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A CRITICAL STUDY OF CORPORATE

OFFENCES

H.T.No. 1726-15-836-006
BRANCH IV - CORPORATE LAWS
ACADEMIC SESSION: 2015-2017

PADALA RAMI REDDY LAW COLLEGE


AMEERPET, HYDERABAD
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am indeed grateful to Padala Rami Reddy Law College (Osmania University),

Hyderabad for having given me the opportunity to submit this Thesis as a part of

the Curriculum in LL.M.

I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisor and guide

Dr. P. Vijaya Kalyani, Principal, P.R.R Law College, for her valuable guidance

towards the successful completion of this work and all other lecturers and staff of

P.R.R College of Law, Osmania University for their constant support and guidance

throughout the course. I express my sincere thanks and gratitude to respected Sir,

D. Rajeshwar Rao, P.R.R Law College, Hyderabad, who has bestowed his

personal attention and extended cooperation with his professional guidance.

I am also grateful to Ms. Hari Priya, Partner at Brown Tree legal Associates and ex-

Legal Advisor at Metro Rail, Hyderabad for the constant support and guidance

during my tenure and during the study and preparation of this thesis. I would also

like to express sincere gratitude to Mr. Gangadhar, Partner at Legal fox9 Associates,

Hyderabad for the constant support and guidance during my tenure and during the

study and preparation of this thesis thereof.

Lastly, I also acknowledge with a deep sense of reverence, my gratitude towards

my parents and members of my family and friends, who have always supported me,

had faith in me and urged me to do better.

H.T.No. 1726-15-836-006
Specialization: Corporate Laws

i
DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this dissertation titled “A Critical Study of Corporate

Offences” is my own original work, submitted to Osmania University,

Hyderabad, in partial fulfillment for the award of Degree of Master of Law

(LL.M.) has not been submitted before to any institution for assessment

purposes.

The views expressed in this dissertation are those of the author and do not

reflect the official policy or position in any jurisdiction.

Further, I have acknowledged all sources used and have cited these in the

reference section.

HT.NO: 1726-15-836-006
BRANCH: CORPORATE LAWS
PADALA RAMI REDDY
LAW COLLEGE, HYDERABAD.

Date: 9th May, 2017.

ii
CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the candidate bearing Hall Ticket No.

1726-15-836-006, a student of LL.M., Final Year Course, Branch IV,

Corporte Laws, Padala Rami Reddy Law College, (Osmania University),

Hyderabad has prepared this dissertation entitled “A Critical Study of

Corporate Offences” under my supervision and it is in accordance with the

norms of the University.

I have verified the contents of the thesis. This thesis is prepared in

accordance with the rules and regulations of Osmania University.

Date: (DR. P. VIJAYA KALYANI)


M.A (ENGLISH LITERATURE), LL.M.,
Ph.D., PGDPM. PGDIPR. GCIPR (WIPO)
Geneva. PGDMM, PGDCA, (LL.D) in laws.
Place: Hyderabad PRINCIPAL,
PADALA RAMI REDDY LAW COLLEGE
AMEERPET, HYDERABAD.

iii
ABSTRACT

The central government has established a central investigative agency

called the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI). Typically, the CBI investigates

and prosecutes cases of serious fraud or cheating that may have ramifications

in more than one state. Where needed, the CBI can be assisted by specialized

wings of the central government especially in economic or cross-border crimes.

It also gets involved in serious crimes where it is necessary to use an agency that

is independent of local political influence. The Serious Fraud Investigation

Office is a multi-disciplinary organization under the Ministry of Corporate

Affairs, consisting of experts in the field of accountancy, forensic auditing, and

law.

Much of our lives and daily routines are affected by corporate activities.

To a great extent, companies provide the food we eat, the water we drink, the

necessities and luxuries of everyday living. Increasingly, particularly with

growing privatization, it is not the State that provides these amenities - but

companies. Such companies generate wealth for the economy and their

shareholders and provide employment for much of the population. Short of a

revolutionary restructuring of the economy and the political institutions of the

country, it is certain that the power and influence of companies will grow and

not diminish in the foreseeable future.

iv
But, with great power comes great responsibility. Just as individuals owe

a duty not to harm or injure others in society without justification, so do

companies owe a duty not to poison our water and food, not to pollute our rivers,

beaches and air, not to allow their workplaces to endanger the lives and safety

of their employees and the public, and not to sell commodities, or provide

transport, that will kill or injure people.

With the advent of Globalization and Industrialization taking place at a

rapid pace the world over today, we are faced with Crimes of a nature which is

becoming institutionalized and hard to detect. Corporate Crimes is a major

challenge to the legal fraternity, the law makers, and the law enforcers. The

Serious Fraud Investigation Office is a multi-disciplinary organization under the

Ministry of Corporate Affairs, consisting of experts in the field of accountancy,

forensic auditing, law, much of our lives and daily routines are affected by

corporate activities. To a great extent, companies provide the food we eat, the

water we drink, the necessities and luxuries of everyday living. Increasingly,

particularly with growing privatization, it is not the State that provides these

amenities - but companies. Such companies generate wealth for the economy and

their shareholders and provide employment for much of the population. Short of

a revolutionary restructuring of the economy and the political institutions of the

country, it is certain that the power and influence of companies will grow and

not diminish in the foreseeable future.

v
TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................ i
DECLARATION ........................................................................................................... ii
CERTIFICATE .............................................................................................................iii
ABSTRACT.................................................................................................................. iv
LIST OF CASES .......................................................................................................... ix

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
1.1 PREAMBLE.................................................................................................... 1
Alternatives to Corporate Criminal Liability.......................................................... 3
1.2 OBJECTIVE OF THE RESEARCH AREA ................................................. 11
1.3 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY .............................................................. 14
1.4 HYPOTHESIS .............................................................................................. 18
1.5 LITERATURE REVIEW .............................................................................. 27
1.6 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY .................................................................. 28
1.7 SCOPE OF THE STUDY ............................................................................. 29
1.8 SCEME OF STUDY ..................................................................................... 34
1.9 CHAPTERIZATION .................................................................................... 36

CHAPTER II
THE REGULATORY PROVISIONS AND AUTHORITIES
DEALING WITH “FRAUD”
2.1 WHAT ARE THE MAIN REGULATORY PROVISIONS AND
AUTHORITIES RESPONSIBLE FOR INVESTIGATING CORPORATE OR
BUSINESS FRAUD? ............................................................................................... 39
2.2 WHAT ARE THE SPECIFIC OFFENCES RELEVANT TO CORPORATE
OR BUSINESS FRAUD? ........................................................................................ 41
2.2.1 Fraud and misrepresentation related with sale of securities. ................. 41
2.2.2 Forgery (section 463, Penal Code). ............................................................. 44
2.2.3 Falsification of accounts (section 477A, Penal Code). ................................ 44
2.2.4 Dishonest misappropriation of property (section 403, Penal Code). .......... 44
2.2.5 Criminal breach of trust (section 405, Penal Code). ................................... 45
2.2.6 Tax crimes. .................................................................................................. 45
2.3 WHAT ARE THE REGULATOR'S POWERS OF INVESTIGATION,
ENFORCEMENT AND PROSECUTION IN CASES OF CORPORATE OR
BUSINESS FRAUD? ............................................................................................... 47
2.4 WHAT ARE THE POTENTIAL SANCTIONS OR LIABILITIES FOR
PARTICIPATING IN CORPORATE BUSINESS FRAUD? ................................. 47

CHAPTER III
BRIBERY AND CORRUPTION
3.1 WHAT ARE THE MAIN REGULATORY PROVISIONS AND
AUTHORITIES RESPONSIBLE FOR INVESTIGATING BRIBERY AND
CORRUPTION?....................................................................................................... 49
3.2 WHAT INTERNATIONAL ANTI-CORRUPTION CONVENTIONS APPLY
IN YOUR JURISDICTION? ................................................................................... 51

vi
3.3 WHAT ARE THE SPECIFIC BRIBERY AND CORRUPTION OFFENCES IN
YOUR JURISDICTION? ......................................................................................... 52
3.4 WHAT DEFENSES, SAFE HARBORS OR EXEMPTIONS ARE
AVAILABLE AND WHO CAN QUALIFY? ......................................................... 53
3.5 CAN ASSOCIATED PERSONS AND AGENTS BE LIABLE FOR THESE
OFFENCES AND IN WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES? .............................................. 54
3.6 WHAT ARE THE REGULATOR'S POWERS OF INVESTIGATION,
ENFORCEMENT AND PROSECUTION IN CASES OF BRIBERY AND
CORRUPTION?....................................................................................................... 54
3.7 WHAT ARE THE POTENTIAL SANCTIONS FOR PARTICIPATING IN
BRIBERY AND CORRUPTION?........................................................................... 55
3.8 TAX TREATMENT .......................................................................................... 55

CHAPTER IV
INSIDER DEALING AND MARKET ABUSE
4.1 WHAT ARE THE MAIN REGULATORY PROVISIONS AND
AUTHORITIES RESPONSIBLE FOR INVESTIGATING INSIDER DEALING
AND MARKET ABUSE? ....................................................................................... 56
4.2 WHAT ARE THE SPECIFIC INSIDER DEALING AND MARKET
ABUSE OFFENCES? .............................................................................................. 57
4.3 WHAT DEFENSES, SAFE HARBORS OR EXEMPTIONS ARE
AVAILABLE AND WHO CAN QUALIFY? ......................................................... 58
4.4 WHAT ARE THE REGULATOR'S POWERS OF INVESTIGATION,
ENFORCEMENT AND PROSECUTION? ............................................................ 59
4.5 WHAT ARE THE POTENTIAL SANCTIONS FOR PARTICIPATING IN
INSIDER DEALING AND MARKET ABUSE? .................................................... 60

CHAPTER V
MONEY LAUNDERING AND TERRORIST FINANCING
5.1 REGULATORY PROVISIONS AND AUTHORITIES RESPONSIBLE
FOR INVESTIGATING MONEY LAUNDERING AND/OR TERRORIST
FINANCING ............................................................................................................ 61
5.2 MONEY LAUNDERING AND TERRORIST FINANCING OFFENCES. 62
5.3 DEFENCES, SAFE HARBOURS OR EXEMPTIONS ARE AVAILABLE
AND WHO CAN QUALIFY ................................................................................... 63
5.4 REGULATOR'S POWERS OF INVESTIGATION, ENFORCEMENT AND
PROSECUTION ...................................................................................................... 63
5.5 SANCTIONS FOR PARTICIPATING IN MONEY LAUNDERING OR
TERRORIST FINANCING OFFENCES ................................................................ 65

CHAPTER VI
FINANCIAL RECORD KEEPING
6.1 GENERAL REQUIREMENTS FOR FINANCIAL RECORD KEEPING
AND DISCLOSURE................................................................................................ 66
6.2 SANCTIONS FOR FAILURE TO KEEP OR DISCLOSE ACCURATE
FINANCIAL RECORDS ......................................................................................... 67
6.3 ARE THE FINANCIAL RECORD KEEPING RULES USED TO
PROSECUTE WHITE-COLLAR CRIMES? .......................................................... 67

vii
6.4 GENERAL DUE DILIGENCE REQUIREMENTS AND PROCEDURES IN
RELATION TO CORRUPTION, FRAUD OR MONEY LAUNDERING WHEN
CONTRACTING WITH EXTERNAL PARTIES .................................................. 68
6.5 CIRCUMSTANCES WHEN A CORPORATE BODY ITSELF BE SUBJECT
TO CRIMINAL LIABILITY ................................................................................... 69
6.6 CIRCUMSTANCES WHEN A IT POSSIBLE TO OBTAIN
IMMUNITY/LENIENCY FOR CO- OPERATION WITH THE AUTHORITIES 69
6.7 INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AND LEGAL INSTRUMENTS ARE
AVAILABLE FOR LOCAL AUTHORITIES ........................................................ 70
6.8 ARE WHISTLEBLOWERS GIVEN STATUTORY PROTECTION? ............ 71
6.9 IMPENDING DEVELOPMENTS OR PROPOSALS FOR REFORM ............ 72
6.10 WHAT ARE THE MAIN STEPS FOREIGN AND LOCAL COMPANIES
ARE TAKING TO MANAGE THEIR EXPOSURE TO
CORRUPTION/CORPORATE CRIME .................................................................. 72

CHAPTER VII
REGULATORY AUTHORITIES
REGULATORY AUTHORITIES ............................................................................... 73

CHAPTER VIII
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF OTHER JURISDICTIONS
8.1 ENGLISH AND FRENCH ................................................................................ 75
8.2 HISTORICAL EVOLUTION ............................................................................ 78
8.3 FRANCE – Ordonnance de Blois ...................................................................... 81
8.4 GERMANIC LAW ............................................................................................ 85
8.5 ITALY, PORTUGAL, GREECE AND SPAIN ................................................. 86
8.6 AMERICAN SOCIETY WAS EXPANDED TO MENS REA OFFENSES .... 88
8.7 ESSENTIAL CONDITIONS FOR CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY .. 90
8.8 ENTITIES .......................................................................................................... 90
8.9 NATURAL PERSONS CAN CAUSE CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY
................................................................................................................................ 101
8.10 ISSUES OF WHAT SANCTIONS ARE APPROPRIATE FOR CORPORATE
................................................................................................................................ 106
8.11 CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES ............................................................................. 109

CHAPTER IX
CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS
CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS .................................................................... 113

BIBLIOGRAPHY……………………………………………………………………..x
 REGULATIONS, PROVISIONS, POLICIES AND ENACTMENTS
 BOOKS
 ARTICLES/REPORTS
 OTHER INnTERNET SOURCES

viii
LIST OF CASES

1. Tesco Supermarkets Ltd. v. Nattrass


2. V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purposes Does It Serve?, 109
Harv. L. Rev. 1477, 1509 (1996).
3. National Rivers Auth. v. Alfred McAlpine Homes E. Ltd., [1994] 4 All E.R. 286
(Q.B. Div'l Ct.)
4. Taff Vale RR. Co. v. Amalgamated Society of RR. Servants, [1901] A.C. 426
5. U.S. v. A& P Trucking Co., 358 U.S. 121, 128
6. U. S. v. Alamo Bank of Texas, 886 F.2d 828, 830 (5th Cir. 1989)
7. Commonwealth v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 275 N.E.2d 33 (Mass., 1971)
8. Granite Construction Co. v. Superior Ct., 149 Cal. App. 3d 465 (1983); Vaughan
$ Sons, Inc. v. State, 737 S.W.2d
9. Ashbury Ry Carriage and Iron Co. v. Riche, [1875] L.R. 7 H.L. 653. People v.
Rochester Ry. & Light Co., 88 N.E. 22 (N.Y. 1909)
10. U.S. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 433 F.2d 174, 204-05 (3d
Cir. 1970)
11. U.S. v. Bank of New England, N.A., 821 F.2d 844 (1st Cir. 1987)

ix
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
1.1 PREAMBLE

India has a quasi-federal political structure comprising of 28 states and seven

centrally administered union territories. It has a democratically elected central union

government (central government) and each state has its own democratically elected

state government. Each state establishes and maintains its own police force.

Investigations are normally handled by the police force of the state where the crime was

committed.

The central government has established a central investigative agency called

the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI). Typically, the CBI investigates and

prosecutes cases of serious fraud or cheating that may have ramifications in more than

one state. Where needed, the CBI can be assisted by specialized wings of the central

government especially in economic or cross-border crimes. It also gets involved in

serious crimes where it is necessary to use an agency that is independent of local

political influence.

The Serious Fraud Investigation Office is a multi-disciplinary organization

under the Ministry of Corporate Affairs, consisting of experts in the field of

accountancy, forensic auditing, and law. Much of our lives and daily routines are

affected by corporate activities. To a great extent, companies provide the food we eat,

the water we drink, the necessities and luxuries of everyday living. Increasingly,

particularly with growing privatization, it is not the State that provides these amenities

- but companies. Such companies generate wealth for the economy and their

shareholders and provide employment for much of the population. Short of a

1
revolutionary restructuring of the economy and the political institutions of the country,

it is certain that the power and influence of companies will grow and not diminish in

the foreseeable future.

But, with great power comes great responsibility. Just as individuals owe a

duty not to harm or injure others in society without justification, so do companies owe

a duty not to poison our water and food, not to pollute our rivers, beaches and air, not

to allow their workplaces to endanger the lives and safety of their employees and the

public, and not to sell commodities, or provide transport, that will kill or injure people.

With the advent of Globalization and Industrialization taking place at a rapid

pace the world over today, we are faced with Crimes of a nature which is becoming

institutionalized and hard to detect. Corporate Crimes is a major challenge to the legal

fraternity, the law makers, and the law enforcers.

The Serious Fraud Investigation Office is a multi-disciplinary organization

under the Ministry of Corporate Affairs, consisting of experts in the field of

accountancy, forensic auditing, law, much of our lives and daily routines are affected

by corporate activities. To a great extent, companies provide the food we eat, the water

we drink, the necessities and luxuries of everyday living. Increasingly, particularly with

growing privatization, it is not the State that provides these amenities - but companies.

Such companies generate wealth for the economy and their shareholders and provide

employment for much of the population. Short of a revolutionary restructuring of the

economy and the political institutions of the country, it is certain that the power and

2
influence of companies will grow and not diminish in the foreseeable future.

But, with great power comes great responsibility. Just as individuals owe a

duty not to harm or injure others in society without justification, so do companies owe

a duty not to poison our water and food, not to pollute our rivers, beaches and air, not

to allow their workplaces to endanger the lives and safety of their employees and the

public, and not to sell commodities, or provide transport, that will kill or injure people.

With the advent of Globalization and Industrialization taking place at a rapid

pace the world over today, we are faced with Crimes of a nature which is becoming

institutionalized and hard to detect. Corporate Crimes is a major challenge to the legal

fraternity, the law makers, and the law enforcers.

Alternatives to Corporate Criminal Liability

Some critics have argued that other types of liability are more efficient than

corporate criminal liability. Law and economics theorists believe that criminal liability

is too over deterring; it induces corporations to spend more resources for prevention

than is economically and socially useful.1 Moreover, the costs of criminal proceedings

are higher than the civil ones and therefore, not justified when both have the same

result—pecuniary penalties.2 It has also been argued that the reputational harm

accompanying corporate criminal liability is either unnecessary or excessive. 3 Thus,

1
Beale & Sawfat, supra note 36, at 93.
2
V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purposes Does It Serve?, 109 Harv. L. Rev.
1477, 1509 (1996).
3
Id. at 1504; Beale & Sawfat, supra note 36, at 94.

3
corporations convicted for minor criminal offenses would suffer unjustified

reputational harm. Corporations that have a good reputation suffer the most, while

corporations not yet created or that previously lost their good reputation suffer little

reputational harm. When a corporation is convicted for a serious crime, the reputational

harm imposed through criminal liability might not even be necessary due to the negative

publicity created by the press. The high risk of reputational harm would also pressure

corporations to speed up the procedures and plead guilty when the charge is groundless.

In addition, the reputational damage resulting from a criminal conviction, unlike civil

damages, “does not provide a reciprocal gain to any injured party.” 4 Hence, several

authors argue that civil liability of corporations is sufficient.

Although the civil liability of corporations has its advantages in compensating

for the injuries caused by corporations, it is not sufficient to prevent corporate criminal

misconduct.

Some offenses, called crimes “of danger,” do not create victims who can sue

the corporations for civil damages. Or in environmental crimes, victims might not even

know about the commission of the crime by the corporations. Moreover, in some crimes

connected with the process of production and distribution of goods, the victim is so far

in the chain that he/she does not even realize that the corporation was the author of the

offense.5 On the other hand, although the benefit to the corporation is substantial due

to a high number of victims, the prejudice caused is so small that the initiation of a civil

4
Beale & Sawfat, supra note 36, at 95
5
Streteanu & Chirita, supra note 9, at 73

4
lawsuit is unjustified.6 Even when a corporation is civilly obligated to pay damages,

civil sanctions may not be sufficient to determine the corporation to refrain from future

misconduct when the benefits obtained from the misconduct outweigh the civil

damages paid. The reputational harm resulting from corporate criminal liability might

encourage faster settlements, thus avoiding pricey trials. 7 Furthermore, criminal

liability expresses the society’s condemnation of the corporate misconduct 8 “thereby

vindicating the proper valuation of persons and goods whose true worth was disparaged

by the corporation's conduct - just as in the case of an individual wrongdoer.” 9

Corporations have an identifiable persona and can express moral judgments distinct

from those of their members. Therefore, corporations can be the subject of the

expressive retributive goal of criminal law.

Another advantage is the possibility of using “the extensive network of federal

and state prosecutors and investigators…”10 which has additional resources compared

to the civil or administrative law enforcement departments. Defendants should afford

the criminal procedure guarantees and speedy trials. The types of the criminal sanctions

are also more diverse; in addition to fines, sanctions of corporate probation, equity

fines, or withdrawal of licenses can be applied.

6
Gobert, supra note 204, at 3 (“millions of customers illegally overcharged by a matter of
pence”).

7
Khanna, supra note 261, at 1507
8
Beale & Sawfat, supra note 36, at 95.

9
Friedman, supra note 71, at 852.

10
Id

5
Civil liability of corporations for criminal fines imposed on corporate officers

is another alternative to corporate criminal liability. This solution has been used in Italy
11
Portugal, 12

Netherlands Belgium Luxemburg, and France. This alternative has been

widely criticized. First, civil liability of corporations for criminal liability oftentimes

serves only as a surety. Second, this system contravenes the principle of individual

punishment; the corporate officer is said to be guilty, but the corporation has to bear the

sanction. The corporation is not the defendant in the criminal procedure and it does not

have the opportunity to prove its case, but the burden of the sanction is placed on it.

Third, this alternative would create inequality of treatment of the individuals convicted

for the offenses; if the law provides as sanctions for the offense both imprisonment and

a fine, the individual condemned to pay a fine will not execute it, but the individual

sanctioned by imprisonment must execute the punishment. Fourth, the identification of

the person who committed the offense is necessary. Corporations have a very complex

structure and sometimes it is very difficult or impossible to determine who the author

of an offense was. Finally, in a system that did not adopt the criminal liability of

corporations, the limits of a fine are established taking into account the potential to pay

of the individual. Therefore, even if the corporation has to pay the fine, the amount

11
Art. 197 the Italian Penal Code provides that corporations are obligated to pay the fine owed
by one of its insolvable representatives or administrators when the offense was committed by
the employee acting within the scope of his employment and in the interest of the corporation.
Codice Penale [C. Pen.] art. 197 (It.)
232 12 271
See Streteanu & Chritia, supra note 9, at 81 (numerous laws provided for
corporate liability for the fines
applied to the corporation’s employees if they acted as such when committing the offense)

6
would be derisory.13 Hence, the civil liability of corporations for criminal fines

imposed on its employees cannot fulfill the purposes of deterrence and retribution.

A very frequently used alternative to corporate criminal liability has been the

imposition of administrative sanctions. They are usually imposed by administrative

bodies which are part of the executive branch, the courts playing a limited role in some

countries when so allowed.14

Some of the reasons why different countries chose to impose administrative

sanctions by administrative bodies, as opposed to criminal sanctions imposed by courts,

are: the belief that moral stigma is superfluous, the flexibility of the concepts of guilt

and individual responsibility in the administrative law, and the specialized nature of the

administrative bodies that could handle the matters more efficiently. 15 Germany, which

still opposes the adoption of corporate criminal liability, has an elaborate system of

administrative-penal sanctioning consecrated in art. 30 of OwiG. Because some

administrative sanctions can be imposed by criminal courts and because they derive

from petty-offenses, the non-criminal character of these administrative sanctions has

been questioned.16 France and Belgium have devised administrative sanctions

whenever it seemed suitable in the course of drafting statutes. 17 Portugal18 and Italy19

have also implemented an extensive system of administrative sanctions. Many critics

13
Id.
14
See Stessens, supra note 16, at 502-03.

15
Id.; Streteanu & Chirita, supra note 9, at 74
16
See Stessens, supra note 16, at 503
17
Id
18
Decree-Law No. 433/10.27.1982
19
Law No. 300 of September 29, 2000; Decree-Law No. 231 of May 8, 2001

7
argue that the strong impact of these sanctions make them resemble criminal sanctions20

which lack the constitutional guarantees of criminal procedure.21 Moreover, corporate

administrative liability raises the same issues as corporate criminal liability does

regarding the mens rea element and the individual character of criminal liability.22

Some authors argue that it is unfair that the individuals may be held criminally liable

while the corporations are merely administratively sanctioned for the same offense. It

is also strongly criticized the fact that corporations are administratively penalized for

minor offense, but escape liability for very serious offenses like manslaughter. 23

Moreover, the administrative sanctions do not symbolize the moral condemnation of

the society. Thus, the doctrine has advanced a possible resolution: corporations should

be held administratively liable for minor offenses, but should be held criminally liable

for more serious offenses.24

Some authors have also argued that individual criminal liability is less

complicated and may be sufficient. This argument has been strongly criticized for

several reasons. First, due to the high complexity of modern corporations, the

individuals responsible for the offense might be impossible to identify. Such is the case

when the decision process is fragmented among multiple departments, when the activity

of some employees is not systematically verified because of his or her position of trust,

or when a decision is taken by a multimember board by secret vote. 25

20
See Stessens, supra note 16, at 504-05 (critics referring to the extremely high administrative
sanctions imposed by the European Commission)
21
Id. at 504
22
Streteanu & Chirita, supra note 9, at 78
23
Id. citing R. Roth, Responsibilite Penale de l’Enterprise: Modeles de Reflexion [sic] Revue
Penale Suisse 349 (1997)
24
Id. citing L. del C. Zungiga Rodriguez, Bases para un Modello de Imputacion de
Responsibilidad Penal a las Personas Juridicas 208 (Aranzadi Ed., 2000)
25
See Heine,, supra note 40; Streteanu & Chirita, supra note 9, at 69

8
Second, prosecutors may conclude that indicting an individual is not justified

because the employee thought that his or her superiors were aware of and approved the

action or because they acted from fear of losing their jobs. 26 third, some of the persons

who made the illegal decision might be located in another country and could not be

prosecuted.27 Fourth, individual criminal liability is most of the times ineffective

because the amount of a fine is tailored to reflect the individual’s financial possibilities,

and some systems allow the reimbursement of fines paid by the corporate employee, or

corporations can insure themselves against intentional and unintentional wrongdoing

(for environmental offenses usually). 28 Lastly, some systems require the designation of

a person responsible for the corporation’s activities or high managers are automatically

presumed responsible without strong requirements of showing of guilt or proximate

cause;29 the agent is compensated for this high risk and is reimbursed for the criminal

fines. This solution encourages corporate wrongdoing because it would be probably

less expensive for a corporation to hire a new manager “responsible with going to

prison” than giving up the illicit activity. 30

All of the above arguments underline the extreme importance of criminal

corporate liability in a modern society. The new technology and development of

industry give raise to unpredictable risks that pose serious threats to our society.

26
Heine, supra note 40, at 176
27
Streteanu & Chirita, supra note 9, at 70
28
Heine, supra note 40, at 176
29
Id. at 177
30
Streteanu & Chirita, supra note 9, at 71, citing C.M.V. Clarkson, Corporate Culpability [sic]
Web J. of Current Legal Issues §3 (1998)

9
Corporations try to obtain the highest profits in the shortest time, and some of them are

ready to achieve this result by any means.

Some corporations are especially incorporated with the secret purpose of

committing criminal offenses. Most countries that adopted criminal liability of

corporations concluded that corporate misconduct should not be left unsanctioned in

the most efficient way. Criminal sanctions’ retributive nature better expresses the

society’s moral condemnation and emphasizes the value of any victim. The experience

of United States, France, and England in implementing criminal sanctions on

corporations shows that corporate criminal liability can successfully improve and

coexist together with the criminal liability of individuals, administrative liability, and

civil liability of corporations and individuals. Corporate criminal liability better

promotes general fairness and is consistent with the principles of criminal law.

10
1.2 OBJECTIVE OF THE RESEARCH AREA

Corporate crimes in a globalize economy has no borders and can affect the

economies of countries on a large scale and on a smaller scale can cause huge losses to

Corporate houses and bring to halt the functioning of their businesses. Keeping in view

the disadvantages brought by the changing economy we render our expert advice to

corporate houses and also leading corporate personalities in mitigation of Corporate

Crimes like:

 Antitrust violations,

 Computer and internet fraud,

 Credit card fraud,

 Phone and telemarketing fraud,

 Bankruptcy fraud,

 Healthcare fraud,

 Environmental law violations,

 Insurance fraud,

 Tax evasion,

 Financial and securities fraud,

 Insider trading

 False and misleading advertising,

 Illegal exploitations of employees,

 Mislabeling of goods,

 Violation of weights and measures,

 Selling adulterated foodstuffs

 Evading corporate taxes

11
 Misappropriation of funds

 Embezzlement

 Black marketing,

 Profiteering and hoarding

 Work place crimes

 Smuggling and violation of foreign exchange

 Data theft

The cause was extreme corporate malfeasance. The plant was not up to

minimal Union Carbide safety standards - large quantities of MIC were unwisely stored

in a heavily populated area, the refrigeration unit for the MIC (which is supposed to

kept at temperatures below 32 F) was deliberately kept turned off to save $40 per day

in costs, the safety systems were dismantled, and the alarm system was turned off. This

was in spite of the fact that the same plant had earlier suffered potentially lethal

accidental releases of gases like the deadly nerve agent phosgene.

There are a number of corporate crimes that have come into light now days. One of the

major havoc that is created in present times is because of mysterious disappearance of

corporations. Of the 5,651 companies listed on Bombay Stock exchange, 2750 have

vanished. It means that one out of two companies that come to the stock exchange to

raise crores of rupees from investors, loot and run away. Even big names like ‘Home

Trade’ (remember Sachin, Sharukh, Hrithik saying Life means more) came up with

huge publicity stunts but after raising money, vanished into the thin air. About 11

million investors have invested Rs. 10,000 crore in these 2750 companies. We have

Securities Exchange Board of India, Reserve Bank of India and Department of

Companies Affairs to monitor the stock exchange transactions but none has

12
documented the whereabouts of these 2750 odd companies suspended from the stock

exchange. Many of the promoters and merchant bankers who are responsible for these

are roaming scot-free. The market regulators and stock exchanges are unable to penalize

them or recover their funds. The regulators have been able to identify only 229 of 2750

vanishing companies so far.

13
1.3 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

Criminal liability of corporations has become one of the most debated topics

of the 20th century. The debate became especially significant following the 1990s, when

both the United States and Europe have faced an alarming number of environmental,

antitrust, fraud, food and drug, false statements, worker death, bribery, obstruction of

justice, and financial crimes involving corporations. The most recent and prominent

case in the United Sates has been the Enron scandal in which one of the largest

accounting firms in the world, Arthur Andersen LLP, was charged with obstruction of

justice.31 Some corporations, including Dynergy, Adelphia Communications,

WorldCom, Global Crossing, Health South, Parmalat (in Italy), and Royal Ahold (in

Netherlands) falsified their financial disclosures. Other corporations, among which are

Royal Caribbean, Olympic Pipeline, Exxon, Pfizer, Bayer, and Shering-Plough

Corporation,32 breached the environmental or health and safety laws. McWane Inc., one

of the world largest manufacturers of cast-iron pipes, has an extensive record of

violations causing deaths.33 These corporate crimes resulted in great losses. The

consequences that most directly affect our society are the enormous losses of money,

jobs, and even lives. At the same time, the long-term effects of these crimes, such as

the damaging effects upon the environment or health, which may not severely affect us

now, should not be underestimated.

31
See Arthur Andersen LLP v. U.S., 544 U.S. 696 (2005)
32
For a detailed list of the top 100 corporate criminals see Russell Mokhiber, Top 100
Corporate Criminals of the Decade, at http://www.corporatepredators.org/top100.html (last
visited Jan. 5, 2006)
33
David Barstow & Lowell Bergman, Deaths on the Job, Slaps on the Wrist, N.Y. Times, Jan.
10, 2003, at A1

14
The reaction to this corporate criminal phenomenon has been the creation of

juridical regimes that could deter and punish corporate wrongdoing. Corporate

misconduct has been addressed by civil, administrative, and criminal laws. At the

present, most countries agree that corporations can be sanctioned under civil and

administrative laws. However, the criminal liability of corporations has been more

controversial. While several jurisdictions have accepted and applied the concept of

corporate criminal liability under various models, other law systems have not been able

or willing to incorporate it. Critics have voiced strong arguments against its efficiency

and consistency with the principles of criminal law. At the same time, a large pool of

partisans, to which I belong as well, has vigorously defended corporate criminal

liability.

In the following sections, I will attempt to determine the purposes of corporate

criminal liability, the reasons why some jurisdictions adopted this concept, but others

still refuse to accept it, the models of corporate criminal liability developed so far, the

reasons why corporate criminal liability developed differently in different countries,

and the lessons we could learn from these developments. Different countries have

adopted various models of criminal liability or refused to adopt any due to their peculiar

historical, social, economic, and political developments. Based on these developments,

each country found it appropriate to respond to the criminal behavior of corporations in

different ways. None of the systems is perfect; each one has advantages and

disadvantages. Although the American system seems to be the best reply to the criminal

corporate phenomenon, other models of corporate criminal liability have some

elements that should be considered for the purpose of creating a better model.

15
The main goals of criminal liability of corporations are similar those of

criminal law in general. The first characteristic of corporate criminal punishment is

deterrence—effective prevention of future crimes. The second consists in retribution

and reflects the society’s duty to punish those who inflict harm in order to “affirm the

victim’s real value.”34 The third goal is the rehabilitation of corporate criminals. Fourth,

corporate criminal liability should achieve the goals of clarity, predictability, and

consistency with the criminal law principles in general. The fifth goal is efficiency,

reflected by the first three goals mentioned above, but also by the costs of implementing

the concept. Finally, we should not forget the goal of general fairness. The models

of corporate liability developed by different countries vary significantly and,

as shown below, none of them reflect all these goals perfectly.

i. Although corporate criminal liability initially started by imitating the

criminal liability of human beings, new models of criminal liability, such as the

aggregation or self-identity theories, have been developed to better fit the corporate

structure and operation. The American system of corporate criminal liability has

been the most developed and extensive system of corporate criminal liability

created so far. The American model includes a large variety of criminal sanctions

for corporations (such as fines, corporate probation, order of negative publicity,

etc.) in attempt to effectively punish corporations when any employee commits a

crime while acting within the scope of his or her employment and on behalf of the

corporation. The most distinguishing and bold element of the American model of

34
Jeffrie G. Murphy & Jean Hampton, Forgiveness and Mercy 130 (1988) cited in Joshua
Dressler, Cases and Materials on Criminal Law 33 (2d ed. 1999), at 46-47

16
corporate criminal liability is the adoption of the aggregation theory. This theory

provides that corporations can be held criminally liable based on the act of one

employee and on the culpability of one or more other employees who,

cumulatively, but not individually, met the requirements of actus reus and mens

rea of the crime. Although this system meets the goals of retribution, rehabilitation,

predictability, and clarity, it apparently has the tendency of being a bit over-

deterring and costly.35 It also has some significant spill-over effects on innocent

shareholders and employees, and, some argue that, due to the adoption of the

aggregation theory in particular, it lacks consistency with the traditional principles

of criminal law.

35
See V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purposes Does It Serve? 109 Harv. L.
Rev. 1477, 1509 (1996); there are also some critics of the current systems of tort corporate
liability who argue that the extensive liability of corporations makes it difficult for corporations
to develop in the United States due to the significant amount of law suits that drain the resources
of corporations. Thus, it has been suggested that the American system of corporate liability has
been forcing corporations to relocate in foreign countries where the law is more lenient and
which, in turn, has a seriously negative effect on the American work force. Information was
obtained at a debate between Richard Scruggs and Steven Hantler.

17
1.4 HYPOTHESIS

Corporations also commit a number of crimes against their own workforce.

With increasing globalization workers find themselves being pushed against the wall

and shrinking revenues for redressal. Now days the debates and rage over corporate

scams talks only of the interest of shareholders. Nowhere is there a mention of the

employee who suffers the most. Take the case of public sector undertakings where

many irregularities can be seen in. Factories were opened in some areas where the raw

material was not available and where the location was correct, imported machinery was

defective. Lavishness on the part of management was one of the factors, which led to

these institutions becoming sick. No doubt that the laborers suffers the most in such

cases. The plight of Mumbai’s textile workers is even worse. Legal dues have not been

paid to 2 lakhs jobless mill workers. Trade unions are fighting with the reality of worker

suicides and growing unemployment and the worker’s families are struggling to get

over their misery, leave alone fight for dues from faceless management.

The government across the world have given a free hand to corporations to

exploit the natural and community resources, while depriving the common people of

their right on these resources. For instance, in India, Corporations at Floor, Kodaikanal

and Gujarat have not only destroyed the water and land resources in these areas, but

also impoverished communities by degrading their livelihood resources and health. All

these communities suffer from disasters similar to Bhopal. Inaccessible to clean and

safe drinking water was found to be a major problem in all these areas. The companies

either pollute the water resources to an extent where it is no more portable or

over exploit it till the water table goes down or dry up the wells. A befitting example

18
could be of Coco Cola bottling plant in Kerala where the company extract excess

amount of water from the ground due to which the water level has gone very low and

the nearby villages are suffering from scarcity of water.

Initially, it has been argued that corporations are not capable of forming the

material and mental elements of a crime due to their immaterial and highly regulated

existence. The attribution of the acts and the mental state of persons acting on behalf of

the corporation to the corporation it was said to contravene the principle of individual

punishment underlying the criminal law. These arguments failed in most legal systems,

but the sphere of individuals and the conditions in which they can lead to the criminal

liability of corporations differs more or less dramatically from country to country.

At first, some critics argued that corporations do not have the capacity to act

on their own and therefore, the actus reus element of a crime cannot be attributed to

them.36 The acts attributed to the corporations are merely those of individuals acting on

behalf of the corporations.

Thus, “[i]mposing criminal liability on a corporate entity requires resort to the

principles of respondent superior, rather than individual responsibility, which is the

hallmark of the criminal law.”37 It is incontestable, that, due to the corporations’ nature,

the actions or inactions cannot be committed directly and personally by the corporation.

However, the acts of the representatives are those of the corporation itself because the

36
Ferguson v. Wilson, (1866) L.R. 2 Ch. App. 77, C.A
37
Beale & Safwat, supra note 36, at 93

19
representatives are not distinct from the corporation; representatives are part of the

corporation, a structural element of the corporation essential for the corporation’s

existence and without which the corporation cannot fulfill its purpose. Moreover,

representatives are not personally liable for acts within the scope of the powers granted

to them, but the corporation is held liable for them. Therefore, admitting the existence

of the corporations’ ability to act does not mean liability for another’s act; it merely

means that corporations are liable for the activity conducted by individuals on their

behalf using the power that has been conferred upon them by the corporations’

bylaws.38 Moreover, those that are subjects of legal duties, not only can perform those

duties, but can also breach them.39

Another argument was based on the ultra vires theory. Critics argue that an

illicit act would fall outside the scope of the corporation and therefore, cannot be

considered to be perpetrated by the corporations.40 The capacity of action of

corporations and their representatives is limited by the laws, articles of incorporation,

and bylaws; no law or bylaw gives them the power to commit a criminal offense.

Therefore, any crime is necessarily ultra vires. The protection of corporations resulting

from the ultra vires theory has been eliminated first in tort law and subsequently, at the

beginning of the 20th century, in the criminal law.41 The purpose of the articles of

incorporation and bylaws is to assure organized services, to avoid confusion regarding

the corporations’ activity, and to permit an efficient surveillance of their activity. It

38
Streteanu & Chirita, supra note 9, at 46
39
Hirsch, supra note 39, at 37
40
Ashbury Ry Carriage and Iron Co. v. Riche, [1875] L.R. 7 H.L. 653. People v. Rochester Ry.
& Light Co., 88 N.E. 22 (N.Y. 1909)
41
Nicolette Parisi, Theories of Corporate Criminal Liability (or Corporations Don’t Commit
Crimes, People Commit Crimes), in Corporations as Criminals 41, 45 (Ellen Hochstedler ed.,
Sage Publications, 1984)

20
would be absurd to consider that the ultra vires theory, destined to insure the legality

of the corporations’ activity, could transform into a reason to refuse to punish the

corporations when acting illegally. 42 Moreover, although the articles of incorporation

provide certain scopes for the corporation, the corporation can do whatever else is

necessary to conduct its activity. The scope of incorporation should not be confused

with the corporations’ scopes during its activity; the scope of incorporation must always

be legal, but the corporations’ actions after incorporation are not always in conformity

therewith.43 Although civil offenses are not within the scope of a corporation,

corporations are nonetheless held liable when committing such offenses. Similarly,

corporations should be held liable for criminal offenses.

The core argument against corporate criminal liability has been the belief that

a corporation cannot have mens rea and therefore, cannot be blameworthy or guilty of

a criminal offense.44

Critics showed that the corporate will and power of decision are exercised

through the will of the collectivity of people managing the corporation. Therefore, it is

said that the mens rea element of a criminal offense does not belong to the corporation,

but to the members who made the decision to take a specific course of action. 45 The

corporation would be punished without being blameworthy and this would be against

the criminal law principles.46 However, the majority of doctrine recognizes the

42
Streteanu & Chirita, supra note 9, at 52
43
Id
44
Hirsch, supra note 39, at 37; Beale & Sawfat, supra note 36, at 93

45
Streteanu & Chirita, supra note 9, at 52
46
Hirsch, supra note 39, at 38

21
independent existence of a corporate will47 which does not always identify itself with

that of the collectivity of members of the corporation.48 The corporation’s capacity to

act and decide has been recognized in contract, administrative, and constitutional law.

Therefore, if a corporation has the capacity to think and decide when it is a

part to a contract (and thus being the subject of contractual rights and obligations), it

cannot be sustained that corporate will power exists when it produces legal effects, but

not when the effects created are illegal (criminal offenses).49 Moreover, being widely

accepted that corporations have civil liability, it would be difficult to explain why the

corporation should not be held liable when the offense committed is more serious

(criminal offense as opposed to civil offense). The culpability of corporations exists

and it is sufficient for the culpability required by the criminal law.50

After defeating these arguments, the issue became how wide the pool of

individuals who can draw the corporate criminal liability should be, by what acts, and

with what mental state.

Although the corporations are the subjects of the law, the action or inaction of

a human being is necessary to engage the corporations’ criminal liability. Initially, the

persons who could engage the corporations’ liability were limited to the corporate

47
See Streteanu & Chirita, supra note 9, 53-59; Friedman, supra note 71, at 847-52
48
For example, when some of the members opposed a specific course of action adopted by the
majority, the minority’s will cannot be identified with that of the corporation represented by
the majority
134 49
Streteanu & Chirita, supra note 9, at 55, citing R. Plascencia Villanueva, Teoria del
Delito
73-74 ([sic] Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico, 2000)
50
Hirsch, supra note 39, at 38

22
organs. The organs represented the soul of the corporation, their actions were the

corporation’s actions, and therefore, the crimes committed by the organs were those of

the corporation.51 Nowadays, in some legal systems, there is a tendency of expanding

the categories of persons who can cause corporate criminal liability.

Under Article 121-2 of the French Penal Code, corporations are criminally

liable for the crimes committed on their behalf by their organs and representatives. 52

When the organs or representatives have the required mens rea and actus reus of the

crime, the corporation is automatically liable.53 The organs are individuals exercising

an administrative or other important function conferred by law or the charter of the

corporation.54 The notion of “representative” is wider than that of “organ,” and includes

other persons such as the temporary administrators, liquidators, and special agents. 55

Therefore, the acts of other members or subordinate employees cannot engage the

criminal liability of corporations even when the acts are committed in the benefit of the

corporations. Due to this requirement, the French system is the most restrictive model

of the jurisdictions presented here.56 However, it is not always necessary to identify the

representative or the organ; such is the case for the crimes by omission or when the

crime was based on a collective decision by secret vote. It is sufficient to know that an

organ or representative acted or failed to act when he or she had a duty to, but knowing

his or her identity is not necessary. 57

51
Streteanu & Chirita, supra note 9, at 120
52
C. Pen. art. 121-2 (Fr.)
53
Streteanu & Chirita, supra note 9, at 134
54
Id. at 121, citing F. Desportes, Responsibilite Penale des Personnes Morales 112 (Tecniques
Juris-Classeurs ed, 2001)
55
Id. at 123; Bouloc, supra note 30, at 238
56
Stessens, supra note 16, at 507
57
Streteanu & Chirita, supra note 9, at 123

23
The organs and representatives must act on behalf of the corporation.58 The

notion of crime committed on behalf of the corporation varies based on the type of

crime committed because the commission of a crime presupposes the existence of a

subjective element—mens rea—and an objective element—the profit.59 Therefore,

when committing theft, the objective element will be more accentuated, but when

committing discrimination the subjective element would have more importance since it

is difficult to point to a specific profit that the corporation would gain from such crime.

Hence, crimes committed solely in the personal interest of the organ or representative

would not engage the criminal liability of the corporation.60

Nevertheless, when the individual acts partially in his benefit and partially in

the benefit of the corporation, the corporation would be held criminally liable. The

benefit may consist in obtaining a profit, avoiding a loss, or any other kind of benefit.61

Acting on behalf of the corporation does not always imply a benefit; such is

the case when a director discriminates in the process of hiring or when he or she

negligently fails to verify the safety equipment used by the corporation’s employees. 62

Despite the fact that the corporation does not benefit from such crimes, it is still held

criminally liable. Moreover, the crimes by omissions are presumed to be committed on

58
C. Pen. art. 121-2 (Fr.)
59
Streteanu & Chirita, supra note 9, at 128
60
Bouloc, supra note 30, at 240
61
Stessens, supra note 16, at 514
62
Streteanu & Chirita, supra note 9, at 128

24
behalf of the corporation when the organ or representative had a duty to act. 63 Even

when an organ or representative acts outside the limits of his or her power, the

corporation is held criminally liable.

In France, the organ or representative of the corporation can commit both

intentional and unintentional crimes on behalf of the corporation. When the mens rea

and the actus reus elements are established with reference to the organ or

representative, the corporation is automatically liable as long as the cause and effect

relationship (but not the culpability) between the commission of the crime and the

activity done on behalf of the organization is proved. 64

In Germany, although corporations cannot be held criminally liable,

corporations are liable for criminal offenses under the administrative-penal law. Both

administrative and criminal courts can impose administrative sanctions. Section 30 of

the OWiG—Administrative Offences Act limits the class of individuals whose acts can

make the corporation liable to the legal representatives or directors of the corporation.

The acts of the representatives or directors are automatically considered those of the

corporation if the crime could have been prevented by the corporation. The corporation

is merely responsible for the offenses, but not criminally culpable.

The class of individuals who can engage the liability of corporations can be

expanded in two ways; first, the courts “have not considered it necessary to name the

persons who have acted provided it is clear that someone in the class described in

63
Id. at 129, citing A. Levy et all, La Responsibilite Penale des Collectivites Territoriales, de
Leurs Elus, de Leurs Agents 30 (Litec Ed., 1995)
64
Id. art. 121-2; De Maglie, supra note 104, at 556

25
section 30 of the OWiG has” and, second, because under section 130 of OWiG lack of

surveillance is an administrative-penal offense, when employees who are not legal

representatives or directors commit an offense that could have been prevented by an

adequate surveillance by officers within the section 30 of OWiG, the corporation is

liable. The lack of surveillance may be due to a defective organization of the

corporation. There must be a showing that the offense could have been revented with

reasonable efforts:65 only then it is justifiable to punish the corporation.

Section 30 of OWiG also provides procedural rules which do not make it

necessary to pursue or identify the individual author of the offense. 66 Moreover, the

offense must be connected with the corporate activities. The organ or representative

must either have violated his or her legal duties, or the conduct must have resulted or

been intended to result in patrimonial benefit to the corporation. 67 Under the German

law, strict liability offenses do not exist because culpability is the core requirement for

liability.

65
Streteanu & Chirita, supra note 9, at 121, citing G. Dannecker, Reflexiones Sobre la
Responsibilidad Penal de las Personas Juridicas [sic] Revista Penal 51 (2001); Hirsch, supra
note 39, at 69
66
Hirsch, supra note 39, at 69
67
Id.; Stessens, supra note 16, at 514

26
1.5 LITERATURE REVIEW

This research paper has required consultation of large number resources in order to

be able to substantiate any point or stance taken in the project. Thus researcher has

adopted the Doctrinal Form of research in compiling this project. The above category

of material consists of law reporters such as AIR and SCC and other commentaries.

Also, secondary soft copy sources of information have been perused from online

databases such as ‘Manupatra’, ‘India Code’ and ‘Judis’ and other international journals

like ‘Hein Online’, ‘JStor’, ‘WestLaw’ and ‘Kluwer Online’. The rest of the data can

be traced back to an assorted range of books and websites consulted, that form a part of

the secondary sources. Some research papers, journals and magazines have also been

referred to.

The various sources of literature used by the author in the research of this thesis are

broadly as follows:

1. Primary sources

Examples: Speeches, letters, diaries, autobiographies, interviews, official

reports, court records, or information from the official /Government sources.

2. Secondary sources

Examples: Biographical works; Commentaries, criticisms; Histories; Literary

criticism such as Journal articles; Magazine and newspaper articles;

Monographs, other than fiction and autobiography, websites.

3. Tertiary sources

Examples: Almanacs; Bibliographies; Dictionaries and Encyclopedias; Fact

books; Guidebooks; Manuals and Textbooks.

27
1.6 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The type of research that will be used in this study is primarily Theorotical

Research, wherein a non empirical approach to research, involving the perusal of

mostly published works like researching through archives of public libraries, court

rooms and published academic journals will be used. The methodology used in this

research paper is deductive in nature.

The type of research approach that will be used in this study Qualitative Research

and will involve describing in detail specific situation using research tools like studying

the available literature, interviews, surveys, and observations. Qualitative Research is

primarily exploratory research. It is used to gain an understanding of underlying

reasons, opinions, and motivations. It provides insights into the problem or helps to

develop ideas or hypotheses for potential quantitative research. Qualitative Research is

also used to uncover trends in the global market, and how the other nations are

combating the same issue. The study also studies the thought and opinions, and dives

deeper into the problem of Insider Trading and how it must be regulated, controlled and

effectively curtailed.

Research Tools: The Research Of this Project was carried out with the help of the

Internet and in the Library of the Padala Rami Reddy Law College, Ameerpet,

Hyderabad. The tools used are mainly books and websites along with the primary

Journal references.

Footnoting style: In whole of the Project Uniform Footnoting Style is adopted in

conformity with the Harvard Blue Book.

28
1.7 SCOPE OF THE STUDY

In common law systems, corporate criminal liability is based on two main

theories: the identification theory and the respondeat superior theory. The

identification theory (also called the alter ego theory) was developed by the English

law by importing the concept from the civil law of tort. Under this anthropomorphic

theory, a sufficiently high ranking corporate member acts not as an agent of the

corporation, but as the corporation itself. In Tesco Supermarkets Ltd. v. Nattrass,68 the

court compared corporations to human bodies; the high ranking managers represent the

nervous systems that control what the corporations do. Therefore, the mens rea and

actus reus of the high ranking managers are automatically those of the corporation and

no other method of proof is necessary. Whether an officer controls the corporation as

the brains control the human body is a question of law; the determining factor of this

test is whether the officer could act independently.

The identification theory has been largely criticized. This theory can function

properly only for small corporations where only the high-ranking managers are

involved in the decision process. Today’s corporations are very complex and many

other persons are involved in the decision making process. Corporate agents other than

the top managers do not engage the criminal liability of corporations. Moreover,

corporations can evade liability by structuring themselves in a way that few decisions

could be taken by controlling officers.69 The identification of the person is also

necessary and this creates a serious bar to prosecution of a highly complex corporation

characterized by diffusion of responsibility. Therefore, crimes that rely on defective

68
Tesco Supermarkets Ltd. v. Natrass, [1972] A.C. 153
69
National Rivers Auth. v. Alfred McAlpine Homes E. Ltd., [1994] 4 All E.R. 286 (Q.B. Div'l
Ct.)

29
organization are not included. Another disadvantage is that it is impossible to cumulate

the acts or mens rea of multiple controlling officers.70

In the English law, the essential conditions of corporate criminal liability vary

based on the nature of the crime. For strict liability crimes, corporations are liable if the

crime resulted in a benefit to the corporations. The jurisprudence considers that if the

law imposes an obligation, the corporations must organize themselves well enough so

they can abide the law.71 The corporations are liable under the respondeat superior

theory for strict liability offenses and for= crimes for which the law expressly or

impliedly provides for indirect liability. 72

For the crimes which require mens rea, corporations are liable under the

identification theory. The natural persons who can make the corporation criminally

liable are those who can identify themselves with the corporation; this category includes

the members of the board of directors, the managing directors, other persons

responsible for the general management of the corporation, and delegates responsible

with management functions who can act independently.

The crime must be committed within the person’s scope of employment. 73 If

these conditions are met, the corporation is criminally liable even when the corporation

itself is defrauded.

70
R. v. H.M. Coroner for East Kent [1989] Cr. App. R. 16
71
Alphacell v. Woodward, [1972] 2 All E.R. 475 (H.L.)
72
Allen v. Whitehead [1930] 1 K.B. 211; Streteanu & Chirita, supra note 5, at 147
73
Director of Public Prosecutions v. Kent & Sussex Contractors, Ltd., [1944] K.B. 146 (K.B.
Div'l Ct. 1943)

30
However, due to the strict limitations of the identification theory, it has been

almost impossible to have convictions of corporations for mens rea crimes. As a result,

the English law has started to slowly change; the courts decided that a corporation can

be convicted for negligently omitting to take some preventive measures even though no

person within the company had this specific duty. 74 At the same time, however, the

English jurisprudence has refused to adopt the aggregate or collective intent theory

based on precedent cases that imposed the necessity to identify the person who had the

required mens rea and actus reus.75 This refusal has been strongly criticized.

The United States has adopted the respondeat superior model from the civil

law. “The principle of respondeat superior represents the implementation of the

principles governing vicarious liability: the actus reus and the mens rea of the

individuals who act on behalf of a corporation are automatically attributed to the

corporation.” The corporation is liable if the employee commits the crime while acting

within the scope of his employment and on behalf of the corporation.

Under the federal law, a corporation may be held criminally liable for the acts

of any employee, not only for the acts of managers or directors.76 The majority of U.S.

jurisdictions agrees with the federal law and attributes the crimes of all the employees

to the corporations.

In addition, the employees must have been acting within the scope of their

employment. The acts “directly related to the performance of the type of duties the

74
Seaboard Offshore, Ltd. v. Secretary of State for Transp., [1994] 2 All E.R. 99, 104 (H.L.)

75
Streteanu & Chirita, supra note 9, at 149, citing S. Field and N. Jorg, Corporate Liability and
Manslaughter: should we be going Dutch? 161 Crim. L. Rev. 161(1991)
76
U. S. v. Gold, 734 F.2d 800 (5 th Cir. 1984); U.S. v. Automatic Medical Laboratories, Inc.,
770 F.2d 399 (4th Cir. 1985).

31
employee has general authority to perform” 77 fall within the scope of employment. It is

also sufficient that the employees act with apparent authority. It does not matter “that

the act was ultra vires or unauthorized or contrary to corporate policy or to specific

instructions given to the agent.”

Unlike English law, under American law it is not necessary to identify the

specific individuals who committed the crime; it is sufficient to prove that one or more

agents of the corporation must have committed it. The American law went a step further

and decided to impose liability based on the act of one employee and the culpability of

another who realized the significance of the act.” This is known under the name of

aggregation theory. 78 This theory also provides that, while no single employee had

sufficient information necessary to have the required mens rea of the offense, if

multiple individuals within the corporation possessed the elements of such knowledge

collectively, their aggregate knowledge can be attributed to the corporation. As a result,

in some situations corporations will be liable when no employee is.

The employee must act on behalf of the corporation. This means that the

employee must act with intent to benefit the corporation, but the corporation does not

have to actually derive a benefit from the employee’s act. If the employee intended to

benefit only himself or a third party, the corporation is not liable except for strict

liability offenses. If the employee intended to benefit both himself and the corporation,

the corporation is held criminally liable.

The Model Penal Code, adopted only by a few American jurisdictions, has

proposed a different model which contains three systems of corporate criminal liability.

77
U.S. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 433 F.2d 174, 204-05 (3d Cir. 1970)
78
For a comprehensive analysis of this model/theory see Lederman, supra note 73, at 661-66

32
The first system is similar to the English alter ego criminal corporate liability.

Corporations are liable for the ordinary or true crimes, such as theft or manslaughter,

committed by managers or other high corporate officers whose acts represent the acts

of the corporation.79 This is a direct criminal liability of corporations. Under the second

system, corporations are liable for price-fixing, securities fraud, or other crimes for

which there is an apparent legislative intent to impose liability on corporations,

“committed by any employee acting within the scope of his employment on the

corporation’s behalf.” However, corporations can defend themselves by showing that

their managers used due diligence when attempting to prevent the crime. 80 Finally,

under the third system, corporations are generally liable for “violations” or regulatory

offenses for which the law imposes strict liability. The offenses can be committed by

any employee within the scope of his employment. The “due diligence” defense is not

available.

79
Wise, supra note 65, at 389
80
Id. at 390

33
1.8 SCEME OF STUDY
Generally, there are two models of corporate criminal liability: a restrictive

direct liability model, followed by France and England, and a wide vicarious liability

model, followed by the United States. The wider model seems to be more effective in

combating corporate crime. The French and English models are not in line with the real

developments of corporate structure. The reluctance of these models to adopt the

aggregate responsibility model is likely to hamper the accomplishment of justice and

accountability for significant types of corporate misconduct. 81

The fragmentation and specialization of corporate departments can create an

ideal way of escaping liability under the restrictive models: one’s apparently innocent

action coupled with another’s will often times form a crime. The requirement that the

crimes be committed by high ranking officers or managers is also a great impediment

in combating corporate crime because corporations will avoid liability by empowering

lower level employees to make decisions. The English system presents another

disadvantage when requiring the identification of the individual who committed the act.

The identification of the individual who committed the crime is often times impossible.

Although they have the advantages of being clear, predictable, and consistent with the

general principles of criminal law, these systems do not meet the requirements of

general fairness and efficiency. Moreover, due to the difficulty of prosecuting

corporations, the English and French systems are less deterring.

On the other hand, the American model establishes a wide system of corporate

criminal liability that promotes general fairness and deterrence. The adoption of the

aggregation theory and the fact that any employee can engage the criminal liability of

corporations under certain circumstances represent great advantages; the American

81
Harding, supra note 48, at 382.

34
model comprehensively covers the wide variety of loopholes existent under other

systems. This system is clear, predictable and efficient in preventing corporate crimes.

At the same time, the wide possibility of convicting corporations for acts of any

employee increases the number of lawsuits against corporations; this causes high costs

for the courts and the corporations, and the loss of jobs and profits for innocent

employees and shareholders.

Some countries did not adopt the concept of criminal liability, and others

adopted a restrictive model. Germany sticks to the old concept of societas deliquere

non potest for doctrinal reasons and because it believes that criminal sanctions are not

necessary. Due to the insufficiencies of the civil and administrative liability, France

distanced itself from the German model. France preferred a more restrictive model

because of the strong doctrinal issues that prevented it from initially adopting the

concept of criminal liability; also, the legislators might have considered it more

appropriate to make little steps and ease the transition towards a more comprehensive

model. Other political issues (such as the strong influence of corporations) may have

prevented the adoption of a wider liability model. These differences can increase the

number of corporate crimes. A country that does not have a comprehensive corporate

sanctioning system will attract corporations whose actions will not be accepted

somewhere else.82 This might create an initial economic benefit for that country, but on

an international, and ultimately national scale, such a result would be undesirable.

82
Stessens, supra note 16, at 520

35
1.9 CHAPTERIZATION
The chapterization for the dissertation/thesis on “A Critical Study of Corporate
Offences” would be as follows:

CHAPTER I- INTRODUCTION
1.1 PREAMBLE
Alternatives to Corporate Criminal Liability
1.2 OBJECTIVE OF THE RESEARCH AREA
1.3 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY
1.4 HYPOTHESIS
1.5 LITERATURE REVIEW
1.6 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
1.7 SCOPE OF THE STUDY
1.8 SCEME OF STUDY
1.9 CHAPTERIZATION

CHAPTER II- THE REGULATORY PROVISIONS AND AUTHORITIES


DEALING WITH “FRAUD”
2.1 WHAT ARE THE MAIN REGULATORY PROVISIONS AND
AUTHORITIES RESPONSIBLE FOR INVESTIGATING CORPORATE OR
BUSINESS FRAUD?
2.2 WHAT ARE THE SPECIFIC OFFENCES RELEVANT TO CORPORATE
OR BUSINESS FRAUD?
2.2.1 Fraud and misrepresentation related with sale of securities.
2.2.2 Forgery (section 463, Penal Code)
2.2.3 Falsification of accounts (section 477A, Penal Code)
2.2.4 Dishonest misappropriation of property (section 403, Penal Code)
2.2.5 Criminal breach of trust (section 405, Penal Code)
2.2.7 Tax crimes
2.3 WHAT ARE THE REGULATOR'S POWERS OF INVESTIGATION,
ENFORCEMENT AND PROSECUTION IN CASES OF CORPORATE OR
BUSINESS FRAUD?
2.4 WHAT ARE THE POTENTIAL SANCTIONS OR LIABILITIES FOR
PARTICIPATING IN CORPORATE BUSINESS FRAUD?

CHAPTER III- BRIBERY AND CORRUPTION


3.1 WHAT ARE THE MAIN REGULATORY PROVISIONS AND
AUTHORITIES RESPONSIBLE FOR INVESTIGATING BRIBERY AND
CORRUPTION?
3.2 WHAT INTERNATIONAL ANTI-CORRUPTION CONVENTIONS APPLY
IN YOUR JURISDICTION?
3.3 WHAT ARE THE SPECIFIC BRIBERY AND CORRUPTION OFFENCES IN
YOUR JURISDICTION?
3.4 WHAT DEFENSES, SAFE HARBORS OR EXEMPTIONS ARE AVAILABLE
AND WHO CAN QUALIFY?
3.5 CAN ASSOCIATED PERSONS AND AGENTS BE LIABLE FOR THESE
OFFENCES AND IN WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES?

36
3.6 WHAT ARE THE REGULATOR'S POWERS OF INVESTIGATION,
ENFORCEMENT AND PROSECUTION IN CASES OF BRIBERY AND
CORRUPTION?
3.7 WHAT ARE THE POTENTIAL SANCTIONS FOR PARTICIPATING IN
BRIBERY AND CORRUPTION?
3.8 TAX TREATMENT

CHAPTER IV - INSIDER DEALING AND MARKET ABUSE


4.1 WHAT ARE THE MAIN REGULATORY PROVISIONS AND
AUTHORITIES RESPONSIBLE FOR INVESTIGATING INSIDER DEALING
AND MARKET ABUSE?
4.2 WHAT ARE THE SPECIFIC INSIDER DEALING AND MARKET ABUSE
OFFENCES?
4.3 WHAT DEFENSES, SAFE HARBORS OR EXEMPTIONS ARE
AVAILABLE AND WHO CAN QUALIFY?
4.4 WHAT ARE THE REGULATOR'S POWERS OF INVESTIGATION,
ENFORCEMENT AND PROSECUTION?
4.5 WHAT ARE THE POTENTIAL SANCTIONS FOR PARTICIPATING IN
INSIDER DEALING AND MARKET ABUSE?

CHAPTER V- MONEY LAUNDERING AND TERRORIST FINANCING


5.1 REGULATORY PROVISIONS AND AUTHORITIES RESPONSIBLE FOR
INVESTIGATING MONEY LAUNDERING AND/OR TERRORIST FINANCING
5.2 MONEY LAUNDERING AND TERRORIST FINANCING OFFENCES
5.3 DEFENCES, SAFE HARBOURS OR EXEMPTIONS ARE AVAILABLE
AND WHO CAN QUALIFY
5.4 REGULATOR'S POWERS OF INVESTIGATION, ENFORCEMENT AND
PROSECUTION
5.5 SANCTIONS FOR PARTICIPATING IN MONEY LAUNDERING OR
TERRORIST FINANCING OFFENCES

CHAPTER VI - FINANCIAL RECORD KEEPING


6.1 GENERAL REQUIREMENTS FOR FINANCIAL RECORD KEEPING
AND DISCLOSURE
6.2 SANCTIONS FOR FAILURE TO KEEP OR DISCLOSE ACCURATE
FINANCIAL RECORDS
6.3 ARE THE FINANCIAL RECORD KEEPING RULES USED TO PROSECUTE
WHITE-COLLAR CRIMES?
6.4 GENERAL DUE DILIGENCE REQUIREMENTS AND PROCEDURES IN
RELATION TO CORRUPTION, FRAUD OR MONEY LAUNDERING WHEN
CONTRACTING WITH EXTERNAL PARTIES
6.5 CIRCUMSTANCES WHEN A CORPORATE BODY ITSELF BE SUBJECT
TO CRIMINAL LIABILITY
6.6 CIRCUMSTANCES WHEN A IT POSSIBLE TO OBTAIN
IMMUNITY/LENIENCY FOR CO- OPERATION WITH THE AUTHORITIES
6.7 INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AND LEGAL INSTRUMENTS ARE
AVAILABLE FOR LOCAL AUTHORITIES
6.8 ARE WHISTLEBLOWERS GIVEN STATUTORY PROTECTION?
6.9 IMPENDING DEVELOPMENTS OR PROPOSALS FOR REFORM

37
6.10 WHAT ARE THE MAIN STEPS FOREIGN AND LOCAL COMPANIES
ARE TAKING TO MANAGE THEIR EXPOSURE TO
CORRUPTION/CORPORATE CRIME

CHAPTER VII - REGULATORY AUTHORITIES

CHAPTER VIII - COMPARATIVE STUDY OF OTHER JURISDICTIONS


8.1 ENGLISH AND FRENCH
8.2 HISTORICAL EVOLUTION
8.3 FRANCE – Ordonnance de Blois
8.4 GERMANIC LAW
8.5 ITALY, PORTUGAL, GREECE AND SPAIN
8.6 AMERICAN SOCIETY WAS EXPANDED TO MENS REA OFFENSES
8.7 ESSENTIAL CONDITIONS FOR CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY
8.8 ENTITIES
8.9 NATURAL PERSONS CAN CAUSE CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY
8.10 ISSUES OF WHAT SANCTIONS ARE APPROPRIATE FOR CORPORATE
8.11 CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES

CHAPTER IX - CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS

BIBLIOGRAPHY

38
CHAPTER II

THE REGULATORY PROVISIONS AND AUTHORITIES


DEALING WITH “FRAUD”

2.1 WHAT ARE THE MAIN REGULATORY PROVISIONS AND


AUTHORITIES RESPONSIBLE FOR INVESTIGATING CORPORATE OR
BUSINESS FRAUD?

India has a quasi-federal political structure comprising of 28 states and seven

centrally administered union territories. It has a democratically elected central union

government (central government) and each state has its own democratically elected state

government. Each state establishes and maintains its own police force. Investigations are

normally handled by the police force of the state where the crime was committed.

The central government has established a central investigative agency called the

Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI). Typically, the CBI investigates and prosecutes

cases of serious fraud or cheating that may have ramifications in more than one state.

Where needed, the CBI can be assisted by specialized wings of the central government

especially in economic or cross-border crimes. It also gets involved in serious crimes

where it is necessary to use an agency that is independent of local political influence.

The Serious Fraud Investigation Office is a multi-disciplinary organization under

the Ministry of Corporate Affairs, consisting of experts in the field of accountancy,

forensic auditing, and law of Information technology, investigation, company law, capital

market and taxation. It detects prosecutes or recommends for prosecution of white-collar

crimes/frauds.

In addition the central government under the Department of Revenue has set up

39
various agencies to fight economic crimes. Some of the significant ones are:

 Central Economic Intelligence Bureau (for economic offences and

implementation of the

 Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act

(COFEPOSA)).

 Directorate of Enforcement (for foreign exchange and money laundering offences).

 Central Bureau of Narcotics (for drug related offences).

 Directorate General of Anti-evasion (central excise related offences).

 Directorate General of Revenue Intelligence (customs, excise and service tax

related

offences).

 The Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI). This was established on

12 April 1992 under the Securities and Exchange Board of India Act 1992

(SEBI Act). SEBI deals with securities fraud and aims to, among other things:

 Protect the interests of investors in securities;

 Promote the development of the securities market;

 Regulate the securities market.

India has a unified (all India) legislation under the Indian Penal Code 1860 (Penal

Code) and the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 for substantive and procedural laws

relating to crime.

40
2.2 WHAT ARE THE SPECIFIC OFFENCES RELEVANT TO CORPORATE
OR BUSINESS FRAUD?

Specific offences relating to business or corporate fraud include insider trading,

money laundering, fraud and misrepresentation related with sale of securities, forgery

falsification of accounts, dishonest misappropriation of property, criminal breach of trust,

cheating and tax crimes.

2.2.1 Fraud and misrepresentation related with sale of securities.

This includes offences such as buying, selling and dealing in securities

fraudulently, or manipulation or deception~ these are covered under the:

1. SEBI Act.

2. Securities and Exchange Board of India Rules 1993 (SEBI Rules).

3. Regulation 3 and 4 of The Securities and Exchange Board of India (Prohibition of

Fraudulent and Unfair Trade Practices Relating to Securities Market) Regulations

2003 lay down the list of prohibited acts as follows. The prohibitions on dealings

in securities include:

 Buying, selling or dealing in securities in a fraudulent manner; using or

employing, in connection with the issue, purchase or sale of any security listed

or proposed to be listed in a recognized stock exchange, any manipulative or

deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of the Act or its rules and

regulations;

 Employing any device, scheme or artifice to defraud in connection with dealing

in or issue of securities that are listed or proposed to be listed on a recognized

41
stock exchange; engaging in any act, practice or course of business that operates

or would operate as fraud or deceit upon any person in connection with any

dealing in or issue of securities that are listed or proposed to be listed on a

recognized stock exchange, in contravention of the provisions of the SEBI Act

or the SEBI Rules.

 Manipulative, fraudulent and unfair trade practices are prohibited. Dealing in

securities is a fraudulent or an unfair trade practice if it involves fraud. This may

include all or any of the following:

 Indulging in an act that creates a false or misleading appearance of trading in the

securities market; dealing in a security not intended to effect transfer of beneficial

ownership but intended to operate only as a device to innate, depress or cause

fluctuations in the price of such security for wrongful gain or avoidance of loss;

 Advancing or agreeing to advance any money to any person thereby inducing any

other person to offer to buy any security in any issue only with the intention of

securing the minimum subscription to such issue; Paying, offering or agreeing to

pay or offer, directly or indirectly, to any person any money or money's worth for

inducing. Such person for dealing in any security with the object of inflating,

depressing, maintaining or causing fluctuation in the price of such security; Any

act or omission amounting to manipulation of the price of a security;

 Publishing or causing to publish or reporting or causing to report by a person

42
dealing in securities any information that is not true "or that he does not believe to

be true prior to or in the course of dealing in securities;

 Entering into a transaction in securities without intention of performing it or

without intention of change of ownership of such security;

 An intermediary reporting trading transactions to his clients entered into on their

behalf

 In an inflated manner in order to increase his commission and brokerage;

 An intermediary not disclosing to his client transactions entered into on his

behalf including taking an option position;

 circular transactions in respect of a security entered into between intermediaries

in order to increase commission to provide a false appearance of trading in such

security or to inflate, depress or cause fluctuations in the price of such security;

 Encouraging the clients by an intermediary to deal in securities solely with the

object of enhancing his brokerage or commission;

 an intermediary buying or selling securities in advance of a substantial client

order or whereby a futures or option position is taken about an impending

transaction in the same or related futures or options contract; Planting false or

misleading news that may induce sale or purchase of securities.

43
2.2.2 Forgery (section 463, Penal Code).

Forgery is defined under the Penal Code as making any false documents or false

electronic record or part of a document or electronic record with the intention to either:

Cause damage or injury, to the public or to any person.

Support any claim or title, or to cause any person to part with property, or to enter into

any express or implied contract, with intent to commit fraud.

2.2.3 Falsification of accounts (section 477A, Penal Code).

An employee is guilty of falsification of accounts if he wilfully and with an intention

to defraud either:

 Destroys or falsifies any book electronic record paper, writing, valuable security

or account that belongs to or is in the possession of his employer, or has been

received by him for or on behalf of his employer.

 Wilfully, and with intent to defraud, makes or facilitates the making of any false

entry in, or omits or alters or facilitates the omission or alteration of any material

particular from or in, any such document.

2.2.4 Dishonest misappropriation of property (section 403, Penal Code).

44
A person commits the offence of dishonest misappropriation of property if he

dishonestly misappropriates or converts to his own use any movable property.

2.2.5 Criminal breach of trust (section 405, Penal Code).

Criminal breach of trust is when a person who is entrusted with property or any

dominion over property is dishonestly misappropriating,

Converting the property to his own use, or dishonestly using or disposing of that property

in violation of any direction of law or legal contract.

2.2.6 Cheating (section 415, Penal Code).

This offence consists of deceiving any person and either:

i. Fraudulently or dishonestly inducing the deceived person to deliver property to

a person or

ii. allow a person to retain property.

Intentionally inducing the deceived person to do or omit to do anything that he would not

do or omit if he were not so deceived, and that causes or is likely to cause damage or harm

to that person in body, mind, reputation or property.

2.2.6 Tax crimes.

Various tax crimes (such as tax evasion, smuggling, customs duty evasion, valued

added tax evasion, and tax fraud) can be prosecuted under the:

45
i. Income Tax Act 1961.

ii. Customs Act 1962.

iii. Central Sales Tax Act 1956.

iv. Central Excise Act 1944.

These offences require a deliberate act by the accused rather than an act of negligence.

Managers’ officers and directors may have personal liability for aiding abetting,

counseling’s or procuring the commission of an offence. Typically, most statutes have a

section titled "Offences by Companies", which contains a template provision making any

person who, at the time the offence was committed, was directly in charge of and

responsible to the company for the conduct of its business guilty of an offence committed

by the company, unless either:

i. The offence was committed without his knowledge.

ii. He exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of the offence.

46
2.3 WHAT ARE THE REGULATOR'S POWERS OF INVESTIGATION,
ENFORCEMENT AND PROSECUTION IN CASES OF CORPORATE OR
BUSINESS FRAUD?

The CBI derives its legal powers of investigation from the Delhi Special Police

Establishment Act 1946 (DSPE). They enjoy the same investigation powers as the Police

and also have the power to launch prosecutions under a separate wing Under the Companies

Act 1956 the central government can inspect the books of accounts of a company, direct

special audits, order investigations and launch prosecutions for any offence.

SEBI has the powers of a civil court, such as ordering discovery and

production of books of account, summoning and enforcing the attendance of persons

and examining the inspection of books, registers and other documents and issuing

commissions for the examination of witnesses or documents.

2.4 WHAT ARE THE POTENTIAL SANCTIONS OR LIABILITIES FOR


PARTICIPATING IN CORPORATE BUSINESS FRAUD?

The prescribed sanctions are as follows:

 Fraudulent and unfair trade practices relating to securities. The higher of either

a fine of INR250 million (as at 1 August 2012, US$1 was about INR55); or Three

times the amount of profits made out of such practices.

 Forgery. Two years' imprisonment and/or a fine.

 Falsification of accounts - Seven years imprisonment and/or fine.

47
 Dishonest misappropriation of property - Two years' imprisonment and/or fine.

 Criminal breach of trust - Three years' imprisonment and a fine.

 Cheating - Simple cases of cheating are punishable with one year's

imprisonment and a fine. Cheating accompanied with delivery of property or

destruction of any valuable security is punishable by seven years' imprisonment.

48
CHAPTER III
BRIBERY AND CORRUPTION
3.1 WHAT ARE THE MAIN REGULATORY PROVISIONS AND
AUTHORITIES RESPONSIBLE FOR INVESTIGATING BRIBERY AND
CORRUPTION?

The following regulations govern bribery and corruption in India:

 The Prevention of Corruption Act 1988. This is a central government law enacted

by

Parliament to combat corruption and bribery among public servants. Under this

Act there is a presumption that a public servant or a person expecting to be a public

servant, who accepts or obtains or agrees or attempts to obtain from any person any

recompense as a motive or reward for doing or forbearing to do any official act, or

for showing favor or disfavor, is guilty of the crime of taking a bribe.

 Public service rules. These are applicable to various categories of public servants.

They

prescribe a code of conduct to be observed by public servants and outline the rules

pertaining to, among other things, accepting gifts and hospitality.

 Penal Code. Sections 1718 and 171E penalize bribery in relation to the exercise of

any

electoral right. Section 169 pertains to a public servant unlawfully buying or

bidding for property, rendering him liable for imprisonment and/or a fine. If the

property is purchased, it will be confiscated.

49
 The Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act 1988. A "benami" transaction is a

transaction under a false name or identity. The Act prohibits any benami

transaction except when a person purchases property in his wife's or unmarried

daughter's name. (This Act was necessary as benami real estate purchases were

historically part of the law in India)

Other legislation that is proposed and pending before Parliament includes:

The Prevention of Bribery of Foreign Public Officials and Officials of Public

international Organizations Bill (2011).

The Citizen's Ombudsman Bill 2011 (Lokpal and Lokayukta Bill)

The three main regulators responsible for inquiring, investigating and prosecuting

corruption cases are the:

 Central Vigilance Commission.

 CBI.

 Anti-Corruption Bureau of each state.

The CBI and the Anti-Corruption Bureaus of each state investigate cases related to

corruption while the Central Vigilance Commission is a statutory body that supervises

corruption cases in governmental departments. It has supervisory powers over the CBI but

does not have authority to prosecute individuals.

Similarly, the state ombudsman (Lok Ayuktas) advises state government departments on

actions against offending government officials. They are fully empowered to initiate

50
investigations against public functionaries in corruption cases and can recommend

punishments In addition, the Prevention of Corruption Act provides for various classes of

police officers who are eligible to investigate offences under the Act.

3.2 WHAT INTERNATIONAL ANTI-CORRUPTION CONVENTIONS


APPLY IN YOUR JURISDICTION?

India is an active participant in the cross-border fight against corruption and has

signed and ratified the UN Convention against Corruption. The purpose of the Convention

includes:

 Promoting and strengthening measures to prevent and combat corruption

efficiently and effectively.

 Strengthening internal co-operation and technical assistance to check and

fight corruption and promote the integrity, accountability and proper

management of public affairs and property

A trilateral India-Brazil-South Africa co-operation agreement has been

established for the purpose of covering various public-policy sectors including ethics and

combating corruption, and social responsibility and transparency.

India is an executive member of International Association of Anti-Corruption

Authorities.

It is also actively involved with the Organization for Economic Co-operation and

Development in its Anticorruption Initiative for Asia-Pacific.

51
3.3 WHAT ARE THE SPECIFIC BRIBERY AND CORRUPTION OFFENCES
IN YOUR JURISDICTION?

Bribery involves any public servant (person in pay or service of the government):

 Receiving illegal recompense in relation to an official act.

 Receiving illegal recompense by corrupt or illegal means for influencing a

public servant.

 Receiving illegal recompense for the exercise of personal influence over s

public servant.

 Obtaining a valuable thing free of charge from any person concerned in a

proceeding or business transacted by the public servant.

The acceptance or agreement to accept or attempt to obtain such recompense is

enough to constitute an offence. Under the Prevention of Corruption Act, a public servant

or a person expecting to be a public servant who accepts or obtains or agrees or attempts to

obtain from any person any recompense as a motive or reward for doing or forbearing to

do any official act, or for showing favour or disfavour, is guilty of the crime of taking a

bribe.

A public servant commits the offence of criminal misconduct if he:

 Habitually accepts, or obtains or agrees or attempts to obtain from any person

or for any other person any recompense other than legal remuneration as a

motive or reward.

 Habitually accepts or obtains or agrees or attempts to obtain any valuable

thing without consideration, or for consideration that he knows to be

inadequate, from any person concerned with an official act.

52
Dishonestly or fraudulently misappropriates or otherwise converts for his own use

any property entrusted to him or under his control as a public servant or allows any other

person to do so.

Obtains for any person or for himself any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage by

corrupt or illegal means or by abusing his position as a public servant.

Obtains (or any person obtains) any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage while

holding office as a public servant, if he or any person on his behalf has at any time during

the period of his Office pecuniary resources or property disproportionate to his known

sources of income and for which he cannot satisfactorily account.

The Penal Code also defines offences of bribery/corruption in relation to elections.

At present there are no regulations relating to private business/commercial bribery.

However, there are ongoing efforts to combat bribery in the private sector. The emerging

trend is to make the sector transparent, accountable and at par with the mechanisms that

are in place for the public sector.

3.4 WHAT DEFENSES, SAFE HARBORS OR EXEMPTIONS ARE


AVAILABLE AND WHO CAN QUALIFY?

Diplomats enjoy immunity under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic

Relations 1961. The Prevention of Corruption Act applies to only public servants and

does not cover the private sector. "Grease" or facilitating payments amount to bribery

under the Act.

53
3.5 CAN ASSOCIATED PERSONS AND AGENTS BE LIABLE FOR THESE
OFFENCES AND IN WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES?

Any person who facilitates bribery whether or not an offence is committed in

consequence of that abetment is liable to be punished under the Prevention of Corruption

Act.

3.6 WHAT ARE THE REGULATOR'S POWERS OF INVESTIGATION,


ENFORCEMENT AND PROSECUTION IN CASES OF BRIBERY AND
CORRUPTION?

In order to detect corrupt or improper practices the central vigilance commissioner

and vigilance commissions have, among other things, the power to:

 Summon and enforce the attendance of any person. the state Examine on oath.

 Order discovery and production of documents.

 Receive evidence on affidavit.

 Requisition public records.

 Issue commissions.

The CB/ and police officers have the power to arrest persons if they reasonably

suspect that a person is guilty of an offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act. In

addition, the officers of the anti-corruption bureau of each state have the powers of a police

officer and therefore the power to arrest.

On conviction, the Prevention of Corruption Act allows for the confiscation of

the assets of a public servant that are in excess of his known sources of income.

Additionally, a police officer can investigate offences under the Act and can, in the course

of investigation, seize or prohibit the operation of a bank account if the funds therein have

a direct link with the commission of an offence under investigation.

54
The Prevention of Corruption Act applies to all citizens of India, whether residing

in India or abroad. The provisions of the Penal Code apply to any offence committed by

any citizen of India outside of India and any person on any ship or aircraft registered in

India wherever it may be.

3.7 WHAT ARE THE POTENTIAL SANCTIONS FOR PARTICIPATING IN


BRIBERY AND CORRUPTION?

Special judges are appointed to try offences of bribery/corruption committed

under the Prevention of Corruption Act. Facilitating the offence is also punishable. The

prescribed punishment is imprisonment of between six months and five years along

with fine. This penalty applies to all offences, other than habitual offenders for whom

an enhanced punishment applies of imprisonment for between two and seven years, and

a fine to be decided by the court.

3.8 TAX TREATMENT


Are there any circumstances under which payments such as bribes, ransoms

or other payments arising from blackmail or extortion are tax-deductible as a

business expense?

Any expenditure incurred for any purpose that is an offence or that is prohibited by law is

not deemed to have been incurred for the purpose of business or profession and no

deduction or allowance can be made in respect of such an expenditure (section 37 ( /),

Indian Income Tax Act 1961). Therefore blackmail, ransom or bribe payments are not

allowed as a tax deductions.

55
CHAPTER IV
INSIDER DEALING AND MARKET ABUSE

4.1 WHAT ARE THE MAIN REGULATORY PROVISIONS AND


AUTHORITIES RESPONSIBLE FOR INVESTIGATING INSIDER DEALING
AND MARKET ABUSE?

SEBI prohibits insider trading. "Insiders" must not (directly or indirectly) deal in

securities of a listed company when in possession of unpublished price-sensitive

information. An "insider' is any person who is connected with the company and expected

to have access to unpublished price-sensitive information in relation to the company's

securities. An insider also cannot communicate counsel or procure unpublished price

sensitive information to or for any person~ Prosecutions for insider trading in securities

are launched by SEBI.

The SEBI (Prohibition of Insider Trading) Regulations 1992 (Insider Trading

Regulations) have been framed under Section 30 of the SEBI Act and are intended to

prevent and curb insider trading in securities.

The Share Dealing Code is a procedure adopted by companies in furtherance to

the Insider Trading Regulations and aims to prevent insider trading activity. It restricts the

directors of a company and other specified employees from dealing in securities of the

company on the basis of any unpublished price-sensitive information that is available to

them by virtue of their position in the company.

SEBI is responsible for dealing with insider trading and market abuse in

accordance with the provisions of the SEBI Act.

56
4.2 WHAT ARE THE SPECIFIC INSIDER DEALING AND MARKET ABUSE
OFFENCES?

Insider trading can be committed in three ways (Regulation 3, Insider Trading

Regulations):

 Dealing in securities the price of which will be affected by the inside information

that is in that persons possession.

 Encouraging another person to deal in such securities.

 Disclosing the inside information to another person.

However, these restrictions are not applicable to any communication required in

the ordinary course of business or profession, or employment or under any law. Regulation

3A prohibits any company from dealing in the securities of another company or associate

of that other company while in possession of any unpublished price-sensitive

information. Therefore, misuse of information, making misleading statements and

encouraging market abuse all fall under the ambit of insider trading.

The Securities and Exchange Board of India (Prohibition of Fraudulent and

Unfair Trade Practices Relating to Securities Market) Regulations, prohibit manipulative,

fraudulent and unfair trade practices. Dealing in securities is a fraudulent or an unfair trade

practice if it involves fraud. This may include any act or omission amounting to

manipulation of the price of a security.

57
4.3 WHAT DEFENSES, SAFE HARBORS OR EXEMPTIONS ARE
AVAILABLE AND WHO CAN QUALIFY?

A defense is available to a company dealing in the securities of another company

while in possession of any unpublished price sensitive information if cumulatively

(Regulation 3B, Insider Trading Regulations):

The decision to enter into the transaction or agreement was taken on its behalf by

a person or persons other than that officer or employee who was in possession of the

information.

The company has put in place such systems and procedures that demarcate the

activities of the company in such a way that the person who enters into a transaction in

securities on behalf of the company cannot have access to information that is in possession

of other officers or employees of the company.

The company had in operation at that time, arrangements that could reasonably

be expected to ensure that the information was not communicated to the person or persons

who made, the decision and that no advice with respect to the transactions or agreement

was given to that person or any of those persons by that officer or employee.

The information was not communicated and no relevant advice was given.

That acquisition of shares of a fisted company is as per the Securities and

Exchange Board of India (Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeovers) Regulations

58
1997 (Takeover code 1997). The Takeover code, among other things, governs the

acquisition of shares and voting rights in public listed companies.

SEBI has recently published the SEBI (Substantial Acquisition of Shares and

Takeovers) Regulations 2011 (Takeover code 2011), which has been in effect from 22

October 2011. This exemption is only available for companies. Section 248 of the SEBI

Act empowers the central government to grant immunity from prosecution to any person

who is alleged to have violated the provisions of the Act but who has made a full and true

disclosure in respect of the alleged violation, subject to certain conditions as it may deem

fit.

This immunity can be taken away by the central government if the person has

given false information or failed to abide by the imposed conditions.

4.4 WHAT ARE THE REGULATOR'S POWERS OF INVESTIGATION,


ENFORCEMENT AND PROSECUTION?

o SEBI has the powers of a civil court, such as ordering discovery and production of

books of account, summoning and enforcing the attendance of persons and

examining the inspection of books registers and other documents and issuing

commissions for the examination of witnesses or documents.

o SEBI can also, either during or after completion of the investigation/inquiry, in the

interest of the investors or securities market:

o Suspend the trading of any security in a recognised stock exchange.

59
o Restrain persons from accessing the securities market and prohibit any person

associated with the securities market from buying, selling or dealing in securities

o Suspend any office-bearer of any stock exchange or self-regulatory organisation

from holding such position.

o Impound and retain the proceeds or securities in respect of any transaction that is

under investigation.

o Direct any intermediary or any person associated with the securities market in any

manner not to dispose of or alienate an asset forming part of any transaction that is

under investigation.

o Appoint one or more officers to inspect the books and records of insider(s) or any

other persons

o Appoint a qualified auditor to investigate into the books of account or the affairs of

an insider.

4.5 WHAT ARE THE POTENTIAL SANCTIONS FOR PARTICIPATING IN


INSIDER DEALING AND MARKET ABUSE?

Insiders who violate the SEBI Regulations are liable to a penalty of up to INR25O

million or three times the amount of profits made out of insider trading whichever is higher.

SEBI may, in addition to the above, pass directions to the defaulting insider not to deal in

the concerned shares in any particular manner and/or prohibit him from disposing of the

concerned shares and/or declaring the concerned transactions as null and void and so on.

In addition, any person indulging in fraud and unfair trade practices relating to securities

(see Question 2), is liable to a penalty of INR250 million or three times the amount of profit

made out of these practices, whichever is higher.

60
CHAPTER V
MONEY LAUNDERING AND TERRORIST FINANCING

5.1 REGULATORY PROVISIONS AND AUTHORITIES RESPONSIBLE FOR


INVESTIGATING MONEY LAUNDERING AND/OR TERRORIST
FINANCING

Money laundering is dealt with under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act

2002. The Act is an endorsement of various international conventions to which India is a

party and seeks to declare laundering of monies through specified crimes as a criminal

offence.

The Prevention of Money-laundering (Maintenance of Records of the Nature and

Value of Transactions the Procedure and Manner of Maintaining and Time for Furnishing

Information and Verification and Maintenance of Records of the Identity of the Clients of

the Banking Companies, Financial Institutions and Intermediaries) Rules 2005 impose an

obligation on banking companies, financial institutions and intermediaries to verify the

identity of investors and maintain records of transactions with each investor.

The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act deals with terrorism and combating

terrorist funding.

The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) issued Know-Your-Customers (KYC)

Guidelines Anti-Money Laundering Standards on 16 August 2005, under” ‘which Banks

are advised to follow certain customer identification procedures for opening of accounts

and monitoring transactions of a suspicious nature and reporting it to the appropriate

authority.

61
In addition, the Indian Government has established a central national agency

called the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU-IND) responsible for receiving, processing,

analysing and disseminating information relating to suspect financial transactions. FIU-

IND is also responsible for coordinating and strengthening national and international

intelligence, investigation and enforcement agencies in pursuing global efforts against

money laundering and related crimes. FIU-IND is an independent body, which reports

directly to the Economic Intelligence Council (EIC) headed by the Finance Minister of

India.

In 2010, India became the 34th member of Financial Action Task Force and is

also a member of the Asia/ Pacific Group on Money Laundering. In December 2010, India

joined the Eurasian Group on Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing as a

member state. India ratified the UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime in

May 2011.

5.2 MONEY LAUNDERING AND TERRORIST FINANCING OFFENCES

Money laundering consists of (directly or indirectly) knowingly assisting, being a

party to or actually involved in any process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime

and the presentation of it as legally obtained property (section 3, Prevention of Money

Laundering Act). The Prevention of Money Laundering Act details 156 offences under 28

statutes as scheduled offences. Money laundering is an offence only if it is related to an

activity connected with the proceeds of a crime specified as a scheduled offence.

62
The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act deals with terrorism and terrorist

funding. It also covers terrorist offences such as conspiracy and commission of a terrorist

act, and harbouring a person who is a terrorist. The Unlawful Activities (Prevention)

Amendment Bill 2011 was introduced in the Parliament on 29 December 2011 to amend

the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act and make it more effective in preventing terrorist

and other unlawful activities. The bill increases the period for which an association can be

declared as unlawful from two years to five years. It also expands the definition of

"terrorist act" to include acts that threaten the economic security of India through the

production, smuggling or circulation of "high quality" counterfeit currency.

The offences of money laundering and terrorist financing are strict liability

offences. The offence need not necessarily have been committed and even an attempt to

commit a crime would constitute a punishable offence.

5.3 DEFENCES, SAFE HARBOURS OR EXEMPTIONS ARE AVAILABLE AND


WHO CAN QUALIFY

There are no exemptions or qualifications applicable to such offences.

5.4 REGULATOR'S POWERS OF INVESTIGATION, ENFORCEMENT AND


PROSECUTION

Investigation can be initiated only by authorities designated by the central

government such as the Directorate of Enforcement. These authorities can carry out

interim measures such as the survey, search, seizure and arrest of the accused. The

Prevention of Money Laundering Act gives the Requirements for:

63
 Financial institutions disclosure requirements in relation to

reportable transactions.

 Confiscation of the proceeds of the crime.

 Declaring money laundering as an extraditable offence.

 Promoting international co-operation in investigation of money

laundering.

Section 13 of Prevention of Money Laundering Act confers powers on the

Director (appointed by the Central Government and entrusted with powers of a civil court)

to ensure compliance and to call for records and make appropriate inquiries where

necessary. It also prescribes a list of officers (such as officers of the Customs and Central

Excise Department, police officers, officers of the RBI, and so on) who are expressly

required to assist the authorities in enforcing of the Act. The enforcement agency has

extensive powers to discharge its duties under the Act. The adjudicating authority for the

purposes of the Act is vested with powers of a civil court.

Under the Unlawful Activity (Prevention) Act, the central government has the

power to prohibit any person from using the funds of an unlawful association. These

prohibitory orders normally entail an arrest warrant/summons the designated authority, in

addition to having the powers of a civil court can also arrest persons or search any building,

conveyance or place. The officers competent to investigate such offences are the Delhi

Special Police Establishment not below the rank of a Deputy Superintendent of Police (or

not below the rank of an Assistant Commissioner of Police in the metropolitan areas). The

courts/regulators do not have extra-territorial jurisdiction to try these offences.

64
5.5 SANCTIONS FOR PARTICIPATING IN MONEY LAUNDERING OR
TERRORIST FINANCING OFFENCES

The punishment for money,-laundering is imprisonment for between three and

seven years and a fine of up to INR5OO000 (section 4, Prevention of Money Laundering

Act)~ For offences specified under paragraph 2 of Part A of the Schedule (Offences under

the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act 1985) the punishment is up to ten

years.

Chapter IV of the. Unlawful Activity (Prevention) Act provides for the

following sanctions:

Unlawful activities. Individuals who take part, commit or abet the commission

of an unlawful activity face imprisonment for up to seven years and a fine. In addition,

individuals who assist in any unlawful activity face imprisonment of up to five years

and/or a fine.

Terrorist activities

The sanctions applicable are:

- Terrorist acts : Acts that result in death are punishable with death or life
imprisonment. Other cases range from five years to life imprisonment.
- Raising funds for terrorist activity and conspiracy: Imprisonment from five
years to life and a fine;
- Harbouring terrorists: Imprisonment from three years to life.
- Membership of a terrorist organization: Life imprisonment and a fine.
- Holding proceeds of terrorism: Life imprisonment and a fine.
These sanctions apply to both individuals and corporate bodies.

65
CHAPTER VI
FINANCIAL RECORD KEEPING

6.1 GENERAL REQUIREMENTS FOR FINANCIAL RECORD KEEPING AND


DISCLOSURE

Banks, financial institutions and intermediaries must (section 12 (1), Prevention

of Money Laundering Act):

Furnish information on prescribed transactions under the Prevention of Money

Laundering Act. Verify and maintain the records of the identity of all its clients.

Records must be maintained for ten years after the transaction concludes.

Banking companies, financial institutions and intermediaries must also furnish

information to Flu-IND when required to do so (section 12 (2) Prevention of Money

Laundering Act).

The maintenance and disclosure of records is specifically provided for in the

Prevention of Money-Laundering (Maintenance of Records of the Nature and Value of

Transactions, the Procedure and Manner of Maintaining and Time for Furnishing

Information and Verification and Maintenance of Records of the Identity of the Clients of

the Banking Companies, Financial Institutions and Intermediaries) Rules 2005.

Rule 3 provides that every banking company or financial institution or

intermediary must maintain a record of Cash transactions of more than INRl million or its

equivalent in foreign currency.

66
Series of cash transactions integrally connected to each other that have been

valued below INRl million or its equivalent in foreign currency where such series of

transactions have taken place within a month.

Cash transactions where forged or counterfeit currency notes or bank notes have

been used as genuine and where any forgery of a valuable security has taken place.

Suspicious transactions whether or not made in cash.

Rule 10 provides that banking companies financial institutions or intermediaries

must maintain records of the identity of its clients in hard and soft copies. The records

must be maintained for a period of ten years from the end date of the transaction between

the client and the banking company or financial institution or intermediary.

6.2 SANCTIONS FOR FAILURE TO KEEP OR DISCLOSE ACCURATE


FINANCIAL RECORDS

To ensure compliance the Director has powers to (section /3, Prevention of Money

Laundering Act): Call for records and make appropriate inquiries. Levy fines of between

INRI 10000 and INR 1, 00,000 on a banking company, financial institution or

intermediary that fails to comply with any provisions of section 12 of the Act.

6.3 ARE THE FINANCIAL RECORD KEEPING RULES USED TO


PROSECUTE WHITE-COLLAR CRIMES?

The financial record keeping rules are used to prosecute white-collar crimes.

Violations of the rules may be used as evidence and trigger the prosecution of other crimes,

such as bribery and/or tax evasion.

67
6.4 GENERAL DUE DILIGENCE REQUIREMENTS AND PROCEDURES IN
RELATION TO CORRUPTION, FRAUD OR MONEY LAUNDERING
WHEN CONTRACTING WITH EXTERNAL PARTIES

Banks are required to undertake customer due diligence (COD) measures

depending on the type of customer, business relationship or transaction. COO measures

typically comprise the following;

- Obtaining sufficient information in order to identify persons who beneficially own

or control a securities account.

- Verifying the customer's identity using reliable, independent source documents,

data or information.

- Identifying beneficial ownership and control. That is, determining which

individual(s) ultimately own(s) or control(s) the customer and/or the person on

whose behalf a transaction is being conducted.

- Verifying the identity of the beneficial owner of the customer and/or the person on

whose behalf a transaction is being conducted, corroborating the other information.

Conducting ongoing due diligence and scrutiny. That is, performing ongoing

scrutiny of the transactions and account throughout the business relationship to

ensure that the transactions being conducted are consistent with the registered

intermediary's knowledge of the customer, its business and risk profile, taking into

account, where necessary, the customers source of funds.

- The financial record keeping rules are used to prosecute white-collar crimes.

Violations of the rules may be used as evidence and trigger the prosecution of other

crimes, such as bribery and/or tax evasion.

68
6.5 CIRCUMSTANCES WHEN A CORPORATE BODY ITSELF BE
SUBJECT TO CRIMINAL LIABILITY

Various judicial decisions have made clear that a company/legal entity is broadly

in the same position as any individual and may be convicted of breach of statutory offences

including those requiring mens rea (a guilty mind).

However, there is no law specifically governing corporate manslaughter in India.

6.6 CIRCUMSTANCES WHEN A IT POSSIBLE TO OBTAIN


IMMUNITY/LENIENCY FOR CO- OPERATION WITH THE
AUTHORITIES

The power to grant a pardon can be exercised by a magistrate during the

investigation of an offence. The provision for pardon applies only to cases triable by the

Sessions Court, that is, where the offence would attract a punishment of imprisonment of

seven years or more.

A pardon may be granted in order to obtain evidence from any person supposed to

have been directly or indirectly concerned with or privy to an offence, A condition for the

grant of a pardon is that the person makes a full and true disclosure of all facts within his

knowledge. Any person who accepts an offer of a pardon would be examined as a witness

in the trial.

Where a person has accepted an offer of a pardon but it is alleged by the public

prosecutor that he has wrongfully concealed an essential fact or given false evidence, or not

complied with the conditions on which the tender was made, he may be tried for the offence

in respect of which the pardon was offered or for any other offence for which he appears to

have been guilty and also for the offence of giving false evidence.

69
The concept of plea-bargaining is recognised in India by a 2005 amendment to the

Code of Criminal Procedure. Plea-bargaining is available only for offences that are

punishable by imprisonment of under seven years.

6.7 INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AND LEGAL INSTRUMENTS ARE


AVAILABLE FOR LOCAL AUTHORITIES

The formal mechanisms for co-operating with foreign prosecutors are given under

section 166A of the Code of Criminal Procedure. One such mechanism is through a letter

rogatory or formal letter of request.

During the course of an investigation into an offence, an application can be made

by an investigating officer that evidence is available in a country or place outside India The

court may then issue a letter of request to a court or authority outside India to:

Examine any person acquainted with the facts and circumstances of the case and

record his statement. Require such person or any other person to produce any document or

thing that may be in his possession pertaining to the case.

Forward all the evidence to the court issuing the letter.

The CBI serves as the national central bureau for the purpose of correspondence

with ICPO-INTERPOL (an international police organisation to extend co-operation

between member countries and their police forces, which may furnish or request information

70
or services for combating International crime) to co-operate and co-ordinate with each

other in relation to collection of information, location of fugitives and so on.

India has negotiated double tax avoidance agreements and finalised tax

information exchange agreements with various countries to strengthen exchange of

information relating to tax evasion, money laundering and so on.

In addition, mutual legal assistance treaties facilitate co-operation in matters

relating to service of notice, summons, attachment or forfeiture of property or proceeds

of crime, or execution of search warrants under section 105 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure.

India has adopted the Convention on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal

Matters and has operational agreements with 31 countries. The Ministry of Home

Affairs carries out these agreements.

6.8 ARE WHISTLEBLOWERS GIVEN STATUTORY PROTECTION?

The law relating to whistleblowers is fairly recent. The Parliament (Lok

Sabha) passed the Public Interest Disclosure and Protection to Persons Making the

Disclosures Bill 2010 on 27 December 2011. The Bill is pending before the Upper

House (Rajya Sabha). The Bill aims to set up a regular mechanism to encourage persons

to disclose information on corruption or wilful misuse of power by public servants,

including ministers. It also aims at providing adequate protection to persons reporting

corruption or wilful misuse of discretion that causes demonstrable loss to the

government, or commission of a criminal offence by a public servant.

71
In the interim, the government has issued recommendations to safeguard the

interests of whistleblowers and the Central Vigilance Commissioner has been

designated as the agency to act on complaints from whistleblowers until the Parliament

passes appropriate legislation.

6.9 IMPENDING DEVELOPMENTS OR PROPOSALS FOR REFORM

The Companies Bill 2011 is pending before Parliament. Among other things,

the Bill will provide for self-regulatory mechanisms to combat corruption. It also

provides for stringent compliance provisions.

6.10 WHAT ARE THE MAIN STEPS FOREIGN AND LOCAL COMPANIES
ARE TAKING TO MANAGE THEIR EXPOSURE TO CORRUPTION/
CORPORATE CRIME

Many companies have become far more mindful of the need to combat

corruption and ensure that there are no rogue elements within their ranks that could

disrupt the company and drag it into controversy. Companies have started voluntarily

complying with the Code of Conduct mooted by the Government for private entities

(though this has not yet come into force). The Code covers best practices such as

whistleblower protection, empowering shareholders' committees using remuneration

committees and so on.

72
CHAPTER VII
REGULATORY AUTHORITIES

1. Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI)1

Status: Government organisation.

Principal responsibilities:

The CBI Normally investigates and prosecutes cases of serious

fraud or cheating that may have ramifications in more than one state. It also investigates

corruption cases.

2. Serious Fraud Investigation Office2

Status: Government organisation.

Principal responsibilities:

A multi-disciplinary organisation under the Ministry of Corporate

Affairs, it detects and prosecutes or recommends for prosecution of white-collar

crimes/frauds.

3. Central Vigilance Commission3

Status: Statutory body.

Principal responsibilities: The Central Vigilance Commission supervises corruption

cases in governmental departments. It has supervisory powers over the CBI but does not

have authority to prosecute individuals.

1
www.cbi.co.in

2
www.sfio.nic.in

3
www.cvc.nic.in

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4. Central Economic Intelligence Bureau4

Status: Government organisation.

Principal responsibilities: The Central Economic Intelligence Bureau monitors economic

offences and co-ordinates co-operation with international agencies in relation to economic

offences.

5. Directorate of Enforcement (DOE)5

Status: Government organisation.

Principal responsibilities: Enforcement of Foreign Exchange Management Act 1999

and the Prevention of Money Laundering Act 2002. The organisation falls under the

Ministry of Finance and is headquartered in New Delhi.

6. Economic Intelligence Council (EIC)6

Status: Government organisation.

Principal responsibilities: Established under the Ministry of Finance to facilitate co-

ordination among the enforcement agencies dealing with economic offences.

4
www.ceib.nic.in
5
www.directorateofenforcement.gov.in
6
www.ceib.nic.in

74
CHAPTER VIII
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF OTHER JURISDICTIONS

8.1 ENGLISH AND FRENCH

The English and French models proved to be more restrictive mainly due to

their requirement that the individuals acting on behalf of the corporation hold a high

position or play a key function within the corporation’s decisional structure. Moreover,

these systems refused to adopt the aggregation theory. Due to the contemporaneous

tendency of corporations to fragment and delegate the power to decide and act, the

prosecution of a significant number of crimes is prevented. Thus, although the

requirements of clarity and consistency with the traditional principles of criminal law

are met for the most part, these models seem to be under-deterring, less retributive,1

and, overall, less efficient. Moreover, due to the lack of the sanction of criminal

probation the way it is instituted in U.S. and, in England, due to the lack of various

other forms of sanctioning, the rehabilitative requirement is not adequately satisfied.

In Germany, the criminal liability of corporations is non-existent. Instead,

Germany implemented a comprehensive administrative-penal system that regulates

corporate criminal wrongdoing. The German legislators believe that the administrative

liability of corporations fulfills the goals of deterrence, predictability, clarity, and

general fairness, and is also less costly to implement than corporate criminal liability.

Moreover, by refusing to adopt the concept of corporate criminal liability, the German

law system pays tribute to the traditional concepts of the criminal law. Thus, Germans

argue that the administrative-penal system is sufficient. However, many critics have

1
When fewer crimes can be prosecuted, it cannot be said that the corporate criminal is
adequately punished for its wrongdoing or that the vengeance of the victims is appropriate

75
emphasized the close similarity between the German administrative-penal law and the

criminal law, and suggested that this system might be just a façade for criminal

sanctioning without the protections offered by the criminal procedure. The German

system underemphasizes the role of the moral stigma that accompanies any criminal

sanction; therefore, it is not characterized by the retribution of the criminal punishment.

In addition, the lack of corporate criminal liability might create the undesirable effect

of attracting corporations whose acts are not tolerated by the criminal law of other

countries; this, in turn, would increase the level of corporate crime.

The Continent European countries have based their legal systems on long

history and traditions that have permanently marked the development of their laws. In

civil law countries, the doctrinal issues heavily influenced the laws and judicial

decisions. And the tradition has been that corporations cannot commit crimes. Germany

still refuses to accept the criminal liability of corporations and remains loyal to the old

maxim societas delinquere non potest. Some of the reasons for this refusal have been

the alleged corporations’ lack of capacity to act, lack of culpability, and

inappropriateness of criminal sanctions.2 The most important reason has been the belief

that the moral stigma of criminal sanctions is not necessary to fulfill the scopes of the

punishment. At the same time, German corporations have been extremely well

regulated by the very advanced German system of administrative law. Thus, Germany

has not yet considered it necessary to override the old doctrinal restraints on corporate

criminal liability.

2
For a more in dept analysis of these arguments, see the following sections of this article

76
France has abandoned the old maxim societas delinquere non potest and

adopted a comprehensive, yet restrictive, system that addresses corporate criminal

liability. This change was a much needed response to the increasing corporate crime

phenomenon, especially when France lacked the very well developed and established

system of administrative law previously developed by Germany. The French system is

more restrictive compared to the American one because it is relatively new and the

legislators have been probably cautious when implementing new concepts. Moreover,

the adoption of corporate criminal liability has encountered a strong opposition from

the French corporations.

Unlike, civil law systems, the common law legal systems have not struggled

with doctrinal issues at the same level of intensity. The Anglo-American legal system

has adopted the concept of corporate criminal liability as soon as it became necessary

(due to the increasing corporate crime and lack of adequate civil or administrative

sanctions) without thinking and re-thinking the old doctrinal traditions and arguments

the way Germany or France did. The English and American law systems incorporated

corporate criminal liability models easily. Although the English model is still much

more restrictive than the American one, several authors predict that the English model

will soon undergo substantial changes towards a model similar to the American one.

Some of the reasons that prevented the adoption of an extensive criminal corporate

liability model in England have been the possible negative effects on innocent

individuals and the high costs that corporations would have to pay for a monitoring

system that would effectively prevent crimes.

77
The development of the concept of corporate criminal liability in different

countries reveals its important functions in our society. However, because corporate

criminal liability is only at its inception, this area of law is open to continuous

improvement. Only time and practice will tell what the best way of achieving the goals

of corporate criminal liability are. In the following sections I will emphasize the

historical, social, and political contexts that influenced the development of the corporate

criminal liability, the essential differences among different models of corporate

criminal liability, and the possible desirable changes in the existing models.

8.2 HISTORICAL EVOLUTION

Corporate criminal liability has its origins in ancient law, and became the

center of the doctrinal discussions at the end of the 19 th century. The history, laws,

economics, and politics unique to each country have had a remarkable influence on the

adoption and development of the concept of corporate criminal liability. This influence

resulted in different models of corporate criminal liability. The concept of criminal

liability of corporations has had a different evolution under civil law systems as

compared to its development under common law systems. At the same time, under the

civil law or common law systems, corporate criminal liability has developed differently

to reflect the historical and socio-economic realities of different countries. The

historical evolution of corporate criminal liability shows that corporate criminal

liability is consistent with the principles of criminal law and the nature of corporations.

Furthermore, the historical development of corporate criminal liability reveals that

criminal liability of corporations is part of an important “public policy bargain. The

bargain balances privileges granted upon the legal recognition of a corporation—such

as limited liability of corporate shareholders and the capability of a group of investors

78
to act through a single corporate form— with law compliance and crime prevention

pressures on the managers of the resulting corporate entity.” 3

Aside from the existence of the Roman state and its territorial units called

civitas or coloniae, the right of individuals to constitute trade, religious, and charitable

associations has been recognized early in the development of the Roman law. The

Roman entities were called universitates personarum (or corpus/ universitas, which

included the Roman state and other entities with religious, administrative, financial, or

economic scopes) and univesritates rerum (which included entities with charitable

scopes). Upon creation by authorization, the entities had their own identity, owned

property separate from that of their founders, and had independent rights and

obligations. Although these entities were viewed as a fiction of the law, and despite the

fact that the Roman doctrine considered that these associations lacked independent will,

in some authors’ view, an entity could commit a crime and criminal causes of actions

against them existed.4 The acknowledgement of the existence of independent entities

with rights and obligations constituted the basis for the evolution of corporate

institutions in the medieval. The Germanic law has also promoted the development of

associations. The land was shared among families, and not among individuals.

However, unlike the Roman universitas, which were fictitious creations of the law, the

Germanic law considered that both the corporations and the individuals were real

subjects of law. In 595, Coltaire II created the centuries and curies (territorial units);

3
Richard Gruner, Corporate Criminal Liability and Prevention 2-7 (Law Journal Press ed., 2nd
release, 2005) (2004)
4
Florin Streteanu & Radu Chirita, Raspunderea penala a persoanei juridice 7 (Rosetti ed., 2002)
(one example is the action against the City of Cheronea; the city was found not-guilty, which
saved it from destruction)

79
these territorial entities were liable for the crimes committed on their territory. 5 The

rationale of the collective responsibility in the Germanic law relied on the function of

the sanction; sanctions were imposed not based on the concept of guilt, but on the

outcome of the action. Therefore, if damages resulted from an individual action, a

sanction was imposed to repair the damages. The sanction was viewed more as

compensation than punishment, and because the property was owned by the

collectivity, it was only logical that the collectivity should pay the damages.

Later, in the 12th-14th centuries, the concept of corporate criminal liability

evolved; the Romanic law clearly imposed criminal liability on the universitas, but only

when its members were acting collectively. 6 At the same time, Pope Innocent IV created

the basis for the maxim societas delinquere non potest by claiming that, unlike

individuals who have willpower and a soul, can receive the communion, and are the

subjects of God’s and emperor’s punishments, universitas are fictions that lack a body

and a soul, and therefore, cannot be punished. However the majority of the doctrine

rejected this argument because of the realties of that time, and admitted the existence

of juristic persons and their capacity of being sanctioned for their crimes if certain

conditions were met. The emperors and popes used to frequently sanction the villages,

provinces, and corporations.7 The sanctions imposed could be fines, the loss of specific

rights, dissolution, and spiritual sanctions upon the members of the corporations, such

as the loss of the right to be buried, or excommunication.8In the 14th century, the

5
Id. at 9, citing Cg. Geminel, De la Responsibilite Penale des Associations 8 (Librarie Arthur
Rousseau ed., 1899)
6
Id. at 11, citing G. Richier, De la Responsibilite Penale des Personnes Morlaes 53 (1943)
(dissertation)
7
Id. at 12
8
Id. at 13-14

80
doctrine recognized that corporations had their own willpower and therefore, their

criminal liability was a given. With a few exceptions (such as bigamy, rape, etc.), an

entity could commit any crime which could be committed by an individual, regardless

of the fact that the crime had no connection with the scope of the corporation.9 This

theory dominated the continental European doctrine until the end of the 18 th Century.

The medieval conception was based on the belief that all the corporations should be

liable, both civilly and criminally, for the acts committed by their members. Cities,

villages, universities, trade, and religious associations have been required to pay fines

for their crimes. At the same time, the Germanic law was still loyal to the old concept

of collective responsibility and, through a 1548 ordinance, sanctioned the cities that did

not keep the peace by fines and loss of all liberties.10

8.3 FRANCE – Ordonnance de Blois

In France, Ordonnance de Blois of 1579 enacted the criminal liability of

corporations. The crime committed must have been the result of the collectivity’s

decision. Therefore, although the corporations were still considered legal fictions, the

existence of corporate criminal liability sustains the conclusion that corporate criminal

liability was not incompatible with the nature of the corporations. Before the French

Revolution, the French Grande Ordonnance Criminelle of 1670 established11 the

criminal liability of corporations on similar basis. In addition, the ordinance provided

9
Id. at 15
10
Id. at 19, citing Geminel, supra note 10
11
Guy Stessens, Corporate Criminal Liability: A Comparative Perspective 43 Int’l & Comp.
L.Q. 493, 494 (1994)

81
for the simultaneous criminal liability of individuals for committing the same crimes as

accomplices.

The French Revolution brought extreme changes in the French law; the

corporations, including the provinces and nonprofit hospitals, have been completely

eliminated and all their goods confiscated.12 The notion of corporation was incompatible

with the individualist aspirations of the revolutionary government. 13 Moreover, the new

government thought that, due to their economic and political influence, corporations

represented a potential threat for the newregime.14 There was also a financial explanation

for this decision; the new revolutionary government was in immediate need of funds.

The finances were mainly owned by the corporations and the easiest way of getting

those funds was by confiscation from the corporations after their elimination.

Therefore, the French Penal Code of 1810 stopped mentioning the criminal liability of

corporations, but not because the concept was incompatible with the doctrine, but

because such liability was futile as a consequence of the corporations’ disappearance

from the French system of law.15

Under the influence of the French Revolution ideals, the majority of the

continental Europe changed its view regarding corporate criminal liability.

Corporations lost their power and importance and became undesirable entities under

the antagonistic coalition of the monarchic absolutism and liberalism. This reality

12
Streteanu & Chirita, supra note 9, at 23
13
Stessens, supra note 16, at 494
14
Streteanu & Chirita, supra note 9, at 23, citing A. Gebara, La Responsibilite des Personnes
Morlaes en Droit Positif Francais 12 (1945) (dissertation)
15
Stessens, supra note 16, at 495

82
determined the creation of doctrinal theories that tried to find a basis for the lack of

criminal liability of corporations. Malblanc and Savigny are the first authors sustaining

the principle societas delinquere non potest in the 19th century.16 The main argument

was that a corporation is a legal fiction which, lacking a body and soul, was not capable

of forming the criminal mens rea or to act in propria persona. Moreover, corporate

criminal liability would violate the principle of individual criminal punishment. 17

German jurists also adhered to the “fiction theory.” Thus, E. Bekker and A. Briz argued

that corporations have a pure patrimonial character which is created for a particular

commercial purpose and lacks juridical capacity. Therefore, corporations cannot be the

subjects of criminal liability.

Critics of the “fiction theory,” such as O. Gierke and E. Zitelman, argued that

corporations are unities of bodies and souls and can act independently. The corporations’

willpower is the result of their members’ will.18 F. von Liszt and A. Maester were some of

the principal authors who tried to substantiate the concept of corporate criminal liability in

this period. They argued that the corporations’ capacity to act under the criminal law is

not fundamentally different from that under civil or administrative law; corporations

are juristic persons that have willpower and can act independently from their

members.19

16
Streteanu & Chirita, supra note 9, at 24-25
17
L.H. Leigh, The Criminal Liability of Corporations and Other Groups: A Comparative View,
80 Mich. L. Rev. 1508, 1509 (1982)
18
Id. at 26, citing St. Stancescu, Studiu Asupra Responsibilitatei Penale a Persoanelor Juridice
31 (Libraria “Universala” Acaly ed. [sic])
19
Id., citing F. von Liszt, Tratado de Derecho Penal 299-300 (Rues ed., 1999), and A. Maestre,
Les Personnes Morales et le Probleme de Leur Responsibilite Penale 137 (1899) (dissertation)

83
During the time of these doctrinal disputes, the number and importance of

corporations in the European society increased significantly. The laws became more

flexible and the states’ role in the process of incorporation diminished. For the purpose of

controlling the corporate misconduct, the Council of Europe recommended that “those

member states whose criminal law had not yet provided for corporate criminal liability to

reconsider the matter.” France responded by making several revisions of its Penal Code for

the purpose of modernizing its text. The revision of 1992 officially recognized the corporate

criminal liability because, in the opinion of the French legislators, it made more judicial

sense and because it lacked other effective ways of sanctioning criminal corporate

misconduct. This process culminated with the Nouveau Code Penale in 1994.20 The French

New Penal Code established, for the first time in any civil law system, a comprehensive set

of corporate criminal liability principles and sanctions21 providing in article 121-2 that,

with the exception of the State, all the juristic persons are criminally liable for the offenses

committed on their behalf by their organs or representatives. The establishment of the

corporate criminal liability attracted the critiques of thousands of corporations that could

not believe in “such a revolution.”33 Ever since, France has had a relatively wide practice

in this field.

France’s example was followed by numerous other European countries. Thus,

Belgium, through the Law of May 4, 1999, modified art. 5 of the Belgian Penal Code and

instituted the criminal liability of juristic persons. Netherlands adopted the concept of

20
B. Bouloc, La Criminalisation du Comportament Collectif – France, in La Criminalisation
du Comportament Collectif: Criminal Liability of Corporations 235, 237 (H. de Doelder &
Klaus Tiedemann eds., Kluwer Law Int’l, 1996)
21
Leonard Orland & Charles Cachera, Essay and Translation: Corporate Crime and
Punishment in France: Criminal Responsibility of Legal Entities (Personnes Morales) Under
the New French Criminal Code (Nouveau Code Penal), 11 Conn. J. Int’l L. 111, 114 (1995)

84
corporate criminal liability even earlier, in 1976. Art. 51 of the Dutch Penal Code provides

that natural persons as well as juristic persons can commit offenses. In 2002 Denmark

modified its Penal Code and established that corporations may be liable for all offenses

within the general criminal code.22

8.4 GERMANIC LAW

Germany on the other hand, due to doctrinal issues, still resists the idea of

incorporating corporate criminal liability in its legal system. 23 In Germany, corporate

criminal liability is still governed by the maxim societas delinquere non potest and

corporate misconduct is the subject of a very developed system of administrative and

administrative-penal law.24 Germany’s administrative-penal system, called

Ordnungswidrigkeiten (OwiG),25 is the successor of Ubertretungen, a category of petty

offences. The reason for “this growth of administrative procedures is of course to be

found in the evolution of the Etat-Gendarme to the twentieth-century welfare State,

resulting in an enormous expansion of the domain of the State.

The administrative fines, called Geldbussen, are imposed by specialized

administrative bodies which are part of the executive branch of the government. The

sanctions can be imposed both to individuals and corporations. Under the

22
Sara Sun Beale & Adam G. Safwat, What Developments in Western Europe Tell Us about
American Critiques of Corporate Criminal Liability+, 8 Buff. Crim. L.R. 89, 97 (2004)
23
Orland & Cachera, supra note 31, at 116
24
H.J. Hirsch, La Criminalisation du Comportament Collectif – Allemange, in La
Criminalisation du Comportament Collectif: Criminal Liability of Corporations 31, 31 (H. de
Doelder & Klaus Tiedemann eds., Kluwer Law Int’l, 1996)
25
Gunter Heine, New Developments in Corporate Criminal Liability in Europe: Can Europeans
Learn from the American Experience—or Vice Versa?, 1998 St. Louis-Warsaw Transatlantic
L.J. 174 (1998)

85
administrative-penal law, punitive sanctions can be applied. However, the imposition

of administrative sanctions does not imply moral stigma “and this consideration seems

to have been the most important for the German legislature in opting for administrative

sanctions rather than leaving the matter under the aegis of the criminal law.” The main

arguments in defense of the lack of corporate criminal liability in Germany are:

corporations do not have the capacity to act, corporations cannot be culpable, and the

criminal sanctions are appropriate, by their nature, only for human beings.

8.5 ITALY, PORTUGAL, GREECE AND SPAIN

Italy, Portugal, Greece, and Spain followed the German model and refuse to hold

corporations criminally liable. For example, Italy imposed a system of administrative

liability of corporations through the Decree-Law No. 300 of September 29, 2000 and the

Decree-Law No. 231 of May 8, 2001.26 However, the Italian doctrine argues that this

administrative liability is, in reality, criminal in nature because it is connected to the

commission of a crime and is applied by using rules of criminal procedure.27

Due to historical circumstances, the evolution of common law systems has

been different and did not embrace the Roman concepts. Unlike the civil law, which

has its sources in legislative acts, the sources of the common law are the judicial

decisions and the legislative acts. The adoption of the concept of corporate criminal

26
See La Relazione al Decreto Legislativo Guida Normativa June 29, 2001(Il Sole 24 Ore
S.p.A. Ed., 2001)
27
Streteanu & Chirita, supra note 9, at 77, citing G. Fiandaca & E. Musco, Diritto Penale. Parte
Generale 146 (Zanachelli Ed., 2001)

86
liability has followed a conservative course under the English law.28 Initially, England

refused to accept the idea of corporate criminal liability for several reasons.

Corporations were considered legal fictions, artificial entities that could do no more

than what “legally empowered to do (ultra vires theory).” Because corporations lacked

souls, they could not have mens rea and could neither be blameworthy, nor punished.

Chief Justice Holt decided that corporations could not be criminally liable, but their

members could. In addition, corporations were very few in number, incorporation being

a privilege granted by the crown. Therefore, the influence of corporations on the society

was minimal.

During the 16th and 17th centuries, corporations became more common and

their importance in the socio-economic life increased. A need for controlling corporate

misconduct became more and more obvious. Corporations have been recognized as

independent entities which owned property distinct from that of their members. The

first step in the English development of corporate criminal liability was made in the

1840s when the courts imposed liability on corporations for strict liability offenses. 29

Lord Bowen decided that the most efficient way of coercing corporations was by

introducing the concept of corporate criminal liability in the English law.30 Soon after,

by borrowing the theory of vicarious liability from the tort law, the courts imposed

vicarious criminal liability on corporations in those cases when natural persons could

28
C. Harding, Criminal Liability of Corporations-United Kingdom , in La Criminalisation du
Comportament Collectif: Criminal Liability of Corporations 369, 382 (H. de Doelder & Klaus
Tiedemann (eds.), Kluwer Law Int’l, 1996)
29
Regina v. Birmingham & Gloucester R.R. Co., (1842) 3 Q. B. 223 (breach of statutory duty;
strict liability for omissions--nonfeaseance); Gt. North Of England R.R. Co., (1846) 9 Q.B.
315(strict liability for actions-- malfeasance)
30
Regina v. Tyler, 173 Eng. Rep. 643 (Assizes 1838)

87
be vicariously liable as well. In 1944, the High Court of Justice decided in three landmark

cases31 to impose direct criminal liability on corporations and established that the mens rea

of certain employees was to be considered as that of the company itself. The motivation of

the decisions was vague and confusing due to the lack of clear and organized criteria for

attributing the mens rea element to corporations. This issue was clarified in 1972 in a case

in which the civil law alter ego doctrine was used to impose the criminal liability on

corporations; this is now known under the name of “identification theory.” The Chamber

of Lords compared the corporation to a human body, different individuals representing

different organs and functions of the juristic person (e.g. the directors and managers

represent the brain, intelligence, and will of the corporation). The willpower of the

corporations’ managers represented the willpower of the corporations. This theory was later

criticized and slightly modified, but this decision still represents the landmark precedent in

the English corporate criminal liability.

8.6 AMERICAN SOCIETY WAS EXPANDED TO MENS REA OFFENSES

The United States initially followed the English example, but later developed

differently and more rapidly due to the important role of corporations in the American

economy and society. The foundation of most forms of political organization in the

American colonies was the corporate charter which perpetuated the corporate form of

governance. Unlike the English courts, the American courts were much faster in

holding corporations criminally liable. Initially, the American courts promoted similar

arguments against corporate criminal liability.

31
DPP v. Kent and Sussex Contractors, Ltd., [1944] 1 All E.R. 119 (director used a false
document); Moore v. Bresler, [1944] 2 All E.R. 515 (tax evasion); R. v. I.C.R. Haulage, Ltd.,
[1944] K.B. 551 (common law conspiracy)

88
The courts started by imposing criminal corporate liability in cases of

regulatory or public welfare offenses not requiring proof of mens rea32—nuisance,

malfeasance, non-feaseance and vicarious liability cases. 33

At the beginning of the 20th century, the corporate criminal liability concept

was widely accepted in the American society and was expanded to mens rea offenses.

The Court held in New York Central & Hudson River R.R. v. U.S.34 that the defendant

corporation can be responsible for and charged with the knowledge and purposes of its

agents, acting within the authority conferred upon them. The Court held that the law

“cannot shut its eyes to the fact that the great majority of business transactions in

modern times are conducted through these bodies, and particularly that interstate

commerce is almost entirely in their hands, and [giving] them immunity from all

punishment because of the old doctrine that a corporation cannot commit a crime would

virtually take away the only means of effectually controlling the subject-matter and

correcting the abuses.

32
E.M. Wise, Criminal Liability of Corporations- US, in La Criminalisation du Comportament
Collectif: Criminal Liability of Corporations 383, 384 (H. de Doelder & Klaus Tiedemann eds.,
Kluwer Law Int’l, 1996)
33
People v. Corporation of Albany, XII Wendell 539 (1834) (non-feasance); State v. Morris
Essex R.R., 23 Zabrinski’s N.J.R. 360 (1852) (misfeasance); see also Brickey, supra note 50,
at 75-81 for a detailed presentation of the nuisance, malfeasance, and nonfeasance liability
development in U.S
34
212 U.S. 481 (1909) (sustaining the constitutionality of the Elkins act which provides that
the acts and omissions of an officer acting within the scope of his employment were considered
to be those of the corporation)

89
8.7 ESSENTIAL CONDITIONS FOR CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY

Criminal liability of corporations has been the subject of vigorous debates for

the last century. International congresses, studies, articles, and notes have addressed

this issue and have been the ground for doctrinal confrontations among the partisans

and adversaries of this concept. Every element of corporate criminal liability has been

discussed, attacked, or defended. Most of the arguments were built on the principle

societas delinquere non potest and on the belief that alternative forms of liability (like

civil or administrative liability of corporations or criminal liability of individuals acting

for the corporation) are superior to corporate criminal liability. In the following

subsections I will show how different countries have responded to these arguments, and

the basic elements of corporate criminal liability which vary from country to country.

First, it must be determined what entities can be held criminally liable. Second, you

will find out for what crimes corporations can be held criminally liable.

8.8 ENTITIES

The first step in determining the applicability of corporate criminal liability is

delineating the types of entities that it applies to. There is no unitary view regarding

this aspect. Initially, some argued that corporations cannot be held criminally liable

because, unlike human beings who are true subjects of law, corporations are legal

fictions. This argument was rapidly abandoned due to the fact that the existence of the

corporations is an incontestable realty in the social, economic, and juridical life of our

society. Nowadays, corporations have legal capacity in the majority of areas of law,

own real property and goods distinct from those of their members, and have their own

rights and obligations.

90
Similar to individuals, corporations have an identifiable persona and the

capacity to express moral judgments.35 Corporations have an identifiable persona in the

sense that they have a unique presence in the community, different from that of their

owners or managers; they have “ethos” that makes them unique and different from the

individuals controlling or working for the corporations.36 The ethos can be derived from

the corporation’s dynamic, structure, monitoring system, aims, policies, promotion of

compliance with the laws, and discipline of the employees.37 The United States

Supreme Court has decided that corporations have the capacity to express independent

points of view and moral judgments, and their freedom of speech should not be abridged

without a compelling state interest.38

Moreover, corporations are recognized as passive legal subjects in criminal

law; a corporation has a cause of action against an individual who harmed it. It would

be at least bizarre to accept that a corporation is a reality when it is harmed by others,

but not when it violates the rights of other persons. 39 Therefore, the “fictive character”

argument cannot be successfully used by the adversaries of corporate criminal liability.

35
Lawrence Friedman, In Defense of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y
833, 846 (2000)
36
Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate Ethos: A Standard for Imposing Corporate Criminal Liability,
75 Minn. L. Rev. 1095, 1099 (1991)
37
Eli Lederman, Models for Imposing Corporate Criminal Liability: From Adaptation and
Imitation Toward Aggregation and the Search for Self-Identity, 4 Buff. Crim. L. R. 694, (2000)
38
Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 787-95 (1978)
39
Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 787-95 (1978)

91
Once it has been decided that corporations can be subjects of criminal law, it

has been subsequently debated whether all corporations should be held criminally

liable. Some authors have argued that the creation of exceptions would produce an

inequitable discrimination. This point of view cannot be sustained because the criminal

law also has exceptions regarding the individuals who can be subjects of criminal

liability.40 Thus, if a government employee acting in his or her ministerial function is

immune from criminal liability, there is no reason why the governmental institutions

would not benefit from the same exception. Some very limited and clearly delineated

exceptions that promote higher interests should be admissible. At the same time, in

order to avoid confusion, entities with no legal status, or entities in process of

dissolution or merger should be held liable when the entities held liable are clearly

individualized.

The majority has agreed that private entities are subject to criminal liability.

The French legislators have raised the issue of freedom of association when deciding

whether entities without a lucrative scope should be held criminally liable. They

decided that the freedom of association cannot be manifested outside the legal limits.

The non-commercial character of the associations cannot justify their impunity when

committing a crime; the exceptions from criminal liability must be absolutely

necessary.41 Thus, private entities with commercial and non-commercial scopes

should be held equally liable under the criminal law. Under article 121-2 of the

40
Id. at 88
41
Id. at 89

92
French Penal Code the juristic persons are criminally liable for the crimes they

committed.42

Therefore, associations, foundations, parties, and syndicates/ unions are

criminally liable because they often own property that could be used for illicit

purposes or they could use information obtained from their members for illegal

purposes.43

The criminal liability of syndicates in England has a special treatment. In 1871,

syndicates were not considered passive subjects of criminal law and the causes of

actions against them were actually causes of actions against their trustees. In 1901, the

English court decided that syndicates could be held criminally liable; if the law

acknowledges the syndicates’ capacity to own property and commit defamation, then

syndicates should bear the responsibility for their unlawful acts.44 Following the strong

protests of the syndicates, the English Parliament adopted in 1906 a law conferring

immunity from criminal liability to syndicates. At the present, the English syndicates

are the only private entities that are not held criminally liable. 45

Unlike England, the United States decided in 1922 that unions can be held

criminally liable. The Supreme Court held in United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal

42
C. Pen. art. 121-2 (Fr.)
43
Streteanu & Chirita, supra note 9, at 89 (for example, information could be used to commit
libel or treason)
44
Taff Vale RR. Co. v. Amalgamated Society of RR. Servants, [1901] A.C. 426
45
Streteanu & Chirita, supra note 9, at 90

93
Co. that trade unions could violate the criminal law provisions and they should not

escape its application.

Because unions manage enormous sums of money and their membership

exceeds hundreds of thousands of people, they should be held criminally liable.

Moreover, the victims of unions’ misconduct cannot realistically sue such a large

number of members individually in order to recover the damages caused.

The majority of legislations granted the state/government an exception from

criminal liability. Art. 121-2 of the French Penal Code provides that the juristic persons,

with the exception of the State, are criminally liable. 46 France also grants an exception

to some territorial collectivities when exercising a governmental function which cannot

make the subject of delegation to private subjects of law. Thus, the majority of public

entities have a criminal responsibility similar to that of private entities.

In common law systems, the rule was that the King can do no wrong. In

England, the state, government, and ministries are not criminally liable for the common

law crimes. However, the laws can provide that the Crown can be held liable for other

crimes.47 In the United States, the Model Penal Code expressly states that the entities

organized by a governmental agency for the purpose of implementing a governmental

activity are not criminally liable. However, the courts have not denied the possibility

that governmental institutions be held criminally liable. Even though there is no case

46
C. Pen. art. 121-2 (Fr.)
47
Leigh, supra note 23 at 18

94
of criminally sanctioning governmental institutions, the administrative liability of such

institutions has been admitted.48

The issue of whether entities without a legal status can be held criminally liable

has been also resolved differently. Some opinions argued that criminal liability of such

entities should not be allowed in order to maintain the coherence, consistency, and

predictability of the criminal law. Others argue that the act of registration or

incorporation should not bear so much importance when the entity is already an

autonomous subject; the predictability of the criminal law can be assured if the law

clearly individualizes the entities that can be assimilated to the juristic persons.

Article 121-2 of the French Penal Code does not acknowledge that the non-

legal-status entities can have the capacity to commit crimes. The Cassation Court

manifested the intention of extending the criminal liability to non-legal status entities

that benefited from such crimes.49

The majority of the French doctrine has negatively criticized this attempt based

on theoretical concepts. The doctrine argued that such a jurisprudential extension of the

concept of juristic person would create insecurity. Moreover, due to the basic

characteristics of the civil law systems, courts are to strictly interpret the law and cannot

create new rules throughout the stare decisis process.

48
Wise, supra note 65, at 394
49
Streteanu & Chirita, supra note 5, at 101

95
In common law systems, the unregistered or unincorporated entities are

criminally liable under the same conditions as the registered or incorporated entities.

Thus, in England, under the Interpretation Act of 1978, the concept of juristic person

includes associations50. In U.S., the traditional view was that, in the absence of a law

passed by Congress that provides otherwise, partnerships or joint ventures cannot be

held criminally liable because they do not have a separate identity from that of their

members.51 However, under the federal law, the concept of “person” includes the

partnerships and other similar entities.52 The U.S. Federal Sentencing Guidelines

defines and lists the organizations which are subject to regulation. “Organization”

means a “person other than an individual.” ”The term includes corporations,

partnerships, associations, joint-stock companies, unions, trusts, pension funds,

unincorporated organizations, governments and political subdivisions thereof, and

nonprofit organizations.”53

On the other hand, corporations and partnerships going trough the process of

dissolution, transformation, or merger are liable for the crimes committed in most of

the countries. Thus, under article 133-1 of the French Penal Code, the fines can be

executed before the end of the liquidation of the corporation. The American law has

similar rules. Succession or merger does not extinguish the corporate criminal liability.

When a corporation merges with another, the former continues to exist as part of the

50
Interpretation Act 1978, Ch. 30, Sch. 1 (Eng.)
51
U.S. v. A& P Trucking Co., 358 U.S. 121, 128
52
Wise, supra note 65, at 393; 49 U.S.C. 303(a); 18 U.S.C. §1
53
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual, 18 U.S.C.S. Appx. § 8A1.1 (2005) [hereinafter U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines]

96
latter, and is responsible for its crimes. The courts have held that corporations in the

process of dissolution can be held criminally liable because corporations continue to

exist for the purpose of “paying, satisfying and discharging any existing debts and

obligations…”54

In Germany, under the non-criminal liability model, corporations and other

legal status entities are autonomous subjects of law enjoying the same fundamental

rights as the individuals.55 The liability of corporations, enterprises, entrepreneurs,

associations, and other juristic persons is equally recognized under the administrative-

penal system. At the same time, public entities and territorial collectivities can be held

liable under the administrative-penal law.56

The American system of defining the entities that can be held liable under the

criminal law has some substantial advantages. Listing the entities that can be held

criminally liable is probably more clear and cheaper; it prevents unnecessary waste of

time and money by the courts when determining what entities can be held criminally

liable. At the same time, the goal of general fairness is satisfied by including non-legal

status entities. This inclusion reflects the reality that non-legal-status entities can

commit crimes and should not escape liability due to a technicality. Because of the

unpredictable situations that can appear due to the development of the law and the

ingenious nature of the human beings creating such entities, the list should not be

54
Melrose Distillers Inc. v. U.S., 359 U.S. 271, 273 (1959); See also Lederman, supra note 73,
at 641
55
Hirsch, supra note 39, at 54
56
Id. at 54-55

97
exhaustive so courts could add to the list new entities based on clear standards that give

appropriate notice. This would satisfy the predictability requirement. The American

model also meets the goals of deterrence and retribution by giving notice to all potential

corporate criminals and by punishing most of them. The only disadvantage would be

the arguable lack of consistency with the general principles of criminal law when

punishing non-legal status entities.

The French and English models are more restrictive. They are less efficient

because they do not clearly enumerate the entities that can be held criminally liable.

The requirement of general fairness is not met when refusing to punish non-legal-status

entities that commit crimes. At the same time, the goals of deterrence and retribution

are not satisfied. However, these systems have the advantages of being clear and

consistent with the general principles of criminal law.

There are three systems of determining for which crimes the corporations can

be held liable. Under the first system—general liability or plenary liability57—the

juristic persons’ liability is similar to that of individuals, corporations being virtually

capable of committing any crime. The second system requires that the legislator

mention for each crime whether corporate criminal liability is possible. The third

system consists of listing all the crimes for which collective entities can be held liable.

102 57
Cristina De Maglie, Centennial Universal Congress of Lawyers Conference-Lawyers
and Jurists in the 21st Century: Paper: Models of Corporate Criminal Liability in
Comparative Law, 4 Wash. U. Global Stud. L. Rev. 547,
(2005)

98
The first system has been adopted by England, Netherlands, Belgium, Canada,

and Australia.58In England, the corporations are liable for almost any type of crimes.

Although general liability is the rule, there are some limits based on the principle lex

non cogit ad impossibilia.59 Thus, juristic persons are not liable for crimes punished

only by imprisonment.108 Presently there are only two crimes punishable only by

imprisonment: murder and treason. Under the same principle, corporations are not

liable for crimes expressly excluded by the legislator or crimes that, due to their nature,

cannot be committed by corporations. Hence, corporations cannot commit bigamy,

incest, perjury, or rape even though, some authors argue that such crimes could be
60
committed by corporations as instigators. The English courts have held that

corporations can be sued for manslaughter.61

The second model expressly provides for such liability. Thus, when one wants

to know whether a corporation is liable for a certain crime, he or she must look in the

code/law, under the section for that specific crime, to see whether the legislator

mentioned the possibility of engaging the criminal liability of corporations. This system

has its rationale in the science of criminology; corporations are sanctioned for specific

crimes based on the frequency of the corporations’ involvement in such crimes.

However, this system is not comprehensive. By trying to exclude the crimes that cannot

be committed by corporations, the French legislators inadvertently omitted some labor

58
See generally La Criminalisation du Comportament Collectif: Criminal Liability of
Corporations (H. de Doelder & Klaus Tiedemann eds., Kluwer Law Int’l, 1996)
59
Streteanu & Chirita, supra note 9, at 112-13 (the law cannot foresee the impossible)
60
Streteanu & Chirita, supra note 9, at 113, citing R. Card, Introduction to Criminal Law 195
([sic] London/Edinburg 1988)
61
R. v. P & O European Ferries (Dover) Ltd., 93 Cr App Rep 72 (1990, UK); Lederman, supra
note 73, at 645-46

99
and economic crimes, and also neglected the fact that even the crimes that cannot be

committed by corporations as authors can probably be committed by corporations as

instigators or accomplices.

The third model is reflected by the American law. The U.S. Sentencing

Guidelines include a detailed list of the offenses that can be committed by corporations.

Corporate criminal liability virtually extends to all the crimes that can be committed by

individuals.116 Thus, a corporation can be convicted for theft, forgery, bribery, and

manslaughter or negligent homicide.62 Also, in People v. O’Neil, even though the

corporation has not been found guilty, the court has not denied the possibility that

corporations can be held criminally liable for murder.

Under the German non-criminal model of corporate liability, the corporations

are administratively liable for crimes or administrative-penal offenses committed by an

organ or representative. Section 30 of Ordnungswidrigkeitengesetz (OWiG) does not

impose a limit on the list of offenses for which corporations can be held liable.

Corporations are not liable for offenses which by their very nature can be committed

only by individuals. The only condition is that the offenses be linked with the

corporation’s activities. However, it is not required that the offense be within the

competences conceded to the corporation. Thus, a corporation can be held liable under

the administrative-penal system for homicides, offenses against the patrimony, etc. 63

62
Granite Construction Co. v. Superior Ct., 149 Cal. App. 3d 465 (1983); Vaughan $ Sons, Inc.
v. State, 737 S.W.2d 805 (Tex. Crim. App., 1987)
63
Id. at 58

100
The American model has the advantages of avoiding confusion and long

searches in various statutes. Thus, the American system meets the requirements of

clarity, predictability, efficiency, and consistency with the general principles of

criminal law. Unless it is certain that there is no other possible crime that a corporation

could be held liable for, the list of crimes should not be exhaustive. In this respect, the

English and German models are good examples because they do not limit the list of

crimes for which corporations can be held criminally liable, but they provide for

liability similar to that of individuals. The French system, in attempt to be clear and

predictable, turned out to be less efficient due to the amount of time necessary to do the

searches in various statutes and to the omission of several crimes. Moreover, similarly

to the English system, the French system omits the possibility that some crimes that

could not be committed by corporations as principals could probably be committed by

corporations as accomplices or instigators.

8.9 NATURAL PERSONS CAN CAUSE CORPORATE CRIMINAL


LIABILITY

Initially, it has been argued that corporations are not capable of forming the

material and mental elements of a crime due to their immaterial and highly regulated

existence. The attribution of the acts and the mental state of persons acting on behalf of

the corporation to the corporation it was said to contravene the principle of individual

punishment underlying the criminal law. These arguments failed in most legal systems,

but the sphere of individuals and the conditions in which they can lead to the criminal

liability of corporations differs more or less dramatically from country to country.

101
At first, some critics argued that corporations do not have the capacity to act

on their own and therefore, the actus reus element of a crime cannot be attributed to

them.64 The acts attributed to the corporations are merely those of individuals acting on

behalf of the corporations. Thus, “[i]mposing criminal liability on a corporate entity

requires resort to the principles of respondeat superior, rather than individual

responsibility, which is the hallmark of the criminal law.”65 It is incontestable, that, due

to the corporations’ nature, the actions or inactions cannot be committed directly and

personally by the corporation. However, the acts of the representatives are those of the

corporation itself because the representatives are not distinct from the corporation;

representatives are part of the corporation, a structural element of the corporation

essential for the corporation’s existence and without which the corporation cannot

fulfill its purpose. Moreover, representatives are not personally liable for acts within

the scope of the powers granted to them, but the corporation is held liable for them.

Therefore, admitting the existence of the corporations’ ability to act does not mean

liability for another’s act; it merely means that corporations are liable for the activity

conducted by individuals on their behalf using the power that has been conferred upon

them by the corporations’ bylaws. 66 Moreover, those that are subjects of legal duties,

not only can perform those duties, but can also breach them.

Another argument was based on the ultra vires theory. Critics argue that an

illicit act would fall outside the scope of the corporation and therefore, cannot be

64
Ferguson v. Wilson, (1866) L.R. 2 Ch. App. 77, C.A
65
Beale & Safwat, supra note 36, at 93
66
Streteanu & Chirita, supra note 9, at 46

102
considered to be perpetrated by the corporations.67 The capacity of action of

corporations and their representatives is limited by the laws, articles of incorporation,

and bylaws; no law or bylaw gives them the power to commit a criminal offense.

Therefore, any crime is necessarily ultra vires. The protection of corporations resulting

from the ultra vires theory has been eliminated first in tort law and subsequently, at the

beginning of the 20th century, in the criminal law.68 The purpose of the articles of

incorporation and bylaws is to assure organized services, to avoid confusion regarding

the corporations’ activity, and to permit an efficient surveillance of their activity. It

would be absurd to consider that the ultra vires theory, destined to insure the legality

of the corporations’ activity, could transform into a reason to refuse to punish the

corporations when acting illegally. Moreover, although the articles of incorporation

provide certain scopes for the corporation, the corporation can do whatever else is

necessary to conduct its activity. The scope of incorporation should not be confused

with the corporations’ scopes during its activity; the scope of incorporation must always

be legal, but the corporations’ actions after incorporation are not always in conformity

therewith. Although civil offenses are not within the scope of a corporation,

corporations are nonetheless held liable when committing such offenses. Similarly,

corporations should be held liable for criminal offenses.

67
Ashbury Ry Carriage and Iron Co. v. Riche, [1875] L.R. 7 H.L. 653. People v. Rochester Ry.
& Light Co., 88 N.E. 22 (N.Y. 1909)
68
Nicolette Parisi, Theories of Corporate Criminal Liability (or Corporations Don’t Commit
Crimes, People Commit Crimes), in Corporations as Criminals 41, 45 (Ellen Hochstedler ed.,
Sage Publications, 1984).

Streteanu & Chirita, supra note 9, at 52

103
The core argument against corporate criminal liability has been the belief that

a corporation cannot have mens rea and therefore, cannot be blameworthy or guilty of

a criminal offense.69 Critics showed that the corporate will and power of decision are

exercised through the will of the collectivity of people managing the corporation.

Therefore, it is said that the mens rea element of a criminal offense does not belong to

the corporation, but to the members who made the decision to take a specific course of

action. The corporation would be punished without being blameworthy and this would

be against the criminal law principles. However, the majority of doctrine recognizes the

independent existence of a corporate will70 which does not always identify itself with

that of the collectivity of members of the corporation.71 The corporation’s capacity to

act and decide has been recognized in contract, administrative, and constitutional law.

Therefore, if a corporation has the capacity to think and decide when it is a part to a

contract (and thus being the subject of contractual rights and obligations), it cannot be

sustained that corporate will power exists when it produces legal effects, but not when

the effects created are illegal (criminal offenses). 72 Moreover, being widely accepted

that corporations have civil liability, it would be difficult to explain why the corporation

should not be held liable when the offense committed is more serious (criminal offense

as opposed to civil offense). The culpability of corporations exists and it is sufficient

for the culpability required by the criminal law. After defeating these arguments, the

issue became how wide the pool of individuals who can draw the corporate criminal

69
Hirsch, supra note 39, at 37; Beale & Sawfat, supra note 36, at 93
70
See Streteanu & Chirita, supra note 9, 53-59; Friedman, supra note 71, at 847-52
71
For example, when some of the members opposed a specific course of action adopted by the
majority, the minority’s will cannot be identified with that of the corporation represented by
the majority
135 72
Streteanu & Chirita, supra note 9, at 55, citing R. Plascencia Villanueva, Teoria del
Delito
73-74 ([sic] Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico, 2000)

104
liability should be, by what acts, and with what mental state. Although the corporations

are the subjects of the law, the action or inaction of a human being is necessary to

engage the corporations’ criminal liability. Initially, the persons who could engage the

corporations’ liability were limited to the corporate organs. The organs represented the

soul of the corporation, their actions were the corporation’s actions, and therefore, the

crimes committed by the organs were those of the corporation. Nowadays, in some legal

systems, there is a tendency of expanding the categories of persons who can cause

corporate criminal liability. Under Article 121-2 of the French Penal Code, corporations

are criminally liable for the crimes committed on their behalf by their organs and

representatives. When the organs or representatives have the required mens rea and

actus reus of the crime, the corporation is automatically liable.73 The organs are

individuals exercising an administrative or other important function conferred by law

or the charter of the corporation.74 The notion of “representative” is wider than that of

“organ,” and includes other persons such as the temporary administrators, liquidators,

and special agents. Therefore, the acts of other members or subordinate employees

cannot engage the criminal liability of corporations even when the acts are committed

in the benefit of the corporations.

Due to this requirement, the French system is the most restrictive model of the

jurisdictions presented here. However, it is not always necessary to identify the

representative or the organ; such is the case for the crimes by omission or when the

crime was based on a collective decision by secret vote. It is sufficient to know that an

73
Streteanu & Chirita, supra note 9, at 134
74
Id. at 121, citing F. Desportes, Responsibilite Penale des Personnes Morales 112 (Tecniques
Juris-Classeurs ed, 2001)

105
organ or representative acted or failed to act when he or she had a duty to, but knowing

his or her identity is not necessary. The organs and representatives must act on behalf

of the corporation. The notion of crime committed on behalf of the corporation varies

based on the type of crime committed because the commission of a crime presupposes

the existence of a subjective element—mens rea—and an objective element—the

profit.75 Therefore, when committing theft, the objective element will be more

accentuated, but when committing discrimination the subjective element would have

more importance since it is difficult to point to a specific profit that the corporation

would gain from such crime. Hence, crimes committed solely in the personal interest

of the organ or representative would not engage the criminal liability of the corporation.

8.10 ISSUES OF WHAT SANCTIONS ARE APPROPRIATE FOR


CORPORATE

The issue of what sanctions are appropriate for corporate criminal activities

has been the constant subject of the doctrinal debates, and often times, has been the

argument for rejecting corporate criminal liability. The first issue raised in this debate

was the individual character of criminal responsibility. The critics argue that by

sanctioning the corporate entity, all its members are sanctioned regardless of whether

they had any participation in the criminal offense. Thus, sanctioning a corporation to

pay a criminal fine would have the indirect effect of diminishing the income of the

stockholders, or the corporation would be forced to reduce the number of innocent

75
Streteanu & Chirita, supra note 9, at 128

106
employees who would lose their income.76 This would amount, in the critics’ view, to

a criminal liability for another’s crimes, which would be unacceptable. However, the

majority of the doctrine sustains that corporate criminal liability does not conflict with

the individual character of criminal responsibility. The only person suffering the direct

effects of a criminal sanction is the corporation. Corporate property is separate from the

property of its members who assumed the risk of losing their contribution to the

corporate patrimony after incorporation. Members form corporations in order to avoid

personal liability. Even though protected by the corporations’ veils, members, through

their corporations, cannot avoid any legal penalties that would result from their actions

as members. Members are not usually personally liable for the corporation’s activity,

any liability being covered by the corporation’s patrimony. The side effects of losing

profits are risks that members have taken from the beginning. As members may benefit

from the advantages resulting from the corporations’ activities, they also may suffer

some inconveniences.77 Moreover, the indirect effects of corporate criminal liability

suffered by the corporation’s members are similar to the indirect effects that family

members of an individual criminal offender suffer. Thus, family members of a

convicted criminal offender would lose the criminal’s material contribution and would

suffer additional societal stigma. Similarly, members of a corporation may lose their

profits, but, unlike family members of a criminal offender, they would not significantly

suffer the infamous effect of the criminal conviction of a corporation if they are not also

individually charged for the criminal offense.

76
James Gobert, Controlling Corporate Criminality: Penal Sanctions and Beyond, 2 Web JCLI
page 6 (1998) available at http://webjcli.ncl.ac.uk/1998/issue2/gobert2.html (last visited
January 14, 2006)
77
Hirsch, supra note 39, at 43

107
It has also been argued that corporate criminal liability would result in double

sanctioning when both the individuals and the corporation are convicted for the same

criminal offense. Thus, the convicted individuals who acted on behalf of the corporation

would be sanctioned through the individual penalty and also by losing income from the

corporation.78 However, as shown above, there is no risk of violating the non bis in

idem principle because the corporation and the individuals have separate patrimonies

and identities. When a representative of the corporation commits a criminal offense we

can distinguish two separate liabilities—individual liability and corporate liability—

which are based on separate elements.79 Therefore, corporate criminal liability is not

incompatible with the individual character of criminal liability.

Part of the doctrine argued that the notion of corporation is incompatible with

the notion of punishment. Critics consider that the concepts of prevention,

rehabilitation, and moral pressure cannot be applied to corporations. Moreover,

corporations cannot be physically retained in prisons (one of the most effective

sanctions known) or executed. The solutions proposed by different countries vary

widely from sanctions that merely affect the patrimony of corporations to those that

affect all the corporations’ attributes. Although corporations cannot always be

sanctioned identically to human beings, the concept of punishment includes a variety

of sanctions that can alternatively be applied, and new types can be created, as

necessary, both in the case of humans and corporations. The criminal fine penalty has

been successfully applied to corporations in the majority of countries and has had a

78
Id.

79
Streteanu & Chirita, supra note 9, at 63

108
deterrent effect when its quantum was properly individualized. 80 The negative publicity

associated with the criminal conviction causes reputational harm that most of the

corporations try to prevent. Criminal convictions would determine the adoption of new

corporate policies and practices designated to prevent future illegalities. Moreover, the

concept of rehabilitation has also been applied to corporations through the penalties of

reorganization or probation.81 The death penalty has been replaced with the penalty of

corporate dissolution. At the same time, the criminal punishment of corporations has

been proven to be just when it was proportional to the culpability of the corporation.

Thus, the experience of the countries that have adopted corporate criminal liability has

shown that criminal sanctions are appropriate means of fulfilling the retributive,

rehabilitative and deterrent goals of the criminal law.

8.11 CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES

The criminal fines are the most common sanction. A pecuniary sanction has the

advantages of directly affecting the corporation, it generates the capital necessary for

compensation or restitution to the victims, it can be executed with minimum costs, and

when appropriately individualized, it has a sufficiently strong impact to accomplish the

scope of the punishment (especially the retributive and deterrent scopes). 82 “Whereas

the greatest threat to an individual may be the loss of liberty, the greatest threat to a

company is the loss of profitability. Because such a loss strikes at the essential purpose

of the company, a fine holds the potential to be an effective deterrent.” A corporation

will balance the monetary gain from the offense with the loss from the potential

80
See supra Introduction
81
Gobert, supra note 204, at 13
82
Streteanu & Chirita, supra note 9, at 170

109
criminal fine. Therefore, the fines must be sufficiently high to have an impact on the

corporations. The amount of the fines should also take into account the financial

resources of the corporation.

At the same time, fines have some disadvantages. A very high fine would have a

negative effect on innocent third parties. Although a corporate manager usually

commits the crime, he will be the last one to suffer the impacts of his actions. 83

However, the stockholders, other employees, and creditors will be affected by the

secondary consequences of the penalty. Other effects can be the increase of the price

for the corporation’s products and even the dissolution of As a penalty, the activity of

the corporation can be suspended for a limited period of time. This sanction has an

important drawback because of the ricochet effect on the employees who would lose

wages. However, this sanction seems to be justified for serious violations of labor or

environmental laws.84 Moreover, as a solution that would attenuate the ricochet effects,

some authors suggested that employees should be paid their salaries for the time of

suspension.

Dissolution represents the capital punishment for corporations. Due to its drastic

effects, some authors argued that the sanction of dissolution should be applied only

when the corporation committed very serious crimes, or when the corporation was

83
Id. at 4
84
Streteanu & Chirita, supra note 9, at 172

110
created for illegal purposes. Others argue that such punishment should be completely

eliminated for the category of corporate sanctions.85

The publication of the decision or the adverse publicity orders (which consist in

the publication at the company’s expense of an advertisement emphasizing the crime

committed and its consequences) are also sanctions for corporate criminal activity.

The German non-criminal model accepts as sanctions the following: fines,

dissolution, confiscation of the fruits of the crime, privation of rights or licenses, and

the imposition of mandatory management oversight. The publication of the judgment

has been rejected because it would be too hostile to the corporations. The maximum

fine varies according to whether the offense was a criminal offense or an administrative

one. For criminal offenses, the corporation can be fined up to DM 1 million. 86 For

administrative offenses the maximum must be more than the ill-gotten gains.

Mandatory oversight can be imposed only when the other measures have been

unsuccessful in preventing the commission of criminal acts and it cannot be imposed

for more than five years.

In England, the standard sanction is the fine. However, because the fines are often

too low in relation to the corporation’s financial means and the damages caused by the

85
Streteanu & Chirita, supra note 9, at 172, citing L. del C. Zungiga Rodriguez, Bases para un
Modello de Imputacion de Responsibilidad Penal a las Personas Juridicas 754 (Aranzadi Ed.,
2000)
86
Stessens, supra note 16, at 516.The amount of this sanction is provided in DM and not in
Euro because of the source’s date

111
offense, corporate probation, confiscation of the proceeds of the crime, and withdrawal

of licenses have also been scarcely accepted.87 Some authors argue that English law

should reassess both the nature of the sanctions applicable to corporate offenders and

the principles of attribution of criminal liability to corporations.88

87
Harding, supra note 48, at 381; Stessens, supra note 16, at 517
88
Harding, supra note 48, at 382

112
CHAPTER IX
CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS

Several countries were, and some still are refusing to accept the concept of

corporate criminal liability due to doctrinal, political, and historical reasons. Out of

those formerly refusing to accept this concept, some started to slowly change their

views. Why now? What has changed? The realities of our times have been changing so

much that legislatures have realized that doctrinal issues are less important than the

prevention and appropriate punishment of large-scale white-collar crimes, money-

laundering, illegal arms sales, environmental harm, product liability, and many others.

Some of the countries that have newly introduced the corporate criminal liability in

their legal systems provide for restrictive systems of engaging liability and punishing

criminal activities of corporations. That might be because they are apprehensive of

rapid and extreme changes in a short period of time. Or maybe the realities of their

societies are not sufficiently pressuring; the historical, social, economic, and political

realties differ from country to country, and these differences have a strong influence on

the legal systems. Also, the influence of the interests of powerful corporations should

not be ignored. Hopefully, all the legal systems will achieve uniformity regarding this

issue.

Although the system developed in United States is presently considered the

most advanced in the world, the American model has a few drawbacks that could

probably beeliminated by using elements from other models or by creating new

solutions. The American system’s most important disadvantages are the significant

spill-over effects on innocent employees and shareholders, the possible over-deterring

effect, and the high costs of implementing corporate criminal liability. However, its

113
advantages outweigh its disadvantages. The American model seems to better reflect the

actual developments of corporate structure and, thus, it is better suited to punish

corporate crime. The retributive and rehabilitative effects of criminal punishment are

almost perfectly reflected by the American model. Moreover, this system is clear,

predictable, consistent with the principles of criminal law, and fair.

The French and English systems are also clear, predictable and consistent with

the general principles of criminal law. Moreover, they do not have significant side

effects on innocent individuals and are not over-deterring. However, these systems

seem to be less deterring and, sometimes, unfair (in the English system for example,

when the corporation is liable even when the manager defrauded the corporation itself).

The prosecution of corporations is very difficult due to the significant restrictions of

these models. Thus, the retributive goal of the criminal law cannot be effectively

achieved. In addition, these systems, together with the German one, would probably

have the effect of attracting potential corporate criminals seeking to avoid liability.

Corporations are independent juristic persons that can cause harm. Therefore,

corporations should bear the responsibility of their actions. Although corporations have

been initially conceived as a method of avoiding personal liability, and although its

members will feel the side effects of sanctioning corporations, members do not lose

more than what they were willing to risk from the beginning (at incorporation).

Moreover, they can prevent corporate crime by adopting special preventive measures,

as the American model suggests.

114
The corporate criminal liability models developed so far show that the only

way to effectively punish and battle corporate crime is to criminally punish

corporations. Prosecution of individuals only is unjust not only to them, but to society

at large because convictions of individuals will rarely affect the way corporations will

conduct their business in the future. Moreover, civil and administrative liability of

corporations is not sufficient. Victims do not always have the financial resources to

pursue a civil claim. Although the administrative liability system promoted by Germany

has some efficiency, similarly to civil liability systems, it lacks the procedural

guarantees and the stigma characteristic to criminal law. Criminal law is the only one

that reaffirms all the values trampled on by corporate criminals. Criminal law punishes

justly; its irreplaceable retributive, deterrent, and rehabilitative characteristics satisfy

the public demand for vengeance. Criminal punishment of corporations sends a

symbolic message: no crime goes unpunished. And a just punishment includes the

moral condemnation of society.

115
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