FOR EDUCATIONAL USE ONLY

12 J. Int'l Econ. L. 1023

Journal of International Economic Law

December, 2009

General Article

*1023 CHALLENGING TRIPS-PLUS AGREEMENTS: THE POTENTIAL UTILITY OF

NON-
VIOLATION DISPUTES

Susy Frankel [FNa1]

Copyright © 2009 by Oxford University Press; Susy Frankel

ABSTRACT
A World Trade Organization (WTO) non-violation complaint is one where an agreement has
not been breached, but the complainant alleges an expected benefit under the agreement has been
abrogated. When the TRIPS Agreement came into force non-violation complaints were not
available for TRIPS disputes. This position was to be reviewed. Non-violation complaints remain
unavailable for TRIPS disputes. In the early days of TRIPS the exclusion of non-violation
disputes seemed rational because of the unique nature of TRIPS, among WTO agreements. The
TRIPS Agreement requires members to implement minimum standards of intellectual property
protection in their national laws. Members therefore have to provide at least that level of
protection. If they do not do so a violation complaint could be initiated. Consequently, it was not
logical to look for any notion of expected benefit beyond the wording of the minimum standards.
However, TRIPS permits members to have greater standards and many members have agreed to
higher standards through free trade agreements. These TRIPS-plus standards have arguably
undermined expected benefits that should flow from TRIPS, especially for users of intellectual
property rights. This article discusses the utility of making non-violation disputes available for
TRIPS disputes from the perspectives of both the users and owners of intellectual property
rights. This analysis includes a discussion of whether TRIPS-plus free trade agreements
undermine expected benefits of the TRIPS Agreement and should thus be the subject of a non-
violation dispute.

*1024 I. INTRODUCTION
The level of intellectual property protection that achieves trade liberalization, and encourages
development and technology transfer, is a central issue in intellectual property from an
international economic law perspective. The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement) [FN1] provides for minimum standards of intellectual
property law that members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) agreed to. [FN2] Many
WTO members tried to negotiate higher standards than were eventually agreed and they now
have higher levels of protection in their laws than those set out in the TRIPS Agreement and
consequently, for those Members, the TRIPS Agreement is a floor rather than a ceiling. The
TRIPS Agreement sets the agreed minimum standards and members are obliged to enact laws
that at least comply with those standards. The result is a number of differing intellectual property
laws at national level. The differences between national laws can lead to disputes between
members as to whether, or not, a law is compliant with the TRIPS Agreement.
In addition to the TRIPS Agreement minimum standards, the requirements of other
multilateral agreements may also be incorporated into a member's law. The most significant
multilateral intellectual property body outside of the WTO is the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO). [FN3]
As well as multilateral minimum standards, national intellectual property laws may also
reflect intellectual property standards agreed in bi-lateral or free trade agreements (FTAs). Since
the TRIPS Agreement came into force in 1995, members have entered into a steadily growing
number of FTAs with intellectual property chapters. [FN4] The intellectual property chapters of
*1025 these agreements vary in scope. [FN5] Many of the FTAs, however, include what are now
commonly called TRIPS-plus provisions. These provide for intellectual property protection
above the minimum standard that the TRIPS Agreement requires.
In many instances TRIPS-plus standards in FTAs have not been truly negotiated, but rather
have come about through something close to coercion. In particular, many of these agreements
are entered into between parties of unequal economic power and the 'smaller' party is seeking
other trade benefits and so will agree to TRIPS-plus standards in order to obtain those other
benefits. The USA and the EU, in particular, have 'template' intellectual property chapters, which
are 'non-negotiable' in exchange for other trade concessions. [FN6] There is much debate over
whether 'high' levels of protection are effectively forced on developing nations, when such levels
of protection are not necessarily of direct or immediate economic benefit. [FN7] These factors
create questions as to whether TRIPS-plus FTAs are legitimate. This article analyzes whether
these intellectual property chapters can be legitimate when they do not recognize the express and
implied parameters of the object and purposes of the TRIPS Agreement.
An important aspect of the TRIPS Agreement is the availability of the WTO dispute
settlement system to hear disputes about violations of all WTO Agreements, including the TRIPS
Agreement. [FN8] The complainant in *1026 such a dispute usually alleges that there has been a
violation of, and consequently a nullification and impairment of, one or more articles of the
WTO agreements. In relation to the GATT [FN9] and GATS, [FN10] but not the TRIPS
Agreement, members can bring what are known as non-violation complaints. [FN11] A
complainant in a non-violation complaint alleges that, although a specific article of an agreement
has not been breached, an expectation of an agreed benefit arising from the agreement has been
nullified or impaired. [FN12]
There has been discussion, but no firm resolution, about whether non-violation disputes
should be available under the TRIPS Agreement. [FN13] This discussion took place even though
the role for non-violation disputes, about GATT and GATS, is unsettled because the parameters
of nonviolation disputes are not well defined. [FN14] Some commentators even suggest that non-
violation disputes are inherently inappropriate in the WTO rules-based system. [FN15]
*1027 Even though it is not possible to bring a TRIPS Agreement non-violation dispute, the
non-violation dispute criteria provide a useful method through which to assess the legitimacy of
TRIPS-plus FTAs. This is because a non-violation analysis requires an assessment of members'
expectations about the scope of benefits arising from the agreement at issue. In this article I use
this approach to analyze the relationship between the purposes of the TRIPS Agreement and the
purposes of TRIPS-plus FTAs.
The TRIPS Agreement has many purposes. Its fundamental objective is to bind its members
to obligations to protect intellectual property rights. TRIPS also has other purposes, which
compete with and therefore require balancing against the protection of intellectual property.
These include the interests of third parties to use and access intellectual property, and the goals
of technology transfer and dissemination. [FN16] The preamble to the TRIPS Agreement and its
articles entitled 'principles' and 'objectives' provide some guidance about the object and purpose
of the Agreement, [FN17] which are important for dispute settlement over alleged breaches of
the Agreement. [FN18]
The purposes of the TRIPS Agreement are expressed through its framework and structure.
The TRIPS Agreement fundamentally differs from other international intellectual property
agreements in its objectives. This is because it is part of the WTO agreements and as such it has
trade-related purposes. Trade-related purposes are not found in any other multilateral intellectual
property agreements. [FN19] The trade related purposes are not only to protect intellectual
property rights, but to also make sure that intellectual property rights do no themselves operate as
unacceptable trade barriers. [FN20]
*1028 The core of TRIPS sets out a series of minimum legal standards that allow members
some autonomy over how they implement those standards in their national intellectual property
law. How much autonomy members have over the detail of their domestic law may depend on
the particular article involved. Some articles of the Agreement function like maximum standards
in that they specify what should not be protected. An example is the idea/expression dichotomy
in copyright which is codified as: [FN21]
Copyright protection shall extend to expressions and not to ideas, procedures, methods of
operation or mathematical concepts as such.
The Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, [FN22] in the context of
compulsory licenses for pharmaceutical patents, recognized the principle of national autonomy in
enacting minimum standards in domestic law. It declared that members may define for
themselves what amounts to a national health-related emergency. [FN23] Article 27 of TRIPS,
which defines the subject matter of patents, is implemented in very different ways in members'
national laws. When it comes to the scope of subject matter of patents there is much dispute over
whether the TRIPS Agreement requires certain types of patents. [FN24] Conversely, some
TRIPS articles allow little flexibility, such as the requirement that members protect computer
programs as literary works in copyright law. [FN25] This does not give members scope to
protect computer programs as another category of copyright work. [FN26] They must protect
computer programs as literary works. [FN27] The degree of autonomy that members do or do not
have lies at the core of any controversies over interpretation of some aspects of the TRIPS
Agreement.
An inevitable consequence of minimum standards of intellectual property, rather than
harmonized detail, is disputes over compliance with those minimum standards. Some disputes
involve complaints that one member's law is not in compliance with and has consequently
violated the TRIPS *1029 Agreement. Other disputes over the TRIPS Agreement are played out,
not in the dispute settlement arena, but rather in the TRIPS Council discussions about the scope
of the TRIPS Agreement. Because of differences in national intellectual property laws and the
difficulties in progressing multilateral negotiations, both within and outside the WTO, members
use FTAs to deepen harmonization of intellectual property obligations at least between the FTA
parties. This creates even more differences in the levels of intellectual property protection that
WTO members have at national level and even more disagreements over the appropriate levels
of intellectual property protection. Some of these disagreements are framed in terms of what
members can expect from the TRIPS Agreement, although, as mentioned above, members
cannot bring non-violation disputes about the TRIPS Agreement.
On the one hand, some developing countries consider that the levels of intellectual property
protection, which they reasonably expected that they would provide, should not be higher than
the TRIPS Agreement level for at least some time. They did not expect to be pressured into
entering FTAs that increased standards. On the other hand, developed countries have treated the
ability to have increased intellectual property standards as without limits. [FN28]
A complainant in a non-violation dispute must allege that it has been deprived of a
reasonably expected benefit. In the case of owners of intellectual property rights the expected
benefit of the TRIPS Agreement will be protection. In the case of users it might be freedom from
over-protection. Concerns about over-protection of intellectual property rights have arisen, in
part, through increased multilateral negotiations to provide higher levels of protection, but
mostly through the expansion of TRIPS-plus FTAs. [FN29] Using the non-violation dispute
criteria, I analyze whether an effect of TRIPS-plus FTAs is to nullify and impair the benefits and
expectations that members have, which flow from the negotiated and agreed structure of the
TRIPS Agreement. That structure is a combination of minimum standards and some national
autonomy over how those minimum standards are implemented. The primary questions I explore
are: (a) how TRIPS-plus FTAs are removing degrees of flexibility over the implementation of
intellectual property law at domestic level; and (b) whether that erosion of flexibility is
consistent with the agreed structure and framework of the TRIPS Agreement.
*1030 I do not dispute that the TRIPS Agreement allows for WTO members to provide
higher levels of intellectual property protection. [FN30] I suggest, however, that providing
higher levels of protection ought to have limits consistent with the wording of the TRIPS
Agreement, in light of its object and purpose, its structure and the benefits that can be expected
from it. [FN31] Also, the ability to provide higher levels of protection does not equate to an
unchecked right to coerce higher levels of protection through FTAs. Rather, the optional nature
of the ability to increase protection is itself a purpose of the TRIPS Agreement that should be
maintained.
Section II discusses the relationship between minimum standards and more extensive
protection under the TRIPS Agreement. Section III discusses how more extensive protection is
applied on a non-discrimination, particularly an MFN, basis. Section IV discusses the object and
purpose of the TRIPS Agreement. An understanding of these fundamental concepts is important
as FTAs should not undermine the Agreement's negotiated object and purpose. Section V
discusses the ways in which international intellectual property norms are created through TRIPS-
plus FTAs. Sections VI and VII assess the role of non-violation disputes in the TRIPS
Agreement context. This includes discussion of what non-violation disputes about the TRIPS
Agreement might look like. I assess potential non-violation disputes brought by members from
an owner of intellectual property rights' viewpoint. To date, the USA is the major proponent of
allowing non-violation disputes for TRIPS. This has meant that potential non-violation disputes
have largely been considered as a device for intellectual property owners to increase protection.
This article, therefore, discusses what non-violation disputes might look like from the viewpoint
of users of intellectual property rights. [FN32] In particular, how users could use non-violation to
argue that increased standards through TRIPS-plus FTAs are a non-violation of the TRIPS
Agreement. Section VIII discusses the overlap of violation and non-violation disputes in the
TRIPS Agreement context. Section IX offers some conclusions.

*1031 II. MINIMUM STANDARDS AND 'MORE EXTENSIVE PROTECTION'

The TRIPS Agreement, and other international agreements on intellectual property, [FN33]
provide minimum legal standards and allow for members to provide increased levels of
protection. Most, if not all, substantive law international intellectual property agreements have
this structure. [FN34]
The minimum standards of the TRIPS Agreement prescribe the level of protection rather than
the exact wording of the law. In this way minimum standards provide for a degree of
harmonization, but those minimums do not deeply harmonize the law to the extent of prescribing
the wording to be used in domestic statutes. This means that there will be differences in laws at
national level and in effect different ways to comply with the minimum standards.
The TRIPS Agreement primarily requires that members provide the minimum levels of
protection through relevant intellectual property legislation. Some aspects of TRIPS can be
affected by non-intellectual property laws. Challenges can be made to laws that are not
designated intellectual property laws, but directly affect TRIPS Agreement requirements. The
Havana Club dispute, for example, concerned a US law that was not primarily a trade mark law,
but rather was about strengthening the boycott on Cuba. [FN35]
Whether a law is treated as within the scope of intellectual property protection that the
TRIPS Agreement requires or outside of that scope is important. [FN36] If a law is within the
scope of the TRIPS Agreement coverage, it is subject to national treatment and MFN. Sui
generis regimes, outside of the requirements of the TRIPS Agreement, are used, correctly or
incorrectly, as ways to avoid national treatment obligations. The Europeans treat the database
unfair extraction right, for example, as outside the ambit of the TRIPS Agreement, because the
Agreement does not require the protection of data. [FN37] *1032 As the TRIPS Agreement has
minimum standards, any greater standards of protection in a member's law should also be subject
to national treatment and MFN. What is greater or outside of the Agreement is not always
straightforward to identify. The European approach to the database example is that because the
TRIPS Agreement does not require protection of data EU database protection need not be subject
to national treatment. The alternative argument is that it ought to be subject to national treatment
because protecting data from unfair extraction is a greater level of database protection than the
TRIPS Agreement requires. It simply requires that the selection and arrangement of databases
that are intellectual creations are protected. [FN38] This issue becomes particularly difficult
when countries protect data not as a sui generis unfair extraction right, but as part of copyright
law which seems to be the situation now in Australia. [FN39]
Another example that illustrates the difficulty of defining the TRIPS Agreement boundaries
is the requirements of trade mark protection. The TRIPS Agreement requires protection of trade
marks that are 'words including personal names, letters, numerals, figurative elements and
combinations of colours'. Many countries have sound and smell marks and some FTAs require
protection of these sorts of trade marks. [FN40] The TRIPS Agreement does not require
protection of smell and sound marks because it states that 'members may require, as a condition
of registration, that signs be visually perceptible' and such marks are not visually perceptible. In
that sense one could say that sound and smell marks are outside the scope of the TRIPS
Agreement, but that is arguably not correct. Such marks are clearly the same category of
protection as those required to be protected under the TRIPS Agreement. [FN41]
 Whatever method is chosen to implement the TRIPS Agreement minimum standards WTO
members' laws will also differ because of the possibility that Members will provide increased
standards. There are three important features of article 1 of the TRIPS Agreement, which sets up
the possibility of more extensive protection.
First, members 'may, but shall not be obliged to, implement in their law more extensive
protection'. [FN42] Quite obviously this means that providing more extensive protection is
optional.
*1033 Second, article 1 permits the provision of more extensive protection 'provided that
protection does not contravene the provisions of the Agreement'. [FN43] This is important
because it contemplates the possibility that some extra protection might contravene the
Agreement. Therefore, the mere fact that something is a higher standard than the minimum
standards of the TRIPS Agreement does not necessarily mean that the higher standard is
compliant with the Agreement. The phrase, 'provided that the protection does not contravene the
agreement', is primarily directed to the non-discrimination principles, national treatment and
most-favored nation (MFN). [FN44] The non-discrimination provisions are a structural part of
the Agreement. [FN45] That is, they affect every part of the Agreement. Increased standards,
although permissible, must not contravene any such structural parts of the Agreement. Thus, an
increased standard must not contravene these non-discrimination provisions. For example, the
minimum standard for duration of a patent is 20 years. [FN46] Any increase of that term in any
member's law must be provided on a non-discriminatory basis to all members of the WTO.
[FN47]
Also of note is that article 1 refers to more extensive protection not more extensive
exceptions. More extensive exceptions are most likely to result in an overall level of protection
that is below the minimum standard required. [FN48]
Third, members are free to determine the appropriate method of implementation of the
TRIPS Agreement standards in their legal system. The freedom over implementation includes
the detail and scope of any laws, *1034 provided that they meet the minimum standards, and also
freedom over the type of laws. The TRIPS Agreement, for example, allows members to choose
whether to protect new plant varieties by patent or a sui generis plant variety rights system.
[FN49]
Freedom for WTO members to choose the method of implementation of TRIPS Agreement
standards is an important recognition of some flexibility of the Agreement and consequent
national autonomy that article 1 allows. The combination of the ability to have greater levels of
protection, and the freedom for all members to implement domestic laws in a manner appropriate
to them, creates a likelihood of differing intellectual property laws at national level. Thus,
minimum standards structure can create disharmony. However, the members of the TRIPS
Agreement have agreed to the minimum standards and national autonomy over implementation
of standards. That approach is a structural feature of the TRIPS Agreement which forms part of
the overall object and purpose of the Agreement.

III. 'MORE EXTENSIVE PROTECTION' AND NON-DISCRIMINATION

As mentioned above, other structural parts of the TRIPS Agreement are the non-
discrimination principles, national treatment and MFN. These principles function to ensure that,
where national laws differ, private right holders from all members receive equal protection
domestically. Without the national treatment principle the minimum standards framework would
almost certainly result in discrimination at domestic level. [FN50] National treatment provisions
are found in other substantive law intellectual property agreements, but the addition of MFN is a
new occurrence with the TRIPS Agreement. [FN51] The TRIPS Agreement does not have an
MFN exemption for FTAs entered into after 1995. [FN52] The absence of this exemption has
had the primary effect of MFN driving the increase of intellectual property protection. The
combination of the TRIPS Agreement minimum legal standards and the absence of an MFN
exemption have not only allowed for, but have, through this relatively unrestricted framework,
encouraged an increase in intellectual property protection through intellectual property chapters
in FTAs. A complexity to *1035 this is the different manner in which MFN operates in the
TRIPS Agreement than in the GATT context. [FN53]
As TRIPS does not have an MFN exemption then any domestic law changes will be provided
on an MFN basis. What that means is that all foreigners will be treated the same by any
member's domestic law. In order to have similar increases in multiple countries, each country
will need to change its domestic law also. This is one reason why the USA and the EU, in
particular, enter into intellectual property chapters in FTAs, with the same or similar clauses,
with a number of different countries. Each FTA is needed to require members to change their
own domestic intellectual property law. If enough countries change their law to a higher standard
then the higher standard has the potential to become the international norm. The wave of
countries increasing copyright term to 70 years is an example of this. Also, if nationals of
country A are able to obtain better protection in country B then this could provide an incentive
for nationals of country A to lobby country A's government to increase protection.
If there was no MFN clause in the TRIPS Agreement that alone would not prevent the rising
tide of increased intellectual property standards. However, if national intellectual property laws
only applied increased standards to FTA parties, based on an MFN exemption, this might slow
down the rising tide of increasing intellectual property standards. Such a conclusion, however, is
necessarily speculative, particularly as not all members of the WTO take the approach,
exemplified by the EU, of exempting protection from national treatment where the protection is a
so-called 'non-TRIPS' protection or has a treaty based exception from national treatment, such as
copyright term.
The required term of copyright protection under the TRIPS Agreement is life plus 50 years.
If a member provides a greater term for copyright, then that member does not need to apply that
term to foreigners on national treatment basis, because there is a specific exemption from
national treatment in the Berne Convention. [FN54] The relevant Berne Convention provision is
incorporated in the TRIPS Agreement. [FN55] The EU takes advantage of this national treatment
exception and only gives the longer term to nationals from countries that also have the longer
term at domestic law. This is known as reciprocity, rather than national treatment. The USA,
unlike the EU, does not discriminate between countries that provide the longer term *1036 and
those that do not. Rather the USA provides its extended 70 year term on a national treatment
basis. [FN56]
Whether an increased standard created at national law and expanded through FTAs becomes
an international norm may also depend on the type of increase that is at issue. The EU has
provided both increased copyright term and the unfair extraction right on a reciprocity rather
than national treatment basis. Many countries have adopted the increased term and the USA, for
example, has included it in its FTAs with others. The same is not true for the unfair extraction
right which has not been so widely taken up. [FN57]
Members who pursue increasing levels of intellectual property protection act as though the
minimum standards framework means that there is nothing preventing standards being increased
indefinitely. The approach that any increase is legitimate in all circumstances is, however, too
simplistic or formalistic. [FN58] It ignores the many questions that arise as to whether increased
standards are necessarily consistent with the object and purpose of the TRIPS Agreement.
[FN59] Such increases are not necessarily trade enhancing. I have argued elsewhere that it is
particularly important in the absence of an MFN exemption for FTAs, as GATT and GATS
expressly have, that intellectual property chapters in FTAs ought at least to be consistent with the
object and purpose of the TRIPS Agreement. [FN60]

IV. THE OBJECT AND PURPOSE OF THE TRIPS AGREEMENT

Each substantive minimum of the TRIPS Agreement has the purpose of providing whatever
that minimum standard is. Additionally, the TRIPS Agreement has some general provisions that
are grouped together in Section I, under the heading 'General Provisions and Basic Principles'
These include the provisions that provide for non-discrimination, establish the minimum
standards framework, autonomy over the implementation of those standards and the option to
have or not have more extensive protection. Other general provisions include the objectives and
principles of the *1037 TRIPS Agreement. All of these general provisions are structural because
they are intended to affect the whole of the Agreement and, as such, they overarch the object and
purpose of individual standards of protection in the other parts of the TRIPS Agreement. [FN61]
Any interpretation exercise that assesses the object and purpose of the Agreement must first
look at the words of the treaty in their context and in light of the treaty's object and purpose.
[FN62]
The preamble is relevant to interpreting the object and purpose of the TRIPS Agreement. It
refers to the 'need' to protect intellectual and property as well the need to 'ensure that measures
and procedures to enforce intellectual property rights do not themselves become barriers to
legitimate trade'. The preamble also states, 'Recognizing the underlying public policy objectives
of national systems for the protection of intellectual property, including developmental and
technological objectives'.
The objectives, in article 7, seek to explain the balance, which is always inherent in
intellectual property at domestic level, between users and owners or producers. [FN63] In
international intellectual property the users and producers tension is manifested as a balance
primarily between the developed and developing countries. [FN64] Article 7, therefore, states the
objective that protecting intellectual property should promote among other things, the transfer
and dissemination of technology.
The principles, in article 8, address ways to achieve this balance. Article 8 provides that
members can have exceptions in their laws to protect public health and 'to promote the public
interest in sectors of vital importance to *1038 their socio-economic and technological
development'. [FN65] These sorts of exceptions are the major way in which WTO members can
develop policies in intellectual property that reflect their economic needs. [FN66]
These objectives and principles are notoriously difficult to interpret in a practical way
because they enshrine competing objectives. The WTO panel in Canada-Pharmaceuticals [FN67]
stated that these principles could not be used to undermine the express wording of other parts of
the Agreement. [FN68] However, the centrality of the objectives and principles of the TRIPS
Agreement was underscored in the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public
Health, which expressly recognized the importance of the objectives and principles to
interpreting the whole agreement. [FN69]
 An analysis of what members could reasonably expect from the wording and structure of the
TRIPS Agreement is also illustrative of its object and purpose. However, it is important not to
stray from the wording of the agreement for this analysis. The Appellate Body made it clear in
India-Patents [FN70] that the Panel had erred in suggesting that legitimate expectations could be
found beyond the wording of the TRIPS Agreement. [FN71] *1039 The Appellate Body
considered that the Panel had erred because it had elided the violation and non-violation dispute
aspects of GATT to reach its conclusion. Such an elision could not be correct in the TRIPS
Agreement context because non-violation disputes were not available. [FN72]
The object and purpose of the TRIPS Agreement should be reflected in intellectual property
chapters of FTAs. If it is not, then the WTO members should not condone, including by
complicit inaction, the expansion of TRIPS- plus FTAs. The next section discusses whether the
norm-pushing effect of TRIPS-plus FTAs have the effect of undermining aspects of the object
and purpose of the TRIPS Agreement.

V. INTERNATIONAL NORM CREATION THROUGH FTAs

The TRIPS Agreement minimum standards are enacted in domestic law and then applied
within a member on a national treatment and MFN basis. [FN73] The minimum standards in the
TRIPS Agreement have become the baseline of the international norms of intellectual property
protection. International intellectual property norms are also created through other international
agreements such as the WIPO agreements. WIPO agreements, that were negotiated post-TRIPS,
should not be regarded as TRIPS Agreement norms, rather they add to what might be described
as international intellectual property norms. [FN74]
FTAs also have a role in creating international norms. A single FTA cannot constitute an
international intellectual property norm, but multiple *1040 FTAs, with similar provisions may
start to have that effect. [FN75] This proposition is verified as it is the open policy of the United
States that increased bilateral and FTA intellectual property standards will support its position to
increase intellectual property standards globally. [FN76]
The absence of an MFN exception has a role in supporting this cross border flow of
intellectual property norms. Even if an FTA or bilateral arrangement is only between two parties,
it affects other nations whose nationals are entitled to intellectual property protection in those
jurisdictions that are party to the FTA. Also, the dispute settlement process may take into
account FTA panel decisions. [FN77] The flow of intellectual property norms from intellectual
property chapters in FTAs is not necessarily easy to track and measure, but the flow undoubtedly
does and will continue to occur.
The TRIPS Agreement provides that members may, but are not obliged to, provide more
extensive protection. However, there are two broad limitations to this general proposition. First,
as discussed above, increased protection must comply with the TRIPS Agreement. [FN78] Also,
international law allows nations to make international commitments with other nations, provided
such commitments do not contravene other international obligations of those nations. [FN79]
As well as requiring domestic implementation of TRIPS-plus standards the sting in the tail of
TRIPS-plus agreements is how such agreements eliminate aspects of the structure of the TRIPS
Agreement with regard to the relationship between minimum standards and national autonomy
over implementation of those standards. One might say that countries that enter into these
agreements consent to eliminate this structure, but this is not dispositive. There is frequently an
imbalance of power in such negotiations and countries enter into intellectual property protections
that are not in their interests. They enter into such chapters because of the other trade benefits in
the FTA as a whole. [FN80] *1041 Also, many developing countries seem to have believed or
perhaps hoped that the TRIPS Agreement minimum standards would be the limits of the
protections they would be obliged to provide. [FN81]
I suggest, therefore, that the proliferation of TRIPS-plus standards may cumulatively amount
to a systemic violation of the TRIPS Agreement structure and purpose. If an FTA does prescribe
deeper harmonization in details of domestic law in a TRIPS-covered area, then that deeper
harmonization changes the minimum standards approach. The violation occurs when multiple
FTAs have that approach and new norms develop without consensus. This even more
problematic if the detailed harmonization comes about through bilateral pressure which is not
only impacts those under pressure, but also other members of the WTO. Without express
negotiation as to harmonization, increased minimum standards should not be used to achieve that
either directly or indirectly through FTAs. These TRIPS-plus intellectual property chapters in
FTAs are therefore contrary to article 1, which says that members may, but are not obliged to,
provide more extensive protection.
The structural provisions of the TRIPS Agreement ought to temper the FTA ratchet-up.
However, the unchecked proliferation of TRIPS-plus standards has run roughshod over and
effectively ignored the real meaning of the structural provisions. I, therefore, question whether
increased intellectual property protection through FTAs is legitimate. [FN82] Increased
standards that violate the structural provisions of TRIPS Agreement should not be permitted.
Such a violation is different from the kind of violations where disputes can be brought to the
DSB alleging that a member's law violates the agreement. *1042 The violation is about the
system and how intellectual property chapters in FTAs are used to increase standards. Therefore,
TRIPS-plus FTAs need to be brought into check and that increased harmonization of intellectual
property rights through increased pressure via FTAs is not legitimate in the agreed international
intellectual property framework. [FN83]
The likely response from those pursuing increased standards is that the minimum standards
really just meant minimum standards and anything above that is legitimate, but that is too narrow
an interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement. The mere fact that the TRIPS Agreement allows
increased standards is an analytically simplistic argument. It might be described as a formalistic
interpretation [FN84] that also ignores the other parts of the Agreement, particularly its object
and purpose, and also the reality of how laws are made at domestic level. [FN85]
As a qualification I note that as not all TRIPS provisions are the same, not all increases are
problematic. There is a difference between TRIPS-plus standards that expand protection of
aspects of the covered categories of the TRIPS Agreement and TRIPS-plus standards that
introduce new and properly sui generis subject matter, such as traditional knowledge. [FN86] As
the TRIPS Agreement does not speak to traditional knowledge matters, such protection may or
must be negotiated elsewhere and there is no flow back effect to other TRIPS members without
their express agreement.
Increases in international intellectual property protection have occurred through bilateral
agreements long before the TRIPS Agreement was created. [FN87] However, the TRIPS-plus
FTAs are not the same as pre-TRIPS bilaterals. The marriage of trade and intellectual property
has made a significant difference in two ways. The first is that more is at stake when negotiating
a trade-related FTA and consequently the coercive effect to increase intellectual property
protection is much more effective when trade and intellectual property are mixed. The second is
that the object and purpose of TRIPS is different from other intellectual property agreements
because of the trade setting. The relationship with trade places limitations on increased
protections. Those limitations are that the object and purposes of the TRIPS Agreement ought to
be compatible with the overall WTO goal *1043 of liberalizing trade. This limitation on
increased standards was not present in pre-TRIPS agreements, which were predominantly
'intellectual property only' until the 1980s. [FN88]
I acknowledge that a difficulty with the argument that there has been a systemic violation of
the TRIPS Agreement is that the letter of the TRIPS Agreement has arguably not been breached
because there is literal or formalistic compliance. Yet members of the TRIPS Agreement should
be able to benefit from the standard of intellectual property protection being the international
norm unless other norms are freely negotiated. The combination of the coercive effect and the
flow of norms from other members' TRIPS-plus FTAs results in some members having lost the
benefit of not being obliged to have increased standards. This suggests that TRIPS-plus FTAs are
not the legitimate forum for changes to the TRIPS Agreement. The central criteria for a
successful non-violation claim is that a benefit from a negotiated agreement is nullified or
impaired, even if the letter of the agreement has not been breached. Therefore, an alternative
approach to my systemic violation argument is that non-violation disputes might be used to
check increased standards where the formation of those standards erodes an expected benefit of
the TRIPS Agreement. In order to consider this further it is necessary to look at what non-
violation disputes are and examples of what TRIPS non-violation disputes might look like.

VI. THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND NON-VIOLATION DISPUTES

A. Non-Violation in General
GATT permits members to bring a dispute against another member even if there is not a
breach of the wording of the agreement: [FN89]
If any contracting party should consider that any benefit accruing to it directly or indirectly
under this Agreement is being nullified or impaired or that the attainment of any objective of the
agreement is being impeded as a result of: ... (b) the application of another contracting party of
any measure, whether or not it conflicts with the provisions of this Agreement ...
These are known as non-violation disputes because there is not a violation of the exact words
of the agreement. Non-violation disputes can be brought in relation to GATT and GATS, but
there is a moratorium in relation to such disputes and the TRIPS Agreement. [FN90] This
moratorium was initially for 5 years. [FN91] During this period the Agreement provides that the
Council for *1044 TRIPS 'shall examine the scope and modalities for complaints of [this] type'.
[FN92] This process of examination continues. Various members of the WTO are in favour of
such disputes being available. Other members consider such complaints are inappropriate.
[FN93] Some FTAs allow for the parties to bring non-violation disputes against each other.
[FN94]
Cho has grouped GATT non-violation reports into 'restraintism' and 'activism' cases. [FN95]
In relation to the restraintism cases a complainant must show that the measure at issue was not
reasonably anticipated at the time the GATT tariff concession was negotiated. [FN96] The
measure at issue must have damaged the competitive position of the imported product concerned.
[FN97] Cho describes cases that meet these criteria as supplementary mode cases because they
'seem to fill in a legal gap'. [FN98] Activism cases do not meet these criteria, particularly there is
no 'connection between tariff concessions and expectations therefrom'. [FN99] Cho therefore
called these 'independent mode' cases because the complainant did not take issue with a specific
tariff, but rather alleged that the party has, by other means, impeded the objectives of the
agreement.
Cho was critical of the independent mode cases and considered it surprising that some
proponents of non-violation cases have suggested they be used in newly emerging areas.
[FN100] He refers to the use of so-called independent mode cases as providing 'a source of
hope'. [FN101] One might ask what the hope is? In the TRIPS Agreement context the 'hope', I
argue, is that the use of non-violation disputes might bring a more robust approach to application
and interpretation of the structural provisions of the TRIPS Agreement.

B. Why Non-Violation Disputes are not Available under the TRIPS Agreement
The structure and nature of the TRIPS Agreement, as an agreement of minimum standards,
makes it appear inappropriate for non-violation disputes. This is because there could not be any
expected benefits other than *1045 the protection required by the minimum standards. Either the
protection was required or it was not.
A simple example demonstrates the core of this difficulty. Say that there is an international
agreement for related areas of intellectual property, labeled for convenience A, B, C and D, but
the agreement does not extend to protection of E because the parties could not agree on E. It
would not be legitimate for a party to assume that it might also benefit from E as a result of the
agreement.
When interpreting an agreement the WTO dispute settlement rules require that panels and the
Appellate Body do not add to agreements, but rather interpret the existing words of the
agreement. [FN102] One of the difficulties with all non-violation disputes is that they run the
possibility of falling foul of this requirement. A complaint that a benefit has been eroded, but the
wording of the agreement has not been breached, immediately looks like adding to the agreement
even if such complaints are allowed.
In the case of intellectual property disputes some non-violation disputes might really amount
to an attempt to stretch the meaning of the minimum standards. A similar difficulty potentially
arises in GATS Agreement cases, where members may, in order to meet national policy
objectives, regulate the supply of services. Cho points out the nebulous nature of that obligation.
[FN103] Many TRIPS Agreement provisions are equally, if not more, nebulous; particularly
provisions allowing exceptions such as the ability to exclude inventions from patentability on the
basis of ordre public or human, animal or plant life or health. [FN104]
The main reason that developing countries have been opposed to the use of non-violation
disputes for the TRIPS Agreement is that they believe such disputes would be used as a tool,
primarily of the USA, to increase intellectual property protections. [FN105] One fear is that
developing countries will have to fight too many disputes in the WTO and that this will be a
drain on resources. This is not a concern that should be treated lightly and has perhaps been a
concern with the WTO dispute settlement process generally.
Since the TRIPS Agreement came into force, however, the push for increased standards takes
place in the FTA arena. The FTA negotiations process has been very costly and detrimental to
many developing countries and the WTO does not provide a mechanism for developing countries
to defend themselves against these pressures. Developing countries, particularly those with little
negotiating power, could benefit from the non-violation *1046 process as it may provide a rules-
based response to the growing and unsustainable pressure to increase intellectual property
protection. The non-violation procedure, with proper rules governing it, could very well provide
the necessary 'defence' to these pressures.
 One aspect of such rules ought to be that the test of loss of 'any benefit ... being nullified or
impaired or that the attainment of any objective ... being impeded' is objectively assessed. A
complainant's subjective view of loss is not sufficient. The objective view would assess whether
the expected benefit was a reasonable expectation based on the actual agreement. This means
that a party who tried to negotiate for more than they eventually achieved cannot use non-
violation to say that it expected more. An objective assessment is a method of controlling non-
violation disputes from becoming a renegotiation tool.
Disputants may attempt to misuse non-violation, but forming rules around TRIPS Agreement
non-violation should help control this. To be sure some parties may bring bad cases, but this does
not mean that Panels will decide cases incorrectly. Rather it may give the opportunity for reports
to better reflect the nature and structural provisions of the TRIPS Agreement as a balance
between the intellectual property 'haves' and 'have-nots'.
My use of the non-violation formula is not to suggest the Appellate Body, in India-Patents,
was wrong. That dispute was brought in the early days of dispute settlement and the TRIPS
Agreement. As discussed above, because non-violation complaints were and still are not
available for TRIPS disputes, the Appellate Body analysis was correct. It is important, however,
to note that in India-Patents, without the non-violation type criteria, the Appellate Body still
found against India.
My approach here is to show two things that are quite different from the issues discussed in
India-Patents. First, why non-violation disputes have, at this stage in the life of the TRIPS
Agreement, become important so that the scope of the Agreement is tested in a rules-based
forum rather than in the power- imbalanced FTA negotiations. Second, to illustrate that the
unchecked use of intellectual property chapters in FTAs is not only a violation of the structural
provisions of the TRIPS Agreement, but potentially an actionable non-violation of some
substantive legitimate expectations arising from the TRIPS Agreement.

C. Why Non-Violation Disputes Might Now be Appropriate for the TRIPS Agreement
Nearly 15 years of operation have shown that there are many grey areas in the TRIPS
Agreement. These grey areas arise through a combination of features of the TRIPS Agreement.
As discussed above, the minimum standards prescribe the level of protection rather than the
exact wording of the law. This means that there will be differences in laws at national level and
in *1047 effect different ways to comply with the minimum standard. Also, the lines between
areas of intellectual property law, within or outside of the scope of the TRIPS Agreement, are not
always so clear. Violation disputes which analyse the wording, in light of the object and purpose
of the TRIPS Agreement, ought to be the first set of tools used to interpret that grey area. There
are, however, some grey areas where members and the system might benefit from non-violation
disputes.
The use of non-violation disputes about the TRIPS Agreement would not require a
connection to a specific tariff because the TRIPS Agreement is not about tariffs. Rather the
connection ought to be to a category of protection in relation to which the TRIPS Agreement
requires its members to enact minimum standards in relation to. Non-violation will be
particularly useful in the minimum standards framework because, in a way that is different from
a violation dispute, non-violation ought to recognize that there are broad expectations arising
from the general provisions of the Agreement. Non-violation recognizes that even though there is
literal compliance with a standard, that is a Vienna Convention interpretation might show
compliance, there has, in fact, been an erosion of a reasonably expected benefit under the TRIPS
Agreement.
Allowing non-violation disputes would provide a way for members to test the parameters of
the agreement in an analytical rules-based environment, rather than in potentially coercive FTA
'negotiations', which are not characterized by freedom of contract and state autonomy. The
TRIPS Agreement cannot be renegotiated in dispute settlement and panels are not authorized to
do anything other than interpret the agreements, [FN106] but disputes do serve the purpose of
allowing members to test their interpretations of the agreement and removes the difficulty of
members being judge of their own cause. [FN107] Being judge in one's own cause is particularly
problematic in FTA negotiations, where there is a power imbalance between negotiating parties,
and the stronger party can simply assert that their interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement is
correct. [FN108]
In order to examine the utility of non-violation disputes further, however, the next part
discusses who potentially may bring non-violation disputes and what they might look like.

*1048 VII. WHAT A TRIPS AGREEMENT NON-VIOLATION DISPUTE MIGHT LOOK

LIKE

A. Owners and Users as Complainants

There are two broad categories of benefits that WTO members might expect from the TRIPS
Agreement. One is the benefits that intellectual property right owners may expect and the other is
what users of intellectual property might expect. [FN109] At national level there will be both
users and owners of intellectual property rights. At international level some WTO members are
recognized as predominantly owners of intellectual property rights and others are recognized
predominantly as users. The United States and the European Union are major owners of
intellectual property by comparison to many small or developing countries, which are often
predominantly users of intellectual property. The benefits that intellectual property owners might
expect pose different issues from the benefits that users of intellectual property might expect.
The legal basis of intellectual property rights is important because the underpinnings of the
rights can assist in defining the appropriate contours of the rights. At national level intellectual
property rights are usually considered to be negative rights. That is they provide the owner with
the exclusive right to exclude third parties. Underlying some of the arguments against the use of
non-violation complaints in the TRIPS Agreement context is that intellectual property rights are
private negative rights and therefore inherently unsuitable to the principles of non-violation,
which looks for the loss of a positive benefit. [FN110]
Even though intellectual property rights at national level are predominantly negative property
rights, international agreements impose on their member countries positive obligations to provide
protection, even if that protection is provided through a negative rights property framework. The
existence of those positive obligations can give a correlative right to individuals to claim
protection of the rights. Human rights treaties, where there is *1049 an obligation on states to
provide authors protection or protection of social and cultural rights, are examples. [FN111]
Generally an intellectual property owner cannot expect anything more than the rights that a
particular domestic law grants them. [FN112] Even though intellectual property rights are private
rights WTO disputes are not about a particular individual's private right, but members'
obligations to provide those private rights in their domestic laws. [FN113] Because the TRIPS
Agreement is part of the WTO 'bargain' about trading relationships the expectation of intellectual
property protection and the resulting trade benefit is not a negative right, but a positive obligation
between member states. The TRIPS Agreement does not transform negative rights into positive
rights of expectation for the benefit of individual intellectual property owners or users. Rather, it
provides Members with the right to expect intellectual property protection for their nationals in
other member states. These are the positive obligations between Member states that have been
and may be the subject of violation disputes. Members who provide that protection should
legitimately expect to benefit from the ability not to be obliged to provide 'more extensive
protection', if they do not wish to do so. The expectation not to provide greater protection and to
be able to use TRIPS flexibilities could be the subject of a non-violation dispute.
Non-violation disputes under the TRIPS Agreement would not be available only for
Members who are predominantly owners of intellectual property rights, but they may be an
avenue for Members, who are predominantly users, to bring disputes. As discussed above, the
TRIPS Agreement creates rights to protect intellectual property, and embodies the objectives of
*1050 technology transfer and dissemination, but this does not give individuals the right to make
use of intellectual property works. For the most part no one user of an intellectual property right,
except under license, has defined rights in the same way owners do. Fair uses of intellectual
property works are a public good required as part of the overall justifications for the scope of
intellectual property protection. Therefore users might need to be cautious about alleging there
are expected benefits arising from any national intellectual property laws. However, when
considered in the international agreement context, reasonably expected benefits of the TRIPS
Agreement, from the net-users' perspective, include transfer and dissemination of technology,
and national autonomy over implementation of TRIPS and whether or not to provide more
extensive protection. [FN114]
In sum, the TRIPS Agreement creates positive rights for Members to reasonably expect
protection, degrees of flexibility and that other Members adhere to the structural provisions of
the Agreement. It is in this context that non-violation complaints may prove useful. I
acknowledge that such disputes may be hard to win and that they ought to be hard to win, but
that cannot be a reason not to have them for appropriate cases. With this in mind the next section
looks at examples of non-violation disputes, including what they might be about, who could
bring them and what they might achieve.

B. Examples of Potential Non-Violation Disputes

The Secretariat Note of the TRIPS Council's discussion of non-violation complaints sets out
some examples of what non-violation complaints could look like. [FN115] One of these is that:
[FN116]
Member A may grant a very large increase in the term of copyright protection which could
effectively nullify or impair benefits that Member B was expecting to enjoy at the time of
negotiations and thereafter nationals of Member B may have invested in the production of
separate works, say movies or plays based on or using that work and expecting it to be in the
public domain.
This example is apposite for discussion because many countries have extended their
copyright term beyond the TRIPS Agreement minimum. [FN117]
*1051 Such a complaint is not a violation complaint as the requirements of the TRIPS
Agreement have been met and exceeded. Because there is a moratorium on non-violation
complaints the complaint could not be brought as a non-violation complaint. However, assuming
that the moratorium is removed, the real question is whether such a complaint is realistic in light
of the object and purposes of the TRIPS Agreement, in particular its structure of minimum
standards and allowance of national autonomy over the method of implementation of those
standards and whether or not to increase those standards.
It cannot be a rational interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement that members froze their
intellectual property laws as at 1995 as, at that time, many countries had ongoing programs of
intellectual property law reform and there were international negotiations over various aspects of
international intellectual property underway and planned. [FN118] In any event, many members'
laws were TRIPS-plus, in the area of copyright term, at that time. However, that does not mean
that Members should reasonably expect copyright term to be indefinitely extended. Can there
now be a legitimate complaint about the continued extension of copyright term?
A violation complaint is unlikely to succeed because the TRIPS Agreement has been literally
complied with, but a non-violation complaint raises some different issues. These different issues
are important as they address the trading relationship between members of the WTO. WTO
members should be allowed to dispute the legitimacy of escalating copyright terms, which are
very protectionist and do not generally facilitate trade. One example is the extension of term for
sound recordings in the EU. Many Members have expected some European sound recordings to
fall into the public domain and people based in those Member states may have planned to
reproduce the sound recordings or to use them to create new copyright works. However, that
expected trade benefit will now probably disappear because the European Commission plans, at
the time of writing, to extend the term of copyright protection in sound recording to 70 years.
[FN119]
*1052 Parallel importing rules provide another example of a user's potential non-violation
complaint. The TRIPS Agreement does not require members to either allow or prohibit parallel
imports of copyright products. [FN120] Australia permitted certain types of parallel imports until
it agreed, in an FTA with the USA, to restrict those imports. Should member states who supplied
the Australian parallel import market be permitted to complain that a benefit it expected in trade
has been removed? This example has the difficulty that parallel importing rules in copyright are
ostensibly outside of the scope of the TRIPS Agreement. [FN121] Therefore members should be
allowed national autonomy over parallel importing rules and cannot claim that these may not
change in other members from time to time. [FN122]
Interpretation of article 27 of the TRIPS Agreement, which prescribes the subject matter of
patent law, is another example. It provides that 'patents shall be available for any inventions,
whether products or processes, in all fields of technology, provided that they are new, involve an
inventive step and are capable of industrial application'. [FN123] Disputes over the scope of
patent and other intellectual property subject matter are some of the hardest disputes to resolve
because the subject matter of intellectual property law and the consequent interpretation of
existing laws are continuously evolving in a way to ensure that existing laws can capture new
technologies as patentable inventions. [FN124] Countries are not able to exclude patents on the
basis of subject matter alone. A country cannot, for example, have a blanket rule that patents are
not available for pharmaceuticals. Despite the prohibition of blanket subject matter
discrimination, disputes over the patentability of pharmaceuticals still exist. These disputes are
about the scope of article 27's requirements in relation to patents for pharmaceuticals.
There is no dispute that first use pharmaceuticals must be patentable to comply with the
TRIPS Agreement. [FN125] However, differences have emerged over whether TRIPS
compliance requires second and subsequent uses of known pharmaceuticals to be patented. New
uses of known pharmaceuticals were not always patentable, even in the developed world,
because the *1053 pharmaceutical was known, and therefore novelty and inventive step could
not be established. These types of patents, often called Swiss claims, [FN126] were patented, in
developed countries, on the basis that although the pharmaceutical compound itself is not
necessarily new, the use is new. [FN127]
India, however, does not allow patents for second and subsequent uses of known compounds
unless there is 'an enhancement of the known efficacy' [FN128] of the substance. This Indian law
is effectively a definition of inventive step for some types of inventions. India and some other
developing countries regard such patents as being for incremental inventions and therefore
resulting in the evergreening of a patent for a pharmaceutical substance. [FN129]
Before the Madras High Court, Novartis unsuccessfully challenged India's refusal to grant
such a patent in relation to the pharmaceutical, known as Gleevec, on the basis that there was no
new efficacy, only a new form of a known substance. [FN130] Among Novartis' submissions
was that the Indian law did not comply with article 27 of the TRIPS Agreement. The Madras
Court did not rule on the TRIPS Agreement argument, rather it decided it did not have
jurisdiction over the issue. [FN131]
The relevant issue here is whether there is any basis for arguing that India's approach to
inventive step is a violation or a non-violation nullification and impairment of the TRIPS
Agreement. The violation question asks if *1054 article 27 is breached. The non-violation
question asks if a member has a complaint, even if the article is not breached, because an
expected benefit of the agreement or the attainment of an objective cannot be realized. [FN132]
The TRIPS Agreement is silent on the definition of inventive step. [FN133] This silence
means that members must implement their own definitions of inventive step. [FN134] This
results in different countries having different approaches to what is an inventive step. There must
be limits to the autonomy that members have in defining inventive step. National definitions
should presumably not be so demanding that nothing could be patentable, thus eliminating the
scope of the TRIPS Agreement. [FN135]
The diversity arises from how inventive step is assessed. Broadly, an inventive step is
something that is not obvious to a person skilled in the art. Beyond this, however, it is impossible
to say that there is any international consensus that could create an international norm, regarding
the level of or meaning of inventive step. Indeed, the perceived need for greater harmonization of
patent law and international negotiations aimed at that recognizes the lack of consensus. [FN136]
As there is no harmonized norm of inventive step and only a minimum standard, that for an
invention to be patentable it must involve an inventive step, it cannot be established that India
has breached article 27. [FN137] Because at the time of the TRIPS Agreement, and now, there
was, and is, no international norm over the patentability of second and subsequent uses of known
pharmaceuticals [FN138] it would be a misuse of the *1055 treaty interpretation to suggest that
there is. The TRIPS Agreement should not be interpreted to say that there is harmonization of
this sort of patent law detail because that would be filling a gap that the parties have not agreed.
[FN139]
If a violation complaint in these circumstances is as unlikely to succeed, as I suggest, could it
be advantageous to bring a non-violation claim in relation to India's law? In my view, such a
complaint about the scope of subject matter in article 27 and India's law should not be successful
for the same reasons that the violation complaint should not succeed. There can be no expected
benefit of a common standard of inventive step. However there would be advantages in allowing
non-violation complaints over this issue. India might complain that the direct and indirect
pressure, through the effect of FTAs, to protect second use pharmaceuticals is a nullification and
impairment of an expected benefit under the TRIPS Agreement. The complainant should argue
that the web of TRIPS-plus FTAs, which require protection of new uses of known
pharmaceuticals, has eroded for some countries, and is eroding for India, the ability to not be
obliged to provide more extensive protection and consequently legitimate expectations under the
TRIPS Agreement are defeated.
The advantage of either non-violation complaint, discussed above, is that the issues would be
decided in a rules-based forum, rather than in the power-imbalanced international FTA
negotiation. On the one hand, I suggest that such a non-violation complaint against India should
lose because there was and is international division over the patenting of new uses of known
pharmaceuticals. In the face of that division, a panel should not conclude that it was a reasonably
expected benefit of the TRIPS Agreement that all Members would provide patents for second use
pharmaceuticals. Some Members and private right holders may have hoped, and even attempted
to negotiate, that this was so, but hope falls short of a legally enforceable expectation. To suggest
that the parties intended that article 27 would result in the same things being patentable
everywhere in the world suggests a level of harmonization that is not a reasonable interpretation
of the wording of article 27, the parties' intentions or any expected benefits arising from TRIPS.
It has always been known in defining inventive step that members are able to enact their own
legislation. Members can and do delineate the details of patent systems according to their
economic circumstances and the need to do so is hardly unexpected. [FN140]
On the other hand, I suggest that a non-violation complaint, brought against the USA and
possibly also the EU, could succeed. This is because several countries have been pressured
through non-negotiable template FTAs into protecting second use pharmaceuticals. Those
countries have done so against their own national interest, which suggests the negotiations were
in some way coercive. Additionally, these FTA provisions are cumulatively *1056 contrary to
the object and purpose of the TRIPS Agreement for developing countries. Such protection is not
contributing to the 'promotion of innovation ... to the mutual advantage of producers and users
...'. [FN141] Also, India has not changed its law to protect second use pharmaceutical patents,
but it is placed under continuous pressure, directly and via TRIPS-plus FTAs creating new
norms, to change its laws. An erosion of a member's expected benefit not be obliged to change
its laws to protect second use pharmaceutical patents has occurred. [FN142]
Whether a Member decides to bring a complaint may in part depend on the remedy available.

C. Remedies for Non-Violation Disputes

If a non-violation dispute is successful because 'a measure has been found to nullify or impair
benefits under, or impede the attainment of objectives', [FN143] of the TRIPS Agreement there
is no obligation to withdraw the measure. 'However in such cases the panel or the Appellate
Body shall recommend that the Member concerned make a mutually satisfactory adjustment.'
[FN144] In the TRIPS Agreement context a mutually a satisfactory adjustment is a peculiar
concept. While a tariff might be mutually adjusted that does not make much sense for an
intellectual property law.
If TRIPS-plus FTAs are found to be a non-violation nullification and impairment of the
object and purpose of TRIPS then the measure that needs to be withdrawn will be found in the
complainant's law not the respondent's. The remedy for TRIPS-plus FTAs, which are
inconsistent with the object and purpose of TRIPS, would be to curb future analogous FTAs and
to allow a members to withdraw the increased protection that thwarts its legitimate TRIPS
expectations. If non-violation disputes are introduced in the TRIPS Agreement, there will need to
be a framing of how these appropriate remedies can be achieved in view of the unique nature of
the TRIPS Agreement among WTO agreements.

VIII. THE OVERLAP OF NON-VIOLATION AND VIOLATION DISPUTES

A. Using Violation because Non-Violation is not Available

It is advantageous to bring a violation complaint, in preference to a non-violation complaint,
because in a violation dispute reliance on the agreement is assumed and once there is an
established breach of the agreement it is also assumed that there has been injury. By comparison,
in a non-violation dispute a complainant needs to demonstrate reliance and causality of the
*1057 injury. Thus, Members are more likely to bring a violation complaint if they can. It is,
however, possible to recast non-violation disputes as violation disputes. [FN145] Indeed, because
non-violation disputes have not been available this may have already occurred, but this
'recasting' should not succeed. Aspects of the dispute between the USA and China demonstrate
this and provide a good illustration of the relationship between violation and nonviolation
nullification and impairment in the TRIPS Agreement context. [FN146]
The USA brought a violation complaint against China about various aspects of China's
copyright and trademark laws. For a number of years the USA and China had been in discussions
over enforcement of intellectual property rights in China. [FN147] The USA eventually
requested the establishment of a WTO panel over several alleged breaches of the TRIPS
Agreement by China. One complaint related to the thresholds of infringing copies that would
give rise to a criminal level of infringement of copyright in China. [FN148] China reduced the
level of the relevant thresholds from 1000 to 500 shortly before the USA requested a Panel. The
essence of the USA's case was that China's thresholds for criminal infringement in copyright law
rendered the requirements of the TRIPS Agreement to provide criminal offences for
infringement ineffective in some circumstances. [FN149]
The scope of criminal liability and remedies for copyright infringement was an area over
which there was little international agreement both in the Uruguay Round leading to the TRIPS
Agreement and subsequently. [FN150] Consequently the enforcement related minimum
standards, including those *1058 specifically about criminal liability and enforcement, are not
prescriptive and rather leave a lot of scope for differing national laws. [FN151]
General differences between WTO members' court systems are recognized in the TRIPS
Agreement, which provides that none of the enforcement obligations create obligations that the
parties provide a system of intellectual property enforcement that is distinct from its general
criminal law. [FN152] This means that intellectual property is not a special case. The Panel in
the China-TRIPS Enforcement report recognized the importance of this provision and noted that
even so there is still an obligation on China to provide the enforcement measures required under
the TRIPS Agreement. [FN153]
There was considerable room to argue that China's thresholds were reasonable in the
circumstances of the conditions in China, including its progressive improvement of measures for
enforcement and the state of criminal law in general. The device of using thresholds for criminal
liability is common. Indeed the USA uses them. [FN154] However, the enforcement must be
effective against commercial infringement. 'Effective' in this context is, at best, a relative term.
So it is difficult to interpret the TRIPS Agreement to mean that a particular threshold number is
too high. Using Vienna Convention principles [FN155] of interpretation, the Panel concluded
that the USA did not make out its case that the criminal thresholds prevented China from
fulfilling its obligations to provide criminal enforcement for counterfeiting and piracy activities
on a commercial scale. [FN156]
The result, in my view, is correct because the United States seemed to hope to read into the
enforcement provisions a level of detail that was not there and, therefore, cannot be said to be the
meaning of the provisions. The relevant provisions in the TRIPS Agreement simply provide a
broad and *1059 undetailed requirement that there be enforcement. [FN157] Given the lack of
detail in the enforcement provisions the US argument was really more of a non-violation
complaint. The essence of what the USA was really complaining about was that a benefit it
expected from the TRIPS Agreement was better levels of enforcement.
What if the USA had been able to bring this as a non-violation compliant? A non-violation
complaint should reach the same result as the Panel did in the violation complaint, because the
level of benefit that the USA wished to claim was not something that could be construed as an
expected benefit arising from the words of the Agreement which show the intention of the
parties. A non-violation claim in assessing expected benefits would not rewrite those intentions.
Until there is a proper international agreement over such issues the WTO dispute settlement body
should not be used to fill the gaps. Even if, however, the non-violation complaint would lose, this
does not mean that it should not be brought. This is a type of non-violation complaint that is
feared, but it is also the type of non-violation complaint that should not be successful because
there is not the kind of expected benefit that a non-violation complaint should address. Bringing
such a complaint would have meant that in addition to treaty interpretation methods of the
Vienna Convention, the Panel decision could have more robustly considered what benefits
members could expect from the enforcement provisions of the TRIPS Agreement. Such analysis
should not be feared. Rather a more robust discussion of the meaning of the enforcement
provisions should be encouraged because a properly reasoned decision would have likely shown
that the US threshold argument was untenable because it had tried to negotiate more detailed
enforcement provisions, but had failed and so cannot afterwards claim an expected benefit of
more detail. [FN158]
Another aspect of robustness for dispute settlement that non-violation complaints might bring
is the possibility of looking at exactly how and why a domestic law, at issue in a dispute, was
reached. Where a domestic *1060 intellectual property law is arrived at through negotiated trade-
offs Dreyfuss and Dinwoodie suggest that: [FN159]
challenges to the side-effects that ... measures have on intellectual property rights are more
naturally categorized as non-violation complaints because they frustrate the objectives of the
Agreement rather than breach specific obligations.
The authors suggest that the WTO dispute settlement system needs to take into account not
just the intellectual property provision at issue before it, but also the context through which a
member came to that provision. In particular, a provision may be reached through trade-offs at a
national level and the authors suggest that it is too great an interference in national autonomy for
those trade-offs to be 'unwound' at international level. [FN160] They give the example of the
extension of copyright term, which was part of a package that included the exemption from
liability of the playing of non-dramatic musical works in certain restaurants and bars. [FN161]
The WTO found that the musical works exemption was a violation of the TRIPS Agreement,
[FN162] but the US Supreme Court upheld the extension of term. [FN163] As the authors note,
sometimes aspects of the negotiated package are found outside intellectual property law and in
those circumstances non-violation complaints may be useful.
B. Non-Violation Disputes and Laws that are not Primarily Intellectual Property Laws
Another area in which non-violation disputes may be important for intellectual property is
where non-intellectual property measures affect the TRIPS Agreement minimum standards. In
the TRIPS Council discussion on non-violation complaints, there are some limited examples of
these potential sorts of complaints. One of the examples is 'A Member could ban all advertising
of cigarettes, including their trademarks, for health reasons'. [FN164] On the face of it this ban
complies with the TRIPS Agreement. [FN165]
The non-violation question is whether or not the ban nullifies and impairs an expected benefit
of the TRIPS Agreement. A Council member responded *1061 to the example that such a ban
could have been anticipated at the time of the Agreement, particularly as such a ban already
existed in some jurisdictions at the time of the Agreement. [FN166] Therefore, it could not be
said that there was loss of an expected benefit. This response must be correct.
Additionally, it cannot be supposed that members of the WTO, when agreeing to the TRIPS
Agreement, consented to not allow other laws to affect intellectual property products. Indeed,
trademark law and other intellectual property law has always been subject to other laws. There
are many examples: Patents can be granted for pharmaceuticals, but pharmaceuticals cannot be
sold in many countries without regulatory approval. Patents can be granted for electrical
products, but safety standards must be met. As mentioned above, the grant of an intellectual
property right is not an affirmative right to use, but rather a right to exclude others, and it is not a
guarantee that any sales will be unregulated or even successful. Intellectual property law, on its
own, does not control market conditions and the TRIPS Agreement, unlike other WTO
Agreements, [FN167] is not a market access agreement. Market access issues, even if they relate
to intellectual property products, must be dealt with in the negotiated disciplines of GATT and
GATS.
It is questionable and arguably not a reflection of the intention of the parties if the TRIPS
Agreement is interpreted so that it is used as a back door to GATT and GATS related market
access or non-discrimination issues. [FN168] However, the relationship between the WTO
agreements is perhaps an ideal area for non-violation complaints because WTO members may
'mix-up' the disciplines in order to achieve certain goals. An example might be where country A,
in order to prevent the sale of products, which it considers have large carbon footprints, enacts a
law banning advertising of trademarks that encourage the purchase of products associated with
distant lands, whether or not the product is made locally or otherwise. Examples might be the
ban of 'Fiji Water' or 'New Zealand Natural' ice cream sold in the USA.
Another relevant example, from the TRIPS Council documents, is where a Member applies a
high tax 'on certain goods with intellectual property rights whose use is deleterious to the
environment.' [FN169] The problem is identifying the loss of benefit in the TRIPS Agreement
context. The possibility that intellectual property goods might be highly taxed in some places is
widely *1062 known and practised. [FN170] If such a tax on goods occurred it would be
appropriate to consider if the tax violates the GATT and if there was a breach of a tariff binding
or a non-discrimination provision.
Also, intellectual property right owners use all sorts of methods beyond mere intellectual
property rights in order to exploit their intellectual property. [FN171] Examples include region
coding of DVDs, other technological protection mechanisms to control territorial or time-related
uses of copyright works and charging different prices in different markets. Region coding and
technological protection mechanisms have received intellectual property style protection through
international negotiations independent of the TRIPS Agreement. [FN172] However, they were
used before that protection was put in place. Protection of technological protection mechanisms
are not an expected benefit of the TRIPS Agreement because they are outside the scope of the
Agreement and the international protection was established after intellectual property rights
owners had used them for some time.
Charging differential prices in markets has been and is a way in which businesses have
exploited the territorial nature of intellectual property rights. [FN173] The charging of different
prices is an exploitation of intellectual property rights rather than a required minimum standard
of an exclusive right of the TRIPS Agreement. It cannot be said that either of these sorts of
examples are an expected benefit of the TRIPS Agreement.
Undoubtedly non-violation disputes should not be used to fill the gaps, both in and between
GATT, GATS and the TRIPS Agreement, via dispute settlement rather than by negotiation.
However, to the extent that a purpose of the TRIPS Agreement is the trading relationship
between its members, [FN174] it is important that the legitimate expectations resulting from that
Agreement are met. This might mean that, where the exploitation of intellectual property rights
under the TRIPS Agreement is frustrated by means that fall short of a violation of GATT or
GATS, there ought to be redress. Multilateral negotiation over these gaps is theoretically the
ideal method of progress, however, it may also be unrealistic that every nuance could be dealt
with in this way. Non-violation disputes are difficult to bring, and as the above *1063 examples
show not easy to win. The difficulties with non-violation disputes are noted, but I do not
conclude that they are dispositive of whether or not such disputes should be allowed in the
TRIPS Agreement context. Rather, these difficulties create sufficient parameters to guard against
their misuse.
It therefore seems that the uses of non-violation disputes might well be appropriately limited
in a way that is not detrimental either to the integrity of the TRIPS Agreement or to WTO
developing countries and least developed country members who have found the TRIPS
Agreement standards hard to comply with and may fear that non-violation disputes would make
that worse.

C. Mechanisms to Control Non-Intellectual Property Law's Effect on Intellectual Property

Members seeking to control the effects of other laws on intellectual property rights have used
a variety of ways to do so. This can be through negotiated packages within their own
jurisdictions [FN175] or between jurisdictions in FTAs. [FN176] The FTA between Australia
and the United States (AUSFTA), for example, has a number of provisions, over and above its
intellectual property provisions, that relate to the marketing and sale of pharmaceuticals.
[FN177] There are provisions that effectively require Australia to limit, and to potentially
remove, certain government subsidization of pharmaceutical sales. [FN178] The existence of
these provisions in AUSFTA is an express recognition that the TRIPS Agreement does not
control these things. This suggests, therefore, that it is arguable that TRIPS Agreement Members
can not use other laws, in relation to the sale and distribution of pharmaceuticals, which might
frustrate some types of exploitation of intellectual property rights. An example is price controls
over pharmaceuticals. These exist in some developed and developing countries. In some
jurisdictions such controls may raise competition law issues. The TRIPS Agreement does not,
however, address competition concerns of this nature. [FN179] There have been no agreed
WTO, or other international, rules on competition. [FN180] Although *1064 intellectual property
rights brush up against and in some jurisdictions incorporate laws against anticompetitive
practices, the TRIPS Agreement does not have express provisions, with one small exception, to
control competition related issues. [FN181] While countries with pharmaceutical industries may
consider that price control mechanisms are frustrating, it could not logically be concluded that
the objectives of the TRIPS Agreement, as agreed to by its members, are frustrated by such
measures.
In addition to the lack of express provisions addressing competition concerns, parts of the
TRIPS Agreement implicitly recognize the distinct role of non-intellectual property laws, but
still require members to provide intellectual property protection. The ability to exclude
inventions from patentability on the grounds of ordre public, for example, is qualified by the
requirement that members must not exclude something from patentability simply because its
exploitation is illegal. [FN182]
As the TRIPS Agreement is about minimum intellectual property standards in trade then it
should, as discussed above, be possible to dispute the trade effects of intellectual property.
Although the TRIPS Agreement should not be interpreted to expand the minimum standards that
it sets out, equally other laws should not be permitted to erode the minimum standards in the
Agreement.

IX. CONCLUSION
Non-violation disputes have been thought of as potentially a tool for the interests of
intellectual property owners to increase the protection of the TRIPS Agreement beyond its
wording. They also are potentially a tool for users of intellectual property to challenge TRIPS-
plus FTAs, which provide more extensive levels of protection without Members always freely
choosing that more extensive protection. This lack of choice is in part because of the coercive
manner in which many of these TRIPS-plus FTA chapters have been negotiated, but also the way
in which TRIPS-plus norms can affect those outside of such TRIPS-plus FTAs. In neither
situation can it be said that Members of the WTO have had a choice over whether or not to apply
'more extensive protection'. Yet the TRIPS Agreement frames this as a *1065 choice. The
erosion of this choice conflicts with the object and purpose of the TRIPS Agreement and so is
more than just a violation of Article 1, but also potentially a non-violation of the Agreement.
Non-violation complaints may provide a way in which both net-owners and net-users of
intellectual property can, in a rules-based forum, have an independent body analyse the expected
benefits of any one party from the TRIPS Agreement. This is particularly important in light of
the evident difficulties that developing countries, in particular, face in keeping up with
intellectual property protection as it increases. Non-violation disputes may provide a means to
provide some limitations on excessive, primarily FTA-based, increases in intellectual property
standards. Because violation cases are required to have a formalistic interpretation non-violation
offers a more robust approach to analysing the expected benefits that reflect the intentions of the
parties and the object and purpose of the TRIPS Agreement, as expressed in its terms.
If non-violation disputes are introduced for the TRIPS Agreement there will need to be a
careful distinction set out between violation and non-violation cases. Disciplines around the use
of non-violation complaints about the TRIPS Agreement must also be developed. These
disciplines must include rules about how the expected benefit criteria of a non-violation dispute
must be an objective assessment. There must be an objective assessment, rather than a subjective
approach that can be shown to be one party's unsuccessful negotiating position or wish-list. Also,
an in-depth framing of rules to provide for appropriate remedies will need to occur.
 Although greater harmonization is potentially beneficial to trade, more extensive protection
is not necessarily beneficial. Harmonization, if it is to occur, should be a progressive process that
happens at the right pace and is the direct result of multilateral agreement, rather than through
the backdoor of TRIPS-plus FTAs. Similarly, non-violation disputes should not be used as a
means to renegotiate the TRIPS Agreement; rather they should be used to recalibrate it so as to
enable developing countries to realize their side of the TRIPS Agreement bargain.

[FNa1]. Professor of Law, Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand. E-mail:

susy.frankel@vuw.ac.nz. I presented an earlier version of this article, 'Is nullification and
impairment of the TRIPS Agreement possible 'as the result' of TRIPS-plus agreements?', at the
Inaugural conference of the SIEL in Geneva 2008. My thanks to the organisers of that
conference. Thanks also to Rochelle Dreyfuss, Jane Ginsburg, Lionel Bentley and Susan Corbett
for comments on draft and my research assistant Jessica Lai.

[FN1]. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement),

15 April 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO
Agreement), Annex 1C, 33 ILM 1197, 1198 (1994).

[FN2]. Article 1.1 of the TRIPS Agreement provides: 'Members shall give effect to the
provisions of this Agreement. Members may, but shall not be obliged to, implement in their law
more extensive protection than is required by this Agreement, provided that such protection does
not contravene the provisions of this Agreement. Members shall be free to determine the
appropriate method of implementing the provisions of this Agreement within their own legal
system and practice.'

[FN3]. There are, however, many multilateral bodies that have agreed on some intellectual
property standards. An example is the Convention on Biological Diversity, done at Rio de
Janeiro, 5 June 1992, UNEP/Bio.Div./N7-INC5; 31 ILM 818, available at http://www.cbd.int.
For a general discussion of the various international fora in which intellectual property issues are
discussed see, Laurence R Helfer, 'Regime Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics
of International Intellectual Property Lawmaking', (2004) 29 Yale J Intl L 1.

[FN4]. The WTO states on its website that 'Regional Trade Agreements' (RTAs) have become in
recent years a very prominent feature of the Multilateral Trading System. The surge in RTAs has
continued unabated since the early 1990s. Some 380 RTAs have been notified to the
GATT/WTO up to July 2007. Of these, 300 RTAs were notified under Article XXIV of the
GATT 1947 or GATT 1994; 22 under the Enabling Clause; and 58 under Article V of the GATS.
At that same date, 205 agreements were in force. If we take into account RTAs which are in
force but have not been notified, those signed but not yet in force, those currently being
negotiated, and those in the proposal stage, we arrive at a figure of close to 400 RTAs which are
scheduled to be implemented by 2010. Of these RTAs, free trade agreements (FTAs) and partial
scope agreements account for over 90%, while customs unions account for less than 10%, see
WTO, 'Regional Trade Agreements',
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm> accessed 21 March 2009. Many
of these agreements, although not all, contain intellectual property chapters.
[FN5]. Some may have very limited IP chapters, such as an agreement to have TRIPS standards.
Others may have extensive TRIPS-plus provisions, see Susy Frankel, 'The Legitimacy and
Purpose of Intellectual Property Chapters in FTAs', in Ross Buckley and others (eds), Challenges
to Multilateral Trade: The Impact of Bilateral Preferential and Regional Trade Agreements
(Kluwer Law International, The Netherlands 2008), (Legitimacy and Purpose of Intellectual
Property Chapters), where I describe these chapters as 'TRIPS equivalent and a little bit extra',
'TRIPS-plus' and 'TRIPS-superplus'.

[FN6]. See 'Intellectual Property Provisions in International Investment Arrangements', United

Nations Conference on Trade and Development, IIA Monitor No. 1 (2007), UN Doc.
UNCTAD/WEB/ITE/IIA/2007/1, at 5 noting that intellectual property chapters in both US and
EU FTAs are often the same, but that the US and EU approaches are different from each other.

[FN7]. See generally Keith E Maskus and JH Reichman (eds), International Public Goods and
Transfer of Technology under a Globalized Intellectual Property Regime (Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge 2005).

[FN8]. Article 64 of the TRIPS Agreement provides: 'The provisions of Articles XXII and XXIII
of GATT 1994 as elaborated and applied by the Dispute Settlement Understanding shall apply to
consultations and the settlement of disputes under this Agreement except as otherwise
specifically provided herein.'

[FN9]. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT), 15 April 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO Agreement), Annex 1A, article
XX, 1867 UNTS 187; 33 ILM 1153 (1994).

[FN10]. General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), 15 April 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO Agreement), Annex 1B, 1869 UNTS. 183, HR
Doc. No. 103-316, 1588.

[FN11]. Article 6.2-3 of the TRIPS Agreement states: '2. Subparagraphs 1(b) and 1(c) of Article
XXIII of GATT 1994 shall not apply to the settlement of disputes under this Agreement for a
period of five years from the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement. 3. During the time
period referred to in paragraph 2, the Council for TRIPS shall examine the scope and modalities
for complaints of the type provided for under subparagraphs 1(b) and 1(c) of Article XXIII of
GATT 1994 made pursuant to this Agreement, and submit its recommendations to the
Ministerial Conference for approval. Any decision of the Ministerial Conference to approve such
recommendations or to extend the period in paragraph 2 shall be made only by consensus, and
approved recommendations shall be effective for all Members without further formal acceptance
process.'

[FN12]. Article XXIII of GATT provides for non-violation and situation complaints. Situation
complaints are rarely used and have not been suggested as relevant in the TRIPS context.
Therefore I focus on non-violation complaints.

[FN13]. Despite the passing of 5 years the moratorium on non-violation complaints continues.
See WTO 4th Ministerial Conference, 'Declaration on Implementation-Related Issues and
Concerns', WT/MIN(01)/17, adopted on 14 November 2001 at Doha, para 11(1), Member States
directed that '[t]he TRIPS Council ... continue its examination of the scope and modalities for
[non-violation] complaints ... and make recommendations to the Fifth Session of the Ministerial
Conference [in Cancún 2003]. It is agreed that, in the meantime, members will not initiate such
complaints under the TRIPS Agreement.' No resolution of the issue was reached at the Cancún
Ministerial Conference and no agreement has subsequently been reached. See also WTO,
Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 'Non-violation and Situation
Complaints--Summary Note by the Secretariat, Revision', IP/C/W/349/Rev.1, 24 November
2004, (TRIPS Council Summary of Non-Violation Issues).

[FN14]. Sungjoon Cho, 'GATT Non-Violation Issues in the WTO Framework: Are They the
Achilles' Heel of the Dispute Settlement Process' (1998) 39 Harv Intl LJ 311.

[FN15]. Ibid. Other commentators consider that such disputes are potentially important because
they enable the disputants not to be their own judge in contentious trade relationships, see eg
those cited in Cho, ibid, fn 42.

[FN16]. Article 7 of the TRIPS Agreement. See also discussion below in Section IV.

[FN17]. Articles 7 and 8 of the TRIPS Agreement. See also discussion below in Section IV.

[FN18]. Although panels have not always paid attention to the object and purpose of the TRIPS
Agreement as a whole, see Susy Frankel, 'WTO Application of "the Customary Rules of
Interpretation of Public International Law" to Intellectual Property' (2006) 46 Virginia Intl L Rev
(2006) (WTO Application of Customary Rules). The need for the objectives and principles to be
recognised in dispute settlement was underscored in the Doha Declaration, see Doha WTO
Ministerial 2001: TRIPS, 'Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health',
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, adopted on 20 November 2001 (Doha Declaration on Public Health), para
5a.

[FN19]. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (Berne Convention),
24 July 1971 (Paris text), 1161 UNTS 3; 102 Stat 2852 and the Paris Convention for the
Protection of Industrial Property (Paris Convention), 14 July 1967 (Stockholm text), 828 UNTS
305. The Berne Convention and the Paris Convention, which are incorporated into the TRIPS
Agreement, are administered by WIPO. These multilateral agreements do not have trade
purposes. The absence of the connection with trade was one factor that motivated the inclusion
of intellectual property in successive GATT negotiating rounds and ultimately in the Uruguay
round that culminated in the TRIPS Agreement.

[FN20]. See TRIPS Agreement, where the preamble states, 'Desiring to reduce distortions and
impediments to international trade, and taking into account the need to promote effective and
adequate protection of intellectual property rights, and to ensure that measures and procedures to
enforce intellectual property rights do not themselves become barriers to legitimate trade'.

[FN21]. Article 10(2) of the TRIPS Agreement.

[FN22]. Doha Declaration on Public Health, above n 18.

[FN23]. Doha Declaration on Public Health, above n 18, para 5 c.

[FN24]. See discussion below in Section VII.

[FN25]. Article 10(2) of the TRIPS Agreement.

[FN26]. Copyright works are protected in categories. For example, literary and artistic works, as
defined by the Berne Convention, Article 2.

[FN27]. As the TRIPS Agreement allows for greater levels of protection, some members also
protect computer programs as patents. By comparison, the requirement to protect industrial
designs leaves flexibility as to whether members provide such protection through copyright law
or by other means. See Article 2(7) of the Berne Convention, which provides: '... it shall be a
matter for legislation in the countries of the Union to determine the extent of the application of
their laws to works of applied art and industrial designs and models, as well as the conditions
under which such works, designs and models shall be protected ...'. This article is incorporated
into the TRIPS Agreement, Article 9(1).

[FN28]. Additionally some multilateral negotiations were underway when the Uruguay Round
was concluded such as those resulting in the World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright
Treaty (WCT) (adopted 20 December 1996) 2186 UNTS 28542; 36 ILM 65 (adopted by the
WIPO Diplomatic Conference), which provides for TRIPS-plus copyright protection.

[FN29]. A major difficulty with the growing number of FTAs is the impact these agreements
have on the multilateral negotiation process. This article is not primarily concerned with this
issue of whether it is better, in the long or short term, to negotiate multilaterally or bilaterally.

[FN30]. Article 1(1) of the TRIPS Agreement, see also above n 2.

[FN31]. Annette Kur and Henning Grosse Ruse Khan suggest that the solution may be
intellectual property maximums, see Annette Kur and Henning Grosse Ruse Khan, 'Enough is
Enough--The Notion of Binding Ceilings in International Intellectual Property Protection'
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? abstract_id=1326429> accessed 21 March 2009. The
difficulties with TRIPS maximums are that they risk being out of date and requiring
renegotiation whenever there are major technological developments. Maximums will, as the
authors acknowledge, also eliminate some of the national policy autonomy that members have to
create their own exceptions.

[FN32]. Members of the TRIPS Agreement are the WTO members. Domestic intellectual
property law that is required under the Agreement, however, confers rights on private right
holders. Right holders can lobby their governments to bring disputes on their behalf, but only
member states have standing before the WTO.
[FN33]. Other agreements of most relevance are the Berne and Paris Conventions, of which parts
are incorporated into the TRIPS Agreement.

[FN34]. For a discussion of minimum standards in the Berne Convention, see generally Sam
Ricketson and Jane C Ginsburg, International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights The Berne
Convention and Beyond (Oxford University Press, New York 2006).

[FN35]. WTO Appellate Body Report, United States--Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act
1988 (Havana Club), WT/DS176/AB/R (adopted 1 February 2002).

[FN36]. Article 1(2) of the TRIPS Agreement states: 'For the purposes of this Agreement, the
term "intellectual property" refers to all categories of intellectual property that are the subject of
Sections 1 through 7 of Section II.' The categories by heading in Section II are: Copyright and
related Rights, Trademarks, Geographical Indications, Industrial designs, Patents, Layout-
designs (Topographies) of Integrated circuits, Protection of Undisclosed Information and Control
of Anti-Competitive Practices in contractual licenses.'

[FN37]. Article 10(2) of the TRIPS Agreement requires protection of intellectual creations.
Some commentators have argued that such protection is nevertheless industrial property and
ought to be subject to the national treatment obligations of the Paris Convention. See P Bernt
Hugenholtz, 'Implementing the European Database Directive' <http://
www.ivir.nl/publications/hugenholtz/PBH-HCJ-LIB.doc> accessed 21 March 2009, citing H
Cohen Jehoram, 'Ontwerp EG-richtlijn databanken', IER 1992/5, at 133. See also JH Reichman
and P Samuelson, 'Intellectual Property Rights in Data?' (1997) 50 Vanderbilt L Rev 51.

[FN38]. See Article 10(2) of the TRIPS Agreement.

[FN39]. In Desktop Marketing Systems v Telstra Corporation Limited, 55 IPR 1 (HCA 2002),
the High Court of Australia (its highest court) held that industrious collection of telephone
directory data in electronic form was sufficiently original to amount to originality for copyright
purposes. See also a discussion over the scope of minimum rights and national treatment in
Ricketson and Ginsburg (n 34) para 6.97.

[FN40]. I am grateful to Rochelle Dreyfuss for suggesting this example to me. For a discussion
of trade mark provisions in FTAs, see Burton Ong, 'The Trademark Law Provisions of Bilateral
Free Trade Agreements' in Graeme B Dinwoodie and Mark D Janis (eds), Trademark Law. A
Handbook of Contemporary Research (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK 2008) 229.

[FN41]. See Article 1(2) of the TRIPS Agreement, set out at above n 36.

[FN42]. Article 1(1) of the TRIPS Agreement, set out at above n 2.

[FN43]. Ibid.

[FN44]. Broadly, national treatment, in the intellectual property context, is the principle that
foreign nationals must be treated the same as domestic nationals, see Article 3 of the TRIPS
Agreement. MFN is the principle that Members must treat nationals of one country the same as
nationals of another country, so that all foreign nationals receive equal treatment, see Article 4 of
the TRIPS Agreement.

[FN45]. Graeme B Dinwoodie and Rochelle Dreyfuss, 'Diversifying Without Discriminating

Complying with the Mandate of the TRIPS Agreement' (2007) 13 Michigan
Telecommunications Technology L Rev 445, 448, (Diversifying Without Discriminating).

[FN46]. Article 33 of the TRIPS Agreement.

[FN47]. Article 33 of the TRIPS Agreement requires patent protection for a term of 20 years. For
copyright works duration is for the life of the author plus 50 years (or 50 years where term is not
calculated from the life of the author but from the making of the copyright work). Members may
extend the TRIPS Agreement requirements for patent and copyright term. Copyright, but not
patent term extension can be applied on a material reciprocity basis rather than a national
treatment basis. That is a member who extends copyright term need not apply that term to
nationals of member states that do not provide the extended term, see Article 7(8) of the Berne
Convention, incorporated into the TRIPS Agreement, Article 9(1). See eg European Directive on
copyright term which only provided the extended 70-year term to nationals from countries that
also provide that extended term. See Council Directive 2006/116/EC, OJ 2006 L372/49, on the
term of protection of copyright and certain related rights, Article 7.

[FN48]. Any exception would have to be compliant with what are known as the three-step tests.
See Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement for copyright three-step test, Article 17 for trade mark
three-step test and Article 30 for patent three-step test.

[FN49]. Article 17(3)(b) of the TRIPS Agreement.

[FN50]. Exceptions to national treatment are found in Article 3(1) of the TRIPS Agreement.

[FN51]. Article 4 of the TRIPS Agreement.

[FN52]. The drafting history shows that an MFN exception was discussed in the Brussels draft,
see Daniel Gervais, The TRIPS Agreement Drafting History and Analysis (3rd edn, Sweet &
Maxwell, London 2008) 187 and Legitimacy and Purpose of Intellectual Property Chapters,
above n 5. Article 4(d) of the TRIPS Agreement provides an MFN exception for agreements in
existence at the time of the WTO agreements' coming into force 'provided that such agreements
are notified to the Council for TRIPS and do not constitute an arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination against nationals of other Members'.

[FN53]. GATT FTAs have an MFN exemption, so that the greater liberalization is confined to
the FTA members. An emerging exception to this is the FTAs between the European Union and
developing countries in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific, known as Economic Partnership
Agreements (EPAs), which are being provided on an MFN basis, rather than incorporating the
MFN exemption. I am grateful to Lorand Bartels for pointing out this parallel in EPAs to me.
[FN54]. See n 47, above.

[FN55]. Article 9(1) of the TRIPS Agreement, incorporating Articles 1-21 of the Berne
Convention.

[FN56]. See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 United States Code (USC) §302, as amended by the
Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub L No. 105-298, 112 Stat 2827 (1998), effective
from 27 October 1998.

[FN57]. Silke von Lewinski, International Copyright Law and Policy (Oxford University Press,
New York 2008), paras 17.155-7.

[FN58]. I adopt here usage of 'formalistic' from Graeme B. Dinwoodie and Rochelle Dreyfuss
who describe the WTO dispute settlement panel approach to interpretation of the agreement as
formalistic because of the way panels look at isolated provisions, rather than the package of
arrangements which led to the particular provision at issue. See Graeme B Dinwoodie and
Rochelle Dreyfuss, 'TRIPS and the Dynamics of Intellectual Property Lawmaking', 36 Case
Western Reserve J Intl L 95 (2004), 96-8 (TRIPS and the Dynamics of Intellectual Property
Lawmaking).

[FN59]. Articles 7 and 8 of the TRIPS Agreement.

[FN60]. WTO Application of Customary Rules, n 18, above.

[FN61]. Another matter relevant to the object and purpose of the TRIPS Agreement is that it is a
WTO covered agreement and as such has a trade related purpose.

[FN62]. Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties, 1115 UNTS 331 (adopted 23 May 1969); 8
ILM 679 (entered into force 17 January 1980) (Vienna Convention). The use of the Vienna
Convention arises from the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes, 15 April 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex 2 (1994) 1869 UNTS 401, (DSU). Article 3(2) of the DSU requires that the WTO
agreements be interpreted 'in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public
international law.' The WTO has accepted that the Vienna Convention embodies the customary
rules of interpretation of public international law.

[FN63]. Article 7 of the TRIPS Agreement, entitled 'Objectives', provides: 'The protection and
enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute to the promotion of technological
innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of
producers and users of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and
economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations.'

[FN64]. There are of course exceptions to this developed versus developing divide. There may
be some issues about which parts of the developed world disagree and one 'side' is allied with the
developing world. The debate on geographical indications is an example. The European Union's
desire to increase the scope of geographical indication protection under the TRIPS Agreement is
supported by some developing countries and opposed by the United States and many other
developed countries. Also, small developed countries often have similar policies to larger
developed countries, but have some similar interests with developing countries because they are
so-called 'net-users' of intellectual property like many developing countries.

[FN65]. Article 8 of the TRIPS Agreement, entitled 'Principles', provides:

1. Members may, in formulating or amending their laws and regulations, adopt measures
necessary to protect public health and nutrition, and to promote the public interest in sectors of
vital importance to their socio-economic and technological development, provided that such
measures are consistent with the provisions of this Agreement.
2. Appropriate measures, provided that they are consistent with the provisions of this
Agreement, may be needed to prevent the abuse of intellectual property rights by right holders or
the resort to practices which unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the international
transfer of technology.

[FN66]. Any exceptions under the Agreement must comply with what is known as the three-
step-test. See Articles 13, 17 and 30 of the TRIPS Agreement.

[FN67]. WTO Panel Report, Canada--Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products (Canada-

Pharmaceuticals), WT/DS114/R (adopted 17 March 2000).

[FN68]. Ibid para 5.12. For a discussion of Canada-Pharmaceuticals see Robert Howse, 'The
Canadian Generic Medicines Panel: A Dangerous Precedent in Dangerous Times' (2000) 3 J
World Intellect Property 493 and TRIPS and the Dynamics of Intellectual Property Lawmaking,
above n 58, 99, 104 and 112.

[FN69]. Doha Declaration on Public Health, above n 18, Article 5, 'In applying the customary
rules of interpretation of public international law, each provision of the TRIPS Agreement shall
be read in the light of the object and purpose of the Agreement as expressed, in particular, in its
objectives and principles.' For a general discussion of the Doha Declaration on Public Health, see
Daniel Gervais, 'The TRIPS Agreement and the Doha Round: History and Impact on Economic
Development' in Peter Yu (ed.), Intellectual Property and Information Wealth: Issues and
Practices in the Digital Age (Praeger Perspectives, London 2002).

[FN70]. WTO Appellate Body Report, India--Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and
Agricultural Chemical Products (India-Patents), WT/DS50/AB/R (adopted 16 January 1998) part
V, entitled 'Interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement'.

[FN71]. The Panel in India-Patents, ibid, stated at part V, entitled 'Interpretation of the TRIPS
Agreement' when interpreting 'the text of the TRIPS Agreement, the legitimate expectations of
WTO Members concerning the TRIPS Agreement must be taken into account, as well as
standards of interpretation developed in past panel reports in the GATT framework, in particular
those laying down the principle of the protection of conditions of competition flowing from
multilateral trade agreements'. The Appellate Body considered this was not correct. In giving its
reasons the Appellate Body outlined the difference between violation and non-violation
nullification and impairment disputes under GATT. The Appellate Body stated that 'The Panel
misapplies Article 31 of the Vienna Convention. The Panel misunderstands the concept of
legitimate expectations in the context of the customary rules of interpretation of public
international law. The legitimate expectations of the parties to a treaty are reflected in the
language of the treaty itself. The duty of a treaty interpreter is to examine the words of the treaty
to determine the intentions of the parties. This should be done in accordance with the principles
of treaty interpretation set out in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention. But these principles of
interpretation neither require nor condone the imputation into a treaty of words that are not there
or the importation into a treaty of concepts that were not intended.'

[FN72]. See n 11, above.

[FN73]. There are some national treatment and MFN exceptions, see Articles 3 and 4 of the
TRIPS Agreement.

[FN74]. WTO Panel Report, United States--Section 110 (5) of the US Copyright Act (United
States--Section 110 (5)), WT/DS160/R (adopted 27 July 2000) para 6.70, erred in finding the
WCT was a helpful contextual guide because the WCT was not yet in force, see WTO
Application of Customary Rules, above n 18, 413- 14. For a discussion of WTO consultations
with WIPO on international intellectual property norms, see Ruth Okediji, 'WIPO-WTO
Relations and the Future of Global Intellectual Property Norms' <http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1338902> accessed 22 March 2009.

[FN75]. Peter Drahos, 'Bilateralism in Intellectual Property', report commissioned by Oxfam GB

as part of its Cut the Cost of Medicines Campaign <
http://www.maketradefair.com/assets/english/bilateralism.pdf> accessed 4 August 2009
(Bilateralism in Intellectual Property).

[FN76]. Jean Frederic Morin, 'Multilateralising TRIPS-Plus Agreements: Is the US Strategy a

Failure?' <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ id=1276464> accessed 21 March
2009.

[FN77]. Also, perhaps perversely, FTA dispute settlement may not take account of WTO
standards, see Peter Drahos, 'The Bilateral Web of Trade Dispute Settlement' <http://
www.twnside.org.sg/title2/FTAs/DisputeResolution/TheBilateralWebOfTradeDisputeSettlement
P> accessed 24 August 2009.

[FN78]. See Section II above.

[FN79]. States have a duty to fulfil in good faith their international obligations under the
generally recognized principles and rules of international law, See Declaration on the Principles
of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States (GA
Resolution 2625 (XXV)); the same idea is found in the UN Charter, Article 2(2). I thank by
colleague Alberto Costi for pointing me to these references.

[FN80]. See, eg Bryan Christopher Mercurio, 'TRIPS-Plus Provisions in FTAs: Recent Trends'
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=947767> accessed 21 March 2009.
[FN81]. Bilateralism in Intellectual Property, above n 75, where the author states at page 1:
During the period that ... TRIPS was being negotiated (1986-1993), there were suggestions
that if developing countries agreed to TRIPS the United States would ease off negotiating
intellectual property standards bilaterally. The following statement in 1989 from the Director for
Intellectual Property at the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) makes the point:
"What happens if we fail [to obtain TRIPS]? I think there are a number of consequences to
failure. First, will be an increase in bilateralism. For those of you who think bilateralism is a bad
thing, a bad thing will come about."
It was always clear at all stages of the TRIPS negotiations that the principal players (the
United States, the European Community and Japan) saw TRIPS as setting only minimum
obligations. Nevertheless, developing countries might reasonably have expected the ... WTO or
... WIPO in some cases to become the principal fora for the negotiation of new intellectual
property standards.

[FN82]. There is disagreement over whether many FTAs in general comply with the GATT and
GATS provisions that permit them, see, eg US Department of Agriculture, Sharon Sheffield,
'Agriculture, GATT, and Regional Trade Agreements', Regional Trade Agreements and U.S.
Agriculture/AER-771 87, 88-9. < http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/aer771/aer771l.pdf>
accessed 22 March 2009. In the TRIPS Agreement context, there is an absence of an express
FTA-allowing provision.

[FN83]. Additionally, such pressured and premature harmonization will probably not be
sustainable. Rochelle Dreyfus and Jerome Reichman, for example, contend that it is premature to
harmonise some details of patent law, see Jerome H Reichman and Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss,
'Harmonization Without Consensus: Critical Reflections on Drafting A Substantive Patent Law'
(2007) 57 Duke LJ 85.

[FN84]. Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss describe the dispute settlement interpretation as formalistic, see
TRIPS and the Dynamics of Intellectual Property Lawmaking, above n 58.

[FN85]. Ibid 97-101.

[FN86]. See generally Mindahi Crescencio Bastida-Muñoz and Geraldine A Patrick, 'Traditional
Knowledge and Intellectual Property Rights: Beyond TRIPS Agreements and Intellectual
Property Chapters of FTAs' (2006) 14 Michigan State J Intl L 259.

[FN87]. Ricketson and Ginsburg (n 34) 1.29.

[FN88]. In the 1980 the USA linked its bilateral investment programs with intellectual property
rights, see Bilateralism in Intellectual Property, above n 75.

[FN89]. Article XXIII(b) of the GATT. See also Article XXIII(3) of the GATS.

[FN90]. See n 13, above.

[FN91]. Article 64(2) of the TRIPS Agreement.

[FN92]. Article 64(3) of the TRIPS Agreement.

[FN93]. The views of members of the WTO are summarized in the TRIPS Council discussion,
see TRIPS Council Summary of Non-Violation Issues, above n 13.

[FN94]. See eg US and Chile FTA, 6 June 2003, 42 ILM 1026 (2003), Article 22(2)(c); and
United States-Australia Free Trade Agreement (AUSFTA), 18 May 2004, 43 ILM 1248, Article
21(2)(c).

[FN95]. Cho (n 14) 316.

[FN96]. Cho (n 14) 316-17.

[FN97]. This is the equivalent of a causation element.

[FN98]. Cho (n 14) 317.

[FN99]. Cho (n 14) 319.

[FN100]. Cho (n 14) 319.

[FN101]. Cho (n 14) 320 citing Armin Von Bodsanady, 'The Non-Violation Procedure of Article
XXIII.22, GATT-Its Operations Rationale' (1992) 6 Journal World Trade 95, at 102.

[FN102]. Article 3(2) of the DSU.

[FN103]. Cho (n 14).

[FN104]. Articles 27(2) and 30 of the TRIPS Agreement. It is exactly because of this nebulous
nature of some provisions that different countries have different laws.

[FN105]. Gail E Evans, 'A Preliminary Excursion into TRIPS and Non-Violation Complaints'
(2000) 3 J World Intellect Property 867.

[FN106]. Article 3(2) of the DSU, which provides: '... Recommendations and rulings of the DSB
cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements.'

[FN107]. The idea that non-violation disputes prevent member's being judge of their own cause
is mentioned in Michael J Trebilcock and Robert Howse, The Regulation of International Trade
(3rd edn, Routledge, London, New York 2005) 514.

[FN108]. An additional benefit of using the WTO is that there is a flow-on effect of the results of
dispute settlement into the negotiations of the TRIPS Council and potentially even other
international intellectual property negotiations.
[FN109]. Many jurisdictions may not consider that users have rights as such. Rather, users are
free to use that which is not otherwise protected by intellectual property. For example, while US-
style fair use is sometimes characterized as a user right in copyright law, countries with other
approaches to copyright tend to characterize such uses as permitted acts, rather than rights of use.
Additionally it is not clear that there is a positive right to benefit from the public domain. Rather
that which is not illegal to use may be used.

[FN110]. The language of negative rights is found in the TRIPS Agreement. In relation to rental
rights in computer programs and film, for example, the TRIPS Agreement states '... a Member
shall provide ... the right to authorize or to prohibit the commercial rental to the public of
originals or copies of their copyright works', see Article 11 of the TRIPS Agreement. The rental
right, like all copyright exclusive rights, is a right to prohibit others rather than a right to
undertake such rental themselves. Another example is found in the requirements for patents. 'A
patent shall confer on its owner the ... exclusive rights ... to prevent third parties not having the
owner's consent from ...', see Article 28 of the TRIPS Agreement.

[FN111]. Examples include the International Convenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, 993 UNTS 3, 5, article 15(1)(b) and (c) (adopted 16 December 1966), providing the right
'to benefit from the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific,
literary or artistic production of which he is the author'. For discussion of this and other human
rights treaties in the intellectual property context see, Laurence R. Helfer, 'Human Rights and
Intellectual Property: Conflict or Coexistence?' (2003) 5 Minnesota J L Sci Technol 47 and
Laurence R Helfer, 'Toward a Human Rights Framework for Intellectual Property' (2007) 40 UC
Davis L Rev 971. Also, such international obligations may give private right holders seeking
protection in some jurisdictions a positive right to require protection from the state even if the
legal mechanism behind the right is a negative property right. In the EU, for instance, there has
been a successful claim to a human right of property for trade mark protection, see discussion in
Helfer 'Toward a Human Rights Framework', 1016.

[FN112]. A much disputed area of intellectual property law is how far trade mark law should go.
Initially trade marks gave a right to use the mark in relation to registered categories of goods or
services and infringement occurred in certain defined circumstances. In recent years the scope of
trademark protection has expanded to protect marks from dilution effects. Internet infringements
have brought to a head issues about whether the trademark is property that ought to be protected
in all circumstances or whether protection is limited to defined categories that may not include
some internet uses. See generally Clarissa Long, 'The Political Economy of Trademark Dilution',
in Graeme B Dinwoodie and Mark D Janis (eds), above n 40, 132.

[FN113]. Private right interests may lobby their governments to bring certain cases.

[FN114]. Members may also reasonably expect that in some circumstances what the Agreement
does not require be protected can be freely used.

[FN115]. TRIPS Council Summary of Non-Violation Issues, above n 13, 13.

[FN116]. Interestingly in the relevant TRIPS Council document there is no response or analysis
of this example, whereas there are some brief responses in relation to other examples. See TRIPS
Council Summary of Non-Violation Issues, above n 13.

[FN117]. The EU, USA and Australia are all countries that have increased the term for the life of
the author plus 50 years to the life of the author plus 70 years, or 70 years where the term is not
calculated using 'life'.

[FN118]. WCT and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, 20 December 1996, S.
Treaty Doc. 105-17; 36 ILM 76 (1997) (adopted by the WIPO Diplomatic Conference), were, for
example, under negotiation at the time the TRIPS Agreement was entered into.

[FN119]. The original proposal was an extension of term to 95 years. For discussion of the
proposal see European Commission, 'Term of Protection' <
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/term-protection/term-protection_ wn.htm>
accessed 21 March 2009; Centre for Intellectual Property and Information Law, University of
Cambridge, 'Review of the Economic Evidence Relating to Term of Copyright in Sound
Recordings' <http:// www.cipil.law.cam.ac.uk/policy_documents/gowers_cipilreport.pdf>
accessed 14 April 2009; 'Address by Professor Lionel Bentley to the Legal Affairs Committee of
the European Parliament', 4 November 2008, <http://
www.cipil.law.cam.ac.uk/Address%20to%20the%20European%20Parliament.pdf> accessed 14
April 2009; Nadine Klass and others, 'Statement of the Max Plank Institute for Intellectual
Property, Competition and Tax Law Concerning the Commission's Plans to Prolong the
Protection Period for Performing Artists and Sound Recordings' (2008) 39 Intl Rev Intellect
Property Competition Law 586; and Natali Helberger and others, 'Never Forever: Why
Extending the Term of Protection for Sounds Recordings is a Bad Idea' (2008) 30 Eur Intellect
Property Rev 174.

[FN120]. Article 6 of the TRIPS Agreement.

[FN121]. Article 6 of the TRIPS Agreement provides: 'For the purposes of dispute settlement
under this Agreement, subject to the provisions of Articles 3 and 4 nothing in this Agreement
shall be used to address the issue of the exhaustion of intellectual property rights.'

[FN122]. Although as parallel importing restrictions prevent the free flow of goods it is
questionable why WTO members are allowed to create such barriers to trade.

[FN123]. Article 7 of the TRIPS Agreement.

[FN124]. See TRIPS and the Dynamics of Intellectual Property Lawmaking, above n 58, 98-9.

[FN125]. To exclude pharmaceuticals, eg from patentability would be to exclude on the basis of

subject matter alone, which is contrary to article 27 of the TRIPS Agreement.

[FN126]. A Swiss type patent claim is a claim for the use of a known substance in the
manufacture of a medicament for the therapeutic and/or prophylactic treatment of a medical
condition. Swiss type claims are designed to circumvent prohibitions on patenting methods of
medical treatments and are also an exception from the absolute rule of novelty, because the
substance or the composition in the claim already forms part of the prior art. Swiss claims are
rationalised on the basis that novelty is not completely abandoned as there is a 'novel' use.
Broadly, the supposed rationale behind allowing Swiss claim patents is a reward for investment
made to find new uses. See generally Rebecca Eisenberg, 'The Problem of New Uses' (2005) 5
Yale J Health Policy, Law Ethics 717.

[FN127]. The original Swiss claim was for a second use of a known pharmaceutical. Since then,
patent have been granted for subsequent uses and for new dosages, see generally Susy Frankel,
'Lord Cooke and Patents: The Scope of "Invention"' (2008) 39 Victoria Univ Wellington L Rev
73, 92-4.

[FN128]. The Patents (Amendment) Act of 2005, India, s 3(d), provides that the following are
not patentable inventions, 'the mere discovery of a new form of a known substance which does
not result in the enhancement of the known efficacy of that substance or the mere discovery of
any new property or new use for a known substance or of the mere use of a known process,
machine or apparatus unless such known process results in a new product or employs at least one
new reactant.'

[FN129]. See generally Allessandra Acuri and Rosa Castro, 'How Innovative is Innovative
Enough? Reflections on the Interpretation of Article 27 TRIPS from Novartis v India'
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ id=1159821> accessed 21 March 2009; see
also Rnjnish Kumar Rai, 'Effect of TRIPS-Mandated Intellectual Property Rights on Foreign
Direct Investment in Developing Countries: A Case Study of the Indian Pharmaceutical Industry'
(2008) 11 J World Intellect Property 404.

[FN130]. For a discussion of the case, see Acuri and Castro, ibid, and Linda L Lee, 'Trials and
TRIPS-ulations: India Patent Law and Novartis AG v. Union of India' (2008) 23 Berkeley
Technol L J 281.

[FN131]. Novartis AG v Union of India (2007) 4 Madras LJ 1153, s 7.

[FN132]. For the non-violation criteria see above Section VI A.

[FN133]. A footnote records that inventive step is synonymous with non-obviousness, see
Article 27 footnote of the TRIPS Agreement.

[FN134]. Reichman and Dreyfuss, above n 83, 97, state, 'Admittedly, TRIPS gives its Members
some leeway to tailor their laws to local needs. For example, states can presumably supply their
own definitions of 'inventive step' and determine for themselves the technological scope of patent
protection.' See also pages 98-9 and the discussion of tying inventive step to a nation's economic
goals. Also of note is that the parameters of inventive step will often be a combination of statute
and case law in common law countries.

[FN135]. There must be some conceptual boundary otherwise the treaty provision would be
meaningless and such an interpretation would not be consistent with the principles of treaty
interpretation. See Rochelle C. Dreyfuss and Andreas F Lowenfeld, 'Two Achievements of the
Uruguay Round: Putting TRIPS and Dispute Settlement Together' (1997) 37 Virginia J Intl L
275, 282-304, where the authors suggest this is an area where the WTO dispute settlement
process should show deference to developing country standards of inventive step. See also JH
Reichman (1997) 'From Free Riders to Fair Followers: Global Competition Under the TRIPS
Agreement', 29 New York Univ J Intl L Politics 11.

[FN136]. There is an ongoing negotiation at WIPO for a harmonization of substantive patent law
treaty, see also discussion in Reichman and Dreyfuss, above n 83.

[FN137]. Acuri and Castro analyse the differences in patentability as resulting from different
welfare effects of patents in light of the objectives and principles of the TRIPS Agreement, see
above n 129, at 10.

[FN138]. If there was any international norm created through TRIPS then it would not be
necessary to provide for protection for second and subsequent use of pharmaceutical patents in
FTAs, see Frederick M Abbott, 'Towards a New Era of Objective Assessment in the Field of
TRIPS and Variable Geometry for the Preservation of Multilateralism' (2005) 8 J Intl Econ L 77,
88-9.

[FN139]. Article 3(2) of the DSU.

[FN140]. For further discussion of how members could do even more diversifying and be TRIPS
compliant, see Diversifying Without Discriminating, above n 45.

[FN141]. TRIPS Agreement, Article 7.

[FN142]. Another potential non-violation complaint for India might be that it reasonably
expected that it would be able to retain its generic pharmaceutical industry.

[FN143]. Article 26(1)(c) of the DSU.

[FN144]. Ibid.

[FN145]. Dreyfuss and Lowenfeld, above n 135.

[FN146]. WTO Panel Report, China--Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of
Intellectual Property Rights (China-TRIPS Enforcement), WT/DS362/R (adopted 26 January
2009).

[FN147]. For a summary of the US position, see Office of the United States Trade
Representative, 'WTO Case Challenging Weaknesses in China's Legal Regime for Protection and
Enforcement of Copyright and Trademarks' <http://
www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/Fact_Sheets/2007/asset_upload_file908_
11061.pdf?ht=> accessed 21 March 2009.
[FN148]. Request for Consultation by the United States, China--Measures Affecting the
Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights (China-TRIPS Enforcement),
WT/DS362/1, 10 April 2007.

[FN149]. Yoshifumi Fukunaga suggests that the type of dispute that looks at ineffectiveness of
remedies falls into a special category of types of TRIPS disputes, see Yoshifumi Fukunaga,
'Enforcing TRIPS: Challenges of Adjudicating Minimum Standards Agreements' (2008) 23
Berkeley Technol LJ 867.

[FN150]. As a result, the requirements for enforcement of intellectual property rights in the
TRIPS Agreement are minimum standards which are more akin to stating general principles
rather than setting out details of enforcement. Article 41:1, the introductory provision to the
enforcement articles of the TRIPS Agreement, requires that:
Members shall ensure that enforcement procedures as specified in this Part are available
under their law so as to permit effective action against any act of infringement of intellectual
property rights covered by this Agreement, including expeditious remedies to prevent
infringements and remedies which constitute a deterrent to further infringements. These
procedures shall be applied in such a manner as to avoid the creation of barriers to legitimate
trade and to provide for safeguards against their abuse.

[FN151]. Article 61 of the TRIPS Agreement provides: 'Members shall provide for criminal
procedures and penalties to be applied at least in cases of wilful trademark counterfeiting or
copyright piracy on a commercial scale. Remedies available shall include imprisonment and/or
monetary fines sufficient to provide a deterrent, consistently with the level of penalties applied
for crimes of a corresponding gravity. In appropriate cases, remedies available shall also include
the seizure, forfeiture and destruction of the infringing goods and of any materials and
implements the predominant use of which has been in the commission of the offence. Members
may provide for criminal procedures and penalties to be applied in other cases of infringement of
intellectual property rights, in particular where they are committed wilfully and on a commercial
scale.'

[FN152]. Article 41(5) of the TRIPS Agreement provides: 'It is understood that this Part does not
create any obligation to put in place a judicial system for the enforcement of intellectual property
rights distinct from that for the enforcement of law in general, nor does it affect the capacity of
Members to enforce their law in general. Nothing in this Part creates any obligation with respect
to the distribution of resources as between enforcement of intellectual property rights and the
enforcement of law in general.'

[FN153]. China-TRIPS Enforcement (n 146).

[FN154]. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 United States Code (USC) §506(a)(1)(B), punished under
Crimes and Criminal Procedures, 19 United States Code (USC) §2319.

[FN155]. Vienna Convention n 62 above.

[FN156]. China-TRIPS Enforcement (n 146).

[FN157]. Also, if the TRIPS Agreement enforcement provisions could be interpreted to prefer
one legal system's approach to enforcement over another, it would be unnecessary for
substantive enforcement measures to be negotiated in other forums such as the Anti-Competitive
Trade Agreement (ACTA) negotiations, see United States Trade Representative, 'Anti-
Competitive Trade Agreement (ACTA)' <http://wwww.ustr/assets/Document_Library/Fact_
Sheets/2008/asseet_upload_file760_15084.pdf> accessed 21 March 2009; and Margot Kaminski,
'The Origins and Potential Impact of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA)' (2009)
34 Yale J Intl L 247.

[FN158]. In any event, a panel report would only be guidance. It does not bind members who are
not parties to the dispute or indeed formally create binding precedent, although it creates
legitimate expectations. For a general discussion of the role of Panel and Appellate Body reports
see WTO, 'Understanding the WTO: Settling Disputes' <http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_
e/whatis_edist1_e.thm> accessed 21 March 2009; and WTO, 'Dispute Settlement: Appellate
Body' <http://www.wto.ord/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/appellate_body_ e.htm> accessed 21 March
2009.

[FN159]. TRIPS and the Dynamics of Intellectual Property Lawmaking, above n 58, 118.

[FN160]. TRIPS and the Dynamics of Intellectual Property Lawmaking, above n 58, 103-9.

[FN161]. TRIPS and the Dynamics of Intellectual Property Lawmaking, above n 58, 105.

[FN162]. WTO Panel Report, United States--Section 110 (5) of the US Copyright Act,
WT/DS160/R, adopted 27 July 2000. Arguably, however, for the US national the bargain
remains in place because the music exemption remains on the statute book and therefore can be
utilised by US bars and restaurants. However, compensation is paid to the EU.

[FN163]. Eldred v Ashcroft, 239 F 3d 372; 537 US 186 (US Sup Ct 2003).

[FN164]. TRIPS Council Summary of Non-Violation Issues, above n 13.

[FN165]. Article 15(4) of the TRIPS Agreement provides: 'The nature of the goods or services to
which a trademark is to be applied shall in no case form an obstacle to registration of the
trademark.' Such a ban would not violate this provision because the trademark is not banned only
its advertisement.

[FN166]. TRIPS Council Summary of Non-Violation Issues, above n 13. Also where the side-
effect is health-related or a matter of national security the TRIPS Agreement anticipates such
exceptions to protection. See, eg Article 27(2) of the TRIPS Agreement, which allows exceptions
to patentability for the protection of the environment, human, animal and plant life or health and
matters of ordre public.

[FN167]. Particularly GATT and GATS.

[FN168]. Each agreement has its own non-discrimination principles. National treatment or MFN
violations should be analysed under the appropriate agreement.

[FN169]. TRIPS Council Summary of Non-Violation Issues, above n 13.

[FN170]. Similarly it is also known that there may be restrictions on the sale of some intellectual
property products, such as those subject to censorship laws in some jurisdictions.

[FN171]. Owners of intellectual property rights charge different prices for products in different
jurisdictions. Indeed, owners often contract between themselves to supply goods only in some
countries and not in others. The territorial nature of intellectual property rights makes this
possible. Members of the TRIPS Agreement could not agree on the principles of exhaustion and
intellectual property rights and this is recorded, see Article 6 of the TRIPS Agreement.

[FN172]. See the WCT.

[FN173]. Other market conditions will also determine price. See Massimiliano Gangi,
'Competition Policy and the Exercise of Intellectual Property Rights' < http://
www.archivioceradi.luiss.it/documenti/archivioceradi/osservatori/intellettuale/Gangi1.pdf>
accessed 21 March 2009.

[FN174]. After all it is an agreement of the World Trade Organization and therefore the trading
relationship between members should be core to its interpretation.

[FN175]. TRIPS and the Dynamics of Intellectual Property Lawmaking, above n 58. As the
authors Dinwoodie and Dreyfuss point out, these 'package deals' are not necessarily recognised
at international level.

[FN176]. Changes to domestic laws as a result of FTAs can also require domestic 'package deals'
in order to pass the legislation.

[FN177]. Articles 17(9)(6), 17(9)(8)(b), 17(10)(1)(a) and (c), and 17(10)(2) and (4) of AUSFTA.

[FN178]. Annex 2-C.2 of AUSFTA.

[FN179]. For a discussion of the nexus between antitrust law and intellectual property law see
Mark D. Janis. 'Minimal Standards for Patent Related Anti-Trust Law Under TRIPS', in Maskus
and Reichman (eds), above n 7.

[FN180]. Attempts have been made but no agreement reached, see Sanoussi Bilal and Marcelo
Olarreaga, 'Competition Policy and the WTO: Is There a Need for a Multilateral Agreement?',
European Institute of Public Administration Working Paper 98/W/02 <http://
www.eipa.eu/files/repository/product/20070814174713_98w02.pdf> accessed 22 March 2009;
and Third World Network, "Developing Countries Resist WTO Agreement on 'Competition
Policy"' <http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/1889-cn.htm> accessed 21 March 2009.
[FN181]. Article 40 of the TRIPS Agreement provides limited control of anti-competitive
practices in licenses.

[FN182]. Article 27(2) of the TRIPS Agreement provides: 'Members may exclude from
patentability inventions, the prevention within their territory of the commercial exploitation of
which is necessary to protect ordre public or morality, including to protect human, animal or
plant life or health or to avoid serious prejudice to the environment, provided that such exclusion
is not made merely because the exploitation is prohibited by their law.' [emphasis added].
END OF DOCUMENT
(c) 2011 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
HANYA UNTUK PENGGUNAAN PENDIDIKAN
12 J. Int 'l Econ. L. 1023

Jurnal Hukum Ekonomi Internasional

Desember, 2009

Umum Pasal

* 1023 MENANTANG PERJANJIAN TRIPS-PLUS: UTILITAS POTENSI NON-

PELANGGARAN PERSELISIHAN

Susy Frankel [FNa1]

Hak Cipta © 2009 oleh Oxford University Press; Susy Frankel

ABSTRAK
Sebuah Organisasi Perdagangan Dunia (WTO) non-pelanggaran keluhan adalah satu di mana
kesepakatan tidak dilanggar, namun pengadu menuduh manfaat yang diharapkan berdasarkan
perjanjian telah dibatalkan. Ketika Perjanjian TRIPS diberlakukan non-pelanggaran keluhan
tidak tersedia untuk perselisihan TRIPS. Posisi ini adalah untuk ditinjau. Non-pelanggaran
keluhan tetap tersedia untuk sengketa TRIPS.Pada hari-hari awal TRIPS pengecualian non-
pelanggaran sengketa terlihat rasional karena sifat unik dari TRIPS, antara perjanjian
WTO. Perjanjian TRIPS mengharuskan anggota untuk menerapkan standar minimum
perlindungan kekayaan intelektual dalam hukum nasional mereka. Oleh karena itu anggota
harus menyediakan setidaknya tingkat perlindungan.Jika mereka tidak melakukannya
pengaduan pelanggaran bisa dimulai. Akibatnya, itu tidak logis untuk mencari gagasan apapun
mengenai manfaat yang diharapkan melampaui kata-kata dari standar minimum. Namun,
TRIPS memungkinkan anggota untuk memiliki standar lebih besar dan banyak anggota telah
sepakat untuk standar yang lebih tinggi melalui kesepakatan perdagangan bebas. Ini TRIPS-
plus standar memiliki manfaat yang diharapkan bisa dibilang merusak yang harus mengalir dari
TRIPS, terutama bagi pengguna hak kekayaan intelektual. Artikel ini membahas utilitas untuk
membuat non-pelanggaran sengketa perselisihan tersedia untuk TRIPs dari perspektif baik
pengguna dan pemilik hak kekayaan intelektual. Analisis ini termasuk diskusi tentang apakah
TRIPS-plus perjanjian perdagangan bebas yang diharapkan melemahkan manfaat dari
Perjanjian TRIPS dan dengan demikian harus menjadi subyek sengketa non-pelanggaran.

* 1024 I. PENDAHULUAN
Tingkat perlindungan kekayaan intelektual yang mencapai liberalisasi perdagangan, dan
mendorong pengembangan dan transfer teknologi, adalah isu sentral dalam kekayaan
intelektual dari perspektif hukum internasional ekonomi. Perjanjian tentang Trade-Related
Aspek Hak Kekayaan Intelektual (TRIPS Agreement) [FN1] menyediakan standar minimum
hukum kekayaan intelektual bahwa anggota Organisasi Perdagangan Dunia (WTO) sepakat
untuk. [FN2] Banyak anggota WTO berusaha untuk menegosiasikan standar yang lebih tinggi
dibandingkan mereka akhirnya setuju dan sekarang mereka memiliki tingkat perlindungan yang
lebih tinggi dalam hukum mereka daripada yang ditetapkan dalam Perjanjian TRIPS dan
akibatnya, untuk para Anggota, Perjanjian TRIPS adalah lantai bukan langit-langit. Perjanjian
TRIPS menetapkan standar minimum yang telah disepakati dan anggota diwajibkan untuk
memberlakukan undang-undang yang setidaknya memenuhi standar tersebut. Hasilnya adalah
sejumlah perbedaan hukum kekayaan intelektual di tingkat nasional. Perbedaan antara hukum
nasional dapat menyebabkan perselisihan antara anggota, apakah, atau tidak, hukum adalah
sesuai dengan Perjanjian TRIPS.
Selain Perjanjian TRIPS standar minimum, persyaratan dari perjanjian multilateral lainnya juga
dapat dimasukkan ke dalam hukum anggota. Yang paling signifikan multilateral kekayaan
intelektual di luar tubuh WTO adalah Organisasi Kekayaan Intelektual (WIPO). [FN3]
Serta standar minimum multilateral, nasional hukum kekayaan intelektual juga dapat
mencerminkan standar kekayaan intelektual yang disepakati dalam perjanjian perdagangan
bilateral atau bebas (FTA). Sejak Perjanjian TRIPS diberlakukan pada tahun 1995, anggota
telah menandatangani sejumlah yang terus berkembang FTA dengan bab kekayaan
intelektual. [FN4] Bab-bab kekayaan intelektual * 1025 perjanjian ini bervariasi dalam ruang
lingkup. [FN5] Banyak FTA, bagaimanapun, termasuk apa yang sekarang biasa disebut TRIPS-
plus ketentuan. Ini memberikan perlindungan kekayaan intelektual di atas standar minimum
yang Perjanjian TRIPS membutuhkan.
Dalam banyak kasus TRIPS-plus standar di FTA belum benar-benar dinegosiasikan, melainkan
telah datang sekitar melalui sesuatu yang dekat dengan paksaan. Secara khusus, banyak dari
perjanjian ini ditandatangani antara pihak kekuatan ekonomi yang tidak setara dan 'kecil' pihak
mencari keuntungan perdagangan lainnya sehingga akan setuju untuk TRIPS-plus standar
untuk memperoleh manfaat lainnya. Amerika Serikat dan Uni Eropa, khususnya, telah bab
kekayaan intelektual 'template', yang 'non-negotiable "dalam pertukaran untuk konsesi
perdagangan lainnya. [FN6] Ada banyak perdebatan mengenai apakah 'tinggi' tingkat
perlindungan secara efektif dipaksakan pada negara-negara berkembang, ketika tingkat seperti
perlindungan belum tentu manfaat ekonomi secara langsung atau segera. [FN7] Faktor-faktor
ini membuat pertanyaan apakah TRIPS-plus FTA yang sah. Artikel ini menganalisis apakah
pasal-pasal kekayaan intelektual dapat sah ketika mereka tidak mengakui mengekspresikan
dan parameter tersirat dari objek dan tujuan dari Perjanjian TRIPS.
Sebuah aspek penting dari Perjanjian TRIPS adalah ketersediaan dari sistem penyelesaian
sengketa WTO untuk mendengar perselisihan tentang pelanggaran dari semua Perjanjian
WTO, termasuk Perjanjian TRIPS. [FN8] Para pengadu dalam * 1026 seperti perselisihan
biasanya menuduh bahwa telah terjadi pelanggaran, dan akibatnya pembatalan dan kerugian,
satu atau lebih artikel dari perjanjian WTO. Dalam kaitannya dengan GATT [FN9] dan GATS,
[FN10] tetapi tidak Perjanjian TRIPS, anggota dapat membawa apa yang dikenal sebagai non-
pelanggaran keluhan. [FN11] Seorang pelapor dalam keluhan non-pelanggaran menuduh
bahwa, meskipun artikel tertentu dari sebuah perjanjian tidak dilanggar, harapan dari manfaat
yang timbul dari perjanjian yang disepakati telah dibatalkan atau terganggu. [FN12]
Telah ada diskusi, tetapi tidak ada resolusi yang tegas, tentang apakah pelanggaran non-
sengketa harus tersedia di bawah Perjanjian TRIPS. [FN13] Diskusi ini berlangsung meskipun
peran untuk non-pelanggaran sengketa, GATT dan GATS tentang, kurang tenang karena
parameter sengketa nonviolation tidak didefinisikan dengan baik. [FN14] Beberapa komentator
bahkan menunjukkan bahwa non-pelanggaran sengketa secara inheren tidak tepat dalam
sistem berbasis peraturan WTO.[FN15]
* 1027 Meskipun tidak mungkin untuk membawa Perjanjian TRIPS non-pelanggaran sengketa,
non-pelanggaran kriteria sengketa menyediakan metode yang berguna yang akan digunakan
untuk menilai legitimasi TRIPS-plus FTA. Hal ini karena analisis non-pelanggaran memerlukan
penilaian harapan anggota tentang ruang lingkup manfaat yang timbul dari perjanjian pada
masalah. Pada artikel ini saya menggunakan pendekatan ini untuk menganalisis hubungan
antara tujuan dari Perjanjian TRIPS dan tujuan TRIPS-plus FTA.
Perjanjian TRIPS telah berbagai tujuan. Tujuan mendasar adalah untuk mengikat anggotanya
untuk kewajiban untuk melindungi hak kekayaan intelektual. TRIPS juga memiliki tujuan lain,
yang bersaing dengan dan karena itu memerlukan keseimbangan terhadap perlindungan hak
milik intelektual. Ini termasuk kepentingan pihak ketiga untuk menggunakan dan mengakses
properti intelektual, dan tujuan transfer teknologi dan diseminasi.[FN16] Pembukaan Perjanjian
TRIPS dan artikel yang berjudul 'prinsip' dan 'tujuan' memberikan beberapa petunjuk tentang
objek dan tujuan dari Persetujuan ini, [FN17] yang penting untuk penyelesaian sengketa
dugaan pelanggaran Perjanjian. [FN18]
Tujuan dari Perjanjian TRIPS diekspresikan melalui kerangka dan struktur. Perjanjian TRIPS
fundamental berbeda dari yang lain perjanjian properti internasional intelektual dalam
tujuannya.Hal ini karena itu adalah bagian dari perjanjian WTO dan karena itu memiliki tujuan
yang terkait dengan perdagangan.Perdagangan tujuan terkait tidak ditemukan dalam
multilateral kekayaan intelektual lainnya. [FN19] tujuan dagang yang terkait tidak hanya untuk
melindungi hak kekayaan intelektual, tetapi juga memastikan bahwa hak kekayaan intelektual
tidak melakukan sendiri beroperasi sebagai hambatan perdagangan tidak dapat
diterima. [FN20]
* 1028 Inti dari TRIPS menetapkan serangkaian standar hukum minimum yang memungkinkan
anggota beberapa otonomi atas bagaimana mereka menerapkan standar-standar dalam hukum
intelektual properti nasional mereka. Berapa banyak anggota otonomi memiliki lebih detail dari
hukum nasional mereka mungkin tergantung pada artikel tertentu yang terlibat. Beberapa artikel
fungsi Perjanjian seperti standar maksimal dalam bahwa mereka menentukan apa yang tidak
boleh dilindungi. Contohnya adalah dikotomi ide / ekspresi dalam hak cipta yang dikodifikasikan
sebagai: [FN21]
Perlindungan hak cipta meliputi expressions dan tidak meliputi ide, prosedur, metode kerja atau
konsep matematis sejenisnya.
Deklarasi Doha pada Perjanjian TRIPS dan Kesehatan Masyarakat, [FN22] dalam konteks
lisensi wajib untuk paten farmasi, mengakui prinsip otonomi nasional dalam memberlakukan
standar minimum dalam hukum domestik. Ini menyatakan bahwa anggota dapat menentukan
sendiri berapa jumlahnya ke keadaan darurat nasional yang berhubungan dengan
kesehatan. [FN23] Pasal 27 TRIPS, yang mendefinisikan subyek paten, diimplementasikan
dengan cara yang sangat berbeda dalam hukum nasional anggota. Ketika datang ke ruang
lingkup subyek paten ada banyak sengketa apakah Perjanjian TRIPS membutuhkan jenis
tertentu paten.[FN24] Sebaliknya, beberapa artikel TRIPS memungkinkan fleksibilitas kecil,
seperti persyaratan bahwa anggota melindungi program komputer sebagai karya sastra dalam
hukum hak cipta.[FN25] ini tidak memberikan ruang lingkup anggota untuk melindungi program
komputer sebagai kategori lain dari pekerjaan hak cipta. [FN26] Mereka harus melindungi
program komputer sebagai karya sastra. [FN27] Tingkat otonomi yang anggota lakukan atau
tidak memiliki terletak pada inti dari setiap kontroversi interpretasi dari beberapa aspek dari
Perjanjian TRIPS.
Sebuah konsekuensi tak terelakkan dari standar minimum kekayaan intelektual, bukan detail
yang harmonis, adalah sengketa kepatuhan terhadap standar minimum. Beberapa sengketa
melibatkan keluhan bahwa hukum salah satu anggota tidak sesuai dengan dan akibatnya telah
melanggar Perjanjian TRIPS * 1029. Perselisihan lain atas Perjanjian TRIPS yang dimainkan,
bukan di arena penyelesaian sengketa, melainkan dalam TRIPs Dewan diskusi tentang ruang
lingkup Perjanjian TRIPS. Karena perbedaan dalam hukum nasional kekayaan intelektual dan
kesulitan dalam kemajuan negosiasi multilateral, baik di dalam dan di luar WTO, anggota
menggunakan FTA untuk memperdalam harmonisasi kewajiban kekayaan intelektual
setidaknya antara pihak-pihak FTA. Hal ini bahkan menciptakan lebih banyak perbedaan dalam
tingkat perlindungan kekayaan intelektual yang anggota WTO memiliki tingkat nasional dan
perselisihan bahkan lebih atas tingkat yang tepat dari perlindungan kekayaan
intelektual. Beberapa perbedaan pendapat dibingkai dalam hal apa anggota dapat harapkan
dari Perjanjian TRIPS, meskipun, sebagaimana disebutkan di atas, anggota tidak dapat
membawa non-pelanggaran sengketa tentang Perjanjian TRIPS.
Di satu sisi, beberapa negara berkembang menganggap bahwa tingkat perlindungan kekayaan
intelektual, yang mereka cukup diharapkan bahwa mereka akan menyediakan, tidak boleh lebih
tinggi daripada tingkat Perjanjian TRIPS untuk setidaknya beberapa waktu. Mereka tidak
berharap akan dipaksa memasuki FTA yang meningkatkan standar. Di sisi lain, negara-negara
maju telah memperlakukan kemampuan untuk meningkat standar kekayaan intelektual sebagai
tanpa batas. [FN28]
Seorang pelapor dalam sengketa non-pelanggaran harus menuduh bahwa ia telah kehilangan
keuntungan yang diharapkan cukup. Dalam hal pemilik hak kekayaan intelektual manfaat yang
diharapkan dari Perjanjian TRIPS akan perlindungan. Dalam kasus pengguna mungkin
kebebasan dari over-perlindungan. Kekhawatiran tentang over-perlindungan hak kekayaan
intelektual muncul, di bagian, melalui perundingan multilateral meningkat untuk memberikan
tingkat perlindungan yang lebih tinggi, tapi kebanyakan melalui perluasan TRIPS-plus
FTA. [FN29] Menggunakan non-pelanggaran kriteria sengketa, saya menganalisis apakah efek
TRIPS-plus FTA adalah untuk meniadakan dan merusak manfaat dan harapan bahwa para
anggota telah, yang mengalir dari struktur dinegosiasikan dan disepakati dari Perjanjian
TRIPS. Struktur yang merupakan kombinasi dari standar minimum dan beberapa otonomi
nasional atas bagaimana standar-standar minimum diimplementasikan. Pertanyaan utama saya
menjelajahi adalah: (a) bagaimana TRIPS-plus FTA menghapus derajat fleksibilitas atas
pelaksanaan hukum kekayaan intelektual di tingkat domestik, dan (b) apakah bahwa erosi
fleksibilitas yang konsisten dengan struktur disepakati dan kerangka Perjanjian TRIPS.
* 1030 Saya tidak membantah bahwa Perjanjian TRIPS memungkinkan untuk anggota WTO
untuk menyediakan tingkat yang lebih tinggi perlindungan kekayaan intelektual. [FN30] saya
sarankan, bagaimanapun, bahwa menyediakan tingkat perlindungan yang lebih tinggi
seharusnya memiliki batasan konsisten dengan kata-kata dari Perjanjian TRIPS, dalam terang
objek dan tujuan, struktur dan manfaat yang dapat diharapkan dari itu. [FN31] Juga,
kemampuan untuk menyediakan tingkat perlindungan yang lebih tinggi tidak sama dengan hak
dicentang untuk memaksa tingkat yang lebih tinggi perlindungan melalui FTA. Sebaliknya, sifat
opsional kemampuan untuk meningkatkan perlindungan sendiri merupakan tujuan dari
Perjanjian TRIPS yang harus dipertahankan.
Bagian II membahas hubungan antara standar minimum dan perlindungan yang lebih luas di
bawah Perjanjian TRIPS. Bagian III membahas bagaimana perlindungan yang lebih luas
diterapkan pada non-diskriminasi, khususnya dasar MFN,.Bagian IV membahas obyek dan
tujuan dari Perjanjian TRIPS.Pemahaman tentang konsep-konsep fundamental yang penting
sebagai FTA tidak boleh merusak objek Perjanjian yang dinegosiasikan dan tujuan. Bagian V
membahas cara-cara di mana norma-norma internasional kekayaan intelektual diciptakan
melalui TRIPS-plus FTA. Bagian VI dan VII menilai peran non-pelanggaran sengketa dalam
konteks Perjanjian TRIPS. Ini termasuk diskusi tentang apa yang non-pelanggaran perselisihan
tentang Perjanjian TRIPS mungkin terlihat seperti.Saya menilai potensi pelanggaran non-
sengketa yang dibawa oleh anggota dari sudut pandang pemilik hak kekayaan intelektual
'. Untuk saat ini, Amerika Serikat adalah pendukung utama yang memungkinkan non-
pelanggaran perselisihan TRIPs. Ini berarti bahwa potensi non-pelanggaran sengketa sebagian
besar telah dianggap sebagai alat untuk pemilik properti intelektual untuk meningkatkan
perlindungan. Artikel ini, oleh karena itu, membahas apa yang non-pelanggaran sengketa
mungkin terlihat seperti dari sudut pandang pengguna hak kekayaan intelektual. [FN32] Secara
khusus, bagaimana pengguna dapat menggunakan non-pelanggaran berpendapat bahwa
standar ditingkatkan melalui TRIPS-plus FTA pelanggaran non-Perjanjian TRIPS. Bagian VIII
membahas tumpang tindih sengketa pelanggaran dan non-pelanggaran dalam konteks
Perjanjian TRIPS. Bagian IX menawarkan beberapa kesimpulan.

* 1031 II. STANDAR MINIMUM DAN 'perlindungan yang lebih ekstensif'

Perjanjian TRIPS, dan perjanjian internasional lainnya pada kekayaan intelektual, [FN33] menyediakan standar
hukum minimum dan memungkinkan anggota untuk menyediakan peningkatan tingkat perlindungan. Kebanyakan,
jika tidak semua, substantif hukum perjanjian internasional kekayaan intelektual memiliki struktur ini. [FN34]
Standar minimum dari Perjanjian TRIPS meresepkan tingkat perlindungan daripada kata-kata yang tepat dari
hukum. Dengan cara ini standar minimum menyediakan tingkat harmonisasi, tetapi mereka minimum tidak mendalam
mengharmonisasikan hukum untuk tingkat resep kata-kata yang akan digunakan dalam undang-undang domestik. Ini
berarti bahwa akan ada perbedaan dalam hukum di tingkat nasional dan dengan cara yang efek yang berbeda untuk
memenuhi standar minimum.
Perjanjian TRIPS mengharuskan anggota terutama memberikan tingkat minimum perlindungan melalui undang-
undang properti intelektual yang relevan. Beberapa aspek TRIPS dapat dipengaruhi oleh non-undang-undang hak
intelektual. Tantangan dapat dibuat undang-undang yang tidak ditunjuk hukum kekayaan intelektual, tetapi langsung
mempengaruhi persyaratan TRIPS Agreement. Sengketa Klub Havana, misalnya, khawatir hukum AS yang tidak
terutama hukum merek dagang, melainkan adalah tentang memperkuat boikot terhadap Kuba. [FN35]
Apakah hukum diperlakukan sebagai dalam lingkup perlindungan kekayaan intelektual bahwa Perjanjian TRIPS
mengharuskan atau di luar lingkup yang penting. [FN36] Jika hukum adalah dalam lingkup cakupan Perjanjian
TRIPS, adalah tunduk pada perlakuan nasional dan MFN. Rezim sui generis, di luar persyaratan dari Perjanjian
TRIPS, digunakan, benar atau salah, sebagai cara untuk menghindari kewajiban perlakuan nasional. Orang-orang
Eropa memperlakukan ekstraksi database yang tidak adil yang tepat, misalnya, sebagai di luar lingkup Perjanjian
TRIPS, karena Perjanjian tidak memerlukan perlindungan data. [FN37] * 1032 Sebagai Perjanjian TRIPS memiliki
standar minimal, setiap standar perlindungan yang lebih besar dalam hukum anggota juga harus tunduk pada
perlakuan nasional dan MFN. Apa yang lebih besar atau di luar Perjanjian ini tidak selalu mudah untuk
mengidentifikasi.Pendekatan Eropa untuk contoh database adalah bahwa karena Perjanjian TRIPS tidak
memerlukan perlindungan perlindungan basis data yang tidak perlu Uni Eropa dikenakan perlakuan
nasional. Argumen alternatif adalah bahwa hal itu harus tunduk terhadap pengobatan nasional karena melindungi
data dari ekstraksi tidak adil adalah tingkat perlindungan yang lebih besar database dari Perjanjian TRIPS
membutuhkan. Ini hanya mensyaratkan bahwa pemilihan dan pengaturan database yang kreasi intelektual
dilindungi. [FN38] Masalah ini menjadi sangat sulit ketika negara-negara melindungi data tidak sebagai hak ekstraksi
sui generis tidak adil, tetapi sebagai bagian dari hukum hak cipta yang tampaknya menjadi situasi sekarang di
Australia. [FN39]
Contoh lain yang menggambarkan kesulitan menentukan batas-batas Perjanjian TRIPS adalah persyaratan
perlindungan merek dagang. Perjanjian TRIPS membutuhkan perlindungan merek dagang yang "kata-kata termasuk
nama pribadi, huruf, angka, unsur figuratif dan kombinasi warna '. Banyak negara memiliki suara dan tanda bau dan
beberapa FTA membutuhkan perlindungan dari macam merek dagang. [FN40] Persetujuan TRIPs tidak memerlukan
perlindungan tanda bau dan suara karena menyatakan bahwa "anggota mungkin memerlukan, sebagai syarat
pendaftaran, bahwa tanda-tanda secara visual jelas 'dan tanda visual tersebut tidak jelas. Dalam arti bahwa
seseorang dapat mengatakan bahwa suara dan bau menandai berada di luar lingkup Perjanjian TRIPS, tapi itu bisa
dibilang tidak benar. Tanda tersebut jelas kategori perlindungan yang sama seperti yang dibutuhkan untuk dilindungi
di bawah Perjanjian TRIPS. [FN41]
Apapun metode yang dipilih untuk menerapkan standar minimal hukum Perjanjian TRIPS anggota WTO juga akan
berbeda karena kemungkinan bahwa Anggota akan menyediakan standar meningkat. Ada tiga fitur penting dari pasal
1 dari Perjanjian TRIPS, yang menyiapkan kemungkinan perlindungan yang lebih luas.
Pertama, anggota dapat, namun tidak wajib, menerapkan dalam hukum mereka perlindungan yang lebih luas
'. [FN42] Cukup jelas ini berarti bahwa memberikan perlindungan yang lebih luas adalah opsional.
* 1033 Kedua, pasal 1 memungkinkan penyediaan perlindungan yang lebih luas 'yang disediakan bahwa
perlindungan tidak bertentangan dengan ketentuan-ketentuan dari Persetujuan'.[FN43] Hal ini penting karena
merenungkan kemungkinan bahwa beberapa perlindungan ekstra yang mungkin bertentangan dengan
Perjanjian. Oleh karena itu, fakta bahwa sesuatu adalah standar yang lebih tinggi dari standar minimum dari
Perjanjian TRIPS tidak berarti bahwa standar yang lebih tinggi sesuai dengan Perjanjian. Ungkapan, 'yang
disediakan bahwa perlindungan tersebut tidak bertentangan dengan perjanjian', terutama diarahkan ke prinsip-prinsip
non-diskriminasi, perlakuan nasional dan paling disukai bangsa (MFN). [FN44] non-diskriminasi merupakan bagian
struktural dari Persetujuan ini. [FN45] Artinya, mereka mempengaruhi setiap bagian dari Perjanjian ini. Standar
meningkat, meskipun diperbolehkan, tidak boleh bertentangan bagian-bagian struktural seperti Perjanjian. Jadi,
standar meningkat tidak harus bertentangan ini non-diskriminasi. Sebagai contoh, standar minimum untuk durasi
paten adalah 20 tahun. [FN46] Setiap kenaikan istilah bahwa dalam hukum setiap anggota harus diberikan atas
dasar non-diskriminatif bagi semua anggota WTO. [FN47]
Juga untuk dicatat adalah bahwa pasal 1 mengacu pada perlindungan yang lebih luas tidak pengecualian yang lebih
luas.Pengecualian yang lebih luas yang paling mungkin untuk menghasilkan tingkat keseluruhan perlindungan yang
di bawah standar minimum. [FN48]
Ketiga, anggota bebas menentukan metode yang tepat pelaksanaan Perjanjian TRIPS standar dalam sistem hukum
mereka. Kebebasan selama pelaksanaan termasuk detail dan ruang lingkup hukum, * 1034 asalkan mereka
memenuhi standar minimum, dan juga kebebasan di atas jenis hukum. Perjanjian TRIPS, misalnya, memungkinkan
anggota untuk memilih apakah untuk melindungi varietas tanaman baru dengan hak paten atau varietas tanaman sui
generis sistem hak-hak. [FN49]
Kebebasan untuk anggota WTO untuk memilih metode pelaksanaan standar Perjanjian TRIPS merupakan
pengakuan penting dari beberapa fleksibilitas dari Perjanjian dan otonomi nasional konsekuen bahwa artikel 1
memungkinkan. Kombinasi kemampuan untuk memiliki tingkat perlindungan yang lebih besar, dan kebebasan untuk
semua anggota untuk menerapkan hukum domestik dengan cara yang sesuai untuk mereka, menciptakan
kemungkinan yang berbeda hukum kekayaan intelektual di tingkat nasional. Dengan demikian, standar minimum
struktur dapat menciptakan ketidakharmonisan.Namun, anggota Perjanjian TRIPS telah sepakat untuk standar
minimum dan otonomi nasional atas penerapan standar.Pendekatan itu adalah fitur struktural dari Perjanjian TRIPS
yang merupakan bagian dari objek keseluruhan dan tujuan Perjanjian.

III. "Lebih luas PERLINDUNGAN 'DAN NON-DISKRIMINASI

Sebagaimana disebutkan di atas, bagian struktural lain dari Perjanjian TRIPS adalah prinsip-prinsip non-diskriminasi,
perlakuan nasional dan MFN. Prinsip-prinsip ini berfungsi untuk memastikan bahwa, di mana hukum nasional
berbeda, pemegang hak pribadi dari semua anggota menerima perlindungan yang sama di dalam negeri. Tanpa
prinsip perlakuan nasional kerangka standar minimum akan hampir pasti mengakibatkan diskriminasi di tingkat
domestik. [FN50] Nasional ketentuan pengobatan ditemukan di lain perjanjian hukum kekayaan intelektual substantif,
tetapi penambahan MFN adalah kejadian baru dengan Perjanjian TRIPS. [FN51] Persetujuan TRIPs tidak memiliki
pengecualian MFN untuk dimasukkan ke FTA setelah 1995. [FN52] Tidak adanya pembebasan ini memiliki efek
utama mengemudi MFN peningkatan perlindungan kekayaan intelektual. Kombinasi dari Perjanjian TRIPS standar
hukum minimum dan tidak adanya pengecualian MFN tidak hanya diperbolehkan, tetapi, melalui kerangka kerja yang
relatif terbatas, mendorong peningkatan perlindungan kekayaan intelektual melalui bab-bab kekayaan intelektual
dalam FTA. Sebuah kompleksitas * 1035 ini adalah cara yang berbeda di mana MFN beroperasi di Perjanjian TRIPS
daripada dalam konteks GATT. [FN53]
Sebagai TRIPS tidak memiliki pengecualian MFN maka setiap perubahan hukum domestik akan disediakan secara
MFN. Apa itu artinya adalah bahwa semua orang asing akan diperlakukan sama oleh hukum domestik setiap
anggota. Dalam rangka untuk memiliki peningkatan serupa di beberapa negara, setiap negara akan perlu mengubah
hukum nasionalnya juga. Ini adalah salah satu alasan mengapa Amerika Serikat dan Uni Eropa, khususnya, masuk
ke bab kekayaan intelektual dalam FTA, dengan klausul yang sama atau mirip, dengan sejumlah negara yang
berbeda. Setiap FTA diperlukan untuk mengharuskan anggota untuk mengubah hukum properti intelektual dalam
negeri sendiri. Jika negara-negara cukup banyak perubahan hukum mereka ke standar yang lebih tinggi maka
standar yang lebih tinggi memiliki potensi untuk menjadi norma internasional.Gelombang negara-negara
meningkatkan jangka waktu hak cipta sampai 70 tahun adalah contoh dari ini. Juga, jika warga negara A dapat
memperoleh perlindungan yang lebih baik di negara B maka ini bisa memberikan insentif bagi warga negara A ke
negara melobi Sebuah pemerintah untuk meningkatkan perlindungan.
Jika tidak ada klausul MFN dalam Perjanjian TRIPS itu saja tidak akan mencegah gelombang pasang meningkat
standar kekayaan intelektual. Namun, jika hukum kekayaan intelektual nasional hanya diterapkan standar meningkat
kepada pihak FTA, berdasarkan pengecualian MFN, ini mungkin memperlambat pasang naik meningkatkan standar
kekayaan intelektual. Seperti kesimpulan, bagaimanapun, adalah selalu spekulatif, terutama karena tidak semua
anggota WTO mengambil pendekatan, dicontohkan oleh Uni Eropa, perlindungan membebaskan dari pengobatan
nasional dimana perlindungan adalah perlindungan yang disebut 'non-TRIPS' atau memiliki berdasarkan perjanjian
pengecualian dari perlakuan nasional, seperti jangka waktu hak cipta.
Istilah diperlukan perlindungan hak cipta di bawah Perjanjian TRIPS hidup ditambah 50 tahun. Jika anggota
memberikan istilah yang lebih besar untuk hak cipta, maka anggota tersebut tidak perlu menggunakan istilah itu
untuk orang asing atas dasar perlakuan nasional, karena ada pengecualian khusus dari pengobatan nasional dalam
Konvensi Berne. [FN54] Para Berne yang relevan Konvensi ketentuan yang tergabung dalam Perjanjian
TRIPS. [FN55] Uni Eropa mengambil keuntungan dari ini pengecualian perlakuan nasional dan hanya memberikan
jangka panjang untuk warga negara dari negara-negara yang juga memiliki jangka panjang di hukum domestik. Ini
dikenal sebagai timbal balik, bukan perlakuan nasional. Amerika Serikat, tidak seperti Uni Eropa, tidak membedakan
antara negara-negara yang menyediakan * jangka panjang 1036 dan mereka yang tidak. Sebaliknya Amerika Serikat
menyediakan diperpanjang 70 tahun pada istilah dasar perlakuan nasional.[FN56]
Apakah standar meningkat diciptakan pada hukum nasional dan diperluas melalui FTA menjadi norma internasional
mungkin juga tergantung pada jenis kenaikan yang menjadi masalah. Uni Eropa telah menyediakan baik jangka
waktu hak cipta meningkat dan hak ekstraksi tidak adil pada timbal balik daripada dasar perlakuan nasional. Banyak
negara telah mengadopsi istilah meningkat dan Amerika Serikat, misalnya, telah termasuk dalam FTA dengan orang
lain. Hal yang sama tidak berlaku untuk hak ekstraksi tidak adil yang belum begitu banyak diambil. [FN57]
Standar Anggota yang mengejar peningkatan tingkat tindakan perlindungan kekayaan intelektual seakan kerangka
standar minimum berarti bahwa tidak ada yang mencegah ditingkatkan tanpa batas. Pendekatan yang meningkatkan
apapun yang sah dalam segala situasi, bagaimanapun, terlalu sederhana atau formalistik. [FN58] Ini mengabaikan
banyak pertanyaan yang muncul, apakah standar meningkat adalah selalu konsisten dengan obyek dan tujuan dari
Perjanjian TRIPS. [FN59] peningkatan tersebut belum tentu meningkatkan perdagangan.Saya telah menyatakan di
tempat lain bahwa sangat penting dalam ketiadaan pengecualian MFN untuk FTA, GATT dan GATS sebagai telah
tegas, bahwa bab kekayaan intelektual dalam FTA harus setidaknya harus konsisten dengan obyek dan tujuan dari
Perjanjian TRIPS. [FN60]

IV. OBYEK DAN TUJUAN PERJANJIAN TRIPS

Setiap minimal substantif dari Perjanjian TRIPS memiliki tujuan memberikan apapun yang
standar minimum. Selain itu, Perjanjian TRIPS memiliki beberapa ketentuan umum yang
dikelompokkan bersama dalam Bagian I, di bawah 'Ketentuan Umum dan Prinsip Dasar' judul
ini meliputi ketentuan-ketentuan yang menyediakan untuk non-diskriminasi, membangun
kerangka kerja standar minimum, otonomi atas pelaksanaan tersebut standar dan pilihan untuk
memiliki atau tidak memiliki perlindungan yang lebih luas. Ketentuan umum lainnya termasuk
tujuan dan prinsip-prinsip Perjanjian TRIPS 1037 *. Semua ketentuan-ketentuan umum bersifat
struktural karena mereka dimaksudkan untuk mempengaruhi seluruh Perjanjian dan, dengan
demikian, mereka melindungi dgn lengkungan obyek dan tujuan dari standar individu
perlindungan di bagian lain dari Perjanjian TRIPS. [FN61]
Setiap latihan interpretasi yang menilai objek dan tujuan dari Perjanjian yang pertama harus
melihat kata-kata perjanjian dalam konteks mereka dan dalam terang objek perjanjian dan
tujuan. [FN62]
Pembukaan yang relevan untuk menafsirkan objek dan tujuan dari Perjanjian TRIPS. Hal ini
mengacu pada 'kebutuhan' untuk melindungi intelektual dan properti serta kebutuhan untuk
'memastikan bahwa langkah-langkah dan prosedur untuk menegakkan hak kekayaan
intelektual sendiri tidak menjadi hambatan perdagangan yang sah'. Pembukaan juga
menyatakan, "Menyadari tujuan kebijakan publik yang mendasari sistem nasional untuk
perlindungan kekayaan intelektual, termasuk tujuan perkembangan dan teknologi '.
Tujuan, dalam pasal 7, berusaha untuk menjelaskan keseimbangan, yang selalu melekat pada
kekayaan intelektual di tingkat domestik, antara pengguna dan pemilik atau produsen. [FN63]
Dalam kekayaan intelektual internasional dan ketegangan produsen pengguna dimanifestasikan
sebagai keseimbangan terutama antara negara maju dan berkembang.[FN64] Pasal 7, oleh
karena itu, negara tujuan yang melindungi kekayaan intelektual harus mempromosikan antara
lain, transfer teknologi dan diseminasi teknologi.
Prinsip-prinsip, dalam pasal 8, alamat cara untuk mencapai keseimbangan ini. Pasal 8
menyatakan bahwa anggota dapat memiliki pengecualian dalam undang-undang mereka untuk
melindungi kesehatan masyarakat dan untuk mempromosikan kepentingan publik dalam sektor
sangat penting untuk * 1038 pembangunan sosio-ekonomi dan teknologi '. [FN65] Ini macam
pengecualian adalah cara utama di mana anggota WTO dapat mengembangkan kebijakan
kekayaan intelektual yang mencerminkan kebutuhan ekonomi mereka. [FN66]
Tujuan-tujuan dan prinsip-prinsip yang sangat sulit untuk menafsirkan dengan cara yang praktis
karena mereka mengabadikan tujuan yang bersaing. Panel WTO di Kanada-Farmasi [FN67]
menyatakan bahwa prinsip-prinsip ini tidak dapat digunakan untuk merusak kata-kata tegas dari
bagian lain Perjanjian. [FN68] Namun demikian, sentralitas tujuan dan prinsip-prinsip Perjanjian
TRIPS digarisbawahi dalam Deklarasi Doha pada Perjanjian TRIPS dan Kesehatan
Masyarakat, yang secara tegas mengakui pentingnya tujuan dan prinsip-prinsip untuk
menafsirkan perjanjian secara keseluruhan. [FN69]
Sebuah analisis dari apa anggota bisa diharapkan dari kata-kata dan struktur Perjanjian TRIPS
juga ilustrasi objek dan tujuannya. Namun, penting untuk tidak menyimpang dari kata-kata
perjanjian untuk analisis ini. Badan Banding menegaskan di India-Paten [FN70] bahwa Panel
telah keliru dalam menunjukkan bahwa harapan yang sah dapat ditemukan di luar kata-kata
dari Perjanjian TRIPS. [FN71] * 1039 Badan Banding menganggap bahwa Panel telah keliru
karena telah elided pelanggaran dan aspek-aspek non-pelanggaran sengketa GATT untuk
mencapai kesimpulan. Seperti penghilangan bunyi dlm percakapan yang tidak dapat benar
dalam konteks Perjanjian TRIPS karena non-pelanggaran sengketa tidak tersedia. [FN72]
Tujuan dan tujuan dari Perjanjian TRIPS harus tercermin dalam bab-bab kekayaan intelektual
FTA. Jika tidak, maka anggota WTO tidak boleh memaafkan, termasuk dengan tidak bertindak
terlibat, perluasan TRIPS-plus FTA. Bagian berikutnya membahas apakah efek norma-
mendorong dari TRIPS-plus FTA memiliki efek merusak aspek-aspek dari objek dan tujuan dari
Perjanjian TRIPS.

V. INTERNASIONAL MELALUI PENCIPTAAN Norm FTA

Standar Perjanjian TRIPS minimum diundangkan dalam hukum domestik dan kemudian
diterapkan dalam anggota pada perlakuan nasional dan dasar MFN. [FN73] Standar minimum
dalam Perjanjian TRIPS telah menjadi dasar dari norma-norma internasional perlindungan
kekayaan intelektual. Norma-norma internasional kekayaan intelektual juga dibuat melalui
perjanjian internasional lainnya seperti perjanjian WIPO. WIPO perjanjian, yang dinegosiasikan
pasca TRIPs, tidak harus dianggap sebagai norma-norma Perjanjian TRIPS, bukan mereka
menambah apa yang mungkin digambarkan sebagai norma-norma internasional kekayaan
intelektual. [FN74]
FTA juga memiliki peran dalam menciptakan norma-norma internasional. Sebuah FTA tunggal
tidak dapat merupakan suatu norma properti internasional intelektual, tapi beberapa * 1040
FTA, dengan ketentuan yang sama mungkin mulai memiliki efek itu. [FN75] proposisi ini
diverifikasi karena merupakan kebijakan terbuka dari Amerika Serikat yang meningkat FTA
bilateral dan standar kekayaan intelektual akan mendukung posisi untuk meningkatkan standar
kekayaan intelektual global. [FN76]
Tidak adanya pengecualian MFN memiliki peran dalam mendukung aliran lintas batas norma
kekayaan intelektual.Bahkan jika FTA atau pengaturan bilateral hanya antara dua pihak, hal itu
mempengaruhi negara-negara lain yang warga negara berhak atas perlindungan kekayaan
intelektual dalam yurisdiksi yang pihak FTA. Juga, proses penyelesaian sengketa dapat
mempertimbangkan keputusan panel rekening FTA.[FN77] Aliran norma kekayaan intelektual
dari bab kekayaan intelektual dalam FTA tidak selalu mudah untuk melacak dan mengukur,
tetapi aliran niscaya dilakukan dan akan terus terjadi.
Perjanjian TRIPS memberikan bahwa anggota mungkin, namun tidak berkewajiban untuk,
memberikan perlindungan lebih luas.Namun, ada dua keterbatasan luas untuk ini proposisi
umum.Pertama, seperti didiskusikan di atas, peningkatan perlindungan harus sesuai dengan
Perjanjian TRIPS. [FN78] Juga, hukum internasional memungkinkan negara-negara untuk
membuat komitmen internasional dengan negara lain, asalkan komitmen tersebut tidak
bertentangan dengan kewajiban internasional negara-negara lain. [FN79]
Serta membutuhkan penerapan domestik TRIPS-plus standar sengatan di ekor TRIPS-plus
perjanjian adalah bagaimana perjanjian tersebut menghilangkan aspek struktur Perjanjian
TRIPS berkaitan dengan hubungan antara standar minimum dan otonomi nasional atas
pelaksanaan standar-standar . Orang mungkin mengatakan bahwa negara-negara yang masuk
ke dalam persetujuan perjanjian untuk menghilangkan struktur ini, tapi ini tidak perwatakan. Ada
sering ketidakseimbangan kekuatan dalam negosiasi tersebut dan negara-negara masuk ke
dalam perlindungan kekayaan intelektual yang tidak dalam kepentingan mereka. Mereka masuk
ke dalam bab-bab seperti itu karena manfaat perdagangan lainnya dalam FTA secara
keseluruhan. [FN80] * 1041 Juga, banyak negara berkembang tampaknya telah percaya atau
mungkin berharap bahwa standar Perjanjian TRIPS minimum akan menjadi batas-batas
perlindungan mereka akan diwajibkan untuk memberikan.[FN81]
Saya sarankan, karena itu, bahwa proliferasi TRIPS-plus standar secara kumulatif dapat
mencapai suatu pelanggaran sistemik dari struktur Perjanjian TRIPS dan tujuan. Jika FTA tidak
meresepkan harmonisasi lebih dalam rincian hukum domestik di daerah TRIPS-tertutup, maka
harmonisasi lebih dalam perubahan pendekatan standar minimum. Pelanggaran terjadi ketika
beberapa FTA memiliki pendekatan itu dan norma-norma baru berkembang tanpa
konsensus. Ini bahkan lebih bermasalah jika harmonisasi rinci terjadi melalui tekanan bilateral
yang tidak hanya dampak mereka di bawah tekanan, tetapi juga anggota lain dari WTO. Tanpa
mengungkapkan negosiasi untuk harmonisasi, peningkatan standar minimum tidak boleh
digunakan untuk mencapai yang baik secara langsung atau tidak langsung melalui FTA. Ini
TRIPS-plus bab kekayaan intelektual dalam FTA karena itu bertentangan dengan pasal 1, yang
mengatakan bahwa anggota mungkin, namun tidak berkewajiban untuk, memberikan
perlindungan lebih luas.
Ketentuan struktural dari Perjanjian TRIPS seharusnya marah FTA ratchet up. Namun,
proliferasi tidak terkendali dari TRIPS-plus standar telah menjalankan mempersulit pemenuhan
dan efektif mengabaikan arti sebenarnya dari ketentuan struktural.Aku, oleh karena itu,
pertanyaan apakah perlindungan kekayaan intelektual melalui peningkatan FTA adalah
sah. [FN82] Peningkatan standar yang melanggar ketentuan-ketentuan struktural Perjanjian
TRIPS seharusnya tidak diizinkan.
Seperti pelanggaran berbeda dari jenis pelanggaran di mana sengketa dapat dibawa ke DSB
menyatakan bahwa hukum anggota melanggar perjanjian. * 1042 pelanggaran adalah tentang
sistem dan bagaimana kekayaan intelektual bab dalam FTA digunakan untuk meningkatkan
standar. Oleh karena itu, TRIPS-plus FTA perlu dibawa ke memeriksa dan bahwa harmonisasi
peningkatan hak kekayaan intelektual melalui tekanan yang meningkat melalui FTA tidak sah
dalam kerangka properti setuju intelektual internasional. [FN83]
Para kemungkinan respon dari orang-orang mengejar standar meningkat adalah bahwa standar
minimum benar-benar hanya berarti standar minimum dan apa pun di atas yang sah, tapi itu
terlalu sempit interpretasi dari Perjanjian TRIPS. Fakta bahwa Perjanjian TRIPS memungkinkan
standar meningkat merupakan argumen analitis sederhana. Ini dapat dijelaskan sebagai
interpretasi formalistik [FN84] yang juga mengabaikan bagian lain dari Perjanjian ini, terutama
objek dan tujuannya, dan juga kenyataan tentang bagaimana hukum dibuat di tingkat
domestik.[FN85]
Sebagai kualifikasi saya perhatikan bahwa tidak semua ketentuan TRIPs adalah sama, tidak
semua kenaikan yang bermasalah. Ada perbedaan antara TRIPS-plus standar yang
memperluas perlindungan aspek kategori tertutup Perjanjian TRIPS dan TRIPS-plus yang
memperkenalkan standar baru dan benar sui generis subyek, seperti pengetahuan
tradisional.[FN86] Sebagai Perjanjian TRIPS tidak berbicara hal-hal pengetahuan tradisional,
perlindungan tersebut mungkin atau harus dinegosiasikan di tempat lain dan ada aliran tidak
kembali efek untuk anggota lain tanpa persetujuan TRIPs mengungkapkan mereka.
Peningkatan perlindungan kekayaan intelektual internasional telah terjadi melalui kesepakatan
bilateral jauh sebelum Perjanjian TRIPS diciptakan. [FN87] Namun, TRIPS-plus FTA tidak sama
dengan pra-TRIPS bilateral. Pernikahan properti perdagangan dan intelektual telah membuat
perbedaan yang signifikan dalam dua cara. Yang pertama adalah bahwa lebih banyak
dipertaruhkan ketika negosiasi terkait perdagangan FTA dan akibatnya efek koersif untuk
meningkatkan perlindungan kekayaan intelektual jauh lebih efektif bila perdagangan dan
kekayaan intelektual dicampur. Yang kedua adalah bahwa obyek dan tujuan TRIPS berbeda
dari yang lain perjanjian kekayaan intelektual karena pengaturan perdagangan.Hubungan
perdagangan dengan keterbatasan tempat pada perlindungan meningkat. Mereka keterbatasan
adalah bahwa obyek dan tujuan dari Perjanjian TRIPS harus kompatibel dengan tujuan WTO
keseluruhan * 1043 dari liberalisasi perdagangan. Keterbatasan pada standar meningkat tidak
hadir dalam pra-perjanjian TRIPs, yang didominasi 'kekayaan intelektual hanya' sampai 1980-
an. [FN88]
Aku mengakui bahwa kesulitan dengan argumen bahwa telah terjadi pelanggaran sistemik dari
Perjanjian TRIPS adalah bahwa surat Perjanjian TRIPS telah dibilang tidak dilanggar karena
ada kepatuhan harfiah atau formalistis. Namun anggota Perjanjian TRIPS harus dapat manfaat
dari standar perlindungan kekayaan intelektual menjadi norma internasional kecuali norma-
norma lain yang bebas dinegosiasikan. Kombinasi dari efek koersif dan aliran norma-norma dari
anggota lain 'TRIPS-plus hasil FTA di beberapa anggota kehilangan keuntungan tidak wajib
memiliki standar meningkat. Hal ini menunjukkan bahwa TRIPS-plus FTA tidak forum yang sah
untuk perubahan Perjanjian TRIPS. Kriteria utama untuk klaim non-pelanggaran yang sukses
adalah bahwa manfaat dari kesepakatan yang dinegosiasikan batal atau terganggu, bahkan jika
surat perjanjian tidak dilanggar. Oleh karena itu, pendekatan alternatif untuk argumen
pelanggaran sistemik saya adalah bahwa pelanggaran non-sengketa dapat digunakan untuk
memeriksa standar meningkat dimana pembentukan standar tersebut mengikis manfaat yang
diharapkan dari Perjanjian TRIPS.Dalam rangka untuk menganggap ini lebih lanjut perlu untuk
melihat apa non-pelanggaran sengketa dan contoh dari apa TRIPS non-pelanggaran sengketa
mungkin terlihat seperti.

VI. PERJANJIAN TRIPS DAN NON-PELANGGARAN PERSELISIHAN

A. Non-Pelanggaran di Umum
GATT memungkinkan anggota untuk membawa sengketa terhadap anggota lain bahkan jika
tidak ada pelanggaran terhadap kata-kata perjanjian: [FN89]
Jika pihak kontraktor harus mempertimbangkan bahwa keuntungan yang diperoleh secara
langsung atau tidak langsung berdasarkan Perjanjian ini sedang ditiadakan atau terganggu atau
bahwa pencapaian suatu tujuan perjanjian sedang terhambat sebagai akibat dari: ... (B)
penerapan pihak lain kontrak ukuran apa pun, apakah atau tidak bertentangan dengan
ketentuan-ketentuan Persetujuan ini ...
Ini dikenal sebagai non-pelanggaran sengketa karena tidak ada pelanggaran dari kata-kata
yang tepat dari perjanjian tersebut.Non-pelanggaran sengketa dapat dibawa dalam kaitannya
dengan GATT dan GATS, tapi ada moratorium dalam kaitannya dengan sengketa tersebut dan
Perjanjian TRIPS. [FN90] moratorium ini awalnya selama 5 tahun. [FN91] Selama periode
Perjanjian ini memberikan bahwa Dewan TRIPs * 1044 'wajib mempelajari lingkup dan
modalitas untuk keberatan dari [ini] ketik'. [FN92] Proses pemeriksaan terus berlanjut. Berbagai
anggota WTO mendukung perselisihan tersebut yang tersedia.Anggota lain mempertimbangkan
pengaduan tersebut tidak tepat. [FN93] Beberapa FTA memungkinkan untuk pihak untuk
membawa sengketa pelanggaran non-terhadap satu sama lain.[FN94]
Cho telah dikelompokkan GATT non-pelanggaran laporan ke 'restraintism' dan 'aktivis'
kasus. [FN95] Dalam kaitannya dengan kasus-kasus restraintism pengadu harus menunjukkan
bahwa ukuran persoalan adalah tidak cukup diantisipasi pada saat konsesi tarif GATT
dinegosiasikan. [FN96] Ukuran pada masalah harus merusak posisi kompetitif dari produk
impor yang bersangkutan. [FN97] Cho menjelaskan kasus yang memenuhi kriteria sebagai
kasus modus tambahan karena mereka tampaknya untuk mengisi celah hukum '. [FN98] kasus
Aktivisme tidak memenuhi kriteria ini, terutama tidak ada 'hubungan antara konsesi tarif dan
harapan darinya'. [FN99] Cho karena itu disebut kasus ini 'modus mandiri' karena pengadu tidak
mengambil masalah dengan tarif tertentu, melainkan menyatakan bahwa partai memiliki,
dengan cara lain, menghambat tujuan perjanjian.
Cho penting dari kasus modus independen dan menganggapnya mengejutkan bahwa beberapa
pendukung non-pelanggaran kasus telah menyarankan mereka dapat digunakan di daerah-
daerah yang baru muncul. [FN100] Dia mengacu pada penggunaan apa yang disebut kasus
modus independen sebagai menyediakan "sumber harapan '. [FN101] Orang mungkin bertanya
apa harapan adalah? Dalam konteks Perjanjian TRIPS yang 'harapan', saya berpendapat,
adalah bahwa penggunaan non-pelanggaran sengketa mungkin membawa pendekatan yang
lebih kuat untuk aplikasi dan interpretasi dari ketentuan-ketentuan struktural dari Perjanjian
TRIPS.

B. Mengapa non-Pelanggaran Perselisihan tidak tersedia di bawah Perjanjian TRIPS

Struktur dan sifat dari Perjanjian TRIPS, sebagai suatu perjanjian standar minimum,
membuatnya tampak tidak pantas untuk non-pelanggaran sengketa. Hal ini karena tidak akan
ada manfaat yang diharapkan selain * 1045 perlindungan yang diperlukan oleh standar
minimum. Entah perlindungan yang diperlukan atau tidak.
Sebuah contoh sederhana menunjukkan inti dari kesulitan ini.Mengatakan bahwa ada
kesepakatan internasional untuk bidang terkait kekayaan intelektual, diberi label untuk
kenyamanan A, B, C dan D, tapi perjanjian tidak mencakup perlindungan E karena para pihak
tidak dapat menyetujui E. tidak akan sah untuk pihak untuk menganggap bahwa hal itu juga
mungkin manfaat dari E sebagai hasil dari perjanjian.
Ketika menafsirkan kesepakatan aturan penyelesaian sengketa WTO mengharuskan panel dan
Badan Banding tidak menambah perjanjian, melainkan menafsirkan kata-kata yang ada
perjanjian. [FN102] Salah satu kesulitan dengan semua non-pelanggaran sengketa adalah
bahwa mereka menjalankan kemungkinan busuk jatuh dari persyaratan ini. Sebuah keluhan
yang menguntungkan telah terkikis, tetapi kata-kata perjanjian tidak dilanggar, segera terlihat
seperti menambahkan kesepakatan bahkan jika keluhan seperti itu diperbolehkan.
Dalam kasus sengketa kekayaan intelektual beberapa pelanggaran non-sengketa mungkin
benar-benar jumlah yang upaya untuk meregangkan arti dari standar minimum. Kesulitan
serupa berpotensi muncul dalam kasus Perjanjian GATS, di mana anggota dapat, dalam rangka
memenuhi tujuan kebijakan nasional, mengatur penyediaan layanan. Cho menunjukkan sifat
samar-samar kewajiban itu. [FN103] Banyak ketentuan-ketentuan Perjanjian TRIPS sama-
sama, jika tidak lebih, samar-samar, khususnya ketentuan yang memungkinkan pengecualian
seperti kemampuan untuk mengecualikan dari paten penemuan atas dasar hewan ketertiban
umum atau manusia, atau kehidupan atau kesehatan tumbuhan. [FN104]
Alasan utama bahwa negara-negara berkembang telah menentang penggunaan non-
pelanggaran sengketa untuk Perjanjian TRIPS adalah bahwa mereka percaya perselisihan
tersebut akan digunakan sebagai alat, terutama dari Amerika Serikat, untuk meningkatkan
perlindungan kekayaan intelektual.[FN105] Salah satu ketakutan adalah bahwa negara-negara
berkembang harus berjuang terlalu banyak perselisihan di WTO dan bahwa ini akan menguras
sumber daya. Ini bukan masalah yang harus dianggap enteng dan mungkin telah menjadi
perhatian dengan proses penyelesaian sengketa WTO pada umumnya.
Sejak Perjanjian TRIPS diberlakukan, Namun, dorongan untuk standar meningkat terjadi di
arena FTA. Proses negosiasi FTA telah sangat mahal dan merugikan banyak negara
berkembang dan WTO tidak menyediakan mekanisme bagi negara-negara berkembang untuk
membela diri terhadap tekanan ini. Negara-negara berkembang, terutama mereka dengan
kekuatan negosiasi kecil, bisa mendapatkan keuntungan dari pelanggaran non-* 1046 proses
karena dapat memberikan respon aturan berbasis tekanan tumbuh dan berkelanjutan untuk
meningkatkan perlindungan kekayaan intelektual. Prosedur non-pelanggaran, dengan aturan
yang tepat yang mengatur itu, bisa sangat baik memberikan 'pertahanan' yang diperlukan untuk
tekanan-tekanan.
Salah satu aspek dari aturan tersebut seharusnya bahwa ujian kehilangan 'manfaat apapun
... yang dibatalkan atau terganggu atau bahwa pencapaian tujuan setiap ... menjadi terhambat
'secara obyektif dinilai. Tampilan subjektif Sebuah pelapor kerugian tidak cukup. Pandangan
objektif akan menilai apakah manfaat yang diharapkan adalah ekspektasi yang wajar
berdasarkan perjanjian yang sebenarnya. Ini berarti bahwa pihak yang mencoba untuk
bernegosiasi untuk lebih dari mereka akhirnya dicapai tidak dapat menggunakan non-
pelanggaran untuk mengatakan bahwa hal itu lebih diharapkan. Penilaian obyektif adalah
metode mengendalikan non-pelanggaran sengketa dari menjadi alat negosiasi ulang.
Berselisih mungkin mencoba untuk menyalahgunakan non-pelanggaran, tetapi membentuk
aturan di sekitar Perjanjian TRIPS non-pelanggaran harus membantu kontrol ini. Untuk
memastikan beberapa pihak dapat membawa kasus-kasus buruk, tapi ini tidak berarti bahwa
Panel akan memutuskan kasus-kasus salah. Melainkan dapat memberikan kesempatan untuk
laporan untuk lebih mencerminkan sifat dan ketentuan struktural dari Perjanjian TRIPS sebagai
keseimbangan antara 'kaya' kekayaan intelektual dan 'si miskin'.
Saya menggunakan rumus non-pelanggaran tidak menyarankan Badan Banding, di India-
Paten, adalah salah. Perselisihan yang dibawa pada hari-hari awal penyelesaian sengketa dan
Perjanjian TRIPS. Seperti dibahas di atas, karena non-pelanggaran keluhan dan masih tidak
tersedia untuk perselisihan TRIPs, analisis Badan Banding benar. Hal ini penting, namun, untuk
dicatat bahwa di India-Paten, tanpa non-pelanggaran kriteria jenis, Badan Banding masih
menemukan melawan India.
Pendekatan saya di sini adalah untuk menunjukkan dua hal yang sangat berbeda dari isu-isu
yang dibahas di India-Paten.Pertama, mengapa non-pelanggaran perselisihan, pada tahap ini
dalam kehidupan Perjanjian TRIPS, menjadi penting sehingga lingkup Persetujuan ini diuji
dalam sebuah forum berbasis aturan daripada dalam kekuasaan-seimbang negosiasi
FTA. Kedua, untuk menggambarkan bahwa penggunaan dicentang bab kekayaan intelektual
dalam FTA tidak hanya merupakan pelanggaran ketentuan struktural dari Perjanjian TRIPS,
tetapi berpotensi yang ditindaklanjuti non-pelanggaran beberapa harapan yang sah substantif
yang timbul dari Perjanjian TRIPS.

C. Mengapa non-Pelanggaran Sengketa Sekarang Mungkin Cocok untuk Perjanjian TRIPS

Hampir 15 tahun beroperasi telah menunjukkan bahwa ada daerah abu-abu banyak di
Perjanjian TRIPS. Ini wilayah abu-abu muncul melalui kombinasi fitur dari Perjanjian
TRIPS.Sebagaimana dibahas di atas, standar minimum meresepkan tingkat perlindungan
daripada kata-kata yang tepat dari hukum.Ini berarti bahwa akan ada perbedaan dalam hukum
di tingkat nasional dan dalam * 1047 cara efek yang berbeda untuk memenuhi standar
minimum. Juga, garis antara bidang hukum kekayaan intelektual, di dalam atau di luar lingkup
Perjanjian TRIPS, tidak selalu begitu jelas. Pelanggaran perselisihan yang menganalisis kata-
kata, dalam cahaya dari objek dan tujuan dari Perjanjian TRIPS, harus set pertama alat yang
digunakan untuk menafsirkan bahwa wilayah abu-abu. Namun demikian, beberapa daerah abu-
abu dimana anggota dan sistem akan manfaat dari non-pelanggaran sengketa.
Penggunaan non-pelanggaran perselisihan tentang Perjanjian TRIPS tidak memerlukan koneksi
ke tarif spesifik karena Perjanjian TRIPS bukan tentang tarif. Sebaliknya koneksi harus ke
kategori perlindungan dalam kaitannya dengan mana Perjanjian TRIPS mengharuskan
anggotanya untuk memberlakukan standar minimum dalam kaitannya dengan.Non-pelanggaran
akan sangat berguna dalam kerangka standar minimum karena, dengan cara yang berbeda dari
sengketa pelanggaran, non-pelanggaran harus mengakui bahwa ada harapan yang luas timbul
dari ketentuan-ketentuan umum Persetujuan ini. Non-pelanggaran mengakui bahwa meskipun
ada kepatuhan literal dengan standar, yang merupakan interpretasi Konvensi Wina mungkin
menunjukkan kepatuhan, ada, pada kenyataannya, menjadi erosi manfaat cukup diharapkan di
bawah Perjanjian TRIPS.
Membiarkan non-pelanggaran sengketa akan menyediakan sebuah cara bagi anggota untuk
menguji parameter perjanjian dalam lingkungan berbasis aturan analitis, daripada dalam
berpotensi memaksa 'negosiasi' FTA, yang tidak ditandai dengan kebebasan kontrak dan
otonomi negara. Perjanjian TRIPS tidak dapat dinegosiasi ulang dalam penyelesaian sengketa
dan panel tidak berwenang untuk melakukan apa pun selain menafsirkan perjanjian, [FN106]
tetapi perselisihan melakukan melayani tujuan memungkinkan anggota untuk menguji
interpretasi mereka perjanjian dan menghilangkan kesulitan hakim anggota yang sebab mereka
sendiri. [FN107] Menjadi hakim dalam menyebabkan sendiri sangat problematis dalam
perundingan FTA, di mana ada ketidakseimbangan kekuatan antara pihak-pihak yang
bernegosiasi, dan pihak yang lebih kuat hanya dapat menyatakan bahwa penafsiran mereka
dari Perjanjian TRIPS benar. [FN108]
Dalam rangka untuk memeriksa utilitas non-pelanggaran sengketa lebih lanjut, namun, bagian
selanjutnya membahas yang berpotensi dapat membawa non-pelanggaran sengketa dan apa
yang mereka dapat terlihat seperti.

* 1048 VII. APA PERJANJIAN NON-PELANGGARAN TRIPS SENGKETA mungkin terlihat

seperti

A. Pemilik dan Pengguna sebagai Pengadu

Ada dua kategori luas dari manfaat yang anggota WTO harapkan dari Perjanjian TRIPS. Salah
satunya adalah manfaat yang pemilik hak kekayaan intelektual dapat mengharapkan dan yang
lain adalah apa yang pengguna kekayaan intelektual harapkan. [FN109] Pada tingkat nasional
akan ada baik pengguna dan pemilik hak kekayaan intelektual. Pada tingkat internasional
beberapa anggota WTO terutama diakui sebagai pemilik hak kekayaan intelektual dan lain-lain
diakui terutama sebagai pengguna. Amerika Serikat dan Uni Eropa adalah pemilik utama dari
kekayaan intelektual jika dibandingkan dengan negara-negara kecil atau berkembang, yang
sering didominasi pengguna kekayaan intelektual. Manfaat yang pemilik properti intelektual
mungkin mengharapkan menimbulkan isu yang berbeda dari manfaat yang pengguna kekayaan
intelektual harapkan.
Dasar hukum hak kekayaan intelektual sangat penting karena dasar-dasar hak-hak dapat
membantu dalam mendefinisikan kontur sesuai hak. Pada tingkat nasional hak kekayaan
intelektual biasanya dianggap hak-hak negatif. Itu adalah mereka menyediakan pemilik dengan
hak eksklusif untuk mengecualikan pihak ketiga. Mendasari beberapa argumen terhadap
penggunaan non-pelanggaran keluhan dalam konteks Perjanjian TRIPS adalah bahwa hak
kekayaan intelektual adalah hak-hak negatif pribadi dan karena itu inheren tidak cocok dengan
prinsip-prinsip non-pelanggaran, yang terlihat atas hilangnya manfaat positif. [FN110]
Meskipun hak kekayaan intelektual di tingkat nasional sebagian besar adalah hak kekayaan
negatif, perjanjian internasional memaksakan pada negara-negara anggota mereka kewajiban
positif untuk memberikan perlindungan, bahkan jika perlindungan yang diberikan melalui suatu
kerangka kerja hak milik negatif. Adanya kewajiban positif dapat memberikan hak korelatif untuk
individu untuk mengklaim perlindungan hak-hak.Perjanjian hak asasi manusia, mana ada *
1049 kewajiban pada negara untuk memberikan perlindungan penulis atau perlindungan hak-
hak sosial dan budaya, adalah contoh.[FN111]
Umumnya pemilik kekayaan intelektual tidak bisa mengharapkan sesuatu yang lebih dari hak-
hak bahwa hukum dalam negeri tertentu hibah mereka. [FN112] Meskipun hak kekayaan
intelektual pribadi hak perselisihan WTO tidak tentang hak pribadi individu tertentu, tetapi
kewajiban anggota untuk memberikan hak-hak pribadi dalam hukum domestik mereka.[FN113]
Karena Perjanjian TRIPS merupakan bagian dari 'murah' WTO tentang hubungan perdagangan
harapan perlindungan kekayaan intelektual dan manfaat perdagangan yang dihasilkan bukan
merupakan hak negatif, tetapi suatu kewajiban positif antara negara anggota. Perjanjian TRIPS
tidak mengubah hak negatif menjadi hak positif dari harapan untuk kepentingan individu pemilik
kekayaan intelektual atau pengguna. Sebaliknya, ia menyediakan Anggota dengan hak untuk
mengharapkan perlindungan kekayaan intelektual bagi warga negaranya di negara-negara
anggota lainnya. Ini adalah kewajiban positif antara negara anggota yang telah dan mungkin
menjadi subyek sengketa pelanggaran. Anggota yang memberikan perlindungan yang sah
harus berharap memperoleh manfaat dari kemampuan untuk tidak berkewajiban untuk
memberikan 'perlindungan lebih luas', jika mereka tidak ingin melakukannya. Harapan untuk
tidak memberikan perlindungan yang lebih besar dan dapat menggunakan fleksibilitas TRIPs
bisa menjadi subjek sengketa non-pelanggaran.
Non-pelanggaran sengketa di bawah Perjanjian TRIPS tidak akan tersedia hanya untuk
Anggota yang sebagian besar adalah pemilik hak kekayaan intelektual, tetapi mereka mungkin
jalan bagi Anggota, yang umumnya pengguna, untuk membawa perselisihan. Seperti dibahas di
atas, Perjanjian TRIPS menciptakan hak untuk melindungi kekayaan intelektual, dan
mewujudkan tujuan * 1050 transfer teknologi dan diseminasi, tetapi ini tidak memberikan
individu hak untuk memanfaatkan karya kekayaan intelektual. Untuk sebagian besar tidak ada
pengguna salah satu hak kekayaan intelektual, kecuali di bawah lisensi, telah mendefinisikan
hak dengan cara yang sama pemilik lakukan. Menggunakan Wajar karya kekayaan intelektual
adalah barang publik diperlukan sebagai bagian dari pembenaran keseluruhan untuk lingkup
perlindungan kekayaan intelektual. Oleh karena itu pengguna mungkin perlu berhati-hati
tentang dugaan diharapkan ada manfaat yang timbul dari setiap hukum kekayaan intelektual
nasional. Namun, ketika dipertimbangkan dalam konteks perjanjian internasional, diharapkan
cukup manfaat dari Perjanjian TRIPS, dari perspektif net-pengguna, termasuk transfer dan
diseminasi teknologi, dan otonomi nasional selama pelaksanaan TRIPS dan apakah atau tidak
untuk memberikan perlindungan yang lebih luas. [FN114]
Singkatnya, Perjanjian TRIPS menciptakan hak-hak positif bagi Anggota untuk cukup
mengharapkan perlindungan, derajat fleksibilitas dan bahwa Anggota lainnya mematuhi
ketentuan-ketentuan struktural Perjanjian. Ini adalah dalam konteks bahwa non-pelanggaran
keluhan mungkin berguna. Aku mengakui bahwa perselisihan tersebut mungkin sulit untuk
menang dan bahwa mereka harus sulit untuk menang, tapi itu tidak dapat menjadi alasan untuk
tidak memiliki mereka untuk kasus-kasus yang sesuai. Dengan pemikiran ini bagian berikutnya
melihat contoh-contoh non-pelanggaran sengketa, termasuk apa yang mereka mungkin
tentang, yang bisa membawa mereka dan apa yang mungkin mereka capai.

B. Contoh Pelanggaran Potensi Non Perselisihan

Catatan Sekretariat Dewan TRIPS diskusi yang non-pelanggaran keluhan menetapkan
beberapa contoh dari apa yang non-pelanggaran keluhan bisa terlihat seperti. [FN115] Salah
satunya adalah bahwa: [FN116]
Seorang anggota dapat memberikan peningkatan yang sangat besar dalam jangka waktu
perlindungan hak cipta yang efektif bisa meniadakan atau merusak manfaat yang B Anggota
mengharapkan untuk menikmati pada saat negosiasi dan kemudian negara B Anggota mungkin
telah diinvestasikan dalam produksi karya yang terpisah, katakanlah film atau bermain
berdasarkan atau menggunakan yang bekerja dan mengharapkan untuk berada dalam domain
publik.
Contoh ini adalah tepat untuk diskusi karena banyak negara telah memperpanjang jangka
waktu hak cipta mereka di luar minimum Perjanjian TRIPS. [FN117]
* 1051 seperti keluhan tidak pengaduan pelanggaran sebagaimana persyaratan dari Perjanjian
TRIPS telah terpenuhi dan terlampaui. Karena ada moratorium non-pelanggaran keluhan
keluhan ini tidak dapat dibawa sebagai keluhan non-pelanggaran. Namun, dengan asumsi
bahwa moratorium dihapus, pertanyaan sesungguhnya adalah apakah seperti keluhan realistik
mengingat objek dan tujuan dari Perjanjian TRIPS, khususnya struktur standar minimum dan
tunjangan otonomi nasional atas metode pelaksanaan yang standar dan apakah atau tidak
untuk meningkatkan standar-standar.
Hal ini tidak bisa menjadi interpretasi rasional dari Perjanjian TRIPS bahwa anggota
membekukan undang-undang kekayaan intelektual mereka seperti pada tahun 1995 sebagai,
pada waktu itu, banyak negara memiliki program yang sedang berlangsung reformasi hukum
kekayaan intelektual dan ada negosiasi internasional atas berbagai aspek properti internasional
berlangsung intelektual dan direncanakan. [FN118] Dalam hal apapun, undang-undang banyak
anggota 'yang TRIPS-plus, di daerah istilah hak cipta, pada waktu itu. Namun, itu tidak berarti
bahwa Anggota cukup harus mengharapkan jangka waktu hak cipta untuk selamanya
diperpanjang.Dapatkah ada sekarang menjadi keluhan yang sah tentang perpanjangan jangka
waktu hak cipta terus?
Keluhan pelanggaran tidak mungkin berhasil karena Perjanjian TRIPS telah harfiah dipenuhi,
tetapi keluhan non-pelanggaran menimbulkan beberapa masalah yang berbeda. Isu-isu yang
berbeda adalah penting karena mereka mengatasi hubungan dagang antara anggota
WTO. Anggota WTO harus diizinkan untuk sengketa legitimasi istilah hak cipta meningkat, yang
sangat proteksionis dan umumnya tidak memfasilitasi perdagangan. Salah satu contoh adalah
perpanjangan istilah untuk rekaman suara di Uni Eropa. Banyak Anggota diharapkan beberapa
rekaman suara Eropa jatuh ke dalam domain publik dan orang-orang yang berbasis di negara-
negara Anggota dapat telah merencanakan untuk mereproduksi rekaman suara atau
menggunakan mereka untuk membuat karya cipta baru.Namun, perdagangan yang
menguntungkan diharapkan sekarang mungkin akan menghilang karena rencana Komisi Eropa,
pada saat menulis, untuk memperpanjang jangka waktu perlindungan hak cipta dalam rekaman
suara untuk 70 tahun.[FN119]
* 1052 aturan mengimpor Paralel memberikan contoh lain potensi keluhan pengguna non-
pelanggaran. Perjanjian TRIPS tidak mengharuskan anggota baik membolehkan atau melarang
impor paralel produk hak cipta. [FN120] Australia diizinkan jenis tertentu impor paralel sampai
disepakati, dalam FTA dengan Amerika Serikat, untuk membatasi impor mereka. Haruskah
negara anggota yang memasok pasar paralel impor Australia diizinkan untuk mengeluh bahwa
manfaat itu diharapkan dalam perdagangan telah dihapus? Contoh ini memiliki kesulitan yang
mengimpor aturan paralel dalam hak cipta seolah-olah di luar lingkup Perjanjian
TRIPS. [FN121] Oleh karena itu anggota harus diizinkan otonomi nasional atas aturan impor
paralel dan tidak bisa mengklaim bahwa ini tidak dapat berubah pada anggota lain dari waktu
ke waktu. [FN122]
Interpretasi pasal 27 dari Perjanjian TRIPS, yang mengatur subyek hukum paten, adalah contoh
lain. Ini menyediakan bahwa 'paten harus tersedia untuk setiap penemuan, apakah produk atau
proses, dalam semua bidang teknologi, asalkan baru, melibatkan langkah inventif dan dapat
diterapkan dalam industri'. [FN123] Perselisihan lingkup paten dan lainnya materi intelektual
properti subjek adalah beberapa perselisihan paling sulit untuk menyelesaikan karena subyek
hukum kekayaan intelektual dan interpretasi akibat hukum yang ada terus berkembang dengan
cara untuk memastikan bahwa hukum yang ada dapat menangkap teknologi baru sebagai
penemuan dipatenkan. [FN124] Negara tidak dapat mengecualikan paten atas dasar materi
pelajaran saja. Sebuah negara tidak dapat, misalnya, memiliki aturan selimut yang paten untuk
obat-obatan tidak tersedia. Meskipun pelarangan diskriminasi selimut materi pokok, perselisihan
paten obat-obatan masih ada. Perselisihan ini tentang ruang lingkup persyaratan pasal 27
dalam kaitannya dengan paten untuk obat-obatan.
Tidak ada perselisihan bahwa obat-obatan penggunaan pertama harus dipatenkan untuk
mematuhi Perjanjian TRIPS.[FN125] Namun, perbedaan telah muncul mengenai apakah TRIPS
kepatuhan membutuhkan menggunakan kedua dan berikutnya obat-obatan diketahui
dipatenkan. Baru ini menggunakan obat-obatan yang dikenal tidak selalu dipatenkan, bahkan di
negara maju, karena * 1053 farmasi dikenal, dan karena itu hal baru dan inventif langkah tidak
dapat didirikan.Jenis paten, sering disebut klaim Swiss, [FN126] yang dipatenkan, di negara
maju, atas dasar bahwa meskipun senyawa farmasi itu sendiri belum tentu baru, menggunakan
yang baru. [FN127]
India, bagaimanapun, tidak memungkinkan paten untuk menggunakan kedua dan selanjutnya
senyawa yang dikenal kecuali ada 'suatu peningkatan kemanjuran dikenal' [FN128] dari
substansi. Ini hukum India secara efektif definisi langkah inventif untuk beberapa jenis
penemuan. India dan beberapa negara berkembang lainnya seperti menganggap paten sebagai
untuk penemuan tambahan dan karenanya mengakibatkan evergreening sebuah paten untuk
suatu zat farmasi. [FN129]
Sebelum Pengadilan Tinggi Madras, Novartis berhasil menantang penolakan India untuk
memberikan seperti paten dalam kaitannya dengan farmasi, yang dikenal sebagai Gleevec,
atas dasar bahwa tidak ada keberhasilan baru, hanya sebuah bentuk baru dari substansi yang
dikenal. [FN130] antara pengajuan Novartis 'adalah bahwa hukum India tidak sesuai dengan
pasal 27 dari Perjanjian TRIPS. Pengadilan Madras tidak menutup kemungkinan pada argumen
Perjanjian TRIPS, melainkan memutuskan tidak memiliki yurisdiksi atas masalah ini. [FN131]
Masalah relevan di sini adalah apakah ada dasar untuk berargumentasi bahwa pendekatan
India untuk langkah inventif adalah pelanggaran atau pembatalan non-pelanggaran dan
penurunan dari Perjanjian TRIPS. Pertanyaan pelanggaran bertanya apakah * 1054 pasal 27
dilanggar. Pertanyaan non-pelanggaran bertanya apakah anggota memiliki keluhan, bahkan jika
artikel tersebut tidak dilanggar, karena manfaat yang diharapkan dari perjanjian atau
pencapaian dari suatu tujuan tidak dapat direalisasikan. [FN132]
Perjanjian TRIPS diam pada definisi langkah inventif. [FN133] keheningan Ini berarti bahwa
anggota harus menerapkan definisi mereka sendiri langkah inventif. [FN134] Hal ini
menyebabkan di negara-negara yang berbeda memiliki pendekatan yang berbeda dengan apa
yang merupakan langkah inventif. Harus ada batas-batas otonomi yang anggota memiliki dalam
mendefinisikan langkah inventif. Definisi nasional mungkin tidak boleh terlalu menuntut apa-apa
yang bisa dipatenkan, sehingga menghilangkan ruang lingkup Perjanjian TRIPS. [FN135]
Keragaman muncul dari bagaimana langkah inventif dinilai.Secara umum, langkah inventif
adalah sesuatu yang tidak jelas bagi orang yang ahli dalam bidang ini. Di luar ini,
bagaimanapun, adalah mustahil untuk mengatakan bahwa ada konsensus internasional yang
dapat menciptakan norma internasional, mengenai tingkat atau makna dari langkah
inventif.Memang, kebutuhan yang dirasakan untuk harmonisasi hukum paten dan negosiasi
internasional yang bertujuan yang mengakui kurangnya konsensus. [FN136] Karena tidak ada
norma harmonis langkah inventif dan hanya standar minimum, bahwa untuk sebuah penemuan
yang akan dipatenkan harus melibatkan langkah inventif, tidak dapat ditetapkan bahwa India
telah melanggar pasal 27. [FN137] Karena pada saat Perjanjian TRIPS, dan sekarang, ada,
dan, tidak ada norma internasional atas paten penggunaan kedua dan berikutnya dari obat-
obatan dikenal [FN138] itu akan menjadi penyalahgunaan penafsiran perjanjian 1055 *
untuk menunjukkan bahwa ada. Perjanjian TRIPS seharusnya tidak ditafsirkan untuk
mengatakan bahwa ada harmonisasi semacam ini detail paten hukum karena itu akan mengisi
celah yang para pihak tidak setuju. [FN139]
Jika pengaduan pelanggaran dalam keadaan adalah sebagai tidak mungkin untuk berhasil,
seperti yang saya sarankan, bisa itu menguntungkan untuk membawa klaim non-pelanggaran
dalam kaitannya dengan hukum India? Dalam pandangan saya, seperti keluhan tentang ruang
lingkup materi yang dibahas dalam undang-undang pasal 27 dan India tidak akan berhasil untuk
alasan yang sama bahwa keluhan pelanggaran seharusnya tidak berhasil. Tidak ada manfaat
yang diharapkan dari standar umum langkah inventif. Namun akan ada keuntungan dalam
memungkinkan non-pelanggaran keluhan atas masalah ini. India mungkin mengeluh bahwa
tekanan langsung dan tidak langsung, melalui efek FTA, untuk melindungi obat-obatan
menggunakan kedua adalah pembatalan dan gangguan dari manfaat yang diharapkan di
bawah Perjanjian TRIPS. Pengadu harus berpendapat bahwa web TRIPS-plus FTA, yang
membutuhkan perlindungan penggunaan baru dari obat-obatan dikenal, telah terkikis untuk
beberapa negara, dan mengikis untuk India, kemampuan untuk tidak berkewajiban untuk
memberikan perlindungan lebih luas dan harapan yang sah akibatnya di bawah Perjanjian
TRIPS dikalahkan.
Keuntungan baik keluhan non-pelanggaran, dibahas di atas, adalah bahwa masalah akan
diputuskan dalam sebuah forum berbasis aturan, bukan dalam negosiasi FTA daya seimbang
internasional. Di satu sisi, saya sarankan bahwa seperti pelanggaran non-keluhan terhadap
India harus kalah karena ada dan divisi internasional atas hak paten penggunaan obat-obatan
baru dikenal. Dalam menghadapi divisi yang, panel tidak harus menyimpulkan bahwa itu adalah
manfaat cukup diharapkan dari Perjanjian TRIPS bahwa seluruh Anggota akan memberikan
hak paten untuk obat-obatan digunakan kedua. Beberapa Anggota dan pemegang hak pribadi
mungkin berharap, dan bahkan mencoba untuk bernegosiasi, bahwa ini begitu, tapi berharap
jatuh pendek dari harapan kekuatan hukum. Untuk menunjukkan bahwa para pihak
dimaksudkan bahwa pasal 27 akan menghasilkan hal yang sama sedang dipatenkan mana-
mana di dunia menunjukkan tingkat harmonisasi yang bukan merupakan penafsiran yang wajar
dari kata-kata dari pasal 27, maksud para pihak atau manfaat yang diharapkan timbul dari
TRIPS . Ini selalu dikenal dalam mendefinisikan langkah inventif bahwa anggota dapat
memberlakukan undang-undang mereka sendiri.Anggota dapat dan melakukan melukiskan
rincian sistem paten sesuai dengan keadaan ekonomi mereka dan kebutuhan untuk
melakukannya adalah tidak terduga. [FN140]
Di sisi lain, saya sarankan bahwa pengaduan pelanggaran non-, membawa melawan Amerika
Serikat dan mungkin juga Uni Eropa, bisa berhasil. Hal ini karena beberapa negara telah
ditekan melalui non-negotiable FTA template ke dalam melindungi farmasi menggunakan
kedua. Negara-negara telah melakukannya bertentangan dengan kepentingan nasional mereka
sendiri, yang menunjukkan negosiasi dalam beberapa cara koersif. Selain itu, ketentuan-
ketentuan FTA kumulatif * 1056 bertentangan dengan objek dan tujuan dari Perjanjian TRIPS
untuk negara-negara berkembang. Perlindungan tersebut tidak memberikan kontribusi bagi
promosi 'inovasi ... untuk saling menguntungkan produsen dan pengguna ...'. [FN141] Juga,
India tidak mengubah hukum untuk melindungi hak paten penggunaan kedua farmasi, tetapi
ditempatkan di bawah tekanan terus-menerus, langsung dan melalui TRIPS-plus FTA
menciptakan norma-norma baru, untuk mengubah hukum-hukumnya. Pengikisan keuntungan
anggota diharapkan tidak diwajibkan untuk mengubah hukum untuk melindungi hak paten
penggunaan kedua farmasi telah terjadi. [FN142]

Apakah Anggota memutuskan untuk membawa keluhan mungkin sebagian tergantung pada
obat yang tersedia.

C. remedies untuk Non-Pelanggaran Perselisihan

Jika sengketa non-pelanggaran ini berhasil karena 'mengukur telah ditemukan untuk
meniadakan atau merusak manfaat di bawah, atau menghambat pencapaian tujuan', [FN143]
dari Perjanjian TRIPS tidak ada kewajiban untuk menarik mengukur."Namun dalam kasus
seperti panel atau Badan Banding harus merekomendasikan bahwa Anggota yang
bersangkutan membuat penyesuaian yang saling memuaskan." [FN144] Dalam konteks
Perjanjian TRIPS yang saling memuaskan penyesuaian adalah sebuah konsep yang
aneh. Sementara tarif mungkin saling disesuaikan yang tidak masuk akal untuk sebuah hukum
kekayaan intelektual.
Jika TRIPS-plus FTA ditemukan untuk menjadi penghapusan non-pelanggaran dan gangguan
dari objek dan tujuan dari TRIPS maka ukuran yang harus ditarik akan ditemukan dalam hukum
pelapor bukan responden. Obat untuk TRIPS-plus FTA, yang tidak konsisten dengan obyek dan
tujuan TRIPS, akan mengekang FTA analog masa depan dan untuk memungkinkan anggota
untuk menarik peningkatan perlindungan yang thwarts harapan sah TRIPS. Jika non-
pelanggaran sengketa yang diperkenalkan dalam Perjanjian TRIPs, akan ada harus menjadi
framing bagaimana pengobatan yang tepat dapat dicapai mengingat sifat unik dari Perjanjian
TRIPS antara perjanjian WTO.

VIII. Tumpang tindih NON-PELANGGARAN DAN PELANGGARAN PERSELISIHAN

A. Menggunakan Pelanggaran Non-Pelanggaran karena tidak Tersedia

Hal ini menguntungkan untuk membawa pengaduan pelanggaran, dalam preferensi untuk
keluhan non-pelanggaran, karena dalam ketergantungan sengketa pelanggaran perjanjian
diasumsikan dan sekali ada pelanggaran mapan perjanjian juga diasumsikan bahwa telah
terjadi cedera. Sebagai perbandingan, dalam sengketa non-pelanggaran pengadu perlu
menunjukkan ketergantungan dan kausalitas dari cedera 1057 *.Dengan demikian, Anggota
lebih cenderung untuk membawa pengaduan pelanggaran jika mereka bisa. Hal ini,
bagaimanapun, mungkin untuk menyusun kembali non-pelanggaran sengketa sebagai
sengketa pelanggaran. [FN145] Memang, karena non-pelanggaran sengketa belum tersedia ini
mungkin sudah terjadi, tapi ini 'membentuk kembali' tidak harus berhasil. Aspek sengketa
antara Amerika Serikat dan Cina menunjukkan hal ini dan memberikan gambaran yang baik
tentang hubungan antara pelanggaran dan pembatalan nonviolation dan gangguan dalam
konteks Perjanjian TRIPS.[FN146]
Amerika Serikat membawa pengaduan pelanggaran terhadap Cina mengenai berbagai aspek
hak cipta China dan hukum merek dagang. Selama beberapa tahun Amerika Serikat dan Cina
telah dalam diskusi selama penegakan hak kekayaan intelektual di Cina. [FN147] Amerika
Serikat akhirnya meminta pembentukan panel WTO atas tuduhan pelanggaran beberapa
Perjanjian TRIPS oleh Cina. Satu keluhan terkait dengan ambang melanggar akan memberikan
salinan yang naik ke tingkat pidana pelanggaran hak cipta di Cina. [FN148] Cina mengurangi
tingkat ambang batas yang relevan 1000-500 sesaat sebelum Amerika Serikat meminta suatu
Panel. Inti dari kasus Amerika Serikat adalah bahwa ambang Cina atas pelanggaran pidana
dalam hukum hak cipta diberikan persyaratan dari Perjanjian TRIPS untuk memberikan tindak
pidana atas pelanggaran tidak efektif dalam beberapa keadaan.[FN149]
Ruang lingkup tanggung jawab kriminal dan obat untuk pelanggaran hak cipta merupakan
daerah di mana ada sedikit perjanjian internasional baik dalam Putaran Uruguay yang
mengarah ke Perjanjian TRIPS dan selanjutnya. [FN150] Akibatnya penegakan standar
minimum yang terkait, termasuk yang * 1058 khusus tentang tanggung jawab pidana dan
penegakan hukum, tidak preskriptif dan agak meninggalkan banyak ruang untuk berbeda
hukum nasional. [FN151]
Perbedaan umum antara sistem pengadilan anggota WTO diakui dalam Perjanjian TRIPS, yang
mengatur bahwa tidak ada kewajiban penegakan menciptakan kewajiban pihak-pihak yang
menyediakan sistem penegakan kekayaan intelektual yang berbeda dari hukum umum
pidananya. [FN152] Ini berarti bahwa properti intelektual bukan kasus khusus. Panel dalam
laporan Penegakan TRIPS China mengakui pentingnya ketentuan ini dan mencatat bahwa
meskipun demikian masih ada kewajiban di China untuk menyediakan penegakan tindakan
yang diperlukan di bawah Perjanjian TRIPS. [FN153]
Ada ruang yang cukup untuk menyatakan bahwa Cina adalah ambang batas yang wajar dalam
situasi kondisi di China, termasuk perbaikan progresif langkah-langkah untuk penegakan hukum
dan negara hukum pidana pada umumnya. Perangkat menggunakan ambang untuk tanggung
jawab pidana umum.Memang Amerika Serikat menggunakan mereka. [FN154] Namun,
penegakan harus efektif terhadap pelanggaran komersial. 'Efektif' dalam konteks ini, di terbaik,
istilah relatif.Jadi sulit untuk menafsirkan Perjanjian TRIPS berarti bahwa sejumlah tertentu
ambang terlalu tinggi. Menggunakan prinsip-prinsip Konvensi Wina [FN155] penafsiran, Panel
menyimpulkan bahwa Amerika Serikat tidak membuat keluar kasusnya bahwa batas kriminal
mencegah Cina dari memenuhi kewajibannya untuk menyediakan penegakan pidana untuk
kegiatan pemalsuan dan pembajakan pada skala komersial. [FN156]
Hasilnya, dalam pandangan saya, benar karena Amerika Serikat tampaknya berharap untuk
membaca ke dalam ketentuan penegakan tingkat detail yang tidak ada dan, karenanya, tidak
dapat dikatakan sebagai arti dari ketentuan.Ketentuan yang relevan dalam Perjanjian TRIPS
hanya menyediakan persyaratan luas dan 1059 * undetailed bahwa ada penegakan
hukum. [FN157] Mengingat kurangnya detail di ketentuan penegakan argumen AS benar-benar
lebih dari keluhan non-pelanggaran. Inti dari apa yang Amerika Serikat benar-benar mengeluh
tentang adalah bahwa manfaat itu diharapkan dari Perjanjian TRIPS adalah tingkat yang lebih
baik dari penegakan hukum.
Bagaimana jika Amerika Serikat telah mampu membawa ini sebagai compliant non-
pelanggaran? Sebuah keluhan non-pelanggaran harus mencapai hasil yang sama seperti Panel
lakukan dalam pengaduan pelanggaran, karena tingkat manfaat yang Amerika Serikat ingin
untuk mengklaim bukan sesuatu yang dapat ditafsirkan sebagai manfaat yang diharapkan
timbul dari kata-kata Perjanjian yang menunjukkan maksud dari para pihak. Sebuah klaim non-
pelanggaran dalam menilai manfaat yang diharapkan tidak akan menulis ulang niat
mereka. Sampai ada perjanjian internasional yang tepat atas masalah-masalah seperti
sengketa WTO penyelesaian tubuh tidak boleh digunakan untuk mengisi kesenjangan. Bahkan
jika, bagaimanapun, keluhan non-pelanggaran akan kehilangan, ini tidak berarti bahwa itu tidak
boleh dibawa. Ini adalah jenis pengaduan pelanggaran non-yang dikhawatirkan, tetapi juga
jenis pelanggaran non-keluhan yang seharusnya tidak berhasil karena tidak ada jenis manfaat
yang diharapkan bahwa pengaduan pelanggaran non-harus alamat. Membawa seperti keluhan
akan berarti bahwa di samping metode penafsiran perjanjian Konvensi Wina, keputusan Panel
bisa memiliki lebih kokoh dianggap apa manfaat anggota bisa berharap dari ketentuan
penegakan Perjanjian TRIPS. Analisis tersebut tidak harus ditakuti. Sebaliknya diskusi yang
lebih kuat dari makna ketentuan penegakan harus didorong karena keputusan benar beralasan
akan kemungkinan menunjukkan bahwa argumen ambang AS bisa dipertahankan karena telah
mencoba untuk menegosiasikan ketentuan penegakan lebih rinci, tetapi gagal sehingga tidak
bisa setelah mengklaim manfaat yang diharapkan dari lebih terinci. [FN158]
Aspek lain dari kekokohan penyelesaian sengketa bahwa non-pelanggaran keluhan mungkin
membawa kemungkinan melihat bagaimana dan mengapa sebuah undang-undang domestik,
pada masalah dalam suatu perselisihan, tercapai. Apabila suatu * 1060 negeri hukum kekayaan
intelektual tiba di melalui negosiasi trade-off Dreyfuss dan Dinwoodie menunjukkan bahwa:
[FN159]
tantangan terhadap efek samping yang ... tindakan terhadap hak kekayaan intelektual yang
lebih alami dikategorikan sebagai non-pelanggaran pengaduan karena mereka menggagalkan
tujuan dari Persetujuan daripada kewajiban pelanggaran tertentu.
Para penulis berpendapat bahwa sengketa WTO sistem penyelesaian perlu
mempertimbangkan tidak hanya penyediaan kekayaan intelektual pada masalah sebelumnya,
tetapi juga konteks di mana anggota datang ke ketentuan itu. Secara khusus, ketentuan dapat
dicapai melalui trade-off pada tingkat nasional dan penulis berpendapat bahwa itu adalah terlalu
besar intervensi dalam otonomi nasional bagi mereka yang trade-off untuk menjadi 'dibatalkan'
di tingkat internasional. [FN160] Mereka memberikan contoh perpanjangan jangka waktu hak
cipta, yang merupakan bagian dari paket yang mencakup pembebasan kewajiban dari bermain
non-dramatis karya musik di beberapa restoran dan bar. [FN161] WTO menemukan bahwa
pembebasan karya musik adalah pelanggaran dari Perjanjian TRIPS, [FN162] tetapi Mahkamah
Agung AS menguatkan perpanjangan masa. [FN163] Sebagai catatan penulis, kadang-kadang
aspek dari paket negosiasi ditemukan di luar hukum kekayaan intelektual dan dalam situasi
non-pelanggaran keluhan mungkin berguna.

B. Non-Pelanggaran Perselisihan dan Hukum yang tidak Terutama Hukum Kekayaan

Intelektual
Daerah lain di mana non-pelanggaran sengketa mungkin penting untuk properti intelektual
dimana non-intelektual properti mempengaruhi langkah-langkah standar minimal Perjanjian
TRIPS. Dalam pembahasan Dewan TRIPS non-pelanggaran keluhan, ada beberapa contoh
terbatas dari jenis potensi keluhan. Salah satu contoh adalah 'A Member bisa melarang semua
iklan rokok, termasuk merek dagang mereka, karena alasan kesehatan'. [FN164] Pada wajah
itu larangan ini sesuai dengan Perjanjian TRIPS. [FN165]
Pertanyaan non-pelanggaran adalah apakah atau tidak melarang membatalkan dan merusak
manfaat yang diharapkan dari Perjanjian TRIPS. Seorang anggota Dewan menanggapi * 1061
ke contoh bahwa larangan seperti itu dapat diantisipasi pada saat Perjanjian, terutama sebagai
larangan tersebut sudah ada dalam beberapa wilayah yurisdiksi pada saat Perjanjian.[FN166]
Oleh karena itu, tidak bisa mengatakan bahwa ada kehilangan manfaat yang
diharapkan. Tanggapan ini harus benar.
Selain itu, tidak dapat dianggap bahwa para anggota WTO, ketika menyetujui Perjanjian TRIPS,
setuju untuk tidak memungkinkan hukum lain untuk mempengaruhi produk properti
intelektual. Memang, merek dagang dan hukum kekayaan intelektual lain selalu tunduk pada
hukum lainnya. Ada banyak contoh: Paten dapat diberikan untuk obat-obatan, namun obat-
obatan tidak dapat dijual di banyak negara tanpa persetujuan peraturan. Paten dapat diberikan
untuk produk listrik, namun standar keselamatan harus dipenuhi. Sebagaimana disebutkan di
atas, pemberian suatu HAKI bukan hak afirmatif untuk menggunakan, melainkan hak untuk
menyingkirkan orang lain, dan itu bukan jaminan bahwa setiap penjualan akan diatur atau
bahkan sukses. Hukum kekayaan intelektual, sendiri, tidak mengontrol kondisi pasar dan
Perjanjian TRIPS, tidak seperti Perjanjian WTO lainnya, [FN167] bukan kesepakatan akses
pasar. Masalah akses pasar, bahkan jika mereka berhubungan dengan produk properti
intelektual, harus ditangani dalam disiplin negosiasi GATT dan GATS.
Hal ini dipertanyakan dan bisa dibilang bukan merupakan cerminan dari maksud para pihak jika
Perjanjian TRIPS ditafsirkan sehingga digunakan sebagai pintu belakang untuk akses pasar
GATT dan GATS terkait atau masalah non-diskriminasi. [FN168] Namun, hubungan antara
perjanjian WTO mungkin daerah yang ideal untuk non-pelanggaran keluhan karena anggota
WTO dapat 'campuran-up' disiplin untuk mencapai tujuan tertentu. Sebuah contoh mungkin di
mana negara A, untuk mencegah penjualan produk, yang dianggap memiliki jejak kaki karbon
yang besar, memberlakukan hukum yang melarang iklan merek dagang yang mendorong
pembelian produk yang berhubungan dengan negeri-negeri jauh, apakah produk tersebut
dibuat lokal atau sebaliknya. Contoh mungkin larangan 'Air Fiji' atau es krim 'New Zealand
Natural' dijual di Amerika Serikat.
Contoh lain yang relevan, dari dokumen-dokumen Dewan TRIPs, adalah di mana seorang
Anggota menerapkan pajak yang tinggi 'atas barang tertentu dengan hak kekayaan intelektual
yang penggunaannya merusak lingkungan. " [FN169] Masalahnya adalah mengidentifikasi
hilangnya manfaat dalam konteks Perjanjian TRIPS. Kemungkinan bahwa barang-barang
kekayaan intelektual mungkin sangat dikenakan pajak di beberapa tempat secara luas * 1062
dikenal dan dipraktekkan.[FN170] Jika seperti pajak atas barang terjadi akan sesuai untuk
mempertimbangkan jika pajak melanggar GATT dan jika ada pelanggaran mengikat tarif atau
ketentuan non-diskriminasi.
Juga, pemilik HAKI menggunakan segala macam metode melampaui sekedar hak kekayaan
intelektual untuk mengeksploitasi kekayaan intelektual mereka. [FN171] Contohnya termasuk
pengkodean wilayah DVD, mekanisme perlindungan lainnya menggunakan teknologi untuk
mengendalikan wilayah atau waktu-terkait karya cipta dan pengisian harga yang berbeda di
pasar yang berbeda. Daerah coding dan mekanisme perlindungan teknologi telah menerima
perlindungan kekayaan intelektual melalui gaya negosiasi internasional independen dari
Perjanjian TRIPS. [FN172] Namun, mereka digunakan sebelum perlindungan yang
diberlakukan. Perlindungan mekanisme perlindungan teknologi bukan merupakan manfaat yang
diharapkan dari Perjanjian TRIPS karena mereka berada di luar lingkup Persetujuan dan
perlindungan internasional didirikan setelah pemilik hak kekayaan intelektual telah
menggunakan mereka untuk beberapa waktu.

Harga diferensial pengisian di pasar telah dan merupakan cara di mana perusahaan telah
mengeksploitasi sifat teritorial hak kekayaan intelektual. [FN173] Pengisian harga yang berbeda
adalah eksploitasi hak kekayaan intelektual daripada standar minimal yang diperlukan
merupakan hak eksklusif Perjanjian TRIPS. Tidak dapat dikatakan bahwa salah satu dari
macam contoh adalah manfaat yang diharapkan dari Perjanjian TRIPS.
Tidak diragukan lagi pelanggaran non-perselisihan tidak boleh digunakan untuk mengisi
kesenjangan, baik dalam dan antara GATT, GATS dan Perjanjian TRIPS, melalui penyelesaian
sengketa bukan oleh negosiasi. Namun, sejauh bahwa tujuan dari Perjanjian TRIPS adalah
hubungan perdagangan antara anggotanya, [FN174] adalah penting bahwa harapan yang sah
yang dihasilkan dari Perjanjian yang terpenuhi. Ini mungkin berarti bahwa, di mana eksploitasi
hak kekayaan intelektual di bawah Perjanjian TRIPS yang frustrasi dengan cara yang jatuh
pendek dari pelanggaran dari GATT atau GATS, harus ada ganti rugi. Negosiasi multilateral
atas kesenjangan ini secara teoritis metode yang ideal kemajuan, Namun, mungkin juga tidak
realistis bahwa setiap nuansa dapat ditangani dengan cara ini.Non-pelanggaran sengketa sulit
untuk membawa, dan sebagai contoh di atas * 1063 menunjukkan tidak mudah untuk
menang.Kesulitan dengan non-pelanggaran sengketa dicatat, tapi saya tidak menyimpulkan
bahwa mereka perwatakan apakah atau tidak perselisihan tersebut harus diperbolehkan dalam
konteks Perjanjian TRIPS. Sebaliknya, kesulitan-kesulitan ini membuat parameter cukup untuk
menjaga terhadap penyalahgunaan mereka.
Oleh karena itu tampaknya bahwa menggunakan non-pelanggaran sengketa mungkin akan
tepat terbatas dalam cara yang tidak merugikan baik untuk integritas Perjanjian TRIPS WTO
atau negara-negara berkembang dan kurang berkembang negara anggota yang telah
menemukan standar TRIPS Agreement sulit untuk mematuhi dan mungkin takut bahwa non-
pelanggaran sengketa akan membuat yang buruk.

C. Mekanisme ke Control Efek Non-Intelektual Property Law di Kekayaan Intelektual

Anggota berusaha untuk mengontrol efek dari undang-undang lain pada hak kekayaan
intelektual telah menggunakan berbagai cara untuk melakukannya. Ini bisa melalui paket
dinegosiasikan dalam yurisdiksi mereka sendiri [FN175] atau antara yurisdiksi di FTA. [FN176]
FTA antara Australia dan Amerika Serikat (AUSFTA), misalnya, memiliki sejumlah ketentuan,
dan di atas ketentuan kekayaan intelektual, yang berhubungan dengan pemasaran dan
penjualan obat-obatan. [FN177] Ada ketentuan yang efektif memerlukan Australia untuk
membatasi, dan berpotensi menghapus, subsidi pemerintah tertentu dari penjualan
farmasi. [FN178] Adanya ketentuan dalam AUSFTA merupakan pengakuan menyatakan bahwa
Perjanjian TRIPS tidak mengontrol hal-hal ini. Ini menunjukkan, karenanya, dapat dikatakan
bahwa Perjanjian TRIPS Anggota tidak dapat menggunakan undang-undang lain, dalam
kaitannya dengan penjualan dan distribusi obat-obatan, yang mungkin menggagalkan beberapa
jenis eksploitasi hak kekayaan intelektual. Contohnya adalah harga kontrol atas obat-obatan. Ini
ada di beberapa negara maju dan berkembang. Dalam beberapa yurisdiksi kontrol tersebut
dapat mengangkat isu-isu hukum persaingan. Perjanjian TRIPS tidak, bagaimanapun, alamat
kekhawatiran persaingan alam ini. [FN179] Tidak ada WTO disepakati, atau internasional
lainnya, aturan tentang persaingan. [FN180] Meskipun * 1064 hak kekayaan intelektual
menyenggol dan dalam beberapa yurisdiksi hukum yang menentang praktek menggabungkan
anti persaingan, Perjanjian TRIPS tidak memiliki ketentuan-ketentuan mengungkapkan, dengan
satu pengecualian kecil, untuk mengendalikan isu persaingan terkait. [FN181] Sementara
negara-negara dengan industri farmasi dapat mempertimbangkan bahwa harga mekanisme
kontrol membuat frustasi, tidak bisa secara logis disimpulkan bahwa tujuan dari Perjanjian
TRIPS, yang disepakati oleh anggotanya, yang frustrasi oleh langkah-langkah tersebut.
Selain kurangnya ketentuan mengungkapkan menangani masalah persaingan, bagian dari
Perjanjian TRIPS implisit mengakui peran yang berbeda non-hukum kekayaan intelektual,
namun masih memerlukan anggota untuk memberikan perlindungan kekayaan
intelektual. Kemampuan untuk mengecualikan dari paten penemuan atas dasar ketertiban
publik, misalnya, kualifikasi oleh persyaratan bahwa anggota tidak boleh mengecualikan
sesuatu dari paten hanya karena eksploitasi adalah ilegal. [FN182]
Sebagai Perjanjian TRIPS adalah tentang standar minimum kekayaan intelektual dalam
perdagangan maka harus, seperti dibahas di atas, mungkin untuk sengketa efek perdagangan
kekayaan intelektual. Meskipun Perjanjian TRIPS seharusnya tidak ditafsirkan untuk
memperluas standar minimum yang menetapkan, sama hukum lainnya tidak boleh diizinkan
untuk mengikis standar minimum dalam Perjanjian.

IX. KESIMPULAN
Non-pelanggaran sengketa telah dianggap sebagai berpotensi menjadi alat untuk kepentingan
pemilik properti intelektual untuk meningkatkan perlindungan dari Perjanjian TRIPS melampaui
pengkalimatannya. Mereka juga berpotensi menjadi alat bagi pengguna kekayaan intelektual
untuk menantang TRIPS-plus FTA, yang memberikan tingkat perlindungan yang lebih luas
tanpa Anggota selalu bebas memilih bahwa perlindungan yang lebih luas. Kurangnya pilihan
adalah sebagian karena cara pemaksaan di mana banyak dari TRIPS-plus bab FTA telah
dinegosiasikan, tetapi juga cara di mana norma TRIPS-plus dapat mempengaruhi orang-orang
luar seperti TRIPS-plus FTA.Dalam situasi tidak bisa dikatakan bahwa Anggota WTO memiliki
pilihan mengenai apakah atau tidak untuk menerapkan 'perlindungan yang lebih luas'. Namun
frame Perjanjian TRIPS ini sebagai pilihan * 1065. Erosi ini konflik pilihan dengan obyek dan
tujuan dari Perjanjian TRIPS dan lebih dari sekedar pelanggaran Pasal 1, tetapi juga berpotensi
non-pelanggaran terhadap Perjanjian.
Non-pelanggaran keluhan mungkin menyediakan cara yang baik bersih-pemilik dan bersih-
pengguna kekayaan intelektual dapat, dalam sebuah forum berbasis aturan, memiliki badan
independen menganalisis manfaat yang diharapkan dari pihak satu dari Perjanjian TRIPS. Hal
ini sangat penting mengingat kesulitan jelas bahwa negara-negara berkembang, khususnya,
menghadapi sesuai dengan perlindungan kekayaan intelektual untuk meningkatkan. Non-
pelanggaran sengketa dapat menyediakan sarana untuk memberikan beberapa batasan yang
berlebihan, terutama FTA berbasis, peningkatan standar kekayaan intelektual. Karena kasus
pelanggaran wajib memiliki interpretasi non-pelanggaran formalistik menawarkan pendekatan
yang lebih kuat untuk menganalisis manfaat yang diharapkan yang mencerminkan niat dari para
pihak dan objek dan tujuan dari Perjanjian TRIPS, sebagaimana dinyatakan dalam ketentuan-
ketentuannya.
Jika non-pelanggaran sengketa yang diperkenalkan untuk Perjanjian TRIPS akan ada perlu
perbedaan hati ditetapkan antara pelanggaran dan non-pelanggaran kasus. Disiplin seputar
penggunaan non-keluhan tentang pelanggaran Perjanjian TRIPS juga harus
dikembangkan. Disiplin-disiplin harus mencakup aturan tentang bagaimana kriteria manfaat
yang diharapkan dari sengketa non-pelanggaran harus menjadi penilaian yang obyektif. Harus
ada penilaian yang obyektif, bukan pendekatan subjektif yang dapat ditampilkan tidak berhasil
satu posisi partai negosiasi atau ingin daftar. Juga, membingkai mendalam aturan untuk
memberikan pengobatan yang tepat akan perlu terjadi.
Meskipun harmonisasi lebih besar berpotensi menguntungkan untuk perdagangan,
perlindungan lebih luas tidak selalu menguntungkan. Harmonisasi, jika terjadi, harus menjadi
proses progresif yang terjadi pada kecepatan yang tepat dan merupakan akibat langsung dari
kesepakatan multilateral, daripada melalui backdoor dari TRIPS-plus FTA. Demikian pula, non-
pelanggaran sengketa tidak boleh digunakan sebagai alat untuk menegosiasikan Perjanjian
TRIPS, melainkan mereka harus digunakan untuk mengkalibrasi ulang itu sehingga
memungkinkan negara-negara berkembang untuk menyadari sisi mereka tawar-menawar
Perjanjian TRIPS.

[FNa1]. Profesor Hukum, Victoria University of Wellington, Selandia Baru. E-mail: susy.frankel
@ vuw.ac.nz. Saya disajikan versi sebelumnya dari artikel ini, 'Apakah pembatalan dan
gangguan dari Perjanjian TRIPS mungkin' sebagai hasil, 'TRIPS-plus dari perjanjian? "Pada
konferensi Pelantikan dari SIEL di Jenewa 2008. Saya terima kasih kepada penyelenggara
konferensi itu. Terima kasih juga kepada Rochelle Dreyfuss, Jane Ginsburg, Lionel Bentley dan
Susan Corbett untuk komentar pada naskah dan penelitian asisten saya Jessica Lai.