Rulings in Special Proceedings (Rules 72-73)

CASE DOCTRINES IN SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS (Rules 72-73)

Prepared by Glenn Rey Anino
University of Cebu

1. Pacific Banking Corp. v. CA, G.R. No. 109373, March 20, 1995 (242 SCRA 492)
Elucidating the crucial distinction between an ordinary action and a special proceeding, Chief Justice
Moran states:"
Action is the act by which one sues another in a court of justice for the enforcement or protection of a
right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong while special proceeding is the act by which one seeks to
establish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact. Hence, action is distinguished from special
proceeding in that the former is a formal demand of a right by one against another, while the latter is but a
petition for a declaration of a status, right or fact. Where a party litigant seeks to recover property from
another, his remedy is to file an action. Where his purpose is to seek the appointment of a guardian for an
insane, his remedy is a special proceeding to establish the fact or status of insanity calling for an
appointment of guardianship.
Considering this distinction, a petition for liquidation of an insolvent corporation should be classified a
special proceeding and not an ordinary action. Such petition does not seek the enforcement or protection
of a right nor the prevention or redress of a wrong against a party. It does not pray for affirmative relief for
injury arising from a party's wrongful act or omission nor state a cause of action that can be enforced
against any person.
What it seeks is merely a declaration by the trial court of the corporation's insolvency so that its creditors
may be able to file their claims in the settlement of the corporation's debts and obligations. Put in another
way, the petition only seeks a declaration of the corporation's debts and obligations. Put in another way,
the petition only seeks a declaration of the corporation's state of insolvency and the concomitant right of
creditors and the order of payment of their claims in the disposition of the corporation's assets.
Contrary to the rulings of the Fourteenth Division, liquidation proceedings do not resemble petitions for
interpleader. For one, an action for interpleader involves claims on a subject matter against a person who
has no interest therein. This is not the case in a liquidation proceeding where the Liquidator, as
representative of the corporation, takes charge of its assets and liabilities for the benefit of the
creditors. He is thus charged with insuring that the assets of the corporation are paid only to rightful
claimants and in the order of payment provided by law.
Rather, a liquidation proceeding resembles the proceeding for the settlement of state of deceased persons
under Rules 73 to 91 of the Rules of Court. The two have a common purpose: the determination of all the
assets and the payment of all the debts and liabilities of the insolvent corporation or the estate. The
Liquidator and the administrator or executor are both charged with the assets for the benefit of the
claimants. In both instances, the liability of the corporation and the estate is not disputed. The court's
concern is with the declaration of creditors and their rights and the determination of their order of
payment.
Furthermore, as in the settlement of estates, multiple appeals are allowed in proceedings for liquidation of
an insolvent corporation.
In G.R. No. 112991 (the case of the Stockholders/Investors), the Liquidator's notice of appeal was filed on
time, having been filed on the 23rd day of receipt of the order granting the claims of the
Stockholders/Investors. However, the Liquidator did not file a record on appeal with the result that he
failed to perfect his appeal. As already stated a record on appeal is required under the Interim Rules and
Guidelines in special proceedings and for cases where multiple appeals are allowed. The reason for this is
that the several claims are actually separate ones and a decision or final order with respect to any claim
can be appealed. Necessarily the original record on appeal must remain in the trial court where other
claims may still be pending.
The Union's contention is untenable. In liquidation proceedings, the function of the trial court is not
limited to assisting in the implementation of the orders of the Monetary Board. Under the same section
(§29) of the law invoked by the Union, the court has authority to set aside the decision of the Monetary
Board "if there is a convincing proof that the action is plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith."

2. Republic v. CA, G.R. No. 163604, May 6, 2005(458 SCRA 200)

Since Title XI of the Family Code, entitled SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDING IN THE FAMILY
LAW, contains the following provision, inter alia:
Art. 238. Unless modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this Title shall apply in all
casesprovided for in this Codes requiring summary court proceedings. Such cases shall be decided in an
expeditious manner without regard to technical rules. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
there is no doubt that the petition of Apolinaria Jomoc required, and is, therefore, a summary proceeding
under the Family Code, not a special proceeding under the Revised Rules of Court appeal for which calls
for the filing of a Record on Appeal. It being a summary ordinary proceeding, the filing of a Notice of
Appeal from the trial court’s order sufficed.
On the alleged procedural flaw in petitioner’s petition before the appellate court. Petitioner’s failure to
attach to his petition before the appellate court a copy of the trial court’s order denying its motion for
reconsideration of the disapproval of its Notice of Appeal is not necessarily fatal, for the rules of
procedure are not to be applied in a technical sense. Given the issue raised before it by petitioner, what the
appellate court should have done was to direct petitioner to comply with the rule.
3. Vda. de Reyes v. CA, G.R. No. L-47027, January 27, 1989 (169 SCRA 524)
It is well settled that even if a decision has become final, clerical errors or mistakes or omission plainly
due to inadvertence or negligence may be corrected or supplied even after the judgment has been entered.
The correction of a clerical error is an exception to the general rule that no amendment or correction may
be made by the court in its judgment once the latter had become final. 11 The court may make this
amendment ex parte and, for this purpose, it may resort to the pleadings filed by the parties, the court's
findings of facts and its conclusions of law as expressed in the body of the decision.
That a special proceeding for the settlement of an estate is filed and intended to settle the entire estate of
the deceased is obvious and elementary. It would be absurd for the heirs to intentionally excluded or leave
a parcel of land or a portion thereof undistributed or undivided because the proceeding is precisely
designed to end the community of interests in properties held by co-partners pro indiviso without
designation or segregation of shares.
4. Uriarte v. CFI, G.R. Nos. L-21938-39, October 29, 1970 (33 SCRA 252)

Under the Judiciary Act of 1948 [Section 44, paragraph (e)], Courts of First Instance have original
exclusive jurisdiction over "all matters of probate," that is, over special proceedings for the settlement of
the estate of deceased persons — whether they died testate or intestate.

The matter of venue, or the particular Court of First Instance where the special proceeding should be
commenced, is regulated by former Rule 75, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, now Section 1, Rule 73 of
the Revised Rules of Court, which provides that the estate of a decedent inhabitant of the Philippines at
the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, shall be in the court of first instance in the province in
which he resided at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the court of first
instance of any province in which he had estate.

In accordance with settled jurisprudence in this jurisdiction, testate proceedings, for the settlement of the
estate of a deceased person take precedence over intestate proceedings for the same purpose. Thus it has
been held repeatedly that, if in the course of intestate proceedings pending before a court of first instance
it is found it hat the decedent had left a last will, proceedings for the probate of the latter should replace
the intestate proceedings even if at that stage an administrator had already been appointed, the latter being
required to render final account and turn over the estate in his possession to the executor subsequently
appointed. This, however, is understood to be without prejudice that should the alleged last will be
rejected or is disapproved, the proceeding shall continue as an intestacy.

Where intestate proceedings before a court of first instance had already been commenced, the probate of
the will should be filed in the same court, either in a separate special proceeding or in an appropriate
motion for said purpose filed in the already pending intestate proceeding. This is especially true where the
party seeking the probate of the will had been informed or had knowledge of the pendency of the intestate
proceedings. It is not in accord with public policy and the orderly and inexpensive administration of
justice to unnecessarily multiply litigation, especially if several courts would be involved, which would be
the result if the probate of will were filed in another court.

It is well-settled in this jurisdiction that wrong venue is merely a waiveable procedural defect, and such
waiver may occur by laches where, a party had been served notice of the filing of the probate petition for
about a year and allowed the proceedings to continue for such time before filing a motion to dismiss the
same.

A party claiming to be an acknowledged natural child of testator is entitled to intervene in proceedings for
the probate of will of testator if it is still open, or to ask for its reopening if it has already been closed, so
as to be able to submit for determination the question of his acknowledgment as a natural child of the
deceased testator, said court having, in its capacity as a probate court, jurisdiction to declare who are the
heirs of the deceased testator and whether or not a particular party is or should be declared his
acknowledged natural child.

5. Roberts v. Leonidas, G.R. No. L-55509, April 27, 1984 (129 SCRA 33)
A testate proceeding is proper in this case because Grimm died with two wills and "no will shall pass
either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed" (Art. 838, Civil Code; sec. 1, Rule 75,
Rules of Court).
The probate of the will is mandatory (Guevara vs. Guevara, 74 Phil. 479 and 98 Phil. 249; Baluyot vs.
Panio, L-42088, May 7, 1976, 71 SCRA 86). It is anomalous that the estate of a person who
died testate should be settled in an intestate proceeding. Therefore, the intestate case should be
consolidated with the testate proceeding and the judge assigned to the testate proceeding should continue
hearing the two cases.
6. Advincula v. Teodoro, G.R. No. L-9282, May 31, 1956, (99 Phil 413)
The provision of Section 4 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court which provides that “when a will has been
proved and allowed, the Court shall issue letters testamentary thereon to the person named as executor
therein, if he is competent, accepts the trusts, and gives bond as required by these rules”, cannot be
enforced, until after said document has been allowed to probate.
The discovery of a document purporting to be the last will and testament of a deceased, after the
appointment of an administrator of the estate of the latter, upon the assumption that he or she had died
intestate, does not ipso facto nullify the letters of administration already issued or even authorize the
revocation thereof, until the alleged will has been “proved and allowed by the court.” (Rule 83, section 1,
of the Rules of Court)
It is untenable from the viewpoint of logic and experience, because a stranger to deceased may be
competent, capable and fit to administer her estate, in much the same as a member of her immediate
family could be incompetent, incapable and unfit to do so. At any rate, Advincula is not a stranger, either
to her or to her estate, he bring her surviving spouse and, as such, one of her forced heirs (Arts. 887, 888,
892, 893, 894, 897 to 900, and 995 to 1001, Civil Code of the Philippines), whether she died testate or
intestate. What is more, he is prima facie entitled to one-half of all property subject to the authority of the
administrator of said estate, apart from his share of the other half thereof, as heir of the deceased, for “all
property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership” — of which he is its
administrator (Article 165, Civil Code of the Philippines) — “unless it be proved that it pertains
exclusively to the husband or to the wife” (See Articles 160 and 185, Civil Code of the Philippines).
7. Lim vs. CA, G.R. No. 124715, January 24, 2000 (323 SCRA 102)
The determination of which court exercises jurisdiction over matters of probate depends upon the gross
value of the estate of the decedent.
Inasmuch as the real properties included in the inventory of the estate of the Late Pastor Y. Lim are in the
possession of and are registered in the name of private respondent corporations, which under the law
possess a personality separate and distinct from their stockholders, and in the absence of any cogency to
shred the veil of corporate fiction, the presumption of conclusiveness of said titles in favor of private
respondents should stand undisturbed.
It is settled that a corporation is clothed with personality separate and distinct from that of the persons
composing it. It may not generally be held liable for that of the persons composing it. It may not be held
liable for the personal indebtedness of its stockholders or those of the entities connected with it.28
Rudimentary is the rule that a corporation is invested by law with a personality distinct and separate from
its stockholders or members. In the same vein, a corporation by legal fiction and convenience is an entity
shielded by a protective mantle and imbued by law with a character alien to the persons comprising it.
Nonetheless, the shield is not at all times invincible. Thus, in FIRST PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL
BANK vs.COURT OF APPEALS, We enunciated:
. . . When the fiction is urged as a means of perpetrating a fraud or an illegal act or as a vehicle for the
evasion of an existing obligation, the circumvention of statutes, the achievement or perfection of a
monopoly or generally the perpetration of knavery or crime, the veil with which the law covers and
isolates the corporation from the members or stockholders who compose it will be lifted to allow for its
consideration merely as an aggregation of individuals. . . .
Piercing the veil of corporate entity requires the court to see through the protective shroud which exempts
its stockholders from liabilities that ordinarily, they could be subject to, or distinguishes one corporation
from a seemingly separate one, were it not for the existing corporate fiction.
The corporate mask may be lifted and the corporate veil may be pierced when a corporation is just but the
alter ego of a person or of another corporation. Where badges of fraud exist, where public convenience is
defeated; where a wrong is sought to be justified thereby, the corporate fiction or the notion of legal entity
should come to naught.
Further, the test in determining the applicability of the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction is
as follows: 1) Control, not mere majority or complete stock control, but complete domination, not only of
finances but of policy and business practice in respect to the transaction attacked so that the corporate
entity as to this transaction had at the time no separate mind, will or existence of its own; (2) Such control
must have been used by the defendant to commit fraud or wrong, to perpetuate the violation of a statutory
or other positive legal duty, or dishonest and unjust act in contravention of plaintiffs legal right; and (3)
The aforesaid control and breach of duty must proximately cause the injury or unjust loss complained of.
The absence of any of these elements prevent "piercing the corporate veil".
Mere ownership by a single stockholder or by another corporation of all or nearly all of the capital stock
of a corporation is not of itself a sufficient reason for disregarding the fiction of separate corporate
personalities.
Moreover, to disregard the separate juridical personality of a corporation, the wrong-doing must be clearly
and convincingly established. It cannot be presumed.
Granting arguendo that the Regional Trial Court in this case was not merely acting in a limited capacity as
a probate court, petitioner nonetheless failed to adduce competent evidence that would have justified the
court to impale the veil of corporate fiction. Truly, the reliance reposed by petitioner on the affidavits
executed by Teresa Lim and Lani Wenceslao is unavailing considering that the aforementioned documents
possess no weighty probative value pursuant to the hearsay rule. Besides it is imperative for us to stress
that such affidavits are inadmissible in evidence inasmuch as the affiants were not at all presented during
the course of the proceedings in the lower court. To put it differently, for this Court to uphold the
admissibility of said documents would be to relegate from Our duty to apply such basic rule of evidence in
a manner consistent with the law and jurisprudence.
8. Consolidated Bank v. IAC, G.R. No. 75017, June 3, 1991 (198 SCRA 34)

Questions or issues relating to venue of actions are basically governed by Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of
Court. It is said that the laying of venue is procedural rather than substantive. It relates to the jurisdiction
of the court over the person rather than the subject matter. Provisions relating to venue establish a relation
between the plaintiff and the defendant and not between the court and the subject matter. Venue relates to
trial not to jurisdiction, touches more of the convenience of the parties rather than the substance of the
case.
The action in the present case pertains to the probate of the intestate estate of the late Don Vicente
Madrigal, in which case a regional trial court properly has jurisdiction over the case, both under the
Judiciary Act of 1948, Sec. 44 (e) and under BP 129, Sec. 19(4).
Objection to improper venue should be made in a motion to dismiss. Until this is done, venue cannot truly
be said to have been improperly laid.
Regrettably, therefore, whale We agree with the petitioner that venue in this case should have been laid in
Quezon City, petitioner's inaction has worked against it:
It is well-settled in this jurisdiction that wrong venue is merely a waiveable procedural defect, and such
waiver may occur by laches . . . (Uriarte v. CFI of Negros Occ., G.R. Nos. L-21938-39, October 29, 1970,
33 SCRA 252 at p. 261)
Foregoing considered, We agree with the Court of Appeals that indeed, petitioner has waived its right to
contest the question of venue.
9. Jao v. CA, G.R. No. 128314, May 29, 2002 (382 SCRA 407)
The main issue before us is: where should the settlement proceedings be had --- in Pampanga, where the
decedents had their permanent residence, or in Quezon City, where they actually stayed before their
demise?
Rule 73, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Where estate of deceased persons be settled. – If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the
time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration
granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time
of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any province in
which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent shall
exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it
depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in
a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of
jurisdiction appears on the record. (underscoring ours)
Clearly, the estate of an inhabitant of the Philippines shall be settled or letters of administration granted in
the proper court located in the province where the decedent resides at the time of his death.
Petitioner Rodolfo invokes our ruling in the case of Eusebio v. Eusebio, et al.,14 where we held that
the situs of settlement proceedings shall be the place where the decedent had his permanent residence or
domicile at the time of death. In determining residence at the time of death, the following factors must be
considered, namely, the decedent had: (a) capacity to choose and freedom of choice; (b) physical presence
at the place chosen; and (c) intention to stay therein permanently.15 While it appears that the decedents in
this case chose to be physically present in Quezon City for medical convenience, petitioner avers that they
never adopted Quezon City as their permanent residence.
The recitals in the death certificates, which are admissible in evidence, were thus properly considered and
presumed to be correct by the court a quo. We agree with the appellate court’s observation that since the
death certificates were accomplished even before petitioner and respondent quarreled over their
inheritance, they may be relied upon to reflect the true situation at the time of their parents’ death.
The death certificates thus prevailed as proofs of the decedents’ residence at the time of death, over the
numerous documentary evidence presented by petitioner. To be sure, the documents presented by
petitioner pertained not to residence at the time of death, as required by the Rules of Court, but
to permanent residence or domicile. In Garcia-Fule v. Court of Appeals,16 we held:
xxx xxx xxx the term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal
residence or domicile." This term "resides", like the terms "residing" and "residence", is elastic and should
be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the
application of venue statutes and rules – Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature
– residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word "domicile"
still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a
distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue,
the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In other words,
"resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical
habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and
actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not
legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place,
while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one’s domicile. No
particular length of time of residence is required though; however, the residence must be more than
temporary.
It does not necessarily follow that the records of a person’s properties are kept in the place where he
permanently resides. Neither can it be presumed that a person’s properties can be found mostly in the
place where he establishes his domicile. It may be that he has his domicile in a place different from that
where he keeps his records, or where he maintains extensive personal and business interests. No
generalizations can thus be formulated on the matter, as the question of where to keep records or retain
properties is entirely dependent upon an individual’s choice and peculiarities.
At any rate, petitioner is obviously splitting straws when he differentiates between venue in ordinary civil
actions and venue in special proceedings. In Raymond v. Court of Appeals and Bejer v. Court of
Appeals, we ruled that venue for ordinary civil actions and that for special proceedings have one and the
same meaning. As thus defined, "residence", in the context of venue provisions, means nothing more than
a person’s actual residence or place of abode, provided he resides therein with continuity and
consistency. All told, the lower court and the Court of Appeals correctly held that venue for the settlement
of the decedents’ intestate estate was properly laid in the Quezon City court.
10. Heirs of Sandejas v. Lina, G.R. No. 141634, February 5, 2001 (351 SCRA 183)
When a contract is subject to a suspensive condition, its birth or effectivity can take place only if and
when the condition happens or is fulfilled.11 Thus, the intestate court's grant of the Motion for Approval of
the sale filed by respondent resulted in petitioners' obligation to execute the Deed of Sale of the disputed
lots in his favor. The condition having been satisfied, the contract was perfected. Henceforth, the parties
were bound to fulfil what they had expressly agreed upon.
Court approval is required in any disposition of the decedent's estate per Rule 89 of the Rules of Court.
Reference to judicial approval, however, cannot adversely affect the substantive rights of heirs to dispose
of their own pro indiviso shares in the co-heirship or co-ownership.12 In other words, they can sell their
rights, interests or participation in the property under administration. A stipulation requiring court
approval does not affect the validity and the effectivity of the sale as regards the selling heirs. It merely
implies that the property may be taken out ofcustodia legis, but only with the court's permission.13 It
would seem that the suspensive condition in the present conditional sale was imposed only for this reason.
Because petitioners did not consent to the sale of their ideal shares in the disputed lots, the CA correctly
limited the scope of the Receipt to the pro-indiviso share of Eliodoro Sr. Thus, it correctly modified the
intestate court's ruling by excluding their shares from the ambit of the transaction.
. We hold that Section 8 of Rule 89 allows this action to proceed. The factual differences alleged by
petitioners have no bearing on the intestate court's jurisdiction over the approval of the subject conditional
sale. Probate jurisdiction covers all matters relating to the settlement of estates (Rules 74 & 86-91) and the
probate of wills (Rules 75-77) of deceased persons, including the appointment and the removal of
administrators and executors (Rules 78-85). It also extends to matters incidental and collateral to the
exercise of a probate court's recognized powers such as selling, mortgaging or otherwise encumbering
realty belonging to the estate. Indeed, the rules on this point are intended to settle the estate in a speedy
manner, so that the benefits that may flow from such settlement may be immediately enjoyed by the heirs
and the beneficiaries.16
Petitioners contend that under said Rule 89, only the executor or administrator is authorized to apply for
the approval of a sale of realty under administration. Hence, the settlement court allegedly erred in
entertaining and granting respondent's Motion for Approval.
We read no such limitation. Section 8, Rule 89 of the Rules of Court, provides:
"SEC. 8. When court may authorize conveyance of realty which deceased contracted to convey. Notice.
Effect of deed. -- Where the deceased was in his lifetime under contract, binding in law, to deed real
property, or an interest therein, the court having jurisdiction of the estate may, on application for that
purpose, authorize the executor or administrator to convey such property according to such contract, or
with such modifications as are agreed upon by the parties and approved by the court; and if the contract is
to convey real property to the executor or administrator, the clerk of the court shall execute the deed. x x
x."
This provision should be differentiated from Sections 2 and 4 of the same Rule, specifically requiring only
the executor or administrator to file the application for authority to sell, mortgage or otherwise encumber
real estate for the purpose of paying debts, expenses and legacies (Section 2);19 or for authority to sell real
or personal estate beneficial to the heirs, devisees or legatees and other interested persons, although such
authority is not necessary to pay debts, legacies or expenses of administration (Section 4).20 Section 8
mentions only an application to authorize the conveyance of realty under a contract that the deceased
entered into while still alive. While this Rule does not specify who should file the application, it stands to
reason that the proper party must be one .who is to be benefited or injured by the judgment, or one who is
to be entitled to the avails of the suit.21
Petitioners aver that the CA's computation of Eliodoro Sr.'s share in the disputed parcels of land was
erroneous because, as the conjugal partner of Remedios, he owned one half of these lots plus a further one
tenth of the remaining half, in his capacity as a one of her legal heirs. Hence, Eliodoro's share should be
11/20 of the entire property. Respondent poses no objection to this computation.22
On the other hand, the CA held that, at the very least, the conditional sale should cover the one half (1/2)
pro indiviso conjugal share of Eliodoro plus his one tenth (1/10) hereditary share as one of the ten legal
heirs of the decedent, or a total of three fifths (3/5) of the lots in administration.23
Petitioners' correct. The CA computed Eliodoro's share as an heir based on one tenth of the entire disputed
property. It should be based only on the remaining half, after deducting the conjugal share.24
The proper determination of the seller-heir's shares requires further explanation. Succession laws and
jurisprudence require that when a marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband or the wife, the
decedent's entire estate - under the concept of conjugal properties of gains -- must be divided equally, with
one half going to the surviving spouse and the other half to the heirs of the deceased.25 After the
settlement of the debts and obligations, the remaining half of the estate is then distributed to the legal
heirs, legatees and devices. We assume, however, that this preliminary determination of the decedent's
estate has already been taken into account by the parties, since the only issue raised in this case is whether
Eliodoro's share is 11/20 or 3/5 of the disputed lots.
11. Vda. de Manalo v. CA, G.R. No. 129242, January 16, 2001 (349 SCRA 135)

It is a fundamental rule that in the determination of the nature of an action or proceeding, the
averments15 and the character of the relief sought 16 in the complaint, or petition, as in the case at bar, shall
 be controlling. A careful srutiny of the Petition for Issuance of Letters of Administration, Settlement and
Distribution of Estatein SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 belies herein petitioners' claim that the same is in the
nature of an ordinary civil action. The said petition contains sufficient jurisdictional facts required in a
petition for the settlement of estate of a deceased person such as the fat of death of the late Troadio
Manalo on February 14, 1992, as well as his residence in the City of Manila at the time of his said death.
The fact of death of the decedent and of his residence within he country are foundation facts upon which
all the subsequent proceedings in the administration of the estate rest.17The petition is SP.PROC No. 92-
63626 also contains an enumeration of the names of his legal heirs including a tentative list of the
properties left by the deceased which are sought to be settled in the probate proceedings. In addition, the
relief's prayed for in the said petition leave no room for doubt as regard the intention of the petitioners
therein (private respondents herein) to seek judicial settlement of the estate of their deceased father,
Troadio Manalo.
It is our view that herein petitioners may not be allowed to defeat the purpose of the essentially valid
petition for the settlement of the estate of the late Troadio Manalo by raising matters that as irrelevant and
immaterial to the said petition. It must be emphasized that the trial court, siting as a probate court, has
limited and special jurisdiction 20 and cannot hear and dispose of collateral matters and issues which may
be properly threshed out only in an ordinary civil action. In addition, the rule has always been to the effect
that the jurisdiction of a court, as well as the concomitant nature of an action, is determined by the
averments in the complaint and not by the defenses contained in the answer. If it were otherwise, it would
not be too difficult to have a case either thrown out of court or its proceedings unduly delayed by simple
strategem.21 So it should be in the instant petition for settlement of estate.
The argument is misplaced. Herein petitioners may not validly take refuge under the provisions of Rule 1,
Section 2, of the Rules of Court to justify the invocation of Article 222 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines for the dismissal of the petition for settlement of the estate of the deceased Troadio Manalo
inasmuch as the latter provision is clear enough. To wit:
Art. 222. No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same family unless it should appear
that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed, subject to the
limitations in Article 2035(underscoring supplied).22
The above-quoted provision of the law is applicable only to ordinary civil actions. This is clear from the
term 'suit' that it refers to an action by one person or persons against another or other in a court of justice
in which the plaintiff pursues the remedy which the law affords him for the redress of an injury or the
enforcement of a right, whether at law or in equity. 23 A civil action is thus an action filed in a court of
justice, whereby a party sues another for the enforcement of a right, or the prevention or redress of a
wrong.24 Besides, an excerpt form the Report of the Code Commission unmistakably reveals the intention
of the Code Commission to make that legal provision applicable only to civil actions which are essentially
adversarial and involve members of the same family, thus:
It is difficult to imagine a sadder and more tragic spectacle than a litigation between members of the same
family. It is necessary that every effort should be made toward a compromise before litigation is allowed
to breed hate and passion in the family. It is know that lawsuit between close relatives generates deeper
bitterness than stranger.25
It must be emphasized that the oppositors (herein petitioners) are not being sued in SP. PROC. No. 92-
63626 for any cause of action as in fact no defendant was imploded therein. The Petition for issuance of
letters of Administration, Settlement and Distribution of Estate in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 is a special
proceeding and, as such, it is a remedy whereby the petitioners therein seek to establish a status, a right, or
a particular fact. 26 the petitioners therein (private respondents herein) merely seek to establish the fat of
death of their father and subsequently to be duly recognized as among the heirs of the said deceased so
that they can validly exercise their right to participate in the settlement and liquidation of the estate of the
decedent consistent with the limited and special jurisdiction of the probate court.
12. In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Ismael Reyes, G.R. No. 139587, November 22, 2000
(345 SCRA 541)
The jurisdiction of the probate court merely relates to matters having to do with the settlement of the
estate and the probate of wills of deceased persons, and the appointment and removal of administrators,
executors, guardians and trustees.18 The question of ownership is as a rule, an extraneous matter which the
Probate Court cannot resolve with finality.19 Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a certain
property should or should not be included in the inventory of estate proceeding, the probate court may
pass upon the title thereto, but such determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final
decision in a separate action to resolve title.20
Settled is the rule that the Regional Trial Court acting as a probate court exercises but limited jurisdiction,
thus it has no power to take cognizance of and determine the issue of title to property claimed by a third
person adversely to the decedent, unless the claimant and all other parties having legal interest in the
property consent, expressly or impliedly, to the submission of the question to the Probate Court for
adjudgment, or the interests of third persons are not thereby prejudiced.
13. PCIB v. CA, G.R. No. 103149, November 15, 2000 (344 SCRA 596)
Petitioner claims that it was not given sufficient opportunity to file an answer in opposition to the
application for preliminary injunction due to its belated receipt of the complaint-in-intervention. Such
contention is untenable. Since it received a copy of the complaint-in-intervention on November 23, 1990,
there was ample time to prepare an answer for the hearing set on December 4, 1990. Moreover, petitioner
was duly notified of the hearing on the application for the writ. In fact, the hearing had been reset and
appropriate notices given to the parties. The record further showed that petitioner’s counsel attended the
hearing on December 4, 1990, but decided not to take part in the proceedings when his motion for
extension of time to file responsive pleading was denied.
Thus, adequate opportunity was given to petitioner to oppose the application for the writ as well as to file
its answer to the complaint-in-intervention. Petitioner may not presume that its motion for extension
would be granted as a matter of course. The grant of an extension of time to file a responsive pleading is
discretionary on the part of the court.
Contrary to petitioner’s contention, the Rules of Court do not require that issues be joined before
preliminary injunction may issue. Preliminary injunction may be granted at any stage of an action or
proceeding prior to the judgment or final order, ordering a party or a court, agency or a person to refrain
from a particular act or acts.21 For as long as the requisites for its issuance are present in the case, such
issuance is valid.
Petitioner’s contention that the writ of injunction issued by the trial court effectively adjudicated
ownership of the mortgaged property in favor of respondent Blanquita Ang is misplaced. It is only upon
expiration of the redemption period, without the judgment debtor having made use of his right of
redemption, that ownership of the land sold in a foreclosure sale becomes consolidated in the
purchaser.22 The probate court issued the writ to enjoin petitioner and other concerned parties from
performing any act which would directly or indirectly enforce the effects of the extra-judicial foreclosure
of decedent’s property caused by petitioner bank, in order to preserve the estate of the decedent.
Consolidation of title would have the consequence of transferring ownership since the buyer in a
foreclosure sale becomes the absolute owner of the property purchased if it is not redeemed during the
period of one year after the registration of the sale.23 Therefore, at the time the writ was issued there was
yet no issue regarding ownership because the period for redemption had not lapsed.
Nevertheless, the probate court may pass upon and determine the title or ownership of a property which
may or may not be included in the estate proceedings, but such determination is provisional in character
and is subject to final decision in a separate action to resolve title.24 Thus, the allegations of Blanquita Ang
that her signatures on the real estate mortgage documents were forged may be ventilated in a separate
proceeding, requiring the presentation of clear and convincing evidence.

14. De Leon v. CA, G.R. No. 128781, August 6, 2002 (386 SCRA 216)
A probate court, whether in a testate or intestate proceeding,22 can only pass upon questions of title
provisionally.23 The rationale therefor and the proper recourse of the aggrieved party are expounded
in Jimenez v. Court of Appeals:
"The patent reason is the probate court’s limited jurisdiction and the principle that questions of title or
ownership, which result in inclusion or exclusion from the inventory of the property, can only be settled in
a separate action.
"All that the said court could do as regards said properties is determine whether they should or should not
be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is a
dispute as to the ownership, then the opposing parties and the administrator have to resort to an ordinary
action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so."24
The Court held in Valero Vda. de Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals26 that the order of exclusion (or
inclusion) is not a final order; that it is interlocutory in the sense that it did not settle once and for all the
title to the subject lots; that the prevailing rule is that for the purpose of determining whether a certain
property should or should not be included in the inventory, the probate court may pass upon the title
thereto but such determination is not conclusive and is subject to the final decision in a separate action
regarding ownership which may be instituted by the parties.
The elevation of the records of Special Proceedings No. C-1679 to the Court of Appeals for the purpose of
petitioners’ appeal from the order removing the administratrix is unnecessary where a record on appeal is
allowed under the Rules of Court. The court a quo loses jurisdiction over the subject of the appeal upon
the approval of the record on appeal and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties; but
retains jurisdiction over the remaining subject matter not covered by the appeal.32
15. Uy v. Capulong, A.M. No. RTJ-91-776, April 7, 1993 (221 SCRA 87)
Every judge should be cognizant of the basic principle that when questions arise as to ownership of
property alleged to be part of the estate of a deceased person, but claimed by some other person to be his
property, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased but by title adverse to that of the
deceased and his estate, such questions cannot be determined in the courts of administration proceedings.
The trial court, acting as probate court, has no jurisdiction to adjudicate such contentions, which must be
submitted to the trial court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction. The failure of respondent judge to
apply this basic principle indicates a manifest disregard of well-known legal rules.
In cancelling the titles of complainants over their properties on mere motion of a party and without
affording them due process, respondent Judge violated her sworn obligation to uphold the law and
promote the administration of justice. It has been held that if the law is so elementary, not to know it or to
act as if one does not know it, constitutes gross ignorance of the law.
The foregoing transgressions of respondent Judge are further aggravated by her refusal to abide by the
Decision of the Court of Appeals annulling her Order of 7 June 1989 which directed the cancellation of
the titles of complainants. She was in fact specifically enjoined from proceeding against them, yet, despite
this Decision, respondent Judge skill authorized the subsequent transfer or alienation to other persons of
properties titled in the name of complainants to the detriment of the latter. This utter disrespect for the
judgment of a higher court constitutes grave misconduct prejudicial to the interest of the public, the bench
and the bar.
16. Enderes v. CA, G.R. No. 128525, December 17, 1999 (321 SCRA 178)
Injunction may issue pendente lite only in cases of extreme urgency, where the right to the possession,
during the pendency of the main case, of the property involved is very clear; where considerations of
relative inconvenience bear strongly in favor of the complainant seeking the possession of the
property pendente lite; where there was willful and unlawful invasion on plaintiff's right, over his protest
and remonstrance, the injury being a continuing one. 9
Before an injunction can be issued, it is essential that the following requisites be present: (1) there must be
a right in esse or the existence of a right to be protected; and (2) the act against which injunction is to be
directed is a violation of such right. 10
We agree with the findings of the SEC as affirmed by the Court of Appeals that petitioners failed not only
to establish a threatened violation of a right but they also failed to discharge the burden of clearly showing
the right to be protected. 11 On the mere contention that the shareholdings of private respondents belong
to the estate of the late Dr. Ortañez which is still the subject of settlement before the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City, petitioners had not established their clear legal rights to obtain injunctive relief against
private respondents. Injunction, whether preliminary or final, is not designed to protect contingent or
future rights.
In support of their position, petitioners cited in their reply the issuance of an Order by the intestate court
declaring that the shares of stock of Philinterlife belong to the estate. It is admitted that the special
proceedings are still pending before the court and the estate had not been partitioned and distributed.
Notwithstanding the proceedings being conducted by the intestate court, the petitioners' rights or interests
over the estate or over the assailed shareholdings in the name of private respondents are still future and
unsettled rights which cannot be protected by the writ of injunction. The rule is well settled that the
jurisdiction of the regional trial court as a probate or intestate court relates only to matters having to do
with the settlement of the estate and probate of will of deceased persons but does not extend to the
determination of questions of ownership that arise during the proceedings. 15
The intestate court may pass upon the title to a certain property for the purpose of determining whether the
same should or should not be included in the inventory but such determination is not conclusive and is
subject to final decision in a separate action regarding ownership which may be constituted by the
parties. 16 The court in charge of the intestate proceedings cannot adjudicate or determine title to
properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are equally claimed to belong to outside
parties. 17 Therefore, the possibility of irreparable damage without proof of violation of an actually
existing right of petitioners over the shareholdings presently in the possession of private respondents is no
ground for an injunction being a mere damnum absque injuria. 18
Contrary to the contentions of petitioners, the SEC found that private respondents are bona fide owners of
shares of stock in Philinterlife constituting the majority thereof or 94% of the outstanding capital stock of
the company. Records show that they have been stockholders of Philinterlife since 1983 up to the present.
It was only in 1994 that petitioners sought the annulment of the shareholdings of private respondents
before the SEC. The grant of the writ of injunction against private respondents by restraining them from
exercising their rights as stockholders would in effect dispose of the main case without a trial. The SEC
acted correctly in denying the issuance of the writ until the merits of the case can be heard. Further, it is a
basic procedural postulate that a preliminary injunction is not proper where its purpose is to take the
property out of control or possession of one party and transfer the same to the hands of another who did
not have such control at the inception of the case 20 and whose title has not been clearly established by
law. 21
17. Cortes v. CA, G.R. No. 117417, September 21, 2000 (340 SCRA 715)
The long standing rule is that probate courts, or those in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate,
cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be part of the estate and which are claimed to
belong to outside parties.6 Stated otherwise, "claims for title to, or right of possession of, personal or real
property, made by the heirs themselves, by title adverse to that of the deceased, or made by third persons,
cannot be entertained by the (probate) court."7
In the present case, however, private respondent Menandro A. Reselva, who refused to vacate the house
and lot being eyed as part of the estate of the late Teodoro T. Reselva, cannot be considered an "outside
party" for he is one of the three compulsory heirs of the former. As such, he is very much involved in the
settlement of Teodoro's estate.8 By way of exception to the above-mentioned rule, "when the parties are all
heirs of the decedent, it is optional upon them to submit to the probate court the question of title to
property."9 Here, the probate court is competent to decide the question of ownership. More so, when the
opposing parties belong to the poor stratum of society and a separate action would be most expensive and
inexpedient.
In the same way, when the controversy is whether the property in issue belongs to the conjugal partnership
or exclusively to the decedent, the same is properly within the jurisdiction of the probate court, which
necessarily has to liquidate the conjugal partnership in order to determine the estate of the decedent which
is to be distributed among the heirs.12
18. Solivio v. CA, G.R. No. 83484, February 12, 1990 (182 SCRA 119)
After a careful review of the records, we find merit in the petitioner's contention that the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 26, lacked jurisdiction to entertain Concordia Villanueva's action for partition and recovery
of her share of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. while the probate proceedings (Spl, Proc. No. 2540) for
the settlement of said estate are still pending in Branch 23 of the same court, there being as yet no orders
for the submission and approval of the administratix's inventory and accounting, distributing the residue of
the estate to the heir, and terminating the proceedings (p. 31, Record).
In the interest of orderly procedure and to avoid confusing and conflicting dispositions of a decedent's
estate, a court should not interfere with probate proceedings pending in a co-equal court. Thus, did we rule
in Guilas v. Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, L-26695, January 31, 1972, 43 SCRA 111,
117, where a daughter filed a separate action to annul a project of partition executed between her and her
father in the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of her mother:
The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under administration only after the payment of all the
debts and the remaining estate delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the same. The finality of the
approval of the project of partition by itself alone does not terminate the probate proceeding (Timbol v.
Cano, 1 SCRA 1271, 1276, L-15445, April 29, 1961; Siguiong v. Tecson, 89 Phil. pp. 28, 30). As long as
the order of the distribution of the estate has not been complied with, the probate proceedings cannot be
deemed closed and terminated Siguiong v. Tecson, supra); because a judicial partition is not final and
conclusive and does not prevent the heirs from bringing an action to obtain his share, provided the
prescriptive period therefore has not elapsed (Mari v. Bonilia, 83 Phil. 137). The better practice, however,
for the heir who has not received his share, is to demand his share through a proper motion in the same
probate or administration proceedings, or for reopening of the probate or administrative proceedings if it
had already been closed, and not through an independent action, which would be tried by another court or
Judge which may thus reverse a decision or order of the probate or intestate court already final and
executed and re-shuffle properties long ago distributed and disposed of. (Ramos v. Ortuzar, 89 Phil. 730,
741-742; Timbol v. Cano, supra; Jingco v. Daluz, L-5107, April 24, 1953, 92 Phil. 1082; Roman Catholic
v. Agustines, L-14710, March 29, 1960, 107 Phil. 455, 460-461; Emphasis supplied)
The probate proceedings are proceedings in rem. Notice of the time and place of hearing of the petition is
required to be published (Sec. 3, Rule 76 in relation to Sec. 3, Rule 79, Rules of Court). Notice of the
hearing of Celedonia's original petition was published in the "Visayan Tribune" on April 25, May 2 and 9,
1977 (Exh 4, p. 197, Record). Similarly, notice of the hearing of her amended petition of May 26, 1977 for
the settlement of the estate was, by order of the court, published in "Bagong Kasanag" (New Light) issues
of May 27, June 3 and 10, 1977 (pp. 182-305, Record). The publication of the notice of the proceedings
was constructive notice to the whole world. Concordia was not deprived of her right to intervene in the
proceedings for she had actual, as well as constructive notice of the same.
Celedonia's allegation in her petition that she was the sole heir of Esteban within the third degree on
his mother's side was not false. Moreover, it was made in good faith and in the honest belief that because
the properties of Esteban had come from his mother, not his father, she, as Esteban's nearest surviving
relative on his mother's side, is the rightful heir to them. It would have been self-defeating and
inconsistent with her claim of sole heirship if she stated in her petition that Concordia was her co-heir. Her
omission to so state did not constitute extrinsic fraud.
Failure to disclose to the adversary, or to the court, matters which would defeat one's own claim or
defense is not such extrinsic fraud as will justify or require vacation of the judgment. (49 C.J.S. 489, citing
Young v. Young, 2 SE 2d 622; First National Bank & Trust Co. of King City v. Bowman, 15 SW 2d 842;
Price v. Smith, 109 SW 2d 1144, 1149)
Clearly, the property of the deceased, Esteban Javellana, Jr., is not reservable property, for Esteban, Jr.
was not an ascendant, but the descendant of his mother, Salustia Solivio, from whom he inherited the
properties in question. Therefore, he did not hold his inheritance subject to a reservation in favor of his
aunt, Celedonia Solivio, who is his relative within the third degree on his mother's side. The reserva
troncal applies to properties inherited by an ascendant from a descendant who inherited it from another
ascendant or 9 brother or sister. It does not apply to property inherited by a descendant from his ascendant,
the reverse of the situation covered by Article 891.
However, inasmuch as Concordia had agreed to deliver the estate of the deceased to the foundation in
honor of his mother, Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana (from whom the estate came), an agreement which
she ratified and confirmed in her "Motion to Reopen and/or Reconsider Order dated April 3, 1978" which
she filed in Spl. Proceeding No. 2540:
4. That ... prior to the filing of the petition they (petitioner Celedonia Solivio and movant Concordia
Javellana) have agreed to make the estate of the decedent a foundation, besides they have closely known
each other due to their filiation to the decedent and they have been visiting each other's house which are
not far away for (sic) each other. (p. 234, Record; Emphasis supplied)
she is bound by that agreement. It is true that by that agreement, she did not waive her inheritance in favor
of Celedonia, but she did agree to place all of Esteban's estate in the "Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana
Foundation" which Esteban, Jr., during his lifetime, planned to set up to honor his mother and to finance
the education of indigent but deserving students as well.
Her admission may not be taken lightly as the lower court did. Being a judicial admission, it is conclusive
and no evidence need be presented to prove the agreement (Cunanan v. Amparo, 80 Phil. 227; Granada v.
Philippine National Bank, L-20745, Sept. 2, 1966, 18 SCRA 1; Sta. Ana v. Maliwat, L-23023, Aug. 31,
1968, 24 SCRA 1018; People v. Encipido, G.R.70091, Dec. 29, 1986, 146 SCRA 478; and Rodillas v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. 58652, May 20, 1988, 161 SCRA 347).
19. Vita v. Montano, G.R. No. L-50553 February 19, 1991 (194 SCRA 180)
We are in conformity with the finding of the trial court that the three (3) parcels of land mentioned in the
complaint were paraphernal properties of Isidra Montanano, being supported by documentary and
testimonial evidence (p. 48, Record on Appeal):
. . . plaintiff claims that in accordance with the inventory prepared by Edilberto Vita of his properties
before his death (Exhs. "O", "O-1", "O-1-A", "O-1-B", and "O-1-C"), the parcel of land covered by Tax
Declaration No. 4 (old) was a paraphernal property of his wife Isidra Montanano while the parcels of land
covered by Tax Declaration Nos. 72 (old) and 73 were conjugal properties of the spouses Edilberto Vita
and Isidra Montanano as they were donated to the latter by Francisca Asilo during their marriage. It is the
contention of the plaintiff that upon the death of Isidra Montanano, her husband Edilberto Vita acquired
ownership of these properties.
This contention of the plaintiff in effect corroborates the claim of the defendants and intervenors that an
the three (3) parcels of land, subject-matter of the complaint, including all the parcels of land being
claimed by them in the intervenor's counterclaim, were all paraphernal properties of Isidra Montanano.
The two (2) parcels of land supposedly received as donation by Isidra Montanano during her marriage
with Edilberto Vita should be classified as her paraphernal properties, it being acquired by her through
lucrative title (Art. 148, Civil Code). On the other hand, plaintiffs testimony that the third parcel of land
covered in the complaint was inherited by Edilberto Vita from Isidra Montanano is an admission that the
said property was the paraphernal property of the latter.
The defendants and intervenors claim that the above-stated three (3) parcels of land and the properties
covered in their counterclaim were donated to them by Isidra Montanano by virtue of two (2) deeds of
donation she executed on November 22, 1938 and December 20, 1940. They presented testimonial and
documentary evidence to prove that Isidra Montanano acquired all these parcels of land, either by
inheritance or donation, from her father Domingo Montanano, her aunt Francisca Asilo and her uncle Juan
Asilo. Aside from this, the tax declarations covering the properties involved in the complaint and
counterclaim are mostly in the name of Isidra Montanano, except one each in the name of her father
Domingo Montanano, her aunt Francisca Asilo and her nephew Jose Samonte. The court is convinced,
therefore, that all the properties involved in this litigation were the paraphernal properties of the deceased
Isidra Montanano.
Whatever merit there may be in plaintiff-appellant's claim that upon the death of Isidra Montanano, the
ownership of these parcels of land (except with respect to the parcel of land covered by Tax Declaration
No. 1253 (4, old) which was validly donated to defendants-appellants and intervenors-appellants by Isidra
Montanano, as We shall discuss later) are vested upon Edilberto Vita by operation of law, subject only to
the right of her nephew and nieces, liquidation of the conjugal partnership of Isidra Montanano and
Edilberto Vita must be undertaken prior to the adjudication of properties to the heirs (Vicente J.
Francisco,The Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines, 1970 Edition, p. 619). In this connection,
contrary to the trial court's ruling, it is not necessary to file a separate proceeding in court for the proper
disposition of the estate of Isidra Montanano. Under Rule 73, Section 2 of the Rules of Court, if both
spouses have died, the conjugal partnership shall be liquidated in the testate or intestate proceedings of
either. In the present case, therefore, the conjugal partnership of Isidra Montanano and Edilberto Vita
should be liquidated in the testate proceedings of the latter.
It is explicit in Article 725 * of the Civil Code that acceptance is necessary in a donation. This applies to
all kinds of donation because the law does not make any distinction. The rationale behind the requirement
of acceptance is that nobody is obliged to receive a benefit against his will (Arturo M.
Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, Volume II, 1972
Edition, p. 521). We uphold the trial court that (p. 50, Record on Appeal):
. . . notwithstanding the fact that from the secondary evidence presented, the said deed of donation mortis
causa of November 22, 1938 seems to have been legally and validly executed, it cannot be given force and
effect as the acceptance thereof by the donees is void and illegal in as much (sic) as they were made at the
time of the execution of the document, not after the death of the donor Isidra Montanano. A donation
mortis causa takes effect only after the death of the donor, consequently it is only after the latter's death
that its acceptance maybe made.
The quoted provision in the second deed of donation should be understood in its entirety. Thus, based on
the first part of the paragraph which states " '[n]a bagaman at sa kasulatang ito ay lubusan ng ibinibigay at
ipinagkakaloob sa bawat isa . . . na iyon ay patuluyan nang ngayo'y iginagawad sa kanila ng walang
pasubali, na magagawa na nila ang buong karapatan ngayon bilang tunay na may-ari . . . " (Emphasis
supplied), supra, it was obviously the intention of Isidra Montanano to grant a donation inter vivos to
defendants-appellants and intervenors-appellants. Although the rest of the paragraph states "'gayon man,
ay kami pa ring mag-asawa ang mananatili sa pag-mamayari, pakikinabang at pamomosision, –– na kani-
kaniyang pag-aaring dito'y ipinagkakaloob, sa buong panahon na ang bawat isa sa amin mag-asawa'y
nabubuhay, at kung kailan bawian kami ng hiram na buhay, ay saka at saka pa lamang maaring matamo
nila ang ganap na pagmamayari at pakikinabang sa mga pag-aaring iyan . . . supra," We have adjudged in
the case of Heirs of Juan Bonsato, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., 95 Phil. 481, 488:
It is true that the last paragraph in each donation contains the phrase "that after the death of the donor the
aforesaid donation shall become effective." . . . However, said expression must be construed together with
the rest of the paragraph, and thus taken, its meaning clearly appears to be that after the donor's death, the
donation will take effect so as to make the donees the absolute owners of the donated property, free from
all liens and encumbrances; for it must be remembered that the donor reserved for himself a share of the
fruits of the land donated. Such reservation constituted a charge or encumbrance that would disappear
upon the donor's death, when full title would become vested in the donees.
As We have ruled in Concepcion, et al. v. Concepcion, 91 Phil. 823, 830:
. . . even if he (donor) says it (the donation) is to take effect after his death, when from the body of the
instrument or donation it is to be gathered that the main consideration of the donation is not the death of
the donor but rather services rendered to him by the donee or his affection for the latter, then the donation
should be considered as inter vivos, . . . and the condition that the donation is to take effect only after the
death of the donor should be interpreted as meaning that the possession and enjoyment of the its of the
property donated should take place only after donor's death.
20. Eastern Shipping v. Lucero, G.R. No. L-60101,August 31, 1983 (124 SCRA 425)
There is thus enough evidence to show the circumstances attending the loss and disappearance of the M/V
Eastern Minicon and its crew. The foregoing facts, quite logically. are sufficient to lead Us to a moral
certainty that the vessel had sunk and that the persons aboard had perished with it. upon this premise, the
rule on presumption of death under Article 391 (1) of the Civil Code must yield to the rule of
preponderance of evidence. As this Court said in Joaquin vs. Navarro 4 "Where there are facts, known or
knowable, from which a rational conclusion can be made, the presumption does not step in, and the rule of
preponderance of evidence controls."
If in the foregoing criminal cases, where the proof required for conviction must be beyond reasonable
doubt, the rule of presumption was not applied and the fact of death was deemed established, with more
reason is this Court justified in entering a finding of death. Indeed, We cannot permit Article 391 to
override, or be substituted for, the facts established in this case which logically indicate to a moral
certainty that Capt. Lucero died shortly after he had sent his last radio message at 9:50 p.m. on February
16, 1980