Kolsto Scientific Literacy For Citizisenship

SCE (WILEJ) RIGHT BATCH
ISSUES AND
TRENDS
Stephen Norris, Section Editor
Scientific Literacy for Citizenship:

Tools for Dealing with the Science
Dimension of Controversial
Socioscientific Issues
STEIN D. KOLSTØ
Department of Applied Education, University of Bergen, Christies Gate 13, N-5020
Bergen, Norway
Received 26 October 1998; revised 7 January 2000; accepted 6 March 2000
ABSTRACT: This article offers a general framework for examining the science dimension
of controversial socioscientific issues. Eight specific content-transcending topics to be
emphasized in science education are proposed. The topics are grouped under the headings
science as a social process, limitations of science, values in science, and critical attitude.
Each topic is explored, and it is argued that knowledge of the topics can serve as tools for
students’ examination of science-related claims in controversial socioscientific issues. The
underlying perspective here is empowerment and the needs of students as lay people. The
need of society as a whole for decisions to be made on a broad and firm basis is nevertheless
also included. The main reason for suggesting the eight content-transcending topics is to
provide focal points for the future development of teaching models aimed at science ed-
ucation for citizenship. 䉷 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Sci Ed 85:291– 310, 2001.
INTRODUCTION
In democratic societies, the quality of the decisions made by the laity is of fundamental
importance. Lay people’s abilities to promote their point of view on socioscientific issues
are therefore significant. To do this they need knowledge of the science involved and the
general characteristics of scientific knowledge. For these reasons, “science for citizenship”
has been discussed as an important educational goal. Within the Science-Technology-
Correspondence to: S. D. Kolstø; e-mail: stein.dankert.kolstoe@psypp.uib.no

Contract grant sponsor: the Norwegian Research Council
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䉷 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. standard
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Society tradition in science education, the emphasis on the interconnections between sci- Base of text
ence and society have entailed a focus on science-related social issues. It has been argued
that to empower the students as citizens, there is a need to emphasize science as an insti-
tution and the processes by which scientific knowledge is produced. One argument has
been that knowledge of the human character of science, values in science, limits of science,
and its tactics for decision making are prerequisite knowledge for thoughtful decision
making (Aikenhead, 1985). The importance of preparing students for decision making on
socioscientific issues has also been recognized by organizations like the American Asso-
ciation for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) (1989) and the National Research Council
(NRC) (1996) in their education proposals.
In recent years, there have been some curriculum responses to this concern about science
and citizenship; for example, several interesting teaching models involving decision mak-
ing on current socioscientific issues (Kortland & Lijnse, 1996; Ratcliffe, 1996; Waarlo,
1997). It is my impression, however, that many of the suggested teaching models suffer
from lack of discussion and inclusion of knowledge concerning the nature of science and
scientific knowledge. When making up one’s opinion about a socioscientific issue, one
more or less consciously makes interpretations of the statements and factual claims offered.
The quality and adequacy of such interpretations depend in part on the general knowledge
possessed by the decision maker. Such prerequisite knowledge includes knowledge of the
nature of science and scientific knowledge.
In this article, I am therefore proposing a general framework for analyzing the science
dimension of such issues. This framework is thought suitable for inclusion in science
education for citizenship at secondary school level. The framework is made up of eight
content-transcending topics. By content-transcending knowledge, I mean knowledge, or
skills and attitudes that do not have their focus on the products of the scientific community:
the concepts, laws, and theories. The focus is shifted from knowledge in science toward
knowledge about science. Traditionally, this means the inclusion of aspects of the nature
of science. I have chosen to use the phrase content-transcending knowledge, first, because
the term nature of science is not well defined, and second, because we may find it important
to include topics that go beyond what is traditionally regarded as included in the concept
nature of science. The last of the eight topics suggested in this article belongs to this
category. The main reasons for suggesting these eight content-transcending topics are:
first, to offer some new ideas and perspectives for the further discussion on science for
citizenship; and second, to provide focal points for the future development of teaching and
learning material aimed at enhancing students’ abilities to examine the science dimension
of controversial issues.
Knowledge as Tools
It is the problem of dealing with controversial socioscientific issues that is the starting
point for this article. This is based on the observation that these are the typical issues
reported in the media, and some of them are also instances of local disputes. These are,
therefore, the kinds of issues that students are likely to be confronted with in their daily
lives. It is also the kinds of issues that some students may want to act upon. Controversial
socioscientific issues often include disagreements related to various actors’ diverging eval-
uations of the validity or trustworthiness of the science-related claims involved. Typical
examples of such knowledge claims concerns whether some specific human practice in-
volves a risk to health or to the environment. The consequences of the risk evaluations short
and of the collective decision making often has far-reaching consequences, making para- standard
mount an adequate interpretation of the science-related knowledge claims involved. As long
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such issues are frequent in modern society, they should be given high priority in science Base of text
education for citizenship.
Science teachers and curriculum developers are faced with several problems when sci-
ence education for citizenship and decision making on controversial issues are to be put
in practice. One of these is the question of which content-transcending topics should be
taught in order to increase students’ competence in interpreting science-related statements.
Such content-transcending topics as the human character of science, values in science,
limits of science, and tactics for decision making in science are too broad to serve as
guidelines in the science classroom. There is a need to specify which values and which
limits to emphasize. A specification of well-reasoned topics would also contribute toward
satisfying the need expressed in the argument that science teachers are not prepared well
enough to teach these aspects of science.
Another issue of concern is the relevance of the knowledge included in science curricula
for the students’ everyday lives. When discussing scientific literacy for citizenship or other
educational aims, rather long lists of topics — concerning both the nature of science and
other topics — are sometimes suggested for inclusion in science curricula (see, e.g., AAAS,
1989; NRC, 1996). What seems to be missing is a discussion of how each suggested topic
might contribute to different problems the students might encounter in their adult life. To
be able to reduce the number of topics to be included in science teaching for citizenship,
one needs to emphasis relevance strongly.
A third important issue is the question of the amount of content-transcending knowledge
needed to interpret knowledge claims encountered when dealing with an issue. It is im-
portant to try to identify a basic framework that is within the reach of most students.
Decision making on socioscientific issues is value based, and at present, we do not know
to what extent knowledge of science can improve the decision-making process. It is, there-
fore, important that students do not judge their understanding of general characteristics of
scientific knowledge to be insufficient to allow them to engage in socioscientific issues of
their concern. This may happen if it is signaled that you have to be aware of a range of
aspects of science before your opinion is worth listening to. (This is similar to the situation
where students, through their science studies, “learn” that they are not capable of under-
standing science.)
A main purpose of this article is to meet these three challenges: the need for specificity,
the need for relevance, and the need to adjust the amount of knowledge to be emphasized
in order to put it within reach of most students. This is done by suggesting a set of eight
content-transcending topics. Each topic is explored for relevance, and it is shown how
knowledge of the topic can serve as a tool for students when examining the science di-
mension of controversial socioscientific issues. The eight topics are meant to constitute a
minimum range of knowledge, skills, and attitudes necessary to emphasize in science
education. This “minimum model” is adopted to meet the “amount of knowledge” problem.
Through awareness of the eight suggested topics, it is hoped that the students will be
able to examine more in-depth the arguments and knowledge claims asserted by scientists
and others in disputes over socioscientific issues. However, the suggested topics are not
meant to offer the students guidelines for how to make the value-based evaluations needed
to arrive at a final personal opinion. The focus of this article is on tools to be used by the
students to examine science-related claims and arguments asserted in controversial issues
in order to understand these more in-depth, and in order to make the students able to extend
the information component of their decision base.
Several authors have discussed what aims and issues should be emphasized in science
education for citizenship. Some of these issues will be explored and made into more short
concrete and achievable aims for science teaching. In drawing upon knowledge from other standard
research areas, I also want to introduce some new issues to the debate: the distinction long
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between descriptive and normative statements, the relevance of anecdotal knowledge, and Base of text
the importance of an attitude of respect toward antagonists. These are not novel and par-
ticular to science education, but it will be argued that they are both relevant and important
to include in science teaching. The set of eight topics will be discussed under the four
main headings science as a social process, limitations of science, values in science, and
critical attitude. At the end of the article, consequences for students’ attitudes, and for
science education, will be commented on.
SCIENCE AS A SOCIAL PROCESS

Several authors have argued in terms of citizenship, decision making, and democratic
participation for teaching the nature of science (Driver, Leach, Millar, & Scott, 1996,
Chap. 2). One immediate problem here is that there does not seem to be a consensus as
to what are the constituting tenets of the nature of science among scientists, philosophers,
or science educators (Fourez, 1989). Another “problem” is that the term nature of science
is a very broad one. It might include both the methods of science, social aspects of science,
the domains and purposes of scientific activity, values in science, philosophical founda-
tions, and more (see, e.g., Driver et al., 1996, Chap. 3; Leach, Driver, Millar, & Scott,
1997; Ryan & Aikenhead, 1992).
The science reported in the media and the science involved in topical socioscientific
issues are often tentative results from frontier science. One aspect of the nature of science
that is important to be aware of when interpreting scientific statements in the media and
elsewhere, is therefore the characteristics of this frontier science.
First Topic: “Science-in-the-Making” and the Role of Consensus in Science

I believe that most science teachers and science educators are rarely convinced at first
glance when new results are emanating from the frontier of science. We gladly read about
new and exciting findings, but keep all possibilities open — for the time being. The reason
is that we first want to know if there is some sort of consensus among the relevant experts
concerning these new scientific knowledge claims.
In my experience, one of the main frustrations mentioned by lay people trying to un-
derstand discussions concerning socioscientific controversial issues and trying to form an
opinion is the perceived disagreement among scientists and other experts. Such disagree-
ments have been found to be interpreted by students in terms of interests, personal opinions,
and incompetence (Driver et al., 1996, Chap. 9; Kolstø, 1999). In one of these inquiries,
a qualitative study of 16-year-old students’ decision making on a controversial issue, it
was found that these kinds of interpretations made it harder for many students to trust the
scientists’ evaluations on the risk issue involved (Kolstø, 1999). The issue in focus in the
study was the question of whether power transmission lines constitute a health hazard, a
controversy that was topical for the students involved. On this issue, different researchers
and institutions had been giving different estimates and evaluations of the possible risk.
Referring to American politicians having to deal with science-related public issues such
as health, energy, and others, Shen (1975) reports that, “Legislators, who must decide on
these issues, often complain not of lack of expert advice from contending sides, but of not
knowing which set of experts to believe” (p. 48). Some understanding of the difference
between textbook science and frontier science may serve as an important tool to understand
and interpret disagreement among experts as natural and necessary.
The differences between textbook science and frontier science have been studied in
detail by several authors (Bauer, 1994; Collins, 1993; Latour, 1987) and are expressed in short
terms of “ready-made-science” and “science-in-the-making” by Latour (1987). “Ready- standard
made-science” denotes the final product, as it were, of scientific inquiry. This science is long
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characterized by a “stable consensus which scientists consider unproductive to challenge” Base of text
(Bingle & Gaskell, 1994, p. 187). Knowledge claims regarded as “ready-made-science”
are seen as uncontroversial statements about reality, as scientific “facts.” The concept
“ready-made-science” thus describes textbook science, and this science is also the one
dominating the content of school science.
“Science-in-the-making,” on the other hand, is the science currently worked on in the
laboratories, in the so-called forefront of research. This science is seen as making debatable
claims by the scientific community that is still subject to revision. Disagreement and debate
about the structure of reality are here seen as natural and legitimate. “Science-in-the-
making” is the science that is presented and debated at conferences, in journals, and in
oral disputes among researchers.
Most controversial socioscientific issues facing ordinary people concern this last aspect
of science (Bingle & Gaskell, 1994). In many such controversies, a lack of consensus
among scientists concerning factual aspects probably is one of the reasons why this con-
tinues to be an issue. Typical examples here are risk issues, environmental or health-related,
where the level of risk — and even the existence of any risk — is being debated among the
researchers.
The distinction between “science-in-the-making” and “ready-made-science” is not
sharp. There is a gray area where important social processes of science take place. This is
an area of competition and collaboration, critique and tentative consensus, and of growing
or diminishing confidence in knowledge claims within the scientific community. In this
process, empirical evidence from experiments usually plays a very important part in the
argumentation. Over time, years or decades, there is sometimes a consensus emerging
among peers where controversies earlier held the ground (Bauer, 1994, Chap. 3). Through
this social process, “science-in-the-making” is thus transferred out of science or into
“ready-made-science.” Discussing the basic tenets of the nature of science, Ryan and
Aikenhead (1992) state that this “consensus among self-appointed experts is the basis of
scientific knowledge.”
There are two quite different ways of interpreting this social process (Driver et al., 1996,
Chap. 3). The radical social constructivist interpretation is that the content of consensual
science is socially constructed. This implies claiming that the natural world is not the
principal determinant of scientific knowledge. The other interpretation is that the process
by which knowledge claims about nature are turned into statements underpinned by con-
sensus among scientists involves criticism, argumentation, and peer review processes. This
last interpretation, which is the one adopted in this article, is less controversial, as it leaves
room for the view that it is nature, and not the scientists, that places the crucial constrains
on theory building. (But there is a range of opinions within this view as to which degree
the natural world and the current worldview constrain scientific theorizing.)
This leaves us with a description of science as involving social processes through which
scientists are scrutinizing the validity of presented experimental evidence and proposed
explanations and through which consensus sometimes evolves. Students’ knowledge of
this social process can serve as a tool for interpreting debate and disagreement among
scientists on scientific issues involved in socioscientific controversies.
Such knowledge, involving the role of consensus in science and the differences between
“science-in-the-making” and “ready-made-science,” will, of course, not solve the problem
of not knowing which experts to believe. It may, however, diminish the tendency to in-
terpret diverging statements in terms of interests and incompetence without further evi-
dence for this to be the case. Interpretations based on these terms may hinder the students
in understanding that the statements offered might be the best estimates currently available. short
This could imply a serious narrowing of the decision base on which their personal opinion standard
on the issue is going to be made. The discussed concepts may also make nonexperts long
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understand the scientists’ view, their claims that no clear-cut answer is possible at the Base of text
present time, and it might make them include a wider range of scientific estimates in their
decision base. With the discussed concepts at their disposal, students may be less liable to
lose trust in scientists and in “ready-made-science” whenever they experience that scientists
disagree among themselves on particular issues. A deeper understanding of the time-
consuming social processes in science can also raise students’ consciousness concerning the
necessity sometimes to make decisions and to act without conclusive scientific knowledge.
In talking about “ready-made-science” in the science classroom as the result of social
processes, we are also affording the students a chance to develop a richer and more ade-
quate picture of science as an institution and of science as — at least to a certain extent —
socially constructed (Driver & Newton, 1997). This contrasts the presentation of scientific
knowledge as merely the result of the individual works of a few brilliant scientists like
Darwin and Einstein and will also constitute a step away from the positivistic epistemology
often implicit in school science.
An understanding of the concept of “science-in-the-making” and the role of consensus
in science will bring us halfway to meeting a need identified by Osborne (1997) for a
science education that seeks to empower young people to act, “The need for students to
understand not only ‘what we know’ but ‘how we know’” (p. 11).
LIMITATIONS OF SCIENCE
Science provides answers to a range of questions, but there are also many questions
within the realm of science that, for different reasons, have not been given any answers
so far. However, the limitations of science to be discussed here do not concern the range
of questions about the material world that can legitimately be asked and answered with
the methods and ideas of science. The issues I want to focus on concern the relationship
of science with other knowledge domains. Of special importance here is the relationship
between scientific knowledge and value judgments and between science and politics. When
coping with socioscientific issues, some knowledge of the nature of scientific models is
also important. This is relevant when discussing science’s relationship to the local and
anecdotal knowledge that is often appreciated by the laity, which constitutes an emotional
area of misunderstandings and mutual repudiation.
Second Topic: Science as One of Several Social Domains

Aikenhead (1985) states that in collective decision making there are several social do-
mains impinging upon the decision making: religion, ethics, politics, military issues, sci-
ence, and others. Not all areas are relevant to every issue. He argues that to avoid mediocre
decisions, one first has to decide which social domains are relevant and then “identify the
social domain in which the final decision will likely be made” (p. 462). This analysis
constitutes a model emphasizing the broader context of decision making. By making the
students work their way through this model when examining controversial socioscientific
issues in science class, it can be communicated to them that science is not the only relevant
knowledge area for decision making, and that it may not even be the most important one,
although it still may count! This is important, as most environmental issues, and also many
other issues, have crucial economic, social, and cultural aspects.
Layton et al. (1993, Chap. 5) provides an example where awareness of the impact of
social needs was lacking. In their study of elderly people, expert advice, and domestic
energy, they show how expert advice based on scientific knowledge about insulation and short
the scientific concept of energy was hard to follow, being at odds with social and standard
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other functions of housewarming and housekeeping considered by the elderly to be im- Base of text
portant. Advice based solely on knowledge from the realm of science turned out to be to
narrow and inadequate.
Examination of the science dimension of socioscientific controversies presupposes that
the students are able to identify questions and topics as science-related or not. In discussing
the purpose of scientific work, Driver et al. (1996) have pointed out that “natural science
addresses questions about the natural world” (p. 42), and that:
Science considers questions about both inanimate and animate objects, but excludes those
where the consciousness of the objects studied might be expected to influence appreciably
data collected. It also excludes questions which involve values (about what “should” or
“ought to” happen), or opinions. (p. 42)
Even if it can be argued that it is difficult to draw clear distinctions between science
and other ways of knowing, it is important that students apprehend these basic ideas
commonly used to define the scientific domain. However, students’ views on the domain
of science are not necessarily far from the one identified by Driver et al. (1996). In their
own study on students’ image of science, they concluded that, “students of all ages tended
to view scientific domains as including physical and biological phenomena and excluding
social phenomena” (p. 84). This indicates that the association of the science domain with
phenomena related to the material world is present among students.
When it comes to the distinctions between the scientific and other domains, one seems
to be of special importance. In a Canadian survey, Fleming (1987) found that about half
of the high-school graduates believed that scientists and engineers should take a leading
role in making important socioscientific decisions. If one confuses the domains of science
and technology with those of politics and ethics, one may believe it to be possible to find
“the right” or “the best” solution to socioscientific controversies by rational means. This
way of thinking is traditionally named technocratic and implies that collective decision
making in society is better left to experts, as they are the only ones who have mastered
rational methods for problem solving. This technocratic view has been thoroughly criti-
cized by researchers in the field of Science and Technology Studies (Andersen & Sørensen,
1992, Chap. 6).
An example from my hometown, Bergen in Norway, illustrates this point. For several
years there has been a debate concerning waste disposal. The problem is that the refuse
disposal site currently used is running full. Several alternatives for the future have been
discussed: solutions beneficial to the economy, the environment, or human health. In 1997,
the local officials were pressed for time, because the area used for waste disposal was
actually full. If experts were allowed to identify “the best” solution, this would imply
neglecting important problems. From the outset, many people and environmental groups
disagreed about the framing of the issue. In their view, the problem should not be the
localization of the new area for waste disposal, but the question of what could be done to
minimize the environmental problems. The environmental organizations and others wanted
waste sorting and recycling, and this could redefine the waste disposal problem radically.
This issue also embedded conflicting values. Some people will be giving one risk or gain
a high rating, and some will give priority to other aspects. If certain experts were to decide
“the best” solution, a range of questions would immediately arise: Who defined the prob-
lem to be managed? Whose values were given priority? For whom is this the best solution?
This example illustrates a presupposition behind the technocratic view that is not tenable,
namely that values and different human needs can be weighted by experts using value- short
free methods. But how, for instance, is it possible to weigh some people’s wish for building standard
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a new power plant based on coal against other people’s wish for clean air? Or how are we Base of text
to weigh between the wish of a mother to watch the news and the wish of her son who
wants her to drive him to football training? Because we have different wishes, values, and
beliefs, society is loaded with these sorts of conflicts. Such conflicts cannot be solved by
means of value-free evaluations or calculations, but have to be negotiated; therefore, we
need politics and discussions to weigh values that in principle cannot be weighted.
Knowledge and consciousness of this idea can serve as a tool for engaging citizens,
both to increase the clarity of their argumentation and to help them see through technocratic
argumentation in debates over controversial issues. This will hopefully involve a dismissal
of claims to “the best solution” and to primacy of scientific and technological aspects in
one’s decision base.
Also within the tradition of science and science education, technocratic thinking has
brought its influence to bear. Ziman (1980, Chap. 3) has argued that science education
traditionally is imbued with “scientism,” and Fourez (1989) claims to have identified re-
mains of technocratic thinking in the relatively new report on Project 2061 from the AAAS
(1989). If we, through school science, want to lay a more tenable foundation for the
education of future scientists and citizens, raising awareness that science is but one of
several social domains relevant to decision making on socioscientific issues should not be
rejected.
Aikenhead’s model may then serve as a tool for the students to raise this awareness.
Awareness of the potential relevance of knowledge from diverse social domains may
increase a decision-maker’s openness to relevant knowledge from other domains than
science. The students’ decision bases may then be radically increased.
Third Topic: Descriptive and Normative Statements

Knowledge of Aikenhead’s model can also make it easier for students to understand a
division that is important for the interpretation of different claims in debates over socios-
cientific controversies: the difference between descriptive and normative statements. In
our Western culture, there is a long tradition of making this distinction. Philosophers have
emphasized the principle that “is” cannot be converted into “ought.” If these categories
are confused, they talk of the “naturalistic fallacy.” This distinction is often institutional-
ized in political systems. Experts and other professionals write reports exploring various
alternative solutions to a task and the possible consequences of each of them, but in the
end, the politicians make value-based decisions on the issues. However, in real life, this
distinction is not quite that clear cut. The descriptive/normative distinction is based on the
idea that neutral and objective descriptions are, in principle, always possible, and this
stance is highly problematic. In addition, scientific theories and value systems have been
seen to interact through history (see, e.g., Graham, 1981). Even so, the students ought to
be familiar with the idea, as it is a powerful tool when trying to decipher statements,
looking for bias and underlying ideologies, and judging when to ask for evidence and
documentation and when to look for underlying values.
The distinction is also a powerful tool when we want to find out whether a certain expert
is presenting their view as a private citizen, where they are outside the limits of their
scientific expertise, or in their capacity as a professional. A feature story in my local
newspaper, Bergens Tidende, on 17 February 1997 on the issue of cosmetics and cancer
contained a quotation from a researcher. The researcher insisted that “a daily dose of more
than 0.1 milligram acrylamic from cosmetics represents an unacceptably high cancer risk
for the consumer.” The assertion that the risk is “unacceptably” high, I will maintain, is short
in this context normative. This is because the researcher’s statement seems to be based on standard
his/her norms about what is acceptable and what is not. My point here is not that the re- long
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searcher in this context ought to have refrained from normative statements. Rather, the Base of text
point is that in some situations it is important to be able to decide whether an expert
statement, the validity of which is hard for a lay person to ascertain, is based on a value
decision. Whenever it is, then my own judgment will be of the same standing as the expert
(to the extent that I have bothered to acquire background information about the case), and
I may regard myself as fully competent to agree or not agree with them.
Knowledge of the distinction between descriptive and normative thus has a potential
for making it easier to evaluate which claims and arguments are to be incorporated as a
part of the knowledge component of one’s decision base and which to regard as mere
opinions.
Fourth Topic: Demands for Underpinning Evidence

Within the scientific community, objectivity and neutrality are highly valued. Scientists
are not supposed to let personal or institutional interests have any impact on their scientific
work. In this sense, science strives to maintain delimitation toward the influence of political
and economical interests on their theories. The role of scientific knowledge in political
decision making is also meant to be objective and neutral, based on the rationale that it
only contributes facts. There is no doubt that objectivity and neutrality are ideals for most
scientists, but these ideals are sometimes difficult to achieve (see, e.g., Collingridge &
Reeve, 1986).
Here I want to argue that the questions of the objectivity and neutrality of “ready-
made-science” as written in textbooks are beyond the scope of interest to most students
and of minor importance to personal decision making. It is when the knowledge is put to
use in a social context that the questions of evidence, objectivity, and neutrality become
urgent.
Geddis (1991) claims that when “dealing with controversial issues, it is important to
uncover how particular knowledge claims may serve the interests of different claimants”
(p. 171). The science relevant to current socioscientific issues and decision making is often
“science-in-the-making.” This science is characterized by a lack of consensus on whether
the evidence is conclusive, and it is problematic to denote the knowledge claims as facts.
In the process of drawing the conclusions necessary to establish a decision base, scientists,
politicians, and lay people can be influenced by their interests. Longino (1983) has argued
that in cases when scientific knowledge is inconclusive, science is more vulnerable to
contextual pressures, making it more value-laden. It has also been argued that scientists
involved in debates on controversial issues tend to be more critical of the evidence the
antagonists are offering than of the evidence their own conclusions are based on (Collin-
gridge & Reeve, 1986).
Geddis (1991) provides an example of the problem of contextual pressure. He discusses
the acid rain controversy between the United States and Canada. What may be regarded
as “the Canadian view” is that the main source of acid rain is the power plants in the Ohio
Valley. The Americans, he says, claim that scientists still do not know the causes of acid
rain. Does this mean “the Americans are wrong, or stupid” as one student remarked?
Geddis points out that the cost to the Americans would be high if drastic cutbacks in sulfur
dioxide emissions were to be conducted. They therefore demand a high degree of certainty
before concluding that their power plants are the source of the acid rain in Canada. The
Canadians can be convinced with a lower degree of certainty, as they will have the benefits
if the claim is considered correct and the Americans take action.
The interesting point here is that “To some extent the epistemology interacts with the short
interests of the stakeholders” (Geddis, 1991, p. 180). This takes us to basic questions like: standard
“What is a fact?” and “For whom is it considered a fact, and why?” In science, we seldom long
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talk of “proving,” but rather discuss the provided evidence, theoretical coherence, and Base of text
underlying assumptions. Karl Popper has stressed that, in principle, scientific theories can
be falsified, but that the formal rules of logic make it impossible to “prove” a theory on
the basis of a limited number of observations. The idea that our demands for evidence
underpinning knowledge claims may vary, and that these demands can be influenced by
our interests, may serve as a tool for interpreting disagreements between scientists, citizens,
or governments, without having to consider our opponents as “stupid.” This idea may also
make the engaged student or citizen evaluate both fellow partisans and antagonists’ knowl-
edge claims more in depth and context. In turn, such evaluation may decrease the subjective
element in the decision-maker’s decision base.
Promoting this idea in school science will imply legitimizing disagreements and stim-
ulating students’ respect for the views of other people. On the other hand, as the idea can
serve as a strong rhetorical device in the hand of powerful organizations, it is important
to stimulate the students to ask themselves what specific interests are at stake. Not all sorts
of interests and not all demands for more evidence have to be seen as legitimate by the
student or citizen.
Fifth Topic: Scientific Models as Context-Bound

All scientific models are sought given an empirical foundation. In the process of model
building, scientists try to underpin their hypothesis with empirical data, a set of data that
might be extended as more research is being done. A resulting model, whether on the level
of empirical law or general theory, has a certain area, a certain range of contexts, where
it has been tested against observations. These “contexts of verification” will to some degree
be simplified compared to many complex real-world situations. This sometimes poses
problems, when a scientific model is sought applied to a situation outside its contexts of
verification. These problems can be at least of two kinds. First, in a complex real-world
system, factors not included in the model may have an influence on the system’s behavior
that makes descriptions and predictions based on the applied model uncertain or mislead-
ing. Second, the application of a scientific model in a new context presupposes that the
characteristics of the new context and those of the model really are concurrent. If this is
not the case, the dynamics inherent in the model will not apply. For these reasons, pre-
dictions based on “ready-made-science” can therefore still be debatable, as if based on
“science-in-the-making,” when applied in new and complex contexts.
An example of the first kind of problem described can be found in the mentioned debate
on power transmission lines and whether these constitute a health hazard. The issue arose
when some researchers found a correlation between childhood exposure to the magnetic
field surrounding the lines and leukemia. Knowing that electromagnetic radiation from
high voltage transmission is not capable of ionizing and has a low intensity, certain sci-
entists asserted that there could not be any causal relationship. At a later stage, other
scientists nevertheless inquired further into the matter and suggested possible causal re-
lationships connecting weak non-ionizing fields and the development of cancer (Thom-
mesen, 1993). So, should we have terminated the leukemia debate on the basis of the
knowledge (or hypothesis?) that only ionizing radiation and radiation with high intensity
may cause tissue damage?
If scientists working on real-world problems are not aware of the importance of ex-
amination of local conditions, problems of the second type described may occur. For
example, what knowledge is needed to predict the remaining amount of radiation in sheep
living in the mountains of Cumbria and eating grass contaminated with radioactive cesium short
from the Chernobyl accident (and possibly also other sources)? The interactions between standard
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scientists and local sheep farmers in Cumbria in the time after the Chernobyl accident has Base of text
been studied in great detail by Wynne (1996):
At first, scientific advice was that there would be no effects at all from the Chernobyl
radiocaesium fall-out. After six weeks, these confident public reassurances were dramat-
ically overturned when on 20 June 1986 the Minister for Agriculture announced the com-
plete ban on sheep sales and movements in several affected areas, including Cumbria.
(p. 24)
The ban was accompanied by reassurances that it would be there for three weeks only, as
the radioactivity levels in the lambs would have been sufficiently reduced by that time.
But, after three weeks, the ban was prolonged indefinitely. The involved scientists still
believed that the radioactivity levels would soon be reduced. Unfortunately for the sheep
farmers, whose economy was dependent on seasonal sales, this did not occur. Not until
later was it discovered that one possible reason was that the soil in upland areas is acid
and peaty, while the prevailing scientific model was based on knowledge of alkaline clay
soils. This example shows that when the area of application of some specific knowledge
is extended, based on the idea of the generality of scientific knowledge, the results may
be seriously misleading.
In Norway, we have a saying that “Theory is different from practice!” This saying is
often used to indicate that, when it comes to practical life, theoretical knowledge is of little
value. As science is an important aspect of environmental protection work, such a deni-
gration of theory is very unfortunate and can lead to mediocre decisions. Nevertheless, the
saying does indeed contain a grain of truth. Theoretical knowledge is by definition knowl-
edge which, in a quest for more general regularities, is abstracted from the world of
practical life experiences. When generalized theoretical knowledge is to be applied to
specific tasks or problems, one must be cognizant of all relevant context-specific con-
straints which are not baked into the theory.
Awareness of scientific models as context-bound is here intended, on the one hand, to
serve as a tool for interpreting experiences or information about scientific predictions that
failed, without concluding that science is irrelevant to societal issues. On the other hand,
such knowledge can make students realize that it is always legitimate to raise objections
to and to discuss the relevance of applications of scientific models to new and complex
situations. Knowledge of models as context-bound is crucial in order to be able to criticize
expert reports and question the premises and assumptions of relevance that they are based
upon. This knowledge can also make the science-minded student or citizen more open to
knowledge claims from people criticizing scientific reports, implying a wider range of
knowledge claims to be evaluated before a personal decision is made.
VALUES IN SCIENCE
Values are an intrinsic part of science. There seems to be agreement on constitutive
values to be an indivisible part of scientific inquiry (Aikenhead, 1985), but disagreement
about to which degree contextual values trickle into science. Elements both from con-
stitutive and contextual values have relevance for interpretation of scientific statements
and information concerning socioscientific issues. The dispute over contextual values
was touched upon in the discussion of interests and demands for underpinning evi-
dence.
Here, I want to concentrate on values of importance for lay people’s understanding of short
the issue of evidence, and for the interpretation of scientists’ public statements. standard
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Sixth Topic: Scientific Evidence Base of text
Aikenhead (1985) has asserted that awareness of the constitutive values in science is
prerequisite knowledge for thoughtful decision making. Objectivity and neutrality have
already been discussed. Some of the criteria for what counts as evidence are another part
of the constitutive values in science, which are important to be aware of in any exploration
of socioscientific issues.
The demand for evidence is central to science. In social issues with a scientific dimen-
sion, engaged citizens often seem frustrated that the evidence they are bringing is not
considered important. The problem is not necessarily a disagreement on the demand for
evidence, but the criteria that have to be fulfilled for the evidence to be considered as such.
In science, only certain types of evidence are valued. Evidence has to be public, intersub-
jective, and open to validation for anyone interested (Tranøy, 1986). In many cases, only
statistical evidence is valued as empirical evidence of relevance for claims to theories of
causal relationships.
This is often contrasted with evidence presented by citizens, which is denoted as “an-
ecdotal evidence” by scientists. To denote the citizens’ valuing of “anecdotal evidence”
as caused by a lack of understanding is to miss one important half of the dispute. “Popular
epistemology” is concerned with local and specific situations (Irwin, 1995, Chap. 5), while
science aims at universally applicable theories and explanations (Driver et al., 1996, Chap.
3). “Anecdotal evidence” has been shown to be of great relevance and importance in
several cases. As Irwin points out, recognition of and demands for further investigations
on potential health hazards have often come through workers in gas industries, plastic
workers, textile workers, and so on, with asbestos workers as the best known example
(Irwin, 1995, Chap. 5). Such examples indicates that anecdotal evidence can point to the
existence of a problem, even if statistical evidence is needed to distinguish between com-
peting explanations of it.
It can thus be argued that both scientific evidence and “anecdotal” evidence have their
areas and limitations. What seems to be needed is mutual understanding concerning the
limitation and potential of different sorts of evidence. Knowledge of the valuing of statis-
tical evidence in science, and the reason for doing so, might serve as a tool to understanding
scientists’ dismissal of local and anecdotal knowledge when this dismissal is appropriate.
It might also make it easier for citizens to interpret scientists’ dismissal of anecdotal
evidence not only as arrogance. This is of great importance if we want people to “stick to
science” in the future. On the other hand, scientists have to do their part to make people
appreciate science, by showing a greater willingness to take a closer look at anecdotal
evidence when it is available. Appreciation of both anecdotal and statistical evidence is
also important, as this might hinder the exclusion of important evidence from a decision-
maker’s’ decision base.
Seventh Topic: “Suspension of Belief”

Many other constitutive norms and values in science can be identified, such as avoiding
logical contradictions, accepting evidence-based knowledge claims, coherence, relevance,
originality, honesty and sincerity, and openness and publicity (Tranøy, 1986, Chap. 8).
These norms and values are not exclusive to science, and many of them are common
among lay people; therefore, they are not discussed here. But one set of practiced values
in science is worth focusing on, as it concerns the communication of scientific information
in public. In a study of a marijuana court case, Aikenhead (1985) shows how the judge short
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misinterpreted the scientists’ reluctance to draw conclusions on insufficient evidence. The Base of text
defendant was caught by police carrying a deteriorated green plant-like material. The
forensic laboratory stated that it was obviously marijuana, but the law defined marijuana
in scientific terms, and the scientists brought in by the defense lawyers testified that there
were three species scientifically defined (on the basis of morphological characteristics). To
these scientists, it was not possible to state the species to which a sample of marijuana
belonged, because of its deteriorated condition. Scientists brought in by the prosecution
disagreed on that. They testified that there was only one species (as they gave priority to
genetic characteristics). The reluctance of the defense scientists to draw a conclusion was
misconstrued as “hedging considerably.” Aikenhead concluded that the judge “appeared
to be uninformed with regards to the values that scientists cherish, particularly the value
‘suspension of belief’ — wait until sufficient evidence accumulates before making a deci-
sion” (p. 455).
The situation where the scientists are unwilling to draw conclusions or to give clear-cut
answers is well known to all of us, and so is the public demand for answers (Millar &
Wynne, 1988). Tranøy (1986, Chap. 4) argues that this circumspection is a consequence
of the high demands within the ideology of science on documentation and evidence, as it
is this documentation that ought to be convincing, not the rhetoric or the authority of the
speaker. For this reason, most scientists probably value “suspension of belief” themselves,
and they also have to practice this value in order to maintain respect from colleagues.
Holton (1978, Chap. 2) argues that “suspension of belief” can be seen as belonging to
what he calls “public science.” This is the science found in journals, textbooks, newspapers,
and so on. According to Holton, the values associated with “public science” have
their counterpart in values associated with “private science” — this is the science of the
laboratory, in private discussions with colleagues, where “suspension of disbelief” is le-
gitimate. This is to provisionally keep on working on one’s idea, in spite of contradictory
evidence.
Holton introduced the value, “suspension of disbelief,” as a descriptive account of the
everyday scientific practice. “Suspension of belief” and the constitutive scientific value
“skepticism” relate closely to each other, but in accordance with the value identified by
Holton, they might be seen as descriptive and normative concepts, respectively.
Both “suspension of belief” and “suspension of disbelief” are values relating to “science-
in-the-making.” The concept “suspension of disbelief” is thus a value operating when a
scientist is working on “science-in-the-making,” and as long as they still believe in
the ideas under consideration. The value “suspension of belief” typically comes to use
when “science-in-the-making” is to be commented upon in public and outside the scien-
tific community. In this situation, most scientists will restrict themselves to information
that they believe to be noncontroversial and consensual among researchers within the field
of study. The whole issue of belief and disbelief disappears, however, from both private
and public science, when “ready-made-science” is on the agenda. The reason is that this
kind of science is seen as consisting of trustworthy facts by scientists (Latour, 1987,
intro.).
Knowledge of the value, “suspension of belief,” in the realm of science and of the
difference between “private science” and “public science,” can be used as tools to interpret
scientific information and to prevent misinterpretation in terms of interests and withholding
of information. This can, in turn, make the student or citizen appreciate the information
offered, as the currently best intersubjective knowledge available. It can thus make it easier
for the decision maker to realize that they have to draw the conclusions, to decide or not
to decide, and to act or not to act on the basis of the available information. short
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CRITICAL ATTITUDE Base of text
Criticism and argumentation are common activities in scientific disputes. They can be
seen as the means by which “science-in-the-making” is transformed into “ready-made-
science.” Bauer (1994, Chap. 3) uses the phrase “knowledge filter” to denote this “time
development.” The filter metaphor is used to indicate that only a small fraction of the
knowledge claims related to “science-in-the-making” in time will survive and become
“ready-made-science.”
As for argumentation, Driver and Newton (1997) assert that:
. . . a strong case can be made that, to enable young people to exercise their choices in
informed ways and to prepare them as future members of a democratic society, they need
support in developing the necessary skills of argument. (p. 15)
Confronted with the vast currents of information in modern society, it is vital that the
students are trained to look at all the assertions they meet in a critical light. In a democracy,
this is always important. We want opinions to be formed and decisions to be made on the
best possible basis. It is therefore important that both potential scientists and lay people
are trained in argumentation and develop a critical attitude toward information, knowledge
claims, and lines of argumentation.
But, argumentation in science does not seem to be easy. Zeidler (1997) has identified
several common errors in students’ arguments in science: problems with validity, naive
conceptions of argument structure, and more. Driver and Newton (1997) refer to several
norms, criteria, and skills connected with argumentation. The skills include the ability to
identify and evaluate the clarity of a claim and the relevance and sufficiency of the grounds.
They also refer to a range of skills identified in the literature as assumed to be required to
analyze issues and to work toward a decision; for example, being able to distinguish
between observation and theory. Many of these issues are difficult ones. If we were to
emphasize all these elements to promote citizenship in school science, the result might be
the opposite of what we are aiming. The risk will be that many students do not learn the
skills and norms of argumentation, but learn that they are not capable of argumentation.
This will imply diminishing the students’ self-confidence and raise the threshold for en-
gagement in discussions on the validity, trustworthiness, and relevance of science-related
knowledge claims.
In addition to the importance of argumentation in discussions with peers, there is the
problem of being able to make scrutinizing questions and convincing arguments when
facing scientists and experts representing institutions, industries, and organizations. This
is important, whether the sources of the knowledge claims are met face-to-face or through
the media. The role of science and scientists in many controversial issues has led Irwin
(1995) to make the following claim:
For most citizens, science has become an obstacle to the expression of con-
cerns. . . . Fears over the environment are met with scientifically based reassurances that
all is well— even though citizens’ experiences may suggest the opposite. Science thus no
longer represents “enlightenment,” but a force to be struggled against. (p. 46)
If this is the situation experienced by people engaged in a socioscientific issue, then one
response could be to emphasize scientific argumentation in school science in order to
improve students’ ability to scientifically evaluate the scientists’ knowledge claims. Norris
(1995) rejects the possibility of intellectual independence, based on a lay evaluation of short
evidence, as a possible outcome of science education. Bingle and Gaskell (1994) have standard
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same standards as a scientist would use is not possible, since “. . . the public has no Base of text
practical access to the standards . . .” (p. 193). It takes training to adopt the standards
and these are often varying from one branch of science to another. To scrutinize scientific
evidence, its validity and relevance, is therefore demanding and probably not within reach
for most students.
Eighth Topic: Scrutinize Science-Related Knowledge Claims

If it is hard to argue against scientists on their home ground, what is then the alternative?
An answer provided by Bingle and Gaskell, given from a social constructivist point of
view, is that “it is appropriate for citizens to evaluate the importance of contextual factors
to the scientific claim made” (1994, p. 191). This is a feasible way for citizens to deal
with knowledge claims from scientists and institutions, when the evaluations are based on
an understanding of the nature of scientific knowledge claims. But evaluations based on
contextual and social factors presuppose information of such factors to be recognized. In
addition, we should not dismiss the possibility that most students can learn to appreciate
the presence of evidence in addition to judging its source. I therefore believe a general
ability to ask what might be called “epistemological questions” to be an attainable goal
for science education, one that meets the need for information both concerning evidence
and social factors. The notion of epistemological questions includes questions focusing on
issues like evidence and its relevance, and also questions for social information, like
sources of claims and evidence, possible interests involved, competence of claim holders,
and level of consensus among scientists. Answers to such questions might contribute to
elucidating unclear or frustrating aspects, and the asking of such questions implies the
practicing of a critical attitude. Asking for evidence might clarify whether a claim is
supported by evidence at all, or whether it is merely a guess, an assumption, or personal
opinion or impression.
It is seldom possible, and not always most elucidating, to ask questions directly to the
source of a statement. Epistemological questions have, therefore, to be used to scrutinize;
for example, the content of newspaper articles, news in the media, information on the
World Wide Web, and in the discussion of an issue with other persons.
The relevance of such questions might be illustrated by the controversy about power
transmission lines, and whether these should be put underground to reduce the possible
health hazard. In a leaflet made by a power company in my hometown, a researcher was
quoted as having said “in Sweden less than one case a year can be explained by huge
power transmission lines. Every year 70 Swedish children get leukemia” (BKK, 1995).
Epistemological questions could here have yielded the following information: Evidence:
A Swedish study, performed by the quoted researcher and a colleague, found childhood
leukemia to be slightly more frequent among children exposed to the magnetic field sur-
rounding power transmission lines. Relevance: The relevance of this finding is that if lines
are put underground, the magnetic field will be reduced and thus the possible risk (whose
claim is this, and what is the evidence?). Source, interests, and competence: But the
statement was made by one involved in the study (and why was it included in this leaflet?).
She is working at the National Institute of Environmental Medicine in Sweden, and their
research is founded partly by governmental and partly from external sources (which?).
Consensus: There has been performed some studies that did find a relationship between
childhood leukemia and exposure to magnetic fields from power transmission lines, and
some that did not. The uncertainty of the different results is significant. So far, there does
not seem to be any consensus in the community of researchers as to whether there is a short
risk involved and as to the magnitude of the possible risk. standard
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information of importance for the evaluation of scientific claims when reading a newspaper Base of text
article. The questions included in the parentheses indicate that answers often need to be
followed up with further epistemological questions. The range of questions asked may, of
course, well be broadened to involve other concepts included in the eight topics suggested
in this article. Appreciation of these topics will hopefully contribute to students’ interpre-
tation and evaluation of answers found.
The previous example also shows that the interpretation of answers to epistemological
questions does not necessarily require an understanding of scientific concepts or theories.
Even if a deeper comprehension of scientific aspects is needed to understand the debate
among scientists involved, a more urgent issue is to increase lay decision-makers’ infor-
mation vigilance, their ability to scrutinize knowledge claims stated.
The pedagogical point of focusing on epistemological questions is that the students have
to gain experience in asking this sort of questions, both of texts and persons. This focus
on experience implies an emphasis on attitudes and skills necessary in order to be able to
examine controversies. First, through such experience, they may get accustomed to making
use of concepts like evidence, relevance, source, interests, competence, and consensus as
analytical tools. Second, it may also have an impact on students’ attitudes if they experience
the critical attitude inherent in epistemological questions as capable of bringing important
information to the surface.
Focusing on the ability to ask questions has several advantages. The emphasis on ques-
tioning can raise students’ consciousness concerning the importance of evidence, rele-
vance, sources, competence, consensus, and interests. In general, training in asking
epistemological questions can increase the students’ information vigilance and, thereby,
broaden their decision base on an issue. It may also raise the students’ demands for open,
explicit, and transparent argumentation, and thereby serve as a tool to make evidence,
documentation, and values more visible. At the same time, it will both legitimize and train
students to criticize knowledge claims. These advantages can be achieved in different
degrees by different students, without the less able students learning that they are totally
unable to contribute arguments and critiques. As seen from the side of the natural sciences,
we may also hope that pseudoscientific and antiscientific assertions will be more readily
discredited if the required level of documentation and argumentation is raised. Thus, we
may be able to find a balance between criticism based on interests, which easily turns into
a skeptical attitude toward science and the development of positive attitudes toward science
based on an appreciation of its demand for evidence.
When questioning knowledge claims, scientific or other, students can have experiences
that help them to find an answer to the question mentioned earlier: “What is a fact?” One
possibility is that they find the answer that Bingle and Gaskell provide. Statements are
facts if they “remain stable when challenged,” and opinions if “modified when challenged”
(1994, p. 197).
DISCUSSION
In this article, I have proposed a general framework for analyzing the science dimension
of controversial socioscientific issues, made up of eight content-transcending topics. It has
been argued that the eight topics can serve as general tools making it easier for students,
and lay people in general, to examine disputed issues with a science dimension. The general
argument has been that content-transcending topics have to be included in science edu-
cation if it is to serve as education for citizenship. The focus has been on tools to understand
science-related knowledge claims in appropriate terms, and on tools to broaden the knowl- short
edge component of the students’ decision base on the issue. Tools to examine knowledge standard
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from other social domains, and also a discussion of the relevance of students’ apprehension Base of text
of scientific concepts and explanations, have thus been omitted. A discussion of the pos-
sible last stage of the decision making on controversial issues, the personal value-based
opinion-forming, has therefore also been left out.
It might be objected that no tools have been provided for the final judgment as to the
relative strength and validity of different arguments and knowledge claims. This article is
built on the view, however, that if we want students to become autonomous and critical,
we have to treat them with the same respect as adults concerning their evaluations and
decisions. It is believed that more knowledge about science will empower them to examine
controversial issues in greater depth, but that evaluations both of the trustworthiness and
relevance of different knowledge claims is best left to the students. The eight suggested
topics are therefore intended to offer the students tools to be used if and when found
appropriate. These tools are meant to help the students to gain insights and knowledge that
prepares them for doing their own evaluations as to the relative relevance and trustwor-
thiness of different knowledge claims with a science dimension.
Another argument for leaving the evaluation to the students is that values and interests
will partly guide this evaluation. This will be the case, although we are focusing on state-
ments and knowledge claims with a science dimension. The possibility for lay people to
evaluate the scientific evidence underpinning scientific knowledge claims was judged de-
manding when discussing the eighth topic, since it takes professional training to adopt the
criteria used for such evaluation. This applies whether the knowledge claims and evidence
are stated by scientists or by others. It will thus hardly be worth the effort to try to identify
criteria aiming at overruling the debate among professionals on scientific issues where
scientists themselves holds diverging opinions.
However, when evaluating the trustworthiness of different claims, the students still may
use the distinction between normative and descriptive statements when judging whether a
statement concerning, for example, risk, is within the domain of science or not. Further,
the concepts of evidence and consensus can be used when judging whether a claim is
merely a guess, or backed by evidence presented by trustworthy sources or even by a
consensus among scientists. But when scientists disagree, the decision maker is forced to
include other knowledge, values, or own interests to be able to conclude which knowledge
claims to build one’s final opinion on an issue.
My conclusion is that guidelines for how to rank different knowledge claims ought to
be omitted when designing teaching models for inclusion of science in social contexts in
the science classroom.
What might then be included? A main purpose of this article has been to propose topics
that can serve as focal points when developing curriculum materials aiming at science for
citizenship. A few remarks on how this might be done are therefore appropriate. Several
authors have pointed to case studies on specific scientific or socioscientific disputes as
arenas for teaching science for citizenship and science as a social enterprise (Driver &
Newton, 1997; Jenkins, 1994; Millar, 1996; Osborne, 1997). In discussing science edu-
cation for the future, Osborne (1997) writes:
Looking forward then, I see an increasing urgency for science education to engage itself
and its students with case studies of scientific issues that emerge in contemporary society.
Only current issues that offer synthesis of the scientific and the social that will promote
the inclination to question and seek a range of options—in short, to be circumspect. (p. 7)
Jenkins (1992) argues that as most science today is connected to contexts of application,
school science should be also. If our students are not to be taught content-transcending short
topics as facts and theories for reproduction on tests, but as ideas to reflect upon, they standard
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have to work on such issues where they naturally occur. This implies that current contro- Base of text
versial issues have to be taken into the science classroom. This article has stressed the
importance of personal opinions on socioscientific issues to be based on adequate inter-
pretations of arguments raised. It has therefore been focused on the examination of the
science dimension of such issues.
It takes practice to gain competence in making such examinations, and training in using
the suggested tools and concepts is therefore needed. This might be accomplished by taking
controversial issues into the science classroom and letting the students examine issues
using selected concepts as analytical tools. For instance, students (alone or in groups) can
work through a set of newspaper articles on an issue and try to identify the science-related
knowledge claims and evidence provided. In a similar way, other concepts included in the
eight topics suggested might be used to examine other aspects of arguments and knowledge
claims: Are some of the identified claims normative? To what degree does there seem to
be a consensus in the science community on the different knowledge claims? Which actors
maintain the different claims? What vested interests might they have? What knowledge of
social aspects is presented as relevant to the issue? and so forth. The students can also be
given tasks where they are to discuss possible reasons for answers to epistemological
questions to be missing in an article, when this is the case. This again might be followed
up by tasks where answers are to be sought elsewhere. Training in explaining the view of
different actors might also be included to increase the students’ abilities to see issues from
different perspectives.
Teaching material to be used in the science classroom, of course, has to be developed
in a detailed manner before being put to use. The ideas previously mentioned are included
to indicate a few possibilities and to illustrate what is meant by doing an examination, in
contrast to a decision, on an issue.
It will probably be natural to conclude the examination of the science dimension of an
issue with a task where the students are to make their own evaluations as to which science-
related knowledge claims are most trustworthy or regarded as most valid. Their reasons,
including arguments based on own values and interests, should be included. The assess-
ment of their answers should, of course, not focus on the conclusions, but on the clarity
and the thoroughness of their argumentation.
Tools for examining knowledge claims from other social domains than science have
been at the outskirts of the scope of this article, maybe making the science dimension of
controversial issues look overemphasized. Obviously, thoughtful decision making on so-
cioscientific issues presupposes an inclusion and an examination of aspects other than the
scientific ones. These aspects will, however, usually be outside the professional domain
of a science teacher. Collaboration with teachers of other subjects may provide an oppor-
tunity for an adequate emphasis and examination of arguments and knowledge claims
relating to other social domains than science.
As a last remark, I will bring attention to a challenge confronting science educators
concerned with the inclusion of social aspects of science in science education. When
developing teaching models aiming at science education for citizenship, it is essential to
have knowledge of students’ and science teachers’ knowledge and views on science as a
social enterprise and science in social contexts. This is in order to be able to take the
students’ preconceptions and attitudes as points of departure, but also in order not to focus
on knowledge or attitudes that the students have already acquired. (It might, for instance,
well be the case that students no longer look upon scientists’ statements as authoritative,
neutral, or objective.) Studies carried out on pupils,’ students,’ and teachers’ views on the
“nature of science” can provide some important information. What nevertheless seems to short
be missing is knowledge of students’ views on science and scientists, as it emerges when standard
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they are coping with current socioscientific issues. The case studies of science in social Base of text
contexts are of some relevance here, but they are focused on adults and on science’s view
of the public. More research focused on students’ knowledge and views on science in
social contexts seems to be needed. To meet this challenge, a research project on students’
perceptions of scientific knowledge claims in a socioscientific dispute has been initiated
by the present author. The chosen context is the controversy over power transmission lines
and the claim that they constitute a health hazard. It is hoped that this research project will
provide some more insight into what ideas and knowledge students draw upon when trying
to examine a controversial socioscientific issue.
The author also wishes to thank Professor Edgar Jenkins for advice and fruitful discussions during
my stay at the University of Leeds.
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Andersen, H. W., & Sørensen, K. H. (1992). Frankenstein’s dilemma—En bok om teknologi, miljø
og verdier. (Frankenstein’s dilemma —A book on technology, environment, and values). Oslo:
Gyldendal Norsk Forlag (Norwegian).
Bauer, H. H. (1994). Scientific literacy and the myth of the scientific method. Urbana, IL: University
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Kolsto Scientific Literacy For Citizisenship

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Scientiﬁc Literacy for Citizenship:

Received 26 October 1998; revised 7 January 2000; accepted 6 March 2000

Correspondence to: S. D. Kolstø; e-mail: stein.dankert.kolstoe@psypp.uib.no

SCIENCE AS A SOCIAL PROCESS

First Topic: “Science-in-the-Making” and the Role of Consensus in Science

Second Topic: Science as One of Several Social Domains

Third Topic: Descriptive and Normative Statements

Fourth Topic: Demands for Underpinning Evidence

Fifth Topic: Scientiﬁc Models as Context-Bound

Seventh Topic: “Suspension of Belief”

Eighth Topic: Scrutinize Science-Related Knowledge Claims

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