Review

Author(s): Jürgen Bast

Review by: Jürgen Bast
Source: Verfassung und Recht in Übersee / Law and Politics in Africa, Asia and Latin America,
Vol. 44, No. 2 (2011), pp. 273-276
Published by: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/43239612
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 273

BUCHBESPRECHUNGEN / BOOK REVIEWS

Sudhir
Krishnaswamy
Democracy inIndia
andConstitutionalism
oftheBasicStructure
A Study Doctrine
NewDelhi(OUP India)2009,244pages,Rs.625,00[Oxford
Indiapaperbacks
2010,
Rs.325,00,£ 11,99viawww.amazon.co.uk]
ISBN-100-19-569379-5
ISBN-13978-0-19-569379-9,

1.Legalbattles aboutlandreform legislationbetween theIndianjudiciary andtheparlia-

mentary bodiesofthecountry startedintheearly1950ies.After somepiecesoflegislation
hadbeensuccessfully challenged byaffected landowners, thefederal Parliament,thenstill
dominated bytheCongress Party,enacted constitutional
amendments toeffectively shield
suchexpropriations from judicialreview. TheSupreme Court,foritspart,foundthatthe
constitutionalamendments violatedtheConstitution and declaredthemnulland void
(Golaknath v StateofPunjab,1967).Thepolitical andlegaldisagreement overtheexis-
tenceof substantive limitsto theParliament's amending powerlingered foryears.The
Supreme Courteventually handeddownthelandmark Kesavananda judgement (Kesa-
vanandaBharativ Stateof Kerala,1973).It heldhateventheamending powermustnot
'damage ordestroy''basicfeatures oftheConstitution'.
This 'basic structuredoctrine' todayis a settledpartof Indianconstitutional law,
though only in fivefurther cases the Supreme Court has invoked the doctrineto strike
downconstitutional amendments. Thekeytestforthedoctrine camewhenIndiraGandhi
wasaboutto establish an authoritarian form ofgovernment in India.The(then)recently
electedPrimeMinister wasdisqualified forpublicoffice andtaking partinfuture elections
by a Statecourt due to her corrupt election The
practices. Parliament thereupon adopteda
package of constitutionalamendments and acts
legislative to retroactivelylegalizeher
actionandto immunize suchpractices judicial
against control. In the so-calledElection
case (IndiraGhandiv Raj Narain,1975),theSupreme Courtheldthatfreeandfairelec-
tionsis anessentialrequirement ofdemocracy whichitselfis a basicfeature oftheConsti-
tution thateventheamending power must Since
respect. then, the basic doctrine
structure
hasattracted muchattention, and
nationally internationally, and has become a controversial
issueoffirstrankintheconstitutional discourseinIndia.

2. Anin-depth ofthisdoctrine
study inIndianconstitutional is thetopicofthe
adjudication
bookdiscussedhere.Itis theauthor'sPhD thesisprepared
attheFaculty ofLaw,Oxford
underthe supervision
University of ProfessorPaul Craig(Krishnaswamy is now a
Professor
ofLawattheWestBengalNational ofJuridical
University SciencesinKolkata).
The studyprovides
thereaderwitha thoughtful reconstruction
of theSupreme Court's
anda forceful
jurisprudence oftheunderlying
justification rationale
toensurecompliance

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274 und inÜbersee
Recht
Verfassung VRÜ 44(201
1)

withprinciples identified as basic features of theConstitution. According to Krishnas-

wamy, thebasicstructure doctrine is a iegitimate doctrine inIndianconstitutional law'that
has 'a soundconstitutional basis' (p. xxxiii).The latter statement is meantto defend the
Supreme Courtagainsttheaccusation of widening thescopeofjudicialreviewbeyond
constitutional boundaries, tothedetriment ofdemocratically electeddecision-makers.
a
Following programmatic introduction, the is
study composed offiveparts. Chapter 1
evaluates thedoctrine's constitutional basisas first developed in Golaknath and re-shaped
in Kesavananda (p. 1-42).Theauthor holdsthattheConstitution ofIndiadoesestablish
substantive limits totheamending power.Theseimplied limits aregrounded intheconsti-
tutional document as a whole, rather thananyparticular provision. Krishnaswamy speaksof
a text-emergent butotherwise unwritten doctrine resulting from a 'structural interpretation'
of theconstitutional document. This method of drawing multi-provisional implications
mustnotbe confused withan 'originalist' readingwhichwouldstresstheintent of the
framers. Stilllessdoesitinvolve or
anymetaphysicalvalue-based justifications.
Thesecondchapter (p. 42-69)clarifies thescopeofthedoctrine. Thecase-lawreveals
a surprisingly widerangeofstateactions tobe subject tobasicstructure review. Thatrange
includes actsother thanconstitutional amendments, suchas theproclamation ofemergency
orevenordinary legislation andexecutive action,provided thattheact,ifupheld, would
damageor destroy basicfeatures of theconstitution. In certain constellations, thebasic
structure doctrine thuscompensates fora lesscomprehensive scrutiny according to other
types ofconstitutional oradministrative lawreview.
Chapter3 (p. 70-130) reviewstheapplication of thedoctrine in thecasesensuing
Kesavananda. Itconfirms theauthor's viewthatbasicstructure review is a substantive type
ofreviewwhosenature is topreserve theintegrity oftheconstitution as a statement ofkey
constitutional principles. A uniform 'damageor destroy' testappliesto all forms ofstate
actionswithout modification. As tothestandard ofreview, Krishnaswamy seesnoneedfor
an additional conceptofjudicialdeference thatwouldlowerthe'hardreview'standard
appliedbytheSupreme Court.
Thefourth chapter (p. 131-163)briefly discussesthegrounds ofreview, i.e. therele-
vantbasicfeatures of theConstitution of India.According to theauthor, thesegrounds
consistof generalconstitutional principles rather thana setof provisions thatareperse
immune from being amended. They are identifiable on a basis.
case-by-case Though inher-
ently to
prone disagreement, a broadly consented listwould include the principles secu-
of
larism, democracy, ruleof and
law,federalism, independence judiciary.of the
Thefinalchapter (p. 164-229)concerns the'legitimacy' ofthebasicstructure doctrine,
i.e. whether it can successfully be defended againstthevariousstrands ofacademicand
publiccritique. Thechapter is subdivided according to threeaspectsoflegitimacy: legal,
moral, andsociological.
In the languageof theauthor,'legal legitimacy' relatesto thejuridicalmethods
employed bytheSupreme Court.Krishnaswarmy demonstrates thataccusing thecourtof

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 /BookReviews
Buchbesprechungen 275

'judicialactivism' often buildsonmisperceptions ofthedoctrine orthenature ofconstitu-

tionaladjudication.
Undertheheading of'morallegitimacy' thenextpartdiscusses issuesofconstitutional
theory. Defending thedoctrine againsttheallegation ofbeinganti-democratic incharacter,
theauthor developsa lineofreasoning on howconstitutionalism anddemocracy canbe
reconciled. Referring to theworkof BruceAckerman, a US scholar,Krishnaswarmy
employsthedistinction between ordinary law-making and higherlaw-making through
fundamental constitutional change.In thelatter case,politicsof a superior deliberative
quality is required toensuretheintegrity oftheprocess. Fromthispointofview,thebasic
structure doctrine is a tooltoguardthedeliberative qualityofconstitutional politics. Con-
sequently, theSupreme Courthasnever deniedtheright oftheconstituent to
power modify
basicfeatures oftheConstitution: theParliament mayindeedcallfora Constituent Assem-
for
bly making a new constitutionor'undoing' thebasic structureof the current.
A secondissueof'morallegitimacy' concerns thenotion ofsovereignty. Herethebook
explains that India has not adopted the British doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty,
despite thecentral roletheParliament hadplayedingaining Independence andinacting as
a Constituent Assembly immediately thereafter. The framers of the Constitution rather
optedfora rigidtypeofconstitution thatalso bindstheParliament andsubjects itto the
judicial review of a Supreme Court.If at all,Krishnaswarmy the of
says, concept sover-
eignty onlycan gaina plausiblemeaning in theIndianconstitutional settingbasedon a
new,institutionally dispersed understanding.
Finally, thenotion of 'sociologicallegitimacy' meansempirical acceptance orsupport
intherelevant circles. In thissection,
theauthor recallsthedifferent stagesofdevelopment
intheCourt'sjurisprudence. Atfirst,thenewdoctrine hashadverylittlesupport among
thepoliticalandlegalelites.After theElectioncase,however, thepicture haschanged,
though thedoctrine stilldoesnotenjoyuncontested elitesupport. Attheveryleast,the
basicstructure doctrine hasemancipated itselffrom theodiumofbeingmerely anideology
toprevent progressive socialchange.

3. Krishnaswamy haswritten a well-structured,

concisebookthatmakesouthiscase in a
verypersuading manner. Itsclarity
andreader-friendlinessarereinforcedbyoutliningthe
structure oftheargument atthebeginning ofeachchapter,nexttoproviding detailed
sum-
mariesat theend.In someinstances, though, itdisplays
an unnecessarydegreeofredun-
dancy(in particular in Chapter 5 wheremostof thepointson 'legallegitimacy' have
already beenmadebefore). Ontheother hand,suchexplanatoryefforts
enabletheauthor to
addressnotonlythespecialists in Indianconstitutionallaw butalso a wideraudience
beyond theacademia. To somedegree, thebookis aneducationalintervention
inthe(Eng-
lish-speaking) discourse
political of the
India,taking Supreme Court'sside in theheated
debateoveralleged judicialactivism.
Itis doubtlessly
alsoan outstanding pieceofdoctrinalconstructivism
inIndianconsti-
tutional law(though thepresent reviewer is notfullycompetenttojudgethis).Krishnas-

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276 und inÜbersee
Recht
Verfassung VRÜ 44(201
1)

wamyrefrains from merelyreporting 'heroic'casesandsummarizing thearguments ofthe

Judges.Takinga remarkably distanced stance,he offers generalizing abstractions and
thatenablehimtoidentify
reflections
critical unfitconceptions undweakjustifications.
As itrepeatedlyconfirms,thebookarguessolelyonthebasisoftheconstitutional texts
andcase-lawin India.Makinga contribution toa general theory of basicstructure review
or engaging withcomparative constitutionalism wouldgo beyonditsintention. Andyet,
suchstatements underratetheeminent theoretical potentialof the study. This book will
deepen thereaders' understandingof the distinction between legislative,amending and
constituentpowers, andtheirrespective correlations witha constitutionalcourt's powerof
judicialreview.In the
particular sections with the denomination
infelicitous 'moral legiti-
macy'(p. 189-221)provide veryinteresting thoughts ofconstitutionaltheory. Theyavoid
theempty andthedecisionist
scholasticism biasthatcharacterize so manycontributions to
theGerman discussionon thepeople'sconstituent a
power.It is pitythatKrishnaswamy
was so hesitant develophis theoretical
to further observations, perhaps in ordernotto
'damageordestroy' theeducationalanddoctrinal valueofthebook.
Whatcan we learnfromtheconfrontation withtheIndianlegaldiscourse to which
Krishnaswamy hasopenedus a window ofaccess?Maybeitis first ofall thesignificance
ofthequestion raisedbythetitleofhisbookwhichis hardly everaskedin theGerman
context: Howcan democracy andconstitutionalism be reconciled in viewofa justiciable
basicstructure In theeyesof thepresent
doctrine? reviewer,a keyinsight is thatbasic
structurereviewservesthepurpose ofguarding thedeliberative integrityofa processthat
couldresult inan 'overallmodification'oftheconstitution (inGerman 'Gesamtänderung',
a term developed in Austrianjurisprudence). However, a constitutionaljurisprudence that
obstructsanylegalpathsto suchoverallconstitutional changewouldundermine thevery
legitimacyonwhichbasicstructure review rests.
/Bielefeld
Bast, Heidelberg
Jürgen

Muthucumaraswamy /JiangyuWang(eds.)
Sornarajah
India
China, and the Economic
International Order
Cambridge Press,Cambridge
University 643 £75.00/US-$ 125.00;
2010, S., hardcover,
ISBN978052111057

Eventhough theongoing changesintheinternationaleconomy andthedawnofan "Asian

areoftenassociated
century" withtheeconomic riseofChina,India'srapid
andpolitical
developmenthasequallybeencallingforattentionforsometime.Indeed, of
theintegration
bothIndiaandChinaintotheworldeconomy is notonlyimproving thelivingstandardsof
morethantwobillionpeople,butis also shifting to someextent theglobalbalanceof
powersfromWestto East.Hence,thetwogiantsarelikelyto increasingly shapeglobal
orderbytheapproaches theyadopttowards economic developmentand law.
international

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