of his citizenship The Court rejected this ruling as totally
baseless. The petitioner is not an unlettered person who was not aware of the consequences of his acts, let alone the fact that he was assisted by counsel when he performed
these acts.
The petitioner claims that his naturalization in Australia made him at worst only a dual national and did not divest him of his Philippine citizenship WRONG, the provisions of
CA No. 63, which enumerates the modes by which Philippine citizenship may be lost. Among these are: (1) naturalization in a foreign country; (2) express renunciation of
citizenship; and (3) subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country, all of which are applicable to the petitioner. The annulment of
his marriage also did not automatically restore his Philippine citizenship. He voluntarily and freely rejected Philippine citizenship and willingly and knowingly embraced the
citizenship of a foreign country. The possibility that he may have been subsequently rejected by Australia, as he claims, does not mean that he has been automatically reinstated
as a citizen of the Philippines.
Under CA No. 63 as amended by PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation. Petitioner did not reacquire
Philippine citizenship by any of these methods. That is why the CID rejected his application for the cancellation of his alien certificate of registration. And that is also the reason
we must deny his present claim for recognition as a citizen of the Philippines.
The petitioner is not now, nor was he on the day of the local elections on January 18, 1988, a citizen of the Philippines. In fact, he was not even a qualified voter under the
Constitution itself because of his alienage. He was therefore ineligible as a candidate for mayor of Baguio City, under Section 42 of the Local Government Code.
The petitioner argues that his alleged lack of citizenship is a "futile technicality" that should not frustrate the will of the electorate of Baguio City, who elected him by a
"resonant and thunderous majority." WRONG, the people of that locality could not have, even unanimously, changed the requirements of the Local Government Code
and the Constitution. The electorate had no power to permit a foreigner owing his total allegiance to the Queen of Australia, or at least a stateless individual owing no
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, to preside over them as mayor of their city. Only citizens of the Philippines have that privilege over their countrymen.
The probability that many of those who voted for the petitioner may have done so in the belief that he was qualified only strengthens the conclusion that the results of
the election cannot nullify the qualifications for the office now held by him. These qualifications are continuing requirements; once any of them is lost during incumbency,
title to the office itself is deemed forfeited. In the case at bar, the citizenship and voting requirements were not subsequently lost but were not possessed at all in the first
place on the day of the election. The petitioner was disqualified from running as mayor and, although elected, is not now qualified to serve as such.
4. RAMON L. LABO, Jr., vs. AUTHOR: LAURETA
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and ROBERTO ORTEGA NOTES:
G.R. No. 105111 July 3, 1992 Involves two consolidated cases. Labos petition for review and Ortegas Mandamus
TOPIC: Qualifications of elective officials and asking to be declared winner.

PONENTE: BIDIN, J
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. Any candidate who has been declared by final
judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not
be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an
election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of
votes in such election, the Court or the Commission shall continue with the trial and
hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any
intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation
of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.

Local Government Code provides:

Sec. 39. Qualifications. (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the
Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in the
case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod,
sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for
at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read
and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.

CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective office. As mandated by law: "An elective local official must be a citizen of
the Philippines."

FACTS:
Ramon Labo, Jr. (again!) launched his candidacy for mayor of Baguio City in the May 11, 1992 elections and filed his certificate of candidacy on March 23, 1992.

Ortega filed on March 26, 1992, a disqualification proceeding against Labo before Comelec, seeking to cancel Labo's certificate of candidacy on the ground of false
representation -stated therein that he is a "natural-born" citizen of the Philippines.
Summons sent thru telegram dated April 1, 1992, requiring him to file his Answer within three (3) non-extendible days but the latter failed to respond.
On April 15, 1992, Ortega filed a motion to declare Labo in default for failure to file his Answer.
On April 24, 1992, the Comelec issued another order directing the Election Registrar of Baguio City to personally deliver the summons.
On May 4, 1992, the disqualification case was set for reception of evidence. At the said hearing, Ortega presented the decision of this Court in Labo v. Commission
on Elections (176 SCRA 1 [1989]) declaring Labo not a citizen of the Philippines.
Labo, on the other hand, though represented by counsel, did not present any evidence. It was only on May 5, 1992 that petitioner submitted his Answer claiming
Filipino citizenship.
On May 9, 1992, respondent Comelec issued the resolution cancelling Labos certificate of candidacy and directed that his name be deleted in the list of candidates.
On the same date, Labo filed a motion to stay implementation of said resolution until after he shall have raised the matter before this Court.
On May 10, 1992, respondent Comelec issued an Order
o that the decision promulgated on May 9, 1992 of disqualification, shall become final and executory only after five (5) days from promulgation pursuant to
Rule 18, Section 13, Paragraph (b) of the Comelec Rules of Procedure. And,
o Labo may still continue to be voted upon subject to the final outcome of this case in the event the issue is elevated to the Supreme Court either on appeal
or certiorari.
On May 13, 1992, respondent Comelec resolved, motu proprio to suspend the proclamation of Labo, hence this petition for review.
On the other hand, on May 15, 1992 petitioner Ortega filed before the Comelec an urgent motion for the implementation of its May 9, 1992 resolution cancelling
Labo's certificate of candidacy eventually ended up as Mandamus (and asking to be declared the winner)
ISSUE(S): W/N Labo is qualified to run for city mayor of Baguio City? Nope.

HELD: WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are DISMISSED for lack of merit. Petitioners both being ineligible for the Office of the City Mayor of Baguio City and in view of the
vacancy created in said office, the vice-mayor elect of said city in the May 11, 1992 elections is hereby declared Mayor of Baguio City after proclamation by the City Board of
Canvassers.
RATIO:
1. If only to refresh the mind of petitioner Labo, as well as that of his counsel, records disclose that summons were issued by respondent Comelec as early as March 27, 1992
followed by a telegram on April 1, 1992. But petitioner chose to ignore the same. Came April 15, 1992, petitioner Ortega filed a motion to declare petitioner Labo in default.
Over-extending him (Labo) the benefit of due process, respondent Comelec issued another order dated April 24, 1992, this time directing the Acting City Election Registrar of
Baguio to personally serve the summons. The alleged delay in the resolution of SPA No. 92-029 can only be attributed to petitioner Labo and no one else.
2. Old case decision reads: WHEREFORE, petitioner Ramon J. (sic) Labo, Jr. is hereby declared NOT a citizen of the Philippines and therefore DISQUALIFIED from continuing to
serve as Mayor of Baguio City. He is ordered to VACATE his office and surrender the same to the Vice-Mayor of Baguio City once this decision becomes final and executory.
Labo insists that he is a Filipino citizen and that he does not hold an Australian citizenship; that the doctrine of res judicata does not apply in citizenship; and that "existing
facts support his continuous maintenance and holding of Philippine citizenship" and "supervening events now preclude the application of the ruling in the first Labo case and
that he now hold and enjoys Philippine citizenship.
No evidence has been offered by respondent to show what these existing facts and supervening events are to preclude the application of the Labo decision.
3. Labo claims, however, that Sec. 72 of the Omnibus Election Code "operates as a legislatively mandated special repatriation proceeding" and that it allows his proclamation
as the winning candidate since the resolution disqualifying him was not yet final at the time the election was held.
The Court finds petitioner Labo's strained argument quixotic and untenable. A perusal of Sec. 6 of RA No. 6646 (above) would readily disclose that the Comelec can legally
suspend the proclamation of petitioner Labo, his reception of the winning number of votes notwithstanding, especially so where, as in this case. Labo failed to present any
evidence before the Comelec to support his claim of reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.

4. Labo claims that he has reacquired his Filipino citizenship by citing his application for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship filed before the OSG.
To date, however, the Special Committee on Naturalization had yet acted upon said application for repatriation as admitted by petitioner. In the absence of any official
action or approval by the proper authorities, a mere application for repratriation, does not, and cannot, amount to an automatic reacquisition of the applicant's Philippine
citizenship.
Petitioner Labo's status has not changed in the case at bar. To reiterate, he (Labo) was disqualified as a candidate for being an alien. His election does not automatically
restore his Philippine citizenship, the possession of which is an indispensable requirement for holding public office (Sec. 39, Local Government Code).
5. Court did not issue TRO.
At the time petitioner Labo filed his petition on May 15, 1992, the May 9, 1992 resolution of respondent Comelec cancelling his (Labo's) certificate of candidacy had already
become final and executory a day earlier, or on May 14, 1992, said resolution having been received by petitioner Labo on the same day it was promulgated, i.e., May 9, 1992
and in the interim no restraining order was issued by this Court.
Thus, Sec. 78 of the Omnibus Election Code provides: (e) The decision, order, or ruling of the Commission shall, after five (5) days from receipt of a copy thereof by the
parties, be final and executory unless stayed by the Supreme Court.
A similar provision is also found in Sec. 3, Rule 39 of the Comelec Rules of procedure
6. To begin with, one of the qualifications of an elective official is that he must be a citizen of the Philippines (LGC Sec. 39 see above) The issue here is citizenship and/or
Labo's alienage the very essence which strikes at the very core of petitioner Labo's qualification to assume the contested office, he being an alien and not a Filipino citizen.
The fact that he was elected by the majority of the electorate is of no moment.

The resolution cancelling Labo's certificate of candidacy on the ground that he is not a Filipino citizen having acquired finality on May 14, 1992 constrains Us to rule against
his proclamation as Mayor of Baguio City.

7. The disqualification of Labo does not necessarily entitle petitioner Ortega as the candidate with the next highest number of votes to proclamation as the Mayor of Baguio
City.

CASE TITLE: Coquilla v. COMELEC AUTHOR: Mendoza

[G.R. No. Date]: 15194; July 31, 2002
TOPIC: Qualifications of elective local official; 1-year Residency requirement NOTES: This is a petition for certiorari to set aside the resolution of COMELEC, ordering
PONENTE: Mendoza
the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of petitioner Teodulo M. Coquilla for

the position of mayor of Oras, Eastern Samar in the May 14, 2001 elections.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:

The term residence is to be understood not in its common acceptation as referring to dwelling or habitation, but rather to domicile or legal residence, that is the place where

a party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain (animus

manendi). Every person acquires a domicile of origin at birth. It is usually the place where the childs parents reside and continues until the same is abandoned by acquisition

of new domicile (domicile of choice ).

Section 39(a) of the Local Government Code (R.A No. 7160):

Qualifications: (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a member

of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year

immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.
FACTS:

1.Petitioner-Teodoro Coquilla (Coquilla) was born on February 17, 1938 of Filipino parents in Oras, Eastern Samar. He grew up and resided there until 1965.

2. When he joined the United States Navy. He was subsequently naturalized as a U.S. citizen. From 1970 to 1973, Coquilla thrice visited the Philippines while on leave from the
U.S. Navy. Even after his retirement from the U.S. Navy in 1985, he remained in the United States.

3.On October 15, 1998, Coquilla came to the Philippines and took out a residence certificate, although he continued making several trips to the United States until August 5,

2000.Subsequently, he applied for repatriation which was approved then on November 10, 2000, he took his oath as a citizen.

4. On November 21, 2000, Coquilla applied for registration as a voter of Butnga, Oras, Eastern Samar. The Election Registration Board approved his application. He filed his

certificate of candidacy for Mayor stating therein that he had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for 2 years.

5.Respondent-Neil Alvarez (Alvarez), who was the incumbent mayor and was running for reelection, sought the cancellation of Coquillas certificate of candidacy on the ground

that the latter had made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by stating that he had been a resident of Oras for 2 years when in truth he had resided

therein for only about six months since November 10, 2000, when he took his oath as a citizen of the Philippines.

6. Coquilla won and was later proclaimed by the Municipal Electoral Board as Mayor of Oras. He subsequently took his oath of office. However, the COMELEC granted Alvarezs

petition and cancelled Coquillas certificate of candidacy stating that he was short of the 1-year residence requirement before the 2001 elections.

7. Coquillas MR was denied. Hence, this petition for Certiorari in the SC.
ISSUE(S): Whether Coquilla had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar at least 1 year before the elections held on May 14, 2001 as he represented in his certificate of
candidacy.

HELD: Petition denied. Coquilla failed to meet the 1-year residence requirement.

RATIO:

1.Coquilla lost his domicile of origin in Oras by becoming a U.S. citizen after enlisting in the U.S. Navy in 1965. From then on and until November 10, 2000, when he

reacquired Philippine citizenship, Coquilla was an alien without any right to reside in the Philippines saves as our immigration laws may have allowed him to stay as a

visitor or as a resident alien.

In Caasi v. Court of Appeals, naturalization in a foreign country result in an abandonment of domicile in the Philippines.

The term residence is to be understood not in its common acceptation as referring to dwelling or habitation, but rather to domicile or legal residence, that is the place where

a party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain (animus

manendi). Every person acquires a domicile of origin at birth. It is usually the place where the childs parents reside and continues until the same is abandoned by acquisition

of new domicile (domicile of choice ).

2. Coquilla cannot contend that he was compelled to adopt American citizenship only by reason of his service in the U.S. Armed Forces. Coquilla was repatriated not under

R.A. No. 2630, which applies to the repatriation of those who lost their Philippine citizenship by accepting commission in the Armed Forces of the United States, but under

R.A. No. 8171, which, as earlier mentioned, provides for the repatriation of, among others, natural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship on account of political or

economic necessity. In any event, the fact is that, by having been naturalized abroad, he lost his Philippine citizenship and with it his residence in the Philippines. Until his

reacquisition of Philippine citizenship on November 10, 2000, petitioner did not reacquire his legal residence in this country.

3. The only evidence of Coquillas status when he entered the country on October 15, 1998, December 20, 1998, October 16, 1999, and June 23, 2000 is the statement

Philippine Immigration[-] Balikbayan in his 1998-2008 U.S. passport. As for his entry on August 5, 2000, the stamp bore the added inscription good for 1-year stay.

The term balikbayan includes a former Filipino citizen who had been naturalized in a foreign country and comes or returns to the Philippines and, if so, he is entitled, among

others, to a visa-free entry to the Philippines for a period of 1-year. It would appear then that when petitioner entered the country on the dates in question, he did so as a

visa-free balikbayan visitor whose stay as such was valid for one year only. Hence, petitioner can only be held to have waived his status as an alien and as a non-resident

only on November 10, 2000 upon taking his oath as a citizen of the Philippines under R.A. No. 8171. He lacked the requisite residency to qualify him as a mayoralty candidate

of Oras, Eastern Samar.

ERNESTO S. MERCADO, petitioner, vs. EDUARDO BARRIOS MANZANO and the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents. [G.R. No. 135083. May 26, 1999]
SYNOPSIS
Petitioner Mercado and private respondent Manzano were candidates for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. The proclamation of private
respondent was suspended in view of a pending petition for disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that private respondent was not a citizen of the
Philippines but of the United States. The Second Division of the COMELEC granted the petition of Mamaril and ordered the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of private
respondent on the ground that he is a dual citizen and under Sec. 40 of the Local Government Code, persons with dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective
position. Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration. The motion remained pending until after the election. The board of canvassers tabulated the votes but suspended
the proclamation of the winner. Petitioner sought to intervene in the case for disqualification. COMELEC en banc reversed the decision and declared private respondent qualified
to run for the position. Pursuant to the ruling of the COMELEC en banc, the board of canvassers proclaimed private respondent as vice mayor. This petition sought the reversal
of the resolution of the COMELEC en banc and to declare the private respondent disqualified to hold the office of the vice mayor of Makati.
On the issue of whether the petitioner has personality to bring this suit considering that he was not the original party in the disqualification case, the Supreme Court ruled
that under Sec. 6 of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, intervention may be allowed in proceedings for disqualification even after election if
there has yet been no final judgment rendered. As regards the issue of citizenship, the Court ruled that by filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for
his present post, private respondent elected Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his American citizenship.
SYLLABUS
1. POLITICAL LAW; ELECTORAL REFORMS LAW OF 1987 (R.A. No. 6646); INTERVENTION, ALLOWED IN PROCEEDINGS FOR DISQUALIFICATION EVEN AFTER ELECTION IF THERE
HAS BEEN NO FINAL JUDGMENT RENDERED; CASE AT BAR. Private respondent argues that petitioner has neither legal interest in the matter in litigation nor an interest to
protect because he is a defeated candidate for the vice-mayoralty post of Makati City [who] cannot be proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City even if the private
respondent be ultimately disqualified by final and executory judgment. The flaw in this argument is it assumes that, at the time petitioner sought to intervene in the
proceedings before the COMELEC, there had already been a proclamation of the results of the election for the vice mayoralty contest for Makati City, on the basis of which
petitioner came out only second to private respondent. The fact, however, is that there had been no proclamation at that time. Certainly, petitioner had, and still has, an
interest in ousting private respondent from the race at the time he sought to intervene. The rule in Labo vs. COMELEC, reiterated in several cases, only applies to cases in
which the election of the respondent is contested, and the question is whether one who placed second to the disqualified candidate may be declared the winner. In the
present case, at the time petitioner filed a Motion for leave to File Intervention on May 20, 1998, there had been no proclamation of the winner, and petitioners purpose
was precisely to have private respondent disqualified from running for [an] elective local position under Section 40(d) of R.A. No. 7160. If Ernesto Mamaril (who originally
instituted the disqualification proceedings), a registered voter of Makati City, was competent to bring the action, so was petitioner since the latter was a rival candidate for
vice mayor of Makati City. Nor is petitioners interest in the matter in litigation any less because he filed a motion for intervention only on May 20, 1998, after private
respondent had been shown to have garnered the highest number of votes among the candidates for vice mayor. That petitioner had a right to intervene at that stage of
the proceedings for the disqualification against private respondent is clear from Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, which
provides: Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason
a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court
or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency
thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of guilt is strong. Under this provision, intervention may be allowed in
proceedings for disqualification even after election if there has yet been no final judgment rendered.
2. ID.; CITIZENSHIP; DUAL CITIZENSHIP; DISTINGUISHED FROM DUAL ALLEGIANCE. Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the
concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. For instance, such a situation may
arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a
person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states. Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our
Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of citizens of the Philippines to posses dual citizenship: (1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign
countries which follow the principle of jus soli; (2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their fathers country such children are
citizens of that country; (3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latters country the former are considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed
to have renounced Philippine citizenship. There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines may, without performing any act, be also a citizen of another
state; but the above cases are possible given the constitutional provisions on citizenship. Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person
simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individuals volition. With
respect to dual allegiance, Article IV, Section 5 of the Constitution provides: Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RATIONALE. In including Section 5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the Constitutional Commission was not with dual citizens per se but with naturalized
citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase dual citizenship in R.A. No. 7160, Section 40(d) and in
R.A. No. 7854, Section 20 must be understood as referring to dual allegiance. Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike
those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should
suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their
condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states. As Joaquin G. Bernas, one of the most perceptive members of the Constitutional
Commission, pointed out: [D]ual citizenship is just a reality imposed on us because we have no control of the laws on citizenship of other countries. We recognize a child
of a Filipino mother. But whether or not she is considered a citizen of another country is something completely beyond our control. By electing Philippine citizenship, such
candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the other country of which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens. It may be that,
from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has not effectively renounced his foreign citizenship.
4. ID.; ID.; FILING OF THE CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY SUFFICED TO RENOUNCE AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP; CASE AT BAR. By filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his
present post, private respondent elected Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his American citizenship. The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to
renounce his American citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. Thus, in Frivaldo vs. COMELEC it was held: It is not disputed
that on January 20, 1983 Frivaldo became an American. Would the retroactivity of his repatriation not effectively give him dual citizenship, which under Sec. 40 of the Local
Government Code would disqualify him from running for any elective local position? We answer this question in the negative, as there is cogent reason to hold that Frivaldo
was really STATELESS at the time he took said oath of allegiance and even before that, when he ran for governor in 1988. In his Comment, Frivaldo wrote that he had long
renounced and had long abandoned his American citizenship-long before May 8, 1995. At best, Frivaldo was stateless in the interim-when he abandoned and renounced
his US citizenship but before he was repatriated to his Filipino citizenship. On this point, we quote from the assailed Resolution dated December 19, 1995: By the laws of
the United States, petitioner Frivaldo lost his American citizenship when he took his oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government when he ran for Governor in 1988, in
1992, and in 1995. Every certificate of candidacy contains an oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government. These factual findings that Frivaldo has lost his foreign
nationality long before the elections of 1995 have not been effectively rebutted by Lee. Furthermore, it is basic that such findings of the Commission are conclusive upon
this Court, absent any showing of capriciousness or arbitrariness or abuse. Until the filing of his certificate of candidacy on March 21, 1998, private respondent had dual
citizenship. The acts attributed to him can be considered simply as the assertion of his American nationality before the termination of his American citizenship. What this
Court said in Aznar vs. COMELEC applies mutatis mutandis to private respondent in the case at bar: Considering the fact that admittedly Osmea was both a Filipino and an
American, the mere fact that he has a Certificate stating he is an American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino [T]he Certification that he is an American does not
mean that he is not still a Filipino, possessed as he is, of both nationalities or citizenships. Indeed, there is no express renunciation here of Philippine citizenship; truth to
tell, there is no implied renunciation of said citizenship. When We consider that the renunciation needed to lose Philippine citizenship must be express, it stands to reason
that there can be no such loss of Philippine citizenship when there is no renunciation, either express or implied. To recapitulate, by declaring in his certificate of candidacy
that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and
bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively
 repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen. On the other hand, private respondents oath of allegiance to the
Philippine, when considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past
elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.
MENDOZA, J.:
Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent Eduardo B. Manzano were candidates for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. The other
one was Gabriel V. Daza III. The results of the election were as follows:
Eduardo B. Manzano 103,853
Ernesto S. Mercado 100,894
Gabriel V. Daza III 54,275[1]
The proclamation of private respondent was suspended in view of a pending petition for disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that private
respondent was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States.
In its resolution, dated May 7, 1998,[2] the Second Division of the COMELEC granted the petition of Mamaril and ordered the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of
private respondent on the ground that he is a dual citizen and, under 40(d) of the Local Government Code, persons with dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any
elective position. The COMELECs Second Division said:
What is presented before the Commission is a petition for disqualification of Eduardo Barrios Manzano as candidate for the office of Vice-Mayor of Makati City in the May 11,
1998 elections. The petition is based on the ground that the respondent is an American citizen based on the record of the Bureau of Immigration and misrepresented himself as
a natural-born Filipino citizen.
In his answer to the petition filed on April 27, 1998, the respondent admitted that he is registered as a foreigner with the Bureau of Immigration under Alien Certificate of
Registration No. B-31632 and alleged that he is a Filipino citizen because he was born in 1955 of a Filipino father and a Filipino mother. He was born in the United States, San
Francisco, California, on September 14, 1955, and is considered an American citizen under US Laws. But notwithstanding his registration as an American citizen, he did not lose
his Filipino citizenship.
Judging from the foregoing facts, it would appear that respondent Manzano is both a Filipino and a US citizen. In other words, he holds dual citizenship.
The question presented is whether under our laws, he is disqualified from the position for which he filed his certificate of candidacy. Is he eligible for the office he seeks to be
elected?
Under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code, those holding dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective local position.
WHEREFORE, the Commission hereby declares the respondent Eduardo Barrios Manzano DISQUALIFIED as candidate for Vice-Mayor of Makati City.
On May 8, 1998, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration.[3] The motion remained pending even until after the election held on May 11, 1998.
Accordingly, pursuant to Omnibus Resolution No. 3044, dated May 10, 1998, of the COMELEC, the board of canvassers tabulated the votes cast for vice mayor of Makati
City but suspended the proclamation of the winner.
On May 19, 1998, petitioner sought to intervene in the case for disqualification.[4] Petitioners motion was opposed by private respondent.
The motion was not resolved. Instead, on August 31, 1998, the COMELEC en banc rendered its resolution. Voting 4 to 1, with one commissioner abstaining, the COMELEC
en banc reversed the ruling of its Second Division and declared private respondent qualified to run for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. [5] The
pertinent portions of the resolution of the COMELEC en banc read:
As aforesaid, respondent Eduardo Barrios Manzano was born in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. He acquired US citizenship by operation of the United States Constitution and
laws under the principle of jus soli.
He was also a natural born Filipino citizen by operation of the 1935 Philippine Constitution, as his father and mother were Filipinos at the time of his birth. At the age of six (6),
his parents brought him to the Philippines using an American passport as travel document. His parents also registered him as an alien with the Philippine Bureau of
Immigration. He was issued an alien certificate of registration.This, however, did not result in the loss of his Philippine citizenship, as he did not renounce Philippine citizenship
and did not take an oath of allegiance to the United States.
It is an undisputed fact that when respondent attained the age of majority, he registered himself as a voter, and voted in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998, which effectively
renounced his US citizenship under American law. Under Philippine law, he no longer had U.S. citizenship.
At the time of the May 11, 1998 elections, the resolution of the Second Division, adopted on May 7, 1998, was not yet final. Respondent Manzano obtained the highest number
of votes among the candidates for vice-mayor of Makati City, garnering one hundred three thousand eight hundred fifty three (103,853) votes over his closest rival, Ernesto S.
Mercado, who obtained one hundred thousand eight hundred ninety four (100,894) votes, or a margin of two thousand nine hundred fifty nine (2,959) votes. Gabriel Daza III
obtained third place with fifty four thousand two hundred seventy five (54,275) votes. In applying election laws, it would be far better to err in favor of the popular choice than
be embroiled in complex legal issues involving private international law which may well be settled before the highest court (Cf. Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections, 257 SCRA
727).
WHEREFORE, the Commission en banc hereby REVERSES the resolution of the Second Division, adopted on May 7, 1998, ordering the cancellation of the respondents certificate
of candidacy.
We declare respondent Eduardo Luis Barrios Manzano to be QUALIFIED as a candidate for the position of vice-mayor of Makati City in the May 11, 1998, elections.
ACCORDINGLY, the Commission directs the Makati City Board of Canvassers, upon proper notice to the parties, to reconvene and proclaim the respondent Eduardo Luis Barrios
Manzano as the winning candidate for vice-mayor of Makati City.
Pursuant to the resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the board of canvassers, on the evening of August 31, 1998, proclaimed private respondent as vice mayor of the City
of Makati.
This is a petition for certiorari seeking to set aside the aforesaid resolution of the COMELEC en banc and to declare private respondent disqualified to hold the office of vice
mayor of Makati City.Petitioner contends that
[T]he COMELEC en banc ERRED in holding that:
A. Under Philippine law, Manzano was no longer a U.S. citizen when he:
1. He renounced his U.S. citizenship when he attained the age of majority when he was already 37 years old; and,
2. He renounced his U.S. citizenship when he (merely) registered himself as a voter and voted in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998.
B. Manzano is qualified to run for and or hold the elective office of Vice-Mayor of the City of Makati;
C. At the time of the May 11, 1998 elections, the resolution of the Second Division adopted on 7 May 1998 was not yet final so that, effectively, petitioner may not be declared
the winner even assuming that Manzano is disqualified to run for and hold the elective office of Vice-Mayor of the City of Makati.
We first consider the threshold procedural issue raised by private respondent Manzano whether petitioner Mercado has personality to bring this suit considering that he
was not an original party in the case for disqualification filed by Ernesto Mamaril nor was petitioners motion for leave to intervene granted.
I. PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO BRING THIS SUIT
 Private respondent cites the following provisions of Rule 8 of the Rules of Procedure of the COMELEC in support of his claim that petitioner has no right to intervene and,
therefore, cannot bring this suit to set aside the ruling denying his motion for intervention:
Section 1. When proper and when may be permitted to intervene. Any person allowed to initiate an action or proceeding may, before or during the trial of an action or
proceeding, be permitted by the Commission, in its discretion to intervene in such action or proceeding, if he has legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of
either of the parties, or an interest against both, or when he is so situated as to be adversely affected by such action or proceeding.
....
Section 3. Discretion of Commission. In allowing or disallowing a motion for intervention, the Commission or the Division, in the exercise of its discretion, shall consider whether
or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties and whether or not the intervenors rights may be fully protected in a
separate action or proceeding.
Private respondent argues that petitioner has neither legal interest in the matter in litigation nor an interest to protect because he is a defeated candidate for the vice-mayoralty
post of Makati City [who] cannot be proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City even if the private respondent be ultimately disqualified by final and executory judgment.
The flaw in this argument is it assumes that, at the time petitioner sought to intervene in the proceedings before the COMELEC, there had already been a proclamation of
the results of the election for the vice mayoralty contest for Makati City, on the basis of which petitioner came out only second to private respondent. The fact, however, is that
there had been no proclamation at that time. Certainly, petitioner had, and still has, an interest in ousting private respondent from the race at the time he sought to intervene. The
rule in Labo v. COMELEC,[6] reiterated in several cases,[7] only applies to cases in which the election of the respondent is contested, and the question is whether one who placed
second to the disqualified candidate may be declared the winner. In the present case, at the time petitioner filed a Motion for Leave to File Intervention on May 20, 1998, there
had been no proclamation of the winner, and petitioners purpose was precisely to have private respondent disqualified from running for [an] elective local position under 40(d)
of R.A. No. 7160. If Ernesto Mamaril (who originally instituted the disqualification proceedings), a registered voter of Makati City, was competent to bring the action, so was
petitioner since the latter was a rival candidate for vice mayor of Makati City.
Nor is petitioners interest in the matter in litigation any less because he filed a motion for intervention only on May 20, 1998, after private respondent had been shown to
have garnered the highest number of votes among the candidates for vice mayor. That petitioner had a right to intervene at that stage of the proceedings for the disqualification
against private respondent is clear from 6 of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, which provides:
Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is
not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall
continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the
suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of guilt is strong.
Under this provision, intervention may be allowed in proceedings for disqualification even after election if there has yet been no final judgment rendered.
The failure of the COMELEC en banc to resolve petitioners motion for intervention was tantamount to a denial of the motion, justifying petitioner in filing the instant
petition for certiorari. As the COMELEC en banc instead decided the merits of the case, the present petition properly deals not only with the denial of petitioners motion for
intervention but also with the substantive issues respecting private respondents alleged disqualification on the ground of dual citizenship.
This brings us to the next question, namely, whether private respondent Manzano possesses dual citizenship and, if so, whether he is disqualified from being a candidate
for vice mayor of Makati City.
II. DUAL CITIZENSHIP AS A GROUND FOR DISQUALIFICATION

The disqualification of private respondent Manzano is being sought under 40 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), which declares as disqualified from
running for any elective local position: . . . (d) Those with dual citizenship. This provision is incorporated in the Charter of the City of Makati.[8]
Invoking the maxim dura lex sed lex, petitioner, as well as the Solicitor General, who sides with him in this case, contends that through 40(d) of the Local Government Code,
Congress has command[ed] in explicit terms the ineligibility of persons possessing dual allegiance to hold local elective office.
To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states,
a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states.[9] For instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres
to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered
a citizen of both states. Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of citizens of the Philippines to possess dual citizenship:
(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle of jus soli;
(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their fathers country such children are citizens of that country;
(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latters country the former are considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced
Philippine citizenship.
There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines may, without performing any act, be also a citizen of another state; but the above cases are clearly
possible given the constitutional provisions on citizenship.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship
is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individuals volition.
With respect to dual allegiance, Article IV, 5 of the Constitution provides: Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law. This
provision was included in the 1987 Constitution at the instance of Commissioner Blas F. Ople who explained its necessity as follows:[10]
. . . I want to draw attention to the fact that dual allegiance is not dual citizenship. I have circulated a memorandum to the Bernas Committee according to which a dual
allegiance and I reiterate a dual allegiance is larger and more threatening than that of mere double citizenship which is seldom intentional and, perhaps, never insidious. That
is often a function of the accident of mixed marriages or of birth on foreign soil. And so, I do not question double citizenship at all.
What we would like the Committee to consider is to take constitutional cognizance of the problem of dual allegiance. For example, we all know what happens in the triennial
elections of the Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chambers of Commerce which consists of about 600 chapters all over the country. There is a Peking ticket, as well as a Taipei
ticket. Not widely known is the fact that the Filipino-Chinese community is represented in the Legislative Yuan of the Republic of China in Taiwan. And until recently, the sponsor
might recall, in Mainland China in the Peoples Republic of China, they have the Associated Legislative Council for overseas Chinese wherein all of Southeast Asia including some
European and Latin countries were represented, which was dissolved after several years because of diplomatic friction. At that time, the Filipino-Chinese were also represented
in that Overseas Council.
When I speak of double allegiance, therefore, I speak of this unsettled kind of allegiance of Filipinos, of citizens who are already Filipinos but who, by their acts, may be said to be
bound by a second allegiance, either to Peking or Taiwan. I also took close note of the concern expressed by some Commissioners yesterday, including Commissioner Villacorta,
who were concerned about the lack of guarantees of thorough assimilation, and especially Commissioner Concepcion who has always been worried about minority claims on our
natural resources.
Dual allegiance can actually siphon scarce national capital to Taiwan, Singapore, China or Malaysia, and this is already happening. Some of the great commercial places in
downtown Taipei are Filipino-owned, owned by Filipino-Chinese it is of common knowledge in Manila. It can mean a tragic capital outflow when we have to endure a capital
famine which also means economic stagnation, worsening unemployment and social unrest.
And so, this is exactly what we ask that the Committee kindly consider incorporating a new section, probably Section 5, in the article on Citizenship which will read as
follows: DUAL ALLEGIANCE IS INIMICAL TO CITIZENSHIP AND SHALL BE DEALT WITH ACCORDING TO LAW.
In another session of the Commission, Ople spoke on the problem of these citizens with dual allegiance, thus:[11]
. . . A significant number of Commissioners expressed their concern about dual citizenship in the sense that it implies a double allegiance under a double sovereignty which some
of us who spoke then in a freewheeling debate thought would be repugnant to the sovereignty which pervades the Constitution and to citizenship itself which implies a
uniqueness and which elsewhere in the Constitution is defined in terms of rights and obligations exclusive to that citizenship including, of course, the obligation to rise to the
defense of the State when it is threatened, and back of this, Commissioner Bernas, is, of course, the concern for national security. In the course of those debates, I think some
noted the fact that as a result of the wave of naturalizations since the decision to establish diplomatic relations with the Peoples Republic of China was made in 1975, a good
number of these naturalized Filipinos still routinely go to Taipei every October 10; and it is asserted that some of them do renew their oath of allegiance to a foreign government
maybe just to enter into the spirit of the occasion when the anniversary of the Sun Yat-Sen Republic is commemorated. And so, I have detected a genuine and deep concern
about double citizenship, with its attendant risk of double allegiance which is repugnant to our sovereignty and national security. I appreciate what the Committee said that this
could be left to the determination of a future legislature. But considering the scale of the problem, the real impact on the security of this country, arising from, let us say,
potentially great numbers of double citizens professing double allegiance, will the Committee entertain a proposed amendment at the proper time that will prohibit, in effect, or
regulate double citizenship?
Clearly, in including 5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the Constitutional Commission was not with dual citizens per se but with naturalized citizens who maintain
their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase dual citizenship in R.A. No. 7160, 40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, 20 must be understood
as referring to dual allegiance. Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be
subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy,
they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of
different states. As Joaquin G. Bernas, one of the most perceptive members of the Constitutional Commission, pointed out: [D]ual citizenship is just a reality imposed on us because
we have no control of the laws on citizenship of other countries. We recognize a child of a Filipino mother. But whether or not she is considered a citizen of another country is
something completely beyond our control.[12]
By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the other country of which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their
status as dual citizens. It may be that, from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has not effectively renounced his foreign citizenship. That is of
no moment as the following discussion on 40(d) between Senators Enrile and Pimentel clearly shows:[13]
SENATOR ENRILE. Mr. President, I would like to ask clarification of line 41, page 17: Any person with dual citizenship is disqualified to run for any elective local position. Under
the present Constitution, Mr. President, someone whose mother is a citizen of the Philippines but his father is a foreigner is a natural-born citizen of the Republic. There
is no requirement that such a natural born citizen, upon reaching the age of majority, must elect or give up Philippine citizenship.
On the assumption that this person would carry two passports, one belonging to the country of his or her father and one belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, may
such a situation disqualify the person to run for a local government position?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. To my mind, Mr. President, it only means that at the moment when he would want to run for public office, he has to repudiate one of his citizenships.
SENATOR ENRILE. Suppose he carries only a Philippine passport but the country of origin or the country of the father claims that person, nevertheless, as a citizen? No one
can renounce. There are such countries in the world.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Well, the very fact that he is running for public office would, in effect, be an election for him of his desire to be considered as a Filipino citizen.
SENATOR ENRILE. But, precisely, Mr. President, the Constitution does not require an election. Under the Constitution, a person whose mother is a citizen of the Philippines
is, at birth, a citizen without any overt act to claim the citizenship.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Yes. What we are saying, Mr. President, is: Under the Gentlemans example, if he does not renounce his other citizenship, then he is opening himself to
question. So, if he is really interested to run, the first thing he should do is to say in the Certificate of Candidacy that: I am a Filipino citizen, and I have only one
citizenship.
SENATOR ENRILE. But we are talking from the viewpoint of Philippine law, Mr. President. He will always have one citizenship, and that is the citizenship invested upon him or
her in the Constitution of the Republic.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. That is true, Mr. President. But if he exercises acts that will prove that he also acknowledges other citizenships, then he will probably fall under this
disqualification.
This is similar to the requirement that an applicant for naturalization must renounce all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty [14] of
which at the time he is a subject or citizen before he can be issued a certificate of naturalization as a citizen of the Philippines. In Parado v. Republic,[15] it was held:
[W]hen a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an oath that he renounces his loyalty to any other country or government and solemnly declares that he owes
his allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, the condition imposed by law is satisfied and complied with. The determination whether such renunciation is valid or fully
complies with the provisions of our Naturalization Law lies within the province and is an exclusive prerogative of our courts. The latter should apply the law duly enacted by the
legislative department of the Republic. No foreign law may or should interfere with its operation and application. If the requirement of the Chinese Law of Nationality were to be
read into our Naturalization Law, we would be applying not what our legislative department has deemed it wise to require, but what a foreign government has thought or
intended to exact. That, of course, is absurd. It must be resisted by all means and at all cost. It would be a brazen encroachment upon the sovereign will and power of the people
of this Republic.
III. PETITIONER'S ELECTION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP

The record shows that private respondent was born in San Francisco, California on September 4, 1955, of Filipino parents. Since the Philippines adheres to the principle
of jus sanguinis, while the United States follows the doctrine of jus soli, the parties agree that, at birth at least, he was a national both of the Philippines and of the United
States. However, the COMELEC en banc held that, by participating in Philippine elections in 1992, 1995, and 1998, private respondent effectively renounced his U.S. citizenship
under American law, so that now he is solely a Philippine national.
Petitioner challenges this ruling. He argues that merely taking part in Philippine elections is not sufficient evidence of renunciation and that, in any event, as the alleged
renunciation was made when private respondent was already 37 years old, it was ineffective as it should have been made when he reached the age of majority.
In holding that by voting in Philippine elections private respondent renounced his American citizenship, the COMELEC must have in mind 349 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act of the United States, which provided that A person who is a national of the United States, whether by birth or naturalization, shall lose his nationality by: . . . (e)
Voting in a political election in a foreign state or participating in an election or plebiscite to determine the sovereignty over foreign territory. To be sure this provision was declared
unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court in Afroyim v. Rusk[16] as beyond the power given to the U.S. Congress to regulate foreign relations. However, by filing a certificate of
candidacy when he ran for his present post, private respondent elected Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his American citizenship. Private respondents certificate of
candidacy, filed on March 27, 1998, contained the following statements made under oath:
6. I AM A FILIPINO CITIZEN (STATE IF NATURAL-BORN OR NATURALIZED) NATURAL-BORN
....
10. I AM A REGISTERED VOTER OF PRECINCT NO. 747-A, BARANGAY SAN LORENZO, CITY/MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, PROVINCE OF NCR .
11. I AM NOT A PERMANENT RESIDENT OF, OR IMMIGRANT TO, A FOREIGN COUNTRY.
12. I AM ELIGIBLE FOR THE OFFICE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED. I WILL SUPPORT AND DEFEND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES AND WILL MAINTAIN TRUE FAITH
AND ALLEGIANCE THERETO; THAT I WILL OBEY THE LAWS, LEGAL ORDERS AND DECREES PROMULGATED BY THE DULY CONSTITUTED AUTHORITIES OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND THAT I IMPOSE THIS OBLIGATION UPON MYSELF VOLUNTARILY, WITHOUT MENTAL RESERVATION OR PURPOSE OF
EVASION. I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE FACTS STATED HEREIN ARE TRUE AND CORRECT OF MY OWN PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE.
 The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his American citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. Thus,
in Frivaldo v. COMELEC it was held:[17]
It is not disputed that on January 20, 1983 Frivaldo became an American. Would the retroactivity of his repatriation not effectively give him dual citizenship, which under Sec. 40
of the Local Government Code would disqualify him from running for any elective local position? We answer this question in the negative, as there is cogent reason to hold that
Frivaldo was really STATELESS at the time he took said oath of allegiance and even before that, when he ran for governor in 1988. In his Comment, Frivaldo wrote that he had
long renounced and had long abandoned his American citizenship long before May 8, 1995. At best, Frivaldo was stateless in the interim when he abandoned and renounced
his US citizenship but before he was repatriated to his Filipino citizenship.
On this point, we quote from the assailed Resolution dated December 19, 1995:
By the laws of the United States, petitioner Frivaldo lost his American citizenship when he took his oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government when he ran for Governor in
1988, in 1992, and in 1995. Every certificate of candidacy contains an oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government.
These factual findings that Frivaldo has lost his foreign nationality long before the elections of 1995 have not been effectively rebutted by Lee. Furthermore, it is basic that such
findings of the Commission are conclusive upon this Court, absent any showing of capriciousness or arbitrariness or abuse.
There is, therefore, no merit in petitioners contention that the oath of allegiance contained in private respondents certificate of candidacy is insufficient to constitute
renunciation of his American citizenship. Equally without merit is petitioners contention that, to be effective, such renunciation should have been made upon private respondent
reaching the age of majority since no law requires the election of Philippine citizenship to be made upon majority age.
Finally, much is made of the fact that private respondent admitted that he is registered as an American citizen in the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation and that he
holds an American passport which he used in his last travel to the United States on April 22, 1997. There is no merit in this. Until the filing of his certificate of candidacy on March
21, 1998, he had dual citizenship. The acts attributed to him can be considered simply as the assertion of his American nationality before the termination of his American
citizenship. What this Court said in Aznar v. COMELEC[18] applies mutatis mutandis to private respondent in the case at bar:
. . . Considering the fact that admittedly Osmea was both a Filipino and an American, the mere fact that he has a Certificate stating he is an American does not mean that he is
not still a Filipino. . . . [T]he Certification that he is an American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino, possessed as he is, of both nationalities or citizenships. Indeed, there
is no express renunciation here of Philippine citizenship; truth to tell, there is even no implied renunciation of said citizenship. When We consider that the renunciation needed
to lose Philippine citizenship must be express, it stands to reason that there can be no such loss of Philippine citizenship when there is no renunciation, either express or implied.
To recapitulate, by declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will
defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far
as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen.
On the other hand, private respondents oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his
education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under oath. Should he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the
loss of his Philippine citizenship through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago,[19] we sustained the denial of entry into the country of petitioner on
the ground that, after taking his oath as a naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared in commercial documents executed abroad that
he was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be taken against any one who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality, but subsequently does
some act constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.

06 CAASI V COURT OF APPEALS AUTHOR: PAGCALIWAGAN

G.R. No. 88831 November 8, 1990 NOTES:
TOPIC: Elective Local Officials; Disqualifications Section 18, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides:
PONENTE: Grino-Aquino Sec. 18. Public officers and employees owe the State and this Constitution allegiance
at all times, and any public officer or employee who seeks to change his citizenship
or acquire the status of an immigrant of another country during his tenure shall be
dealt with by law.
Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines (B.P. Blg. 881) provides:
SEC. 68. Disqualifications ... Any person who is a permanent resident of or an
immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office
under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or
immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement
provided for in the election laws.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:

FACTS:
2 cases consolidated with same objective; disqualification under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code of Private Respondent Merito Miguel (Miguel) for the position of
Municipal Mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan, to which he was elected in the local elections of January 18, 1988 on the ground that he is a green card holder, hence, a permanent
resident of USA, not Bolinao.

G.R. No. 84508 Certiorari of decision of the COMELEC 1st Division dismissing 3 petitions of Casante, Catabay, and Celeste for the disqualification of Miguel filed prior to the
local elections on January 18, 1988.

G.R. No. 88831 Petition for review of decision of CA dismissing petition for quo warranto filed by Caasi, a rival candidate, also to disqualify Miguel on account of his being a
green card holder.

Miguel, answered to both petitions that:

He holds a green card issued to him by the US Immigration Service, but he denied that he is a permanent resident of US
He obtained the green card for convenience in order that he may freely enter the US for his periodic medical examination and to visit his children here
He is permanent resident of Bolinao, Pangasinan, that he voted in all previous elections, including the plebiscite on February 2, 1987 for the ratification of
the 1987 Constitution and the Congressional elections on May 18, 1987.
ISSUE(S):
1. WON a green card is proof that the holder is a permanent resident of the US.
2. WON Miguel had waived his status as a permanent resident of or immigrant to the USA prior to the local elections on January 18, 1988.

HELD: YES. YES.

RATIO:
In the case of Miguel, the Court deems it significant that in the "Application for Immigrant Visa and Alien Registration" which Miguel filled up in his own handwriting and
submitted to the US Embassy in Manila before his departure for the United States in 1984, Miguel's answer to Question No. 21 therein regarding his "Length of intended stay
(if permanently, so state)," Miguel's answer was,"Permanently."
On its face, the green card that was subsequently issued by the United States Department of Justice and Immigration and Registration Service to Miguel identifies him in
clear bold letters as a RESIDENT ALIEN. On the back of the card, the upper portion, the following information is printed: Alien Registration Receipt Card. Person identified by
this card is entitled to reside permanently and work in the United States."
Miguel's immigration to the United States in 1984 constituted an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines. For he did not go to the United States merely
to visit his children or his doctor there; he entered the limited States with the intention to have there permanently as evidenced by his application for an immigrant's (not a
visitor's or tourist's) visa. Based on that application of his, he was issued by the U.S. Government the requisite green card or authority to reside there permanently. As a
resident alien in the U.S., Miguel owes temporary and local allegiance to the U.S., the country in which he resides (3 CJS 527). This is in return for the protection given to him
during the period of his residence therein.
Section 18, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that "any public officer or employee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant
of another country during his tenure shall be dealt with by law" is not applicable to Miguel for he acquired the status of an immigrant of the United States before he was
elected to public office, not "during his tenure" as mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan. The law applicable to him is Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code (Refer to NOTES).
Did Miguel, by returning to the Philippines in November 1987 and presenting himself as a candidate for mayor of Bolinao in the January 18,1988 local elections, waive his
status as a permanent resident or immigrant of the United States? To be "qualified to run for elective office" in the Philippines, the law requires that the candidate who is a
green card holder must have "waived his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country." Therefore, his act of filing a certificate of candidacy for elective
office in the Philippines, did not of itself constitute a waiver of his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of the United States. The waiver of his green card should be
manifested by some act or acts independent of and done prior to filing his candidacy for elective office in this country. Without such prior waiver, he was "disqualified to run
for any elective office". Records of this case does not have proof that he had waived his status as such before he ran for election as municipal mayor of Bolinao on January
18, 1988. Therefore, he was disqualified to become a candidate for that office.
Miguel's application for immigrant status and permanent residence in the U.S. and his possession of a green card attesting to such status are conclusive proof that he is a
permanent resident of the U.S. despite his occasional visits to the Philippines. The waiver of such immigrant status should be as indubitable as his application for it. Absent
clear evidence that he made an irrevocable waiver of that status or that he surrendered his green card to the appropriate U.S. authorities before he ran for mayor of Bolinao
in the local elections on January 18, 1988, thus, he was disqualified to run for said public office, hence, his election thereto was null and void.

RODRIGUEZ v. COMELEC, MARQUEZ [G.R. 120099; July 24, 1996] AUTHOR: RAMOS
TOPIC: Disqualifications PONENTE: Francisco, J. NOTES:
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
"FUGITIVE FROM JUSTICE" as a ground for the disqualification or ineligibility of a person seeking to run for any elective local position under LGC Sec 40(e), should be
understood according to the definition given in the Marquez Decision
o not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those who flee after being charged to avoid prosecution.
EXCEPTION: When, in good faith, a person leaves the territory of another state, homeward bound, and learns later of charges filed against him while in his own country,
the fact that he does NOT subject himself to the jurisdiction of the former state does NOT qualify him outright as a fugitive from justice.
'LAW OF THE CASE' the opinion delivered on a former appeal. More specifically, it means that whatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule
of decision between the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case, whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the facts on which
such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court."
EMERGENCY RECIT: Rodriguez won the gubernatorial post of Quezon (both in 1992 and 1995). His rival Marquez contested this, arguing that he was a fugitive from justice
because of the fact that he left the US while there was a pending criminal case against him. Rodriguez counters that he had already left for the Philippines long before criminal
case was filed. In an earlier case, the Supreme Court defined Fugitive from Justice as those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those who flee after
being charged to avoid prosecution, but it did not rule as to WON Rodriguez fell within such definition. It required COMELEC to receive evidence and rule on the issue. Initially,
COMELEC ruled that Rodriguez was a fugitive from justice, but later ruled that he was not, considering the limited definition from the earlier SC decision (albeit conflicted in
such a ruling). Marquez wanted SC to expand the definition based on US jurisprudence, such that Rodriguez would be a fugitive from justice. SC ruled for Rodriguez and stuck
to the earlier definition.
FACTS:
Eduardo Rodriguez and Bienvenido Marquez, Jr were candidates for the gubernatorial post of Quezon Province in the May 1992 elections
o Rodriguez won and was proclaimed duly-elected governor
o Marquez challenged this via petition for quo warranto before COMELEC (Rodriguez is a fugitive from justice! He left the US while a criminal case was filed
against him on Nov 12, 1985 before the L.A. Municipal Court for fraudulent insurance claims, grand theft and attempted grand theft)
COMELEC: dismissed Marquezs petition on Feb 2, 1993 (also denied an MR)
o Marquez challenged the COMELEC dismissal before the SC via petition for certiorari (G.R. 112889), the crux of which is whether Rodriguez is a "fugitive
from justice" under the LGC based on the alleged pendency of a criminal charge against him
April 11, 1995: Marquez challenged Rodriguez' candidacy via petition for disqualification before the COMELEC (same allegation), while Rodriguez petition for certiorari
(for the G.R. 112889 case) was still pending
Apr 18, 1995: Marquez Decision (G.R. 112889) was promulgated
o SC: FUGITIVE FROM JUSTICE includes not only those who (1) flee after conviction to avoid punishment but also those who, (2) after being charged, flee
to avoid prosecution
o SC: WON Rodriguez is a "fugitive from justice" was NOT decided. That task is for COMELEC upon remand of the case to it
Rodriguez sought reconsideration and a motion to admit additional arguments, to which a certification from the Commission on Immigration
was attached, showing that he left the US on Jun 25, 1985 (5 months prior to the institution of the criminal complaint). [DENIED]
May 7, 1995: after the promulgation of the Marquez Decision, COMELEC promulgated a Consolidated Resolution (quo warranto and disqualification cases) declaring
Rodriquez as a fugitive from justice, and thus disqualified. He must vacate his office and is disqualified from running in the upcoming race.
o COMELEC, allegedly keeping in mind the Marquez Decision definition of "fugitive from justice, found Rodriguez to be one based on evidence (which
COMELEC allowed to be presented ex-parte after Rodriguez walked-out of the hearing following the denial of his motion to postpone)
authenticated copy of the Nov 12, 1995 warrant of arrest issued by the LA Municipal Court vs Rodriguez
 authenticated copy of the felony complaint
o authenticated documents show the pendency of a criminal complaint vs. Rodriguez and the fact that there is an outstanding warrant against him amply
proves Marquez's contention that the respondent is a fugitive from justice.
Rodriguez: long before the complaint was allegedly filed, I was already in the Philippines! I cannot be a fugitive from justice, because to be so,
one must be aware of the filing of the criminal complaint, and ones disappearance must show a clear desire to evade the warrant
COMELEC: NO MERIT! This allegation in the Answer was not even supported by any document to show when he left the US and when he
returned here. On the contrary, his wife was arrested on Nov 6, 1985 in the US by the FBI in an apartment paid for him
May 8, 1995 election: Rodriguez and Marquez fought again for the same position (Rodriguez won again)
o Marquez tried to suspend Rodriguez' proclamation (granted on May 11, BUT Provincial Board of Canvassers still proclaimed Rodriguez on May 12)
May 16, 1995: Marquez filed the instant petition for certiorari (G.R. No. 120099) based on COMELECs rulings against Rodriguez
May 22, 1995: Marquez filed before the COMELEC an omnibus motion to annul Rodriguezs proclamation and to cite the Quezon PBCC in contempt
June 23, 1995: COMELEC nullified Rodriguez' proclamation and ordered some members of the PBCC to explain why they should not be cited in contempt
o With respect to Marquezs sought-after proclamation, they deferred ruling on the matter until the instant petition (GR 120099) was resolved
Aug 3, 1995: Marquez filed a motion for TRO to restrain Rodriguez from exercising powers and functions as the Governor of Quezon (GRANTED)
Oct 24, 1995: SC directed COMELEC (again) to receive evidence from both parties, finish the proceedings, and make a report to the SC
Dec 26, 1995: COMELEC submitted its REPORT, declaring that Rodriguez is NOT a fugitive from justice, as defined in the Marquez decision
o Intent to evade is a material element of the Marquez decision definition, which is ABSENT here because Rodriguez arrived in the Philippines (Jun 25, 1985)
long before the criminal charge was instituted in the LA Court (Nov 12, 1985)
o Still, it expressed its persistent discomfort on WON it correctly applied the Marquez Decision definition of "FUGITIVE FROM JUSTICE [NOTE: basically, they
wanted to expand the definition from that of the Marquez Decision, such that Rodriquez would still qualify as a fugitive]
Marquez Decision: those who (1) flee after conviction to avoid punishment; those who (2) flee after being charged to avoid prosecution
BUT in many cases, the term 'fugitive from justice' contemplates other instances NOT explicitly mentioned in the main opinion
Blacks Law Dictionary: person, who, having committed a crime, flees from jurisdiction of the court where crime was committed or
departs from his usual place of abode and conceals himself within the district
King v. Noe: person who, having committed or been charged with a crime in one state, has left its jurisdiction and is found within
the territory of another when it is sought to subject him to the criminal process of the former state
Hughes v. Pflanz: person who, having committed within a state a crime, when sought for, to be subjected to criminal process, is
found within the territory of another state
Moreno's Philippine Law Dictionary: one having committed, or being accused, of a crime in one jurisdiction and is absent for any
reason from that jurisdiction. Specifically, one who flees to avoid punishment.
From the above rulings, the objective facts sufficient to constitute FLIGHT FROM JUSTICE are
a) a person committed a 'crime' OR has been charged for the commission thereof; and
b) thereafter, leaves the jurisdiction of the court where said crime was committed or his usual place of abode
Filing of charges prior to flight is NOT always an antecedent requirement to label one a 'fugitive from justice.
Mere commission of a 'crime' without charges having been filed for the same and flight subsequent thereto are sufficient
Justice Davide's separate opinion in GR 112889: disqualification for being a fugitive does NOT involve the issue of the presumption
of innocence. The disqualification then is based on his flight from justice.
US cases: fact that they (person who have committed crime within a state) are not within the state to answer its criminal process
when required renders them, in legal intendment, fugitives from justice
As such, the fact that there are pending charges in the US and that Rodriguez is in the PH fugitive from justice
o Considering the equally valid yet different interpretations resulting from the SC decision (GR 112889), COMELEC merely evaluated the evidence in light of
the varied constructions open to it and submitted the final determination of the case to the SC as the final interpreter of the law
ISSUE: WON Rodriguez falls within the definition of fugitive from justice / Which definition (main opinion or expanded) of fugitive from justice is binding
HELD: NO, he did NOT. Marquez Decisions definition is binding. Petition GRANTED. COMELEC resolutions against Rodriguez (May 7&11) SET ASIDE.
Marquez Decision definition of FUGITIVE FROM JUSTICE
1) those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment
2) those who flee after being charged to avoid prosecution
o intent to evade is the compelling factor for one's flight from a particular jurisdiction (intent to evade arises only from the subjects knowledge of an already
instituted indictment or of a promulgated judgment of conviction)
o Rodriguez' case CANNOT fit in this concept
his arrival in the Philippines from the US (Jun 25, 1985) PRECEDED the filing of the felony complaint in the LA Court (Nov 12, 1985) and of the
issuance of the arrest warrant by same foreign court (by almost 5 months)
impossible for Rodriguez to have known about such felony complaint and arrest warrant at the time he left the US. What prosecution or
punishment then was Rodriguez deliberately running away from with his departure from the US?
Respondent: impossible for petitioner not to have known of said investigation due to its magnitude
SC: Investigations of this nature, no matter how extensive or prolonged, are shrouded with secrecy to afford law enforcers the advantage of surprise and effect the
arrest of those who would be charged. Otherwise, having been forewarned, sabotage of the investigation may be resorted to
o It was 17 days after Rodriguez' departure that charges against him were filed (CANNOT overturn the presumption of good faith). Evidence of Rodriguez proves
that his compulsion to return to the Philippines was due to his desire to join in the political campaigns against Marcos
o When, in good faith, a person leaves the territory of another state, homeward bound, and learns later of charges filed against him while in his own country,
the fact that he does NOT subject himself to the jurisdiction of the former state does NOT qualify him outright as a fugitive from justice.
o In the ABSENCE of an intent to evade the laws of the US, petitioner had every right to depart therefrom when he did and to return to the Philippines.
Granting that Rodriguez came to know of the charges only later, under the circumstances, is there a law that requires petitioner to travel to the US and subject himself
to the monetary burden and tedious process of defending himself before that country's courts?
o moral uprightness is NOT a standard so far-reaching as to demand of political candidate the performance of supererogatory obligations
o An alleged 'fugitive from justice' must perform acts in order not to be so categorized.
A person who is aware of the imminent filing of charges against him OR of the same already filed in connection with acts he committed in the
jurisdiction of a particular state, is under an obligation NOT to flee said place of commission
o HOWEVER, as in petitioner's case, his departure from the US may NOT place him under a similar obligation.
subsequent knowledge while in the Philippines and non-submission to US jurisdiction does NOT make him a fugitive from justice.
As he was a public officer appointed and elected immediately after his return, Rodriguez had every reason to devote utmost priority to the
service of his office. Going back to the US in the middle of his term would jeopardize the interest of the public he serves.
Marquez (and COMELEC) urges the Court to re-define "fugitive from justice" by broadening the concept to include the mere fact that he leaves the jurisdiction where a
charge is pending against him, regardless of whether or not the charge has already been filed at the time of his flight
SC: "law of the case" doctrine FORBIDS the Court to craft an expanded re-definition of the Marquez Decisions definition of "fugitive from justice"
 o 'LAW OF THE CASE' the opinion delivered on a former appeal. More specifically, it means that whatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling
legal rule of decision between the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case, whether correct on general principles or not, so long
as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court."
o where the evidence on a second or succeeding appeal is substantially the same, subsequent appeals and will not be readjudicated therein
o the same parties (Rodriguez and Marquez) and issue (WON Rodriguez is a "fugitive from justice") are involved here and in the Marquez Decision
Marquez Decision was an appeal from EPC 92-28 (the Marquez' quo warranto petition before the COMELEC)
This petition is also an appeal from EPC 92-28 although COMELEC resolved the latter jointly with SPA 95-089 (Marquez' petition for DQ)
o to re-define "fugitive from justice" would only foment instability in our jurisprudence

8. Rolando P. Dela Torre vs COMELEC and Marcial Villanueva AUTHOR: The Talio (I think Chris is busy with ANC so Im taking his place instead)
[G.R. No. 121592; July 5, 1996] NOTES: Short Case
TOPIC: Disqualifications
PONENTE: Cruz, J. LGC Sec. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for
any elective local position:

(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral

turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of
imprisonment within two (2) years after serving sentence;
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
Fencing is defined in Sec. 2 of PD 1612 as the act of any person who, with intent to gain for himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell
or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value which he knows, or should be known to him, to have been
derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft.
Moral turpitude is deducible from the third element. Actual knowledge by the "fence" of the fact that property received is stolen displays the same degree of malicious
deprivation of one's rightful property as that which animated the robbery or theft which, by their very nature, are crimes of moral turpitude. The duty not to appropriate,
or to return, anything acquired either by mistake or with malice is so basic it finds expression in some key provisions of the Civil Code on "Human Relations" and "Solutio
Indebiti"
His conviction of fencing which we have declared as a crime of moral turpitude and thus falling squarely under the disqualification found in Sec. 40(a), subsists and
remains totally unaffected notwithstanding the grant of probation. In fact, a judgment of conviction in a criminal case ipso facto attains finality when the accused applies
for probation, although it is not executory pending resolution of the application for probation. Clearly then, his theory has no merit.
FACTS:
Dela Torre seeks the nullification of two resolutions issued by the COMELEC allegedly with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in a case for
disqualification filed against him before the COMELEC.
The first assailed resolution dated May 6, 1995 declared the Dela Torre disqualified from running for the position of Mayor of Cavinti, Laguna in the May 8, 1995 elections,
citing as the ground, Section 40(a) of the LGC.
In disqualifying him, the COMELEC held that documentary evidence established that Dela Torre was fund guilty by the MTC for violation PD 1612 (Anti-Fencing Law).
Upon appeal, the RTC affirmed his conviction, which became final on Jan. 18, 1991. [Nature of the offense of violating PD1612 is said to involve moral turpitude.]
The second assailed resolution, dated Aug. 28, 1995, denied Dela Torres MR. In said motion, he claimed that Sec. 40 (a) of the LGC does not apply to his case inasmuch
as the probation granted to him by the MTC on Dec. 21, 1994 which suspended the execution of the judgment of conviction and all other legal consequences flowing
therefrom, rendered inapplicable Section 40 (a) as well.
ISSUE(S):
1. WON the crime of fencing involves moral turpitude.
2. WON the grant of probation affects the applicability of Sec. 40(a) of the LGC.

HELD:
Darth Vader: Obi-Wan never told you what happened to your father.
Luke: He told me enough. He told me you killed him.
Darth Vader: No. I am your father.
Luke: No. No. Thats not true. Thats impossible.
Darth Vader: Search your feelings. You know it to be true.
Luke: Noooooo! Nooooo!
RATIO:
The Court has consistently adopted the definition in Black's Law Dictionary of "moral turpitude" as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which
a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman or conduct contrary to
justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.
Not every criminal act, however, involves moral turpitude. It is for this reason that "as to what crime involves moral turpitude, is for the Supreme Court to determine". In
resolving the foregoing question, the Court is guided by one of the general rules that crimes mala in se involve moral turpitude, while crimes mala prohibita do not, the
rationale of which was set forth in "Zari v. Flores," to wit:
It (moral turpitude) implies something immoral in itself, regardless of the fact that it is punishable by law or not. It must not be merely mala prohibita, but
the act itself must be inherently immoral. The doing of the act itself, and not its prohibition by statute fixes the moral turpitude. Moral turpitude does not,
however, include such acts as are not of themselves immoral but whose illegality lies in their being positively prohibited.
This guidelines nonetheless proved short of providing a clear-cut solution, for in "International Rice Research Institute v. NLRC, the Court admitted that it cannot always
be ascertained whether moral turpitude does or does not exist by merely classifying a crime as malum in se or as malum prohibitum. There are crimes which are mala in
se and yet but rarely involve moral turpitude and there are crimes which involve moral turpitude and are mala prohibita only. In the final analysis, whether or not a crime
involves moral turpitude is ultimately a question of fact and frequently depends on all the circumstances surrounding the violation of the statue.
Fencing is defined in Sec. 2 of PD 1612 as the act of any person who, with intent to gain for himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell
or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value which he knows, or should be known to him, to have been
derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft.
From the foregoing definition may be gleaned the elements of the crime of fencing which are:
o A crime of robbery or theft has been committed;
 o The accused who is not a principal or accomplice in the crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or
buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of value, which have been derived from the proceeds of the said crime;
o The accused knows or should have known that the said article, item, object or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery
or theft; and [Emphasis supplied.]
o There is, on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for another.
Moral turpitude is deducible from the third element. Actual knowledge by the "fence" of the fact that property received is stolen displays the same degree of malicious
deprivation of one's rightful property as that which animated the robbery or theft which, by their very nature, are crimes of moral turpitude. The duty not to appropriate,
or to return, anything acquired either by mistake or with malice is so basic it finds expression in some key provisions of the Civil Code on "Human Relations" and "Solutio
Indebiti"
The same underlying reason holds even if the "fence" did not have actual knowledge, but merely "should have known" the origin of the property received. In this regard,
the Court held that when knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is an element of the offense, such knowledge is established if a person is aware of the high
probability of its existence unless he actually believes that it does not exist. On the other hand, the words "should know" denote the fact that a person of reasonable
prudence and intelligence would ascertain the fact in the performance of his duty to another or would govern his conduct upon assumption that such fact exists.
Regarding the second issue where Dela Torre contends that his probation had the effect of suspending the applicability of Sec. 40(a) of LGC, suffice it to say that the
legal effect of probation is only to suspend the execution of the sentence. His conviction of fencing which we have declared as a crime of moral turpitude and thus falling
squarely under the disqualification found in Sec. 40(a), subsists and remains totally unaffected notwithstanding the grant of probation. In fact, a judgment of conviction
in a criminal case ipso facto attains finality when the accused applies for probation, although it is not executory pending resolution of the application for
probation. Clearly then, his theory has no merit.

09. MAGNO v. COMELEC AUTHOR: S A Y O

[G.R. No. 147904. October 4, 2002] NOTES:
TOPIC: Disqualifications of Elective Public Officials
PONENTE: CORONA BP 881: Sec. 12. Disqualifications. Any person who has been declared by competent
authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for
subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for which he has been sentenced
to a penalty of more than eighteen (18) months, or for a crime involving moral
turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has
been given plenary pardon, or granted amnesty.
The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon
the declaration by competent authority that said insanity or incompetence had been
removed or after the expiration of a period of five years from his service of sentence,
unless within the same period he again becomes disqualified.

LGC: Section 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are disqualified from
running for any elective local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for
an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years
after serving sentence.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:

In David vs. COMELEC, RA 7160 is a codified set of laws that specifically applies to local government units. Section 40 thereof specially and definitively provides
for disqualifications of candidates for elective local positions. It is applicable to them only. On the other hand, Section 12 of BP 881 speaks of disqualifications
of candidates for any public office. It deals with the election of all public officers. Thus, Section 40 of RA 7160, insofar as it governs the disqualifications of
candidates for local positions, assumes the nature of a special law which ought to prevail.

The intent of the legislature to reduce the disqualification period of candidates for local positions from five to two years is evident. The cardinal rule in the
interpretation of all laws is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the law. The reduction of the disqualification period from five to two years is the
manifest intent.

Therefore, although his crime of direct bribery involved moral turpitude, petitioner nonetheless could not be disqualified from running in the 2001 elections.
Article 12 of the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881) must yield to Article 40 of the Local Government Code (RA 7160). Petitioners disqualification ceased as of
March 5, 2000 and he was therefore under no such disqualification anymore when he ran for mayor of San Isidro, Nueva Ecija in the May 14, 2001 elections.
FACTS:
This petition originated from a case filed by private respondent (Montes) for the disqualification of petitioner (Magno) as mayoralty candidate of San Isidro, Nueva
Ecija during the 2001 elections on the ground that petitioner was previously convicted by the Sandiganbayan of four counts of direct bribery penalized under Article
210 of the RPC.
It appears that on July 25, 1995, petitioner was sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 3 months and 11 days of arresto mayor as minimum to 1 year 8
months and 21 days of prision correccional as maximum, for each of the four counts of direct bribery.
Thereafter, petitioner applied for probation and was discharged on March 5, 1998 upon order of the Regional Trial Court of Gapan, Nueva Ecija.
On May 7, 2001, COMELEC rendered a decision granting the petition of private respondent and declaring that petitioner was disqualified from running for the
position of mayor in the 2001 elections. (COMELEC cited Section 12 of the BP 881 or the Omnibus Election Code)
The above provision explicitly lifts the disqualification to run for an elective office of a person convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude after five (5) years from
the service of sentence. According to the COMELEC, inasmuch as petitioner was considered to have completed the service of his sentence on March 5, 1998, his five-
year disqualification will end only on March 5, 2003.
Petitioner filed MR but was denied hence this petition
Petitioners Arguments:
direct bribery is not a crime involving moral turpitude.
Section 40 of RA 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, which he claims is the law applicable to the case at bar, not BP 881 or
the Omnibus Election Code as claimed by the COMELEC
Petitioner insists that he had already served his sentence as of March 5, 1998 when he was discharged from probation. Such being the case, the two-year
disqualification period imposed by Section 40 of the Local Government Code expired on March 5, 2000. Thus, petitioner was qualified to run in the 2001
elections.
 Meanwhile, Sonia Lorenzo was proclaimed by the COMELEC as the duly elected mayor of San Isidro, Nueva Ecija.(NOT IMPORTANT)

ISSUE(S): What should apply? LGC? Omnibus Election Code?- LGC

WON the crime of direct bribery involves moral turpitude- YES

RATIO:
In this case, we need not review the facts and circumstances relating to the commission of the crime considering that petitioner did not assail his conviction. By applying
for probation, petitioner in effect admitted all the elements of the crime of direct bribery:

the offender is a public officer;

the offender accepts an offer or promise or receives a gift or present by himself or through another;
such offer or promise be accepted or gift or present be received by the public officer with a view to committing some crime, or in consideration of the
execution of an act which does not constitute a crime but the act must be unjust, or to refrain from doing something which it is his official duty to do;
the act which the offender agrees to perform or which he executes is connected with the performance of his official duties.

Moral turpitude can be inferred from the third element. The fact that the offender agrees to accept a promise or gift and deliberately commits an unjust act or refrains
from performing an official duty in exchange for some favors, denotes a malicious intent on the part of the offender to renege on the duties which he owes his fellowmen
and society in general. Also, the fact that the offender takes advantage of his office and position is a betrayal of the trust reposed on him by the public. It is a conduct
clearly contrary to the accepted rules of right and duty, justice, honesty and good morals. In all respects, direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude.
Unfortunately, however, neither this Court nor this case is the proper forum to rule on (1) the validity of Sonia Lorenzos proclamation and (2) the declaration of petitioner
as the rightful winner. Inasmuch as Sonia Lorenzo had already been proclaimed as the winning candidate, the legal remedy of petitioner would have been a timely election
protest. (NOT IMPORTANT)

10. Borja vs. COMELEC AUTHOR: SOLIS

[G.R. No. 133495. September 3, 1998] NOTES:
TOPIC: Term of Office; Three-Term Limit Rule, Sec. 8, Art. X, Constitution Sec. 43, Local This case presents for determination the scope of the constitutional provision barring
Government Code elective officials, with the exception of barangay officials, from serving more than
PONENTE: Mendoza, J. three consecutive terms.

CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve the same elective position.
Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office; he must also have been elected to the same position for the
same number of times before the disqualification can apply.

FACTS:
18 January 1988-- Capco was elected vice-mayor of Pateros for a term ending 30 June 1992.
2 September 1989Private Respondent Jose T. Capco, Jr. became mayor of Pateros, by operation of law, upon the death of incumbent, Cesar Borja.
11 May 1992Capco was relected mayor for another term of three years.
8 May 1995--Capco was re-elected as mayor for another term of three years.
Capco then filed for a certificate of candidacy for mayor of Pateros for the 11 May 1998 elections. Petitioner Benjamin Borja, Jr., a candidate for mayor, sought
disqualification of Capco on the theory that the latter would have already served as mayor for three consecutive terms and would therefore be ineligible to serve for
another term after that.
Second Division of COMELEC: ruled the disqualification of Capco from running for re-election as mayor of Pateros.
COMELEC en banc: REVERSED. Capco is eligible to run for mayor.
The election results showed that Capco yielded a higher number of votes and was proclaimed re-elected as mayor of Pateros.
Petitioner Borja filed a petition for certiorari to set aside COMELEC en bancs decision and to declare that Capco disqualified to serve another term as mayor of
Pateros.
Petitioner Borja contends thar Capcos service as mayor from 1989 to 1992 should be considered as service for full one term, and since he thereafter served from
1992 to 1998 two more terms as mayor, he should be considered to have served three consecutive terms within the contemplation of Art. X, 8 of the Constitution and
43 (b) of the LGC. Borja stresses the fact that, upon the death of Mayor Cesar Borja on 2 September 1989, Capco became the mayor and thereafter served the
remainder of the term. Borja argues that it is irrelevant that Capco became mayor by succession because the purpose of the constitutional provision in limiting the
number of terms elective local officials may serve is to prevent monopolization of political power.
ISSUE(S): Whether a vice-mayor who succeeds to the office of mayor by operation of law and serves the remainder of the term is considered to have served a term in that
office for the purpose of the three-term limit.

HELD: NO.

RATIO:
The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve the same elective position. Consequently, it is
not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office; he must also have been elected to the same position for the same
number of times before the disqualification can apply.
Capco was qualified to run again as mayor in the next election because he was not elected to the office of mayor in the first term but simply found himself thrust
into it by operation of law. Neither had he served the full term because he only continued the service, interrupted by the death, of the deceased mayor. The vice-
mayors assumption of the mayorship in the event of the vacancy is more a matter of chance than of design. Hence, his service in that office should not be counted
in the application of any term limit.
The policy embodied in the constitutional provision (Art. X, Section 8) is not only to prevent the establishment of political dynasties but also to enhance the freedom
of choice of the people. A consideration of the historical background of Art. X, Section 8 of the Constitution reveals that the members of the Constitutional
Commission were as much concerned with preserving the freedom of choice of the people as they were with preventing the monopolization of political power. In
discussing term limits, the drafters of the Constitution did so on the assumption that the officials concerned were serving by reason of election.
 To consider Capco to have served the first term in full and therefore ineligible to run a third time for reelection would be not only to falsify reality but also to unduly
restrict the right of the people to choose whom they wish to govern them.

ROMEO LONZANIDA vs. THE HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTION and AUTHOR: TAN
EUFEMIO MULI NOTES:
G.R. No. 135150 July 28, 1999
TOPIC: Term of Office; Three-Term Limit Rule
PONENTE: GONZAGA-REYES, J.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
Two conditions for the application of the disqualification must concur:
1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post and
2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.
FACTS:
Petitioner Romeo Lonzanida was duly elected and served two consecutive terms as municipal mayor of San Antonio, Zambales prior to the May 1995 elections.
In the May 1995 elections, Lonzanida ran for mayor of San Antonio, Zambales and was again proclaimed winner. He assumed office and discharged the duties thereof.
His proclamation in 1995 was however contested by his then opponent, Juan Alvez, who filed an election protest before the RTC, which declared a failure of elections.
Accordingly, the office of the mayor of the Municipality of San Antonio, Zambales was declared vacant.
Both parties appealed to the COMELEC, which:
o Declared Alvez the duly elected mayor and
o Issued a writ of execution ordering Lonzanida to vacate the post.
Lonzanida obeyed; Alvez assumed office for the remainder of the term.
In the May 1998 elections, Lonzanida again filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor of San Antonio.
His opponent, Eufemio Muli, timely filed a petition to disqualify Lonzanida from running for mayor of San Antonio in the 1998 elections on the ground that he had served
three consecutive terms in the same post.
Petitioner Lonzanida was proclaimed winner.
COMELEC First Division:
o Issued a resolution granting the petition for disqualification upon a finding that Lonzanida had served three consecutive terms as mayor of San Antonio,
Zambales
o Found that Lonzanida's assumption of office by virtue of his proclamation in May 1995, although he was later unseated before the expiration of the term,
should be counted as service for one full term in computing the three term limit under the Constitution and the Local Government Code
COMELEC En Banc affirmed.
Petitioner Lonzanida:
o Maintains that he was duly elected mayor for only two consecutive terms and that his assumption of office in 1995 cannot be counted as service of a term
for the purpose of applying the three term limit for local government officials, because he was not the duly elected mayor of San Antonio in the May 1995
election and
Private respondent Eufemio Muli:
o Maintains that the petitioner's assumption of office in 1995 should be considered as service of one full term because he discharged the duties of mayor for
almost three years until March 1, 1998 or barely a few months before the next mayoral elections and
Solicitor-General:
o Prays for the dismissal of the petition and
o Contends that petitioner Lonzanida discharged the rights and duties of mayor from 1995 to 1998 which should be counted as service of one full term, albeit
he was later unseated, because he served as mayor for the greater part of the term.
ISSUE(S): Whether petitioner Lonzanida's assumption of office as mayor of San Antonio Zambales from May 1995 to March 1998 may be considered as service of one full term
for the purpose of applying the three-term limit for elective local government officials.

HELD: No! Petition granted.

RATIO:
Section 8, Art. X of the Constitution provides that, the term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law shall be three years and no such officials shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the
office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.

Section 43 of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160) restates the same rule, that: No local elective official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in
the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected.

Two conditions for the application of the disqualification must concur:

3) That the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post and
4) That he has fully served three consecutive terms.

The two requisites for the application of the three term rule are absent.
1. Petitioner cannot be considered as having been duly elected to the post in the May 1995 elections, and second, the petitioner did not
fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term by reason of involuntary relinquishment of office.
o After a re-appreciation and revision of the contested ballots the COMELEC itself declared by final judgment that petitioner Lonzanida
lost in the May 1995 mayoral elections and his previous proclamation as winner was declared null and void. His assumption of office
as mayor cannot be deemed to have been by reason of a valid election but by reason of a void proclamation.
o It has been repeatedly held by this court that a proclamation subsequently declared void is no proclamation at all and while a
proclaimed candidate may assume office on the strength of the proclamation of the Board of Canvassers he is only a presumptive
winner who assumes office subject to the final outcome of the election protest.
o Petitioner Lonzanida did not serve a term as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales from May 1995 to March 1998 because he was not duly
elected to the post; he merely assumed office as presumptive winner, which presumption was later overturned by the COMELEC
when it decided with finality that Lonzanida lost in the May 1995 mayoral elections.
2. Petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term by reason of involuntary relinquishment of office.
 o The respondents' contention that the petitioner should be deemed to have served one full term from May 1995-1998 because
he served the greater portion of that term has no legal basis to support it; it disregards the second requisite for the application
of the disqualification, i.e., that he has fully served three consecutive terms.
o The second sentence of the constitutional provision under scrutiny states, "Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of
time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which he was elected."
o The clear intent of the framers of the constitution is to bar any attempt to circumvent the three-term limit by a voluntary
renunciation of office and at the same time respect the people's choice and grant their elected official full service of a term is
evident in this provision.
o Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three term limit; conversely,
involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of
continuity of service.
o The petitioner vacated his post a few months before the next mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in
compliance with the legal process of writ of execution issued by the COMELEC to that effect. Such involuntary severance from
office is an interruption of continuity of service and thus, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term.

In sum, the petitioner was not the duly elected mayor and that he did not hold office for the full term; hence, his assumption of office from
1995 to March 1998 cannot be counted as a term for purposes of computing the three term limit. The Resolution of the COMELEC finding him
disqualified on this ground to run in the May 1998 mayoral elections should therefore be set aside.

Adormeo v. COMELEC AUTHOR: TIGLAO

[G.R. No. 147927 | 4 February 2002] NOTES: Recall a petition designed to remove an official from office by reason of lack
TOPIC: Three Term Limit Rule | PONENTE: J. Quisumbing of confidence. It is initiated only in the middle of the year.

CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:

An elective official, who has served for three consecutive terms and who did not seek the elective position for what could be his fourth term, but later won in a recall
election, had an interruption in the continuity of his service. For, he had become in the interim [i.e. from the end of the 3rd term up to the recall election] a private citizen.
FACTS:
Petitioner and private respondent, which was also the incumbent mayor, were the only candidates who filed their COC for Mayor of Lucena City in the May 2001
elections.
Ramon Talaga, Jr. (respondent) was elected mayor in May 1992. He served a full term. He was re-elected in May 1995, where he again served a full term. In the
May 1998 elections, he lost to Tagarao. However, before Tagaraos term ended (1998-2001), a recall election was conducted in May 2000 wherein Talaga won and
served the unexpired term of Tagarao until June 2001.
Talaga ran again for Mayor in 2001 but was challenged on the ground that he had already served as mayor for three consecutive terms in violation of the three
term limit rule.
Respondent counters by saying that his service as city mayor of Lucena is not consecutive. He lost his bid for a second re-election in 1998 and during Tagaraos
incumbency, he was a private citizen. Hence, he had not ben a mayor for three consecutive terms.
COMELEC disqualified Talaga to run for mayor. He then filed a motion for reconsideration which COMELEC granted, which resulted to Talaga being elected as
Mayor.
Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE(S): W/N Talaga had already served three consecutive terms as mayor of Lucena City.

HELD: No. Private respondent was not elected for 3 consecutive terms. For nearly 2 years, he was a private citizen. The continuity of his term as mayor was disrupted by his
defeat in the 1998 elections.

RATIO:
The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position. Consequently, it is not
enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times
before the disqualification can apply.

For nearly two years Talaga was a private citizen. The continuity of his mayorship was disrupted by his defeat in the 1998 elections. The time between his second term and the
recall election is sufficient interruption. Thus, there was no three consecutive terms as contemplated in the disqualifications in the LGC.

Talaga only served two consecutive full terms. There was a disruption when he was defeated in the 1998 elections. His election during the 2000 recall election is not a
continuation of his two previous terms which could constitute his third term thereby barring him for running for a fourth term. Victory in the 2000 recall election is not the
voluntary renunciation contemplated by the law.

Hence, being elected in a recall election interrupts the 3 consecutive term limit.

Socrates Vs. COMELEC AUTHOR: Valera

[G.R. No. 154512. November 12, 2002] NOTES: Consolidated petitions for certiorari
Term Limits: Carpio

CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:

The clear intent is that involuntary severance from office for any length of time interrupts conintuity of service and prevents the service before and after the
interruption from being joined together to form a contintous service or terms.
A necessary consequence of the interruption of continuity of service is the start of a new term following the interruption. An official elected in recall election
serves the unexpired term of the recalled official. This unexpired term is in itself one term for purposes of counting the three-term limit
FACTS:
On july 2, 2002, 312 out of 528 members of the incumbent barangay officials of Puerto Princess convened themselves into a Preparatory Recall Assembly. The
PRA was convened to initiate the recall of Socrates who assumed office as Mayor of the city on June 30, 2001.
 The members designated Mark Hagedorn, as interim chairman of the PRA, he was the president of Brngy Captains.
On the Same dates PRA passed reso No. 01-02(Recall Resolution) which declared its loss of confidence in Socrates and called for his recall.
The PRA requested the Comelec to sched the recall election w/in 30%
On July16, 2002, Socrates filed with the Comelec to nullify and deny due course to the Recall Resolution.
On August 14,2002, the Comelec en banc dismissed the Socrates petition for lack of merit. However the COMELEC gave due course to the recall resolution and
scheduled it on Sept 7, 2002
The Comelec en banc fixed the campaign period from August 27 Sept 5
On Aug 23, 2002, Edward Hagedorn filed his COC for mayor in the recall election
Adovo and Gilo filed a petition with the Comelecto disqualify Hagedorn from running in the recall election and to cancel his COC. Consequently a Petition in
Intervention filed by Olave was a petition in intervention, also seeking to disqualify Hagedorn, Maanay filed another petition stating the same allegations. w/c
is>
- Hagedorn s disqualified from running for a 4th consecutive term. Having been elected and served as mayor for 3 years.
The Comelec 1st division was dismissed the case for lack of merit and declared Hagedorn qualified to run in the recall election. The Comelec also resets the recall
election from sept 7, to sept 24
Several other cases.

G.R. No. 154512-Recall election itself

G.R. No. 154683-additional 15 days.
G.R. Nos. 155083-84
Petitioners assail the Comelecs resolution declaring Hagedorn to run for mayor in the recall. They also prayed for the issuance of a TRO to enjoin proclamation
of the winning candidate in the recall election. The TRO was granted
On sept 24, 2002, the Court ordered the Comelec to desist from proclaiming any winning candidate in the recall election.
Socrates then filed a motion for leave to file an attached petition for intervention seeking the same rates.
Hagedorn gather the highest # votes in the recall election while Socrates came in second.
Hagedorn then filed motions to lift the order restraint, the Court granted Socrates motion to leave for intervention.

ISSUE(S): WON Hagedorn is qualified to run for mayor in the recall election.

HELD: Yes, since the recall election isnt the next immediate election after his 3 terms.

RATIO:
The three-term limit rule for elective local officials is found in Section 8, Article X of the Constitution, which states:
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official
shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in
the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
This three-term limit rule is reiterated in Section 43 (b) of RA No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, which provides:
Section 43. Term of Office. (a) x x x
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of
time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official was elected.

The Constitutional and statute provisions have 2 parts, the 1st being that an elective local official can serve for more than 3 consecutive terms. The clear intent is
that only consecutive terms count in taking account the 3 term limits. The 2nd part provides that voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time does not
interrupt the continuity of service The clear intent is that involuntary severance from office for any length of time interrupts continuity of service and prevents
the service before and after the interruption from being joined together to form a continuous service or terms.
After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate reelection for a fourth term. The prohibited election refers to the next regular
election for the same office following the end of the third consecutive term. Any subsequent election, like a recall election, is no longer covered by the prohibition
for two reasons. First, a subsequent election like a recall election is no longer an immediate reelection after three consecutive terms. Second, the intervening
period constitutes an involuntary interruption in the continuity of service.
Clearly, what the Constitution prohibits is an immediate reelection for a fourth term following three consecutive terms. The Constitution, however, does not
prohibit a subsequent reelection for a fourth term as long as the reelection is not immediately after the end of the third consecutive term. A recall election mid-
way in the term following the third consecutive term is a subsequent election but not an immediate reelection after the third term.
Neither does the Constitution prohibit one barred from seeking immediate reelection to run in any other subsequent election involving the same term of office.
What the Constitution prohibits is a consecutive fourth term. The debates in the Constitutional Commission evidently show that the prohibited election referred
to by the framers of the Constitution is the immediate reelection after the third term, not any other subsequent election
In the case of Hagedorn, his candidacy in the recall election on September 24, 2002 is not an immediate reelection after his third consecutive term which ended
on June 30, 2001. The immediate reelection that the Constitution barred Hagedorn from seeking referred to the regular elections in 2001.Hagedorn did not seek
reelection in the 2001 elections.
Hagedorn was elected for three consecutive terms in the 1992, 1995 and 1998 elections and served in full his three consecutive terms as mayor of Puerto Princesa.
Under the Constitution and the Local Government Code, Hagedorn could no longer run for mayor in the 2001 elections. The Constitution and the Local Government
Code disqualified Hagedorn, who had reached the maximum three-term limit, from running for a fourth consecutive term as mayor. Thus, Hagedorn did not run
for mayor in the 2001 elections. Socrates ran and won as mayor of Puerto Princesa in the 2001 elections. After Hagedorn ceased to be mayor on June 30, 2001, he
became a private citizen until the recall election of September 24, 2002 when he won by 3,018 votes over his closest opponent, Socrates.
From June 30, 2001 until the recall election on September 24, 2002, the mayor of Puerto Princesa was Socrates. During the same period, Hagedorn was simply a
private citizen. This period is clearly an interruption in the continuity of Hagedorns service as mayor, not because of his voluntary renunciation, but because of a
legal prohibition. Hagedorns three consecutive terms ended on June 30, 2001. Hagedorns new recall term from September 24, 2002 to June 30, 2004 is not a
seamless continuation of his previous three consecutive terms as mayor. One cannot stitch together Hagedorns previous three-terms with his new recall term to
make the recall term a fourth consecutive term because factually it is not. An involuntary interruption occurred from June 30, 2001 to September 24, 2002 which
broke the continuity or consecutive character of Hagedorns service as mayor
The court cited the Case of Lonzanida, wherein the court explained interruption of service is such that the second sentence of the constitutional provision under
scrutiny states, Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for
which he was elected. The clear intent of the framers of the constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the three-term limit by a voluntary renunciation of office
and at the same time respect the peoples choice and grant their elected official full service of a term is evident in this provision. Voluntary renunciation of a term
 does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three-term limit; conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the
full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service.
In Hagedorns case, the nearly 15-month period he was out of office, although short of a full term of three years, constituted an interruption in the continuity of his
service as mayor. The Constitution does not require the interruption or hiatus to be a full term of three years. The clear intent is that interruption for any length of
time, as long as the cause is involuntary, is sufficient to break an elective local officials continuity of service.
The court then cited the case of Adorneo which states that the recall term of Talaga began only from the date he assumed office after wnning the recall election,
thus Talagas recall term did not retroact to include the tenure of his predecessor. Talagas recall term was made to so retroact, then he would have been disqualified
to run in the 2001 elections because he would already have served three consecutive terms prior to the 2001 elections. One who wins and serves a recall term
does not serve the full term of his predecessor but only the unexpired term. The period of time prior to the recall term, when another elective official holds office,
constitutes an interruption in continuity of service. Clearly, Adormeo established the rule that the winner in the recall election cannot be charged or credited with
the full term of three years for purposes of counting the consecutiveness of an elective officials terms in office.
In the same manner, Hagedorns recall term does not retroact to include the tenure in office of Socrates. Hagedorn can only be disqualified to run in the September
24, 2002 recall election if the recall term is made to retroact to June 30, 2001, for only then can the recall term constitute a fourth consecutive term. But to consider
Hagedorns recall term as a full term of three years, retroacting to June 30, 2001, despite the fact that he won his recall term only last September 24, 2002, is to
ignore reality. This Court cannot declare as consecutive or successive terms of office which historically and factually are not. Worse, to make Hagedorns recall term
retroact to June 30, 2001 creates a legal fiction that unduly curtails the freedom of the people to choose their leaders through popular elections.

MELANIO L. MENDOZA and MARIO E. IBARRA v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and AUTHOR: ACIDO
LEONARDO B. ROMAN NOTES: Petition for certiorari. This is the Resolution quoting the decision of the Court
G.R. No. 149736, December 17, 2002 regarding the validity of Leonardo B. Romans election as Governor of Bataan. The
TOPIC: Term of Office; Three-Term Limit Rule PONENTE: Clerk of Court facts are consolidated from the separate opinions. The ratio has the justices votes:
shaded bullets are the Clerk of Courts summaries, unshaded bullets are other
important statements from the separate opinions.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
Art. X, Section 8 of the Constitution:
The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than
three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term
for which he was elected.
Section 43 of the Local Government Code:
"Sec. 43. Term of Office. (a) The term of office of all local elective officials elected after the effectivity of this Code shall be three (3) years, starting from noon of June 30,
1992 or such date as may be provided for by law, except that of elective barangay officials: Provided, That all local officials first elected during the local elections immediately
following the ratification of the 1987 Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992.
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected."
FACTS:
Respondent Leonardo B. Roman held the post of Governor of Bataan province a number of times:
o 19861988 Appointed OIC Governor of Bataan by former President Corazon Aquino and served up to 1988.
o 19881992 Elected Governor and served up to 1992.
o 19941995 Elected Governor during the RECALL election in 1993, assumed office on June 28, 1994 and served up to 1995.
o 19951998 Elected Governor and served up to 1998.
o 19982001 Elected Governor and served up to 2001.
February 22, 2001: Roman again filed a certificate of candidacy for the same post in the May 14, 2001 regular elections. He ran unopposed and won by a landslide
with 183,730 votes.
May 16, 2001: Roman was proclaimed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Bataan.
May 25, 2001: Melanio L. Mendoza and Mario E. Ibarra, residents and registered voters of Tenejero, Balanga, Bataan, filed with the COMELEC en banc a petition for
quo warranto. Petitioners alleged that Roman has served as governor of Bataan for 3 consecutive terms counted from his assumption of office by virtue of the 1993
recall election. As such, he is disqualified/ineligible to seek a fourth term for the same position in 2001, as he would violate the three-term limit for local elective
positions. Petitioners thus prayed that Romans proclamation as the elected governor of Bataan in the 2001 elections be nullified.
August 15, 2001: In a resolution, COMELEC dismissed petitioners petition for quo warranto on the ground that Roman has not exceeded the three-term limit because
his service by virtue of the 1993 recall election cannot be counted as a full term and, therefore, should not be considered in applying the three-term limit.
Mendoza and Ibarra filed a petition for certiorari, seeking to set aside the resolution of the COMELEC, and to declare Roman's election as governor of Bataan on May
14, 2001 as null and void for violation of the three-term limit (see case law).
ISSUE: Whether or not Romans last election violates the three-term limit in the Constitution.

HELD: The petition is dismissed, with the Court voting 8-7, so nope.

RATIO:
PREVIOUSLY ON SUITS
Socrates v. COMELEC: The Court considered Edward Hagedorn, following his three full terms of nine years as city mayor, still qualified to run in a recall election conducted
about a year and a half after the most recent regular local elections. A recall election term then, not being a full three-year term, is not to be counted or used as a basis for
disqualification whether it is held prior or subsequent to the nine-year full three-term limit.

8 VOTED TO DISMISS
Vitug, J. (joined by Ynares-Santiago, J.): The Constitution envisions a continuous and an uninterrupted service for three full terms before the proscription applies.
Therefore, not being a full term, a recall term should not be counted or used as a basis for the disqualification whether served prior (as in this case) or subsequent
(as in the Socrates case) to the nine-year, full three-term limit.
o In order that the three-consecutive term limit can apply, two conditions must concur: (1) that the elective local official concerned has been elected for
three consecutive terms to the same local government position, and (2) that he has served three consecutive full terms, albeit a voluntary renunciation
of the office for any length of time shall not be deemed to be an interruption in the continuity of the service for the full term for which he is elected.
o Where a candidate appears to be the clear choice of the people, doubts on the candidates eligibility, even only as a practical matter, must be so
resolved as to respect and carry out, not defeat, the paramount will of the electorate.
 Mendoza, J. (joined by Quisumbing, J.): A term during which succession to a local elective office takes place or a recall election is held should not be counted in
determining whether an elective local official has served more than three consecutive terms. He argued that the Constitution does not prohibit elective local
officials from serving for more than three consecutive terms because, in fact, it excludes from the three-term limit interruptions in the continuity of service, so long
as such interruptions are not due to the voluntary renunciation of the office by an incumbent. Hence, the period from June 28, 1994 to June 30, 1995, during which
respondent Leonardo B. Roman served as governor of Bataan by virtue of a recall election held in 1993, should not be counted. Since on May 14, 2001 respondent
had previously served as governor of Bataan for only two consecutive terms (1995-1998 and 1998-2001), his election on that day was actually only his third term
for the same position.
o Two ideas thus emerge from a consideration of the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission. The first is the notion of service of term, derived
from the concern about the accumulation of power as a result of a prolonged stay in office. The second is the idea of election, derived from the concern
that the right of the people to choose those whom they wish to govern them be preserved. Indeed, a fundamental tenet of representative democracy
is that the people should be allowed to choose those whom they please to govern them.
Panganiban, J. (joined by Puno, J.): A recall term should not be considered as one full term, because a contrary interpretation would in effect cut short the elected
official's service to less than nine years and shortchange his constituents. The desire to prevent monopoly of political power should be balanced against the need
to uphold the voters' obvious preference who, in the present case, is Roman who received 97 percent of the votes cast. He explained that, in Socrates v. COMELEC,
he also voted to affirm the clear choice of the electorate, because in a democracy the people should, as much as legally possible, be governed by leaders freely
chosen by them in credible elections. He concluded that, in election cases, when two conflicting legal positions are of almost equal weight, the scales of justice
should be tilted in favor of the people's overwhelming choice.
o Petitioners have not clearly demonstrated that the ineligibility of respondent governor is so patently antagonistic to constitutional and legal principles
that overriding it and thereby giving effect to the peoples will would ultimately be more prejudicial to the democratic fundamentals and juristic
traditions of our country.
Azcuna, J. (joined by Bellosillo, J.): It is clear from the constitutional provision that the disqualification applies only if the terms are consecutive and the service is
full and continuous. Hence, service for less than a term, except only in case of voluntary renunciation, should not count to disqualify an elective local official
from running for the same position. This case is different from Socrates v. COMELEC, where the full three consecutive terms had been continuously served so that
disqualification had clearly attached.
o What is prohibited is not simply an "immediate reelection," as contended by the majority in Socrates v. COMELEC, but rather serving for more than
three consecutive terms, i. e., service in the immediately following term, the fourth term. Serving during such term, whether from the start, in the
middle or at the end, would still consist in service "for more than three consecutive terms." In reference to the prohibited service, it is not required
that it be for the full term. What is proscribed is service, of any length, during the prohibited term, for such would still constitute service for more than
three consecutive terms. In the present case, respondent Romans election as governor in the recall election of 1992 should not be counted as one full
term.

7 VOTED TO GRANT
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J. (joined by Davide, Jr., C.J., Austria-Martinez, Corona, and Callejo, Sr., JJ.): The recall term served by respondent Roman, comprising the
period June 28, 1994 to June 30, 1995, should be considered as one term. Since he thereafter served for two consecutive terms from 1995 to 1998 and from 1998
to 2001, his election on May 14, 2001 was actually his fourth term and contravenes Art. X, Section 8 of the Constitution.
o In applying the three-term limit to an elective official, the foregoing constitutional and statutory provisions provide that (1) he should have been elected
to a public office; and (2) he should have served three consecutive terms for the same elective position. These two requirements are present in the
instant case, thus barring respondent from serving as governor of Bataan from 2001 to 2004. It bears emphasis that the said constitutional and statutory
provisions on term limits make no distinction as to the nature of the election whether regular, special or recall elections. The elementary rule in
statutory construction is that where the law does not distinguish, the courts should make no distinction.
o While the discussion on term limits specifically refers to special elections for Senators and Representatives, the same principle equally applies to a recall
term of local officials. The constitutional provision is explicit that "the term of office of elective local officials, . . . shall be three years and no such
officials shall serve for more than three consecutive terms." In other words, the Constitution limits the service of elective local officials to a total of nine
consecutive years. To exclude the service of such official who won the recall election would certainly permit a circumvention of the purpose of the
three-term rule, since he may hold the same elective position longer than three consecutive terms, or more than the maximum nine consecutive years,
as in the case of respondent Roman.
o The object of the three-term limit is to forestall the accumulation of massive political power by an elective local official who intends to perpetuate
himself in office. Another purpose is to broaden the choices of the electorate of the candidates who will run for office, and to infuse new blood in the
political arena by disqualifying officials from running for the same office after serving nine (9) consecutive years. It is in the light of these objectives that
this Court should interpret the constitutional proscription.
Carpio, J. (joined by Carpio-Morales, J.): A recall term constitutes one term and that to totally ignore a recall term in determining the three-term limit would
allow local officials to serve for more than nine consecutive years contrary to the manifest intent of the framers of the Constitution. He contended that
respondent Roman's election in 2001 cannot exempt him from the three-term limit imposed by the Constitution.
o A recall term arises from a special election for a fixed term of office the unexpired term of the recalled official. The official elected in a recall election
has the same functions and powers as an official elected to the same office in a regular election. The recall term is a legal and political fact that cannot
just be dismissed as a stray term.

01 Osmea vs. Commission on Elections AUTHOR: Adre

[G.R. No. 100318. July 30, 1991] NOTES: VERY lengthy discussion about jurisdiction kesa sa Main Issue ng
TOPIC: Tenure of Office constitutionality. Kaya pasensya na kung lengthy din

PONENTE: Paras, J.
The case calls for a determination of the validity and constitutionality of Republic Act
7056, "An Act Providing for the National and Local Elections in 1992, Pave the Way for
Synchronized and Simultaneous Elections Beginning 1995, and Authorizing
Appropriations Therefor," which was signed into law on June 20,
1991.(RA7056:http://www.lawphil.net/statutes/repacts/ra1991/ra_7056_1991.html)
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: The legislature cannot extend the term of officers by providing that they shall hold over until their successors are elected and qualified where the
Constitution has in effect fixed the term and the day on which the official term shall begin

It is not competent for the legislature to extend the term of officers by providing that they shall hold over until their successors are elected and qualified where the constitution
has in effect or by clear implication prescribed the term and when the Constitution fixes the day on which the official term shall begin, there is no legislative authority to continue
the office beyond that period, even though the successors fail to qualify within the time.
FACTS:
PETITION for prohibition, mandamus and injunction to review the constitutionality of Republic Act 7056.

The case was filed by Gov. Emilio Osmea (Cebu), Gov. Roberto Pagdanganan (on behalf of the League of Governors of the Philippines) and 4
congressmen(Representatives Pablo P. Garcia (3rd District-Cebu), Raul V. del Mar (North District-Cebu City), Antonio T. Bacaltos (1st District-Cebu), Wilfredo G. Cainglet
(3rd District-Zamboanga del Norte) and Romeo Guanzon (lone District-Bacolod City)) filed assailing the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7056 passed on June 20, 1991.

They filed this petition claiming that they have actual and material interest in the subject matter of the case not only as public officials sworn to support and defend the
Constitution but also as taxpayers having an interest in seeing to it that public funds are properly and lawfully disbursed.

In assailing the said law, they claim that:

1. R.A. 7056 violates the mandate of the Constitution for the holding of synchronized national and local elections on the second Monday of May 1992;
2. R.A. 7056, particularly the 2nd paragraph of Section 3 thereof, providing that all incumbent provincial, city and municipal officials shall hold over beyond June
30, 1992 and shall serve until their successors shall have been duly elected and qualified violates Section 2, Article XVIII (Transitory Provision) of the Constitution;
3. The same paragraph of Section 3 of R.A.7056, which in effect, shortens the term or tenure of office of local officials to be elected on the 2nd Monday of
November, 1992 violates Section 8, Article X of the Constitution;
4. Section 8 of Republic Act 7056, providing for the campaign periods for Presidential, Vice-Presidential and Senatorial elections, violates the provision of Section
9, Article IX under the title "Commission on Elections" of the Constitution;
5. The so-called many difficult if not insurmountable problems mentioned in Republic Act 7056 to synchronized national and local elections set by the Constitution
on the second Monday of May, 1992, are not sufficient, much less, valid justification for postponing the local elections to the second Monday of November 1992,
and in the process violating the Constitution itself. If, at all, Congress can devise ways and means, within the parameters of the Constitution, to eliminate or at least
minimize these problems and if this, still, is not feasible, resort can be made to the self-correcting mechanism built in the Constitution for its amendment or revision.
SolGen, counsel for COMELEC, prays for the denial of this petition arguing that the question is political in nature and that the petitioners lack legal standing to file the
petition and what they are asking for is an advisory opinion from the court, there being no justiciable controversy to resolve.
SolGen contends that Republic Act 7056 is a valid exercise of legislative power by Congress and that the regular amending process prescribed by the Constitution does
not apply to its transitory provisions.
ISSUE(S):
1st: Whether or not Court has jurisdiction . YES
2nd: Whether or not R.A. 7056 is unconstitutional. YES.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, Republic Act 7056 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL, hence, NULL and VOID.
RATIO:
1ST issue (JURISDICTION):
The Court has the competence and right to act on the matter at bar because what was presented was the question on the legality of R.A. No. 7056 and not its
wisdom.
The Court also stated that even if the issue was political in nature, it was not exclusively a political one, hence, involving a question of national importance and
falls for juridical review.
The Court further stated that under Section 1, Art. VIII of the 1987 constitution, it is within the powers of the court to determine whether there is grave abuse of
discretion resulting to excess or lack of jurisdiction by other branches of the government.

The issue presented in the case at bar, is justiciable rather than political. Even if the question were political in nature, it would still come within Courts powers of review under
the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us by Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, which includes the authority to determine whether grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction has been committed by any branch or instrumentality of the government. As for the other alleged procedural flaws lack of court
standing, etc., assuming the existence of such flaws, the same may be brushed aside, conformably with existing doctrine so that the important constitutional issue raised may
be addressed.

Accordingly, Court is left with no other alternative but to uphold the jurisdiction over the present cases. It goes without saying that Court does this not because the Court is
superior to the Executive and/or Legislative but simply because the Executive, the Legislative and this Court are subject to the Constitution as the supreme law.

As the Court stated in Daza v. Singson, supra:

. . . But as our jurisdiction has been invoked and more importantly because a constitutional stalemate has to be resolved, there was no alternative for us except to act and to
act decisively. In doing so, of course, we are not imposing our will upon the said agencies, or substituting our discretion for theirs, but merely discharging our sworn
responsibility to interpret and apply the Constitution. That is a duty we do not evade, lest we ourselves betray our oath.

2nd Issue (Constitutionality):

It is unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court held that the law contravenes Article XVIII, Sections 2 and 5 of the 1987 Constitution which provides for the synchronization of national and local
elections. The said law, on the other hand, provides for the de-synchronization of election by mandating that there be two separate elections in 1992.

Upon the other hand, and contrary to the express mandate of the 1987 Constitution, Republic Act 7056 provides for two (2) separate elections in 1992 as follows:
Sec. 2. Start of Synchronization To start the process of synchronization of election in accordance with the policy hereinbefore declared there shall be held:
(a) An election for President and Vice-President of the Philippines, twenty four (24) Senators and all elective Members of the House of Representatives on the second
Monday of May, 1992, and
(b) An election of all provincial, city and municipal elective officials on the second Monday of November, 1992.
 The purpose of Republic Act 7056 is as stated in Section 1 thereof under the heading "Statement of Policy"
. . . to start, as much as practicable, the synchronization of the elections so that the process can be completed in the 1995 elections with the result that beginning
1995 there shall be only one (1) simultaneous regular elections for national and local elective officials every three (3) years.

The term of synchronization in the mentioned constitutional provision was used synonymously as the phrase holding simultaneously since this is the precise intent in
terminating their Office Tenure on the same day or occasion. This common termination date will synchronize future elections to once every three years.

R.A. No. 7056 also violated Sec. 2, Art. XVIII of the 1987 Constitution which provides that the local official first elected under the Constitution shall serve until
noon of June 30, 1992. But under Sec. 3 of RA 7056, these incumbent local officials shall hold over beyond June 30, 1992 and shall serve until their successors shall have been
duly elected and qualified. The Supreme Court, quoting Corpus Juris Secundum, states that it is not competent for the legislature to extend the term of officers by providing
that they shall hold over until their successors are elected and qualified where the constitution has in effect or by clear implication prescribed the term and when the Constitution
fixes the day on which the official term shall begin, there is no legislative authority to continue the office beyond that period, even though the successors fail to qualify within
the time.

R.A. No. 7056 also violated the clear mandate of Sec. 8, Art. X of 1987 Constitution which fixed the term of office of all elective local officials, except barangay
officials, to three (3) years. If the local election will be held on the second Monday of November 1992 under RA 7056, those to be elected will be serving for only two years
and seven months, that is, from November 30, 1992 to June 30, 1995, not three years.

The law was also held violative of Sec. 9, Article IX of the Constitution by changing the campaign period. RA 7056 provides for a different campaign period, as follows:

a) For President arid Vice-Presidential elections one hundred thirty (130) days before the day of election.
b) For Senatorial elections, ninety (90) days before the day of the election, and
c) For the election of Members of the House of Representatives and local elective provincial, city and municipal officials forty-five (45) days before the
day of the elections.
All these the postponement of the holding of a synchronized national and local election from 1992 to 1995; the hold-over provision for incumbent local officials; the
reduction of the term of office of local officials to be elected on the second Monday of November 1992 and the change in the campaign periods, are violative of the 1987
Constitution.

Solicitor General: that the method of amendment or revision prescribed by the Constitution (Article XVIII) does not apply to the Transitory Provisions because in the nature of
things Transitory Provisions are to be carried out as soon as practicable, and Congress can, in the exercise of its legislative power enact the needed legislation, in this case RA
7056, deserves no consideration at all. The 1987 Constitution has stated in clear and categorical language that "the six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-President
elected in the February 7, 1986 election is, for purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992 (Article XVIII, Sec. 5)." As discussed earlier,
the elections referred to, to be synchronized with the election of the President and Vice-President on the second Monday of May 1992, is the election for Senators, Members
of the House of Representatives and local officials.

Incidentally, Webster defines

Synchronization as the act or result of synchronizing; concurrence of events or motions in respect to time.
Synchronize to happen or take place at the same time; to represent or arrange event so as to indicate coincidence or co-existence; to cause to agree in time.
It is noteworthy that the Solicitor General evaded the issue of the constitutionality of Republic Act 7056. Although he made a lengthy discussion on the procedural issues and
on the legislative power of Congress, he failed to refute the arguments of the petitioners that Republic Act 7056 violated several provisions of the 1987 Constitution more
importantly, the provision on synchronization of election.
In summary:
RA 7056 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL because it suggests:
o A separate national and local elections
o Extension on the terms of incumbent elective officials
o Local officials elected will only serve 2 years and 7 months (3 years dapat under Sec.8, Art. 10 of 1987 Constitution)
o Different campaign periods. (COMELEC lang ang dapat may jurisdiction over this under Sec. 9 Art. 9 of Constitution and not the congress.)

LABO v. COMELEC SUPRA

A.M. No. MTJ-94-985 February 21, 1995

APOLINARIO MUEZ, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE CIRIACO ARIO, MCTC, San Francisco, Agusan del Sur, respondent.

MENDOZA, J.:
This is an administrative complaint1 against respondent Judge Ciriaco C. Ario of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of San Francisco, Agusan del Sur for knowingly rendering an
unjust judgment as defined and penalized under Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code. The complaint was originally filed with the Office of the Ombudsman which, after
dismissing the case for lack of probable cause for filing in court, nevertheless referred the case to this Court "for possible administrative action against respondent."
It appears that on December 26, 1989, Mayor Irisari of Loreto, Agusan del Sur summoned to his office herein complainant Apolinario S. Muez for conference respecting a land
dispute which Muez had with one Tirso Amado. As complainant failed to attend the conference, Mayor Irisari issued a warrant of arrest against him on December 27, 1989. 2
The warrant was served on complainant by CFC Redelio Caballes and Cpl. Rolando Limayan and by virtue of it complainant was brought before Mayor Irisari, although no
investigation was later conducted.
Complainant filed a complaint3 against Mayor Irisari for grave misconduct and usurpation of judicial function with the Office of the Ombudsman as well as administrative
complaint4 for violation of the Constitution, misconduct in office and abuse of authority with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur.
After preliminary investigation, the investigating officer of the Office of the Ombudsman filed a case5 for usurpation of judicial function against Mayor Asuero Irisari in the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Loreto, Agusan del Sur. Originally raffled to the judge of that court, the criminal case was later assigned to respondent Judge Ciriaco Ario on
account of the inhibition of the first judge.
Accused Irisari moved to quash the information on the ground that the acts complained of did not constitute a crime under the law. He contended that under 143(3) of the
former Local Government Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 337), mayors were authorized to issue warrants of arrest.6
On July 28, 1992, respondent Judge Ario denied the motion to quash on the ground that the power of mayors to issue warrants of arrest had ceased to exist as of February 2,
1987 when the Constitution took effect.
For its part the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, acting on the administrative complaint against the mayor, found him guilty of misconduct in office and abuse of authority and
accordingly ordered him suspended for eight (8) months without pay. On appeal, however, the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) reversed on the ground that
what the mayor had issued to the complainant, although denominated "Warrant of Arrest," was actually just an invitation or a summons.
On September 21, 1992, Mayor Irisari filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of denial of respondent judge, invoking the resolution of the DILG.
In an order dated February 15, 1993, respondent Judge Ario reconsidered his previous order and dismissed the case. Respondent said in his order:
The accused, in his Motion for Reconsideration, asserts that since the question about the warrant of arrest issued against Apolinario Muez has been
resolved in an administrative proceedings as not the warrant of arrest contemplated by law, it would follow then that this case now before this Court
against the accused be dismissed. The Court finds that the subject matter in this case and that in the administrative complaint arose from one and the
same incident and it involved the same parties.
Courts are not bound by the findings of administrative agencies like the DILG as in this case if such findings are tainted with unfairness and there is
arbitrary action or palpable serious error.
. . . The Court believes that the resolution by the administrative agency in DLG-AC-60-91 is not tainted with unfairness and arbitrariness neither it shows
arbitrary action or palpable and serious error, therefore, it must be respected (Mangubat vs. de Castro, G.R. 33892; July 28, 1988; Blue Bar Coconut
Philippines vs. Tantuico, Jr., et al., G.R. 47051, July 29, 1988, Cuerdo vs. Commission on Audit, G.R. 84592, October 27, 1988).
Upon receipt of this order, complainant Muez sent two letters dated July 5 and 12, 1933 to the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission charging respondent Judge Ciriaco C. Ario
with knowingly rendering an unjust judgment for dismissing the case against Mayor Irisari. The matter was indorsed to the Office of the Ombudsman which, as already stated,
referred it to this Court for possible disciplinary action against respondent judge.7
We agree with the Office of the Ombudsman that while respondent judge may have acted in good faith, he should nevertheless be administratively held liable.
The acts alleged in the information constitute a crime. Under Art. 241 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of usurpation of judicial authority involves the following elements: (1)
that the offender is an officer of the executive branch of the government; and (2) that he assumes judicial powers, or obstructs the execution of any order or decision rendered
by any judge within his jurisdiction. These elements were alleged in the information. Mayor Irisari was an officer of the executive branch.
It is not true that what he had issued against the complainant was not a warrant of arrest. It was. In plain terms it stated:
Republic of the Philippines
PROVINCE OF AGUSAN DEL SUR
MUNICIPALITY OF LORETO
Office of the Mayor

WARRANT OF ARREST
TO: ANY OFFICE OF THE LAW
This Municipality
G R E E T I N G S:
You are hereby requested/ordered to effect the arrest of Apolinario Muez of Poblacion, Loreto, Agusan del Sur, for his refusal to acknowledge the
Summons dated December 26, 1989, and bring him before the Office of the Municipal Mayor to answer an inquiry/investigation in connection with the
complaint of one Tirso Amado held pending before this Office.
FOR COMPLIANCE.
 For and in the absence of
the Municipal Circuit Judge
Any one reading the warrant could not have been mistaken that it was a warrant for the arrest of the complainant Apolinario Muez. As a matter of fact Mayor Irisari justified
his order on the basis of 143(3) of the former Local Government Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 337) which expressly provided that in cases where the mayor may conduct
preliminary investigation, the mayor shall, upon probable cause after examination of witnesses, have the authority to order the arrest of the accused." This provision had,
however, been repealed by Art. III, 2 of the 1987 Constitution, as this Court held in Ponsica v. Ignalaga,8 in which it was explained:
No longer does the mayor have at this time the power to conduct preliminary investigations, much less issue orders of arrest. Section 143 of the Local
Government Code, conferring this power on the mayor has been abrogated, rendered functus officio by the 1987 Constitution which took effect on
February 2, 1987, the date of its ratification by the Filipino people. Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution pertinently provides that "no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or things to be
seized." The constitutional proscription has thereby been manifested that thenceforth, the function of determining probable cause and issuing, on the
basis thereof, warrants of arrest or search warrants, may be validly exercised only by judges, this being evidenced by the elimination in the present
Constitution of the phrase, "such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law" found in the counterpart provision of said 1973 Constitution
who, aside from judges, might conduct preliminary investigation and issue warrants of arrest or search warrants.
That there was no pending criminal case against the complainant did not make the order against him any less an order of arrest, contrary to the opinion of DILG.
On the other hand, the issuance of the warrant when there was before him no criminal case, but only a land dispute as it is now being made to appear, only made it worse for
the mayor, for it would then appear that he assumed a judicial function which even a judge could not have done. All the more, therefore, respondent judge should not have
dismissed the criminal case against the mayor.
It cannot be pretended that Mayor Irisari merely intended to invite or summon Muez to his office because he had precisely done this the day before he issued the warrant of
arrest, and he ordered the arrest of complainant because the latter had refused to appear before him. The summons issued by Mayor Irisari shows clearly that he understood
the difference between a summons and a warrant of arrest. The summons read:
Republic of the Philippines
PROVINCE OF AGUSAN DEL SUR
MUNICIPALITY OF LORETO
Office of the Mayor

SUMMON
TO: Mr. Apolinario Muez
Loreto, Agusan del Sur
G R E E T I N G S:
You are hereby demanded to appear before the Office of the Municipal Mayor on 27 December 1989 at around 9:30 A.M. then and there to answer in an
inquiry/investigation in connection with a certain complaint of Mr. Tirso Amado lodged in this office.
PLEASE FAIL NOT under the penalty of the law.
Loreto, Agusan del Sur, Philippines.
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Indeed, respondent had previously denied the motion to dismiss which the accused Mayor Irisari had filed on the ground that the authority (B.P. Blg. 337, 143[3]) invoked by
him as basis for his warrant of arrest had been abrogated by the Constitution. He subsequently reversed himself on the ground that the decision of the DILG, finding Mayor
Irisari not guilty, "must be respected." He said, "Courts are not bound by findings of administrative agencies like the DILG as in this case if such findings are tainted with
unfairness and there is arbitrary action or palpable serious error." Since the DILG decision was not so tainted, "therefore, it must be respected."
Respondent Judge Ciriaco Ario should have known that the case of Mayor Irisari was not before him on review from the decision of an administrative agency and, therefore,
there was no basis for applying the rule on substantiality of evidence. What was before him was a criminal case and he should have considered solely the facts alleged in the
information in resolving the motion to dismiss of the accused. At the very least, he showed poor judgment and gross ignorance of basic legal principles, for which he should be
reminded of what this Court said in Libarios v. Dabalos:9
In the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge done in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action, even though such
acts may be erroneous. But, while judges should not be disciplined for inefficiency on account merely of occasional mistakes or errors of judgment, yet, it
is highly imperative that they should be conversant with basic legal principles.
In every case, a judge should endeavor diligently to ascertain the facts and the applicable law unswayed by partisan or personal interests, public opinion
or fear of criticism. . . . A judge owes it to the public and the administration of justice to know the law he is supposed to apply to a given controversy. He
is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules. There will be faith in the administration of justice
only if there be a belief on the part of litigants that the occupants of the bench cannot justly be accused of a deficiency in their grasp of legal principles. 10
But there is more than just gross ignorance of legal principles shown here. Although he denies it, what the respondent judge appears to have actually done in this case was to
rely on the opinion of the DILG which found the mayor not guilty of serious misconduct in office on the ground that he had not really issued a warrant of arrest against the
complainant but only an invitation or a summons. To justify his reliance on the opinion of the DILG, respondent judge invoked the rule in administrative law that the findings of
facts of administrative agencies when supported by substantial evidence, are binding on the courts in the absence of a showing of fraud, imposition or dishonesty. We have
already stated why that is grossly erroneous. What we are here concerned is that by relying on the opinion of the DILG, disregarding a previous ruling he had made which was in
accordance with law, respondent judge showed lack of capacity for independent judgment.
WHEREFORE, a FINE of P5,000.00 is imposed on respondent Judge Ciriaco Ario. He is enjoined to exercise greater care and diligence in the performance of his duties as a judge
and warned that a repetition of the similar offense will be dealt with more severely. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 83987 December 27, 1994

GREATER BALANGA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
MUNICIPALITY OF BALANGA, BATAAN; SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF BALANGA, BATAAN; HON. MELANIO S. BANZON, JR.; HON. DOMINGO D. DIZON; HON. AGRIPINO C.
BANZON; HON. EDUARDO P. TUAZON; HON. GABRIEL J. NISAY; HON. LORENZO P. TAPAN; HON. FEDERICO S. BUSTAMANTE; HON. ROLANDO H. DAVID; HON. EDILBERTO Q.
DE GUZMAN; HON. ALFREDO C. GUILA; and HON. GAVINO S. SANTIAGO, respondents.
Ricardo C. Valmonte and Reynaldo L. Bagatsing for petitioner.

QUIASON, J.:
This a a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court to annul Executive Order No. 1, s-88 and Resolution No. 12, s-88 issued,
respectively, by the Mayor and the Sangguniang Bayan of Balanga, Bataan.
I
This case involves a parcel of land, Lot 261-B-6-A-3 of the subdivision plan Psd 03-007623, situated in Barrio San Jose, Municipality of Balanga, Province of Bataan. The lot has an
area of 8,467 square meters. It is registered under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 120152 issued on January 11, 1988 by the Register of Deeds of the Province of Bataan in the
name of petitioner Greater Balanga Development Corporation. Petitioner is a domestic corporation owned and controlled by the Camacho family, which donated to the
Municipality of Balanga the present site of the Balanga Public Market. The lot in dispute lies behind the Balanga Public Market.
In 1987, petitioner conducted a relocation survey of the area. It discovered that certain portions of the property had been "unlawfully usurped and invaded" by the Municipality
of Balanga, which had "allowed/tolerated/abetted" the construction of shanties and market stalls while charging market fees and market entrance fees from the occupants and
users of the area. A portion of the lot had also been utilized as an unloading site ("bagsakan") of transient vegetable vendors, who were charged market and entrance fees by
the municipality.
On January 11, 1988, petitioner applied with the Office of the Mayor of Balanga for a business permit to engage in business in the said area. On the same day, Mayor Melanio S.
Banzon, Jr. issued Mayor's Permit No. 2729, granting petitioner the privilege of a "real estate dealer/privately-owned public market operator" under the trade name of Balanga
Public Market. The permit was to expire on December 31, 1988. Petitioner likewise registered "Balanga Central Market" as a trade name with the Bureau of Trade Regulations
and Consumer Protection.
On February 19, 1988, however, the Sangguniang Bayan of Balanga passed Resolution No. 12, s-88 annulling the Mayor's permit issued to petitioner and advising the Mayor to
revoke the permit "to operate a public market."
Pursuant to said Resolution, Mayor Banzon, on March 7, 1988, issued Executive Order No. 1, s-88 revoking the permit insofar as it authorized the operation of a public market.
On July 13, 1988, petitioner filed the instant petition with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction or restraining order aimed at
the reinstatement of the Mayor's permit and the curtailment of the municipality's collection of market fees and market entrance fees. The Court did not issue the preliminary
reliefs prayed for.
Respondent asserted that as the local chief executive, the Mayor may issue, deny or revoke municipal licenses and permits. They contended that Resolution No. 12, s-88 of the
Sangguniang Bayan, the basis of Executive Order No. 1, s-88, was a legitimate exercise of local legislative authority and, as such, the revocation of petitioner's permit was not
tainted with any grave abuse of discretion.
Petitioner replied that since it had not violated any law or ordinance, there was no reason for respondents to revoke the Mayor's permit issued to it. On the contrary, petitioner
asserted that the executive order and the resolution in question were quasi-judicial acts and not mere exercises of police power. It questioned respondents' failure to observe
due process in revoking the permit and challenged the legality of the collection of the market and entrance fees by the municipality.
In their Rejoinder, respondents pointed out that petitioner had violated an existing municipal ordinance when it failed to disclose the true status of the area involved in the
permit and when it did not secure separate permits for its two businesses, i.e., one as "real estate dealer" and another as "privately-owned public market operator."
Respondents referred to Section 3A-06(b) of the Balanga Revenue Code which, inter alia, enjoins an applicant for a Mayor's permit from making a false statement in his
application and provides for the penalties for violation of any existing ordinance regulating business establishments.
II
Mayor's Permit No. 2729 was revoked by Executive Order No. 1, s-88, which reads as follows:
By virtue of the authority vested upon me by law as Mayor of the Municipality of Balanga, and as per Resolution No. 12, s-88 of the Sangguniang Bayan of
Balanga, the Mayor's Permit in the latter portion of its purpose, i.e., "to operate a public market," issued to the Greater Balanga Development
Corporation, is hereby REVOKED, effective immediately.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I hereunto have set my hand this 7th day of March 1988, at Balanga, Bataan.
(SGD.) MELANIO S. BANZON, JR.
Municipal Mayor
(Rollo, p. 36)
The authority of the Mayor to revoke a permit he issued is premised on a violation by the grantee of any of the conditions for which the permit had been granted. Respondents
claimed that petitioner had violated the provisions of Section 3A-06(b) of the Balanga Revenue Code when it failed to inform the Mayor that the lot in controversy was the
subject of adverse claims for which a civil case was filed.
Section 3A-06(b) of the Balanga Revenue Code reads:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) The application for a Mayor's permit shall state the name, residence and citizenship of (sic) the applicant's full description of the business, the
particular place where (sic) the same shall be conducted, and such other pertinent information and date (sic) as any (sic) be required. If the applicant
deliberately makes a false statement in the application form, the Municipal Mayor may revoke the permit and the applicant may be prosecuted and
penalized in accordance with the pertinent provisions of penal laws.
In case a person desires to conduct the same kind or line of business in another place within the Municipality, in addition to or aside from the
establishment specified in his permit, he shall secure a separate permit for each business and pay the corresponding fee imposed in this article. If a
person desires to engage in more than one kind or line of business, he shall pay the fee imposed on each separate business, notwithstanding the fact that
he may conduct or operate all distinct business (sic), trades or occupation in one place only.
xxx xxx xxx
(h) Revocation of Permit. The Municipal Mayor may revoke a permit, in effect close the establishment, upon a violation of existing ordinance
regulating business establishments or any provisions of this article, in addition to the fine and imprisonment that they (sic) may be imposed by the court
for violation of this article (Memorandum of the Solicitor General, pp. 16-17; Rollo, p. 322).
Respondents claim that petitioner (1) deliberately made a false statement in the application form when it failed to provide the information that their place of business is the
subject of adverse claims; and (2) failed to apply for two separate permits for the two lines of business it proposed to engage in.
The application for Mayor's permit in the case at bench requires the applicant to state what type of "business", profession, occupation and/or calling privileges" is being applied
for. Petitioner left this entry bank in its application form (Rollo, p. 324). It is only in the Mayor's permit itself that petitioner's lines of business appear, which in this case are two
separate types, one as real estate dealer and another as public market operator.
The permit should not have been issued without the required information given in the application form itself. Revoking the permit, however, because of a false statement in the
application form cannot be justified under the aforementioned provision. There must be proof of willful misrepresentation and deliberate intent to make a false statement.
Good faith is always presumed, and as it happened, petitioner did not make any false statement in the pertinent entry.
Neither was petitioner's applying for two businesses in one permit a ground for revocation. The second paragraph of Section 3A-06(b) does not expressly require two permits for
their conduct of two or more businesses in one place, but only that separate fees be paid for each business. The powers of municipal corporations are to be construed
in strictissimi juris and any doubt or ambiguity must be construed against the municipality (City of Ozamiz v. Lumapas, 65 SCRA 33 [1975]). Granting, however, that separate
permits are actually required, the application form does not contain any entry as regards the number of businesses the applicant wishes to engage in.
Respondents insinuated bad faith on the part of petitioner in failing to supply the pertinent information in the application form and for taking advantage of the fact that Mayor
Banzon was then newly installed as Mayor of Balanga. The absence of the material information in the application form was nonetheless supplied in the face of the permit signed
and issued by Mayor Banzon himself (Rollo, p. 17).
Under the law, the Sangguniang Bayan has the power to provide for the establishment and maintenance of public markets in the municipality and "to regulate any business
subject to municipal license tax or fees and prescribe the conditions under which a municipal license may be revoked" (B.P. Blg. 337, Sec. 149 [1] [f & r]). It was this authority
which respondent Sangguniang Bayan invoked when it issued Resolution No. 12, s-88.
The said Resolution stated that the land subject of this case was earmarked for the expansion of the Balanga Public Market; that this land was owned not by petitioner but by
the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3803 entitled "Leoncia Dizon, et. al. v. Aurora B. Camacho"; that the Municipality of Balanga was not apprised of the existence of the civil case; that
the decision awarding the lot to the plaintiffs and the issuance of the Mayor's permit to petitioner who was not the rightful owner had caused "anxiety, uncertainty and
restiveness" among the stallholders and traders in the subject lot; and that the Sangguniang Bayan therefore resolved to annul the said Mayor's permit insofar as it concerns the
operation of a public market.
As may be gleaned from said Resolution, the main reason for the revocation of the Mayor's permit was the controversy engendered by the filing of Civil Case No. 3803 before
the Regional Trial Court, Balanga, Bataan involving the ownership of certain portions of Lot 261-B, the land from which Lot 261-B-6-A-3 was derived.
Lot 261-B was originally owned and registered in the name of Aurora T. Banzon Camacho, who subdivided the land into nine lots under LRC
Psd-277050 and designated them as Lots 261-B-1 to 261-B-9. She denoted some of the lots to the Municipality of Balanga which now comprise the Balanga Public Market, and
sold others to third persons.
On January 30, 1974, five buyers of certain portions of Lot 261-B filed Civil Case No. 3803 against Camacho for partition and delivery of titles. Camacho was declared in default
and the plaintiffs forthwith presented their evidence. On December 20, 1974, the trial court rendered a decision ordering the defendant to segregate the definite portions sold
to the plaintiffs and deliver to them the corresponding titles thereto. This decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals on January 30, 1981 in CA-G.R. No. 59148-R (G.R. No.
62223, Rollo, pp. 50-58).
The defendant elevated the matter to this Court. In a Resolution dated March 21, 1983, we denied the petition for lack of merit (G.R. No. 62223, Rollo, p. 100).
The question now is whether Lot 261-B-6-A-3 is a part of the land adjudged by the trial court in Civil Case No. 3803 to the plaintiffs, or any one of them.
Lot 261-B-6-A-3 was originally registered in the name of Camacho under TCT No. T-104438. She denoted the land to her daughter, Aurora Fe (Rollo,
p. 329). TCT No. 104438 was then cancelled and TCT No. T-104461 issued in the donee's name, who in turn, transferred the land to herein petitioner. TCT
No. 104461 of Aurora Fe was cancelled and TCT No. 120152 was issued in petitioner's name on January 11, 1988. On the same day, the Mayor's permit to operate the lot as a
public market was also granted.
It is the position of respondents that the series of transfers of the subject lot reveals a scheme to avoid the application of the decision in Civil Case
No. 3803.
There is no question that Lot 261-B-6-A-3 is a portion of Lot 261-B-6, and the claims of the plaintiffs in the civil case were on Lots 261-B-6 and
261-B-7 (Rollo, p. 327). As to whether plaintiffs' claims embraced specifically Lot 261-B-6-A-3 could not be determined from the face of the decision in the civil case. There is no
showing that Lot 261-B-6-A-3 was awarded by the court to one of the plaintiffs therein. There is no proof either that the judgment in said case had already been executed and
the titles delivered to the plaintiffs.
The question of ownership over Lot 261-B had already been settled with finality by the Supreme Court in 1983 in G.R. No. 62223. Entry of judgment was likewise, made in the
same year. When the Mayor's permit was revoked on February 19, 1988, five years had already elapsed since the case was decided. Petitioner was able to survey the land and
have the survey approved on March 21, 1984 (Rollo, pp. 15-16), and on January 11, 1988, petitioner obtained in its name TCT No. 120152 "without any memorandum of
encumbrance or encumbrances pertaining to any decision rendered in any civil case" (Rollo,
p. 199). Clearly, for all intents and purposes, petitioner appeared to be the true owner of Lot 261-B-6-A-3 when respondents revoked its permit to engaged in business on its
own land.
Assuming arguendo that Lot 261-B-6-A-3 was actually one of those awarded to the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3803 and the Transfer Certificate of Title of petitioner is spurious,
this still does not justify the revocation of the Mayor's permit.
A close scrutiny of the records reveals that the Sangguniang Bayan did not establish or maintain any public market on the subject lot. The resolution merely mentioned the plan
to acquire the lot for expansion of the public market adjacent thereto. Until expropriation proceedings are instituted in court, the
landowner cannot be deprived of its right over the land (Province of Rizal v. San Diego, 105 Phil. 33 [1959]; Republic v. Baylosis, 96 Phil. 461 [1955]). Of course, the Sangguniang
Bayan has the duty in the exercise of its police powers to regulate any business subject to municipal license fees and prescribe the conditions under which a municipal license
already issued may be revoked (B.P. Blg. 337, Sec. 149 [1] [r]). But the "anxiety, uncertainty, restiveness" among the stallholders and traders cannot be a valid ground for
revoking the permit of petitioner. After all, the stallholders and traders were doing business on property not belonging to the Municipal government. Indeed, the claim that the
executive order and resolution were measures "designed to promote peace and order and protect the general welfare of the people of Balanga" is too amorphous and
convenient an excuse to justify respondents' acts (Villacorta v. Bernardo, 143 SCRA 480 [1986]).
Moreover, we find that the manner by which the Mayor revoked the permit transgressed petitioner's right to due process (Gordon v. Veridiano II, 167 SCRA 51 [1988]). The
alleged violation of Section 3A-06(b) of the Balanga Revenue Code was not stated in the order of revocation, and neither was petitioner informed of this specific violation until
the Rejoinder was filed in the instant case. In fact, with all the more reason should due process have been observed in view of the questioned Resolution of the Sangguniang
Bayan.
The knowledge of the pendency of Civil Case No. 3803 could not ipso facto nullify any claim petitioner had on the lot. This necessitated first and foremost a determination of the
exact parameters of the lot and a finding that petitioner is not the true owner thereof. The finding that Civil Case No. 3803 was already settled by the Supreme Court should
have apprised respondents of the possibility that the decision therein may have already been executed.
Indeed, the cases of Austin Hardware Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 69 SCRA 564 (1976) and Enriquez v. Bidin, 47 SCRA 183 (1972) are in point. In these cases, the revocation of
the Mayor's permit was upheld by this Court because the grounds for revocation were admitted and not disputed.
If only for the violation of due process which is manifest from Executive Order No. 1, s-88 and Resolution No. 12, s-88, the Mayor's arbitrary action can be annulled.
In view of the undisputed fact that the respondent Municipality is not the owner of Lot 261-B-6-A-3, then there is no legal basis for it to impose and collect market fees and
market entrance fees. Only the owner has the right to do so.
Be that as it may, the Mayor's permit issued on January 11, 1988 cannot now be reinstated despite the nullity of its revocation. The permit expired on December 31, 1988.
WHEREFORE, (1) the petition for certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED and Executive Order No. 1, s-88 and Resolution No. 12, s-88 issued, respectively, by respondents Mayor
and Sangguniang Bayan of Balanga, Bataan are NULLIFIED for having been issued in grave abuse of discretion; and (2) the petition for mandamus is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 111397. August 12, 2002]
HON. ALFREDO LIM and RAFAELITO GARAYBLAS, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. WILFREDO REYES and BISTRO PIGALLE, INC., respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari[1] of the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 25, 1993,[2] and its Resolution dated July 13, 1993[3] which denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration. The assailed Decision sustained the orders dated December 29, 1992, January 20, 1993 and March 2, 1993, [4] issued by Branch 36 of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila. The trial courts orders enjoined petitioner Alfredo Lim (Lim for brevity), then Mayor of Manila, from investigating, impeding or closing down the
business operations of the New Bangkok Club and the Exotic Garden Restaurant owned by respondent Bistro Pigalle Inc. (Bistro for brevity).
The Antecedent Facts
On December 7, 1992 Bistro filed before the trial court a petition[5] for mandamus and prohibition, with prayer for temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary
injunction, against Lim in his capacity as Mayor of the City of Manila. Bistro filed the case because policemen under Lims instructions inspected and investigated Bistros license as
well as the work permits and health certificates of its staff. This caused the stoppage of work in Bistros night club and restaurant operations. [6] Lim also refused to accept Bistros
application for a business license, as well as the work permit applications of Bistros staff, for the year 1993.[7]
In its petition, Bistro argued that Lims refusal to issue the business license and work permits violated the doctrine laid down this Court in De la Cruz vs. Paras,[8] to wit:
Municipal corporations cannot prohibit the operation of nightclubs. They may be regulated, but not prevented from carrying on their business.
 Acting on Bistros application for injunctive relief, the trial court issued the first assailed temporary restraining order on December 29, 1992, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, respondent and/or his agents and representatives are ordered to refrain from inspecting or otherwise interfering in the operation of the establishments of
petitioner (Bistro Pigalle, Inc.).[9]
At the hearing, the parties submitted their evidence in support of their respective positions. On January 20, 1993, the trial court granted Bistros application for a writ of
prohibitory preliminary injunction. The dispositive portion of the trial courts order declared:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, Petitioners application for a writ of prohibitory preliminary injunction is granted, and Respondent, and any/all persons acting under his
authority, are and (sic) ordered to cease and desist from inspecting, investigating and otherwise closing or impeding the business operations of Petitioner Corporations
establishments while the petition here is pending resolution on the merits.
Considering that the Respondent is a government official and this injunction relates to his official duties, the posting of an injunction bond by the Petitioners is not required.
On the other hand, Petitioners application for a writ of mandatory injunction is hereby denied, for to grant the same would amount to granting the writ of mandamus prayed
for. The Court reserves resolution thereof until the parties shall have been heard on the merits.[10]
However, despite the trial courts order, Lim still issued a closure order on Bistros operations effective January 23, 1993, even sending policemen to carry out his closure
order.
On January 25, 1993, Bistro filed an Urgent Motion for Contempt against Lim and the policemen who stopped Bistros operations on January 23, 1993. At the hearing of the
motion for contempt on January 29, 1993, Bistro withdrew its motion on condition that Lim would respect the courts injunction.
However, on February 12, 13, 15, 26 and 27, and on March 1 and 2, 1993, Lim, acting through his agents and policemen, again disrupted Bistros business operations.
Meanwhile, on February 17, 1993, Lim filed a motion to dissolve the injunctive order of January 20, 1993 and to dismiss the case. Lim insisted that the power of a mayor to
inspect and investigate commercial establishments and their staff is implicit in the statutory power of the city mayor to issue, suspend or revoke business permits and licenses. This
statutory power is expressly provided for in Section 11 (l), Article II of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila and in Section 455, paragraph 3 (iv) of the Local Government Code
of 1991.
The trial court denied Lims motion to dissolve the injunction and to dismiss the case in an order dated March 2, 1993, the dispositive portion of which stated:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby orders:
(1) The denial of respondents motion to dissolve the writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction or the dismissal of the instant case;
(2) Petitioner-corporation is authorized to remove the wooden cross-bars or any other impediments which were placed at its establishments, namely, New Bangkok Club and
Exotic Garden Restaurant on February 12, 1993 and February 15, 1993, respectively, and thereafter said establishments are allowed to resume their operations;
(3) All the other petitioners are allowed to continue working in the aforenamed establishments of petitioner-corporation if they have not yet reported; and
(4) The hearing on the contempt proceedings is deferred to give sufficient time to respondent to elevate the matters assailed herein to the Supreme Court.[11]
On March 10, 1993, Lim filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against Bistro and Judge Wilfredo Reyes. Lim claimed that the
trial judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing the writ of prohibitory preliminary injunction.
On March 25, 1993, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision.[12] In a resolution dated July 13, 1993, the Court of Appeals denied Lims motion for
reconsideration.[13]
On July 1, 1993, Manila City Ordinance No. 7783[14] took effect. On the same day, Lim ordered the Western Police District Command to permanently close down the
operations of Bistro, which order the police implemented at once.[15]
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In denying Lims petition, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion since it issued the writ after hearing on the basis of the
evidence adduced.
The Court of Appeals reasoned thus:
x x x. A writ of preliminary injunction may issue if the act sought to be enjoined will cause irreparable injury to the movant or destroy the status quo before a full hearing can be
had on the merits of the case.
A writ of preliminary injunction, as an ancillary or preventive remedy, may only be resorted to by a litigant to protect or preserve his rights or interests and for no other purpose
during the pendency of the principal action. It is primarily intended to maintain the status quo between the parties existing prior to the filing of the case.
In the case at bar, We find that the respondent Judge did not act improvidently in issuing the assailed orders granting the writ of preliminary injunction in order to maintain the
status quo, while the petition is pending resolution on the merits. The private respondent correctly points out that the questioned writ was regularly issued after several
hearings, in which the parties were allowed to adduce evidence, and argue their respective positions.
The issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is within the limits of the sound exercise of discretion of the court and the appellate court will not interfere, except, in a clear
case of abuse thereof. x x x.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED DUE COURSE and is accordingly DISMISSED.[16]
Hence, this petition.
The Issues
In their Memorandum, petitioners raise the following issues:
1. DID RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMIT GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING HIS SAID ASSAILED ORDERS OF
DECEMBER 29, 1992, JANUARY 20, 1993 AND MARCH 2, 1993?
2. DID RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMIT REVERSIBLE ERRORS IN RENDERING ITS ASSAILED DECISION OF MARCH 25, 1993 AND ITS ASSAILED RESOLUTION
OF JULY 13, 1993?
3. DID SAID CIVIL CASE NO. 92-63712 AND SAID CA-G.R. SP NO. 30381 BECOME MOOT AND ACADEMIC WHEN THE NEW BANGKOK CLUB AND THE EXOTIC GARDEN
RESTAURANT OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT WERE CLOSED ON JULY 1, 1993 PURSUANT TO ORDINANCE NO. 7783?
The Ruling of the Court
The petition is without merit.
Considering that the constitutionality of Ordinance No. 7783 was not raised before the trial court or the Court of Appeals, and this issue is still under litigation in another
case,[17] the Court will deal only with the first two issues raised by petitioner.
Validity of the Preliminary Injunction
Bistros cause of action in the mandamus and prohibition proceedings before the trial court is the violation of its property right under its license to operate. The violation
consists of the work disruption in Bistros operations caused by Lim and his subordinates as well as Lims refusal to issue a business license to Bistro and work permits to its staff for
the year 1993. The primary relief prayed for by Bistro is the issuance of writs of mandatory and prohibitory injunction. The mandatory injunction seeks to compel Lim to accept
Bistros 1993 business license application and to issue Bistros business license. Also, the mandatory injunction seeks to compel Lim to accept the applications of Bistros staff for
work permits. The writ of prohibitory injunction seeks to enjoin Lim from interfering, impeding or otherwise closing down Bistros operations.
The trial court granted only the prohibitory injunction. This enjoined Lim from interfering, impeding or otherwise closing down Bistros operations pending resolution of
whether Lim can validly refuse to issue Bistros business license and its staffs work permits for the year 1993.
Lim contends that the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the prohibitory injunction. Lim relies primarily on his power, as Mayor of the City of Manila, to grant and refuse
municipal licenses and business permits as expressly provided for in the Local Government Code and the Revised Charter of the City of Manila. Lim argues that the powers granted
by these laws implicitly include the power to inspect, investigate and close down Bistros operations for violation of the conditions of its licenses and permits.
On the other hand, Bistro asserts that the legal provisions relied upon by Lim do not apply to the instant case. Bistro maintains that the Local Government Code and the
Revised Charter of the City of Manila do not expressly or impliedly grant Lim any power to prohibit the operation of night clubs. Lim failed to specify any violation by Bistro of the
conditions of its licenses and permits. In refusing to accept Bistros business license application for the year 1993, Bistro claims that Lim denied Bistro due process of law.
The Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the prohibitory preliminary injunction.
We uphold the findings of the Court of Appeals.
The authority of mayors to issue business licenses and permits is beyond question. The law expressly provides for such authority. Section 11 (l), Article II of the Revised
Charter of the City of Manila, reads:
Sec. 11. General duties and powers of the mayor. The general duties and powers of the mayor shall be:
x x x.
(l) To grant and refuse municipal licenses or permits of all classes and to revoke the same for violation of the conditions upon which they were granted, or if acts prohibited
by law or municipal ordinances are being committed under the protection of such licenses or in the premises in which the business for which the same have been granted is
carried on, or for any other reason of general interest. (Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, Section 455 (3) (iv) of the Local Government Code provides:
Sec. 455. Chief Executive, Powers, Duties and Compensation: xxx.
(b) For efficient, effective and economical governance the purpose of which is the general welfare of the City and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code, the City
Mayor shall:
(3) x x x.
(iv) Issue licenses and permits and suspend or revoke the same for any violation of the condition upon which said licenses or permits had been issued, pursuant to law or
ordinance. (Emphasis supplied)
From the language of the two laws, it is clear that the power of the mayor to issue business licenses and permits necessarily includes the corollary power to suspend, revoke
or even refuse to issue the same. However, the power to suspend or revoke these licenses and permits is expressly premised on the violation of the conditions of these permits
and licenses. The laws specifically refer to the violation of the condition(s) on which the licenses and permits were issued. Similarly, the power to refuse to issue such licenses and
permits is premised on non-compliance with the prerequisites for the issuance of such licenses and permits. The mayor must observe due process in exercising these powers,
which means that the mayor must give the applicant or licensee notice and opportunity to be heard.
True, the mayor has the power to inspect and investigate private commercial establishments for any violation of the conditions of their licenses and permits. However, the
mayor has no power to order a police raid on these establishments in the guise of inspecting or investigating these commercial establishments. Lim acted beyond his authority
when he directed policemen to raid the New Bangkok Club and the Exotic Garden Restaurant. Such act of Lim violated Ordinance No. 7716[18] which expressly prohibits police raids
and inspections, to wit:
Section 1. No member of the Western Police District shall conduct inspection of food and other business establishments for the purpose of enforcing sanitary rules and
regulations, inspecting licenses and permits, and/or enforcing internal revenue and customs laws and regulations. This responsibility should be properly exercised by Local
Government Authorities and other concerned agencies. (Emphasis supplied)
These local government officials include the City Health Officer or his representative, pursuant to the Revised City Ordinances of the City of Manila,[19] and the City Treasurer
pursuant to Section 470 of the Local Government Code.[20]
Lim has no authority to close down Bistros business or any business establishment in Manila without due process of law. Lim cannot take refuge under the Revised Charter
of the City of Manila and the Local Government Code. There is no provision in these laws expressly or impliedly granting the mayor authority to close down private commercial
establishments without notice and hearing, and even if there is, such provision would be void. The due process clause of the Constitution requires that Lim should have given
Bistro an opportunity to rebut the allegations that it violated the conditions of its licenses and permits.
The regulatory powers granted to municipal corporations must always be exercised in accordance with law, with utmost observance of the rights of the people to due
process and equal protection of the law.[21] Such power cannot be exercised whimsically, arbitrarily or despotically. In the instant case, we find that Lims exercise of this power
violated Bistros property rights that are protected under the due process clause of the Constitution.
Lim did not charge Bistro with any specific violation of the conditions of its business license or permits. Still, Lim closed down Bistros operations even before the expiration
of its business license on December 31, 1992. Lim also refused to accept Bistros license application for 1993, in effect denying the application without examining whether it
complies with legal prerequisites.
Lims zeal in his campaign against prostitution is commendable. The presumption is that he acted in good faith and was motivated by his concern for his constituents when
he implemented his campaign against prostitution in the Ermita-Malate area. However, there is no excusing Lim for arbitrarily closing down, without due process of law, the
business operations of Bistro. For this reason, the trial court properly restrained the acts of Lim.
Consequently, the Court of Appeals did not err in upholding the trial courts orders. The sole objective of a writ of preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo until
the merits of the case can be heard fully. It is generally availed of to prevent actual or threatened acts, until the merits of the case can be disposed of.[22] In the instant case, the
issuance of the writ of prohibitory preliminary injunction did not dispose of the main case for mandamus. The trial court issued the injunction in view of the disruptions and
stoppage in Bistros operations as a consequence of Lims closure orders. The injunction was intended to maintain the status quo while the petition has not been resolved on the
merits.
WHEREFORE, the petition is denied for lack of merit. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP NO. 30381 is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
CASE TITLE De Rama v CA AUTHOR: De Leon
[G.R. No. Date] G.R. No. 131136 February 28 2001 Nilagay ko na lahat ng issue about appointments. Pati rin procedural.
TOPIC: Appointive Local Officials
PONENTE: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: an appointment accepted by the appointee cannot be withdrawn or revoked by the appointing authority and shall remain in force and in effect until
disapproved by the Commission.
FACTS:
Maikling digest: - pero about midnight appointments lang.

Evelyn Abeja run for reelection but lost to de Rama. Before she vacated her office, she extended permanent appointments to 14 new employees of the municipal
government. de Rama, upon assuming office, recalled said appointments contending that these were "midnight appointments" and, therefore, prohibited under Sec. 15
Art. VII of the Constitution. SC held that the records reveal that when de Rama brought the matter recalling the appointments of the 14 employees before the Civil Service
Commission, the only reason he cited to justify his actions that these were "midnight appointments" that are forbidden under the Constitution. However, the CSC ruled,
and correctly so, that the said prohibitions applies only to presidential appointments. In truth and in fact, there is no law that prohibits local elective officials from making
appointments during the last days of his or her tenure.

Digest:
Upon his assumption to the position of Mayor of Pagbilao, Quezon, petitioner Conrado L. de Rama wrote a letter dated July 13, 1995 to the Civil Service Commission (or CSC),
seeking the recall of the appointments of fourteen (14) municipal employees
Petitioner de Rama justified his recall request on the allegation that the appointments of the said employees were midnight appointments of the former mayor, Ma.
Evelyn S. Abeja, done in violation of Article VII, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:
Section 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make
appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
While the matter was pending before the CSC, three of the above-named employees, namely: Elsa Marino, Morell Ayala, and Flordeliza Oriazel, filed with the CSC a claim for
payment of their salaries, alleging that although their appointments were declared permanent by Conrado Gulim, Director II of the CSC Field Office based in Quezon, petitioner
de Rama withheld the payment of their salaries and benefits pursuant to Office Order No. 95-01, which was issued on June 30, 1995, wherein the appointments of the said
fourteen (14) employees were recalled.

CSC issued an Order finding that since the claimants-employees had assumed their respective positions and performed their duties pursuant to their appointments, they are
therefore entitled to receive the salaries and benefits appurtenant to their positions. Citing Rule V, Section 10 of the Omnibus Rules which provides, in part, that if the appointee
has assumed the duties of the position, he shall be entitled to receive his salary at once without awaiting the approval of his appointment by the Commission, the CSC Legal
and Quasi-Judicial Division ruled that the said employees cannot be deprived of their salaries and benefits by the unilateral act of the newly-assumed mayor.

The CSC denied petitioners request for the recall of the appointments of the fourteen employees, for lack of merit. The CSC also cited Rule V, Sections 9 and 10 of the Omnibus
Rules, and declared that the appointments of the said employees were issued in accordance with pertinent laws. Thus, the same were effective immediately, and cannot be
withdrawn or revoked by the appointing authority until disapproved by the CSC. The CSC also dismissed petitioners allegation that these were midnight appointments, pointing
out that the Constitutional provision relied upon by petitioner prohibits only those appointments made by an outgoing President and cannot be made to apply to local elective
officials.

The CSC upheld the validity of the appointments on the ground that they had already been approved by the Head of the CSC Field Office in Lucena City, and for petitioners
failure to present evidence that would warrant the revocation or recall of the said appointments. MR denied

Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the CSCs Resolution, as well as the Order of the CSC Legal and Quasi-Judicial Division, averring that the CSC was without jurisdiction:
(1) to refuse to revoke the subject appointments; and (2) to uphold the validity of said appointments, even assuming that there was failure to present evidence that would
prove that these appointments contravened existing laws or rules. He also posited that the CSC erred in finding the appointments valid despite the existence of circumstances
showing that the same were fraudulently issued and processed. (supplemental pleading ata ito)

Petitioner filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals, arguing that the CSC arrived at the erroneous conclusion after it ignored his supplement to the consolidated
appeal and motion for reconsideration wherein he laid out evidence showing that the subject appointments were obtained through fraud.
After reviewing the facts and issues raised by petitioner, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution dated May 16, 1997 which held that there was no abuse of the power
of appointment on the part of the outgoing mayor.
The Court of Appeals further held that the fact that the appointments of Marino, Ayala, Ramos, Mendoza and Glory were made more than four (4) months after the
publication of the vacancies to which they were appointed is of no moment. Setting aside petitioners suppositions, the Court of Appeals ruled that Republic Act No. 7041 does
not provide that every appointment to the local government service must be made within four (4) months from publication of the vacancies.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration arguing that the appellate court erred in upholding the CSCs resolutions despite the following defects:
I. No screening process and no criteria were adopted by the Personnel Selection Board in nominating the respondents;
II. No posting in three (3) conspicuous public places of notice of vacancy as required by the rules and the law;
III. Merit and fitness requirements were not observed by the selection board and by the appointing authority as required by the Civil Service rules;
IV. Petitioner has valid grounds to recall the appointments of respondents.
-MR denied.

ISSUE(S): W/N the appointees can be recalled.

HELD: No

RATIO:
This argument is too specious to be given credence. The records reveal that when the petitioner brought the matter of recalling the appointments of the fourteen (14)
private respondents before the CSC, the only reason he cited to justify his action was that these were midnight appointments that are forbidden under Article VII, Section 15
of the Constitution. However, the CSC ruled, and correctly so, that the said prohibition applies only to presidential appointments. In truth and in fact, there is no law that
prohibits local elective officials from making appointments during the last days of his or her tenure. Petitioner certainly did not raise the issue of fraud on the part of the
outgoing mayor who made the appointments. Neither did he allege that the said appointments were tainted by irregularities or anomalies that breached laws and regulations
governing appointments. His solitary reason for recalling these appointments was that they were, to his personal belief, midnight appointments which the outgoing mayor had
no authority to make.
Even in petitioners consolidated appeal and motion for reconsideration, he did not make any assertion that these appointments were violative of civil service rules and
procedures. Indeed, he harped on the CSCs alleged lack of jurisdiction to refuse to recall the subject appointments. After first invoking the authority of the CSC to approve or
affirm his act, he then contradicted himself by arguing that the CSC had no jurisdiction to do so, but only after the CSC had ruled that the recall was without legal basis. He
emphasized that he alone has sole discretion to appoint and recall the appointment of municipal employees, an authority which, he stressed, the CSC cannot usurp. Yet,
nowhere in said pleading did he cite any other ground, much less present proof that would warrant the recall of said appointments.
Perhaps realizing the weakness of his arguments, albeit belatedly, petitioner filed a supplement to the appeal and motion for reconsideration where, for the very first
time, he alleged that the appointments were fraught with irregularities for failing to comply with CSC rules and regulations. Nevertheless, the CSC overruled petitioners
assertions, holding that no new evidence had been presented to warrant a reversal of its earlier resolution.
Accordingly, the CSC, as well as the Court of Appeals, found that the allegations in his supplemental pleading did not constitute new evidence that can be the proper
subject of a supplemental pleading. These were old facts and issues which he failed to raise earlier. Consequently, the CSC and the Court of Appeals did not err in refusing to
give credence to the supplemental pleading.
Be that as it may, these alleged irregularities were considered by the CSC and the Court of Appeals as new issues which were raised for the first time on appeal. It is
rather too late for petitioner to raise these issues for the first time on appeal. It is well-settled that issues or questions of fact cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. We
have consistently held that matters, theories or arguments not brought out in the original proceedings cannot be considered on review or appeal where they are raised for the
first time. To consider the alleged facts and arguments raised belatedly in the supplemental pleading to the appeal at this very late stage in the proceedings would amount to
trampling on the basic principles of fair play, justice and due process.
A thorough perusal of the records reveal that the CSCs ruling is supported by the evidence and the law. The fourteen (14) employees were duly appointed following
two meetings of the Personnel Selection Board held on May 31 and June 26, 1995. There is no showing that any of the private respondents were not qualified for the positions
they were appointed to. Moreover, their appointments were duly attested to by the Head of the CSC field office at Lucena City. By virtue thereof, they had already assumed
their appointive positions even before petitioner himself assumed his elected position as town mayor. Consequently, their appointments took effect immediately and cannot
be unilaterally revoked or recalled by petitioner.
It has been held that upon the issuance of an appointment and the appointees assumption of the position in the civil service, he acquires a legal right which cannot be
taken away either by revocation of the appointment or by removal except for cause and with previous notice and hearing. Moreover, it is well-settled that the person assuming
a position in the civil service under a completed appointment acquires a legal, not just an equitable, right to the position. This right is protected not only by statute, but by the
Constitution as well, which right cannot be taken away by either revocation of the appointment, or by removal, unless there is valid cause to do so, provided that there is
previous notice and hearing.
Petitioner admits that his very first official act upon assuming the position of town mayor was to issue Office Order No. 95-01 which recalled the appointments of the
private respondents. There was no previous notice, much less a hearing accorded to the latter. Clearly, it was petitioner who acted in undue haste to remove the private
respondents without regard for the simple requirements of due process of law. In doing so, he overstepped the bounds of his authority. While he argues that the appointing
power has the sole authority to revoke said appointments, there is no debate that he does not have blanket authority to do so. Neither can he question the CSCs jurisdiction
to affirm or revoke the recall.
Rule V, Section 9 of the Omnibus Implementing Regulations of the Revised Administrative Code specifically provides that an appointment accepted by the appointee
cannot be withdrawn or revoked by the appointing authority and shall remain in force and in effect until disapproved by the Commission. Thus, it is the CSC that is authorized
to recall an appointment initially approved, but only when such appointment and approval are proven to be in disregard of applicable provisions of the civil service law and
regulations.

01 OSEA V MALAYA AUTHOR: DELFIN

[G.R. No. 139821. January 30, 2002] NOTES:
TOPIC: LOCAL BOARDS
PONENTE: YNARES-SANTIAGO
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
Sec. 99. Functions of Local School Boards. --- The provincial, city or municipal school board shall: xxx xxx xxx.
The Department of Education, Culture and Sports shall consult the local school boards on the appointment of division superintendents, district supervisors, school principals,
and other school officials.
However, the same is only applicable in case of appointments not re-assignments.
FACTS:
Dr. Eleanor Osea filed for a Protest with the Civil Service Commission. She was appointed as Officer-in-Charge, Assistant Schools Division Superintendent of Camarines
Sur, by then Secretary Ricardo T. Gloria of DECS, upon the endorsement of the Provincial School Board of Camarines Sur. She claims that Dr. Malayas appointment by
President Ramos to the position of Schools Division Superintendent of Camarines Sur instead of her is null and void as it was made without prior consultation with the
Provincial School Board, in violation of Section 99 of the Local Government Code of 1991.

The Civil Service Commission dismissed the protest-complaint. It held that Section 99 of the Local Government Code of 1991 contemplates a situation where DECS issues
the appointments, whereas respondents appointment was made by no less than the President, in the exercise of his appointing power. Moreover, the designation of Dr.
Malaya as Schools Division Superintendent of Camarines Sur and of petitioner as Schools Division Superintendent of Iriga City were in the nature of reassignments, in
which case consultation with the local school board was unnecessary.

Dr. Osea filed for a Motion for Reconsideration but the same was denied. The petitioner appealed to the CA but was also denied. Hence, Dr. Osea filed a petition for
review on the two resolutions that denied its protest.

It maintains that the CA erred in holding the appointment was a re-assignment rather than an appointment in that Section 99 of the LGU would have applied.

ISSUE(S):
o WON the same is reassignment or appointment? WON Section 99 of the LGU applies?
HELD:
o This is the case of reassignment not appointment, Section 99 of thr LGU does not apply. Petition dismissed.
RATIO:
Appointment should be distinguished from reassignment. An appointment may be defined as the selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an individual
who is to exercise the functions of a given office. When completed, usually with its confirmation, the appointment results in security of tenure for the person
chosen unless he is replaceable at pleasure because of the nature of his office.

On the other hand, a reassignment is merely a movement of an employee from one organizational unit to another in the same department or agency which does
not involve a reduction in rank, status or salary and does not require the issuance of an appointment. In the same vein, a designation connotes merely the imposition
of additional duties on an incumbent official.

In the case at bar, the appointment issued by President Ramos in favor of respondent to the Schools Division Superintendent position on September 3, 1996 did
not specify her station. It was Secretary Gloria who, in a Memorandum dated November 3, 1997, assigned and designated respondent to the Division of Camarines
Sur, and petitioner to the Division of Iriga City. The designation of respondent as Schools Division Superintendent of Camarines Sur was not a case of appointment.
Her designation partook of the nature of a reassignment from Iriga City, where she previously exercised her functions as Officer-in-Charge-Schools Division
Superintendent, to Camarines Sur. Clearly, therefore, the requirement in Section 99 of the Local Government Code of 1991 of prior consultation with the local
school board, does not apply. It only refers to appointments made by the Department of Education, Culture and Sports. Such is the plain meaning of the said law.

Section 99 of the Local Government Code of 1991 applies to appointments made by the Department of Education, Culture and Sports. This is because at the time
of the enactment of the Local Government Code, schools division superintendents were appointed by the Department of Education, Culture and Sports to specific
division or location. The appointment may not be specific as to location.
However, in 1994, the Career Executive Service Board issued Memorandum Circular No. 21, Series of 1994, placing the positions of schools division superintendent
and assistant schools division superintendent within the career executive service. Consequently, the power to appoint persons to career executive service
positions was transferred from the Department of Education, Culture and Sports to the President.
[Unrelated]On right to the position/security of tenure:
Petitioner asserts a vested right to the position of Schools Division Superintendent of Camarines Sur, citing her endorsement by the Provincial School Board. Her
qualification to the office, however, lacks one essential ingredient, i.e., her appointment thereto. While she was recommended by Secretary Gloria to President
Ramos for appointment to the position of Schools Division Superintendent of Camarines Sur, the recommendation was not acted upon by the President. Petitioners
designation as Officer-in-Charge, Assistant Schools Division Superintendent, was expressly made subject to further advice from the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports. Thus, her designation was temporary. In fact, there was a need to recommend her to the President for appointment in a permanent capacity.
Inasmuch as she occupied her position only temporarily, petitioner can be transferred or reassigned to other positions without violating her right to security of
tenure. Indeed, petitioner has no vested right to the position of Schools Division Superintendent of Camarines Sur.

DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):

07 Ganzon v CA AUTHOR: Enriquez

August 5, 1991
TOPIC: Disciplinary Actions PONENTE: Sarmiento NOTES: 3 consolidated petitions to. 2 kay Ganzon tapos isa doon sa isang member ng
sangguniang panglungsod. Di naman na discuss yung facts ng sa isang official. Pero
parehas lang sila ng contention na walang power ang Sec. of Loc Gov na mag suspend.

Walang nabanggit na arguments on the part of Sec. Loc Gov regarding his power to
suspend.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: Preventive suspension may be imposed by the Minister of Local Government if the respondent is a provincial or city official and there is reasonable
ground to believe that the respondent has committed the act or acts complained of. Preventive suspension shall not extend beyond 60 days.

A preventive suspensions continuance for an unreasonable length of time raises a due process question. For even if thereafter respondent were acquitted, in the meanwhile
his right to hold office had been nullified
FACTS: Rodolfo Ganzon was the then mayor of Iloilo City. 10 complaints were filed against him on grounds of misconduct and misfeasance of office. Just in case Sir asks these
are the complaints against him:
A clerk, alleged that she supported the rival candidate of Ganzon, Ganzon then, using as an excuse the exigency of the service and the interest of the public, pulled
her out from rightful office where her qualifications are best suited and assigned her to a work that should be the function of a non-career service employee. To
make matters worse, a utility worker in the office of the Public Services, whose duties are alien to the complainant's duties and functions, has been detailed to take
her place.
Dra. Ortigoza alleged that Ganzon handpicked her to perform task not befitting her position as Assistant City Health Officer of Iloilo City; that her office was
padlocked without any explanation or justification and that her salary was withheld without cause.
The Vice Mayor and some members of the Sangguniang Panglungsod alleged that a councilors key to his office was unceremoniously and without previous notice,
taken by Ganzon. Without an office, the councilor had to hold office at Plaza Libertad, The Vice-Mayor and the other complainants sympathized with him and
decided to do the same. However, Ganzon, together with its fully-armed security men, forcefully drove them away from Plaza Libertad. The councilor denounced
the Ganzons actuations the following day in the radio station and decided to hold office at the Freedom Grandstand at Iloilo City and there were so many people
who gathered to witness the incident. However, before the group could reach the area, Ganzon, together with his security men, led the firemen using a firetruck
in dozing water to the people and the bystanders
A barangay tanod, who was appointed by the former mayor, was arrested and detained without any warrant of arrest issued against him. And that he was mauled
by other detainees which caused injuries.

The Secretary of Local Government issued 3 suspension orders against Ganzon based on the merits of some of the complaints (mentioned above) filed against him. Hence,
Ganzon was in a situation wherein he may face 600 days of suspension. (600 because 1 preventive suspension order = 60 days)

This prompted Ganzon to file an action for prohibition to the CA.

The CA ruled against Ganzon and upheld the suspension orders issued by the Secretary of Local Government. Hence, this petition to the SC. SC issued TRO barring the Secretary
of Local Government from implementing the suspension orders.

Ganzon argues that:

1. The Secretary of Local Government is devoid of any authority to suspend and remove local officials.
2. The 1987 Constitution no longer allows the President, as the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions did, to exercise the power of suspension and/or removal over local
officials. According to Ganzon, the Constitution, by deleting the phrase as may be provided by law stripped the President of the power of control over local
governments. The provision in question reads as follows:
Art. X. Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments. Provinces with respect
to component cities and municipalities, and cities and municipalities with respect to component barangays shall ensure that
the acts of their component units are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions.
It modifies a counterpart provision appearing in the 1935 Constitution:
Sec. 10. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general supervision
over all Local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed.
3. That the deletion of ("as may be provided by law") is significant, as: (1) the power of the President is "provided by law" and (2) hence, no law may provide for it
any longer.
4. That the 1987 Constitution has left the President mere supervisory powers and denied her control which embraces disciplinary authority. He cited several cases
decided by the SC wherein the latter said that the President does not have authority to suspend local officials.
ISSUE(S): Whether the Secretary of Local Government, as the Presidents alter ego, can suspend and or remove local officials.

HELD: Yes.

RATIO: The deletion of "as may be provided by law" was meant to stress, sub silencio, the objective of the framers to strengthen local autonomy by severing congressional
control of its affairs. The 1987 Constitution did not prohibit, and insofar as existing legislation authorizes the President (through the Secretary of Local Government), to proceed
against local officials administratively.
Also, Art. X. Sec. 3 allowed Congress to enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government xxx, and provide for the
xxx removal, xxx, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units.
Hence, Batas Blg. 337 (Local Government Code at that time) can be applied. Under Sec. 63 of the LGC at that time, Preventive suspension may be imposed by the Minister of
Local Government if the respondent is a provincial or city official and there is reasonable ground to believe that the respondent has committed the act or acts complained of.
Preventive suspension shall not extend beyond 60 days.

Regarding the 4th argument of Ganzon, the SC said that supervision" is not incompatible with disciplinary authority. The cases Ganzon cited did not ban the Chief Executive
from exercising acts of disciplinary authority. It only ruled that way because the said authority was lodged elsewhere.
The SC said that it is reluctant to say that the 1987 Constitution has repealed the Local Government Code. It stated that "supervision" and "removal" are compatible terms and
one may stand with the other notwithstanding the stronger expression of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution.
On the issue of successive 60 day suspensions and the possibility of facing 600 days of suspension because of 10 complaints
The SC said that it is not of course tolerating misfeasance in public office (assuming that Mayor Ganzon is guilty of misfeasance) but it is certainly another question to make
him serve 600 days of suspension, which is effectively, to suspend him out of office.
The SC cited a case wherein it stated that: A preventive suspensions continuance for an unreasonable length of time raises a due process question. For even if thereafter
respondent were acquitted, in the meanwhile his right to hold office had been nullified. Clearly, there would be in such a case an injustice suffered by him. Nor is he the only
victim. There is injustice inflicted likewise on the people of who voted for him. They were deprived of the services of the man they had elected to serve them. In that sense, to
paraphrase Justice Cardozo, the protracted continuance of this preventive suspension had outrun the bounds of reason and resulted in sheer oppression.
The sole objective of a suspension, as we have held, is simply "to prevent the accused from hampering the normal cause of the investigation with his influence and authority
over possible witnesses" or to keep him off "the records and other evidence.
Suspension is not a penalty and is like a preventive imprisonment in which the accused is held to insure his presence at the trial. In both cases, the accused (the respondent)
enjoys a presumption of innocence unless and until found guilty.
Suspension finally is temporary and as the Local Government Code provides, it may be imposed for no more than sixty days. As we held, 63 a longer suspension is unjust and
unreasonable, and we might add, nothing less than tyranny.
As we observed earlier, imposing 600 days of suspension which is not a remote possibility Mayor Ganzon is to all intents and purposes, to make him spend the rest of his term
in inactivity. It is also to make, to all intents and purposes, his suspension permanent. (I think the SC said Sec. of Loc Gov is trying to harass Ganzon kasi ayaw atang sumali ni
Ganzon sa political party ni Sec. Loc Gov tapos ayaw din ata ni Ganzon mag operate ng lotto area niya. And instead na consolidated yung cases against kay Ganzon hinati hati
nila para hindi na niya ma hold ang office)
It is also, in fact, to mete out punishment in spite of the fact that the Mayor's guilt has not been proven. Worse, any absolution will be for naught because needless to say, the
length of his suspension would have, by the time he is reinstated, wiped out his tenure considerably.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions are DISMISSED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued is LIFTED. The suspensions of the petitioners are AFFIRMED, provided
that the petitioner, Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon, may not be made to serve future suspensions on account of any of the remaining administrative charges pending against him for
acts committed prior to August 11, 1988. The Secretary of Interior is ORDERED to consolidate all such administrative cases pending against Mayor Ganzon.
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):

8 Reyes v. Commission on Elections AUTHOR: Garcia

[G.R. No. 120905 March 7, 1996] NOTES:
TOPIC: Disciplinary Actions Second Issue lang yung important sa topic
PONENTE: Mendoza, J.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
a public official could not be removed for misconduct committed during a prior term and that his reelection operated as a condonation of the officers previous
misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor
FACTS:
Renato U. Reyes was the incumbent mayor of Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro.
October 26, 1994 an administrative complaint was filed against him with the Sangguinang Panlalawigan by Dr. Ernesto Manalo:
o Renato Reyes exacted and collected P50,000,00 from each market stall holder in Bongabong Public Market;
o Certain checks issued to him by the National Reconciliation Development Program of the Department of Interior and Local Government were
never received by the Municipal Treasurer nor reflected in the books of accounts of the same officer;
o He took 27 heads of cattle from beneficiaries of a cattle dispersal program after the latter had reared and fattened the cattle for seven
months.
February 6, 1995 the Sangguinang Panlalawigan found petitioner guilty of the charges and ordered his removal from office.
Renato Reyes filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with the RTC of Mindoro alleging that the proceedings had been terminated without giving him
a chance to be heard.
February 7, 1995 TRO was issued by the court.
March 3, 1995 (upon expiration of the TRO) an attempt was made to serve the decision upon petitioners counsel in Manila. However, the counsel refused to accept
the decision. Subsequent attempts to serve the decision upon petitioner himself also failed, as he also refused to accept the decision.
March 20, 1995 Renato Reyes filed a certificate of candidacy.
March 23, 1995 Vice Governor Pedrito A. Reyes issued an order for Renato Reyes to vacate the position of mayor and peacefully turn over the office to the
incumbent vice mayor. But service of the order upon petitioner was also refused.
March 24, 1995 Rogelio de Castro, as registered voter of Bongabong, sought the disqualification of petitioner as candidate for mayor (Section 40 par. B of LGC)
May 9, 1995 COMELEC issued a resolution declaring Renato Reyes, having been removed from office, disqualified from running for public office.
May 10, 1995 Municipal Board of Canvassers of Bongabong proclaimed him the duly elected mayor.
July 3, 1995 Reyes filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution of the COMELEC but his motion was denied.
July 20, 1995 Reyes filed a case alleging grave abuse of discretion by the COMELEC on the ground that the decision in the administrative case against him is not yet
final and executory because he has not been served a copy thereof and therefore could not be used as basis for his disqualification.
o Invoking the case of Aguinaldo v. Santos, Reyes argues that his election on May 8, 1995 is a bar to his disqualification.
Julius Garcia, who obtained the second highest number of votes in the same election, intervened in the COMELEC, contending that because Reyes was disqualified, he
was entitled to be proclaimed mayor of Bongabong. COMELEC denied Garcias prayer.
ISSUE(S):
1. Whether or not the administrative case against Reyes is not yet final and executory
2. Whether or not the reelection of Reyes rendered the administrative charges against him moot and academic
3. Whether or not Garcia was entitled to be proclaimed mayor of Bongabong
HELD:
1. No. The case against Reyes is final and executory
2. No.
3. No.
RATIO:
Finality of the administrative case:
Service was completed when the decision was served upon his counsel in his office in Manila on March 3, 1995. In addition, as the secretary of Sangguniang
Panlalawigan certified, service by registered mail was also made on Reyes. Although the mail containing the decision was not claimed by him, service was deemed
completed five days after the last notice to him on March 27, 1995.
If a judgment or decision is not delivered to a party for reasons attributable to him, service is deemed completed and the judgment or decision will be considered
validly served as long as long as it can be shown that the attempt to deliver it to him would be valid were it not for his or his counsels refusal to received it.
Reyes was given sufficient notice of the service, he hould have received the decision and taken an appeal. But Reyes did not do so. Accordingly, the decision became
final on April 2, 1995, 30 days after the first service upon petitioner.

Effect of Reelection
Aguinaldo v. COMELEC a public official could not be removed for misconduct committed during a prior term and that his reelection operated as a condonation of
the officers previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. But that was because in that case, before the petition questioning
the validity of the administrative decision removing petitioner could be decided, the term of office during which the alleged misconduct was committed expired.
Removal cannot extend beyond the term during which the alleged misconduct was committed. If a public official is not removed before his term of office expires,
he can no longer be removed if he is thereafter reelected for another term.
Although Reyes brought an action to question the decision in the administrative case, the TRO issued in the action he brought lapsed, with the result that the
decision was served on petitioner and it thereafter became final because petitioner failed to appeal to the Office of the President. He was thus validly removed
from office and pursuant to LGC, he was disqualified from running for reelection.
It is noteworthy that at the time Aguinaldo cases were decided, there was no provision similar to section 40 (b).

Garcias issue
To simplistically assume that the second placer would have received the other votes would be to substitute our judgment for the mind of the voter. The second
placer is just that, a second placer. He lost the elections. He was repudiated by either a majority or plurality of voters. He could not be considered the first among
qualified candidates because in a field which excludes the disqualified candidate, the conditions would have substantially changed. We are not prepared to
extrapolate the results under the circumstances.

10. HON. EDUARDO NONATO JOSON, in his capacity as the Governor of the Province AUTHOR: LAURETA
of Nueva Ecija, petitioner, vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY RUBEN D. TORRES, the NOTES:
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR & LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, represented by
SECRETARY ROBERT Z. BARBERS and UNDERSECRETARY MANUEL R. SANCHEZ, MR. Pls check LGC Sec 60-61, 63 wont put em here na para short lang to
OSCAR C. TINIO, in his capacity as Provincial Vice-Governor of Nueva Ecija, and MR. A.O. No. 23:
LORETO P. PANGILINAN, MR. CRISPULO S. ESGUERRA, MS. SOLITA C. SANTOS,
MR.VICENTE C. PALILIO, and MR. NAPOLEON G. INTERIOR, in their capacity as Sec. 2. Disciplining Authority. All administrative complaints, duly verified, against
Provincial Board Members of Nueva Ecija, elective local officials mentioned in the preceding Section shall be acted upon by the
G.R. No. 131255. May 20, 1998 President. The President, who may act through the Executive Secretary, shall
TOPIC: Disciplinary Actions hereinafter be referred to as the Disciplining Authority.

PONENTE: PUNO, J
Sec. 3. Investigating Authority. The Secretary of the Interior and Local
Government is hereby designated as the Investigating Authority. He may constitute an
Investigating Committee in the Department of the Interior and Local Government for
the purpose.

The Disciplining Authority may, however, in the interest of the service, constitute a
Special Investigating Committee in lieu of the Secretary of the Interior and Local
Government.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: An erring elective local official has rights akin to the constitutional rights of an accused. These rights are essentially part of procedural due process. The
local elective official has the (1) the right to appear and defend himself in person or by counsel; (2) the right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him; and (3)
the right to compulsory attendance of witness and the production of documentary evidence. These rights are reiterated in the Rules Implementing the Local Government
Code 70 and in A.O. No. 23.
FACTS:
On September 17, 1996, private respondents filed with the Office of the President a letter-complaint dated September 13, 1997 charging petitioner with grave
misconduct and abuse of authority.
Alleged that in the morning of September 12, 1996, they were at the session hall of the provincial capitol for a scheduled session of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan when petitioner belligerently barged into the Hall, angrily kicked the door and chairs in the Hall and uttered threatening words at them; close
behind petitioner were several men with long and short firearms who encircled the area.
Private respondents claim that this incident was an offshoot of their resistance to a pending legislative measure supported by petitioner that the province
of Nueva Ecija obtain a loan of P150 million from the Philippine National Bank; that petitioner's acts were intended to harass them into approving this loan;
that fortunately, that they opposed the loan because the province of Nueva Ecija had an unliquidated obligation of more than P70M incurred without prior
authorization from the Sangguniang Panlalawigan; that
That the presence of his private army posed grave danger to private respondents' lives and safety.
Private respondents prayed for the suspension or removal of petitioner; for an emergency audit of the provincial treasury of Nueva Ecija; and for the review
of the proposed loan in light of the financial condition of the province, by PNB.
The letter-complaint was submitted with the joint affidavit of Elnora Escombien and Jacqueline Jane Perez, two (2) employees of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan who witnessed the incident.
President Ramos acted on the complaint by writing on its margin the following:
To: SILG (Robert Barbers) info Exec. Sec. and Sec. of Justice:
1. Noted. There appears no justification for the use of force, intimidation or armed followers in the situation of 12 Sep at the Session Hall.
2. Take appropriate preemptive and investigative actions.
3. BREAK NOT the PEACE.
Acting upon the instructions of the President, Secretary Barbers notified petitioner of the case against him and attached to the notice a copy of the complaint and its
annexes. In the same notice, Secretary Barbers directed petitioner "to submit [his] verified/sworn answer thereto, not a motion to dismiss, together with such
documentary evidence that [he] has in support thereof, within fifteen (15) days from receipt."
Immediately thereafter, Secretary Barbers proceeded to Nueva Ecija and summoned petitioner and private respondents to a conference to settle
the controversy. The parties entered into an agreement whereby petitioner promised to maintain peace and order in the province while private
respondents promised to refrain from filing cases that would adversely affect their peaceful co-existence.
The peace agreement was not respected by the parties and the private respondents reiterated their letter-complaint. Petitioner was again ordered
to file his answer to the letter-complaint within fifteen days from receipt. He asked for extension 4 times (looking for counsel, Christmastime, busy
with duties etc).
Three months later, on April 22, 1997, Undersecretary Manuel Sanchez, then Acting Secretary of the DILG, issued an order declaring petitioner in
default and to have waived his right to present evidence. Private respondents were ordered to present their evidence ex-parte. Upon MR, he was
again given the chance to file his Answer.
Undersecretary Sanchez reinstated the order of default and directed private respondents to present their evidence ex-parte on July 15, 1997. The
following day, June 24, 1997, petitioner, through counsel, filed a "Motion to Dismiss." Petitioner alleged that the letter-complaint was not verified
on the day it was filed with the Office of the President; and that the DILG had no jurisdiction over the case and no authority to require him to
answer the complaint.
Upon recommendation of Sec Barbers, Exec Sec Torres issued an order, by authority of the President, placing petitioner under preventive suspension for
sixty (60) days pending investigation of the charges against him.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals challenging the order of preventive suspension and the order of default. Meanwhile, the
proceedings before the DILG continued. On August 20, 1997, Undersecretary Sanchez issued an order denying petitioner's "Motion to Dismiss" and "Urgent Ex-Parte Motion
for Reconsideration." In the same order, he required the parties to submit their position papers within an inextendible period of ten days from receipt after which the case
shall be deemed submitted for resolution.
Petitioner claimed that there was nothing in his conduct that threatened the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan or caused alarm to the
employees. He said that like Vice-Governor Tinio, he was always accompanied by his official security escorts whenever he reported for work. He also
alleged that the joint affidavit of Elnora Escombien and Jacqueline Jane Perez was false.

On October 15, 1997, petitioner filed a "Motion to Conduct Formal Investigation." Petitioner prayed that a formal investigation of his case be conducted
pursuant to the provisions of the Local Government Code of 1991 and Rule 7 of Administrative Order No. 23; and that this be held at the province of
Nueva Ecija
CA dismissed.
ISSUE(S): W/N Disciplinary proceedings were proper? No,

HELD: Resolution of Exec Sec null and void.

RATIO:
What are the laws that govern?
1. Administrative disciplinary proceedings against elective local officials are governed by the Local Government Code of 1991, the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991, and Administrative Order No. 23 entitled "Prescribing the Rules and Procedures on the Investigation of
Administrative Disciplinary Cases Against Elective Local Officials of Provinces, Highly Urbanized Cities, Independent Component Cities, and Cities and Municipalities in
Metropolitan Manila." In all matters not provided in A.O. No. 23, the Rules of Court and the Administrative Code of 1987 apply in a suppletory character.
Section 60 (pls check) of Chapter 4, Title II, Book I of the Local Government Code enumerates the grounds for which an elective local official may be
disciplined, suspended or removed from office.
An administrative complaint against an erring elective official must be verified and filed with the proper government office. A complaint against an elective
provincial or city official must be filed with the Office of the President. (Sec 61 LGC, pls check)
In the instant case, petitioner Joson is an elective official of the province of Nueva Ecija. The letter-complaint against him was therefore properly filed with
the Office of the President. According to petitioner, however, the letter-complaint failed to conform with the formal requirements set by the Code. He
alleges that the complaint was not verified by private respondents and was not supported by the joint affidavit of the two witnesses named therein; that
private respondents later realized these defects and surreptitiously inserted the verification and sworn statement while the complaint was still pending
with the Office of the President.
SC: The absence of the document, page or book number of the notarial register of the subscribing officer is insufficient to prove petitioner's claim.
The requirement of verification was deemed waived by the President himself when he acted on the complaint. Verification is a formal, not jurisdictional
requisite.
2. DILG Sec has jurisdiction. Jurisdiction over administrative disciplinary actions against elective local officials is lodged in two authorities: the Disciplining Authority and the
Investigating Authority.
Pursuant to A.O. No. 23, the Disciplining Authority is the President of the Philippines, whether acting by himself or through the Executive Secretary.
The power of the President over administrative disciplinary cases against elective local officials is derived from his power of general supervision over local
governments. (Section 4, Article X of the 1987 Constitution)
The power to discipline evidently includes the power to investigate. As the Disciplining Authority, the President has the power derived from the Constitution itself
to investigate complaints against local government officials. A.O. No. 23, however, delegates the power to investigate to the DILG or a Special Investigating
Committee, as may be constituted by the Disciplining Authority. This is not undue delegation, contrary to petitioner Joson's claim. The President remains the
Disciplining Authority. What is delegated is the power to investigate, not the power to discipline.
The power of the DILG to investigate administrative complaints is based on the alter-ego principle or the doctrine of qualified political agency.
Sections 1 and 3, Rule 5 of A.O. No. 23 provide: When an administrative complaint is therefore filed, the Disciplining Authority shall issue an order requiring the
respondent to submit his verified answer within fifteen (15) days from notice.
Strictly applying the rules, the Office of the President did not comply with the provisions of A.O. No. 23. The Office should have first required petitioner to file his
answer. Thereafter, the complaint and the answer should have been referred to the Investigating Authority for further proceedings. Be that as it may, this
procedural lapse is not fatal.
3. In his third assigned error, petitioner also claims that the DILG erred in declaring him in default for filing a motion to dismiss. He alleges that a motion to dismiss is not a
pleading prohibited by the law or the rules and therefore the DILG Secretary should have considered it and given him time to file his answer.

It is true that a motion to dismiss is not a pleading prohibited under the Local Government Code of 1991 nor in A.O. No. 23. Petitioner, however, was instructed not to file a
motion to dismiss in the order to file answer. Thrice, he requested for extension of time to file his answer citing as reasons the search for competent counsel and the
demands of his official duties. And, thrice, his requests were granted. Even the order of default was reconsidered and petitioners was given additional time to file answer.
After all the requests and seven months later, he filed a motion to dismiss!

In view of petitioner's inexcusable failure to file answer, the DILG did not err in recommending to the Disciplining Authority his preventive suspension during the
investigation. Preventive suspension is authorized under Section 63 of the Local Government Code.
Executive Secretary Torres found that all the requisites for the imposition of preventive suspension had been complied with. In failing to file answer, the issues
were deemed to have been joined. The Executive Secretary also found that the evidence of petitioner Joson's guilt was strong and that his continuance in office
during the pendency of the case could influence the witnesses and pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the evidence against him.
4. The denial of petitioner's Motion to Conduct Formal Investigation is erroneous. The rejection of petitioner's right to a formal investigation denied him procedural due
process. Section 5 of A.O. No. 23 provides that at the preliminary conference, the Investigating Authority shall summon the parties to consider whether they desire a formal
investigation. This provision does not give the Investigating Authority the discretion to determine whether a formal investigation would be conducted.
Petitioner's right to a formal investigation was not satisfied when the complaint against him was decided on the basis of position papers. There is nothing in the
Local Government Code and its Implementing Rules and Regulations nor in A.O. No. 23 that provide that administrative cases against elective local officials can
be decided on the basis of position papers. A.O. No. 23 states that the Investigating Authority may require the parties to submit their respective memoranda but
this is only after formal investigation and hearing.
The provisions for administrative disciplinary actions against elective local officials are markedly different from appointive officials. The rules on the removal and
suspension of elective local officials are more stringent. The procedure of requiring position papers in lieu of a hearing in administrative cases is expressly allowed
with respect to appointive officials but not to those elected.
When an elective official is suspended or removed, the people are deprived of the services of the man they had elected. Implicit in the right of suffrage is that the
people are entitled to the services of the elective official of their choice. Suspension and removal are thus imposed only after the elective official is accorded his
rights and the evidence against him strongly dictates their imposition.

DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
CASE TITLE: Pablico v. Villapando AUTHOR: Mendoza
[G.R. No.147870 DateJuly 31, 2002] NOTES:
TOPIC: Disciplinary Actions
PONENTE: Ynares-Santiago
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
The power to remove erring elective local officials from service is lodged exclusively with the courts.
Where the disciplining authority is given only the power to suspend and not the power to remove, it should not be permitted to manipulate the law by usurping the power to
remove.
FACTS:
Solomon B. Maagad, and Renato M. Fernandez, both members of the Sangguniang Bayan of San Vicente, Palawan, filed with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan an
administrative complaint against respondent-Alejandro A. Villapando, then Mayor of San Vicente, Palawan, for abuse of authority and culpable violation of the Constitution.
They alleged that Villapando, on behalf of the municipality, entered into a consultancy agreement with Orlando M. Tiape, a defeated mayoralty candidate in the May 1998
elections. And argue that the consultancy agreement amounted to an appointment to a government position within the prohibited one-year period under Article IX-B, Section
6, of the 1987 Constitution.
According to Villapando, he did not appoint Tiape, rather, he merely hired him. And according to DOJ opinion no. 106, the appointment of a defeated candidate within one
year from the election as a consultant does not constitute an appointment to a government office or position as prohibited by the Constitution.
The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan found Villapando guilty and imposed on him the penalty of dismissal from service. Villapando appealed to the Office of the
President, which affirmed the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan.
Petitioner-Ramir Pablico, then vice-mayor, took his oath of office following the dismissal of Villapando. Villapando filed a petition to annul the oath administered but was
denied by the RTC. When Villapando appealed to the CA, the appellate court declared the decisions of the Office of the President and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan
dismissing Villapando void, and ordered Pablico to vacate the Office of Mayor.
Petitoner-Pablico contends that Article 124 (b), Rule XIX of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code, adds that (b) An elective local official may be
removed from office on the grounds enumerated in paragraph (a) of Section 60 by order of the proper court or the disciplining authority whichever first acquires jurisdiction
to the exclusion of the other. And the disciplining authority is the Sangguniang Panlalawigan and the Office of the President.
Hence, this instant petition for review.
ISSUE(S): Whether or not the Sangguniang Panlalawigan and the Office of the President can remove/dismiss Villapando as mayor.

HELD: No. Petition denied.

RATIO:

It is clear from the last paragraph of Section 60 of the Local Government Code that the penalty of dismissal from service upon an erring elective local official may be decreed
only by a court of law. And according to Salalima et.al. v. Guingona, The Office of the President is without any power to remove elected officials, since such power is
exclusively vested in the proper courts as expressly provided for in the last paragraph of the aforequoted Section 60.
The law on suspension or removal of elective public officials must be strictly construed and applied, and the authority in whom such power of suspension or removal is vested
must exercise it with utmost good faith, for what is involved is not just an ordinary public official but one chosen by the people through the exercise of their constitutional right
of suffrage.
The Court also denied Pablicos contention when it stated that: Article 124 (b), Rule XIX, of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code, insofar as
it vests power on the disciplining authority to remove from office erring elective local officials, is void for being repugnant to the last paragraph of Section 60 of the Local
Government Code of 1991.
Even Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., the principal author of the Local Government Code of 1991, expressed doubt as to the validity of Article 124 (b), Rule XIX of the
implementing rules.
The disciplining authority of the power to remove elective local officials is clearly beyond the authority of the Oversight Committee that prepared the Rules and Regulations.
No rule or regulation may alter, amend, or contravene a provision of law, such as the Local Government Code. Implementing rules should conform, not clash, with the law that
they implement, for a regulation, which operates to create a rule out of harmony with the statute, is a nullity.

01 PABLICO V VILLAPANDO AUTHOR: PAGCALIWAGAN

G.R. No. 147870 July 31, 2002 NOTES:
TOPIC: Removal
PONENTE: Ynares-Santiago
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
The power to remove erring elective local officials from service is lodged exclusively with the courts. Hence, Article 124 (b), Rule XIX, of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Local Government Code, insofar as it vests power on the disciplining authority to remove from office erring elective local officials, is void for being
repugnant to the last paragraph of Section 60 of the Local Government Code of 1991.
FACTS:
The purely legal issue was posed in connection with a dispute over the mayoralty seat of San Vicente, Palawan. Considering that the term of the contested office expired on
June 30, 2001, this case may be dismissed for being moot and academic. Court resolved to pass upon the issue concerning the application of certain provisions of Local
Government Code of 1991.

Maagad and Fernandez (members of Sangguniang Bayan) filed with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan and administrative complaint against Villapando,
Mayor, for abuse of authority and culpable violation of Constitution. Complaint alleged that:
Villapando on behalf of the municipality entered into a consultancy agreement with Tiape (defeated mayoralty candidate in the May 1998 elections)
Consultancy agreement amounted to an appointment to a government position within the prohibited 1-year period under Article IX-B, Section 6, of
the 1987 Constitution.
 Villapando in his answer, countered that:
He did not appoint Tiape, but merely hired him
Invoked Opinion No. 106, s. 1992; of the DOJ (August 21, 1992) stating that the appointment of a defeated candidate within 1 year from the election
as a consultant does not constitute an appointment to a government office or position as prohibited by the Constitution

Sangguniang Panlalawigan: Villapando guilty of the administrative charge and imposed the penalty of dismissal from service
Office of the President: Affirmed the decision

Pending MR, Pablico, Vice-Mayor, took his oath of office as Municipal Mayor
Villapando filed with RTC a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction and prayer for restraining order.
Executive Judge granted TRO effective for 72 hours Pablico ceased from discharging functions of Mayor
Case was re-raffled Motion for extension of 72-hour TRO was denied. Thus, Pablico resumed assumption of functions of Mayor
Villapando instituted certiorari and prohibition before CA

CA: Declared void the assailed decisions of OP and Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan. Ordered Pablico to vacate the Office.

ISSUE(S): WON the local legislative bodies and/or OP validly impose the penalty of dismissal from service on erring elective local officials.

HELD: NO.

RATIO:
An elective local official may be removed from office on the grounds enumerated above by order of the proper court.
It is clear from the last paragraph of the aforecited provision that the penalty of dismissal from service upon an erring elective local official may be decreed only by a court of
law.
The power to remove erring elective local officials from service is lodged exclusively with the courts. Hence, Article 124 (b), Rule XIX, of the Rules and Regulations Implementing
the Local Government Code, insofar as it vests power on the disciplining authority to remove from office erring elective local officials, is void for being repugnant to the last
paragraph of Section 60 of the Local Government Code of 1991.

The law on suspension or removal of elective public officials must be strictly construed and applied, and the authority in whom such power of suspension or removal is vested
must exercise it with utmost good faith, for what is involved is not just an ordinary public official but one chosen by the people through the exercise of their constitutional right
of suffrage. Their will must not be put to naught by the caprice or partisanship of the disciplining authority. Where the disciplining authority is given only the power to suspend
and not the power to remove, it should not be permitted to manipulate the law by usurping the power to remove

02 AGUINALDO v. SANTOS, VARGAS [G.R. 94115 August 21, 1992] AUTHOR: RAMOS
TOPIC: Removal PONENTE: Nocon, J. NOTES:
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: THE NOTORIOUS AGUINALDO DOCTRINE (should already be repealed by the Binay case)
Co public official CANNOT be removed for administrative misconduct committed during a prior term, since his re-election to office operates as a condonation of the
officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor.
NOTE: this rule has NO application to criminal cases
FACTS:
Petitioner was the Governor of the province of Cagayan (since the local elections of Jan 17, 1988)
Shortly after Dec 1989 coup d'etat was crushed, Santos sent a telegram and a letter (dated Dec 4, 1989) to petitioner requiring him to show cause why should not be
suspended or removed from office for disloyalty to the Republic, within 48 hours from receipt thereof
Dec 7, 1989: a sworn complaint for disloyalty to the Republic and culpable violation of the Constitution was filed by Veronico Agatep, Manuel Mamba and Orlino Agatep,
(mayors of the Cagayan municipalities of Gattaran, Tuao and Lasam, respectively) vs. petitioner for acts during the coup
Jan 5, 1990: Dept. of Local Government received a letter from petitioner (dated Dec 29, 1989) in reply to the Dec 4, 1989 letter
o petitioner denied being privy to the plans or participating in the execution of the coup, though he admitted that he was sympathetic to the cause
o Secretary considered petitioner's reply letter as his answer to the complaint of Mayors
o On the basis thereof, Secretary suspended petitioner from office for 60 days from notice, pending the outcome of the formal investigation
Secretary ultimately rendered the assailed decision, finding petitioner guilty and ordering his removal. Then Vice-Gov Melvin Vargas became Governor
Petitioners arguments
1. Secretarys power to dismiss local government officials [under several provisions of BP 337 / the old LGC] was repealed by the 1987 Constitution;
2. As such, Secretary could not appoint respondent Vargas as Governor
3. alleged act of disloyalty should be proved by proof beyond reasonable doubt, not by preponderance of evidence (act charged is rebellion under RPC)
While this case was pending before the SC, petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for Governor of Cagayan for the May 11, 1992 elections
o 3 separate petitions for his disqualification were then filed against him, all based on the ground that he had been removed from office
o COMELEC granted the petitions (May 9, 1992). On the same day, upon petitioners motion to clarify, it ruled that inasmuch as its resolutions become final
and executory only after 5 days from promulgation, petitioner may still be voted upon as a candidate, pending the cases final outcome
May 13, 1992: petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the SC (G.R. 105128-30; Aguinaldo v. COMELEC), seeking to nullify COMELECs resolution ordering his
disqualification
o SC issued a TRO vs. COMELEC to cease and desist from enforcing its May 9, 1992 resolution pending the outcome of the disqualification case
o Thus, the canvassing of the votes and returns proceeded; however, COMELEC was ordered not to proclaim a winner until SC has decided the case
 Jun 9, 1992: the petition was granted (May 9, 1992 COMELEC resolution annulled) on the ground that the decision of respondent Secretary has not yet attained finality
and is still pending review with the SC.
o Since petitioner won by a landslide margin in the elections (170,382 votes, while the next closest of 3 other candidates only received 54,412), the resolution
paved the way for his eventual proclamation as Governor
ISSUES:
1. WON the Secretary of Local Government has the power to dismiss local government officials [YES, under the Constitution and BP 337]
2. WON the Secretary of Local Government has the power to Vargas as governor [YES, by virtue of the Vice-Governors succession in case of vacancy]
3. WON proof beyond reasonable doubt was required to remove him [NO, this was an administrative case for removal, not a criminal case for rebellion]
4. WON the case is moot and academic due to his re-election [YES. Aguinaldo doctrine. Yuck.]
HELD: Though SC disagreed with all of petitioners arguments, it held that the case was MOOT & ACADEMIC due to his re-election. Petition GRANTED
1. Secretary has the power to dismiss local government officials (under the Constitution and the law)
o Constitutional basis: Art VII (17) and X (4) of the 1987 Constitution vests in the President the POWER OF CONTROL over all executive departments, bureaus
and offices and the POWER OF GENERAL SUPERVISION over local governments
acts of the department head are presumptively the acts of the President unless expressly rejected by him.
o Statutory grant: BP 337 itself has constitutional roots (enacted pursuant to Art XI, Sec. 2 of the 1973 Constitution) which specifically required a local
government code to provide, among other things, the removal of local government officials
similar provision is found in Sec 3, Art X of the 1987 Constitution
o Inasmuch as the power of the legislature to enact a LGC, which provides for the manner of removal of local government officials, is found in both the 1973
and the 1987 Constitutions, then it CANNOT be said that BP 337 was repealed by the present Constitution
Bagabuyo et al. vs. Davide, Jr., et al.: BP 337 remained in force despite the present Constitution, until the proposed LGC of 1991 is approved
o power of the Secretary to remove local elective government officials is found in Secs. 60 and 61 of BP 337
2. Secretary has the power to appoint Vargas as Governor of Cagayan
o Section 48 (1) of B.P. Blg 337: In case a permanent vacancy arises when a governor refuses to assume office, fails to quality, dies or is removed from office,
voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office, the vice-governor shall assume the office for the
unexpired term of the former
3. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is NOT required in administrative cases
o Petitioner is NOT being prosecuted criminally under the RPC, but administratively with the end in view of removing him as the Governor of Cagayan for acts
of disloyalty to the Republic where the quantum of proof required is only substantial evidence
4. Petitioner's re-election as Governor rendered the administration case MOOT & ACADEMIC.
o Expiration of petitioner's term of office during which the acts charged were allegedly committed, and his subsequent reelection, the petitioner must be
dismissed for the reason that the issue has become academic
o Offenses committed, or acts done, during a previous term are generally held NOT to furnish cause for removal and this is especially true were the
Constitution provides that the penalty in proceeding for removal shall NOT extend beyond the removal from office, and disqualification from holding office
for a term for which the officer was elected or appointed
underlying theory is that each term is separate from other terms, and that the reelection to office operates as a condonation of the officer's
misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor
o Court should NEVER remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office. To do otherwise would be to deprive the people of their right
to elect their officers. When people elect a man to office, it must be assumed that they did this with knowledge of his life and character, and that they
disregarded or forgave his fault or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any.
o public official CANNOT be removed for administrative misconduct committed during a prior term, since his re-election to office operates as a condonation
of the officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor.
NOTE: this rule has NO application to criminal cases pending against petitioner for acts he may have committed during the failed coup.

G.R. Nos. 217126-27, November 10, 2015

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES, IN HER CAPACITY AS THE OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS (SIXTH DIVISION) AND JEJOMAR ERWIN S. BINAY, JR., Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
"All government is a trust, every branch of government is a trust, and immemorially acknowledged so to be[.]"1ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The Case

Before the Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition2 filed on March 25, 2015 by petitioner Conchita Carpio Morales, in her capacity as the Ombudsman (Ombudsman),
through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), assailing: (a) the Resolution3 dated March 16, 2015 of public respondent the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453,
which granted private respondent Jejomar Erwin S. Binay, Jr.'s (Binay, Jr.) prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) against the implementation of the Joint
Order4 dated March 10, 20,15 of the Ombudsman in OMB-C-A-15-0058 to 0063 (preventive suspension order) preventively suspending him and several other public officers and
employees of the City Government of Makati, for six (6) months without pay; and (b) the Resolution5dated March 20, 2015 of the CA, ordering the Ombudsman to comment on
Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt6 in CA-G.R. SP No. 139504.

Pursuant to the Resolution7 dated April 6, 2015, the CA issued a writ of preliminary injunction8 (WPI) in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 which further enjoined the implementation of the
preventive suspension order, prompting the Ombudsman to file a supplemental petition9 on April 13, 2015.
The Facts

On July 22, 2014, a complaint/affidavit10 was filed by Atty. Renato L. Bondal and Nicolas "Ching" Enciso VI before the Office of the Ombudsman against Binay, Jr. and other public
officers and employees of the City Government of Makati (Binay, Jr., et al), accusing them of Plunder11 and violation of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019,12 otherwise known as "The
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act," in connection with the five (5) phases of the procurement and construction of the Makati City Hall Parking Building (Makati Parking
Building).13

On September 9, 2014, the Ombudsman constituted a Special Panel of Investigators14 to conduct a fact-finding investigation, submit an investigation report, and file the
necessary complaint, if warranted (1st Special Panel).15 Pursuant to the Ombudsman's directive, on March 5, 2015, the 1st Special Panel filed a complaint16 (OMB Complaint)
against Binay, Jr., et al, charging them with six (6) administrative cases17 for Grave Misconduct, Serious Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service,
and six (6) criminal cases18 for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, Malversation of Public Funds, and Falsification of Public Documents (OMB Cases).19

As to Binay, Jr., the OMB Complaint alleged that he was involved in anomalous activities attending the following procurement and construction phases of the Makati Parking
Building project, committed during his previous and present terms as City Mayor of Makati:
Binay, Jr.'s First Term (2010 to 2013)20
(a) On September 21, 2010, Binay, Jr. issued the Notice of Award21
for Phase III of the Makati Parking Building project to Hilmarc's Construction Corporation (Hilmarc's), and
consequently, executed the corresponding contract22 on September 28, 2010,23without the required publication and the lack of architectural design,24 and approved the release
of funds therefor in the following amounts as follows: (1) P130,518,394.80 on December 15, 2010;25 (2) P134,470,659.64 on January 19, 2011;26 (3) P92,775,202.27 on February
25, 2011;27 (4) P57,148,625.51 on March 28, 2011;28(5) P40,908,750.61 on May 3, 2011;29 and (6) P106,672,761.90 on July 7, 2011;30

(b) On August 11, 2011, Binay, Jr. issued the Notice of Award31 for Phase IV of the Makati Parking Building project to Hilmarc's, and consequently, executed the corresponding
contract32 on August 18, 2011,33 without the required publication and the lack of architectural design,34 and approved the release of funds therefor in the following amounts as
follows: (1) P182,325,538.97 on October 4, 2O11;35 (2) P173,132,606.91 on October 28,2011;36 (3) P80,408,735.20 on December 12, 2011;37 (4) P62,878,291.81 on February 10,
2012;38 and (5) P59,639,167.90 on October 1, 2012;39

(c) On September 6, 2012, Binay, Jr. issued the Notice of Award40 for Phase V of the Makati Parking Building project to Hilmarc's, and consequently, executed the corresponding
contract41 on September 13, 2012,42 without the required publication and the lack of architectural design,43 and approved the release of the funds therefor in the amounts of
P32,398,220.0544 and P30,582,629.3045 on December 20, 2012; and
Binay, Jr.'s Second Term (2013 to 2016)46

(d) On July 3, 2013 and July 4, 2013, Binay, Jr. approved the release of funds for the remaining balance of the September 13, 2012 contract with Hilmarc's for Phase V of the
Makati Parking Building project in the amount of P27,443,629.97;47 and

(e) On July 24, 2013, Binay, Jr. approved the release of funds for the remaining balance of the contract48 with MANA Architecture & Interior Design Co. (MANA) for the design
and architectural services covering the Makati Parking Building project in the amount of P429,011.48.49

On March 6, 2015, the Ombudsman created another Special Panel of Investigators to conduct a preliminary investigation and administrative adjudication on the OMB Cases
(2nd Special Panel).50Thereafter, on March 9, 2015, the 2nd Special Panel issued separate orders51 for each of the OMB Cases, requiring Binay, Jr., et al. to file their respective
counter-affidavits.52

Before Binay, Jr., et al.'s filing of their counter-affidavits, the Ombudsman, upon the recommendation of the 2nd Special Panel, issued on March 10, 2015, the subject preventive
suspension order, placing Binay, Jr., et al. under preventive suspension for not more than six (6) months without pay, during the pendency of the OMB Cases.53 The Ombudsman
ruled that the requisites for the preventive suspension of a public officer are present,54 finding that: (a) the evidence of Binay, Jr., et al.'s guilt was strong given that (1) the losing
bidders and members of the Bids and Awards Committee of Makati City had attested to the irregularities attending the Makati Parking Building project; (2) the documents on
record negated the publication of bids; and (3) the disbursement vouchers, checks, and official receipts showed the release of funds; and (b) (1) Binay, Jr., et al. were
administratively charged with Grave Misconduct, Serious Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service; (2) said charges, if proven to be true, warrant
removal from public service under the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS), and (3) Binay, Jr., et al.'s respective positions give them access to
public records and allow them to influence possible witnesses; hence, their continued stay in office may prejudice the investigation relative to the OMB Cases filed against
them.55 Consequently, the Ombudsman directed the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), through Secretary Manuel A. Roxas II (Secretary Roxas), to
immediately implement the preventive suspension order against Binay, Jr., et al., upon receipt of the same.56

On March 11, 2015, a copy of the preventive suspension order was sent to the Office of the City Mayor, and received by Maricon Ausan, a member of Binay, Jr.'s staff.57
The Proceedings Before the CA

On even date,58 Binay, Jr. filed a petition for certiorari59 before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 139453, seeking the nullification of the preventive suspension order, and
praying for the issuance of a TRO and/or WPI to enjoin its implementation.60Primarily, Binay, Jr. argued that he could not be held administratively liable for any anomalous
activity attending any of the five (5) phases of the Makati Parking Building project since: (a) Phases I and II were undertaken before he was elected Mayor of Makati in 2010; and
(b) Phases III to V transpired during his first term and that his re-election as City Mayor of Makati for a second term effectively condoned his administrative liability therefor, if
any, thus rendering the administrative cases against him moot and academic.61In any event, Binay, Jr. claimed that the Ombudsman's preventive suspension order failed to
show that the evidence of guilt presented against him is strong, maintaining that he did not participate in any of the purported irregularities.62 In support of his prayer for
injunctive relief, Binay, Jr. argued that he has a clear and unmistakable right to hold public office, having won by landslide vote in the 2010 and 2013 elections, and that, in view
of the condonation doctrine, as well as the lack of evidence to sustain the charges against him, his suspension from office would undeservedly deprive the electorate of the
services of the person they have conscientiously chosen and voted into office.63

On March 16, 2015, at around 8:24 a.m., Secretary Roxas caused the implementation of the preventive suspension order through the DILG National Capital Region - Regional
Director, Renato L. Brion, CESO III (Director Brion), who posted a copy thereof on the wall of the Makati City Hall after failing to personally serve the same on Binay, Jr. as the
points of entry to the Makati City Hall were closed. At around 9:47 a.m., Assistant City Prosecutor of Makati Billy C. Evangelista administered the oath of office on Makati City
Vice Mayor Romulo V. Pea, Jr. (Pea, Jr.) who thereupon assumed office as Acting Mayor.64

At noon of the same day, the CA issued a Resolution65 (dated March 16, 2015), granting Binay, Jr.'s prayer for a TRO,66 notwithstanding Pena, Jr.'s assumption of duties as Acting
Mayor earlier that day.67Citing the case of Governor Garcia, Jr. v. CA,68 the CA found that it was more prudent on its part to issue a TRO in view of the extreme urgency of the
matter and seriousness of the issues raised, considering that if it were established that the acts subject of the administrative cases against Binay, Jr. were all committed during
his prior term, then, applying the condonation doctrine, Binay, Jr.'s re-election meant that he can no longer be administratively charged.69 The CA then directed the Ombudsman
to comment on Binay, Jr.'s petition for certiorari .70

On March 17, 2015, the Ombudsman manifested71 that the TRO did not state what act was being restrained and that since the preventive suspension order had already been
served and implemented, there was no longer any act to restrain.72

On the same day, Binay, Jr. filed a petition for contempt,73 docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 139504, accusing Secretary Roxas, Director Brion, the officials of the Philippine National
Police, and Pena, Jr. of deliberately refusing to obey the CA, thereby allegedly impeding, obstructing, or degrading the administration of justice.74 The Ombudsman and
Department of Justice Secretary Leila M. De Lima were subsequently impleaded as additional respondents upon Binay, Jr.'s filing of the amended and supplemental petition for
contempt75 (petition for contempt) on March 19, 2015.76 Among others, Binay, Jr. accused the Ombudsman and other respondents therein for willfully and maliciously ignoring
the TRO issued by the CA against the preventive suspension order.77

In a Resolution78dated March 20, 2015, the CA ordered the consolidation of CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 and CA-G.R. SP No. 139504, and, without necessarily giving due course to
Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt, directed the Ombudsman to file her comment thereto.79 The cases were set for hearing of oral arguments on March 30 and 31, 2015.80
The Proceedings Before the Court

Prior to the hearing of the oral arguments before the CA, or on March 25, 2015, the Ombudsman filed the present petition before this Court, assailing the CA's March 16, 2015
Resolution, which granted Binay, Jr.'s prayer for TRO in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453, and the March 20, 2015 Resolution directing her to file a comment on Binay, Jr.'s petition for
contempt in CA-G.R. SP No. 139504.81 The Ombudsman claims that: (a) the CA had no jurisdiction to grant Binay, Jr.'s prayer for a TRO, citing Section 14 of RA 6770,82 or "The
Ombudsman Act of 1989," which states that no injunctive writ could be issued to delay the Ombudsman's investigation unless there is prima facie evidence that the subject
matter thereof is outside the latter's jurisdiction;83 and (b) the CA's directive for the Ombudsman to comment on Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt is illegal and improper,
considering that the Ombudsman is an impeachable officer, and therefore, cannot be subjected to contempt proceedings.84

In his comment85 filed on April 6, 2015, Binay, Jr. argues that Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution specifically grants the CA judicial power to review acts of any branch
or instrumentality of government, including the Office of the Ombudsman, in case of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, which he asserts was
committed in this case when said office issued the preventive suspension order against him.86 Binay, Jr. posits that it was incumbent upon the Ombudsman to1 have been
apprised of the condonation doctrine as this would have weighed heavily in determining whether there was strong evidence to warrant the issuance of the preventive
suspension order.87 In this relation, Binay, Jr. maintains that the CA correctly enjoined the implementation of the preventive suspension order given his clear and unmistakable
right to public office, and that it is clear that he could not be held administratively liable for any of the charges against him since his subsequent re-election in 2013 operated as a
condonation of any administrative offenses he may have committed during his previous term.88 As regards the CA's order for the Ombudsman to comment on his petition for
contempt, Binay, Jr. submits that while the Ombudsman is indeed an impeachable officer and, hence, cannot be removed from office except by way of impeachment, an action
for contempt imposes the penalty of fine and imprisonment, without necessarily resulting in removal from office. Thus, the fact that the Ombudsman is an impeachable officer
should not deprive the CA of its inherent power to punish contempt.89

Meanwhile, the CA issued a Resolution90 dated April 6, 2015, after the oral arguments before it were held,91 granting Binay, Jr.'s prayer for a WPI, which further enjoined the
implementation of the preventive suspension order. In so ruling, the CA found that Binay, Jr. has an ostensible right to the final relief prayed for, namely, the nullification of the
preventive suspension order, in view of the condonation doctrine, citing Aguinaldo v. Santos.92 Particularly, it found that the Ombudsman can hardly impose preventive
suspension against Binay, Jr. given that his re-election in 2013 as City Mayor of Makati condoned any administrative liability arising from anomalous activities relative to the
Makati Parking Building project from 2007 to 2013.93 In this regard, the CA added that, although there were acts which were apparently committed by Binay, Jr. beyond his first
term namely, the alleged payments on July 3, July 4, and July 24, 2013,94 corresponding to the services of Hillmarc's and MANA - still, Binay, Jr. cannot be held administratively
liable therefor based on the cases of Salalima v. Guingona, Jr.,95 and Mayor Garcia v. Mojica96 wherein the condonation doctrine was still applied by the Court although the
payments were made after the official's re-election, reasoning that the payments were merely effected pursuant to contracts executed before said re-election.97 To this, the CA
added that there was no concrete evidence of Binay, Jr.'s participation for the alleged payments made on July 3, 4, and 24, 2013.98

In view of the CA's supervening issuance of a WPI pursuant to its April 6, 2015 Resolution, the Ombudsman filed a supplemental petition99 before this Court, arguing that the
condonation doctrine is irrelevant to the determination of whether the evidence of guilt is strong for purposes of issuing preventive suspension orders. The Ombudsman also
maintained that a reliance on the condonation doctrine is a matter of defense, which should have been raised by Binay, Jr. before it during the administrative proceedings, and
that, at any rate, there is no condonation because Binay, Jr. committed acts subject of the OMB Complaint after his re-election in 2013.100

On April 14 and 21, 2015,101 the Court conducted hearings for the oral arguments of the parties. Thereafter, they were required to file their respective memoranda.102 In
compliance thereto, the Ombudsman filed her Memorandum103 on May 20, 2015, while Binay, Jr. submitted his Memorandum the following day.104

Pursuant to a Resolution105 dated June 16, 2015, the Court directed the parties to comment on each other's memoranda, and the OSG to comment on the Ombudsman's
Memorandum, all within ten (10) days from receipt of the notice.

On July 15, 2015, both parties filed their respective comments to each other's memoranda.106Meanwhile, on July 16, 2015, the OSG filed its Manifestation In Lieu of
Comment,107 simply stating that it was mutually agreed upon that the Office of the Ombudsman would file its Memorandum, consistent with its desire to state its "institutional
position."108 In her Memorandum and Comment to Binay, Jr.'s Memorandum, the Ombudsman pleaded, among others, that this Court abandon the condonation doctrine.109 In
view of the foregoing, the case was deemed submitted for resolution.chanrobleslaw
The Issues Before the Court

Based on the parties' respective pleadings, and as raised during the oral arguments conducted before this Court, the main issues to be resolved in seriatim are as follows:
I. Whether or not the present petition, and not motions for reconsideration of the assailed CA issuances in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 and CA-G.R. SP No.
139504, is the Ombudsman's plain, speedy, and adequate remedy;cralawlawlibrary
II. Whether or not the CA has subject matter jurisdiction over the main petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453;cralawlawlibrary
III. Whether or not the CA has subject matter jurisdiction to issue a TRO and/or WPI enjoining the implementation of a preventive suspension order issued
by the Ombudsman;cralawlawlibrary
IV. Whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion in issuing the TRO and eventually, the WPI in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 enjoining the implementation of
the preventive suspension order against Binay, Jr. based on the condonation doctrine; and
V. Whether or not the CA's directive for the Ombudsman to ' comment on Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt in CA- G.R. SP No. 139504 is improper and
illegal.

The Ruling of the Court

The petition is partly meritorious.chanrobleslaw

I.

A common requirement to both a petition for certiorari and a petition for prohibition taken under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is that the petitioner has no other
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Sections 1 and 2 thereof provide:
Section 1. Petition for certiorari. - When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a
person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the
proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

xxxx

Section 2. Petition for prohibition. - When the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
functions, are without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any other
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts r with certainty
and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to desist from further proceedings in the action or matter specified therein, or otherwise granting such
incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

x x x x (Emphases supplied)

Hence, as a general rule, a motion for reconsideration must first be filed with the lower court prior to resorting to the extraordinary remedy of certiorari or prohibition since a
motion for reconsideration may still be considered as a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The rationale for the pre-requisite is to grant an
opportunity for the lower court or agency to correct any actual or perceived error attributed to it by the re-examination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case.110

Jurisprudence states that "[i]t is [the] inadequacy, [and] not the mere absence of all other legal remedies and the danger of failure of justice without the writ, that must usually
determine the propriety of certiorari [or prohibition]. A remedy is plain, speedy[,] and adequate if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of the
judgment, order, or resolution of the lower court or agency, x x x."111

In this light, certain exceptions were crafted to the general rule requiring a prior motion for reconsideration before the filing of a petition for certiorari, which exceptions also
apply to a petition for prohibition.112 These are: (a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in
the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an
urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action
is perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency
for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the
lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the proceedings were ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue raised
is one purely of law or where public interest is involved.113

In this case, it is ineluctably clear that the above-highlighted exceptions attend since, for the first time, the question on the authority of the CA - and of this Court, for that matter
- to enjoin the implementation of a preventive suspension order issued by the Office of the Ombudsman is put to the fore. This case tests the constitutional and statutory limits
of the fundamental powers of key government institutions - namely, the Office of the Ombudsman, the Legislature, and the Judiciary - and hence, involves an issue of
transcendental public importance that demands no less than a careful but expeditious resolution. Also raised is the equally important issue on the propriety of the continuous
application of the condonation doctrine as invoked by a public officer who desires exculpation from administrative liability. As such, the Ombudsman's direct resort
to certiorari and prohibition before this Court, notwithstanding her failure to move for the prior reconsideration of the assailed issuances in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 and CA-G.R.
SP No. 139504 before the CA, is justified.chanrobleslaw
II.

Albeit raised for the first time by the Ombudsman in her Memorandum,114 it is nonetheless proper to resolve the issue on the CA's lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the
main petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453, in view of the well-established rule that a court's jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings. The rationale is that subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by law, and the lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of and to render
judgment on the action.115 Hence, it should be preliminarily determined if the CA indeed had subject matter jurisdiction over the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 petition, as the
same determines the validity of all subsequent proceedings relative thereto. It is noteworthy to point out that Binay, Jr. was given the opportunity by this Court to be heard on
this issue,116 as he, in fact, duly submitted his opposition through his comment to the Ombudsman's Memorandum.117 That being said, the Court perceives no reasonable
objection against ruling on this issue.

The Ombudsman's argument against the CA's lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the main petition, and her corollary prayer for its dismissal, is based on her interpretation of
Section 14, RA 6770, or the Ombudsman Act,118 which reads in full:
Section 14. Restrictions. - No writ of injunction shall be issued by any court to delay an investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman under this Act, unless there is a prima
facie evidence that the subject matter of the investigation is outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman.

No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on pure question of law.

The subject provision may be dissected into two (2) parts.

The first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 is a prohibition against any court (except the Supreme Court119) from issuing a writ of injunction to delay an investigation being
conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman. Generally speaking, "[injunction is a judicial writ, process or proceeding whereby a party is ordered to do or refrain from doing a
certain act. It may be the main action or merely a provisional remedy for and as an incident in the main action."120 Considering the textual qualifier "to delay," which connotes a
suspension of an action while the main case remains pending, the "writ of injunction" mentioned in this paragraph could only refer to injunctions of the provisional kind,
consistent with the nature of a provisional injunctive relief.

The exception to the no injunction policy is when there is prima facie evidence that the subject matter of the investigation is outside the office's jurisdiction. The Office of the
Ombudsman has disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies, with the exception only
of impeachable officers, Members of Congress, and the Judiciary.121 Nonetheless, the Ombudsman retains the power to investigate any serious misconduct in office allegedly
committed by officials removable by impeachment, for the purpose of filing a verified complaint for impeachment, if warranted.122 Note that the Ombudsman has concurrent
jurisdiction over certain administrative cases which are within the jurisdiction of the regular courts or administrative agencies, but has primary jurisdiction to investigate any act
or omission of a public officer or employee who is under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.123

On the other hand, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 provides that no appeal or application for remedy may be heard against the decision or findings of the
Ombudsman, with the exception of the Supreme Court on pure questions of law. This paragraph, which the Ombudsman particularly relies on in arguing that the CA had no
jurisdiction over the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 petition, as it is supposedly this Court which has the sole jurisdiction to conduct a judicial review of its decisions or findings, is
vague for two (2) reasons: (1) it is unclear what the phrase "application for remedy" or the word "findings" refers to; and (2) it does not specify what procedural remedy is solely
allowable to this Court, save that the same be taken only against a pure question of law. The task then, is to apply the relevant principles of statutory construction to resolve the
ambiguity.

"The underlying principle of all construction is that the intent of the legislature should be sought in the words employed to express it, and that when found[,] it should be made
to govern, x x x. If the words of the law seem to be of doubtful import, it may then perhaps become necessary to look beyond them in order to ascertain what was in the
legislative mind at the time the law was enacted; what the circumstances were, under which the action was taken; what evil, if any, was meant to be redressed; x x x [a]nd
where the law has contemporaneously been put into operation, and in doing so a construction has necessarily been put upon it, this construction, especially if followed for some
considerable period, is entitled to great respect, as being very probably a true expression of the legislative purpose, and is not lightly to be overruled, although it is not
conclusive."124

As an aid to construction, courts may avail themselves of the actual proceedings of the legislative body in interpreting a statute of doubtful meaning. In case of doubt as to what
a provision of a statute means, the meaning put to the provision during the legislative deliberations may be adopted,125 albeit not controlling in the interpretation of the law.126

A. The Senate deliberations cited by the

Ombudsman do not pertain to the second
paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770.

The Ombudsman submits that the legislative intent behind Section 14, RA 6770, particularly on the matter of judicial review of her office's decisions or findings, is supposedly
clear from the following Senate deliberations:127
Senator [Edgardo J.] Angara, x x x. On page 15, Mr. President, line 14, after the phrase "petition for" delete the word "review" and in lieu thereof, insert the
word CERTIORARI. So that, review or appeal from the decision of the Ombudsman would only be taken not on a petition for review, but on certiorari.

The President [Jovito R. Salonga]. What is the practical effect of that? Will it be more difficult to reverse the decision under review?

Senator Angara. It has two practical effect ways, Mr. President. First is that the findings of facts of the Ombudsman would be almost conclusive if supported by substantial
evidence. Second, we would not unnecessarily clog the docket of the Supreme Court. So, it in effect will be a very strict appeal procedure.

xxxx

Senator [Teofisto T.] Guingona, [Jr.]. Does this mean that, for example, if there are exhaustive remedies available to a respondent, the respondent himself has the right to
exhaust the administrative remedies available to him?

Senator Angara. Yes, Mr. President, that is correct.

Senator Guingona. And he himself may cut the proceeding short by appealing to the Supreme Court only on certiorari ?

Senator Angara. On question of law, yes.

Senator Guingona. And no other remedy is available to him?

Senator Angara. Going to the Supreme Court, Mr. President?

Senator Guingona. Yes. What I mean to say is, at what stage, for example, if he is a presidential appointee who is the respondent, if there is f no certiorari available, is the
respondent given the right to exhaust his administrative remedies first before the Ombudsman can take the appropriate action?

Senator Angara. Yes, Mr. President, because we do not intend to change the administrative law principle that before one can go to court, he must exhaust all administrative
remedies xxx available to him before he goes and seeks judicial review.

xxxx

Senator [Neptali A.] Gonzales. What is the purpose of the Committee in changing the method of appeal from one of a petition for review to a petition for certiorari?

Senator Angara. To make it consistent, Mr. President, with the provision here in the bill to the effect that the finding of facts of the Ombudsman is conclusive if supported by
substantial evidence.

Senator Gonzales. A statement has been made by the Honorable Presiding Officer to which I concur, that in an appeal by certiorari , the appeal is more difficult. Because
in certiorari it is a matter of discretion on the part of the court, whether to give due course to the petition or dismiss it outright. Is that not correct, Mr. President?

Senator Angara. That is absolutely correct, Mr. President

Senator Gonzales. And in a petition for certiorari , the issue is limited to whether or not the Ombudsman here has acted without jurisdiction and has committed a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Is that not the consequence, Mr. President.

Senator Angara. That is correct, Mr. President.

Senator Gonzales. And it is, therefore, in this sense that the intention of the Committee is to make it harder to have a judicial review, but should be limited only to cases that I
have enumerated.

Senator Angara. Yes, Mr. President.

Senator Gonzales. I think, Mr. President, our Supreme Court has made a distinction between a petition for review and a petition for certiorari ; because before, under the 1935
Constitution appeal from any order, ruling or decision of the COMELEC shall be by means of review. But under the Constitution it is now by certiorari and the Supreme Court said
that by this change, the court exercising judicial review will not inquire into the facts, into the evidence, because we will not go deeply by way of review into the evidence on
record but its authority will be limited to a determination of whether the administrative agency acted without, or in excess of, jurisdiction, or committed a grave abuse of
discretion. So, I assume that that is the purpose of this amendment, Mr. President.

Senator Angara. The distinguished Gentleman has stated it so well.

Senator Gonzales. I just want to put that in the Record. Senator Angara. It is very well stated, Mr. President.

xxxx

The President. It is evident that there must be some final authority to render decisions. Should it be the Ombudsman or should it be the Supreme Court?
Senator Angara. As I understand it, under our scheme of government, Mr. President, it is and has to be the Supreme Court to make the final determination.

The President. Then if that is so, we have to modify Section 17.

Senator Angara. That is why, Mr. President, some of our Colleagues have made a reservation to introduce an appropriate change during the period of Individual Amendments.

xxxx

The President. All right. Is there any objection to the amendment inserting the word CERTIORARI instead of "review"? [Silence] Hearing none, the same is approved.128

Upon an assiduous scrutiny of these deliberations, the Court is, however, unconvinced that the provision debated on was Section 14, RA 6770, as the Ombudsman invokes. Note
that the exchange begins with the suggestion of Senator Angara to delete the word "review" that comes after the phrase "petition for review" and, in its stead, insert the word
"certiorari" so that the "review or appeal from the decision of the Ombudsman would not only be taken on a petition for review, but on certiorari" The ensuing exchange
between Senators Gonzales and Angara then dwells on the purpose of changing the method of review from one of a petition for review to a petition for certiorari - that is, to
make "the appeal x x x more difficult." Ultimately, the amendment to the change in wording, from "petition for review" to "petition for certiorari" was approved.

Noticeably, these references to a "petition for review" and the proposed "petition for certiorari" are nowhere to be found in the text of Section 14, RA 6770. In fact, it was earlier
mentioned that this provision, particularly its second paragraph, does not indicate what specific procedural remedy one should take in assailing a decision or finding of the
Ombudsman; it only reveals that the remedy be taken to this Court based on pure questions of law. More so, it was even commented upon during the oral arguments of this
case129 that there was no debate or clarification made on the current formulation of the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 per the available excerpts of the Senate
deliberations. In any case, at least for the above-cited deliberations, the Court finds no adequate support to sustain the Ombudsman's entreaty that the CA had no subject
matter jurisdiction over the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 petition.

On the contrary, it actually makes greater sense to posit that these deliberations refer to another Ombudsman Act provision, namely Section 27, RA 6770. This is because the
latter textually reflects the approval of Senator Angara's suggested amendment, i.e., that the Ombudsman's decision or finding may be assailed in a petition for certiorari to this
Court (fourth paragraph), and further, his comment on the conclusive nature of the factual findings of the Ombudsman, if supported by substantial evidence (third paragraph):
Section 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. (1) All provisionary orders of the Office of the Ombudsman are immediately effective and executory.

A motion for reconsideration of any order, directive or decision of the Office of the Ombudsman must be filed within five (5) days after receipt of written notice and shall be
entertained only on any of the following grounds:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(1) New evidence has been discovered which materially affects the order, directive or decision;cralawlawlibrary

(2) Errors of law or irregularities have been committed prejudicial to the interest of the movant. The motion for reconsideration shall be resolved within three (3) days from
filing: Provided, That only one motion for reconsideration shall be entertained.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman when supported by substantial evidence are conclusive. Any order, directive or decision imposing the penalty of public censure
or reprimand, suspension of not more than one (1) month's salary shall be final and unappealable.

In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives, or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition
for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45
of the Rules of Court.

The above rules may be amended or modified by the Office of the ' Ombudsman as the interest of justice may require. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

At first blush, it appears that Section 27, RA 6770 is equally ambiguous in stating that a "petition for certiorari" should be taken in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
as it is well-known that under the present 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, petitions for certiorari are governed by Rule 65 of the said Rules. However, it should be discerned that
the Ombudsman Act was passed way back in 1989130and, hence, before the advent of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.131 At that time, the governing 1964 Rules of
Court,132 consistent with Section 27, RA 6770, referred to the appeal taken thereunder as a petition for certiorari , thus possibly explaining the remedy's textual denomination, at
least in the provision's final approved version:
RULE 45
Appeal from Court of Appeals to Supreme Court

SECTION 1. Filing of Petition with Supreme Court. - A party may appeal by certiorari , from a judgment of the Court of Appeals, by filing with the Supreme Court a petition
forcertiorari , within fifteen (15) days from notice of judgment or of the denial of his motion for reconsideration filed in due time, and paying at the same time, to the clerk of
said court the corresponding docketing fee. The petition shall not be acted upon without proof of service of a copy thereof to the Court of Appeals. (Emphasis supplied)

B. Construing the second paragraph of

Section 14, RA 6770.

The Senate deliberations' lack of discussion on the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 notwithstanding, the other principles of statutory construction can apply to
ascertain the meaning of the provision.

To recount, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 states that "[n]o court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or findings of the
Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on pure question of law." ;cralawlawlibrary

As a general rule, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 bans the whole range of remedies against issuances of the Ombudsman, by prohibiting: (a) an appeal against
any decision or finding of the Ombudsman, and (b) "any application of remedy" (subject to the exception below) against the same. To clarify, the phrase "application for
remedy," being a generally worded provision, and being separated from the term "appeal" by the disjunctive "or",133 refers to any remedy (whether taken mainly or
provisionally), except an appeal, following the maxim generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda: general words are to be understood in a general sense.134 By the same
principle, the word "findings," which is also separated from the word "decision" by the disjunctive "or", would therefore refer to any finding made by the Ombudsman (whether
final or provisional), except a decision.

The subject provision, however, crafts an exception to the foregoing general rule. While the specific procedural vehicle is not explicit from its text, it is fairly deducible that the
second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 excepts, as the only allowable remedy against "the decision or findings of the Ombudsman," a Rule 45 appeal, for the reason that it is
the only remedy taken to the Supreme Court on "pure questions of law," whether under the 1964 Rules of Court or the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure:
 Rule 45, 1964 Rules of Court

RULE 45
Appeal from Court of Appeals to Supreme Court

xxxx

Section 2. Contents of Petition. The petition shall contain a concise statement of the matters involved, the assignment of errors made in the court below, and the reasons
relied on for the allowance of the petition, and it should be accompanied with a true copy of the judgment sought to be reviewed, together with twelve (12) copies of the record
on appeal, if any, and of the petitioner's brief as filed in the Court of Appeals. A verified statement of the date when notice of judgment and denial of the motion for
reconsideration, if any, were received shall accompany the petition.

Only questions of law may be raised in the petition and must be distinctly set forth. If no record on appeal has been filed in the Court of Appeals, the clerk of the Supreme
Court, upon admission of the petition, shall demand from the Court of Appeals the elevation of the whole record of the case. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Rule 45, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure

RULE 45
Appeal by Certiorari to the Supreme Court

Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. - A party desiring to appeal by certiorarifrom a judgment, final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan,
the Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial Court or other courts, whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The
petition may include an application for a writ of preliminary injunction or other provisional remedies and shall raise only questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth.
The petitioner may seek the same provisional remedies by verified motion filed in the same action or proceeding at any time during its pendency. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

That the remedy excepted in the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 could be a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1964 Rules of Court or the 1997 Rules of
Procedure is a suggestion that defies traditional norms of procedure. It is basic procedural law that a Rule 65 petition is based on errors of jurisdiction, and not errors of
judgment to which the classifications of (a) questions of fact, (b) questions of law, or (c) questions of mixed fact and law, relate to. In fact, there is no procedural rule, whether in
the old or new Rules, which grounds a Rule 65 petition on pure questions of law. Indeed, it is also a statutory construction principle that the lawmaking body cannot be said to
have intended the establishment of conflicting and hostile systems on the same subject. Such a result would render legislation a useless and idle ceremony, and subject the laws
to uncertainty and unintelligibility.135There should then be no confusion that the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 refers to a Rule 45 appeal to this Court, and no other.
In sum, the appropriate construction of this Ombudsman Act provision is that all remedies against issuances of the Office of the Ombudsman are prohibited, except the above-
stated Rule 45 remedy to the Court on pure questions of law.

C. Validity of the second paragraph of

Section 14, RA 6770.

Of course, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770's extremely limited restriction on remedies is inappropriate since a Rule 45 appeal -which is within the sphere of the
rules of procedure promulgated by this Court - can only be taken against final decisions or orders of lower courts,136 and not against "findings" of quasi-judicial agencies. As will
be later elaborated upon, Congress cannot interfere with matters of procedure; hence, it cannot alter the scope of a Rule 45 appeal so as to apply to interlocutory "findings"
issued by the Ombudsman. More significantly, by confining the remedy to a Rule 45 appeal, the provision takes away the remedy of certiorari, grounded on errors of
jurisdiction, in denigration of the judicial power constitutionally vested in courts. In this light, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 also increased this Court's appellate
jurisdiction, without a showing, however, that it gave its consent to the same. The provision is, in fact, very similar to the fourth paragraph of Section 27, RA 6770 (as above-
cited), which was invalidated in the case of Fabian v. Desiertoni137 (Fabian).138

In Fabian, the Court struck down the fourth paragraph of Section 27, RA 6770 as unconstitutional since it had the effect of increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Court
without its advice and concurrence in violation of Section 30, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.139 Moreover, this provision was found to be inconsistent with Section 1, Rule 45
of the present 1997 Rules of Procedure which, as above-intimated, applies only to a review of "judgments or final orders of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court
of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial Court, or other courts authorized by law;" and not of quasi-judicial agencies, such as the Office of the Ombudsman, the remedy now being a
Rule 43 appeal to the Court of Appeals. In Ruivivar v. Office of the Ombudsman,140 the Court's ratiocinations and ruling in Fabian were recounted:
The case of Fabian v. Desierto arose from the doubt created in the application of Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770 (The Ombudsman's Act) and Section 7, Rule III of A.O. No. 7 (Rules
of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman) on the availability of appeal before the Supreme Court to assail a decision or order of the Ombudsman in administrative
cases. In Fabian, we invalidated Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770 (and Section 7, Rule III of A.O. No. 7 and the other rules implementing the Act) insofar as it provided for appeal
by certiorari under Rule 45 from the decisions or orders of the Ombudsman in administrative cases. We held that Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770 had the effect, not only of
increasing the appellate jurisdiction of this Court without its advice and concurrence in violation of Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution; it was also inconsistent with
Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which provides that a petition for review on certiorari shall apply only to a review of "judgments or final orders of the Court of
Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial Court, or other courts authorized by law." We pointedly said:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
As a consequence of our ratiocination that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 should be struck down as unconstitutional, and in line with the regulatory philosophy adopted in
appeals from quasi-judicial agencies in the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases
should be taken to the CA under the provisions of Rule 43.141 (Emphasis supplied)

Since the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 limits the remedy against "decision or findings" of the Ombudsman to a Rule 45 appeal and thus - similar to the fourth
paragraph of Section 27, RA 6770142 - attempts to effectively increase the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction without its advice and concurrence,143 it is therefore concluded
that the former provision is also unconstitutional and perforce, invalid. Contrary to the Ombudsman's posturing,144Fabian should squarely apply since the above-stated
Ombudsman Act provisions are in part materia in that they "cover the same specific or particular subject matter,"145 that is, the manner of judicial review over issuances of the
Ombudsman.

Note that since the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 is clearly determinative of the existence of the CA's subject matter jurisdiction over the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453
petition, including all subsequent proceedings relative thereto, as the Ombudsman herself has developed, the Court deems it proper to resolve this issue ex mero motu (on its
own motion146). This procedure, as was similarly adopted in Fabian, finds its bearings in settled case law:
The conventional rule, however, is that a challenge on constitutional grounds must be raised by a party to the case, neither of whom did so in this case, but that is not an
inflexible rule, as we shall explain.

Since the constitution is intended for the observance of the judiciary and other departments of the government and the judges are sworn to support its provisions, the courts
are not at liberty to overlook or disregard its commands or countenance evasions thereof. When it is clear , that a statute transgresses the authority vested in a legislative body,
it is the duty of the courts to declare that the constitution, and not the statute, governs in a case before them for judgment.

Thus, while courts will not ordinarily pass upon constitutional questions which are not raised in the pleadings, the rule has been recognized to admit of certain exceptions. It
does not preclude a court from inquiring into its own jurisdiction or compel it to enter a judgment that it lacks jurisdiction to enter. If a statute on which a court's jurisdiction in a
proceeding depends is unconstitutional, the court has no jurisdiction in the proceeding, and since it may determine whether or not it has jurisdiction, it necessarily follows that it
may inquire into the constitutionality of the statute.

Constitutional questions, not raised in the regular and orderly procedure in the trial are ordinarily rejected unless the jurisdiction of the court below or that of the appellate
court is involved in which case it may be raised at any time or on the court's own motion. The Court ex mero motu may take cognizance of lack of jurisdiction at any point in
the case where that fact is developed. The court has a clearly recognized right to determine its own jurisdiction in any proceeding.147 (Emphasis supplied)

D. Consequence of invalidity.

In this case, the Rule 65 petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 was filed by Binay, Jr. before the CA in order to nullify the preventive suspension order issued by the
Ombudsman, an interlocutory order,148 hence, unappealable.149

In several cases decided after Fabian, the Court has ruled that Rule 65 petitions for certiorari against unappelable issuances150 of the Ombudsman should be filed before the CA,
and not directly before this Court:

In Office of the Ombudsman v. Capulong151 (March 12, 2014), wherein a preventive suspension order issued by the Office of the Ombudsman was - similar to this case - assailed
through a Rule 65 petition for certiorari filed by the public officer before the CA, the Court held that "[t]here being a finding of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Ombudsman, it was certainly imperative for the CA to grant incidental reliefs, as sanctioned by Section 1 of Rule 65."152

In Dagan v. Office of the Ombudsman153 (November 19, 2013), involving a Rule 65 petition for certiorari assailing a final and unappealable order of the Office of the Ombudsman
in an administrative case, the Court remarked that "petitioner employed the correct mode of review in this case, i.e., a special civil action for certiorari before the Court of
Appeals."154 In this relation, it stated that while "a special civil action for Certiorari is within the concurrent original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals,
such petition should be initially filed with the Court of Appeals in observance of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts." Further, the Court upheld Barata v. Abalos, Jr.155 (June 6,
2001), wherein it was ruled that the remedy against final and unappealable orders of the Office of the Ombudsman in an administrative case was a Rule 65 petition to the CA.
The same verdict was reached in Ruivivar156 (September 16, 2008).

Thus, with the unconstitutionality of the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770, the Court, consistent with existing jurisprudence, concludes that the CA has subject matter
jurisdiction over the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 petition. That being said, the Court now examines the objections of the Ombudsman, this time against the CA's authority to
issue the assailed TRO and WPI against the implementation of the preventive suspension order, incidental to that main case.
III.

From the inception of these proceedings, the Ombudsman has been adamant that the CA has no jurisdiction to issue any provisional injunctive writ against her office to enjoin
its preventive suspension orders. As basis, she invokes the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 in conjunction with her office's independence under the 1987 Constitution.
She advances the idea that "[i]n order to further ensure [her office's] independence, [RA 6770] likewise insulated it from judicial intervention,"157particularly, "from injunctive
reliefs traditionally obtainable from the courts,"158 claiming that said writs may work "just as effectively as direct harassment or political pressure would."159

A. The concept of Ombudsman independence.

Section 5, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution guarantees the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman:
Section 5. There is hereby created the independent Office of the Ombudsman, composed of the Ombudsman to be known as Tanodbayan, one overall Deputy and at least one
Deputy each for Luzon, Visayas[,] and Mindanao. A separate Deputy for the military establishment may likewise be appointed. (Emphasis supplied)

In Gonzales III v. Office of the President160 (Gonzales III), the Court traced the historical underpinnings of the Office of the Ombudsman:
Prior to the 1973 Constitution, past presidents established several Ombudsman-like agencies to serve as the people's medium for airing grievances and for direct redress against
abuses and misconduct in the government. Ultimately, however, these agencies failed to fully realize their objective for lack of the political independence necessary for the
effective performance of their function as government critic.

It was under the 1973 Constitution that the Office of the Ombudsman became a constitutionally-mandated office to give it political independence and adequate powers to
enforce its mandate. Pursuant to the ( 1973 Constitution, President Ferdinand Marcos enacted Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1487, as amended by PD No. 1607 and PD No. 1630,
creating the Office of the Ombudsman to be known as Tanodbayan. It was tasked principally to investigate, on complaint or motu proprio, any administrative act of any
administrative agency, including any government-owned or controlled corporation. When the Office of the Tanodbayan was reorganized in 1979, the powers previously vested
in the Special Prosecutor were transferred to the Tanodbayan himself. He was given the exclusive authority to conduct preliminary investigation of all cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan, file the corresponding information, and control the prosecution of these cases.

With the advent of the 1987 Constitution, a new Office of the Ombudsman was created by constitutional fiat. Unlike in the 1973 Constitution, its independence was expressly
and constitutionally guaranteed. Its objectives are to enforce the state policy in Section 27, Article II and the standard of accountability in public service under Section 1, Article
XI of the 1987 Constitution. These provisions read:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 27. The State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take positive and effective measures against graft and corruption.

Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must, at all times, be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty,
and efficiency; act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.161 (Emphasis supplied)

More significantly, Gonzales III explained the broad scope of the office's mandate, and in correlation, the impetus behind its independence:
Under Section 12, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the Office of the Ombudsman is envisioned to be the "protector of the people" against the inept, abusive, and corrupt in
the Government, to function essentially as a complaints and action bureau. This constitutional vision of a Philippine Ombudsman practically intends to make the Ombudsman an
authority to directly check and guard against the ills, abuses and excesses , of the bureaucracy. Pursuant to Section 13 (8), Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, Congress enacted
RA No. 6770 to enable it to further realize the vision of the Constitution. Section 21 of RA No. 6770 provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 21. Official Subject to Disciplinary Authority; Exceptions. - The Office of the Ombudsman shall have disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the
Government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies, including Members of the Cabinet, local government, government-owned or controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries, except over officials who may be removed only by impeachment or over Members of Congress, and the Judiciary.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
As the Ombudsman is expected to be an "activist watchman," the < Court has upheld its actions, although not squarely falling under the broad powers granted [to] it by the
Constitution and by RA No. 6770, if these actions are reasonably in line with its official function and consistent with the law and the Constitution.

The Ombudsman's broad investigative and disciplinary powers include all acts of malfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance of all public officials, including Members of the
Cabinet and key Executive officers, during their tenure. To support these broad powers, the Constitution saw it fit to insulate the Office of the Ombudsman from the pressures
and influence of officialdom and partisan politics and from fear of external reprisal by making it an "independent" office, x x x.

xxxx

Given the scope of its disciplinary authority, the Office of the Ombudsman is a very powerful government constitutional agency that is considered "a notch above other
grievance-handling investigative bodies." It has powers, both constitutional and statutory, that are commensurate , with its daunting task of enforcing accountability of public
officers.162 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Gonzales III is the first case which grappled with the meaning of the Ombudsman's independence vis-a-vis the independence of the other constitutional bodies. Pertinently, the
Court observed:

(1) "[T]he independence enjoyed by the Office of the Ombudsman and by the Constitutional Commissions shares certain characteristics - they do not owe their existence to any
act of Congress, but are created by the Constitution itself; additionally, they all enjoy fiscal autonomy. In general terms, the framers of the Constitution intended that these
'independent' bodies be insulated from political pressure to the extent that the absence of 'independence' would result in the impairment of their core
functions"163;cralawlawlibrary

(2) "[T]he Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have the independence and flexibility needed in the discharge of their constitutional duties. The
imposition of restrictions and constraints on the manner the independent constitutional offices allocate and utilize the funds appropriated for their operations is anathema to
fiscal autonomy and violative not only [of] the express mandate of the Constitution, but especially as regards the Supreme Court, of the independence and separation of powers
upon which the entire fabric of our constitutional system is based";164 and

(3) "[T]he constitutional deliberations explain the Constitutional Commissions' need for independence. In the deliberations of the 1973 Constitution, the delegates amended the
1935 Constitution by providing for a constitutionally-created Civil Service Commission, instead of one created by law, on the premise that the effectivity of this body is
dependent on its freedom from the tentacles of politics. In a similar manner, the deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the Commission on Audit highlighted the
developments in the past Constitutions geared towards insulating the Commission on Audit from political pressure."165

At bottom, the decisive ruling in Gonzales III, however, was that the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman, as well as that of the foregoing independent bodies, meant
freedom from control or supervision of the Executive Department:
[T]he independent constitutional commissions have been consistently intended by the framers to be independent from executive control or supervision or any form of political
influence. At least insofar as these bodies are concerned, jurisprudence is not scarce on how the "independence" granted to these bodies prevents presidential interference.

In Brillantes, Jr. v. Yorac (G.R. No. 93867, December 18, 1990, 192 SCRA 358), we emphasized that the Constitutional Commissions, which have been characterized under the
Constitution as "independent," are not under the control of the President, even if they discharge functions that are executive in nature. The Court declared as unconstitutional
the President's act of temporarily appointing the respondent in that case as Acting Chairman of the [Commission on Elections] "however well-meaning" it might have been.

In Bautista v. Senator Salonga (254 Phil. 156, 179 [1989]), the Court categorically stated that the tenure of the commissioners of the independent Commission on Human
Rights could not be placed under the discretionary power of the President.

xxxx

The kind of independence enjoyed by the Office of the Ombudsman certainly cannot be inferior - but is similar in degree and kind - to the independence similarly guaranteed by
the Constitution to the Constitutional Commissions since all these offices fill the political interstices of a republican democracy that are crucial to its existence and proper
functioning.166 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

Thus, in Gonzales III, the Court declared Section 8 (2), RA 6770, which provides that "[a] Deputy or the Special Prosecutor, may be removed from office by the President for any
of the grounds provided for the removal of the Ombudsman, and after due process," partially unconstitutional insofar as it subjected the Deputy Ombudsman to the disciplinary
authority of the President for violating the principle of independence. Meanwhile, the validity of Section 8 (2), RA 6770 was maintained insofar as the Office of the Special
Prosecutor was concerned since said office was not considered to be constitutionally within the Office of the Ombudsman and is, hence, not entitled to the independence the
latter enjoys under the Constitution.167

As may be deduced from the various discourses in Gonzales III, the concept of Ombudsman's independence covers three (3) things:

First: creation by the Constitution, which means that the office cannot be abolished, nor its constitutionally specified functions and privileges, be removed, altered, or modified
by law, unless the Constitution itself allows, or an amendment thereto is made;cralawlawlibrary

Second: fiscal autonomy, which means that the office "may not be obstructed from [its] freedom to use or dispose of [its] funds for purposes germane to [its]
functions;168hence, its budget cannot be strategically decreased by officials of the political branches of government so as to impair said functions; and

Third: insulation from executive supervision and control, which means that those within the ranks of the office can only be disciplined by an internal authority.

Evidently, all three aspects of independence intend to protect the Office of the Ombudsman from political harassment and pressure, so as to free it from the "insidious
tentacles of politics."169

That being the case, the concept of Ombudsman independence cannot be invoked as basis to insulate the Ombudsman from judicial power constitutionally vested unto the
courts. Courts are apolitical bodies, which are ordained to act as impartial tribunals and apply even justice to all. Hence, the Ombudsman's notion that it can be exempt from an
incident of judicial power - that is, a provisional writ of injunction against a preventive suspension order - clearly strays from the concept's rationale of insulating the office from
political harassment or pressure.

B. The first paragraph of Section 14, RA

6770 in light of the powers of Congress and the
Court under the 1987 Constitution.
The Ombudsman's erroneous abstraction of her office's independence notwithstanding, it remains that the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 textually prohibits courts from
extending provisional injunctive relief to delay any investigation conducted by her office. Despite the usage of the general phrase "[n]o writ of injunction shall be issued by any
court," the Ombudsman herself concedes that the prohibition does not cover the Supreme Court.170 As support, she cites the following Senate deliberations:
Senator [Ernesto M.] Maceda. Mr. President, I do not know if an amendment is necessary. I would just like to inquire for the record whether below the Supreme Court, it is
understood that there is no injunction policy against the Ombudsman by lower courts. Or, is it necessary to have a special paragraph for that?

Senator Angara. Well, there is no provision here, Mr. President, that will prevent an injunction against the Ombudsman being issued.

Senator Maceda. In which case, I think that the intention, this being one of the highest constitutional bodies, is to subject this only to certiorari to the Supreme Court. I think
an injunction from the Supreme Court is, of course, in order but no lower courts should be allowed to interfere. We had a very bad experience with even, let us say, the Forestry
Code where no injunction is supposed to be issued against the Department of Natural Resources. Injunctions are issued right and left by RTC judges all over the country.

The President. Why do we not make an express provision to that effect?

Senator Angara. We would welcome that, Mr. President.

The President. No [writs of injunction] from the trial courts other than the Supreme Court.

Senator Maceda. I so move, Mr. President, for that amendment.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] Hearing none, the same is approved.171

Further, she acknowledges that by virtue of Sections 1 and 5 (1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, acts of the Ombudsman, including interlocutory orders, are subject to the
Supreme Court's power of judicial review As a corollary, the Supreme Court may issue ancillary mjunctive writs or provisional remedies in the exercise of its power of judicial
review over matters pertaining to ongoing investigations by the Office of the Ombudsman. Respecting the CA, however, the Ombudsman begs to differ. 172

With these submissions, it is therefore apt to examine the validity of the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 insofar as it prohibits all courts, except this Court, from issuing
provisional writs of injunction to enjoin an Ombudsman investigation. That the constitutionality of this provision is the lis mota of this case has not been seriously disputed. In
fact, the issue anent its constitutionality was properly raised and presented during the course of these proceedings.173 More importantly, its resolution is clearly necessary to the
complete disposition of this case.174

In the enduring words of Justice Laurel in Angara v. The Electoral Commission (Angara),175 the "Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of
power to the executive, the legislative[,] and the judicial departments of the government."176 The constitutional demarcation of the three fundamental powers of government is
more commonly known as the principle of separation of powers. In the landmark case of Belgica v. Ochoa, Jr. (Belgica),177 the Court held that "there is a violation of the
separation of powers principle when one branch of government unduly encroaches on the domain of another."178 In particular, "there is a violation of the principle when there is
impermissible (a) interference with and/or (b) assumption of another department's functions."179

Under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, judicial power is allocated to the Supreme Court and all such lower courts:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

This Court is the only court established by the Constitution, while all other lower courts may be established by laws passed by Congress. Thus, through the passage of Batas
Pambansa Bilang (BP) 129,180 known as "The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980," the Court of Appeals,181 the Regional Trial Courts,182 and the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts183 were established. Later, through the passage of RA 1125,184 and Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1486,185 the Court of
Tax Appeals, and the Sandiganbayan were respectively established.

In addition to the authority to establish lower courts, Section 2, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution empowers Congress to define, prescribe, and apportion the
jurisdiction of all courts, exceptthat it may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5186 of the same Article:
Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, ' and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction
over cases enumerated in Section 5 hereof.

x x x xChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Jurisdiction, as hereinabove used, more accurately pertains to jurisdiction over the subject matter of an action. In The Diocese ofBacolod v. Commission on Elections,187 subject
matter jurisdiction was defined as "the authority 'to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong and is conferred by the
sovereign authority which organizes the court and defines its powers.'"

Among others, Congress defined, prescribed, and apportioned the subject matter jurisdiction of this Court (subject to the aforementioned constitutional limitations), the Court
of Appeals, and the trial courts, through the passage of BP 129, as amended.

In this case, the basis for the CA's subject matter jurisdiction over Binay, Jr.'s main petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 is Section 9(1), Chapter I of BP 129, as
amended:
Section 9. Jurisdiction. - The Court of Appeals shall exercise:
1. Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, and quo warranto, and auxiliary writs or processes, whether or
not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction[.]

Note that the CA's certiorari jurisdiction, as above-stated, is not only original but also concurrent with the Regional Trial Courts (under Section 21 (1), Chapter II of BP 129), and
the Supreme Court (under Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution). In view of the concurrence of these courts' jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari,
the doctrine of hierarchy of courts should be followed. In People v. Cuaresma,188 the doctrine was explained as follows:
[T]his concurrence of jurisdiction is not x x x to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which
application therefor will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and should also serve as a general
determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the
issuance of extraordinary writs against first level ("inferior") courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals.189
When a court has subject matter jurisdiction over a particular case, as conferred unto it by law, said court may then exercise its jurisdiction acquired over that case, which is
called judicial power.

Judicial power, as vested in the Supreme Court and all other courts established by law, has been defined as the "totality of powers a court exercises when it assumes
jurisdiction and hears and decides a case."190 Under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, it includes "the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."

In Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.191 the Court explained the expanded scope of judicial power under the 1987 Constitution:
The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept of judicial power, involving the settlement of conflicting rights as conferred by law. The second part of the
authority represents a broadening of f judicial power to enable the courts of justice to review what was before forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion of the political
departments of the government.

As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly the Supreme Court, the power to rule upon even the wisdom of the decisions of the executive and the
legislature and to declare their acts invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because they are tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The catch, of course, is the meaning of "grave
abuse of discretion," which is a very elastic phrase that can expand or contract according to the disposition of the judiciary.192

Judicial power is never exercised in a vacuum. A court's exercise of the jurisdiction it has acquired over a particular case conforms to the limits and parameters of the rules of
procedure duly promulgated by this Court. In other words, procedure is the framework within which judicial power is exercised. In Manila Railroad Co. v. Attorney-
General,193 the Court elucidated that "[t]he power or authority of the court over the subject matter existed and was fixed before procedure in a given cause began. Procedure
does not alter or change that power or authority; it simply directs the manner in which it shall be fully and justly exercised. To be sure, in certain cases, if that power is not
exercised in conformity with the provisions of the procedural law, purely, the court attempting to exercise it loses the power to exercise it legally. This does not mean that it
loses jurisdiction of the subject matter."194

While the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts is, by constitutional design, vested unto Congress, the power to promulgate rules
concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts belongs exclusively to this Court. Section 5 (5), Article VIII
of the 1987 Constitution reads:
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law,
the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be
uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain
effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

In Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice195 (Echegaray), the Court traced the evolution of its rule-making authority, which, under the 1935196 and 1973 Constitutions,197 had been
priorly subjected to a power-sharing scheme with Congress.198 As it now stands, the 1987 Constitution textually altered the old provisions by deleting the concurrent power of
Congress to amend the rules, thus solidifying in one body the Court's rule-making powers, in line with the Framers' vision of institutionalizing a "[s]tronger and more
independent judiciary."199

The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission would show200 that the Framers debated on whether or not the Court's rule-making powers should be shared
with Congress. There was an initial suggestion to insert the sentence "The National Assembly may repeal, alter, or supplement the said rules with the advice and concurrence of
the Supreme Court", right after the phrase "Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts,
the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged^" in the enumeration of powers of the Supreme Court. Later, Commissioner
Felicitas S. Aquino proposed to delete the former sentence and, instead, after the word "[underprivileged," place a comma (,) to be followed by "the phrase with the
concurrence of the National Assembly." Eventually, a compromise formulation was reached wherein (a) the Committee members agreed to Commissioner Aquino's proposal to
delete the phrase "the National Assembly may repeal, alter, or supplement the said rules with the advice and concurrence of the Supreme Court" and (b) in turn, Commissioner
Aquino agreed to withdraw his proposal to add "the phrase with the concurrence of the National Assembly." The changes were approved, thereby leading to the present lack
of textual reference to any form of Congressional participation in Section 5 (5), Article VIII, supra. The prevailing consideration was that "both bodies, the Supreme Court and
the Legislature, have their inherent powers."201

Thus, as it now stands, Congress has no authority to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure. As pronounced in Echegaray:
The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first time was given the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights. The Court was also r granted for the first time the power to disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. But most importantly,
the 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate
rules of pleading, practice and procedure is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, more so with the Executive.202 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Under its rule-making authority, the Court has periodically passed various rules of procedure, among others, the current 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Identifying the
appropriate procedural remedies needed for the reasonable exercise of every court's judicial power, the provisional remedies of temporary restraining orders and writs of
preliminary injunction were thus provided.

A temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction both constitute temporary measures availed of during the pendency of the action. They are, by nature,
ancillary because they are mere incidents in and are dependent upon the result of the main action. It is well-settled that the sole objectof a temporary restraining order or a
writ of preliminary injunction, whether prohibitory or mandatory, is to preserve the status quo203 until the merits of the case can be heard. They are usually granted when it is
made to appear that there is a substantial controversy between the parties and one of them is committing an act or threatening the immediate commission of an act that will
cause irreparable injury or destroy the status quo of the controversy before a full hearing can be had on the merits of the case. In other words, they are preservative remedies
for the protection of substantive rights or interests, and, hence, not a cause of action in itself, but merely adjunct to a main suit.204 In a sense, they are regulatory processes
meant to prevent a case from being mooted by the interim acts of the parties.

Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure generally governs the provisional remedies of a TRO and a WPI. A preliminary injunction is defined under Section 1,205 Rule 58, while
Section 3206 of the same Rule enumerates the grounds for its issuance. Meanwhile, under Section 5207 thereof, a TRO may be issued as a precursor to the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction under certain procedural parameters.
The power of a court to issue these provisional injunctive reliefs coincides with its inherent power to issue all auxiliary writs, processes, and other means necessary to carry its
acquired jurisdiction into effect under Section 6, Rule 135 of the Rules of Court which reads:
Section 6. Means to carry jurisdiction into effect. - When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, f processes and other means necessary to
carry it into effect may be employed by such court or officer; and if the procedure to be followed in the exercise of such jurisdiction is not specifically pointed out by law208 or by
these rules, any suitable process or mode of proceeding may be adopted which appears comfortable to the spirit of the said law or rules.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

In City of Manila v. Grecia-Cuerdo,209 which is a case involving "[t]he supervisory power or jurisdiction of the [Court of Tax Appeals] to issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction"210 over "decisions, orders or resolutions of the RTCs in local tax cases originally decided or resolved by them in the exercise of their original or appellate
jurisdiction,"211 the Court ruled that said power "should coexist with, and be a complement to, its appellate jurisdiction to review, by appeal, the final orders and decisions of the
RTC, in order to have complete supervision over the acts of the latter:"212
A grant of appellate jurisdiction implies that there is included in it the power necessary to exercise it effectively, to make all orders that ; will preserve the subject of the
action, and to give effect to the final determination of the appeal. It carries with it the power to protect that jurisdiction and to make the decisions of the court thereunder
effective. The court, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, has authority to control all auxiliary and incidental matters necessary to the efficient and proper exercise of that
jurisdiction. For this purpose, it may, when necessary, prohibit or restrain the performance of any act which might interfere with the proper exercise of its rightful jurisdiction in
cases pending before it.213 (Emphasis supplied)

In this light, the Court expounded on the inherent powers of a court endowed with subject matter jurisdiction:
[A] court which is endowed with a particular jurisdiction should have powers which are necessary to enable it to act effectively within such jurisdiction. These should be
regarded as powers which are inherent in its jurisdiction and the court must possess them in order to enforce its rules of practice and to suppress any abuses of its process
and to t defeat any attempted thwarting of such process.

x x x x cralawlawlibrary

Indeed, courts possess certain inherent powers which may be said to be implied from a general grant of jurisdiction, in addition to those expressly conferred on them. These
inherent powers are such powers as are necessary for the ordinary and efficient exercise of jurisdiction; or are essential to the existence, dignity and functions of the courts,
as well as to the due administration of justice; or are directly appropriate, convenient and suitable to the execution of their granted powers; and include the power to
maintain the court's jurisdiction and render it effective in behalf of the litigants.214 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

Broadly speaking, the inherent powers of the courts resonates the long-entrenched constitutional principle, articulated way back in the 1936 case of Angara, that "where a
general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred."215

In the United States, the "inherent powers doctrine refers to the principle, by which the courts deal with diverse matters over which they are thought to have intrinsic authority
like procedural [rule-making] and general judicial housekeeping. To justify the invocation or exercise of inherent powers, a court must show that the powers are reasonably
necessary to achieve the specific purpose for which the exercise is sought. Inherent powers enable the judiciary to accomplish its constitutionally mandated functions."216

In Smothers v. Lewis217 (Smothers), a case involving the constitutionality of a statute which prohibited courts from enjoining the enforcement of a revocation order of an alcohol
beverage license pending appeal,218 the Supreme Court of Kentucky held:
[T]he Court is x x x vested with certain "inherent" powers to do that which is reasonably necessary for the administration of justice within the scope of their jurisdiction. x x x
[W]e said while considering the rule making power and the judicial power to be one and the same that ". . . the grant of judicial power [rule making power] to the courts by the
constitution carries with it, as a necessary incident, the right to make that power effective in the administration of justice." (Emphases supplied)

Significantly, Smothers characterized a court's issuance of provisional injunctive relief as an exercise of the court's inherent power, and to this end, stated that any attempt on
the part of Congress to interfere with the same was constitutionally impermissible:
It is a result of this foregoing line of thinking that we now adopt the language framework of 28 Am.Jur.2d, Injunctions, Section 15, and once and for all make clear that a court,
once having obtained jurisdiction of a cause of action, has, as an incidental to its constitutional grant of power, inherent power to do all things reasonably necessary to the
administration of justice in the case before it. In the exercise of this power, a court, when necessary in order to protect or preserve the subject matter of the litigation, to
protect its jurisdiction and to make its judgment effective, may grant or issue a temporary injunction in aid of or ancillary to the principal action.

The control over this inherent judicial power, in this particular instance the injunction, is exclusively within the constitutional realm of the courts. As such, it is not within the
purview of the legislature to grant or deny the power nor is it within the purview of the legislature to shape or fashion circumstances under which this inherently judicial
power may be or may not be granted or denied.

This Court has historically recognized constitutional limitations upon the power of the legislature to interfere with or to inhibit the performance of constitutionally granted and
inherently provided judicial functions, x x x

xxxx

We reiterate our previously adopted language, ". . . a court, once having obtained jurisdiction of a cause of action, has, as incidental to its general jurisdiction, inherent power to
do all things reasonably necessary f to the administration of justice in the case before it. . ." This includes the inherent power to issue injunctions. (Emphases supplied)

Smothers also pointed out that the legislature's authority to provide a right to appeal in the statute does not necessarily mean that it could control the appellate judicial
proceeding:
However, the fact that the legislature statutorily provided for this appeal does not give it the right to encroach upon the constitutionally granted powers of the judiciary. Once
the administrative action has ended and the right to appeal arises the legislature is void of any right to control a subsequent appellate judicial proceeding. The judicial rules
have come into play and have preempted the field.219 (Emphasis supplied)

With these considerations in mind, the Court rules that when Congress passed the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 and, in so doing, took away from the courts their power
to issue a TRO and/or WPI to enjoin an investigation conducted by the Ombudsman, it encroached upon this Court's constitutional rule-making authority. Clearly, these
issuances, which are, by nature, provisional reliefs and auxiliary writs created under the provisions of the Rules of Court, are matters of procedure which belong exclusively
within the province of this Court. Rule 58 of the Rules of Court did not create, define, and regulate a right but merely prescribed the means of implementing an existing
right220 since it only provided for temporary reliefs to preserve the applicant's right in esse which is threatened to be violated during the course of a pending litigation. In the
case of Fabian,211 it was stated that:
If the rule takes away a vested right, it is not procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the right to appeal, it may be classified as a substantive matter; but if it operates as a
means of implementing an existing right then the rule deals merely with procedure.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Notably, there have been similar attempts on the part of Congress, in the exercise of its legislative power, to amend the Rules of Court, as in the cases of: (a) In Re: Exemption of
The National Power Corporation from Payment of Filing/ Docket Fees;222 (b) Re: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS)
from Payment of Legal Fees;223 and (c) Baguio Market Vendors Multi-Purpose Cooperative (BAMARVEMPCO) v. Cabato-Cortes224 While these cases involved legislative
enactments exempting government owned and controlled corporations and cooperatives from paying filing fees, thus, effectively modifying Rule 141 of the Rules of Court (Rule
on Legal Fees), it was, nonetheless, ruled that the prerogative to amend, repeal or even establish new rules of procedure225 solely belongs to the Court, to the exclusion of the
legislative and executive branches of government. On this score, the Court described its authority to promulgate rules on pleading, practice, and procedure as exclusive and
"[o]ne of the safeguards of [its] institutional independence."226

That Congress has been vested with the authority to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts under Section 2, Article VIII supra, as well as to create
statutory courts under Section 1, Article VIII supra, does not result in an abnegation of the Court's own power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice, and procedure under
Section 5 (5), Article VIII supra. Albeit operatively interrelated, these powers are nonetheless institutionally separate and distinct, each to be preserved under its own sphere of
authority. When Congress creates a court and delimits its jurisdiction, the procedure for which its jurisdiction is exercised is fixed by the Court through the rules it
promulgates. The first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 is not a jurisdiction-vesting provision, as the Ombudsman misconceives,227 because it does not define, prescribe, and
apportion the subject matter jurisdiction of courts to act on certiorari cases; the certiorari jurisdiction of courts, particularly the CA, stands under the relevant sections of BP 129
which were not shown to have been repealed. Instead, through this provision, Congress interfered with a provisional remedy that was created by this Court under its duly
promulgated rules of procedure, which utility is both integral and inherent to every court's exercise of judicial power. Without the Court's consent to the proscription, as
may be manifested by an adoption of the same as part of the rules of procedure through an administrative circular issued therefor, there thus, stands to be a violation of the
separation of powers principle.

In addition, it should be pointed out that the breach of Congress in prohibiting provisional injunctions, such as in the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770, does not only
undermine the constitutional allocation of powers; it also practically dilutes a court's ability to carry out its functions. This is so since a particular case can easily be mooted by
supervening events if no provisional injunctive relief is extended while the court is hearing the same. Accordingly, the court's acquired jurisdiction, through which it exercises
its judicial power, is rendered nugatory. Indeed, the force of judicial power, especially under the present Constitution, cannot be enervated due to a court's inability to regulate
what occurs during a proceeding's course. As earlier intimated, when jurisdiction over the subject matter is accorded by law and has been acquired by a court, its exercise
thereof should be undipped. To give true meaning to the judicial power contemplated by the Framers of our Constitution, the Court's duly promulgated rules of procedure
should therefore remain unabridged, this, even by statute. Truth be told, the policy against provisional injunctive writs in whatever variant should only subsist under rules of
procedure duly promulgated by the Court given its sole prerogative over the same.

The following exchange between Associate Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen (Justice Leonen) and the Acting Solicitor General Florin T. Hilbay (Acting Solicitor General
Hilbay) mirrors the foregoing observations:
JUSTICE LEONEN:
Okay. Now, would you know what rule covers injunction in the Rules of Court?

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

Rule 58, Your Honor.

JUSTICE LEONEN:
58, that is under the general rubric if Justice Bersamin will correct me if I will be mistaken under the rubric of what is called provisional remedies, our resident expert because
Justice Peralta is not here so Justice Bersamin for a while. So provisional remedy you have injunction, x x x.

xxxx

JUSTICE LEONEN:
Okay, Now, we go to the Constitution. Section 5, subparagraph 5 of Article VIII of the Constitution, if you have a copy of the Constitution, can you please read that provision?
Section 5, Article VIII the Judiciary subparagraph 5, would you kindly read that provision?

ACTING SOLICTOR GENERAL HILBAY.

"Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts..."

JUSTICE LEONEN:
Okay, we can stop with that, promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts. This is the power, the competence, the jurisdiction of what
constitutional organ?

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

The Supreme Court, Your Honor.

JUSTICE LEONEN:
The Supreme Court. This is different from Article VIII Sections 1 and 2 which we've already been discussed with you by my other colleagues, is that not correct?

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

Correct, Your Honor.

JUSTICE LEONEN:
Okay, so in Section 2, [apportion] jurisdiction that is the power of Congress, is that not correct?

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

Correct, Your Honor.

JUSTICE LEONEN:
On the other hand, the power to promulgate rules is with the Court, is that not correct?

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

Correct, Your Honor.

JUSTICE LEONEN:
A TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction, would it be a separate case or is it part of litigation in an ordinary case?
ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:
It is an ancillary remedy, Your Honor.

JUSTICE LEONEN:
In fact, it originated as an equitable remedy, is that not correct?

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

Correct, Your Honor.

JUSTICE LEONEN:
In order to preserve the power of a court so that at the end of litigation, it will not be rendered moot and academic, is that not correct?

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

Correct, Your Honor.

JUSTICE LEONEN:
In that view, isn't Section 14, first paragraph, unconstitutional?

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

No, Your Honor.

xxxx

JUSTICE LEONEN.
Can Congress say that a Court cannot prescribe Motions to Dismiss under Rule 16?

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

Your Honor, Congress cannot impair the power of the Court to create remedies, x x x.

JUSTICE LEONEN.
What about bill [of] particulars, can Congress say, no Court shall have the power to issue the supplemental pleading called the bill of t particular [s]? It cannot, because that's
part of procedure...

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

That is true.

JUSTICE LEONEN
...or for that matter, no Court shall act on a Motion to Quash, is that not correct?

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

Correct.

JUSTICE LEONEN:
So what's different with the writ of injunction?

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

Writ of injunction, Your Honor, requires the existence of jurisdiction on the part of a court that was created by Congress. In the absence of jurisdiction... (interrupted)

JUSTICE LEONEN:
No, writ of injunction does not attach to a court. In other words, when they create a special agrarian court it has all procedures with it but it does not attach particularly to that
particular court, is that not correct?

ACTING SOLICTOR GENERAL HILBAY:

When Congress, Your Honor, creates a special court...

JUSTICE LEONEN:
Again, Counsel, what statute provides for a TRO, created the concept of a TRO? It was a Rule. A rule of procedure and the Rules of Court, is that not correct?

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE LEONEN:
And a TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction does not exist unless it is [an] ancillary to a particular injunction in a court, is that not correct?

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

Correct, Your Honor.

xxxx228 (Emphasis supplied)

In Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010,229 the Court instructed that "[i]t is through the Constitution that the fundamental powers of government are established,
limited and defined, and by which these powers are distributed among the several departments. The Constitution is the basic and paramount law to which all other laws must
conform and to which all persons, including the highest officials of the land, must defer." It would then follow that laws that do not conform to the Constitution shall be stricken
down for being unconstitutional.230

However, despite the ostensible breach of the separation of powers principle, the Court is not oblivious to the policy considerations behind the first paragraph of Section 14, RA
6770, as well as other statutory provisions of similar import. Thus, pending deliberation on whether or not to adopt the same, the Court, under its sole prerogative and authority
over all matters of procedure, deems it proper to declare as ineffective the prohibition against courts other than the Supreme Court from issuing provisional injunctive writs to
enjoin investigations conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman, until it is adopted as part of the rules of procedure through an administrative circular duly issued therefor.
Hence, with Congress interfering with matters of procedure (through passing the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770) without the Court's consent thereto, it remains that the
CA had the authority to issue the questioned injunctive writs enjoining the implementation of the preventive suspension order against Binay, Jr. At the risk of belaboring the
point, these issuances were merely ancillary to the exercise of the CA's certiorari jurisdiction conferred to it under Section 9 (1), Chapter I of BP 129, as amended, and which it
had already acquired over the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 case.
IV.

The foregoing notwithstanding, the issue of whether or not the CA gravely abused its jurisdiction in issuing the TRO and WPI in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 against the preventive
suspension order is a persisting objection to the validity of said injunctive writs. For its proper analysis, the Court first provides the context of the assailed injunctive writs.

A. Subject matter of the CA's iniunctive writs is the preventive suspension order.

By nature, a preventive suspension order is not a penalty but only a preventive measure. In Quimbo v. Acting Ombudsman Gervacio,231 the Court explained the distinction,
stating that its purpose is to prevent the official to be suspended from using his position and the powers and prerogatives of his office to influence potential witnesses or
tamper with records which may be vital in the prosecution of the case against him:
Jurisprudential law establishes a clear-cut distinction between suspension as preventive measure and suspension as penalty. The distinction, by considering the purpose aspect
of the suspensions, is readily cognizable as they have different ends sought to be achieved.

Preventive suspension is merely a preventive measure, a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. The purpose of the suspension order is to prevent the accused
from using his position and the powers and prerogatives of his office to influence potential witnesses or tamper with records which may be vital in the prosecution of the
case against him. If after such investigation, the charge is established and the person investigated is found guilty of acts warranting his suspension or removal, then he is
suspended, removed or dismissed. This is the penalty.

That preventive suspension is not a penalty is in fact explicitly provided by Section 24 of Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987
(Executive Order No. 292) and other Pertinent Civil Service Laws.
Section. 24. Preventive suspension is not a punishment or penalty for misconduct in office but is considered to be a preventive measure. (Emphasis
supplied)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Not being a penalty, the period within which one is under preventive suspension is not considered part of the actual penalty of suspension. So Section 25 of the same Rule XIV
provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 25. The period within which a public officer or employee charged is placed under preventive suspension shall not be considered part of the actual penalty of
suspension imposed upon the employee found guilty.232 (Emphases supplied)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The requisites for issuing a preventive suspension order are explicitly stated in Section 24, RA 6770:
Section 24. Preventive Suspension. - The Ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively suspend any officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation, if in his
judgment the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the
performance of duty; (b) the charges would warrant removal from the service; or (c) the respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him.

The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the Office of the Ombudsman but not more than six (6) months, without pay, except when the delay in
the disposition of the case by the Office of the Ombudsman is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, in which case the period of such delay shall not be
counted in computing the period of suspension herein provided. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In other words, the law sets forth two (2) conditions that must be satisfied to justify the issuance of an order of preventive suspension pending an investigation, namely:
(1) The evidence of guilt is strong; and

(2) Either of the following circumstances co-exist with the first requirement:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(a) The charge involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty;cralawlawlibrary

(b) The charge would warrant removal from the service; or

(c) The respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him.233ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

B. The basis of the CA's injunctive writs is the condonation doctrine.

Examining the CA's Resolutions in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 would, however, show that the Ombudsman's non-compliance with the requisites provided in Section 24, RA 6770 was
not the basis for the issuance of the assailed injunctive writs.

The CA's March 16, 2015 Resolution which directed the issuance of the assailed TRO was based on the case of Governor Garcia, Jr. v. CA234 (Governor Garcia, Jr.), wherein the
Court emphasized that "if it were established in the CA that the acts subject of the administrative complaint were indeed committed during petitioner [Garcia's] prior term, then,
following settled jurisprudence, he can no longer be administratively charged."235 Thus, the Court, contemplating the application of the condonation doctrine, among others,
cautioned, in the said case, that "it would have been more prudent for [the appellate court] to have, at the very least, on account of the extreme urgency of the matter and the
seriousness of the issues raised in the certiorari petition, issued a TRO x x x"236 during the pendency of the proceedings.

Similarly, the CA's April 6, 2015 Resolution which directed the issuance of the assailed WPI was based on the condonation doctrine, citing the case of Aguinaldo v. Santos237 The
CA held that Binay, Jr. has an ostensible right to the final relief prayed for, i.e., the nullification of the preventive suspension order, finding that the Ombudsman can hardly
impose preventive suspension against Binay, Jr. given that his re-election in 2013 as City Mayor of Makati condoned any administrative liability arising from anomalous activities
relative to the Makati Parking Building project from 2007 to 2013.238 Moreover, the CA observed that although there were acts which were apparently committed by Binay, Jr.
beyond his first term , i.e., the alleged payments on July 3, 4, and 24, 2013,239 corresponding to the services of Hillmarc's and MANA - still, Binay, Jr. cannot be held
administratively liable therefor based on the cases of Salalima v. Guingona, Jr.,240 and Mayor Garcia v. Mojica,241 wherein the condonation dobtrine was applied by the Court
although the payments were made after the official's election, reasoning that the payments were merely effected pursuant to contracts executed before said re-election.242

The Ombudsman contends that it was inappropriate for the CA to have considered the condonation doctrine since it was a matter of defense which should have been raised and
passed upon by her office during the administrative disciplinary proceedings.243 However, the Court agrees with the CA that it was not precluded from considering the same
given that it was material to the propriety of according provisional injunctive relief in conformity with the ruling in Governor Garcia, Jr., which was the subsisting jurisprudence at
that time. Thus, since condonation was duly raised by Binay, Jr. in his petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453,244 the CA did not err in passing upon the same. Note that although
Binay, Jr. secondarily argued that the evidence of guilt against him was not strong in his petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453,245 it appears that the CA found that the application of
the condonation doctrine was already sufficient to enjoin the implementation of the preventive suspension order. Again, there is nothing aberrant with this since, as remarked
in the same case of Governor Garcia, Jr., if it was established that the acts subject of the administrative complaint were indeed committed during Binay, Jr.'s prior term, then,
following the condonation doctrine, he can no longer be administratively charged. In other words, with condonation having been invoked by Binay, Jr. as an exculpatory
affirmative defense at the onset, the CA deemed it unnecessary to determine if the evidence of guilt against him was strong, at least for the purpose of issuing the subject
injunctive writs.

With the preliminary objection resolved and the basis of the assailed writs herein laid down, the Court now proceeds to determine if the CA gravely abused its discretion in
applying the condonation doctrine.

C. The origin of the condonation doctrine.

Generally speaking, condonation has been defined as "[a] victim's express or implied forgiveness of an offense, [especially] by treating the offender as if there had been no
offense."246

The condonation doctrine - which connotes this same sense of complete extinguishment of liability as will be herein elaborated upon - is not based on statutory law. It is a
jurisprudential creation that originated from the 1959 case of Pascual v. Hon. Provincial Board ofNueva Ecija,247 (Pascual),which was therefore decided under the 1935
Constitution.

In Pascual, therein petitioner, Arturo Pascual, was elected Mayor of San Jose, Nueva Ecija, sometime in November 1951, and was later re-elected to the same position in
1955. During his second term, or on October 6, 1956, the Acting Provincial Governor filed administrative charges before the Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija against him for
grave abuse of authority and usurpation of judicial functions for acting on a criminal complaint in Criminal Case No. 3556 on December 18 and 20, 1954. In defense, Arturo
Pascual argued that he cannot be made liable for the acts charged against him since they were committed during his previous term of office, and therefore, invalid grounds for
disciplining him during his second term. The Provincial Board, as well as the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, later decided against Arturo Pascual, and when the case
reached this Court on appeal, it recognized that the controversy posed a novel issue - that is, whether or not an elective official may be disciplined for a wrongful act committed
by him during his immediately preceding term of office.

As there was no legal precedent on the issue at that time, the Court, in Pascual, resorted to American authorities and "found that cases on the matter are conflicting due in
part, probably, to differences in statutes and constitutional provisions, and also, in part, to a divergence of views with respect to the question of whether the subsequent
election or appointment condones the prior misconduct."248Without going into the variables of these conflicting views and cases, it proceeded to state that:
The weight of authorities x x x seems to incline toward the rule denying the right to remove one from office because of misconduct during a prior term, to which we fully
subscribe.249 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The conclusion is at once problematic since this Court has now uncovered that there is really no established weight of authority in the United States (US) favoring the doctrine of
condonation, which, in the words of Pascual, theorizes that an official's re-election denies the right to remove him from office due to a misconduct during a prior term. In fact, as
pointed out during the oral arguments of this case, at least seventeen (17) states in the US have abandoned the condonation doctrine.250 The Ombudsman aptly cites several
rulings of various US State courts, as well as literature published on the matter, to demonstrate the fact that the doctrine is not uniformly applied across all state jurisdictions.
Indeed, the treatment is nuanced:

(1) For one, it has been widely recognized that the propriety of removing a public officer from his current term or office for misconduct which he allegedly committed in a prior
term of office is governed by the language of the statute or constitutional provision applicable to the facts of a particular case (see In Re Removal of Member of Council
Coppola).251 As an example, a Texas statute, on the one hand, expressly allows removal only for an act committed during a present term: "no officer shall be prosecuted or
removed from office for any act he may have committed prior to his election to office" (see State ex rel. Rowlings v. Loomis).252 On the other hand, the Supreme Court of
Oklahoma allows removal from office for "acts of commission, omission, or neglect committed, done or omitted during a previous or preceding term of office" (see State v.
Bailey)253 Meanwhile, in some states where the removal statute is silent or unclear, the case's resolution was contingent upon the interpretation of the phrase "in office." On
one end, the Supreme Court of Ohio strictly construed a removal statute containing the phrase "misfeasance of malfeasance in office" and thereby declared that, in the absence
of clear legislative language making, the word "office" must be limited to the single term during which the offense charged against the public officer occurred (see State ex rel.
Stokes v. Probate Court of Cuyahoga County)254 Similarly, the Common Pleas Court of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania decided that the phrase "in office" in its state constitution
was a time limitation with regard to the grounds of removal, so that an officer could not be removed for misbehaviour which occurred; prior to the taking of the office
(see Commonwealth v. Rudman)255 The opposite was construed in the Supreme Court of Louisiana which took the view that an officer's inability to hold an office resulted from
the commission of certain offenses, and at once rendered him unfit to continue in office, adding the fact that the officer had been re-elected did not condone or purge the
offense (see State ex rel. Billon v. Bourgeois).256 Also, in the Supreme Court of New York, Apellate Division, Fourth Department, the court construed the words "in office" to refer
not to a particular term of office but to an entire tenure; it stated that the whole purpose of the legislature in enacting the statute in question could easily be lost sight of, and
the intent of the law-making body be thwarted, if an unworthy official could not be removed during one term for misconduct for a previous one (Newman v. Strobel).257

(2) For another, condonation depended on whether or not the public officer was a successor in the same office for which he has been administratively charged. The "own-
successor theory," which is recognized in numerous States as an exception to condonation doctrine, is premised on the idea that each term of a re-elected incumbent is not
taken as separate and distinct, but rather, regarded as one continuous term of office. Thus, infractions committed in a previous term are grounds for removal because a re-
elected incumbent has no prior term to speak of258 (see Attorney-General v. Tufts;259State v. Welsh;260Hawkins v. Common Council of Grand Rapids;261Territory v.
Sanches;262 and Tibbs v. City of Atlanta).263

(3) Furthermore, some State courts took into consideration the continuing nature of an offense in cases where the condonation doctrine was invoked. In State ex rel. Douglas v.
Megaarden,264 the public officer charged with malversation of public funds was denied the defense of condonation by the Supreme Court of Minnesota, observing that "the
large sums of money illegally collected during the previous years are still retained by him." In State ex rel. Beck v. Harvey265 the Supreme Court of Kansas ruled that "there is no
necessity" of applying the condonation doctrine since "the misconduct continued in the present term of office[;] [thus] there was a duty upon defendant to restore this money
on demand of the county commissioners." Moreover, in State ex rel. Londerholm v. Schroeder,266 the Supreme Court of Kansas held that "insofar as nondelivery and excessive
prices are concerned, x x x there remains a continuing duty on the part of the defendant to make restitution to the country x x x, this duty extends into the present term, and
neglect to discharge it constitutes misconduct."

Overall, the foregoing data clearly contravenes the preliminary conclusion in Pascual that there is a "weight of authority" in the US on the condonation doctrine. In fact, without
any cogent exegesis to show that Pascual had accounted for the numerous factors relevant to the debate on condonation, an outright adoption of the doctrine in this
jurisdiction would not have been proper.

At any rate, these US cases are only of persuasive value in the process of this Court's decision-making. "[They] are not relied upon as precedents, but as guides of
interpretation."267 Therefore, the ultimate analysis is on whether or not the condonation doctrine, as espoused in Pascual, and carried over in numerous cases after, can be held
up against prevailing legal norms. Note that the doctrine of stare decisis does not preclude this Court from revisiting existing doctrine. As adjudged in the case of Belgica,
the stare decisis rule should not operate when there are powerful countervailing considerations against its application.268 In other words, stare decisis becomes an intractable
rule only when circumstances exist to preclude reversal of standing precedent.269 As the Ombudsman correctly points out, jurisprudence, after all, is not a rigid, atemporal
abstraction; it is an organic creature that develops and devolves along with the society within which it thrives.270 In the words of a recent US Supreme Court Decision, "[w]hat we
can decide, we can undecide."271

In this case, the Court agrees with the Ombudsman that since the time Pascual was decided, the legal landscape has radically shifted. Again, Pascual was a 1959 case decided
under the 1935 Constitution, which dated provisions do not reflect the experience of the Filipino People under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Therefore, the plain difference
in setting, including, of course, the sheer impact of the condonation doctrine on public accountability, calls for Pascual's judicious re-examination.

D. Testing the Condonation Doctrine.

Pascual's ratio decidendi may be dissected into three (3) parts:

First, the penalty of removal may not be extended beyond the term in which the public officer was elected for each term is separate and distinct:
Offenses committed, or acts done, during previous term are generally held not to furnish cause for removal and this is especially true where the constitution provides that the
penalty in proceedings for removal shall not extend beyond the removal from office, and disqualification from holding office for the term for which the officer was elected or
appointed. (67 C.J.S. p. 248, citing Rice vs. State, 161 S.W. 2d. 401; Montgomery vs. Nowell, 40 S.W. 2d. 418; People ex rel. Bagshaw vs. Thompson, 130 P. 2d. 237; Board of
Com'rs of Kingfisher County vs. Shutter, 281 P. 222; State vs. Blake, 280 P. 388; In re Fudula, 147 A. 67; State vs. Ward, 43 S.W. 2d. 217).
The underlying theory is that each term is separate from other terms x x x.272

Second, an elective official's re-election serves as a condonation of previous misconduct, thereby cutting the right to remove him therefor; and
[T]hat the reelection to office operates as a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. (43 Am. Jur. p. 45,
citing Atty. Gen. vs. Hasty, 184 Ala. 121, 63 So. 559, 50 L.R.A. (NS) 553.273(emphasis supplied)

Third, courts may not deprive the electorate, who are assumed to have known the life and character of candidates, of their right to elect officers:
As held in Conant vs. Grogan (1887) 6 N.Y.S.R. 322, cited in 17 A.I.R. 281, 63 So. 559, 50 LRA (NS) 553
The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office. To do otherwise would be to deprive the people of their right to elect their
officers. When the people have elected a man to office, it must be assumed that they did this with knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregarded or forgave
his faults or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It is not for the court, by reason of such faults or misconduct to practically overrule the will of the people.274 (Emphases
supplied)

The notable cases on condonation following Pascual are as follows:

(1) Lizares v. Hechanova275 (May 17, 1966) - wherein the Court first applied the condonation doctrine, thereby quoting the above-stated passages from Pascual in verbatim.

(2) Insco v. Sanchez, et al.276 (December 18, 1967) - wherein the Court clarified that the condonation doctrine does not apply to a criminal case. It was explained that a criminal
case is different from an administrative case in that the former involves the People of the Philippines as a community, and is a public wrong to the State at large; whereas, in the
latter, only the populace of the constituency he serves is affected. In addition, the Court noted that it is only the President who may pardon a criminal offense.

(3) Aguinaldo v. Santos277 (Aguinaldo; August 21, 1992) - a case decided under the 1987 Constitution wherein the condonation doctrine was applied in favor of then Cagayan
Governor Rodolfo E. Aguinaldo although his re-election merely supervened the pendency of, the proceedings.

(4) Salalima v. Guinsona, Jr.278 (Salalima; May 22, 1996) -wherein the Court reinforced the condonation doctrine by stating that the same is justified by "sound public policy."
According to the Court, condonation prevented the elective official from being "hounded" by administrative cases filed by his "political enemies" during a new term, for which
he has to defend himself "to the detriment of public service." Also, the Court mentioned that the administrative liability condoned by re-election covered the execution of the
contract and the incidents related therewith.279

(5) Mayor Garcia v. Mojica280 (Mayor Garcia; September 10, 1999) - wherein the benefit of the doctrine was extended to then Cebu City Mayor Alvin B. Garcia who was
administratively charged for his involvement in an anomalous contract for the supply of asphalt for Cebu City, executed only four (4) days before the upcoming elections. The
Court ruled that notwithstanding the timing of the contract's execution, the electorate is presumed to have known the petitioner's background and character, including his past
misconduct; hence, his subsequent re-election was deemed a condonation of his prior transgressions. More importantly, the Court held that the determinative time element in
applying the condonation doctrine should be the time when the contract was perfected; this meant that as long as the contract was entered into during a prior term, acts
which were done to implement the same, even if done during a succeeding term, do not negate the application of the condonation doctrine in favor of the elective official.

(6) Salumbides, Jr. v. Office of the Ombudsman281 (Salumbides, Jr.; April 23, 2010) - wherein the Court explained the doctrinal innovations in the Salalima and Mayor
Garcia rulings, to wit:
Salalima v. Guingona, Jr. and Mayor Garcia v. Hon. Mojica reinforced the doctrine. The condonation rule was applied even if the administrative complaint was not filed before
the reelection of the public official, and even if the alleged misconduct occurred four days before the elections, respectively. Salalima did not distinguish as to the date of
filing of the administrative complaint, as long as the alleged misconduct was committed during the prior term, the precise timing or period of which Garcia did not further
distinguish, as long as the wrongdoing that gave rise to the public official's culpability was committed prior to the date of reelection.282 (Emphasis
supplied)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The Court, citing Civil Service Commission v. Sojor,283 also clarified that the condonation doctrine would not apply to appointive officials since, as to them, there is no sovereign
will to disenfranchise.

(7) And finally, the above discussed case of Governor Garcia, Jr. -wherein the Court remarked that it would have been prudent for the appellate court therein to have issued a
temporary restraining order against the implementation of a preventive suspension order issued by the Ombudsman in view of the condonation doctrine.

A thorough review of the cases post-1987, among others, Aguinaldo, Salalima, Mayor Garcia, and Governor Garcia, Jr. - all cited by the CA to justify its March 16, 2015 and April
6, 2015 Resolutions directing the issuance of the assailed injunctive writs - would show that the basis for condonation under the prevailing constitutional and statutory
framework was never accounted for. What remains apparent from the text of these cases is that the basis for condonation, as jurisprudential doctrine, was - and still remains -
the above-cited postulates of Pascual, which was lifted from rulings of US courts where condonation was amply supported by their own state laws. With respect to its
applicability to administrative cases, the core premise of condonation - that is, an elective official's re-election cuts qff the right to remove him for an administrative offense
committed during a prior term - was adopted hook, line, and sinker in our jurisprudence largely because the legality of that doctrine was never tested against existing legal
norms. As in the US, the propriety of condonation is - as it should be -dependent on the legal foundation of the adjudicating jurisdiction. Hence, the Court undertakes an
examination of our current laws in order to determine if there is legal basis for the continued application of the doctrine of condonation.
The foundation of our entire legal system is the Constitution. It is the supreme law of the land;284 thus, the unbending rule is that every statute should be read in light of the
Constitution.285 Likewise, the Constitution is a framework of a workable government; hence, its interpretation must take into account the complexities, realities, and politics
attendant to the operation of the political branches of government.286

As earlier intimated, Pascual was a decision promulgated in 1959. Therefore, it was decided within the context of the 1935 Constitution which was silent with respect to public
accountability, or of the nature of public office being a public trust. The provision in the 1935 Constitution that comes closest in dealing with public office is Section 2, Article II
which states that "[t]he defense of the State is a prime duty of government, and in the fulfillment of this duty all citizens may be required by law to render personal military or
civil service."287 Perhaps owing to the 1935 Constitution's silence on public accountability, and considering the dearth of jurisprudential rulings on the matter, as well as the
variance in the policy considerations, there was no glaring objection confronting the Pascual Court in adopting the condonation doctrine that originated from select US cases
existing at that time.

With the advent of the 1973 Constitution, the approach in dealing with public officers underwent a significant change. The new charter introduced an entire article on
accountability of public officers, found in Article XIII. Section 1 thereof positively recognized, acknowledged, and declared that "[p]ublic office is a public trust." Accordingly,
"[p]ublic officers and employees shall serve with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, and shall remain accountable to the people."

After the turbulent decades of Martial Law rule, the Filipino People have framed and adopted the 1987 Constitution, which sets forth in the Declaration of Principles and State
Policies in Article II that "[t]he State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take positive and effective measures against graft and
corruption."288 Learning how unbridled power could corrupt public servants under the regime of a dictator, the Framers put primacy on the integrity of the public service by
declaring it as a constitutional principle and a State policy. More significantly, the 1987 Constitution strengthened and solidified what has been first proclaimed in the 1973
Constitution by commanding public officers to be accountable to the people at all times:
Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all timesbe accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty,
and efficiency and act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

In Belgica, it was explained that:

[t]he aphorism forged under Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, which states that "public office is a public trust," is an overarching reminder that every instrumentality
of government should exercise their official functions only in accordance with the principles of the Constitution which embodies the parameters of the people's trust. The notion
of a public trust connotes accountability x x x.289 (Emphasis supplied)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The same mandate is found in the Revised Administrative Code under the section of the Civil Service Commission,290 and also, in the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees.291

For local elective officials like Binay, Jr., the grounds to discipline, suspend or remove an elective local official from office are stated in Section 60 of Republic Act No.
7160,292 otherwise known as the "Local Government Code of 1991" (LGC), which was approved on October 10 1991, and took effect on January 1, 1992:
Section 60. Grounds for Disciplinary Action. - An elective local official may be disciplined, suspended, or removed from office on any of the r following
grounds:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(a) Disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines;cralawlawlibrary
(b) Culpable violation of the Constitution;cralawlawlibrary
(c) Dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in office, gross negligence, or dereliction of duty;cralawlawlibrary
(d) Commission of any offense involving moral turpitude or an offense punishable by at least prision mayor;cralawlawlibrary
(e) Abuse of authority;cralawlawlibrary
(f) Unauthorized absence for fifteen (15) consecutive working days, except in the case of members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlunsod, sanggunian
bayan, and sangguniang barangay;cralawlawlibrary
(g) Application for, or acquisition of, foreign citizenship or residence or the status of an immigrant of another country; and
(h) Such other grounds as may be provided in this Code and other laws.
An elective local official may be removed from office on the grounds enumerated above by order of the proper court.

Related to this provision is Section 40 (b) of the LGC which states that those removed from office as a result of an administrative case shall be disqualified from running for
any elective local position:
Section 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position:

xxxx

(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;

x x x x (Emphasis supplied)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

In the same sense, Section 52 (a) of the RRACCS provides that the penalty of dismissal from service carries the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification from holding
public office:
Section 52. - Administrative Disabilities Inherent in Certain Penalties. -
a. The penalty of dismissal shall carry with it cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, perpetual disqualification from holding public office,
and bar from taking the civil service examinations.

In contrast, Section 66 (b) of the LGC states that the penalty of suspension shall not exceed the unexpired term of the elective local official nor constitute a bar to his candidacy
for as long as he meets the qualifications required for the office. Note, however, that the provision only pertains to the duration of the penalty and its effect on the official's
candidacy. Nothing therein states that the administrative liability therefor is extinguished by the fact of re-election:
Section 66. Form and Notice of Decision. - x x x.

xxxx

(b) The penalty of suspension shall not exceed the unexpired term of the respondent or a period of six (6) months for every administrative offense, nor shall said penalty be a bar
to the candidacy of the respondent so suspended as long as he meets the qualifications required for the office.
Reading the 1987 Constitution together with the above-cited legal provisions now leads this Court to the conclusion that the doctrine of condonation is actually bereft of legal
bases.

To begin with, the concept of public office is a public trust and the corollary requirement of accountability to the people at all times, as mandated under the 1987
Constitution, is plainly inconsistent with the idea that an elective local official's administrative liability for a misconduct committed during a prior term can be wiped off by the
fact that he was elected to a second term of office, or even another elective post. Election is not a mode of condoning an administrative offense, and there is simply no
constitutional or statutory basis in our jurisdiction to support the notion that an official elected for a different term is fully absolved of any administrative liability arising from an
offense done during a prior term. In this jurisdiction, liability arising from administrative offenses may be condoned bv the President in light of Section 19, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution which was interpreted in Llamas v. Orbos293 to apply to administrative offenses:
The Constitution does not distinguish between which cases executive clemency may be exercised by the President, with the sole exclusion of impeachment cases. By the same
token, if executive clemency may be exercised only in criminal cases, it would indeed be unnecessary to provide for the exclusion of impeachment cases from the coverage of
Article VII, Section 19 of the Constitution. Following petitioner's proposed interpretation, cases of impeachment are automatically excluded inasmuch as the same do not
necessarily involve criminal offenses.

In the same vein, We do not clearly see any valid and convincing , reason why the President cannot grant executive clemency in administrative cases. It is Our considered view
that if the President can grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures in criminal cases, with much more reason can she grant executive clemency
in administrative cases, which are clearly less serious than criminal offenses.

Also, it cannot be inferred from Section 60 of the LGC that the grounds for discipline enumerated therein cannot anymore be invoked against an elective local official to hold him
administratively liable once he is re-elected to office. In fact, Section 40 (b) of the LGC precludes condonation since in the first place, an elective local official who is meted with
the penalty of removal could not be re-elected to an elective local position due to a direct disqualification from running for such post. In similar regard, Section 52 (a) of the
RRACCS imposes a penalty of perpetual disqualification from holding public office as an accessory to the penalty of dismissal from service.

To compare, some of the cases adopted in Pascual were decided by US State jurisdictions wherein the doctrine of condonation of administrative liability was supported by either
a constitutional or statutory provision stating, in effect, that an officer cannot be removed by a misconduct committed during a previous term,294 or that the disqualification to
hold the office does not extend beyond the term in which the official's delinquency occurred.295 In one case,296 the absence of a provision against the re-election of an officer
removed - unlike Section 40 (b) of the LGC-was the justification behind condonation. In another case,297 it was deemed that condonation through re-election was a policy under
their constitution - which adoption in this jurisdiction runs counter to our present Constitution's requirements on public accountability. There was even one case where the
doctrine of condonation was not adjudicated upon but only invoked by a party as a ground;298 while in another case, which was not reported in full in the official series, the crux
of the disposition was that the evidence of a prior irregularity in no way pertained to the charge at issue and therefore, was deemed to be incompetent.299Hence, owing to
either their variance or inapplicability, none of these cases can be used as basis for the continued adoption of the condonation doctrine under our existing laws.

At best, Section 66 (b) of the LGC prohibits the enforcement of the penalty of suspension beyond the unexpired portion of the elective local official's prior term, and likewise
allows said official to still run for re-election This treatment is similar to People ex rel Bagshaw v. Thompson300 and Montgomery v. Novell301 both cited in Pascual, wherein it was
ruled that an officer cannot be suspended for a misconduct committed during a prior term. However, as previously stated, nothing in Section 66 (b) states that the elective local
official's administrative liability is extinguished by the fact of re-election. Thus, at all events, no legal provision actually supports the theory that the liability is condoned.

Relatedly it should be clarified that there is no truth in Pascual's postulation that the courts would be depriving the electorate of their right to elect their officers if condonation
were not to be sanctioned. In political law, election pertains to the process by which a particular constituency chooses an individual to hold a public office. In this jurisdiction,
there is, again, no legal basis to conclude that election automatically implies condonation. Neither is there any legal basis to say that every democratic and republican state has
an inherent regime of condonation. If condonation of an elective official's administrative liability would perhaps, be allowed in this jurisdiction, then the same should have been
provided by law under our governing legal mechanisms. May it be at the time of Pascual or at present, by no means has it been shown that such a law, whether in a
constitutional or statutory provision, exists. Therefore, inferring from this manifest absence, it cannot be said that the electorate's will has been abdicated.

Equally infirm is Pascual's proposition that the electorate, when re-electing a local official, are assumed to have done so with knowledge of his life and character, and that they
disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. Suffice it to state that no such presumption exists in any statute or procedural rule.302 Besides, it is
contrary to human experience that the electorate would have full knowledge of a public official's misdeeds. The Ombudsman correctly points out the reality that most corrupt
acts by public officers are shrouded in secrecy, and concealed from the public. Misconduct committed by an elective official is easily covered up, and is almost always
unknown to the electorate when they cast their votes.303 At a conceptual level, condonation presupposes that the condoner has actual knowledge of what is to be
condoned. Thus, there could be no condonation of an act that is unknown. As observed in Walsh v. City Council of Trenton304decided by the New Jersey Supreme Court:
Many of the cases holding that re-election of a public official prevents his removal for acts done in a preceding term of office are reasoned out on the theory of condonation. We
cannot subscribe to that theory because condonation, implying as it does forgiveness, connotes knowledge and in the absence of knowledge there can be no condonation. One
cannot forgive something of which one has no knowledge.

That being said, this Court simply finds no legal authority to sustain the condonation doctrine in this jurisdiction. As can be seen from this discourse, it was a doctrine adopted
from one class of US rulings way back in 1959 and thus, out of touch from - and now rendered obsolete by - the current legal regime. In consequence, it is high time for this
Court to abandon the condonation doctrine that originated from Pascual, and affirmed in the cases following the same, such as Aguinaldo, Salalima, Mayor Garcia, and Governor
Garcia, Jr. which were all relied upon by the CA.

It should, however, be clarified that this Court's abandonment of the condonation doctrine should be prospective in application for the reason that judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the laws or the Constitution, until reversed, shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines.305 Unto this Court devolves the sole authority to interpret what the
Constitution means, and all persons are bound to follow its interpretation. As explained in De Castro v. Judicial Bar Council.306
Judicial decisions assume the same authority as a statute itself and, until authoritatively abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent that they are applicable, the criteria that
must control the actuations, not only of those called upon to abide by them, but also of those duty-bound to enforce obedience to them.307

Hence, while the future may ultimately uncover a doctrine's error, it should be, as a general rule, recognized as "good law" prior to its abandonment. Consequently, the people's
reliance thereupon should be respected. The landmark case on this matter is People v. Jabinal,308 wherein it was ruled:
[W]hen a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had relied on
the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof.

Later, in Spouses Benzonan v. CA,309 it was further elaborated:

[Pursuant to Article 8 of the Civil Code "judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines." But while
our decisions form part of the law of the land, they are also subject to Article 4 of the Civil Code which provides that "laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is
provided." This is expressed in the familiar legal maxim lex prospicit, non respicit, the law looks forward not backward. The rationale against retroactivity is easy to perceive. The
retroactive application of a law usually divests rights that have already become vested or impairs the obligations of contract and hence, is
unconstitutional.310ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Indeed, the lessons of history teach us that institutions can greatly benefit from hindsight and rectify its ensuing course. Thus, while it is truly perplexing to think that a doctrine
which is barren of legal anchorage was able to endure in our jurisprudence for a considerable length of time, this Court, under a new membership, takes up the cudgels and now
abandons the condonation doctrine.

E. Consequence of ruling.

As for this section of the Decision, the issue to be resolved is whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing
the assailed injunctive writs.

It is well-settled that an act of a court or tribunal can only be considered as with grave abuse of discretion when such act is done in a capricious or whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and
hostility.311 It has also been held that "grave abuse of discretion arises when a lower court or tribunal patently violates the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence."312

As earlier established, records disclose that the CA's resolutions directing the issuance of the assailed injunctive writs were all hinged on cases enunciating the condonation
doctrine. To recount, the March 16, 2015 Resolution directing the issuance of the subject TRO was based on the case of Governor Garcia, Jr., while the April 6, 2015 Resolution
directing the issuance of the subject WPI was based on the cases of Aguinaldo, Salalima, Mayor Garcia, and again, Governor Garcia, Jr. Thus, by merely following settled
precedents on the condonation doctrine, which at that time, unwittingly remained "good law," it cannot be concluded that the CA committed a grave abuse of discretion based
on its legal attribution above. Accordingly, the WPI against the Ombudsman's preventive suspension order was correctly issued.

With this, the ensuing course of action should have been for the CA to resolve the main petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 on the merits. However, considering that
the Ombudsman, on October 9, 2015, had already found Binay, Jr. administratively liable and imposed upon him the penalty of dismissal, which carries the accessory penalty of
perpetual disqualification from holding public office, for the present administrative charges against him, the said CA petition appears to have been mooted.313 As initially
intimated, the preventive suspension order is only an ancillary issuance that, at its core, serves the purpose of assisting the Office of the Ombudsman in its investigation. It
therefore has no more purpose - and perforce, dissolves - upon the termination of the office's process of investigation in the instant administrative case.

F. Exceptions to the mootness principle.

This notwithstanding, this Court deems it apt to clarify that the mootness of the issue regarding the validity of the preventive suspension order subject of this case does not
preclude any of its foregoing determinations, particularly, its abandonment of the condonation doctrine. As explained in Belgica, '"the moot and academic principle' is not a
magical formula that can automatically dissuade the Court in resolving a case. The Court will decide cases, otherwise moot, if: first, there is a grave violation of the
Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved; third, when the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of
controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review."314 All of these scenarios obtain in this case:

First, it would be a violation of the Court's own duty to uphold and defend the Constitution if it were not to abandon the condonation doctrine now that its infirmities have
become apparent. As extensively discussed, the continued application of the condonation doctrine is simply impermissible under the auspices of the present Constitution which
explicitly mandates that public office is a public trust and that public officials shall be accountable to the people at all times.

Second, the condonation doctrine is a peculiar jurisprudential creation that has persisted as a defense of elective officials to escape administrative liability. It is the first time that
the legal intricacies of this doctrine have been brought to light; thus, this is a situation of exceptional character which this Court must ultimately resolve. Further, since the
doctrine has served as a perennial obstacle against exacting public accountability from the multitude of elective local officials throughout the years, it is indubitable that
paramount public interest is involved.

Third, the issue on the validity of the condonation doctrine clearly requires the formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public. The issue does
not only involve an in-depth exegesis of administrative law principles, but also puts to the forefront of legal discourse the potency of the accountability provisions of the 1987
Constitution. The Court owes it to the bench, the bar, and the public to explain how this controversial doctrine came about, and now, its reasons for abandoning the same in
view of its relevance on the parameters of public office.

And fourth, the defense of condonation has been consistently invoked by elective local officials against the administrative charges filed against them. To provide a sample size,
the Ombudsman has informed the Court that "for the period of July 2013 to December 2014 alone, 85 cases from the Luzon Office and 24 cases from the Central Office were
dismissed on the ground of condonation. Thus, in just one and a half years, over a hundred cases of alleged misconduct - involving infractions such as dishonesty, oppression,
gross neglect of duty and grave misconduct - were placed beyond the reach of the Ombudsman's investigatory and prosecutorial powers."315 Evidently, this fortifies the finding
that the case is capable of repetition and must therefore, not evade review.

In any event, the abandonment of a doctrine is wholly within the prerogative of the Court. As mentioned, it is its own jurisprudential creation and may therefore, pursuant to its
mandate to uphold and defend the Constitution, revoke it notwithstanding supervening events that render the subject of discussion moot.chanrobleslaw
V.

With all matters pertaining to CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 passed upon, the Court now rules on the final issue on whether or not the CA's Resolution316 dated March 20, 2015
directing the Ombudsman to comment on Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt in CA-G.R. SP No. 139504 is improper and illegal.

The sole premise of the Ombudsman's contention is that, as an impeachable officer, she cannot be the subject of a charge for indirect contempt317 because this action is criminal
in nature and the penalty therefor would result in her effective removal from office.318 However, a reading of the aforesaid March 20, 2015 Resolution does not show that she
has already been subjected to contempt proceedings. This issuance, in? fact, makes it clear that notwithstanding the directive for the Ombudsman to comment, the CA has not
necessarily given due course to Binay, Jr.'s contempt petition:
Without necessarily giving due course to the Petition for Contempt respondents [Hon. Conchita Carpio Morales, in her capacity as the Ombudsman, and the Department of
Interior and Local Government] are hereby DIRECTED to file Comment on the Petition/Amended and Supplemental Petition for Contempt (CA-G.R. SP No. 139504) within an
inextendible period of three (3) days from receipt hereof. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Thus, even if the Ombudsman accedes to the CA's directive by filing a comment, wherein she may properly raise her objections to the contempt proceedings by virtue of her
being an impeachable officer, the CA, in the exercise of its sound judicial discretion, may still opt not to give due course to Binay, Jr.'s contempt petition and accordingly, dismiss
the same. Sjmply put, absent any indication that the contempt petition has been given due course by the CA, it would then be premature for this Court to rule on the issue. The
submission of the Ombudsman on this score is perforce denied.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. Under the premises of this Decision, the Court resolves as follows:

(a) the second paragraph of Section 14 of Republic Act No. 6770 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL, while the policy against the issuance of provisional injunctive writs by courts
other than the Supreme Court to enjoin an investigation conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman under the first paragraph of the said provision is DECLARED ineffective until
the Court adopts the same as part of the rules of procedure through an administrative circular duly issued therefor;cralawlawlibrary

(b) The condonation doctrine is ABANDONED, but the abandonment is PROSPECTIVE in effect;cralawlawlibrary

(c) The Court of Appeals (CA) is DIRECTED to act on respondent Jejomar Erwin S. Binay, Jr.'s (Binay, Jr.) petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 in light of the Office of the
Ombudsman's supervening issuance of its Joint Decision dated October 9, 2015 finding Binay, Jr. administratively liable in the six (6) administrative complamts, docketed as
OMB-C-A-15-0058, OMB-C-A-15-0059, OMB-C-A-15-0060, OMB-C-A-15-0061, OMB-C-A-15-0062, and OMB-C-A-15-0063; and

(d) After the filing of petitioner Ombudsman Conchita Carpio Morales's comment, the CA is DIRECTEDto resolve Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt in CA-G.R. SP No. 139504 with
utmost dispatch. SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallaw

04. Evardone v. COMELEC AUTHOR: S A Y O

G.R. No. 94010 December 2, 1991
TOPIC: RECALL NOTES:
PONENTE: J. PADILLA Two consolidated petitions have their origin in en banc Resolution No. 90-0557 by the
COMELEC which approved the recommendation of the Election Registrar of Sulat,
Eastern Samar to hold and conduct the signing of the petition for recall of the
incumbent Mayor of Sulat, Eastern Samar, on 14 July 1990.

G.R. No. 94010- petition for prohibition with an urgent prayer for immediate issuance
of a restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the holding of
the signing of the petition for recall on 14 July 1990.
G.R. No. 95063- petition for review on certiorari which seeks to set aside:
a. en banc Resolution No. 90-0660 (COMELEC nullifying the signing process for the
recall)
b. en banc Resolution No. 90-0777 (denying petitioners MR, on the basis of the TRO
issued in G.R. No. 94010)
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
Chapter 3 (Sections 64 to 59) of B.P. Blg. 337 provides for the mechanism for recall of local elective officials. Section 69 expressly authorizes the respondent COMELEC to
conduct and supervise the process of and election on recall and in the exercise of such powers, promulgate the necessary rules and regulations.
FACTS:
Felipe Evardone is the mayor of the Municipality of Sulat, Eastern Samar, having been elected to the position during the 1988 local elections. He assumed
office immediately after proclamation.
14 February 1990- Alexander R. Apelado, Victorino E. Aclan and Noel A. Nival (hereinafter referred to as Apelado, et al.) filed a petition for the recall of
Evardone with the Office of the Local Election Registrar.
20 June 1990- COMELEC issued Resolution No. 90-0557, approving the recommendation of Mr. Vedasto B. Sumbilla, Election Registrar of Sulat, Eastern
Samar, to hold on 14 July 1990 the signing of the petition for recall against incumbent Mayor Evardone of the said Municipality.
10 July 1990- Evardone filed before this Court a petition for prohibition with urgent prayer for immediate issuance of restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction (G.R. No. 94010; 1st Case)
12 July 1990- this Court resolved to issue a (TRO), effective immediately and continuing until further orders from the Court, ordering the respondents to
cease and desist from holding the signing of the petition for recall on 14 July 1990, pursuant to respondent COMELECs Resolution No. 2272 dated 23 May
1990.
26 July 1990- COMELEC nullified the signing process held in Sulat, Eastern Samar for being violative of the order (the TRO) of this Court in G.R. No. 94010.
(en banc resolution No. 90-0660)
Apelado, et al., filed MR; COMELEC DENIED. Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari (G.R. No. 95063)

JUST IN CASE:
Evardone maintains that Article X, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution repealed Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 in favor of one to be enacted by Congress. Said
Section 3 provides:

Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system
of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local government units their powers, responsibilities, and
resources, and provide for the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating
to the organization and operation of the local units.

Since there was, during the period material to this case, no local government code enacted by Congress after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution nor
any law for that matter on the subject of recall of elected government officials, Evardone contends that there is no basis for COMELEC Resolution No. 2272
and that the recall proceedings in the case at bar is premature.
The respondent COMELEC, in its Comment (G.R. No. 94010), avers that:

The constitutional provision does not refer only to a local government code which is in futurum (future) but also in esse (existence). It merely sets forth the guidelines which
Congress will consider in amending the provisions of the present Local Government Code. Pending the enactment of the amendatory law, the existing Local Government Code
remains operative. The adoption of the 1987 Constitution did not abrogate the provisions of BP No. 337, unless a certain provision thereof is clearly irreconciliable with the
provisions of the 1987 Constitution. In this case, Sections 54 to 59 of Batas Pambansa No. 337 are not inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution. Hence, they are
operative.

ISSUE(S): WON COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in promulgating Resolution No. 2272 which is null and void for being
unconstitutional- NO

RATIO:
Article XVIII, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution expressly provides that all existing laws not inconsistent with the 1987 Constitution shall remain operative, until
amended, repealed or revoked. Republic Act No. 7160 providing for the Local Government Code of 1991, approved by the President on 10 October 1991, specifically
repeals B.P. Blg. 337 as provided in Sec. 534, Title Four of said Act.
But the Local Government Code of 1991 will take effect only on 1 January 1992 and therefore the old Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337) is still the law applicable
to the present case.
We therefore rule that Resolution No. 2272 promulgated by respondent COMELEC is valid and constitutional. Consequently, the respondent COMELEC had the
authority to approve the petition for recall and set the date for the signing of said petition.
However, recall at this time is no longer possible because of the limitation provided in Sec. 55 (2) of B.P. Blg. 337, which states: SEC. 55. Who May Be Recalled;
Ground for Recall; When Recall May not be Held.x x K, (2) No recall shall take place within two years from the date of the officials assumption of office or one
year immediately preceding a regular local election.
The Constitution has mandated a synchronized national and local election prior to 30 June 1992, or more specifically, as provided for in Article XVIII, Sec. 5on the
second Monday of May, 1992. Thus, to hold an election on recall approximately seven (7) months before the regular local election will be violative of the above
provisions of the applicable Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337).

06. Reynaldo O. Malonzo vs COMELEC, The Liga ng mga Barangay (Caloocan AUTHOR: The Talio
Chapter), Alex L. David, Conrado G. Cruz, Trinidad Repuno, Gloria M. Cruz, Mirali M. NOTES:
Durr, Fermin Jimenez, Aurelio Biluan, Rogelio Saraza, Helene Valbuena, and Higino
Rullepa PRA Preparatory Recall Assembly

[G.R. No. 127066; March 11, 1997]

TOPIC: Recall RATIO: Bullets 4-onwards are the important once. I just added bullets 1-3 in case he
asks random questions since he has a tendency to ask about all the issues.
PONENTE: Torres, Jr., J.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
The law on recall did not prescribe an elaborate proceeding. Neither did it demand a specific procedure. What is fundamental is compliance with the provision that there
should be a session called for the purpose of initiating recall proceedings, attended by a majority of all the members of the preparatory recall assembly, in a public place
and that the resolution resulting from such assembly be adopted by a majority of all the PRA members.
FACTS:
Malonzo was duly elected as Mayor in the elections held on [May 8, 1995], winning over former Mayor Macario Asistio, Jr. Barely 1 year into his term, Malonzos office
as Mayor was put to serious question when on [July 7, 1996], 1,057 Punong Barangays and Sangguniang Barangay members and Sangguniang Kabataan chairmen,
constituting a majority of the members of the PRA of the City of Caloocan, met, and upon deliberation and election, voted for the approval of PRA Resolution No. 01-
96, expressing loss of confidence in Mayor Malonzo, and calling for the initiation of recall proceedings against him.
PRA Resolution No. 01-96 was filed with the COMELEC for appropriate action. In response, Malonzo filed a Petition with the COMELEC alleging, principally, that the
recall process was deficient in form and substance, and therefore, illegally initiated.
The COMELEC found the petition devoid of merit and declared the recall proceedings to be in order. It also ruled that the Liga ng mga Barangay is authorized to initiate
the recall and convene the Preparatory Recall Assembly.
Nov. 28, 1996 - Malonzo filed a petition for Certiorari with prayer for TRO and application for writ of preliminary injunction with the SC, assailing the COMELEC's resolution
as having been issued with grave abuse of discretion. The Petition, in the main, raises the issue of the validity of the institution and proceedings of the recall, putting to
fore the propriety of the service of notices to the members of the Preparatory Recall Assembly, and the proceedings held, resulting in the issuance of the questioned
Resolution.
Nov. 29, 1996 the SC ordered the COMELEC to cease and desist from proceeding with the recall election projected on [Dec. 14, 1996], and directing the respondents
to file their respective Comments, due to the importance of the matters in issue, and the proximity of the Recall Election date declared by the COMELEC.
The private respondents filed their comment on [Dec. 6, 1996], alleging that all the requirements for the holding of a recall election were duly complied with and that
the petition is therefore without basis. On the other hand, the OSG filed a Manifestation in lieu of the comment on [Feb. 7, 1997], with the surprising submission that
the COMELEC was amiss in its duties as enforcer of election laws.
According to the OSG, the veracity of notices sent to 42 members of the Preparatory Recall Assembly were not directly passed upon by the COMELEC before it issued
the questioned Resolution. It thus submits that the propriety of notices sent to said PRA members must first be determined by the COMELEC, after giving private
respondents the chance to prove the same, otherwise, a discussion of the other issues in the present petition would be premature.
ISSUE(S): WON the COMELEC was correct in declaring PRA Resolution No. 01-96 in order.

HELD: Just say yes! Coz Im aching and I know you are too.
RATIO:
The Court finds that there is no need to refer the matter of the veracity of the questioned notices sent to certain members of the PRA back to the COMELEC, for the
reason that the COMELEC has already conducted an investigation into the same, and has found the proceedings instituting the recall to be in accord with law.
The Solicitor General's observation that the issue of veracity of the notices was not directly passed upon by the COMELEC is incorrect. On the contrary, the matter of
validity of notices to the members of the PRA was sufficiently considered by the COMELEC, as in response to Malonzos request for a technical examination of the recall
documents, the COMELEC directed its Election Records and Statistics Department (ERSD) to resolve the matter of notices sent to the PRA members. The ERSD in turn
performed its task and reported its findings to the COMELEC.
Needless to state, the issue of propriety of the notices sent to the PRA members is factual in nature, and the determination of the same is therefore a function of the
COMELEC. In the absence of patent error, or serious inconsistencies in the findings, the Court should not disturb the same. The factual findings of the COMELEC, based
on its own assessments and duly supported by gathered evidence, are conclusive upon the court, more so, in the absence of a substantiated attack on the validity of the
same.
 The pertinent provisions of law, as regards the initiation of the recall process, are Secs. 69 and 70 of RA 7160:

Sec. 69. By whom Exercised. The power of recall for loss of confidence shall be exercised by the registered voters of a local government unit to which the local elective
official subject to such recall belongs.

Sec. 70. Initiation of the Recall Process.

(a) Recall may be initiated by a preparatory recall assembly or by the registered voters of the local government unit to which the local elective official
subject to such recall belongs.

(b) There shall be a preparatory recall assembly in every province, city, district, and municipality which shall be composed of the following:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) City level. All punong barangay and sangguniang barangay members in the city;
xxx xxx xxx
(c) A majority of all the preparatory recall assembly members may convene in session in a public place and initiate a recall proceeding against any elective official in the local
government unit concerned. Recall of provincial, city, or municipal officials shall be validly initiated through a resolution adopted by a majority of all the members of the
preparatory recall assembly concerned during its session called for the purpose.

(d) Recall of any elective provincial, city, municipal, or barangay official may also be validly initiated upon petition of at least 25% of the total number of registered voters in
the local government unit concerned during the election in which the local official sought to be recalled was elected.

(1) A written petition for recall duly signed before the election registrar or his representative, and in the presence of a representative of the petitioner and a representative of
the official sought to be recalled, and in a public place in the province, city, municipality, or barangay, as the case may be, shall be filed with the COMELEC through its office in
the local government unit concerned. The COMELEC or its duly authorized representative shall cause the publication of the petition in a public and conspicuous place for a
period of not less than ten (10) days nor more than twenty (20) days, for the purpose of verifying the authenticity and genuineness of the petition and the required percentage
of voters.

(2) Upon the lapse of the aforesaid period, the COMELEC or its duly authorized representative shall announce the acceptance of candidates to the position and thereafter
prepare the list of candidates which shall include the name of the official sought to be recalled.

Malonzos insistence, that the initiation of the recall proceedings was infirm since it was convened by the Liga, is misplaced. Malonzo observes that "respondent Liga is
an organization of all barangays. It is not an organization of barangay captains and kagawads. The barangays are represented in the Liga by the barangay captains as
provided under Sec. 492 of the LGC. It also provides that the Kagawad may represent the barangay in the absence of the barangay chairman." The Liga ng mga Barangay
is undoubtedly an entity distinct from the PRA. It just so happens that the personalities representing the barangays in the Liga are the very members of the PRA, the
majority of whom met on July 7, 1996, and voted in favor of the resolution calling for the recall of Mayor Malonzo, after deliberation reported in the record, in accordance
with the existing law. Thus, the Punong Barangays and Sangguniang Barangay members convened and voted as members of the PRA of the City of Caloocan, and not as
members of the Liga. The recall proceedings, therefore, cannot be denied merit on this ground.
As the the COMELEC pertinently observes:
The Minutes of the session of the PRA indicated that there was a session held. Attendees constitute the majority of all the members of the PRA, as we shall later on establish.
Rules of procedure, simple they may be were formulated. Deliberations were conducted on the main issue, which was that of petitioner's recall. The members were given the
opportunity to articulate on their resolve about the matter. More importantly, their sentiments were expressed through their votes signified by their signatures and
thumbmarks affixed to the Resolution. No proof was adduced by Malonzo to substantiate his claim that the signatures appearing thereon represented a cause other than that
of adopting the resolution. The law on recall did not prescribe an elaborate proceeding. Neither did it demand a specific procedure. What is fundamental is compliance with
the provision that there should be a session called for the purpose of initiating recall proceedings, attended by a majority of all the members of the PRA, in a public place and
that the resolution resulting from such assembly be adopted by a majority of all the PRA members.

07 CLAUDIO vs. COMELEC AUTHOR: TAN

[G.R. No. 140714. May 4, 2000] NOTES:
TOPIC: RECALL Consolidation of 2 petitions:
PONENTE: Mendoza, J. 1. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition against COMELEC filed by Claudio
-Dismissed. No grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC. (RELEVANT)
2. Petition for Mandamus to compel COMELEC to fix a date for the recall
-Dismissed. Moot and academic because on March 9, 2000, COMELEC already set a
date for the recall elections on April 15, 2000
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
The are two limitations on recall in paragraph (b) of Section 74 of the LGC:
1. No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the official's assumption to office.
2. No recall shall take place within one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election.

The term recall in paragraph (b) refers only to the recall election, excluding the convening of the PRA and the filing of a petition for recall with the COMELEC, or the gathering
for a petition for recall.

The law does not include the campaign period in counting the 1 year.
FACTS:
Jovito Claudio was the duly elected mayor of Pasay City in the May 11, 1998 elections. He assumed office on July 1, 1998.
 On May 19, 999, several barangay chairs formed an ad hoc committee for the purpose of convening the Preparatory Recall Assembly (PRA). Richard Advincula, was
designated chair.
On May 29, 1999, 1,073 members of the PRA composed of barangay chairs, kagawads, and sangguniang kabataan chairs of Pasay City, adopted Resolution No. 01, S-1999,
entitled RESOLUTION TO INITIATE THE RECALL OF JOVITO O. CLAUDIO AS MAYOR OF PASAY CITY FOR LOSS OF CONFIDENCE.
The petition for recall was filed on, accompanied by an affidavit of service of the petition on the Office of the City Mayor.
Oppositions to the petition were filed by petitioner Jovito O. Claudio, Rev. Ronald Langub, and Roberto L. Angeles, alleging procedural and substantive defects in the
petition, to wit:
1. the signatures affixed to the resolution were actually meant to show attendance at the PRA meeting;
2. most of the signatories were only representatives of the parties concerned who were sent there merely to observe the proceedings;
3. the convening of the PRA took place within the one-year prohibited period;
4. the election case, filed by Wenceslao Trinidad, seeking the annulment of the proclamation of petitioner Claudio as mayor of Pasay City, should first be decided
before recall proceedings against petitioner could be filed; and
5. the recall resolution failed to obtain the majority of all the members of the PRA, considering that 10 were actually double entries, 14 were not duly accredited
members of the barangays, 40 sangguniang kabataan officials had withdrawn their support, and 60 barangay chairs executed affidavits of retraction.
The COMELEC granted the petition for recall and dismissed the oppositions against it.
1. The 1,073 members who attended the May 29, 1999 meeting were more than necessary to constitute the PRA, considering that its records showed the total
membership of the PRA was 1,790, while the statistics of the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) showed that the total membership of the PRA
was 1,876. In either case, since only a majority is required to constitute the PRA, clearly, a majority had been obtained in support of the recall resolution.
2. The signatures of 958 members of the PRA were sufficient.
3. The pendency of the case questioning the proclamation of petitioner was not a prejudicial question, which must first be decided before any recall election could be
held. Petitioner was merely using the pendency of the case to delay the recall proceedings.
4. The petition for recall did not violated the bar on recall within one year from the elective official's assumption of office. Recall is a process which starts with the
filing of the petition for recall. Since the petition was filed on July 2, 1999, exactly one year and a day after petitioner Claudio's assumption of office, the petition
was filed on time.
Hence, these petitions (refer to notes).
The bone of contention in this case is Section 74 of the Local Government Code (LCG) which provides:
Limitations on Recall. - (a) Any elective local official may be the subject of a recall election only once during his term of office for loss of confidence.
(b) No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the official's assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election.
ISSUE #1: Whether the Word "Recall" in Paragraph (b) of 74 of the Local Government Code Includes the Convening of the Preparatory Recall Assembly and the Filing by it of a
Recall Resolution.

HELD: NO! The term recall in paragraph (b) refers only to the recall election, excluding the convening of the PRA and the filing of a petition for recall with the COMELEC, or
the gathering for a petition for recall.

RATIO:
To sum up, the term "recall" in paragraph (b) refers to the recall election and not to the preliminary proceedings to initiate recall -
1. Because 74 speaks of limitations on "recall" which, according to 69, is a power which shall be exercised by the registered voters of a local government unit. Since the voters
do not exercise such right except in an election, it is clear that the initiation of recall proceedings is not prohibited within the one-year period provided in paragraph (b);
2. Because the purpose of the first limitation in paragraph (b) is to provide voters a sufficient basis for judging an elective local official, and final judging is not done until the day
of the election; and
3. Because to construe the limitation in paragraph (b) as including the initiation of recall proceedings would unduly curtail freedom of speech and of assembly guaranteed in
the Constitution.
As the recall election in Pasay City is set on April 15, 2000, more than one year after petitioner assumed office as mayor of that city, we hold that there is no bar to its
holding on that date.

ISSUE #2: Whether the Phrase "Regular Local Election" in the Same Paragraph (b) of 74 of the Local Government Code includes the Election Period for that Regular Election or
Simply the Date of Such Election.

HELD: NO! The law does not include the campaign period in counting the 1 year.

RATIO:
The law is unambiguous in providing that "[n]o recall shall take place within . . . one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election."
Actually, because no recall election may be held until one year after the assumption of office of an elective local official, presumably on June 30 following his election, the
free period is only the period from July 1 of the following year to about the middle of May of the succeeding year. This is a period of only nine months and 15 days, more
or less.
To construe the second limitation in paragraph (b) as including the campaign period would reduce this period to eight months. Such an interpretation must be rejected,
because it would devitalize the right of recall which is designed to make local government units" more responsive and accountable."
Indeed, there is a distinction between election period and campaign period. Under the Omnibus Election Code, unless otherwise fixed by the COMELEC, the election
period commences ninety (90) days before the day of the election and ends thirty (30) days thereafter. Thus, to follow petitioner's interpretation that the second limitation
in paragraph (b) includes the "election period" would emasculate even more a vital right of the people.

ISSUE #3:Whether the Recall RESOLUTION was Signed by a Majority of the PRA and Duly Verified.

HELD: YES
 RATIO:
Petitioner alleges other grounds for seeking the annulment of the resolution of the COMELEC ordering the holding of a recall election. He contends that a majority of the
signatures of the members of the PRA was not obtained because 74 members did not really sign the recall resolution. According to petitioner, the 74 merely signed their
names on pages 94-104 of the resolution to signify their attendance and not their concurrence. Petitioner claims that this is shown by the word "Attendance" written by
hand at the top of the page on which the signatures of the 74 begin.
This contention has no basis. To be sure, this claim is being raised for the first time in this case. It was not raised before the COMELEC, whose order embodying the
stipulations of the parties and defining the issues to be resolved does not include the issue now being raised by petitioner.
The other point raised by petitioner is that the recall petition filed in the COMELEC was not duly verified, because Atty. Nelson Ng, who notarized it, is not commissioned
as notary public for Pasay City but for Makati City. As in the case of the first claim, this issue was not raised before the COMELEC itself. It cannot, therefore, be raised now.

DISSENTING OPINIONS:
J. PUNO: I respectfully submit that by holding that recall initiatives can start right after Day One of an official's assumption to office, the majority failed to recognize the need
for stability of a public office. By holding that these initiatives can be undertaken not once, not twice but endlessly within one year after an official's assumption to office, the
majority exposed our people to an overdose of politics. By holding that recall initiatives can be done prematurely, the majority forgot that such initiatives are meaningful only
if they are used to adjudge an official's performance in office. By holding that recall initiatives can be done even without giving an official a fair chance to serve the people, the
majority has induced incumbents to play the politics of compromise instead of the politics of performance. By holding that recall initiatives can be done at any one's caprice,
the majority has cast a blind eye on the expenses that accompany such exercise. These expenses have to be repaid later, an undeniable cause of cronyism and corruption in
government. I vote to grant the petition.

J. KAPUNAN: Contrary to the majority view, I humbly submit that "recall" under Section 74(b) is not limited to the election itself, but, rather, it is a process which begins once
the PRA makes its first affirmative acts towards the recall of the elective local official concerned, i.e. the convening of the PRA and the passing by the PRA of a recall resolution
during a session called for the said purpose, and culminates with the holding of the recall election.

I cannot subscribe to the observation of the majority that to construe the limitation in Section 74 (b) "as including the initiation of recall proceedings would unduly curtail
freedom of speech and of assembly guaranteed by the Constitution." The people can assemble and discuss their opinions and grievances against the incumbent official, at
anytime during his term and as often as they would like, because it is their right to do so. An exercise of their right to peaceably assemble and exchange views about the
governance of the local official would not be violative of the limitations set forth in Section 74(b). However, once notice is sent, during the prohibited period, stating that the
purpose of the meeting is to convene the PRA and to pass a recall resolution, and the same is actually approved, then Section 74(b) is transgressed. In this instance, the limitation
of the electorate's freedom of speech and assembly is not violated since the time bar provision is imposed by the legislature in the exercise of its police power. The limitation
in Section 74(b) is analogous to the prohibition under Section 80 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code, which prohibits a person from
engaging in any election campaign or partisan political activity except during the campaign period. The limitation on the freedom of speech and assembly imposed by Section
80 has never been questioned as being unconstitutional.

Finally, I do not find any logical reason to support the view that the recall process should be counted only from the time of the filing of the recall resolution or petition with the
COMELEC. Although the filing of the petition for recall with the COMELEC is, admittedly, an important component in the recall process, it, however, cannot be considered as the
starting point of the same. The filing of the petition, being merely a consequential mechanical act, is just a next step in the process of recall after PRA's acts of convening the
recall assembly and passing the recall resolution. Once a petition for recall is filed, the only role of the COMELEC is the verification of its authenticity and genuineness. After
such verification the COMELEC is mandated by law to set the date of the recall election. Clearly, the role of the COMELEC in the recall process under Section 70 of R.A. 7160 is
merely ministerial in nature. Such being the case, it cannot be correctly argued that the crucial moment in the recall process is the actual filing of the petition with the COMELEC.

I vote, therefore, to grant the petition.

MACALINGCAG and CARLOS v. CHANG MISSING case

12. Garcia v. Pajaro and the City of Dagupan AUTHOR: Castro

[G.R. No. 141149. July 5, 2002] NOTES: Sebastian Garcia Local Treasury Officer and Revenue Officer at the City
TOPIC: Discipline over Local Appointive Officials Treasurers office; appointed by City Mayor Manaois

PONENTE: Panganiban, J. Juanito Pajaro regularly appointed City Treasurer; Garcias superior

CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:

The city treasurer may institute, motu propio, disciplinary proceedings against a subordinate officer or employee. The Administrative Code of 1987, specifically Book V on the
civil service, is the primary law governing appointive officials and employees in the government. The power to discipline is specifically granted by Section 47 of the
Administrative Code of 1987 to heads of departments, agencies and instrumentalities, provinces and cities.
FACTS:
Sebastian Garcia is a Revenue Collector (employee at the City Treasurers Office) appointed by then City Mayor Cipriano Manaois.
He has been rating unsatisfactory in his performance for several semesters, which is why a Formal Charge was filed against him.
As a matter of procedure under civil service laws, Garcia was ordered suspended by City Treasurer Juanito Pajaro from June 1, 1990 to March 15, 1992 and
directed the withholding of his salary because of the Formal Charge.
He did not honor the suspension order as the City Treasurer acted as the complainant, investigator and judge and there was no complaint against him from
the Office of the City Mayor.
Neither did he believe in the order nor submit himself for investigation. He claims that contrary to the charges of the City Treasurer for neglect of duties, he
has been doing his duties and obligations.
As a result of the ex-parte investigation, the matter of preventive suspension of Garcia was submitted to and approved by the Regional Director, Bureau of
Local Government Finance.
Garcia was not acquitted in the charge, but was penalized with a suspension of six (6) months without pay.
In the meantime, Garcia was able to get an appointment from the City Mayor for the position of Supervising Revenue Collector, but such appointment was
not approved by the CSC.
 Alleging that his benefits were unduly withheld, Garcia filed a claim for damages before the Regional Trial Court, which was dismissed. He assailed that
Pajaro has no authority to discipline him.
The Court of Appeals affirmed RTC ruling. It held that Pajaro was vested with legal power and authority to institute disciplinary action against subordinate
officers and employees.
Garcias contention: The officer empowered to institute disciplinary proceedings against him is the City Mayor of Dagupannot the City Treasurer. He further asserts that
under Section 78 of the Local Government Code of 1983, the city treasurer does not have the power to discipline him.
ISSUE: Whether the City Treasurer can discipline petitioner
HELD: Yes.

RATIO:
Under the old and the present Local Government Codes, appointive officers and employees of local government units are covered by the Civil Service Law.
Moreover, the investigation and the adjudication of administrative complaints against appointive local officials and employees, as well as their suspension and
removal, shall be in accordance with the Civil Service Law and rules and other pertinent laws.

The Administrative Code of 1987, specifically Book V on the civil service, is the primary law governing appointive officials and employees in the government.
This Code enumerates the grounds for disciplining them. They may be removed or dismissed summarily (1) [w]hen the charge is serious and the evidence of guilt
is strong; (2) [w]hen the respondent is a recidivist x x x; and (3) [w]hen the respondent is notoriously undesirable. Technical rules of procedure and evidence are
not strictly applied; due process in the administrative context cannot be fully equated with that in the strict judicial sense.

The power to discipline is specifically granted by Section 47 of the Administrative Code of 1987 to heads of departments, agencies and instrumentalities,
provinces and cities. On the other hand, the power to commence administrative proceedings against a subordinate officer or employee is granted by Section 34
of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the said Administrative Code to the secretary of a department, the head of office of equivalent rank, the head of a
local government unit, the chief of an agency, the regional director or a person with a sworn written complaint.

The City Treasurer may institute, motu propio, disciplinary proceedings against a subordinate officer or employee. Local Administrative Regulations (LAR) No. 2-
85, which was issued by the Ministry of Finance on March 27, 1985, authorized the minister (now secretary) of finance, the regional director, and head of a local
treasury or an assessment office to start administrative disciplinary action against officers or employees subordinate to them.

In the case at bar, the city treasurer is the proper disciplining authority referred to in Section 47 of the Administrative Code of 1987. The term agency refers to
any of the various units of the government including a department, a bureau, an office, an instrumentality, a government-owned or controlled corporation, or
a local government or a distinct unit therein. Respondent Pajaro, as the city treasurer, was the head of the Office of the Treasurer; while petitioner, a senior
revenue collector, was an officer under him. Thus, the city treasurer is the proper disciplining authority who could investigate petitioner and issue a preventive
suspension order against him.

Petitioners contention that it is only the city mayor who may discipline him is not persuasive. Section 455 (b-1-x) of the 1991 Local Government Code states that
the city mayor may cause to be instituted administrative or judicial proceedings against any official or employee of the city. This rule is not incongruent with the
provisions of the 1987 Administrative Code, which authorizes the heads of agencies to discipline subordinate employees. Likewise, the old Local Government Code
does not vest in city mayors the sole power to discipline and to institute criminal or administrative actions against any officers or employees under their jurisdiction.
In fact, there is no provision under the present Local Government Code expressly rescinding the authority of the Department of Finance to exercise disciplinary
authority over its employees. By the same token, there is nothing that prohibits the city treasurer from filing a complaint against petitioner. As a corollary, the
power to discipline evidently includes the power to investigate.

In the present case, Respondent Pajaro was authorized to issue the assailed Preventive Suspension Order against petitioner, because the latter was charged with
gross neglect of duty, refusal to perform official duties and functions, and insubordination - grounds that allowed the issuance of such Order, as provided by Section
51 of the 1987 Administrative Code. Clearly, the city treasurer acted within the scope of his power when he commenced the investigation and issued the assailed
Order.

As regards due process, Petitioners refusal to attend the scheduled hearings, despite due notice, was at his own peril. He therefore cannot validly claim that his
right to due process was violated. In an administrative proceeding, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain ones side. Such process requires
notice and an opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered. One may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation in an oral argument, but alsoand
perhaps even many times more creditably and practicablythrough pleadings. So long as the parties are given the opportunity to explain their side, the
requirements of due process are satisfactorily complied with. Moreover, this constitutional mandate is deemed satisfied if a person is granted an opportunity to
seek reconsideration of an action or a ruling

13 Javellana vs. DILG & Santos AUTHOR: Miguel M. Consing

[G.R. No. 102549; August 10, 1992] NOTES:
TOPIC: Practice of Profession See Sec. 90 of the LGC for the full provision on practice of a profession for local
PONENTE: Grio-Aquino, J. government officers.
FACTS:
Atty. Javellana was elected as City Councilor of Bago City, Negros Occidental.

On October, 1989, City Engineer Divinagracia filed an admin case against Javellana. The complaint alleged that Javellana practiced law without securing authority for
that purpose from the Regional Director, Department of Local Government, as required by DLG Memorandum Circulars 80-38, (and later 90-81).

Basically, Javellana, while already a City Councilor, acted as counsel for 2 persons who filed an illegal dismissal case against Divinagracia.

Atty. Javellana filed a MTD in the admin case against him. He argued that the DLG Memorandum Circulars were unconstitutional since under the Constitution only the
SC has the sole and exclusive authority to regulate the practice of law. However, the MTD was denied.

5 months later, the LGC was promulgated; it provided in Sec. 90 (b) that:
Sanggunian members may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools except during session hours: Provided, That sanggunian members who are
members of the Bar shall not:
(1) Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a local government unit or any office, agency, or instrumentality of the government is the adverse party;
(2) Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the national or local government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his office;
(3) Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative proceedings involving the local government unit of which he is an official; and
(4) Use property and personnel of the Government except when the sanggunian member concerned is defending the interest of the Government.

Javellana filed a petition for review on certiorari, again arguing that the above Memorandum Circulars and Sec. 90 are unconstitutional because (1) only the SC has the
sole authority to regulate the practice of law. And (2) They constitute class legislation, being discriminatory against the legal and medical professions, because only
sanggunian members who are lawyers and doctors are restricted in the exercise of their profession, while dentists, engineers, architects, teachers, opticians, morticians
and others are not so restricted
ISSUE(S): Can a Local Government public official engage in the practice of his profession while employed in the Government?
HELD/RATIO: Yes, but subject to the provisions of the LGC, more specifically Sec. 90.

With regard to the argument that the above provision and Memorandum Circulars violate the Constituiton, the Court held that neither the statute nor the circular trenches upon
the Supreme Court's power and authority to prescribe rules on the practice of law. The Local Government Code and DLG Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 simply prescribe rules
of conduct for public officials to avoid conflicts of interest between the discharge of their public duties and the private practice of their profession, in those instances where the law
allows it.

As to issue of class legislation, the Court held that Section 90 of the Local Government Code does not discriminate against lawyers and doctors. It applies to all provincial and
municipal officials in the professions or engaged in any occupation. Section 90 explicitly provides that sanggunian members "may practice their professions, engage in any
occupation, or teach in schools expect during session hours." If there are some prohibitions that apply particularly to lawyers, it is because of all the professions, the practice of law
is more likely than others to relate to, or affect, the area of public service.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
See Ratio.

And of course, a public office is a public trust.