POSSESSION

What are good indicia of possession in the concept of an owner?

Tax declarations and land tax payments. (See Tupaz vs. Ricamora, CA 37 O.G. 58 and
Camarines Sur vs. Director of Lands, 64 Phil. 600) But note that such declarations
and payments are not enough to prove calid title; they only show intent to possess
the property in the concept of an owner.

From 1994, Concepcion and her predecessors had been in continuous and
uninterrupted possession of the land since 1944. As far back as 1927, her
father mortgaged the land. This was redeemed in 1943. In 1960, Concepcion’s
mother mortgaged the same land. This was redeemed in 1962. In 1967,
Aurelia, Concepcion’s sister, mortgaged the land. This was redeemed in 1970.
In 1973, Jose, Jesus, and Antonio executed an affidavit of confirmation of the
deed of sale and quitclaim over the land in favor of Aurelia who had it
surveyed and declared the land for taxation purposes in her name. When
Aurelia died, she left no issue except her sisters one of whom was Concepcion.
The latter filed an action to quiet title against Jose, Jesus, and Juana. The trial
court ruled in favor of Concepcion but the Court of Appeals reversed the
decision of the trial court. Which decision is correct?

The decision of the trial court. It was incumbent upon Jose et al. and not Concepcion
to prove that the ;and belonged to them. Concepcion is a possessor in concept of an
owner and there is a ;egal presumption that she possesses with a just title which she
could not be obliged to show or prove it. In the absence of any proof that the
affidavit of quitclaim executed by Jose et al. did not express the true intent of the
executors, the principle on parol evidence will apply and hence, the affidavit must
be construed exactly as it is: a quitclaim. (Tupue vs. Urgel, G.R. No. 73491, May 23,
1988)

Angelina bought a diamond ring from Rafael on October 13, 1947. This ring
was stolen sometime in February 1952. Before Angelina lost the ring, she had
been wearing it for more than 5 years and therefore, she became familiar with
it. In one occasion, Angelina saw the missing ring in the finger of Consuelo who
said that she purchased the ring from Mrs. Miranda who got the ring from
Angelita who in turn got it from Aling Petring. Claiming that her possession of
the ring is in good faith, Consuelo now refused to return the ring to Angelina.
May Angelina recover the ring from Consuelo? Discuss the law applicable.

The controlling provision is Article 559 of the Civil Code. Angelina, having been
unlawfully deprived of the diamond ring in question, is entitled to recover it from
Consuelo who was found in possession of the same. The only exception the law
allows is when there is acquisition in good faith by the possessor at a public sale, in
which case the owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price. As
authoritatively interpreted in Cruz vs. Pahati (98 Phil. 788), the right of the owner
cannot be defeated even by proof that there was good faith in the acquisition of th
 possessor. There is a reiteration of this principle in Aznar vs. Yapchiangco, thus:
“Suffice it to say in this regard that the right of the owner to recover personal
property acquired in good faith by another, is based on his being dispossessed
without his consent. The common law principle that where one of two innocent
persons must suffer by a fraud perpetrated by another, the law imposes the loss
upon the party who, by his, misplaced confidence, has enabled the fraud to be
committed, cannot be applied in a case which is covered by an express provision of
the New Civil Code specifically Article 559.” (Consuelo S. de Garcia, et al. vs. Court of
Appeals, et als., L-20264, January 30, 1971; 37 SCRA, p. 129)

X steals the ring of B. X pledges the same to R Pawnshop. B does not readily
discover the theft committed by X. And so when X fails to redeem the ring, R
Pawnshop sells the same at public auction where Y is the highest bidder and
buyer in good faith of the ring. Upon learning of this, B sues Y to recover the
ring. Decide.

B cannot recover the ring from Y unless B indemnifies Y for what the latter pays for
the ring. This is so because Y acquires the ring at public auction, a situation excepted
from the rule in Article 559 of the New Civil Code that the owner who is unlawfully
deprived of his personal property may recover the same without paying any
indemnity.

USUFRUCT

A is a usufructuary of a land belonging to B. He transferred his usufructuary

right to C who took possession of the land. While possessing it, C, without
knowledge of A, cut 100 coconut trees on the land. Is A liable to B for the
damages caused by C on the land under usufruct? Give your reasons.

Yes, the cutting of the coconut trees by the transferee not being authorized. C, under
Article 557, NCC, could cut the trees only if the same is necessary to restore or
improve some of the things in usufruct but he shall first inform the owner of the
necessity for the work. Such is not the case of the given problem. And so, A is liable
to B as under Article 590, NCC, a usufructuary who alienates or leases his right of
usufruct shall answer for any damage which the things in usufruct may suffer
through the fault or negligence of the person who substitutes him.

Will the usufructuary’s claim of ownership of the property held in usufruct

amount to a renunciation?
No, the renunciation must be clear. (City of Manila vs. El Monte de Piedad)
 EASEMENTS

X is granted an easement of the right of way by Y to transport A’s sugar cane

pver his (X) railway in ten railroad cars a day. The railway was constructed by
X over the land of Y. Due to the failure of A to supply sufficient sugar cane, and
because of the need of increasing his sugar milling production, X takes the
sugar cane of B, C, and D and using 20 railroad cars a day, transports them
over the railway thru the land of Y, to his sugar central. Has X violated the
restrictions imposed by Y for the use of the easement? If not, why not? Give
your reasons.

Based on the opinion in Valderrama vs. North Negros Central (48 Phil 492), there
would be no violation of restrictions for use of easement on the part of X because
there is no additional burden to the owner of the servient estate. Only “20 railroad
cars” are being used: but, of course the suppliers of the sugar cane are different. No
undue prejudice is done to the owner of the servient estate. The violation, if any, is
not substantial enough to justify the complaint on Y’s part. The manner of the
exercise of the easement is not substantially apart from that previously established
and therefore, there is no violation of Article 626 of the New Civil Code.

Will easements under Article 638 of the Civil Code (relating to navigating and
floatage) exist even without compensation?
No, it a condition precedent for such easements to exist, that the property (desmed
private) subject thereto should be expropriated and just compensation paid. (Roxas
vs. City of Manila, 9 Phil 215.)

Is express prohibition from obstructing light and view given to the owner of
the adjacent lot by means of a letter sufficient basis for acquisitive
prescription?

No. The law requires a formal prohibition, that is an instrument acknowledged

before a notary public. (Cid vs. Javier, L-1416, June 30, 1960.)

How do you characterize voluntary easements in Article 688 of the New Civil
Code?

They are not contractual in nature; they constitute the act of the owner. If he exacts
any condition, like the payment of the indemnity, any person willing to pay it may
make use of the easement. If the contention be made that a contract is necessary, it
may be stated that a contract exists from the time all those who desire to make use
of the easement are disposed to pay the required indemnity. (North Negros Sugar
Co., Inc. vs. Hidalgo, 63 Phil. 664)

NUISANCE
Is the construction by a province of a pumping station with 3.8 meters from a
person’s house actionable nuisance?

Yes, because in such case, the occupants of the house will suffer the noise,
vibrations, smoke, etc. coming from the station during its operation, thus
endangering the comfort, health, and even the lives of the persons concerned in case
of fire. (Bengzon vs. Pangasinan, 62 Phil. 816)

Is a brewer and ice plant built in San Miguel, Manila a nuisance?

No, so long as such plant shall be operated with a minimum offense to nearby
residences, San Miguel, Manila being an industrial center.

When is noise an actionable nuisance?

A noise may constitute an actionable nuisance but it must be a noise which affects
injuriously the health or comfort of ordinary people in the vicinity to an
unreasonable extent. Injury to a particular person in a peculiar position or of
specifically sensitive characteristics will not render the noise an actionable
nuisance. In the conditions of present living, noise seems inseparable from the
conduct of many necessary occupations. Its presence is a nuisance in the popular
sense in which that word is used, but in the absence of statute, noise becomes
actionable only when it passes the limits of reasonable adjustment to the conditions
of the locality and of the needs of the listener. What those limits, are not fixed by any
definite measure of quantity or quality. They depend upon the circumstances of the
particular case. They may be affected, but are not controlled, by zoning ordinance.
The delimitation of designated areas to use for manufacturing, industry or general
business is not a license to emit every noise profitable attending the conduct of any
one of them. (Velasco vs. Meralco, L-18390, August 6, 1971; 40 SCRA, p. 342.)

May the City Engineer of the City of Manila summarily remove houses
constructed without governmental authority on public streets and
waterways?

Yes, he is so authorized under the Charter of the City of Manila which shall prevail
over the Civil Code, such Charter being a special law. (Sitchon vs. Auino, 52 G 1399;
Quinto vs. Lacson L-137700, May 30, 1960)

Civic groups attempted to seek an injunction or prohibition of the public

bidding for an incinerator-thermal plant for garbage disposition on the
ground that it would constitute a nuisance per se due to pollution. Will the
action prosper? Why?

No. Since it is not yet clear that pollution would result, such civic groups cannot yet
restrain by injunction and/or prohibition such biding. This is so because of the
principle that a mere tendency to injure is not sufficient to warrant an injunction
against an alleged nuisance, nut there must be something actually appreciable which
of itself arrests the attention, and rests not merely on theory, but strikes the
common sense of the ordinary citizen. (Philipps vs. Roque River Vlley Canal Co., 156,
p. 794, 7 ALR 791)

MODES OF ACQUIRING OWNERSHIP

Will mere loss of a thing convert such thing into a res nullius?
No. There must be an abandonment. (Narciso vs. Ortiz, CA, 45 O.G. Supp. 5, p. 162)