TORTS & DAMAGES l Midterm Reviewer l Dean Joan Largo l For the exclusive use of EH 404

3. Distribution of losses and risks

Introduction

Function of the law of Torts and Damages In transportation law, we learned that an employer can be liable
even if the employee disobeyed the order of the employer, such
that he failed to drive safely causing accident leading to say, 112
1. To seek compensation for the damage suffered
passengers. These laws distribute the loss as well as the risk.
Without these laws governing negligence, it might be the case that
2. A means of shaping behavior or corrective damages
the victim goes uncompensated even if he did not have a hand in
causing the damages.
Philip Morris v. Williams
Example:
In the case, someone died because of lung cancer. It was an illness
that was caused or traced to smoking. The heirs, specifically the
The passengers did not have a hand in the hiring of this reckless
wife, filed a case against Philip Morris. The court granted hefty
bus driver. Had the law been such that the employer can say that
amount of damages in favor of the wife. This went on appeal to
he is not liable because the employee disobeyed his orders, then
the US Supreme Court solely for the purpose of reducing the
the passengers will be the one to bear the loss.
amount of damages. It was not any more a question of whether
she would be granted damages. It was just a question of how much
These laws step in for purposes of compensation, shaping behavior
because here this was several millions of dollars so Philip Morris is
in the society, and for distributing loss and risk.
asking for reduction of damages.

Torts v. Quasi Delict

The argument of the wife was Philip Morris made the cigarette
carcinogenic. Then the counter argument was then you should
Dean: There are distinctions between torts and quasi-delict in relation
have stopped smoking. But the argument in refuting Philip Morris
to Article 2176 of the Civil Code.
argument was that Philip Morris had allegedly made cigarettes so
addicting that even if the husband wanted to stop smoking, he
As to origin
cannot just stop. And because Philip Morris made the cigarette
smoking addictive, the proximate causation was traced to Philip
Tort law is common law in origin, while quasi-delict is civil law because
Morris for the death of the husband.
it is in our Civil Code and we are a principally a civil law country.
Dean: When you are faced with that kind of case, do you think
Common law v. Civil law jurisdiction
behavior would somehow change?

Common Law Civil Law

McDonalds case

Jurisprudential A judge decides the case based

A lady bought a coffee in McDonalds drive thru. But the McDo made
(reliance on case laws) on the existing laws.
the coffee very hot that when she was bringing the coffee and
place it in her lap, the hot liquid spilled over and caused burns. She
filed a case. The court granted damages in her favor. And that led
McDo to put a notice in all of the coffee that is being sold that the
coffee is extremely hot. But it also prompted McDo to recalibrate If there are no laws, the judge
the machine that was used in making the coffee that if it is meant If there is no law supporting will acquit the accused. The
for drive thru or even if meant to be consumed in the store, it must your cause, the judge or the judge will also inform the
not be very hot that it will injure/burn the customer. litigant is not confined to what is legislature of the lack of law on
provided for by law. the matter.
Dean: You can use the cases in tort law to reshape or redefine
behavior in the society. If you transport that thinking into Philippine You may call on unwritten He cannot go beyond the four
setting, if you have cases being litigated that takes forever to finish customs and traditions in order corners of the law.
and at the end of this litigation what you have is the damages in to justify your claims.
the staggering high sum of 50,000 for the fact of death, 50,000 for
the moral damages suffered.
Philippines is a civil law country
All in all, 100,000 after 15 years of litigation. Then what kind of Judicial power is the duty of the courts to settle controversies involving
behavior do you think you would encourage for example among rights that are legally demandable and enforceable. In the Philippines,
motorists. In a medical malpractice suit where at the end of the all our cases are anchored on laws which may be statutory,
really long case what you get is damages in the sum of 500,000 fundamental, inherent, or human rights. The judge cannot rule on any
inclusive of actual and moral damages and even exemplary matter which doesn’t have any provision granting you some rights.
damages, you are not really prodding (sic) the hospitals because
then the amount of compensation they are asked to give is Dean: That has an effect on how cases are litigated. When it is tort in
something they can afford especially in the context of you litigating the context of common law and there is still no decided case & provision
it or a long period. of the law to support your case, then you can call on customs &
traditions. But here, we are told that you go to court and you should be
able to point to court some laws in order to support your case.

1|U N I V E R S I T Y O F S A N C A R L O S
TORTS & DAMAGES l Midterm Reviewer l Dean Joan Largo l For the exclusive use of EH 404
Quasi-delict under Civil Law
Dean: Your study of quasi-delict will focus closely on what is said in the
law. If we want to know what quasi-delict is, we are told to look at Arts.
2176 – 2194, and you go by the definition of the law. The nature & form
that quasi-delict can take is defined, formed & shaped by the law.
Tort, being of common law jurisdiction
Tort can be any that the judge can conjure it to be depending how
persuasive the litigant or counsel of the litigant is.
IOW, here in our jurisdiction, which is civil law, quasi-delict is limited to
what the law says. It has to be based on what 2176 defines it to be.
But, you have to take note that cases decided by the SC forms part of
the law of the land.
 Quasi-delict – Art. 2176 plus cases decided by SC
 Tort – Anything that the judge considers wrong
In the cases, SC said that tort can be any wrong whether intentional or
unintentional. Quasi-delict is what Art. 2176 says which is founded on
negligence.
Dean: For example in the 2011 Bar Exam, the examinees were asked to
familiarize themselves with such terms as battery, assault, false
imprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Those are
kinds of torts cases. And if you notice, those are intentional acts but
those can still be considered tort actions because tort can be anything.
False imprisonment
Lopez v. Winchell’s Donut House
The employee/saleslady was accused of stealing the proceeds of
respondent. She was forbidden from leaving the store until she was able
to explain where the sales went. When she was able to get out, the first
thing she did was file a case of false imprisonment against the owners
of the donut house. It became a landmark case because it defined what
is meant by false imprisonment. The Court said that there is false
imprisonment when there is an actual prohibition or intent to restrain.
If there is no actual restraint, then there is no false imprisonment.
Dean: The point being that it is considered tort even if it is an intentional
act. You cannot say that if it were quasi-delict because 2176 defines
quasi-delict as anything where there is fault or negligence and there is
no pre-existing contract. It can only be quasi-delict if there is negligence,
and not of intent.
Quasi-delict
Fault or Negligence
Article 2176, NCC
“Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, is called quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this
chapter.”
Dean: In Art. 2176, what is prominent is the concept of fault or
negligence. In our jurisdiction it can only be quasi-delict if it has an
element of fault or negligence.
2|U N I V E R S I T Y O F S A N C A R L O S
Fault or negligence
In Criminal Law, a crime may either be committed in two ways:
1. Intentional felonies – intent (dolo or with malice)
2. Culpable felonies – culpa (negligence)
Otherwise known as culpa criminal– crime that is committed
through negligence
Article 3, RPC
“Acts and omissions punishable by law are felonies (delitos). Felonies
are committed not only by means of deceit (dolo) but also by means of
fault (culpa).There is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate
intent; and there is fault when the wrongful act results from imprudence,
negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill.”
Reyes: Imprudence indicates a deficiency of action. Negligence indicates
a deficiency of perception. If a person fails to take the necessary
precaution to avoid injury to person or damage to property, there is
imprudence. If a person fails to pay proper attention and to use due
diligence in foreseeing the injury or damage impending to be caused,
there is negligence. Negligence usually involves lack of foresight.
Imprudence usually involves lack of skill.
Dean: Criminal negligence in RPC
(a) Reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property
(b) Reckless imprudence resulting in homicide
Q. Can one act of negligence give rise to two cases, criminal and
quasi delict?
ANS: Yes.
Barredo vs. Garcia
Facts:
There was a collision between a taxi driven by Fontanilla and a carretela
guided by Dimapalis. The latter overturned which caused injuries to a
16-year-old boy who died 2 days later. A criminal action was filed against
Fontanilla in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, and he was convicted.
The court in the criminal case granted the petition that the right to bring
a separate civil action be reserved. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
sentence of the lower court in the criminal case.
Parents of the deceased brought an action in the Court of First Instance
against Barredo as the sole proprietor of the Malate Taxicab and
employer of Fontanilla. The main theory of the defense is that the
liability of Fausto Barredo is governed by the Revised Penal Code; hence,
his liability is only subsidiary, and as there has been no civil action
against Pedro Fontanilla, the person criminally liable, Barredo cannot be
held responsible in the case.
Issue:
Whether the plaintiffs may bring this separate civil action against Fausto
Barredo, thus making him primarily and directly responsible under
Article 1903 of the Civil Code as an employer of Pedro Fontanilla.
TORTS & DAMAGES l Midterm Reviewer l Dean Joan Largo l For the exclusive use of EH 404
Ruling:
A quasi-delict or "culpa aquiliana" is a separate legal institution under
the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is
entirely apart and independent from delict or crime. Upon this principle
and on the wording and spirit, Article 1903 of the Civil Code, the primary
and direct responsibility of employers may be safely anchored.
Art. 1092. Civil obligations arising from felonies or misdemeanors shall
be governed by the provisions of the Penal Code.
Art. 1093. Those which are derived from acts or omissions in which fault
or negligence, not punishable by law, intervenes shall be subject to the
provisions of Chapter II, Title XVI of this book.
While the terms of Art. 1902 of the Civil Code seem to be broad enough
to cover the driver's negligence in the instant case, nevertheless Art.
1092 limits cuasi-delitos to acts or omissions "not punishable by law."
But inasmuch as article 365 of the Revised Penal Code punishes not only
reckless but even simple imprudence or negligence, the fault or
negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code has apparently been
crowded out.
It is this overlapping that makes the "confusion worse confounded."
However, a closer study shows that such a concurrence of scope in
regard to negligent acts does not destroy the distinction between the
civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for cuasi-delitos
or culpa extra-contractual. The same negligent act causing damages
may produce civil liability arising from a crime under Article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code, or create an action for cuasi-delito or culpa extra-
contractual under Articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code.
Some of the differences between crimes under the Penal Code and the
culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito under the Civil Code are:
1. That crimes affect the public interest, while cuasi-delitos are only
of private concern.
2. That, consequently, the Penal Code punishes or corrects the
criminal act, while the Civil Code, by means of indemnification,
merely repairs the damage.
3. That delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts, because the former
are punished only if there is a penal law clearly covering them,
while the latter, cuasi-delitos, include all acts in which "any king of
fault or negligence intervenes." However, it should be noted that
not all violations of the penal law produce civil responsibility, such
as begging in contravention of ordinances, violation of the game
laws, infraction of the rules of traffic when nobody is hurt.
A quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual is a separate and distinct legal
institution, independent from the civil responsibility arising from criminal
liability, and that an employer is, under article 1903 of the Civil Code,
primarily and directly responsible for the negligent acts of his employee.
In the present case, the taxi driver was found guilty of criminal
negligence, so that if he had even sued for his civil responsibility arising
from the crime, he would have been held primarily liable for civil
damages, and Barredo would have been held subsidiarily liable for the
same. But the plaintiffs are directly suing Barredo, on his primary
responsibility because of his own presumed negligence — which he did
not overcome — under article 1903.
3|U N I V E R S I T Y O F S A N C A R L O S
Thus, there were two liabilities of Barredo: First, the subsidiary one
because of the civil liability of the taxi driver arising from the latter's
criminal negligence; and, Second, Barredo's primary liability as an
employer under article 1903. The plaintiffs were free to choose which
course to take, and they preferred the second remedy. In so doing, they
were acting within their rights. It might be observed in passing, that the
plaintiff choose the more expeditious and effective method of relief,
because Fontanilla was either in prison, or had just been released, and
besides, he was probably without property which might be seized in
enforcing any judgment against him for damages.
The foregoing authorities clearly demonstrate the separate individuality
of cuasi-delitos or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code. Specifically they
show that there is a distinction between civil liability arising from criminal
negligence (governed by the Penal Code) and responsibility for fault or
negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code, and that the
same negligent act may produce either a civil liability arising from a
crime under the Penal Code, or a separate responsibility for fault or
negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code.
Dean: There is a distinction between the negligent act that is a crime
and the negligent act that gives rise to a civil act. Quasi-delict is broader
than a crime because a crime is a crime if it the law says it is but a quasi-
delict can be what the law says it is and as interpreted by the cases.
Quantum of proof required
1. Criminal cases – proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt
2. Quasi-delict – preponderance of evidence
In other words, quasi-delict has an individuality of its own.
Q. Can you file a criminal case against the driver and a civil case
for damages based on culpa aquiliana against the same driver?
ANS: Yes.
Article 2177, NCC
The responsibility for civil liability arising from crime is entirely separate
and distinct from the civil liability arising from the quasi-delict.
Dean: The wording in Article 2177 was taken from the case of Barredo
vs. Garcia, which pre-dated our civil code.
Barredo v. Garcia
Supra.
The same negligent act causing damages may produce civil liability
arising from a crime under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, or
create an action for cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual under Articles
1902-1910 of the Civil Code.
The individuality of cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual looms clear
and unmistakable.
A quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual is a separate and distinct legal
institution, independent from the civil responsibility arising from criminal
liability, and that an employer is, under article 1903 of the Civil Code,
primarily and directly responsible for the negligent acts of his employee.
The employer is primarily and directly liable under article 1903 of the
Civil Code.
TORTS & DAMAGES l Midterm Reviewer l Dean Joan Largo l For the exclusive use of EH 404
Dean: In this case, the court said that the civil liability arising from crime
and civil liability arising from negligence are two different institutions.
Civil liability for quasi-delict has an individuality of its own.
Compare Rafael Reyes with Manliclic vs. Calaunan.
Rafael Reyes Trucking Corp. v. People
Facts:
Petitioner Corporation is in the business of transporting beer products.
One morning, one of its trucks collided with an incoming Nissan dragging
it to the left shoulder of the road and climbed a ridge above said
shoulder where it finally stopped. The Nissan was severely damaged and
its two passengers died instantly.
Private respondents filed a criminal case against the driver with a
reservation to file a separate civil action from the offense charged.
Subsequently, a complaint against petitioner Corporation, as employer
of the driver, based on quasi-delict was filed. Subsequently, however,
private respondents opted to pursue the criminal action and manifested
that they would prosecute the civil aspect ex delicto in the criminal
action but did not withdraw the civil case they filed against the
petitioner.
The trial court hearing the criminal case found the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt and ordered the herein petitioner corporation
subsidiarily liable for all the damages awarded to the complainants.
Issue:
May petitioner be held subsidiarily liable for the damages awarded to
the offended parties in the criminal action against the truck driver
despite the filing of a separate civil action by the offended parties against
the employer of the truck driver?
Ruling:
No.
In negligence cases, the aggrieved party has the choice between (1) an
action to enforce civil liability arising from crime under Article 100 of the
RPC and (2) a separate action for quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the
Civil Code. Once the choice is made, the injured party cannot avail
himself of any other remedy because he may not recover damages twice
for the same negligent act or omission of the accused. This is the rule
against double recovery.
In other words, “the same act or omission can create two kinds of
liability on the part of the offender, that is, civil liability ex delicto, and
civil liability quasi delicto. Either of which may be enforced against the
culprit, subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that
the offended party cannot recover damages under both types of liability.
In the instant case, the offended parties elected to file a separate civil
action for damages against the petitioner as employer of the accused,
based on quasi-delict, under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. Private
respondents sued petitioner Corporation, as the employer of the
accused, to be vicariously liable for the fault of the latter.
Dean: In Rafael Reyes, the Court said you have a choice as to whether
you will pursue a criminal case for reckless imprudence against the
4|U N I V E R S I T Y O F S A N C A R L O S
driver or a civil case for negligence against the same driver. Once the
choice is made, then you cannot anymore file the other case otherwise,
you will commit forum shopping.
Manliclic vs. Calaunan
Facts:
Respondent Calaunan with Mendoza was on their way to Manila on
board his owner-type jeep. Philippine Rabbit Bus was likewise bound for
Manila driven by petitioner Manliclic. The 2 vehicles collided. Respondent
suffered minor injuries while his driver was unhurt. By reason of such,
a criminal case was filed at the RTC charging Manliclic with Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Physical Injuries.
Respondent also filed a complaint for damages against petitioners
Manliclic and PRBLI. The criminal case was tried ahead of the civil case.
PRBLI maintained that it observed and exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employee,
specifically Manliclic.
RTC decided in favor of Calaunan and CA affirmed in all respects.
Manliclic was then acquitted of the criminal charges against him.
However, in the civil case, he, along with PRBLI, was still made to pay
damages to respondent
Issues:
1. Whether a civil case based on quasi-delict can be filed separately
from the criminal case based on the same negligent act.
2. What is the effect of acquittal in the civil case?
Ruling:
1. Yes.
The civil case for damages was one arising from, or based on,
quasi-delict. Manliclic was sued for his negligence or reckless
imprudence in causing the collision, while petitioner PRBLI was
sued for its failure to exercise the diligence of a good father in the
selection and supervision of its employees.
A quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution with
a substantivity all its own that is entirely apart and independent
from a delict or crime — a distinction exists between the civil
liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for quasi-delicts
or culpa extra-contractual. The same negligence causing damages
may produce civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal
Code, or create an action for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-
contractual under the Civil Code.
2. Acquittal of the accused, even if based on a finding that he is not
guilty, does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability based
on quasi delict.
If an accused is acquitted based on reasonable doubt on his guilt,
his civil liability arising from the crime may be proved by
preponderance of evidence only. However, if an accused is
acquitted on the basis that he was not the author of the act or
omission complained of, said acquittal closes the door to civil
liability based on the crime or ex delicto.
TORTS & DAMAGES l Midterm Reviewer l Dean Joan Largo l For the exclusive use of EH 404
The responsibility arising from fault or negligence in a quasi-delict
is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from
negligence under the Penal Code. An acquittal or conviction in the
criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the civil case based on quasi-
delict or culpa aquiliana.
Dean: In this case, the driver was also negligent and a criminal
case was also filed against him and then a civil case was later on
filed against the driver and the registered owner of the vehicle.
When you commit one negligent act, it can give rise to a criminal
obligation and civil obligation. But the criminal obligation carries
with it civil obligations arising from the crime. It is different from
the civil liability arising from quasi-delict.
Here, the Court said you do not have to choose. You can pursue
both without having one to let one await for the outcome of the
other. It is therefore, possible that you have a civil case for quasi-
delict and a criminal case for reckless imprudence proceeding
separately. It is possible that one maybe acquitted in the criminal
case but there is finding of negligence in the civil case.
TN: Rafael Reyes was decided much earlier than Manliclic. Manliclic
is the controlling principle.
Important: One negligent act may give rise to two actions
proceeding independently, without one having to await for the
outcome of the other.
Effect of acquittal in the criminal case
Q. What is the effect of the acquittal in the criminal case with
respect to the civil case for quasi-delict?
ANS: It depends on the ground of acquittal:
1. If based on reasonable doubt – no effect
2. If based on the fact that the accused has not committed the crime
or no negligence was committed – civil case for quasi-delict will still
continue
Dean: In Manliclic, the court said, regardless of whether the criminal
case was filed and decided in the sense that the criminal act has not
happened, the civil case for quasi-delict continues. For how else can you
honor the fundamental principle that quasi-delict has individuality of its
own. But the outcome in the criminal case can surely persuade. As in
fact, when you are the one trying the civil case for quasi-delict, you
might want to offer the evidence presented in the criminal case. But, it
will not bind the court trying the civil case.
Important: Acquittal of accused, even if on the finding that he is not
guilty, does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability based on
quasi-delict. What is extinguished is the civil liability arising from crime.
Q. Do you have to make a reservation in the criminal case in
order to file the civil case based on quasi-delict?
ANS: No.
Dean: Before, such reservation was made as a requirement and was
made part of the Rules of Court. But Article VIII Sec. 5, par. 5 of the
1987 Constitution says that the rule-making power is circumscribed by
five limitations, among which is that the Court must not promulgate
5|U N I V E R S I T Y O F S A N C A R L O S
rules that will diminish or modify substantive rights. Independent civil
action is a substantive tight because it is a creation of the civil code. It
is created by law, ergo a substantive right.
TN: Remember this argument because in the bar, you might be asked
on the justification against such requirement of making a reservation.
There had been fluctuations as to whether or not such reservation is
necessary. So, before taking the bar, know the present rule.
Culpa Contractual v. Culpa Aquiliana
Culpa Contractual
 Breach of contract through negligence
 Culpa (negligence) is incidental to the breach
Culpa Aquiliana
 There is negligence
 Culpa (negligence) is in itself a source of obligation or the main
cause of action
Q. Can you file a case culpa contractual and culpa aquiliana at
the same time without committing forum shopping?
ANS: Yes.
Vicente Calalas v. Court Of Appeals
Facts:
Sunga, a student at Silliman University, took a jeep owned and operated
by Calalas. The jeep was full so she used an extension seat near the
door. A passenger disembarked so Sunga gave way. Then a truck driven
by Verena owned by Salva bumped the jeep. As a result, Sunga got
injured and sustained a fracture.
She was confined in the hospital for about two weeks and was told she
would remain in a cast for a period of three months. A damage suit was
filed on grounds of breach of contract of carriage, and a third party
complaint was filed by Calalas against Salva, owner of the truck.
Issue:
Whether Calalas may be held liable?
Ruling:
Yes, regardless of the filing of another civil case for such case involves
an action based on quasi-delict. In the instant case, the cause of action
is based on breach of contract of carriage.
The first, quasi-delict, also known as culpa aquiliana or culpa extra
contractual, has as its source the negligence of the tortfeasor.
The second, breach of contract or culpa contractual, is premised upon
the negligence in the performance of a contractual obligation
The doctrine is a device for imputing liability to a person where there is
no relation between him and another party. In such a case, the
obligation is created by law itself. But, where there is a pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, it is the parties themselves who
create the obligation, and the function of the law is merely to regulate
the relation thus created.
TORTS & DAMAGES l Midterm Reviewer l Dean Joan Largo l For the exclusive use of EH 404
Dean: You can actually file culpa contractual and culpa aquiliana against
two different persons because you have different causes of action.
Q. But what about in a case where a case for culpa contractual
and culpa aquiliana were filed against one and the same
person? Is this allowed?
ANS: No, because only one wrong was committed, hence there is only
one source even though that wrong or tortious act may give rise to
several causes of action.
Dean: As ruled in Transatlantica case, culpa aquiliana and culpa
contractual are fundamentally different. One is incidental while one is
the main case. You can’t have both. This is also affirmed in Construction
Development Corporation v. Estrella where the Court ruled that at the
most, what you can do is pursue both cases against one defendant but
as alternative causes of action, thus they are radically and fundamentally
different. In civil procedure, you can have joinder of causes of action if
they can be joined.
Q. Can you file culpa aquiliana even if there is a contract?
ANS:
GR: No. You cannot file culpa aquiliana because the contract is the law
between the parties. If there is a contract, then you don’t go to quasi
delict or culpa aquiliana.
XPN: Air France v. Carrascoso which held that there can still be a tort if
the act that breaches the contract is itself a tort.
Dean: But don’t cite Air France, it will betray your age.
Regino v. Pangasinan
Facts:
In a fund raising campaign held by PCST, each student was required to
pay for two tickets and those who refused to pay were denied the
opportunity to take the final examinations. In refusing to pay said
tickets, Regino was disallowed in taking the final exam and as a result
she failed.
Issue:
Is the school liable for damages?
Ruling:
Yes.
The school-student relationship is contractual in nature. The school
undertakes to provide students with sufficient education to enable them
to pursue higher education or a profession and the students agree to
abide by the academic requirements of the school and to observe its
rules and regulations. Further, schools inform prospective enrollees the
amount of fees and the terms of payment. The obligation on the part of
the school has been established in which the Court held that an
institution of higher learning has a contractual obligation to afford its
students a fair opportunity to complete the course they seek to pursue.
1
Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
6|U N I V E R S I T Y O F S A N C A R L O S
In the present case, PCST imposed the assailed revenue-raising
measure belatedly, in the middle of the semester. It exacted the dance
party fee as a condition for the students taking the final examinations,
and ultimately for its recognition of their ability to finish a course. The
fee, however, was not part of the school-student contract entered into
at the start of the school year. Hence, it could not be unilaterally
imposed to the prejudice of the enrollees
Generally, liability for tort arises only between parties not otherwise
bound by a contract. An academic institution, however, may be held
liable for tort even if it has an existing contract with its students, since
the act that violated the contract may also be a tort.
Distinction between Tort and Quasi Delict
Torts Quasi-delict
Common law in origin Civil Law concept
Object of study would be
Broader in scope – includes
provisions of law, thus limited in
customs, usages
scope
Negligent and intentional act Only negligent act
Q. Is tort broader than quasi delict?
ANS: Yes, because it encompasses both negligent and intentional acts.
Gashem Shookat v. CA
Facts:
A complaint for damages was filed by Marilou Gonzales against Gashem
Baksh for the alleged violation of their agreement to get married. She
alleged that he visited her parents in Pangasinan to secure their approval
to the marriage; that he forced her to live with him and that she was a
virgin before she began living with him.
Unfortunately, his attitude towards her allegedly changed. He allegedly
started maltreating and threatening to kill her, which she sustained
injuries as a consequence. Ultimately, Baksh repudiated their marriage
agreement, claiming that he is already married to another.
In his Answer with Counterclaim, Baksh denied the allegations, claiming
that there was no such marriage proposal and that he did not maltreat
her. The trial court ruled in Marilou’s favor. Aggrieved, Baksh appealed
to the Court of Appeals but likewise met the same fate. Thus, this
petition.
Issue:
Whether Article 211 of the NCC from where the lower courts heavily
based their decisions, is applicable to the case at bar.
Ruling:
Yes.
It is true that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable
wrong. Nonetheless, Article 21 of the NCC which expanded the concept
TORTS & DAMAGES l Midterm Reviewer l Dean Joan Largo l For the exclusive use of EH 404
of tort or quasi-delict grants adequate legal remedy for the untold
number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to
specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books.
Where a man’s promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the
acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that
promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself
unto him in a sexual congress, when in reality, he had no intention of
marrying her and the promise was only a subtle scheme to entice her to
the sexual act – could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article
21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and
deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which
followed thereafter.
Q. Is tort broader than our system of civil wrong?
ANS: No. Our system of civil wrong is broader.
Dean: Our system of civil wrong is broader than tort because it has
reference to entire civil wrongs not just quasi delict. This is because you
also include Art 19, 20, 21 the whole system of civil wrong. Thus, our
law on civil wrongs has become much more supple and adaptable than
the Anglo-American law on torts (Shookat v CA).
Summary on the concept of Quasi-Delict
1. It is a civil law concept
2. It limits us to the concept of fault or negligence
3. You don’t look to Art. 2176 when there is contract because then
the relationship between the parties will be governed by the
contract. Go to 2176 only in the absence of contract
Act or Omission
Negligence
If there is fault or negligence, and there is no pre-existing contractual
relation, there is quasi delict.
Article 1173, NCC
The fault or negligence is the omission of that diligence which is required
by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with circumstances of
the persons, of the time and of the place. When negligence shows, bad
faith, the provisions of Articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2 shall apply.
Dean: Negligence is the omission of that degree of care required of the
circumstances of persons, time and place. In other words, it is relative.
It is dependent on circumstances of persons, place and time such that
what might be negligence in one occasion may not be considered
negligence in another occasion.
Reservation: The above notion is a dangerous proposition. There should
be a standard that you can use in order to know whether in this
particular instance, there is negligence.
Elements of Negligence
Article 1174, NCC
Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise
declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation requires
the assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for those events
which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen were inevitable.
7|U N I V E R S I T Y O F S A N C A R L O S
Dean: Art 1174 provides that no person will be considered negligent
unless the event could not be foreseen or which, if foreseen, it is
inevitable.
Elements of negligence
1. Foreseeability of harm – if the harm is not foreseeable, you cannot
be faulted for not taking the needed precaution.
2. Failure to take the needed precaution – the needed precaution
would have to depend upon the circumstances of person, place and
time.
Picart v. Smith
Facts:
Picart was riding his pony over Carlatan bridge, San Fernando, La Union
when Smith approached from the opposite direction on his automobile.
As Smith neared the bridge, he blew his horn as a warning of his
approach since Picart was on the wrong side of the road.
Having been perturbed by the novelty of the automobile or the rapidity
of its approach, Picart improperly pulled his horse over to the railing on
the right. Smith, however, assuming that the horseman would move to
the other side, guided his automobile without diminution of speed
toward such same side, that being the proper side of the road for the
car.
When Smith was only a few feet away, he then turned to the right but
passed so closely to the horse that the latter being frightened, jumped
around and was killed by the passing car. Picart filed for damages for
the death of his pony and also for the contusions he received which
caused temporary unconsciousness and required medical attention for
several days.
Issue:
Whether or not Smith was guilty of negligence as to give rise to civil
liability.
Ruling:
Yes. As the defendant started across the bridge, he had the right to
assume that the horse and rider would pass over to the proper side; but
as he moved toward the center of the bridge it was demonstrated to his
eyes that this would not be done; and he must in a moment have
perceived that it was too late for the horse to cross with safety in front
of the moving vehicle.
In the nature of things, this change of situation occurred while the
automobile was yet some distance away; and from this moment it was
no longer within the power of the plaintiff to escape being run down by
going to a place of greater safety. The control of the situation had then
passed entirely to the defendant; and it was his duty either to bring his
car to an immediate stop or, seeing that there were no other persons
on the bridge, to take the other side and pass sufficiently far away from
the horse to avoid the danger of collision.
Instead of doing this, the defendant ran straight on until he was almost
upon the horse. He was deceived into doing this by the fact that the
horse had not yet exhibited fright. But in view of the known nature of
horses, there was an appreciable risk that, if the animal in question was
TORTS & DAMAGES l Midterm Reviewer l Dean Joan Largo l For the exclusive use of EH 404
unacquainted with automobiles, he might get excited and jump under
the conditions which here confronted him. When the defendant exposed
the horse and rider to this danger he was, in our opinion, negligent in
the eye of the law.
The test for determining whether a person is negligent in doing an act
whereby injury or damage results to the person or property of another
is this: Would a prudent man, in the position of the person to whom
negligence is attributed, foresee harm to the person injured as a
reasonable consequence of the course about to be pursued. If so, the
law imposes a duty on the actor to refrain from that course or to take
precaution against its mischievous results, and the failure to do so
constitutes negligence. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the
ignoring of the admonition born of this prevision, is the constitutive fact
in negligence.
TN: Court also discussed that there was contributory negligence on the
part of Picart for being on the wrong side of the road but doctrine of last
clear chance was applied making Smith liable. (another topic)
Dean: Why is it that the driver was negligent never mind that it was not
him that was on the wrong side of the road? The court said there was
foreseeability of harm. If you want to know whether the person is
negligent, you ask yourself: Can the harm be foreseen? If the harm
cannot be foreseen, you cannot ask yourself has he taken the needed
precaution. But if the harm can be foreseen, the way to test negligence
is to also ask yourself, has he taken the needed precaution? Even if
negligence is really a relative concept, one that is dependent of
circumstances of persons, place and time, there are however elements
that are there or standards to make use of there is negligence in such
particular case.
Precautions dependent on circumstances
Dean: The needed precaution would have to depend upon the
circumstances of person, place and time.
Example: You don’t expect a minor to take the same kind of precaution
that an adult would take. Also, you will not take the same precaution if
you were driving on a clear sunny day than driving at night.
Degree of diligence required of a child
Ylarde v Aquino
Facts:
Private respondent Mariano Soriano was the principal of the Gabaldon
Primary School wherein private respondent Edgardo Aquino was a
teacher therein. That time, the school had several concrete blocks which
were remnants of the old school shop that was destroyed in World War
II. Realizing that the huge stones were serious hazards to the
schoolchildren, another teacher by the name of Sergio Banez started
burying them. Deciding to help his colleague, private respondent
Edgardo Aquino gathered some of his pupils aged ten to eleven after
class dismissal to dig beside a one-ton concrete block in order to make
a hole wherein the stone can be buried.
As teacher-in-charge, he called Reynaldo Alonso, Francisco Alcantara,
Ismael Abaga and Novelito Ylarde, to dig until the excavation was one
meter and forty centimeters deep. When the depth was right enough to
accommodate the concrete block, private respondent Aquino and his
four pupils got out of the hole. He then left the students to level the
8|U N I V E R S I T Y O F S A N C A R L O S
loose soil around the open hole while he went to see Banez to get some
Rope.
Three of the four kids, Alonso, Alcantara and Ylarde, playfully jumped
into the pit. Then, without any warning at all, the remaining Abaga
jumped on top of the concrete block causing it to slide down towards
the opening. Alonso and Alcantara were able to scramble out of the
excavation on time but unfortunately for Ylarde, the concrete block
caught him before he could get out, pinning him to the wall in a standing
position which caused him several injuries and later on died.
Petitioners filed a suit for damages against both private respondents
Aquino and Soriano. The lower court dismissed the complaint and was
affirmed by the CA.
Issue:
Were there acts and omissions on the part of private respondent Aquino
amounting to fault or negligence which have direct causal relation to the
death of his pupil Ylarde?
Ruling:
Yes, Aquino is liable for damages.
The negligent act of private respondent Aquino in leaving his pupils in
such a dangerous site has a direct causal connection to the death of the
child Ylarde. Left by themselves, it was but natural for the children to
play around. Tired from the strenuous digging, they just had to amuse
themselves with whatever they found. Driven by their playful and
adventurous instincts and not knowing the risk they were facing three
of them jumped into the hole while the other one jumped on the stone.
Since the stone was so heavy and the soil was loose from the digging,
it was also a natural consequence that the stone would fall into the hole
beside it, causing injury on the unfortunate child caught by its heavy
weight.
Everything that occurred was the natural and probable effect of the
negligent acts of private respondent Aquino. Needless to say, the child
Ylarde would not have died were it not for the unsafe situation created
by private respondent Aquino which exposed the lives of all the pupils
concerned to real danger.
A truly careful and cautious person would have acted in all contrast to
the way private respondent Aquino did. Were it not for his gross
negligence, the unfortunate incident would not have occurred and the
child Ylarde would probably be alive today, a grown- man of thirty-five.
Due to his failure to take the necessary precautions to avoid the hazard,
Ylarde's parents suffered great anguish all these years.
We cannot agree with the finding of the lower court that the injuries
which resulted in the death of the child Ylarde were caused by his own
reckless imprudence. It should be remembered that he was only ten
years old at the time of the incident. As such, he is expected to be playful
and daring. His actuations were natural to a boy his age. The degree of
care required to be exercised must vary with the capacity of the person
endangered to care for himself.
A minor should not be held to the same degree of care as an adult, but
his conduct should be judged according to the average conduct of
persons of his age and experience. The standard of conduct to which a
child must conform for his own protection is that degree of care
ordinarily exercised by children of the same age, capacity, discretion,
TORTS & DAMAGES l Midterm Reviewer l Dean Joan Largo l For the exclusive use of EH 404
knowledge and experience under the same or similar circumstances.
Bearing this in mind, we cannot charge the child Ylarde with reckless
imprudence.
Dean: Ylarde was saying he was not negligent. And every allegation that
one is negligent or not negligent would have to be tested on the
foreseeability and failure to take the needed precaution. Court did not
believe that the teacher was not negligent. Why? Children are playful
and that is part of their nature. And it could have been incumbent upon
him to foresee the possibility of being playful with the boulder and for
the harm to ensue but he left them on their own
What about the allegation that the minors themselves can be charged
of contributory negligence? Can you charge the minors with
foreseeability of harm and failure to take the needed precaution? No,
because the court said that the degree of care varies on the capacity of
a person.
Degree of diligence required of a Bank
Associated Bank v Tan
Facts:
Vicente Henry Tan is a regular depositor-creditor of the Associated Bank.
He deposited a postdated UCPB check with the said bank in the amount
of P101,000.00 which was added to his original deposit. The check was
duly entered in his bank record and upon advice and instruction of the
bank that it was already cleared and backed up by sufficient funds, Tan,
on the same date, withdrew the sum of P240,000.00. A day after, Tan
deposited the amount of P50,000.00 making his existing balance in the
amount of P107,793.45, because he has issued several checks to his
business partners.
However, his suppliers and business partners went back to him alleging
that the checks he issued bounced for insufficiency of funds. Thereafter,
Tan, thru his lawyer, informed the bank to take positive steps regarding
the matter for he has adequate and sufficient funds to pay the amount
of the subject checks. Nonetheless, the bank did not bother nor offer
any apology regarding the incident. Consequently, Tan filed a Complaint
for Damages with the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City.
The trial court rendered its decision in favor of the respondent and
against the petitioner. It was shown that respondent was not officially
informed about the debiting of the P101,000.00 from his existing
balance and that the bank merely allowed the respondent to use the
fund prior to clearing merely for accommodation because the bank
considered him as one of its valued clients.
It ruled that the bank manager was negligent in handling the particular
checking account of the respondent stating that such lapses caused all
the inconveniences to the respondent. Affirming the trial court, the CA
ruled that the bank should not have authorized the withdrawal of the
value of the deposited check prior to its clearing. Having done so,
contrary to its obligation to treat respondents account with meticulous
care, the bank violated its own policy. Without such notice, it is estopped
from blaming respondent for failing to fund his account.
Issue:
Whether petitioner, which is acting as a depository bank and a collecting
agent, has properly exercised its right to set-off the account of its client
for a check deposit which was dishonored by the drawee bank.
9|U N I V E R S I T Y O F S A N C A R L O S
Ruling:
Obligation as a depositor bank
The banking business is impressed with public interest. "Consequently,
the highest degree of diligence is expected, and high standards of
integrity and performance are even required of it. By the nature of its
functions, a bank is under obligation to treat the accounts of its
depositors with meticulous care.
The degree of diligence required of banks is more than that of a good
father of a family where the fiduciary nature of their relationship with
their depositors is concerned. Indeed, the banking business is vested
with the trust and confidence of the public; hence the "appropriate
standard of diligence must be very high, if not the highest, degree of
diligence."
The standard applies, regardless of whether the account consists of only
a few hundred pesos or of millions. The fiduciary nature of banking,
previously imposed by case law, is now enshrined in Republic Act No.
8791 or the General Banking Law of 2000. Section 2 of the law
specifically says that the State recognizes the "fiduciary nature of
banking that requires high standards of integrity and performance."
The respondents did not treat the account of the petitioner with highest
degree of care. It is undisputed -- nay, even admitted -- that purportedly
as an act of accommodation to a valued client, petitioner allowed the
withdrawal of the face value of the deposited check prior to its clearing.
That act certainly disregarded the clearance requirement of the banking
system.
Obligation as a collecting agent
As a general rule, a bank is liable for the wrongful or tortuous acts and
declarations of its officers or agents within the course and scope of their
employment. Due to the very nature of their business, banks are
expected to exercise the highest degree of diligence in the selection and
supervision of their employees.
Jurisprudence has established that the lack of diligence of a servant is
imputed to the negligence of the employer, when the negligent or
wrongful act of the former proximately results in an injury to a third
person; in this case, the depositor. The manager of the banks
Cabanatuan branch, Consorcia Santiago, categorically admitted that she
and the employees under her control had breached bank policies. They
admittedly breached those policies when, without clearance from the
drawee bank in Baguio, they allowed respondent to withdraw on
October 1, 1990, the amount of the check deposited.
Degree of diligence required of an owner of a gun store
Pacis v. Morales
Facts:
Alfred Dennis Pacis, then 17 years old, died due to a gunshot wound in
the head which he sustained while he was at the Top Gun Firearm and
Ammunition Store located at Upper Mabini Street, Baguio City. The gun
store was owned and operated by defendant Jerome Jovanne Morales.
The bullet which killed Alfred Dennis Pacis was fired from a gun brought
in by a customer of the gun store for repair which was left by defendant
Morales, who was in Manila that time, in a drawer of a table located
TORTS & DAMAGES l Midterm Reviewer l Dean Joan Largo l For the exclusive use of EH 404
inside the gun store. It appears that Matibag and Herbolario later
brought out the gun from the drawer and placed it on top of the table
to which Alfred Dennis Pacis got hold of the same. Matibag asked Alfred
Dennis Pacis to return the gun. The latter followed and handed the gun
to Matibag. It went off, the bullet hitting the young Alfred in the head.
The trial court held that the accidental shooting of Alfred which caused
his death was partly due to the negligence of respondent’s employee
Aristedes Matibag (Matibag). Matibag and Jason Herbolario (Herbolario)
were employees of respondent even if they were only paid on a
commission basis.
Under the Civil Code, respondent is liable for the damages caused by
Matibag on the occasion of the performance of his duties, unless
respondent proved that he observed the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent the damage.
The Court of Appeals held that respondent cannot be held civilly liable
since there was no employer-employee relationship between respondent
and Matibag. The Court of Appeals found that Matibag was not under
the control of respondent with respect to the means and methods in the
performance of his work. Even if no employer-employee relationship
existed, it found that no negligence can be attributed to respondent.
Issue:
Whether respondent is negligent for the death of Alfred Dennis Pacis.
Ruling:
Yes.
Unlike the subsidiary liability of the employer under Article 103 of the
Revised Penal Code, the liability of the employer, or any person for that
matter, under Article 2176 of the Civil Code is primary and direct, based
on a person’s own negligence.
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there
being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such
fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter.
A higher degree of care is required of someone who has in his
possession or under his control an instrumentality extremely dangerous
in character, such as dangerous weapons or substances. Such person in
possession or control of dangerous instrumentalities has the duty to take
exceptional precautions to prevent any injury being done thereby. Unlike
the ordinary affairs of life or business which involve little or no risk, a
business dealing with dangerous weapons requires the exercise of a
higher degree of care.
As a gun store owner, respondent is presumed to be knowledgeable
about firearms safety and should have known never to keep a loaded
weapon in his store to avoid unreasonable risk of harm or injury to
others. Respondent has the duty to ensure that all the guns in his store
are not loaded.
Firearms should be stored unloaded and separate from ammunition
when the firearms are not needed for ready-access defensive use. With
more reason, guns accepted by the store for repair should not be loaded
precisely because they are defective and may cause an accidental
discharge such as what happened in this case.
10 | U N I V E R S I T Y O F S A N C A R L O S
Respondent was clearly negligent when he accepted the gun for repair
and placed it inside the drawer without ensuring first that it was not
loaded. In the first place, the defective gun should have been stored in
a vault. Before accepting the defective gun for repair, respondent should
have made sure that it was not loaded to prevent any untoward
accident.
For failing to ensure that the gun was not loaded, respondent himself
was negligent. Clearly, respondent did not exercise the degree of care
and diligence required of a good father of a family, much less the degree
of care required of someone dealing with dangerous weapons, as would
exempt him from liability in this case
Dean: In short, businesses imbued with public interest are treated with
higher degree of diligence than other businesses not involved with public
interest.
Degree of diligence required of a disabled man
Francisco v. Chemical Bulk Carriers
Facts:
Respondent Chemical Bulk Carriers Inc. (CBCI) filed a case against
Petitioner Francisco for damages based on Articles 19, 20,21,and 22of
the Civil Code. CBCI alleged that its diesel fuels were delivered and sold
to Francisco by a certain Gregorio Bacsa who represent himself as an
employee of CBCI. However, Bacsa was not authorized by CBCI and that
Bacsa only stole the diesel fuels. CBCI wanted to recover the diesel fuels
from Francisco but this cannot longer be done because Francisco had
already sold it to third persons. Hence, CBCI filed this case for damages
against Francisco.
In his defense, the heirs of Francisco, who substituted Francisco in the
case, argued that he cannot be held liable for damages because he is a
purchaser in good faith. The heirs of Francisco argue that the Court of
Appeals erred when it ruled that Francisco was liable to CBCI because
he failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family when he
bought the diesel fuel. They argue that since Francisco was blind, the
standard of conduct that was required of him was that of a reasonable
person under like disability.
Moreover, they insist that Francisco exercised due care in purchasing
the diesel fuel by doing the following: (1) Francisco asked his son to
check the identity of Bacsa; (2) Francisco required direct delivery from
Petron, the supplier of CBCI; (3) Francisco required that he be named
as the consignee in the invoice; and (4) Francisco required separate
receipts from Bacsa to evidence actual payment.
Issue:
Whether Francisco is liable for damages for failing to exercise the
required diligence under the circumstances in purchasing the diesel fuels
of CBCI which was just stolen by Bacsa.
Ruling:
Yes.
Francisco is liable for damages. Francisco should pay the actual value of
the diesel fuels which can no longer be recovered. He failed to exercise
the required diligence under the circumstances.
TORTS & DAMAGES l Midterm Reviewer l Dean Joan Largo l For the exclusive use of EH 404
One who is physically disabled is required to use the same degree of
care that a reasonably careful person who has the same physical
disability would use. Physical handicaps and infirmities, such as
blindness or deafness, are treated as part of the circumstances under
which a reasonable person must act. Thus, the standard of conduct for
a blind person becomes that of a reasonable person who is blind.
We note that Francisco, despite being blind, had been managing and
operating the Caltex station for 15 years and this was not a hindrance
for him to transact business until this time. In this instance, however,
we rule that Francisco failed to exercise the standard of conduct
expected of a reasonable person who is blind.
First, Francisco merely relied on the identification card of Bacsa to
determine if he was authorized by CBCI. Francisco did not do any other
background check on the identity and authority of Bacsa. Second,
Francisco already expressed his misgivings about the diesel fuel, fearing
that they might be stolen property, yet he did not verify with CBCI the
authority of Bacsa to sell the diesel fuel. Third, Francisco relied on the
receipts issued by Bacsa which were typewritten on a half sheet of plain
bond paper.
If Francisco exercised reasonable diligence, he should have asked for an
official receipt issued by CBCI. Fourth, the delivery to Francisco, as
indicated in Petron’s invoice, does not show that CBCI authorized Bacsa
to sell the diesel fuel to Francisco. Clearly, Francisco failed to exercise
the standard of conduct expected of a reasonable person who is blind.
Since CBCI was unlawfully deprived of its property, it may recover from
Francisco, even if Francisco pleads good faith.
Dean: It is relative. The test of negligence is the same. Foreseeability of
harm, failure to take the needed precaution, and the needed precaution
would have to be relative depending on the circumstance of the person,
things time. There is no minimum standard of care that you have to
observe.
General standard of care is that of a reasonably prudent person.
Minimum: Slight degree of care.
Q. If there is a minimum, can we stipulate that the required
diligence in this particular conduct is slight degree of diligence?
ANS: When the degree of care is specified by law, we can’t do anything.
But the law states: “When it is otherwise declared by stipulation”.
Q. Other than those cases where the degree of care is specified
by law, can we stipulate that the level of care to be observed is
lesser than that of a reasonably average person? Would that be
contrary to public policy?
ANS: (not answered; possible midterm question at 5%)
Q. May Article 2185 which is applicable to motor vehicles, be
applied by analogy to non-motorized vehicles?
ANS: No.
11 | U N I V E R S I T Y O F S A N C A R L O S
Anonuevo v. CA
Facts:
At around 9 PM, Villagracia was traveling along Boni Avenue on his
bicycle, while Anonuevo, traversing the opposite lane, was driving his
Lancer car. The two collided which resulted to serious injuries suffered
by Villagracia which necessitated his hospitalization several times and
forced him to undergo 4 operations. Villagracia instituted an action for
damages before the RTC.
Añonuevo claims that Villagracia violated traffic regulations when he
failed to register his bicycle or install safety gadgets thereon. He posits
that Article 2185 of the New Civil Code applies by analogy. The provision
reads:
Article 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed
that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at
the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.
He claims that Villagracia's own fault and negligence serves to absolve
the former of any liability for damages.
Issue:
Whether Article 2185 of the New Civil Code, which presumes the driver
of a motor vehicle negligent if he was violating a traffic regulation at the
time of the mishap, should apply by analogy to non-motorized vehicles.
Ruling:
No.
We cannot sustain the contention that Art. 2185 should apply to non-
motorized vehicles, even if by analogy. While the duty of using ordinary
care falls alike on the motorist and the rider or driver of a bicycle, it is
obvious, for reasons growing out of the inherent differences in the two
vehicles, that more is required from the former to fully discharge the
duty than from the latter.
The generally accepted view is that the violation of a statutory duty
constitutes negligence, negligence as a matter of law, or negligence per
se. Now, should the doctrine of negligence per se apply to Villagracia,
resulting from his violation of an ordinance?
We are hard put to conclude that Villagracia would have avoided injury
had his bicycle been up to par with safety regulations. This Court has
appreciated that negligence per se, arising from the mere violation of a
traffic statute, need not be sufficient in itself in establishing liability for
damages. The failure of the bicycle owner to comply with accepted
safety practices, whether or not imposed by ordinance or statute, is not
sufficient to negate or mitigate recovery unless a causal connection is
established between such failure and the injury sustained.
It may constitute negligence barring or diminishing recovery if the
bicyclist is struck by a motorist as long as the absence of such lights was
a proximate cause of the collision. However, the absence of such lights
will not preclude or diminish recovery if the scene of the accident was
well illuminated by street lights, if substitute lights were present which
clearly rendered the bicyclist visible, if the motorist saw the bicycle in
spite of the absence of lights thereon, or if the motorist would have been
unable to see the bicycle even if it had been equipped with lights.
TORTS & DAMAGES l Midterm Reviewer l Dean Joan Largo l For the exclusive use of EH 404
A bicycle equipped with defective or ineffective brakes may support a
finding of negligence barring or diminishing recovery by an injured
bicyclist where such condition was a contributing cause of the accident.
The proximate cause of the accident was the speeding up of Añonuevo.
He failed to establish a causal connection between the safety violations
imputed to Villagracia and the accident itself. Instead, he relied on a
putative presumption that these violations in themselves sufficiently
established negligence appreciable against Villagracia. Since the onus on
Añonuevo is to conclusively prove the link between the violations and
the accident, we can deem him as having failed to discharge his
necessary burden of proving Villagracia's own liability.
Neither can we adjudge Villagracia with contributory negligence.
Añonuevo himself admitted having seen Villagracia from 10 meters
away, thus he could no longer claim not having been sufficiently warned
either by headlights or safety horns. The fact that Añonuevo was
recklessly speeding as he made the turn likewise leads us to believe that
even if Villagracia's bicycle had been equipped with the proper brakes,
the cyclist would not have had the opportunity to brake in time to avoid
the speeding car.
Q. Why don’t we apply the presumption of negligence?
ANS: It cannot be applied expressly because the law does not
contemplate of bicycles. Also, it cannot be applied by analogy.
Dean: Even if we cannot apply bicycles expressly, we cannot also apply
it by analogy. Physical effort is needed to run bicycles. This is different
from the engines used in motorized vehicles which can run at greater
speeds. The framers of the law were aware of the differences between
motorized and non-motorized vehicles. Despite this, they decided to
craft regulations only governing motor vehicles. They did not intend to
cover non-motorized vehicles.
Causal relation between Act or Omission and Damage
A. Res Ipsa Loquitur
B. Doctrine of Proximate Cause
C. Doctrine of Imputed Negligence2
D. Burden of Proof
Res Ipsa Loquitor
Res ipsa loquitor
Where the thing which caused the injury complained of is shown to be
under the management of defendant or his servants and the accident is
such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who
have its management or control use proper care, it affords reasonable
evidence, in absence of explanation of defendant, that the incident
happened because of want of care.
Dean: This doctrine is found in jurisprudence and not expressly found in
our laws. The doctrine is an inference of negligence.
Elements
1. The accident is of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless
someone is negligent
2
Discussion on page 17 under Vicarious Liability
12 | U N I V E R S I T Y O F S A N C A R L O S
2. The cause of the injury was under the exclusive control of the
person in charge
3. The injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action
or contribution on the part of the person injured.
Africa v. Caltex Phils
Facts:
A fire broke out at the Caltex service station in Manila. It started while
gasoline was being hosed from a tank truck into the underground
storage, right at the opening of the receiving truck where the nozzle of
the hose was inserted.
The fire then spread to and burned several neighboring houses,
including the personal properties and effects inside them. The owners
of the houses, among them petitioners here, sued Caltex and Boquiren
(agent in charge of operation).
Issue:
Whether or not the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable.
Ruling:
Yes.
Res ipsa Loquitur is a rule to the effect that “where the thing which
caused the injury complained of is shown to be under the management
of defendant or his servants and the accident is such as in the ordinary
course of things does not happen if those who have its management or
control use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in absence of
explanation of defendant, that the incident happened because of want
of care.
The gasoline station, with all its appliances, equipment and employees,
was under the control of appellees. A fire occurred therein and spread
to and burned the neighboring houses. The person who knew or could
have known how the fire started were the appellees and their
employees, but they gave no explanation thereof whatsoever. It is fair
and reasonable inference that the incident happened because of want
of care.
In this case, there was fire in the gasoline station that ravaged the entire
neighborhood and it was difficult to establish who was negligent. In the
case, the elements of Res Ipsa Loquitur are as follows:
1. It would not have happened had somebody been negligent
2. The cause of the incident is under the exclusive control of the
person in charge and
3. The injury suffered was not caused by the voluntary action of the
one injured.
The evidence was within the exclusive control of defendant Caltex.
There was a difficulty in producing evidence. The inference of res ipsa
loquitor was applied. The accident would not have occurred unless
somebody was negligent. The cause was within the exclusive control of
Caltex.
Dean: In the case of Perla Compania v. Sarangaya, the Supreme Court
emphasized that the presumption is an inference which means that the
TORTS & DAMAGES l Midterm Reviewer l Dean Joan Largo l For the exclusive use of EH 404
counsel has to bring in the facts which will give rise to the inference. It
was explicit in saying that if you were not able to bring proof of
negligence, you cannot cure that by saying that the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitor applies. This is not some replacement for whenever you forgot
to provide proof of negligence.
Perla Compania de Seguros Inc v. Spouses Sarangaya
Facts:
Spouses Sarangaya had a building where Perla Compania, through its
branch manager and co-petitioner Bienvenido Pascual, entered into a
contract of lease of the first door of the “Super A Building.” He renovated
the rented space and divided it into two – one was converted into an
office, the other was made into a garage. He decided to “warm up” the
car. When he pulled up the handbrake and switched on the ignition key,
the engine made an “odd” sound and did not start.
He then saw a small flame coming out of the engine. He tried to push it
out of the garage but fire spewed out of its rear compartment and
engulfed the whole garage. He was trapped inside and suffered burns.
The respondents were busy watching television when they heard two
loud explosions. In no time, fire spread inside their house, destroying all
their belongings, furniture and appliances.
Issue:
Whether or not Perla is applicable under the Res Ipsa Loquitur Doctrine.
Ruling:
Yes.
Pascual is liable under res ipsa loquitur doctrine. In such instance, the
plaintiff relies on proof of the happening of the accident alone to
establish negligence. The doctrine provides a means by which a plaintiff
can pin liability on a defendant who, if innocent, should be able to
explain the care he exercised to prevent the incident complained of.
Thus, it is the defendant’s responsibility to show that there was no
negligence on his part.
To sustain the allegation of negligence based on the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur, the following requisites must concur:
1. The accident is of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless
someone is negligent;
2. The cause of the injury was under the exclusive control of the
person in charge and
3. The injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary
action or contribution on the part of the person injured.
Under the first requisite, the occurrence must be one that does not
ordinarily occur unless there is negligence. A flame spewing out of a car
engine, when it is switched on, is obviously not a normal event. Neither
does an explosion usually occur when a car engine is revved. Hence, in
this case, without any direct evidence as to the cause of the accident,
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur comes into play and from it, we draw
the inference that based on the evidence at hand, someone was in fact
negligent and responsible for the accident.
Under the second requisite, the instrumentality or agency that triggered
the occurrence must be one that falls under the exclusive control of the
13 | U N I V E R S I T Y O F S A N C A R L O S
person in charge thereof. In this case, the car where the fire originated
was under the control of Pascual.
Being its caretaker, he alone had the responsibility to maintain it and
ensure its proper functioning. Where the circumstances which caused
the accident are shown to have been under the management or control
of a certain person and, in the normal course of events, the incident
would not have happened had that person used proper care, the
inference is that it occurred because of lack of such care. The burden of
evidence is thus shifted to defendant to establish that he observed all
that was necessary to prevent the accident from happening. In this
aspect, Pascual utterly failed.
Under the third requisite, there is nothing in the records to show that
respondents contributed to the incident. They had no access to the car
and had no responsibility regarding its maintenance even if it was parked
in a building they owned.
Here, the fact that Pascual, as the caretaker of the car, failed to submit
any proof that he had it periodically checked (as its year-model and
condition required) revealed his negligence. A prudent man should have
known that a 14-year-old car, constantly used in provincial trips, was
definitely prone to damage and other defects. For failing to prove care
and diligence in the maintenance of the vehicle, the necessary inference
was that Pascual had been negligent in the upkeep of the car.
Dean: In the case of Layugan, the Supreme Court emphasized that the
doctrine can only be invoked only when direct evidence is absent or not
readily available. It is not rare that lawyers invoke this as an end
argument, or when they are pushed to the wall.
Layugan v. IAC
Facts:
Pedro T. Layugan filed an action for damages against Godofredo Isidro,
alleging that while at Baretbet, Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya, the Plaintiff
and a companion were repairing the tire of their cargo truck which was
parked along the right side of the National Highway; that defendant's
truck, driven recklessly by Daniel Serrano bumped the plaintiff, that as
a result, plaintiff was injured and hospitalized where he incurred and will
incur more expenses as he recuperates from said injuries; Plaintiff's right
leg was amputated and that because of said injuries he would be
deprived of a lifetime income.
Defendants Isidro [owner] and Serrano [driver] averred that he knows
his responsibilities as a driver and further contends that it was the
negligence of plaintiff that was the proximate cause of the accident.
They alleged that plaintiff parked his truck in a manner which occupied
a part of the highway and he did not even put a warning sign.
The RTC ruled in favor of the Petitioners. The CA reversed the decision,
stating that it is the petitioners who were negligent since they did not
exercise caution by putting warning signs that their truck is park on the
shoulder of the highway.
Issue:
Whether the CA correctly applied the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
Ruling:
No.
TORTS & DAMAGES l Midterm Reviewer l Dean Joan Largo l For the exclusive use of EH 404
The SC held that the CA erroneously appreciated the evidence. It was
proven that the petitioner placed a warning sign within 3 to 4 meters
from their truck in the form of a lighted kerosene lamp. The existence
of this warning sings was corroborated by Serrano, respondent's driver,
and further stated that when he saw a parked truck, he kept on stepping
on the brake pedal but it did not function. Thus despite this warning
signs, the truck recklessly driven by Serrano and owned by Respondent
Isidro bumped the truck of petitioner.
The private respondent is sued under Art. 2176 in relation to Art. 2180,
paragraph 5, of the Civil Code. In the latter, when an injury is caused
by the negligence of a servant or employee there instantly arises a
presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master
or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in
supervision over him after selection, or both. Such presumption is juris
tantum and not juris et de jure and consequently, may be rebutted.
It follows necessarily that if the employer shows to the satisfaction of
the court that in the selection and in the supervision he has exercised
the care and diligence of a good father of a family, the presumption is
overcome and he is relieved from liability. In disclaiming liability for the
incident, the private respondent stresses that the negligence of his
employee has already been adequately overcome by his driver's
statement that he knew his responsibilities as a driver and that the truck
owner used to instruct him to be careful in driving.
We do not agree with the private respondent in his submission. In the
first place, it is clear that the driver did not know his responsibilities
because he apparently did not check his vehicle before he took it on the
road. If he did he could have discovered earlier that the brake fluid pipe
on the right was cut, and could have repaired it and thus the accident
could have been avoided.
Moreover, to our mind, the fact that the private respondent used to
instruct his driver to be careful in his driving, that the driver was
licensed, and the fact that he had no record of any accident, as found
by the respondent court, are not sufficient to destroy the finding of
negligence of the Regional Trial Court given the facts established at the
trial. The private respondent or his mechanic, who must be competent,
should have conducted a thorough inspection of his vehicle before
allowing his driver to drive it.
In the light of the circumstances obtaining in the case, we hold that
Isidro failed to prove that the diligence of a good father of a family in
the supervision of his employees which would exculpate him from
solidary liability with his driver to the petitioner.
But even if we concede that the diligence of a good father of a family
was observed by Isidro in the supervision of his driver, there is not an
iota of evidence on record of the observance by Isidro of the same
quantum of diligence in the supervision of his mechanic, if any, who
would be directly in charge in maintaining the road worthiness of his
(Isidro's) truck.
But that is not all. There is paucity of proof that Isidro exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection of his driver, Daniel
Serrano, as well as in the selection of his mechanic, if any, in order to
insure the safe operation of his truck and thus prevent damage to
others. Accordingly, the responsibility of Isidro as employer treated in
Article 2180, paragraph 5, of the Civil Code has not ceased.
Important: The doctrine of res ipsa loquitor cannot be invoked when
there is direct evidence. It can be invoked when and only when under
14 | U N I V E R S I T Y O F S A N C A R L O S
the circumstances involved, direct evidence is not readily available or is
absent.
Dean: In the recent case of Carmen Jr. v. Bacoy, no person walking
along the road may be sideswiped by an incoming vehicle unless the
driver was negligence. Dean thinks that in this case, direct evidence was
difficult to obtain. There may be times when theory doesn’t mean
practice. Application may vary but they are always anchored on theory.
Carmen Jr. v. Bacoy
Facts:
The Bacoy family were on their way home from a Christmas party they
attended when they were run over by a Fuso passenger jeep registered
in the name of petitioner Oscar del Carmen, Jr. (Oscar Jr.) and used as
a public utility. During the pendency of said criminal case, Emilia's father,
Geronimo Bacoy (Geronimo), in behalf of the six minor children of the
Monsaluds, filed Civil Case No. 96- 20219, an independent civil action
for damages based on culpa aquiliana.
Oscar Jr.'s core defense to release him from responsibility for the death
of the Monsaluds is that his jeep was stolen. He highlights that the
unauthorized taking of the jeep from the parking area was indeed
carried out by the clandestine and concerted efforts of Allan and his five
companions, notwithstanding the obstacles surrounding the parking
area and the weight of the jeep.
Issue:
Whether or not the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable.
Ruling:
Yes.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable here.
First, no person just walking along the road would suddenly be
sideswiped and run over by an on-rushing vehicle unless the one in
charge of the said vehicle had been negligent.
Second, the jeep which caused the injury was under the exclusive
control of Oscar Jr. as its owner. When Oscar Jr. entrusted the ignition
key to Rodrigo, he had the power to instruct him with regard to the
specific restrictions of the jeep's use, including who or who may not
drive it. As he is aware that the jeep may run without the ignition key,
he also has the responsibility to park it safely and securely and to
instruct his driver Rodrigo to observe the same precaution.
Lastly, there was no showing that the death of the victims was due to
any voluntary action or contribution on their part.
Solidum v. People of the Philippines
Facts:
Gerald Albert Gercayo was born with an imperforate anus. Two days
after his birth, Gerald underwent colostomy. However, Gerald was
admitted at the Ospital ng Maynila for a pull-through operation. Dr.
Leandro Resurreccion headed the surgical team, and was assisted by
Dr. Joselito Lucerio, Dr. Donatella Valeria and Dr. Joseph Tibio. The
anesthesiologist included Drs. Abella, Razon and Solidum.
TORTS & DAMAGES l Midterm Reviewer l Dean Joan Largo l For the exclusive use of EH 404
2. No.
During the operation, Gerald experienced bradycardia and went into a
coma. His coma lasted for two weeks but he regained consciousness
only after a month. He could no longer see, hear, or move. A complaint
for reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries was filed
by Gerald’s parents against the team of doctors alleging that there was
failure in monitoring the anesthesia administered to Gerald.
Issues:
1. Whether or not petitioner is liable for medical negligence.
2. Whether or not res ipsa loquitur can be resorted to in medical
negligence cases.
Ruling:
1. No.
Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the protection of
the interests of another person that degree of care, precaution,
and vigilance that the circumstances justly demand, whereby such
other person suffers injury. Reckless imprudence, on the other
hand, consists of voluntarily doing or failing to do, without malice,
an act from which material damage results by reason of an
inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person to perform
or failing to perform such act.
The negligence must be the proximate cause of the injury. For,
negligence no matter in what it consists, cannot create a right of
action unless it is the proximate cause of the injury complained of.
And the proximate cause of an injury is that cause, which, in
natural and continuous sequence and unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the
result would not have occurred.
An action upon medical negligence – whether criminal, civil or
administrative – calls for the plaintiff to prove by competent
evidence each of the following four elements namely:
1. The duty owed by the physician to the patient, as created by
the physician-patient relationship, to act in accordance with
the specific norms or standards established by his profession;
2. The breach of the duty by the physician’s failing to act in
accordance with the applicable standard of care;
3. The causation, is, there must be a reasonably close and casual
connection between the negligent act or omission and the
resulting injury; and
4. The damages suffered by the patient.
In the medical profession, specific norms on standard of care to
protect the patient against unreasonable risk, commonly referred
to as standards of care, set the duty of the physician in respect of
the patient.
The standard of care is an objective standard which conduct of a
physician sued for negligence or malpractice may be measured,
and it does not depend therefore, on any individual’s physician’s
own knowledge either. In attempting to fix a standard by which a
court may determine whether the physician has properly
performed the requisite duty toward the patient, expert medical
testimony from both plaintiff and defense experts is required.
15 | U N I V E R S I T Y O F S A N C A R L O S
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur means that where the thing which
causes injury is shown to be under the management of the
defendant, and the accident is such as in ordinary course of things
does not happen if those who have management use proper care,
it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by
defendant that the accident arose from want of care.
Nevertheless, despite the fact that the scope of res ipsa loquitur
has been measurably enlarged, it does not automatically apply to
all cases of medical negligence as to mechanically shift the burden
of proof to the defendant to show that he is not guilty of the
ascribed negligence.
Res ipsa loquitur is not a rigid or ordinary doctrine to be
perfunctorily used but a rule to be cautiously applied, depending
upon the circumstances of each case. It is generally restricted to
situations in malpractice cases where a layman is able to say, as a
matter of common knowledge and observation, that the
consequences of professional care were not as such as would
ordinarily have followed if due care had been exercised.
A distinction must be made between the failure to secure results,
and the occurrence of something more unusual and not ordinarily
found if the service or treatment rendered followed the usual
procedure of those skilled in that particular practice. It must be
conceded that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur can have no
application in a suit against a physician or surgeon which involves
the merits of a diagnosis or of a scientific treatment. The physician
or surgeon is not required at his peril to explain why any particular
diagnosis was not correct, or why any particular scientific treatment
did not produce the desired results.
Thus, res ipsa loquitur is not available in a malpractice suit if the
only showing is that the desired result of an operation or treatment
was not accomplished. The real question, therefore, is whether or
not in the process of the operation any extraordinary incident or
unusual event outside the routine performance occurred which is
beyond the regular scope of customary professional activity in such
operations, which if unexplained would themselves reasonably
speak to the average man as the negligent case or causes of the
untoward consequence. If there was such extraneous intervention,
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may be utilized and the dependent
is called upon to explain the matter, by evidence of exculpation, if
he could.
The facts given by the petitioners were not enough to say that the
blindness and paralysis of the patient were caused by the
negligence of the doctors. In hospitals, death does not necessarily
mean that someone was negligent. In the case of Solidum, it was
not sufficiently proven that the blindness & paralysis of the baby
were caused automatically by the doctors’ negligence. Res ipsa
loquitur is not applicable just because the results intended were
not reached. It will only apply if there really was negligence, such
as when a medical tool was left inside the body of the patient.
TN: Keep this case in mind because when we reach the medical
negligence topic, we’ll read this alongside Ramos v. CA (the MR).
Dean: There is negligence when there is foreseeability of harm and
failure to take the needed precaution. Once there is negligence, it
TORTS & DAMAGES l Midterm Reviewer l Dean Joan Largo l For the exclusive use of EH 404
is incumbent upon him who alleges negligence to prove negligence,
such that you can make presumptions or inference of negligence.
The other thing, however, to make up a cause of action for quasi-
delict is it’s not enough to establish negligence. The important
component is that this negligence must also be the proximate
cause of the injury. Even if there was negligence, if the negligence
was not the proximate cause of the injury, then there can still be
no injury. It is equally important to understand the concept of
proximate cause.
Doctrine of proximate cause
Proximate cause
That cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, cause unbroken
by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without
which the result would not have occurred.'
Art 2179, NCC
When the plaintiff’s own negligence was the immediate and proximate
cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence
was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury
being the defendant’s lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover
damages, but the court’s shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.
Bataclan v. Medina
Facts:
The passengers called the help of the villagers and as it was dark, the
villagers brought torch with them. The driver and the conductor failed
to warn the would-be helpers of the fact that gasoline has spilled from
the overturned bus so a huge fire ensued which engulfed the bus
thereby killing the 4 passengers trapped inside.
Issue:
What is the proximate cause of the accident?
Ruling:
Proximate cause is that cause, which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the
injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.
And more comprehensively, 'the proximate legal cause is that acting first
and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events
in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each
having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the
final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and
probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances
that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary
prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the
moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might
probably result therefrom.
The proximate cause was the overturning of the bus which was caused
by the negligence of the driver because he was speeding and also he
was already advised by Medina to change the tires yet he did not. Such
negligence resulted to the overturning of the bus. The torches carried
by the would-be helpers are not to be blamed.
16 | U N I V E R S I T Y O F S A N C A R L O S
It is just but natural for the villagers to respond to the call for help from
the passengers and since it is a rural area which did not have flashlights,
torches are the natural source of lighting. Further, the smell of gas could
have been all over the place yet the driver and the conductor failed to
provide warning about said fact to the villagers.
Fe Cayao- Lasam v. Ramolete
One liner: No negligence can be attributed to the petitioner-doctor
because the immediate cause of the accident resulting in Editha’s injury
was her own omission when she did not return for a follow-up check-
up, in defiance of petitioner doctor’s orders.
Facts:
Respondent Editha Remolete, then three months pregnant, was brought
to Lorma Medical Center due to vaginal bleeding. A pelvic sonogram was
conducted that revealed the weak cardiac pulsation of the fetus, and
later revealed no fetal movement.
Due to persistent & profuse bleeding, Editha was advised to undergo a
Dilatation and Curettage Procedure or raspa, which was accordingly
performed. She was thereafter discharged the following day.
Later, Editha was again brought to the same hospital because she was
suffering from vomiting or severe abdominal pains. She was attended
by three doctors and was informed that there was a dead fetus inside
her womb. She underwent laparotomy, where she was found to have a
massive intra-abdominal hemorrhage and ruptured uterus. As a result,
she has no more chance to bear a child.
The Board of Medicine of the PRC exonerated the petitioner from the
charges. Aggrieved, respondents appealed this decision to the PRC,
which reversed the findings of the Board. Thus, this petition.
Issue:
Whether petitioner was guilty of medical negligence.
Ruling:
No.
Medical malpractice, in our jurisdiction, is often brought as a civil action
for damages under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. The defenses in an
action for damages, provided for under Article 2179 are:
Art. 2179. When the plaintiffs own negligence was the immediate
and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages.
But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and
proximate cause of the injury being the defendants lack of due
care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall
mitigate the damages to be awarded.”
Edtiha failed to return for her follow-up check-up despite petitioner’s
advice.
In the testimony of Dr. Manalo, he stated that assuming that there was
in fact a misdiagnosis, the same would have been rectified if Editha
followed the petitioners order to return for a check-up.
Contributory negligence is the act or omission amounting to want of
ordinary care on the part of the person injured, which, concurring with
the defendants negligence, is the proximate cause of the injury.
TORTS & DAMAGES l Midterm Reviewer l Dean Joan Largo l For the exclusive use of EH 404
Difficulty seems to be apprehended in deciding which acts of the injured
party shall be considered immediate causes of the accident.
Where the immediate cause of an accident resulting in an injury is the
plaintiffs own act, which contributed to the principal occurrence as one
of its determining factors, he cannot recover damages for the injury.
Based on the evidence presented in the present case under review, in
which no negligence can be attributed to the petitioner, the immediate
cause of the accident resulting in Editha’s injury was her own omission
when she did not return for a follow-up check-up, in defiance of
petitioner’s orders. The immediate cause of Editha’s injury was her own
act; thus, she cannot recover damages from the injury.
Sanitary Steam Laundry v. CA
Facts:
This case involves a collision between a Mercedes Benz panel truck of
petitioner Sanitary Steam Laundry and a Cimarron which caused the
death of three persons and the injuries of several others. Petitioner
claims that the driver of the Cimarron was guilty of violation of traffic
rules and regulations at the time of the mishap. Hence, in accordance
with Art. 2185 of the Civil Code, he was presumed to be negligent.
Issue:
Whether or not there was contributory negligence on the part of the
Cimarron driver and if it contributed to the collision?
Ruling:
No.
It has not been shown how the alleged negligence of the Cimarron driver
contributed to the collision between the vehicles. Indeed, petitioner has
the burden of showing a causal connection between the injury received
and the violation of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code. He must
show that the violation of the statute was the proximate or legal cause
of the injury or that it substantially contributed thereto. Negligence,
consisting in whole or in part, of violation of law, like any other
negligence, is without legal consequence unless it is a contributing cause
of the injury.
Petitioner says that "driving an overloaded vehicle with only one
functioning headlight during nighttime certainly increases the risk of
accident," that because the Cimarron had only one headlight, there was
"decreased visibility," and that the fact that the vehicle was overloaded
and its front seat overcrowded "decreased its maneuverability."
However, mere allegations such as these are not sufficient to discharge
its burden of proving clearly that such alleged negligence was the
contributing cause of the injury.
All these point to the fact that the proximate cause of the accident was
the negligence of petitioner's driver. As the trial court noted, the
swerving of petitioner's panel truck to the opposite lane could mean not
only that petitioner's driver was running the vehicle at a very high speed
but that he was tailgating the passenger jeepney ahead of it as well.
17 | U N I V E R S I T Y O F S A N C A R L O S
Tison v. Pomasin
Facts:
Two vehicles, a tractor-trailer and a jitney, figured in a vehicular mishap.
Multiple death and injuries to those in the jitney resulted. `At the time
of the incident, Jabon, the driver of the tractor-trailer, was prohibited
from driving the truck due to the restriction imposed on his driver's
license, i.e., restriction code 2 and 3.
Issue:
Who is the negligent party or the party at fault?
Ruling:
The jitney driver.
Going downward, the jitney had the tendency to accelerate. The fall into
the shoulder of the road can result in the loss of control of the jitney,
which explains why it was running in a zigzag manner before it hit the
tractor-trailer. There was no showing that the tractor-trailer was
speeding. There is a preponderance of evidence that the tractor-trailer
was in fact ascending. Considering its size and the weight of the tractor-
trailer, its speed could not be more than that of a fully loaded jitney
which was running downhill in a zigzagging manner.
Clearly, the negligence of the jitney driveri was the proximate cause of
the accident. We did not lose sight of the fact that at the time of the
incident, Jabon was prohibited from driving the truck due to the
restriction imposed on his driver's license, i.e., restriction code 2 and 3.
Driving without a proper license is a violation of traffic regulation.
Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, the legal presumption of negligence
arises if at the time of the mishap, a person was violating any traffic
regulation. However, in Sanitary Steam Laundry, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, we held that a causal connection must exist between the injury
received and the violation of the traffic regulation. It must be proven
that the violation of the traffic regulation was the proximate or legal
cause of the injury or that it substantially contributed thereto.
Negligence, consisting in whole or in part, of violation of law, like any
other negligence, is without legal consequence unless it is a contributing
cause of the injury. Likewise controlling is our ruling in Añonuevo v.
Court of Appeals where we reiterated that negligence per se, arising
from the mere violation of a traffic statute, need not be sufficient in itself
in establishing liability for damages.
The rule on negligence per se must admit qualifications that may arise
from the logical consequences of the facts leading to the mishap. The
doctrine (and Article 2185, for that matter) is undeniably useful as a
judicial guide in adjudging liability, for it seeks to impute culpability
arising from the failure of the actor to perform up to a standard
established by a legal fiat. But the doctrine should not be rendered
inflexible so as to deny relief when in fact there is no causal relation
between the statutory violation and the injury sustained.
In the instant case, no causal connection was established between the
tractor-trailer driver's restrictions on his license to the vehicular collision.
Furthermore, Jabon was able to sufficiently explain that the Land
Transportation Office merely erred in not including restriction code 8 in
his license.
TORTS & DAMAGES l Midterm Reviewer l Dean Joan Largo l For the exclusive use of EH 404

Burden of proving negligence Assumption of risk

General Rule
He who alleges has the burden of proving what has been alleged.
Example: In negligence, he who alleges negligence has the burden of
proving negligence.
Exception
Presumptions established by law.
For as long as you put on the circumstance that would bring about the
presumption, negligence will be established.
Examples:
Art. 2184, NCC
In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if
the former, who was in the vehicle, could have, by the use of the due
diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is disputably presumed that a
driver was negligent, if he had been found guilty or reckless driving or
violating traffic regulations at least twice within the next preceding two
months. If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provisions of
Article 2180 are applicable.
Art. 2185, NCC
Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving
a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was
violating any traffic regulation.
Concept
The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria ("to which a person assents is not
esteemed in law as injury") refers to self-inflicted injury or to the consent
to injury which precludes the recovery of damages by one who has
knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to danger, even if he is not
negligent in doing so.
Taylor v. Manila Electric Railroad
Facts:
David Taylor at the time when he received his injuries was 15 years old
and considered mature for an average boy of his age, having
considerable aptitude and training in mechanics. David and Manuel
(another boy who was 12 years old) went to the power plant of Manila
Electric in Isla del Provisor to look for a certain Mr. Murphy. However,
Murphy was not around and the boys wandered in the power plant
premises. As they were walking around, they found several fulminating
caps (intended for use in the explosion of blasting charges of dynamite).
They took as much as they could and brought them to Manuel’s home.
As they were going home they met Jessie Adrian who was less than 9
years old at the time. The kids proceeded to experiment with the
fulminating caps: sticking them into the light bulb socket and trying to
break the caps open. They then opened one of the caps with a knife and
found some yellowish substance inside. They got some matches and
lighted it up which caused an explosion, injuring all three kids.

Issue:
Defenses

Complete Defenses Whether Manila Electric is liable for the injuries of Taylor despite the fact
1. Plaintiff’s own negligence that Taylor trespassed into the premises of the power plant.
2. Assumption of Risk
3. Doctrine of Last Clear Chance Ruling:
4. Emergency Rule
5. Prescription No.

Partial Defense: General rule

1. Doctrine of Contributory Negligence
The conduct of an infant of tender years (children, basically) is not to
be judged by the same rule which governs that of an adult. While it is
Complete Defenses
the general rule in regard to an adult that to entitle him to recover
Plaintiff’s own negligence damages for an injury resulting from the fault or negligence of another
he must himself have been free from fault, such is not the rule in regard
Article 2179, NCC to an infant of tender years.

When the plaintiff’s own negligence was the immediate and proximate
cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence
was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury
being the defendant’s lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover
damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.
Fe Cayao- Lasam v. Ramolete
Supra.
The care and caution required of a child is according to his maturity and
capacity only, and this is determined in such case by the circumstances
of the case. Children, wherever they go, must be expected to act upon
childlike instincts and impulses; and others who are chargeable with a
duty of care and caution toward them must calculate upon this, and take
precautions accordingly.
If they leave exposed to the observation of children anything which
would be tempting to them, and which they in their immature judgment
might naturally suppose they were at liberty to handle or play with, they
should expect that liberty to be taken." The owners of premises where
there are things attractive to children are exposed, or upon which the
public are expressively or impliedly permitted to enter to or upon which
the owner knows or ought to know children are likely to roam about for

18 | U N I V E R S I T Y O F S A N C A R L O S
TORTS & DAMAGES l Midterm Reviewer l Dean Joan Largo l For the exclusive use of EH 404
pastime and in play, must calculate upon this, and take precautions
accordingly.
Exception
However, in the case at bar, Taylor was found to have been mature
enough to know the consequence of lighting up the yellow substance in
a fulminating cap considering that he was already mature at the time
and that he had an above average aptitude in mechanics.
True, he may not have known and probably did not know the precise
nature of the explosion which might be expected from the ignition of
the contents of the cap, and of course he did not anticipate the resultant
injuries which he incurred; but he well knew that a more or less
dangerous explosion might be expected from his act, and yet he willfully,
recklessly, and knowingly produced the explosion.
Afialda v. Hisole and Hisole
Facts:
Loreto Afialda was employed by the defendant spouses as caretaker of
their carabaos at a fixed compensation. While tending the animals, he
was gored by one of them and later died as a consequence of his
injuries. His elder sister then filed a case for damages under Article 1905
of the Civil Code which provides to wit:
“The possessor of an animal, or the one who uses the same,
is liable for any damages it may cause, even if such animal
should escape from him or stray away. This liability shall cease
only in case the damage should arise from force majeure from
the fault of the person who may have suffered it.”
The lower court held that the owner of an animal is answerable only for
damages caused to a stranger, and that for damage caused to the
caretaker of the animal, the owner would be liable only if he had been
negligent or at fault under Article 1902.
Claiming that the lower court was in error, plaintiff contends that Article
1902 does not distinguish between damage caused to a stranger and
damage caused to the caretaker and makes the owner liable whether or
not he has been negligent or at fault.
Issue:
Whether the owner of the animal is liable when damage is caused to its
caretaker.
Ruling:
No. The animal was in custody and under the control of the caretaker,
who was paid for his work as such. Obviously, it was the caretaker's
business to try to prevent the animal from causing injury or damage to
anyone, including himself. And being injured by the animal under those
circumstances, was one of the risks of the occupation which he had
voluntarily assumed and for which he must take the consequences.
19 | U N I V E R S I T Y O F S A N C A R L O S
Instance where assumption of risk does not apply
Ilocos Norte Electric Company v. CA
Facts:
A strong typhoon “Gening” buffeted the province of Ilocos Norte,
bringing heavy rains and consequent flooding. When the floodwaters
were beginning to recede, the deceased Isabel Lao Juan, proceeded
towards the direction of the Five Sisters Emporium to look after her
merchandise therein that might have been damaged.
Wading in a waist-deep flood, the deceased screamed "Ay" and quickly
sank into the water. Two girls attempted to help, but fear dissuaded
them because on the spot where the deceased sank, was an electric
wire dangling from a post and moving in snake-like fashion in the water.
Issue:
Whether or not the principle of assumption of risk applies.
Ruling:
No.
It is imperative to note the surrounding circumstances which impelled
the deceased to leave the comforts of a roof and brave the subsiding
typhoon. The deceased was on her way to her grocery store to see to it
that the goods were not flooded. As such, shall we punish her for
exercising her right to protect her property from the floods by imputing
upon her the unfavorable presumption that she assumed the risk of
personal injury? Definitely not.
A person is excused from the force of the rule that when he voluntarily
assents to a known danger he must abide by the consequences --- if an
emergency is found to exist or if the life or property of another is in peril.
Clearly, an emergency was at hand, as the deceased's property, a source
of her livelihood, was faced with an impending loss.
Furthermore, the deceased, at the time the fatal incident occurred, was
at a place where she had a right to be without regard to petitioner's
consent as she was on her way to protect her merchandise. Hence,
private respondents, as heirs, may not be barred from recovering
damages as a result of the death caused by petitioner's negligence.
Nikko Hotel Manila Garen, et.al v. Reyes
Facts:
Respondent Roberto Reyes, more popularly known by the screen name
"Amay Bisaya," alleged that Dr. Violeta Filart invited him to join her in a
party at the hotel’s penthouse in celebration of the natal day of the
hotel’s manager. When dinner was ready, Mr. Reyes lined-up at the
buffet table but, to his great shock, shame and embarrassment, he was
stopped by petitioner herein, Ruby Lim, who was Hotel Nikko’s Executive
Secretary. In a loud voice and within the presence and hearing of the
other guests, Ruby Lim told him to leave the party
Issue:
Whether the doctrine of volenti non fit injuria considering that Mr. Reyes
is a gate crasher.
TORTS & DAMAGES l Midterm Reviewer l Dean Joan Largo l For the exclusive use of EH 404
Ruling:
The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria ("to which a person assents is not
esteemed in law as injury") refers to self-inflicted injury or to the consent
to injury which precludes the recovery of damages by one who has
knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to danger, even if he is not
negligent in doing so.
As formulated by petitioners however, this doctrine does not find
application to the case at bar because even if respondent Reyes
assumed the risk of being asked to leave the party, petitioners, under
Articles 19 and 21 of the New Civil Code, were still under obligation to
treat him fairly in order not to expose him to unnecessary ridicule and
shame.
Thus, the threshold issue is whether Ruby Lim acted abusively in asking
Roberto Reyes to leave the party thereby becoming liable under Articles
19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Parenthetically, and if Ruby Lim were so
liable, whether or not Hotel Nikko, as her employer, is solidarily liable
with her.
From an in depth review of the evidence, we find more credible the
lower court’s findings of fact. In the absence of any proof of motive on
the part of Ms. Lim to humiliate Mr. Reyes and expose him to ridicule
and shame, it is highly unlikely that she would shout at him from a very
close distance. Ms. Lim having been in the hotel business for twenty
years wherein being polite and discreet are virtues to be emulated, the
testimony of Mr. Reyes that she acted to the contrary does not inspire
belief and is indeed incredible.
Important: Assumption of risk does not apply to a gate crasher
because he does not assume the risk that he will be humiliated because
he will be banking on “Abuse of right doctrine”.
“Abuse of right doctrine”
Article 19, NCC
Every person must in the exercise of his rights and in the performance
of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good faith.
Article 21, NCC
Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner
that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.
Doctrine of Last Clear Chance
Other names: Humanitarian Doctrine, Doctrine of Discovered Peril,
Doctrine of Supervening Negligence.
Doctrine of Last Clear Chance
The doctrine of last clear chance provides that where both parties are
negligent but the negligent act of one is appreciably later in point of
time than that of the other, or where it is impossible to determine whose
fault or negligence brought about the occurrence of the incident, the
one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm but
failed to do so, is chargeable with the consequences arising therefrom.
Stated differently, the rule is that the antecedent negligence of a person
does not preclude recovery of damages caused by the supervening
20 | U N I V E R S I T Y O F S A N C A R L O S
negligence of the latter, who had the last fair chance to prevent the
impending harm by the exercise of due diligence.
Dean: Also known as ‘doctrine of supervening negligence” because the
application of doctrine of last clear chance will always have the scenario
of two parties being negligent. However, the negligence of one is far
removed from the negligence of the other such that the proximate cause
is really the negligence of the defendant because the latter had the last,
clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm but failed to do so. The
negligence of the plaintiff which is prior and antecedent is not anymore
considered.
Emergency Rule
Concept
Under the "emergency rule", an individual who suddenly finds himself in
a situation of danger and is required to act without much time to
consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending
danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what
subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be a better solution,
unless the emergency was brought by his own negligence.
Valenzuela v. CA
Facts:
Petitioner Valenzuela filed a case for damages for the injuries she
suffered. Argued that while driving her vehicle, her tires became flat
thus prompting her to park along the sidewalk. While standing at the
rear portion of her vehicle to fix the tire, she was bumped by a vehicle
driven by Respondent Li resulting to amputation of her leg. In his
defense, Respondent Li argued that the proximate cause of the accident
is the negligence of Petitioner Valenzuela because she parked her
vehicle in a no parking zone.
Issue:
Whether there was negligence on Valenzuelas’ part.
Ruling:
No.
Respondent Li is liable for damages. There was no negligence on the
part of Petitioner Valenzuela. Courts have traditionally been compelled
to recognize that an actor who is confronted with an emergency is not
to be held up to the standard of conduct normally applied to an
individual who is in no such situation.
The law takes stock of impulses of humanity when placed in threatening
or dangerous situations and does not require the same standard of
thoughtful and reflective care from persons confronted by unusual and
oftentimes threatening conditions.
Under the circumstances described, Valenzuela did exercise the
standard reasonably dictated by the emergency and could not be
considered to have contributed to the unfortunate circumstances which
eventually led to the amputation of one of her lower extremities. The
emergency which led her to park her car on a sidewalk in Aurora
Boulevard was not of her own making, and it was evident that she had
taken all reasonable precautions.
TORTS & DAMAGES l Midterm Reviewer l Dean Joan Largo l For the exclusive use of EH 404
Dean: When you are faced with an emergency situation not of your own
making or of your own negligence, you cannot be faulted for not taking
a measure that would have avoided the impending danger.
Important: The emergency must not have been caused by the party
invoking it.
Prescription
Prescription
Article 1150, NCC
The time for prescription for all kinds of actions, when there is no special
provision which ordains otherwise, shall be counted from the day they
may be brought.
Article 1146, NCC
The following actions must be instituted within four years:
(1) Upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff;
(2) Upon a quasi-delict
Important: Quasi-delict prescribes within 4 years from occurrence of
the cause.
Example:
When two vessels collide, you cannot file culpa contractual against both
owners of the vessels for you only have a contract of carriage with one
of the vessels. So, you file a culpa aquiliana case with the other owner
of the vessel.
You do not have wait for the outcome of the investigation of the MARINA
before you can file a case for culpa aquiliana against the owner, captain
or officers of the other vessel. So upon collision, that is when you start
counting 4 years.
Capuno v. Pepsi-Cola
Facts:
A vehicular collision between a Pepsi-Cola delivery truck, driven by
Elordi, and a private car, driven by Capuno, took place in Pampanga.
Capuno and two other passengers, Buan and Paras, died because of the
accident and the heirs filed a case of Triple Homicide through Reckless
Imprudence against Elordi on January 5, 1953.
On October 1, 1953 pending the criminal case, the heirs of Buan filed a
civil action for damages against Pepsi and Elordi. However, on June 11,
1958, the Buan’s heirs and Pepsi entered into a compromise settlement
and they gave up their claims for damages.
On September 26, 1958, the Capunos commenced a civil action for
damages against Pepsi and Elordi. A motion for dismissal was filed on
the ground that the action has already prescribed.
Issue:
Whether the right of the heirs of Capuno to file a civil action has
prescribed.
Ruling:
Yes.
21 | U N I V E R S I T Y O F S A N C A R L O S
The action has already prescribed. Actions for damages based on quasi-
delict must be filed within 4 years.
As to the question of when the prescriptive period of four years shall
begin to run, the same is governed by Article 1150 which shall be “from
the day the action may be brought”, which means from the day the
quasi-delict occurred or was committed.
The foregoing considerations dispose of appellants' contention that the
four-year period of prescription in this case was interrupted by the filing
of the criminal action against Jon Elordi inasmuch as they had neither
waived the civil action nor reserved the right to institute it separately.
They filed the separate civil action based on quasi-delict more than 5
years later, and consequently, as held in Paulan vs. Sarabia, "the
institution of a criminal action cannot have the effect of interrupting the
institution of a civil action based on a quasi-delict."
Incomplete or Partial Defense
Doctrine of Contributory Negligence
Article 2179, NCC
“When the plaintiff’s own negligence was the immediate and proximate
cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence
was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury
being the defendant’s lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover
damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.”
Contributory negligence
Contributory negligence is the conduct on the part of the injured party,
contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls
below the standard which he is required to conform for his own
protection. It is an act or omission amounting to want of ordinary care
on the part of the person injured which, concurring with the defendant's
negligence, is the proximate cause of the injury.
Dean: The two parties are still negligent. But, the negligence of one is
not removed by the negligence of the other. Their negligence is
concurring. Both are the proximate causes of the incident hence, the
plaintiff will also be held responsible. Plaintiff can recover damages but
will be mitigated.
Type of Defense: A partial or incomplete defense in so far as the
defendant is concerned because he will still be held responsible.
Nat’l Transmission Corp. v. De Jesus
Facts:
A complaint for damages was filed by the heirs of Baby John De Jesus
against petitioner National Transmission Commission (NPC).
It appears that De Jesus was employed as Lineman II by NPC and died
due to electrocution while performing a hotspot correction at Kalaklan
Station allegedly due to the negligence of his foreman, Danilo Manahan
and of petitioner.
The RTC ruled in favor of the heirs, declaring that petitioner was not
able to prove that it exercised the diligence required by Article 2018 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines.
TORTS & DAMAGES l Midterm Reviewer l Dean Joan Largo l For the exclusive use of EH 404
As reflected on and admitted in the Accident Investigation Report
presented in evidence, it was declared that petitioner's hired foreman,
Danilo Manahan, was assigned to supervise a task he was not familiar
with, i.e. proper work sequence and coordination required therein.
It was further established that at the time of the incident, De Jesus
requested for a grounding cluster to protect himself, but the foreman
ordered him not to come down anymore and just proceed and continue
to climb which resulted in the subject incident.
The CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC, but reducing the amount of
damages by 20% after a finding of contributory negligence on the part
of the victim.
Issues:
1. Whether NPC was liable under Article 2180.
2. Whether there was contributory negligence on the part of Baby
John De Jesus.
Ruling:
1. Yes.
Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides that "employers shall be
liable for the damages caused by their employees and household
helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even
though the former are not engaged in any business or industry."
Worthy to mention that the responsibility treated in the above-
quoted article shall cease when the persons therein mentioned
prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent damage. Unfortunately, petitioner failed to
overcome the presumption of negligence in the present case, as
found by the lower courts.
2. Yes.
The failure on the part of the late De Jesus to use the required
protective equipment was an act of negligence contributory to that
unfortunate incident which led to his untimely death. He should
have insisted for the said required grounding cluster
notwithstanding his foreman's directive to proceed without it.
Accordingly, the CA was correct in affirming the RTC ruling finding
petitioner liable to pay for the amount of damages awarded with
the modification that it should be reduced by 20%.
Jarco Marketing v. CA
Facts:
On 9 May 1983, Criselda and Zhineth were at Syvel's Department Store,
Makati City. Criselda was signing her credit card slip at the payment and
verification counter when she felt a sudden gust of wind and heard a
loud thud. She looked behind her. She then beheld her daughter
Zhieneth on the floor, her young body pinned by the bulk of the store's
gift-wrapping counter or structure. The child died.
Private respondents filed a complaint for damages. In their answer,
petitioner claimed that Criselda was negligent in exercising care and
diligence over her daughter by allowing her to freely roam around in a
store filled with glassware and appliances. Zhieneth too, was guilty of
22 | U N I V E R S I T Y O F S A N C A R L O S
contributory negligence since she climbed the counter, triggering its
eventual collapse on her.
Issue:
Whether the negligence is attributable to petitioner for maintaining a
defective counter or to Criselda and Zhieneth for failing to exercise due
and reasonable care while inside the store premises.
Ruling:
The negligence is solely attributable to petitioner.
Anent the negligence Zhieneth, the Supreme Court applied the
conclusive presumption that favors children below 9 years old in that
they are incapable of contributory negligence.
Criselda should likewise be absolved from any contributory negligence.
She momentarily released the child's hand from her clutch when she
signed her credit card slip which was at this precise moment, reasonable
and usual for Criselda to let go of her child.
Dean: The doctrine of contributory negligence will not apply to children
aged 9-12, 12-15. Persons below 9 years old are conclusively presumed
to be incapable of contributory negligence. But, persons aged 9-12 must
be shown to have acted with discernment because they are only
presumptively presumed to be incapable of contributory negligence.
Liability for Act or Omission
Persons liable in an action for Quasi-Delict
Persons liable in an action for Quasi-Delict
1. Tortfeasor
2. Vicarious liability
(a) Parents
(b) Guardians
(c) Owners and Managers of Establishments
(d) Employers
(e) Owner of Vehicle
(f) State
(g) Teachers
3. Provinces, Cities, and Municipalities
4. Proprietors of Building, Engineer, Architect, Contractor
Tortfeasor
Article 2176, NCC
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being no
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relations between the
parties, is called quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this
Chapter.
Article 2194, NCC
The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-
delict is solidary.
Example on solidary liability:
There are four tortfeasors and the award is 1M. You need not go against
the four but you may go against any or two, or three of them, subject
to reimbursement. This is important for facilitating enforcement in
favour of the winning party.
TORTS & DAMAGES l Midterm Reviewer l Dean Joan Largo l For the exclusive use of EH 404
Doctrine of Vicarious Liability or Imputed Negligence
Article 2180, NCC
The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s
own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible.
Important: The basis of the liability is one’s own negligence but the
negligence flows from the fact that the person for whom one is
responsible has committed an act or omission of negligence or
intentional act causing damage.
Two requisites:
1. There must be a person for whom one is responsible
2. The person for whom one is responsible has committed an act of
negligence or intentional act causing damage.
Q. What is the effect of the concurrence of the two requisites?
ANS: One is presumed negligent.
Dean: If one is not remiss in his obligation in supervising, the one who
committed the negligent act or intentional act causing damage would
not have committed it. The fact that such act or omission was committed
means that one is negligent and hence, can be held responsible.
TN: It can be an intentional act causing damage.
Nature of liability
Vicarious liability is primary and direct because the basis of liability is
one’s own negligent act.
Importance of direct liability
In an instance employer-employee relationship, the employee hit a
pedestrian causing serious physical injury. It was the employee’s
negligent act but the employer is also responsible for his own negligence
flowing from the fact that he must have been negligent in failing to
supervise him.
He may be brought to court alone by himself without having to implead
the person who caused the damage because after all, the cause of action
is founded on his negligence although it is imputed from the act or
omission of the person under him
Cerezo v. Tezon
Dean: Landmark case in this regard.
Facts:
A damage suit was filed only against the Spouses Cerezo and no service
of summons was served to the driver who caused damage to another.
Issue:
Whether the driver is an indispensable party which the ROC requires him
to be impleaded?
23 | U N I V E R S I T Y O F S A N C A R L O S
Ruling:
No, because the basis of the action on quasi-delict is the employer’s own
negligence. The liability is primary and direct. In a direct liability you can
proceed against him singly or together with the person for whose act or
omission he is made answerable.
It is the option of the plaintiff to implead this one or to just have him as
the defendant. If he doesn’t implead the person for whom one is
responsible, it will not result the dismissal of the case not being an
indispensable party. Non indispensable because basis of the cause of
action is the employer’s own negligence.
Q. What is the consequence if a party is an indispensable party
but he is not joined as party to the case?
ANS: He must be impleaded. In case an indispensable party is not
impleaded, the court shall order the party to implead the indispensable
party. If you failed to comply with the order of the court, among of the
sanctions is the dismissal of the case because of the noncompliance of
the order to implead.
Reason why the employee is not usually impleaded
1. Death of the employee
2. Cannot be found
Persons responsible for the acts of other people
1. Parents
2. Guardians
3. Owners and manages of an establishment of enterprise
4. Employers
5. Owner of vehicle
6. State
7. Teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades
Parents
Article 2180 (b), NCC
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in
their company.
Old Rule: The father is made liable, and in case of his death or
incapacity, the mother.
New Rule: Under the Family Code, parents, without qualification, shall
be liable for injuries for the acts or omission for their unemancipated
children living with their company and under parental authority, subject
to appropriate defenses provided for by law.
Dean: Unemancipated child is usually one where you are under parental
authority. One of the effects of emancipation is termination of parental
authority. So until and unless emancipated, an unemancipated child is
under the parental authority of the parents
Minority
RA 6809
Nothing in this code shall be construed to derogate from the duty or
responsibility of parents for children onwards below 21 as mentioned in
the second and third paragraph of 2180. For purposes of vicarious
liability, minor should be read to mean below 21.
TORTS & DAMAGES l Midterm Reviewer l Dean Joan Largo l For the exclusive use of EH 404
Dean: According to Tolentino, the very reason why parents are held
vicariously liable because the child is under their parental authority. So
if the child committed an act causing damage to another, the parents
are deemed to have been remiss in exercising parental authority over
him.
But when the child turns 18, he is also emancipated from parental
authority. You have then a situation where no parental authority yet you
are still made liable. Akin to a case parental responsibility sans parental
authority.
Bar Question
On May 5, 1989, 16 year old Cruzano was issued a student permit, drove
to school a car a gift from parents. On even day, as his class was
scheduled to go on field trip his teacher requested him to accommodate
in his car 4 of his classmates because the van rented by the school was
too crowded.
On the way to museum, which the students were scheduled to visit,
Cruzano caused a wrong maneuver, causing collision with the jeepney.
One of his classmates dies, and he and three others got injured. Who is
liable for the death of the child? And the injuries suffered by the Cruzano
and his two other classmates? (2%) How about damage to the jeepney?
(2%) Under the same set off acts, what if it is made mid-1994?
ANS: Parents are vicariously liable if the child is below 21.
Q. In cases of adoption where the adopted child committed an
act causing damage to another just before the adoption decree
was granted, who will be made liable? The biological parents or
the adopting parents?
Tamargo v. Court of Appeals
Biological parents are liable if at the time of the incident, they had
control and supervision over the child. The reason why hold parents
vicariously liable is because of the control and supervision they have
with the minors. The reckoning point is who has actual custody at the
time of incident.
Guardians
Article 2180 (c), NCC
Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated
persons who are under their authority and live in their company.
Dean: They are also liable for damages caused by the minors or
incapacitated persons who are under their authority and live in their
company.
Important: If the person has no parents or guardian, then the property
of the minor or insane person shall be held answerable.
Owners and managers of an establishment
Article 2180 (d), NCC
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise
responsible for the damages caused be their employees in the service
of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of
their functions.
24 | U N I V E R S I T Y O F S A N C A R L O S
Employers
Article 2180 (e), NCC
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees
and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks,
even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
Two kinds of employers:
1. Employers engaged in the business
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are
likewise responsible for the damages caused be their employees in
the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on
the occasion of their functions.
2. Employers not engaged in business
If not engaged in business, he will be responsible for acts of the
employees within the scope of their assigned tasks.
Ex: Practice of law is not a business but a profession.
Employees of lawyer: Secretary, messenger, driver, bodyguard
Q. When can you say that the employee is acting within the
scope of the assigned task?
Issue: If the employee has been issued a company vehicle which
company vehicle he used in going to and from the workplace, or going
to and from the house, would you consider the employee acting within
the scope of the assigned task as to make the employer vicariously liable
if in the course of travelling, a collision occurred?
Ex: The employee lives in Talisay and the office is in Cebu City IT Park.
The employee was issued a company vehicle and he used that vehicle
in going from Talisay to IT Park. Somewhere along the way, an accident
happened. Can it be said that he is acting within the scope of the
assigned task at the time he is using the company vehicle so as to make
the employer vicariously liable by the person who was damaged or
injured?
Castilex v. Court of Appeals
Facts:
At around 1:30 to 2:00 in the morning, Romeo So Vasquez (son of
respondents Vicente and Luisa Vasquez), was driving a Honda
motorcycle around Fuente Osmeña Rotunda. He was traveling counter-
clockwise, (the normal flow of traffic in a rotunda) but without any
protective helmet or goggles.
Benjamin Abad was a manager of petitioner Castilex Industrial
Corporation, registered owner of a Toyota Hi-Lux Pick-up. Abad drove
the said company car but instead of going around the Osmeña rotunda
he made a short cut against the flow of the traffic in proceeding to his
route to General Maxilom St.
In the process, the motorcycle of Vasquez and the pick-up of Abad
collided with each other causing severe injuries to the former. Abad
brought Vasquez to Cebu Doctors' Hospital where he died.
A criminal case was filed against Abad but which was subsequently
dismissed for failure to prosecute. An action for damages was then
TORTS & DAMAGES l Midterm Reviewer l Dean Joan Largo l For the exclusive use of EH 404
commenced by respondents against Abad. Trial court ruled in favor of
private respondents and ordered Abad to pay jointly and solidarily
respondents.
Petitioner Castilex and Abad separately appealed the decision. Court of
Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court holding Abad and petitioner
Castilex liable but held that the liability of the latter is "only vicarious
and not solidary" with the former.
Hence, Castilex filed the instant petition.
Issue:
Whether an employer may be held vicariously liable for the death
resulting from the negligent operation by a managerial employee of a
company-issued vehicle.
Ruling:
No.
The mere fact that Abad was using a service vehicle at the time of the
injurious incident is not of itself sufficient to charge petitioner with
liability for the negligent operation of said vehicle unless it appears that
he was operating the vehicle within the course or scope of his
employment. American Jurisprudence on the employer's liability for the
injuries inflicted by the negligence of an employee in the use of an
employer's motor vehicle:
“It has been held that an employee who uses his employer's
vehicle in going from his work to a place where he intends to eat
or in returning to work from a meal is not ordinarily acting within
the scope of his employment in the absence of evidence of some
special business benefit to the employer.”
Abad was engaged in affairs of his own or was carrying out a personal
purpose not in line with his duties at the time he figured in a vehicular
accident. It was then about 2:00 am, way beyond the normal working
hours. Abad's working day had ended; his overtime work had already
been completed. His being at a place which, as petitioner put it, was
known as a "haven for prostitutes, pimps, and drug pushers and
addicts," had no connection to petitioner's business; neither had it any
relation to his duties as a manager. Rather, using his service vehicle
even for personal purposes was a form of a fringe benefit or one of the
perks attached to his position
Since no evidence that Abad was acting within the scope of the functions
entrusted to him, petitioner Castilex had no duty to show that it
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in providing Abad
with a service vehicle. Thus, petitioner is relieved of vicarious liability for
the consequences of the negligence of Abad in driving its vehicle
Important: Apply the ‘Special Benefit Test’. If the employer gets some
special benefits by reason of the employee using the vehicle, it can be
said that the employee is acting within the scope of the assigned task
at that time. Therefore the employer can be held vicariously liable.
In the present case, the Supreme Court ruled that there is no special
benefit that the employer derives from the fact that it issued a company
vehicle and the employee reports on time. Rather, it is for the
employee’s benefit. There is no special benefit, because you are
expected to be on time. Thus, the employer is not acting within the
scope of the assigned task.
25 | U N I V E R S I T Y O F S A N C A R L O S
Liability of Employer under the Revised Penal Code
Article 103, RPC
Subsidiary liability shall also apply to employers, teachers, persons, and
corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonious committed by
their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the
discharge of their duties.
Dean: This provision makes the employer subsidiarity liable for the act
of the employee for as long as the following elements are established:
1. The employer is engaged in some kind of industry
2. The employee committed the offense in the discharge of the
duties; and
3. The employee is insolvent.
Scenario illustrating the application of Art 103
Ex: A lawyer hired a driver and the driver shot another while discharging
his functions as driver.
You are an employer engaged in an industry. Employee committed an
offense in the discharge of his duties and he is an insolvent.
Scenario: People v. employees. Employee gets convicted. Asked to pay
damages but he is an insolvent. That is proven by the return of the
service of writ of execution unsatisfied.
When do you bring in the responsibility of the employer under
the RPC?
Illustration: EE (security guard of pawnshop) has committed an act
causing damage. Pawnshop company is the employer. EE was guarding
the premises and somebody attempted to steal, he had to fire a warning
shot killing the person.
A case was filed against the employee, the guard. The EE was criminally
convicted and imprisoned for 6 years and civil liability for 1 million. The
judgment has become final and private complainant wanted to collect
civil liability aspect of the case. The sheriff said, EE insolvent. So the
return of the writ of execution will indicate that EE has no property or
assets to satisfy the 1m civil obligation indicated in the judgment. What
do we do next?
Go after employer. How? Through a motion. You will therefore bring in
the employer by mere motion.
Private prosecutor may drag the employer by filing a motion to
enforce subsidiary liability upon the employer.
Important: It should contain a Notice of Hearing and should have at
least 3 days (3-day notice rule) unless it is urgent or a non-litigious
motion. The hearing must be scheduled no later than 10 days from the
time of filing. This is to avoid dilatory motions.
In the motion you will allege that:
1. ER is engaged in some kind of industry
2. EE committed the act in discharge of his functions
3. EE is insolvent by showing the unsatisfied writ of execution by the
sheriff as attached
TORTS & DAMAGES l Midterm Reviewer l Dean Joan Largo l For the exclusive use of EH 404

Dean: The case is really against the employee and all throughout the Subsidiary Liability v. Primary and Direct Liability
trial of the case you don’t have the employer’s participation. He may or
may not even know that there is an existing case against the employee
but at the final stage of the case you will bring in the employer by mere Primary and Direct Liability Subsidiary Liability
motion and you will have the employer satisfy the civil aspect of the
judgment against the employee. The argument of the employer: “I am
now the one being held responsible for the obligation of the employee Article 2180, Civil Code Article 103, Revised Penal Code
and I wasn’t even heard all throughout the trial of the case against the
employee”. In other words, the employer will cry violation of due
process. Available defense for the
employer: Available defense for the
Q. Was there violation of due process? employer:
Due diligence of a good father
ANS: No, because in the hearing of the Motion to Hold the Employer in the family in the selection Absence of the enumerate
Subsidiarily Liable, you will indicate the three enumerated above and and supervision of the employee elements (industry, EE-ER
the employer is given the opportunity to refute the existence of these relationship, act done in the
elements. Important: Diligence in both discharge of the functions,
selection and supervision must insolvency)
Q. If indeed all of these exist, what is now the defense of the be established.
employer?

ANS: None. The employer is now liable to pay the obligation of the
employee against the judgment against the latter.
Q. Why is it called subsidiary?
ANS: Becomes it comes only after it has been established that employee
cannot satisfy the judgment by reason of his insolvency.
Important: ER must allege as defense that the all the elements to hold
him liable are not present. If all the elements are there, the SC said that
such ER will be ipso facto subsidiarily liable upon the EE’s conviction and
upon proof of the latter’s insolvency. There is no defense.
Trial Technique: You go after the ER, by first going after the EE in a
criminal case where ER will not be on his guard because almost always
EE will not have a good defense. Unlike the ER, it will usually secure the
best lawyer.
Summary on the vicarious liability of an employer under Article
2180
1. It is a direct liability
2. It is a primary responsibility
Q. How do you show due diligence in the selection?
ANS: Examine the qualification of the employee before he was hired by
looking at his possession of license, experience, record of service.
However, it is not enough to prove it by testimonial evidence, it must be
coupled with a strong corroborating documentary evidence.
Q. How do you show diligence in the supervision?
ANS: Having a standard operating procedure or some rules in the
workplace. However, it is not enough to have rules. It is equally
important to enforce those rules by showing some Memorandums
indicating that you have called the attention of your employee for every
breach in the rule of the company and that you have disciplined the
employee for violations of those rules. In short, having rules, monitor its
compliance, and enforcing the full compliance of the rules.
Dean: Applicable in proving diligence in the selection and supervision:
“Given the bias nature of the testimony and the possibility of
that just being invented, it’s not enough to show it by testimonial
evidence. There has to be, on top of the testimonial evidence, a
corresponding corroborating documentary evidence.”

Important: Because it is a direct liability of employer and primary
responsibility of the employer, you don’t have to implead the employee.
You don’t have to bring the employee if you want to hold the employer
vicariously liable precisely because the liability of the employer is direct
and it is his own liability that is the subject matter of the case.
Q. Why would it be his own liability?
Q. If you are the lawyer handling the case for the employer,
how do you show due diligence in supervision? What
documents will you show?
ANS: The disciplinary measures taken must be reduced in writing
because this is what the court said. Concrete proof, including
documentary evidences, must be shown.

ANS: Because it is his own negligence that is the subject matter or the Examples:
main cause of action except the negligence flows from the occurrence 1. Attendance sheets in seminars
of the act of the employee under his supervision. 2. Company rules
3. Memos
4. The data that employees submit upon employment

Reason: Biased nature of the testimony of the employer and his

witnesses. The memos are important not only for compliance with the
procedural due process in labor laws, but also as evidence in the
supervision of employees. Memos should be duly filed and recorded.

26 | U N I V E R S I T Y O F S A N C A R L O S
TORTS & DAMAGES l Midterm Reviewer l Dean Joan Largo l For the exclusive use of EH 404

Employers of Common Carriers Q. If the parents of the boy do not file a separate civil case
against the bus company can they still make the bus company
Article 1759, NC liable?
Common carriers are liable for the death or injuries to passengers
ANS: Yes. Under Art.103 of RPC employer’s subsidiary liability.
through the negligence or wilful acts of the former’s employees,
although such employees may have acted beyond the scope of their
Bar Question: 2013 (8%)
authority or in violation of the orders of the common carriers. This
liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they
PhilAsia air flight 916 crash-landed at the Cagayan de Oro airport
exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection
because of pilot’s miscalculation of the plane’s approach. The plane
and supervision of their employees.
undershot the runway. 50 people on board 10 passengers died. Of the
10 who died, one was a passenger who managed to leave the plane but
Discussion: Common carriers are liable for the death or injuries of
an ambulance coming to the rescue run over him. Another was an airline
passengers through negligence of willful acts of employees. Employers
employee who had a free ride.
cannot set up the defense that the employee acted beyond the scope of
his duties, or in violation of the orders of the common carriers.
A. What are the causes of action against the airline and the pilots?

Dean: In the bar, the defense usually is that there was a speed limit
imposed by the company and the driver failed to observe such, resulting
in death or injuries. Employers cannot set up this defense. The proper
defense is extraordinary diligence and not due diligence in the selection
and supervision of employees. Defense of good father or a family is not
available. The interplay of 2180, 103 of RPC and 1759 of CC are
important to bar examinees because if not in civil law, you will encounter
this in commercial law.
Article 103 (RPC) – Subsidiary liability.
The subsidiary liability under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code
comes only after conviction of the employees.
Important: If there is conviction but the judge failed to include the civil
aspect, the employer cannot also be held liable. There must be judgment
of conviction with finding of the civil liability of the employee.
It is the civil aspect that is the subject matter of the employer’s
subsidiary obligation. The nature of the liabilities is ipso facto and your
only defense is that the elements are not present. If they are present,
there are no available defenses.
Article 2180 (CC) – Vicarious liability of employer
Contemplates a situation where an employee committed an act or
omission. It covers not only negligent but also willful acts of the
employee. If it caused damage to another, you will bring in the vicarious
liability of the employer.
Employer is presumed negligent by the fact that the employee
committed an act or omission resulting to damage to another.
Bar Question: 2015 (7%)
Here’s a driver of a bus owned by Z who run over a boy who died
instantly. A criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting to homicide
was filed against the driver and was convicted and asked to pay 2 million
as actual and moral damages. Without even trying to find out if the
driver has assets or means to pay the awarded damages the parents
filed a civil action against the bus company to make it directly liable to
damages. Will this prosper? What’s the cause of action against the bus
company by the parents of the boy?
Dean: What will you file? Art 103 – RPC, Art 2180 (against airline against
company as employer) or file a case against the pilots?
ANS: File a criminal case for reckless imprudence against the pilots.
Remember that insolvency is the requirement before PhilAsia may be
impleaded by mere motion. (question was not concretely answered
during discussion).
B. How will you handle the case of the passenger who was run over by
the ambulance and the airline employee who simply hitched a free ride
to Cagayan de Oro?
ANS: The passenger who was run over by an ambulance may file against
Phil Asia and the owner of the hospital.
Bar Question:
One of the passenger buses owned by Continental Transit Corporation
(CTC), plying its usual route, figured in a collision with another bus
owned by Universal Transport, Inc. (UTI). Among those injured inside
the CTC bus were: Romeo, a stow away; Samuel, a pickpocket then in
the act of robbing his seatmate when the collision occurred; Teresita,
the bus driver’s mistress who usually accompanied the driver on his trips
for free; and Uriel, holder of a free riding pass he won in a raffle held
by CTC.
(a) Will a suit for breach of contract of carriage filed by Romeo,
Samuel, Teresita, and Uriel against CTC prosper? Explain. (3%)
(b) Do Romeo, Samuel, Teresita, and Uriel have a cause of action
for damages against UTI? Explain. (3%)
(c) What, if any, are the valid defenses that CTC and UTI can raise
in the respective actions against them? Explain. (3%)
ANS: (Note: Dean only answered C)
Defenses of CTC and UTI:
 CTC: Extraordinary diligence
 UTI, who is being held responsible for quasi-delict: Diligence in the
selection and supervision of employees
Dean: You have 2181, but keep in mind that there is a nuance to it,
which is 2184.

ANS: Yes. They must file a civil case against the company and the cause
of action is founded on 2180.

27 | U N I V E R S I T Y O F S A N C A R L O S
TORTS & DAMAGES l Midterm Reviewer l Dean Joan Largo l For the exclusive use of EH 404
Article 2181, NCC
Whoever pays for the damage caused by his dependents or employees
may recover from the latter what he has paid or delivered in satisfaction
of the claim.
Article 2184, NCC
In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if
the former, who was in the vehicle, could have, by the use of the due
diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is disputably presumed that a
driver as negligence, if he had been found guilty of reckless driving or
violating traffic regulations at least twice within the next preceding two
months.
Bar Question:
Dr. Jack, a surgeon, holds clinic at the St. Vincent's Hospital and pays
rent to the hospital. The fees of Dr. Jack are paid directly to him by the
patient or through the cashier of the hospital. The hospital publicly
displays in the lobby the names and specializations of the doctors
associated or accredited by it, including that of Dr. Jack. Marta engaged
the services of Dr. Jack because of recurring stomach pain. It was
diagnosed that she is suffering from cancer and had to be operated on.
Before the operation, she was asked to sign a "consent for hospital
care," which reads:
"Permission is hereby given to the medical, nursing and laboratory staff
of the St. Vincent's Hospital to perform such procedures and to
administer such medications and treatments as may be deemed
necessary or advisable by the physicians of this hospital for and during
the confinement."
After the surgery, the attending nurses reported that two (2) sponges
were missing. Later, Marta died due to complications brought about by
the sponges that were left in her stomach. The husband of Marta sued
the hospital and Dr. Jack for damages arising from negligence in the
medical procedure. The hospital raised the defense that Dr. Jack is not
its employee as it did not hire Dr. Jack nor pay him any salary or
compensation. It has absolutely no control over the medical services and
treatment being provided by Dr. Jack. Dr. Jack even signed an
agreement that he holds the hospital free and harmless from any liability
arising from his medical practice in the hospital.
Is St. Vincent's Hospital liable for the negligence of Dr. Jack? Explain
your answer. (5%)
ANS: Professional Services, Inc. v. Natividad and Enrique Agana (2007)
On whether the hospital is an employer: This is the importance of
hospitals publicly displaying the names of the doctors. They are holding
themselves out therefore as if the doctors were part of the hospital, but
not as employees.
Ways of making an employer liable – three possible attacks:
1. Art. 2180
2. Art. 103 of the RPC
3. Art. 1759 – If the employer is a common carrier
28 | U N I V E R S I T Y O F S A N C A R L O S
On Article 1759
Under this provision, it is hard to prove extraordinary diligence.
Acting beyond the scope of the task and due diligence in the
selection & supervision are not available defenses. If in the answer
you find the defense of due diligence in the selection & supervision,
file a reply within 10 days, and respectfully point out that under
this provision, you can’t raise this defense.
Difference between Article 2180 NCC, Article 103 RPC and
Article 1759 NCC
Please see Annex ‘A’.
Benefit of pursuing employer under Article 103 of the RPC
1. Almost always, the employer is not involved at first instance. So,
they would not bother.
2. You can bring in the employer at the last stage where he will have
no defense.
TN: Notices in hotels that they are not responsible in any loss are void
stipulations. Responsibilities of hotel keepers if diminished, such
stipulation is held void.
Example: You held an employer liable under 2180. There is a case by
the plaintiff against the employer for vicarious liability. Employer was
not able establish diligence in selection and supervision. Employer paid
1M. Art. 2181 said: Whatever employer paid or delivered in satisfaction
of a claim, you can ask employee for recovery. You can send a demand
letter to employee if you can still find him .The employer can ask 1M for
recovery, but there is a nuance to 2181, which is 2184.
Owners of Motor Vehicles
Article 2184, NCC
In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if
the former, who was in the vehicle, could have, by the use of the due
diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is disputably presumed that a
driver was negligent, if he had been found guilty or reckless driving or
violating traffic regulations at least twice within the next preceding two
months.
If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provisions of Article 2180
are applicable.
Dean: There is an employer, but the scenario is confined to a driver of
a vehicle where the owner was in the vehicle. If you were in the vehicle
and you could have prevented the misfortune from happening, but you
did not, you will be solidarily liable with the driver.
Example:
A case was filed against the owner of a vehicle, who was with the driver,
and they were asked by the court to pay P1M. The judgment creditor
has the option to go after the owner & driver of the vehicle or only
against the driver or owner because the liability is solidary. If you’re the
lawyer, you might want to go directly to the employer.
Q. Can he ask for reimbursement?
ANS: Yes, up to P 500,000. However, if he was not in the vehicle, the
driver will be treated just like other employees – bring in Art. 2181.
TORTS & DAMAGES l Midterm Reviewer l Dean Joan Largo l For the exclusive use of EH 404
Bar Question
Rommel’s private car, while being driven by the regular family driver,
Amado, hits a pedestrian causing the latter’s death. Rommel is not in
the car when the incident happened.
(a) Is Rommel liable for damages to the heirs of the deceased?
Explain. (2%)
(b) Would your answer be the same if Rommel was in the car at the
time of the accident? Explain. (2%)
(Not answered by Dean)
State
Article 2180 (f), NCC
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special
agent, but not when the damage has been caused by the official to
whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what is provided
in Article 2176 shall be applicable.
Special agent
The state is responsible if it acts through a special agent, and these are
those people given specific or fixed assignment, that are inconsistent
with the normal responsibility of a duly appointed officer.
Merritt v. Government of the Philippine Islands
Facts:
Merritt was riding on a motorcycle and was going toward the western
part of Calle Padre Faura, passing along the west side thereof. Upon
crossing Taft Avenue, the General Hospital ambulance, turned suddenly
and unexpectedly and long before reaching the center of the street, into
without having sounded any whistle or horn, by which movement it
struck Merritt. By reason of the resulting collision, the plaintiff was so
severely injured that, it affected its capacity even to conduct their
business.
Act No. 2457 was enacted which authorized Merritt to bring suit against
the Government of the Philippine to fix the responsibility for the collision
between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital, and
to determine the amount of the damages, if any.
The trial court found that the accident was caused by the ambulance’s
negligence. Hence, damages were awarded in favour of plaintiff.
The Government appealed contending that the trial court erred: (a) in
finding that the collision between the plaintiff's motorcycle and the
ambulance of the General Hospital was due to the negligence of the
chauffeur; (b) in holding that the Government of the Philippine Islands
is liable for the damages sustained by the plaintiff as a result of the
collision, even if it be true that collision was due to the negligence of the
chauffeur; and (c) in rendering judgment against the defendant for the
sum of P14,741.
Issue:
Whether the Government, in enacting Act No. 2457, simply waived its
immunity from suit or did it also concede its liability to Merritt?
29 | U N I V E R S I T Y O F S A N C A R L O S
Ruling:
It simply waived its immunity from suit.
As to the scope of legislative enactments permitting individuals to sue
the state where the cause of action arises out of either tort or contract,
the rule is that by consenting to be sued, a state simply waives its
immunity from suit. It does not thereby concede its liability to plaintiff,
or create any cause of action in his favor, or extend its liability to any
cause not previously recognized.
It merely gives a remedy to enforce a pre-existing liability and submits
itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to interpose any
lawful defense.
It being quite clear that Act No. 2457 does not operate to extend the
Government's liability to any cause not previously recognized, the Court
examined the substantive law touching the defendant's liability for the
negligent acts of its officers, agents, and employees.
Paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the civil Code reads:
"The state is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent,
but not when the damage should have been caused by the official to
whom properly it pertained to do the act performed, in which case the
provisions of the preceding article shall be applicable."
This concept does not apply to any executive agent who is an employee
of the active administration and who in his own responsibility performs
the functions which are inherent in and naturally pertain to his office
and which are regulated by law and the regulations."
The state by virtue of such provision of law, is not responsible for the
damages suffered by private individuals in consequence of acts
performed by its employees in the discharge of the functions pertaining
to their office, because neither fault nor even negligence can be
presumed on the part of the state in the organization of branches of the
public service and in the appointment of its agents; on the contrary, we
must presuppose all foresight humanly possible on its part in order that
each branch of service serves the general weal and that of private
persons interested in its operation.
It is, therefore, evident that the State is only liable for the acts of its
agents, officers and employees when they act as special agents and that
the chauffeur of the ambulance of the General Hospital was not such an
agent.
TN: Whether the Government intends to make itself legally liable for the
amount of damages above set forth, which the plaintiff has sustained
by reason of the negligent acts of one of its employees, by legislative
enactment and by appropriating sufficient funds therefor, we are not
called upon to determine. This matter rests solely with the Legislature
and not with the courts.
Dean: The driver is not considered as special agent because in that case,
his being an ambulance driver was his regular function. Before the state
can be sued it must have consent, implied or expressed by law
Examples of implied consent
1. When it initiated a suit
2. When it enters into a contract
TORTS & DAMAGES l Midterm Reviewer l Dean Joan Largo l For the exclusive use of EH 404
TN: Suability and Liability is a different thing that provision is for liability
only, in order for the state to be liable it must be acting through a special
agent
Reasons why we cannot sue the state:
1. State is the source of law, and how can you have a right, against
the source of the law, upon which your right to sue depends.
2. For the state not to be interfered with its public service.
Q. When is a case considered a case against the state?
ANS: When the state is required to do a positive act such as:
1. Release of funds, or
2. Release of property
Dean: It is rather unusual to somebody who has studied this
fundamental concept of non-suability of state to file a case against the
state and sue it by its name, you almost always camouflage it by filing
a case not against the state by its name, not against the republic but
against a government agency
Q. When is a case against a government agency considered a
case against the state?
ANS: When a government agency is involved, you first determine the
character of the agency whether incorporated or unincorporated.
1. If incorporated
It will have a juridical personality on its own and therefore not a
suit against the state whether or not it is performing a
governmental or proprietary function.
Important: The discussion of whether it is performing
governmental or non-governmental function will go into the
discussion of liability. But for suability, the charter vests it the
capacity to sue and be sued. So if it is incorporated, don’t do the
function test. It is suable because the suit against it is not suit
against the State since it has personality of its own.
2. If unincorporated
It has no personality on its own but a part and parcel of the
governmental machinery. Ex. DOJ and DOH. Because it has no
personality of its own, the case that you will file is a case against
the State.
Dean: If you will file a case against a person, it will only be a case against
the state if you will be suing the government official in its official capacity
and there was no allusion of any malice, bad faith, and corruption.
Because if there is, then that’s his personal obligation, you would not be
making the State perform some positive act to satisfy the obligation.
If the suit is against the State, this is where consent has to come in.
Important: If it’s a suit against the State and there is no consent, the
judge by himself can dismiss the case right away. For the judge not to
dismiss the case, he must find some consent of the state to be sued.
30 | U N I V E R S I T Y O F S A N C A R L O S
Two ways of expressing consent:
1. Express consent – If there is a law (legislation).
Important: Declaration by the president or a waiver of the
Solicitor General will not suffice.
Two kinds of legislations:
(a) General consent to be sued – If you have a money claim
arising from contracts, whether express or implied, against
the government, there is already a general law which says
that you can lodge the money claim against COA. If COA
does not pay, you can directly file a case after the lapse of
60 days.
(b) Special or specific consent to be sued – Example: Merritt
case, he asked a member of the Congress to pass a law
granting him authority to sue the government.
2. Implied consent
Example: When the government expropriates a property. The
Constitution says that private property can only be taken if there is
just compensation which can only be determined by Court. Thus,
impliedly, when the government expropriates, there is an
understanding that there will be a court case if only to determine
just compensation.
When the government files a case, it opens itself from
counterclaims.
Bar Question:
In the last quarter of 2012, about 5,000 container vans of imported
goods intended for the Christmas Season were seized by agents of the
Bureau of Customs. The imported goods were released only on January
10, 2013. A group of importers got together and filed an action for
damages before the Regional Trial Court of Manila against the
Department of Finance and the Bureau of Customs.
The Bureau of Customs raised the defense of immunity from suit and,
alternatively, that liability should lie with XYZ Corp. which the Bureau
had contracted for the lease of ten (10) high powered van cranes but
delivered only five (5) of these cranes, thus causing the delay in its
cargo-handling operations. It appears that the Bureau, despite demand,
did not pay XYZ Corp. the Php 1.0 Million deposit and advance rental
required under their contract.
(a) Will the action by the group of importers prosper? (5%)
(b) Can XYZ Corp. sue the Bureau of Customs to collect rentals for
the delivered cranes? (5%)
Bar Question:
Singco sued the government for damages, after trial court ruled in his
favor and awarded damages amounting 50M. To satisfy the judgment
against the government, which option is valid for Mr. Singco?
(a) Garnish the government funds (Dean: But remember that
government funds have specific purposes such that if you divert
it to other public purpose it is already technical malversation)
TORTS & DAMAGES l Midterm Reviewer l Dean Joan Largo l For the exclusive use of EH 404
(b) File a claim with COA pursuant to Commonwealth Act 327 (Dean:
you go to COA if it is a money claim arising from contract, this is
money claim arising from judgment)
(c) Make representation to Congress to appropriate the amount to
satisfy the judgment
(d) File a petition for mandamus in court to compel Congress to
appropriate (Dean: But you cannot compel the government to
exercise a discretionary power which is legislative power)
(e) Proceed to execute the judgment as provided for by the Rules of
Court because the state anyway allowed itself to be sued. (Dean:
Consent to be sued is not consent to be liable, consent to be sued
is good only up to the proceedings prior to the execution.)
Teachers
Article 2180, NCC
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be
liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices,
so long as they remain in their custody.
Article 218, Family Code
The school, its administrators and teachers, or the individual, entity or
institution engaged in child are shall have special parental authority and
responsibility over the minor child while under their supervision,
instruction or custody.
Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities
whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or
institution.
Important: In Art. 2180, the first word that is important is the word
“by”. It says there that teachers shall be liable for damages caused by
their pupils or students. It’s not “to”. It does not say that teachers shall
be liable for damages caused to their pupils or students.
Q. NSTP students were making a human barricade and a
passerby punched one student. Is the NSTP teacher liable?
ANS: No. The relevant question is who caused that damage. If it is
caused by a student under his care and supervision then, yes. But since
in this case, the injury was caused by a passerby, the teacher cannot be
held liable.
“So long as they remain in their custody”
You are under the school’s custody so long as you are in school, even if
you are not in the classroom because you are taking recess. The idea
then is that you are in school for some legitimate student purpose like
attending a class, taking a short break to back to the classroom after
the recess.
Amadora v. CA
Facts:
Alfredo Amadora, while in the auditorium of the school, was mortally hit
by a gun by Pablito Daffon resulting in the former’s death. Daffon was
convicted of homicide through reckless imprudence.
31 | U N I V E R S I T Y O F S A N C A R L O S
The victim’s parents, herein petitioners, filed a civil action for damages
against Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, its rectors, high school principal,
dean of boys, the physics teacher together with Daffon and two other
students.
Complaints against the students were dropped. Respondent Court
absolved the defendants completely and reversed CFI Cebu’s decision
for the following reasons:
1. Since the school was an academic institution of learning and not a
school of arts and trades
2. That students were not in the custody of the school since the
semester has already ended
3. There was no clear identification of the fatal gun, and
4. In any event, defendants exercised the necessary diligence through
enforcement of the school regulations in maintaining discipline.
Petitioners on the other hand claimed their son was under school
custody because he went to school to comply with a requirement for
graduation (submission of physics reports).
Issues:
1. Whether Article 2180 covers even establishments which are
technically not schools of arts and trades, and, if so, when the
offending student is supposed to be "in its custody.
2. Whether the victim was in the custody of the authorities of the
school at the time of the incident.
3. Whether any of the respondents are liable for damages.
Ruling:
1. The provision should apply to all schools, academic as well as non-
academic.
Where the school is academic rather than technical or vocational
in nature, responsibility for the tort committed by the student will
attach to the teacher in charge of such student, following the first
part of the provision. This is the general rule.
In the case of establishments of arts and trades, it is the head
thereof, and only he, who shall be held liable as an exception to
the general rule.
In other words, teachers in general shall be liable for the
acts of their students except where the school is technical in
nature, in which case it is the head thereof who shall be
answerable. “Teachers" should apply to the words "pupils and
students" and "heads of establishments of arts and trades" to the
word "apprentices.
There is really no substantial distinction between the academic and
the non-academic schools insofar as torts committed by their
students are concerned. The same vigilance is expected from the
teacher over the students under his control and supervision,
whatever the nature of the school where he is teaching.
2. Yes.
At the time Alfredo was fatally shot, he was in the custody of the
authorities of the school notwithstanding classes had formally
ended when the incident happened. It was immaterial if he was in
TORTS & DAMAGES l Midterm Reviewer l Dean Joan Largo l For the exclusive use of EH 404
the school auditorium to finish his physics requirement or merely
to submit to submit his physics report for what was important is
that he was there for a legitimate purpose that would have also
brought him in the custody of the school authorities.
3. No.
None of the respondents are liable.
The rector, high school principal and the dean of boys cannot be
held liable because none of them was the teacher-in-charge as
defined in the provision. Each was exercising only a general
authority over the students and not direct control and influence
exerted by the teacher placed in-charge of particular classes. The
evidence of the parties does not disclose who the teacher-in-
charge of the offending student was.
In the absence of a teacher- in charge, dean of boys should
probably be held liable considering that he had earlier confiscated
an unlicensed gun from a student and later returned to him without
taking disciplinary action or reporting the matter to the higher
authorities. Though it was clear negligence on his part, no proof
was shown to necessarily link this gun with the shooting incident.
Also, the mere fact that Alfredo Amadora had gone to school that
day in connection with his physics report did not necessarily make
the physics teacher, respondent Celestino Dicon, the teacher-in-
charge of Alfredo's killer.
At any rate, assuming that he was the teacher-in-charge, there is
no showing that Dicon was negligent in enforcing discipline upon
Daffon or that he had waived observance of the rules and
regulations of the school or condoned their non-observance. His
absence when the tragedy happened cannot be considered against
him because he was not supposed or required to report to school
on that day. And while it is true that the offending student was still
in the custody of the teacher-in-charge even if the latter was
physically absent when the tort was committed, it has not been
established that it was caused by his laxness in enforcing discipline
upon the student. On the contrary, the private respondents have
proved that they had exercised due diligence, through the
enforcement of the school regulations, in maintaining that
discipline.
In the absence of a teacher- in charge, dean of boys should
probably be held liable considering that he had earlier confiscated
an unlicensed gun from a student and later returned to him without
taking disciplinary action or reporting the matter to the higher
authorities. Though it was clear negligence on his part, no proof
was shown to necessarily link this gun with the shooting incident.
Finally, Colegio San Jose-Recoletos cannot directly be held liable
under the provision because only the teacher of the head of school
of arts and trade is made responsible for the damage caused by
the student.
Hence, under the facts disclosed, none of the respondents were
held liable for the injury inflicted with Alfredo resulting in his death.
Petition was denied.
32 | U N I V E R S I T Y O F S A N C A R L O S
Dean: The Court said, for as long as you are in school whether for a
legitimate student activity, as when you are going to finish a project, or
even when you are not doing any student activity but you are there
simply to enjoy a legitimate student right or privilege, as when you’re
here to enjoy the company of classmates, the library, or when you are
here to just enjoy the ambiance.
Then the Family Code comes along. It says even when you are not in
school, even outside the school for as long as it is for an authorized
school activity the teacher is liable.
So you see the change of the meaning of the phrase “so long as you
remain in our custody”. From attending classes to not attending classes
but being just here in school for a legitimate student privilege to now
include even activities done outside the school premises for as long as
they are authorized.
The only thing that has changed between 2180 and 218 is the persons
to be held responsible.
If teacher, then 2180 may be made as basis, but if you want the school
or the administrators to be held liable as well, then you go to Family
Code 218.
Because there is nothing in 2180 that holds schools and administrators
liable, except that the heads of schools of arts and trade refers to the
administrator but not to an academic institution. The other difference
also is that 2180 deals with liability of teachers for damages caused by
their students, but 218 says school, teacher, and administrator for the
acts of the unemancipated minor.
So if one involved is a minor you can use 218 of the Family Code, but if
the one involved is not a minor then your legal basis is Article 2180 of
the Civil Code dealing only with teachers.
Important: There’s another way you can hold the school responsible.
And that is in the concept of school as employer or school by way of
contract.
Regino v. Pangasinan Colleges
There is an existing contract between the school and student. On the
part of the school we have the obligation to provide you with an
environment conducive to learning, and on the part of the students, they
have to pay the tuition and abide by the school rules and regulations.
3 ways in holding the school liable:
1. Art. 218 of the Family Code
2. School as employer
3. School under its contractual obligation.
How do you establish diligence of good father of a family?
Amadora case:
The SC said, here is a teacher who has exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family. Because evidence was presented showing that this
teacher enforced the rules and regulations of the school. The court said
that there was no showing of laxness in enforcing the rules and
regulations of the school. So even he was not there, you might have
thought that this might have been a case of absence of due diligence
because he was not there at that time. The counter-argument was that
he was not expected to be there because there were no more classes,
TORTS & DAMAGES l Midterm Reviewer l Dean Joan Largo l For the exclusive use of EH 404
but still he was able to show due diligence because he enforced the
school rules and regulations.
Knowing that now we have extended the reach of the responsibility of
teachers to include even activities outside the school, this is the reason
why in the problem you are asked teachers to deal with students of basic
education, pupils, minors. And teachers of college of business and
economics, or law and economics, IOW, no longer minors. CHED said,
the one that governs higher educations, in so far as field trips and
educational tours are concerned, you’ve got to follow CMO17 Series of
2012.
You have CHED being very strict about the rules to observe when you
want to go on a field trip or educational tour. First is you cannot just do
this at your will. You must have to point this particular field trip or ed.
Tour to some learning outcome. You might even want to indicate what
title or what particular reason, what aspect in the syllabus are we
triggering.
The other is advanced coordination with the LGU if you are doing the
educational tour or field trip with the LGU, there should be consultation
with the faculty and the students, with attached minutes of consultation.
If you will be doing the trip outside of the place where the school is
located, you have to coordinate with a DOT accredited travel agency.
And then, students must have to be required to come up with learning
journals, risk assessment plan, and a duly notarized consent and medical
clearance by the parent of physician and medical certificate and medical
certificate. There should be a documentation pertaining to the program.
When you want the school to be responsible, you have to show that the
school activity was authorized.
LGUs (Provinces, Cities, Municipalities)
Article 2189, NCC
Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the
death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of the defective
condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public
works under their control and supervision.
Dean: Under Art 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary for the liability
therein established to attach, that the defective public works belong to
the province, city or municipality from which responsibility is exacted.
What said article requires is that the province, city or municipality has
either “control or supervision” over the public building in question.
(Jimenez v. City of Manila)
Jimenez v. City of Manila
Facts:
Petitioner alleged that on August 15, 1974 he, together with his
neighbors, went to Sta. Ana public market to buy "bagoong" at the time
when the public market was flooded with ankle deep rainwater. On his
way home, he stepped on an uncovered opening obscured by the dirty
rainwater, causing a dirty and rusty four-inch nail, stuck inside the
uncovered opening, to pierce the left leg of petitioner. After
administering first aid treatment at a nearby drugstore, his companions
helped him hobble home. Petitioner became ill and his leg swelled with
great pain and was thereafter hospitalized. After discharge, he had to
walk around in crutches. His injury prevented him from attending to the
school buses he is operating.
33 | U N I V E R S I T Y O F S A N C A R L O S
Petitioner sued for damages the City of Manila and the Asiatic Integrated
Corporation under whose administration the Sta. Ana Public Market had
been placed. The trial court dismissed the complaint. Upon appeal, the
IAC held the Asiatic Integrated Corporation liable for damages but
absolved respondent City of Manila.
Issue:
Whether the IAC erred in not ruling that respondent City of Manila
should be jointly and severally liable with Asiatic Integrated Corporation
for the injuries petitioner suffered.
Ruling:
The petition is impressed with merit.
Respondent City of Manila maintains that it cannot be held liable for the
injuries sustained by the petitioner because under the Management and
Operating Contract, Asiatic Integrated Corporation assumed all
responsibility for damages which may be suffered by third persons for
any cause attributable to it. It has also been argued that the City of
Manila cannot be held liable under the Revised Charter of Manila which
provides:
The City shall not be liable or held for damages or injuries to
persons or property arising from the failure of the Mayor, the
Municipal Board, or any other City Officer, to enforce the
provisions of this chapter, or any other law or ordinance, or from
negligence of said Mayor, Municipal Board, or any other officers
while enforcing or attempting to enforce said provisions.
Upon the other hand, Article 2189 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
provides that:
Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages
for the death of, or injuries suffered by any person by reason of
defective conditions of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings
and other public works under their control or supervision.
Thus, it is clear that the Revised Charter of Manila refers to liability
arising from negligence, in general, regardless of the object, thereof,
while Article 2189 of the Civil Code governs liability due to "defective
streets, public buildings and other public works" in particular and is
therefore decisive on this specific case.
Under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary for the liability
therein established to attach, that the defective public works belong to
the province, city or municipality from which responsibility is exacted.
What said article requires is that the province, city or municipality has
either "control or supervision" over the public building in question. In
the case at bar, there is no question that the Sta. Ana Public Market,
despite the Management and Operating Contract between respondent
City and Asiatic Integrated Corporation remained under the control of
the former.
There is no argument that it is the duty of the City of Manila to exercise
reasonable care to keep the public market reasonably safe for people
frequenting the place for their marketing needs. Petitioner had the right
to assume that there were no openings in the middle of the
passageways and if any, that they were adequately covered. Had the
opening been covered, petitioner could not have fallen into it. Thus the
negligence of the City of Manila is the proximate cause of the injury
TORTS & DAMAGES l Midterm Reviewer l Dean Joan Largo l For the exclusive use of EH 404
suffered. The City is therefore liable for the injury suffered by the
petitioner.
Proprietors of Buildings
Article 2190, NCC
The proprietor of a building or structure is responsible for the damages
resulting from its total or partial collapse, if it should be due to the lack
of necessary repairs.
De Roy v. Court of Appeals
Facts:
The firewall of a burned-out building owned by petitioners collapsed and
destroyed the tailoring shop occupied by the family of private
respondents, resulting in injuries to private respondents and the death
of Marissa Bernal, a daughter. Private respondents had been warned by
petitioners to vacate their shop in view of its proximity to the weakened
wall but the former failed to do so.
The RTC rendered judgment finding petitioners guilty of gross
negligence and awarding damages to private respondents. On appeal,
the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto by the Court of
Appeals. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether petitioners are free of liability since respondents had the last
clear chance of avoiding the incident.
Ruling:
No.
Article 2190 of the Civil Code provides that "the proprietor of a building
or structure is responsible for the damage resulting from its total or
partial collapse, if it should be due to the lack of necessary repairs.”
Petitioners’ argument that private respondents had the "last clear
chance" to avoid the accident if only they heeded the warning to vacate
the tailoring shop and , therefore, petitioners prior negligence should be
disregarded, is incorrect since the doctrine of "last clear chance," which
has been applied to vehicular accidents, is inapplicable to this case.
Collateral Source Rule
Concept
A tortfeasor has no right to any mitigation of damages because of
payments or compensation received by the injured person from an
independent source.'
Mitsubishi Union v. Mitsubishi
Facts:
The Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) of the parties in this case
provides that the company shoulder the hospitalization expenses of the
dependents of covered employees subject to certain limitations and
restrictions. Accordingly, covered employees pay part of the
hospitalization insurance premium through monthly salary deduction
while the company, upon hospitalization of the covered employees'
34 | U N I V E R S I T Y O F S A N C A R L O S
dependents, shall pay the hospitalization expenses incurred for the
same.
The conflict arose when a portion of the hospitalization expenses of the
covered employees' dependents were paid or shouldered by the
dependent's own health insurance. While the company refused to pay
the portion of the hospital expenses already shouldered by the
dependents' own health insurance, the union insists that the covered
employees are entitled to the whole and undiminished amount of said
hospital expenses, applying the collateral source rule.
Issue:
Whether the collateral source rule would apply.
Ruling:
No.
The collateral source rule is 'predicated on the theory that a tortfeasor
has no interest in, and therefore no right to benefit from monies received
by the injured person from sources unconnected with the defendant'.
According to the collateral source rule, 'a tortfeasor has no right to any
mitigation of damages because of payments or compensation received
by the injured person from an independent source.'
The rationale for the collateral source rule is based upon the quasi-
punitive nature of tort law liability. It has been explained as follows: The
collateral source rule is designed to strike a balance between two
competing principles of tort law: (1) a plaintiff is entitled to
compensation sufficient to make him whole, but no more; and (2) a
defendant is liable for all damages that proximately result from his
wrong.
A plaintiff who receives a double recovery for a single tort enjoys a
windfall; a defendant who escapes, in whole or in part, liability for his
wrong enjoys a windfall. Because the law must sanction one windfall
and deny the other, it favors the victim of the wrong rather than the
wrongdoer. Thus, the tortfeasor is required to bear the cost for the full
value of his or her negligent conduct even if it results in a windfall for
the innocent plaintiff.
Collateral source rule was originally applied to tort cases wherein the
defendant is prevented from benefitting from the plaintiff’s receipt of
money from other sources. Under this rule, if an injured person receives
compensation for his injuries from a source wholly independent of the
tortfeasor, the payment should not be deducted from the damages
which he would otherwise collect from the tortfeasor. The collateral
source rule applies in order to place the responsibility for losses on the
party causing them.
Thus, it finds no application to cases involving no-fault insurances under
which the insured is indemnified for losses by insurance companies,
regardless of who was at fault in the incident generating the losses.
Here, it is clear that MMPC is a no-fault insurer. Hence, it cannot be
obliged to pay the hospitalization expenses of the dependents of its
employees which had already been paid by separate health insurance
providers of said dependents.