CASE NO.

1
TABLARIN VS. GUTIERREZ [152 SCRA 730; G.R. No. 78164; 31 July 1987]

Facts: The petitioners sought to enjoin the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, the Board of
Medical Education and the Center for Educational Measurement from enforcing Section 5 (a) and (f) of
Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, series of 1985, dated 23 August 1985 and
from requiring the taking and passing of the NMAT as a condition for securing certificates of eligibility
for admission, from proceeding with accepting applications for taking the NMAT and from administering
the NMAT as scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in the future. The trial court denied said petition on 20 April
1987. The NMAT was conducted and administered as previously scheduled.
Republic Act 2382, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 4224 and 5946, known as the "Medical Act of 1959"
defines its basic objectives in the following manner:
"SECTION 1. Objectives. This Act provides for and shall govern (a) the standardization and regulation
of medical education; (b) the examination for registration of physicians; and (c) the supervision, control
and regulation of the practice of medicine in the Philippines."
The statute, among other things, created a Board of Medical Education. Its functions as specified in
Section 5 of the statute include the following:
"(a) To determine and prescribe requirements for admission into a recognized college of medicine; x x x
(f) To accept applications for certification for admission to a medical school and keep a register of those
issued said certificate; and to collect from said applicants the amount of twenty-five pesos each which
shall accrue to the operating fund of the Board of Medical Education;
Section 7 prescribes certain minimum requirements for applicants to medical schools:
"Admission requirements. The medical college may admit any student who has not been convicted by
any court of competent jurisdiction of any offense involving moral turpitude and who presents (a) a record
of completion of a bachelor's degree in science or arts; (b) a certificate of eligibility for entrance to a
medical school from the Board of Medical Education; (c) a certificate of good moral character issued by
two former professors in the college of liberal arts; and (d) birth certificate. Nothing in this act shall be
construed to inhibit any college of medicine from establishing, in addition to the preceding, other
entrance requirements that may be deemed admissible.
MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, issued by the then Minister of Education, Culture and Sports and dated 23
August 1985, established a uniform admission test called the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT)
as an additional requirement for issuance of a certificate of eligibility for admission into medical schools
of the Philippines, beginning with the school year 1986-1987. This Order goes on to state that: "2. The
NMAT, an aptitude test, is considered as an instrument toward upgrading the selection of applicants for
admission into the medical schools and its calculated to improve the quality of medical education in the
country. The cutoff score for the successful applicants, based on the scores on the NMAT, shall be
determined every year by the Board of Medical Education after consultation with the Association of
Philippine Medical Colleges. The NMAT rating of each applicant, together with the other admission
requirements as presently called for under existing rules, shall serve as a basis for the issuance of the
prescribed certificate of eligibility for admission into the medical colleges.

Issue: Whether or not Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order No.
52, s. 1985 are constitutional.

Held: Yes. We conclude that prescribing the NMAT and requiring certain minimum scores therein as a
condition for admission to medical schools in the Philippines, do not constitute an unconstitutional
imposition.
The police power, it is commonplace learning, is the pervasive and non-waivable power and authority of
the sovereign to secure and promote all the important interests and needs in a word, the public order
of the general community. An important component of that public order is the health and physical safety
and well-being of the population, the securing of which no one can deny is a legitimate objective of
governmental effort and regulation. Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration is whether there
is some reasonable relation between the prescribing of passing the NMAT as a condition for admission to
medical school on the one hand, and the securing of the health and safety of the general community, on
the other hand. This question is perhaps most usefully approached by recalling that the regulation of the
practice of medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a reasonable method of protecting the
health and safety of the public.
MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985 articulates the rationale of regulation of this type: the improvement of the
professional and technical quality of the graduates of medical schools, by upgrading the quality of those
admitted to the student body of the medical schools. That upgrading is sought by selectivity in the
process of admission, selectivity consisting, among other things, of limiting admission to those who
exhibit in the required degree the aptitude for medical studies and eventually for medical practice. The
need to maintain, and the difficulties of maintaining, high standards in our professional schools in
general, and medical schools in particular, in the current stage of our social and economic development,
are widely known. We believe that the government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like the
NMAT as a means for achieving its stated objective of "upgrading the selection of applicants into [our]
medical schools" and of "improv[ing] the quality of medical education in the country. We are entitled to
hold that the NMAT is reasonably related to the securing of the ultimate end of legislation and regulation
in this area. That end, it is useful to recall, is the protection of the public from the potentially deadly
effects of incompetence and ignorance in those who would undertake to treat our bodies and minds for
disease or trauma.

CASE NO. 2
Miriam College Foundation, Inc. v CA 348 SCRA 265 December 15, 2000

Facts: The members of the editorial board of the Miriam College Foundations school paper were
subjected to disciplinary sanction by the College Discipline Committee after letters of complaint were filed
before the Board following the publication of the school paper that contains obscene, vulgar, and sexually
explicit contents. Prior to the disciplinary sanction to the defendants they were required to submit a
written statement to answer the complaints against them to the Discipline Committee but the defendants,
instead of doing so wrote to the Committee to transfer the case to the DECS which they alleged to have
the jurisdiction over the issue. Pushing through with the investigation ex parte the Committee found the
defendants guilty and imposed upon them disciplinary sanctions. Defendants filed before the court for
prohibition with preliminary injunction on said decision of the Committee questioning the jurisdiction of
said Discipline Board over the defendants.

Issue: WON the Discipline Board of Miriam College has jurisdiction over the defendants.

Held: The court resolved the issue before it by looking through the power of DECS and the Disciplinary
Committee in imposing sanctions upon the defendants. Section 5 (2), Article XIV of the Constitution
guarantees all institutions of higher learning academic freedom. This institutional academic freedom
includes the right of the school or college to decide for itself, its aims and objectives, and how best to
attain them free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare
calls for some restraint. Such duty gives the institution the right to discipline its students and inculcate
upon them good values, ideals and attitude. The right of students to free speech in school is not always
absolute. The court upheld the right of students for the freedom of expression but it does not rule out
disciplinary actions of the school on the conduct of their students. Further, Sec. 7 of the of the Campus
Journalism Act provides that the school cannot suspend or expel a student solely on the basis of the
articles they write EXCEPT when such article materially disrupts class work of involve substantial
disorder or invasion of the rights of others. Therefore the court ruled that the power of the school to
investigate is an adjunct of its power to suspend or expel. It is a necessary corollary to the enforcement of
rules and regulations and the maintenance of a safe and orderly educational environment conducive to
learning. That power, like the power to suspend or expel, is an inherent part of the academic freedom of
institutions of higher learning guaranteed by the Constitution. The court held that Miriam College has the
authority to hear and decide the cases filed against respondent students.

CASE NO. 3
Sps. Eugene C. Go and Angelita Go vs. Colegio De San Juan De Letran, et al.

Facts: In October 2001, Mr. George Isleta, the Head of Letrans Auxiliary Services Department, received
information that certain fraternities were recruiting new members among Letrans high school students,
together with the list of allegedly involved students.The school conducted medical examinations on the
students involved and on November 20, 2002, Dr. Emmanuel Asuncion, the school physician, reported
that six (6) students bore injuries on the posterior portions of their thighs. Mr. Rosarda, the Assistant
Prefect for Discipline, conferred with the students and asked for their explanations in writing. Four (4)
students, admitted that they were neophytes of the Tau Gamma Fraternity and were present in a hazing
rite held in Tondo, Manila. They also identified the senior members of the fraternity present at their
hazing. These included Kim, then a fourth year high school student.
In the meantime, the schools security officer, prepared an incident report that the Tau Gamma Fraternity
has been recruiting members from Letrans high school department. He had spoken to one of the
fraternity neophytes and obtained a list of eighteen (18) members of the fraternity currently enrolled at the
high school department. Kims name was also in the list. Mr. Rosarda has informed Kims mother, Mrs.
Go, that her son is a fraternity member whereas she expressed her disbelief stating that her son has always
been in constant supervision. Mr. Rosarda thereafter spoke to Kim and asked him to explain his side. Kim
responded through a written statement dated December 19, 2001; he denied that he was a fraternity
member.
In time, the respondents found that twenty-nine (29) of their students, including Kim, were fraternity
members. The respondents found substantial basis in the neophytes statements that Kim was a senior
fraternity member. Based on their disciplinary rules, the Father Prefect for Discipline (respondent Rev. Fr.
Jose Rhommel Hernandez) recommended the fraternity members dismissal from the high school
department rolls. On January, 2002, the petitioners filed a complaint for damages before the RTC of
Caloocan City claiming that the respondents had unlawfully dismissed Kim. They refused to accept the
respondents finding that Kim was a fraternity member. They likewise insisted that due process had not
been observed. Mr. and Mrs. Go also sought compensation for the business opportunity losses they
suffered while personally attending to Kims disciplinary case.
In ruling for the petitioners, the RTC ruled that Kim was dismissed without due process, his membership
in the fraternity was not duly proven, and the school had no authority to dismiss KIM from school.
The Court of Appeals disagreed with the RTC and reversed the decision, thereby prompting the
petitioners to elevate the matter to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA had erred in setting aside the decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. C-
19938, whereas petitioners claim that respondents had unlawfully dismissed Kim from the high school
department rolls

RULING: the RTCs statement that Letran, a private school, possesses no authority to impose a dismissal,
or any disciplinary action for that matter, on students who violate its policy against fraternity membership
must be corrected. The RTC reasoned out that Order No. 20, series of 1991, of the then Department of
respondents cite as legal basis for Letrans policy, only covered public high schools and not private high
schools such as Letran. However, in ascertaining the meaning of DECS Order No. 20, s. 1991, the entire
order must be read in whole, not in isolated parts, but with reference to every other part and every word
and phrase in connection with its context. The orders title may also serve as an aid for construction,
which states, Prohibition of Fraternities and Sororities in Elementary and Secondary Schools. This
serves to clarify whatever ambiguity in the fourth paragraph. It directs the prohibition to elementary and
secondary schools in general, and does not distinguish between private and public schools.
Incidentally, the penalty for non-compliance with DECS Order No. 20, s. 1991, is expulsion, a severe form
of disciplinary penalty consisting of excluding a student from admission to any public or private school in
the country. In contrast, the penalty prescribed by the rules of Letran for fraternity membership among
their high school students is dismissal, which is limited to the exclusion of an erring student from the rolls
of the school. Private schools have the authority to promulgate and enforce a similar prohibition pursuant
to their right to establish disciplinary rules and regulations. This right has been recognized in the Manual
of Regulations for Private Schools, which has the character of law.

CASE NO. 4
Capitol Medical Center v CA - 178 SCRA 493

FACTS: The teachers and students of CMC declared a strike, refusing to hold classes and take
examinations. Petitioner, upon proper procedure and effort, decided to close the school effective at the
end of the first semester of school year due to aggravated rift and disturbance on the peace of the hospital
and fearful of possible action by hostile students which might endanger the safety and lives of the patients
in the hospital.

ISSUE: Did the respondents have a legal right to reopen the school and to be readmitted therein?

HELD: closing down of a medical school; striking students and faculty Once a student is accepted for
enrollment in a given course, the school may not expel him or refuse re-enroll him until he completes his
course except when he is academically deficient or has violated the rules of discipline; There is no contract
that the school shall remain open for the entire duration of his course; The contract between the college
and a student who is enrolled and pays the fees for a semester is for the entire semester only and not the
entire course; The law does not require a school to see a student through the completion of his course. If
the school closes or is closed by proper authority at the end of a semester, the student has no cause of
action for breach of contract against the school.

CASE NO. 5
G.R. No. 97238 July 15, 1991
JULIA L. TAN and JAMES L. TAN, petitioners, vs. CA

Petitioner Julia L. Tan is an 84 year old widow who is the Principal of Grace Christian High School
offering both elementary and secondary courses while petitioner James L. Tan is the Administrative
Consultant of the school. This case arose from the refusal of the petitioners to admit and enroll certain
students for the school year 1987-1988 because heated controversies, acts of misbehavior, and a refusal to
dialogue with the school administration led the school authorities to believe that it would be best for all
concerned if these children enrolled in other schools.
Two separate petitions for mandamus with prayers for preliminary mandatory injunction were eventually
filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The first case docketed as Civil Case No. Q-51039 was
assigned to Branch 79 of the court. The second case which led to the present petition was docketed as
Civil Case No. Q-89-2357 and was assigned to Branch 88. The latter case was filed by Vicente Luy and his
daughter Vonette Luy, who were also petitioners in Civil Case No. Q-51039.
On July 1, 1987, Branch 79 in Civil Case No. Q-51039 issued an order granting the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction. The school and the petitioners were ordered to allow enrollment of the subject
children.
While the two cases were pending in court, the children were enrolled and continued their studies. During
the enrollment period in May, 1989, however, the petitioners refused the enrollment in the first year high
school of Carmella Ang See, Michael Robert Ang, Karen Gay Dipasupil and Vonette Luy on the ground
that the school was under no legal duty to still accept them in the high school after graduating them from
the elementary course.
On May 23, 1989, Vicente Luy (father of Vonette Luy) together with other parents Josefina Ang, Teresita
Ang See and Teresita Dipasupil filed in Branch 79, a motion to hold in indirect contempt the petitioners
for refusing to enroll their children in alleged disobedience of the writ of preliminary injunction issued on
July 1, 1987. On May 25, 1989, Branch 88 issued an order in the second case granting the prayer for the
issuance of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and ordering the petitioners to enroll Vonette
Luy in the first year high school.
In the meantime, the herein petitioners challenged in the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. SP No. 13179) the
order granting the writ of a preliminary mandatory injunction by Branch 79. On June 26, 1989, the Court of
Appeals set aside the order prompting the respondents to file a petition for certiorari with us. The case was
docketed as G.R. No. 90063.
Sometime in 1986, private respondent Grace Christian High School ("Grace Christian") applied with the
then Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports (MECS) for a tuition-fee increase of fifteen percent (15%)
for the School Year (SY) 1986-87. Private respondent Grace Christian had applied for, and been granted,
yearly increments in tuition fees from SY 1973-74 (except for SY 1983-84) until SY 1985-1986. On 18
December 1986, Grace Christian received a notice from the MECS that its fee-increase application had
been definitely approved on 10 November 1986.
Meanwhile, a group of parents whose children are enrolled in Grace Christian, allegedly alarmed by what
they perceived to be the deterioration despite the periodic fee increases in academic standards and
physical facilities of the school, formed the Grace Christian High School Parents-Teachers Association
("Association"). The Association, composed of a majority of the parents (despite its name, no faculty
member sits on the executive committee) demanded: (a) recognition as an organization; and (b)
representation in Grace Christian's policy-making process, viz., faculty selection and improvement of the
physical plant. Feeling that their demands had been largely ignored, the Association in October 1985
asked for a formal dialogue with the school administration. During a heated exchange in this dialogue,
one of the petitioners herein, William Tiu, stood up and pointed a finger and shouted at Grace Christian's
vice-principal, and later spat on the latter.
On 23 September 1986, Grace Christian had been granted provisional authority by the MECS to impose a
fifteen percent (15%) increase in tuition fee for SY 1986-1987. Thereupon, some of the above-mentioned
group of parents lobbied with the other parents urging non-payment of the fee increase. During the
enrollment period for the second semester of SY 1986-1987, a number of parents, among them petitioners
(comprising nine [9] members or officers of the 19 member executive committee, of the Association)
refused to pay the incremental fee: Grace Christian in turn refused to receive these parents' payment of
regular (i.e., the fee before the fifteen [15%] increase) tuition fee for that semester. On 16 December 1986,
Grace Christian reminded the parents about the payment of the approved increased tuition fee for the
second semester.
From 23 February to 5 March 1987, a group of parents, petitioners included, staged a rally outside the
school gates. Banners and placards critical of the school administration were set up. The latent animosity
between the Association (or some members thereof) and Grace Christian began to flare up. Petitioners
first came out with statements in the print and broadcast media attacking Grace Christian's periodic fee
increases and allegedly deteriorating academic standards. Some of the petitioners, armed with video-
cameras, forced their way into the school premises and interrupted a class in session, urging students
therein to speak using the allotted class hour against school policies. Some of the students walked
out of their classrooms to join their parents in the rally outside.
On 27 February 1987, the Association through a letter asked Secretary Quisumbing of the Department of
Education, Culture, and Sports (DECS) to reconsider the 23 September 1986 (as well as the 10 November
1986) order granting the school's application for a fee increase. On 12 March 1987, the Association
obtained a "freeze-order" from the DECS, enjoining Grace Christian from imposing the already approved
fifteen percent (15%) fee increase, until the DECS shall have received proof that sixty percent (60%) of the
increase had been apportioned to salaries of Grace Christian's faculty. After submission by Grace
Christian of proof of payment of salary increases to the faculty, the DECS in an Indorsement dated 16
March 1987 lifted the "freeze-order," thereby allowing the school to resume collection of the fifteen
percent (15%) fee increase.
Meanwhile, the already adversarial relationship between Grace Christian and the Association further
deteriorated when the school administrators overheard several of the Prep (pre-school) students chanting
slogans against the school and its teachers, indicating that their parents had imbued them with hostility or
at least disdain and scorn for the school.
During the period 14-18 April 1987, petitioners were individually and personally informed through a letter
by the principal of Grace Christian that, as they were severely critical of the school's policies, it would be
best for all concerned if their children enrolled in some other school. On 25 May 1987, the first day of the
enrollment period for SY 1987-88, petitioners were informed that as their respective children were in the list
of "referral" cases, the school principal would confer with them either in the afternoon of 29 May 1987, the
last day of enrollment, or on 30 May 1987. Petitioners felt that their children were being singled out by the
school and decided not to see the principal and instead proceeded to the DECS for advise. The DECS in a
lst Indorsement dated 1 June 1987 ordered private respondent School to enroll petitioner's children. The
latter however refused to enroll these students, prompting petitioners to file an action for mandamus in
court. The trial court on 11 June 1987, to maintain the status quo between the parties, ordered the
temporary enrollment of petitioner's children. (Resolution-GR No. 90063, pp. 1-4)
While Civil Case No. Q-51039 was being considered on appeal by the Court of Appeals and later the
Supreme Court, the proceedings were also going on in Civil Case No. Q-89-2357, which had been filed by
Vonette C. Luy and her father Vicente Luy and assigned to Branch 88 on April 26, 1989.
The Luy petition alleged:
xxx xxx xxx
. . . [T]hat during the school year 1989-1990 appellants unjustifiably refused to admit her in the High
School Department, despite the fact that she was given a reservation slip which she was instructed to fill
up and "return not later than April 15, 1989 together with report card for this year." Before April 15, 1989,
she submitted the reservation slip to the school principal, but the principal informed her that she would no
longer be admitted because her father was very vocal against certain school policies and activities. As the
school principal refused to allow her to enroll in the High School Department, her father wrote a letter
complaint dated April 7, 1989 to the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS). The
Department indorsed the letter to the school for immediate comment and/or appropriate action (Exhibits
"E" and "D"). In reply, the lawyer of the school wrote the DECS to reiterate the school's decision not to
enroll Vonette Luy in its High School Department (Exhibit "E"). (Rollo, pp. 40-41)
The school and herein petitioners Julia and James Tan opposed the issuance of the writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction on the grounds that:
. . . (a) the right of a student to enroll in a private school is not absolute; (b) Vonette C. Luy failed to
exhaust all administrative remedies; and (c) there is no clear legal basis for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction. (Rollo, p. 41)
On May 25, 1989, Judge Tirso D.C. Velasco issued the writ, stating
In view of the foregoing, the petitioner has clearly established her right to be admitted to the First Year,
High School Department, Grace Christian School, Quezon City and the unmitigated duty of respondents
to admit the petitioner to the aforesaid High School Department.
The Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction is hereby GRANTED and the respondents are ordered to
allow the enrollment of petitioner in the High School Department, Grace Christian High School, Quezon
City, after posting a bond of Five Thousand Pesos of compliance to this Court within three (3) days from
receipt hereof. (pp. 73-74, Records.) (Rollo, pp. 41-42)
A motion for reconsideration was filed followed by a supplemental motion for reconsideration. The
petitioners stated that the Department of Education, Culture, and Sports had decided their administrative
case upholding the right of the school to refuse enrollment in the first year high school of Vonette Luy as
well as the other students similarly situated. (See Annex "D", Rollo, pp. 52-53)
Significantly, the petitioners also pointed out to the court that Vicente Luy and his daughter were
engaging in forum shopping because Civil Case No. Q-51039 had been filed earlier by Mr. Luy himself
and various other parents. There was pending exactly the same cause of action on contempt and both
cases were raising the same issues.
As earlier stated, the first case on the grant of mandatory injunction was at that time already with the
Court of Appeals. On June 9, 1989, Vicente Luy filed a motion to declare the petitioners in contempt of
court for refusing to enroll Vonette Luy in high school.
We note that on this same date, June 9, 1989, the other court presided over by Judge Godofredo Legaspi
denied the similar motion for contempt filed by Mr. Luy, Josefina Ang, Teresita Ang See, and Teresita
Dipasupil. On June 13, 1989, Judge Tirso Velasco ordered the petitioners to comply with the writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction or he would act on the motion for contempt. The petitioners opposed
this order stating that Judge Legaspi had just denied the similar motion for contempt in the other case
(Civil Case No. Q-51039). In this opposition, the petitioners again charged Mr. Luy with forum shopping
contending that the first case he filed with others should take precedence over Civil Case No. Q-89-2357
pending before Judge Velasco's court.
On June 16, 1989, Judge Velasco issued the order questioned in this petition, stating:
IN VIEW HEREOF, and for continuously defying not only the writ of this court but also the three Orders
of June 7, June 13 and June 15, 1989, the Court finds the two respondents Julia L. Tan and James Tan
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of indirect contempt and hereby sentences each of them to suffer a
penalty of imprisonment of ten (10) days and to pay the cost. They are likewise fined P500.00 each.
The Court orders that a warrant of arrest be immediately issued and served upon them to start service of
sentence. The Court will determine whether, during this period of time, petitioner Vonette Luy shall have
been enrolled in respondent school for if not a determination shall be made whether respondents shall be
continuously held in custody until compliance by them of the court's writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction. (Rollo, p. 57)
Only ten (10) days later, on June 26, 1989, the Court of Appeals set aside the writ issued by Judge Velasco
which had commanded the herein petitioners to enroll the protesting school children. It lifted the writ of
preliminary injunction it had issued. A motion for reconsideration was denied
The parents went to our Court. We initially issued a status quo order, enjoining the parties to maintain the
situation existing before the decision of the Court of Appeals was rendered.
On December 12, 1989, however, we decided the controversy in favor of herein petitioners and the school.
The Court in G.R. No. 90063 declared the petition of the parents and their children unmeritorious. We
stated:
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the Petition for lack of merit. However, the children
here affected shall be allowed to fill the current school year (including the summer term, if any), as the
questioned Order of the Court of Appeals shall take effect only as of the beginning of SY 1990-91."(Padilla,
J., took no part, Gutierrez, Jr., J., is on official leave)." (at p. 7)
The petition in this case is impressed with merit.
Where relations between parents and students on the one hand, and teachers and administrators upon the
other hand, have deteriorated to the level here exhibited, a private school may, in the interest of the rest of
the student body and of the faculty and management as a whole, and of the children of the parents
affected, require the affected children to be enrolled elsewhere. The maintenance of a morally conducive
and orderly educational environment will be seriously imperiled if, under the circumstances of this case,
Grace Christian is forced to admit petitioners' children and to reintegrate them to the student body. It may
even be argued that petitioners' children have been innocent victims in a deplorable confrontation
between some parents and respondent School, but the situation here finds some analogy in labor cases
where, because of pre-existing and supervening strained relations, reinstatement is not always a feasible
solution. (G.R. No. 90063, December 12, 1989, pp. 5-6; 7)
The issue before us was the right to enroll in high school of students who graduated from the elementary
department of the same institution. Exactly the same issue is raised in the case which gave rise to the
contempt order and to the present petition. Under the common facts of the two cases, both the DECS and
this Court have found the petitioners' position valid.
We cannot close this case without deploring the action of Vicente Luy and his counsel for filing Civil Case
No. Q-89-2357 in 1989 when exactly the same issues were already before Branch 79 in Civil Case No. Q-
51039 filed by, among others, Mr. Luy in 1987. This results not only in unnecessarily clogging the heavily
burdened dockets of our courts but also in the unseemly sight of two Branches of the same trial court and
two Divisions of the Court of Appeals issuing contradictory decisions one in favor of the school and the
other in favor of the students and their parents. This problem of forum shopping is now before our
Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court.
Pending any amendment of the Rules or a circular remedying this problem, lawyers and litigants alike are
warned to be more candid with courts of justice and not engage in forum shopping through deliberate
splitting of actions or appeals in the hope that even as one case is dismissed, another would still be open.
The Court of Appeals in this case was also misled. It ruled:
It is important to note that Civil Case No. Q-51039 was filed for the purpose of requiring appellants to
maintain the eight (8) students in the roll of students in the Elementary Department. This prayer was
granted when the court issued the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction asked for. Herein appellants
thereafter complied with the said order. It was only when the school refused to admit the eight (8)
students in its High School Department that they filed the motion for contempt. Said motion was denied
because what the initial petition prayed for was for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction to maintain the enrollment in the Elementary Department of the students and not their
admission in the High School Department of said school. Therefore, the right of the students to be
admitted in the High School Department was not in issue hence, the court was correct in ruling that it had
no jurisdiction to declare the appellants in contempt of court for the act complained of, thereby dismissing
the charge without considering its merits. (Rollo, pp. 45-46)
Civil Case No. Q-51039 was filed by Vicente Luy and other parents not only to continue enrolling their
children in the elementary department but also to compel the enrollment of their other children in the high
school department of Grace Christian School. As pointed out by the petitioners, there were eighteen (18)
students involved in Civil Case No. Q- 51039, not eight (8) as stated by the Court of Appeals. Vonette Luy
had two sisters, Vivian Luy and Virna Luy who were high school students and who joined in the petition.
The case involved not only elementary grade but also high school students.
No thinking person can dispute the fact that our country is suffering from the effects of a serious
deterioration of academic and other standards in our educational system. This Court is disturbed by the
big number of candidates taking the bar examinations who, after six (6) years in the elementary grades,
four (4) years in high school, and eight (8) years in college appear to be functionally semi-illiterate judging
from the answers they give to bar examination questions. The same is true of other disciplines,
professions, and occupations. A drastic upgrading of educational standards especially in the elementary
and high school levels is imperative.
It is for the above reason that Government should uphold and encourage schools and colleges which
endeavor to maintain the highest standards of education. We have consistently sustained the rights of
students to legitimately address their grievances both to school authorities, media, and the general public
to the extent of sometimes countenancing uncivil and rowdy behavior. However, we have not hesitated to
strike down violence and anarchy when certain students and their inevitable supporters misuse the grant
of "ordered liberty" mandated by the Constitution. Educators who insist on high standards and who
enforce reasonable rules of discipline deserve support from courts of justice and other branches of
Government.
CASE NO. 6
UP Board of Regents VS Court of Appeals and AROKIASWAMY WILLIAM MARGARET CELINE
G.R. No. 134625. August 31, 1999

Facts: Private respondent Ms. Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine a citizen of India enrolled doctoral
program in UP CSSP Diliman QC. She is ready for oral defense with selected panel members Drs. E.
Arsenio Manuel, Serafin Quiason, Sri Skandarajah, Noel Teodoro, and Isagani Medina, the last included
as the deans representative. Even though Dr. Medina noticed that there were portions of her dissertation
that was lifted from different sources without proper acknowledgement, she was still allowed to continue
to with her oral defense. Four (4) out five (5) give her a passing mark with condition to incorporate the
suggestion made by the panel members. Dr. Medina did not sign the approval form. Dr. Teodoro also
noted that a revision should be submitted.
On March 24, 1993, The CSSP College Faculty Assembly approved her graduation pending the final
revised copies of her dissertation. Private respondent submitted the supposedly final revised copies
although petitioners maintained that suggestions were not incorporated. She left a copy for Dr. Teodoro
and Dr. Medina and did not wait for their approval relying to the Dean Paz remarks during previous
meeting that a majority vote was sufficient for her to pass. The supposedly revised copies were later
disapproved by Dr. Teodoro and Dr. Medina. Private respondent was disappointed with the
administration. She charge Dr. Diokno and Medina with maliciously working for the disapproval of her
dissertation and further warned Dean Paz against encouraging perfidious act against her. Dean Paz
attempts to exclude the private respondent in the graduating list in a letter addressed to the Vice
Chancellor for Academic Affairs (Dr. Milagros Ibe), pending for clarification of her charges against panel
members and accusations relating to her dissertation. Unfortunately the letter did not reach on time and
the respondent was allowed to graduate. Dean Paz wrote a letter that she would not be granted an
academic clearance unless she substantiated the accusations. In a letter addressed to Dean Paz, Dr.
Medina formally charged private respondent with plagiarism and recommended for the withdrawal of her
doctorate degree. Dean Paz formed an ad-hoc committee (Ventura Committee) to investigate and
recommend to Chancellor Dr. Roman to withdraw her doctorate degree. Private respondent was informed
of the charges in a letter. Ventura Committee finds at 90 instances or portions of thesis lifted from other
sources with no proper acknowledgement. After it was unanimously approved and endorsed from the
CSSP and Univ. Council the recommendation for withdrawal was endorsed to Board of Regents who
deferred its actions to study further for legal implications. Private respondent was provided with a copy of
findings and in return she also submitted her written explanation. Another meeting was scheduled to
discuss her answer.
Zafaralla Committee was also created and recommends private respondent for withdrawal of her degree
after establishing the facts that there were massive lifting from published sources and the private
respondent also admits herself of being guilty of plagiarism.
On the basis of the report and recommendation of the University Council, the Board of Regents send a
letter to inform private respondent that it was resolved by majority to withdraw your doctorates degree.
On August 10, 1995, private respondent then filed a petition for mandamus with a prayer for a writ
of preliminary mandatory injunction and damages to RTC QC. She alleged that petitioners had unlawfully
withdrawn her degree without justification and without affording her procedural due process. She prayed
that petitioners be ordered to restore her degree and to pay her P500, 000.00 as moral and exemplary
damages and P1, 500,000.00 as compensation for lost earnings. RTC dismissed for lack of merit. The Court
of Appeals reversed the lower courts decision and ordered to restore her doctorates degree.

Issue/s:
1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in granting the writ of mandamus and ordering
petitioners to restore doctoral degree.
2. Whether or not the court of appeals erred in holding that respondents doctoral degree cannot be
recalled without violating her right to enjoyment of intellectual property and to justice and equity.

Held/Ruling:
The decision of Court of Appeals was reversed.
1. Yes. The court of appeals decisions was based on grounds that the private respondent was denied
of due process and that she graduated and no longer in the ambit of disciplinary powers of UP.
In all investigations held by the different committee assigned to investigate the charges, the private
respondent was heard on her defense. In fact she was informed in writing about the charges and was
provided with a copy from the investigating committee. She was asked to submit her explanation which
she forwarded. Private respondent also discussed her case with the UP Chancellor and Zafaralla
Committee during their meetings. She was given the opportunity to be heard and explain her side but
failed to refute the charges of plagiarism against her.
The freedom of a university does not terminate upon the "graduation" of a student, as the Court of
Appeals held because the "graduation" of such a student that is in question. The investigation began
before graduation. She was able to graduate because there were many investigations conducted before the
Board finally decided that she should not have been allowed to graduate.
2. Yes. The court held that academic freedom is guaranteed to institutions of higher learning by Art
XIV of the 1987 Constitution. This freedom includes deciding whom a university will confer degrees on. If
the degree is procured by error or fraud then the Board of Regents, subject to due process being followed,
may cancel that degree.
Art. XIV, Section 5 par. 2 of the Constitution provides that "academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all
institutions of higher learning."
It is a freedom granted to "institutions of higher learning" which is thus given "a wide sphere of authority
certainly extending to the choice of students." If such institution of higher learning can decide who can
and who cannot study in it, it certainly can also determine on whom it can confer the honor and
distinction of being its graduates.

CASE NO. 7
CAGAYAN CAPITOL COLLEGE v. NLRC [ GR Nos. 90010-11, Sep 14, 1990 ]

Private respondents Virgilio VilIegas and Leonor Pagapong were teachers on a probational basis of the
petitioner college.
Villegas was initially hired as an instructor in the Nautical Science Department of said petitioner and was
extended an appointment on a ten-month contractual basis which ended on March 31, 1982.
Upon expiration of said contract he re-applied and was given a new contract commencing on June 1, 1982
and ending on March 31, 1983. Thereafter he re-applied for employment and was given a contract for a
fixed period starting June 1, 1983 up to March 31, 1984. Upon mutual agreement the contract was extended
to include the summer of 1984 up to May 31, 1984 which is still part of the school-year 1983-1984.
Upon expiration of said period he sent a letter re-applying for employment with the petitioner.
His application, however, was turned down because of various complaints from his students borne out by
the report of his superiors who investigated the matter.
Thus, he filed a complaint in the Regional Arbitration Office of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) in Cagayan City for illegal dismissal with reinstatement, payment of backwages, moral damages
and attorney's fees. Included in the complaint were claims for underpayment of salary, allowances, wage
orders and his share in tuition fee increases per Presidential Decree No. 451. It was docketed as NLRC
Case no. RAB-C-0513-84.
On the other hand, respondent Pagapong was initially hired as a probationary instructor in the High
School Department of petitioner college on June 15, 1981 on a contractual basis to end on March 31, 1982.
Upon re-application her contract was renewed for another fixed period covering June 1, 1982 up to March
31, 1983. Her employment was on a probationary basis. Similarly, a third contract was executed by the
petitioner college covering the period starting June 15, 1983 and ending on March 31, 1984. Upon the
termination of the said third contract respondent Pagapong wrote to petitioner seeking re-employment.
Her application was accompanied by a clearance. However, her application was denied upon the
recommendation of her immediate superiors who considered her inefficient.
Thus, she filed with the Regional Arbitration Branch of the NLRC a complaint for illegal dismissal with
reinstatement, with backwages, moral damages and attorney's fees. She also included claims for
underpayment of wages, allowances, wage orders and non-payment of shares in tuition fee increases per
Presidential Decree no. 451. It was docketed as NLRC Case no. RAB-C-0560-84.
The cases of respondents Villegas and Pagapong were jointly heard upon agreement of the parties, the
issues and facts being identical.
In their position paper, private respondents Villegas and Pagapong alleged that they were dismissed by
petitioners without valid grounds and that they were deprived of their constitutional right to due process
and security of tenure. They also raised the issue of non-compliance with presidential decrees and wage
orders pertaining to the payment of emergency cost of living allowance (ECOLA) and their basic salary,
including non-payment of their shares in tuition fee increases under Presidential Decree no. 451.
Petitioners, on the other hand, filed their position paper and supplemental manifestations wherein they
denied that private respondents were illegally dismissed. They maintained that the private respondents
alleged employment contracts on a probation basis expired and that the same were not renewed because
their performances were considered unsatisfactory while they were on probation. Petitioners further
contended that private respondents, as probationary employees, did not qualify for tenureship as their
services on probation, upon evaluation, did not reach the standard prescribed for probationary employees.
Petitioners also denied that private respondents are entitled to backwages, since they were not illegally
dismissed and asserted that they have been paid their wages, allowances and their shares in tuition fee
increases and that they were not entitled to moral damages and attorney's fees.
On August 8, 1985, a decision was rendered by Executive Labor Arbiter Ildefonso G. Agbuya dismissing
the complaint for illegal dismissal based on the following disquisition:
"From the above-quoted portion of the parties' position paper it is undisputed that Complainants were
hired on a ten (10) months contractual basis as faculty members for a period of three (3) consecutive
contracts of employment (school year). Based on these facts alone, the complaint for illegal dismissal
should be dismissed because it is judicial knowledge that probationary period of instructors or faculty
members of any particular school pursuant to the rules of the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports is
for three (3) years. Since the employment of Complainants fall (sic) within the probationary period of
three (3) years, it is therefore management's prerogative whether to renew the same for permanency or
stop the relationship as what happened in this particular cases (sic). We are limiting the basis of our
opinion on the probationary period provided for by the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports and
need not discuss the merits as argued by both parties in their respective position paper (sic)." (pp.211 -
212, Records)."
Private respondents appealed said decision to the NLRC which rendered a decision on May 30, 1989
modifying the appealed decision in this manner:
"After a careful review of the records and based on the foregoing facts, we find and so hold that the Labor
Arbiter committed reversible error.
It is an undisputed fact that complainant Virgilio Villegas worked with respondent Cagayan Capitol
College for six (6) consecutive regular semesters, as college instructor, while complainant Leonor
Pagapong worked with the same respondent for three (3) consecutive years as classroom teacher.
In this regard, the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools expressly provides that 'xxx probationary
period for academic personnel shall not be more than xxx six (6) consecutive regular semesters for those
in the tertiary level'. (Section 102 of the Manual, 7th Edition, 1984). The same Manual also provides that
'full-time teachers who have rendered three (3) consecutive years of satisfactory service shall be
considered permanent' (Section 75, ibid.).
Based on this Manual of Regulations of Private Schools both complainants obtained permanent status in
their appointment with the respondent Cagayan Capitol College and cannot be dismissed except for
cause. The non-renewal of their employment contract with the respondent is therefore tantamount to
illegal dismissal. Hence, complainants are entitled to reinstatement with backwages and other benefits.
As regards the claim for moral and exemplary damages, we concur with the findings of the Labor Arbiter
that the same is without basis. We likewise adopt the award of attorney's fees of 10% out of the total
monetary award that complainants may receive.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is hereby MODIFIED, declaring respondents guilty of illegal
dismissal and ordering respondents to reinstate complainants to their former position or any equivalent
position with three (3) years backwages without qualification or deduction.
Respondents are likewise ordered to pay 10% of the total award as attorney's fee.
The claims for moral and exemplary damages are dismissed for lack of merit."
A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioners but this was denied by the public respondent in a
resolution dated July 28, 1989. Hence this petition wherein petitioners assail the said decision of public
respondent based on the following grounds:
I
THAT THE HON. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND SERIOUSLY ERRED IN INTERPRETING THE PERTINENT
PROVISIONS OF THE MANUAL OF REGULATIONS FOR PRIVATE SCHOOLS, 7th EDITION,
1970, THE LABOR CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND OTHER APPLICABLE LAWS AND
JURISPRUDENCE BY RULING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HAVE ACQUIRED
PERMANENT EMPLOYMENT STATUS AND CANNOT BE DISMISSED EXCEPT FOR CAUSE.
II
THAT PUBLIC RESPONDENT NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND SERIOUSLY ERRED IN THE INTERPRETATION OF
EXISTING LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE BY RULING THAT THE ACT OF PETITIONERS IN
NOT RENEWING THE TEACHING CONTRACTS OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS IS
TANTAMOUNT TO ILLEGAL DISMISSAL AND IN CONSEQUENTLY ORDERING THEIR
REINSTATEMENT WITH BACK WAGES."
In the same petition is a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the public
respondent from enforcing the questioned decision dated May 30, 1989 pending resolution of the petition.
In sum, the petitioner prays for the annulment of said decision dated May 30, 1989 and the resolution
dated July 28, 1989 promulgated by the NLRC.
Acting on the petition, the Court, on October 4, 1989, without giving due course to the petition, required
the respondents to comment thereon within ten (10) days from notice and issued a temporary restraining
order enjoining the public respondent from enforcing the questioned decision and resolution and further
required petitioner to file a bond in the amount of P20,000.00 within forty-eight (48) hours from notice.
After careful deliberation on the petition, the comment thereto of respondents and the memoranda of the
parties, the Court finds that the petition is impressed with merit.
There is no question that private respondents were probationary teachers. Thus, they are covered by the
policy instructions issued by the Department of Labor and Employment that the probationary
employment of professional instructors and teachers shall be subject to the standards established by the
Department of Education and Culture. Said standards are embodied in paragraph 75 of the Manual of
Regulations for Private Schools, as follows:
"75. Full time teachers who have rendered three (3) consecutive years of satisfactory services shall be
considered permanent."
In University of Sto. Tomas vs. National Labor Relations Commission,[6] this Court in interpreting the
foregoing rule, held that the legal requisites for a teacher to acquire permanent employment and security
of tenure are as follows:
"(1) The teacher is a full time teacher;
(2) The teacher must have rendered three (3) consecutive years of service; and
(3) Such service must have been satisfactory."
There is no question that private respondents have been employed for three (3) consecutive years as
teachers at petitioners's college and on a full time basis. However, they do not automatically become
permanent unless it is shown that their services during the probationary period were satisfactory.
The contention of respondents that upon termination of the three-year probationary period the teacher
automatically becomes permanent is not quite correct. It must be conditioned on the compliance with the
third requisite that the services of said teacher during the probationary period was satisfactory.
``
At the start of their employment, private respondents were duly furnished the Faculty Manual expressly
stating among others, the duties of teachers and the grounds for termination of employment or non-
appointment to permanent status of a probationary employee.
In the case of respondent Villegas, it appears that there were complaints of students during his last year of
service and that these complaints were duly investigated by the Acting Dean of the Nautical Department
who came up with the report of the acts complained of.
Thus, his performance was considered unsatisfactory and was not renewed by petitioner college after the
third year. That he was made to teach in the summer of 1984 appears to be prompted by the fact that the
summer sessions were still part of the third probationary period which started in July of the first semester
of school year 1981-82.
Similarly, respondent Pagapong was found to be inefficient due to her absences.
The Court thus finds and so holds that private respondents were not illegally dismissed by petitioner.