CHAPTER 2 PALE

3S SY 2015-2016

40. Rodolfo Bernardo vs. Atty. Ismael Mejia

A.C. No. 2984, August 31, 2007
Nachura

FACTS: In 1992, Mejia was disbarred on the following grounds: 1) misappropriation and
conversion to his personal use part of a sum of money entrusted to him, 2) falsification of certain
documents, and 3) issuing a worthless check as payment of a loan obtained from Bernardo
(Mejia’s former client). Hence, this petition for review with plea for reinstatement in the practice of
law filed by Mejia. He acknowledged his indiscretions in the law profession, that he is already 71
years old, that 15 years had already lapsed after disbarment and that he has long repented and
suffered enough.

ISSUE: Whether to grant the petition for reinstatement

SC RULING: YES. The applicant must, like a candidate for admission to the bar, satisfy the Court
that he is a person of good moral character, a fit and proper person to practice law. The Court will
take in to consideration that applicant’s character and standing prior to the disbarment, the
nature and character of the charges for which he was disbarred, his conduct subsequent to the
disbarment, and the time that has elapsed between the disbarment and the application for
reinstatement.
After his disbarment, he put up the Mejia Law Journal, a publication containing his
religious and social writings. He also organized a religious organization and named it “El Cristo
Movement and Crusade on Miracle of Heart and Mind.” While the age of the petitioner and the
length of time during which he has endured the ignominy of disbarment are not the sole measure
in allowing a petition for reinstatement, the Court takes cognizance of the rehabilitation of Mejia.
Since his disbarment in 1992, no other transgression has been attributed to him, and he has
shown remorse. Hence, the petition for reinstatement is granted.
In addition, the practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. Adherence to the
rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality and faithful
compliance with the rules of the legal profession are the continuing requirements for enjoying the
privilege to practice law.

41. Conrado Que vs. Atty. Anastacio Revilla, Jr.

A.C. No. 7054, November 11, 2014
Per Curiam

FACTS:
On 4 December 2009, Atty. Revilla was disbarred from the practice of law on the following
grounds: abuse of court procedures and processes; filing of multiple actions and forum shopping;
willful, intentional and deliberate resort to falsehood and deception before the courts; maligning
the name of his fellow lawyer; and fraudulent and unauthorized appearances in court.
On 8 July 2010, Revilla filed a Petition for Judicial Clemency and Compassion praying
that his license to practice law be restored based on humanitarian considerations. The petition
was denied.
On 11 January 2011, Revilla filed an Appeal for Grace, Succor, and Mercy. He
maintained that complainant Que failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that he
committed grossly immoral conduct. He also attempted to pass the blame on another individual –
Gerolin Piedad, the General Manager of Kalayaan Development Corporation. The appeal was
again denied.
 On 13 July 2011, Revilla again wrote the court seeking for forgiveness stating among
others that he has learned his lesson, but at the same time, questioning the Court’s finding for
lack of factual support. He appended to his appeal proofs of his updated payment of IBP dues,
MCLE compliance, and a letter from the Bishop of Marinduque. Again, he appeal was denied.
On 17 May 2012, Revilla again wrote the Court reiterating his prayer to lift the order of
disbarment. He alleged that he has never been involved in any immoral or illegal activities, has
devoted himself as a Church Minister leader, has conducted monthly lectures on marriage at the
Diocese of Novaliches, and has been a monthly financial contributor to Mt. Carmel Church. The
plea was denied, together with his subsequent letters on 30 August 2012 and 27 March 2013.
On 18 July 2014, Revilla filed the present Profound Appeal for Judicial Clemency
reiterating his apologies and stressing that the penalty has already served its purpose as it has
already taken its toll on his health. Apparently, he is suffering from chronic kidney disease.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Revilla should be reinstated in the practice of law

HELD:
No. Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. It is a special privilege granted
and continued only to those who demonstrate special fitness in intellectual attainment and moral
character.
The basic inquiry in a petition for reinstatement to the practice of law is whether the
lawyer has sufficiently rehabilitated himself or herself in conduct and character. It rests to a great
extent on the sound discretion of the Court so that the petitioner must prove by clear and
convincing evidence that he or she is again worthy of membership in the Bar.
In the present appeal, although that Court believes that the respondent is not inherently
lacking in moral fiber as shown by his conduct prior to his disbarment, the Court is not convinced
that he had sufficiently achieved moral reformation. More than 4 years is not sufficient to enable
him to reflect and realize his professional transgressions considering that this is the second time
that Revilla was accused and found guilty of gross misconduct, the first was Plus Builders, Inc.
vs. Atty. Revilla. The period that passed is not considerably long considering the nature and
perversity of his misdeeds. Also, his previous inclinations to pass the blame on other individuals
contradicts his assertion that he has repented.

42. People vs. Maceda

Gr. No. 89591-96 January 24, 2000

Facts: This case arose when a motion for reconsideration was denied with regards to the August
13, 1990 decision wherein the Supreme Court held that respondent Judge Maceda did not
commit any grave abuse of discrestion in issuing the order of August 8, 1989. Such order gives
the custody over private respondent Javellana to the Clerk of Court of RTC branch 12 of Antique,
Atty. Del Rosario, during the pendency of the criminal cases. It specifically provided private
respondent's detention in residence of Atty. Del Rosario.

However such order was not strictly complied with because private respondent was not detained.
He went about his normal activities, even engaging in the practice of law. Despite a resolution
prohibiting him from accepting a certain crimininal case (case no. 4262) private respondent still
accepted and continued practicing law.

Senior state prosecutor Guingoyon filed with SC a motion seeking clarification, which was noted
by SC. The questions are the issues forthwith.

Issues:
1. Is Atty. now (Judge) del Rosario still the custodian of Atty Javellana?
2. Does the resolution prohibiting Atty Javellana from appearing as counsel refer only to that
certain criminal case?

Held:
1. No. When Atty. Del Rosario was appointed judge, he ceased to be the personal custodian of
accused Javellana and the succeeding clerk of court muat be deemed the custodian under the
same undertaking. However, the perceived threats to Javellana's life no longer exist. Thus the
order of giving his custody to the clerk of court must be recalled and he must be detained at the
provincial jail of Antique

2. No. As a matter of law, when a person indicted for an offense is arrested, he is deemed placed
under the custody of the law. He is placed in actual restraint of liberty in jail so that he may be
bound to answer for the commission of the offense. Let it be stressed that all prisoners whether
under private preventive detention or serving final sentence can not practice their profession nor
engage in any business or occupation, or hold office, elective or appointive, while in detention.
This is a necessary consequence of arrest and detention. Hence, the prohibition to practice law
referred to all cases except where private respondent would appear in court to defend himself.

43. Zeta vs. Malinao

Adm. Matter No. P-220 December 20, 1978
Barredo, J.

FACTS:
1. Julio Zeta filed a letter complaint with the Department of Justice against Respondent
Felicisimo Malinao, court interpreter of the Court of First Instance of Catbalogan, Samar. The
letter-complaint charged him with:
1. Illegally appearing in court as counsel even if he is not a lawyer.
 Appears before the municipal courts of Catbalogan, Daram, Zumaraga, Talalora
and Sta. Rita, Samar
 Collects fees and treats the same as means of livelihood

2. Grave misconduct in office by instigating and encouraging individuals to commit

crime, telling them not to be afraid as he is a court employee and has influence over
the judges

3. Crime of falsification
 Unfaithfully filing his daily time record
 Making it appear that he was in office when in fact he is not
 Collects salaries for those days

4. Violation of Executive order and Civil Service Law

 Members of civil service are prohibited from engaging in private practice of any
profession without permission from the Department head

2. The DOJ referred the matter to District Judge Segundo Zosa, CFI Catbalogan for
investigation, report and recommendation.

3. Malinao avers that he has not violated any rule or law, much less Sec. 12, Rule 18 of the
Civil Service Rules. He argues that his participation in the cases were gratuitous as the
persons therein could not engage the services of counsel by reason of poverty and the
absence of one in the locality.
4. Judge Zosa found that Malinao was guilty of the charges and recommends that he be
reprimanded.
a. Inspection of the court records of the following municipal courts showed that Malinao
appeared before them as counsel, spanning the years of 1960 to 1970:
o Sta. Rita: 3 times
o Daram: 4 times
o Zumarraga: 2 times
b. Inspection of his daily time records in the CFI Catbalogan shows that 3 of the entries
were false in that he made it appear that he was in the Catbalogan office when in fact
he appeared as counsel in cases before the municipal courts in Daram and
Zumarraga.
c. He violated the Civil Service Law (Section 12, Rule 18 RA 2260) for appearing as
counsel in the municipal courts of Sta. Rita, Daram and Zumarraga.

ISSUE: Is Malinao administratively liable for violating the Civil Service Law?

RULING: Yes, Malinao is administratively liable for violating the Civil Service Law for
practicing a profession (the legal profession) while in the Civil Service without the permission of
his Department Head, with no license to practice law at that. The Court found the conclusions of
fact of Judge Zosa to be amply supported by the evidence. He appeared before the municipal
courts of Daram, Zumarraga and Sta. Rita without the permission of his Department Head and,
worse, even falsified his daily time record to hide such fact.

Moreover, in doing so, Malinao engaged in unauthorized practice of law. There is no merit in his
argument that he merely did so gratuitously because the records show that he was doing it as a
regular practice obviously for considerations other than pure love of justice.

Malinao’s actuations warrant a more drastic sanction that that of reprimand as recommended by
Judge Zosa. Malinao is thus ordered dismissed from his position as interpreter of the CFI
Catbalogan, Samar, with prejudice to re-employment in the judicial branch of the government.

44. Rogelio Tan, Norma Tan and Maliyawao Pagayokan vs Benedicto Balajadia
G.R. No. 169517; March 14, 2006
Ynares-Santiago,J.;

Facts: Prior to the present case, the respondent filed a criminal case against herein petitioners for
usurpation of authority, grave coercion and violation of city tax ordinance due to the alleged illegal
collection of parking fees by petitioners from respondent. In paragraph 5 of the complaint-
affidavit, respondent asserted that he is a "practicing lawyer based in Baguio City with office
address at Room B-207, 2/F Lopez Building, Session Road, Baguio City." However, certifications
issued by the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines showed that
respondent has never been admitted to the Philippine Bar. Petitioners claim that respondent is
liable for indirect contempt for misrepresenting himself as a lawyer. Hence, this present petition
for contempt against herein respondent.

Respondent avers that the allegation in paragraph 5 of the complaint-affidavit that he is a

practicing lawyer was an honest mistake. He claims that two complaint-affidavits were drafted by
Liza Laconsay, Secretary of Atty. Paterno Aquino; one for the incident at 10am and the other for
the 1pm incident. Respondent insists that the complaint-affidavit regarding the 1:00 o'clock
parking incident correctly alleged that he is "a businessman with office address at Room B-204,
2/F Lopez Building, Session Road, Baguio City." However, the complaint-affidavit regarding the
10:00 o'clock parking incident, which is the subject of the instant petition, erroneously referred to
him as a practicing lawyer because Atty. Aquino's secretary copied verbatim paragraph 5 of Atty.
Aquino’s complaint-affidavit. It appears that Atty. Aquino had previously filed a complaint-affidavit
against petitioners involving the same subject matter.

Laconsay, Atty. Aquino's secretary, executed an affidavit admitting the mistake in the preparation
of the complaint-affidavit. Respondent alleged that he did not read the complaint-affidavit
because he assumed that the two complaint- affidavits contained the same allegations with
respect to his occupation and office address. Respondent claims that he had no intention of
misrepresenting himself as a practicing lawyer.

Issue: Whether respondent is liable for indirect contempt due to unauthorized practice of law

Held: NO. In several cases, we have ruled that the unauthorized practice of law by assuming to
be an attorney and acting as such without authority constitutes indirect contempt which is
punishable by fine or imprisonment or both. The liability for the unauthorized practice of law under
Section 3(e), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court is in the nature of criminal contempt. In determining
liability for criminal contempt, well-settled is the rule that intent is a necessary element, and no
one can be punished unless the evidence makes it clear that he intended to commit it. In the
cases where a party was found liable for the unauthorized practice of law, the party was guilty of
some overt act like signing court pleadings on behalf of his client; appearing before court
hearings as an attorney; or deliberately attempting to practice law and holding out himself as an
attorney through circulars with full knowledge that he is not licensed to do so.

In the case at bar, a review of the records supports respondent's claim that he never intended to
project himself as a lawyer to the public. It was a clear inadvertence on the part of the secretary
of Atty Aquino. The affidavit of Liza Laconsay attesting to the circumstances that gave rise to the
mistake in the drafting of the complaint- affidavit conforms to the documentary evidence on
record. Taken together, these circumstances show that the allegation in paragraph 5 of
respondent's complaint- affidavit was, indeed, the result of inadvertence. No evidence was
presented to show that respondent acted as an attorney or that he intended to practice law.
Consequently, he cannot be made liable for indirect contempt considering his lack of intent to
illegally practice law. Thus, the petition is dismissed with a warning to be more careful and
circumspect in his future actions.

45. Lijauco vs Atty Terrado

AC No. 6317; Aug 31, 2006

FACTS: On February 13, 2004, an administrative complaint was filed by complainant Luzviminda
Lijauco against respondent Atty. Rogelio Terrado for gross misconduct, malpractice and conduct
unbecoming an officer of the court when he neglected a legal matter entrusted to him despite
receipt of payment representing attorney’s fees. According to complainant, she engaged the
services of respondent sometime in January 2001 for Php70,000 to assist in recovering her
deposit with Planters Development Bank (Buendia, Makati Branch) in the amount of Php 180, 000
and the release of her foreclosed house and lot located in Calamba, Laguna. The property
identified as Lot No. 408-C-2 and registered as TCT No. T-402119 in the name of said bank is the
subject of a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession then pending before the Regional
Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna, Branch 24 docketed as LRC Case No. B-2610.

Complainant alleged that respondent failed to appear before the trial court in the hearing for the
issuance of the Writ of Possession and did not protect her interests in the Compromise
Agreement which she subsequently entered into to end LRC Case B-2610. Respondent denied
the accusations and averred that the Php70, 000 he received from complainant was payment for
legal services for the recovery of deposit w/ PDB and did not include the LRC case. The
complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and
recommendation. The Investigating Commissioner found respondent guilty of violationg Rules
1.01 and 9.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

By openly admitting he divided the Php70,000.00 to other individuals as commission/referral fees

respondent violated Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
provides that a lawyer shall not divide or stipulate to divide a fee for legal services with persons
not licensed to practice law. Worst, by luring complainant to participate in a compromise
agreement with a false and misleading assurance that complainant can still recover after Three
(3) years her foreclosed property respondent violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which says a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral
or deceitful conduct.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent violated Rules 1.01 and 9.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility

HELD: YES. The practice of law is a privilege bestowed on those who show that they possessed
and continue to possess the legal qualifications for it. Indeed, lawyers are expected to maintain at
all times a high standard of legal proficiency and morality, including honesty, integrity and fair
dealing. They must perform their fourfold duty to society, the legal profession, the courts and their
clients, in accordance with the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code
of Professional Responsibility. Lawyers are prohibited from engaging in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct and are mandated to serve their clients with competence and
diligence. They shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to them, and this negligence in
connection therewith shall render them liable. Utmost fidelity is demanded once counsel agrees
to take the cudgels for his client’s cause.

Respondent’s claim that the attorney’s fee pertains only to the recovery of complainant’s savings
deposit from Planter’s Development Bank cannot be sustained. Records show that he acted as
complainant’s counsel in the drafting of the compromise agreement between the latter and the
bank relative to LRC Case No. B-2610. Respondent admitted that he explained the contents of
the agreement to complainant before the latter affixed her signature. Moreover, the Investigating
Commissioner observed that the fee of P70,000.00 for legal assistance in the recovery of the
deposit amounting to P180,000.00 is unreasonable. A lawyer shall charge only fair and
reasonable fees.

Respondent’s disregard for his client’s interests is evident in the iniquitous stipulations in the
compromise agreement where the complainant conceded the validity of the foreclosure of her
property; that the redemption period has already expired thus consolidating ownership in the
bank, and that she releases her claims against it. Complainant agreed to these concessions
because respondent misled her to believe that she could still redeem the property after three
years from the foreclosure. The duty of a lawyer to safeguard his client’s interests commences
from his retainer until his discharge from the case or the final disposition of the subject matter of
litigation. Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship and gives
rise to the duty of fidelity to the client’s cause.

Respondent’s admission that he divided the legal fees with two other people as a referral fee
does not release him from liability. A lawyer shall not divide or stipulate to divide a fee for legal
services with persons not licensed to practice law, except in certain cases.

(Correlate:) Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is a basic postulate in legal
ethics. When a lawyer takes a client’s cause, he covenants that he will exercise due diligence in
protecting his rights. The failure to exercise that degree of vigilance and attention makes such
lawyer unworthy of the trust reposed in him by his client and makes him answerable not just to his
client but also to the legal profession, the courts and society.
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months effective from notice, and STERNLY
WARNED that any similar infraction will be dealt with more severely. He is further ordered to
RETURN, within thirty (30) days from notice, the sum of P70,000.00 to complainant Luzviminda
C. Lijauco and to submit to this Court proof of his compliance within three (3) days therefrom.

46. Plus Builders vs Atty Anastacio Revilla

Facts: Petitioners filed a disturbance case in 1999 against Leopoldo de Guzman and others who
were tenant-farmers before the Provincial Adjudication Board of Cavite where the latter ruled in
favor of the former. One Damien Villaresca filed a motion for reconsideration on behalf of the
tenant farmers but was not given due course. One Atty. Willy Roxas filed a manifestation and a
notice of appeal to the CA claiming that he represents the tenant-farmers and that they are
members of the Kalayaan Development Cooperative. Seeing an opportunity to earn monetary
claims in a Disturbance Compensation , respondent filed a motion to leave to allow amendment
of caption to include the name of the Kalayaan Development Corporation(KDC) in which he
attached his retainer contract to prove that he is the counsel of the latter.

Due to the failure of receiving monetary benefits in the said case,mrespondent applied for a writ if
preliminary injunction and quashal of the writ of execution of the PARAD averring that his clients
were indeed tenant-farmers of the land in dispute and the tenancy agreement must be respected
which was granted. Emboldened by the writ, respondent filed a case of indirect contempt against
petitioner which was also granted. The petitioners elevated the case to the CA which ruled in its
favor by reason of the 1999 Parad decision in its favor.

Feeling ill of his defeat in the administrative tribunal, respondent filed an action to quiet title with
prayer of issuance of TRO in the RTC of Imus to delay execution of the 1999 PARAD decision in
which he signed the pleading under the name of KDC Legal Services in which KDC was a
partner. Respondent avers this time that the tenant-farmers were owners of the land in dispute.
Due to the fsct that respondent did not apprise the court of his case in PARAD, the RTC issued a
TRO in his favor but was subsequently revoked by reason of discovery of the 1999 Parad
decison. Hence, petitioners now file a case for disbarment against respondent for abusing court
processes. The IBP found respondent in violation of Rules 1.03, 9.03, 10.03 and 12.04 due to his
during the hearing.

Issue: WON should be held administratively liable for his acts.

Held: YES. Lawyers are expected to act with honesty in all their dealings. They must never abuse
their right of recourse to the courts especially if their case has already been repeatedly rejected.
Here, respondent represented in Parad that his clients were mere tenant-farmers but when he
filed an action to quiet title, he represented the as owners of the land in dispute. Lawyers should
not misuse court processes to defeat justice and to delay the execution of judgements as
mandated by Rules 10.03 ans 12.04. Also, respondent kept silent in the matter that he signed
pleadings under the name of KDC legal services in which KDC was a partner. His silence on the
matter was deemed an admittance and is a violation of rule 9.01 which states that lawyers shall
not delegate functions to non-lawyers which may only be done by members of the Bar.

The Court however found that disbarment was too severe of a punishment and merely gave a
respondent a two year suspension from the practice of law.
CHAPTER 3 PALE
3S SY 2015-2016

47. Pangan vs. Ramos’ SANTA PANGAN, complainant, vs. ATTY. DIONISIO RAMOS,
respondent

FACTS: This has reference to the motion of complainant, Santa Pangan, to cite respondent
Dionisio Ramos for contempt. On September 7, 1978 and March 13, 1979, the hearings in this
administrative case were postponed on the basis of respondent’s motions for postponement.
These motions were predicated on respondent’s allegations that on said dates he had a case set
for hearing before Branch VII, Court of First Instance of Manila, entitled People v. Marieta M. Isip.
Upon verification, the attorney of record of the accused in said case is one “Atty. Pedro D.D.
Ramos, 306 Doña Salud Bldg., Dasmariñas, Manila.” Respondent admits that he used the name
of “Pedro D.D. Ramos” before said court, and avers that he had a right to do so because in his
Birth Certificate his name is “Pedro Dionisio Ramos” and that the “D.D.” in “Pedro D.D. Ramos” is
but an abbreviation of “Dionisio Dayaw”, his other given name and maternal surname.

ISSUE: WON respondent may use a name other than the one inscribed in the ROA

HELD: No. The name appearing in the “Roll of Attorneys” is “Dionisio D. Ramos”. The attorney’s
roll or register is the official record containing the names and signatures of those who are
authorized to practice law. A lawyer is not authorized to use a name other than the one inscribed
in the Roll of Attorneys in his practice of law. The official oath obliges the attorney solemnly to
swear that he “will do no falsehood”. As an officer in the temple of justice, an attorney has
irrefragable obligations of “truthfulness, candor and frankness”. Indeed, candor and frankness
should characterize the conduct of the lawyer at every stage. This has to be so because the court
has the right to rely upon him in ascertaining the truth. In representing himself to the court as
“Pedro D.D. Ramos” instead of “Dionisio D. Ramos”, respondent has violated his solemn oath.
The duty of an attorney to the courts to employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes
confided to him, such means as are consistent with truth and honor, cannot be overemphasized.
As stated in a case, his “high vocation is to correctly inform the court upon the law and the facts
of the case, and to aid it in doing justice and arriving at correct conclusions. He violates his oath
of office when he resorts to deception, or permits his client to do so.” In using the name of “Pedro
D.D. Ramos” before the courts instead of the name by which he was authorized to practice law—
Dionisio D. Ramos—respondent in effect resorted to deception. He demonstrated lack of candor
in dealing with the courts. Dionisio D. Ramos is severely REPRIMANDED and warned that a
repetition of the same overt act may warrant his suspension or disbarment from the practice of
law.

48. Artiaga vs Villanueva

49. Garvida vs Sales

G.R. No. 124893
April 18, 1997
Puno, J.

Facts:

The Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) national elections was scheduled on May 6, 1996. On March
16, 1996, petitioner Lynette Garvida applied for membership in the Katipunan ng mga Kabataan
of Barangay San Lorenoz, Bangui, Ilocos Norte. The application was denied by the Board of
Election Tellers on the ground that she exceeded the age limit for membership as she was
already 21 years and 10 months old. On April 2, 1996, she filed with the MCTC a “Petition for
Inclusion as Registered Kabataang Member and Voter” which was favored upon. The Board of
Election Tellers appealed to the RTC but the presiding judge inhibited himself because of the
close association he had with the petitioner. On April 23, 1996, petitioner filed her CoC for the
position of SK Chairman of the same barangay. In a letter dated the same day, respondent
Election Officer DInisio Rios, as per advice of Provincial Election Supervisor Noli Pipo,
disapproved petitioner’s CoC because of her age. Petitioner appealed to the COMELEC Regional
Director Filemon Asperin who set aside the respondents’ order and allowed her to run. On May 2,
1996, respondent Rios issued a memorandum to petitioner informing her of her ineligibility to run
and directing her to explain within 24 hours why her CoC should not be cancelled. Earlier,
however, and without the knowkedge of COMELEC officials, respondent Florecio Sales filed woth
the COMELEC En Banc a “Petition of Denial and/or Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy”
against petitioner. The petion was ent through facsimile and registered mail on April 29, 1996. On
the same day that respondent Rios issued the memorandum, the COMELEC En Banc issued an
order directing the Board of Election Tellers and Board of Canvassers to suspend the
proclamation of petitioner in the event she won. On May 6, 1996, petitioner garnered the highest
votes but was not proclaimed pursuant to the COMELEC En Banc order. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Did the COMELEC En Banc act with grave abuse of discretion by disregarding its Rules of
Procedure by entertaining respondent Sales’ petition?

Held:

Yes. Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides that a petition to deny due course to
or cancel a certificate of candidacy for an elective office may be filed with the Law Department of
the COMELEC on the ground that the candidate has made a false material representation in his
certificate. The petition may be heard and evidence received by any official designated by the
COMELEC after which the case shall be decided by the COMELEC itself.

Under the same Rules of Procedure, jurisdiction over a petition to cancel a certificate of
candidacy lies with the COMELEC sitting in Division, not en banc. Cases before a Division may
only be entertained by the COMELEC en banc when the required number of votes to reach a
decision, resolution, order or ruling is not obtained in the Division. Moreover, only motions to
reconsider decisions, resolutions, orders or rulings of the COMELEC in Division are resolved by
the COMELEC en banc. It is therefore the COMELEC sitting in Divisions that can hear and
decide election cases.

In the instant case, the COMELEC en banc did not refer the case to any of its Divisions upon
receipt of the petition. It therefore acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion when
it entertained the petition and issued the order of May 2, 1996.

The COMELEC en banc also erred when it failed to note that the petition itself did not comply with
the formal requirements of pleadings under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.

Every pleading before the COMELEC must be printed, mimeographed or typewritten in legal size
bond paper and filed in at least ten (10) legible copies. Pleadings must be filed directly with the
proper Clerk of Court of the COMELEC personally, or, by registered mail.

In the instant case, the subject petition was not in proper form. Only two (2) copies of the petition
were filed with the COMELEC. Also, the COMELEC en banc issued its Resolution on the basis of
the petition transmitted by facsimile, not by registered mail.
Filing a pleading by facsimile transmission is not sanctioned by the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, much less by the Rules of Court. A facsimile is not a genuine and authentic pleading.
It is, at best, an exact copy preserving all the marks of an original

Without the original, there is no way of determining on its face whether the facsimile pleading is
genuine and authentic and was originally signed by the party and his counsel. It may, in fact, be a
sham pleading. The uncertainty of the authenticity of a facsimile pleading should have restrained
the COMELEC en banc from acting on the petition and issuing the questioned order. The
COMELEC en banc should have waited until it received the petition filed by registered mail.

50. Re: Suspension of Atty. Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo, Former Senior State Prosecutor

Facts:

This administrative case stemmed from the events of the proceedings in Crim. Case No. 5144,
entitled People v. Luis Bucalon Plaza, heard before the sala of Presiding Judge Jose Manuel P.
Tan, RTC of Surigao City, Branch 29.

CC No. 5144 was originally raffled to the sala of Judge Floripinas C. Buyser, RTC of Surigao City,
Branch 30. The counsel for the defense filed a Motion to Fix the Amount of Bail Bond.
Respondent Atty. Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo, then Senior State Prosecutor and the deputized
prosecutor of the case, objected mainly on the ground that the original charge of murder, was
non-bailable. Judge Buyser inhibited himself from further trying the case because of the “harsh
insinuation” of Senior Prosecutor Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo that he “lacks the cold neutrality of an
impartial magistrate,” by allegedly suggesting the filing of the motion to fix the amount of bail bond
by counsel for the accused.

The case was transferred to Branch 29, presided by Judge Tan. Judge Tan favorably resolved
the Motion to Fix the Amount of Bail Bond, and fixed the amount of the bond at P40,000.
Respondent filed a MR which was denied. In October, 2003, respondent appealed from the
Orders dated November 12, 2002 and February 10, 2003, to the CA.

Instead of availing himself only of judicial remedies, respondent caused the publication of an
article regarding the Order granting bail to the accused in the August 18, 2003 issue of the
Mindanao Gold Star Daily.

Title: “Senior prosecutor lambasts Surigao judge for allowing murder suspect to bail out,”

“Senior state prosecutor Rogelio Bagabuyo lambasted Judge Manuel Tan of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) Branch 29 based in Surigao City for ruling on a motion that sought a bailbond for
Luis Plaza who stands charged with murdering a policeman…Plaza reportedly posted a
P40thousand bail bond. Bagabuyo argued that the crime of murder is a nonbailable offense. But
Bagabuyo admitted that a judge could still opt to allow a murder suspect to bail out in cases when
the evidence of the prosecution is weak. But in this murder case, Bagabuyo said the judge who
previously handled it, Judge Floripinas Buyser, described the evidence to be strong. Buyser
inhibited from the case for an unclear reason. Bagabuyo said he would contest Tan’s decision
before the Court of Appeals and would file criminal and administrative charges of certiorari
against the judge. Bagabuyuo said he was not afraid of being cited in contempt by Judge Tan.
“This is the only way that the public would know that there are judges there who are displaying
judicial arrogance.”

In an Order dated August 21, 2003, the RTC directed respondent and the writer of the article,
Mark Francisco of the Mindanao Gold Star Daily, to explain why they should not be cited for
indirect contempt of court for the publication of the article which degraded the court and its
presiding judge with its lies and misrepresentation. The said Order stated that contrary to the
statements in the article, Judge Buyser described the evidence for the prosecution as not strong,
but sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused only for homicide. Moreover, it was not true that
Judge Buyser inhibited himself from the case for an unclear reason. Judge Buyser, in an Order
dated August 30, 2002, declared in open court in the presence of respondent that he was
inhibiting himself from the case due to the harsh insinuation of respondent that he lacked the cold
neutrality of an impartial judge.

Respondent admitted that he caused the holding of the press conference, but refused to answer
whether he made the statements in the article until after he shall have filed a motion to dismiss.
For his refusal to answer, the trial court declared him in contempt of court pursuant to Sec. 3,
Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. He is ordered to suffer the penalty of 30 days in jail. The BJMP is
hereby ordered to arrest him if he does not put up a bond of P100,000.00. Respondent posted
bond

Despite the citation of indirect contempt, respondent presented himself to the media for interviews
in Radio Station DXKS, and again attacked the integrity of Judge Tan and the trial court’s
disposition in the proceedings of Crim. Case No. 5144.

In an Order dated October 20, 2003, RTC required respondent to explain and to show cause why
he should not be held in contempt for his media interviews. In the Order, the trial court stated that
respondent was interviewed by Jun Clergio, and that the interview was repeatedly aired on
September 30, 2003 and in his news program between 6:00 and 8:00 a.m. on October 1, 2003.
He was also interviewed by Tony Consing on October 1 and 2, 2003, between 8:00 and 9:00 a.m.
in his radio program. In those radio interviews, respondent allegedly called Judge Tan a judge
who does not know the law, a liar, and a dictator who does not accord due process to the people.

Respondent denied the charge that he sought to be interviewed by radio station DXKS. He,
however, stated that right after the hearing of September 30, 2003, he was approached by
someone who asked him to comment on the Order issued in open court, and that his comment
does not fall within the concept of indirect contempt of court. He also admitted that he was
interviewed by his friend, Tony Consing, at the latter’s instance. He justified his response during
the interview as a simple exercise of his constitutional right of freedom of speech and that it was
not meant to offend or malign, and was without malice.

The trial court found respondent’s denials to be lame as the interview showed disrespect of the
court and its officers.

“this conviction I have now about judges who are ignorant of the law is made firmer by time. I
study everyday. I read new jurisprudence and the law to insure that when I file the disbarment
case against this Judge who does not know his law, I am certain that he loses his license. . . .
This judge who is ignorant of the law should not only be removed as a judge but should also be
disbarred. Just take a look at his Order, Ton, and see what a liar he is…”

“Why did I say that he is a liar? It states that this Order was “given in open court,” and in God’s
mercy, he did not state the amount of P100,000.00 as bail bond.”

“Because he does not know the law, I said, “Your Honor, I have the right to appeal.” Then he
came back and said, “BJMP, arrest Bagabuyo”

“He imposed a bail of P100,000.00. How come? This is where you will see his gross ignorance of
‘the law.”

“He made me come in order to humiliate me because he wanted me arrested, he wanted me

imprisoned, but because he is ignorant of the law, he ordered the BMJP. For God’s sake, Mr.
Tan, what’s wrong with you, Mr. Tan? Please read the law. What is your thinking? That when you
are a judge, you are also a dictator? No way, no sir, ours is a democratic country where all and
everyone is entitled to due process of law—you did not accord me due process of law”

“I am not worried because I have a truckload of jurisprudence that judges who are ignorant of the
law must be removed from the Bench. But what law has he been reading? I heard that he is a
mahjong aficionado (mahjongero) and that is why he is studying mahjong.”

The trial court concluded that respondent, as a member of the bar and an officer of the court, is
duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of the court, and should not promote distrust in the
administration of justice.

The Office of the Bar Confidant recommended the implementation of the trial court’s order of
suspension.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty Bagabuyo should be suspended?

RULING: Yes. Lawyers are licensed officers of the courts who are empowered to appear,
prosecute and defend; and upon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are devolved
by law as a consequence. Membership in the bar imposes upon them certain obligations. Canon
11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates a lawyer to “observe and maintain the
respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and [he] should insist on similar conduct by
others.” Rule 11.05 of Canon 11 states that a lawyer “shall submit grievances against a judge to
the proper authorities only.”

Respondent violated Rule 11.05 of Canon 11 when he admittedly caused the holding of a press
conference. Respondent also violated Canon 11 when he indirectly stated that Judge Tan was
displaying judicial arrogance in the article. Respondent’s statements in the article, which were
made while Crim. Case No. 5144 was still pending in court, also violated Rule 13.02 of Canon 13,
which states that “a lawyer shall not make public statements in the media regarding a pending
case tending to arouse public opinion for or against a party.

In regard to the radio interview given to Tony Consing, respondent violated Rule 11.05 of Canon
11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for not resorting to the proper authorities only for
redress of his grievances against Judge Tan. Respondent also violated Canon 11 for his
disrespect of the court and its officer when he stated that Judge Tan was ignorant of the law, that
as a mahjong aficionado, he was studying mahjong instead of studying the law, and that he was a
liar.

Respondent also violated the Lawyer’s Oath, as he has sworn to “conduct [himself] as a lawyer
according to the best of [his] knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts
as to [his] clients.”

The Court is not against lawyers raising grievances against erring judges but the rules clearly
provide for the proper venue and procedure for doing so, precisely because respect for the
institution must always be maintained. \

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Atty. Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo is found guilty of violating
Rule 11.05, Canon 11 and Rule 13.02, Canon 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and
of violating the Lawyer’s Oath, for which he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1)
year effective upon finality of this Decision, with a STERN WARNING that the repetition of a
similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.
51. TIONGCO vs. HON. AGUILAR

G.R. No. 115932 January 25, 1995

DAVIDE, J.:

FACTS:

The Court required ATTY. JOSE B. TIONGCO to show cause why he should not be
dealt with administratively for the violation of Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility considering that the insinuation of counsel for the petitioners is that the Court
did not read the petition as borne out by the following statement: ". . . Truly, it is hard to
imagine that this Honorable Court had read the petition and the annexes attached thereto
and hold that the same has "failed to sufficiently show that the respondent Court had
committed a grave abuse of discretion in rendering the questioned judgment." Petitioner
averred that the respondent Judge has "joined the defendants and their counsel in a
scheme to unlawfully deprive petitioners of the possession and fruits of their property for
the duration of appeal"; and with respect to the Order of 30 May 1994, described the
respondent Judge as a "liar," "perjurer," or "blasphemer."

In his 2-page Compliance, he alleged that: If the undersigned has called anyone a "liar"
"thief" "perfidious" and "blasphemer" it is because he is in fact a liar, thief, perfidious and
blasphemer; "this Honorable First Division, however, forget, that the undersigned called him
a "robber", a "rotten manipulator" and "abetter" of graft and shady deals. On the other
hand, if the undersigned called anybody "cross-eyed," it must be because he is indeed
crosseyed — particularly when he sees but five (5) letters in an eight (8) letter-word;
Indeed, it must be a lousy Code of Professional Responsibility and therefore stands in
dire need of amendment which punishes lawyer who truthfully expose incompetent and
corrupt judges before this Honorable Supreme Court; It is therefore, respectfully submitted,
that for all his pains, the undersigned does not deserve or is entitled to the honors of
being dealt with administratively or otherwise. and prays: WHEREFORE, in view of the
foregoing, the undersigned respectfully prays of this Honorable Supreme Court, that it
forebear from turning the undersigned into a martyr to his principles. Yet, he added the
following: WITH THE UNDERSIGNED'S RESPECTFUL APOLOGIES — AND UNDYING
LOVE.

ISSUE:

Whether Atty. Tiongco violated Canon 11 which refers to the duty to give respect to the courts.

HELD:

YES. It must at once be noted that Atty. Tiongco did not at all show cause why he
should not be dealt with administratively for violation of Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility in view of his unfounded and malicious insinuation that this
Court did not at all read the petition in this case before it concluded that the petition
failed to sufficiently show that the respondent court had committed a grave abuse of
discretion. Moreover, while he tried to justify as true his descriptions of the respondent
judge as a "liar," "thief." perfidious," and "blasphemer" he did not offer any excuse for his
use of the rest of the intemperate words enumerated in the resolution. Worse, feeling
obviously frustrated at the incompleteness of the Court's enumeration of the intemperate
words or phrases, he volunteered to point out that in addition to those so enumerated, he
also called the respondent judge a "robber," "rotten manipulator," "abettor" of graft and
corruption, and "cross-eyed."

Atty. Tiongco's Compliance is unsatisfactory and is entirely unacceptable for the following
reasons: first, he impliedly admitted the falsity of his insinuation that the Court did not
read the petition' second, except as to the words "liar," "thief," "perfidious'" and
"blasphemer," he failed to address squarely the other intemperate words and phrases
enumerated in the resolution of 26 September 1994, which failure amounts to an
admission of their intemperateness; third, he did not indicate the circumstances upon
which his defense of truth lies; and, fourth, he miserably failed to show the relevance of
the harsh words and phrase to his petition. By falsely and maliciously insinuating that this
Court did not at all read the petition in this case, Atty. Tiongco not only exhibited his
gross disrespect to and contempt for this Court and exposed his plot to discredit the
Members of the First Division of the Court and put them to public contempt or ridicule;
he, as well, charged them with the violation of their solemn duty to render justice,
thereby creating or promoting distrust in judicial administration which could have the effect
of "encouraging discontent which, in many cases, is the source of disorder, thus
undermining the foundation on which rests the bulwark called judicial power to which
those who are aggrieved turn for protection and relief."

Consequently, Atty. Tiongco has made a strong case for a serious violation of Canon 11
of the Code of Professional Responsibility which reads as follows: CANON 11 — A
LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS
AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY
OTHERS. This duty is closely entwined with his vow in the lawyer's oath "to conduct
himself as a lawyer with all good fidelity to the courts"; his duty under Section 20 (b),
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court "[t]o observe and maintain the respect due to the courts
of justice and judicial officers"; and his duty under the first canon of the Canons
Professional Ethics "to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake
of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its incumbent
of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance."

It does not, however, follow that just because a lawyer is an officer of the court, he
cannot criticize the courts. That is his right as a citizen, and it is even his duty as an
officer of the court to avail of such right. Nevertheless, such a right is not without limit.
For, as this Court warned in Almacen: But it is a cardinal condition of all such criticism
that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A
wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and slander of
courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross
violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer
to disciplinary action. The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is
essential to the orderly administration of justice. hence, in the assertion of their client's
rights, lawyers — even those gifted with superior intellect — are enjoined to rein up their
tempers. Elsewise stated, the right to criticize, which is guaranteed by the freedom of
speech and of expression in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution, must be exercised
responsibly, for every right carries with it a corresponding obligation. Freedom is not
freedom from responsibility, but freedom with responsibility.

Proscribed then are, inter alia, the use of unnecessary language which jeopardizes high
esteem in courts, creates or promotes distrust in judicial administration, or tends
necessarily to undermine the confidence of the people in the integrity of the members of
this Court and to degrade the administration of justice by this Court or abrasive and
offensive language, or of disrespectful, offensive, manifestly baseless, and malicious
statements in pleadings or in a letter addressed to the judge, or of disparaging,
intemperate, and uncalled-for remarks.

That Atty. Tiongco had exceeded the bounds of decency and propriety in making the
false and malicious insinuation against this Court, particularly the Members of the First
Division, and the scurrilous characterizations of the respondent judge is, indeed, all too
obvious. Such could only come from anger, if not hate, after he was not given what he
wanted. Anger or hate could only come from one who "seems to be of that frame of
mind whereby he considers as in accordance with law and justice whatever he believes
to be right in his own opinion and as contrary to law and justice whatever does not
accord with his views". When such anger or hate is coupled with haughtiness or
arrogance as when he even pointed out other intemperate words in his petition and with
seething sarcasm as when he prays that this Court "forebear[s] from turning . . . [him]
into a martyr to his principles" and ends up his Compliance with the "RESPECTFUL
APOLOGIES — AND UNDYING LOVE" (Constitution — Preamble, 66th word), "nothing
more can extenuate his liability for gross violation of Canon 11 of the Code of
professional Responsibility and his other duties entwined therewith as earlier adverted to.

52. Banogon vs. Zerna

L-35469, October 9, 1987

Justice Cruz

Facts:

The original decision in this case was rendered by the cadastral court way back on February 9,
1926, sixty one years ago. A motion to amend that decision was filed on March 6, 1957, thirty one
years later. This was followed by an amended petition for review of the judgment on March 18,
1957, and an opposition thereto on March 26, 1957. On October 11, 1971, or after fourteen
years, a motion to dismiss the petition was filed. The petition was dismissed on December 8,
1971, and the motion for reconsideration was denied on February 14, 1972. The petitioners then
came to us on certiorari to question the orders of the respondent judge.

The petitioners contend that the said judgment had not yet become final and executory because
the land in dispute had not yet been registered in favor of the private respondents. The said
judgment would become so only after one year from the issuance of the decree of registration. If
anyone was guilty of laches, it was the private respondents who had failed to enforce the
judgment by having the land registered in their name the pursuant thereto. For their part, the
private respondents argue that the decision of February 9, 1926, became final and executory
after 30 days, same not having been appealed by the petitioners during that period. They slept on
their rights for thirty one years before it occurred to them to question the judgment of the
cadastral court. In fact, their alleged predecessor-in-interest, Filomeno Banogon, lived for
nineteen more years after the 1926 decision and did not see fit to challenge it until his death in
1945. The herein petitioners themselves waited another twelve years, or until 195 7, to file their
petition for review.

Issue:

W/N the petition should be granted

Held:

No. A reading (of the petitioner’s defense, Rivera v. Moran) will show that it is against their
contentions and that under this doctrine they should not have delayed in asserting their claim of
fraud. Their delay was not only for thirty one days but for thirty one years. Laches bars their
petition now. Their position is clearly contrary to law and logic and to even ordinary common
sense.

Litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is assent essential to an
effective and efficient administration of justice that, once a judgment has become final, the
winning party be not, through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Courts must
therefore guard against any scheme calculated to bring about that result. Constituted as they are
to put an end to controversies, courts should frown upon any attempt to prolong them.

Regarding the argument that the private respondents took fourteen years to move for the
dismissal of the petition for review, it suffices to point out that an opposition thereto had been
made as early as March 26, 1957, or nine days after the filing of the petition. Moreover, it was for
the petitioners to move for the hearing of the petition instead of waiting for the private
respondents to ask for its dismissal. After all, they were the parties asking for relief, and it was the
private respondents who were in possession of the land in dispute.

As officers of the court, lawyers have a responsibility to assist in the proper administration of
justice. They do not discharge this duty by filing pointless petitions that only add to the workload
of the judiciary, especially this Court, which is burdened enough as it is. A judicious study of the
facts and the law should advise them when a case, such as this, should not be permitted to be
filed to merely clutter the already congested judicial dockets. They do not advance the cause of
law or their clients by commencing litigations that for sheer lack of merit do not deserve the
attention of the courts. Petition dismissed, with costs against the petitioners.

53. MEDINA v. YAN

G.R. No. L30978, September 30, 1974

FERNANDEZ, J.:

FACTS: On November 23, 1968 petitioner Fortunato Medina, a Filipino citizen who was in
Saigon, South Vietnam, was arrested and apprehended by the South Vietnam police and some
members of the Philippine Civic Action Group (PHILCAG) at the instance of the Philippine Military
Attaché in that city. He was flown back to the Philippines and on November 27, 1968 petitioner
was transferred to the custody of the174th PC Command Officer at Bano, Arayat, Pampanga.

On November 29, 1968 petitioner, through counsel, filed a petition for habeas corpus
directly with the Supreme Court to secure his release from confinement. On the same day the writ
of habeas corpus was issued by the SC, made returnable to the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Quezon City Branch.

Honorable Judge Masakayan rendered a decision ordering the respondents or whoever acts in
their place and stead, to immediately set free and release petitioner Fortunato Medina from
custody. The Solicitor General, as counsel for the respondents, appealed said decision to the
Court of Appeals.

On February 14, 1969, pending appeal, Atty. Amelito R. Mutuc filed an "Urgent Motion for
Release" without bond, of the petitioner Medina. Said motion was denied and the Bond was set at
Php 5,000.00, thus petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration.

However, on May 9, 1969, the issue of the Manila Times carried a news item that petitioner
Medina had escaped from confinement in the municipal jail of Arayat, Pampanga upon advice of
his counsel, Atty. Amelito Mutuc. In his statement, Atty. Mutuc admitted that he have advised
petitioner to escape for after all, his detention is illegal and it is the only way for the latter to regain
his freedom.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Mutuc may be held liable for contempt.

HELD: YES, the act of Atty. Amelito Mutuc of advising, encouraging and practically assisting in
the escape of the petitioner-appellee, Fortunato Medina, from the custody of the law as a
detention prisoner, constitutes a deliberate and wanton violation of his oath as a lawyer.

Hence, Atty. Amelito Mutuc was required to show cause why he should not be held liable
and dealt with for contempt of court, and why he should not be suspended under Rule 138,
Section 28, of the Rules of Court, from the practice of law as a member of the Philippine Bar.

54. Javellana vs Lutero

G.R. No. L-23956

July 21, 1967

FACTS:

On March 29, 1963 the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Jaro, Iloilo filed a detainer complaint
against Elpidio Javellana with the municipal court of Iloilo City, presided by Judge Nicolas Lutero.
The hearing, originally set for April 30, 1963, was postponed to May 24 for failure of the
defendant to receive summons, and then postponed again to June 27 for the same reason. It was
thereafter postponed to July 16, then to July 24, and finally to August 27, all at the behest of the
defendant's Atty. Jose Hautea, on the grounds that "he has not finished his business transactions
in Manila" and that "he hurt his right foot toe." The last postponement was granted by the
municipal court with the warning that no further postponement would be entertained.

When the case was called for trial on August 27, 1963, neither the defendant nor his counsel Atty.
Hautea appeared although one Atty. Romy Peña who was present in court verbally moved for the
postponement of the trial on the ground that Atty. Hautea was in Manila attending to a business
transaction. The verbal motion for postponement was denied and the plaintiff was directed to
adduce his evidence. During the presentation of the plaintiff's evidence, the municipal court
received a telegram from Atty. Hautea requesting postponement of the hearing. The trial
proceeded nevertheless, and, on the basis of the plaintiff's evidence, the court on the same date
rendered judgment for the plaintiff and against the defendant.

On September 11, a motion to set aside judgment and for new trial was filed. This motion was
denied on September 26; a copy of the order of denial was received by him on the same date. On
November 16, 1963, or about 50 days later, the defendant thru his same counsel filed a petition
for relief (from the judgment of the municipal court)with the Court of First Instance of Iloilo. This
petition was given due course. On February 22, 1964, after due hearing, the Court of First
Instance rendered judgment dismissing the petition.

ISSUE:

Considering the environmental circumstances obtaining in this case does the appeal have merit?

HELD:
No. A counsel for any party in a judicial controversy, by mandate of the canons of legal ethics,
and with due regard for the elementary standards of fair play, is duty bound to prepare for trial
with diligence and deliberate speed. This norm of conduct is no less applicable in a detainer case,
such as the one at bar, even if the issues are essentially simple and uncomplicated. It is obvious
that the counsel for the petitioner-appellant has been remiss in this respect.

The case was set for trial six times. Thrice it was postponed at the behest of the said counsel.
The last postponement was granted on July 24, 1963 with the unequivocal admonition by the
judgment that no further postponement would be countenanced. The case was reset for hearing
on August 27, 1963, which means that the appellant's counsel had more than a month's time to
so adjust his schedule of activities as to obviate a conflict between his business transactions and
his calendar of hearings. Came August 27, and neither he nor the appellant appeared at the trial.
His absence on the latter date was not occasioned by illness or some other supervening
occurrence which unavoidably and justifiably prevented him from appearing in court.

In our view, it was the bounden duty of the said counsel, under the circumstances, to give
preferential attention to the case. As things were, he regarded the municipal court as a mere
marionette that must ever await his pleasure. This attitude on his part is censurable as it reveals
more than just a modicum of disrespect for the judiciary and the established machinery of justice.

An appeal from the decision of a municipal court to the Court of First Instance has the effect of
vacating the decision, and the action is to be tried de novo without regard to the proof presented
in the municipal court or the conclusions reached thereon. To grant the appellant's petition for
relief would amount to reviving his right to appeal which he had irretrievably lost through the gross
inaction of his counsel. This in law cannot be done. This Court, hereby assesses treble costs
against the petitioner-appellant Elpidio Javellana, said costs to be paid by his counsel, Atty. Jose
Hautea.

55. FRANCISCO A. ACHACOSO, in his own behalf and in behalf of Capital Insurance &
Surety Co., Inc., petitioners, vs. THE HON.COURT OF APPEALS,COTRAM, S.A., CAPITAL
LIFE ASSURANCE CORP., and JOAQUIN G. GARRIDO,respondents.

No. L-35867. June 28, 1973.

TEEHANKEE, J.:

FACTS:

Petitioner filed a petition for review of the Court of Appeals’ decision dismissing petitioner's
petition for mandamus filed with said court to compel the Manila court of first instance to allow
petitioner's proposed appeal from its adverse judgment dismissing plaintiff's complaint. The Court
required respondents to comment thereon. Respondents filed an extensive eighteen page
comment, and petitioner's counsel, Rodrigo M. Nera, filed a motion for leave to file reply within 15
days from notice, alleging that there was need for such reply "in order that this Honorable Court
may be fully and completely informed of the nature of the controversy which gave rise to the
instant petition." The Court granted such leave and notice of such leave was served on counsel.
On the last day for filing of the reply, counsel asked for an additional 15 days averring that "due to
the pressure of urgent professional work and daily trial engagements of the undersigned counsel
during the original period granted, he has not had sufficient material time to complete the
preparation of petitioner's reply." The Court granted the requested extension. On the last day of
the extended period for filing of the reply, counsel again asked for still another 15-day extension,
stating that "due to the pressure of urgent professional work and daily trial engagements of the
undersigned counsel, he has not had sufficient material time to complete the preparation of
petitioner's reply. The undersigned counsel humbly apologizes that in view of his crowded
schedule, he has been constrained to ask for this extension, but respectfully assures the
Honorable Court that this will be the last one requested." The Court granted counsel's motion for
such third and last extension. The period for the filing of petitioner's reply lapsed without counsel
having filed any reply or manifestation explaining his failure to do so. The Court denied the
petition for review for lack of merit, further required petitioner's counsel to show cause why
disciplinary action should not be taken against him for failure to file the reply after having obtained
such leave and three extensions of time within which to do so. Counsel filed his verified
Explanation stating that he was retained in the case "on a piece-work basis on the verbal
understanding that all expenses for the preparation of pleadings and the cost of services of a
stenographer-typist shall be furnished in advance by petitioner upon being notified thereof;" that
when he asked for a third extension, he so informed petitioner and requested him to "remit the
expenses for the preparation of the reply as per agreement" and that he tried to contact petitioner
before the expiration of the extended period but failed to do so as petitioner "was then most of the
time out of his office." Counsel relates that when he received notice of the Court's resolution
denying the petition and requiring his explanation—long after the expiration on April 13, 1973 of
the extended period for the filing of the reply—that he wrote petitioner and in turn asked petitioner
to explain the latter's failure to comply with his request for a remittance of P500.00 to cover the
necessary expenses, and that petitioner had replied that counsel's letter had been misplaced by a
clerk, and hence, petitioner had "failed to act on the same."

ISSUE:

Whether or not the acts of the counsel warrants disciplinary action from the court.

HELD:

Counsel's explanation is far from satisfactory. If indeed he was not in a financial position to
advance the necessary expenses for preparing and submitting the reply, then he could have filed
timely the necessary manifestation that he was foregoing the filing of such reply on petitioner's
behalf. His inaction unduly delayed the Court's prompt disposition of the case after the filing by
respondents of their comments on the petition showing its lack of merit. The Court would have
then so disposed of the petition had it not been for petitioner's plea to be given time and
opportunity to file a reply to the comments in order to fully apprise the Court of the nature of the
controversy, which plea the Court granted in reliance on his good faith. Yet after having obtained
three extensions of time for the filing of the reply, counsel simply failed to file any reply nor to give
the Court the courtesy of any explanation or manifestation for his failure to do so. Counsel readily
perceived in his explanation that his conduct comes close to delaying the administration of justice
and trifling with the Court's processes. It does not reflect well on counsel's conduct as an officer
of the Court that after assuring the Court that the third extension requested by him "in view of his
crowded schedule" and "of urgent professional work and daily trial engagements" would be the
last within which period he would at last file the awaited reply, for him thereafter to let the period
simply lapse without any explanation whatsoever, and worse, to wait to be found out, and have
the Court require him to explain.

Considering that counsel's record shows no previous infractions on his part since his admission
to the Philippine Bar in 1953, the Court is disposed to be lenient in this instance. The Court
administers a reprimand on Atty. Rodrigo M. Nera, with the warning that a repetition of the same
or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.

56. RENERIO SAMBAJON, RONALD SAMBAJON, CRISANTO CONOS, and FREDILYN

BACULBAS vs. ATTY. JOSE A. SUING
A.C. No. 7062
[Formerly CBD Case No. 04-1355]
September 26, 2006
CARPIO MORALES, J.

FACTS:

* Complainants filed a complaint before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for the
disbarment of respondent Atty. Jose A. Suing on the grounds of deceit, malpractice, violation of
Lawyers Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.

* Herein complainants were among the complainants in a NLRC Case, Microplast, Inc. Workers
Union, Represented by its Union President Zoilo Ardan, et al. v. Microplast, Incorporated and/or
Johnny Rodil and Manuel Rodil, for Unfair Labor Practice (ULP) and Illegal Dismissal, while
respondent was the counsel for the therein respondents.

* Said case was consolidated with another NLRC Case, Microplast Incorporated v. Vilma Ardan,
et al., for Illegal Strike.

* In the August 29, 2001 Decision, the Labor Arbiter Ariel Cadiente Santos dismissed the Illegal
Strike case, and declared the employer-clients of respondent guilty of ULP.

* Thus, the Labor Arbiter ordered the reinstatement of all the complainants to their former
position with full backwages from date of dismissal until actual reinstatement.

* The Decision having become final and executory, the Labor Arbiter issued on September 2,
2003 a Writ of Execution,

* In the meantime, on the basis of individual Release Waiver and Quitclaims dated February 27,
2004 purportedly signed and sworn to by seven of the complainants in the ULP and Illegal
Dismissal case before Labor Arbiter Santos in the presence of respondent, the Labor Arbiter
dismissed said case insofar as the seven complainants were concerned, by Order dated March 9,
2004.

* Herein complainants, four of the seven who purportedly executed the Release Waiver and
Quitclaims, denied having signed and sworn to before the Labor Arbiter the said documents or
having received the considerations therefor.

* Hence, spawned the administrative complaint at bar, alleging that respondent, acting in collusion
with his clients Johnny and Manuel Rodil, frustrated the implementation of the Writ of Execution by
presenting before the Labor Arbiter the spurious documents.

* In his Report and Recommendation dated September 27, 2005, IBP Commissioner Salvador B.
Hababag, who conducted an investigation of the administrative complaint at bar, recommended
that respondent be faulted for negligence and that he be reprimanded therefor with warning.

* The Board of Governors of the IBP, by Resolution No. XVII-2005-226, approved and adopted
the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Hababag.

* After the records of the case were forwarded to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC), the
Director for Bar Discipline of the IBP transmitted additional records including a Motion to Amend
the Resolution No. XVII-2005-226 filed by respondent.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent can be disbarred for his alleged manipulation of four
alleged RELEASE WAIVER AND QUITCLAIM by herein complainants who subsequently
disclaimed the same as bogus and falsified.

RULING:

A lawyer takes an oath when he is admitted to the Bar. By doing so he thereby

becomes an Officer of the Court on whose shoulders rests the grave
responsibility of assisting the courts in the proper, fair, speedy and efficient
administration of justice.

Respondent was under obligation to protect his clients interest, especially given the
amount allegedly given by them in consideration of the execution of the documents. His answers
to the clarificatory questions of Commissioner Hababag do not, however, show that he discharged
such obligation.

As an officer of the court, a lawyer is called upon to assist in the administration of

justice. He is an instrument to advance its cause. Any act on his part that tends to obstruct,
perverts or impedes the administration of justice constitutes misconduct. While the
Commission on Bar Discipline is not a court, the proceedings therein are nonetheless part
of a judicial proceeding, a disciplinary action being in reality an investigation by the Court
into the misconduct of its officers or an examination into his character.

While the disbarment of respondent is, under the facts and circumstances attendant to the
case, not reasonable, neither is reprimand as recommended by the IBP. This Court finds that
respondents suspension from the practice of law for six months is in order.

WHEREFORE, respondent, Atty. Jose A. Suing, is found GUILTY of negligence and

gross misconduct and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of Six (6) Months,
with WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.