Journal of Personality 00:00, Month 2017

Cognitive-Adaptive Trait Theory: A C 2017 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

V
DOI: 10.1111/jopy.12319

Shift in Perspective on Personality

Gerald Matthews
University of Central Florida

Abstract
Traditional, biologically based trait theories have deservedly gained broad acceptance, but some long-standing core issues of
personality research remain unresolved. Recent research questions whether (a) there can be a single universal structural
model of personality superfactors, (b) current theory adequately specifies the processes that mediate behavioral and emo-
tional expressions of traits, and (c) brain-based accounts of traits adequately explain their role in real-world functioning and
adaptation. This article reviews the perspective on these issues provided by cognitive-adaptive trait theory. This theory rejects
the view that personality dimensions directly reflect brain systems. Instead, traits correspond to variation in strategies for
managing key adaptive challenges. Thus, each trait is expressed in environments that pose those challenges, and each trait cor-
responds to skills and self-knowledge that facilitate adaptation to those environments. The cognitive-adaptive theory affords
novel perspectives on trait psychometrics, theoretical accounts of mediating processes, and real-world adaptation.

Keywords: Personality traits, cognitive processes, skill, adaptation, psychometrics

Traits are dened simply as stable dispositions, that is, descrip-
tions of individual differences in styles of thought, feeling, and
behavior. Modern accounts of traits (Deary, 2009) go beyond
description to assign a causal status to traits. Typically, trait the-
ories include both a structural description of major trait dimen-
sions, such as the Five-Factor Model (FFM; McCrae & Costa,
2008), and an account of neural or social-cognitive processes
that mediate between traits and individual differences in behav-
ior. Different versions of trait theory differ psychometrically,
regarding which traits qualify as major superfactors, and theoret-
ically, in terms of which neural or psychological systems are the
key causal agents. However, the leading theories, reviewed by
Matthews, Deary, and Whiteman (2009), share common
assumptions, including some degree of behavioral consistency
of the individual, stability over time, biological basis for traits,
and cross-cultural generality (McCrae & Costa, 2008), sugges-
ting that an eventual standard theory of traits may emerge. These
assumptions are also shared by accounts of personality that rec-
ognize constructs beyond dimensional traits such as characteris-
tic life adaptations and integrative life narratives (McAdams &
Pals, 2006). Naturally, trait assumptions remain open to critical
questioning (e.g., Cervone, 2008); this article addresses the
broad consensus of trait researchers.
Matthews et al. (2009) summarized four key accomplish-
ments that support the acceptance of trait theory. First, there is
sufcient convergence of psychometric measurement models,
including the FFM, for optimism about future prospects for a
consensus personality structure. Second, psychophysiological
studies, which increasingly employ brain-imaging methods,
demonstrate that major traits have a biological basis (DeYoung
& Gray, 2009; Kennis, Rademaker, & Geuze, 2013). Evidence
from behavior genetics on the heritability of traits is consistent
with psychobiological accounts, although linkages between
traits and specic polymorphisms have proved elusive
(Turkheimer, Pettersson, & Horn, 2014). Third, behavioral
expressions of traits are increasingly understood within main-
stream psychological theory. The major subdisciplines of the
eld, including biological, cognitive, social, and health psychol-
ogy, provide an array of explanatory models for behaviors and
other relevant outcomes. Studies of traits are not some arcane
numerology but an indispensable facet of psychological science.
Fourth, traits predict various consequential life outcomes, sup-
porting applications including personnel selection, clinical guid-
ance, and educational interventions (Ozer & Benet-Martnez,
2006; R. Roberts, Martin, & Olaru, 2015). These advances have
persuaded many researchers that traits are more than mere social
constructions (Matthews et al., 2009).
Signicant challenges remain for the trait perspective. While
many researchers see the FFM as at least a pragmatically useful
frame of reference, psychometric uncertainties remain over
extensions to the FFM, development of more granular trait mod-
els, and the relationships between stable trait and transient state
dimensions. Theoretical accounts of traits often take a rather
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Gerald
Matthews, Institute for Simulation and Training, University of Central
Florida, 3100 Technology Parkway, Orlando, FL 32826. Email: gmatthews@
ist.ucf.edu.
2 Matthews
broad-brush approach of limited use for predicting individual
differences in behavior in specic contexts. Theory is also lim-
ited in its treatment of how traits make a difference to the indi-
vidual in real-life settings, and the processes mediating between
traits and adaptation to life challenges (Cervone, 2008).
In this article, I will consider solutions to some of the chal-
lenges facing contemporary trait theory. I will do so from the
perspective of research on personality and human performance
in laboratory and real-life settings, using tasks that provide
objective measures of behavior such as accuracy and response
time. The cognitive-adaptive theory of traits (CATT; Matthews,
1999, 2004, 2008a, 2016; Matthews et al., 2009) was developed
to explain associations between traits and performance. In this
article, I focus on the wider implications of the theory for under-
standing traits and their behavioral impacts. Specically, I will
identify some burning issues that remain for the psychomet-
rics, theoretical bases, and real-world signicance of traits and
then outline the unique perspectives and possible solutions pro-
vided by CATT.
UNRESOLVED ISSUES IN PERSONALITY
THEORY
Psychometric Uncertainties
McCrae and Costa (2008; McCrae et al., 2000) claim that psy-
chometric modeling of data from various personality measures
consistently reveals the ve dimensions of Extraversion (E),
Neuroticism (N), Conscientiousness (C), Agreeableness (A),
and Openness (O). Behavior-genetic studies show substantial
heritability for each FFM dimension (typically 0.5, including
nonadditive factors). The FFM shows high rank-order stability
(r .75) in adulthood, with the factor structure remaining stable
over time. The FFM factors are said to be replicated in most cul-
tures and recognizable in all. Most trait researchers see the FFM
as at least a useful working approximation of psychometric
structure, but whether the FFM is a precise and universal mea-
surement model remains open to debate. The extent to which
latent factor modeling identies the FFM remains controversial
(Boyle, 2008), and scales do not meet strict criteria for measure-
ment invariance across cultures (Church, 2016; Fetvadjiev &
Van de Vijver, 2015).
The major traits correlate with various aspects of task per-
formance (for reviews, see Matthews, 2008a, 2009). Increas-
ingly, studies cover all of the FFM, as well as additional
traits such as anxiety (M. W. Eysenck & Derakshan, 2011).
Laboratory tasks include those requiring speeded response,
attention, and memory; real-world tasks support job and aca-
demic performance (Matthews et al., 2009). However, several
issues remain.
Additional Superfactors. Several authors make persuasive
cases for adding to the Big Five. For example, the HEXACO
model adds an additional Honesty factor supported by substan-
tial psychometric evidence (Ashton, Lee, & De Vries, 2014).
There may also be culturally specic factors that are of compara-
ble importance to the Big Five in the culture concerned, such as
those associated with Chinese values (Fetvadjiev & Van de
Vijver, 2015).
Contextualized Traits. The universality of the FFM is part of
its appeal. However, traits that are tied to a specic context may
be more predictive of performance. For example, in evaluative
contexts, traits such as test anxiety and math anxiety may be pre-
ferred to broad traits (Zeidner, 1998). Similarly, stress response
to vehicle driving is better predicted by traits tied to the driving
context than by broad traits (Matthews, 2002).
Differentiating Traits and States. Transient states are
important for trait psychology, as they are frequently supposed
to mediate trait expression. For example, arousal states played a
central role in H. J. Eysencks theory (1967). However, there is
less consensus on their psychometric treatment. One approach is
to match states directly to traits, as in traitstate anxiety research
(Spielberger & Reheiser, 2009). Positive and negative affect are
seen as counterparts to E and N (Watson, 2000), leaving unde-
ned state mediators of other traits. In the performance context,
there is no direct correspondence between trait and state dimen-
sions (Matthews et al., 2002).
Theoretical Issues: Mediators of Trait Effects
Developing a theory of traits requires specifying the underlying
neural or psychological processes indexed by the trait, processes
that may mediate associations between the trait and behavior.
Biological trait models offer an especially clean paradigm of this
kind, to the extent that traits can be linked to neural processes or
systems (Corr, 2009; H. J. Eysenck, 1967). Unfortunately,
despite evidence for correlations between traits and various indi-
ces of brain functioning (DeYoung & Gray, 2009), there seems
to be no one-to-one correspondence or isomorphism between
specic traits and specic brain systems (Matthews, 2004; Zuck-
erman, 2005). The heritability of traits afrms their biological
basis, but it is frustratingly difcult to nd brain markers that
correlate highly and reliably with trait measures (for more
detailed critiques of biological trait theory, see Matthews,
2008b, 2016; Matthews & Gilliland, 1999).
Personality traits may also express psychological rather than
physiological constructs. From a clinical perspective, Beck (e.g.,
Clark & Beck, 1999) identied various systematic distortions in
self-beliefs and reasoning that accompany depression and anxi-
ety. If every person has a self-schema that encodes his or her per-
ceived self-worth in long-term memory, along with idiographic
self-beliefs, then we can dene self-esteem as a nomothetic con-
struct that inuences traits such as N. From a more process-
oriented standpoint, traits are based in cybernetic goal-seeking
processes that regulate the self (Carver & Scheier, 2001) or in
information-processing constructs such as executive function
(M. W. Eysenck & Derakshan, 2011).
Cognitive-Adaptive Theory
Many trait psychologists distinguish levels of theorizing
associated with biological and social-cognitive underpinnings
for personality. The distinction is sometimes expressed as one
between temperament and personality, where temperament
refers to basic, primarily biological, individual differences evi-
dent in early childhood, and personality is acquired patterns of
thought, behavior, and socialization built on the temperamental
platform (McCrae et al., 2000; Rothbart, Sheese & Conradt,
2009; Strelau, 2001). This approach is starkly realized in
McCrae and colleagues (2000) ve-factor theory (FFT). The
FFM is a structural description of traits, not a theory. FFT aims
to explain the FFM traits as representing temperamental basic
tendencies that shape learning of characteristic adaptations,
including skills, habits, beliefs, roles, relationships, and elements
of the self, though developmental processes. FFT is a paradigm
that represents much current thinking about personality and a
possible avenue toward a standard trait model.
For the performance psychologist, this catholic approach to
theory building allows for some trait effects to be mediated
directly by neural processes, and others to reect more context-
bound psychological processes such as strategy choice. In fact,
the cognitive theory of performance recognizes an equivalent
distinction between structural effects that reect variation in
basic processing efciency and strategic effects that reect effects in part reect temporally stable, specic operating
voluntary control over processing (Hockey, 1986). Thus, con-
temporary personality theory captures something of the joint
biological and social-cognitive character of traits that lends itself
to explanatory models for individual differences in behavior.
Nevertheless, signicant theoretical challenges remain.
Mismatch of Constructs and Assessments. If dimensions
of personality or temperament are biologically based, they
should be most validly assessed objectively. Indeed, neo-
Pavlovian studies employed objective, psychophysiological
tests for constructs such as strength of the nervous system. Con-
versely, characteristic adaptations in FFT (McCrae & Costa,
2008) include the self-concept and so are better suited to
questionnaire assessment. As FFT identies the Big Five as
dimensions of temperament (basic tendencies), it is strange
that self-report remains the primary mode of assessment. Typical
psychophysiological measures are subject to limitations such as
temporal instability that may limit their usefulness as indices of
traits (Strelau, 1991), but it should nonetheless be possible to
assess stable individual differences in arousability or sensitivity
to reinforcement. On the one hand, self-reports are only mod-
estly associated with basic neural mechanisms (Matthews & Gil-
liland, 1999), suggesting a lack of convergent evidence.
Convergence between self-report and objective, implicit person-
ality measures is also limited (Gawronski & De Houwer, 2014).
On the other hand, self-reports reect self-concept, suggesting a
lack of divergence from personality in the form of characteristic
adaptations.
The Role of Self-Perceptions. A long-standing criticism is
that traits are essentially artifacts of the cognitive processes we
3
apply to understanding ourselves and other people (Mischel,
1968). The systematic distortion hypothesis (Schweder, 2007)
states that traits are the product of a preexisting model of con-
ceptual associations between personality data. The model biases
memory and inferencing processes when people complete per-
sonality questionnaires. The application of multimethod dimen-
sional models that incorporate other-ratings (Chang, Connelly,
& Geeza, 2012) argues against the hypothesis, but, given the
prevalence of cognitive biases and heuristics, such critiques
should be taken seriously. Bias in self-perception is likely to fur-
ther weaken the utility of self-reports as markers for latent brain
characteristics.
Specifying Characteristic Adaptations. In FFT (McCrae &
Costa, 2008), characteristic adaptations is an all-embracing
notion of numerous psychological constructs. The broad deni-
tion captures the pervasiveness of trait inuences, but it has the
disadvantage of mixing together constructs that may play differ-
ent roles in mediating trait inuences on behavior. There are sev-
eral conceptual distinctions that are important to accommodate
theoretically, as stated below.
Stable Personality Attributes vs. States. Personality
parameters of the mind (Matthews & Harley, 1993). Such
parameters moderate stimulus-response (S-R) relationships.
However, as explored in anxiety research (Spielberger & Rehe-
iser, 2009), some effects of personality are mediated by broader-
based changes in transient psychological states.
Content vs. Process. Personality is related to both stable
elements of self-knowledge, such as self-esteem, and individual
differences in processing routines, such as self-verication or
social comparison (Wells & Matthews, 2015).
Core Personality Attributes vs. Contextualized Learning.
Some concomitants of personality, such as stress vulnerability
and generalized self-esteem, may be intrinsic features of the trait
apt to inuence behavior across a variety of different situations.
For example, trait anxiety may be associated with amplication
of the threat value attached to stimuli (M. W. Eysenck & Derak-
shan, 2011). Other characteristic adaptations cited by McCrae
et al. (2000), including skills and habits, are learned and thus
context dependent.
Explicit vs. Implicit Processes. The emergence of
implicit personality measures as a counterpart to explicit assess-
ments (Gawronski & De Houwer, 2014) requires further articu-
lation of how conscious and unconscious elements of
personality are interrelated.
Accommodation of Cognitive Processes. In the perfor-
mance context, the constructs and methodologies of cognitive
psychology have proved critical for theory (M. W. Eysenck &
Derakshan, 2011; Humphreys & Revelle, 1984). Use of broad
4 Matthews
constructs such as general arousal simply does not support effec-
tive prediction of individual differences in performance
(Matthews & Gilliland, 1999). Instead, major traits such as E are
associated with a cognitive patterning (Hockey, 1986; Mat-
thews, 2008a), that is, a set of independent, often modest, biases
in multiple processing components associated with selective
attention, memory, problem solving, response execution, and so
forth. Advancements in cognitive neuroscience increasingly
connect these processing-based individual differences to brain
mechanisms. The theoretical problem is that while we can
develop cognitive mini-theories that apply to specic perfor-
mance paradigms such as vigilance or selective attention to
threat, the multiplication of mechanisms threatens the coherence
of a cognitive account of personality. How do we explain a trait
that has multiple and distinct small expressions, but no single
cognitive or biological basis?
Individual Differences in Adaptation: Traits in
Real Life
Traditional personality trait theory has a linear, feedforward
structure (Matthews, 2004, 2016). Genes and childhood experi-
ences dene the main attributes of personality at an early age,
which are then expressed in emotional and behavioral form for
the remainder of life. In turn, individual differences in typical
response inuence real-world outcomes such as mental health,
educational and work success, and deviance from social norms.
This picture captures something of the stability of personality,
evidenced in the reliable but modest correlations between child-
hood assessments and adult outcomes (Caspi & Shiner, 2008),
but it does not fully illuminate personalityenvironment across
the life span. Two issues that are especially challenging to tradi-
tional theory are the malleability of traits and the importance of
contextualized skills for real-life outcomes.
Stable and Malleable Elements of Personality. Recent
research suggests that over time spans of years, traits may be more
malleable than previously believed. Changes in social roles drive
commensurate changes in FFM traits (Hudson, Roberts, & Lodi-
Smith, 2012). The identication of the FFM with basic tempera-
ment requires either skepticism about the evidence for malleability
(McCrae et al., 2000) or a reexamination of which personality con-
structs are more and less stable. In the traditional view, adult per-
sonality inuences the environment, but there is only limited
feedback from the environment to personality. For example, extra-
verts acquire larger networks of friends, but having many friends
does not elevate E. By contrast, dynamic interactionist views
assume a continuous interaction in which personality and environ-
ment mutually shape one another (Endler & Parker, 1992).
Context and Skill. Traditional personality theories assume
that basic attributes associated with traits have direct adaptive
impact. H. J. Eysencks (1967) theory supposes that individual
differences in cortical arousal directly impact performance
according to the inverted-U principle. Reinforcement sensitivity
theory (RST; Corr, 2009; Gray, 1987) states that activation of
brain reward and punishment systems inuences individual dif-
ferences in approach and avoidance behaviors. However,
acquired skills rather than basic neural or cognitive processes
typically determine whether a person gains or loses from real-
life encounters (Ericsson & Towne, 2010; Matthews, 1999). For
example, enhanced selective attention to threat may be a core
attribute of trait anxiety (Cisler & Koster, 2010). However, in
real-life environments in which attention to threat is important,
such as military surveillance in a multitasking environment
(Panganiban, Matthews, Knott, & Funke, 2011), performance in
part reects learned skills for visual search and attentional con-
trol, skills whose acquisition and execution are inuenced by
anxiety. Personality, as well as cognitive abilities, will substan-
tially inuence individual differences in skill (Ackerman, 2003,
2014), but it is the skill that mediates the adaptive costs and ben-
ets of the personality trait.
COGNITIVE-ADAPTIVE THEORY OF
PERSONALITY
CATT starts from the premise that trait variation reects differ-
ent strategies for adapting to environmental opportunities and
pressures (Matthews, 2008a). Somewhat in the spirit of J. J.
Gibson, we should ask not only what is inside the head, but
what the head is inside of. Traits may be most relevant to manag-
ing human social environments that are cognitively demanding,
such as attending a party where one does not have much in com-
mon with the other people there. There is the scope for gains,
such as enjoyment of social interaction and opportunities to
make potentially useful contact, but realizing those gains
requires specialized social skills. Extraversion then reects an
adaptation to the environment that increases the likelihood of
proting from it. Note that adaptation here refers to selecting,
implementing, and regulating strategies for managing external
demands and challenges (Lazarus, 1991), not the evolutionary
sense of the term. Natural selection plays a role in shaping the
brain systems that, indirectly, inuence the characteristic adapta-
tions identied with personality traits, but evolutionary factors
are beyond the present scope.
This article focuses primarily on E and N. The latter trait
reects differing strategies for handling social threat. Other
FFM traits may be conceptualized adaptively (Matthews,
2008a). In brief, C contrasts sustained, systematic effort against
opportunism as strategies for success. A contrasts cooperative
and competitive social strategies, and O is a choice between
self-directed reasoning, curiosity, and exploration versus tradi-
tional received knowledge and pragmatism in handling intellec-
tual challenges. In CATT, trait characteristics are not
intrinsically adaptive or maladaptive. E is typically seen as adap-
tive, but there is a downside of E, such as poor listening skills
and lack of appreciation of proactive behavior by subordinates
(Judge, Piccolo, & Kosalka, 2009). Grant, Gino, and Hoffman
Cognitive-Adaptive Theory
(2011) found pizza stores with extraverted leaders only achieved
higher prots when employees were passive. Similarly, the
affective downside of N is balanced by greater awareness and
foresight for risk (Panganiban et al., 2011) and the motivational
advantages of defensive pessimism (Tamir, 2005). Indeed, adap-
tive value may vary with cultural and historical circumstances;
for example, high C is more adaptive in an orderly society in
which long-term effort pays off.
CATT diverges from typical denitions of traits. Deary
(2009) points out that the trajectory of modern theory has been
toward replacing supercial, descriptive accounts of traits as col-
lections of covarying behaviors with accounts of traits as latent
causal entities, typically identied with properties of brain sys-
tems such as reticulo-cortical arousability (H. J. Eysenck, 1967).
By contrast, in CATT, traits are constructs that emerge from col-
lections of neural and cognitive processes that serve a common
adaptive purpose. The emergent nature of traits poses challenges
for both assessment and for causal modeling. Self-report scales
assess explicit processes, and data on correlates of the FFM are
biased accordingly. Multimethod assessment including objec-
tive tests provides a possible solution. From the causal perspec-
tive, CATT attributes observed associations between traits and
behaviors to multiple processes, with different processes playing
a mediating role in different contexts. For some research ques-
tions, we can treat the trait as a unitary construct, whereas others
may require discriminating the separate component processes.
For example, C may be associated with neural and information-
processing functions for effortful control, positive affect in per-
formance settings, skills for time management and task comple-
tion, and self-efcacy for task performance (Matthews &
Zeidner, 2012; R. Roberts et al., 2015). With a broad focus on
job performance, we can treat these different attributes as a pack-
age, identied with C as a causal inuence on success. A more
granular approach is to discriminate the different attributes as
causal inuences on behavior, rather than the trait itself.
The theory recognizes two classes of inuence on adaptive
behaviors that mediate trait effects: cognitive skills and self-
knowledge. Skills are dened in cognitive models such as that of
Anderson (2007). For example, a car sales agent will have a
standard script to encourage positive attitudes in potential cus-
tomers that can be modied to deal with a range of types of car
buyers with only limited conscious thought. Personality traits
are related to cognitive skills such as time management (C; Mac-
Cann, Fogarty, & Roberts, 2012) and information seeking (O;
cf. Goff & Ackerman, 1992), as well as cognitive-social skills
such as interacting with strangers (E), detecting possible malice
or criticism (N), and seeing someone elses perspective (A).
Use of skills is accompanied by self-regulation based on sta-
ble self-knowledge (explicit and implicit). Especially in chal-
lenging environments, the person needs to monitor the
effectiveness of skill execution and process feedback, set appro-
priate goals, and determine whether additional effort is needed
to compensate for lack of skill. Self-regulation is also intimately
related to emotional response, which may be positive (e.g., pride
in accomplishment) or negative (e.g., sadness if goals are not
5
attained). Self-regulation encompasses here many constructs
investigated in personality research as potential mediators of
trait expression, such as self-esteem, self-efcacy, affective
states, appraisal, coping, and emotional control. Self-regulation
is dynamically related to skills. Actual skill typically correlates
with positive elements of self-regulation, such as higher self-
efcacy, but self-regulation is also biased by personality. For
example, trait anxiety and N appear to relate to both objective
social skills decits in threatening contexts and to underestima-
tion of personal competency (Matthews, 2004). Conversely,
quality of self-regulation can enhance or limit objective skill
execution (Kanfer & Ackerman, 1996). Effective self-regulation
may improve task focus and maintain motivation, whereas dys-
functional styles of self-regulation may lead to distraction due to
personal worries and withdrawal of effort from the task. Thus,
there is a three-way correspondence between traits, environ-
ments matched to the trait, and skills that are central to the trait
and support adaptation.
Figure 1 illustrates the cognitive-adaptive perspective on E.
The primary trait adaptation is to demanding social encounters.
In addition to skills for social interaction, such as uency of
expression, persuasiveness, and nonverbal expression (e.g.,
Kluemper, McLarty, Bishop, & Sen, 2015), extraverts also
require capabilities for tolerance of social stress, such as apprais-
ing situational demands as challenges rather than threats, and
preferring task-focused coping (Carver & Scheier, 2001). Multi-
ple information-processing and neural correlates of traits, on the
left of Figure 1, support acquisition of these skills. Research on
the cognitive patterning of E (Matthews, 2008a; Matthews &
Zeidner, 2012) identies multiple basic processing correlates of
E, including superior divided attention under high processing
load, inhibition of distractor stimuli, and verbal uency. These
processing attributes, predominantly set during childhood
through genetic and environmental inuences, facilitate learning
social skills such as keeping track of multiple speakers in a con-
versation, ignoring irrelevant speech, and intervening in ongoing
conversations. Processing attributes contribute indirectly rather
than directly to adaptation: The skills and self-regulative pro-
cesses that they support are more important for individual differ-
ences in adaptation. Biologically based trait correlates such as
arousability similarly inuence skill acquisition indirectly; for
example, overarousal in social settings limits social skill devel-
opment. Thus, CATT is a variant of investment theories (Acker-
man, 2014; Hudson et al., 2012). Consistent with traditional
thinking on traits, basic cognitive and neural inuences are
determined early in life, and they remain quite stable in
adulthood.
The more malleable aspects of personality are represented by
the adaptive triangle shown to the right of Figure 1. Cognitive
skills, self-knowledge, and contextualized behaviors interact
continuously. Adaptation operates over different timescales:
The model shown in Figure 1 concerns typical outcomes of typi-
cal behaviors, such as the extravert repeatedly interacting with
others at parties. High levels of expertise support greater benets
when the skill is exercised, leading to increased opportunities to
6 Matthews
Figure 1 A cognitive-adaptive model of extraversion.
practice the skill (e.g., extraverts receive more party invitations)
and further skill improvement. Self-regulative factors such as
self-efcacy may also motivate the person to choose activities in
which the skill is required (e.g., extraverts seek out parties), lead-
ing to greater expertise, practice, and self-condence. Con-
versely, a typical adaptation for introverts is working in the
absence of immediate reward or help from others, supported by
skills for sustaining attention, reective problem solving, and
boredom tolerance (Matthews, 2008a).
Often, social skills and condence will align, but individuals
show a range of adaptive patterns. The extravert with high con-
dence but low actual skill risks becoming a saloon-bar bore; lim-
itations in social perception may limit the impact of negative
feedback from others on self-concept. Adaptation may also
change over time. Bendersky and Shah (2013) discuss how, in
business team contexts, the condence and enthusiasm of extra-
verts (reecting self-regulation) is initially perceived positively
by other team members. Over time, extraverts contributions to
the groups tasks may fail to match initial expectations, leading
to a loss of status within the group.
Variation in N reects alternate strategies for handling threat
(see Figure 2). N especially moderates response to social threat
(e.g., Brock & Lawrence, 2014), a type of stressor that poses
unique challenges. Social threats are often (a) extended over
time, (b) ambiguous or disguised in nature, (c) associated with
familiar people, (d) possibly benecial, and (e) unable to be
addressed by a single coping strategy (Matthews, 2004). For
example, a person in a troubled intimate relationship may have
to work to decode mixed signals coming from the other person,
as well as use a variety of coping strategies to repair the relation-
ship or to leave it with hope for the future. Faced with this com-
plex problem-solving task, the typical high N strategy is to
remain vigilant for possible threats and to act to anticipate and
avoid possible threats. Hence, N is associated with sensitivity to
possible criticism and a preference for avoidant coping (Mat-
thews, 2004). Such a strategy may be adaptive in picking up
early signs that an intimate relationship is in trouble. Fear of
social disapproval may also be motivating and associated with
high levels of preparation and contribution to tasks performed at
work (Smillie, Yeo, Furnham, & Jackson, 2006; Tamir, 2005).
However, such strategies also carry potential costs of overesti-
mating threat and excessive stress response, worry, and rumina-
tion (Wells & Matthews, 2015). Conversely, the characteristic
low N strategy is to wait for a clear threat to become evident and
then to deal with it directly (e.g., through task-focused coping).
Maladaptive outcomes associated with high N including
emotional disorder may reect dynamic adaptive processes,
including dysfunctional self-regulation. Social anxiety is associ-
ated with avoidance of feared situations, leading to skill degrada-
tion and irrational negative beliefs about social encounters (Wells
Cognitive-Adaptive Theory
Figure 2 A cognitive-adaptive model of neuroticism.
& Matthews, 2015). The high N individual is vulnerable to styles
of metacognition that focus attention on negative thoughts, lead-
ing to perseverative worry that keeps social threats salient, limits
constructive reappraisal of the threat, and blocks exposures to the
threat that would allow acquisition of compensatory social skills.
Bendersky and Shah (2013) describe a more benign dynamic in
the business context. High N individuals do not inspire condence
in others and tend to be assigned lower status in work groups.
However, because it is relatively easy for them to exceed expecta-
tions, they gain status within the group over time.
Personality From the Cognitive-Adaptive
Perspective
Historically, impetus for psychometric studies of personality
came from the example of the periodic table of the elements
(Mershon & Gorsuch, 1988). That is, there is a precise taxon-
omy of personality dimensions that provides a universal frame
of reference for all traits. In addition, the periodic table metaphor
suggests that each trait corresponds to a specic property of the
brain, as each element is dened by atomic number. CATT
departs from this metaphor in several respects.
First, standard personality dimensions, including the Big
Five, are associated with the interlocking patterns of skills, self-
7
knowledge, and adaptation that constitute the adaptive triangle.
By contrast with FFT (McCrae & Costa, 2008), traits are associ-
ated with characteristic adaptations, not basic tendencies. Traits
are indirectly, not directly, related to brain systems. Even the
more reliable associations between traits and metrics of neural
functioning tend to be small in magnitude (Matthews &
Amelang, 1993; Matthews & Gilliland, 1999). Conversely,
associations between traits and self-regulative constructs, such
as self-beliefs and styles of appraisal and coping, are often quite
large, as illustrated by the convergence of low N with other ele-
ments of core self-regulation (Ferris, Johnson, Rosen, & Tan,
2012).
Second, while traditional psychobiological theory favors
establishing isomorphisms between major traits and specic
brain systems, such as reward and punishment systems (Corr,
2009), CATT rejects isomorphism. Mappings between brain
attributes and traits may be complex; for example, one attribute
may contribute to multiple traits (Zuckerman, 2005).
Third, the isomorphism assumption encourages the search
for a master-process for each trait that explains the majority of
observed trait expression. In H. J. Eysencks (1967) theory,
individual differences in cortical arousability inuence condi-
tioning, task performance, and regulation of level of stimulation,
potentially explaining numerous expressions of extraversion-
8 Matthews

Table 1 Comparison of Principles of Standard Trait Theories With Cognitive-Adaptive Theory

Type of Issue Standard Trait Theory Cognitive-Adaptive Theory

Psychometric Psychometrics defines a universal set of five (or
more) superfactors.
Universal superfactors are more fundamental than
contextualized traits.
Trait and state dimensions correspond directly.
Theoretical Trait superfactors correspond directly to brain
systems that are the source of trait coherence.
Biased self-perceptions are peripheral to trait
definition.
Cognitive correlates of traits are secondary to neural
processes or are learned characteristic adaptations.
Adaptive/ Applied Trait stability reflects brain stability; characteristic
adaptations are more malleable.
Adaptive outcomes reflect feedforward from basic
brain systems to learning and performance.
Superfactor assessments are essential research tools,
but no precise universal model can be defined.
Universal and contextualized traits are equally
important for adaptation but differ in scope.
Trait and state dimensions reflect different sets of
adaptive challenges and are not directly
commensurate.
Neural influences on traits are indirect; trait struc-
ture corresponds to key adaptive strategy variation.
Trait coherence derives from common functionality
of multiple processes.
Biased self-perceptions are one of several aspects of
self-knowledge contributing to traits.
Cognitive correlates of traits provide a platform for
acquiring the skills characteristic of the trait.
Trait stability reflects multiple processes, including
skill and self-knowledge generalization across life
transitions, and personsituation interactions.
Adaptive outcomes reflect levels of contextualized
skills, functionality of self-knowledge in context,
and level of exposure to relevant environments.

introversion. By contrast, supported by evidence on cognitive
patterning (Matthews, 2008a), CATT assumes that traits are dis-
tributed across multiple processes to be understood at different
levels of explanation (Matthews, 2000). Thus, mediating mecha-
nisms for trait effects vary according to the context and the task
performed.
Fourth, what gives traits coherence is not a single master-
process, but their adaptive focus. E is correlated with numerous pro-
cesses, often with small magnitude, but they all serve a common
goal of facilitating adaptation to demanding social environments.
This perspective on traits provides novel answers to long-
standing issues in personality theory that differ in some respects
from traditional trait theory perspectives. Table 1 summarizes
the key differences. Psychometrically, CATT questions whether
there will ever be a truly universal trait model, given that even
the central adaptive challenges for humanity vary at least some-
what across cultures, contexts, and generations. The theory also
rejects the idea of well-dened brain systems constituting the
basis for each trait; instead, trait coherence reects the contribu-
tion of multiple, dissociable processes to adaptation. Finally, in
real life, the consequences of traits depend primarily on acquired
skills and self-knowledge. Next, these differences in perspective
from standard models are discussed in more detail.
Psychometric Uncertainties
Psychometric studies of the FFM do not identify ve key
brain attributes, but ve prototypical environmental chal-
lenges that support contrasting adaptive strategies. Goldberg
(1990) dened these challenges as Power, Love, Work,
Affect, and Intellect, but in each case the nature of the chal-
lenge requires considerable further denition. For example,
exerting power is relatively straightforward if one arrives at a
leadership role with levers of inuence already at ones dis-
posal (Bill Gates and Mark Zuckerberg are reputed to be
introverted; Bernstein, 2015). Doing so under social pressure
is difcult, and more closely linked to E. Traits reect adapta-
tions to environmental challenges, but environments are noto-
riously difcult to dene and categorize. Indeed, even core
environmental challenges vary somewhat across cultures and
across generations. Consequently, traits are necessarily some-
what fuzzy in nature, and we should not expect a precise uni-
versal structural model. Indeed, as H. J. Eysenck (1967)
recognized, arguments over trait denition cannot be resolved
by psychometrics alone.
Universality of trait structure speaks to a common human
nature, variation to the moderation of adaptive challenges by
culture. However, the FFM shows some variation across cul-
tures, especially non-Western and/or nonindustrialized cultures
(Church, 2016). For example, Gurven, Von Rueden,
Massenkoff, Kaplan, and Lero Vie (2013) failed to reproduce
the standard FFM in the indigenous, largely illiterate, Tsimane
foragerhorticulturalist people of Bolivia. They attributed the
cultural difference in personality structure to the distinctive
social environments of small-scale societies. For example, artis-
tic interests are expressed in a communal setting so that there is
more intercorrelation of E and O items than in industrialized
populations. Gurven et al. (2013) also suggest that Westernized
cultures may have more complex factor structures than prein-
dustrial ones because there are more environmental niches
available.
Cognitive-Adaptive Theory
Additional Superfactors. From the cognitive-adaptive per-
spective, whether there are ve, six, or more superfactor traits is
not critical. A metaphor is the question of how many planets
there are in the solar system. There is a nite number of major
planets, which is important for astronomers to dene, but that
number reects the contingent processes guiding planetary for-
mation rather than any basic law of physics or chemistry. Simi-
larly, denition of what is a major or minor trait remains
somewhat arbitrary. The controversy over whether Honesty in
the HEXACO model is a major Big Six trait dimension
(Ashton et al., 2014; McCrae & Costa, 2008) is then equivalent
to the debate over whether Pluto is a planet. It is more important
to determine whether Honesty has antecedents and conse-
quences that differentiate this trait from the Big Five in theoreti-
cally interesting or practically important ways. Generally, there
remain signicant psychometric issues surrounding structural
models of personality, including the FFM (Boyle, 2008), and
psychometrics alone may not lead directly to causal models of
trait action.
Contextualized Traits. The FFM represents the major chal-
lenges of being human (Goldberg, 1990). However, if traits cor-
respond to environmental challenges, there should also be traits
for more specialized environments. Thus, the existence of con-
textualized traits falls naturally out of the cognitive-adaptive
approach. For example, in developed cultures, formalized test-
ing of students is important enough that different strategies for
handling the pressures of being evaluated will exist, dening the
test anxiety trait (Zeidner, 1998). The general social threat linked
to N overlaps with more narrowly dened evaluation threats,
and so the traits correlate while remaining distinct constructs. In
evaluative contexts, traits such as test anxiety and math anxiety
are more predictive of performance than broad traits (Zeidner,
1998). The structure of contextualized traits differs from the
FFM because environmental pressures do not align with those
of life in general. For example, aggressiveness is more promi-
nent as a driver personality dimension than E because trafc
environments limit the range of social responses (Matthews,
2002). They provide more scope for frustration and conict
between vehicles than opportunities for social inuence, which
typically require people to converse.
Differentiating Traits and States. A direct correspondence
between trait and state dimensions is often assumed, whether on
theoretical grounds or through development of parallel scales
(Spielberger & Reheiser, 2009). CATT rejects this view because
short-term adaptive challenges of goal-directed behavior do not
directly map onto the longer-term challenges associated with
trait variation (Matthews & Zeidner, 2004). In the performance
context, for example, major state factors are associated with
commitment of effort (task engagement), managing overload
(distress), and reection on the personal relevance of the task
(worry). These dimensions correlate modestly with traits such as
C and N in predictable ways, but they do not directly align with
traits (Matthews et al., 2002).
9
Theoretical Issues: Mediators of Trait Effects
Mismatch of Constructs and Assessments. Using self-
reports to investigate individual differences in neural processes
is problematic. Thus, we could measure traits objectively,
through psychophysiology, and explore their antecedents and
consequences. Personality theorists have been curiously reluc-
tant to adopt this approach. In child temperament research espe-
cially, there are well-established associations between traits
dened through behavioral observations and psychophysiologi-
cal measures (e.g., Kagan, 2014; Rothbart et al., 2009). How-
ever, using the behavioral measures to predict physiological
response does not directly address the extent to which tempera-
ment can be directly explored through psychophysiology.
One of the challenges here is that individual differences in psy-
chophysiological metrics do not seem to support a superfactor
structure akin to the Big Five, as FFT (McCrae et al., 2000) pre-
dicts. In a recent study of individual differences in workload
response, Matthews, Reinerman-Jones, Barber, and Abich (2015)
assessed EEG, ECG, eye tracking, and hemodynamic responses
to multiple task scenarios in 151 participants. Factors could be
dened within specic response systems (e.g., EEG) but not
across systems. In other words, individual differences in brain
functioning may have numerous degrees of freedom that do not
map readily onto extant personality structures. Research on bio-
logical bases for personality might focus more productively on
more narrowly dened endophenotypes, consistent with the
molecular genetic evidence that traits are inuenced by many
genes of small effect (Montag & Reuter, 2014). Improvements in
brain-recording technology may provide better denition, but for
now there is much still to be learned about dimensions of brain
functioning and how they are expressed in behavior. From the
cognitive-adaptive perspective, brain characteristics (and genes)
are all upstream from the core constructs of personality, which are
more tractable psychometrically and theoretically.
The Role of Self-Perceptions. CATT accommodates a role
for biased self-perceptions in inuencing personality. Stable
self-beliefs are encoded in memory during childhood and form
part of the self-schema in adults (Clark & Beck, 1999). There is
extensive evidence for cognitive bias and distortion in evaluat-
ing the personalities of others (e.g., Denrell, 2005) and of the
self, especially in the emotional disorder literature. Clark and
Becks (1999) classic studies show low self-esteem in depres-
sion is linked to systematic errors in thinking. Within CATT,
such biases are a part of self-regulation and may feed styles of
processing that shape adaptation, such as self-verication and
self-enhancement (Robinson & Sedikides, 2009). Thus, the the-
ory sees self-perception biases as an integral part of the major
traits, with the power to shape behaviors such as overcondent
engagement in risky behaviors (Wohleber & Matthews, 2016).
Biases are thus more than nuisance response styles, consistent
with evidence that variance in social desirability is actually
associated with substantive personality traits (Connelly &
Chang, 2016).
10
Specifying Characteristic Adaptations. The multiplicity of
psychological constructs that may mediate trait effects is chal-
lenging, and there is no simple resolution to the issue. However,
the cognitive-adaptive perspective may contribute to conceptual
clarity, especially in distinguishing objectively measurable skills
that are associated with the trait from self-regulative constructs.
A limitation of much contemporary personality research (includ-
ing some of this authors studies) is the ambiguity of subjective
measures of mediating constructs. For example, individual dif-
ferences in coping sometimes mediate trait effects on well-being
(Matthews et al., 2009). Task-focused coping is associated with
more positive outcomes (Matthews et al., 2009), but does that
mean that people use task focus more often, that they are better
at implementing task-focused strategies, that they gain con-
dence from believing they have a plan of action, or that they
encounter more situations for which task focus is appropriate?
The theory highlights the need for greater clarity of thought
about explicit and implicit aspects of personality. Both skills and
self-regulation have conscious and unconscious elements.
A cognitive-adaptive perspective separates different explana-
tions. In a recent study, Zeidner and Matthews (2016) showed
that perceived social support mediates the association between
emotional intelligence and well-being. However, there are sev-
eral alternate, though potentially complementary, explanations
for this nding. Perceiving oneself as socially supported (self-
regulation) may elevate well-being in the absence of any objec-
tive benet. The individuals skills in securing and gaining from
social support (skill) may improve well-being via better objec-
tive outcomes. Perceived social support may signal ones partic-
ipation in a mutually supportive network (dynamic adaptation).
These different support processes may well coexist, but they can
be distinguished and tested empirically.
Accommodation of Cognitive Processes. CATT was
developed initially (Matthews, 1999) to accommodate the diver-
sity of cognitive correlates of traits revealed in information-
processing studies, along with the modest magnitude and con-
text sensitivity of traitperformance associations. The theory
proposes that contextualized skills, such as social skills, may be
more central to traits than basic information-processing compo-
nents, such as those for speeded response, attention, and mem-
ory. Like brain characteristics, their role in trait denition may
be indirect rather than direct. A chastening feature of the theory
is that it emphasizes the complexity of associations between per-
sonality and cognitive processes, including the necessity of
referring to different explanatory levels, ranging from basic neu-
roscience to high-level strategizing shaped by self-knowledge.
These different types of level can be formally distinguished
within cognitive science theory (Matthews, 2000). Researchers
naturally favor parsimony and elegance in theory, but we have
to live with a messier reality.
For example, Matthews and Zeidner (2012) investigated trait
and state correlates of Fan, McCandliss, Sommer, Raz, and
Posners (2002) Attention Network Test, which assesses indi-
vidual differences in functioning of three brain networks for
Matthews
attention, via performance metrics. Both C and E were associ-
ated with superior executive functioning, but seemingly for dif-
ferent reasons. The effect of C was mediated by the subjective
state of task engagement, which is associated with challenge
appraisal and task-focused coping in performance settings. Fur-
ther investigation might require an analysis at the self-
knowledge level to understand how C inuences understanding
of the personal relevance of the task and willingness to invest
effort in it. By contrast, E was unrelated to task engagement, and
the effect of E on executive function was not mediated by indi-
vidual differences in subjective state. In this case, we might
probe individual differences in the parameters of neural or cog-
nitive architecture supporting executive control of attention. In
an applied context, such as individual differences in resistance
to distraction in social settings, we might also be concerned with
contextualized skills for directing attention.
Individual Differences in Adaptation: Traits in
Real Life
Stable and Malleable Elements of Personality. Traditional
trait theory (e.g., McCrae & Costa, 2008) discriminates stable
and malleable elements fairly sharply. Basic tendencies,
grounded in neural processes, show similar stability to the brain.
Following brain maturation, further changes will be relatively
small in magnitude. By contrast, characteristic adaptations are
learned and may change with external circumstances.
CATT is in agreement with traditional theory on the relative
stability of neural processes but attributes less of adult trait sta-
bility to direct effects of brain systems on personality, given that
traits are an indirect rather than a direct expression of individual
differences in brain functioning. Instead, the theory attributes
stability to several separate factors, which might be dissociated.
Stability of basic neural and information-processing characteris-
tics will nudge adaptation in similar directions in different con-
texts. For example, biologically based stress vulnerability will
encourage the high N adaptive strategy across multiple types of
threat.
Skills and self-knowledge also contribute to personality
change and stability, in complex ways. The key issue for skills is
how much they generalize to new contexts as the persons life
circumstances change, including taking on new social roles
(Hudson et al., 2012). Thus, stability of external circumstances
is an inuence on stability of traits. The level of generalization,
and hence the extent to which trait stability is promoted, depends
on the various factors that control skill transfer (Anderson,
2007), including variability in environmental exposures or
choices over time. Internalized self-knowledge may also be a
source of either stability or change depending on whether self-
regulatory processes maintain a stable self-concept in changing
circumstances or promote personal reinvention. Constructs such
as narrative identity capture longer-term processes of this kind,
including idiographic elements (Cervone, 2008; McAdams &
Pals, 2006).
Cognitive-Adaptive Theory
Stability also reects the various forms of dynamic person
situation interaction (Caspi & Roberts, 2001). For example, high
N may be maintained by awareness of social threat (reactive
interaction), by styles of interpersonal interaction that elicit neg-
ative emotions in others (evocative interaction), and by associat-
ing with or valuing like-minded others (proactive interaction).
Thus, CATT largely aligns with more dynamic perspectives on
trait development (e.g., Hudson et al., 2012). Where it may add
novelty is in separating skills from self-regulation. For example,
reactive interaction in highly neurotic individuals might be a
product of a learned style of stimulus encoding that is prone to
categorize events as threats, inuenced by selective attention
bias. It might also reect a self-regulative style that dictates the
importance of active search for possible threats and personal
vulnerability. Both types of processes appear to be implicated in
emotional disorders (Wells & Matthews, 2015). The role of
skills highlights the importance of habitual styles of information
processing, of which the person may have limited awareness,
whereas the role of self-knowledge implicates self-regulative
processes, including self-verication (Tamir, 2005).
Context and Skills. By contrast with traditional trait perspec-
tives, individual differences in declarative and procedural skills
(Anderson, 2007) acquired within a specic context are central
to traits in CATT (Matthews, 1999). Thus, individual differ-
ences in contextualized skill will often be more important as
mediators of trait expression than basic neural or cognitive pro-
cesses. The common advantage of both multiple narrowly
dened scales and contextualized measures over general trait
measures in predictive validity (Boyle, 2008; Matthews et al.,
2009) reects the context-bound nature of many skills, although
some key social skills, such as emotional expressivity and clarity
of communication, will generalize across numerous contexts.
Furthermore, the more specialized the environment, the weaker
the validity of standard traits will be. Vehicle driving, for exam-
ple, is a microworld that is distinct from other everyday life set-
tings. Standard traits such as those in the FFM have real but
modest validity for predicting adaptive criteria such as risky
behavior and stress response, whereas scales specialized for the
driving context perform better (Matthews, 2002).
A skill-centered perspective on traits also suggests greater
scope for interventions in applied settings than standard trait the-
ory (e.g., FFT) does. R. Roberts et al. (2015) link the FFM to
skills that can be trained to increase educational potential and
workforce readiness. For example, Durlak, Weissberg, Dym-
nicki, Taylor, and Schellinger (2011) demonstrated in a meta-
analysis that school-based social and emotional learning (SEL)
programs are effective in various respects, including improving
tolerance of academic stressors (associated with N), setting
appropriate academic goals (C), and resolving conicts with
peers and teachers (A). Importantly, such interventions typically
do not seek to change personality in some global sense but to
develop skills that are relevant to the students circumstances.
In the workplace, underlying dispositions are fairly stable,
but the patterns of behavior reecting personality characteristics
11
are changeable (Sackett & Walmsley, 2014). Individuals can be
trained to use day planners, checklists, and other aids supporting
personal organization even if they are low in C. Such interven-
tions would likely enhance a contextualized measure of work-
place C more than the general trait. Training also moderates the
predictive validity of traits. For example, one factor in the sur-
prisingly weak correlation between E and sales performance is
that managers train introverted sales staff in the contextual skills
required (Grant, 2013). According to the present analysis, inter-
ventions that change skills important across multiple contexts
will inuence traits. Training in stress management techniques
that can be applied in a variety of work and nonwork contexts
might reduce N, consistent with evidence that cognitive-
behavioral interventions for anxiety can lower N (Barlow,
Sauer-Zavala, Carl, Bullis, & Ellard, 2014). Further research is
needed to substantiate this hypothesis (e.g., B. W. Roberts et al.,
2017).
CONCLUSIONS
Modern trait theory provides a set of answers to traditional ques-
tions that are in many ways satisfactory. We can measure mean-
ingful and stable individual differences, establish mappings
between traits and biological and psychological attributes, and
use trait assessments to support decision making in various
applied settings. CATT (Matthews, 1999, 2008a) seeks to
address some of the remaining issues. In doing so, it contrasts
with theories that dene explicit biological bases for traits (Corr,
2009; Eysenck & Eysenck, 1985) and FFT (McCrae & Costa,
2008). In some instances, theoretical differences are nuanced,
for example, in dening which aspects of personality are mallea-
ble. Other differences are more fundamental. In particular,
CATT rejects the view that traits can be identied with any sin-
gle or small number of causal processes that mediate associa-
tions between traits and behavior, including individual
differences in brain systems for arousal or motivation. Traits are
distributed across numerous processes at different levels of
abstraction from the neural substrate, and they gain coherence
from their adaptive function, not from isomorphism with any
underlying structure or process.
Finally, CATT suggests the limits of natural science meta-
phors for personality. It is appealing to think of traits as xed,
essential characteristics of the person akin to height and blood
type. From the cognitive-adaptive perspective, the essentialist
position is often useful as a working approximation, given that
traits are fairly stable and fairly universal. However, this position
ceases to be useful when we address several specic research
questions, including the relationship between traits and brain
characteristics, the role of cognitive processes in expressions of
personality, and the scope for personality modication in
applied settings. Instead, future research should focus more on
the role of individual differences in generalizable skills, includ-
ing those for building interpersonal relationships, interpreting
ones place in the world, acquiring new information, and
12
navigating the world of work. Key questions for the future are
the role of basic neural and cognitive processes in skill acquisi-
tion, the role of self-knowledge in supporting acquisition and
learning of skills, and the dependence of various forms of per-
sonsituation interaction on individual differences in skill.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author declared no potential conicts of interest with respect
to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author received no nancial support for the research,
authorship, and/or publication of this article.
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