Rebuilding

the Worlds
Pipeline Infrastructure
William J. Hoff
Group Director , Engineering Services
Gulf Interstate Engineering Company
Edward J. Wiegele
President, Professional Services
Willbros Engineers (U.S.) LLC
William J. Hoff
US Pipeline Infrastructure

3
International Pipelines Beyond North America

Source: Pipeline & Gas Journal's Mid-Year International Pipeline Report

10,166 mi South & Central America and Caribbean

1,980 mi Western Europe & EU Countries
8,318 mi Middle East
8,523 mi Africa
17,039 mi Former Soviet Union-Eastern Europe
35,546 mi Asia Pacific Region
81,572 mi Total
4
 Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act: 1968
Regulations Effective Date: 1970

Source: Oil Pipeline Characteristics and Risk Factors:

Illustrations from the Decade of Construction, 2001
5
 Timeline of Key Events
Timeline Event
1968 US Passes Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act
Pipeline Safety Provisions Become Law

1970 Gas Pipeline Safety Regulations Developed

Effective Date for All Gas Operators

1979 US Passes Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety Act

For All US Liquid Operators

Dec 1, 2000 Liquids IMP Rule 49 CFR 195.452

Industry Reference API 1162

Dec 15, 2003 Gas IMP Rule 49 CFR 192 Subpart O

Industry References: ASME B31.8S

Why is this Requirements / Standards are being adopted by other countries

Important? Opportunities exist to assist Operators in Integrity Management
Long term need for these Services

6
 Background to Understanding US Regulations

Incidents Leading to Pipeline Integrity Regulations

Olympic Pipeline
Bellingham Washington - June 1999
Gasoline Pipeline Rupture
Fatalities: 3 young boys

El Paso Pipeline
Carlsbad, New Mexico - August 2000
Natural Gas Pipeline Rupture
Fatalities: 12

7
Olympic Pipeline Accident Bellingham, WA

8
 Olympic Pipeline Accident Bellingham, WA

Cherry Point Performing Software Upgrade on SCADA

Refinery Computers
Pipeline Switched Delivery Points
Rupture
Notice pressure rise considered normal
Water Treatment Plan
(actually due valve closure)
SCADA becomes unresponsive
Electrician takes down pump station manually
Whatcom Creek
Pressure surge backs up the line, surge relief
valve fails to open
Pressure surge causes rupture at water
treatment plant (unknown)
Valve Fails Deleted software upgrade, rebooted SCADA,
to Open
and restarted pipeline
Pipeline is restarted
Additional product is released at rupture site

Renton
Station
9
 Olympic Pipeline Accident Bellingham, WA
Event Tie to IMP Rule
Cherry Point
Refinery SCADA Upgrade - Personal Knowledge & Training
Pipeline
- Management of Change
Rupture - Quality Assurance
Water Treatment Plan Pressure Rise - Personal Knowledge & Training
& Restart of P/L
Damage at Water - Threat ID 3rd Party Damage
Treatment Plant - Preventive & Mitigative Measures
Whatcom Creek

Smart Pig Run - Assessment Methods

- Conducting Assessments
- Remediation
Valve Fails - Personal Knowledge & Training
to Open
Pipeline Rupture - Minimize Enviro / Safety Risks
- Personal Knowledge & Training

Relief Valve - Management of Change

Failure - Personal Knowledge & Training
Renton
Station
10
El Paso Pipeline Carlsbad, NM Accident

11
 El Paso Pipeline Carlsbad, NM Accident

12 Fatalities
Cause: Internal Corrosion

Addl Ties to IMP Rule

Threat: Internal Corrosion

Cyclic Fatigue:
Suspension Bridge

12
 Similar Requirements for Gas & Liquids Pipelines
Hazardous Liquid Pipelines
49 CFR 195.452
Applicable to High Consequence Areas
Industry Standard: API 1162
Required Elements
Identify High Consequence Areas
Identify Threats
Perform Risk Analysis
Prepare Assessment Plan
Perform Remediation
Perform Continual Evaluation
Maintain Performance Metrics
Implement Preventive & Mitigative Measures
Utilize Management of Change
Develop Quality Assurance Program
Record Keeping
Develop Communications Plan
13
Natural Gas Pipelines
49 CFR 192 Subpart O
Applicable to High Consequence Areas
Industry Standard: ASME B31.8S
Required Elements
Identify High Consequence Areas
Identify Threats
Perform Risk Analysis
Prepare Assessment Plan
Perform Remediation
Perform Continual Evaluation
Maintain Performance Metrics
Implement Preventive & Mitigative Measures
Utilize Management of Change
Develop Quality Assurance Program
Record Keeping
Develop Communications Plan
 Key Differences Between Gas & Liquids Pipelines
Hazardous Liquid Pipelines
Maximum 5 Year Assessment Cycle
Product Characteristics
Liquid run off based on terrain
Potential migration in rivers and streams
Potential groundwater contamination
Natural Gas Pipelines
Maximum 7 Year Assessment Cycle
Product Characteristics
Local well defined Impact Area
No run off, vertical dispersion
No impact to groundwater

High Consequence Area Definition High Consequence Area Definition

Commercially Navigable Waterway Method 1: Class Location
High Population Area Method 2: Potential Impact Radius
Other Populated Areas Both Methods Include: Identified Sites
Usually Sensitive Areas

Remediation Conditions Remediation Conditions

Immediate Immediate
60 Days 1 Year
180 Days Monitor

Other Considerations Other Considerations

Runoff Modeling, Potential to Impact BTU Content Affects Impact Radius

14
 Discussion of Natural Gas Pipeline Integrity Rule

Filtering Criteria Gas Transmission Pipelines

Is the pipeline system subject to 49 CFR 192?

Does it have Transmission Pipe per 192.3?
Have High Consequence Areas been
identified on the system?

15
 Gas Integrity
Management Program

Required Program Elements

a) Identification of HCAs
b) Baseline Assessment Plan
c) Threat Identification
d) Direct Assessment Plan
e) Remediation
f) Continual Evaluation & Assessment
g) Confirmatory Direct Assessment
h) Preventive & Mitigative Measures
i) Performance Plan
j) Record Keeping
k) Management of Change
l) Quality Assurance
m) Communications Plan
n) Procedure to provide risk analysis
& IMP to Regulators upon request
o) Minimizing environmental / safety risks
p) Identification of new HCAs

16
 Identification of High Consequence Areas

HCA Methods Typically Used

1. Class Location Reduces Length
2. Potential Impact Circle (PIC)
Both Include Identified Sites

17
 High Consequence Areas PIR Method

PIR 0.69 pd 2

PIR = Radius of a Circular Area in Feet

Surrounding the Point of Failure
p = Maximum Allowable Operating
Pressure (MAOP) in the pipeline
segment in pounds per square inch
d = Nominal Diameter of the Pipeline in
Inches.

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High Consequence Area More than 20 Buildings
Potential Impact
Circle with more
than 20 Buildings

19
 Identified Sites
(a) An Outside Area or Open Structure that is occupied by twenty (20) or
more persons on at least 50 days in any twelve (12)-month period.
(The days need not be consecutive.)
Beaches Outdoor Theaters
Playgrounds Stadiums
Recreational Facilities Recreational Areas near water
Camping Grounds Areas Outside a Religious Facility

b) (b) A Building that is occupied by twenty (20) or more persons on at

least five (5) days a week for ten (10) weeks in any twelve (12)-month
period. (The days and weeks need not be consecutive.)
Religious Facilities General Stores
Office Buildings Roller Skating Rinks
Community Centers 4-H Facilities

c) A Facility occupied by persons who are confined, are of impaired

mobility, or would be difficult to evacuate
Hospitals Day-Care Facilities
Prisons Retirement Facilities
Schools Assisted-Living Facilities

20
HCA Identified Site

Identified Site

PIR PIR
PIR
PIR

21
 HCA Identified Site
Potential Impact Radius
PIR 0.69 pd 2

p = 1200 psi
d = 20-inch

PIR 0.69 (1200)20 2

PIR 478 feet
PIR = Radius of a Circular Area in Feet
Surrounding the Point of Failure Identified Site
p = Maximum Allowable Operating
Pressure (MAOP) in the pipeline
segment in pounds per square inch
d = Nominal Diameter of the Pipeline in
Inches.

22
 Steps to a Baseline Assessment Plan

Activity Purpose Plan

Threat Identification Addresses All Threats

& Evaluation (9 Categories)

Selects Appropriate
Assessment Method Assessment Method Baseline
Selection for Each Identified Assessment Plan
Threat

Prioritized
Risk Analysis
Risk Ranking
& Prioritization
of Assessments

23
 Threat Identification
Prescriptive Approach Performance Based Approach
9 Categories 21 Specific Threats
. (a) Time Dependent (a) Time Dependent
1 (1) External Corrosion (1) External Corrosion
(2) Internal Corrosion 1 (2) Internal Corrosion
2
(3) Stress Corrosion Cracking 2 (3) Stress Corrosion Cracking
3
3

(b) Static or Resident (b) Static or Resident

4 (1) Manufacturing Related Defects (1) Manufacturing Related Defects
4
Defective Pipe Seam Defective Pipe Seam
Defective Pipe 5 Defective Pipe
5 (2) Welding / Fabrication Related (2) Welding / Fabrication Related
Defective Pipe Girth Weld 6 Defective Pipe Girth Weld
Defective Fabrication Weld 7 Defective Fabrication Weld
Wrinkle Bend or Buckle 8 Wrinkle Bend or Buckle
Stripped Threads / Broken Pipe / 9 Stripped Threads / Broken Pipe /
Coupling Failure Coupling Failure
6 (3) Equipment Failures (3) Equipment Failures
Gasket O-ring failure 10 Gasket O-ring failure
Control / Relief Equipment Malfunction 11 Control / Relief Equipment Malfunction
Seal / Pump Packing Failure 12 Seal / Pump Packing Failure
Miscellaneous 13 Miscellaneous

(c) Time Independent (c) Time Independent

(1) Third Party / Mechanical Damage 14 (1) Third Party / Mechanical Damage
7 Damage by 1st, 2nd,or 3rd Parties 15 Damage by 1st, 2nd,or 3rd Parties
Previously Damaged Pipe 16 Previously Damaged Pipe
. Vandalism Vandalism
8 (2) Incorrect Operations Human Error 17 (2) Incorrect Operations Human Error
Incorrect Operations Incorrect Operations
9 (3) Weather Related and Outside Force 18 (3) Weather Related and Outside Force
Cold Weather 19 Cold Weather
Lightning 20 Lightning
Heavy Rains or Floods 21 Heavy Rains or Floods
Earth Movements Earth Movements

24
Assessment Method Selection

Inline Inspection
Metal Loss Tools
Crack Detection Tools
Caliper / Geometry Tools
Pressure Test
49 CFR 192 Subpart J Pressure Test
Spike Test
Direct Assessment
External Corrosion Direct Assessment
Internal Corrosion Direct Assessment
Stress Corrosion Cracking Direct Assessment
Other Approved Technology

25
 Risk Analysis & Prioritization

Single Threat: Most Common

Riski = Pi x Ci

Pipeline Segment:
Consider All 9 Threat Categories
9

Risk = (P1 x C1 ) (P2 x C 2 ) . (P9 x C9 )

i 1

where:
P = Probability of failure
C = Consequence of failure
1 to 9 = Threat Category

26
 Baseline Assessment Plan

Risk Analysis and HCA Assessment Method Assessment Method

Prioritization Method Selection Selection

Risk Risk Section HCA HCA HCA Assessment Assessment Assessment Assessment
Rank Score Pipeline Section Length Method ID Miles 1 Date 2 Date
1 4956 River Road to Griffin Tap 8.7 PIR 105 3.5 ECDA Jan 2012 ICDA Jan 2012
2 3013 Brookside Station to Valve 25 9.8 PIR 65 2.4 ECDA Mar 2012 ICDA Mar 2012
3 2835 Valve 27 to Raven Station 8.3 PIR 78 1.2 Press Test Aug 2012 Spike Test Aug 2012
4 2530 Fairview Station to South River Valve 7.2 PIR 21 2.1 ILI - MFL Nov 2012 Caliper Nov 2012
5 2298 Preston Tap to Valve 20 6.9 PIR 107 0.9 ECDA 1st Qtr 2013 ICDA 1st Qtr 2013
6 1756 Larkin Street Trap to Valve 13 8.4 PIR 86 1.6 ILI - MFL 2nd Qtr 2013 Caliper 2nd Qtr 2013
7 1406 Valve 11 to Edgebrook tap 5.6 PIR 92 0.7 ILI - MFL 2nd Qtr 2013 Caliper 2nd 2013

27
 Pipeline Integrity Management Trends

Gas Transmission Integrity Management

Assessment Miles per Year HCA Repairs per Year

28
 Opportunities
Remediation
Pipeline Retrofitting for Inline Inspection Tools
Direct Assessment
Hydrostatic Testing
Pipeline Replacement
Automatic Shut Off / Remote Control Valves
Preventative and Mitigative Measures

29
 Recent Pipeline Integrity Developments

Pacific Gas and Electric

San Bruno, CA - September 2010
Natural Gas Pipeline Rupture
Fatalities: 8

National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)

Probable Cause
Inadequate Quality Assurance during a pipeline relocation
Inadequate Pipeline Integrity Management Program
Incomplete and inaccurate pipeline information
Did not consider the design & materials in risk assessment
Failed to consider welded seam cracks in risk assessment
Assessment method was unable to detect welded seam defects
Integrity Program reviews were superficial - No Improvements made

30
 New PHMSA Advisory Bulletins
January 10, 2011
Establish MAOP using Record Evidence
Perform detailed Threat and Risk Analysis
Use accurate data especially to determine MAOP
Use Risk Analysis: Assessment Selection
Preventive & Mitigative Measures

May 7, 2012
Verification of Records
New annual reporting requirements for Gas Operators (2013)
Report progress toward verification of records
Records must be Traceable, Verifiable, and Complete

31
 PODS IPLOCA Work Group

Formed to:
Develop Industry Standards Data
Standards for New Pipeline Construction

Data structure specifically designed for Design & Construction

Improved data management over entire life cycle

Common format for data and metadata

Material tracking and traceability

As-built survey / progress tracking during construction

Common database deliverable to Operator

Ability to assure data is Traceable, Verifiable, and Complete

32
 Opportunities

Pipeline Data Gathering

Records Validation
MAOP Validation
Geographic Information System Development
Field Verification

33
Edward J. Wiegele
Chief Reasons for Accidents

35
 What is Pipeline Integrity Management &
Maintenance?

Program design
Program execution
(assessments/reviews)
Follow-on engineering &
construction

Engineering activities include:

IMP design & O&M manual

development
Risk analysis
System integrity validation and
assessment
ILI program design and
implementation Construction activities include:
GIS Services, database design
and analysis Pipeline rehabilitation
Data collection and as-builting Pipeline take up and relay
Establishing operating plans to Hydrostatic testing
keep pipelines in good working
order Anomaly digs (investigation and repair
work)
Leveraging technology to
Maintenance work
monitor and assess conditions
real time Call out and emergency work

36
 Why is this important?

With the stringent regulations in US, the market for

pipeline construction on existing pipelines and
facilities is expanding at a rapid rate
In global markets where there are few regulations
related to integrity, the existing infrastructure will need
attention
This market will grow world wide, and if the incident
rate increases it will accelerate

37
 Work to Re-Build the Pipeline Infrastructure

Re-building a pipeline system requires consideration

of more elements than a new construction project
Pipeline GIS
Mapping and
Records Engineering
System Risk Project
Assessments Management

Pipeline Integrity
Assessments Budget
Controls
Operations / Project
Maintenance Elements
ROW /
Permitting
Repairs

Commissioning
Procurement
& Startup
Construction Logistics
Management
38
 Challenges to gaining clear, timely visibility
into pipeline integrity

Traditional pipeline integrity analysis

process

Disparate systems and data

Dated views of assets

Uneven field data updates

No single version of the truth

Repairs not tracked

39
Meeting Business Goals Can Be Difficult

40
 Assessment Method ILI Tools

Metal Loss Tools

Transverse Field (TFI) MFL

Compression Wave Ultrasonics Circumferential Field for Narrow
MFL Axial Field Indirect
Liquid Coupled Direct Measure- Axial Oriented Metal Loss
Measurement
ment

Crack Detection Tools

Shear Wave Ultrasonics Elastic Wave Wheel Coupled Emat Gas Only
Liquid Coupled For Gas or Liquid

41
External Corrosion Direct Assessment

42
 Assessing Unpiggable Pipelines through
Direct Assessment

The Direct Assessment Process is suitable for ECDA, ICDA and SCCDA. Data
is mined or created at each step is also being provided back to GIS database to
further enhance and provide an integrity driven deliverable for future risk
calculations.
1) Pre-Assessment: incorporating various field and operation data gathering,
data integration, and analysis and validating that DA is an acceptable
assessment method
2) Indirect Inspection: combination of above ground tools and calculations to
flag possible corrosion sites (calls), based on the evaluation or
extrapolation of the data acquired during Pre-Assessment
3) Direct Examination: excavation and direct assessment to confirm
corrosion at the identified sites, and remediation as defined in regulation
4) Post Assessment: determine if direct assessment sites are representative
of the conditions of the pipeline, and what activities needs to be conducted
moving forward based on the findings from the previous steps

43
 Pipeline Integrity Process Where To Take
Action

There is a defined process to determine the location of the integrity work

which is influenced by and dependent on:
Assessment of the operating conditions of the line
GIS/integrity management data analysis
Results from ILI or Direct Assessments
Field verification digs
Environmental conditions around the line
Probability of failure
Consequence of failure
Accuracy of data and imagery
Population density

44
 Construction work is extensive

One company in the US plans to spend $1B USD/year

for 10 years on an 8000 mile system
Making lines piggable
Hydrostatic testing
Anomaly repairs from ILI runs and ECDA work
Pipeline replacements
Additional valves to improve shut down response times
New controls systems
Improvements to corrosion control systems
This type of work extended around the world
represents a tremendous amount of activity well into
the future

45
 Digs and Repairs

The following is an example of an actual process for

construction activities that are required following
integrity assessments where a pipeline is in need of
attention
Costs to assess and repair represent a significant cost
advantage over replacement of the pipeline and are
preferred by most operators
Repairs are less disruptive to the environment
Proper assessment methods provide accurate dig and
repair locations

46
Excavation

47
Evaluation of Pipe

48
 Integrity Management
Non-Destructive Evaluation (NDE)

49
Coat and Jeep and Backfill on to next dig

50
Integrity Field Repair Methods

51
Hydrotesting and Pipeline Replacements

Strength testing is an
option vs. replacement
Smaller distances but
multiple locations
Take up and relay or
offset and relay
Interconnections and
service disruptions are a
significant issue
Coordination with
Owner company
operations critical
 Tracking the Work - Correcting the Data
Centerline Adjustment

Blue is where the centerline was moved based on surveys and the Red line is where the
original centerline existed from the digitization process from the maps. The heavy set blue
line is attributed to the PCM survey and was utilized to further adjust the extends of the
pipeline segment.
53
 Technology ensures improved visibility of
condition of pipeline assets

The operators need secure and intuitive enterprise

wide access to one version of the truth.

Access to accurate and Comply with Safety

current information Confidently validate and Regulatory
from anywhere at-risk Locations Laws

54
 Current State of Enterprise Integrity Data
Cloud
Delivery Model

Server

GIS Department Enterprise Public

GeoEye Proprietary. 2012
GeoEye, Inc. All Rights Reserved
User Types
55
 Future State of Enterprise Integrity Data
Cloud
Delivery Model

Server

GIS Department Engineering Operations

GeoEye Proprietary. 2012
GeoEye, Inc. All Rights Reserved
User Types
56
 Integrity Information Needs to be in the
Hands of Operators and Service Providers

Accessfromlaptops,
tablets,smart
phonesandother
portabledevices.

GeoEye Proprietary. 2012 GeoEye, Inc. All Rights Reserved

57
Confidently Validate at-risk Locations

58
Confidently Validate at-risk Locations
Accesstocurrent
imageryshowspipeline
proximitytocritical
infrastructure

59
 Safety and Compliance Benefits

Access up to date,
reliable information

Avoid fines and

penalties

Avoid cost and

negative PR

60
Questions?