XX.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
2.COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 119761, August 29, 1996
Vitug, J.

FACTS: Fortune Tobacco Corporation was issued certificates of trademark registration over its “Champion,” “Hope,” and “More”
cigarettes. The initial position of the Commission was to classify the same as foreign brands since they were listed in the World
Tobacco Dictionary as belonging to foreign companies. However Fortune Tobacco changed the names to “Hope Luxury” and
“Premium More” removing the same from the foreign brand category. Subsequently, RA 7654 amended Section 142(c)(1) of the
National Internal Revenue Code providing for a 55% ad valorem tax on locally manufactured cigarettes bearing a foreign brand and
a 45% tax on other locally manufactured cigarettes. About a month after its enactment, the BIR issued Memorandum Circular No.
37-93 (RMC 37-93) which reclassified Hope, More and Champion to locally manufactured cigarettes bearing a foreign brand. It
provided that the test for imposition of the 55% tax is that the brand must be originally owned by a foreign manufacturer, regardless
of whether or not the right to use or title to the same was sold to the local manufacturer. And if the ownership is not determinable,
the listing of brands in the current World Tobacco Directory shall govern. Thus, Fortune Tobacco was subjected to the 55% tax and
was assessed a tax deficiency of more than P9M.
RMC 37-93 is being assailed for lack of publication and prior hearing. Peitioner however maintains that the same is merely an
interpretative ruling of the BIR which can become effective wihotut any prior need for notice or publication.

ISSUE: Whether or not RMC 37-93 is an interpretative rule

HELD: NO, RMC 37-93 is a legislative rule. A legislative rule is in the nature of subordinate legislation, designed to implement a
primary legislation by providing the details thereof. It is generally required that before a legislative rule is adopted there must be a
hearing and publication. On the other, interpretative rules are designed to provide guidelines to the law which the administrative
agency is in charge of enforcing. It requires nothing more than issuance for its effectivity.
Prior to the issuance of RMC 37-93, Hope, More and Champion cigarettes were in the category of locally manufactured cigarettes
subject to the 45% tax rate. In order to place such brands within the scope of RA 7654 and subject to the increased tax rate, RMC
37-93 had to be issued. In so doing, the BIR not simply interpreted the law. It legislated under its quasi-legislative authority. The
due observance of the requirements of notice, hearing and publication should have been complied with.

_________________________

3.SPO1 LEONITO ACUZAR v. APRONIANO JOROLAN and HON. EDUARDO A. APRESA, PEOPLES LAW
ENFORCEMENT BOARD (PLEB) Chairman, New Corella, Davao del Norte
G.R. No. 177878 | April 7, 2010

Facts:

Aproniano Jorolan filed an Administrative case against petitioner before the PLEB charging him of Grave Misconduct for allegedly
having an illicit relationship with Jorolan’s minor daughter. Jorolan also instituted a criminal case against petitioner before the MTC
for Violation of the Child Abuse Act.

Petitioner filed his Counter-Affidavit before the PLEB vehemently denying all the accusations leveled against him. In support
thereof, petitioner attached the affidavit of complainants daughter, Rigma A. Jorolan, who denied having any relationship with the
petitioner or having kissed him despite knowing him to be a married person.

Petitioner filed a motion to suspend the proceedings before the PLEB pending resolution of the criminal case filed before the regular
court, which was denied for lack of merit. MR also denied for allegedly being dilatory.

After due proceedings, the PLEB ruled that Petitioner is guilty of grave misconduct (child abuse) which is punishable by dismissal.

Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and TRO with the RTC. Petitioner alleged
that the subject decision was issued without giving him an opportunity to be heard. He likewise averred that the respondent Board
acted without jurisdiction in proceeding with the case without the petitioner having been first convicted in the criminal case before
the regular court. Petitioner pointed out that under the PLEB Rules of Procedure, prior conviction was required before the Board
may act on the administrative case considering that the charge was actually for violation of law, although denominated as 1 for
grave misconduct.
The trial court rendered a Decision annulling the Decision of the PLEB. The CA rendered its Decision reversing and setting aside
the trial courts decision.

Issue:
Whether or not CA erred in reversing the RTC – No
Ruling:

No, CA is correct in reversing the RTC.

Petitioner opted to file a petition for certiorari before the trial court on the pretext that the PLEB had no jurisdiction to hear the
administrative case until petitioner is convicted before the regular court. According to petitioner, although the case filed before the
PLEB was captioned as Grave Misconduct, the offense charged was actually for Violation of Law, which requires prior conviction
before a hearing on the administrative case can proceed. Thus, petitioner insists that the PLEB should have awaited the resolution
of the criminal case before conducting a hearing on the administrative charge against him.

The contention however is untenable. A careful perusal of respondents affidavit-complaint against petitioner would show that
petitioner was charged with grave misconduct for engaging in an illicit affair with respondents minor daughter, he being a married
man, and not for violation of law, as petitioner would like to convince this Court. Misconduct generally means wrongful, improper
or unlawful conduct, motivated by premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose. It usually refers to transgression of some
established and definite rule of action, where no discretion is left except what necessity may demand; it does not necessarily imply
corruption or criminal intention but implies wrongful intention and not to mere error of judgment. On the other hand, violation of
law presupposes final conviction in court of any crime or offense penalized under the Revised Penal Code or any special law or
ordinance. The settled rule is that criminal and administrative cases are separate and distinct from each other. In criminal cases,
proof beyond reasonable doubt is needed whereas in administrative proceedings, only substantial evidence is required. Verily,
administrative cases may proceed independently of criminal proceedings. The PLEB, being the administrative disciplinary body
tasked to hear complaints against erring members of the PNP, has jurisdiction over the case.

The remedy of appeal from the decision of the PLEB to the Regional Appellate Board was available to petitioner. Since appeal was
available, filing a petition for certiorari was inapt. The existence and availability of the right of appeal are antithetical to the
availment of the special civil action of certiorari. Corollarily, the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that
before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a precondition that he should have availed of the means of
administrative processes afforded to him. If a remedy is available within the administrative machinery of the administrative agency,
then this alternative should first be utilized before resort can be made to the courts. This is to enable such body to review and correct
any mistakes without the intervention of the court.
_________________________
4.GLOBE TELECOM, INC. v THE NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, ET AL.
G.R. No. 143964, July 26, 2004

DOCTRINE: The assailed Order of NTC violated due process for failure to sufficiently explain the reason for the decision rendered,
for being unsupported by substantial evidence, and for imputing violation to, and imposing a corresponding fine on, Globe, despite
the absence of due notice and hearing which would have afforded Globe the right to present evidence on its behalf.

FACTS: Petitioner Globe Telecom, Inc. (Globe) and private respondent Smart Communications, Inc. (Smart) are both grantees of
valid and subsisting legislative franchises, authorizing them, among others, to operate a Cellular Mobile Telephone System (CMTS)
utilizing the Global System for Mobile Communication (GSM) technology which supports the Short Message Services (SMS) or
“texting.”

On June 4, 1999, Smart filed a Complaint with public respondent National Telecommunications Commission (NTC), praying for
the immediate interconnection of Smart and Globe’s GSM networks, particularly their respective SMS or texting services. Smart
alleged that Globe, with evident bad faith and malice, refused to grant Smart’s request for the SMS interconnection.

After the NTC issued a Show Cause Order to Globe which informed them of the Complaint, Globe filed its Answer with Motion to
Dismiss. Globe interposed grounds that the Complaint was premature, Smart’s failure to comply with the conditions precedent
required in Section 6 of NTC Memorandum Circular 9-7-93, and its omission of the mandatory Certification of Non-Forum
Shopping.

On July 19, 1999, the NTC issued the assailed Order, which declared, among others, that both Smart and Globe have been providing
SMS without authority from it, in violation of Section 420(f) of MC No. 8-9-95, which requires public telecommunications entities
(PTEs) intending to provide value-added services (VAS) to secure prior approval from NTC through an administrative process.
Yet, in view of what it noted as the peculiar circumstances of the case, NTC refrained from issuing a Show Cause Order with a
Cease and Desist Order, and instead directed the parties to secure the requisite authority to provide SMS within 30 days, subject to
the payment of fine in the amount of P200.00, from the date of violation and for every day during which such violation continues.

Upon filing a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with the CA, Globe claimed, among others, that the NTC Order is a patent
nullity as it imposed an administrative penalty for an offense for which neither it nor Smart was sufficiently charged nor heard on
in violation of their right to due process. After issuing a Temporary Restraining Order, the CA-Special Fifth Division affirmed the
NTC Order in toto. Globe’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration was likewise denied by the CA. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Did NTC act with due process in levying the fine against Globe?

RULING: NO, it did not. It is essential to understand that the assailed Order was promulgated by NTC in the exercise of its quasi-
judicial functions. The case arose when Smart had filed the initial complaint against Globe before NTC for interconnection of SMS.
NTC issued a Show Cause Order requiring Globe to answer Smart’s charges. Hearing were conducted, and a decision made on the
merits, signed by the three Commissioners of the NTC, sitting as a collegial body.

The assailed NTC’s determination and corresponding penalty were rendered in the exercise of quasi-judicial functions. Therefore,
all the requirements of due process attendant to the exercise of quasi-judicial power apply to the present case. Among them are the
seven cardinal primary rights in justiciable cases before administrative tribunals, as enumerated in Ang Tibay v CIR.

NTC violated several of these cardinal rights due Globe in the promulgation of the assailed Order.

First. The NTC Order is not supported by substantial evidence. Neither does it sufficiently explain the reasons for the decision
rendered.

While stability in the law, particularly in the business field, is desirable, there is no demand that the NTC slavishly follow precedent.

However, the Court thinks it essential, for the sake of clarity and intellectual honesty, that if an administrative agency decides
inconsistently with previous action, that it explain thoroughly why a different result is warranted, or if need be, why the previous
standards should no longer apply or should be overturned. Such explanation is warranted in order to sufficiently establish a decision
as having rational basis. Any inconsistent decision lacking thorough ratiocination in support may be struck down as being arbitrary.
And any decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity.

Second. Globe and Smart were denied opportunity to present evidence on the issues relating to the nature of VAS and prior approval.

The opportunity to adduce evidence is essential in the administrative process, as decisions must be rendered on the evidence
presented, either in the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. If no evidence is procured
pertinent to a particular issue, any eventual resolution of that issue on substantive grounds despite the absence of evidence is flawed.
Moreover, if the parties did have evidence to counter the ruling but were wrongfully denied the opportunity to offer the evidence,
the result would be embarrassing on the adjudicator.

Third. The imposition of fine is void for violation of due process.

Section 21 of the Public Service Act requires notice and hearing because fine is a sanction, regulatory and even punitive in character.
Indeed, the requirement is the essence of due process. Notice and hearing are the bulwark of administrative due process, the right
of which is among the primary rights that must be respected even in administrative proceedings. The right is guaranteed by the
Constitution itself and does not need legislative enactment. The statutory affirmation of the requirement serves merely to enhance
the fundamental precept. The right to notice and hearing is essential to due process and its non-observance will, as a rule, invalidate
the administrative proceedings.

Being an agency of the government, NTC should, at all times, maintain a due regard for the constitutional rights of party litigants.
In this case, NTC blindsided Globe with a punitive measure for a reason Globe was not made aware of, and in any manner that
contravened express provisions of law. Consequently, the fine imposed by NTC on Globe is also invalid. Otherwise put, since the
very basis for the fine was invalidly laid, the fine is necessarily void.

_________________________
5. ARSENIO PASCUAL, JR.,
vs.
BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS, respondent-appellant, SALVADOR GATBONTON and ENRIQUETA
GATBONTON,
DOCTRINE: "The accused has a perfect right to remain silent and his silence cannot be used as a presumption of his guilt."

FACTS:
Arsenio Pascual, Jr., petitioner-appellee, filed on February 1, 1965 with the Court of First Instance of Manila an action for prohibition
with prayer for preliminary injunction against the Board of Medical Examiners, now respondent-appellant. It was alleged therein
that at the initial hearing of an administrative case for alleged immorality, counsel for complainants announced that he would present
as his first witness herein petitioner-appellee, who was the respondent in such malpractice charge. Thereupon, petitioner-appellee,
through counsel, made of record his objection, relying on the constitutional right to be exempt from being a witness against himself.
Respondent-appellant, the Board of Examiners, took note of such a plea, at the same time stating that at the next scheduled hearing,
on February 12, 1965, petitioner-appellee would be called upon to testify as such witness, unless in the meantime he could secure a
restraining order from a competent authority.

Petitioner-appellee then alleged that in thus ruling to compel him to take the witness stand, the Board of Examiners was guilty, at
the very least, of grave abuse of discretion for failure to respect the constitutional right against self-incrimination, the administrative
proceeding against him, which could result in forfeiture or loss of a privilege, being quasi-criminal in character. With his assertion
that he was entitled to the relief demanded consisting of perpetually restraining the respondent Board from compelling him to testify
as witness for his adversary and his readiness or his willingness to put a bond, he prayed for a writ of preliminary injunction and
after a hearing or trial, for a writ of prohibition.

On February 9, 1965, the lower court ordered that a writ of preliminary injunction issue against the respondent Board commanding
it to refrain from hearing or further proceeding with such an administrative case, to await the judicial disposition of the matter upon
petitioner-appellee posting a bond in the amount of P500.00.

The answer of respondent Board, while admitting the facts stressed that it could call petitioner-appellee to the witness stand and
interrogate him, the right against self-incrimination being available only when a question calling for an incriminating answer is
asked of a witness. It further elaborated the matter in the affirmative defenses interposed, stating that petitioner-appellee's remedy
is to object once he is in the witness stand, for respondent "a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law,"
precluding the issuance of the relief sought. Respondent Board, therefore, denied that it acted with grave abuse of discretion.

A decision was rendered by the lower court on August 2, 1965, finding the claim of petitioner-appellee to be well-founded and
prohibiting respondent Board "from compelling the petitioner to act and testify as a witness for the complainant in said investigation
without his consent and against himself." Hence this appeal both by respondent Board and intervenors, the Gatbontons. As noted at
the outset, we find for the petitioner-appellee.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner may be compelled to take the witness stand?
HELD:

The appeal apparently proceeds on the mistaken assumption by respondent Board and intervenors-appellants that the
constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination should be limited to allowing a witness to object to questions the answers to
which could lead to a penal liability being subsequently incurred. It is true that one aspect of such a right, to follow the language of
another American decision, 11 is the protection against "any disclosures which the witness may reasonably apprehend could be used
in a criminal prosecution or which could lead to other evidence that might be so used." If that were all there is then it becomes
diluted.lawphi1.ñet

The constitutional guarantee protects as well the right to silence. As far back as 1905, we had occasion to declare: "The accused has
a perfect right to remain silent and his silence cannot be used as a presumption of his guilt." 12Only last year, in Chavez v. Court of
Appeals, 13 speaking through Justice Sanchez, we reaffirmed the doctrine anew that it is the right of a defendant "to forego testimony,
to remain silent, unless he chooses to take the witness stand — with undiluted, unfettered exercise of his own free genuine will."

Why it should be thus is not difficult to discern. The constitutional guarantee, along with other rights granted an accused, stands for
a belief that while crime should not go unpunished and that the truth must be revealed, such desirable objectives should not be
accomplished according to means or methods offensive to the high sense of respect accorded the human personality. More and more
in line with the democratic creed, the deference accorded an individual even those suspected of the most heinous crimes is given
due weight. To quote from Chief Justice Warren, "the constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is the respect a government
... must accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens." 14

It is likewise of interest to note that while earlier decisions stressed the principle of humanity on which this right is predicated,
precluding as it does all resort to force or compulsion, whether physical or mental, current judicial opinion places equal emphasis
on its identification with the right to privacy. Thus according to Justice Douglas: "The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination
clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may not force to surrender to his detriment." 15 So also with
the observation of the late Judge Frank who spoke of "a right to a private enclave where he may lead a private life. That right is the
hallmark of our democracy." 16 In the light of the above, it could thus clearly appear that no possible objection could be legitimately
raised against the correctness of the decision now on appeal. We hold that in an administrative hearing against a medical practitioner
for alleged malpractice, respondent Board of Medical Examiners cannot, consistently with the self-incrimination clause, compel the
person proceeded against to take the witness stand without his consen

_________________________

6.
_________________________

PAT-OG VS CSC
G.R. No. 198755 June 5, 2013
Mendoza, J.
Topic: Administrative Law
FACTS
Pat-Og was a 3rd year high school teacher of Antadao National High School in Sagada, Mountain Province. While he was
conducting his MAPEH class, Robert Bang-On joined his class, who were then practicing basketball shots. Bang-On was a second-
year high school student,
When Pat-Og ordered the boys to form two lines, Robert, who thought the order was to form three lines, inserted himself between
the two lines. Pat-Og then punched him in the stomach for failing to follow instructions. Bang-On was hospitalized. He filed an
administrative case for Grave Misconduct against Pat-Og and a criminal case for Less Serious Physical Injuries.
In the administrative case, Pat-Og denied punching Bang-On and claimed that he merely stared them down when they became
unruly. In the criminal case, he was found guilty and applied for probation.
The Civil Service Commission-Cordillera Administrative Region, after conducting hearing, found him liable for Simple Misconduct
and ordered his suspension for six months without pay. He appealed to the Civil Service Commission, but it affirmed with
modification the CSC-CAR ruling, finding him liable for Grave Misconduct and ordering his dismissal from the service.
The CSC ruled that Alberto’s conviction in the criminal case, which he acquiesced, can be admitted as evidence in the administrative
case because it involved the same facts and issues. He was not denied due process when he was not afforded opportunity to cross-
examine Robert’s witnesses, as the same is not indispensable in administrative due process. Also, the CSC ruled that his act of
punching a student was a wanton transgression of the proper norms of conduct of a public school teacher.
In his motion for reconsideration, he raised for the first time the issue of jurisdiction of the CSC over the case. He argued that his
case should have been referred to and investigated by a committee first under the Magna Carta For School Teachers provided under
RA 4670. However, the CSC denied his motion for reconsideration, holding he is estopped from challenging the jurisdiction of the
CSC.
When he appealed to the CA, it affirmed the CSC ruling.
ISSUE
1. Whether or not the CSC had jurisdiction since administrative charges against Pat-Og were not initially heard under a
committee before being filed with the CSC.
2. Whether or not Pat-Og was denied the administrative due process for never having the opportunity to cross-examine the
witnesses.
3. Whether Pat-og should be held liable for simple misconduct or dismissal.
HELD
1. Yes. In Puse v. Santos-Puse, the CSC, the Department of Education (DepEd) and the Board of Professional Teachers-Professional
Regulatory Commission (PRC) have concurrent jurisdiction over administrative cases against public school teachers.
Under Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, the CSC is the body charged with the establishment and administration of a career
civil service which embraces all branches and agencies of the government. The Administrative Code of 1987 and the Civil Service
Decree of the Philippines expressly provide that the CSC has the power to hear and decide administrative disciplinary cases instituted
with it or brought to it on appeal. Thus, the CSC, as the central personnel agency of the government, has the inherent power to
supervise and discipline all members of the civil service, including public school teachers.
Under Section 9 of R.A. No. 4670, the jurisdiction over administrative cases of public school teachers is lodged with the
investigating committee constituted therein. Also, under Section 23 of the Philippine Teachers Professionalization Act of 1994, the
Board of Professional Teachers is given the power, after due notice and hearing, to suspend or revoke the certificate of registration
of a professional teacher for causes enumerated therein.
Concurrent jurisdiction is that which is possessed over the same parties or subject matter at the same time by two or more separate
tribunals. When the law bestows upon a government body the jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving specific matters, it is
to be presumed that such jurisdiction is exclusive unless it be proved that another body is likewise vested with the same jurisdiction,
in which case, both bodies have concurrent jurisdiction over the matter. Where concurrent jurisdiction exists in several tribunals,
the body that first takes cognizance of the complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the others. In this case, it was
CSC which first acquired jurisdiction over the case because the complaint was filed before it. Thus, it had the authority to proceed
and decide the case to the exclusion of the DepEd and the Board of Professional Teachers.
2. No. The essence of due process is simply to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, a fair and reasonable opportunity
to explain one’s side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. Administrative due process
cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense. In administrative proceedings, a formal or trial-type hearing is
not always necessary and technical rules of procedure are not strictly applied. Hence, the right to cross-examine is not an
indispensable aspect of administrative due process. The petitioner cannot, therefore, argue that the affidavit of Bang-on and his
witnesses are hearsay and insufficient to prove his guilt. At any rate, having actively participated in the proceedings before the CSC-
CAR, the CSC, and the CA, the petitioner was apparently afforded every opportunity to explain his side and seek reconsideration
of the ruling against him.
3. Dismissal but tempered to suspension. Misconduct means intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or
standard of behavior. To constitute an administrative offense, misconduct should relate to or be connected with the performance of
the official functions and duties of a public officer. In grave misconduct, as distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of
corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of an established rule must be manifest.
Teachers must strictly practice the set of ethical and moral principles, standards, and values laid down in the Code of Ethics of
Professional Teachers. Section 8 of Article VIII of the same Code expressly provides that "a teacher shall not inflict corporal
punishment on offending learners." Clearly then, Pat-Og’s violation is a flagrant disregard for the established rule contained in the
said Code tantamount to grave misconduct. Under Section 52(A)(2) of Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in
the Civil Service, the penalty for grave misconduct is dismissal from the service, which carries with it the cancellation of eligibility,
forfeiture of retiremen
__________________________
7.Maglalang vs PAGCOR
GR No 190566; December 11, 2013

Facts: Mark Maglalang was a teller at the Casino Filipino operated by PAGCOR. In December 2008, he committed an error
counting the money of a lady customer. Due to tension that arose between the two, they were invited to the casino’s Internal
Security Office in order to air their respective sides. He was required to file an Incident Report. By January 2009, he was issued a
memo charging him with Discourtesy. He was later on found guilty of the same and 30-day suspension was imposed. He filed MR
seeking reversal of the decision and also Motion for Production to be furnished with documents relative to the case. Both were
denied. He then filed petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA. He ascribed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction to the acts of PAGCOR in adjudging him guilty of the charge, in failing to observe the proper procedure
in the rendition of its decision and in imposing the harsh penalty of a 30-day suspension. He further explained that he did not
appeal to the Civil Service Commission because the penalty imposed on him was only a 30-day suspension which is not within the
CSC’s appellate jurisdiction. CA outrightly dismissed the petition for certiorari for being premature as petitioner failed to exhaust
administrative remedies before seeking recourse from the CA.
Issue: WON CA was correct in outrightly dismissing the petition for certiorari filed before it on the ground of non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies.
Decision: CA’s outright dismissal of the petition for certiorari on the basis of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies is bereft
of any legal standing
Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, he or
she should have availed himself or herself of all the means of administrative processes afforded him or her.
Exceptions: (1) when there is a violation of due process; (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question; (3) when the
administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; (4) when there is estoppel on the part of the
administrative agency concerned; (5) when there is irreparable injury; (6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose
acts as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter; (7) when to require exhaustion of
administrative remedies would be unreasonable; (8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim; (9) when the subject
matter is a private land in land case proceedings; (10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and
(11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention, and unreasonable delay would greatly prejudice
the complainant; (12) where no administrative review is provided by law; (13) where the rule of qualified political agency
applies and (14) where the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot.
The case falls squarely under exception number 12 since the law per se provides no administrative review for administrative cases
whereby an employee like petitioner is covered by Civil Service law, rules and regulations and penalized with a suspension for not
more than 30 days.
The judicial recourse petitioner availed of in this case before the CA is a special civil action for certiorari ascribing grave abuse of
discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of PAGCOR, not an appeal. An appeal and a special civil action
such as certiorari under Rule 65 are entirely distinct and separate from each other. One cannot file petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules where appeal is available, even if the ground availed of is grave abuse of discretion. A special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65 lies only when there is no appeal, or plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law. Certiorari cannot be allowed when a party to a case fails to appeal a judgment despite the availability of that remedy, as the
same should not be a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal. The remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not
alternative or successive.
_________________________
8. ZAMBALES CHROMITE MINING CO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
No. L-49711. November 7, 1979
Aquino, J.:
DOCTRINES:
1. Secretary Gozon acted with grave abuse of discretion in reviewing his decision as Director of Mines. The palpably flagrant
anomaly of a Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources reviewing his own decision as Director of Mines is a mockery of
administrative justice.
2. In order that the review of the decision of a subordinate officer might not turn out to be a farce, the reviewing officer must perforce
be other than the officer whose decision is under review; otherwise, there could be no different view or there would be no real review
of the case. The decision of the reviewing officer would be a biased view; inevitably, it would be the same view since being human,
he would not admit that he was mistaken in his first view of the case.
FACTS:
In Mines Administrative Case No. V-227, Director Gozon issued an order dated October 5, 1960 wherein he dismissed the case
filed by the petitioners or protestants (Zambales Chromite Mining Co., Inc. or the group of Gonzalo P. Nava). In that case, they
sought to be declared the rightful and prior locators and possessors of sixty-nine mining claims located in Santa Cruz, Zambales.
On the basis of petitioners' evidence (the private respondents did not present any evidence and they filed a demurrer to the evidence
or motion to dismiss the protest), Director Gozon found that the petitioners did not discover any mineral nor staked and located
mining claims in accordance with law. In that same order, Director Gozon ruled that the mining claims of the groups of Gregorio
Martinez and Pablo Pabilona, now the private respondents-appellees, were duly located and registered.
The petitioners appealed from that order to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. While the appeal was pending,
Director Gozon was appointed Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Instead of inhibiting himself, he decided the appeal,
DANR Case No. 2151, on August 16, 1963 as it he was adjudicating the case for the first time. 'Thus, Secretary Gozon exercised
appellate jurisdiction over a case which he had decided as Director of Mines. He acted as reviewing authority in the appeal from his
own decision. He ruled that the petitioners had abandoned the disputed mining claims, while, on the other hand, the Martinez and
Pabilona groups had validly located the said claims. Hence, he dismissed the appeal from his own decision.
On September 20, 1963, the petitioners filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Zambales, assailing Secretary Gozon's
decision and praying that they be declared the prior locators and possessors of the sixty-nine mineral claims in question. Impleaded
as defendants in the case were the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, the Director of Mines and the members of the
Martinez and Pabilona groups.
After hearing, the lower court sustained Secretary Gozon's decision and dismissed the case. It held that the disqualification petition
of a judge to review his own decision or ruling (Sec. 1, Rule 137, Rules of Court) does not apply to administrative bodies; that there
is no provision in the Mining Law, disqualifying the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources from deciding an appeal from
a case which he had decided as Director of Mines; that delicadeza is not a ground for disqualification; that the petitioners did not
seasonably seek to disqualify Secretary Gozon from deciding their appeal, and that there was no evidence that the Secretary acted
arbitrarily and with bias, prejudice, animosity or hostility to the petitioners
The petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Sixth Division of that Court reversed the judgment of the trial court and
declared that the petitioners were the rightful locators and possessors of the said sixty-nine mining claims and held as invalid the
mining claims overlapping the same. That Division found that the petitioners (Nava group) had discovered minerals and had validly
located the said sixty-nine mining claims and that there was no sufficient basis for Secretary Gozon's finding that the mining claims
of the Martinez and Pabilona groups were validly located.
The defendants, now the private respondents-appellees, filed a motion for reconsideration based principally on the ground that the
Court of Appeals should have respected the factual findings of the Director of Mines and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources on the theory that the facts found in administrative decisions cannot be disturbed on appeal to the courts, citing Republic
Act No. 4388 which amended section 61 of the Mining Law effective June 19, 1965; Pajo vs. Ago, 108 Phil. 905; Palanan Lumber
& Plywood Co., Inc. vs. Arranz 65 O.G. 8473; Timbancaya vs. Vicente, 119 Phil. 169, Ortua vs. Singson Encarnacion, 59 Phil. 440.
The petitioners opposed that motion for reconsideration. In their opposition, they reiterated the contention in their brief that Secretary
Gozon's decision was void and, therefore, the factual findings therein are not binding on the courts
. The same Sixth Division in its second decision of October 13, 1978, set aside its first decision and granted the motion for curiously
enough, the first decision was reconsidered not on the ground advanced by the movants-defendants, now the private respondents
(Martinez and Pabilona groups), which was that the factual findings of the administrative officials should be upheld, but on the
ground raised in petitioners' opposition, namely, that Secretary Gozon's decision was void because he was disqualified to review
his own decision as Director of Mines.
So the Court of Appeals in its second decision remanded the case to the Minister of Natural Resources for another review of Director
Gozon's decision. This was the prayer of the petitioners in their brief but in their opposition to the motion for reconsideration, they
prayed that the first decision of the Court of Appeals in their favor be maintained.
Since the second decision did not satisfy the parties, they filed motions for reconsideration. The petitioners in their motion reiterated
their prayer that the first decision be reinstated. They abandoned their prayer that the case be returned to the Minister of Natural
Resources. On the other hand, the private respondents in their motion insisted that the trial court's decision be affirmed on the basis
of the factual findings of the Director of Mines and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. The Court of Appeals denied
both motions in its resolutions of December 27, 1978 and January 15, 1979. Only the petitioners appealed from the second decision
of the Court of Appeals.
There is an arresting and noteworthy peculiarity in the present posture of this case now on appeal to this Court (as arresting and
noteworthy as the peculiarity that Secretary Gozon reviewed his own decision as Director of Mines):
That twist or peculiarity is that while the petitioners (Nava group) in their appellants' brief in the Court of Appeals prayed that
Secretary Gozon's decision, alleged to be biased, be declared void and that the case be returned to the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources for another review of Director Gozon's order, in their appellants' brief in this Court, they changed that relief and
they now pray that the second decision of the Court of Appeals, referring this case to the Minister of Natural Resources for another
review, be declared void and that its first decision be affirmed.
In contrast, the private respondents, who did not appeal from the second decision of the Court of Appeals, instead of sustaining its
holding that this case be referred to the Minister of Natural Resources or instead of defending that second decision, they being
appellees, pray for the affirmance of the trial court's judgment sustaining the decisions of Director and Secretary Gozon. The
inconsistent positions of the parties, which were induced by the contradictory decisions of the Court of Appeals, constitute the
peculiar twist of this case in this Court.

ISSUE:
Whether Secretary Gozon acted with grave abuse of discretion in reviewing his decision as Director of Mines.

HELD: YES.
The palpably flagrant anomaly of a Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources reviewing his own decision as Director of Mines
is a mockery of administrative justice. The Mining Law, Commonwealth Act No. 13-i, provides:
SEC. 61. Conflicts and disputes arising out of mining locations shall be submitted to the Director of Mines for decision:
Provided, That the decision or order of the Director of Mines may be appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
within thirty days from the date of its receipt.
In case any one of the parties should disagree from the decision or order of the Director of Mines or of the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources, the matter may be taken to the court of competent jurisdiction within thirty days from the receipt of such
decision or order; otherwise the said decision or order shag be final and binding upon the parties concerned. (As amended by
Republic Act No. 746 approved on June 18,1952).*
Undoubtedly, the provision of section 61 that the decision of the Director of Mines may be appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources contemplates that the Secretary should be a person different from the Director of Mines.
In order that the review of the decision of a subordinate officer might not turn out to be a farce the reviewing officer must perforce
be other than the officer whose decision is under review; otherwise, there could be no different view or there would be no real review
of the case. The decision of the reviewing officer would be a biased view; inevitably, it would be the same view since being human,
he would not admit that he was mistaken in his first view of the case.
That is the obvious, elementary reason behind the disqualification of a trial judge, who is promoted to the appellate court, to sit in
any case wherein his decision or ruling is the subject of review (Sec. 1, Rule 137, Rules of Court: secs. 9 and 27, Judiciary Law). A
sense of proportion and consideration for the fitness of things should have deterred Secretary Gozon from reviewing his own decision
as Director of Mines. He should have asked his undersecretary to undertake the review. Petitioners-appellants were deprived of due
process, meaning fundamental fairness, when Secretary Gozon reviewed his own decision as Director of Mines.
_________________________
9. PHILIPPINE SINTER CORPORATION and PHIVIDEC INDUSTRIAL AUTHORITY, petitioners, vs. CAGAYAN
ELECTRIC POWER and LIGHT CO., INC.
TICKLER: Injunction against a final, executor order
FACTS: On January 21, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino and her Cabinet approved a Cabinet Reform Policy for the power
sector and issued a Cabinet Memorandum, Item No. 2. Which provided that then existing franchise grantees should continue
direct connection for industries authorized under the BOI-NPC Memorandum of of 12 January 1981, until such time as the
appropriate regulatory board determines that direct connection of industry to NPC is no longer necessary in the franchise area of the
specific utility or cooperative.
Pursuant to the Memorandum, Cagayan Electric Power (Cagayan Electric) filed a petition to have all direct power connections of
NPC (National Power Corp) within areas under CAGAYAN ELECTRIC’s FRANCHISE, to be DISCONNECTED.
The ERB (Energy regulation Board) granted CAGAYAN ELECTRIC’s petition.
To implement the decision in CAGAYAN ELECTRIC wrote Philippine Sinter Corporation (PSC), petitioner, and advised the latter
of its desire to have the power supply of PSC, directly taken from NPC (NAPOCOR), disconnected, cut and transferred CAGAYAN
ELECTRIC..
PSC and PIA (another corporation) filed an injunction against Cagayan Electric with the RTC of Cagayan de Oro. The RTC ruled
in favor of PSC and PIA, and granted the injunction. CAGAYAN POWER appealed to the CA, the CA ruled in Cagayan’s favor.
Hence this petition on certiorari by PSC.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not injunction lies against the final and executory judgment of the ERB.
RULING:
1. No. After a judgment has gained finality, it becomes the ministerial duty of the court to order its execution. No court, perforce,
should interfere by injunction or otherwise to restrain such execution. The rule, however, concededly admits of exceptions; hence,
when facts and circumstances later transpire that would render execution inequitable or unjust, the interested party may ask a
competent court to stay its execution or prevent its enforcement. So, also, a change in the situation of the parties can warrant an
injunctive relief.
Clearly, an injunction to stay a final and executory decision is unavailing except only after a showing that facts and circumstances
exist which would render execution unjust or inequitable, or that a change in the situation of the parties occurred. Here, no such
exception exists as shown by the facts earlier narrated.
Granting that the ERB decision has not attained finality,or that the ERB is not co-equal with the RTC, still injunction will not lie.
As a rule, to justify the injunctive relief prayed for, the movant must show:
1. the existence of a right in esse or the existence of a right to be protected;
1. the act against which injunction is to be directed is a violation of such right. In the case at bar, petitioners failed to show any
clear legal right which would be violated if the power supply of PSC from the NAPOCOR is disconnected and transferred to
CEPALCO
Wherefore, petition is denied.
________________________
10.Ombudsman vs. Antonio Reyes
G.R. No. 170512 | Oct. 5, 2011
J. De Castro

Doctrine:

Due process, as a constitutional precept, does not always and in all situations require a trial-type proceeding. Due process is
satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against him and given an opportunity to explain or defend himself. In administrative
proceedings, the filing of charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to answer the accusations against
him constitute the minimum requirements of due process. The essence of due process is simply to be heard, or as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of.

Facts:

(Digest of a very long case) Jaime B. Acero executed an affidavit against herein respondents Antonio Reyes and Angelito Pealoza,
who were the Transportation Regulation Officer II and Clerk III, respectively, of the Land Transportation Office (LTO) District
Office in Mambajao, Camiguin.

Acero narrated that he went to the Land Transportation Office, at Mambajao, Camiguin to apply for a driver’s license. After the
examination, Pealoza informed him that he failed in the examination; however if he is willing to pay additional assessment then
they will reconsider his application. Affiant was then referring to Pealoza and Reyes. Reyes knew that affiant is with the Commission
on Audit.

Pealoza denied telling Acero that if the latter were willing to pay additional costs, Reyes and Pealoza would reconsider his
application. Pealoza stated, among others, that he did administer the examination to Acero but since he was very busy, he requested
their security guard, Dominador Daypuyat, to check the answers of Acero using their answer guide. After Daypuyat checked Aceros
paper, Pealoza noted the score of 22/40. Pealoza informed Acero of the failing grade and told him that it was up to Reyes to decide
on the matter. Acero then went to the office of Reyes and after a few minutes, he came back and returned his application documents
to Pealoza. After examining the application form, Pealoza saw that the same did not contain Reyes signature but a plus sign (+) and
the number 27 beside the score of 22/40. Pealoza knew that it was Reyes who wrote the + 27 and the same indicated that Acero had
to pay additional costs in order to pass the examination, as was done in the past.

Thereafter, when Pealoza allegedly informed Reyes that Acero was an auditor, the latter was summoned into Reyes office. Reyes
asked if Acero wanted to retake the examination or just pay the additional costs. Acero eventually said yes and Pealoza inferred that
the former agreed to pay Reyes the extra costs. Pealoza recounted that Reyes instructed him to prepare the driver’s license of
Acero. Pealoza gave Aceros application documents to Lourdes Cimacio, the senior statistician, who processed the driver’s license.

To corroborate this allegation, Pealoza submitted the affidavits of Amper and Valdehueza. Amper was a former LTO employee who
allegedly had first-hand knowledge of the practice of Reyes of imposing and pocketing additional fees; while Valdehueza declared
that he was an applicant for a driver’s license who was likewise made to pay the said additional fees to Reyes. Upon the other hand,
Reyes counter-affidavit repudiated the allegations of Acero, insisting that it was Pealoza who illegally took the amount of P500.00
from Acero.

In his counter-affidavit, Reyes claimed that Acero’s complaint was a blatant distortion of the truth and a mere fabrication of the
complainant.

The Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao rendered a decision, adjudging Reyes guilty of grave misconduct and finding Pealoza
guilty of simple misconduct.

On Appeal, the Court of Appeals granted the petition of Reyes and reversed the judgment of the Office of the Ombudsman-
Mindanao.

Hence, the Office of the Ombudsman (petitioner) filed the instant petition, raising the fundamental issue of whether the charge of
grave misconduct against Reyes was sufficiently proven by substantial evidence. Petitioner settled this issue in the affirmative, while
the Court of Appeals ruled otherwise.

Petitioner’s contention: In assailing the judgment of the Court of Appeals, petitioner avers that the findings of fact of the Office of
the Ombudsman are entitled to great weight and must be accorded full respect and credit as long as they are supported by substantial
evidence. Petitioner argues that it is not the task of the appellate court to weigh once more the evidence submitted before an
administrative body and to substitute its own judgment for that of the administrative agency with respect to the sufficiency of
evidence.

Respondent’s contention: Reyes faults petitioner for placing too much reliance on the counter-affidavit of Pealoza, as well as the
affidavits of Amper and Valdehueza. Reyes claims that he was not furnished a copy of the said documents before petitioner rendered
its Decision. Reyes, thus, argues that his right to due process was violated. Petitioner, on the other hand, counters that Reyes was
afforded due process since he was given all the opportunities to be heard, as well as the opportunity to file a motion for
reconsideration of petitioner’s adverse decision.

Issue:

Whether the petition has merit

Held:

No. Case was remanded to the Ombudsman due to a violation of administrative due process for failure of the prosecution to furnish
the respondent copies of the affidavits of the witnesses against him.

The Court finds merit in Reyes’ (respondent’s) contention.

Ledesma v. Court of Appeals elaborates on the well-established doctrine of due process in administrative proceedings as follows:

Due process, as a constitutional precept, does not always and in all situations require a trial-type proceeding. Due process is satisfied
when a person is notified of the charge against him and given an opportunity to explain or defend himself. In administrative
proceedings, the filing of charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to answer the accusations against
him constitute the minimum requirements of due process. The essence of due process is simply to be heard, or as applied
to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of.

As laid down in Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations, due process in administrative proceedings requires compliance with the
following cardinal principles:
(1) the respondents right to a hearing, which includes the right to present ones case and submit supporting evidence, must be
observed;
(2) the tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
(3) the decision must have some basis to support itself;
(4) there must be substantial evidence;
(5) the decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the
parties affected;
(6) in arriving at a decision, the tribunal must have acted on its own consideration of the law and the facts of the controversy and
must not have simply accepted the views of a subordinate; and
(7) the decision must be rendered in such manner that respondents would know the reasons for it and the various issues involved.

In the present case, the fifth requirement stated above was not complied with. Reyes was not properly apprised of the evidence
offered against him, which were eventually made the bases of petitioner’s decision that found him guilty of grave misconduct.

To recall, after the affidavit of Acero was filed with the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, the respondents therein, i.e., Reyes
and Pealoza, were ordered to submit their counter-affidavits in order to discuss the charges lodged against them. While Pealoza
acknowledged in his counter-affidavit his participation in the illicit transaction complained of, he pointed to Reyes as the main
culprit. Pealoza thereafter submitted the affidavits of Amper and Valdehueza as witnesses who would substantiate his
accusations. However, the records reveal that only the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao and Acero were furnished copies of the
said affidavits. Thus, Reyes was able to respond only to the affidavit of Acero. It would appear that Reyes had no idea that Pealoza,
a co-respondent in the administrative case, would point an accusing finger at him and even supply the inculpatory evidence to prove
his guilt. The said affidavits were made known to Reyes only after the rendition of the petitioner’s decision.

The fact that Reyes was able to assail the adverse decision of the petitioner via a Motion for Reconsideration Cum Motion to Set
the Case for Preliminary Conference did not cure the violation of his right to due process in this case. Reyes filed the said motion
precisely to raise the issue of the violation of his right to due process. There is nothing on record to show that Reyes was furnished
with, or had otherwise received, a copy of the affidavits of Pealoza, Amper and Valdehueza, whether before or after the Decision
dated September 24, 2001 was issued. Thus, it cannot be said that Reyes had a fair opportunity to squarely and intelligently answer
the accusations therein or to offer any rebuttal evidence thereto.

It is true that, in the past, this Court has held that the right to due process of a respondent in an administrative case was not violated
if he was able to file a motion for reconsideration to refute the evidence against him. However, the instant case should be
differentiated from Ruivivar v. Office of the Ombudsman, which likewise involved the issue of administrative due process. In the
said case, Ruivivar was found administratively liable for discourtesy in the course of her official functions and was meted the penalty
of reprimand. In her motion for reconsideration, Ruivivar argued that she was deprived of due process because she was not furnished
copies of the affidavits of complainant’s witnesses. Thereafter, the Ombudsman ordered that Ruivivar be furnished with copies of
the affidavits of the witnesses, with the directive for her to file any pleading that she may deem appropriate. As Ruivivar still opted
not to controvert the affidavits that were belatedly provided to her, the Ombudsman ruled that her right to due process was not
violated and her administrative liability was upheld. The Court affirmed the ruling of the Ombudsman, declaring that the law can
no longer help one who had been who had been given ample opportunity to be heard but who did not take full advantage of the
proffered chance.

Case remanded to the Office of the Ombudsman and the latter was ordered to furnish respondent Antonio T. Reyes copies of the
affidavits of Angelito G. Pealoza, Rey P. Amper and Rickie Valdehueza.

_________________________