1NC

Interpretation: The US capital “F” capital “G” is the United States Faceters Guild
Usfacetersguild.org 15 "About Us – United States Faceters Guild." Usfacetersguild.org. 29 Oct. 2015.
Web. 31 Aug. 2017. <https://usfacetersguild.org/about-us/>

About Us Our Constitution lists our purposes as (1) to promote the art, skill, and teaching of faceting; (2)
to expand the knowledge of natural and laboratory-made crystals; (3) to develop and promote uniform rules for faceting competitions within
the US and among other countries; (4) to sponsor or assist in managing competitions; and (5) to serve as a national repository and clearing
house for faceting designs, published materials, and general information for faceters everywhere. An
equally important objective
of the USFG is to advance the skills of faceters who want to achieve as close to perfection as possible.
One of the best ways to approach perfection is to enter competitions where skilled judging denotes
perfection, or via “private assessment.” We are working on a system to allow members to have stones critiqued by a qualified
master cutter. Our organization had its beginning as the USA Competition Faceters in January 1990, when it was proposed as a support group
for the USA team in the Australian Faceting Challenge. Our first newsletter appeared in April 1991. At that time, the goals were expanded to
include compiling a set of rules for Single Stone Competitions. Since that time, we have established a comprehensive set of Single Stone Rules
to assist in encouraging greater uniformity in the judging of single stone competitions.

The plan text does not fiat United States federal government action, but rather action
from the United States Faceters Guild – two implications
1. Solvency deficit – they can’t do shit if the actor is the Faceters Guild instead of
the federal government
2. Real World DA – small mistakes in real legislation can have huge effects on the
governmental process – typos can cost huge amounts of money or kill a bill that
may have passed – vote neg on the plan flaw to discourage the habit of ignoring
small mistakes – the devil is in the details.
 1NC Morality
It’s clear that the ethics of the 1AC are exclusively for a community of the living. This
“rationality”, that life is inherently better than death, forms the basis for the original
exclusion- of death and the dead. This dichotomy pervades social space through
systems of normative violence against those that are not “normal”.
Baudrillard, 93 (Jean; Frenchie; “Symbolic Exchange and Death”)
Foucault's analysis, amongst the masterpieces of this genuine cultural history, takes the form of a genealogy of discrimination in which, at the
start of the nineteenth century, labour and production occupy a decisive place. At the very core of the 'rationality' of our
culture, however, is an exclusion that precedes every other, more radical than the exclusion of madmen , children or inferior
races, an exclusion preceding all these and serving as their model : the exclusion of the dead and of death. There is an
irreversible evolution from savage societies to our own: little by little , the dead cease to exist. They are
thrown out of the group's symbolic circulation. They are no longer beings with a full role to play, worthy
partners in exchange, and we make this obvious by exiling them further and further away from the group of the living. In the domestic
intimacy of the cemetery, the first grouping remains in the heart of the village or town, becoming the first ghetto,
prefiguring every future ghetto, but are thrown further and further from the centre towards the
periphery , finally having nowhere to go at all, as in the new town or the contemporary metropolis, where there are no
longer any provisions for the dead, either in mental or in physical space. Even madmen, delinquents and misfits can find a welcome in the new
towns, that is, in the rationality of a modern society. Only the death-function cannot be programmed and localised.
Strictly speaking, we no longer know what to do with them, since, today, it is not normal to be dead, and this is new. To be dead is
an unthinkable anomaly; nothing else is as offensive as this. Death is a delinquency, and an incurable deviancy. The dead
are no longer inflicted on any place or spacetime, they can find no resting place ; they are thrown into a radical utopia. They are no
longer even packed in and shut up, but obliterated. But we know what these hidden places signify· the
factory no longer exists because labour is everywhere ; the prison no longer exists because arrests and
confinements pervade social space-time ; the asylum no longer exists because psychological control
and therapy have been generalised and become banal, the school no longer exists because every
strand of social progress is shot through with discipline and pedagogical training; capital no longer
exists (nor does its Marxist critique) because the law of value has collapsed into self-managed survival in all its
forms, etc. , etc. The cemetery no longer exists because modern cities have entirely taken over their function: they are ghost
towns, cities of death . If the great operational metropolis is the final form of an entire culture, then, quite simply, ours is a
culture of death.3

: Two mistakes the aff made – first is the use of fiat to reproduce the impossible
future. Second, their use of big-stick impacts that will come at some unamenable
future time utilizes the mode of greedy nihilism. Both of these force are life denying.
Sherman, no date Jerry Sherman, Philosophy at the University of New Mexico, no date [http://evans-
experientialism.freewebspace.com/sherman01.htm]
Epistemic pessimism is about these motives, about what we are trying to do. Nietzsche understands knowledge as an attempted power-relationship with the world, a way of trying to handle it. And he concludes that nothing can be done with it, except for a possible aesthetic mastery. Let
me show some examples. The clearest statements of this view come from the early, unpublished works, but consider first the passage already seen from Beyond Good and Evil 22, where Nietzsche writes: "[A new interpreter] might, nevertheless, end by asserting the same about this
world as you do, namely that it has a `necessary' and `calculable' course, not because laws obtain in it, but because they are absolutely lacking, and every power draws its ultimate consequence at every moment." If the universe lacks laws, then one cannot do much with it. One does not

the long run technology

know how to interact successfully with it. Nietzsche knew, of course, that technology is a successful interaction with a lawful world, but he is not enthralled with this ability. His pessimism keeps sight of the fact that in

does not solve the human problem. It cannot overcome death of either the individual or the species.
We can do limited things, but ultimately science does not make sense of the world. The last clause in the quoted sentence is obscure, but
it suggests that we should not look in some "beyond" for explanations and purposes: what you see is what you get, and it has no order into which we can successfully fit our human lives. Consider the following passage, which appears with slight variations in three places in the early

"In a remote corner of the universe there was once a star

Nachlass, including essays called "On the Pathos of Truth" and the better known "On Truth and Lies in a Non-Moral Sense":

on which clever animals discovered knowledge. It was the proudest and most deceptive minute of
world history, but only a minute. After nature had taken only a few breaths the star began to grow
cold and the clever animals were forced to die. And it was time, for while they were priding
themselves on having discovered so much, they finally discovered, to their consternation, that all their
knowledge had been wrong. They died and cursed truth as they died . 4 This pessimism about knowledge is based partly on the fact that technology's successes are
temporary. In this respect, Nietzsche has a strange bedfellow in Bertrand Russell. He begins his 1903 essay, "A Free Man's Worship," with a story, as told by Mephistopheles to Dr. Faustus, that is remarkably like the short account of failed knowledge above. It is the story of a heartless
creator who performs a pointless drama of human existence and then says, "It was a good play; I will have it performed again." It is as if Russell were writing his own version of Nietzsche's eternal return. After this story, Russell preaches an existentialist message: Such, in outline, but even

That man is the product of causes which

more purposeless, more void of meaning, is the world which Science presents for our belief. Amid such a world, if anywhere, our ideals must henceforward find a home.

had no prevision of the end they were achieving; that his origin, his growth, his hopes and fears, his
loves and his beliefs, are but the outcome of accidental collocations of atoms; that no fire, no
heroism, no intensity of thought and feeling, can preserve an individual life beyond the grave; that all
the labours of the ages, all the devotion, all the inspiration, all the noonday brightness of human
genius, are destined to extinction in the vast death of the solar system, and that the whole temple of
Man's achievement must inevitably be buried beneath the debris of a universe in ruins--all these
things, if not quite beyond dispute, are yet so nearly certain, that no philosophy which rejects them
can hope to stand. Only within the scaffolding of these truths, only on the firm foundation of
unyielding despair, can the soul's habitation henceforth be safely built . . ..5 Russell expressed these sentiments early in his career and shortly after Nietzsche's
death, without allying himself with Nietzsche or expressing any appreciation of his import. And, of course, Russell did not enter into the great distrust of rationality that Nietzsche was bringing into the twentieth century. Nevertheless, when he says that "all the noonday brightness of
human genius [is] destined to extinction in the vast death of the solar system," he sees the power of knowledge reduced in the long run to impotence. He also agrees with Nietzsche's pessimism when he says that "man is the product of causes which had no prevision of the end they were
achieving," and that "his hopes and fears, his loves and his beliefs, are but the outcome of accidental collocations of atoms." If our ideas are the product of accident, how likely is it that they can successfully get a grip on this world and turn it to human advantage? Russell comes clos e to
saying that this world is one with which we can do nothing. But the person who says that directly, under the influence of Nietzsche, and who clearly interprets Nietzsche in this epistemically pessimistic way, is Heidegger. He does this through the way he understands

Nietzsche's doctrine of "eternal return" or "eternal recurrence of the same." In Heidegger's eyes, this doctrine presents the world as one with which

The collective character of the world. . . into all eternity is chaos."6

we can do nothing. It is the "most abyssmal thought," the "greatest burden." It shows us that "

It is a chaos that lacks order but not necessity--the same point made above in Beyond Good and Evil: it
is a "necessitous chaos."7 Furthermore, the world as presented through the eternal return is "the
necessitous chaos of perpetual becoming."

To will a different existence structured by universal truths rejects the world as-is. This
nihilistic hatred of existence makes all attempts at value impossible
White, 90 (Alan, Professor of Philosophy Williams College, “Delusion Frames, From Within Nietzsche’s Labyrinth,”
http://www.williams.edu/philosophy/faculty/awhite/WNL%20web/Delusion%20frames.htm,)

nihilism as a "psychological state" is bound up with the failure of the

I take as my starting point Nietzsche's assertion that the emergence of

attempt to endow the world with value by attributing to it an ultimate "purpose," "unity," or "truth"
(N:11[99] / WP:12). This failure leads to nihilism as "the radical rejection of value, meaning, and desirability"

(N:2[127] / WP:1). These descriptions suggest that nihilism has its origin in a negation, i.e., in the failure of an attempt, or in the

rejection of a purported value. Yet neither of these negations can be the first step towards nihilism, because neither is a first step at all. The failure of an attempt
presupposes that it has been made, and any rejection presupposes either prior acceptance or, at least, prior awareness of a question.I therefore suggest that the first step

towards nihilism -- a step that, in Nietzsche's view, leads historically to the second -- is the step taken with the judgment that the existence of our world
of becoming would be justified only through a purpose that guides it, through an "infinitely valuable" unity

that underlies it, or through another world, a "true world" or "world of being" that is accessible through it (N:11[99] / WP:12). This step, like
the step to rejection, is a negation in that it contains, at least implicitly, the judgment that our "world of becoming" as it presents itself, in isolation from such purpose, unity, or truth, "ought
not to exist" (N:9[60] / WP:585); the step presupposes the judgment that without some such source of worth, which cannot be contained within the flux of a "world of becoming," that world --
our world -- would be worthless. Is the person who has taken this first step -- who has judged that the world requires justification -- a nihilist? Certainly not an avowed one: this person will

this person is "nihilistic" in a way that one who simply accepts the
use the appellation "nihilist," if at all, only for others. Nevertheless,

world of becoming is not. From the Nietzschean perspective, those who posit the extraneous source of value are nihilists in that (1) they judge of our
world that it ought not to be (on its own), and (2) they believe in a world that is, despite their beliefs
to the contrary, "fabricated solely from psychological needs," a world to which we have "absolutely
no right" (N:11[99] / WP:12). To be sure, they are not aware that the world of their belief is a mere fabrication; that is why they will deny being nihilists. For this reason, if it is
 their
appropriate to term them "nihilists" at all, an essential qualification must be added: their nihilism is unconscious. Or, to adopt a more Nietzschean term, they are religious nihilists:

affirmation of another world or source of value is a consequence of their denial of our world as bearer
of its own value.Nihilism becomes conscious -- avowed or, in a Nietzschean term, "radical" -- with a second step, the step taken with the judgment that the sources of value are
absent, that the three categories of value remain uninstantiated. "Radical nihilism," in Nietzsche's explicit definition, is the conviction of an absolute untenability of existence when it

is a matter of the highest values that one recognizes; plus the insight that we have not the slightest
right to posit a being or an in-itself of things that would be 'divine' or incarnate morality. (N:10[192] / WP:3)

This is specifically manifested in their attempts to perpetuate life despite the

inevitability of our own death. Desire for a world of absolute security is desire for a
world where value is no longer possible . Committing ourselves to perpetuating life
when we know death and extinction are inevitable is the worst form of nihilism
Kacou, 8 (“Why Even Mind?: On the a Priori Value of Life,” BA, Government & Politics, University of Maryland MA, Global Security Studies,
Johns Hopkins Univ. JD, Florida Coastal School of Law, JPL)
We have also noted that circumstantial entanglements could conceivably make us think we want what we do not want. In other words, irrational behavior becomes possible: it becomes possible to find discrete pleasure in things

that should not give us pleasure—say, because they compromise access to greater pleasure. This explains why it becomes possible to even deny the value of life-as-such. We can also reason that it is
the circumstance that the perpetuation of life and pleasure seems practically (i.e., a posteriori) impossible—because we
believe we are mortal and expect to die—that forces us to, not only reevaluate our death but also, focus more on the other dimensions of
pleasure (intensity and diversity). And, what is even more interesting: it is the denial of the truth of this apparent circumstance, this
imperfection of pleasure, which forms the central concern of theological worldviews (which devalue pleasure in its finite form—at least, to
the extent that it does not seem conditioned by them). This concern finds expression in two assertions: that experience belongs to an immortal soul; and that perfect pleasure is guaranteed in “heaven.” * “Heaven” is

defined as a place where nothing bad can occur—a place where problems and dissatisfaction are not
possible. (A place of absolute, necessary security.) As we have seen, however, any desire for such a place would seem to
entail a desire for a place where value is no longer possible—because value always entails a preference over alternatives (one of which is bad). In other
words, desiring to go to heaven would be the same as desiring the end of desire, the disappearance of

value. We need not investigate in detail the circumstances that make it possible to say that such a place ought to exist. (Perhaps it relates to a fear of Murphy’s Law—“what can go wrong will go wrong.”)[35] But we can
“see” how tempting it is to say so, and thus unwittingly sacrifice the possibility of the good to the desire for its necessity. Those who commit to such a place, we call

“greedy nihilists.” Hamlet, for instance, even though he does not actually mention a place we would call “heaven,”
shows that he is a greedy nihilist when he laments “outrageous fortune” to the point of finding value in the idea of the end of experience—he wishes that things in general were

incapable of going wrong. (This is precisely the contrary of amor fati.) It is as if one needed to be
able to believe in the possibility of a perfect, everlasting, totalitarian state of goodness in order to be
able to find anything good at all. Heaven can be defined as “God’s realm.” That “God” may be defined as an inescapable (perhaps even all-inclusive, somehow), eternally consistent,
committed and supreme preference and power. Through these attributes, It makes heaven possible. Therefore, it is Its authority that conditions the possibility of the good itself (which for greedy nihilists, as we have shown, is
conditioned on the idea of its necessity). Thus, that “God” becomes the source or foundation of ethics and value. Accordingly, when the idea that such a “God” does not exist becomes contemplated, the idea that the good itself

With the idea of the disappearance of the duty imposed by that “God” also comes the idea of the
does not exist also becomes contemplated.

disappearance of the good itself. Thus, it is as if the greedy nihilistic theist needed to feel compelled to
love anything at all by such “God,” without which she would be terminally overcome with a sense of
all-encompassing futility. In other words, she would become a passive nihilist—in the Nietzschean
sense. In sum, there would be two sides to this paradoxical coin we can now call the Nietzschean God. On one side, it is something that guarantees the preservation of one’s “willingness to care,” so to speak, more or less
like an anti-depressant. Because of immortality and heaven, it becomes impossible to “lose” the world. On the other side, it is something that forces one to care. Because of immortality and hell, it becomes impossible to “escape”
the world—and costly to try to do so.

We should not impose order on chaos – suffering is inevitable; the only option is to
affirm the value in that suffering and give it meaning
Kain, 7 (Philip J., “Nietzsche, Eternal Recurrence, and the Horror of Existence”, Journal of Nietzsche Studies, issue 33, Penn state University,
Muse)//RSW

Nietzsche simply dismisses the designed cosmos, which few believe in anymore anyway (WP 12a). On the other hand, Nietzsche takes the
perfectible cosmos very seriously. He resists it with every fiber of his being.5 For Nietzsche, we must stop wasting time and
energy hoping to change things, improve them, make progress (see, e.g., WP 40, 90, 684)—the outlook of liberals,
socialists, and even Christians, all of whom Nietzsche tends to lump together and excoriate. For [End Page 50] Nietzsche, we cannot
reduce suffering, and to keep hoping that we can will simply weaken us. Instead, we must conceal an alien and
terrifying cosmos if we hope to live in it. And we must develop the strength to do so. We must toughen ourselves. We need
more suffering, not less. It has "created all enhancements of man so far . . ." (BGE 225, 44; WP 957; GM II:7). If we look
deeply into the essence of things, into the horror of existence, Nietzsche thinks we will be overwhelmed—paralyzed. Like Hamlet we will not be
able to act, because we will see that action cannot change the eternal nature of things (BT 7). We must see, Nietzsche says, that "a profound
illusion . . . first saw the light of the world in the person of Socrates: the unshakeable faith that thought . . . can penetrate the deepest abysses
of being, and that thought is capable not only of knowing being but even of correcting it. This sublime metaphysical illusion accompanies
science as an instinct . . ." (BT 15). In Nietzsche's view, we cannot change things. Instead, with Hamlet we should "feel it to be ridiculous or
humiliating that [we] should be asked to set right a world that is out of joint" (BT 7; cf. TI "Anti-Nature," 6). Knowledge of the horror of
existence kills action—which requires distance and illusion. The horror and meaninglessness of existence must be veiled if we are to live and
act. What
we must do, Nietzsche thinks, is construct a meaning for suffering. Suffering we can handle.
Meaningless suffering, suffering for no reason at all, we cannot handle. So we give suffering a meaning.
We invent a meaning. We create an illusion. The Greeks constructed gods for whom wars and other forms of suffering were festival
plays and thus an occasion to be celebrated by the poets. Christians imagine a God for whom suffering is punishment for sin (GM II:7; cf. D 78).
One might find all this unacceptable. After all, isn't it just obvious that we can change things, reduce suffering, improve existence, and make
progress? Isn't it just obvious that modern science and technology have done so? Isn't it just absurd for Nietzsche to reject the possibility of
significant change? Hasn't such change already occurred? Well, perhaps not. Even modern environmentalists might resist all this obviousness.
They might respond in a rather Nietzschean vein that technology may have caused as many problems as it has solved.
The advocate of the perfectible cosmos, on the other hand, would no doubt counter such Nietzschean pessimism by arguing that even if
technology does cause some problems, the solution to those problems can only come from better technology. Honesty requires us to
admit, however, that this is merely a hope, not something for which we already have evidence, not
something that it is absurd to doubt—not at all something obvious. Further technology may or may not
improve things. The widespread use of antibiotics seems to have done a miraculous job of improving our
health and reducing suffering, but we are also discovering that such antibiotics give rise to even more
powerful bacteria that are immune to those [End Page 51] antibiotics. We have largely eliminated diseases
like cholera, smallpox, malaria, and tuberculosis, but we have produced cancer and heart disease. We
can cure syphilis and gonorrhea, but we now have AIDS. Even if we could show that it will be possible to
continuously reduce suffering, it is very unlikely that we will ever eliminate it. If that is so, then it remains a
real question whether it is not better to face suffering, use it as a discipline, perhaps even increase it, so
as to toughen ourselves, rather than let it weaken us, allow it to dominate us, by continually hoping to
overcome it. But whatever we think about the possibility of reducing suffering, the question may well become moot. Nietzsche tells a
story: "Once upon a time, in some out of the way corner of that universe which is dispersed into
numberless twinkling solar systems, there was a star upon which clever beasts invented knowing. That
was the most arrogant and mendacious minute of 'world history,' but nevertheless, it was only a minute.
After nature had drawn a few breaths, the star cooled and congealed, and the clever beasts had to die"
(TL 1, 79). Whatever progress we might think we are making in reducing suffering, whatever change we
think we are bringing about, it may all amount to nothing more than a brief and accidental moment in
biological time, whose imminent disappearance will finally confirm the horror and meaninglessness of
existence. The disagreement here is not so much about the quantity of suffering that we can expect to find in the world but, rather, its
nature. For proponents of the designed cosmos, suffering is basically accidental. It is not fundamental or central to life. It is not a necessary part
of the nature of things. It does not make up the essence of existence. We must develop virtue, and then we can basically expect to fit and be at
home in the cosmos. For the proponents of a perfectible cosmos, suffering is neither essential nor unessential. The cosmos is neutral. We must
work on it to reduce suffering. We must bring about our own fit. For Nietzsche, evenif we can change this or that, even if we
can reduce suffering here and there, what cannot be changed for human beings is that suffering is
fundamental and central to life. The very nature of things, the very essence of existence, means
suffering. Moreover, it means meaningless suffering—suffering for no reason at all. That cannot be changed—it can only be concealed.
The desire to order the world through a supra-sensible morality or metaphysics is a
hatred of life expressed through ressentiment. The benefits of the aff are meaningless
when compared to the purpose of existence – to have ressentiment or not to have
ressentiment, there is no greater difference. This is how we frame the round.
Deleuze, 83 (Gilles, 1983, Nietzsche and Philosophy, pg. 34, JPL)

Nietzsche calls the enterprise

Is this difference only psychological? A difference of mood or tone? Nietzsche’s philosophy depends, in general, on the principle that ressentiment, bad conscience etc. are not psychological determinations.

of denying life and depreciating existence nihilism. ressentiment, bad conscience, ascetic He analyses the principal forms of nihilism,

ideal; the whole of nihilism and its forms he calls the spirit of revenge. different forms of nihilism are But, the

not reducible to psychological determinations, historical events or ideological currents, not even to
at all

metaphysical structures. revenge is undoubtedly expressed biologically, psychologically, historically

The spirit of

and metaphysically the spirit of

; the spirit of revenge is a type, it is not separable from a typology, the key stone of Nietzschean philosophy. But the problem is: what is the nature of this typology? Far from being a psychological trait

revenge is the principle on which our whole psychology depends. Ressentiment is not part of psychology
but the whole of our psychology it
, without knowing it, is a part of ressentiment. In the same way, when Nietzsche shows that Christianity is full of ressentiment and bad conscience he does not make nihilism a historical event,

is rather the motor of universal history

element of history as such, the , the famous “historical meaning” or “meaning of history” which at one time found its most adequate manifestation in Christianity. And when

there is no metaphysics which does not judge

Nietzsche undertakes the critique of nihilism he makes nihilism the presupposition of all metaphysics rather than the expression of particular metaphysics:

and depreciate life in the name of a supre-sensible world. We cannot even say that nihilism and its
forms are categories of thought, for the categories of thought, of reasonable thought – identity,
causality, finality – themselves presuppose an interpretation of force which is that of ressentiment . For all these

the whole of metaphysics, psychology, history and above all

reasons Nietzsche can say: “The instinct of revenge has gained such a hold on humanity over the centuries that

morality bear its imprint. As soon as man began thinking he introduced the bacillus of revenge into
things The spirit of revenge is the
” (VP III 458). We must understand this as meaning that the instinct of revenge is the force which constitutes the essence of what we call psychology, history, metaphysics and morality.

genealogical element of our thought, the transcendental principle of our way of thinking. Nietzsche’s
struggle against nihilism and the spirit of revenge will therefore mean the reversal of metaphysics, the
end of history as history of man and the transformation of the sciences. And we do not really know what
a man denuded of ressentiment would be like . A man who would not accuse or depreciate existence – would he still be a man, would he think like a man? Would he not already be something other than a

To have ressentiment or not to have ressentiment – there is no greater difference, beyond

man, almost the Overman?

psychology, beyond history, beyond metaphysics. It is the true difference or transcendental typology – the genealogical and hierarchical difference. Nietzsche presents the aim of his philosophy as

an overthrow of the principle on which thought depends

the freeing of thought from nihilism and its various forms. Now, this implies a new way of thinking, , a straightening out of the

we have only been able to think in terms of ressentiment and bad conscience
genealogical principle itself, a “transmutation”. For a long time . We have

We have opposed knowledge to life in order to judge life, to make it something

had no other ideal but the ascetic ideal. in order

blameworthy, responsible or erroneous. We turned will into something bad, something stricken by a
basic contradiction: we have said that it must be rectified, restrained, limited and even denied and
suppressed There is no philosopher who, discovering the essence of will, has not groaned at
. It was only any good at this price.

his own discovery and has not immediately seen bad omens for the future and the source of
, like the timid fortuneteller,

all evils of the past. Nietzsche is the only one who does not
Schopenhauer pushed this old conception to its extreme limit; the penitentiary of the will, he said, and the wheel of Ixion.

groan at the discovery of the will, who does not try to exorcise it, or limit its effect. an The phrase “a new way of thinking” means

affirmative thought, a thought which affirms life and the will to life, a thought which finally expels the
whole of the negative; to believe in the eternal return
to believe in the innocence of the future and the past, . What Nietzsche calls his glad tidings is that existence is no longer treated as

The glad tidings are tragic thought,

blameworthy nor does the will feel guilty for existing. “Will, this is what the liberator and the messenger of joy is called” (Z II “Of Redemption”). for tragedy is not found in the recriminations of

The tragic does not even fight against ressentiment, bad

ressentiment, the conflicts of bad conscience or the contradictions of a will which feels guilty and responsible.

conscience or nihilism. the tragic is

According to Nietzsche it has never been understood that the tragic = the joyful. This is another way of putting the great equation: to will = to create. We have not understood that

pure and multiple positivity, dynamic gaiety. it affirms chance and the necessity of chance Affirmation is tragic because ; because it
affirms multiplicity and the unity of multiplicity. The dicethrow is the tragic. All the rest is nihilism , Christian and dialectic pathos, caricature of the tragic, comedy of bad
conscience .

The alternative is to reject the aff in an affirmation of chance and necessity. This is the
diceroll – an affirmation of life despite its lack of purpose
Owen and Ridley 2K (David Owen is Reader in Political Philosophy and Deputy Director of the Centre for Post-Analytic Philosophy at the
University of Southampton. He is the author of numerous books and articles in social and political philosophy with a focus on Nietzsche. Aaron
Ridley is a professor of Philosophy at the School of Humanities at the University of Southampton. He has also written multiple books about
Nietzschean ethics. Why Nietzsche still? page 149-54)
The threat here is obvious: What is to be feared, what has a more calamitous effect than any other calamity, is that man should inspire not profound fear but profound nausea; also not great fear but great pity. Suppose these two were one day to unite, they would inevitably beget one of
the uncanniest monsters: the "last will" of man, his will to nothingness, nihilism. And a great deal points to this union. (GM III:I4) So suicidal nihilism beckons. The one response to the situation that is absolutely ruled out is the one that has so far proved most successful at addressing

Nietzsche argues that two plausible responses to the

problems of this sort, namely, adoption of the ascetic ideal, because the present crisis is caused by the self-destruction of that ideal. But

crisis are possible nonetheless The first

for modern man. Both of these involve the construction of immanent ideals or goals: one response is represented by the type the Last Man, the other by the type the Ubermensch.

response recognizes the reality of suffering and concludes that the latter our (post-ascetic) inability to accord transcendental significance to it and

provides an overwhelming reason for abolishing the former to whatever extent is possible. This has the effect of elevating

this response takes the form of

the abolition of suffering into a quasi-transcendental goal and brings with it a new table of virtues, on which prudence figures largest. In other words, a rapport a soi characterized by a style of

calculative rationality directed toward the avoidance of suffering at any cost of utilititarianism , for example,

and any other account of human subjectivity that accords preeminence to maximizing preference
satisfaction. The earth has become small,
In Thus Spoke Zarathustra Nietzsche portrays this type as follows: "What is love? What is creation? What is longing? What is a star?" thus asks the Last Man and blinks.

and upon it hops the Last Man, who makes everything small. His race is as inexterminable as the flea;
the Last Man lives longest. " We have discovered happiness," say the Last Men and blink. They have left the places where living was hard: for one needs warmth. One still loves one's neighbor and rubs oneself against him: for one needs

warmth. Sickness and mistrust count as sins with them: one should go about warily. He is a fool who still stumbles over stones or over men! A little poison now and then: that produces pleasant dreams. And a lot of poison at last, for a pleasant death. They still work, for work is

Everyone
entertainment. But they take care the entertainment does not exhaust them. Nobody grows rich or poor any more: both are too much of a burden. Who still wants to rule? Who obey? Both are too much of a burden. No herdsman and one herd.

wants the same thing, everyone is the same: whoever thinks otherwise goes voluntarily into the
madhouse "Formerly all the world was mad," say the most acute of them and blink. They are clever and know everything that has ever happened: so there is no end to their mockery. They still quarrel, but they soon make up-otherwise indigestion would result. They

Nietzsche's general
have their little pleasure for the day and their little pleasure for the night: but they respect health. "We have discovered happiness," say the Last Men and blink. (Z: I "Prologue" 5) hostility to this first form of response is evident. His

objection to the Last Man is that the Last Man's ideal is committed to the denial of chance and , like the ascetic ideal,

necessity as integral features of human existence. Whereas the ascetic ideal denies chance and necessity per se so that, while suffering remains real, what is objectionable about it is abolished,

the Last Man's ideal is expressed as the practical imperative to abolish suffering , and hence, a fortiori, what is objectionable about it – that is,

the Last Man's ideal is unrealizable, insofar as human existence

our exposure to chance and necessity. This general objection has two specific dimensions. The first is that

involves ineliminable sources of suffering- not least our consciousness that we come into being by chance and cease to be by necessity. Thus the Last Man's ideal is predicated on a neglect of truthfulness. The

pursuit of the Last Man's ideal impoverishes and arbitrarily restricts our
second dimension of Nietzsche's objection is that

understanding of what we can be and forecloses our future possibilities of becoming otherwise , in doing so,

than we are. Thus the Last Man's ideal entails an atrophying of the capacities (for self-overcoming, etc.) bequeathed by the ascetic ideal. Nietzsche brings these two dimensions together in Beyond Good and Evil: "You want, if possible – and there is no more insane

The second response

'if possible' – to abolish suffering. ... Well-being as you understand it – that is no goal, that seems to us an end, a state that soon makes man ridiculous and contemptible – that makes his destruction desirable" (BGE 225). to the

recognizes both the reality and the ineliminability of

nihilistic threat posed by the selfdestruction of the ascetic ideal is definitive of the Ubermensch type. This response

suffering and concludes that an affirmation of chance and necessity must therefore be built into the
very conception of what it is for something to function as a (postascetic) ideal this response . So , insofar as it cultivates

an affirmation of chance and necessity amor fati), overcomes the hatred of our dissatisfaction (i.e., (ascetic) (modern)

with this-worldly existence . Yet the success of this overcoming is conditional on the exercise and development of the very capacities and disposition that are the bequest of the ascetic ideal. The disposition to truthfulness is a condition of
recognizing the ineliminability of chance and necessity. But actually to recognize, let alone affirm, this awful fact about human existence requires the exercise of the capacities for self-surveillance (so that one can monitor oneself for the symptoms of self-deception in the face of this fact),
self-discipline (so that one can resist the understandable temptation to deceive oneself about this fact), and self-overcoming (so that one can develop, in the face of this temptation, one's capacities for self-surveillance and self-discipline). Thus the ascetic ideal provides the tools required
to overcome the crisis precipitated by its own self-destruction. In other words, the Ubermensch's ideal simply is the exercise and cultivation of the capacities and the disposition required to affirm the fact that chance and necessity are ineliminable. And because chance and necessity are

such exercise and cultivation must itself be perpetual, a process without the
ineliminable, and therefore require perpetually to be affirmed anew,

slightest prospect of an end. The contrast with the Last Man's ideal is stark. Whereas the latter offers
a feeling of power to its devotees by positing as realizable the unrealizable ideal of no more suffering-
that is, of a fixed, final, completed state of being – the Ubermensch’s ideal offers a feeling of power
predicated only on the continual overcoming of the desire for any such state. What the Last Man longs for, in other words., the Ubermensch
 the Ubermensch's ideal should represent a process as inherently
distinguishes himself by unendingly and truthfully refusing to want. It is of the first importance that

valuable, rather than a product (such as the Last Man's completed state of life without suffering ). There are two

a life oriented to the affirmation of this fact must

reasons for thinking this important. The first is the one mentioned above given that chance and necessity are ineliminable features of living a life,

recognize the ineliminably processual character of such an affirmation, and hence the ineliminably
processual character of an ideal that serves rather than denies "the most fundamental prerequisites
of life " (GM III:28). The other reason is that this ideal exhibits the form of practical reasoning that Nietzsche's genealogy itself deploys. By contrast with, say, Kant's conception of practical reasoning, which centers on an opposition between the real and the ideal (between the

heteronomous and the autonomous), and denies "the most fundamental prerequisites of life," Nietzsche's conception involves a continual process of movement from the attained to the attainable; and it is precisely this that the rapport a soi constitutive of the Ubermensch exhibits. Thus,
while Kant offers a juridical conception of practical reasoning structured in terms of the idea of law, Nietzsche offers a medical or therapeutic conception articulated through the idea of the type or exemplar. Which is to say, Nietzsche's genealogical investigation (at its best, i.e., its most
self-consistent) exemplifies precisely that commitment to the affirmation of life which it recommends, that is, to an Ubermenschlich rapport a soi. Process, not product; Dionysus, not Apollo.

Their fantasy of the affirmative creates and violent division between agency of the state
and subject.
Kappeler 95 [Susanne, The Will to Violence, former Associate Professor at the School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Al Akhawayn
University, p. 10-11]

We are the war' does not mean that the responsibility for a war is shared collectively and diffusely by an entire society - which would be
equivalent to exonerating warlords and politicians and profiteers or, as Ulrich Beck says, upholding the notion of `collective irresponsibility',
where people are no longer held responsible for their actions, and where the conception of universal responsibility becomes the equivalent of a
universal acquittal.' On the contrary, the object is precisely to analyse the specific and differential responsibility of everyone in their diverse
situations. Decisions to unleash a war are indeed taken at particular levels of power by those in a position to make them and to command such
collective action. We need to hold them clearly responsible for their decisions and actions without lessening theirs by any collective
`assumption' of responsibility. Yet our
habit of focusing on the stage where the major dramas of power take place
tends to obscure our sight in relation to our own sphere of competence, our own power and our own
responsibility - leading to the well-known illusion of our apparent `powerlessness’ and its accompanying phe-
nomenon, our so-called political disillusionment. Single citizens - even more so those of other nations - have come to
feel secure in their obvious non-responsibility for such large-scale political events as, say, the wars in Croatia and
Bosnia-Hercegovina or Somalia - since the decisions for such events are always made elsewhere. Yet our insight that
indeed we are not responsible for the decisions of a Serbian general or a Croatian president tends to mislead us into thinking that therefore we
have no responsibility at all, not even for forming our own judgement, and thus into underrating the responsibility we do have within our own
sphere of action. In particular, it
seems to absolve us from having to try to see any relation between our own
actions and those events, or to recognize the connections between those political decisions and our own
personal decisions. It not only shows that we participate in what Beck calls `organized irresponsibility', upholding the apparent lack of
connection between bureaucratically, institutionally, nationally and also individually organized separate competences. It also proves the
phenomenal and unquestioned alliance of our personal thinking with the thinking of the major powermongers: Forwe tend to think
that we cannot `do' anything, say, about a war, because we deem ourselves to be in the wrong situation; because we
are not where the major decisions are made. Which is why many of those not yet entirely disillusioned
with politics tend to engage in a form of mental deputy politics, in the style of `What would I do if I
were the general, the prime minister, the president, the foreign minister or the minister of defence?' Since we seem to regard
their mega spheres of action as the only worthwhile and truly effective ones, and since our political analyses tend
to dwell there first of all, any question of what I would do if I were indeed myself tends to peter out in the
comparative insignificance of having what is perceived as `virtually no possibilities': what I could do
seems petty and futile. For my own action I obviously desire the range of action of a general, a prime minister, or a General Secretary
of the UN - finding expression in ever more prevalent formulations like `I want to stop this war', `I want military intervention', `I want to stop
this backlash', or `I want a moral revolution." 'We
are this war', however, even if we do not command the troops or
participate in so-called peace talks, namely as Drakulic says, in our `non-comprehension’: our willed refusal to feel
responsible for our own thinking and for working out our own understanding, preferring innocently to drift along the
ideological current of prefabricated arguments or less than innocently taking advantage of the advantages these offer. And we
`are' the war in our `unconscious cruelty towards you', our tolerance of the `fact that you have a yellow form for refugees and I don't' - our
readiness, in other words, to build identities, one for ourselves and one for refugees, one of our own and one for the `others'. We
share in
the responsibility for this war and its violence in the way we let them grow inside us, that is, in the way
we shape `our feelings, our relationships, our values' according to the structures and the values of war
and violence.

1. Cross apply the Deleuze evidences arguments about assigning roles and
functions to structures. The evidence specifically talks about when we create
structures and put institute rules and mechanics to achieve some acclaimed
good, all we end up creating is ressentiment. This is uniquely true in the debate
where theory in rounds are just used as a winning strategy and due to the
fluidness of debate their interpretation for the most part leaves a lot to be
desired. This should be the first card you call at the end of the round
This has two implications
a. You should drop the affirmative debater--- I don’t have to win that my
model of debate is good or bad, you should drop my opponent
regardless for ressentiment creation. Cross apply the Deleuze evidence
and previous analysis for further proof. Since the Deleuze framing has
gone conceded that means this argument controls the round, all their
standards about why I should loose are meaningless according to the
Deleuze evidence, meaning that you can only evaluate the impact of
ressnetiment, which their will to theory creates. This is a voting issue for
ressnetiment creation
b. Theory is an RVI—This is uniquely true in this case. Cross apply the
Deleuze analysis above, If I win that not only their model of debate
creates ressentiment and their will to theory does, under my delusion
framing which pre reqs thiers framing I should automatically win the
round. Don’t let them get away with generic theory claims in the 2ar,
they need to specifically address our warranted k cross applications, also
don’t let them make new arguments on already conceded kritik
arguments.