In Re Farber (State v. Jascalevich) occurred in New Bedford.
occurred in New Bedford. The material he assembled formed the basis for a television program that followed. The third
78 N.J. 259, 394 A.2d 330, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 997 (1978)
MOUNTAIN, J. In these consolidated appeals The New York Times Company and Myron Farber, a reporter employed
by the newspaper, challenge judgments entered against them in two related matters--one a proceeding in aid of a
litigant (civil contempt), the other for criminal contempt of court. The proceedings were instituted in an ongoing murder
trial now in its seventh month, as a result of the appellants' failure to comply with two subpoenas duces tecum, directing
them to produce certain documents and materials compiled by one or both of these appellants in the course of Farber's
investigative reporting of certain allegedly criminal activities. Farber's investigations and reporting are said to have
contributed largely to the indictment and prosecution of Dr. Mario E. Jascalevich for murder. Appellants moved
unsuccessfully before Judge William J. Arnold, the trial judge in State v. Jascalevich, to quash the two subpoenas; an
order was entered directing that the subpoenaed material be produced for in camera inspection by the court....
Impelled by appellants' persistent refusal to produce the subpoenaed materials for in camera inspection, Judge Arnold
issued an order returnable before Judge Theodore W. Trautwein, directing appellants to show cause why they should
not be deemed in contempt of court....
Judge Trautwein determined that both appellants had wilfully contemned Judge Arnold's order directing that materials
be produced for in camera inspection and found them guilty as charged. A fine of $100,000 was imposed on The New
York Times and Farber was ordered to serve six months in the Bergen County jail and to pay a fine of $1,000.
Additionally, in order to compel production of the materials subpoenaed on behalf of Jascalevich, a fine of $5,000 per
day for every day that elapsed until compliance with Judge Arnold's order was imposed upon The Times; Farber was
fined $1,000 and sentenced to confinement in the county jail until he complied with the order....
I. THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Appellants claim a privilege to refrain from revealing information sought by the subpoenas duces tecum essentially for
the reason that were they to divulge this material, confidential sources of such information would be made public. Were
this to occur, they argue, newsgathering and the dissemination of news would be seriously impaired, because much
information would never be forthcoming to the news media unless the persons who were the sources of such
information could be entirely certain that their identities would remain secret. The final result, appellants claim, would be
a substantial lessening in the supply of available news on a variety of important and sensitive issues, all to the detriment
of the public interest. They contend further that this privilege to remain silent with respect to confidential information and
the sources of such information emanates from the "free speech" and "free press" clauses of the First Amendment.
In our view the Supreme Court of the United States has clearly rejected this claim and has squarely held that no such
First Amendment right exists. In Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), three news media representatives argued
that, for the same reason here advanced, they should not be required to appear and testify before grand juries, and that
this privilege to refrain from divulging information, asserted to have been received from confidential sources, derived
from the First Amendment. Justice White, noting that there was no common law privilege, stated the issue and gave the
Court's answer in the first paragraph of his opinion:
"The issue in these cases is whether requiring newsmen to appear and testify before state or federal grand juries
abridges the freedom of speech and press guaranteed by the First Amendment. We hold that it does not." Branzburg v.
Hayes, supra, 408 U.S. at 667 (1972).
In that case one reporter, from Frankfort, Kentucky, had witnessed individuals making hashish from marijuana and had
made a rather comprehensive survey of the drug scene in Frankfort. He had written an article in the Louisville Courier-
Journal describing this illegal activity. Another, a newsman-photographer employed by a New Bedford, Massachusetts
television station, had met with members of the Black Panther movement at the time that certain riots and disorders
1|P a g e
investigative reporter had met with members of the Black Panthers in northern California and had written an article
about the nature and activities of the movement. In each instance there had been a commitment on the part of the
media representative that he would not divulge the source of his article or story.
By a vote of 5 to 4 the Supreme Court held that newspaper reporters or other media representatives have no privilege
deriving from the First Amendment to refrain from divulging confidential information and the sources of such information
when properly subpoenaed to appear before a grand jury. The three media representatives were directed to appear and
testify. The holding was later underscored and applied directly to this case by Justice White in a brief opinion filed in this
cause upon the occasion of his denial of a stay sought by these appellants. He said,
"There is no present authority in this Court either that newsmen are constitutionally privileged to withhold duly
subpoenaed documents material to the prosecution or defense of a criminal case or that a defendant seeking the
subpoena must show extraordinary circumstances before enforcement against newsmen will be had." New York Times
and Farber v. Jascalevich, 439 U.S. 1317, 1322 (1978)....
[A]mong the many First Amendment protections that may be invoked by the press, there is not to be found the privilege
of refusing to reveal relevant confidential information and its sources to a grand jury which is engaged in the
fundamental governmental function of "[f]air and effective law enforcement aimed at providing security for the person
and property of the individual...." 408 U.S. at 690. The reason this is so is that a majority of the members of the United
States Supreme Court have so determined....
Thus we do no weighing or balancing of societal interests in reaching our determination that the First Amendment does
not afford appellants the privilege they claim. The weighing and balancing has been done by a higher court. Our
conclusion that appellants cannot derive the protection they seek from the First Amendment rests upon the fact that the
ruling in Branzburg is binding upon us and we interpret it as applicable to, and clearly including, the particular issue
framed here. It follows that the obligation to appear at a criminal trial on behalf of a defendant who is enforcing his Sixth
Amendment rights is at least as compelling as the duty to appear before a grand jury.
II. THE SHIELD LAW(1)2
In Branzburg v. Hayes, supra, the Court dealt with a newsman's claim of privilege based solely upon the First
Amendment. As we have seen, this claim of privilege failed. In Branzburg no shield law was involved. Here we have a
shield law, said to be as strongly worded as any in the country.
We read the legislative intent in adopting this statute in its present form as seeking to protect the confidential sources of
the press as well as information so obtained by reporters and other news media representatives to the greatest extent
permitted by the Constitution of the United States and that of the State of New Jersey. It is abundantly clear that
appellants come fully within the literal language of the enactment....
III. THE SIXTH AMENDMENT AND ITS NEW JERSEY COUNTERPART
Viewed on its face, considered solely as a reflection of legislative intent to bestow upon the press as broad a shield as
possible to protect against forced revelation of confidential source materials, this legislation is entirely constitutional.
Indeed, no one appears to have attacked its facial constitutionality.
It is, however, argued, and argued very strenuously, that if enforced under the facts of this case, the Shield Law violates
the Sixth Amendment of the Federal Constitution as well as Article 1, ¶10 of the New Jersey Constitution.... Essentially
the argument is this: The Federal and State Constitutions each provide that in all criminal prosecutions the accused
shall have the right "to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor." Dr. Jascalevich seeks to obtain
evidence to use in preparing and presenting his defense in the ongoing criminal trial in which he has been accused of
multiple murders. He claims to come within the favor of these constitutional provisions--which he surely does. Finally,
when faced with the Shield Law, he invokes the rather elementary but entirely sound proposition that where Constitution
and statute collide, the latter must yield. Subject to what is said below, we find this argument unassailable.
The compulsory process clause of the Sixth Amendment has never been elaborately explicated by the Supreme Court.
Not until 1967, when it decided Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, had the clause been directly construed. Westen,
Confrontation and Compulsory Process: A Unified Theory of Evidence for Criminal Cases, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 567, 586
(1978). In Washington the petitioner sought the reversal of his conviction for murder. A Texas statute at the time
provided that persons charged or convicted as co-participants in the same crime could not testify for one another. One
Fuller, who had already been convicted of the murder, was prevented from testifying by virtue of the statute. The record
indicated that had he testified his testimony would have been favorable to petitioner. The Court reversed the conviction
on the ground that petitioner's Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process had been denied. At the same time it
determined that the compulsory process clause in the Sixth Amendment was binding on state courts by virtue of the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It will be seen that Washington is like the present case in a significant
respect. The Texas statute and the Sixth Amendment could not both stand. The latter of course prevailed. So must it be
here.
Quite recently, in United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), the Court dealt with another compulsory process issue.
There the Special Prosecutor, Leon Jaworski, subpoenaed various tape recordings and documents in the possession of
President Nixon. The latter claimed an executive privilege and refused to deliver the tapes. The Supreme Court
conceded that indeed there was an executive privilege and that although "[n]owhere in the Constitution ... is there any
explicit reference to a privilege of confidentiality, yet to the extent this interest relates to the effective discharge of a
President's powers, it is constitutionally based." 418 U.S. at 711. Despite this conclusion that at least to some extent a
president's executive privilege derives from the Constitution, the Court nonetheless concluded that the demands of our
criminal justice system required that the privilege must yield....
It is important to note that the Supreme Court in this case compelled the production of privileged material--the privilege
acknowledged to rest in part upon the Constitution--even though there was no Sixth Amendment compulsion to do so.
The Sixth Amendment affords rights to an accused but not to a prosecutor. The compulsion to require the production of
the privileged material derived from the necessities of our system of administering criminal justice.
privilege. Rather it is a preliminary step to determine whether, and if so to what extent, the statutory privilege must yield
to the defendant's constitutional rights.
Appellants' position is that there must be a full showing and definitive judicial determination of relevance, materiality,
absence of less intrusive access, and need, prior to any in camera inspection. The obvious objection to such a rule,
however, is that it would, in many cases, effectively stultify the judicial criminal process. It might well do so here. The
defendant properly recognizes Myron Farber as a unique repository of pertinent information. But he does not know the
extent of this information nor is it possible for him to specify all of it with particularity, nor to tailor his subpoena to
precise materials of which he is ignorant. Well aware of this, Judge Arnold refused to give ultimate rulings with respect
to relevance and other preliminary matters until he had examined the material. We think he had no other course. It is not
rational to ask a judge to ponder the relevance of the unknown.
The same objection applies with equal force to the contention that the subpoena is overbroad. Appellants do not assert
that the subpoena is vague and uncertain, but that the data requested may not be relevant and material. To deal
effectively with this assertion it is not only appropriate but absolutely necessary for the trial court to inspect in camera
the subpoenaed items so that it can make its determinations on the basis of concrete materials rather than in a
vacuum....
While we agree, then, that appellants should be afforded the hearing they are seeking, one procedural aspect of which
calls for their compliance with the order for in camera inspection, we are also of the view that they, and those who in the
future may be similarly situated, are entitled to a preliminary determination before being compelled to submit the
subpoenaed materials to a trial judge for such inspection. Our decision in this regard is not, contrary to the suggestion in
some of the briefs filed with us, mandated by the First Amendment; for in addition to ruling generally against the
representatives of the press in Branzburg, the Court particularly and rather vigorously, rejected the claims there
asserted that before going before the grand jury, each of the reporters, at the very least, was entitled to a preliminary
hearing to establish a number of threshold issues. Branzburg v. Hayes, supra, 408 U.S. at 701-07. Rather, our
insistence upon such a threshold determination springs from our obligation to give as much effect as possible, within
ever-present constitutional limitations, to the very positively expressed legislative intent to protect the confidentiality and
secrecy of sources from which the media derive information. To this end such a determination would seem a necessity.

Article I, ¶10 of the Constitution of the State of New Jersey contains, as we have seen, exactly the same language with
respect to compulsory process as that found in the Sixth Amendment. There exists no authoritative explication of this
constitutional provision. Indeed it has rarely been mentioned in our reported decisions. We interpret it as affording a
defendant in a criminal prosecution the right to compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of documents
and other material for which he may have, or may believe he has, a legitimate need in preparing or undertaking his
defense. It also means that witnesses properly summoned will be required to testify and that material demanded by a
properly phrased subpoena duces tecum will be forthcoming and available for appropriate examination and use.

Testimonial privileges, whether they derive from common law or from statute, which allow witnesses to withhold
evidence seem to conflict with this provision. This conflict may arise in a variety of factual contexts with respect to
different privileges. We confine our consideration here to the single privilege before us--that set forth in the Shield Law.
We hold that Article 1, ¶10 of our Constitution prevails over this statute....

IV. PROCEDURAL MECHANISM

Appellants insist that they are entitled to a full hearing on the issues of relevance, materiality and overbreadth of the
subpoena. We agree. The trial court recognized its obligation to conduct such a hearing, but the appellants have
aborted that hearing by refusing to submit the material subpoenaed for an in camera inspection by the court to assist it
in determining the motion to quash. That inspection is no more than a procedural tool, a device to be used to ascertain
the relevancy and materiality of that material. Such an in camera inspection is not in itself an invasion of the statutory
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 Coating (fake) EPC#2 81,876.96 5446 04/21/99

G.R. No. 172835 December 13, 2007

4. a. Dry Lubricant ASC-EP 87,346.52 5712 05/20/99
AIR PHILIPPINES CORPORATION, Petitioner, b. Anti-Seize Compound (fake) ASC-EP 124,108.10 4763 & 02/16/99 &
vs. 2000 5890 06/24/99
PENNSWELL, INC. Respondent.

DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Petitioner Air Philippines Corporation seeks, via the instant Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the
nullification of the 16 February 2006 Decision1 and the 25 May 2006 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 86329, which affirmed the Order3 dated 30 June 2004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Makati City, Branch 64, in
Civil Case No. 00-561.
According to petitioner, respondent’s products, namely Excellent Rust Corrosion, Connector Grease, Electric Strength
Protective Coating, and Anti-Seize Compound, are identical with its Anti-Friction Fluid, Contact Grease, Thixohtropic
Grease, and Dry Lubricant, respectively. Petitioner asseverated that had respondent been forthright about the identical
character of the products, it would not have purchased the items complained of. Moreover, petitioner alleged that when
the purported fraud was discovered, a conference was held between petitioner and respondent on 13 January 2000,
whereby the parties agreed that respondent would return to petitioner the amount it previously paid. However, petitioner
was surprised when it received a letter from the respondent, demanding payment of the amount of P449,864.94, which
later became the subject of respondent’s Complaint for Collection of a Sum of Money against petitioner.

Petitioner Air Philippines Corporation is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of air transportation services. During the pendency of the trial, petitioner filed a Motion to Compel10 respondent to give a detailed list of the ingredients
On the other hand, respondent Pennswell, Inc. was organized to engage in the business of manufacturing and selling and chemical components of the following products, to wit: (a) Contact Grease and Connector Grease; (b) Thixohtropic
industrial chemicals, solvents, and special lubricants. Grease and Di-Electric Strength Protective Coating; and (c) Dry Lubricant and Anti-Seize Compound.11 It appears that
petitioner had earlier requested the Philippine Institute of Pure and Applied Chemistry (PIPAC) for the latter to conduct a
On various dates, respondent delivered and sold to petitioner sundry goods in trade, covered by Sales Invoices No. comparison of respondent’s goods.
8846,4 9105,5 8962,6 and 8963,7 which correspond to Purchase Orders No. 6433, 6684, 6634 and 6633, respectively.
Under the contracts, petitioner’s total outstanding obligation amounted to P449,864.98 with interest at 14% per annum On 15 March 2004, the RTC rendered an Order granting the petitioner’s motion. It disposed, thus:
until the amount would be fully paid. For failure of the petitioner to comply with its obligation under said contracts,
respondent filed a Complaint8 for a Sum of Money on 28 April 2000 with the RTC.
The Court directs [herein respondent] Pennswell, Inc. to give [herein petitioner] Air Philippines Corporation[,] a detailed
list of the ingredients or chemical components of the following chemical products:
In its Answer,9 petitioner contended that its refusal to pay was not without valid and justifiable reasons. In particular,
petitioner alleged that it was defrauded in the amount of P592,000.00 by respondent for its previous sale of four items,
covered by Purchase Order No. 6626. Said items were misrepresented by respondent as belonging to a new line, but a. Contact Grease to be compared with Connector Grease;
were in truth and in fact, identical with products petitioner had previously purchased from respondent. Petitioner
asserted that it was deceived by respondent which merely altered the names and labels of such goods. Petitioner b. Thixohtropic Grease to be compared with Di-Electric Strength Protective Coating; and
specifically identified the items in question, as follows:
c. Dry Lubricant to be compared with Anti-Seize Compound[.]
Label/Description Item No. Amount P.O. Date
[Respondent] Pennswell, Inc. is given fifteen (15) days from receipt of this Order to submit to [petitioner] Air Philippines
Corporation the chemical components of all the above-mentioned products for chemical comparison/analysis.12
1. a. Anti-Friction Fluid MPL-800 153,941.40 5714 05/20/99
b. Excellent Rust Corrosion (fake) MPL-008 155,496.00 5888 06/20/99 Respondent sought reconsideration of the foregoing Order, contending that it cannot be compelled to disclose the
chemical components sought because the matter is confidential. It argued that what petitioner endeavored to inquire
upon constituted a trade secret which respondent cannot be forced to divulge. Respondent maintained that its products
2. a. Contact Grease COG #2 115,236.00 5540 04/26/99 are specialized lubricants, and if their components were revealed, its business competitors may easily imitate and
b. Connector Grease (fake) CG 230,519.52 6327 08/05/99 market the same types of products, in violation of its proprietary rights and to its serious damage and prejudice.

The RTC gave credence to respondent’s reasoning, and reversed itself. It issued an Order dated 30 June 2004, finding
3. a. Trixohtropic Grease EPC 81,876.96 4582 01/29/99 that the chemical components are respondent’s trade secrets and are privileged in character. A priori, it rationalized:
b. Di-Electric Strength Protective

3|P a g e
The Supreme Court held in the case of Chavez vs. Presidential Commission on Good Government, 299 SCRA 744, p.
764, that "the drafters of the Constitution also unequivocally affirmed that aside from national security matters and
intelligence information, trade or industrial secrets (pursuant to the Intellectual Property Code and other related laws) as
well as banking transactions (pursuant to the Secrecy of Bank Deposit Act) are also exempted from compulsory
disclosure."
Trade secrets may not be the subject of compulsory disclosure. By reason of [their] confidential and privileged
character, ingredients or chemical components of the products ordered by this Court to be disclosed constitute trade
secrets lest [herein respondent] would eventually be exposed to unwarranted business competition with others who may
imitate and market the same kinds of products in violation of [respondent’s] proprietary rights. Being privileged, the
detailed list of ingredients or chemical components may not be the subject of mode of discovery under Rule 27, Section
1 of the Rules of Court, which expressly makes privileged information an exception from its coverage.13
Alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court with the Court of Appeals, which denied the Petition and affirmed the Order dated 30 June 2004 of the
RTC.
The Court of Appeals ruled that to compel respondent to reveal in detail the list of ingredients of its lubricants is to
disregard respondent’s rights over its trade secrets. It was categorical in declaring that the chemical formulation of
respondent’s products and their ingredients are embraced within the meaning of "trade secrets." In disallowing the
disclosure, the Court of Appeals expounded, thus:
The Supreme Court in Garcia v. Board of Investments (177 SCRA 374 [1989]) held that trade secrets and confidential,
commercial and financial information are exempt from public scrutiny. This is reiterated in Chavez v. Presidential
Commission on Good Government (299 SCRA 744 [1998]) where the Supreme Court enumerated the kinds of
information and transactions that are recognized as restrictions on or privileges against compulsory disclosure. There,
the Supreme Court explicitly stated that:
"The drafters of the Constitution also unequivocally affirmed that, aside from national security matters and intelligence
information, trade or industrial secrets (pursuant to the Intellectual Property Code and other related laws) as well as
banking transactions (pursuant to the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act) re also exempt from compulsory disclosure."
It is thus clear from the foregoing that a party cannot be compelled to produce, release or disclose documents, papers,
or any object which are considered trade secrets.
In the instant case, petitioner [Air Philippines Corporation] would have [respondent] Pennswell produce a detailed list of
ingredients or composition of the latter’s lubricant products so that a chemical comparison and analysis thereof can be
obtained. On this note, We believe and so hold that the ingredients or composition of [respondent] Pennswell’s
lubricants are trade secrets which it cannot be compelled to disclose.
[Respondent] Pennswell has a proprietary or economic right over the ingredients or components of its lubricant
products. The formulation thereof is not known to the general public and is peculiar only to [respondent] Pennswell. The
legitimate and economic interests of business enterprises in protecting their manufacturing and business secrets are
well-recognized in our system.
[Respondent] Pennswell has a right to guard its trade secrets, manufacturing formulas, marketing strategies and other
confidential programs and information against the public. Otherwise, such information can be illegally and unfairly
4|P a g e
utilized by business competitors who, through their access to [respondent] Pennswell’s business secrets, may use the
same for their own private gain and to the irreparable prejudice of the latter.
xxxx
In the case before Us, the alleged trade secrets have a factual basis, i.e., it comprises of the ingredients and formulation
of [respondent] Pennswell’s lubricant products which are unknown to the public and peculiar only to Pennswell.
All told, We find no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of public respondent
Judge in finding that the detailed list of ingredients or composition of the subject lubricant products which petitioner [Air
Philippines Corporation] seeks to be disclosed are trade secrets of [respondent] Pennswell; hence, privileged against
compulsory disclosure.14
Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied.
Unyielding, petitioner brought the instant Petition before us, on the sole issue of:
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS RULED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PREVAILING LAWS AND
JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT UPHELD THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE CHEMICAL COMPONENTS
OR INGREDIENTS OF RESPONDENT’S PRODUCTS ARE TRADE SECRETS OR INDUSTRIAL SECRETS THAT
ARE NOT SUBJECT TO COMPULSORY DISCLOSURE.15
Petitioner seeks to convince this Court that it has a right to obtain the chemical composition and ingredients of
respondent’s products to conduct a comparative analysis of its products. Petitioner assails the conclusion reached by
the Court of Appeals that the matters are trade secrets which are protected by law and beyond public scrutiny. Relying
on Section 1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Court, petitioner argues that the use of modes of discovery operates with desirable
flexibility under the discretionary control of the trial court. Furthermore, petitioner posits that its request is not done in
bad faith or in any manner as to annoy, embarrass, or oppress respondent.
A trade secret is defined as a plan or process, tool, mechanism or compound known only to its owner and those of his
employees to whom it is necessary to confide it.16 The definition also extends to a secret formula or process not
patented, but known only to certain individuals using it in compounding some article of trade having a commercial
value.17 A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device, or compilation of information that: (1) is used in
one's business; and (2) gives the employer an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not possess
the information.18 Generally, a trade secret is a process or device intended for continuous use in the operation of the
business, for example, a machine or formula, but can be a price list or catalogue or specialized customer list.19 It is
indubitable that trade secrets constitute proprietary rights. The inventor, discoverer, or possessor of a trade secret or
similar innovation has rights therein which may be treated as property, and ordinarily an injunction will be granted to
prevent the disclosure of the trade secret by one who obtained the information "in confidence" or through a "confidential
relationship."20 American jurisprudence has utilized the following factors21 to determine if an information is a trade
secret, to wit:
(1) the extent to which the information is known outside of the employer's business;
(2) the extent to which the information is known by employees and others involved in the business;
(3) the extent of measures taken by the employer to guard the secrecy of the information;
 (4) the value of the information to the employer and to competitors;
(5) the amount of effort or money expended by the company in developing the information; and
(6) the extent to which the information could be easily or readily obtained through an independent source. 22
In Cocoland Development Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission,23 the issue was the legality of an
employee’s termination on the ground of unauthorized disclosure of trade secrets. The Court laid down the rule that any
determination by management as to the confidential nature of technologies, processes, formulae or other so-called
trade secrets must have a substantial factual basis which can pass judicial scrutiny. The Court rejected the employer’s
naked contention that its own determination as to what constitutes a trade secret should be binding and conclusive upon
the NLRC. As a caveat, the Court said that to rule otherwise would be to permit an employer to label almost anything a
trade secret, and thereby create a weapon with which he/it may arbitrarily dismiss an employee on the pretext that the
latter somehow disclosed a trade secret, even if in fact there be none at all to speak of.24 Hence, in Cocoland, the
parameters in the determination of trade secrets were set to be such substantial factual basis that can withstand judicial
scrutiny.
The chemical composition, formulation, and ingredients of respondent’s special lubricants are trade secrets within the
contemplation of the law. Respondent was established to engage in the business of general manufacturing and selling
of, and to deal in, distribute, sell or otherwise dispose of goods, wares, merchandise, products, including but not limited
to industrial chemicals, solvents, lubricants, acids, alkalies, salts, paints, oils, varnishes, colors, pigments and similar
preparations, among others. It is unmistakable to our minds that the manufacture and production of respondent’s
products proceed from a formulation of a secret list of ingredients. In the creation of its lubricants, respondent expended
efforts, skills, research, and resources. What it had achieved by virtue of its investments may not be wrested from
respondent on the mere pretext that it is necessary for petitioner’s defense against a collection for a sum of money. By
and large, the value of the information to respondent is crystal clear. The ingredients constitute the very fabric of
respondent’s production and business. No doubt, the information is also valuable to respondent’s competitors. To
compel its disclosure is to cripple respondent’s business, and to place it at an undue disadvantage. If the chemical
composition of respondent’s lubricants are opened to public scrutiny, it will stand to lose the backbone on which its
business is founded. This would result in nothing less than the probable demise of respondent’s business.
Respondent’s proprietary interest over the ingredients which it had developed and expended money and effort on is
incontrovertible. Our conclusion is that the detailed ingredients sought to be revealed have a commercial value to
respondent. Not only do we acknowledge the fact that the information grants it a competitive advantage; we also find
that there is clearly a glaring intent on the part of respondent to keep the information confidential and not available to the
prying public.
We now take a look at Section 1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Court, which permits parties to inspect documents or things
upon a showing of good cause before the court in which an action is pending. Its entire provision reads:
SECTION 1. Motion for production or inspection order. – Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefore, the
court in which an action is pending may (a) order any party to produce and permit the inspection and copying or
photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party, of any designated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters,
photographs, objects or tangible things, not privileged, which constitute or contain evidence material to any matter
involved in the action and which are in his possession, custody or control; or (b) order any party to permit entry upon
designated land or other property in his possession or control for the purpose of inspecting, measuring, surveying, or
photographing the property or any designated relevant object or operation thereon. The order shall specify the time,
place and manner of making the inspection and taking copies and photographs, and may prescribe such terms and
conditions as are just.
5|P a g e
A more than cursory glance at the above text would show that the production or inspection of documents or things as a
mode of discovery sanctioned by the Rules of Court may be availed of by any party upon a showing of good cause
therefor before the court in which an action is pending. The court may order any party: a) to produce and permit the
inspection and copying or photographing of any designated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs,
objects or tangible things, which are not privileged;25 which constitute or contain evidence material to any matter
involved in the action; and which are in his possession, custody or control; or b) to permit entry upon designated land or
other property in his possession or control for the purpose of inspecting, measuring, surveying, or photographing the
property or any designated relevant object or operation thereon.
Rule 27 sets an unequivocal proviso that the documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or
tangible things that may be produced and inspected should not be privileged.26 The documents must not be privileged
against disclosure.27 On the ground of public policy, the rules providing for production and inspection of books and
papers do not authorize the production or inspection of privileged matter; that is, books and papers which, because of
their confidential and privileged character, could not be received in evidence.28 Such a condition is in addition to the
requisite that the items be specifically described, and must constitute or contain evidence material to any matter
involved in the action and which are in the party’s possession, custody or control.
Section 2429 of Rule 130 draws the types of disqualification by reason of privileged communication, to wit: (a)
communication between husband and wife; (b) communication between attorney and client; (c) communication between
physician and patient; (d) communication between priest and penitent; and (e) public officers and public interest. There
are, however, other privileged matters that are not mentioned by Rule 130. Among them are the following: (a) editors
may not be compelled to disclose the source of published news; (b) voters may not be compelled to disclose for whom
they voted; (c) trade secrets; (d) information contained in tax census returns; and (d) bank deposits. 30
We, thus, rule against the petitioner. We affirm the ruling of the Court of Appeals which upheld the finding of the RTC
that there is substantial basis for respondent to seek protection of the law for its proprietary rights over the detailed
chemical composition of its products.
That trade secrets are of a privileged nature is beyond quibble. The protection that this jurisdiction affords to trade
secrets is evident in our laws. The Interim Rules of Procedure on Government Rehabilitation, effective 15 December
2000, which applies to: (1) petitions for rehabilitation filed by corporations, partnerships, and associations pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 902-A,31 as amended; and (2) cases for rehabilitation transferred from the Securities and
Exchange Commission to the RTCs pursuant to Republic Act No. 8799, otherwise known as The Securities Regulation
Code, expressly provides that the court may issue an order to protect trade secrets or other confidential research,
development, or commercial information belonging to the debtor.32 Moreover, the Securities Regulation Code is explicit
that the Securities and Exchange Commission is not required or authorized to require the revelation of trade secrets or
processes in any application, report or document filed with the Commission.33 This confidentiality is made paramount as
a limitation to the right of any member of the general public, upon request, to have access to all information filed with the
Commission.34
Furthermore, the Revised Penal Code endows a cloak of protection to trade secrets under the following articles:
Art. 291. Revealing secrets with abuse of office. — The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos
shall be imposed upon any manager, employee or servant who, in such capacity, shall learn the secrets of his principal
or master and shall reveal such secrets.
Art. 292. Revelation of industrial secrets. — The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods and
a fine not exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed upon the person in charge, employee or workman of any
manufacturing or industrial establishment who, to the prejudice of the owner thereof, shall reveal the secrets of the
industry of
the latter.
Similarly, Republic Act No. 8424, otherwise known as the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997, has a restrictive
provision on trade secrets, penalizing the revelation thereof by internal revenue officers or employees, to wit:
SECTION 278. Procuring Unlawful Divulgence of Trade Secrets. - Any person who causes or procures an officer or
employee of the Bureau of Internal Revenue to divulge any confidential information regarding the business, income or
inheritance of any taxpayer, knowledge of which was acquired by him in the discharge of his official duties, and which it
is unlawful for him to reveal, and any person who publishes or prints in any manner whatever, not provided by law, any
income, profit, loss or expenditure appearing in any income tax return, shall be punished by a fine of not more than two
thousand pesos (P2,000), or suffer imprisonment of not less than six (6) months nor more than five (5) years, or both.
Republic Act No. 6969, or the Toxic Substances and Hazardous and Nuclear Wastes Control Act of 1990, enacted to
implement the policy of the state to regulate, restrict or prohibit the importation, manufacture, processing, sale,
distribution, use and disposal of chemical substances and mixtures that present unreasonable risk and/or injury to
health or the environment, also contains a provision that limits the right of the public to have access to records,
reports or information concerning chemical substances and mixtures including safety data submitted and data
on emission or discharge into the environment, if the matter is confidential such that it would divulge trade
secrets, production or sales figures; or methods, production or processes unique to such manufacturer,
processor or distributor; or would otherwise tend to affect adversely the competitive position of such
manufacturer, processor or distributor.35
Clearly, in accordance with our statutory laws, this Court has declared that intellectual and industrial property rights
cases are not simple property cases.36 Without limiting such industrial property rights to trademarks and trade names,
this Court has ruled that all agreements concerning intellectual property are intimately connected with economic
development.37 The protection of industrial property encourages investments in new ideas and inventions and stimulates
creative efforts for the satisfaction of human needs. It speeds up transfer of technology and industrialization, and
thereby bring about social and economic progress.38 Verily, the protection of industrial secrets is inextricably linked to
the advancement of our economy and fosters healthy competition in trade.
Jurisprudence has consistently acknowledged the private character of trade secrets.1âwphi1 There is a privilege not to
disclose one’s trade secrets.39 Foremost, this Court has declared that trade secrets and banking transactions are among
the recognized restrictions to the right of the people to information as embodied in the Constitution.40 We said that the
drafters of the Constitution also unequivocally affirmed that, aside from national security matters and intelligence
information, trade or industrial secrets (pursuant to the Intellectual Property Code and other related laws) as well as
banking transactions (pursuant to the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act), are also exempted from compulsory disclosure.41
Significantly, our cases on labor are replete with examples of a protectionist stance towards the trade secrets of
employers. For instance, this Court upheld the validity of the policy of a pharmaceutical company prohibiting its
employees from marrying employees of any competitor company, on the rationalization that the company has a right to
guard its trade secrets, manufacturing formulas, marketing strategies and other confidential programs and information
from competitors.42 Notably, it was in a labor-related case that this Court made a stark ruling on the proper
determination of trade secrets.
In the case at bar, petitioner cannot rely on Section 7743 of Republic Act 7394, or the Consumer Act of the Philippines, in
order to compel respondent to reveal the chemical components of its products. While it is true that all consumer
products domestically sold, whether manufactured locally or imported, shall indicate their general make or active
ingredients in their respective labels of packaging, the law does not apply to respondent. Respondent’s specialized
6|P a g e
lubricants -- namely, Contact Grease, Connector Grease, Thixohtropic Grease, Di-Electric Strength Protective Coating,
Dry Lubricant and Anti-Seize Compound -- are not consumer products. "Consumer products," as it is defined in Article
4(q),44 refers to goods, services and credits, debts or obligations which are primarily for personal, family, household or
agricultural purposes, which shall include, but not be limited to, food, drugs, cosmetics, and devices. This is not the
nature of respondent’s products. Its products are not intended for personal, family, household or agricultural purposes.
Rather, they are for industrial use, specifically for the use of aircraft propellers and engines.
Petitioner’s argument that Republic Act No. 8203, or the Special Law on Counterfeit Drugs, requires the disclosure of
the active ingredients of a drug is also on faulty ground.45 Respondent’s products are outside the scope of the cited law.
They do not come within the purview of a drug46 which, as defined therein, refers to any chemical compound or
biological substance, other than food, that is intended for use in the treatment, prevention or diagnosis of disease in
man or animals. Again, such are not the characteristics of respondent’s products.
What is clear from the factual findings of the RTC and the Court of Appeals is that the chemical formulation of
respondent’s products is not known to the general public and is unique only to it. Both courts uniformly ruled that these
ingredients are not within the knowledge of the public. Since such factual findings are generally not reviewable by this
Court, it is not duty-bound to analyze and weigh all over again the evidence already considered in the proceedings
below.47 We need not delve into the factual bases of such findings as questions of fact are beyond the pale of Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court. Factual findings of the trial court when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding and conclusive
on the Supreme Court.48
We do not find merit or applicability in petitioner’s invocation of Section 1249 of the Toxic Substances and Hazardous
and Nuclear Wastes Control Act of 1990, which grants the public access to records, reports or information concerning
chemical substances and mixtures, including safety data submitted, and data on emission or discharge into the
environment. To reiterate, Section 1250 of said Act deems as confidential matters, which may not be made public,
those that would divulge trade secrets, including production or sales figures or methods; production or processes unique
to such manufacturer, processor or distributor, or would otherwise tend to affect adversely the competitive position of
such manufacturer, processor or distributor. It is true that under the same Act, the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources may release information; however, the clear import of the law is that said authority is limited by the
right to confidentiality of the manufacturer, processor or distributor, which information may be released only to a medical
research or scientific institution where the information is needed for the purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment of a
person exposed to the chemical substance or mixture. The right to confidentiality is recognized by said Act as
primordial. Petitioner has not made the slightest attempt to show that these circumstances are availing in the case at
bar.
Indeed, the privilege is not absolute; the trial court may compel disclosure where it is indispensable for doing
justice.51 We do not, however, find reason to except respondent’s trade secrets from the application of the rule on
privilege. The revelation of respondent’s trade secrets serves no better purpose to the disposition of the main case
pending with the RTC, which is on the collection of a sum of money. As can be gleaned from the facts, petitioner
received respondent’s goods in trade in the normal course of business. To be sure, there are defenses under the laws
of contracts and sales available to petitioner. On the other hand, the greater interest of justice ought to favor respondent
as the holder of trade secrets. If we were to weigh the conflicting interests between the parties, we rule in favor of the
greater interest of respondent. Trade secrets should receive greater protection from discovery, because they derive
economic value from being generally unknown and not readily ascertainable by the public.52To the mind of this Court,
petitioner was not able to show a compelling reason for us to lift the veil of confidentiality which shields respondent’s
trade secrets.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 16 February 2006, and the Resolution dated 25 May 2006,
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 86329 are AFFIRMED. No costs. SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 118940-41 and G.R. No. 119407 July 7, 1997
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
GREGORIO MEJIA y VILLAFANIA, EDWIN BENITO, PEDRO PARAAN, and JOSEPH FABITO, accused-appellants.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
In the evening of 10 March 1994, along the expressway at Barangay Ventinilla, Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan, several
persons on board a passenger jeepney driven by Teofilo Landingin attacked the latter and a passenger, Virgilio
Catugas, thereby inflicting upon them multiple stab wounds. Landingin was pulled out from his seat and dumped on the
shoulder of the road. One of the attackers took the wheel of the jeepney and drove away. Catugas was thrown out to
the middle of the road when the jeepney started to move away. Landingin died as a consequence of the injuries he
sustained. Catugas survived.
Held to account for the above acts were Gregorio Mejia, Edwin Benito, Pedro Paraan, Joseph Fabito, Romulo
Calimquim, one alias Dennis, Alex Mamaril, one alias Mondragon, and another unidentified person. Mejia and Benito
were taken into police custody a few hours after the incident; Paraan, the following day; and Fabito, five days after.
Calimquim was found dead three days after the incident in question, while the others have remained at large. Three
separate criminal complaints for murder, 1 frustrated murder, 2 and violation of R.A. No. 6539 (Anti Carnapping Act of
1992, as amended) 3 were filed against them with the Municipal Trial Court of Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan.
Despite service on them of subpoenas requiring submission of counter- affidavits, accused Mejia, Benito, Paraan, and
Fabito and did not submit their counter-affidavits.
On 9 May 1994, Judge Lilia C. Espanol issued an order 4 declaring the accused "to have waived their right to be heard
in preliminary investigation"; finding a prima facie case against the accused; recommending that they be charged with
and prosecuted for the crimes of murder, frustrated murder, and violation of R.A. No. 6539, as amended; and ordering
that the records of the cases be forwarded to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for appropriate action.
After appropriate proceedings, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pangasinan filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Dagupan City three separate informations for murder, frustrated murder, and violation of the Anti-Carnapping
Act of 1972, as amended, against the aforenamed persons. The informations were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos.
94-00617-D, 94-00619-D, and 94-00620-D, respectively. The first was later amended. The accusatory portions of the
informations read as follows:
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 94-00617-D (as amended)
That on or about March 10, 1994 in the evening along the expressway at barangay Ventinilla, Municipality of
Sta. Barbara, province of Pangasinan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, armed with knives with intent to kill, treachery, evident premeditation and taking
advantage of superior strength, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack and stab TEOFILO LANDINGIN inflicting upon him stab
wounds which caused his instant death to the damage and prejudice of his heirs.
Contrary to Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. 5
7|P a g e
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 94-00619-D
That on or about March 10, 1994 in the evening along the expressway at barangay Ventinilla, Municipality of
Sta. Barbara, province of Pangasinan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, armed with knives and with intent to kill, treachery, evident premeditation, and taking
advantage of superior strength, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack and stab VIRGILIO CATUGAS Y CASTAÑEDA inflicting upon
him multiple stab wounds, the accused having then performed all the acts of execution which would have
produced the crime of Murder as a consequence but which nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of
causes independent of the will of the accused and that is due to the timely and able medical assistance
rendered to said Virgilio Catugas y Castañeda which prevented his death to his damage and prejudice.
Contrary to Art. 248 in relation with Art. 6 of the Revised Penal Code. 6
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 94-00620-D
That on or about March 10, 1994 in the evening along the expressway at barangay Ventinilla, Municipality of
Sta. Barbara, province of Pangasinan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused armed with knives by means of violence against person by stabbing to death
TEOFILO LANDINGIN, owner-driver of a passenger jeep bearing Plate No. APP-432 with marking Lovely and
thereafter with intent to gain, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take and drive away said passenger jeep bearing Plate No. APP-432 with
marking Lovely owned and driven by Teofilo Landingin without the latter's consent, to the damage and
prejudice of his heirs.
Contrary to Republic Act 6539 as amended. 7
The first two were assigned to Branch 44 of the RTC of Dagupan City presided by Judge Crispin C. Laron (hereafter,
LARON court) and thereafter consolidated and jointly tried. The third was assigned to Branch 43 of the said court
presided by Judge Silverio Q. Castillo (hereafter, CASTILLO court).
At their arraignments, Mejia, Benito, Paraan, and Fabito entered a plea of innocence in each case.
I
THE CASE IN THE LARON COURT
In Criminal Case No. 94-00617-D (Murder) and Criminal Case No. 94-00619-D (Frustrated Murder) in the LARON court,
the prosecution presented the following witnesses: Virgilio Catugas, policemen Dominguillo Gulen and Bernardo
Clemente, Dr. Cristito Garcia, Ma. Nora Landingin, and Dr. Roberto Valenzuela. Virgilio Catugas was recalled as
rebuttal witness. In their defense, accused Mejia, Benito, Paraan, and Fabito took the witness stand. They also
presented as additional witnesses Roberto Lambot, Shirley Lomboy, Conrado Benito, policeman Bernardo Clemente,
and Felicidad Fabito in their evidence in chief and Julia Paraan as sur-rebuttal witness.
The evidence for the prosecution in these cases may be summarized as follows:
At around 7:00 p.m. of 10 March 1994, Virgilio Catugas was in front of the CSI Supermarket in Dagupan City waiting for
a transportation to take him to his home at Talibaew, Calasiao, Pangasinan. Later, a passenger jeepney plying the
Dagupan City — Calasiao route and driven by Teofilo Landingin arrived. He boarded it and occupied that portion of the
passengers' seat behind the driver's seat. There were already some passengers inside the jeepney, but they
disembarked before the jeepney reached the boundary of Dagupan City and Calasiao, leaving behind Landingin,
Catugas, and two other passengers. 8
When the jeepney reached the MacArthur Highway in San Miguel, Calasiao, nine persons flagged down the jeepney
and boarded it. One of them, whom Catugas identified to be accused Edwin Benito, sat beside the driver; the rest took
the passenger seats behind the driver's seat. Catugas fully recognized Benito because there was light at the ceiling of
the jeepney and at the "signboard" portion of the jeepney and the latter sometimes turned his face toward the back
where Catugas was seated. Catugas had further observed Benito's face, ears, and eyes. 9He also recognized accused
Mejia, Fabito, and Paraan. 10
The nine passengers told Landingin that they were bound for Pangasinan Village Inn (PVI) in Bued, Calasiao. But when
they reached PVI, one of them said that his companions did not know where they were going, and informed Landingin
that he would take care of the fare upon reaching Nansangaan, Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan. Upon reaching Nansangaan,
one of the nine passengers asked Landingin to drive a little farther. Later, Mejia asked Catugas whether he was
Landingin's companion; Catugas answered in the affirmative. Mejia then announced: "[T]his is a hold-up"; while Benito
said: "[N]obody will be able to be saved his life [sic]." Another companion of Mejia said: "Proceed." All of the nine drew
their daggers and stabbed Landingin and Catugas. 11
Landingin died on that same evening. Dr. Cristito Garcia, who conducted an autopsy on Landingin's cadaver, found
three stab wounds — two of which were fatal. According to him, the cause of Landingin's death was cardiorespiratory
arrest resulting from hypovolemic shock due to internal hemorrhage. 12 Nora Landingin, wife of Teofilo Landingin, spent
P1,500 daily during the wake of her husband; P12,000 for his burial; and P16,000 for the tomb. Nora felt sad because of
his death. 13
On the other hand, Catugas, who was pushed out of the jeepney and landed on the road, was brought by some people
to the Villaflor Memorial Hospital. 14 Dr. Roberto Valenzuela performed on Catugas exploratory laparatomy debridement
and found three multi-lacerations in the right upper extremities and several others on the left upper extremities which
could have been caused by bladed instruments. 15 Catugas survived and was confined for seven days. He spent more
than P50,000 for his hospitalization and medical expenses. The hospital billed him in the amount of P44,667.25. 16
In the same evening of 10 March 1994, while Policeman Dominguillo Gulen of the Mabini Police Station, Mabini,
Pangasinan, was approaching his residence at the poblacion in Sual, Pangasinan, on board a police patrol car, he saw
six men walking in front of his house. When he stopped the car, the men ran away. He gave chase and caught two of
them, namely, accused Mejia and Benito. Gulen thought that they belonged to an "akyat-bahaygang." When asked what
they were doing, the two answered that they were not doing anything and that they were not robbers. They told Gulen
that they were from Sta. Barbara. Benito even showed his driver's license and told Gulen that he did not commit any
crime and that he was willing to go to the police station. Gulen then brought the two and turned them over to the police
station in Sual, Pangasinan. 17
Policeman Bernardo Clemente, who was the desk officer at 1:00 a.m. of 11 March 1994, entered in the police blotter
this turn-over and talked to the two. In the course of their conversation, Benito reported that they rode on a jeepney,
which was abandoned somewhere in Sual. Clemente decided to make a follow-up of this report. With Benito as their
guide, Clemente and three other policemen were able to find the jeepney with the marking LOVELY in Sitio Nipa,
Barangay Baguioen, Sual, Pangasinan. The jeepney had bloodstains on the front and back seats. They brought it to the
police station and had the matter recorded in the police blotter. Clemente then instructed the radio operator to call the
police station of Sta. Barbara and inform it of the turn-over of Mejia and Benito. At 1:45 a.m. of 11 March 1994, the PNP
elements of Sta. Barbara Police Station came and received the two, as well as the passenger jeepney. 18
8|P a g e
Also on 11 March 1994, at 12:00 noon, some concerned citizens of Sual apprehended Joseph Fabito in Sitio Looc,
Poblacion Sual, as a murder suspect. He was turned over to the Sual Police Station. After having been informed of this
arrest, the Sta. Barbara Police Station took him into its custody. These facts were entered in the Sual Police Station
blotter. 19
The accused admitted to having flagged down and boarded Landingin's jeepney that fateful evening of 10 March 1994,
but denied having committed the crimes. They claimed that it was Romulo Calimquim and his companions who killed
Landingin, stabbed Catugas, and drove away the jeepney. The following is a summary of their version of the events.
Edwin Benito, a resident of Ventinilla West, Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan, was the driver of the Elf truck of Lito Lomboy of
Bued, Calasiao, Pangasinan, which was used in hauling sand and gravel. His co-accused Mejia Paraan and Fabito
were his helpers.
At around 3:00 p.m. of 10 March 1994, after they completed delivering sand and gravel, the accused returned the truck
and went to the house of Fabito's brother-in-law in San Miguel, Calasiao. After two hours of waiting in vain for the
brother-in-law, Paraan suggested that they go to the house of his future brother-in-law in Bacayao Norte, Calasiao. After
some snacks they proceeded to the town proper and strolled for a while. Then, Benito thought that it was time to go
home to Sta. Barbara and suggested that they should. They proceeded to a waiting shed near the National High School
to wait for a transportation for Sta. Barbara. At the waiting shed, they saw Romulo Calimquim with three other
companions, who were also waiting for a transportation for Sta. Barbara. Calimquim then flagged down an approaching
passenger jeepney. He and his companions boarded it. So did Benito and his companions. Calimquim sat beside the
driver. The rest took the back seat. 20
According to Paraan, it was Alex Mamaril, the man with a "huge body," who sat beside the driver. 21
At the junction of the roads leading to the Municipal Hall of Sta. Barbara and that leading to the national highway, the
man who sat beside the driver (Calimquim, according to Benito; Mamaril, according to Paraan) ordered the driver to
proceed to the national highway; the driver did. But after reaching the highway, in Ventinilla, Sta. Barbara, the former
ordered the latter to stop, announced that "this is a hold up," then stabbed the driver several times, pulled his body out
of the jeepney, took over the wheel, and drove the jeepney. 22 In the meantime, at the back seat, one of the companions
of Calimquim pointed a knife at Benito; while the others told Benito's companions to lie on their belly. It was when
Catugas attempted to fight back that he was stabbed. 23 Catugas was then thrown out of the jeepney. 24
Benito and his companions were prevented by the group of Calimquim from alighting from the jeepney. Upon reaching a
mountain in Sual,
Pangasinan, 25 the man on the wheel ordered Benito, Mejia, Paraan, and Fabito to alight from the jeepney. The group of
Calimquim pointed knives 26 and a
gun 27 at them. Then suddenly there was a light coming from below. They ran away from the group of Calimquim. 28
Benito and Mejia were together. 29 Later, a policeman saw them. The two told the policeman that they are not
"troublesome persons." The policeman brought them to the Police Station of Sual. There, Benito reported what had
happened and accompanied the policemen to the place where the jeepney in question was located. 30 Afterwards, the
two were detained at Sta. Barbara Police Station. While in detention, they were informed that Calimquim was killed and
his body was found in Alaminos. 31
Paraan lost his way. He returned to Sta. Barbara only on 14 March 1994 and went to the house of Roland, his brother-
in-law, in Bacayao Norte, to ask him to request a barangay councilman to accompany him to the police station. It was
the barangay captain who accompanied him the following day to the police station. There, the police authorities told him
that he was among the assailants of Landingin and that he was the one who stabbed Catugas in the night of 10 March
1994 and one of the suspects in the carnapping of the jeepney of Landingin. 32Paraan was forthwith placed inside the
jail.
Fabito stayed for awhile in the mountain. At 2:00 a.m. of 11 March 1994, he was by the seashore. He stayed there until
6:00 a.m. and inquired from someone the location of the police station. He went to that station which happened to be
Sual Police Station. There, he narrated to the policemen what had happened. When a policeman asked him whether he
was the killer, he answered in the negative. At around 1:00 p.m., he was brought to the Sta. Barbara Municipal Jail,
where he was detained for three months. Then, he was committed to the Provincial Jail. 33
Sometime after Catugas was discharged from the hospital and was already driving a tricycle, the parents of the accused
met with him and informed him that the accused told them that they (the accused) did not commit any wrong. Catugas
answered that he had suffered several wounds and spent much for his hospitalization and that since the accused were
the ones apprehended, he would just tell a lie so he could recover the amounts he spent. Catugas then asked P20,000
from each of the accused, or a total of P80,000, and repeated this demand five to six times. 34
The defense, through the testimony of Policemen Bernardo Clemente, also proved that Romulo Calimquim died due to
a gunshot wound on 13 March 1994 in Barangay Paitan West, Sual, Pangasinan, as evidenced by Entry No. 4338 of
Page 260 of the Police Blotter. 35
On rebuttal, Catugas insisted that it was accused Edwin Benito who stabbed Landingin and that accused Mejia, Paraan,
and Fabito were the ones who stabbed him. He further declared that it was the parents of the accused who offered to
pay him, but he refused because such an offer could not "be accepted by [his] conscience." 36
The defense then presented Julia Paraan as surrebuttal witness. She denounced as untrue the testimony on rebuttal of
Catugas that the parents of accused were the ones who offered to pay him money. Julia declared that they visited
Catugas to ask him whether it was true that their children committed the crime. On their first visit, Catugas told them that
he could not yet answer that question; but when they returned, Catugas told them that they had to pay the aggregate
sum of P80,000, or P20,000 per family of the accused. 37
The trial court gave full credit to the version of the prosecution and relied heavily on the identification of the accused by
Catugas, the absence of ulterior motive on the part of the latter, and the offer of the parents of the accused to
compromise the cases.
In its decision dated 17 November 1994, 38 the LARON court convicted accused Mejia, Benito, Paraan, and Fabito of the
crime of murder and of frustrated murder, with treachery as the qualifying circumstance and nighttime and band as
aggravating circumstances. Accordingly, it sentenced the first three accused to suffer the penalty of death for the crime
of murder; and ten years and one day of prision mayor to seventeen years, four months, and one day of reclusion
temporal for the crime of frustrated murder. It credited Paraan with the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority, he
being only seventeen years old at the time of the commission of the crimes charged; and sentenced him to reclusion
perpetua for murder, and six years of prision correccional to ten years an one day of prision mayor for frustrated murder.
The Court also ordered the four accused to pay the heirs of Teofilo Landingin the amounts of P50,000 as death
indemnity; P16,000 for the cost of the tomb; and P12,000 for funeral expenses; and to pay Catugas the amount of
P44,687.25 for hospital expenses, plus costs.
II
THE CASE IN THE CASTILLO COURT
9|P a g e
In Criminal Case No. 94-00620-D (violation of the Anti-Carnapping Act) in the CASTILLO Court, the prosecution
presented as its witnesses Virgilio Catugas and Nora Landingin. The former was recalled as rebuttal witness. The
accused Mejia, Benito, Paraan, and Fabito took the witness stand and presented as additional witnesses Conrado
Benito and Felicidad Fabito. Their testimonies were substantially the same as those they made in the murder and
frustrated murder cases in the LARON court.
Prosecution witness Virgilio Catugas added that after Landingin was stabbed, he was thrown out of the jeepney to the
shoulder of the road and that one of the culprits took the wheel of the jeepney, started off its engine, and drove off. 39 He
further declared that while he was confined at the hospital, the policemen of Sta. Barbara investigated him, showed him
pictures of the suspects, supplied the suspect's names, 40 and took his statement. 41 After he was discharged therefrom,
he was able to talk with the father of accused Benito. He told the father of his hospitalization expenses and asked
P80,000, as a settlement of the case, to be paid by the parents of the accused on an agreed date; but before that date
came, he had already testified against the accused. 42
Prosecution witness Nora Landingin, widow of Teofilo Landingin, further testified that her husband owned the passenger
jeepney in question, as evidenced by Certificate of Registration No. 19253856, 43 and Official Receipt No. MVRR
91354948. 44 The jeepney was worth P140,000. 45
The CASTILLO court gave full faith to the testimony of Virgilio Catugas. It debunked the version of the defense on
account of the following "inculpating evidence," which, according to it, bolstered its finding that the accused were the
authors of the crime charged:
1. Accused Gregorio Mejia, Edwin Benito, Joseph Fabito and Pedro Paraan speak of
innocence and fear for their lives during the ruthless incident, unfortunately they never
sustained any bodily injury on their bodies.
If the intention of Mok Calimquim and company is to hurt anybody, they could not have
concentrated on the persons of Teofilo Landingin and Virgilio Catugas only but they
should have also inflicted stabbing thrusts against their persons (accused).
2. They (accused) posited that for fear of their lives they did not do anything except to
passively stay at the back seat of the jeepney motionless from the place of stabbing
incident in Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan up to the mountains in Sual, Pangasinan.
Again, if one of the motives of Mok and company is to carnapp [sic] the passenger
jeepney of Teofilo Landingin then the logical conclusion that can be had in the instant
situation is for the group of Mok to liquidate the driver and all passengers for that matter,
including the four (4) accused to eliminate the presence of eyewitnesses.
Unfortunately, the four (4) accused joined the group of Mok in going to Sual, Pangasinan
without offering any slight resistance in the premises.
The natural conclusion that can be derived thereat is that, Mok and company belonged
to the group of the four (4) accused who were responsible in perpetrating the offense
charged.
3. Assuming en gratia argumenti that Mok and company are the real offenders, why is it
that during the long span of travel from Sta. Barbara to Sual, they never made any
 attempt to jump off the passenger jeepney; neither did they show positive signs to invite
the attention of PNP members stationed along the long route starting in Dagupan City,
Binmaley, Lingayen, Bugallon, Labrador, Pangasinan.
4. Accused Gregorio Mejia and Edwin Benito steadfastly claim innocence of the crime
charged. In fact, they averred that upon reaching Sual, Pangasinan, they reported to the
responding peace officers what happened to them and that their reports was recorded in
the Police Blotter of Sual Station.
The assertion of accused Benito and Mejia is tainted with absolute falsity and is
debunked by the entry in the Police Blotter of Sual Police Station (Exh. G); the subject
certification negates accused's statement of innocence. The subject entry which is
contained in the Book of Events of Sual Police Station belies any complaint/report made
by accused Edwin Benito/Gregorio Mejia that they were kidnapped or deprived of their
liberty with the use of guns and bladed weapons. Upon the other hand, the Certification
squarely bespeaks of the incarceration/detention of said accused (Mejia and Benito) at
Sual Police Station for they were suspected of having carnapped the passenger jeepney
involved in the above case.
5. With respect to accused Joseph Fabito and Pedro Paraan, they likewise vehemently
denied the accusation lodged against them. Unfortunately, their conclusion of innocence
crumbled when they joined the group from the crime scene starting in Sta. Barbara,
Pangasinan up to their destination in Sual, Pangasinan. In fact when they reached Sual,
Pangasinan they scampered and run away to different directions to avoid apprehension.
Instead of proceeding to the Sual Police Station or making any report to the nearest
authorityi.e. Barangay Captain of the place they decided to escape which they did with
impunity. The records in the Police Blotter of Sual is negatived (sic) of any entry about
the whereabouts of accused Paraan and Fabito. 46
The court then convicted accused Gregorio Mejia, Edwin Benito, Pedro Paraan, and Joseph Fabito guilty of the violation
of the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, as amended. It sentenced the first three accused to death; and Paraan, to reclusion
perpetua on account of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority. It also ordered them to pay the costs.
III
THE APPEALS AND ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
Although review in cases where the death penalty is imposed by the trial court is automatic pursuant to Section 22 of
R.A. No. 7659, 47 the convicted accused filed with this Court their notices of appeal from the decision of the LARON
court and of the CASTILLO court on 18 November 1994 and 22 February 1995, respectively.
Criminal Cases Nos. 94-00617-D and 94-00619-D were docketed in this Court as G.R. Nos. 118940-41, and Criminal
Case No. 94-00620-D was docketed as G.R. No. 119407.
On 2 February 1996, after they filed separate Appellant's Briefs in G.R. Nos. 118940-41 and in G.R. No. 119407, the
appellants filed a motion for the consolidation of these cases, which we granted on 27 February 1996.
10 | P a g e
In their Appellant's Brief in G.R. Nos. 118940-41, the appellants impute upon the trial court the following errors: (a) in
giving full faith and credence to the unsubstantiated testimony of prosecution witness Virgilio Catugas relative to the
incident in question; (b) in holding them as the persons who stabbed the jeepney driver and Virgilio Catugas in the
evening of 10 March 1994 despite the fact that clear and convincing evidence were proffered to point at the real culprits,
Romulo Calimquim and his companions; (c) in rendering a verdict of conviction notwithstanding the failure of the
prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt; and (d) in convicting them of the crimes charged instead of
the crimes homicide and frustrated homicide — on the assumption that they are guilty.
Being interrelated, the appellants discussed jointly these assigned errors. They submit that:
(1) The uncorroborated testimony of Catugas on the identification of the appellants
leaves much to be desired. He should not be believed, for he could not even remember
who among the appellants were wearing short pants, hat, and shoes at that time. If
policeman Gulen could not even identify in court appellant Mejia whom he apprehended
in the evening of 10 March 1994 and brought to the Sual Police Station, it was with more
reason that Catugas could not have identified the assailants since it was nighttime. The
possibility that Catugas got confused, if not mentally and physically drained, as a result
of the shocking incident is not far-fetched. There is then a very strong and compelling
reason to believe that Catugas mistook the appellants as the real hold-uppers.
(2) Catugas told Conrado Benito and Felicidad Fabito that their children did not commit
any wrong, but Catugas "vacillated and testified falsely against accused-appellants when
they were not able to produce the amount of P20,000.00 each as earlier demanded from
them." Catuga's denial of their testimony is self-serving and cannot overcome the
positive testimony of Conrado and Felicidad.
(3) The actuations of appellants specifically that of Edwin Benito augurs well with their
claim of innocence," when they were apprehended. Benito readily showed his driver's
license, answered questions propounded by policeman Clemente, and without hesitation
he helped or guided the policemen in locating the jeepney at the place where it was
abandoned. He did not try to hide or conceal anything when he was confronted about
the incident. Moreover, when Benito and Mejia were picked up by a policeman on that
fateful night, they were not "tainted with blood."
(4) On the assumption that they are guilty they could only be liable for homicide and
frustrated homicide, since treachery was not established.
In their Appellants' Brief in G.R. No. 119407, they make the following assignment of errors: (a) the facts charged in the
information do not constitute violation of the crime of Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, as amended; (b) The court a
quo erred in convicting them of the crime charged on the basis of surmises and conjecture; and (c) the court a quo erred
in convicting them by relying fully on the evidence of the prosecution and completely disregarding the evidence of the
defense.
As to the first, the appellants argue that intent to gain, which is an essential ingredient of the crime of carnapping, was
not proved. They claim that from the evidence adduced "it is very clear that the incident was only a hold-up and that the
jeepney was taken to Sual as escape vehicle."
In support of the second and third assigned errors, which they discussed jointly, the appellants submit that:
 (1) The trial court's conclusion on their culpability was based on mere surmises and
conjectures and contradicted by the evidence on the record. The fact that the group of
Calimqium did not hurt any of the four appellants and that the latter offered no resistance
does not prove appellant's membership in Calimquim's group. That they did not even
jump off the passenger jeepney or show positive signs to invite the attention of the PNP
stationed along the route from Dagupan City to Sual, it was because of fear since
Calimquim's group pointed knives at each of them and ordered them to lie down in
stooping position. The absence of conspiracy was shown by the fact that in Sual, after
they were released as hostages, they ran in separate directions and did not join the
group of Calimquim.
(2) The entry in the Sual Police Station police blotter that Benito and Mejia were
suspected of having carnapped the passenger jeepney does not bind them, for it was
made by a police officer and was contrary to what they had reported.
(3) There is no basis for the conclusion that Paraan and Fabito had escaped.
(4) The trial court should not have relied on the testimony of Catugas whose
identification of the appellants was based only on the pictures and on the information of
the policemen. It was impossible for Catugas to narrate in detail the participation of each
accused, considering that the light in the jeepney was dim and his principal attention was
concentrated on defending himself.
(5) Appellant's reporting of the incident disproved their membership in the group of
Calimquim. If they were members, their natural course would have been to hide from the
authorities. Their voluntary submission to the police immediately after the incident should
have been given credence as part of the res gestae.
In the Consolidated Appellee's Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) urges us to affirm in toto the challenged
decisions for failure of the appellants to show that the trial court committed error in finding the prosecution evidence
clear, sufficient, and convincing to convict. Catugas, who made an eyewitness account, had the opportunity to observe
the appellants during the commission of the crime and had no ill-motive to implicate the appellants falsely. As to the
charge that he perjured because the appellants were not able to produce the amount of P80,000 which he allegedly
demanded from them, the same should not be believed. The truth is, it was the parents of the appellants who
approached Catugas and offered him P80,000 in order that he would not testify against the appellants. Catugas did not
accept the offer, as it was against his principles to tell a lie.
The OSG also maintains that treachery was duly proved and, hence, the trial court was correct in convicting the
appellants of murder for the death of Teofilo Landingin and frustrated murder for stabbing Virgilio Catugas. Their
conviction for violation of the Anti-Carnapping Act is also proper, since their main purpose was to get the jeepney and
they killed Landingin in order that they could get it. They presented to evidence to prove that they ran away with the
jeepney for any lawful purpose.
In their Consolidated Reply Brief, the appellants try to show that the identification made by prosecution witness Catugas
cannot be denominated as clear, positive, and convincing; for, while it may be true that he "could have taken glimpse or
glance at the faces of all the accused-appellants, this fact alone is not adequate and fell short of the required test of
'positive identification'." They strongly suggest that Catugas had ill-motive to testify falsely against them in that he was
not paid the P80,000 he demanded.
11 | P a g e
IV
THE CRIMES COMMITTED AND THE
ISSUE OF CULPABILITY OF APPELLANTS
Before we go any further, remarks on some procedural matters are in order. The crimes charged in the informations
filed before the LARON court and CASTILLO court are irretrievably linked with or related to one another. They arose out
of the same incident, are founded on the same factual milieu, and would be proved by testimonies of the same
witnesses. The three cases then should have been consolidated and jointly tried in one branch of the RTC of Dagupan
City. What were jointly tried were only the cases for murder and frustrated murder. Section 14 of Rule 119 of the Rules
of Court provides:
Sec. 14. Consolidation of trials of related offenses. Charges for offenses founded on the same facts or
forming part of a series of offenses of similar character may be tried jointly at the court's discretion.
The purpose or object of consolidation is to avoid multiplicity of suits, guard against oppression or abuse, prevent delay,
clear congested dockets, simplify the work of the trial court, and save unnecessary cost or expense; in short, the
attainment of justice with the least expense and vexation to the parties
litigants. 48 In Raymundo v. Elipe, 49 we held that although consolidation of several cases involving the same parties and
the same subject matter is one addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, joint hearing becomes a matter of
duty if two or more cases are tried before the same judge, or even filed with the different branches of the same court,
provided one of such cases has not been partially tried.
We are unable to understand why neither the LARON court or the CASTILLO court nor any of the parties caused, or
moved for, a consolidation of the case for violation of the Anti-Carnapping Act (which has the higher docket number)
with the cases for murder and frustrated murder in the LARON court (which have lower docket numbers). It was only
after the filing of their separate Appellant's Brief in G.R. Nos. 118940-41 and in G.R. No. 119407 that the appellants
moved to consolidate the latter with the former.
This failure to consolidate the three cases at the trial court level could contribute some difficulty in the appreciation of
the evidence. The principal witnesses of the parties testified in all the three cases. Yet, the assessment of their
testimony and credibility in the LARON court must not be influenced by their testimonies in the case before the
CASTILLO court, and vice versa. In the LARON court, prosecution witness Catugas was unclear in some details of the
incident, but clear in the CASTILLO court. Upon the other hand, there were details he disclosed in one of the courts
which were not given in the other court. The same observation may be had on the testimonies of the appellants before
both courts. As one reads the transcripts of the testimonies of these witnesses in both cases, it would be quite difficult to
avoid forming impressions in light of the totality of their testimonies in both courts. Our minds and mental processes
must be kept away from the pitfalls of such impressions, for the rules on evidence and the constitutional presumption of
innocence in favor of the appellants dictate that we resolve the appeals in the cases before the LARON court and the
case before the CASTILLO court solely on the basis of the evidence presented before such courts, respectively.
The next preliminary matter to be resolved is whether the crimes of murder in Criminal Case No. 94-00617-D and
frustrated murder in Criminal Case No. 94-00619-D are absorbed in the violation of the Anti-Carnapping Act in Criminal
Case No. 94-00620-D.
R.A. No. 7659 which took effect on 31 December 1993 50 is applicable to these cases because the crimes were
committed on 10 March 1994. Section 14 of the Anti-Carnapping Act was amended by Section 20 of R.A. No. 7659 and
now imposes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death when the owner, driver, or occupant of the carnapped motor
vehicle is killed or raped in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof. This Section, as
amended, reads in full as follows:
 Sec. 14. Penalty for Carnapping. — Any person who is found guilty of carnapping, as this term is defined in
Section Two of this Act, shall, irrespective of the value of motor vehicle taken, be punished by imprisonment
for not less than fourteen years and eight months and not more than seventeen years and four months, when
the carnapping is committed without violence or intimidation of persons, or force upon things; and by
imprisonment for not less than seventeen years and four months and not more than thirty years, when the
carnapping is committed by means of violence against or intimidation of any person, or force upon things;and
the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed when the owner, driver or occupant of the
carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the
occasion thereof . (Emphasis supplied).
In the original Section 14 of R.A. No. 6539, the last clause read as follows:
and the penalty of life imprisonment to death shall be imposed when the owner, driver or occupant of the
carnapped vehicle is killed in the commission of the carnapping. (emphasis supplied).
Three amendments have thus been made, viz: (1) the change of the penalty of life imprisonment to reclusion perpetua,
(2) the inclusion of rape, and (3) the change of the phrase "in the commission of the carnapping" to "in the course of the
commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof." The latter makes clear the intention of the law to make the
offense a special complex crime, by way of analogy vis-a-vis paragraphs 1 to 4 of Article 294 of the Revised Penal
Code on robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons. As such, the killing (or the rape) merely qualifies the
crime of carnapping which for lack of specific nomenclature may be known as qualified carnapping or carnapping in an
aggravated form. In short, considering the phraseology of the amended Section 14, 51 the carnapping and the killing (or
the rape) may be considered as a single or indivisible crime or a special complex crime which, however, is not covered
by Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code.
Since Section 14 of R.A. No. 6539 uses the words "IS KILLED," no distinction must be made between homicide and
murder. Whether it is one or the other which is committed "in the course of carnapping or on the occasion thereof"
makes no difference insofar as the penalty is concerned.
It follows then that the killing of the driver, Teofilo Landingin — whether it be homicide or murder — cannot be treated as
a separate offense, but should only be considered to qualify the crime of carnapping.
Nonetheless, although there could only be one single offense of qualified carnapping or carnapping in an aggravated
form, the prosecution had still to prove the essential requisites of the homicide or murder of Landingin and that of
carnapping. This should have been another reason for the consolidation of the carnapping case in the CASTILLO court
with the cases before the LARON court.
But do the words "IS KILLED" in the last clause of Section 14 of R.A. No. 6539, as amended, include the crime of
frustrated murder or homicide? Put a little differently, does murder or homicide in its frustrated stage also qualify
carnapping if it is committed "in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof"? The
answer must be in the negative in light of the use in said Section 14 of the words "IS KILLED". The unmistakable import
thereof is that it refers only to the consummated felony of either murder or homicide.
If attempted or frustrated murder or homicide is committed "in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the
occasion thereof," then it must be deemed to fall under the clause (of Section 14) "when the carnapping is committed by
means of violence against or intimidation of any person."
We shall now take up the issue of the culpability of the appellants.
12 | P a g e
The evidence adduced by the prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt the carnapping of Teofilo
Landingin's passenger jeepney, which is a motor vehicle under the definition in Section 2 of R.A. No. 6539. 52 The
passenger jeepney was taken, with intent of gain, from Landingin by means of violence against him which caused his
death and against a passenger, Virgilio Catugas, who suffered physical injuries.
But, has the prosecution established with moral certainty the guilt of the appellants? The LARON and the CASTILLO
courts held that it did.
Enshrined in the Bill of Rights is the right of the accused to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. 53To
overcome the presumption, nothing but proof beyond reasonable doubt must be established by the prosecution. 54Save
in certain circumstances as where, for instance, the accused admits the commission of the acts alleged to constitute a
crime but interposes justifying circumstances, the burden is never shifted to the accused or diminished by the weakness
of his defense. Indeed, unless the prosecution successfully discharges that burden, the accused need not even offer
evidence in his behalf. 55
In our jurisdiction accusation is not synonymous with guilt. The freedom of the accused is forfeit only if the requisite
quantum of proof necessary for conviction be in existence. This, of course, requires the most careful scrutiny of the
evidence for the State, both oral and documentary, independent of whatever defense is offered by the accused. Every
circumstance favoring the accused's innocence must be duly taken into account. The proof against the accused must
survive the test of reason. Strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment. The conscience must be
satisfied that on the accused could be laid the responsibility for the offense charged. 56 If the prosecution fails to
discharge the burden, then it is not only the accused's right to be freed; it is, even more, the court's constitutional duty to
acquit him. 57
After a painstaking review of the records and the transcripts of the stenographic notes of the testimonies of the
witnesses in the cases before the LARON court and the CASTILLO court, we are not convinced with moral certainty that
the appellants committed the crimes charged. Reasonable doubt burdens our conscience; our minds cannot rest easy
on a verdict of conviction.
The prosecution had nine suspects in these cases: the four appellants and the five others, namely, Romulo Calimquim,
Alex Mamaril, a certain Dennis, a certain Mondragon, and another described as John Doe. All nine were forthwith
charged with the crimes of murder, frustrated murder, and carnapping in Criminal Cases Nos.
3310,58 3313, 59 3311, 60 respectively, of the Municipal Trial Court of Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan, and then in the
informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 94-00617-D, 61 and 94-00619-D 62 of the LARON court and Criminal Case No. 94-
00620-D 63 of the CASTILLO court, respectively.
The theory of the appellants is that they were not members of the group of Romulo Calimquim. The prosecution has no
proof to prove otherwise; but the LARON and the CASTILLO courts, through inferences from certain facts, concluded
that the appellants were. The conclusion is rather tenuous. While the rigorous cross-examination of the appellants in all
these cases has established close relationship among the appellants by reason of their residence and work, (Benito, as
sand-and-gravel truck driver and Mejia, Fabito, and Paraan as his keepers), it miserably failed to establish any
relationship between them and the five others headed by Calimquim. What then looms large in our minds is that the
appellants and the five others happened to be passengers of Landingin's jeepney by accident, not by design. If the
appellants were with the five others until Sual, Pangasinan, it was because they were intimidated and made to lie down
on their belies inside the jeepney.
Another circumstance further proves that the appellants did not belong to the group of Calimquim. Upon arrival in the
mountains of Sual, they fled from the Calimquim group when the first opportunity to do so came. We find to be
absolutely without basis the statement of the CASTILLO court that the appellants abandoned Landingin's jeepney in
Sitio Nipa, Baquioen, Sual, Pangasinan, "upon seeing the arrival of concerned citizens and members of the Sual Police A I saw his face, sir.
Station; the responding peace officers effected the recovery of the subject jeepney sans the accused/culprits." No Q How were you able to recognize the last person (referring to Edwin Benito)?
prosecution witness so testified. In the CASTILLO court, no policeman was presented as witness for the prosecution. A He was besides [sic] the driver, Sir. 65
The evidence presented by both the prosecution and the defense reveal that after appellants Benito and Mejia were Further indicating the uncertainty of his identification, he made the following admissions
picked up by Policeman Gulen on the latter's suspicion that they were members of an akyat-bahay gang, they on cross-examination:
voluntarily informed the police authorities of the Sual Police Station of what happened. It was this information that Q Now, you said you recognized the persons who sat besides [sic] the driver, is it not?
brought the policemen to where the subject jeepney was located. Benito even accompanied the policemen. This A Yes, sir.
resulted in the recovery of the jeepney by the policemen. Appellant Paraan also presented himself later to the Police Q Please point to him?
Station of Sta. Barbara. Appellant Fabito, although apprehended by concerned citizens of the place to where he had A He was wearing a dark color.
fled, voluntarily reported what he knew to the police authorities of Sual and Sta. Barbara. Q Was it a T-shirt or a polo shirt?
A I cannot tell, sir.
Unfortunately, the CASTILLO court relied heavily on the entries in the police blotters of the police stations of Sual and Q How about the person sitting in front of you whom you pointed to this person wearing
Sta. Barbara. The silence of the entries on what the appellants had declared in court is not conclusive evidence that in red T-shirt?
they did not report the incident to the police authorities. They had no participation in the preparation of the entries. A I can no longer remember, sir.
Entries in the police blotters should not be given undue significance or probative value, for they are normally incomplete Q How about the person next to the one with red t-shirt, do you remember his shirt?
and inaccurate sometimes from either partial suggestion of for want of suggestion or inquiries.64 The entries in question A I don't know, sir.
are sadly wanting in material particulars. At the very most, they only recorded the impression that the appellants were Q How about Gregorio Mejia, do you remember his clothes?
"suspects." A I cannot remember, sir.
Q You can't remember also whether one of these accused was wearing a hat at that
time?
As to the alleged participation of the appellants in the commission of the crimes, the prosecution had to rely solely on A I cannot remember, sir.
the testimony of Virgilio Catugas. The totality of his testimony in the cases before the LARON court leaves much to be
In the case before the CASTILLO court, he declared that he was stabbed by the nine
desired. The prosecutor who conducted the direct examination was unable to propound sensible questions to elicit clear persons. Thus:
answers bound to reconstruct faithfully the events surrounding the commission of the alleged crimes. This deficiency COURT:
thus tempted the trial judge to ask more questions. Despite the latter's participation, the testimony of Catugas fails to Q Who were involved in stabbing?
convince us that the appellants indeed participated in the commission of the crimes. On cross-examination in the A All of them, sir.
LARON court, Catugas categorically admitted that he did not know the names of the appellants and that he could Q Who was the assailant and who was stabbed?
recognize only three of the nine accused. Thus: A The 9 persons, sir.
Q When you said 9 persons, they were the 9 persons who participated in the stabbing
ATTY. TAMINAYA: incident and who were the victims?
Q Now, in paragraph 8 of your statement, you said and you mentioned the names of the A Me and the driver, sir.
person and I will now read: PROS. MARATA:
Q How about the true names of the suspect, do you know them? Q How many times were you stabbed by the nine persons, four of whom were inside the
A In fact I do not know, however, based on the police investigation of Sta. Barbara PNP, courtroom?
they were, Gregorio Mejia, Edwin Benito, Joseph Fabito, Pedro Paraan, Mok A From the scar left of my body, there are 22 stabbed wounds, sir. 66
Calimquim, alyas Dennis, Alex Mamaril, Dennis Abrigo alyas Mondragon and one unidentified Yet, no further questions were asked for him to convincingly show that the appellants
person. inflicted any of the stab wounds on his body. Further compounding the uncertainty and
can you tell this Court why these persons were written in your statement? unreliability of Catuga's testimony, he candidly admitted on cross-examination that only one
A Because of the police investigation. person stabbed him. Thus:
Q So, were it not of the police and the pictures, you were not able to identify the ATTY. TAMINAYA:
accused, is that correct? Q How many times were you stabbed by them?
A I can recognize the others, sir. A Twice, sir.
Q How many of the nine (9) can you recognize? Q And you cannot recognize the person who stabbed your?
A Three (3) of them, sir. A I can identify him, sir.
COURT: Q How many persons stabbed you then?
Q What you do mean when you said that that you can recognize three (3) of them? A Only one (1) person, sir. 67
A I can remember those persons who sat near me. Upon further questioning by the court, Catugas declared that six of the nine stabbed him:
Q Who of the four (4) accused who sitted [sic] near you? COURT:
A The one wearing red T-shirt, the second to the last of the four accused. Q How many stab wounds did you sustain?
Q So, how were you able to identify these [sic] persons who is [sic] wearing in [sic] red A More than twenty (20) stab wounds, sir.
T-shirt?
13 | P a g e
 Q A while ago you mentioned there were two (2) initial stab blows with respect to the Proceed.
other stab blow who delivered this stab blow? ATTY. TIMANAYA:
A His companions and also Gregorio Mejia, sir. Q And the parents of Edwin Benito cannot pay that P80,000.00 because they are poor?
COURT: A They will not pay that amount on that date, we have agreed of another date for them to
Proceed. pay, sir.
ATTY. TAMINAYA: COURT:
Q When you said his companions and Gregorio Mejia are you referring to the five (5) Q Did the parents of Edwin Benito made a counter offer?
other persons as the companions of Gregorio Mejia who participated in stabbing you? A That is already their counter proposal, sir.
A I think it is about six (6) of them who stabbed me, sir. 68 Q What you want to tell the Honorable Court is that you agreed to pay you P80,000.00
He could not remember anymore the person who inflicted the last stab wound, and then but he cannot pay you at that very moment?
declined to point to anyone of the herein four appellants as the person who did it. Thus: A Yes, sir.
COURT: COURT:
Q When they stopped stabbing you they did not stab you anymore? Proceed.
A They still stabbed me on my right upper arm, sir. (Witness showing his scar near the ATTY. TAMINAYA:
shoulder.) Q Did you agree for the amount of P80,000.00?
Q You said you were stabbed on your right shoulder, who stabbed you among these COURT:
nine (9) persons? That is the settlement money.
A I could not remember anymore, sir. ATTY. TAMINAYA:
Q When you said you cannot remember, you cannot tell this Court whether it was one Q So, it is clear that if only they have given P80,000.00, you should not have testified in
among the four (4) accused in this case who stabbed you on your right upper arm? this case?
A I could not point the person responsible in stabbing my shoulder because that is the A PROSECUTOR MARATA:
last stab wound, sir. 69 Improper, your honor.
It would thus be sheer speculation and conjecture to conclude from Catuga's testimony ATTY. TAMINAYA
in the CASTILLO court that the appellants had inflicted any of the stab wounds on Catugas. As follow-up question, you Honor.
Moreover, on question by the trial judge in the CASTILLO court, Catugas categorically COURT:
admitted that none of the appellants participated in the stabbing of Landingin. Thus: Sustained. Hypothetical.
COURT: ATTY. TAMINAYA:
xxx xxx xxx Q You said that there was the agreed date, what happened on the agreed date?
Q These two persons who participated in stabbing Teofilo Landingin, can you inform the A The date has not yet arrived but I have already testified, sir.
Court if the four (4) accused now or these two persons are among the four (4) accused now? COURT:
A They are not here, sir. 70 Q When you said you have already testified, you are referring to your testimony in RTC
Finally, Catugas was not entirely free from any ulterior motive in implicating the Branch 44?
appellants. He admitted that he demanded P80,000 from the parents of the appellants, but before A Yes, sir. 71
they could give the money on the agreed date, he testified against the appellants in the LARON In the LARON court, efforts were made by the prosecution to cushion the impact of
court. The following exchanges between him and counsel for the defense before the CASTILLO Catugas' demand for payment of P80,000 in consideration of his exculpatory testimony. It wanted
court are revealing: to prove that the parents of the appellants were in fact the ones who proposed. But the testimony
ATTY. TAMINAYA: of Conrado Benito, which the prosecution failed to satisfactorily rebut, is that the parents went to
Q After you were released from the hospital, were you able to talk with the father of see him to verify whether their children had indeed committed the crimes; but Catugas replied that
Edwin Benito? since the appellants were the ones apprehended, he would just pinpoint them so that he could
A Yes, sir. recover what he had spent. He then demanded P80,000, which he equally apportioned among
Q And you told them about your expenses in the hospital, is that correct? the parents of the four appellants. Conrado Benito testified as follows:
A Yes, sir. Q What did you tell him?
Q And you demanded from them to pay P40,000.00 is that correct? A I told him that our children telling us that they did not commit any wrong and I told
A I was asking P80,000.00, sir. them to tell the truth and we are not consenting them to whatever they have done if they done
COURT: something wrong.
Q Why were you asking the amount of P80,000.00 then? Q What was the answer of Virgilio Catugas?
A Because he pleaded to me, sir. A He said, he suffered several wounds and that he spent so much for his hospitalization,
Q What you are trying to convey to the Court is that you are settling the case with Edwin and he said also that they were the persons who were apprehended and so, I will just tell a lie for
Benito the amount of P80,000.00? the same because how could I collect for the amount I spent if I will not tell a lie?
A Yes, sir. COURT:
COURT: Q You consider Virgilio Catugas as a liar and you are not a liar?
14 | P a g e
 A Yes, sir.
ATTY. TAMINAYA:
Q Can you tell this Court what did you tell him about that expenses?
A I said, "then we can at least help you", because he is saying that he suffered several
wounds.
Q How much did Virgilio Catugas tell you?
A The last time that we talked, he ask[ed] us to give P20,000.00 each.
COURT:
Q How many times did he tell your?
A For 5 to 6 times because he told us to return to him. 72
But the parents could not deliver the P20,000 each was to pay, for they could not afford
it. Conrado so declared, thus:
ATTY. TAMINAYA:
Q When Virgilio Catugas told you to give P20,000.00, can you tell this court if he made
mention to the wife of Teofilo Landingin?
A Because he is collecting from us P20,000.00, he told us that we would not tell the
same to Mrs. Landingin.
Q Were you able to give that P20,000.00?
A No sir, not even a single centavo.
Q Why?
A We cannot pay because even payment for attorney's fees, we cannot afford. 73

The LARON court gave credence to the version of the prosecution and even took the incident as offer of compromise,
which may be considered an implied admission of guilt. Said court misapplied Section 27 of Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court. 74 There is no evidence whatsoever that any of the appellants authorized his parents to approach Catugas or
knew the matter of payment of P80,000. Moreover, if one were to believe the explanation of Catugas that the amount of
P80,000 represented the expenses he incurred for his hospitalization and medical bills, then the offer to reimburse it is
not admissible in evidence as proof of criminal liability pursuant to the last paragraph of Section 27 of Rule 130.

On the whole then we entertain, unavoidably, serious doubt on the participation of the appellants in the commission of
the crimes charged.

WHEREFORE, the challenged decisions in Criminal Case No. 94-00617-D (for Murder) and Criminal Case No. 94-
00619-D (for Frustrated Murder) of Branch 44 and in Criminal Case No. 94-00620-D (violation of Anti-Carnapping Act of
1972) of Branch 43 of the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City are REVERSED. Accused-appellants Gregorio Mejia,
Edwin Benito, Pedro Paraan, and Joseph Fabito are ACQUITTED on the ground that their guilt therefor has not been
proved beyond reasonable doubt or with moral certainty. Their immediate release from detention is hereby ordered,
unless other lawful and valid grounds for their further detention exist.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

15 | P a g e
 Mahlandt v. Wild Canid Survival & Research Center, Inc.
588 F.2d 626 (8th Cir. 1979)
VAN SICKLE, J. This is a civil action for damages arising out of an alleged attack by a wolf on a child. The sole issues
on appeal are as to the correctness of three rulings which excluded conclusionary statements against interest. Two of
them were made by a defendant, who was also an employee of the corporate defendant; and the third was in the form
of a statement appearing in the records of a board meeting of the corporate defendant.
On March 23, 1973, Daniel Mahlandt, then 3 years, 10 months, and 8 days old, was sent by his mother to a neighbor's
home on an adjoining street to get his older brother, Donald. Daniel's mother watched him cross the street, and then
turned into the house to get her car keys. Daniel's path took him along a walkway adjacent to the Poos' residence. Next
to the walkway was a five foot chain link fence to which Sophie had been chained with a six foot chain. In other words,
Sophie was free to move in a half circle having a six foot radius on the side of the fence opposite Daniel.
Sophie was a bitch wolf, 11 months and 28 days old, who had been born at the St. Louis Zoo, and kept there until she
reached 6 months of age, at which time she was given to the Wild Canid Survival and Research Center, Inc. It was the
policy of the Zoo to remove wolves from the Children's Zoo after they reached the age of 5 or 6 months. Sophie was
supposed to be kept at the Tyson Research Center, but Kenneth Poos, as Director of Education for the Wild Canid
Survival and Research Center, Inc., had been keeping her at his home because he was taking Sophie to schools and
institutions where he showed films and gave programs with respect to the nature of wolves. Sophie was known as a
very gentle wolf who had proved herself to be good natured and stable during her contacts with thousands of children,
while she was in the St. Louis Children's Zoo.
Sophie was chained because the evening before she had jumped the fence and attacked a beagle who was running
along the fence and yapping at her.
A neighbor who was ill in bed in the second floor of his home heard a child's screams and went to his window, where he
saw a boy lying on his back within the enclosure, with a wolf straddling him. The wolf's face was near Daniel's face, but
the distance was so great that he could not see what the wolf was doing and did not see any biting. Within about 15
seconds the neighbor saw Clarke Poos, about seventeen, run around the house, get the wolf off of the boy, and
disappear with the child in his arms to the back of the house. Clarke took the boy in and laid him on the kitchen floor.
Clarke had been returning from his friend's home immediately west when he heard a child's cries and ran around to the
enclosure. He found Daniel lying within the enclosure, about three feet from the fence, and Sophie standing back from
the boy the length of her chain, and wailing. An expert in the behavior of wolves stated that when a wolf licks a child's
face that it is a sign of care, and not a sign of attack; that a wolf's wail is a sign of compassion, and an effort to get
attention, not a sign of attack. No witness saw or knew how Daniel was injured. Clarke and his sister ran over to get
Daniel's mother. She says that Clarke told her, "a wolf got Danny and he is dying." Clarke denies that statement. The
defendant, Mr. Poos, arrived home while Daniel and his mother were in the kitchen. After Daniel was taken in an
ambulance, Mr. Poos talked to everyone present, including a neighbor who came in. Within an hour after he arrived
home, Mr. Poos went to Washington University to inform Owen Sexton, President of Wild Canid Survival and Research
Center, Inc., of the incident. Mr. Sexton was not in his office so Mr. Poos left the following note on his door:
Owen, would you call me at home, 727-5080? Sophie bit a child that came in our back yard. All has been taken care of.
I need to convey what happened to you. [Exhibit 11]
Denial of admission of this note is one of the issues on appeal.
16 | P a g e
Later that day, Mr. Poos found Mr. Sexton at the Tyson Research Center and told him what had happened. Denial of
plaintiff's offer to prove that Mr. Poos told Mr. Sexton that, "Sophie had bit a child that day," is the second issue on
appeal.
A meeting of the Directors of the Wild Canid Survival and Research Center, Inc., was held on April 4, 1973. Mr. Poos
was not present at that meeting. The minutes of that meeting reflect that there was a "great deal of discussion ... about
the legal aspects of the incident of Sophie biting the child." Plaintiff offered an abstract of the minutes containing that
reference. Denial of the offer of that abstract is the third issue on appeal.
Daniel had lacerations of the face, left thigh, left calf, and right thigh, and abrasions and bruises of the abdomen and
chest. Mr. Mahlandt was permitted to state that Daniel had indicated that he had gone under the fence. Mr. Mahlandt
and Mr. Poos, about a month after the incident, examined the fence to determine what caused Daniel's lacerations. Mr.
Mahlandt felt that they did not look like animal bites. The parallel scars on Daniel's thigh appeared to match the
configuration of the barbs or tines on the fence. The expert as to the behavior of wolves opined that the lacerations were
not wolf bites or wounds caused by wolf claws. Wolves have powerful jaws and a wolf bite will result in massive
crushing or severing of a limb. He stated that if Sophie had bitten Daniel there would have been clear apposition of teeth
and massive crushing of Daniel's hands and arms which were not injured. Also, if Sophie had pulled Daniel under the
fence, tooth marks on the foot or leg would have been present, although Sophie possessed enough strength to pull the
boy under the fence.
The jury brought in a verdict for the defense.
The trial judge's rationale for excluding the note, the statement, and the corporate minutes, was the same in each case.
He reasoned that Mr. Poos did not have any personal knowledge of the facts, and accordingly, the first two admissions
were based on hearsay; and the third admission contained in the minutes of the board meeting was subject to the same
objection of hearsay, and unreliability because of lack of personal knowledge....
[T]he statement in the note pinned on the door is not hearsay, and is admissible against Mr. Poos. It was his own
statement, and as such was clearly different from the reported statement of another. Example, "I was told that...." It was
also a statement of which he had manifested his adoption or belief in its truth. And the same observations may be made
of the statement made later in the day to Mr. Sexton that, "Sophie had bit a child...."
Are these statements admissible against Wild Canid Survival and Research Center, Inc.? They were made by Mr. Poos
when he was an agent or servant of the Wild Canid Survival and Research Center, Inc., and they concerned a matter
within the scope of his agency, or employment, i.e., his custody of Sophie, and were made during the existence of that
relationship.
Defendant argues that Rule 801(d)(2) does not provide for the admission of "in house" statements: that is, it allows only
admissions made to third parties.
The notes of the Advisory Committee on the Proposed Rules discuss the problem of "in house" admissions with
reference to Rule 801(d)(2)(C) situations. This is not a (C) situation because Mr. Poos was not authorized or directed to
make a statement on the matter by anyone. But the rationale developed in that comment does apply to this (D)
situation. Mr. Poos had actual physical custody of Sophie. His conclusions, his opinions, were obviously accepted as a
basis for action by his principal. See minutes of corporate meeting. As the Advisory Committee points out in its note on
(C) situations:
communication to an outsider has not generally been thought to be an essential characteristic of an admission. Thus a
party's books or records are usable against him, without regard to any intent to disclose to third persons. V Wigmore on
Evidence §1557.
Weinstein's discussion of Rule 801(d)(2)(D), states that:
Rule 801(d)(2)(D) adopts the approach ... which, as a general proposition, makes statement made by agents within the
scope of their employment admissible.... Once agency, and the making of the statement while the relationship
continues, are established, the statement is exempt from the hearsay rule so long as it relates to a matter within the
scope of the agency.
After reciting a lengthy quotation which justifies the rule as necessary, and suggests that such admissions are
trustworthy and reliable, Weinstein states categorically that although an express requirement of personal knowledge on
the part of the declarant of the facts underlying his statement is not written into the rule, it should be. He feels that is
mandated by Rules 805 and 403.
So here, remembering that relevant evidence is usually prejudicial to the cause of the side against which it is presented,
and that the prejudice which concerns us is unreasonable prejudice; and applying the spirit of Rule 801(d)(2), we hold
that Rule 403 does not warrant the exclusion of the evidence of Mr. Poos' statements as against himself or Wild Canid
Survival and Research Center, Inc.
But the limited admissibility of the corporate minutes, coupled with the repetitive nature of the evidence and the low
probative value of the minute record, all justify supporting the judgment of the trial court under Rule 403.
The judgment of the District Court is reversed and the matter remanded to the District Court for a new trial consistent
with this opinion. [G.R. No. 91114. September 25, 1992.]

Rule 805 recites, in effect, that a statement containing hearsay within hearsay is admissible if each part of the statement
falls within an exception to the hearsay rule. Rule 805, however, deals only with hearsay exceptions. A statement based
on the personal knowledge of the declarant of facts underlying his statement is not the repetition of the statement of
another, thus not hearsay. It is merely opinion testimony. Rule 805 cannot mandate the implied condition desired by
Judge Weinstein.

Rule 403 provides for the exclusion of relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger
of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by consideration of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence. Nor does Rule 403 mandate the implied condition desired by Judge
Weinstein.

Thus, while both Rule 805 and Rule 403 provide additional bases for excluding otherwise acceptable evidence, neither
rule mandates the introduction into Rule 801(d)(2)(D) of an implied requirement that the declarant have personal
knowledge of the facts underlying his statement. So we conclude that the two statements made by Mr. Poos were
admissible against Wild Canid Survival and Research Center, Inc.

As to the entry in the records of a corporate meeting, the directors as primary officers of the corporation had the
authority to include their conclusions in the record of the meeting. So the evidence would fall within 801(d)(2)(C) as to
Wild Canid Survival and Research Center, Inc., and be admissible. The "in house" aspect of this admission has already
been discussed. Rule 801 (d)(2)(D), supra.

But there was no servant, or agency, relationship which justified admitting the evidence of the board minutes as against
Mr. Poos.

None of the conditions of 801(d)(2) cover the claim that minutes of a corporate board meeting can be used against a
non-attending, non-participating employee of that corporation. The evidence was not admissible as against Mr. Poos.

There is left only the question of whether the trial court's rulings which excluded all three items of evidence are justified
under Rule 403. He clearly found that the evidence was not reliable, pointing out that none of the statements were
based on the personal knowledge of the declarant.

Again, the problem was faced by the Advisory Committee on Proposed Rules. In its discussion of 801(d)(2) exceptions
to the hearsay rule, the Committee said:

The freedom which admissions have enjoyed from technical demands of searching for an assurance of trustworthiness
in some against-interest circumstances, and from the restrictive influences of the opinion rule and the rule requiring first
hand knowledge, when taken with the apparently prevalent satisfaction with the results, calls for generous treatment of
this avenue to admissibility. 28 U.S.C.A., Volume of Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 801, p.527, at p.530.

17 | P a g e
 Pe o p le v s M a l nga n
C H I C O - N A Z A R I O, J . :
T he C a se
F or r ev i ew i s t h e D e c i si o n [ 1 ] o f t h e C o u r t of A pp ea l s i n C A - G. R . C R H C N o. 0 1 139
p r o m u l ga te d on 2 S e p t e m b e r 2 0 0 5 , a f f ir m in g w it h m od if i ca t ion t he J ud gm ent [ 2 ] of th e
R e g io na l T r i al C our t ( R T C ) o f M a n i la , Br a n ch 4 1 , in C r im in al C as e N o . 01 - 18 84 24
p r o m u l ga te d o n 13 O c t o b e r 2 0 0 3 , f i n d i n g a p p e l lan t Ed na M al ng an y M ay o ( E dna) g ui lt y
b e yo n d r ea s ona b le d o u b t o f t h e cr i m e o f “ Ar s o n w i th M u lt ip le H o m ic i de or Ar so n r e su lt in g to
t h e d e at h of s i x ( 6) p e o p l e , ” a n d se n t e n c in g h e r t o s uff er t he pe na lt y of d eat h.
T he F a ct s
As sum m ar i ze d [ 3 ] b y t h e C o u r t o f Ap p e a ls , t he an te c e den t f a ct s ar e a s fo l low s:
F r om t h e p e r s o n a l a c co u n t o f R em ig io Ber nar d o, t he B ar a nga y
C ha ir m an in t h e a r e a , a s w e l l a s t h e p e r son a l a cc ou nt o f th e pe d ic ab dr i ver
nam ed R o la n d o Gr u t a , i t w a s a t a r o u n d 4 :4 5 a .m . o n Ja nu ar y 2, 2 001 w h en
R em ig io Ber n a r d o a n d h i s t a n o d s sa w t he a c cu se d - app el l ant ED N A, on e
hir ed as a h o u s e m a i d b y R o b e r t o S e p ar a, Sr . , w it h he r he ad tur ni ng i n
di ffer en t d ir e c t i o n s , h u r r i e d l y l e a v in g t h e ho us e of h er e m p lo yer a t N o. 17 2
M od er n a S tr e e t , B a lu t , T o n d o , M a n i la . She w a s s ee n t o h a ve bo ar de d a
ped i ca b w h i ch w a s d r i ve n b y a p e r s o n l a t er i den t if ie d as R ol an do Gr ut a. S he
w as h ear d b y t h e p e d i ca b d r i v e r t o h a ve in s tr u ct ed th at sh e be br ou gh t
t o N i pa Str e e t , b u t u p o n h e r a r r i v a l t h e r e, s he ch an g ed h er m in d an d a s ke d
tha t s he b e b r o u g h t i n s t e a d t o B a la sa n Str ee t w her e sh e f ina l l y a li gh te d,
aft er p a yi ng f o r h e r f a r e .
T hir ty m in u t e s l a t e r , a t a r o und 5 :1 5 a .m . Bar a n ga y C ha ir m an
Ber n ar d o’ s g r o u p l a t e r d i s co ve r e d t h a t a fir e gut t ed th e h ou se o f t he
em p lo y er o f t h e h o u se m a i d . Ba r a n g a y C ha ir m an Ber nar d o a nd h i s t an od s
r es po nde d to t h e f ir e u p o n h e a r in g s h o u t s fr o m th e r e s ide nt s a nd t her e af ter ,
fir em e n fr o m t h e F ir e D i st r i ct 1 - N C R a r r iv ed a t th e fir e s ce ne t o co nt ai n th e
fir e.
Whe n B a r a n g a y C h a ir m a n Be r n a r d o r et ur n ed t o th e Bar a ng a y H a ll ,
he r e ce i ve d a r e p o r t f r o m p e d i ca b d r i ver R ol an do Gr u ta, w ho w a s a l so a
tan od , th at s h o r t l y b e f o r e t h e o cc u r r e n c e o f t he f ir e, he saw a w om a n ( t he
hou s em a i d) c o m in g o u t o f t h e h o u s e at N o. 17 2 M oder na Str e et , B al ut ,
T ond o, M an i la a n d h e r e ce i ve d a ca l l f r o m h i s w ife t el l in g h im of a w om an
( the sa m e ho u s e m a i d ) w h o w a s a ct in g s t r a nge l y a nd s us pi c io u sl y on Ba la sa n
Str e et . B ar a n g a y C h a ir m a n Be r n a r d o , R o lan do Gr uta and th e o ther ta no ds
pr o ce ede d to B a l a sa n St r e e t a n d f o u n d t he w o m a n w ho w a s l ater id ent i fi ed
as t he ac c u se d - a p p e l la n t . A f t e r R o la n d o Gr ut a po s it i ve l y i den t if ie d th e
w om a n a s th e sa m e p e r s o n w h o l e f t N o . 1 72 M o der n a Str e et , Ba lu t, T o ndo ,
18 | P a g e
M an i la , B ar a ng ay C h air m a n B er nar do an d h i s tan od s appr eh en de d h er a nd
br ou gh t her t o t he B ar a ng ay H al l f or i n ve st ig at i on. At t he Bar a ng a y H a l l,
M er ced i ta M e nd oz a, ne i gh bor of R ob er t o Se par a , Sr . an d w ho se h ou se w a s
al so b ur ne d, i de nt if ie d t he w om an a s a c cu s ed - a pp e ll ant ED N A w ho w a s th e
hou s em a i d of R ob er t o S ep ar a, Sr . U po n i n spe c ti on , a di sp o sa bl e l i ght er w a s
fou nd i n si de a c cu s ed - a pp e l lan t ED N A ’s b ag . T her e af ter , a c cu se d - a pp el la nt
ED N A co nf e ss ed t o Bar a nga y C h a ir m a n Ber nar do i n th e pr e se n ce of
m u lt it ude s of a ngr y r e s id e nt s ou t si de the Bar an ga y H al l t ha t s he se t h er
em p lo y er ’ s h ou se on f ir e b ec au se sh e ha d no t bee n p ai d her sa lar y for a bo ut
a y ear a nd th at sh e w a nte d to g o ho m e to h er pr ov i nc e bu t her em pl o yer t o ld
her to j us t r id e a br oo m s t ic k in g oi ng h om e .
Ac c us ed - ap pe l lan t ED N A w as th en t ur ne d ov er to ar so n in ve st i gat or s
hea de d b y S[F ] O4 D a n il o T al us an , w ho br ou gh t h er to t he S an La zar o F ir e
Sta t ion in S ta. C r u z , M an i la w h er e s he w a s fur ther in ve s ti ga te d a nd t hen
det ai ne d.
Whe n M er ced i ta M en do za w ent to th e S an L a zar o F ir e St at io n to
gi ve her sw or n s tat em ent , sh e h ad the op por tu ni ty to as k ac c us ed - ap pe l lan t
ED N A at t he la tter ’ s d ete nt i on c e ll w h y s he d id the bur ni ng o f her e m p lo y er ’ s
hou s e a nd a c cu se d - a pp el l ant E D N A r e pl i ed th at s he s et th e hou s e on f ir e
be ca us e w he n s he a s ke d p er m is s io n to g o ho m e to h e r pr o v in c e, th e w i fe o f
her e m p lo y er R o ber to Se p ar a, Sr . , n am ed Vir g in ia S epar a ( si c) sh ou te d a t
her : “ S i ge um uw i k a, pa g dat in g m o m ap ut i k a na. Sum a ka y k a s a w a li s,
pag da ti n g m o m a put i k a n a ” ( T SN , J an uar y 2 2, 20 02 , p.6) ( “ G o a hea d, w he n
yo u ar r i ve yo ur c o lor w ou l d be fa ir a lr e ad y. R i de a br oo m s t ic k , w h en yo u
ar r i ve y our co lor w ou l d b e fa ir a lr ead y .” ) A nd w he n M er c ed it a M e nd o za
as ke d a c c us ed - app e ll an t ED N A h ow sh e b ur ne d the ho us e, a cc u se d -
app e ll an t ED N A to ld her : “ N ag lu k ot a ko ng m ar am in g di yar y o, s in in di ha n ko
ng di s po sa bl e l igh ter at h i nag i s ko s a ib aba w n g la m es a sa lo ob ng b aha y ”
( T SN , Ja nu ar y 22, 20 02 , p. 7 .) ( “ I cr um pl ed new s pap e r s, l igh te d th em w it h a
di sp o sa bl e l ig hte r a nd thr e w th em o n t op of t he ta bl e i ns id e th e h ou s e.” )
Whe n in ter v iew ed b y C ar m e li ta V al de z, a r ep or ter of A BS - C BN
N etw or k , a c c us ed - app e ll an t ED N A w h i le un der det en t io n ( si c) w a s h ear d b y
SF O 4 ( s ic) D an i lo T a lu sa n as ha v in g a dm it te d th e cr im e a nd ev en nar r ate d
the m a nn er ho w s he a cc om pl i sh ed it . SF O 4 ( s i c) D an i l o T a lu sa n w as ab le to
hear th e sa m e c onf e ss i o n, t h is t im e a t h i s hom e, w hi l e w a t ch in g t he
te le v is i on pr ogr a m “ T r ue C r im e” ho st ed by Gu s Ab el ga s a l so o f A BS - C BN
N etw or k .
T he f ir e r e su lt ed in [t h e] de str uc t ion of th e ho u se of R ober to Se par a ,
Sr . an d oth er ad jo in i ng ho us es a nd t he de at h o f R o ber t o Se par a , Sr . a nd
Vir g in ia Se par a to ge ther w it h t he ir f our ( 4) c hi ldr en, na m e l y: M i ch ae l,
D ap hne , Pr i s c i ll a an d R obe r to, Jr .
On 9 J anu ar y 2 00 1, an Inf o r m at io n [ 4 ] w a s f il ed be for e the R T C o f M an i la , Br an ch 41,
ch ar g in g a c cu se d - a pp el l ant w it h t he cr i m e of Ar so n w it h M u l ti pl e H om i ci de . T h e ca se w a s
do ck et ed a s C r i m i na l C a s e N o . 01 - 188 42 4. T he a c cu sa tor y por ti on o f sa id Inf or m a t ion
pr o vi de s:
 Pr o s. R e ba ga y:
T hat o n o r a b o u t Ja n u a r y 2 , 2 0 0 1, in t he C it y o f M a n il a, P hi l ip p ine s , W he n w a s t ha t?
the s a id a cc u se d , w i t h i n t e n t t o c a u se d am a ge , d i d t h en an d t her e w i ll fu l l y,
un law fu l ly , f e lo n io u s l y a n d d e l ib e r a t e l y se t fir e up on t he tw o - stor e y A: O n J an uar y 2 s he w a s int er vi ew e d b y t he m e di a, s ir . T h e o ne w ho too k
r es id en ti a l ho u s e o f R O BE R T O S E PAR A an d fa m il y m o st l y m a de of w oo den the co v er ag e w a s C ar m e l it a Va ld e z of C ha nne l 2 , A BS - C BN . T he y
m at er i a ls l o ca t e d a t N o . 1 7 2 M o d e r n a S t . , B al ut , T o nd o, t h is ci t y, by l i ght i ng ha ve a fo ota ge t hat E dn a a dm itt ed b efor e the m , s ir .
cr u m p le d n ew sp a p e r w i t h t h e u s e o f d i s p os ab l e l ig h ter in s ide s ai d h ou se
kn ow in g t he s a m e t o b e a n i n h a b it e d hou s e a nd s it uat ed i n a th i c k ly Q: A nd w her e w er e yo u w h en Ed na M a ln ga n m ade th at st at em en t or
pop u lat ed p la ce a n d a s a co n s e q u e n ce t her eo f a co nf lagr at io n e n su ed a nd adm i s si on t o C ar m e l it a Va l de z of A BS - C BN ?
the s a id bu i ld in g , t o g e t h e r w it h so m e s e v en ( 7) ad jo in i ng r e s id en t ia l h ou s es ,
w er e r az ed b y f ir e ; t h a t b y r e a so n a n d o n th e o c ca s i on o f t he s ai d f ir e, the A: I w a s a t our of fi c e, s i r .
fo ll ow in g, na m e l y,
Q: W as t her e a n y o th er o c ca s io n w her ei n the ac cu s ed m a de a not her
1. R o b e r t o Se p a r a , Sr ., 4 5 ye ar s o f a ge co nf es s io n r el at i ve to t he a dm is s io n of th e cr im e ?
2. V ir g in i a Se p a r a y M en do z a, 40 y ear s of a ge
3. M ic h a e l Se p a r a , 24 y ear s of ag e A: Ye s , s ir .
4. D a p h n e Se p a r a, 18 y ear s of ag e
5. Pr i sc i l la S e p a r a, 14 y ear s of a ge Q: W he n w as t hat ?
6. R o b e r t o Se p a r a , Jr . , 1 1 ye ar s o f ag e
A: La st F r i da y , sir . It w as s how n in T r u e C r im e of Gu s A be lg as . Sh e w as
su st a in ed b u r n in ju r ie s w h i c h w e r e th e d ir e ct ca us e o f th eir dea th in ter v iew ed a t th e C i t y J ai l an d s he a dm it te d th at sh e w a s th e on e
im m ed i ate l y t h e r e a f t e r . [ 5 ] w ho au th or ed t he cr im e, s ir .

Pr o s. R e ba ga y:
Whe n ar r a ig n e d , a c c u s e d - a p p e ll a n t w it h as s i sta n ce of c ou n se l de
o f ic i o , p lea de d [ 6 ] “ N o t Gu i lt y” t o t h e cr im e ch a r g e d. T h er ea fter , tr i al e n sue d. [ 7 ]
A:
T he pr o s ec u t io n p r e s e n t e d f i ve ( 5 ) w it ne s se s , na m e ly , S P O4 [ 8 ] D an i lo T a lu s an,
R o l a n do Gr uta , R em ig i o B e r n a r d o , M e r c e d it a M en do za an d R od ol fo M o v i ll a t o es ta bl i sh i ts Q:
ch a r g e t ha t a c cu s ed - a p p e ll a n t E d n a co m m it t e d t h e cr i m e of ar so n w it h m u lt ip le h om ic i de.
SP O 4 D an i lo T a lu sa n , a r s o n i n v e st ig a t o r , t e st if ie d t h at h e w a s on e of th os e w ho
r e s p o nde d t o th e f ir e t h a t o c cu r r e d o n 2 J a n u a r y 20 01 and w h ic h star te d a t N o . 1 72 M od er na A:
St . , B al ut , T on do, M a n i la . H e s t a t e d t h a t t h e f ir e k i l le d R ob er to Se par a, Sr . an d al l t he o ther
m e m b er s of h i s fa m il y , n a m e l y h i s w i f e , Vir g in ia , and h i s ch i ldr en , M i c hae l , D ap hn e, Pr i sc i l la
a n d R ob er t o, Jr .; th e f ir e a l so d e st r o y e d t h e ir a b o de as w e ll as s i x n ei gh bor in g hou s es . H e
l ik e w i se te s ti f ied t ha t h e t w i ce h e a r d a c c u s e d - a p pe l l ant – o n ce w h i le t he lat te r w a s b ei ng
in t e r v iew ed by C ar m e l it a Va ld e z, a r e p o r t e r o f AB S - C BN , an d t he ot her ti m e w he n i t w as Q:
sh o w n on c ha nne l 2 o n t e l e v i s io n d u r i n g t h e a ir i ng o f th e t el e vi s io n pr ogr am e nt it le d “ T r ue
C r im e ” ho st ed b y Gu s A b e l g a s – co n f e s s t o h a v i n g c o m m itt ed th e cr im e ch ar g ed, to w it:
A:
Pr o s. R e ba ga y:
Ba se d o n y o u r in ve st i g a t i o n , w a s th er e a n y o c ca s io n w h en t he
ac cu s e d E d n a M a ln g a n a d m i t t e d to th e bur ni ng o f t h e h ou se o f th e
Se pa r a F a m i l y?
And w h er e w er e yo u w he n th at ad m i s s io n t o G u s Ab el ga s w a s m a de ?
I w a s in th e ho us e a nd I ju st saw i t on t v, s ir .
W hat w as t ha t adm i s si on t hat yo u he ar d per s ona l l y, w h en y ou w er e
pr e se nt, w h en t he a c cu s ed m a de t he c on fe s si on to C ar m e l it a
Va ld e z?
“ N ag l uk ot p o si y a ng pa pe l, si n id ih an n iy a ng l ig hter a t in i la ga y n iy a
sa i ba baw n g m e sa ‘ yu ng m ga di y ar y o at s i nun og n i ya. ”
x x x x
A s id e fr o m th at sta te m en t, w a s t her e an y o th er st ate m e nt m ad e b y th e
ac cu s ed E dn a M a lng an ?
Ye s , s ir . “ K a ya p o n i ya nag aw a ‘ yo n g al it po s i ya sa ka n ya ng a m o n a
s i Vir gi n ia, h in d i si y a p in a suw e ld o a t g us to na po n i ya ng um uw i n a
( s ic) a yaw s i ya ng pa ya ga n. N ag sa l it a p a p o sa k an ya na, “ Su m a k ay
ka na l an g s a w al i s. P ag b al i k m o d i to m ap ut i ka na” . ( s i c) ‘Y on po
ang si na bi n g ka n yan ga m o . ”

x x x x Att y . M a sw e ng :
T h at w a s a st at em e nt of an a l le ged d ea d p er so n, yo ur H on or .
Wi tn es s :
Ye s, s ir . C our t :
“ S ab i n i Va ld e s, ha ? ”
19 | P a g e
 A: “ M i s m o ng na k it a p o ng d a law ang m a ta ko na doo n si y a ga l in g sa
Pr o s. R e ba ga y: bah a y n g Se par a F a m il y .”
“ S ab i n i Ed n a M a ln g a n k a y C a r m e l ita Va ld ez ,” Yo ur H o nor .
Q: H ow lon g ha ve you k now n t he S ep ar a F am i ly , if yo u kn ow th em ?
C our t :
“ D o ub l e h e a r sa y n a ‘ yo n . ” A: Ab ou t t w o y ear s, sir .

Pr o s. R e ba ga y: Q: H ow a bo ut t hi s E dn a , t he o ne yo u ju s t po in te d ( to) aw h i le a go ? D o y ou
N o, Y o u r H o n o r , t h e w i t n e s s w a s pr e se nt, Y our H o nor , w he n th at kn ow her pr ior to J an uar y 2 , 2 00 1?
co nf e s s io n w a s m a d e b y t h e a c cu s ed to C ar m e l ita V a l de z. [ 9 ]
A: Ye s , s ir . I kn ew ( si c) her for tw o year s .

R ol an do Gr u t a , t h e p e d i c a b d r iv e r a n d on e of t he b ar an ga y ta no ds in th e a r ea, C our t :
t e st if ie d: W h y?

Pr o s. R e ba ga y: Wi tn es s :
M r . Wi t n e s s , w h a t is y o u r p r o f e s si on ? “ M ad al a s ko po si y a ng m a gi ng pa s ah er o ng a k i ng pe di c ab.”

A: S id ec a r d r i v e r , s ir . Pr o s. R e ba ga y:
H ow abo ut th e Se pa r a f am i ly ? Wh y do y ou kno w th em ?
Q: O n J an u a r y 2 , 2 0 0 1 a t a r o u n d 4 : 45 in th e m or n ing , do y ou r e ca l l
w her e w e r e ( s i c) yo u ? A: T he y w er e t he em p lo yer s of E dn a, s ir .

A: I w a s a t t h e co r n e r o f M o d e r n a S t r e et, sir . Q: Y ou sa i d you s aw Ed na co m ing ou t fr om th e hou s e o f t he Se par a

F am il y . Wh at ha pp en ed w hen yo u sa w Ed na c om i n g o ut fr om th e
Pr o s. R e ba ga y: hou s e o f the S ep ar a F am i l y ?
An d w h i l e yo u w e r e a t t h e c o r n e r o f M od er n a St. , w h at ha ppe ne d if
an y, M r . W it n e s s? A: “ Wa l a p a po ng an o ‘ y an na i sa ka y k o na s i ya sa s id ec ar .”

A: I sa w Ed n a c o m in g o u t f r o m t h e d o or of th e hou se of R ober to S ep ar a, Q: A nd w h at d i d y ou o bs er v e fr o m E dn a w he n y o u sa w her co m i ng o ut

s ir . fr om th e ho us e of th e Se pa r a f am i ly ?

Q: D o y ou k n o w t h e n u m b e r o f t h e h o u se of t he S epar a F am il y ? A: “ N ag m a m a da li p o s iy ang l um a kad a t p a li ng a - l i ng a.”

A: 17 2 M o d e r n a St . , Ba l u t , T o n d o , M a n i la , s ir . x x x x

x x x x Q: A fter she b oar ded yo ur p ed i ca b, w ha t hap pe ne d, i f a n y?

Q: A nd yo u sa i d y o u s a w Ed n a c o m in g ou t f r o m th e hou s e of t he S ep ar a A: “ N ag pa ha ti d p o s i ya sa a k in . ”
F am il y . H o w f a r i s t h a t h o u se f r o m t he p l ac e w h er e yo u w er e w ai t ing
at the co r n e r o f M o d e r n a a n d Pa u li no S tr ee t s? Q: W her e ?

A: Ab ou t t h r e e m e t e r s f r o m M o d e r na a nd Pa ul i no S tr ee t s w her e m y A: T o N i pa Str ee t, s ir .
ped i ca b w a s p l a c e d . M y d i s t a n c e w as a bou t t hr e e m e te r s, s ir .
Q: D id y ou br ing h er t o N ip a Str eet a s s he r eq ue st ed?
x x x x
A: Ye s , s ir .
Q: A nd h o w d i d yo u k n o w t h a t t h e h o u s e w h er e Ed na ca m e o ut i s t hat of
the h o u se o f t h e S e p a r a F a m i l y? x x x x

20 | P a g e
 Q: Y ou s a i d t h a t yo u b r o u g h t h e r t o N ipa S tr e et. Wh at ha pp ene d w he n x x x x
yo u g o ( s i c) t h e r e a t N i p a S t r e e t , i f a n y?
A: I w a s ca l le d b y our B ar an ga y C ha ir m an in or d er to id en ti f y Ed na, sir .
A: “ N ag pa h i n t o p o s i ya d o o n n g s a g l it , m ga ta tl on g m inu to p o.”
x x x x[10]
Q: W hat d id s h e d o w h e n s h e a s ked ( y ou) to st op th er e for thr e e
m i nu t e s?
R em ig io B er n ar d o, Bar an ga y C ha ir m an of t he ar e a w he r e t he f ir e o cc ur r e d, s tat ed :
A: Af ter t h r e e m i n u t e s sh e r e q u e s t e d m e t o br in g her d ir ec tl y to B al a sa n
Str e e t , s ir . Pr o s. R e ba ga y:

x x x x On J an uar y 2 , 20 01 , do y ou r e ca l l i f th er e is a f ir e t hat oc c ur r ed
so m ew her e in y our ar e a of jur i sd i ct io n, par ti c ul ar ly M o der n a Str eet ?
Q: W ha t h a p p e n e d a f t e r t h a t ?
A: Ye s , s ir .
A: Wh en w e a r r i ve d t h e r e , sh e a l i g h t e d a nd pa y ( s i c) P5 .00 , s ir .
Q: N ow , w her e w er e y o u w h en t hi s i n ci de nt ha pp e ned ?
Q A nd th e n w h a t t r a n s p ir e d a f t e r s h e a li gh te d fr o m your p ed i ca b?
A: “ Ka s i ug al i k o n a po tuw in g um a ga ng - um a ga p o a ko na p upu nt a sa
Wi tn es s : bar a ng ay H al l m ga si gur o 6 :0 0 o r 5 :00 o ’ c l oc k , m e su m iga w ng
I w e nt h o m e a n d I lo o k e d f o r a n o t her pa s s eng er , sir . su no g n ir es po nd eha n na m i n iy on g su no g eh m e da l a k am ing f ir e .”

Pr o s. R e ba ga y: C our t :
Aft er t h a t , w h a t h a p p e n e d w h e n y ou w er e on y ou w a y to y our ho u se Yo u j u st an sw er t he qu es t io n. Wh er e w er e y ou w h e n th i s in c id en t
to lo o k f o r p a s se n g e r s ? hap pe ne d?

A “ N a ki ta ko n a n g a p o n a p a g d a t in g k o sa M od er na , na gl a lag ab la b na Wi tn es s :
apo y . ” I w a s at t he Bar an g ay H a l l, Y our H on or .

Q: F r om w h a t p la ce w a s t h a t f ir e c o m in g o ut ?
A: F r om t h e h o u s e o f R o b e r t o S e p a r a F am i ly , s ir .
x x x x
Pr o s. R e ba ga y:
Aft er y o u n o t i ce d t h a t t h e r e w a s a f ir e fr om t he h ou se of R o ber to
Se pa r a F a m i l y, w h a t d id y o u d o if a ny ?
A: “ S iy em p r e p o , is a n g Ba r a n g a y T a n od po a ko, n agr e s pon de na po ka m i
sa s u n o g . B in u k s a n n a p o n g C h a ir m a n n am in g ‘ yun g t an gk e,
bi nom b a n a p o n a m i n g ‘ y u n g a p o y ng tu b ig.”
Pr o s. R e ba ga y:
An d yo u sa id t hat t her e w a s a f ir e t ha t o c cur r ed , w hat d id y ou do ?
Wi tn es s :
“ Iy on n ga n agr e spo nd e k am i do on sa s uno g e h na k it a k o i yo ng su no g
m u kh a t al ag ang ar so n d a hi l nap a ka la k i ka ag ad, m e r on p on g m ga
ti pon g … I y ong n am ata y po c on tr a ct or p o i yo n eh ka y a s ig ur o
nap a kar a m ing ka la t ng m ga p int ur a , m ga c on ta in e r , ka ya h in d i
p o na m i n naa pu l a ka ag ad i yo ng ap o y, na su no g u l ti m o i yo ng fir e
tan k na m in s a la ka s ,” s ir .
Pr o s. R e ba ga y:
N ow , w i l l y ou p lea s e te l l us w h er e th i s f ir e o cc u r r ed?

Q: A fter t h a t in c id e n t , M r . W it n e s s, h a v e y ou s een Ed na Ag a in ( s i c) .” A: At t he ho u se of th e s i x v ic ti m s, s ir .

A: N o, sir . Q: W ho se h ou se i s t h at ?

Pr o s. R e ba ga y: A: T he ho u se of t he v i ct im s, sir .
And a f t e r t h a t in c id e n t , d i d yo u co m e t o kno w if E dn a w as
appr e h e n d e d o r n o t ? x x x x

21 | P a g e
 Pr o s. R e ba ga y: Att y . H er m a n:
Yo u s a i d t h a t y o u r e s p o n d e d t o t h e p la c e, w h at tr an s pir ed a ft er y ou It ’s n ot un der th e e x em p t io n u nd er t he R u le s of C o ur t , Y our H o nor .
r es po n d e d t o t h e p l a ce ? H e i s t e st if y in g a c cor d ing t o w h at h e h a s h ear d.

A: “ I y on n g a p o a n g n a g s a b i m a y lu m ab a s na i s ang b ab ae p o n oo n sa C our t :
bah a y n a n a g m a m a d a l i h a b a n g m a y su no g, m e is an g b ar an ga y ta no d T hat ’ s p ar t of the nar r at io n . W het her it i s tr ue or n ot , tha t’ s an oth er
po a k o n g n a g sa b i m a y h u m a h a n go s n a i san g b ab ae na m a y d al an g m at ter . L et i t r e m a in .
bag p a p u n t a p o r o o n p a la b a s n g sa sa k ya n,” s ir .
Pr o s. R e ba ga y:
Q: A nd s o w h a t h a p p e n e d ? N ow , w h o w er e pr e s ent w h en th e a c cu s ed ar e t el l in g yo u t h is ?

A: “ S iy em p r e h in d i n a m a n a k o n a g t a n ong k ung s in o ng a yon m a y d um at in g A: “ Iy on n ga i yo ng m g a ta nod k o, m am am a y a n do on n a ka pa li g id,

ga li n g n a sa b a h a y n a m i n g , m a y tu m aw ag, t um a w ag p o si K on se ha la s iy em pr e m a y s un og n ag k ak ag ul o, g u st o ng a s i ya ng ku ni n n g m g a
Al fo n s o n a m a y i sa n g b a b a e n a h ind i m ap ak a li d oo n s a C al l e Pe dr o m am am ay an p ar a sa k tan h in di ko m a ib ig a y pa pa ta y in si y a gaw a n g
Al fo n s o , ke k o n s e h a l n a b a ka i to sab i n i ya i y on g gan it o ga no on m a y na m a ta y e h a ni m n a tao and na m at a y, ka y a i yo ng m ga ta o
nir es p o n d e h a n k o p o , ” s ir . k ino k on tr o l s i y a m ad id i sgr as ya s i ya d ah i l pi n - p oi nt ed p o s i ya , Yo ur
H on or , i yon g d am i na i yo n l ib o i y on g n ak ap al i gi d d oo n s a b ar a ng ay
Q: W her e d id yo u r e s p o n d ? ha ll na pa k ah ir a p aw at in . G us to ng - g u sto si y an gk un in n g m g a t ao ng -
ba ya n, na ga l it da hi l an g da m i ng ba ha y ho ng na s un og.” [ 1 1 ]
A: At B a la sa n , s ir , b u t i t ’ s n o t t h e a r e a of m y jur i sd i ct io n.

x x x x F or h er par t , M er ce di ta M end o za, o ne of t he n ei gh b or s of t he S ep ar a F am i l y and

w ho se h ou se w a s on e of th os e de str oy ed b y th e f ir e , r ec ou nte d:
Q: W hat h a p p e n e d w h e n yo u r e a ch e d th at pl a ce ?
Pr o s. R e ba ga y:
A: “ S iy a p o a n g n a h u l i k o d o o n , ” s ir . M ad am W itn e s s, o n J anu ar y 2 , 2 00 1, do yo u r e ca l l w her e w er e y ou
r es id i ng th en ?
C our t :
W i tn e s s p o i n t in g t o a c cu s e d E d n a M a lng an . A: Ye s , s ir .

Pr o s. R e ba ga y: Q: W her e w er e yo u r e si di ng at ?
And w h a t h a p p e n e d ?
A: At N o . 170 M od er na St. , Ba lu t, T on do , M an i la , s ir .
A: I br ou g h t h e r t o t h e b a r a n g a y h a l l, s ir .
Q: W hy di d you tr an s fe r your r es i de nc e? Aw h i le ago yo u t es ti f ied th at
Q: A nd w h a t h a p p e n e d a t t h e b a r a n g a y h al l? yo u ar e now r e s id in g at 14 7 M o der na St ., B al ut , T o nd o, M a ni l a?

A: “ In em b e st ig a h a n k o , k in u h a n a m in g i yo ng b ag n i ya , m e l i ght er s i ya eh . A: Be c au se o ur h ou s e w as b ur ne d, s ir .
Ina m i n n i ya p o s a a m i n n a ka ya n i ya s inu no g h in d i si y a p in as a sa hod
ng m o r e o r le s s i s a n g t a o n n a e h . N g ay on sa b i k o ba k it e h gu s to ko Q: M or e or le s s, h ow m uc h d id t he lo s s in cur r ed on t he b ur n in g of y our
ng u m u w i n g p r o b i n s ya a n g sa b i sa ak i n ng am o ko s u m a ka y n a l an g hou s e ( si c) ?
daw p o a ko n g w a l i s t in g t in g p a r a m a k auw i,” sir .
A: M or e o r le s s, P1 00 ,0 00. 00 , sir
Att y . H er m a n :
We w o u l d l i ke t o o b j e ct , Yo u r H onor o n the gr ou n d t ha t t ha t i s Q: D o y ou k no w t he a c c us ed i n t h is ca se E dn a M a l nga n?
hear s a y .
A: Ye s , s ir .
Pr o s. R e ba ga y:
T hat is n o t a h e a r sa y st a t e m e n t , Y our H o nor , str ai gh t fr om t he m o ut h Q: W hy d o yo u kn ow he r ?
of the a c cu s e d .
A: Sh e i s the h ou se h el per of th e f am i l y w ho w er e ( s ic) b ur ne d, s ir .
22 | P a g e
 Q: W hat f a m i ly ? A: I ta l ked t o h er w he n w e w ent t her e a t tha t da y, s ir .

A: C i far a ( si c) f a m il y, si r . Q: W hat tr an sp ir e d th en ?

Q: W ho i n p a r t i cu la r d o yo u kn o w a m o n g C if ar a ( s i c ) fa m i l y? A: I ta l ked t o her an d I t ol d her , “ Edn a, b ak i t m o n am a n g in aw a ‘ y un g

gan un ?”
A: T he w o m a n , s ir .
Q: A nd w h at w a s the a n sw er o f Edn a?
Q: W hat is t h e n a m e ?
A: Sh e an sw er ed , “ Ka s i pa g na gpa pa al am a ko s a ka ny an g um u w i n g
A: V ir g in i a M e n d o za C if a r a ( s i c) , s ir . pr ob in s y a, na gpa pa a lam p o s i ya ng um uw i n g pr ob i ns y a a ng s in a sa bi
daw po sa k an ya n i B a by C i far a ( s i c) na, ( s i c) ” Si ge u m u w i k a,
Q: Ar e yo u r e l a t e d t o V i r g i n i a M e n d o z a C if ar a ( s i c) ? pag da ti ng m o m ap ut i k a na. S um a ka y k a sa w a l i s pa gd at in g m o
m ap ut i k a n a.”
A: M y h u sb a n d , s ir .
Pr o s. R e ba ga y:
Q: W hat i s t h e r e l a t io n s h i p o f y o u r h u sba nd to t he la te Vir gi n ia M en do za W ha t is th e b as i s t h er e t ha t s he w a s t he o ne w ho b ur n ed t he ho u se o f
C if ar a ( s i c) ? the C ifar a ( s i c) f am i ly ?

A: T he y w e r e f ir st c o u s i n s , s ir . A: I a l so as k ed h er , “ Pa an o m o g in aw a ‘ yu ng su nog ?” Sh e t ol d
m e , “ N a gl u kot a ko n g m ar a m i ng d iy ar yo, s i ni nd ih an k o ng d is po s ab le
Q: H ow f a r i s yo u r h o u s e f r o m t h e h o u s e o f th e C if ar a ( s i c) f am i ly ? l igh ter a t h in ag i s n i ya sa ib aba w ng la m e sa sa lo ob n g
bah a y” . ( s i c) [ 1 2 ]
A: “ M a gk a d i k it l a n g p o . Pa d e r la n g a n g pa g ita n.”

Q: Y ou sa id t h a t Ed n a M a ln g a n w a s w or ki ng w it h the C if ar a ( si c) f am i ly . La st l y, t he pr o se cu t ion p r es ent ed R od o lfo M ov i l la , ow n er of the ho us e si tu a ted

Wha t i s t h e w o r k o f E d n a M a l n g a n? be si de th at of th e Sep ar a f am il y . H e te s ti fi ed th at hi s hou s e w a s a ls o g ut ted b y t he f ir e t hat
k il l ed th e Se par a f am il y a n d t hat h e tr i ed to h el p sa i d v ic t im s but t o n o a va il .
A: “ N an ga n g a m u h a n p o . ” H o u s e h e lp e r , s ir .
T he pr os e cu ti on pr e se nt ed oth er d oc um ent ar y e v id en ce [ 1 3 ] an d t her e af ter r e s ted it s
Q: H ow l o n g d o y o u kn o w E d n a M a l ng an as ho us e he l per o f t he C i f ar a ca se .
( s ic) f a m il y ?
Whe n i t ca m e t i m e f or th e def en se t o pr e se nt e x cu lp a tor y e v id en c e, i ns te ad o f d oi ng
A: I ca nn o t e st im a t e b u t s h e s t a ye d t h er e for thr ee to four ye ar s , s ir . so , a c cu se d - a pp el l ant f i le d a M o t ion to A dm it D em ur r er t o Ev i den c e [ 1 4 ] and th e
cor r es po nd in g D em ur r er to E v id en ce [ 1 5 ] w i th t he f or m er e x pr e s sl y sta t in g t ha t s ai d D em ur r er
Q: D o y ou k n o w w h o c a u s e d t h e b u r n i ng of th e ho us e o f th e C if ar a ( s i c) to E vi de n ce w a s be in g f i le d “ x x xw i th ou t e x pr e s s le av e o f co ur t x x x.” [ 1 6 ]
fam i l y?
In h er D e m ur r er to Ev i de nc e , a c cu s ed - a pp e ll an t a s ser t s t ha t th e pr o s ec ut i on ’s
Wi tn es s : ev id e n c e w a s in s uff i c ie nt to pr o ve her g u il t be yo nd r ea s ona b le do ub t for the f ol l ow ing
Ed na M a ln g a n , s ir . r ea so ns : [ 1 7 ] ( a) t ha t s he i s ch ar ge d w ith cr im e no t d ef ine d a nd p en al i ze d b y l aw ; ( b) t ha t
c ir c um st an ti a l e v id en c e w a s in s uff i c ie nt to pr o v e h er gu il t be yo nd r ea s ona b le do ubt ; a nd ( c)
Pr o s. R e ba ga y: tha t th e te s ti m o ni e s g i ve n b y th e w i tn e ss e s of t he pr os e cut i on w er e h ea r sa y, th us ,
W h y d o yo u k n o w t h a t it w a s E d n a M a l nga n w h o bur ne d t he h ou s e of in adm i s s ib le i n ev i de nc e ag ai ns t her .
the C if a r a ( s i c) f a m i ly ?
T he pr o se c ut io n f i le d it s C om m en t/ Op po s it io n to a c cu se d - a pp el l ant ’ s D em ur r er to
A: Wh en t h e f ir e i n c i d e n t h a p p e n e d , s ir , o n J anu ar y 3, w e w ent t o Sa n Ev i de nc e .
La zar o F ir e St a t io n a n d I s a w Ed na M a ln ga n det a ine d ther e, s ir .
On 1 3 O ct ob er 200 3, a c ti ng on t he D em ur r er to E v ide n ce , the R T C pr om ul g ate d
Q: A nd so w h a t is yo u r b a s i s i n p o in t in g to E dn a M a lng an a s t he cu lpr it it s J udg m e nt [ 1 8 ] w her e in i t pr o ce ede d to r es o lv e th e s ub je ct ca s e ba se d on the ev id en c e of
or t he o n e w h o b u r n e d t h e h o u s e o f the C if ar a ( s i c) f a m i l y?
23 | P a g e
t h e p r o s ec ut io n. T he R T C co n s i d e r e d a c c u s e d - a p pe l l ant to ha v e w ai v ed her r ig ht t o pr e se nt
e v id e n c e, ha v in g f i le d t h e D e m u r r e r t o E vi d e n ce w i th ou t lea v e o f c our t .
In fi nd i ng a c cu se d - a p p e l la n t Ed n a g u i l t y b e yon d r ea so na bl e do ubt o f th e cr im e o f
Ar s o n w ith M ul t ip le H o m i c id e , t h e R T C r u le d t h a t :
T he f ir s t a r g u m e n t o f t h e a c cu se d th at sh e i s c har ged w it h an ac t no t
def in ed a nd p e n a l i ze d b y l a w i s w it h o u t m er it . x x x t he cap t ion w hi c h
ch ar g es the a c c u se d w i t h t h e cr i m e o f Ar s on w it h M ul t ip le H om i ci de i s
m er e l y de s cr i p t i ve o f t h e c h a r g e o f Ar so n t ha t r e su l te d t o M u lt ip le H o m i c id e.
T he fa ct i s th a t t h e a cc u se d i s ch a r g e d w ith Ar s on w h i ch r e su lt ed t o M u lt ip l e
H om i ci de ( d e a t h o f v ic t im s ) a n d t h a t ch ar ge i s em bo di ed a nd sta te d in t he
bod y of t he i n f o r m a t i o n . W h a t i s c o n t r o l li ng i s th e al l ega ti on i n th e b od y of
the In for m a ti o n a n d n o t t h e t it le o r c a p t i o n th er eo f. x x x .
x x x x
T he se c o n d a n d t h ir d a r g u m e n t s w il l be d is c u ss ed j oi nt ly a s t he y ar e
in ter r e l ate d w i t h e a ch o t h e r . x x x.
x x x x
[W] h il e th er e is n o d ir e ct e v id e n c e t h a t p oi nt s to the a c c u se d i n th e a ct o f
bur n in g t he h o u se o r a c t u a l l y s t a r t i n g t he su bj e c t fir e, t he fo ll ow in g
c ir c um st an ce s t h a t sh o w t h a t t h e a c cu s ed i nt en ti o na ll y cau s ed or w a s
r es po ns i bl e f o r t h e su b j e ct f ir e h a ve b e e n du l y e sta b li s hed :
1. t h a t i m m e d ia t e ly b e f o r e t h e bur ni ng of th e h ou s e, t he a cc u se d
hur r ied l y an d w i t h h e a d t u r n i n g i n d i f f e r en t d ir e ct io n s ( pa l in ga - li ng a) w en t
out o f th e s a id h o u se a n d r o d e a p e d i c a b a pp ar en t ly n ot k now i ng w h er e t o g o
x x x;
2. t h a t im m e d ia t e ly a f t e r t h e f ir e , u po n a r ep or t t hat th er e w a s a
w om a n in B a la sa n St . w h o a p p e a r s c o n f u sed a nd ap pr ehe n si v e ( b al i sa) , the
Bar a ng a y C h a ir m a n a n d h i s t a n o d s w en t t her e, fo und th e a c cu s ed an d
appr eh end ed h e r a n d b r o u g h t h e r t o t h e bar a ng ay ha l l a s sh ow n b y t he
te st im on y of B a r a n g a y C h a i r m a n R e m i g io B er nar do ; a n d
3. t h a t w h e n s h e w a s a p p r eh end ed an d i n ve st i gat ed by th e
bar a ng ay of f i c ia l s a n d w h e n h e r b a g w as op ene d, the sa m e c ont a ine d a
di sp o sa bl e l i g h t e r a s li k e w i se sh o w n by th e te s ti m on y o f t he B ar a ng ay
C ha ir m an.
[T ]h e t im in g o f h e r h u r r i e d d e p a r t u r e an d n er vou s dem ea nor im m e di at el y
bef or e th e f ir e w h e n sh e l e f t t h e h o u se an d r o de a ped i ca b a nd her s am e
dem ea nor , p h y s i ca l a n d m e n t a l c o n d i t i o n w h en fo un d a nd ap pr eh en de d a t th e
sa m e p la ce w h e r e sh e a l i g h t e d f r o m t h e pe di c ab an d t he di s co v er y of t he
l igh ter in her b a g t h e r e a f t e r w h e n in v e s t ig ate d i nd i sp u tab l y sho w her gu i lt a s
ch ar g ed.
24 | P a g e
I f t her e is a ny d ou b t o f h er g u il t t ha t r e m a in s w it h t he c ir cu m sta nt ia l
ev id en c e aga i ns t her , th e sa m e i s r e m o ve d or ob l it er a ted w it h th e
co nf es s io n s/a dm i s si on s o f th e c om m i s s io n of t he o f fen s e and the m an ner
ther eof tha t s he m ad e to t he pr os e cut i on w it ne s se s B ar an ga y C h a ir m a n
R em ig io B er n ar d o, M er ce d i ta M e ndo z a a nd t o t he m e d i a, r es pe ct i ve l y.
x x x x
[H ]er con fe s s io ns /a dm i ss i o ns ar e p os i ti v e a c kn ow le d gm e nt of gu i lt of t he
cr im e an d ap pe ar to ha v e bee n v o lu ntar i l y an d int e l li ge nt l y g iv en . T h es e
co nf es s io n s/a dm i s si on s, e s pe ci a ll y the on e g i ve n to h er ne ig hb or M er c ed it a
M en do za a nd t he m e di a, a lb ei t un co un se l le d an d m a de w h i le she w as
a lr ead y un der th e cu s tod y of aut hor it i es , it i s be l ie ve d, ar e not vi ol at i ve of
her r ig ht un der th e C on s ti tu ti on.
T he de cr e ta l par t o f the R T C ’ s Ju dg m e nt r ea ds :
WH E R EF OR E, t he D e m ur r er t o E vi de nc e i s her eb y de ni ed a nd
ju dgm en t i s h er e b y r e nd er ed fi nd in g th e a c cu s ed ED N A M A LN GA N Y M A YO
gu il t y b ey on d r e a son ab l e d oub t o f t he cr im e o f Ar s on w it h M u lt ip le H o m i c id e
or Ar s on r e su lt in g t o the d e ath of si x ( 6) peo p le an d s ent en c in g h er t o su ff er
the m an da tor y pe na lt y o f dea th , an d or d er i ng h er t o pa y th e h eir s o f th e
v ic t im s R ob er to Sep ar a , Sr . an d V ir g in ia S ep ar a and ch i ldr e n M i c ha el ,
D ap hne , Pr i s c il l a an d R ob er to , Jr ., th e a m ou nt o f F ift y T ho us an d
( P50 ,0 00 .00) P es o s f or ea ch v i ct im an d th e a m oun t o f One H u ndr e d
T hou s and ( P1 00, 00 0. 00) Pe so s a s t em per a te d am age s f o r th eir bur n ed
hou s e or a tot a l of F o ur H un dr ed T h ou s and ( P40 0, 000 .0 0) Pe so s a nd t o
R od ol fo M o v il la th e a m o unt of On e H u ndr ed [T h ou sa nd] ( P1 00 ,0 00. 00)
Pe so s .
D ue to t he d ea th pe na lt y i m po s ed b y th e R T C , th e c a se w a s d ir e c tl y e le v ate d to th i s
C our t f or a ut om at i c r e v i ew . C o nfor m a bl y w ith o u r de c i si on in P eo p le v . Efr en M a teo y
Gar c ia , [ 1 9 ] h ow e v er , w e r ef er r ed t he c as e a nd it s r e co r ds t o t he C A f or ap pr o pr i at e a ct io n an d
di sp o si t ion .
On 2 Sep te m b er 20 05 , th e C o ur t of A pp ea l s af f ir m e d w it h m o d if ic at io n t he d e ci s ion
of the R T C , t he f al lo o f w hi ch r ea d s:
WH E R EF OR E, pr e m i s e s c o ns id er e d, th e a s sa i le d Oc t ober 13 , 2 00 3
Ju dg m en t o f t he R e gi on a l T r ia l C our t of M a n il a, Br a n ch 41 , f in d in g a c cu se d -
app e ll an t E dn a M al ng an y M a yo gu i lt y b e yo nd r e a s ona b le dou bt of Ar so n
w it h m u lt ip l e hom i c id e and s en ten c in g her to su ffer t he D E AT H P EN ALT Y i s
her e b y AF F I R M ED w it h M O D IF IC AT I ON in th at sh e i s fur t her or de r ed t o p ay
P5 0,0 00 .00 as m or a l da m ag e s and ano th er P5 0, 000 .0 0 as ex em pl ar y
dam ag es for ea c h of t he vi ct im s w h o per i sh ed in t he f ir e , to b e pa id t o th e ir
he ir s . S he i s or der e d to p ay R odo l fo M ov i l la, o ne w ho se h ou se w as al s o
bur n ed , t he s um of P 50 ,0 00 .00 a s e xem p lar y dam ag e.
Pur su an t t o Se ct io n 13 ( a) , R u le 1 24 of th e 2 00 0 R ul es of C r i m in al
Pr o ce dur e a s am en de d b y A.M . N o . 00 - 5 - 0 3 - SC dat ed S ep te m ber 28 , 20 04,
 w hi c h be ca m e e f f e c t iv e o n Oc t o b e r 1 5 , 2 004 , th e C our t o f A ppe a ls , af ter
r end er i ng j ud g m e n t , h e r e b y r e f r a i n s f r o m m a k in g a n entr y of j ud gm ent a nd
for t hw ith c er t if i e s t h e ca s e a n d e le va t e s th e e nt ir e r e c or d o f th i s ca se to th e
Su pr em e C ou r t f o r r e v ie w . [ 2 0 ]
It i s the c o n t e n t io n o f a c cu s e d - a p p e ll an t th at th e e vi de n ce pr e sen te d b y the
p r o se cu ti on is n ot su f f ic i e n t t o e s t a b l i sh h e r gu i l t b e yo nd r ea s ona b le d ou bt a s the
p e r p e t r a tor o f t he cr i m e c h a r g e d . I n su p p o r t o f s a id e x cu lp at or y pr opo s it i on, sh e a s si gn s th e
f o ll o w in g er r or s [ 2 1 ] :
I.
T H E H ON OR A BL E C OU R T ER R ED I N R U LIN G T H AT T H E C IR C U M ST AN T IA L
EV ID E N C E PR E SEN T ED BY T H E PR OS EC U T I ON IS SU F F IC IE N T T O
C ON VIC T T H E AC C U SE D ; a n d
II.
T H E H ON OR AB L E C OU R T E R R E D I N A LL O WIN G AN D GI VIN G C R ED EN C E
T O T H E H EA R S AY E V I D EN C E AN D U N C OU N S EL LED AD M I SS I ON S
AL LE G ED L Y G I V EN B Y T H E AC C U S ED T O T H E W IT N E SS E S B AR A N G A Y
C H AI R M AN R EM I GI O B ER N AR D O, M ER C ED IT A M E N D OZ A AN D T H E M ED I A.
T H ER E I S N O C OM PL E X C R I M E OF AR S ON WIT H ( M U LT I PL E ) H O M IC I D E .
T he Inf or m at io n in t h i s ca s e e r r o n e o u s ly c har ge d a c c us ed - app e ll an t w ith a c om pl ex
cr im e , i. e. , Ar s on w it h M u l t ip le H o m i c id e . Pr e se n t ly , t her e ar e tw o ( 2) law s tha t go ver n th e
cr im e o f ar son w her e d e a t h r e su lt s t h e r e f r o m – Ar ti c le 320 o f th e R e vi s ed P en al C ode ( R PC ) ,
a s a m e nd ed b y R e pub l i c A c t ( R A) N o . 7 6 5 9 , [ 2 2 ] a n d Se ct io n 5 of Pr e s id ent i al D ecr ee ( PD ) N o.
1 6 1 3 [ 2 3 ] , qu ote d her e u n d e r , t o w it :
R ev i se d Pe n a l C o d e :
AR T . 3 2 0 . D e s t r u ct i ve Ar so n . – x x x x
I f a s a c o n se q u e n ce o f t h e co m m i ss i on of an y of t he ac ts pe na l i zed
und er t hi s Ar t i c le , d e a t h r e s u l t s , t h e m an dat or y p en al ty of de at h sha l l be
im po se d. [E m p h a si s s u p p li e d . ]
Pr e s id e n t ia l D e cr e e N o . 1 6 1 3 :
SEC . 5 . Wh e r e D e a t h R e s u l t s f r o m Ar s on . – I f b y r ea s o n o f or o n t he
oc ca s io n of t h e a r s o n d e a t h r e su lt s , t he p en al ty o f r e c lu s io n p er p et ua to
dea th s ha l l b e i m p o s e d . [ E m p h a si s s u p p l i ed. ]
Ar t . 3 20 of t he R P C , a s a m e n d e d , w it h r e sp e c t t o de st r uc ti v e ar s on , a nd t he pr o v i s ion s o f PD
N o . 1 6 13 r e sp ec t in g o t h e r c a s e s o f a r so n p r o vi de o nl y on e pe na lt y for th e c o m m is s io n of
a r s o n , w h eth er co n s i d e r e d d e st r u c t i v e o r o t h er w i se , w h er e dea th r e su l ts th er e fr om .
T h e r a i s on d 'ê tr e i s th a t a r so n i s it se l f t h e e n d a n d d e ath i s s i m p l y t he c on s equ e nc e. [ 2 4 ]
25 | P a g e
Wh eth er t he cr im e o f ar s on w i l l a bs or b th e r e su l t ant de at h or w i l l h av e t o b e a sep ar a te
cr im e al to get her , th e j oi nt di s cu s s io n [ 2 5 ] of th e la te M r . C hi ef Ju s ti c e R am on C . Aq ui no an d
M m e . J us t ic e C ar ol i na C . Gr i ño - Aq ui no , on t he s ub je ct o f th e cr i m e s of ar so n an d
m ur d er /h om i c id e, i s hi gh l y i ns tr u ct i ve :
Gr o i zar d sa y s tha t w he n fir e is u se d w i th th e in t ent to ki l l a
par t i cu lar p er son w ho m a y be in a ho u se a nd th at o bj ec t iv e i s at ta in ed b y
bur n in g the h ou se , t he cr i m e i s m ur d er o nl y . W he n t he Pe na l C od e d e cl ar e s
tha t k i l li ng c om m it te d b y m ean s of f ir e i s m ur d er , it i nte nd s t ha t f ir e sh ou ld
be p ur p os e ly ad op te d a s a m e an s to t ha t e nd . T he r e c an be no m ur d er
w it ho ut a de s ig n to t ak e l if e. [ 2 6 ] I n ot her w or d s, i f t he m a in o b je ct o f the
off en der i s t o k i l l b y m e an s of f ir e, t he o ffe n se is m ur der . Bu t i f th e m a i n
ob je ct i ve i s th e b ur n in g of t he bu i ld i ng, th e r es u l ti ng ho m i c id e m a y b e
ab sor bed b y th e cr im e o f ar so n. [ 2 7 ]
x x x x
If t he ho u se w a s se t o n f ir e a fter th e v ic t im s t her ei n w er e k i ll ed , f ir e w o ul d
not b e a q ua l if y in g c ir cu m s tan c e. T h e a c cu se d w ou ld b e l ia b le f or th e
se par ate o ffe n se s of m ur de r or hom i c id e, a s t he c a se m a y b e, a nd ar son . [ 2 8 ]
A cc or d in g ly , i n ca s e s w h er e b oth bur n i ng an d d eat h o cc ur , in or d er to d et er m ine w ha t
cr im e / cr i m e s w a s/w er e p er petr ate d – w he th e r ar s on , m ur d er or ar s on an d ho m i c i de/ m ur der , it
i s d e r i gu eur to as c er ta i n t he m ai n o bj e ct iv e o f th e m a le fa ct or : ( a) if t he m a in ob j ec ti v e i s t he
bur n in g of t he bu i ld in g or ed if i ce, bu t d ea th r es u lt s b y r e a son or on the o c ca s io n of ar so n,
the cr i m e i s s im pl y ar so n, and t he r e su lt in g hom i c id e i s ab sor be d; ( b) if , on th e ot her ha nd ,
the m a in o b je ct i ve i s to k i ll a par t i cu l ar per so n w h o m ay be in a bu i ld in g or e di f ic e, w h en f ir e
i s r es or t ed to a s t he m ea ns t o ac c om pl i sh su ch g o al t he cr i m e c om m i tt ed i s m ur d er o n ly ;
la st l y, ( c) i f t he o bj e ct i ve i s, l i kew i se , to k i ll a par ti c u lar per s on, a nd in f ac t the off en der ha s
alr ead y don e s o, but fir e i s r e sor te d to as a m e an s t o co ver up t he k il l in g, t he n th er e ar e tw o
se par ate a nd d is t in ct cr i m e s co m m it te d – h om i c ide /m u r der and ar s on .
Wher e th en do es t hi s c a se fa ll u nder ?
F r om a r e ad in g of th e bo dy of the I nf or m a ti on :
T hat o n or a bo ut Jan uar y 2 , 200 1, in t he C it y o f M a n il a, P hi l ip p ine s ,
the s ai d a c cu se d, w ith i nte nt t o c au s e da m a ge , d id th en a nd ther e w i ll fu l ly ,
un law fu l ly , f e lon i ou s ly a nd de l ib er at e ly s et fir e upo n t he tw o - s tor e y
r es id en ti a l hou s e of R O B E R T O S EP AR A an d fa m i l y m o st l y m ad e of w o od en
m at er i a ls lo c ate d at N o. 1 7 2 M od er na S t. , Ba lu t, T on d o, th i s c i ty , b y l ig ht in g
cr u m p le d n ew spa per w i th the us e o f d i sp os ab l e l ig h ter in s ide s ai d h ou se
kn ow in g t he s am e to b e an i nha b ite d hou s e a nd s it uat ed i n a th i c k ly
pop u lat ed p la ce an d a s a co ns eq ue n ce t her eo f a co nf lagr at io n e n su ed a nd
the s a id bu i ld in g, to get her w it h so m e s ev en ( 7) ad jo in i ng r e s id en t ia l h ou s es ,
w er e r a ze d b y fir e; th at b y r ea s on a nd o n th e oc c a si on of t he sa id f ir e , th e
fo ll ow in g, na m e l y,
1. R ob er t o Se par a , Sr . , 4 5 ye ar s of a ge
2. V ir g in i a Sep ar a y M en do za , 4 0 ye ar s o f ag e
 3. M ic h a e l S e p a r a , 2 4 ye ar s of a ge on th at f at efu l e ar l y m or n in g as o b ser ve d f ir s th and by R ol an do Gr ut a, o ne o f th e w it ne s se s o f
4. D a p h n e Se p a r a , 1 8 y e ar s o f a ge the pr o s e cut i on, b el i e h er c la im o f n or m al c y, t o w it :
5. Pr i sc i l la Se p a r a , 1 4 ye ar s of a ge
6. R o b e r t o Se p a r a , Jr . , 1 1 ye ar s of a ge Q: Y ou s a i d you s aw Ed na co m ing ou t fr om th e hou s e o f t he Se par a
F am il y . Wh at ha pp en ed w hen yo u sa w Ed na c om i n g o ut fr om th e
su st a in e d b u r n in ju r ie s w h i ch w er e th e d ir e ct c au se of th e ir de at h hou s e o f the S ep ar a F am i l y ?
im m ed i ate l y t h e r e a f t e r . [ 2 9 ] [ Em p h a s i s su p p l ie d.]
A: “ Wa l a p a po ng an o ‘ y an na i sa ka y k o na s i ya sa s id ec ar . ”
a c cu s ed - app e ll an t i s b e in g c h a r g e d w it h t h e cr im e of ar son . It i t is cl ear fr o m t he for e go i ng
t h a t h er in te nt w a s m e r e l y t o d e st r o y h e r e m p lo ye r ’ s h ou se thr ou gh th e us e of f ir e. Q: A nd w h at d i d y ou o bs er v e fr o m E dn a w he n y o u sa w her co m i ng o ut
fr om th e ho us e of th e Se pa r a f am i ly ?
We now go to t h e i ss u e s r a i se d . U n d e r t h e f ir st a s si gn m en t o f er r or , in a s ser t i ng the
in su f f i c ien c y o f th e p r o s e c u t io n ’ s e v id e n ce t o e st ab l i sh h er g ui lt be yo nd r e a so nab l e do ubt , A: “ N ag m a m a da li p o s iy ang l um a kad a t p a li ng a - l i ng a . ”
a c cu s ed - app e ll an t ar g u e s t h a t t h e p r o s e cu t i o n w a s o n ly a bl e t o add u ce c i r cu m s ta n t ia l
e v id e n c e – har dl y en o u g h t o p r o v e h e r g u il t b e yo nd r ea so nab l e d ou bt. S he r at io c ina te s th at x x x x
t h e f o l lo w i ng c ir cu m st a n ce s :
Q: A fter she b oar ded yo ur p ed i ca b, w ha t hap pe ne d, i f a n y?
1. T h a t im m e d ia t e l y b e f o r e t h e b ur ni ng of th e ho u se , th e a c cu s ed
hur r ie d l y a n d w it h h e a d t u r n i n g i n d i ffer en t dir ec t ion s ( pa li ng a - l i nga) A: “ N ag pa ha ti d p o s i ya sa a k in . ”
w ent o u t o f t h e s a i d h o u se a nd r o de a p ed i ca b a ppar en tl y n ot
kn ow in g w h e r e t o g o f o r sh e f ir st r eq ue st ed to be br o u ght to N ipa S t. Q: W her e ?
but u p o n r e a ch in g t h e r e r e q u e st e d ag ai n to b e br o u ght t o Ba la s an
St. a s s h o w n b y t h e t e st i m o n y o f pr os e cu ti on w itn e ss R ol an do Gr uta ; A: T o N i pa Str ee t, s ir .

2. T h a t im m e d i a t e l y a f t e r t h e f ir e , up on a r epor t t ha t ther e w a s a Q: D id y ou br ing h er t o N ip a Str eet a s s he r eq ue st ed?

w om a n i n Ba la s a n S t . w h o a p pe ar s co nfu s ed a nd ap pr e he ns i ve
( ba li s a ) , t h e Ba r a n g a y C h a ir m a n an d h i s ta no d s w e nt t her e , f oun d A: Ye s , s ir .
the a c cu se d a n d a p p r e h e n d e d h er a nd br oug ht h er t o t he bar an ga y
ha ll a s sh o w n b y t h e t e st im o n y of Bar an ga y C ha ir m an R em ig i o x x x x
Ber n a r d o ; a n d
Q: Y ou s ai d t ha t yo u b r oug ht her to N ipa S tr e et. Wh at ha pp ene d w he n
3. T ha t w h e n sh e w a s a p p r e h e n d e d a nd i n ve st ig ate d b y th e bar a ng a y yo u go ( s i c) t her e a t N i pa S tr ee t, i f a n y?
o f f i c ia l s a n d w h e n h e r b a g w a s o pe ne d, the sam e con ta in ed a
di sp o sa b l e l ig h t e r a s l i k e w i s e s how n b y th e te s ti m on y o f th e A: “ N ag p a hi nt o p o s i ya doo n ng s ag l it, m ga ta tl on g m inu to p o . ”
Bar a n g a y C h a ir m a n . [ 3 0 ]
Q: W hat d id s he do w he n s he a s ked ( y ou) to st op th er e for thr e e
f a ll s hor t o f pr ov i ng t h a t s h e h a d a n y i n vo l ve m e n t in se tt in g her em p l oy er ’s ho us e o n f ir e , m i nut e s?
m u ch le s s s ho w gu i lt b e yo n d r e a s o n a b le d o u b t , g i ven t ha t “ it i s a f a ct t ha t ho u s em a id s ar e
t h e f ir st p er s on s i n t h e h o u s e t o w a ke u p ear l y to p er f or m r ou ti n e ch or es f or t he ir A: Af ter thr e e m i nut e s sh e r e qu es te d m e t o br in g her d ir ec tl y to B al a sa n
e m p lo y er s ,” [ 3 1 ] o ne o f w h i c h i s p r e p a r i n g a n d co o ki ng t he m or n in g m ea l for th e m em ber s o f Str e et , s ir .
t h e h ou se ho ld ; an d n e ce s s i t y r e q u ir e s h e r t o g o ou t ear ly t o lo o k for op en stor es or e ve n
n e a r b y m ar ket p la ce s t o b u y t h in g s t h a t w i l l co m p le te t he ear l y m ea l for t he da y . [ 3 2 ] S he th en x x x x
co n c l ud es t hat i t w a s n o r m a l f o r h e r t o h a ve b e e n s ee n g oi ng ou t of her em pl o ye r ’ s h ou se i n
a h u r r y at tha t t im e o f t h e d a y a n d “ t o l o o k a t a l l dir e ct io ns to i ns ur e th at the ho u s e i s se c ur e
a n d t h at t her e ar e n o o t h e r p e r so n s i n t h e v ic i n i t y .” [ 3 3 ] We qu ot e w i th ap pr o va l t he pr o no un ce m e nt of t he R T C i n di s cr e di t ing a c cu se d -
app e ll an t’ s af or e m en t ion ed r at ion a le:
We ar e f ar fr om p e r s u a d e d .
[O ]b v io us l y it i s ne v er n or m a l, c om m on or or d in ar y to le a ve th e h ou se i n
T r ue, b y t he n a t u r e o f t h e ir j o b s, h o u se m a id s ar e r e qu ir ed to s tar t the da y ea r l y; su ch a d i st ur b ed, ner v ou s and ag it at ed m an ner , d e m ea nor and c on di t ion .
h o w e v er , c on tr ar y t o s a i d a s se r t io n , t h e a c t u a t io n s a nd th e d em ea nor of a c cu s ed - a pp el l ant T he t im i ng o f h er hur r ie d dep ar tur e a nd ner vo us dem ea nor im m ed i ate l y
bef or e the f ir e w he n sh e l eft th e h ou se an d r o de a ped i ca b and her s am e
26 | P a g e
 dem ea nor , p h y s i ca l a n d m e n t a l c o n d i t i o n w h en fo un d a nd ap pr eh en de d a t th e
sa m e p l ac e w h e r e sh e a li g h t e d f r o m t h e pe d ic ab a n d th e d is c ov er y of t he
l igh ter in her b a g t h e r e a f t e r w h e n in v e s t ig ate d i nd i sp u tab l y sho w her gu i lt a s
ch ar g ed. [ 3 4 ]
Al l t he w itn e s se s a r e in a c c o r d t h a t a c cu s ed - a pp el l ant ’ s ag it at ed a pp ear a n ce w a s out
o f t h e or di nar y. R em a r k a b l y, s h e h a s n e v e r d e n i ed th i s ob ser v at io n.
We g i ve gr e a t w e ig h t t o t h e f i n d i n g s o f th e R T C a nd s o ac c or d cr ed en ce to th e
t e st im on ie s of th e p r o se cu t i o n w i t n e ss e s a s it h ad the o ppor tu ni t y t o o b ser ve t hem
d ir e c t ly . T he cr e d ib i li t y g iv e n b y t r ia l co u r t s t o p r o s ec ut ion w i tn es s es i s a n i m p or tan t a sp ec t
o f e vi de nc e w h i ch ap p e l la t e co u r t s ca n r e ly o n b e ca u se o f it s un i que o pp or tu n it y to ob s er v e
t h e m , p ar t i cu lar l y th e ir d e m e a n o r , c o n d u ct , a n d a tt itu de , dur in g th e d ir e ct a nd cr o s s -
e x a m in at io n b y co u n se l s. H e r e , R e m i g io Be r n a r do , R ol an do Gr ut a a nd M er c ed i ta M e ndo z a
a r e d i si nt er e st ed w itn e ss e s a n d t h e r e is n o t a n i ot a o f ev i de nc e i n th e r ec or d s to in di c ate
t h a t t he y ar e su bor n e d w it n e s se s . T h e r e co r d s o f th e R T C e v en s how t hat R e m ig i o B er n ar d o,
t h e B a r a nga y C h air m a n , k e p t a c cu s e d - a p p e ll a n t fr o m be in g m a ul ed b y t he angr y cr ow d
o u t s id e of th e b ar a ng a y h a l l:
Pr o s. R e ba ga y:
N ow , w h o w e r e p r e s e n t w h e n t h e a c cu s ed ar e ( s i c) te l l ing you t hi s ?
A: “ Iy on n g a i yo n g m g a t a n o d k o , m am am a y a n do on n a ka pa li g id,
s iy em p r e m a y s u n o g n a g k a k a g u l o, g u st o ng a s i ya ng ku ni n n g m g a
m am a m a y a n p a r a sa k t a n h in d i ko m a ib ig a y pa pa ta y in si y a gaw a n g
m a y n a m a t a y e h a n i m n a t a o and na m at a y, ka y a i yo ng m ga ta o
k ino k o n t r o l s i ya m a d id i sg r a s ya s i ya d ah i l pi n - p oi nt ed p o s i ya , Yo ur
H on o r , i yo n g d a m i n a i yo n l ib o i y on g n ak ap al i gi d d oo n s a b ar a ng ay
ha ll n a p a k a h ir a p a w a t in . G u s t i n g - gu st o si y an g kun i n ng m ga ta on g -
ba ya n , n a g a l it d a h i l a n g d a m i n g ba ha y ho ng na s un og . ” [ 3 5 ]
Ac c us ed - ap p e l la n t h a s n o t sh o w n a n y co m p el l in g r ea s on w hy th e w it ne s se s
p r e se nte d w ou l d ope n ly , p u b l i c ly a n d d e l i b e r a t e l y l ie o r c on co c t a st or y , to sen d an i nno c en t
p e r so n t o j ai l a l l th e w h i le k n o w i n g t h a t t h e r ea l m a l efa c tor r em a in s at l ar ge . S uc h
p r o p o si ti on def i es lo g ic . A n d w h e r e t h e d e f e n s e fa i le d to sh ow a ny ev i l or im pr oper m ot i ve
o n t h e p ar t of the pr o s e cu t io n w it n e s se s, t h e p r e su m pt ion i s th at th eir te s ti m o n ie s ar e tr u e
a n d t h u s ent i tl ed to f u l l f a i t h a n d cr e d e n ce . [ 3 6 ]
Wh i le th e p r o s e c u t io n w it n e s se s d i d n o t se e a c cu se d - app el l ant ac tu al l y s tar ti ng th e
f ir e t ha t b ur n ed s e v e r a l h o u s e s a n d k i ll e d t h e S epar a f am i l y, her gu i lt m a y st i ll b e
e s t a b l i sh ed thr oug h c ir c u m s t a n t ia l e v id e n c e p r ov i d ed t ha t: ( 1) t her e i s m or e th an on e
c ir c u m st an ce ; ( 2) the f a ct s f r o m w h ic h t h e in f e r e n ce s ar e d er i v ed ar e pr o ven ; a nd, ( 3) th e
co m b in at io n of a l l th e c ir c u m st a n ce s i s s u ch a s to pr od u ce c on v i ct io n be yo nd r ea s ona b le
doubt.[37]
C ir cu m s ta nt ia l e v i d e n c e is t h a t e v id e n ce w h i ch pr o v es a f ac t or s er ie s o f f a ct s fr om
w h i c h th e fa ct s in i ss u e m a y b e e st a b li s h e d b y in fer en ce . [ 3 8 ] I t i s f oun de d on ex p er i en ce a nd
o b se r ve d fa ct s a nd co in c id e n ce s e st a b l is h in g a co nn ec ti on b etw ee n th e kn ow n and pr o ven
f a ct s a nd t he fa ct s so u g h t t o b e p r o ve d . [ 3 9 ] I n or der t o br ing ab ou t a con v ic t ion , t he
27 | P a g e
c ir c um st an ti a l e v id en c e pr e se nt ed m u st co ns t itu te an u nbr o k en c ha in , w hi c h le ad s to o ne fa ir
and r e as on ab le con c lu s io n po in t in g t o the a c cu s ed, t o t he e x cl u si on of o th er s , as th e gu i lt y
per so n. [ 4 0 ]
In th i s ca s e, th e in ter lo c ki ng te s ti m o ni e s of th e pr o se c ut io n w it ne s se s , t ak en
tog et her , ex em p li fy a ca se w her e c on v ic ti on c an b e uph e ld o n th e b a si s o f cir cu m s ta nt ia l
ev id en c e. F ir s t, pr o s e cut i o n w it ne s s R o la nd o Gr u ta , t he dr iv er of t he pe d ic ab th at a cc u se d -
app e ll an t r od e o n, te st i fi ed tha t h e kn ew f or a fa ct th at sh e w or k ed as a h ou s e m a id of t he
v ic t im s, a nd th at h e p os it i v el y id ent i fi ed her a s t he pe r so n hur r i ed l y l ea v in g th e h ou se o f t he
v ic t im s on 2 Ja nu ar y 2 00 1 a t 4:4 5 a .m . , an d a ct in g i n a n er vou s m an ner . T ha t w hi l e r id i ng
on th e ped i ca b, a c cu s ed - ap pe ll an t w a s un sur e of h er i nte nd ed d es ti na t ion . U po n r ea ch in g th e
pl ac e w her e h e or ig i na l ly p i ck ed up a c cu se d - a ppe l la nt on l y a fe w m in ut es a fter d r opp in g her
off , R ol an do Gr u ta s aw th e Se par a s ’ ho u se be i ng gu tt ed by a b la z ing
fir e. S e con d, R e m i g io B er n ar do t es t if ie d t ha t he an d h is t an od s , i n cl ud i ng R o l and o Gr u ta ,
w er e th e on es w ho pi c ke d up a c cu se d - a ppe l lan t Ed na a t Ba la sa n S tr ee t ( w her e
R ol an do Gr ut a dr op pe d he r of f) aft er r e ce i vi ng a ca l l th at th er e w a s a w om a n a ct in g
str ang e ly a t s ai d str e et an d w ho a pp ear e d to h a ve no w her e to go . T h ir d ,
SP O 4 D an i lo T a lu sa n ov er h ear d a cc u se d - ap pe l la nt ad m i t t o C ar m e l ita V al de z, a r epor ter of
C ha nne l 2 ( AB S - C BN ) t ha t sa id a c cu se d - a pp el l ant s ta r ted th e f ir e , pl u s t he fa ct tha t h e w as
ab le see t he t e le ca st of G u sA be l ga s ’ sh ow w h er e a c cu se d - a ppe l la nt , w h il e be i ng i nter v iew ed ,
co nf es s ed to th e cr im e a s w e l l. T h e f or e go in g t e st i m on ie s j u xt apo s ed w i th th e t es t im o n y
o f M er ce di ta M end o za va l id at ing th e f a ct t ha t a c cu s ed - app el l ant c on fe s se d t o ha v ing s tar ted
the f ir e w h ic h k i l led the S e par a fa m il y a s w e l l a s b ur n ed s e ve n ho us e s in c lu d in g t hat of th e
v ic t im s, co nv i nc i ng l y for m a n un br o ke n c ha in , w h i c h le ad s t o th e un as s ai l ab l e co n cl u si on
pi np oi nt in g ac c us ed - ap pe l l ant a s th e p er son b eh in d th e cr i m e of si m p le ar so n.
In her s e co nd a ss i gn ed er r or , ac c us ed - ap pe l lan t qu e st io n s t he a dm i s si bi l it y of her
un co un se l le d e xtr a j ud i ci al c on fe s s ion gi v en t o pr o se cu t io n w i tne s se s , na m e l y R em ig i o
Ber n ar d o, M er ce di ta M e nd oz a, an d to th e m ed i a. A c cu se d - a ppe l la nt Ed na c o nte nd s t ha t
be in g un co un se l le d e xtr aj u di c ia l c on fe s si on , her a dm i s si on s t o ha v in g co m m it te d t he cr im e
ch ar g ed sho u ld h a ve b ee n ex c lu de d i n e vi de n ce a ga in st h er for be in g v i ol at i ve o f Ar t ic l e III ,
Se ct io n 12( 1) o f t he C o n st it ut ion .
Par t i cu l ar l y, s he t a ke s e x c ept io n t o th e t e st im on y o f pr o se cu ti o n w i tn es s es R em ig io
Ber n ar d o an d M er ce d ita M end o za for b e in g hear s ay and in t he na tur e of a n u nc ou ns e ll ed
adm i s si on .
Wi th t he a bo ve vi ta l p ie c es o f e vi de nc e e x cl ud ed, a c cu se d - a pp el la nt is o f the
po si t ion t hat th e r em a i ni ng pr oo f o f h er al le ge d g u il t, c on si s ti ng i n t he m a i n o f cir cu m s ta nt ia l
ev id en c e, i s in ad eq ua te to es ta bl i sh h er g u il t b e yo nd r ea so nab l e d ou bt .
We par tl y d i sagr ee .
Ar t i cl e I II , Se ct i on 12 of t h e C o n st it ut io n in p ar t pr o v i de s:
( 1) An y per so n und er i nv es t ig at io n f or t he co m m i s s ion of a n
off en se s ha l l ha ve th e r ig h t t o b e in for m ed of h i s r ig ht to r em ai n s il en t a nd
to h av e com pe te nt a nd in d epe nd ent c oun s el pr e fer a b l y o f h is ow n ch o ic e. If
the per so n ca nn ot aff or d t he ser v i ce s o f co un se l, he m u st be pr o v id ed w i th
one . T he s e r i ght s ca n n ot b e w a iv ed ex c ep t i n w r i ti ng and in the pr e se n ce o f
co un se l .

x x x x
( 3) An y co n f e s s io n o r a d m i s si on ob ta in ed in v io la ti on of t h is
Se ct io n or Se ct i o n 1 7 h e r e o f sh a ll b e in a d m i s s ib le i n ev id en c e.
We ha v e he ld t h a t t h e a b o ve q u o t e d p r o v is i on ap p l ie s to t he s ta ge o f cu st o di al
in ve s t i ga ti on – w he n t h e i n ve st i g a t i o n is n o l o n g er a gen er a l i nq uir y int o an un s ol ve d cr i m e
b u t s t ar t s to f o cu s o n a p a r t i cu l a r p e r s o n a s a su sp e ct . [ 4 1 ] Sa id co n st it ut io na l g u ar an te e ha s
a l so b e en ex te nde d t o s i t u a t io n s in w h i ch a n in d i v id u al ha s n ot b ee n f or m a l l y a r r es ted bu t
h a s m er e l y be en “ i nv i t e d ” f o r q u e st io n in g . [ 4 2 ]
T o be a dm i ss i b l e i n e v id e n ce a g a i n s t a n ac c us ed , th e ex tr a ju di c ia l co nfe s s io ns m ade
m u st s at i sf y the f ol l o w in g r e q u ir e m e n t s:
( 1) it m u st b e vo l u n t a r y;
( 2) it m u s t b e m a d e w it h t h e a s s i st a n ce of co m pet en t a nd ind ep en de nt
co un se l ;
( 3) it m u st b e e x p r e s s ; a n d
( 4) it m us t b e i n w r it i n g . [ 4 3 ]
Ar gu ab l y , th e b a r a n g a y t a n o d s, i n c l u d in g t he B ar a nga y C ha ir m an , in th i s par t i cu lar
in st a n c e, m a y be de e m e d a s l a w e n f o r ce m e n t o ff i ce r for pur po se s of a pp l yi ng Ar t i c le II I,
Se ct io n 1 2( 1) a nd ( 3 ) , o f t h e C o n s t it u t io n . W he n ac c u sed - ap pe l lan t w a s br oug ht t o
t h e b a r an ga y ha l l in t h e m o r n in g o f 2 Ja n u a r y 2 0 01, s he w as a lr ea d y a s us pe ct , ac tu al l y t he
o n ly on e, in th e f ir e t h a t d e st r o y e d se v e r a l h o u se s as w e ll a s ki l le d t he w ho l e fa m i l y of
R o b e r to Se par a, Sr . S h e w a s , t h e r e f o r e , a l r e a d y u nd e r cu st od ia l in ve s ti ga ti on an d th e r i ght s
g u a r a n tee d b y Ar ti c le I I I , S e ct io n 1 2 ( 1 ) , o f t h e C on st it ut io n s ho ul d ha v e a lr e ad y be en
o b se r ve d or ap pl i ed t o h e r . A c cu se d - a p p e l la n t ’ s co nf es s io n t o Bar a ng a y C ha ir m an R em ig io
Be r n a r d o w a s m ad e in r e sp o n se t o t h e “ i n t e r r og at i on” m ad e b y t he la tter – adm it te dl y
co n d u c te d w i th ou t fir s t i n f o r m in g a cc u se d - a p p e l la nt of h er r ig ht s u nd er th e C o ns ti tu ti on or
d o n e i n th e pr e se n ce o f c o u n se l. F o r t h i s r e a so n , t he con fe s s ion of a c cu s ed - a pp el la nt , g iv en
t o B a r a nga y C ha ir m a n R e m ig io Be r n a r d o , a s w e ll a s th e l ig ht er fo und b y th e l at ter in h er ba g
a r e i na dm i s si b le in e v id e n c e a g a in st h e r a s su ch w er e o bta i ne d i n v io l at i on o f her
co n s t itu t ion a l r ig ht s.
Be t ha t a s i t m a y , t h e in a d m i s s ib il i t y o f ac c us ed - ap pe l lan t ’s co nf e ss i on t o B ar a n ga y
C h a ir m an R e m i g io B e r n a r d o a n d t h e l ig h t e r a s e v id e nc e do no t au tom at i ca l l y l ead t o her
a c q u it ta l. I t sh ou ld w e l l b e r e c a ll e d t h a t t h e co n s ti tut i ona l s af egu ar d s dur in g cu st od ia l
in ve s t i ga ti on s do not a p p ly t o t h o se n o t e l i ci t e d t hr o ugh qu e s t io ni ng by th e p o l i ce or th e ir
a g e n t s bu t g i ve n in a n o r d i n a r y m a n n e r w h e r e by t h e a c cu s ed v er ba l l y adm i ts to ha v in g
co m m it ted th e of fe ns e a s w h a t h a p p e n e d i n t h e ca se a t bar w hen a cc u se d - ap pe l la nt a dm it ted
t o M e r c ed it a M e ndo z a , o n e o f t h e n e i g h b o r s o f R o be r to S ep ar a, Sr ., t o ha v in g s tar ted t he f ir e
in t h e S ep ar a s ’ ho u se . T h e t e st im o n y o f M e r c e d it a M en do za r ec ou nt in g s a id a dm is s io n i s ,
u n f o r t u na te l y f or a c c u s e d - a p p e ll a n t , a d m i s s ib le i n e v id en ce ag a in st her a nd i s not c o ver e d
b y t h e af or e sa id co n st it u t io n a l g u a r a n t e e . Ar t i cl e I II o f t he C on st it ut io n, or th e B i l l of R i gh ts ,
so le l y g o ver n s t he r e l a t io n sh ip b e t w e e n t h e in d i v id ua l on on e ha nd a nd the St a te ( an d i t s
a g e n t s) on t he o th er ; i t d o e s n o t co n c e r n it se lf w it h t he r e lat i on b etw ee n a pr i v a te i nd i vi du al
a n d a not her pr i va t e i n d iv i d u a l – a s b ot h a cc u se d - ap pe l la nt an d pr o se c ut io n
w it n e s s M er ce di ta M e n d o z a u n d o u b t e d ly a r e . [ 4 4 ] H er e , ther e i s n o e vi de nc e o n r e c or d t o sho w
28 | P a g e
tha t sa i d w it ne s s w a s a ct in g und er po l i ce a uth or i t y, s o appr opr ia te l y, a c cu se d -
app e ll an t’ s un c ou ns e ll ed e x tr a jud i c ia l con fe s s io n to s ai d w i tn e ss w a s pr o per l y adm it te d b y
the R T C .
Ac c us ed - ap pe l lan t li k ew i se as s ai l s t he a dm i s s ion of t he te st im on y of
SP O 4 D an i lo T a lu sa n. C o n ten di ng t ha t “ [ w ]h en S P O 4 D a n il o T al u sa nte s ti fi ed i n co ur t, h i s
st or y is m or e of e v ent s , w hi c h ar e no t w it h in h i s per so na l kn ow le dg e but b as ed fr o m
ac co un t s of w i tn e ss e s w h o d er iv ed inf or m at io n al l e ged l y fr o m the a c cu s ed or s om e oth er
per so ns x x x” . I n oth er w or d s, s he ob j ec t s t o t he t e st im on y for be i ng m er el y h ear sa y. Wi th
th is im p ut at io n of in ad m is s i bi l it y, w e a gr ee w it h w hat t he C our t of Ap pe al s h ad to sa y:
Al th ou gh th i s te st i m on y o f SF O 4 D an i lo T a lu s an i s he ar s ay b e ca us e
he w a s not pr e s ent w he n Gu s A be lg as int er vi ew e d a c cu se d - a ppe l la nt ED N A,
it m a y ne ver th el e ss b e a d m i tte d in e v ide n ce a s a n i nde pe nd ent l y r el e van t
st ate m e nt to e s tab l i sh not t he tr uth bu t t he t en or of th e s tat em en t or t he fa ct
t h a t t he s tat em en t w as m a de [P eop l e v. M a l lar i, G.R . N o. 10 35 47 , Ju l y 2 0,
199 9, 3 10 SC R A 6 21 c it in g Pe op le v. C u s i, Jr . , G .R . N o. L - 209 86 , Au gu st 14,
196 5, 14 SC R A 9 44 .]. I n P eop l e v s. Ve l as qu e z , G .R . N os . 13 263 5 & 14 38 72 -
7 5 , F e br uar y 21 , 200 1, 3 52 SC R A 45 5, th e Su pr em e C our t r u le d t ha t:
“ U nder t he d oc tr ine o f i nd epe nd en tl y r e le v ant
st ate m e nt s, r eg ar d le s s o f t he ir tr u th or fa l s it y, th e fa ct tha t
su ch st at em e nt s h av e be e n m ad e i s r e le v ant . T he h ear sa y
r ul e d oe s n ot ap pl y , a nd t he st ate m e nt s ar e adm i s si bl e a s
ev id en c e. E v id en c e a s to the m a k ing of su ch s tat e m en t i s
not se co nd ar y b ut pr im ar y, f or t he st ate m e nt i t se l f m a y
co ns t itu te a fa ct i n i s su e or be c ir c um st an ti a ll y r e l e va nt a s
to the e x i st en ce of su ch a f ac t.” [ 4 5 ]
As r e gar d s th e co nf es s io n g iv en b y ac c us ed - ap pe l la nt to th e m ed ia , w e n ee d no t
di s cu s s it f ur th er for th e r e por t er s w er e ne ver pr e s en t ed to te s ti fy in c our t .
As a f in al a t te m p t at e xc u l pat io n, a c cu se d - a pp el l ant as ser t s t ha t s in ce t he i den t it ie s
of the b ur ne d bo di e s w er e ne ver con c lu s i ve l y es ta bl i she d, s he c an no t b e r es p on si b le for
the ir de at hs .
Su ch a s ser ti on i s ber ef t o f m er it.
In t he cr im e o f ar so n, th e i den ti t ie s o f t he v i ct im s ar e im m a ter ia l in th at in ten t t o k il l
the m par ti c ul ar ly i s no t on e of t he e le m e nt s o f th e c r im e. A s w e ha ve c lar if ie d e ar l i er , th e
k il l in g of a per s on i s a bs or bed in th e c har g e of ar so n, s i m p le or de s tr u ct i ve . T he pr o s ec ut io n
nee d o nl y pr o ve , t ha t th e bur n in g w as i nte nt i ona l an d th at w ha t w a s in te nt io na l l y b ur ne d is
an in hab i ted ho u se or dw el l in g. A ga in , in t he c as e of Pe op le v . Sor ia no, [ 4 6 ] w e e xp la i ned
tha t:
Al th ou gh i nte nt m ay b e an i ngr e di en t of th e cr im e o f Ar so n , i t m a y be
in fer r e d fr om t he a ct s o f the a cc u se d. T h er e i s a pr e su m pt i on t ha t o ne
in ten d s th e n at ur a l c on se q uen c es o f hi s a ct ; an d w he n it i s sho w n th at o ne
 ha s de l ib er a t e l y se t f ir e t o a b u i ld in g , t he pr o s e c ut ion i s not b ou nd t o
pr od u ce fur th e r e v id e n ce o f h is w r o n g f u l in te nt. [ 4 7 ]
T he ul t im a te q u e r y n o w i s w h i c h k in d o f a r s on i s a c cu se d - a ppe l la nt gu i lt y of ?
As pr e v io us l y d i s cu s se d , t h e r e a r e t w o ( 2) ca te gor ie s o f th e cr im e o f a r so n:
1 ) d e s tr u ct i ve ar s on , u n d e r Ar t . 3 2 0 o f t h e R e vi s ed P e na l C od e, a s am end ed b y R ep ub li c A c t
N o . 7 65 9; a n d 2) s im p l e a r so n , u n d e r Pr e s i d e n t ia l D ecr ee N o. 1 61 3. S a id c la s s if i cat i on is
b a se d o n t he k i nd, ch a r a ct e r a n d l o c a t io n o f t h e pr op er t y b ur n ed, r e gar d l es s of the v a lue o f
t h e d a m a ge c au s ed, [ 4 8 ] t o w it :
Ar t i cl e 3 2 0 o f T h e R e v i se d Pe n a l C o de , a s am en de d by R A 7 65 9,
co nt em p l ate s t h e m a l i ci o u s b u r n in g o f str u c tur es , b oth pu bl i c a nd pr i v ate ,
hot el s , b u il d in g s , e d if i ce s , t r a i n s , ve s se l s, a ir cr af t , f ac tor ie s an d o th er
m i l it ar y , go v e r n m e n t o r co m m e r c ia l e s t a b l i sh m e nt s b y an y per s on or gr o up of
per so ns . [ [ 4 9 ] ] T h e cl a s si f i c a t io n o f t h i s t yp e o f cr i m e i s kn ow n as D e s tr u ct i ve
Ar s on , w h i ch is p u n i s h a b l e b y r e c lu s io n per p et ua to dea th . T he r e a son for
the law is se lf - e v i d e n t : t o e f f e ct i ve l y d i sc our age and d eter t he c om m i s s io n of
th is da s tar d l y cr im e , t o p r e ve n t t h e d e s t r u ct i on of pr o per t ie s an d pr ot ec t t he
l iv e s o f inn o ce n t p e o p le . Ex p o s u r e t o a br ew in g co nf lagr at io n le a ve s o n ly
de str u c ti on a n d d e sp a ir i n it s w a ke ; h e nc e, t he S tat e m a nd at es gr ea ter
r etr i bu ti on t o a u t h o r s o f t h i s h e in o u s cr im e . T he e xc ep ti on al l y s ev er e
p u n i sh m e nt i m p o s e d f o r t h i s cr im e t a ke s i nt o co n s id er at i on th e e xtr e m e
dan ger to h u m a n l i ve s e xp o s e d b y t h e m a l ic i ou s bur n in g of th e se s tr u ct ur e s;
the da ng er t o p r o p e r t y r e s u l t i n g f r o m t h e co nf la gr a ti on; th e f a ct t ha t it i s
nor m al l y d if f i c u l t t o a d o p t p r e ca u t io n s a ga in s t it s c om m i s s io n, an d th e
di ff i cu lt y in p in p o in t in g t h e p e r p e t r a t o r s; an d, th e gr ea ter i m pa c t o n the
so c ia l, e co no m i c, s e c u r it y a n d p o l it i ca l f abr i c o f t he n at io n. [E m p ha s is
su pp l ie d.]
If a s a co n s e q u e n c e o f t h e co m m i s si on of an y of t he ac ts pe n a l i ze d
und er Ar t. 3 2 0 , d e a t h s h o u ld r e su lt , t h e m a nd at or y p e na lt y of de ath sha l l be
im po se d.
On t h e o t h e r h a n d , PD 1 6 1 3 w h i ch r ep ea le d Ar t s . 3 21 to 3 26 - B of
T he R e v i se d Pe n a l C o d e r e m a in s t h e g o ver ni ng law for S im p l e Ar so n . T h i s
de cr e e con te m p la t e s t h e m a l i c io u s b u r n i ng of pu b li c and pr iv at e str uc tur es ,
r egar dl e ss o f s i ze , n o t in c lu d e d in Ar t . 3 20 , as a m e nde d b y R A 7 659 , an d
c la s si f ied a s o t h e r ca se s o f a r s o n . T he s e in c l ude h ou se s, dw e ll i ng s ,
go ver nm e nt b u il d i n g s , f a r m s , m i l l s, p l ant at io n s, r a i lw a y s, b u s st at io n s,
air por t s , w h a r v e s a n d o t h e r in d u st r ia l e st ab l i sh m e nt s . [ [ 5 0 ] ] A lt ho ugh th e
pur p o se of th e l a w o n S im p l e Ar s o n i s t o pr e ve nt th e h ig h in c id en ce o f f ir es
and o th er cr im e s in vo l v in g d e st r u c t i o n , pr o te ct t he na t io na l e con om y a nd
pr e ser ve th e so c ia l , e c o n o m i c a n d p o li t i c al sta b il it y of the n at io n, PD 16 13
tem per s t he p e n a lt y t o b e m e t e d t o o f f e n d er s. T h i s se par a te c la s si f ic at io n o f
Si m p le Ar so n r e c o g n iz e s t h e n e e d t o le s se n t he s ev er i t y o f p un i sh m en t
co m m en sur at e t o t h e a ct o r a ct s c o m m i tte d, de pe n di ng on th e p ar t i cu lar
fa ct s an d cir c u m st a n ce s o f e a ch c a se . [ Em ph as i s s upp l ied .]
T o e m p ha s iz e :
29 | P a g e
T he nat ur e of D e str u ct i ve Ar so n i s d i st i ngu i sh ed fr om S i m p le
Ar s on b y th e degr ee o f pe r ver s it y or v i ci ou s ne s s o f the cr i m i na l of fe nd er .
T he a c ts c om m i tt ed un der Ar t. 32 0 o f t he R e v is ed Pe na l C o de ( a s a m en de d)
co ns t itu t ing D e str u c ti v e Ar so n ar e c har ac ter i ze d as h ei no us cr i m e s for b ei ng
gr i ev ou s, od i ou s a nd ha tef ul off en s es an d w h i ch , b y r ea so n of th e ir i nh er en t
or m a ni fe s t w ic k edn e s s, v i c iou s ne s s, atr o c it y an d pe r ver s it y ar e r e pu gna nt
and ou tr a geo u s t o t he c om m on s ta ndar d s a nd nor m s of d e ce nc y an d m or a l it y
in a ju s t, ci v i li z ed a nd or de r ed s o ci et y. [ 5 1 ] O n t he o the r h an d, a ct s co m m it ted
und er PD 161 3 co n st it ut in g S im pl e Ar s on ar e cr i m e s w it h a le s ser de gr ee of
per ver s it y an d v i c io u s ne s s t hat the la w pu n is he s w it h a l es s er pe na lt y . In
oth er w or d s , S im p l e Ar so n c ont em p lat e s cr im es w it h le s s s ig n if i ca nt s o ci a l,
ec on om i c, po li t ic a l a nd nat i ona l se c ur i t y i m p l i cat i on s t han D e str uc t iv e Ar s on .
H ow e v er , ac t s f al l in g und er S im p le Ar so n m a y n e ve r the le s s be c on ver te d
in to D es tr u ct i ve Ar so n d ep end i ng o n t he q ua l if y in g c ir cum s tan c es pr e s ent .
[Em ph a si s s up pl i ed. ] [ 5 2 ]
Pr e s ci nd in g fr om t he a bo v e c lar if i cat i on v i s- à - v i s t he de s cr ip ti on o f t he cr i m e a s
st ate d i n th e ac c us at or y p o r ti on of t he I nfor m a ti on , it i s qu it e e vi de nt t hat a c cu s e d - ap pe l la nt
w as c har g ed w i th t he cr im e of S im p le Ar so n – for ha v ing “ de l ib er at e ly s et f ir e u pon th e t w o -
st or e y r e s id en ti al ho u se of R O BE R T O S EP AR A a nd f am il y x x x kno w i ng th e s a m e t o b e a n
in ha bi te d hou s e an d s it uat ed i n a th i c kl y p opu l ate d pl ac e an d a s a c on se qu en ce t her e of a
co nf la gr at i on e ns ue d an d th e s a id b ui l di ng , tog et her w i th so m e s e ve n ( 7 ) ad j oi n in g
r es id en ti a l h ou s es , w er e r a ze d by f ir e .” [ Em ph a si s s up pl ie d. ]
T he f a ct s o f t he ca s e a t b ar i s so m ew ha t si m il ar t o t he f a ct s o f t he ca s e o f Pe op le
v. S or i an o . [ 5 3 ] T he a c cu se d i n t he l att er ca s e c au se d t he bur n i ng of a par t i cu l ar
hou s e. U n for tun at el y , t he bl az e spr ea d and g utt ed d ow n f iv e ( 5) n ei gh bor in g h ou se s. T he
R T C t her ei n fo un d th e ac c u se d gu i lt y of d e str u c ti v e ar so n u n der p ar agr ap h 1 [ 5 4 ] o f Ar t. 3 20 o f
the R e vi s ed Pen a l C o de, as am e nd ed by R ep ub l i c Ac t N o . 7 659 . T h i s C o ur t, thr o ugh M r .
Ju st i ce B e ll o si l lo , how ev er , de c lar ed th at :
x x x [T ] he ap p li c ab le pr o v i s ion o f l aw s hou l d b e Se c. 3, par . 2, of PD 1 613 ,
w hi c h im po s es a p en a lt y of r e cl u si on t em por a l t o r ec lu s io n per p et ua f or
oth er ca se s of ar son a s t he pr o per ti e s b ur ne d by a c cu se d - a pp el la nt
ar e sp e ci f ic a ll y d e scr i bed as h ou s es , c on tem p lat i ng i nh ab it ed h ou s es or
dw e l li ng s u nd er the af or e s ai d l aw . T h e de s cr ip ti on s a s a l leg ed in t he se co nd
Am e nd ed In for m at i on par ti cu lar l y r efer t o t he s tr u ct ur e s a s ho u se s r ath er
tha n as b ui ld i ng s or e d if i ce s. T he a pp l ic ab le law s ho ul d t her e for e b e Se c . 3 ,
Par . 2, o f PD 16 13, and n ot Ar t. 3 20 , par . 1 o f th e Pe na l C o de. In ca se of
am b ig u it y i n c on str uc ti on o f p en al law s , it i s w e ll - se tt l ed th at su ch law s s ha l l
be c on str ue d s tr i ct l y a ga in st t he g ov er n m e nt, a nd l ib er a ll y in fa v or of t he
ac cu s ed .
T he e le m e nt s o f ar so n u n der S e c. 3 , p ar . 2 , o f PD 161 3 ar e: ( a)
ther e i s int en ti on al bur n i ng; a nd ( b) w ha t i s int e nt ion a ll y b ur n ed is an
in ha bi te d h ou se or d w e ll i n g. I n ci de nt al l y, th es e e l em ent s co n cur in th e ca se
at bar . [ 5 5 ]
 As st ate d in t h e b o d y o f t h e I n f o r m a t i o n , ac c us ed - ap p el la nt w a s c har ged w it h ha v ing PER P ET U A . A c cu se d - ap p el la nt i s her eb y or d er ed to pa y th e he ir s o f e ac h o f the
in t e n t ion a ll y bur ne d t h e t w o - s t o r e y r e si d e n t ia l h o u se of R ob er t Se par a. Sa id c o nf lagr at io n v ic t im s P5 0,0 00 .0 0 a s c i v i l in dem n it y.
l ik e w i se spr ea d a nd d e st r o ye d se ve n ( 7 ) a d jo i n i n g h o us es . C on se qu ent l y, i f pr o v ed, a s it w a s
p r o ve d, at t he tr ia l, s h e m a y b e c o n v i ct e d , a n d sen te n ce d ac c or d in gl y , of th e cr i m e of s i m p le
a r s o n . Su c h i s the c a s e “ n o t w i t h st a n d i n g t h e e r r or i n th e d es i gna t io n of th e of fen s e i n t he SO OR D ER ED .
in f o r m at io n, t he inf or m a t io n r e m a i n s e f f e c t iv e i n sof ar a s i t s tat e s th e fa ct s con st it ut in g th e
cr im e a ll eg ed th er e in . ” [ 5 6 ] “ Wh a t i s co n t r o l l in g i s n ot t he ti t le of t he c om p l a in t, nor t he
d e si g n at io n of the of f e n s e ch a r g e d o r t h e p a r t ic u lar law or p ar t t her eo f al l eg ed ly v io la te ,
x x x , b ut th e de s cr i p t i o n o f t h e cr i m e ch a r g e d a n d t he par t i cu lar f ac t s t her ei n r ec i ted .” [ 5 7 ]

T her e i s, th u s, a n e e d t o m o d if y t h e p e n a lt y i m p os ed b y t he R T C as S ec . 5 o f P D N o.
1 6 1 3 ca te gor i ca l ly pr o v i d e s t h a t t h e p e n a lt y t o b e i m p o se d f or s im pl e ar s on i s :

SEC . 5 . Wh e r e D e a t h R e su l t s f r o m Ar s on . - If b y r ea s on of or o n t he
oc ca s io n o f a r so n d e a t h r e s u l t s, t h e pen a lt y o f r e cl u si on per pe tu a t o
dea th s ha l l b e i m p o s e d . [ E m p h a si s s u p p l i ed. ]

Ac c or d in gl y , t h e r e b e i n g n o a g g r a v a t in g c ir c um st an c e al le ge d in t he I nf or m a t ion , the
im p o sa bl e pe na lt y on a c cu s e d - a p p e l l a n t is r e c lu s io npe r pet ua .

Apr o po s th e c iv i l l ia b i l it ie s o f a c c u s e d - ap pe ll an t, c ur r en t jur i spr u de nc e [ 5 8 ] d i c tat e

t h a t t h e c i vi l i nd em n i t y d u e f r o m a c cu se d - a p p e l la nt i s P5 0,0 00 .00 f or t he de ath of ea ch of th e
v ic t im s. [ 5 9 ] H ow e ver , t h e m o n e t a r y a w a r d s f o r m or a l an d e xe m p lar y da m a ge s gi ve n b y th e
C o u r t of A pp ea l s, b o t h i n t h e a m o u n t o f P 5 0 , 0 0 0. 00, d ue t he h e ir s of t he vi c ti m s , ha v e to
b e d e le te d f or la c k o f m a t e r i a l b a si s. Si m i l a r l y , t he C our t o f Ap pe al s aw ar d of e xe m p lar y
d a m a g es to R o do lf o M o v il l a in t h e a m o u n t o f P5 0, 00 0.0 0 for t he d e str u c ti on o f h i s ho u se,
a l so h a s t o be d el et e d , b u t in t h i s i n s t a n ce f o r be i n g im pr o per . M or al dam ag e s c an no t be
a w a r d b y t hi s C o ur t in t h e a b se n c e o f p r o o f o f m e nt al or p h ys i ca l suf fer in g on t he par t of t he
h e ir s o f t he v i ct i m s . [ 6 0 ] C o n c e r n in g t h e a w a r d of e x em p lar y d am a ge s, t he r ea so n f or the
d e le t i on be in g t ha t n o a g g r a v a t in g cir c u m st a n ce h ad bee n a l le ge d a nd pr o ve d b y th e
p r o se cu ti on i n th e ca se a t b a r . [ 6 1 ]

T o su m m ar i ze , a c c u se d - a p p e l la n t ’ s a l t e r nat i ve p le a th at s he b e a c qu it te d o f th e
cr im e m us t be r e je ct e d . W i t h t h e e v id e n ce o n r e c or d , w e f i nd no co gen t r ea so n to d is tur b t he
f i n d in gs o f t he R T C a n d t h e C o u r t o f Ap p e a ls . I t i s in dub it ab l e t hat a c cu se d - a pp el la nt i s th e
a u t h o r of th e cr im e o f s im p l e a r s o n . A ll t h e c ir cu m s tan ti a l e v id en c e pr e sen te d be for e t he
R T C , vi ew ed in it s e n t ir e t y, i s a s c o n v in c in g a s d i r ec t e v id en ce an d, as s u ch , n eg ate s
a c cu s ed - app e ll an t’ s in n o ce n c e , a n d w h e n co n si d er ed co nc ur r e nt l y w i th h er adm i s si on g i ve n
t o M e r ce di ta M end o za , t h e f o r m e r ’ s g u i lt b e y on d r ea s on ab le d ou bt is tw i ce as
e v id e n t. H en ce , her co n v i ct io n i s e f f e c t i v e l y ju st if i e d. M or e s o, a s it i s pr op it io us to n ote
t h a t i n s tar k con tr a st t o t h e f a ct u a l cir c u m st a n ce s pr es en ted by th e pr o s ec ut io n, a c cu se d -
a p p e ll an t ne it her m u st e r e d a d e n i a l n o r a n a l ib i ex c e pt f or th e pr o po s it io n t hat her g ui l t ha d
n o t b e en e st ab l i sh ed b e yo n d r e a s o n a b le d o u b t .

IN VI EW WH ER EOF , t h e D e c i s io n o f t h e C our t of A pp ea ls da te d 2 S ept em ber 20 05,

in C A G.R . C R H C N o . 0 1 1 3 9 , i s h e r e b y AF F I R M E D i ns of ar as t he c on v i ct io n of a cc u sed -
a p p e ll an t E D N A M AL N G A N Y M AY O i s c o n ce r n e d. T he se nt en ce t o b e im po se d a nd th e
a m o u n t of da m a ge s t o b e a w a r d e d , h o w e ve r , a r e M O D IF I ED . In a c cor da nc e w it h Se c . 5 o f
Pr e s id e nt ia l D e cr e e N o . 1 6 1 3 , a c cu se d - a p p e l la nt i s h er e by se nte n ce d t o R EC L U S I ON
30 | P a g e
G.R. No. 186228 March 15, 2010
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ANTONIO LAUGA Y PINA ALIAS TERIO, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Before Us for final review is the trial court’s conviction of the appellant for the rape of his thirteen-year old daughter.
Consistent with the ruling of this Court in People v. Cabalquinto,1 the real name and the personal circumstances of the
victim, and any other information tending to establish or compromise her identity, including those of her immediate
family or household members, are not disclosed in this decision.
The Facts
In an Information dated 21 September 2000,2 the appellant was accused of the crime of QUALIFIED RAPE allegedly
committed as follows:
That on or about the 15th day of March 2000, in the evening, at Barangay xxx, municipality of xxx, province of
Bukidnon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being the father of
AAA with lewd design, with the use of force and intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally have
carnal knowledge with his own daughter AAA, a 13 year[s]old minor against her will.3
On 12 October 2000, appellant entered a plea of not guilty.4 During the pre-trial conference, the prosecution and the
defense stipulated and admitted: (a) the correctness of the findings indicated in the medical certificate of the physician
who examined AAA; (b) that AAA was only thirteen (13) years old when the alleged offense was committed; and (c) that
AAA is the daughter of the appellant.5 On trial, three (3) witnesses testified for the prosecution, namely: victim AAA;6 her
brother BBB;7 and one Moises Boy Banting,8 a "bantay bayan" in the barangay. Their testimonies revealed the following:
In the afternoon of 15 March 2000, AAA was left alone at home.9 AAA’s father, the appellant, was having a drinking
spree at the neighbor’s place.10 Her mother decided to leave because when appellant gets drunk, he has the habit of
mauling AAA’s mother.11 Her only brother BBB also went out in the company of some neighbors.12
At around 10:00 o’clock in the evening, appellant woke AAA up;13 removed his pants, slid inside the blanket covering
AAA and removed her pants and underwear;14 warned her not to shout for help while threatening her with his fist;15 and
told her that he had a knife placed above her head.16 He proceeded to mash her breast, kiss her repeatedly, and
"inserted his penis inside her vagina."17
Soon after, BBB arrived and found AAA crying.18 Appellant claimed he scolded her for staying out late.19 BBB decided to
take AAA with him.20 While on their way to their maternal grandmother’s house, AAA recounted her harrowing
experience with their father.21 Upon reaching their grandmother’s house, they told their grandmother and uncle of the
incident,22 after which, they sought the assistance of Moises Boy Banting.23
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Moises Boy Banting found appellant in his house wearing only his underwear.24 He invited appellant to the police
station,25 to which appellant obliged. At the police outpost, he admitted to him that he raped AAA because he was
unable to control himself.26
The following day, AAA submitted herself to physical examination.27 Dra. Josefa Arlita L. Alsula, Municipal Health Officer
of x x x, Bukidnon, issued the Medical Certificate, which reads:
hyperemic vulvae with 4 o’clock & 6 o’clock freshly lacerated hymen; (+) minimal to moderate bloody discharges 2° to
an alleged raping incident28
On the other hand, only appellant testified for the defense. He believed that the charge against him was ill-motivated
because he sometimes physically abuses his wife in front of their children after engaging in a heated argument,29 and
beats the children as a disciplinary measure.30 He went further to narrate how his day was on the date of the alleged
rape.
He alleged that on 15 March 2000, there was no food prepared for him at lunchtime.31 Shortly after, AAA arrived.32 She
answered back when confronted.33 This infuriated him that he kicked her hard on her buttocks.34
Appellant went back to work and went home again around 3 o’clock in the afternoon.35 Finding nobody at home,36he
prepared his dinner and went to sleep.37
Later in the evening, he was awakened by the members of the "Bantay Bayan" headed by Moises Boy Banting.38They
asked him to go with them to discuss some matters.39 He later learned that he was under detention because AAA
charged him of rape.40
On 8 July 2006, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, Malaybalay City, Bukidnon, rendered its decision41 in Criminal Case
No. 10372-0, finding appellant guilty of rape qualified by relationship and minority, and sentenced him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua.42 It also ordered him to indemnify AAA P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P50,000.00
as civil indemnity with exemplary damages of P25,000.00.43
On 30 September 2008, the decision of the trial court was AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS44 by the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00456-MIN.45 The appellate court found that appellant is not eligible for parole and it increased
both the civil indemnity and moral damages from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00.46
On 24 November 2008, the Court of Appeals gave due course to the appellant’s notice of appeal.47 This Court required
the parties to simultaneously file their respective supplemental briefs,48 but both manifested that they will no longer file
supplemental pleadings.49
The lone assignment of error in the appellant’s brief is that, the trial court gravely erred in finding him guilty as charged
despite the failure of the prosecution to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt,50 because: (1) there were
inconsistencies in the testimonies of AAA and her brother BBB;51 (2) his extrajudicial confession before Moises Boy
Banting was without the assistance of a counsel, in violation of his constitutional right;52 and (3) AAA’s accusation was
ill-motivated.53
Our Ruling
Appellant contests the admissibility in evidence of his alleged confession with a "bantay bayan" and the credibility of the
witnesses for the prosecution.
Admissibility in Evidence of an Extrajudicial Confession before a "Bantay Bayan"
Appellant argues that even if he, indeed, confessed to Moises Boy Banting, a "bantay bayan," the confession was
inadmissible in evidence because he was not assisted by a lawyer and there was no valid waiver of such requirement.54
The case of People v. Malngan55 is the authority on the scope of the Miranda doctrine provided for under Article III,
Section 12(1)56 and (3)57 of the Constitution. In Malngan, appellant questioned the admissibility of her extrajudicial
confessions given to the barangay chairman and a neighbor of the private complainant. This Court distinguished. Thus:
Arguably, the barangay tanods, including the Barangay Chairman, in this particular instance, may be deemed as law
enforcement officer for purposes of applying Article III, Section 12(1) and (3), of the Constitution. When accused-
appellant was brought to the barangay hall in the morning of 2 January 2001, she was already a suspect, actually the
only one, in the fire that destroyed several houses x x x. She was, therefore, already under custodial investigation and
the rights guaranteed by x x x [the] Constitution should have already been observed or applied to her. Accused-
appellant’s confession to Barangay Chairman x x x was made in response to the ‘interrogation’ made by the latter –
admittedly conducted without first informing accused-appellant of her rights under the Constitution or done in the
presence of counsel. For this reason, the confession of accused-appellant, given to Barangay Chairman x x x, as well
as the lighter found x x x in her bag are inadmissible in evidence against her x x x.1avvphi1
[But such does] not automatically lead to her acquittal. x x x [T]he constitutional safeguards during custodial
investigations do not apply to those not elicited through questioning by the police or their agents but given in an ordinary
manner whereby the accused verbally admits x x x as x x x in the case at bar when accused-appellant admitted to
Mercedita Mendoza, one of the neighbors x x x [of the private complainant].58 (Emphasis supplied)
Following the rationale behind the ruling in Malngan, this Court needs to ascertain whether or not a "bantay bayan" may
be deemed a law enforcement officer within the contemplation of Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution.
In People of the Philippines v. Buendia,59 this Court had the occasion to mention the nature of a "bantay bayan," that is,
"a group of male residents living in [the] area organized for the purpose of keeping peace in their community[,which is]
an accredited auxiliary of the x x x PNP."60
Also, it may be worthy to consider that pursuant to Section 1(g) of Executive Order No. 309 issued on 11 November
1987, as amended, a Peace and Order Committee in each barangay shall be organized "to serve as implementing arm
of the City/Municipal Peace and Order Council at the Barangay level."61 The composition of the Committee includes,
among others: (1) the Punong Barangay as Chairman; (2) the Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan; (3) a Member of
the Lupon Tagapamayapa; (4) a Barangay Tanod; and (5) at least three (3) Members of existing Barangay-Based Anti-
Crime or neighborhood Watch Groups or a Non Government Organization Representative well-known in his
community.62
This Court is, therefore, convinced that barangay-based volunteer organizations in the nature of watch groups, as in the
case of the "bantay bayan," are recognized by the local government unit to perform functions relating to the preservation
of peace and order at the barangay level. Thus, without ruling on the legality of the actions taken by Moises Boy
Banting, and the specific scope of duties and responsibilities delegated to a "bantay bayan," particularly on the authority
to conduct a custodial investigation, any inquiry he makes has the color of a state-related function and objective insofar
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as the entitlement of a suspect to his constitutional rights provided for under Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution,
otherwise known as the Miranda Rights, is concerned.
We, therefore, find the extrajudicial confession of appellant, which was taken without a counsel, inadmissible in
evidence.
Be that as it may, We agree with the Court of Appeals that the conviction of the appellant was not deduced solely from
the assailed extrajudicial confession but "from the confluence of evidence showing his guilt beyond reasonable doubt."63
Credibility of the Witnesses for the Prosecution
Appellant assails the inconsistencies in the testimonies of AAA and her brother BBB. AAA testified that BBB
accompanied her to the house of their grandmother. Thereafter, they, together with her relatives, proceeded to look for
a "bantay bayan." On the other hand, BBB testified that he brought her sister to the house of their "bantay bayan" after
he learned of the incident.
Citing Bartocillo v. Court of Appeals,64 appellant argues that "where the testimonies of two key witnesses cannot stand
together, the inevitable conclusion is that one or both must be telling a lie, and their story a mere concoction."65
The principle, however, is not applicable in the case at bar. In Bartocillo, the two testimonies could not simply stand
together because:
On one hand, if we are to believe Susan, Orlando could not have possibly seen the hacking incident since he had
accompanied Vicente home. On the other hand, if we are to accept the testimony of Orlando, then Susan could not
have possibly witnessed the hacking incident since she was with Vicente at that time.
Here, the testimony of AAA does not run contrary to that of BBB. Both testified that they sought the help of a "bantay
bayan." Their respective testimonies differ only as to when the help was sought for, which this Court could well attribute
to the nature of the testimony of BBB, a shortcut version of AAA’s testimony that dispensed with a detailed account of
the incident.
At any rate, the Court of Appeals is correct in holding that the assailed inconsistency is too trivial to affect the veracity of
the testimonies.66 In fact, inconsistencies which refer to minor, trivial or inconsequential circumstances even strengthen
the credibility of the witnesses, as they erase doubts that such testimonies have been coached or rehearsed.67
Appellant’s contention that AAA charged him of rape only because she bore grudges against him is likewise
unmeritorious. This Court is not dissuaded from giving full credence to the testimony of a minor complainant by motives
of feuds, resentment or revenge.68 As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals:
Indeed, mere disciplinary chastisement is not strong enough to make daughters in a Filipino family invent a charge that
would not only bring shame and humiliation upon them and their families but also bring their fathers into the gallows of
death.69 The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that it is unbelievable for a daughter to charge her own father with
rape, exposing herself to the ordeal and embarrassment of a public trial and subjecting her private parts to examination
if such heinous crime was not in fact committed.70 No person, much less a woman, could attain such height of cruelty to
one who has sired her, and from whom she owes her very existence, and for which she naturally feels loving and lasting
gratefulness.71 Even when consumed with revenge, it takes a certain amount of psychological depravity for a young
woman to concoct a story which would put her own father to jail for the most of his remaining life and drag the rest of the
family including herself to a lifetime of shame.72 It is highly improbable for [AAA] against whom no proof of sexual
perversity or loose morality has been shown to fake charges much more against her own father. In fact her testimony is
entitled to greater weight since her accusing words were directed against a close relative.73
Elements of Rape
Having established the credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution, We now examine the applicability of the Anti-
Rape Law of 199774 to the case at bar.
The law provides, in part, that rape is committed, among others, "[b]y a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a
woman" "through force, threat or intimidation."75 The death penalty shall be imposed if it is committed with
aggravating/qualifying circumstances, which include, "[w]hen the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the
offender is a parent."76
The consistent and forthright testimony of AAA detailing how she was raped, culminating with the penetration of
appellant’s penis into her vagina, suffices to prove that appellant had carnal knowledge of her. When a woman states
that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was committed.77Further, when such
testimony corresponds with medical findings, there is sufficient basis to conclude that the essential requisites of carnal
knowledge have been established.78
to P75,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto84 and P75,000.00 as moral damages.85 However, the award of exemplary
damages should have been increased from P25,000.00 to P30,000.00.86 Also, the penalty of reclusion perpetua in lieu
of death was correctly imposed considering that the imposition of the death penalty upon appellant would have been
appropriate were it not for the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346, or An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death
Penalty in the Philippines.87 We further affirm the ruling of the Court of Appeals on appellant’s non-eligibility for parole.
Sec. 3 of Republic Act No. 9346 clearly provides that "persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua,
or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetuaby reason of the law, shall not be eligible for parole."
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 30 September 2008 in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00456-MIN is
hereby AFFIRMED. Appellant Antonio Lauga is GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of qualified rape, and is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole and to pay AAAP75,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.

The Court of Appeals pointed out that the element of force or intimidation is not essential when the accused is the father
of the victim, inasmuch as his superior moral ascendancy or influence substitutes for violence and intimidation.79 At any
rate, AAA was actually threatened by appellant with his fist and a knife allegedly placed above AAA’s head.80

It may be added that the self-serving defense of appellant cannot prevail over the positive and straightforward testimony
of AAA. Settled is the rule that, "alibi is an inherently weak defense that is viewed with suspicion because it is easy to
fabricate."81 "Alibi and denial must be supported by strong corroborative evidence in order to merit
credibility."82 Moreover, for the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must establish two elements – (1) he was not at
the locus delicti at the time the offense was committed; and (2) it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene at
the time of its commission.83 Appellant failed in this wise.

Aggravating/Qualifying Circumstances

The presence of the qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship with the offender in the instant case has
likewise been adequately established. Both qualifying circumstances were specifically alleged in the Information,
stipulated on and admitted during the pre-trial conference, and testified to by both parties in their respective testimonies.
Also, such stipulation and admission, as correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, are binding upon this Court
because they are judicial admissions within the contemplation of Section 4, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Court. It
provides:

Sec. 4. Judicial admissions. - An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the
same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through
palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.

Penalty

Finally, in increasing the amount of civil indemnity and damages each from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00, the Court of
Appeals correctly considered controlling jurisprudence to the effect that where, as here, the rape is committed with any
of the qualifying/aggravating circumstances warranting the imposition of the death penalty, the victim is entitled
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