Relational Self in Classical Confucianism: Lessons from

Confucius Analects

Kirill O. Thompson

Philosophy East and West, Volume 67, Number 3, July 2017, pp. 887-907 (Article)

Published by University of Hawai'i Press

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1353/pew.2017.0068

For additional information about this article

https://muse.jhu.edu/article/664500

Access provided by National Taiwan University (17 Jul 2017 15:27 GMT)
RELATIONAL SELF IN CLASSICAL CONFUCIANISM:
LESSONS FROM CONFUCIUS ANALECTS

Kirill O. Thompson
Department of Foreign Languages and Literatures
National Taiwan University

Introduction

Ones translating, reading, and understanding of texts from other eras and traditions
are conditioned by tacit assumptions built into ones own vocabulary and psycho-
cultural understanding of selfof which one tends to be only intuitively aware.
Thus,for example, when encountering the vocabulary in Classical Chinese for I,
me, mine, self, et cetera, modern readers are inclined to import their own
linguistic, cognitive, and cultural intuitions about these terms, unconsciously and
without second thought. This has been particularly problematic for modern Western
readers of the Confucian classics, who tend to take self as ontologically and ethi
callyindividual. However, recent psychological accounts of self as relational, West-
ern as well as Eastern, offer a new opening for contemporary readers to understand
the implicit classical Confucian notion of self that animates the early texts. The
present study first traces developments in Western philosophical accounts of self
from, roughly, the modern self to the postmodern self to the relational self; it then
explores how the relational view opens the way to a fresh understanding of self in
classical Confucianism by focusing on the expressions for self used in Confucius
Analects.

Modernist to Postmodernist Self, Relational Self

The arrival of Postmodernism in the 1970s included a questioning of modernist

assumptions about the self as a bounded, independent mental entity at the core of
personal identity. Many Western thinkers had conceived of this self-enclosed, her-
metically sealed self as the center of each persons consciousness and conscience,
and thus as descriptively given and prescriptively required.1 The self had seemed
to them at once an answer to their introspective experience and to be required by
their intuitive sense of personal responsibility, conscience, duty, and so forth. Draw-
ing on the findings of various social science disciplines and insights from cultural
studies, however, postmodernists have gradually whittled away at this modernist idea
of the self. Mainly, they have stressed the extent to which persons, selves, are at best
social constructions, reflections of sociocultural milieus. Some of them have gone
on to excavate how various philosophical, religious, historical, and cultural determi-
nants have inclined modern people to buy into the idea of an impermeable, bounded
selfan idea that itself had transmigrated from the Pythagorean and Platonic soul to

Philosophy East & West Volume 67, Number 3 July 2017 887907 887
2017 by University of Hawaii Press
 the Christian soul and on to increasingly secularized variations under the rubric of
mind, notably by the modern philosophers.2
This postmodern questioning of the modern conception of the self has led to
aplethora of new accounts of self and personhood, generally viewed as the re
flection of ones sociocultural milieu. Countering the idea of unity and autonomy,
postmodernists have stressed the multiplicity, passivity, and constructed nature of
personal selfhood. However effective they have been in breaking up the modernist
conception of self, postmodern accounts have tended not to square adequately with
the psychological facts or be sufficiently explanatory. Generally, we do not usually
experience people (or ourselves) as quite so multiple, passive, or thrown together
as postmodern theory demands. The people of our experience tend to follow rela
tively coherent lifelines. They engage in critical reflection; they choose alternative
courses of action, occasionally even jumping into alternative sociocultural outlooks
and milieus. Their grasp of ethical principles and moral values is often determined by
their own feelings and critical reflections, et cetera, and is not simply a reflection of
contemporary trends. Ironically, it appears that postmodern thinkers would have had
to transcend the constraints of their account of the self in order to have formulated
their own creative theories.
Probably the most formidable empirical challenge to the postmodern view
comes from research on identical twins. In study after study of identical twins who
were separated in infancy and lived without communication (sometimes even with-
out knowledge of each other) in very different circumstances, it is found that they
tend, for example, to have virtually identical personalities, styles, tastes in colors,
clothes, foods, and even moral attitudes, to the extent that they drive the same make
and color of automobile; marry a spouse with the same name, temperament, and
appearance; work in the same profession; and so on.3 This is not to argue for biolog-
ical determinism or a return to the modernist conception of the enclosed, bounded
self; rather, I am just registering that people tend not to be so passive, multiple, or
anarchic as postmodern theory demands, even if they do, in many respects, especially
on the surface level, tend to reflect their sociocultural milieu. Many personal traits
and preferences are inbornsuch as athletic prowess and cognitive aptitudeor are
ingrained in early childhood, and persist through peoples lives as they adjust, adapt,
and attune themselves to changes in their milieus. In sum, people display more
purpose, direction, and consistency in their lifelines than postmodern theory seems
to be able to countenance.
In light of these considerations, I regard the postmodern view of the self and
personhood as a transitional view that is based largely on exploring the implications
of denying the modernist view of the self. Postmodernism likely just offers the pre-
lude to a more adequate accounting of the self and personhood. In recent years, steps
have been taken toward just such a more adequate view under the rubric of a rela-
tional view of self, particularly as developed and elaborated in books and articles by
the Swarthmore University psychologist Kenneth Gergen (2009) and National Taiwan
University psychologist Kwang-Kuo Hwang (2012).4

888 Philosophy East & West

Confucianism and the Relational Self

Scholars of Confucianism generally agree that classical Confucian texts implicitly

give relational presentations of self (Hall and Ames 1987, Hall and Ames 1997,
Ames 2003, Yao 1996, Wong 2004, Pryba 2007, Hwang and Chang 2009, Hwang
2012), and explore the implications of this view regarding Confucian conceptions of
the person, ethics, sociopolitical theory, and even clinical therapy. The present study
is aimed at nudging the discussion forward by pressing the implications of the rela-
tional view of self. For example, if the relations are actually priorthe primary
realitiesthen the selves are posterior and dependent on the relations. And so,
what we call Selves and take as terms or relata of these relations are not to be
regarded as discrete or basic entities in themselves at allbut rather as dynamic
aspects or features that take shape in the contexts of the relations.5 In the words
ofBrent Slife, Each thing, including each person, is first and always a nexus of
relations (Gergen 2009, p. 55).
To anticipate, we can reflect that, from birth if not from conception,6 peo-
plearenever discrete entities,7 which objectively observe and respond to other
discreteentities in the external world; rather, they find themselves forever

caughtupin the midst of things, relationally and interactively immersed in the
flow,the stream of life, all the while reacting, adjusting, adapting, attuning them-
selves, et cetera.8 On this account, determinate relations constitute confluences
inthe flow that forms, conditions, and directs these relata. Characterized broadly
asconfluences in the flow of life, relations may be defined and viewed at
various
levelsand spheres, just as can the notion of flow itself.9 Specifically,
ethicalhumanrelationships, Confucius abiding concern, whether familial, friend-
ship,social, or professional, constitute confluences in the flow of characteristically
human life,inwhich the human relata are interactively co-formed and charac
terized. Traditionally, Westerners speak of people influencing each other more
orlesson the model of mechanical causation. In the relational view, however,
theterm confluence is used to indicate that the relata are changing together
underthe pattern of a given relationship in the flow of life. One side or the

other may lead in the joint process of change, yet neither remains untouched,
unaffected.
Given that the very term self begs a number of questions about the nature
ofpersons, I suggest following Kenneth Gergen that the expression relational self
be replaced by relational being.10 (Heidegger similarly sought to avoid question
begging about subjectivity and selfhood by commencing his Existential analysis
byspeaking of Dasein or Being-there rather than of self or person.) This is to em-
phasize that we are not talking about selves in relation or just relational selves,
expressions that put the person-as-self aheadand independentof interpersonal
relationship. Tellingly, the expression relational being stresses that relations are the
thing; they are confluences in the flow of life, and people are shaped, characterized,
and identified in and through their relations.11

Kirill O. Thompson 889

 Preliminary Challenges to the Relational View

Before proceeding, we should entertain several questions regarding whether people

arent really independent selves, even in the Confucian view. Going back to the
Confucian classics, for example, one could ask the following questions: Isnt my
body exclusively me? Isnt it exclusively mine? Doesnt each person have her dis-
tinctive natural propensities (xing ) endowed by nature?12 Doesnt each person
cultivate herself, that is, her own unique virtues in her own way in order to effectively
face and interact with other persons, selves, if you will? Doesnt each person have
an inner life and look within and thus have reason to be circumspect about her
uniqueness (shendu )?
Without doubt, every person is based on, or works from, a discrete physical
body, and while the body qua human being is interactively disposed, the person can
still reflect on her individual physique, features, character, actions, et cetera. How-
ever, the body alone doesnt either constitute, or even isolate, the person: the body
qua embodied person is constituted through its relations as formative and constitu-
tive confluences. Even though the body in itself is a discrete physical entity, it is the
product of a physical confluence of relations between the parents, on whose acts of
conception, sustenance, and nurturing it depends to survive infancy and develop
into a mature person. Even though the body is presented as a discrete entity, its ap-
pearance is not at all independent, isolated, or unique qua body; rather, the bodys
presentation is highly conditioned, for example congenitally, socially, and educa-
tionally. It bears and transmits countless signs and signals operative in its milieu, for
example with regard to affiliation, standing, allegiance, clique, and stance. We could
even say that the human body has evolved as a species presence in nature. The
natural propensities are the responsive sensitivities through which a person is
co-formed in the nexus of all the confluences of relations. And, self-reflection itself
isnot the solipsistic musing of an independent mind in its own private inner world
ofthought; it is more an inner monitoring of ones co-formation and attunement
process in the context of ones distinctive evolving bundles of relations.

Confucius Terms for I, Me, and Self as Relational

What about Confucius terms for self? Are they consistent with the relational ac-
count? In the following, we consider several terms used by Confucius in the Analects
that correspond to the English word self. First, the Analects records Confucius as
using the term ji for self in several senses. In his negative formulation of the
Golden Rule (that is, the Silver Rule), he uses ji as an indexical to mark off oneself
in contrast to other, with no special implications about the status or content of
self: That which one does not want done to oneself, one does not do to others
(12.21). In other instances, he uses ji to refer to the basic, raw selfthe self that has
to be worked, that is, relationalized, via learning and cultivation. For example,
he gives the admonition to Master oneself [or the self] by practicing the rites; this
is how to be humane (ren ) (12.1). As the raw material of self, ji corresponds to the

890 Philosophy East & West

naively self-centered empirical self associated with sense perception and the feel-
ings; for Confucius, the rites are the received, accepted vehicles for reorienting and
relationalizing ji by making it more sensitively responsive within its bundles of
relations such that one will conduct ones interpersonal relations conscientiously,
respectfully, and caringly. In effect, the admonition isnt so much to become rela-
tional as it is to appreciate relationality as the natural default state of human life,
andto view the self-centered orientation as immature, small-minded, and, indeed,
idiotic in the old Athenian sense of not being involved in ones community. In this
sense, to be humane (ren) is to have mastered ones immature, self-centered incli-
nations and to have become sensitive to, adept at, and fluent in conducting interper-
sonal relations. Ideally, the ren person has cultivated herself as a virtuoso of human
relations, and has become discerning, intuitive, and able to handle new or compli-
cated (relational) situations.
Confucius contrasts learning for oneself (weiji zhi xue ) with learn-
ing for others (weiren zhi xue ) (14.24). Doesnt this evoke the notion of a
bounded self vis--vis discrete others? Here, the English translation plays on
Western assumptions about the self: learning for oneself, in effect, seems to be for
enhancing ones private inner world if not for ones selfish interests. However, since
for Confucius ji is the raw material of self to be worked, weiji zhi xue is the learning
by which one works it out oneself, that is, for example, making oneself more sensi-
tive to interpersonal relationalityand disposed to relate in sensitive, balanced
ways. Weiren zhi xue would entail just doing it for the grades, the sheepskin, ones
face for others, such as for ones teachers, parents, and superiors, rather that for the
relationally transformative effects.
The Analects also reads, Cultivate ji by being respectful (14.42), certainly an
emotive stance suited for co-relating. The text continues, Cultivate ji in order to
make others secure.... Cultivate ji in order to make the people secure (ibid.). More-
over, of the sage-king Shun, the Analects reads, He himself (ji) was deferential and
faced south (15.5). This position and attitude were deemed ideal for framing the
relational intercourse between the sage-king Shun and his ministers and supplicants.
Further, The exemplar demands it of himself (ji); the petty demands it of others
(15.21), that is, the exemplar is devoted to working herself to make her relational
conduct interpersonally efficacious, whereas the petty person, in effect, seeks to gain
from others, to make the relationship work forrather than throughthem. Finally,
the Analects notes that the leader must win the trust of the people before making
demands on them, or they themselves (ji) would feel used. By the same token, the
people must win the trust of the leader before remonstrating with him, or he himself
(ji) would feel maligned (19.10). In Confucius usage, ji never refers to a bounded,
private self. Rather it always indicates self in relationship with others; it presup
poses others and relations to have meaning and content. These assumptions under-
write Confucius appeals to work the self.
Second, Confucius also used the term wu for self. I take wu to represent ones
social presence because the graph shows a five over a mouth, and thus signifies
the five apertures composing the human face: two eyes, two nostrils, and a mouth.

Kirill O. Thompson 891

 Be that as it may, Confucius use of wu has clear relational overtones in each of the
following: If I am not at the sacrifice, it is as if I did not sacrifice (3.12). Even today,
it is important to show face on certain occasions in Chinese culture; for ones per-
sonal presence is a mark of ones sincerity and regard for the other. Confucius also
said, As I am not employed in office, I cultivate the arts (9.7). Cultivating the arts is
a way to embellish ones social graces and face.
Finally, Confucius said I (wu) have nothing that I have not told you, my disci-
ples (7.24). And, I am with Dian (11.24). These two propositions are of particular
interest. In 7.24, Confucius meant not that his oral teachings per se were or were
notcomplete, but rather that his entire repertoire of words and conduct as a caring
teacher-partner in their teacher-student relationship communicated the fullness of
his instruction, not to mention the model he presented in relational intercourse
withothers that the students had observed. In 11.24, I am with Dian signifies the
essence of Confucius basic relational spirit. Earlier in the passage, Confucius had
asked a group of his best students what were their life aspirations. Now, after several
of the students had said what they would do as court officials, Dian (Zeng Shi),
twanging lute in hand, says he would like to don his spring attire and go off with a
group of friends to bathe in the river Yi, enjoy the zephyrs on the rain altar, and return
home together in song.13 Confucius seconds that emotion. The story intimates
thatthe essence of Confucius instruction was not strictly etiquette, professional
training, and the ability to work effectively. His real concern was to instruct students
to co-relate and interact positively in the pulse, the flow, of lifeno matter whether
the relational confluences are personal, familial, social, or simply natural. Ultimately,
for Confucius, such co-relational participation in lifes flow should be an intimate,
aesthetic, joyful dance that betokens, and bestows, harmony.
The third term Confucius used for self is wo , which has come down as the
first-person-singular pronoun in modern Chinese. Confucius used wo in propositions
about himself, without any overt connection to others: When I intend to be humane
(ren), humanity is right there (7.30). I transmit but do not create; in this, I venture
to compare myself to Old Peng (7.1). I do not have knowledge from birth; but
Itakepleasure in the old, and am keen to pursue it (7.20). I broadened myself
byculture, and restrained myself by the rites (9.11). And, the Master abstained
fromself (9.4). While these propositions do not concern self in relation to others
perse, they nonetheless present self as relational: by definition, being humane in
Confucius sense of ren is striving to fulfill ones interpersonal relations; it is acting
positively in the confluence of relations. Mencius intimated this in saying Renzhe
ren ye , that is, the humane are fully human; humanity at root is rela
tional.14 The notion of transmitting rather than creating is a paean to the notion of
co-creation, the recognition that innovation is collaborative, across time as well as
between people who are present now.15 One broadens yet restrains oneself in order
to enrich and refine ones relational intercourse. Finally, abstention from self is a
fascinating paean to relational being: relationships as confluences in the flow of life
are the realities in and of which self is but a facet, a co-reflection. To insist on ones
self, just like insisting on having ones way, would not only be isolating; it would

892 Philosophy East & West

be obstructive of the very intercourse that constitutes living fullyand thus most
richly being oneself.

Confucian Introspection and Mental States as Relational

Chapter 1 of the Zhongyong reads:

Nothing is more evident than what is hidden; nothing is more apparent than what is
minute. Therefore, the exemplar is circumspect about his uniqueness.16

Is this evidence that early Confucianism not only recognized the private inner
world of self but was preoccupied with the subtle impulses that lie hidden in ones
inner space? I would contend, instead, that this passage presents introspection in just
the way that it is understood in relational psychology, for which introspection tends
to focus on ones interpersonal relationships, even unrealized but hoped-for relation-
ships. The expressions the hidden is apparent and the minute is evident serve to
show that ones impulses and intentions are not utterly private inner possessions of
self, but rather are factors in the overall play of ones intentions and conduct that,
ultimately, perceptive others can discern. Does uniqueness (du ) refer back to a
private inner self? Again, I would argue that uniqueness here refers to the unique
sets of relations in which each person is born and constituted in his or her flow of life.
In a sense, ones relationality means that ones conduct and performances are reflec-
tions of ones originative, nurturing, and constitutive sets of relations. Hence, ones
relationality, ones nexus in bundles of relations, does not mean that one does not
have the responsibility or initiative we tend to think of as belonging to autonomous
individual agents: relationality involves immanent responsibility to and for the other
relata. Moreover, the notion of initiative reflects the importance not only of playing
ones role as relatum but of making good on, and for, the relationship, even on and
for ones relationships as a whole. For better or for worse, ones achievements reflect
back on ones relationships, even if only indirectly or at a distance.
The following lines, which climax Zhongyong chapter 1, again, are often taken
to refer to the inner world of consciousness:

The pre-aroused state of joy and anger, sorrow, and happiness is called equilibrium
(zhong ) [tranquility, equipoise]; aroused, timely, and in due proportion is called har-
mony (he ). Equilibrium is the great root of the empire and harmony is the penetrating
way of the empire.

From the relational perspective, we admit that this describes a mental state but not in
the sense of a private inner world of self. It must be noted that this account of the
pre-aroused and aroused states of mind is descriptive of the highly cultivated person
who normally keeps his mind tranquil, but is prescriptive for others in the sense of
apsycho-emotional model or goal to emulate and realize: relationally, one is to
maintain a tranquil heart in equilibrium in order to be fully receptive and respon-
sivewhen matters come up. While scholars are often curious about the feel or q uality
of this mental state itself, this is not the point. What was important about such inner

Kirill O. Thompson 893

 tranquility in classical Confucianism was that it was a state of equipoise in which
onewas poised, alert, and set to respond directly and aptly. Daoists also saw the
potential power in tranquility as evidenced in the saying that Laozi was a sleeping
dragonthat is, possessed of unlimited potential. Again, this Zhongyong passage
concludes that when the emotions are aroused, one responds in a timely fashion and
in due proportion in a harmony-engendering way.

Confucius Realized Person as Relational Being

Confucius lexicon includes an assortment of terms for realized people, which to

some commentators express fixed ideals or at least character types of certain molds,
for example the junzi as the gentleman, the noble person; the renzhe as
the benevolent, human-hearted person; and the shengren as the sage, the wise
man. This sort of reading misses Confucius core point: the fully realized person
hascomprehended and is living through his or her relationality. The junzi, the exem-
plars, always operate within bundles of networks of human relationship, whether
familial, social, professional, political, et cetera. Versatile, they present themselves
differently in the different types of relations. I would argue that they also are innova-
tors and precedent-setters, as they are prepared to meet lifes inevitable new sorts of
scene, event, and relationship (Hall and Ames 1987, p. 115). (Hence, the vaunted
consistency insisted on by many Western moral thinkers was recognized to be an
unworkable ideal long ago in ancient China.) The junzi operate as exemplars who
guide and fulfill their relationships in mutually proper and harmony-engendering
ways. With the expression renzhe, Confucius characterized the master, the virtuoso
at interacting respectfully and propitiously in handling interpersonal relationships.
Finally, the shengren is a fully interconnected person and a master of sensitive
communication, whether through language, ritual practice, or general conduct.

Notably, the graph for sheng depicts an ear on the left and a mouth on the right,
over a person. For example, in discussing the source of the great wisdom of [the
sage-king] Shun, Zhongyong chapter 5 affirms that, Shun liked to ask others ques-
tions, and to inquire into the shallow words he heard. He tended to cover over the
ineffectual while m
aking the efficacious prominent. He would grasp two extremities,
and apply their Mean in leading the people. This was why Shun was considered to be
so great!17

Forms of Relational (Self) Development and Confucianism

After critiquing theories of self and mental health that identify inner unity and consis-
tency or coherence as prerequisites, Kenneth Gergen elaborates on the basic fact
ofthe multiplicity of peoples relational self/being. Simply put, even in the most
ordinary everyday life, people need to present themselves differently and interact
indiffering ways according to relationship and context.18 Gergen suggests that peo-
ple tend to relate and develop in three basic ways, through (1) modeling others, (2)
becoming somebody, and (3) co-acting with others (2009, pp. 135ff.).

894 Philosophy East & West

 (1) Regarding modeling, Gergen writes:
Others actions serve as models for what is possible. As we observe others in action, they
fill our consciousness, thus providing the possibility of incorporating their actions into our
own repertoire.... Through observation we incorporate the potentials of being the other.
No him, no me.Dizzy Gillespie of Louis Armstrong. (italics added)

(2) Becoming somebody refers to coming into being anew by starting to play a
new role, assume a new identity, or the like. Gergen writes:
With my mother, I come into being as a child; with my children, I come into being as a
parent, and so on. Each relationship will bring me into being as a certain kind of person,
and the actions that I acquire will enter the repository of potentials for future use....
Weare prepared for a future in which we imitate various versions of ourselves.... [A]s
the years accumulate, so do the laminations of possibility.... In the latter years, one
mayif one daresdraw from an enormous repertoire of potentials. One may re-visit
and re-kindle in ways that are impossible for the young. When we feel most private, most
deeply into ourselves, we are in some other sense most deeply connected with others
through whom we have learned to become a self.Stephen Mitchell19

(3) Co-action refers to the interactive scenarios that we play out in the context of
our relationships. Gergen gives the vivid example of learning to dance. When we
learn to dance we learn to
move our bodies in the prescribed way; we also watch our partners, and possibly imitate
them as well.... We learn the coordinated activity of the dance itself, how it goes when
we move in this direction, or in that. In the same way, I learn what it is to participate in
the give and take of an argument, in classroom discussion, scenarios of emotion ... and
so on. In sum, all meaning/full relations leave us with anothers way of being, a self that
we become through the relationship, and a choreography of co-action. From these three
sources, we emerge with enormous possibilities of being. (italics added)

Turning back to Confucius view of the formation and development of relational

self/being, we note that the principal approach he takes in instructing his students is
(1) modeling. Throughout the Analects Confucius sets an example by speaking and
interacting with his students and others. Clearly, whatever book learning the students
undertake is intended not just for its own sake or for passing examinations but rather
for the models of conduct and elocution it presents that support and enhance the
students sensitivity to and appropriate handling of human relationships. As Hall and
Ames astutely point out, the Confucian ritual rites are models that are handed
down from the past and kept alive through each new generations re-enactments. The
rituals continue to stay vital and valid to the extent that they still express the quality
and value of the relationship or event they embellish (1987, pp. 178ff.). Moreover,
Confucius is cognizant that (2) we become new selves, new people, in the contexts
of new relationships. Much of his instruction involves leading the students to be
ableto adapt to and fulfill the new roles and relationships appropriately and fittingly
and to stay thoughtful, judicious, and fair in interactions in each new level of rela-
tionship. Finally, Confucius (3) regards most human action as co-action. Even ones

Kirill O. Thompson 895

 actions that at first sight appear to be solitary turn out to be undertaken on behalf
ofor in preparation for co-action or for participating effectively in human rela
tionships.20 This is reflected in Confucius methods of instruction by dialogue and
modeling, his comments on conduct, and his interactions with and advice for
rulersas well. Similarly, rulers, too, are discreetly told to think of themselves not
interms of their power and perks but rather in terms of their interactive role in the
communityand, above all, in terms of their responsibilities to the people.
With his instruction and teachings, Confucius sought to remedy the breakdown
of Zhou institutions and society. He diagnosed that people were increasingly self-
centered and losing sight of the basic relationality that constituted any viable society
and polity; hence, in his discussions he always sought, in so many words, to remind
people of their basic relationality as well as to instill relational virtues and practices
to reinforce the cohesion of family, society, and court.

First-Order and Second-Order Relational Ethics and Confucianism

Viewed in the context of relational self/being as opposed to that of autonomous

s ubjects, virtues and ethics take on a different complexion; their role changes from
setting transcendent normative rules governing conduct or standards of moral per-
sonhood to immanently moderating the play of relationships as confluences. Rather
than being justified by abstract criteria, such as the categorical imperative or utility,
they are deemed appropriate and applicable to the extent that they support and
sustain human flourishing in real contexts in the flow of life.21
Kenneth Gergen speaks of first-order morality (Gergen 2009, p. 357) and second-
order morality (p. 364). First-order morality or ethics involves the values inherent in
the constitutive patterns of any viable relationship. It is not an explicit set of rules
butrather implicit and pervasive, such as in the classroom: from the tone and pitch
of my voice, my posture, and the direction of my gaze, to the intervals during which
students may talk (p. 357). First-order morality does not concern good or evil, but
rather the notion of being sensible within a way of life (p. 358). For the most part,
being sensible means being balanced and positive. However, this model is limited
inat least two ways. One way is that not all of the received patterns or practices can
fit all of the people within the group or community itself, such as coupling by gays
and lesbians in a Mormon community, or simply counterculture activities. Another
way involves conflicts of beliefs, values, and practices between different commu
nities in one society, such as between Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland,
or between two different societies with conflicting interests and perhaps ideologies,
such as between the United States and Cuba or China. Second-order morality seeks
to facilitate interaction between such discordant or opposing groups, and usually
involves some sort of collaborative activity that restores the possibility of generat-
ingfirst-order morality (p. 360). Second-order morality involves the idea of rela
tional responsibility, the idea that all of the problems and conflicts are relational in
nature and can be settled by goodwill and the willingness to make adjustments on
allsides.22

896 Philosophy East & West

 Confucius legion of particular virtues, including, for example, filiality and frater-
nity, and four of his five cardinal virtues, namely humaneness, appropriateness, ritual
conduct, and reliability, are examples of first-order morality. They set forth the atti-
tudes, virtues, values, and patterns of conduct that Confucius deemed conducive to
fecund, fulfilling relationships in Zhou principalities. His virtue of wisdom (zhi )
was addressed mainly to second-order issues that required thinking outside the box,
and at times transcending the strictures of humaneness and ritual conduct. For exam-
ple, Confucius praised a realpolitik-minded minister, Guan Zhong, who did not grasp
the garden-variety sort of humaneness associated with ritual conduct (Analects 3.22),
but who was compassionate and bestowed benefits in ways that expressed genuine
humaneness (14.9). Moreover, he laid the grounds for harmony and peace among
conflicting feudal lords (14.16, 14.17). Hence, Guan Zhongs relational virtues out-
stripped those of the standard Confucian moralists. Confucius himself spoke favor-
ably the customs and lifestyles of non-Chinese tribes and even spoke of leaving the
corrupt Chinese to live among them (9.14). Also indicative of Confucius second-
order openness to other cultures: when he visited different cultures he would inquire
politely into their rites, customs, and practices. This respectful humility distin-
guishedConfucius during his lifetime. Unfortunately, later Confucians often held
firm to their inward-looking first-order morality and were somewhat closed to the
more outward-looking second-order morality, except when events conspired to
compel them to open up.

Relational Wisdom of Daoism

From the relational perspective, ethics and moralitywhether as designed for au-
tonomous selves or for relational selves/beingwhich give sharp definitions of
what is good and what actions are right, create situations in which so-called
bad or evil and wrong are highlighted and cover ever wider spectra of conduct
and affairs, which in turn leads to increased dissonance, disharmony, and conflict.
From the relational perspective, however, there are no inherent wrongs or evils. In
the relational analysis, it tends to be differences of style or misalignments that
aredeclared bad or wrong. Gergen calls this effect the formation of virtuous evil
(Gergen 2009, p. 358). He points out that this happens not only in obvious conflicts
between, say, people of different cultures or within one person of mixed heritage,
buteven in one persons feeling the pull of competing life goods, such as between
career and family or different love interests (Gergen 2009, p. 359):

It is good to defend ones country, but it is also good to avoid killing others. In every
choice, I am both moral and immoral. For every relationship of which I am a part, I am
also part of another relationship for which my present action may be misbegotten.... At
every moment, the voice of the disapproving judge hovers over the shoulders.

Something similar happens with the articulation of universal ideals. They are origi-
nally intended to bridge our differences and underwrite harmony between us.
However, such articulations often result in a hierarchy in which good and evil are

Kirill O. Thompson 897

 antipodes. It is also a hierarchy for the control of the less than good.... Universal
goods are premised on the intent to eliminate some form of action that seems reason-
able and right from at least one other point of view (Gergen 2009, p. 361).
These relational points were already made in the classical Daoist texts, the Laozi
and Zhuangzi. Laozi chapter 2 reads: When beauty is universally affirmed as
beauty,there is ugliness. When goodness is universally affirmed as goodness, there
isevil.... Thus, the wise deals with things through non-interference and teaches
through no-words (Chang 1975, pp. 78). Interestingly, non-interference means
acting by making discreet, apt, non-intentional responses to situations. Teaching with
no-words does not mean keeping silent; it means not speaking fixed doctrines:
the words of the wise Daoist are conversational and fit the present life-situation.
Wecould say that the words of the wise are immanent rather than transcendent in
meaning and intention. Similarly, Zhuangzi chapter 2 argues for the ungroundedness
(and implicit relationality) of our facts as well as of our values:
What does the Way rely upon, that we have true and false? What do words rely upon, that
we have right and wrong? How can the Way go away and not exist? How can words exist
and not be acceptable? When the Way relies on little accomplishments and words rely on
vain show, we have the rights and wrongs of the Confucians and Mohists. What one calls
right the others call wrong, what one calls wrong the other calls right. But if we want to
right their wrongs and wrong their rights, then the best thing to use is clarity....
... Where there is recognition of right there must be recognition of wrong; where
thereis recognition of wrong there must be recognition of right. Therefore the Sage
doesnot proceed in such a way, but illuminates all in the light of Heaven.23 (Watson
1964, pp. 3435)

In the first passage above, the Laozi is advising the king to be empty-minded, that is,
to be open-minded and responsive to all of the perspectives of his subjects because,
as king, he is the leader of many different groups of peoples with their own respective
outlooks and valuesand should be responsive to all of them. Indeed, elsewhere,
the Laozi notes that the king refers to himself as a motherless orphan; this is to
underscore that the king has no personal relations and thus is open and fair in
hisrelations with all of the people. In the second passage, Zhuangzi is advising his
readers to keep in mind that peoples views and values are all perspectival, and thus
to be responsive to them in context rather than to stick to rigid views and values and
quarrel with them until the end of time.

Conclusion: Relational Being/Living for a Humane and Sustainable Future

Classical Confucian thought was centered on relational self/being. Grasping this re-
alization puts us in a stronger position to understand classical Confucian concepts,
values, and precepts. Additionally, it places us in a stronger position to read and
translate early Confucian texts. Importantly, the fact that major, lasting, influential
traditions, such as Confucianism and Daoism, have bodied forth a relational ac-
count, not just of the person, but of all sorts of human values, customs, practices,
ethics, forms of life, et cetera, lends prima facie persuasiveness to the relational view

898 Philosophy East & West

of self/being: it is not just a newfangled new age discourse about human identity
and relationships. Rather, it has characterized and constituted some of the most
stable and abiding traditions in history. Consequently, the Confucian example pro-
vides precious insights into not only human relationships, values, and practices, but
also into human institutions and especially human problems as well.
In the preceding, we explored relational insights into the formation of the human
self/being, as well as human values and practices. Regarding dysfunctional human
institutions,24 realizing the primacy of relationship, we are encouraged to make our
institutions more caring, responsive, and interactive. Consider our schools and educa-
tion. People debate endlessly over such things as curricula, course content, test scores,
and the relative merits of the teacher-centered classroom (traditional) versus the
student-centered classroom (pragmatist). In the relational perspective, questions of
curriculum and content, even test scores, are not entirely germane when the underly-
ing and substantive project of education is relational person-making. As to teacher-
centered versus student-centered classrooms, the relational view denies the very
dichotomy and advocates a dynamic, interactive classroom with questions, dialogues,
joint explorations, and back-and-forth between teacher-partners and student-partners.
The relational view involves a learning process that carries teacher and student both
forward. At times the dynamic will look teacher-centered, and often it will be student-
centered; in fact, the learning process will have its own autonomy, and the lead and
direction of the class, the flow, will naturally rotate back and forth between students
and teacher. Regarding personal problems, the relational view denies, for example,
that psychological problems are usually problems of individual agents; rather, it
inclines us to seek to identify, understand, and ameliorate peoples problems through
adjusting the dynamics of their dysfunctional relationships. Such is also the case with
marital problems; the relational view underscores that it takes two to tango.
Representative of a corresponding sea change in the counseling field, we hear
relatively less, say, of the problem child and much more of the dysfunctional
family of which the problem son or daughter is just a reflection. (Notice how the
term child can give the illusion of an isolated atomic individual while son or
daughter highlights relationship. Of course, a child is somebodys offspring, but
that relatedness gets overlooked in institutional thought and [mal]practice.)
By extension, the relational view of self/being opens the way to more sensitive
and balanced mutual understandings and relationships, as well as meeting problems
on a social, national, and international scale. The present study has been intended
mainly to sketch out the relational view for the light it sheds on classical Confucian-
ism and vice versa, and to commend more specific relational inquiries into other
spectra and features of human life as well.

Appendix: Selected Readings from the Analects that Illustrate Confucius

Relational View of Self/Being
The following are randomly selected passages from the Analects chapters 1 and 4
that illustrate the natural fit of the relational account of self/being to that text. I chose

Kirill O. Thompson 899

 chapter 1 simply at random in order to show that relationality permeates the Analects
presentations of self/being. I chose chapter 4 because it is generally thought to be the
earliest section of the Analects and thus the closest to the Master.

Analects, Chapter 1

1.2Few who are filial or fraternal would be likely to offend against their superiors.
... The exemplar devotes himself to the root. When the root is established,
theWay unfolds. As to being filial and fraternal, they are the roots of being
humane.

In the relational self/being account, parent-child relations and sibling relations usu-
ally tend to play primal roles in a persons formation: people enter life and take shape
via confluences of parental and sibling relations. Hence, being filial and fraternal
constitute a person, and set the pattern for his or her engaging in and responding to
other relations later. For Confucius, filial and fraternal relations not only cast and
seta persons mold; they yield his or her inner sense of norms for navigating inter
personal relations in general. Filiality can be said to be returning to prominence in
East Asia due both to Chinas single-child policy and to the rise of small nuclear
families across modern urban East Asia.

1.9Tend carefully to the funerary rites and pay respect to the long departed; then
the peoples attunement will be ample.

Relational self/being extends beyond the physical body: one remains constituted
bythe impact and remembrance of ones forebears. For their part, departed elders
considered the course and fate of their progeny. Zhu Xi naturally felt at one with his
ancestors not only in spirit but in that he felt that their blood coursed through his
veins and their qi flowed in his body. Indeed, at certain junctures, people will pause
to consider how the departed would regard their situation.25

1.10The Master [learns about a principalitys institutions] by being cordial, forth-

right, respectful, modest, and deferential.... His manner of inquiring is unlike
others.

Confucius understood and respected that other societies had different customs, dif-
ferent patterns of realizing relational being. Hence, he was particularly courteous
and respectful in inquiring into their ways. This was his second-order morality and
manner of forming trans-cultural relations. His larger quest was to gain a sense of the
range of customs or patterns of relational being and of which ones were perhaps
more harmony-engendering and co-propitious.

1.12In ritual action, harmony is prized. The Way of the late kings was beautiful in
this regard....

900 Philosophy East & West

Like social dance, ritualized conduct facilitates harmony in relational being. As Zhou
society became complicated and stratified, the rituals were further instituted and
codified to support and guide the peoples intuitions about relational being in family,
community, and the court.

1.13Being faithful comes close to being appropriate, it means being able to repeat
ones words. Being respectful comes close to propriety, it means distancing
oneself from shame and disgrace. Not departing from ones parental intimacy,
it means that one honors them as models.

Again, these propositions provide guidance for co-functioning propitiously in

relational being. Faithfulness yields trust, respect yields character, intimacy yields
role-modeling.

1.14The exemplary person in eating does not just eat his fill and in dwelling does
not just seek comfort. He is attentive to affairs, circumspect in speech, and he
frequents the company of people who mastered the Way in order to adjust
himself. He is one who takes joy in learning.

In light of relational being, eating and dwelling are basic interpersonal activities,
tobe done with relational sensitivity and propriety. Our feasts and creature
comforts are to be sharedand should be aimed at facilitating relational harmony,
rather than, say, to stir awe at ones riches. Attentiveness and circumspection are
alsorelationally directed, for example how to handle affairs and how to communi-
cate in view of relational being. Presumably, artisans of the Way would present
models, indices, references for gauging the balance and quality of ones own rela-
tional endeavors. Learning is essentially about cultivating ones responsive sensitivity
toward, and in, relationships. Since the goal of study is to refine ones aptitude for
harmony-engendering relational conduct, study itself is a joy in that it yields a d
eeper
appreciation of life.

Analects, Chapter 4

4.1The Master said, In a neighborhood, the presence of humane people makes it

beautiful. How could anyone who doesnt choose to live in the company of the
humane be deemed wise?

Humane people are those who are deemed masters, virtuosos, at conducting inter-
personal relationships. Indeed, life among such people would be secure, balanced,
and culturally educative and embellished.

4.4The Master said, If ones will is set on being humane, one will tend to be free
of wrong.

Kirill O. Thompson 901

 As people are relational creatures, one who is set on becoming adept at handling
interpersonal relations is certainly setting off on the right foot and has half the battle
won.

4.8The Master said, If at dawn one discerns the Way, at dusk one can face death.

The Way represents the tapestry and stream of upright human relationships. One who
starts life with a measure of appreciation and discernment into the Way in this sense
will feel fulfilled and free of regret at lifes end.

4.10The Master said, In their actions in the empire, exemplars are free of biases
for and against. Rather, they proceed with appropriateness.

The exemplars are not parochial and do not stick to abstract or artificial codes, but
strive always to act with aplomb and appropriateness in view of relationship and
situation.

4.25The Master said, The virtuous will not live in isolation; they will certainly
have neighbors.

In Confucius relational view of self/being and life, the virtuous indicates those
who are open, sensitive, and appropriately responsive to others. Such congenial
people will surely flourish with others and usually tend to have company.

4.26The Master said, If in your friendships, you are unrelenting, you will find
yourself an outcast.

In this passage, Confucius displays his emotional intelligence about human relation-
ships: one cannot simply push directly and work actively for what one feels is right
or wants; at times, one must also be somewhat soft and sensitive to the mood and
ambiance of the othersand tread lightly.

Notes

This article was originally a paper presented at the Third Seminar of the International
Forum on Confucian Culture in East Asia, Confucian Premodernity, Modernity, Post-
modernity (III): Centering on Confucianisms Postmodernity (
(): =
()), jointly sponsored by the Academy of Korean Studies
and the Institute for Advanced Studies in Humanities and Social Science of National
Taiwan University in Taipei, Taiwan on May 2829, 2010. A revised version of the
paper was presented at Colloque International: Self-Talk: Forms and Practices,
hosted by the Institut des Humanits de Paris at the Universit Paris Diderot on

902 Philosophy East & West

 eptember 1012, 2012. This article benefited from the comments of John Tucker
S
and Mark Setton in Taipei, and Stephanie Smadja and Anders Holmberg in Paris, as
well as from the critical input of two anonymous reviewers for Philosophy East and
West. The author is solely responsible for any remaining shortcomings or errors.
1Hume, Nietzsche, and Wittgenstein were exceptions to the rule. Kant postu
lated the transcendental ego to unify the manifold nature of experience and the
eternal soul to support faith in ethics and religion.
2Many intelligent people in the West still cleave to the idea of a bounded
autonomous self, fearing they would lose something precious if it were to
besomehow banished or shown to be ephemeral. Judeo-Christian rhetoric, of
course, feeds, and feeds on, such fears.
3Twins who have not known each other sometimes tend to share more traits
incommon than do identical twins who grew up together, because the latter
consciously tend to make efforts to distinguish themselves from each other.
4Hwang proposes that relational self characterizes the person in most non-
Western societies, and is a pioneer in relational indigenous psychology (IP).
Thepresent article draws more on Gergens research because he discloses the
relational self even in societies that proclaim individualism.
5This strikes me as paralleling the shift in atomic physics from particle theory to
string theory.
6Recognizing the dependence of a persons existence on sexual relations be-
tween the parents, Descartes was careful to claim that God was the author of
our genuine self, our independent eternal soul, such that our parents merely
provided us with a corpuscular bodythus making our soul become the ghost
in the machine.
7And rarely are they discreet.
8As Kierkegaard famously contended, we are always caught up in the press and
pull of daily life and find it humanly impossible to step out of it, la Hegel, and
conceptualize it abstractly, logically, and absolutelyat least in this lifetime.
9The Chinese classic Yijing or Book of Changes models relations and transforma-
tions at all levels.
10Indeed, the expression postmodern self itself appears to be oxymoronic in
that the postmodern view deconstructs the ground for any coherent notion of
self.
11Daoism fits this model, as well. It widens the scope of relations and flow to
nature and cosmos. Indeed, reminiscent of Daodejing chapter 1, Gergen states
that The totality of confluences is indescribable. And Mozis critique of Con-
fucian accounts of human relations can be viewed as his effort to readjust the
patterns of confluence to be more equitable (horizontal) and less hierarchical
(vertical).

Kirill O. Thompson 903

 12This question does seem to have teeth vis--vis Postmodernism, which makes
the person so much a passive reflection of his or her conditioning environs.
Even when they regard the person as actively interacting in or with the environ-
ment, postmodernists tend to conceive this inter-activity on the model of an
economy of needs rather than natural propensities.
13Bathing symbolizes ritual purification. The Great Learning chapter 2 states that
the bathing tub of King Tang was inscribed with the words: If one daily renews,
and renews day after day, one will experience renewal daily.
14The graph for humaneness, ren , depicts two people facing each other in a
balanced relationship.
15Recent creativity research stresses the extent that creative breakthroughs tend to
be collaborative and interpersonal. See Sawyer 2006 and Miell 2004.
16On Zhongyong chapter 1, see Thompson 2008a and Ames and Hall 2001.
17Following the analysis of Hall and Ames. While the Chinese term for sagacity
incorporates heeding and speaking, sagacity means nasal acuity, reflecting
the Wests preoccupation with having a nose for sensing the facts of situa-
tions, perhaps as more basic than relational niceties.
18Consider the different faces children present, respectively, to their parents,
peers, and teachers in the course of a day. In a lecture at the University of
Hawaii some years ago, Roger Ames gave the example of a supermarket

cashierin Honolulu who spoke in the appropriate dialect and manner to

eachrespective customer according to his or her appearing to be local or a
ainlander.
m
19Cf. our account of Confucian introspection in the section above on Confucian
Introspection and Mental States as Relational.
20The Julie Delpy character, Celine, in the film Before Sunrise, says, Isnt every-
thing that we do in some sense for love?
21They need not be construed as entirely immanent: they still have to be transcen-
dent enough to provide anchorage and traction when relations go awry and
become internally harmful, as with abusive family relations, or externally harm-
ful, as with unwarranted, irrational violence and hate directed at outsiders.
22Obviously, this is not a complete model or account of conflict resolution. There
is evil out there to be faced firmly. The present concern is simply to sketch out
the contours of the relational view of self/being.
23For discussion on the relational fluidity of self/being and enlightened language
use in the Zhuangzi, see Thompson 2008b.
24In Thorstein Veblens terms, imbecilic institutions.
25Cf. Englishman Thomas Grays Elegy Written in a Country Churchyard (1749),
Stanza 23: On some fond breast the parting soul relies / Some pious drops the

904 Philosophy East & West

 closing eye requires / Evn from the tomb the voice of Nature cries / Evn in our
Ashes live their wonted Fires.

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