F. C. S. Schiller, Must Philosophers Disagree

Symposium: Must Philosophers Disagree?
Author(s): F. C. S. Schiller, C. A. Mace and J. L. Stocks

Source: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes, Vol. 12,
Creativity, Politics and the A Priori (1933), pp. 118-149
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MUST PHILOSOPHERS DISAGREE ?
By Dr. F. C. S. SCHILLER, C. A. MACE and Prof. J. L. STOCKS.
I.--By F. C. S. SCHILLER.
THE question which we are met to discuss to-night is not a

dispute about the facts. We are all aware that philosophers
are even more prone to disagree than doctors, and probably all
of us are ready upon occasion to contribute our quota to the
disagreements that mark, and scar, the face of philosophy. But
what may well be a subject for wonder and inquiry is the ex-
planation of these facts. How did this state of affairs ever
arise and spread, and what reasons are there for it ? And is
there any cure ? Or is there something in the nature of philosophy
which makes it inevitable that philosophers should disagree ?
This is the question I wish to discuss and to which I wish to
give a reasoned answer in the affirmative. It is a very serious,
and not at all a flippant, question, not only because it appears
at first sight to affect the credit of philosophy, but also because
to answer it we shall have to go deep into the nature of philosophy
itself, and to go into some of the most essential differences
between philosophy and science.
I.
I wish, moreover, to discuss this question as seriously as it

deserves, and with no desire to score debating points. I hope,
therefore, that no gay and frivolous dialectician will try to burke
our discussion by pointing out that I have astutely chosen the
better part, because, whatever happens, my contention must
obviously prove victorious. For whether others agree with me
or disagree, whether we quarrel or agree to differ, we shall
equally prove that disagreement is characteristic of philosophy.
MUTST PHILOSOPHERS DISAGREE ? 119
Such a dialectical victory, however, would be profo

adequate, because it would not reveal why in philosophy
ment is normal and universal, whereas in all other su
occasional and abnormal. I want, therefore, ab init
face the whole paradox of the situation, and to admit
discredit it has brought upon philosophy. It is pr
reasonable to ask how a subject can be scientific or w
serious attention in which the experts differ as do t
sophers, and as they have done for the last two or thr
years.
In reply, I would suggest that here is precisely one
points in which philosophy is not analogous to sc
therefore, it is taken for granted, without more ado,
ment among experts is the essence of science, it is
philosophy can lay no claim to be science. But, nev
this difference, so far from constituting a defect in p
may really be its glory: it may really mean that philos
completes and transcends science, and aims at a highe
so, its toleration of differences and disagreements
characteristic mark of its superiority.
II.
In support of this suggestion let us inquire first of all, how

in the sciences the required basis for agreement is actually
reached. Whenever we take a science, not as an already made
structure of established doctrines, but in its historical setting
as a special department of knowing which has been marked off
from the rest from motives of convenience for the purposes of
inquiry, we find that its chief feature is always that it rests on
abstractions and selections. Just because every science is a
" special science," it selects a special aspect of the whole field of
possible inquiry, and cultivates it by special methods, suited to
its special purpose. But the other side of special attention is
120 I. c. . sCHILLn.
rejection and abstraction. Ever

from whatever is not relevant
ently arbitrary procedure is o
begun to be noticed even by l
by hoping that some other sc
omitted; and it is, of course,
fulfilled.
It is, however, to be emphasized that there is nothing in

this procedure to guarantee that all such omissions will be made
good. If there are abstractions which are universal and are
made in all the sciences, if there are aspects of the real which
are universally omitted, there will be no way of rectifying them
within the framework of science; they will either be left un-
corrected or else some other discipline will have to be devised to
deal with them.
III.
Now I shall venture to maintain that this possibility is

exemplified in fact. There are big and important aspects o
the real which fall without the purview of every science, and
which can, therefore, be considered only by philosophy, i
philosophy is taken comprehensively enough.
There is, for example, the great fact of personality. Thi
means that every vital process in the various centres of exper
ence, every feeling, every perception, every reasoning, present
individual differences. The actual behaviour of every one
strictly the revelation of an idiosyncrasy.
Idiosyncrasies, however, appear to be beneath the notice, or
beyond the reach, of science. In every science these individual
or personal differences are ignored in constructing the standard
ized percipient, thinker, or observer, whose reactions are treat
as " normal." Similarly, large tracts of actual experience ar
submerged and excluded as " subjective," in order to focu
MUST PHILOSOPHERS DISAGREE ? 121
scientific attention upon the selected and preferred

which are judged fit to reveal objective reality. Hence
data which are truly given, all arise in the personal cont
individual soul : they are never the scientific " data " f
about, which the sciences argue: the latter are
sumpta, selected from the former, dictated by the
of each science; and seen in the glamour of some fa
theory.
Thus it is "objectivity" which is always factitious and
fictitious; the " worlds " of the various sciences, that is, their
selected spheres of interest and operation, are really the out-
come of highly selective value-judgments: they are literally
creations of the sciences, built out of the crude data of our
actual experience by the special purpose of each science.
In this procedure, however, one central feature of the actual
experience is always omitted. Actual experience is always
grouped around a personal self, which has come to be what it is
by a unique historical development. So all experienced reality
arises in a personal context and is egocentric, and every self
differs more or less from every other; as we all discover when
we deal with other selves.
To all appearance, however, scientific procedure simply

abstracts from these differences and refuses to consider them.
Ever since Plato's* day philosophers have asserted or assumed
that science is not concerned with the individual. It cares only
for the universal, for classification by " kinds " which are taken
to be the same in " essence." It aims at, and sets up, "laws "
and " universals," which " particulars " have merely to " obey "
and exemplify. Thus the differences between particulars,
even when not denied outright, are simply assumed to be irrele-
vant for scientific purposes, and are ignored as such. It is by this
assumption alone that science is enabled to construct the common
* See Thecetetus, 209.
122 F. c. s. SCHIL.R .
world of intersubjective intercourse, or "obje

which different observers can combine to explore.
But this assumption is plainly afiction, a fiction
which the real function and purpose have been gr
stood. It is true that the sciences use formulas, f
references to the time and the place and the part
tions out of which the " laws " were compiled hav
expunged. But the reason for this is not, as
believed by philosophers, either that the par
unworthy of scientific attention or that science
apprehending it. Particular cases are precis
sciences are engaged in predicting, and their " tr
by their success in predicting the flow of events.
is no more concerned with eclipse in general with
any particular eclipse than the doctor (pace Arist
cerned with man in general without treating
patient. Both use the general rule to handle t
case. Nor can any case be so particular that it can
as the foundation for a general law. For it rests
us, and our attitude towards it, to take any com
culars as a "case," of as yet undetermined "la
imagination can easily equip even the most unique
event with shadowy companions to form its " kin
The true reason, therefore, for the apparent abs
the particulars of cases is simply the desire for a
which can be " universalized " and is not restricted to the events
which have occurred on a particular occasion. The "law" has to

be liberated from its historical setting, merely because it is needed
for use upon other " cases " with their historical setting. Thus
the abstraction from particularity is intended merely to produce
applicability.
* Op. Rhetoric, I. 2.
IV.
The abstraction from personality in the sciences has
meaning and function. It is intended to eliminate, or
to slur over, the annoying discrepancies between the
individual ways of taking the world, which are such ob
calculating and predicting personal reactions, and it
not indeed perfectly, but sufficiently to warrant the abs
It succeeds sufficiently to permit us all to speak of " the
world, in which all persons share, and to conceal its r
from nearly all. Yet in ultimate analysis "the " w
artefact, a construction, and fiction. It is constr
omitting from the infinitely numerous worlds of persona
ence the infinitely numerous items which are merely
and cannot be shared. They simply are not counte
not count. After ejecting them, the sciences can
happily to explore the remainder of the real, which is
" objective," and to lay down " laws " which hold " un
All of which is very convenient, comfortable, profitable a
matically intelligible.
But it is abstraction, none the less, and it is not th
story. After the sciences have done their utmost and
what the truth is according to their several lights, the
with a big unsolved problem, the problem of the who
problem they can offer no solution, because their wh
cedure has been to dissect the apparently presente
selecting such parts as seem to them relevant to t
purpose and interests of each science. So the final outcom
scientific attitude towards the real is, not a cosmos, bu
a congeries of sciences that have selected different a
the Whole, studied different "facts," and departed fr
given in different directions. The cosmic jig-saw puzzl
cut up. Humpty Dumpty has been effectively dismem
and just because it is a special science, no science can p
124 P. c. S. SCHILLER.
put him together again. It is therefore essent

wrong in method to debate whether the Whole is
in geometrical terms or in physical or in psych
ask whether " God " (if that is the name adopted
is more of a mathematician, or of a physicist, of
or even of a humorist. A new discipline, with a n
a new aim, is needed to cope with the problem of
V.
Now, of course, there is such a discipline, and always has

been, though its functions have not always been understood.
The traditional name for it is Philosophy, and its ambition is
precisely that of putting a glorified and transfigured Humpty
Dumpty together again, that is, of moulding the findings of the
sciences into a harmonious view of the (hypothetical) cosmos.
In other words, Philosophy, and Philosophy alone, is the study
of all the data, and to its all-embracing purpose nothing can be
presumed to be irrelevant -except, of course (and the excep-
tion is of great importance), such scientific details as may safely
be taken to make no difference to its purpose or to the meaning
of the real.
Whence, of course, it follows at once that Philosophy has no

right to make abstractions. Rather, it must undo the arbitrary
abstractions the sciences have made, and make good any damage
they may have done. Now this applies particularly to the
scientific abstraction from personality. Personality cannot be
ignored by Philosophy; it is a fact for Philosophy which cannot
be overlooked. It may even turn out to be a most important
fact, which Philosophy is bound to exalt to a place of honour.
For it would seem to be the one fact which is capable of providing
any unifying principle to connect together and arrange the
results of the sciences, so that in its light they can be seen to
form a whole and a harmony.
Hence Philosophy has always rightly claimed

itself with the totality of being, the existence of
usually taken for granted. Moreover, of this total
it has always claimed to take a wholesale and syno
On both these grounds personality is entitled to
and to philosophic recognition. It is indisputabl
primary facts to be taken into account. And histo
always inspired philosophies with their principles
The historians of philosophy--nearly all of th
pedants--have laboured long and earnestly t
kaleidoscopic succession of philosophies as step
development in which every later philosopher "pr
and studied, all his predecessors. But the real fa
so much more romantic than these romances. A
philosophy was the offspring, the legitimate offs
idiosyncrasy, and the history and psychology of i
far more to do with its development than der Gan
selbst. Whenever it is possible to reconstruct the p
history of a philosopher, it plainly attests the t
apergu. And the reason why so many philosop
mysteries is precisely because we cannot reconstruc
logy of their authors.
Very often this is our own fault. The philosoph
not inquisitive enough. By a sedate (or professoria
it does not ask philosophers what they mean, or w
they have written as they have, while they are ali
till they are dead, and can no longer explaiiq the
then it starts guessing their riddles. Thereby it m
them; it turns them into desiccated lecture-fod
provides innocuous sustenance for ruminant p
speak with some feeling, as one who does not grea
prospect of nourishing parasitic historians after
Anyhow, these can now speculate, safely, endlessly and
126 F. C. 8. SCHILLER.
about what a philosopher may have meant, nay,

meant; they are no longer in danger of being u
telling them what he did mean. They can, moreov
that such speculations are the finest sort of mental
Without let or hindrance they can bring him into log
with doctrines he may never have heard of, and can c
catalogue his logical lapses without troubling about th
logical explanation. Hence the historian of philosoph
no consistency in any philosophy. Taken as timeless
in abstraction from the personality in which they w
and grew up, all are defective, nay, incomprehensib
not one that is wholly consistent, no, not one. Ther
which is wholly clear and intelligible, which cann
debatable or be involved in a fog. But it never seem
to the critic that his method may be at fault. The rea
of the philosophic system he criticizes may be psych
aesthetic rather than logical: a system of philoso
regarded as a sort of poetry, and often of lyrica
that! Nevertheless, he insists on viewing the system
outside, as a logical structure, and not as a psycholog
extending over a lifetime. And he thereby throws aw
the key to understanding.
Thus we see that Philosophy cannot fulfil its chose
of unifying experience without including in its synt
idiosyncrasies and personalities which the whole affor
can it understand its own history.
VI.
Two consequences follow. In the first place, any unity

philosophy can aim at will have to be of a very tolerant and
elastic kind, and such that it can find room for personaldifferences,
without crumbling. This should, of course, discredit all philosophic
methods which are dogmatic, authoritarian and intolerant, and
favour those which are freer and more flexible, and

scope for individual differences and personal prefe
let me say, the pragmatic.
Secondly, the personal philosophies, which alo
have any logical warrant, will necessarily differ.
not follow that they will differ without limit a
measure, and will not allow themselves to be classif
way. We shall expect rather to find that they group
in natural classes, of which the members show c
likeness, and differ markedly from other classes.
This, moreover, is just the situation which in fact
history reveals. The great types of philosophic dive
great problems on which philosophers disagree, are
sistent, and exemplify themselves from generation t
in different philosophies. They carry on an inco
unending warfare, precisely because neither side h
penetrated to the psychological core of its oppon
Could they do so, and catch a glimpse of each othe
economy and inner harmony, they might understan
traditional methods of controversy had been so ine
it is wiser to recognize these facts than to try to ir
and to stretch them all on the Procrustean bed of a
and absolute scheme of development.
VII.
But, of course, it is a wholly different question whether it

follows from the fact that philosophies must differ, that they
must differ to the extraordinary extent they do. I must confess
that I do not think they need, and that for the acerbities and
futilities of philosophic controversy philosophers are much to
blame. For philosophers are peculiar people, who excel ordinary
folk quite as much in the oddities of their idiosyncrasies as in the
profundities of their thought. It is probably because they feel
128 7. C. S. scLLER,.
this themselves that they feel it necessary to v

alities. So when they start in to build their
habitually conceal their destination and cover
never, if they can help it, do they reveal the ro
reached their conclusions. The logical con
philosophic system never expresses its psychol
which has to be worked out, laboriously and im
after its author is dead, from unpublished scrap
letters, and drafts that have accidentally escap
So when two philosophers engage in controve
ever understand each other. They hardly e
understand each other. They have brooded a
long over their own solitary thoughts and the
interpretations of books, that they have be
capable of making contact with another liv
shrink from such contact. So neither of them
all his cards upon the table, or even in his han
keep their best trumps up their sleeves !
It is probably for this reason that both are p
have invented a technical language of their ow
widely from previous usage, to which they h
glossary, and which they do not use consistent
frequent relapses into more ordinary dialect
not understand each other's language, and figh
A further bar to fruitful discussion in ph
curious etiquette which apparently taboos the as
about a philosopher's meaning while he is al
only a consequence of the awe which his charac
not merely of the greater freedom of speculatio
mentators enjoy and exploit, when their subject
and cannot rise up and rebuke them, as Kant
it has certainly preserved the vitality of many i
and interminable controversies which fill the histories of
philosophy, and which could have been ended at o

the living philosophers a few searching questions.
VIII.
On the other hand, if these defects could be remedied,

Philosophy could, I think, largely be acquitted of the heaviest
charge that lies upon it, that of unconscionable obscurity. The
obscurity of many philosophers is notorious and indisputable;
but it may be explained as a defence-reaction. They write
obscurely in order to be respected by academic colleagues who
dare not criticize what they are not sure they have understood,
and in order not to be found out.
But the great philosophic issues themselves are not essentially

obscure. They can be stated quite simply and plainly, and so
that their vital importance becomes clear even to the plain
man.
So, theoretically, they could be discussed, openly

and effectively, and settled to a large extent
opinion, a grave indictment of our universiti
philosophic staffs do so miserably little to sett
questions.
What is, therefore, most sorely needed in Philosophy is the
institution of thorough and systematic discussion of the great
questions in dispute between the different sorts (not schools !)
of philosophers. The protagonists in these discussions should
be selected, not so much for their age, infirmities and reputation,
but for their open-mindedness, honesty and good temper. I
believe that they could clear up and clear away a majority of the
questions which cast a slur on Philosophy, in considerably less
than the five to ten years which Prof. E. A. Burtt* thinks would
be needed for them to understand each other even with " the
* Publications in Philosophy of the College of the Pacific, Vol. 1,

p. 92, 1932.
I
130 F. C. S. SCHILLER.
utmost good will and forbearance on each side ":

the minority, which, like the clash between
pessimism, are perhaps too vital and cut too deep in
to be disposed of thus, they could at least make cle
of difference, and agree to differ. And would no
a great advance ?
II.-By C. A. MACE.
"Is there something in the nature of philosophy which makes

it inevitable that philosophers should disagree ? "
Dr. Schiller answers this question in the affirmative. I
propose to answer it in the negative. Since mine would appear
to be the easier part-the simpler and more orthodox position-
it will be convenient to state it at the outset; and then to
inquire where and on what grounds, precisely, Dr. Schiller
disagrees.
I.
Philosophers try to answer certain questions. This, I trust,

is not a controversial statement. It is not necessary to inquire
into the particular kind of question they try to answer, since
what I have to say applies to questions of every kind.
The answer to any question is an assertion to the effect that
something or other is the case. If two philosophers disagree
they give incompatible answers. One asserts that something is
the case; the other either directly asserts that it is not the case,
or he asserts something that entails that it is not in the case.
It follows, of course, that at least one of the two philosophers
gives an incorrect answer to the question raised. Since, how-
ever, both were trying to give the correct answer, Dr. Schiller's
thesis is, in effect, that the nature of philosophy is such that
philosophers must sometimes do the very opposite to what
they are trying to do.
In contrast with this extremely paradoxical doctrine my own
view will seem very tame. In fact, had it not been so explicitly
contradicted, I should have considered it much too trivial to
state. It is simply this.
I hold that it is sometimes possible for a philosopher to know
that something is the case; and that, when this is so, it is not
12
132 C. A. MACE.
necessary for anyone else to

regard, therefore, to matte
evitable that philosophers sh
It may be that there are
not possible to know what i
sophical questions which it
this is so it is not inevitable
whatever to be the case. It i
sopher to guess. One phi
be the case, whilst another
however, although X and Y a
that
each is possible, are not
ment. Similar consideration
that he likes to think that X is the case and the other asserts
that he likes to think that Y is the case. They differ, but they
do not disagree.
There are matters upon which it is perhaps impossible to
know for certain what is the case, but upon which we are not
entirely ignorant; and upon which what we venture to say is
neither a sheer guess nor a statement of a preference. A philo-
sopher may hold that it is more or less probable that so and so
is the case, or he may hold that a certain assumption would
enable him to explain certain facts more readily than any other
assumption. This, in point of fact, would seem to be an ex-
tremely common type of philosophical situation. One philo-
sopher will assert that it is much more likely than not that
reality is spiritual, whilst another asserts that it is more likely
than not that it is not spiritual. Again, one philosopher will
say that he finds it illuminating to suppose that an ink-pot
is a colony of souls, whilst another says that this is not at all
illuminating.
The position I wish to defend with regard to differences such
as these is simply that either they are not disagreements or that
they are not inevitable. If two philosophers estim

the probability of a given proposition they may
doing so in relation to different data. But in this cas
disagree. It cannot be the case that the same p
have two incompatible probabilities is relation to
Hence if two philosophers estimate this probabili
on the same information, one is making a mis
however, nothing in the nature of philosophy wh
such a faulty estimate being made.
Similar considerations apply to the "hypot
structions" of philosophers. One philosoph
correctly say that a certain hypothesis gives the b
of the facts a, b, c, whilst another philosopher
another hypothesis gives the best explanatio
p, q, r. In this they do not disagree. But ther
the nature of philosophy to necessitate that each
patible hypotheses should be declared to be the on
which will explain the same facts.
Now all this, as 1 have already confessed, appe
be dreadfully platitudinous. But with some of
Dr. Schiller is prepared to disagree. Wherein
the difference of opinion lie ?
II.
There would seem to be two trains of thought in Dr. Schiller's

argument. In the first of these the necessity of philosophical
disagreement is derived from the fact of individual differences in
personality-a fact that is interpreted as implying that only
"personal philosophies " have any logical warrant. In the
second train of thought, however, some all-embracing synthesis
of personal philosophies (though "a tolerant and elastic syn-
thesis ") seems to be envisaged. The two trains of thought call
for separate consideration.
134 c. A. MACE.
The first line of thought would seem

The data of philosophy are not the d
distinguish between the real data of
'data' " of science. As to the precise na
I find it difficult to be quite clear. Som
as though the scientific data were mer
philosophical data, and sometimes he s
former involves a systematic falsificat
above all, Dr. Schiller wishes to empha
real data arise within the context of an
sequence of which every datum presen
It looks as if Dr. Schiller wishes to maintain that when one
philosopher has a given piece of knowledge as a datum then

no other philosopher can have precisely the same piece of
knowledge.
The business of philosophy, Dr. Schiller argues, is to provide
an harmonious view of the cosmos, and this involves piecing
together all the available data. The initial obscurity in the dis-
tinction between the real data of philosophy and the so-called
data of science involves a consequential obscurity here. It is
not clear whether philosophy has to construct its view of the
cosmos from the " factitious and fictitious " worlds of the special
sciences or from the real data of personal experience. It is more
likely that the latter is intended, since it is from the individual
differences in the personal data that Dr. Schiller wishes to infer
the necessity of differences in the final philosophical views which
result.
The argument, therefore, appears to be that since philosophers

commence from different data, and since they can only construct
a view of the cosmos from their own data, the views so constructed
must inevitably be discordant.
On this argument I offer but two comments. The first is that
each of its premises is mistaken, and the second is that were
they in fact true they would yield precisely the opposit

to that which Dr. Schiller draws.
It appears to me to be certainly mistaken to suppose that

philosophers must commence their inquiries from data that they
do not hold in common. Even granting "the great fact of
personality," even granting that every experience and every
case of knowing presents individual differences, it does not
follow that two philosophers may not have before them precisely
the same datum. Two cases of knowing will, of course, differ in
some respect ; but they need not differ in every respect in which
it is possible to compare them. In particular, they need not
differ in respect of what is known. If Dr. Schiller knows, for
example, that every vital process presents individual differences,
I see no reason why someone else should not know this too.
The knowings, being themselves vital processes, will themselves
exhibit individual differences. They may differ in many ways.
As Dr. Schiller suggests, they will at least differ in their contexts,
but what is known may be precisely and in every way the same.
Again, even if it were the case that in some sense all the
"data " must be private, it does not follow that there is no
common cosmos with which philosophy is concerned. I take it
that Dr. Schiller does not seriously deny that knowledge is
communicable. Such communication would seem to be pre-
supposed by the assertion that individuals differ in their thoughts
and feelings. Dr. Schiller may tell me about his own thoughts
and feelings. The information, though not perhaps a datum in
the sense in which my own experiences are data, is certainly
something to be taken into account by me. After all, "my"
cosmos must contain Dr. Schiller.
But let us suppose with Dr. Schiller that every philosopher

starts from data that are personal idiosyncrasies, and let us
suppose that every philosopher is restricted to such data. No
doubt they will construct philosophies that differ. But they
136 C. A. MACE.
will not disagree. So long as

is entitled to assert--that his
picture-there can arise no
only the existence of incom
assertion that philosophers d
Perhaps, after all, Dr. Schil
that it is inevitable that phi
he wishes only to assert that
compatible, accounts of their
trying to reveal their idio
Schiller roundly declares, is t
syncrasy. Where then is th
plausibly be maintained that
of an idiosyncrasy, but we
disagreement with Picasso.
There is, however, a second
argument.
It remains-in spite of all that has been said-the chosen
function of philosophy to unify experience, and in the later stages
of his argument Dr. Schiller suggests that the synthesis must
incorporate all legitimate philosophies (and that all philosophies
are legitimate). What, however, Dr. Schiller appears to envisage
in this connection is a sort of natural history of philosophers
conceived on psychological lines. Such a history is no doubt
an appropriate study for philosophers, though it can hardly be
described as philosophy itself. Clearly a history of this kind
cannot be the revelation of the idiosyncracies of the philosophical
historian. Only an intolerable muddle will result if to all the
personal philosophies we add a set of equally personal histories
of all the rest. If one historian of philosophy asserts that such
and such a philosophy is the product of such and such psycho-
logical conditions, it is not open to another historian to assert
that it came about in quite a different way. Here then we are on
terra firma and have transcended the necessity for d

We are on terra firmz since each historian endeavo
only what really is the case. As Dr. Schiller put
concerned only with the real facts and not with th
Where fact alone determines what is asserted there is no dis-
agreement.
But why does Dr. Schiller describe the unity of this history
"as tolerant and elastic "? If you set out to study all the
philosophies that exist you must at least admit the existence
of the philosophies you study. If this be tolerance, tolerance is
an easy virtue to possess. Botany must be a very tolerant and
elastic science since it admits the existence of so many different
plants. But a botanist may hold that some of the plants are
poisonous. I see no reason why a historian of philosophy should
not hold that some philosophies are false.
III.-By J. L. STOCKS.
A.
A PHILOSOPHER, like any other man, claims truth for what he

says or writes, with such varying degrees of confidence as he
may from time to time indicate. Further, he believes that
truth cannot contradict truth. If, therefore, he detects at any
point incompatibility between his beliefs and those of a brother
philosopher he is sure that one or both of them is wrong; and
he will strive to refute the other view, or amend his own, or find
some reconciling middle way. If Dr. Schiller's thesis were that
such incompatibilities and contradictions are unavoidable in
the field of philosophy, not in the sense that humanum est errare
(a generalization which applies equally to science), but in the
sense that in philosophy (but not in science) truth may contradict
truth, then it would deserve summary rejection as expressing a
philosophically disabling scepticism.
Some of Dr. Schiller's contentions bring him very near to
this kind of scepticism. Quot homines, tot veritates would be a
fair rendering of some passages in his paper. But on the other
hand he clearly thinks that many of the disagreements of
philosophers are unnecessary, and he envisages the possibility
of an ultimate unity in which the disagreements which remain
will combine in " free and flexible " association. Whether this
unity is so flexible as to abrogate the Law of Contradiction, he

does not say; but I take it to be less hospitable than that. If
so, he does leave some room for discussion and argument between
philosophers, even though the ultimate irrational of a personal
equation cannot be expelled, and though in the end for him,
consequently, the most that can be expected is an agreement to
differ.
However that may be, it is evident from the opening of

Dr. Schiller's paper that his general object is to explain what
he takes to be an empirically verifiable fact-the fa

philosophers do not agree in the sense in which scientist
He is asking why this is so, and whether it must alway
whether, that is, philosophy is merely less successf
advanced, at present than the sciences, or whether the m
and problems of philosophy have some deep-rooted pecu
in them that makes this comparative absence of agr
among philosophers inevitable, so that no conceivable ad
would remove it.
This being his problem, Dr. Schiller very natural

properly goes on to ask what are the characteristic pecul
of the philosophic, as contrasted with the scientific, pr
His answer, is, in effect, that every science is the prod
twofold abstraction and that philosophy is essentially an
to undo both sides of the abstraction. A science is abstract,
first, because it confines itself rigidly to certain features of what
comes within the observation of the scientist. The chemist
deals with the chemical properties of things, the economist

with their economic properties, and so on. Qud chemist or
economist neither pays any attention to anything else. This is
an abstraction, because there is no merely chemical or economic
man or thing. A science is abstract, secondly, because it gives
no account of individual things and events, except so far as
they conform to certain general types and laws; and it is to
the determination of these generalities that the efforts of every
science are consistently directed. Thus science knows things
and events only in that formal and schematic aspect in which
they repeat one another, and not in their material uniqueness
and individuality. This is an abstraction, because each thing
and event is also a unique individual existent. Philosophy
will undo the first abstraction, so far as it succeeds in deter-
mining the nature of the whole, as opposed to the part, i.e.,
of the real which is at once chemical and economic and so on.
140 J. L. STOCKS
It will undo the second abstracti

the types and general laws of sc
its individuality.
So far I follow Dr. Schiller q
and I accept his estimate of the
the philosophic problem. But i
lost. To make it plausible he se
he has nowhere formulated or de
philosophic personalism out of
unlike science, attends to indivi
surely on the principle that " li
not the personal equation of the
with brother scientists, as tha
disagreement with brother ph
Dr. Schiller can answer this qu
principle I have quoted. " Beca
least I understand him-" because
able in things and events is kn
repeatable in thinking minds, wh
in things and events is grasped o
of the investigator." But to m
observer's idiosyncrasy is a po
judgment in precisely the sam
attempts to understand the in
to formulate general laws, and
accidentally*) is it a condition
* Any special factor of personal equi

help to the discovery of truth, e.g.,
gift for mechanical improvisation, e
disabling, such as a slight deafness o
effort; but these are operative as pr
correct judgment is made ; they are
so that those who lack these peculiar
stand the judgment.
Therefore the greater part of Dr. Schiller's paper,

incidental truth and enlightenment it may contain, i
beside the mark. Owing to the weakness of this lin
its connexion with the problem from which it starts, a
therefore fundamentally to advance the matter b
starting point.
With Mr. Mace's reply, so far as it goes, I am in
agreement; but it follows from what I have already s
for me it goes only a very short way. Mr. Mace makes
of cogent objections to the results at which Dr. Schille
but he does not provide, or even suggest, an alternativ
of the problem from which Dr. Schiller starts. For a
to the contrary, one might suppose that the method a
dure of philosophy is in principle precisely the same
the sciences. And if that is so, the character and exte
actual disagreement of philosophers, as we know
explicable only by the greater difficulty of the probl
confront them, or by their relative incompetence as inves
or by both. He does not even say anything in his
show that he is aware of this difference or recognize
problem at all.
What I shall try and do then in this paper is to
conception of philosophy which will account for the
relations between philosophers, and specially for the
disagreement between them.
B.
I have already said that I agree with Dr. Schiller that the
essential peculiarity of the philosophic task and method depends
upon the fact that it is an attempt to undo the twofold abstrac-
tion on which science rests. Philosophy, unlike science, has to
do with the whole and with the individual. The further explora-
tion of the implications of this statement should give us the
142 J. L. STOCKS.
solution of the problem set

philosophers. We have then
what respects will a treatment
treatment of a part ? Seco
the knowledge or understan
from the knowledge or unders
rest of this paper will be an
questions; and I assume thr
enquiry is the only form of h
either on the whole or on the individual in the full sense of
these words.
The first of my questions is one which was asked long ago

by Plato in the Republic, as incidental to this very problem of
the distinction between science and philosophy; and it was
answered, I believe, once for all by him correctly. The whole
is not a member of a system, as, e.g., a geometrical figure is,
and cannot therefore be elucidated by formulating the organising
principles of a system and working down from them to the
determination of a particular feature within it. The general
movement must be in the reverse direction; it must start from
the constituents and work towards the whole which they
constitute. But since the constituents only reveal their nature
fully when seen within the whole which they constitute, it
follows, first, that the exploration of any constituent in isolation,
i.e., any science, must fall short of being knowledge in the full
sense and, secondly, that the philosophic progress must always
be tentative up to the very last moment in which to completed
philosophy the truth of truths is revealed. Philosophy cannot
be a march from certainty to certainty, or, in other words,
philosophy cannot demonstrate and prove. Even if, per
impossibile, one could know the parts fully without knowing the
whole, it might still be doubted whether a valid argument
could be framed from the nature of the parts to the nature of
the whole. But actually the sciences, which are

the systematic exploration of a part, so far as
the starting point of the philosopher, are taken
absolute and unquestionable certainties, on which
but as approximations to truth, which he is free t
reinterpret as his argument may require.
A scientific system therefore grows piecemeal.
removed from one another in place and time and
with no knowledge of one another's work, but st
common assumptions and operating on similar lin
and extend independently the repute of their com
by showing the capacity of these principles to pr
factory working definition of whole masses of pre
phenomena. To extend the application of the prin
the science in this way is to make a scientific dis
every worker in the field of science aims at such
great or small. Thus the body of workers wi
form administratively a single co-operative orga
on minute subdivision of the field of work. Hum
ensures of course that there will be disputes and
Rival explanations will be offered of a given group of
and the decision between them may remain for l
An alleged discovery will have to run the gaun
criticism, increasing in severity in proportion to t
influence. But all differences between scientists a
of one kind. They are differences as to the defini
within a system which in its general outlines is taken
by all disputants. They are therefore differenc
solution is always, as it were, within sight. At an
new calculation or a new experiment may settle th
for all.
In philosophy, on the other hand, there are no

There can be no piecemeal advance. Any ad
144 J. L. STOCKS.
made must be on the whole fr

that is in question, it is imp
effort and subdivision of the f
disagreements to difference
agreement. If the problem
attempted solution must take
Kant says, in which nothing i
quid superesset agendum. But
one who writes " thinking na
do," then the only possible excus
philosophy after one has been pu
between the new philosophy
definitely numerous, but the
of the parts then there may
independent investigators, bet
rule and controversy the ex
determine the whole must com
and if they co-operate at all th
of a different order.
C.
So much for the implications of the opposition of whole

and part. We have now to turn to the other opposition, that
of individual and universal. My second question was, in what
respects will the knowledge or understanding of the individual
differ from the knowledge or understanding of the universal ?
This is a much harder question than the last, and in answering
it there is less help to be got from our predecessors, because
there has been and still is, a strong prejudice in favour of the
view that knowledge is always of the universal, so that the
individual is, as such, unknowable. To some extent the question
here may be verbal, as to the meaning to be attached to the
word " knowledge "; and it is for that reason that I have
MUST PHILOSOPHERS DISAGREE . 145
added the alternative word " understanding." On the strictest
view the term "knowledge " may not even be applied to the
general body of science. It is confined to the abstract and
hypothetical systems, of which mathematics is the type, and is
withdrawn as the concrete and categorical enters. What word
is used is unimportant; but to me it seems clear, first, that science,
whether rightly called knowledge or not, will always fail to
reach the individual, not in the sense that so great a perfection
is not in practice to be looked for, but in the sense that no
conceivable advance would bring the individual within its
reach; and, secondly, that the intellectual effort, to which both
the sciences and the abstract disciplines pre-eminently called
knowledge belong, must remain incomplete and unsatisfied
until this citadel of individuality is captured. No whole can
satisfy which is exhibited as a mere system of categories or
class of classes; it must be an individual, with individual
constituents.
Now the individual, though a complete stranger to science,

is not by any means a stranger to human thought. Life is
lived, as we believe, by individuals in intimate contact with
other individuals. To the thought which subserves and inspires
action science and mathematics contribute no doubt in all sorts
of ways; but if they are allowed to predominate, so that the

individuality of the situation and its constituents is not recog-
nized, the result is a practical pedantry and incompetence,
which is a familiar enough phenomenon, recorded proverbially
in the traditional divorce between theory and practice. I have
myself tried elsewhere* to expound the limitations of the
universal in this field, and to show how it requires to be supple-
mented (not superseded) by the individual. I have argued that
morality depends on this, and that Kant's generally accepted
* In the first four essays in a volume called The Limit~ of Purpose.
146 J. L. STOCKS.
precept that every man should

in-himself is in effect a recogni
over that ground here. The p
practical life a grasp of individ
that it is achieved, not by exclu
reckoning, but by putting it in
There are other modes of hu
contact is made with the ind
biography; above all, there is
would complicate the matter to
here. Apart from that, it is un
example of the practical reason
includes all these in subordina
thought. If we want evidence f
the modes of thought and argu
by the demand that he shall r
shall do best to take it from the
to the practical life. There m
their peril. At every moment t
of a concrete situation in all i
escape from the facts and no po
for decision.
Philosophy then, I argue, bein

or understanding of the worl
general character more like a ma
of a friend whom he knows well t
possessions. Such knowledge h
but these are relatively rare an
that Wordsworth loved and lived with Annette Vallon was a
shock to many Wordsworthians. On the strength of what they

already knew they had built up a picture of Wordsworth, into
which the implications of this new fact fitted with difficulty.
The difficulty was not due to any conflict with what was
previously taken for fact; some of Wordsworth's poetr

was actually made more intelligible by the new discov
they felt that their whole interpretation of the po
stake. They were compelled to unravel and weave afre
of its subtle complexities. Yet, when the first nov
worn off, they saw that the change was very slight
and that the criticism of those who wrote before this
was made retained, apart from minor details, its f
The impact on philosophy of an epoch-making sc
discovery is precisely similar to this. There is a shock
outburst of feverish activity in the philosophic camp,
a pause the philosophers are to be seen finding their
quietly to Plato. Such a shock should clearly be less se
philosophy, which is an interpretation of all life and all ex
than in the interpretation of a very limited historical per
for in the context of the whole, a revolution in any de
of life and thought, however cataclysmic it may seem
temporaries, will inevitably be reduced to a mere rip
surface of life.
Such an effort at interpretation is wrongly desc

inductive in its procedure. Induction presupposes abst
and direction towards the universal. It is at home therefore in
science, but not in philosophy. The philosopher is not engaged

in formulating hypotheses which can be tested, modified and
accepted or rejected, according to the degree of their adequacy
to the facts. At times his procedure will approximate roughly
to this, as at times it will approximate to the deductive mathe-
matical pattern. But the resemblance in each case is super-
ficial, masking a fundamental difference. Fact and interpreta-
tion cannot be set for him in clear-cut opposition, as in more
abstract enquiries; the two are united in reciprocal dependence
within the framework of a problematic individuality. What
guides the philosopher from the beginning and throughout is a
K2
148 J. L. STOCKS.
Wekanschauuutung, a vision of the

multiplicity. All his argumen
thought subserve the task of enri
this vision. He would know th
so surely, for all the inevitable i
that no new revelation of it coul
If this, or something like it,
the lack of agreement and co-o
takes on a new colour. The star
a mass of evidence as to what t
is, or is said to be. In the coll
facts co-operative effort is ef
ultimately avoidable. This ev
systematized into solid bodies o
of regular instruction, and are
they provide material for resea
generation succeeds to generati
with the philosophic interpreta
should continuously accompan
interpretation, if it is honest
material to be interpreted and not
of it. An interpreter therefore
many rival interpreters stand b
his own independent view. He
always trying to convince other
does not attempt to teach his p
he tries to encourage in them i
philosophizing. He offers them
of an activity which he invites t
He stimulates them to their ow
Each philosopher then is a
interpretation which he offers
speaks in a sense as though he w
world. But though this is so, he would be foolish if h

his work without due attention to those who are and have been
engaged upon similar work, above all if he refused to accept

guidance and inspiration from those who have achieved the
greatest success in such work in the past. In this sense there
is ample co-operation among philosophers.

F. C. S. Schiller, Must Philosophers Disagree

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F. C. S. Schiller, Must Philosophers Disagree

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Symposium: Must Philosophers Disagree?

Author(s): F. C. S. Schiller, C. A. Mace and J. L. Stocks

THE question which we are met to discuss to-night is not a

I wish, moreover, to discuss this question as seriously as it

Such a dialectical victory, however, would be profo

In support of this suggestion let us inquire first of all, how

rejection and abstraction. Ever

It is, however, to be emphasized that there is nothing in

Now I shall venture to maintain that this possibility is

scientific attention upon the selected and preferred

To all appearance, however, scientific procedure simply

world of intersubjective intercourse, or "obje

which have occurred on a particular occasion. The "law" has to

put him together again. It is therefore essent

Now, of course, there is such a discipline, and always has

Whence, of course, it follows at once that Philosophy has no

Hence Philosophy has always rightly claimed

about what a philosopher may have meant, nay,

Two consequences follow. In the first place, any unity

favour those which are freer and more flexible, and

But, of course, it is a wholly different question whether it

this themselves that they feel it necessary to v

philosophy, and which could have been ended at o

On the other hand, if these defects could be remedied,

But the great philosophic issues themselves are not essentially

So, theoretically, they could be discussed, openly

* Publications in Philosophy of the College of the Pacific, Vol. 1,

utmost good will and forbearance on each side ":

"Is there something in the nature of philosophy which makes

Philosophers try to answer certain questions. This, I trust,

necessary for anyone else to

they are not inevitable. If two philosophers estim

There would seem to be two trains of thought in Dr. Schiller's

The first line of thought would seem

philosopher has a given piece of knowledge as a datum then

The argument, therefore, appears to be that since philosophers

they in fact true they would yield precisely the opposit

It appears to me to be certainly mistaken to suppose that

But let us suppose with Dr. Schiller that every philosopher

will not disagree. So long as

terra firma and have transcended the necessity for d

A PHILOSOPHER, like any other man, claims truth for what he

unity is so flexible as to abrogate the Law of Contradiction, he

However that may be, it is evident from the opening of

he takes to be an empirically verifiable fact-the fa

This being his problem, Dr. Schiller very natural

deals with the chemical properties of things, the economist

It will undo the second abstracti

* Any special factor of personal equi

Therefore the greater part of Dr. Schiller's paper,

solution of the problem set

The first of my questions is one which was asked long ago

the whole. But actually the sciences, which are

In philosophy, on the other hand, there are no

made must be on the whole fr

So much for the implications of the opposition of whole

Now the individual, though a complete stranger to science,

of ways; but if they are allowed to predominate, so that the

* In the first four essays in a volume called The Limit~ of Purpose.

precept that every man should

Philosophy then, I argue, bein

shock to many Wordsworthians. On the strength of what they

previously taken for fact; some of Wordsworth's poetr