EUROPE,AMERICA, AND TECHNOLOGY:

PHILOSOPHICALPERSPECTIVES
 PHILOSOPHY AND TECHNOLOGY
VOLUME 8

Series Editor: PAUL T. DURBIN

EditorialBoard

Albert Borgmann,Montana Joseph Margolis, Temple

Mario Bunge, McGill
EdmundF. Byrne, Indiana-
Purdue at Indianapolis
Stanley Carpenter,Georgia Tech
RobertS. Cohen, Boston-
Ruth SchwartzCowan, SUNY-
StonyBrook
HubertL. Dreyfus, California -
Berkeley
BernardL. Gendron,Wisconsin-
Milwaukee
Ronald Giere, Minnesota
Steven L. Goldman,Lehigh
Virginia Held, CUNY
GilbertHottois, UniversiteLibre de
Bruxelles
Don Ihde, SUNY- StonyBrook
Melvin Kranzberg,Georgia Tech
Douglas MacLean,Maryland,
BaltimoreCounty
RobertMcGinn, Stanford
Alex Michalos, Guelph
Carl Mitcham,PennsylvaniaState
University
Joseph Pitt, Virginia Polytechnic
FriedrichRapp, Dortmund
Nicholas Rescher, Pittsburgh
EgbertSchuurman,Technical
UniversityofDelft
KristinShrader-Frechette,South
Florida
ElisabethStraker, Cologne
Ladislav Tondl, Czechoslovak
Academyof Science
Marx Wartofsky,CUNY
CarolineWhitbeck,M.I.T.
LangdonWinner,R.P.I.
WalterCh. Zimmerli,Technical
UniversityCarolo-Wilhelmina,
Braunschweig

The titles publishedin this series are listed at the end of this volume.
 OFFICIALPUBLICATIONOF
THE SOCIETYFOR PHILOSOPHYAND TECHNOLOGY

PHILOSOPHY AND TECHNOLOGY

VOLUME 8

EUROPE, AMERICA,
AND TECHNOLOGY:
PHILOSOPHICAL
PERSPECTIVES

Editedby

PAUL T. DURBIN
UniversityofDelaware

SPRINGER-SCIENCE+BUSINESSMEDIA, B.V.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Europe, Amerlca.
Europe. AmerIca, and technology phIlosophIcal perspectlves
phl1osophlcal perspectIves I edIted
edlted
by Paul T. DurbIn.
p.c m. -- (Ph i • as
0 S 00 P
phhYYan
andd tee h n0 log Y
Y ,,88) )
Includes blbliographical
bIbliographical references and Index.
ISBN 978-94-010-5429-4 ISBN 978-94-011-3242-8 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-94-011-3242-8
1. Technology--Phi los~phy. DurbIn, Paul T.
I. DurbIn. Series.
II. Serles.
11.
T14.E84 1991
601--dc20 91-619
ISBN 978-94-010-5429-4

printedon acid-free paper

All Rights Reserved

© 1991 SpringerScience+Business Media Dordrecht
Originallypublishedby Kluwer Academic Publishers in 1991
Softcover reprintof the hardcover1st edition 1991
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 TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE vii

INTRODUCTION:The Developmentof Technology in Eastern

and WesternEurope- Albert Borgmann 1

PART I
SYMPOSIUMON IVAN ILLICH

LEONARDJ. WAKS / Ivan Illich's Philosophy of Technology:

Introduction 15
CARL MITCHAM/ Tools for Conviviality:Argument,Insight,
Influence 17
LEONARDJ. WAKS / Ivan Illich and Deschooling Society:
A Reappraisal 57
ROBERTN. PROCTOR/ Ivan Illich's Medical Nemesis:
Fifteen Years Later 75
LARRY D. SPENCE/ Ivan Illich's H20 and the Watersof
Forgetfulness 95

PART II
MISCELLANY

THOMAS ALEXANDER/ The Technology of Desire:

John Dewey, Social Criticism,and the Aesthetics of Human
Existence 109
HANS LENK / Ideology, Technocracy,and Knowledge Utilization 127
MANUEL MEDINA / Technology and Scientific Concepts:
Mechanics and the Concept of Mass in Archimedes 141
FRIEDRICHRAPP / The Limited Promise of Technology
Assessment 157

v
vi TABLE OF CONTENTS

KRISTINSHRADER-FRECHETTE / Adam Smith and Alma

Mater:Technology and the Threatto Academic Freedom 175

PART III
SYMPOSIUMON EDUCATIONIN
SCIENCE,TECHNOLOGY,AND V ALVES

LEONARD J. WAKS / Symposiumon Educationin Science,

Technology, and Values: Introduction 193
ROBERTK. FULLINWIDER/ Science and Technology Educa-
tion as Civic Education 197
MICHAELS. PRITCHARD/ STS, CriticalThinking,and
Philosophy for Children 217
LEONARDJ. WAKS / STS Educationand the Paradoxof Green
Studies 247

INDEX 259
 PREFACE

As Europe moves toward 1992 and full economic unity, and as Eastern
Europe tries to find its way in the new economic order, the United States
hesitates. Will the new Europeaneconomic order be good for the U.S. or
not? Such a question is exacerbated by world-wide changes in the
technological order, most evident in Japan'snew techno-economicpower.
As might be expected, philosophershave been slow to come to grips with
such issues, and lack of interestis compoundedby differentphilosophical
styles in differentparts of the world. What this volume addresses is more
a matter of conflicting styles than a substantive confrontation with the
real-worldissues.
But there is some attemptto be concrete. The symposium on Ivan Illich
- with contributionsfrom philosophers and social critics at the Pennsyl-
vania State University, where Illich has taught for several years - may
suggest the old cliche of Old World vs. New World. Illich's fulminations
against technology are often dismissed by Americans as old-world-style
prophecy, while Illich seems largely unknown in his native Europe. But
AlbertBorgmann,born in Germanythough now settled in the U.S., shows
that this old dichotomy is difficult to maintainin our technological world.
Borgmann'sfocus is on urgent technological problems that have become
almost painfully evidentin both Europeand America.
A similar internationalizingof the theoreticalproblematicshows up in
Hans Lenk's critique of scientific ideology and in Friedrich Rapp's
limited endorsement of technology assessment. Kristin Shrader-
Frechette'swarning about threats to the autonomy of the university has
the U.S. as its primaryfocus, but she does include examples from some
non-Americanuniversities.
Thomas Alexander focuses on that quintessential American
philosopher,John Dewey, but what Alexanderemphasizes is the need to
reinstatean "aesthetic"dimension of meaning and values in a technologi-
cal world. The one contributionthat seems to focus almost exclusively on
the U.S. - the symposium on educationfor life in a technological world-

vii
Paul T. Durbin (ed.), Europe, America, and Technology: Philosophical Perspectives, vii-viii.
© 1991 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Vlll PREFACE

seems nevertheless (like Alexander's article) to include valuable lessons

not only for any technological country but also for any country seeking to
use technology to aid in economic development.
Finally, Manuel Medina's piece of classical historical scholarship
arrives at surprising and importantconclusions still relevant to discus-
sions of the relationship between science and technology today. At the
heart of Western rationalityin the work of Archimedes, Medina shows,
lies technology. It is not just that Archimedes needed technical means and
technological models to elaborate his system of proto-mechanics; the
instrumentsused for the elaboration were borrowed from the world of
commerce and trade.
I need to acknowledge the special help of Leonard Waks, of Penn
State's Science, Technology, and Society program,in the preparationof
this volume. It was his idea to submit the education symposium, and he
kept the pressure on his fellow contributorsto the Illich symposium so
that publicationof the entire volume would not be too long delayed. I also
need to acknowledge the excellent secretarialhelp of Gail Ross and Mary
Imperatoreof the University of Delaware; they retyped several articles
and the notes for most of the others.

UniversityofDelaware PAUL T. DURBIN

 ALBERT BORGMANN

INTRODUCTION:THE DEVELOPMENTOF TECHNOLOGY

IN EASTERNAND WESTERNEUROPE

In 1989 the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe collapsed suddenly

and totally.1 One cannot but admire the courage of the people who in the
name of freedom stood up to their totalitarian governmentsand forced
them to resign. Their actions markedglorious moments in the traditionof
modernliberation.Adam Michnikput it his way.
The struggle for freedom is beautiful. Anyone who has taken part in this struggle has
felt, almost physically, how everything that is best and most precious within him was
awakened.2

Yet soon doubts and questions emerged from the revolutionaryglory.

What enabled liberation to occur and succeed now? And what would
eventually lend substance and shape to liberty? The answer to both
questions is in large partthe development of technology if by technology
we mean the characteristic way we have arranged our material cir-
cumstancesand our social affairs.
Obviously there was no theory of technology that could have predicted
the events of 1989. In fact, the prevailingimplicit views of technology on
the liberal side forecast stability and moderate prosperity in the Com-
munist world. The conservative predictions turned out to be right, not
because they possessed superior insight but because they had been
tenaciously repeatedfor a generationand a half. Thus the recent develop-
ments in EasternEurope provide an opportunityto rethink the status of
technology in modern history as well as the fate of modernity itself. For
as it happened,the fall of Communismcoincided with the decline of the
modernera.
Since the Second World War till very recently there was evidence that
technology and Communist regimes were compatible and jointly
successful. In the late forties already, the Soviet Union drew even with
American nuclear armament.The launching of the sputnik in 1957 gave
the impression that Soviet education and engineering were superior to
American accomplishments. Some of the Eastern European countries

Paul T. Durbin (ed.), Europe, America.and Technology:Philosophical Perspectives, 1-11.

© 1991 KluwerAcademicPublishers.
2 ALBERT BORGMANN

appearedto develop vigorous and productiveeconomies. As late as 1987,

East Gennany's per capita income was reported to rank twelfth in the
world, ahead of the United Kingdom's. Its GNP was listed sixteenth in
the world; Poland'swas thirteenth.3
This evidence fit well with the theories of technological convergence
elaborated by Galbraithin 1967 and by Heilbroner in 1974. Both the
United States and the Soviet Union, Galbraith noted, were industrial
countries, and devotion to the industrialsystem committed and subjected
both countries to the same requirements,the needs of long tenn and
broadlyintegratedplanning,of heavy capital expenditures,of providing a
highly skilled labor force, and of deference to technical expertise. The
imperative of the industrial system, as Galbraithsaw it, asserted itself
against the free enterpriseideology in the United States as well as against
party ideology in the Soviet Union. And while the system prosperedin
America, it did at least fairly well in Russia.4
Heilbroner,at the much darkermoment in 1974, in retrospectsaw the
capitalist and socialist systems as reasonably successful. Both triumphed
over the dire predictions of their critics but fell short of their own
aspirations. Both had so far been able to appease social difficulties
through economic growth.5 And both, he said, looking to the future,
would face
the challenge of drastically curtailing, perhaps even dismantling. the mode of
productionthat has been the most cherishedachievementof both systems.6

The events of 1989, however, revealed a radical divergence between the

two systems. Nowhere was the contraststarkerthan between the two parts
of Gennany. While according to the 1987 figures East Gennany's per
capita income was supposed to have been two-thirdsof West Gennany's,
only seven places furtherdown in the global ranking,the reality of 1989
showed robust prosperityin the West and catastrophicexhaustion in the
East. West Gennany approximateson a national scale the cleanliness and
prettiness of Disney World. It possesses one of the most productive
economies in the world'? And it is among the leading nations in protect-
ing its environment.8 East Gennany, to the contrary, has a primitive
telephone system, a transportationsystem in disrepair, housing near
decay, polluted rivers, noxious air, contaminated soil, dying forests,
outdated industrial plants, and chaotic records, accounts, and statistics.
Similardevastationsareto be found in the otherEastEuropeancountries.9
This deplorablecontrastbetween East and West is not due to a failure
 INTRODUCfION 3

of convergence as though Communist and democratic countries started

from radically different positions and failed somehow to follow jointly
the imperative of technology toward a common goal. Rather the two
systems startedin similar ways on the road of technology but then took
divergent directions. Modern technology began everywhere as an
aggressive assault on the naturaland social reality, carriedout according
to increasinglymethodicaland universaldesigns. The basic patternof this
aggressive realism and methodical universalism was a division and
coordination of counterparts, of production and consumption, of
machinery and commodity, of labor and leisure, of regimentation and
discretion. The former members of these pairs were initially dominantto
the point of oppression. The latterconstitutedthe promise of technology;
and enough people gave the promise enough credence for technological
elites to impose the pattern of technology on an uncertain and oc-
casionally resistantpopulace.
In the West technological leadership arose from the bourgeoisie; in
Russia it came from the Communist party. In Eastern Europe the latter
leadership forced out the former when modern technology was nearing
maturity after the war. Accordingly in the West, the giant corporations
emerged as the characteristic shape of the aggressive and universal
design. In the Communistworld, aggressive universalismwas taken to its
ultimate limit in the totally planned national economy. Thus, Leninist
Communism had an affinity with early technology and initially worked
fairly well in Russia after the First World War and in China after the
Second.
The theory that compelling power over naturaland social reality can
only derive from methodical and universal designs is one of the beliefs
that has inauguratedthe modern era and given it its characteristicshape.
The one-sidedness of this theory was first compensated for by popular
patience and eventually, in the West, by the realizationthat a comprehen-
sive approachto reality is not reducible to the rules and instructionsof a
command economy but must be appropriatedas an implicit patternby a
substantial majority of the population. The sharing of competence was
preparedfor by anotherinauguralbelief of modernity,the belief in liberal
democracy.
The appropriationof technology and the developmentof democracyare
components of a single process, and one component cannot for long
prosperwithout the other. Liberal democracy is unrealizablewithout the
pattern of technology. The machinery side of the latter furnishes
4 ALBERTBORGMANN

democracy with the shared and sometimes coercive understandingsany

prosperoussociety requires.The commodity side marks out the realm of
choice and discretion that is the pride of liberal democracy. Technology
in turncan prosperwithout the threatof indifference and subversiononly
if most everyone is given a stake in it, and it has dependedon democracy
so to be appropriated.
If we agree to call the amalgam of modern technology and liberal
democracy "technocracy,"we can see that the democratic aspect of the
development of technocracy is much more evident to us than the tech-
nological side. This is due to the intellectuals' fateful disdain of the
materialculture. At any rate, the developmentof liberal democracy was a
difficult and gradual process, reversed in places by fascist interludes.lO
Nowhere has it ever proceeded beyond the requirementsof technocracy,
and never has it led to genuine social justice. Instead it has resulted in a
complex distributionof power and privilege. The egalitarianside of this
arrangementgives everyone individually mobility and the right to private
property and collectively the possibility to nudge through elections the
ship of state in this direction or that. On the selective side, it favors the
members of families commanding cultural and financial capital, and it
greatly rewards those endowed with aggressive intelligence. Modern
technocracycame to maturityin the postwarWesterndemocracies, and it
turnedout to be enormouslyproductiveand affluent.
In the Soviet Union, the initial and reasonablyeffective Leninist union
of technology and Communism failed to evolve into a technocracy.11
InsteadStalin aggravatedthe laborious and regimentedside of technology
and extended its aggressive universalism into an oppressive
totalitarianism.The pall of this degenerate version of technology and
polity spread over the entire Communist world. At length, technology
without the nourishment of democracy began to languish. Central
planning, as a design formulatedand promulgatedin rules and instruc-
tions, inevitably was an impoverishedand ambiguous guide to social and
economic action. And central planning, as the imposition by a cadre of
the party on the disfranchised populace, met with incomprehensionor
hostility. Even so, the requirementsof survival and the allure of technol-
ogy sustained a measure of devotion to industrialprogress, led to minor
attemptsat creatinga more hospitabletechnological setting, and produced
occasional improvementsof performance.
The achievementsof the Communisteconomies on the commodity side
of technology, i.e., in leisure and consumption, were respectable in a
 INTRODUCfION 5

diachronic view. By the seventies and eighties, people on the average

were much better housed, fed, and educated, they were in better health
and had more free time and consumergoods than fifty years ago. But seen
synchronicallywith the affluence of their Westernneighbors,theirlot was
austere and shabby, and the attempts at sealing off the invidious news
from across the borders failed. Envy of Western prosperity and
resentmentof Communistbungling grew.
But even if the Communist economies had been free of damning
comparisons on the commodity side, the machinery side of production
and administration would have run into disastrous difficulties. The
Eastern command economies had brought the aggressiveness and
universalismof early modem technology to catastrophicconclusions. The
insistence on universal planning and direction had led to wasteful and
shoddy production.To sustain even such inferiorperformancein the face
of social indifference, it had become necessary to exploit the naturaland
industrialenvironmentso aggressively that it was broughtto the brink of
destruction.
The Western democratic economies had, by the late 1980s, not only
achieved mature and prosperousmodern technocracies;they had already
begun to outgrow modern technology and to move into the postmodern
phase. The aggressive realism of modem technocracyturnedout to be a
self-limiting enterprise. Not only does the forceful exploitation of
resources eventually come to the limit of what nature can yield in raw
materialsand absorb in wastes. More important,the abundantproduction
of goods leads to the saturationof markets.Hence technological progress
seeks less tangible fields of activity and turns to the processing of
information and the providing of services. And in a market already
crowded with goods, it searches for smaller openings, niches, and even
crevices to insert its products in. The flexible specialization needed to
accomplish this task is incompatible with the ways of the gigantic and
rigid corporation.The latter must yield to the small, mobile, and expert
postmodern firm or transform itself into a more decentralized and
adaptableenterprise.12
Thus the aggressive realism and methodical universalism of modern
technology are replacedby informationprocessing and flexible specializa-
tion. To postmodern technology there corresponds a postmodern tech-
nocracy, i.e., a specifically postmodern appropriationof technology.
One's relationto technology is both more intimate and more relaxed. It is
more intimate because the infrastructureof technological customs and
6 ALBERTBORGMANN

devices is now so thick and complex that it no longer needs the rigor and
discipline of large corporatestructures.To communicateand cooperatein
sophisticatedand patternedways is now second natureto all who have the
franchise in technology. Computers, networks, and transportationlinks
facilitate informedcooperationand are furtherrefined by it. An emerging
hyperintelligenceenvelops and integrateseveryone.13 At the same time,
postmoderntechnology provides more mobility and discretion. Affluence
and sophisticationhave produced abundanceand redundancy.There are
abundantpossibilities of residence, enterprise, education, and employ-
ment. And in the event of failure, redundancyallows one to fall back on a
second chance, another supplier, a further communications link. To be
sure, the postmodern economy is not endlessly forgiving. It rewards
reliable cooperation. But failure of accommodation or luck is not
forbiddinglypunished.
Postmodern technocracy has made its peace with the resistance of
physical reality. It advances not by way of more blasting and damming,
more mining and smelting, but by using sophisticated information to
create intangible consumer goods and to produce tangible goods more
efficiently. Having given up on materialresistance,it pours its energy into
the hyperactive extension and refinement of informationstructures.The
latter constitute a novel kind of reality, richer, more pliable and brilliant
than the dark, recalcitrant,and severe things of tangible reality. Hyper-
reality is a fitting term for this new realm.14 It is a descendantof technol-
ogy and reflects the technological pattern,being divided into an instru-
ment and a final half. Instrumental hyperreality consists of software and
data-bases that allow us to represent and manipulate production and
administration.Final hyperrealitycomprises the realm of the alluring and
disposable experiences that electronics and media technology have
opened up for us.
What resistance postmodernhyperactivitymeets in its advancementof
hyperreality is of a cultural rather than tangible sort, consisting of
constraintsof custom, tradition,and language. Accordingly, the emerging
postmodern technocracy of Western Europe is now in the process of
removing these obstacles. By 1992 they will yield to an Economic and
MonetaryUnion with a common currencyand a common language, viz.,
English.
While in Eastern Europe a once encompassing but fundamentally
misguided and mishandled modem economy is breaking into bits and
pieces, we see in Western Europe the coalescence of an all-enveloping
 INTRODUCfION 7

postmodern or rather hypermoderntechnology and technocracy. Every

indication testifies to the overpowering allure of hypermodern tech-
nocracy.I5 The democratic European countries, so far unaffiliated with
the Economic Community, are seeking admission.I6 And so would the
EasternEuropeancountriesif they were in a position to do so. To become
eligible, however, they must learn democracyand appropriatetechnology.
This requiresthem to take the lessons Stalin had deprived them of. They
have to returnto the point where a technological elite teaches them and
gradually shares with them competence in running the machinery of a
technocracy.Political, economic, and technical experts from the West are
called in and consulted with touching docility. There are bitter struggles
to build up an indigenous technological elite from the ranks of formerly
dissident intellectuals and from the experienced, if tainted, nomenkla-
turaP And so far, the people have been patient in suffering the disloca-
tions and deprivationthat accompanythis painful learning.
What the Communistcountriesdid teach their people are technological
microskills, literacy, numeracy, scientific competence, and craft skills.
What is sorely lacking are the technological macroskills, the
competencies of commercial research and development, of rationalizing
production, organizing commerce, handling financial transactions,
managing employees.I8 There are neither the institutions nor the habits
wherein these competencies are realized. Technocracy is a complex and
unified fabric. There is no loom in EasternEurope that could serve as a
framework to join the various strands of technocracy in an orderly
fashion. To build up a technocracyunderEasternEuropeanconditions is
like weaving a textureby intertwiningthreadson the floor.
All these difficulties are aggravatedby the fact that EasternEurope is
caught in the friction between modem and postmoderntechnocracy. The
system and the yields of modem technocracyare most appropriateto the
Eastern European economies, the system because it is closest to the
technology that they know, the yields because there is a penned up
demand in Eastern Europe for the modem devices and appliances that
have already saturatedWestern markets. Yet the open country and the
untappedresources that once provided fertile fields for modem technol-
ogy and technocracyhave been laid waste in EasternEurope.And merely
modem cars, television sets, and telephones not only appearawkwardand
poor compared with their sleek and sophisticated postmodern siblings;
they also fit poorly with the postmodern setting of the West to which
everyone and everything aspires and seeks to adhere. The ugly little
8 ALBERTBORGMANN

wheezing, creeping, polluting East German Trabantcar has become the

symbol of modernshabbiness.
The typical postmodernfirm, small in size, potent in expertise, flexible
in operation, and specialized in production seeks locations where the
workforce is skilled, the quality of life is high, and first rate academic
institutionsare near. EasternEurope meets only the first of these require-
ments. Hence no one will move his or her firm from the West to the East.
The prospects for economic prosperityin EasternEurope are bleak. Even
East Germany, which comparedwith EasternEurope is favored over the
Eastern European countries with every conceivable advantage, will
remain poor and desolate for decades.19 Not even the desperatehope for
salvation through a powerful regime is available. One thing the East
Europeanswill not forget is the failure of central and dictatorialgovern-
ment. Nor is there hope in any endeavorto surrounda national economy
with protective barriers that would permit it to recover slowly and
peacefully. It was precisely the relative insulation from the global
economy that led to cancerous developments in Eastern Europe.20 The
only resources the East Europeanspossess are technological microskills
and patience. And the only help from Western Europe that can be relied
upon will be measures that are consistent with containing the miseries of
Eastern Europe, viz., measures to curtail and remedy pollution and
measures to keep the restless populationin place.21 For at least a decade
people in Eastern Europe will have to struggle bitterly in relative
deprivation.
What are the wider implications that emerge from these reflections?
We are confronted with the global triumph of technology, i.e., with a
form of life that secures ever more refined consumption in an order of
invidious inequality. Security, consumption, and inequality are the
distinctive traitsof this system. Of these, consumptionis centraland most
difficult to grasp and in this sense most distressing. Social theorists have
avoided it and concentratedtheir dissatisfaction with technocracy on the
technocraticfailure to provide security and justice.
As long as technology was less than widely and fully embraced, the
deficiencies of technology proved morally invigoratingfor people of high
aspirationwho had essentially given up on culture and religion and were
reluctant to take on consumption. The lack of political and ecological
security empowered and inspired them to stirring moral sermons. If the
nuclear threat was not met, nothing else much mattered. It had to be
opposed above all. Ifthe populationbomb was not defused, we would by
 INTRODUCTION 9

the year 2,000 be reducedto mining the desertedhigh rise buildings of the
metropolitan cities for resources. For conservatives, the crucial issue
before the late eighties was to mobilize the free world against the injustice
of Communism. For liberals the last best hope in their critique of the
establishmentwas some sort of Marxism. Communism was but a crude
approximationof what they hoped for, but it was at least that. Now the
nuclear threat has lifted. The population question has become ambigu-
ous.22 Resources are more abundantthan ever.23 And the people in the
once Communist countries, who, the liberals thought, had taken a
measure of pride in what egalitarianismthey had, have sacrificed austere
equality to unequal prosperity wherever they have had a chance.24 The
conservativespronouncethemselves vindicatedand exhaustedboth.
The evaporationof these once bracing moral conceits has revealed the
depressing culturaland ethical vacuity of our time. All voices have been
stilled or muffled except those of the economists. Consider once more
Germany. In the late seventies and early eighties there was a notion
among West German intellectuals that East Germanymight be the more
real Germany, less willing to prostitute its culture for Americanized
consumption, more devoted to literatureand music, to inwardness and a
sense of duty for duty's sake. Surely some of the West Germanjubilations
at the collapse of the Wall sprang from a hope for a deeper national
wholeness and health, a recovery of the towns where Luther, Bach, and
Goethe had resided, a reawakening and restorationof the anaesthetized
and amputatedcapital, reintegrationof Prussianenlightenmentand civic
dedication.
Plausibly, the Germanshave exercised restrainton theirdeeperfeelings
not to arouse suspicion of a chauvinist recrudescence.Unhappily, at any
rate, economic concerns have entirely flooded the area that was kept free
of nationalist zeal. Reunification has devolved to an entirely economic
problem.Economics is the linguafrancaof technology and technocracy.
If from the Europeandevelopments we look to the United States, the
American situation is fundamentallymore hopeful in being superficially
more desolate. We were once the exemplar of modern technocracy,
unequalledin technological and democratic vigor. And we are finding it
extremely difficult, even distasteful, to move on to the postmodernphase
of technocracy.There is much sullenness and resentmentof the Japanese
and Europeanupstarts who are about to push us off the top of the hill.
There is no lack of admonitions that we bestir ourselves to hyperactive
exertion. And many of our leading professionals are heeding the call. But
10 ALBERTBORGMANN

they are often a mounted vanguardwithout the supportof foot soldiers.

The ideologists on the right have lost their fervor and those on the left
their confidence. Thus we have a grace period. Neither are we caught in
the misery of devastated modem technology as the East Europeansare,
nor are we rushingheadlong towardhypermoderntechnology the way the
West Europeansand the Japanese are. Thus we have the opportunityto
settle for a calmerand more graceful postmodernworld.

UniversityofMontana

NOTES

I For convenience, I will stipulatethe fonner iron curtainas the dividing line between
Eastern and Western Europe. As will appearfrom the context, "WesternEurope"is
sometimes used in the sense of EuropeanEconomic Community.
2 Quoted in LawrenceWeschler, "Shock,"New Yorker,10 December 1990, p. 127.
3 StatisticalAbstractof the United States 1990, p. 840.
4 John Kenneth Galbraith, The New Industrial State (Boston: Houghton Mifflin,
1967), pp. 107-108 and 389-391.
5 Robert L. Heilbroner,An Inquiry into the Human Prospect, 2nd ed. (New York:
Norton, 1980; original, 1974), pp. 77-111.
6 Ibid., p. 190.
7 Statistical Abstract,p. 841.
8 Marlise Simons, "EuropeansBegin to Calculate the Price of Pollution,"New York
Times, 9 December 1991, section IV, p. 3.
9 "Wirhaben alles verloren,"Spiegel 10 December 1990, pp. 134-152. Simon Head,
"TheEast GennanDisaster,"New YorkReviewofBooks, 17 January1991, pp. 41-44.
10 Dankwart A. Rustow, "Democracy: A Global Revolution?" Foreign Affairs 69
(Fall 1990): 82-86.
11 It is naively utopianon Keith Tester'spartto blame Lenin for his failure to involve
the people in the establishmentof the new order, and it is desperatelyutopian to warn
Western technocrats that they would ignore the lesson of Lenin's "failure"at their
peril. See Keith Tester, "The Uses of Error: The Collapse of 'Really Existing
Socialism'," Telos, no. 83 (Spring 1990): 151-161. See to the contrary Robert
Heilbroner,"TheTriumphof Capitalism,"New Yorker,23 January1989, pp. 98-109.
12 Michael J. Piore and Charles F. Sabel, The Second IndustrialDivide (New York:
Basic Books, 1984).
13 George Bugliarello, "TowardHyperintelligence,"Knowledge: Creation. Diffusion.
Utilization 10 (1988): 67-89.
14 Umberto Eco, Travels in Hyperreality, trans. H. William Weaver (San Diego:
Harcourt,1986).
IS Rustow, "Democracy,"p. 80, Serge Schemann, "GennansFear Becoming Eastern
Europe'sKeeper,"New YorkTimes, 9 December 1990, section IV, pp. 1 and 3.
16 Rustow, "Democracy,"p. 90.
 INTRODUCTION 11

17 Ibid., pp. 89-90. Weschler, "Shock," pp. 121-122. Timothy Garton Ash,
"Germanyat the Frontier,"New YorkReviewofBooks, 17 January1991, p. 21.
18 Weschler, "Shock,"pp. 96-120.
19 Head, "East-German Disaster,"pp. 41-44.
20 Rustow, "Democracy,"pp. 76-79.
21 Ash, "Germanyat the Frontier,"p. 22.
22 JonathanLieberson, "Too Many People?" New York Review of Books, 26 June
1986, pp. 36-42. Julian L. Simon, "The Unreported Revolution in Population
Economics,"Public Interest, no. 101 (Fall 1990): 89-100.
23 John Tierney, "Bettingthe Planet,"New YorkTimes Magazine, 2 December 1990,
pp. 52-53 and 78-81.
24 Rustow, "Democracy,"p. 80. Weschler, "Shock," p. 93. Ash, "Germanyat the
Frontier,"p. 21.
 PART I

SYMPOSIUMON IVAN ILLICH

 LEONARDI. WAKS

IVAN ILLICH'SPHILOSOPHY
OF TECHNOLOGY:INTRODUCTION

Ivan Illich - philosopher,historian,educator,and social critic - was born

in Vienna, Austria, on September4, 1926. In the Fall term of 1990, the
Penn State Science, Technology, and Society Program organized a
symposium on Illich's thought to celebratehis fifth year as our colleague
and in anticipationof his sixty-fifth birthdayin 1991. RustumRoy put the
idea in motion by urging several members of the STS faculty and invited
guests to prepareinformal talkson the key books in the Illich corpus and
the majorthemes explored in them.
Lee Hoinacki, long-time Illich associate and a visiting professor,
agreed to chair the meetings with logistical assistance from Richard
Dietrich. Carl Mitcham, who had succeeded Roy as acting program
directorat the beginning of the term, helped to select topics and speakers.
Barbara Duden, whose prodding had led Illich to prepare his most
controversialbook, Gender (1982), gave a talk on the backgroundand
reception of that work. Brian Winston, Dean of Penn State's School of
Communications, gave an equally provocative talk on ABC: The Al-
phabetization of the Popular Mind (co-authored with Barry Sanders,
1988). Illich, as busy and restless as always, droppedin from time to time
to hector the participants, but did not formally attend symposium
sessions.
Four talks addressed Illich's philosophy of technology directly, and
after the symposium Mitcham urged me to coax the authors to convert
these into articles for this volume in the Philosophy and Technology
series. Each of these selects a text, considers its reception upon publica-
tion, then provides a re-readingand considers its contemporaryrelevance.
Mitchambegins with Tools For Conviviality(1973), the work in which
Illich lays out most explicitly his program: providing a philosophical
"epilog"for the industrialera. For Mitcham, the overlooked significance
of this foundational book is its sustained argument for tools as an
independentvariable in human affairs -a variable that demands focused
moral and political reflection.

15
Paul T. Durbin (ed.), Europe, America,and Technology:Philosophical Perspectives, 15-16.
© 1991 KluwerAcademicPublishers.
16 LEONARD J. WAKS

I then turn back to the book which established Illich's notoriety,

Deschooling Society (1971). This is a keystone work in his philosophy of
technology because for Illich, the system of schools is both a paradigmof
industrial socio-technical systems and the "most insidious" of them all,
because it holds all the other manipulativeinstitutions in place. I provide
a reading of the text in light of positions Illich developed in later works,
and then weigh some objections which scholars have made against
Illich's methods and his social ideals.
RobertProctor,a historianof biology and bio-ethical issues, focuses on
Medical Nemesis (1976), which among all of Illich's books has probably
received the fairest considerationfrom the professional group it attacked.
Proctorobserves the impact that Medical Nemesis had on the health-care
dialogue, and then reviews and re-evaluates its central distinctions,
assertions, and arguments.
Finally, political scientist LarrySpence looks at H20 and the Watersof
Forgetfulness (1985), a late work which has received little attentionfrom
scholars. Spence asks why social scientists have difficulties with Illich.
He concludes that Illich's historical-humanistmethods are intended to
restore the very historical specificity which social scientists seek to
eliminate from their analyses. For purposes of prediction and control,
social scientists seek to assimilate past situations to presentproblems and
potential solutions in the future. To do this they must eliminate precisely
that in the past which makes it different from the present. Illich, for his
radically differentpurposeof elucidatingthe total (past-present)situation,
focuses on the very data obscuredby social scientific analysis.
A volume on Ivan Illich, based in part on the 1990 symposium, is
planned, with Roy as editor. Different versions of the papers printedhere
are expected to be included in that volume.

The PennsylvaniaState University

 CARL MITCHAM

TOOLSFOR CONVIVIALITY:
ARGUMENT, INSIGHT,INFLUENCE

Ivan Illich is the author of more than ten books during the last twenty
years publishedin over a dozen languages. In their diversity these works
can appear to defy thematic unity. Their focus seems variously to be
pastoral theology, education, development policy, medicine, economics,
urban planning, gender, literacy. What follows is an exercise in taking
one of these books, Tools for Conviviality, as central to the Illich corpus
as capable of benefiting from a detailed interpretiveanalysis.1
The rationalefor focusing on Tools for Convivialitycan be articulated
as follows: Illich's first books which are not simply collections of
previously published essays are Deschooling Society (1971), Tools for
Conviviality (1973), Energy and Equity (1974), and Medical Nemesis
(1976). The next monographdoes not appearuntil six years later, with the
publicationof Gender (1982). The initial four monographsthus constitute
a kind of founding set, circumscribedby time. It is also the case that
among these books the first, third,and fourth are case studies of particular
problems - that is, schools, transportation,and medicine - with the third
being more an extended essay than a monograph.2 Only the second, Tools
for Conviviality,is a general analysis. It is, moreover,a volume that refers
back to preceding work and anticipateswork still to come. It is the book
to which Illich makes the most explicit references in later work.3 Its
centrality is not only temporal but substantial,thus calling for extended
considerationof its argument.

1. ARGUMENT

The argumentof any text is situated within an expository structure.Tools

for Conviviality is composed of five chapters. The central and longest is
chapter 3, "The Multiple Balance." This is, however, divided into six
numberedand named sections. The largest undividedsection in the text is
chapter 2, "Convivial Reconstruction."Chapter2 consists of thirty-six
pages, chapter 3 of thirty-eight. No other chapter is more than sixteen

17
Paul T. Durbin (ed.), Europe, America,and Technology:Philosophical Perspectives, 17-56.
© 1991 KluwerAcademicPublishers.
18 CARL MITCHAM

pages in length. A cursory inspection of the overt features of the book

thus suggests that these two chapters consitute, in different ways,
complementarycenters.
Exactly how the center is a center is, however, preparedby a begin-
ning. Precedingthe first chapterare sections entitled"Acknowledgments"
and "Introduction."The acknowledgmentsare extensive and mention by
name over fifty persons from countries in Europeand North, Central,and
South America. The Center for InterculturalDocumentation(CIDOC) is
also explicitly credited. It is clear from the acknowledgmentsthat this is
to some extent a cooperative text or a text that grows out of cooperative
effort.
The introductionbegins by defining this cooperative text as part of a
larger work-in-progress,"an epilog to the industrialage" (p. xxi). Illich
says that he wants "to trace the changes in language, myth, ritual and law
which took place in the currentepoch" (p. xxi). Illich thus identifies his
work with the owl of Minervataking wing at the end of the day. But Illich
also immediately declares that he wants "to show that two thirds of
mankind still can avoid passing through the industrialage, by choosing
right now a post-industrialbalance in their mode of productionwhich the
hyperindustrialnations will be forced to adopt as an alternativeto chaos"
(p. xxi). Not only is Illich looking back with the owl of Minerva, he is
looking forwardwith the cock of Athena.
The introductionfurthermentions how this book is partof a publishing
series entitled "World Perspectives" edited by Ruth Nanda Anshen.
Deschooling Society was in the same series.4 To emphasize the connec-
tion, Illich summarizes three conclusions of CIDOC research that are
presented in that previous text. But, he suggests, the conclusions of
Deschooling Society can be generalized - which is thus evidently the
function of the presenteffort.
The most general conception to be found in Deschooling Society is a
distinction between what are termed "right manipulative" and "left
convivial" institutions.This distinction, which is developed in the central
chapter of his first monograph, provides the title of the second
monograph.
As an initial cut at the basic generalizationof the presenttext, however,
Illich puts forth the thesis that industrial growth in both goods and
services can, up to a certain level, be beneficial, although afterward
further expansion readily becomes detrimental. This foreshadows the
explicit argument of the first chapter, a case study of how medicine
 ARGUMENT,INSIGHT,INFLUENCE
TOOLSFOR CONVIVIAUTY: 19

illustrates these two turning points. His basic interest, however, is "a
generaltheory of industrialization"(p. xxiii) that would assess the relation
between human beings and tools in a multidimensionalframework.This,
it will tum out, foreshadows the concerns of chapters2 and 3, the already
suggested centralchapters.
At the end of the introductionIllich offers a comment on his title and
use of the term "convivial"or "conviviality."In an italicized sentence he
writes that "a society, in which modern technologies serve politically
interrelatedindividualsrather than managers, [he will] call convivial"(p.
xxiv). He admits this is a potentially misleading term, but chooses it as a
challenge to thought, and associates it with self-limiting discipline and
austerity in the classical sense of Aristotle and Aquinas. As he says,
"Austerityis a virtue which does not exclude enjoyments but only those
which are destructive of personal relatedness" (p. xxv). Conviviality
names that disciplined being-with-othersexpressed through serious but
playful enjoyment.
Some self-limitation is necessary for living with (Latin con + vivo)
others, for friendshipand its playful engagements. Austerityis that virtue
which is necessary to delimit or restrict irrelevantelements and distrac-
tions that can undermine the play which is constitutive of and makes
possible pleasurablebeing togetherwith others. The sexual connotationof
the word "tool"- and the need for active but sparing use of the male
organ if "conviviality"is to be maintained- is not unrelatedto Illich's
fundamental argument. It will be further suggested that tools for con-
viviality must be tools of conviviality; conviviality cannot be accidentally
superimposed on just any tools by the intentions of users or agents.
Finally, conviviality has implications not only for living with other
persons, but also (and even) for living with other tools. Some tools inhibit
not only certain human relationships but also relationships with other
kinds of tools. Othernessin Illich's context includes more than persons.
At this point Illich introduces one of only two footnotes in his text, a
reference to Hugo Rahner'sMan at Play. (Hugo is the brother of the
influentialCatholic theologian KarlRahner.)
The fIrst chapter,"Two Watersheds,"uses the example of medicine, an
example that will be developed at much greaterlength and with copious
footnotes in Illich's subsequent book, Medical Nemesis. The "two
watersheds" argument can be stated succinctly as follows. The first
"watershed"or threshold in medicine occurred around 1913, when a
diseased patient began to have a better than even chance that a profes-
20 CARL MITCHAM

sional physician would be able to provide effective treatment.The second

threshold occurred during the mid-1950s, when modern professionalized
medicine began to cause as well as cure disease.
The rise of iatrogenic illness to prominence in medical care creates a
new kind of medicine. From this point on medicine will spend increasing
time dealing with problems it causes - from staph infections caused by
residence in hospitals, and bacilli which have become immune to sulfa
drugs or first generation antibiotics, to the mistakes or complications of
surgery and debilitating therapies. Indeed, it is possible that more than
fifty percent of the effort in modern medicine is now devoted to dealing
with problems or illnesses that would not exist if modern medicine itself
did not exist. Certainly the problem of testing and evaluating medical
procedures (both pharmacological and technological) has become an
increasingconcern of the medical community.5
At the conclusion of chapter 1, Illich states that the two watersheds
phenomenon is not limited to high-tech medicine, but inherent and
manifest in many branches of modern technology. Moreover,
"development"beyond the second thresholddepends on a combinationof
ideological inertia with conceptual transformationsthat are typical of
social institutions. Insistence that, since previous technical change has
been beneficial, furthertechnical change should be too, is reinforced by
subtle re-definitionsof goals in technical terms dependenton professional
expertise.
At first new knowledge is applied to the solution of a clearly stated problem and
scientific measuring sticks are applied to account for the new efficiency. But at a
second point the progress demonstrated in a previous achievement is used as a
rationalefor the exploitation of society as a whole in the service of a value which is
determined and constantly revised by an element of society, by one of its self-
certifying professionalelites (p. 7).
It is technical imperatives of professionalized medicine, not the health
care needs of the general public, that have, since the mid-1950s, driven
the course of medical change through coronary bypass operations and
hysterectomies, computerized tomography, nuclear magnetic resonance,
and positron emission tomography scanners, organ transplants,artificial
hearts and so on. It is professional scientists and engineers who argued in
the late 1940s for establishmentof the National Science Foundationas a
means for the governmental support of science and technology
independentof military or political supervision- for the good of society,
of course. It is similar self-certifying professional elites who defend the
 ARGUMENT, INSIGHT,INFLUENCE
TOOLSFOR CONVIVIALITY: 21

HumanGenome Projectand the superconductingsupercollider.

This first chaptersets the stage for the general issue to be addressedby
the remainder of the book: how to avoid or respond to the second
threshold, after which technology begins to be less unambiguously
effective in meeting basic human needs. The simple answer is that
somehow technological development must be limited or altered in its
direction. The "more"ideology - more technology, more science, more
political management, even more infonnation and interdisciplinary
research- is not the solution.
Any attemptto alter a social or technological process will include one
or both of two elements: the carrot and the stick. Chapter2, "Convivial
Reconstruction,"is (as it were) the carrot of imaginative alternative
possibilities. Chapter 3, "The Multiple Balance," presents the stick of
crisis or necessity that will force us to actualize these possibilities.
Chapters 2 and 3 thus provide a kind of systole and diastole of Illich's
argument.
This systole-diastole characterof the argumentis repeatedin foreshor-
tened fonn by chapters 4, "Recovery,"and 5, "Political Inversion."The
former articulatesthe ideals behind three obstacles to the development of
a politics of tools; the latter, how these obstacles can be overcome or how
a politics of tools might be forced upon us. Following an introductioninto
the heart of Illich's argument,there is a kind of four-chamberedbeat that
takes us throughit, and then places us back in the body of our own lives.
The first beat of this four-chamberedheart is chapter2. As the first, it
is also, and in this sense, the most important;it sets the rhythmfor all that
follows.
Chapter2, with two untitledbreaks in its text, can be divided into seven
sections. The first three sections fill sixteen pages and are punctuatedby a
break; the next three sections again fill sixteen pages, punctuatedby a
second break;the last section covers four pages.
In the first or introductorysection of four pages, it is emphasized that
the essence of what is needed is a new conception or understandingof
tools and, indeed, new kinds of tools. It is this new understandingor
perspective on tools, and the attemptto identify the new kinds of tools to
which this understandingleads, which is the theme of chapter 2 - and,
indeed, of the book.
The key issue for Illich is that people "need new tools to work with
rather than new tools that 'work' for them" (p. 10). The distinctive
characterof modem technology is its tendency to become progressively
22 CARL MITCHAM

independentof sustained human engagement. "People need not only to

obtain things, they need above all the freedom to make things among
which they can live, to give shape to them according to their own taste
and to put them to use in caring for and about others"(p. 11). To procure
for themselves these new kinds of tools, there must be developed a new
politics. This new politics of tools
would aim principally to exclude the design of artifacts ... that are obstacles to the
exercise of ... personal freedom. Such politics would limit the scope of tools as
demanded by the protectionof three values: survival, justice, and self-defined work
(p.13).

Illich notes, in passing, that these ideals may well be violated temporarily
in any historical transition from the present politics of tools which
promotes the expansive and virtually unlimited development of what
might be termed autonomous tools to a more austere conviviality of
engagementtools.
In a second four-page section Illich itemizes six issues he will not
address in the discussion that follows. He will (1) not provide utopian
solutions, (2) nor a manual for action, (3) nor focus on the characterof
users. He will (4) not sketch political tactics or strategies, (5) nor detail
the applications of distributive and participatoryjustice. He (6) admits
that a convivial society will include some inequality, and that modem
convivial tools "wouldbe incomparablymore efficient than primitive and
more widely distributedthan industrial [machines]"(p. 17). Illich is not
an egalitarian democrat, but neither is he the proponent of a romantic
returnto preindustriallife simply construed.
Having specified what the focus is not, Illich undertakesa transitionto
his primarytheme, which he calls the specification of "negative design
criteriafor technological devices" (p. 18). Although it is such criteriathat
must ground any politics of the limitation - or any politically imple-
mented delimiting - of tools, this is not, he warns, a thesis which is easy
to broach or appreciate.Industrializeddisengagement from tools, not to
mention the promotion by educational institutions of the political
ideology of the expansion of autonomoustools, clouds the common mind.
Thereare implicit references,once again, to Deschooling Society.
With this transitionalwarning Illich turns in the third section to the
crucial argumentof his text. (This third section of six pages constitutes
the most sustained and concentratedpassage in the whole book.) Illich
begins by defining a tool "broadly enough to include not only simple
 TOOLSFOR CONVNJALfTY:
ARGUMENT,INSIGHT,INFLUENCE 23

hardware such as drills, pots, syringes, brooms, building elements, or

motors, [along with] large machines like cars or power stations, [but also]
productive institutions such as factories ... and productive systems for
intangible commodities such as those which produce 'education,'
'health,' 'knowledge,' or 'decisions'" (p. 20). His concept of tool
subsumes "into one category all rationally designed devices, be they
artifactsor rules, codes or operators,and [distinguishes] all these planned
and engineered instrumentalitiesfrom [those which] in any given culture
are not deemed to be subject to rationalization"(pp. 20-21). A tool is any
explicitly articulatedrationalstructure,whethermaterialor cultural.
Among this broad spectrumof tools, what kinds satisfy the criterionof
conviviality?The common idea is thattools in this broadsense are able to
be used to promoteconviviality or non-conviviality- or any other ends -
depending on end-user intentions and the social processes within which
they function. The issue is primarilyone of intentionor use, individual or
communal.
But according to what Illich has already said, his "subjectis tools and
not intentions"(p. 14). He wants to "focus on the structureof tools, not on
the characterstructureof their users" (p. 15). Although it is true that "an
individualrelates himself in action to his society throughthe use of tools
that he actively masters,"it is also the case that "he is passively acted
upon"by his tools and that "the shape of the tool [can determine]his own
self-image" (p. 21).
The use of industrialtools [for instance] stamps in an identical way the landscapeof
cities. ... Highways, hospital wards, classrooms, office buildings, apartments,and
stores look everywhere the same. Identical tools also promotethe developmentof the
same charactertypes. Policemen in patrol cars or accountantsat computerslook and
act alike all over the world, while their poor cousins using nightstick or pen are
differentfrom region to region (p. 15).

Two points are to be noted here. One is that technologies make or

transformusers as much as makersor users transformtechnologies or the
world. The otheris that some technologies (namely, moderntechnologies)
homogenize their world and their users, whereas others (traditional
technologies) leave natural diversities intact. This means that "the
progressive homogenization of personalities and personal relationships
cannot be stemmed without a retooling of society" (p. 15). "Convivial
tools are those which give each person who uses them the greatest
opportunityto enrich the environmentwith the fruits of his or her vision"
(p.21).
24 CARL MITCHAM

To consider this principle more clearly in relation to the structureof

tools, Illich begins by distinguishing hand tools from power tools. The
hand tool uses human metabolic energy, the human sensory organs, and
the human mind in orderto performspecific tasks which are not strongly
determinedin advance. The hammer, for example, depends on muscular
energy from the arm and the sensorimotorintelligence of internalbalance,
proprioception,and hand-eye coordinationto performa diversity of tasks:
nailing and pulling nails in timber, planks, drywall, shingles, etc., while
constructinghouses, barns,crates, or furniture.
By contrast, the power tool uses non-humanenergy, that is, is moved
more or less by energy from outside the human body: from domesticated
animals, wind or water, heat and steam, internal combustion engines, or
electricity. Human engagement with an externally powered tool tends to
be limited to hand-eye coordinationfor the performanceof increasingly
predeterminedand specialized functions. There is one kind of nail gun for
drywall, anotherfor shingles, with neitherbeing interchangeableor usable
for fastening timberor planking.
As the power tool is transformedinto the machine, the human being
becomes not so much the user as an operatoror monitor. Already with
draft animals attached to plows, for instance, users have to do more
watching of what is going on than if they were hoeing or raking, but they
still have to take care of living "energy sources" which also require
guidance operating through multiple sensorimotor engagements
(sensorimotorcoordinationof hand-eye, eye-sound, sound-handand feet,
body shifts, etc.). In the long multi-phased trajectoryfrom horse-drawn
plow to airplane, human guidance is made increasingly de-incarnated,
dependentmore and more on eye interpretationof analogical and digital
gauges, and thus progressively dependent on technical or professional
training.
Tools foster conviviality to the textent to which they can be easily used, by anybody,
as often or as seldom as desired, for the accomplishmentof a purpose chosen by the
user. The use of such tools by one person does not restrainanotherfrom using them
equally. They do not requireprevious certificationof the users (p. 22).
Although hand tools much more readily than machines lend themselves to
convivial use, "the distinction between convivial and manipulatorytools
is independent of the level of technology of the tool" (p. 22). The
telephone system, for instance, is an electronic tool for conviviality -
indeed, it is an institutional tool for conviviality. But as an originally
 ARGUMENT, INSIGHT,INFLUENCE
TOOLSFOR CONVIVIALITY: 25

convivial institution "moves toward its second watershed [it] tends to

become highly manipulative" (p. 23), that is, to require specialized
knowledge or professional certification, to impose its own "intentions"
(as it were), to be useable only at a cost to someone else. As the system
for electronic communication moves from telephone to radio to
television, access to active usability is replaced by passive consumption
and manipulativeprogrammingunderthe directionof professionalelites.
Nevertheless, "it is a mistake to believe that all large tools and all
centralized production would have to be excluded from a convivial
society" (p. 23). "The criteria of conviviality are to be considered as
guidelines to the continuousprocess by which a society'S membersdefine
their liberty" (p. 24). There are no purely manipulative or convivial
societies. The crucial issue for citizens living within technological society
is to consider the balance between convivial and manipulativetools, to
admit the existence of the latter, and to strive to foster and protectthem.
Not only is Illich no preindustrialromantic,he is no purist.
Although Illich does not make the historical reference, his inspiration
derives from the same insight as that of the early 19th century Luddites,
and he carries on a running argumentwith the inadequacies of counter-
Luddite or socialist commitments. Socialists and Marxists of all varieties
ignore "the one issue that counts: careful analysis of the basic structureof
tools" (p. 25), and emphasize instead transformationsin the structureof
ownership.The real issue
is not the juridicalownershipof tools, but ratherthe discovery of the characteristicsof
some tools which make it impossible for anybody to "own" them. The concept of
ownership cannot be applied to a tool that cannot be controlled. The issue ... is what
tools can be controlledin the public interest. ... Certaintools are destructiveno matter
who owns them, whether it be the Mafia, stockholders, a foreign company, the state,
or even a workers'commune (pp. 22-26).

At this point Illich catches his breathand punctuateshis argumentwith a

breakin the text.
When Illich resumes his discourse, he does so with a four-page analysis
of the relation between energy input and the equitable or just distribution
and use of tools. In premodern or hand tool-dependent societies, "to
control more power than others [a person] had to lord it over [others]"(p.
28). Human energy expended in the act of guidance is not only progres-
sively dwarfed by the energy expended through the machine itself, but
coordinate with the creation of power tools utilizing non-humansources
of energy there is introducedinto the social fabric a radical inequality of
26 CARL MITCHAM

energy access. The argumentof this section, as repeatedand elaboratedat

other points in the text (e.g., in chapter3, sections 4 and 6), is rephrased
as the extended essay, Energy and Equity.
There follows a five-page consideration of ancient and modem
conceptions of work. A sixth section provides seven pages of examples of
convivial reconstructionin medicine, in transportation,and in housing.
Following a second break, a four-page reprise on justice and tools
concludes the argument.Illich states, in words reminiscentof John Stuart
Mill, that "a just society [is] one in which liberty for one person is
constrained only by the demands created by equal liberty for another"
(p. 41).6 Some tools or arrangementsof tools have an inherenttendency
to interferewith or to restrictthe liberty of choice and action of persons in
their midst. It is just as illegitimate to constructor to maintain such tools
as it is personally to constrain the choices and actions of another. This
theory of justice, which takes personal liberty as its foundational good,
when applied to technology demands the principled limitation of "tools
that by their very nature prevent such liberty" (p. 41). "The principal
source of injustice in our epoch is political approvalfor the existence of
tools that by their very naturerestrictto a very few the liberty to use them
in an autonomousway" (p. 43).
What is required is especially a criticism of power tools, since these
have an inherent tendency toward centralized control and specialization
that allows "neitherthe workernor most engineers a choice over what use
will be made of the energy they manage"(p. 42).
The public ownershipof resources and of the means of production,and public control
over the marketand over net transfersof power, must be complementedby a public
determinationof the tolerablebasic structureof modem tools. This means that politics
in a postindustrialsociety must be mainly concerned with the development of design
criteriafor tools ratherthan as now with the choice of productiongoals (p. 43).

At the same time, the inversion of the politics of tools that would result
must be shown to be, not just ideal, but also necessary. Ought implies not
only can, but demand. "To translate the theoretical possibility of a
postindustrialconvivial life style into a political programfor new tools, it
must be shown that the prevailing fundamentalstructureof our present
tools menaces the survival of mankind" (p. 45). The carrot is to be
complementedby the stick.
Chapter3, "The Multiple Balance," argues the dynamic instability of
the industrial or power-tool-dependent society across five distinct
 ARGUMENT.INSIGHT.INFLUENCE
TOOLSFOR CONVIVIAUTY: 27

dimensions and a sixth dimension of their multiple interrelationships.In

response to each of these, Illich seeks to recoverthree principlesof moral,
political, and juridical procedurethat underlie his critique of tools: the
legitimacy of agonistic discussion, the rightful influence of history or
tradition, and the primacy of non-professionals "for binding policy
decisions" (p. 48).
With regard to the environment, pollution deprives humanity of "the
right to the fundamental physical structure"of the biological world
(p. 47). Human beings have "evolved to fit into one niche in the
universe,"and the Earthas their home "is now threatened"(p. 49). This
threatpoints not only toward"the need to limit procreation,consumption,
and waste [but equally to the need to] radically reduce our expectations
that machines will do our work for us" (pp. 49-50). We must reject "the
false expectationthat somehow humanaction can be engineeredto fit into
the requirementsof the world conceived as a technological totality" (p.
50).
Already in the early 1970s, Illich identifies the dangerof overemphasiz-
ing the issue of ecology. He specifically criticizes Paul Ehrlich (to whom
is attributedthe only undocumentedquotationin the text, a quotationthat
he immediately makes his own), and Barry Commoner, and raises the
problem of what a colleague will later term "the gospel of global
efficiency."7 Illich, in a deft quotation from HerbertMarcuse regarding
"the materializationof values" or the instantiatingof values in technical
programs, at once points out an essential issue sometimes obscured by
new left neo-Marxistjargon and distances himself from that jargon.(To
Marcuse'sOne-DimensionalMan Illich accords his second footnote.)
With regard to work, the challenge is what Illich calls "radical
monopolies."Radical monopoly results from "thedominance of one type
of product rather than one brand"(p. 52), a domination which occurs
"when people give up their native ability to do what they can do for
themselves and for each other, in exchange for something 'better'that can
be done for them only by a majortool" (p. 54). Cars - not just cars made
by some one company - radically monopolize urban transit (excluding
bicycles, horses, etc.). Schools radically monopolize education(excluding
self-education, tutoring, mentoring, apprenticeship, etc.). Physicians
radically monopolize medical care (excluding chiropractors,
homeopathists, osteopaths, etc. - not to mention self, parents, and
children). Neither consumerprotectionlaws nor socialism is an adequate
response to radicalmonopolies.
28 CARL MITCHAM

With regardto education,Illich notes the increasing costs of education

but rejects two common rationalizationsfor this situation:education as a
means to some social end (greaterproductivity),and as an outputin itself
(post-industrial society theory). Education is increasingly expensive
because the increasing social density of nonconvivial tools necessitates it,
and because education using nonconvivial tools is economically un-
feasible. The more high-tech the tool, the more its use is dependent on
training manual instructionsor professional trainers. But even when we
learn "how to operate the TV or the telephone ... their workings are
hidden" from us (p. 59). By contrast, from personal trial-and-error
engagementit is possible to learn not only how to use a convivial tool, but
how it works. What are today called "user-friendlyinterfaces"in no way
address the disparity Illich identifies. (Illich's remarks on the convivial
characterof the alphabet and books anticipate points reiteratedlater in
greater detailin ABC: The Alphabetizationo/the Popular Mind.)8
Because of the separationof teaching about how to work things from
learning about how things work, modem education is incapable of
bringing about the kind of radical transformationof behaviorrequiredby
the presentmulti-dimensionalcrisis. Although it is true that "people must
learn to live within bounds,"this learning "cannotbe taught"(p. 65). "A
new practice '" can only be the result of a new relation between people
and their tools" (p. 66).
With regard to politics, there exists an increasing, technologically
mediatedconcentrationof power.
As tools get bigger, the number of potential operators declines. There are always
fewer operators of cranes than of wheelbarrows. Never before have tools ap-
000

proachedpresentpower [and] been so integratedat the service of a small elite (po 70).

With regard to culture, technical obsolescence and recurring technical

change threatentradition. When artifacts are manufacturedby complex,
single-product, expensive machines and machine systems, the gradual,
incremental wearing out of products (which will be replaced one at a
time) cannot support technical change. What is needed instead is the
suddent rejection and replacementof large numbersof artifacts.Obsoles-
cence, whether by advertisedfashion, economic redundancy,or technical
pressure is a necessary feature of the nonconvivial tool-dependentsocial
order. Cultureis transformedfrom a vehicle of traditionand preservation
into a means for enforcing change.
Reviewing the five basic imbalances, Illich maintains that these must
 TOOLSFOR CONVIVIALITY:
ARGUMENT,INSIGHT,INFLUENCE 29

not be taken as independent variables. They are intimately interrelated

and must be counteractedtogether. This is indicated by personal frustra-
tions in response to the logic by which persons are regularly constrained
to choose ends because they fit tools ratherthan tools because they fit
ends. Given such a situation,one either learns to abstainor goes mad.
To promote the first option, and the re-creation of appropriateor
convivial tools, Illich calls for the development of what he terms
"counterfoil research" that will "provide guidelines for detecting the
incipient stages of murderouslogic in tools [and] devise tools and tool
systems that optimize the balance of life, thereby maximizing liberty for
all" (p. 77). The basic principle is that, "Tools ... have an optimal, a
tolerable, and a negative range"of application(p. 78), which need to be
clearly identified, throughempiricalas well as conceptualinvestigation.
Just as he is neitherromanticnor purist, so is Illich no rationalist.The
conceptual clarifications of his text are regularly complemented by
empirical information and by arguments from experience. The non-
academic character of the text is nowhere more obvious than in the
absence of bibliographyand references. Illich does not just call for the
initiationof counterfoilresearch,he does it.
Turning again, then, to the carrot, chapter 4, "Recovery,"outlines a
functioning politics of tools. Tools both extend and eliminate human
capabilities.9 A politics of tools depends on public recognition of the
elimination possibility, "establishingprocedures which permit ordinary
people" to exclude "themalignanttool and control the expedient"one (p.
85). The obstacles to such recognition and practice are the idolatry of
science, debasements of common language, and loss of respect for
traditional processes of social decision making. In initiating a
demythologizationof science, a recovery of language, and a defense of
legal procedure,Illich directly reaffirms three principles that were only
indirectlyelucidatedin chapter3 - i.e., agonistic discussion, tradition,and
non-professionalauthority.
Scientism and technocracy are based on mistaken ideas about
knowledge and informationas realities independentof human interpreta-
tion. The corruption of language likewise turns human actions into
substances to be possessed. "To work"and "to learn"become "jobs"and
"education";actions that were part of living become things to have. By
virtue of both scientism and the corruptionof language
Limiting tools for the sake of freedom and conviviality is ... an issue that cannot be
30 CARL MITCHAM

raised. To recommend limits on tools sounds as deeply obscene today as the

recommendationfor greatersexual frankness and freedom as a condition for a good
marriagelaw would have soundeda generationago (p. 91).
Promotionof an authenticpolitics of tools depends on the use of language
as "a second-ordertool" to clarify issues (p. 91) and law "as a tool for the
inversion of society" (p. 93).
Formal adversaryprocedureis the paradigmatictool for citizens to oppose the threat
of industry to their basic liberties. ... Like ordinary English, formal process is a
convivial tool (p. 97).
Before it became common practice among the anti-nuclearand environ-
mental movements, Illich was advocating the activist utilization of legal
procedureto protestand alterthe course of technologicalchange.
Finally, in chapter 5, "Political Inversion," Illich returns again to
necessities. The political inversion that constitutes a true politics of tools
will rest on a new consensus growing out of a convergence of
"enlightenedself-interest,"not "sharedideologies" (p. 102). The forma-
tion of such a new majoritycan be stimulatedby crisis situations. A crisis
has "the potential of turning public imagination inside out" (p. 103).
''Thatpeople would accept multiple limits to growth without catastrophe
seems highly improbable" (p. 105). But "the transformation of
catastropheinto crisis depends on the confidence an emerging group of
clear-thinkingand feeling people can inspire in theirpeers"(p. 106).
The only response to this crisis is a full recognition of its depth and an acceptanceof
inevitable self-limitation. The more varied the perspectives from which this insight is
shared by interest groups and the more disparatethe interest that may be protected
only by a reduction of power within society, the greater the probability that the
inevitable will be recognized as such (p. 107).

In the end, political inversion will come about not just on the basis of an
attractive ideal but because of a kick from history. Yet for the kick to
bring about anything more than meaningless pain, there must be insight
into old needs and new possibilities.
The argument of Tools for Conviviality can thus be summarized as
follows:
Chapter1 Modem tools exhibit two levels of utilization; initially
subordinateto human ends, they eventually take on a self-
serving character.
Chapter2 The inner structureof modem tools that grounds the second
level of utilization is, first, the mechanical adaptationof non-
 TOOLSFOR CONVIVIAUTY:
ARGUMENT,INSIGHT,INFLUENCE 31

human sources of energy and, second, the creation of

coordinatetechnical means.
Chapter3 At the second level of utilization there emerge at least five
distinct imbalances in environment,work, meaning, freedom,
and culture.
Chapter4 Recovery of balances across these five dimensions and their
interrelationsrequires the development of a politics of tools
based on demythologized science, non-technical language,
and legal procedures.
Chapter5 This inversion of politics can be fully realized only if
catastropheturnsto crisis throughinsight.

2. INSIGHT

Against the backgroundof this interpretiveoverview of the argument,it is

appropriateto venturea thematicappreciationof the text. Such a thematic
appreciationcan also provide a basis for considering furtherrelations to
the Illich corpus and to larger traditions of philosophical reflection on
technology.
Tools for Conviviality grows out of a recognition of the fundamental
importanceof insight. This insight into insight (as it were) is the formal
foundation of the work, with both theoretical and practicalimplications.
For the owl of Minerva, to look back over an epoch and discern its
structUre is coordinate with soaring above or transcending that past.
Insight brings with it detachment,throughthe moment of understanding.
But for the cock of Athena, to become enlightened about alternativesof
the future is also a spur to action and engagement, an entering into or
seizing upon the opportunitiesof history.
On numerous occasions in the text, Illich alludes to the enlightenment
that will lead to practice:
The crisis can be solved only if we learn to invert the presentdeep structureof tools
... (p. 10, italics added).

This world-wide crisis of world-wide institutions can lead to a new consciousness

aboutthe natureof tools ... (p. 12, italics added).

The circle can be brokenonly by a widely sharedinsight (p. 19, italics added).

It is now time to correct this mistake and shake-off the illusion ... (p. 20, italics
added).
32 CARL MITCHAM

The only solution ... is the sharedinsight ... (p. 50, italics added).

[The] political choice of a frugal society remains a pious dream unless [it is possible]
to define concrete proceduresby which more people are enlightenedabout the nature
of ourpresentcrisis ... (p. 10 1, italics added).

We still have a chance to understandthe causes of the coming crisis, and to prepare
for it (pp. 104-105, italics added).

Public, counterfoil research can significantly help ... individuals become more
cohesive and self-conscious ... (p. 105, italics added, in a section entitled "Insightinto
Crisis").

The only response to this crisis is a full recognition of its depth ... (p. 107, italics
added).
Notice that such remarkscluster in the opening and concluding chapters
of the text.
This insight that shared insight or awareness leads to humanand social
transformationnaturally calls to mind the title of Illich's first book,
Celebration of Awareness (1970).10 A brief aside on Celebration of
Awareness can thus enhance an understandingof the relation between
Tools for Convivialityand Illich's work as a whole.
Celebration of Awareness is a collection of twelve occasional pieces,
four not previously published. The flrst two grew out of, or were in
response to, the Vietnam War. The next flve and largest set of essays are
concerned with the Catholic Church, especially as related to Puerto
Ricans, the place of the Church in Latin America, and ecclesiastical
structure.Indeed, the central and longest essay - which is almost twice as
long as any other in the book - is entitled "The Vanishing Clergyman."
The next two sets of essays are concerned with schools, then with
developmentand the impact of technological change. The flnal essay is a
plea for culturalrevolutionthroughawareness.
The two essays on education will be expanded into Illich's flrst
monograph, Deschooling Society. The two essays on development
constitutethe seed of the presenttext, Tools for Conviviality.
Illich's appeal in ToolsforConvivialityis not only for a new philosophi-
cal analysis of tools, but also - as he develops with passion in his flnal
chapter - for an "inversion"of the politics of tools. "Inversion,"the
interchange of position or order, is closely related to "conversion,"
metanoia, literally "after-thought,"figuratively repentance.The idea that
true social transformationis dependenton personal interiorreassessment
 TOOLSFOR CONVNIAUTY:ARGUMENT, INSIGHT,INFLUENCE 33

is a thesis that can be found in the Western philosophicaland theological

traditionat least since Plato and the Hebrew prophets.
Nevertheless, recognition of the importanceof insight is not sufficient
in itself to ground insight or activate its transformativepotential. Insight
about insight is not enough. There must be insight concerning something.
Illich's substantive insight is that tools have consequences, that tech-
nological artifactshave inherentcharacteristicswhich can influence use,
the behaviorof the user, and the society in which use takes place. This is
Illich's special contribution to greater awareness or enlightenment
concerning the modern technological condition in which humanity finds
itself. It is also one which is explicitly rejected by the common ideology
of the neutralityof tools or technology. Indeed, one way of readingTools
for Convivialityis as a sustainedcritiqueof the neutralityof technology.
There are, of course, anticipationsof this idea in the Western intellec-
tual traditionlong before Illich. Not to mention more remote instances,
there is the complex culturalresponse to the IndustrialRevolution. To the
societal problems associated with the rise of modern technology - that is,
of industrial tools and artifacts - there are basically two possible
responses. One is to argue that the problems are not caused by material
objects, but by the social context in which these objects exist. The second
is to argue that in reality the problemis the objects. The first can be called
the socialist response, the second the Luddite - or, more fairly, the
artifactist- response.
An aside on terminology. The practical proposals of socialism are
based on more theoreticalstudies from sociology. If, to avoid arguing ad
hominem, it is preferableto use "socialist"and "socialism"in place of
"Marxist"and "Marxism,"then some less personalterm should be found
for that position commonly referred to with the words "Luddite"or
"Luddism."For theoreticalstudies upon which Luddite practice could be
based, one possible candidate is the term "mechanology," used by
Jacques Lafitte and Gilbert Simondon to refer to a phenomenology of
machines, taking machines as a generic term that includes tools. t 1 But the
Lafitte-Simondontheoreticalproject confines itself to the inner evolution
of mechanical development and fails to address issues dealing with the
external implications of the inner alternative structures of artifacts
Moreover, insofar as theoretical study leads to political program, the
terms "mechanist"and "mechanism"would have exactly the wrong
connotations. What the anti-socialist (not anti-technologist!) school
promotes is a phenomenologyof artifactsor artifactology,on the basis of
34 CARL MITCHAM

which can be formulateda political programthat can be termed artifact-

ism.
The tradition of artifactology or artifactist thought prior to Illich
includes, besides Lafitte and Simondon, at least the following eclectic
melange:
Jacques Ellul's presentation(1954) of a "characterologyof technique"as exhibiting
automatismof technical choice, self-development, unity (or indivisibility), the linking
togetherof techniques, technical universalism,and technical autonomy.12

GuntherAnders'sargument(1961) that artifactscan have maxims, so that the Kantian

categorical imperativemust be extended to read: "Have and use only those things, the
inherentmaxims of which could become your own maxims and thus the maxims of a
generallaw."13

Lewis Mumford's distinction between authoritarian and democratic technics

(1964).14

Marshall McLuhan's thesis (1964) that independent of content, a particularcom-

municationsmedium is its own message.15

Jean Baudrillard'sdescription (1968) of the postmodem "system of objects" as

constitutinga linguistic-likephenomenonliberatedfrom economies of production.16

HerbertA. Simon'sproject,"sciences of the artificial"(1969).17

Richard Weaver's analysis of machines as constituting, as is said of military forces

priorto utilization, their own "forces in being"or influence (1970).18

It is crucial to note - as references to Lafitte and Simondon should

already indicate, and the inclusion of Baudrillardand Simon here can
reinforce- that artifactistthoughtis in no way inherentlyanti-technology.
As an artifactology, it simply subscribes to the thesis that artifacts have
consequences; there is room for considerable disagreement about the
characterof those consequences, and whether they are to be promoted or
restricted.
In none of the cases listed, however, do the authorsprovide extended or
detailed analysis of the inner structures of artifacts and the ways such
structuresgive to artifacts inherent tendencies toward specific kinds of
human engagement and use. Their focus remains largely at some macro
and in one sense symbolic level, stressing externalrelations.
Although Ellul makes some observations about the personal and
societal effects of machines qua machines - and is commonly mis-
 TOOLS FOR CONVNJAUTY: ARGUMENT, INSIGHT,INFLUENCE 35

construedas opposed to the artificialityqua artificialityof artifacts19 - his

central interest is technical action. As a result, his characterologyapplies
more to technology and tools as social institutions than to tools as
materialobjects. Anders and McLuhanlimit themselves to considerations
of particularkinds of artifacts - nuclear weapons and communications
technologies, respectively. McLuhan, as well, increasingly clothes
analysis in an oracularrhetoric,2oas does Baudrillard,for whom it is the
unexplicated objectlessness of distinctively contemporary artifacts that
turns them into signs. Simon's interest is as much in providing a meta-
scientific analysis of the unities present in such positive sciences of
artificial phenomena as organization theory, management science, and
behavioralpsychology as it is in artifactsor artificiality.21 Weaver'sideas
are at most a suggestive analogy about the general ability of any collec-
tion of artifactsto influence individualdecision and social behavior.
Mumford, it is true, especially in earlier work, provides a broad
perspective on artifice - one that takes note of differences between
machines and tools as well as of the distinctive identities exhibited by
clothes, containers, structures, apparatus, utensils, and utilities. One
perceptive observation concerns how "in the series of objects from
utensils to utilities there is the same relation between the workman and
the process that one notes in the series between tools and automatic
machines: differences in the degree of specialization, the degree of
impersonality."22 But on the whole Mumford's arguments remain
somewhat impressionistic,and as much analogic as analytic. It is also true
that even when, as with the case of the mechanical clock, Mumford
analyzes the influence of machines on human affairs, he does not relate
this influence to the structurally distinct properties of the artifacts
themselves.
Illich's analysis, by contrast, puts forth an analysis of the inner
structures of tools with concrete implications for the explanation of
distinctive human-artifactengagements that can be summarized in the
following table.

~
Immediate source Immediate source
of energy of guidance
Kinds of tools
(matter) (form)
Hand tools Human beings Human beings
Power tools Non-human realities Human beings
36 CARL MITCHAM

Although Illich fails to make what might have been a useful reference to
Mumford'sbroaderspectrum of distinctions, he nevertheless provides a
pointed analysis of the inner characterof two types of tools and the ways
these differentialinner structuresconstrainhumanengagements, indepen-
dent of particularintentions, good or bad. For Illich, tools embody or
express not only the intentions of individualhumanmakers and users, but
also, and equally significantly, they embody what may perhapsperversely
be termed"unintendedintentions"- which, for that very reason, must be
investigated. There is the need for a phenomenology of the artificial
related to but not limited by concerns for the effective manipulationand
managementof artifacts.
As operating or functional entities, tools can be analyzed into material
and formalelements. Energy constitutesa kind of prime matterof motion,
providing the raw or unformed impulse for operating; while guidance,
operating of course through the tool itself, gives the functioning of any
tool a formal definition.23 Because of dependence on human users for
both the material and formal elements of their functioning, hand tools
exhibit a unique dependency on and qualitatively distinct engagement
with human beings. Insofaras the energy to operatepower tools becomes
independent of human users, such tools begin to exhibit a certain
autonomy of any individual user. Moreover, because power tools
concentrateincreasingly greaterquanta of energy in the hands of users,
they necessarily introduce into the social order inequalities that would
otherwise not be present.
This sketch of a contributionto the phenomenology of artifacts begins
to reveal a straightforwardsense in which technology can become
autonomous in relation to human users (if not makers), and how a tool
can have inherent characteristics that ground distinctive impacts on
societal orders- independentof particularsocial contexts within which it
might be embedded or particularsocial process with which it may be
associated. It is also relatively simple to see the meaning of Illich's
repeated call for new kinds of engagement tools for human beings to
work with (tools employing humanenergy and guidance) instead of more
tools to work for humans (tools requiring less and less direct human
energy or guidance). The latter increasingly disallow end-users to
introduce their personal intentions into the world, to leave behind traces
of themselves in ways that have created the rich worlds of traditional
artifice which have, in the past, served as dwelling places of humanity.
 TOOLSFOR CONVlVIAUrY:ARGUMENT,INSIGHT, INFLUENCE 37

Users now become consumers, and leave behind traces of themselves

only in theirwastes.
Moreover, with hand tools, the general bodily engagement and the
dependency on human energy provide the basis for direct, intuitive,
judgmentsabout the efficacy of a particulartool in a particularcontext. If
a hand tool does not work, the user knows it, immediately and through
direct experience. To swing a dull axe, and feel in the hands and arms the
throw-backof momentum that fails to be inserted into the grain of the
wood, hearing at the same time a thud ratherthan a sharp crack, provides
all the evidence the woodsman needs that a blade requires file and
whetstone. As tools are transformedinto machines and become vehicles
for the utilization of energy originatingoutside the human body, the user
is reducedto operatoror manipulator,and the humanbeing is deprivedof
many of the direct or immediate indicatorsof efficacy. To compensate,to
provide a new basis for judgment, human users develop a science of
mechanics, with its quantified measures and gauges of efficiency. The
quantification of efficacy by the input-outputcalculus of efficiency in
tum gives birthto new constructionsof artifice, the world of machines.
This analysis goes beyond Illich's own work, which remains no more
than the suggestive initiation of a comprehensive phenomenology of
artifactsand their humanengagements. But, drawingon the mechanologi-
cal analyses of Lafitte and Simondon, and setting aside the need to
address issues of the influence of what may be called the phenomenology
of passive artifacts, one can summarize, in the following schema, a
provisionalextension of Illich's thought.

~
Immediate source Immediate source
of energy of guidance
Kinds of tools
(matter) (form)
Tools Individual human beings Individual human beings
Premodern Groups of human beings Individual human beings
machines or animals or inanimate
nature (wind and water)
Modern Technologically controlled Individual human beings
machines nature and mechanical controls
(steam) (commanded by other
human beings)
Cybernetic Technologically controlled Electronic controls
devices and abstracted nature
(electricity)
38 CARL MITCHAM

Illich's hand tool-power tool distinction simplifies a conceptual gradient

from tools properly so-called to cybernetic devices. Machines are first of
all hand-employedtools; then tools that requireenergy input from gangs
of laborers (as with galley slaves rowing a ship) or animals (a team of
oxen pulling a mold board plow) or the readily accessible motions of
nature (wind caught by the sail). External input undergoes further
transmutation with the development of, first, the heat engine, then
electricity, to drive a mechanical prime mover. The power of the steam
engine almost exponentially exceeds any previous energy source;
electricity takes such powers into similar realms of scientific and
conceptualabstraction.
Transmutationsin guidance and formal functioning follow suit. Note,
for instance, how along with the harnessingof power from the heat engine
there developed internal technical requirements for technological
controls; these were initially realized in the mechanical governor,
introducinga formal decoupling of human operatorsfrom actual machine
operation. Such formal decoupling at the level of operation is, however,
coordinate both with the emergence of the engineering analysis of
mathematicizedcontrol-and with an expandedexternalcoupling through
the consumption of mass-producedproducts. At the same time, it may
well be that electrical and electronic power tools such as kitchen ap-
pliances and personal computers reintroducea degree of individualized
control that was not possible with large-scale, steam-poweredindustrial
machines.
Against such a backgroundone can begin to identify certain necessary
refinementsin Illich's program,as well as trajectoriesfor future research,
and some weaknesses.
First, Illich's statement that "the distinction between convivial and
manipulatorytools is independentof the level of technology of the tool"
(p. 22) calls for clarification.Surely the larger implication of his analysis
is that this is not the case; traditionaltools are inherentlymore convivial
than modem machines, which are technologically more advanced.
Second, there are strong grounds for questioning Illich's broad
conception of a tool as covering simple and complex physical artifacts
and social institutions, first-orderand second-ordertools. This is an idea
that Illich shares, remarkablyenough, with the American Pragmatists.
John Dewey, for instance, argues that all human activities - whether the
making and using of artifacts, the forming of social institutions, or even
rational inquiry - constitute kinds of tools.24 Human activity engaged
 TOOLSFOR CONVIVIALITY:
ARGUMENT, INSIGHT,INFLUENCE 39

with anything in any way is instrumentalfor the achievement of some

human value. The difficulty with such an approachis that it obscures the
need for different kinds of analyses when dealing with material objects
and social institutions, not to mention thinking and methods of inquiry-
each of which becomes convivial or nonconvivial in quite distinctive
ways. With social institutions, for instance, it is quantity of individual
interactionsand bureaucraticline and staff structuresthat are central, not
quantaof energy input and technical control mechanisms.
Finally, granted a distinction between material artifacts and social
institutions, the unique interest Illich shares with Anders comes more
clearly into view. A numberof philosophers- most notably, Hans Jonas-
have raised and reflected on the impact of technology on ethics and the
need to expand ethical concepts to take account of choices and actions
made possible and prevalentby modem technology.25 Yet in most cases
the focus has remained,as in traditionalethics, on humanaction, however
technologically influenced or modified. With Anders and Illich the focus
goes beyond human action to consider the inner characterof tools and
technology in relation to fundamentalethical principles - deontological
and utilitarian,respectively.
Illich's insight in this area nevertheless remains paradoxical if not
problematic.Although the paradoxcannot be explored here in any depth,
the following may fairly be noted. There is a gap between Mill's formula-
tion of a principle for limiting political action on others and Illich's
attemptto adapt that principle to limiting the constructionof tools which
influence the lives of self and others. To some extent the problems are
inherent in Mill's own theory of liberty. A negative principle against X
actions or constructionsis not the same as a positive principle for non-X
actions and constructions.Although No S is P is equivalentto S is non-P
by obversion, the logic of imperativesdoes not allow a move from Do not
do X to Do non-X. Furthermore,the connection between Mill's ideal of
diversity in individual human development may be at most contingently
connected with his principle prohibitingharm or interferencewith others,
except for self-protection. Indeed, if human beings by nature live in
community, then the protection of communities may well take priority
over individual liberty as the only way to support profound diversity.
Illich also fails to give any serious consideration to the way Mill's
principle has become itself an ideological supportfor that advanced and
advancing technological individualism which is only an appearanceof
diversity.26
40 CARL MITCHAM

The essential insight of Tools for Conviviality remains that tools, as

materialobjects, matter.It is not just intentionsthat count; it is also tools
- not wholly independentof, but at least as an independentvariable with
end-user intentions. Different types of tools influence in morally and
politically significantrespects what end-userscan and cannotdo, and how
they can and cannot do it. The social process of making and using tools
reflects the tools used in the making and using as well as social contexts
and processes. Indeed, the structureof the tools may well be the more
fundamental issue. This constitutes (as it were) an inversion of and
challenge to received wisdom regarding relations between material
entities and human intentions. In the popular wisdom, entities do not
matter, intention does. "Technology is neutral.""Gunsdon't kill people,
people do." Illich, like everyone else, grantsthat intentionsmatter,but not
in ways that provide comfort for the status quo regarding technological
objects. Indeed, Illich's intention is to promote precisely the insight that
will alter not just accidental uses (which remain contingently dependent
on good will, and in many instances are opposed and resistantto the inner
structuresand implications of artifacts) but the things themselves - and,
thereby,essential use.
3. INFLUENCE

The influence of Tools for Convivialityis - given Illich's carefully crafted

argumentand the significance of its insights - exceptionally limited. The
book has been largely overlooked by philosophers of technology who
share Illich's fundamentalconcern. Its only serious impact has been in
discussions surroundingthe idea of alternativetechnology.
The issue here is not the influence of Illich's work in general. nor the
general intellectual and cultural appreciationof Tools for Conviviality.
The issue is the influence of this one text in the field of philosophy.
Yet as backgroundto this restrictedconcern. consider first some more
general observations. According to Dissertation Abstracts there have
been, up through 1988, twenty-five dissertationson the work of Illich.27
Of these twenty-five dissertations, sixteen have been in the area of
education, only one in philosophy. Others are scattered about in such
fields as sociology (three instances), mass communications, urban
planning, theology, anthropology,and social work. This is a reasonably
accurateindicationof the relative weights given to the various aspects of
Illich's work by the scholarly academic community, at least in the United
States.
 TOOLSFOR CONVIVIALITY:
ARGUMENT,INSIGHT,INFLUENCE 41

In lllich's citation indices for the social sciences and for the arts and
humanities, a similar range occurs. The books most often cited are
Deschooling Society and, to almost as great an extent, Medical Nemesis.
Indeed, it is surprising that, given the number of citations of Medical
Nemesis, there have been no dissertations on that work. (Perhaps the
explanationis just that graduateeducationin the medical communitydoes
not producedissertations,while graduatestudy in educationdoes.)
Following this summary measure of the general influence of lllich's
work, considerthe specific area of philosophy. In the United States and in
the English-speakingworld generally, The Philosopher'sIndex is the best
single bibliographicreference. Up through 1973 The Philosopher'sIndex
contains no references to any work by or about Illich. In 1974 there is one
citation of an article on Deschooling Society.28 In 1975 there are three
citations of articles on Deschooling Society.29 In 1976 there is a reference
to one article replying to a 1975 citation.30 The first five citations of
articles on Illich in The Philosopher'sIndex from 1974 to 1976 are all to
Deschooling Society.
Between 1974 and 1976 the only article by Illich in The Philosopher's
Index is one on medicine.31 There is also one citation of a review of
Medical Nemesis in 1976. 32 In 1977 an article appearsdiscussing a thesis
which becomes part of Medical Nemesis.33 During 1978 and 1979 Illich
falls completely out of The Philosopher'sIndex- no articles about, by, or
reviews of - to reappearwith three more articles on Deschooling Society
in 1980,34 one in 1981,35 two in 1982. 36 In 1981 there are two citations of
articles by Illich in a Belgian philosophy joumal,37 but there are no other
articles by or reviews of Illich books duringthese three years. From 1983
to 1989 there are no articles on nor reviews of Illich's work, although
Medical Nemesis is cited as a book in 1985 and a contributionto an edited
collection is listed in 1986. 38 The discussion of lllich in the professional
philosophical literature focuses almost exclusively on Deschooling
Society, and peaks in the mid-1970s. The first and so far only article in
English to undertakea philosophical discussion of Tools for Conviviality
is one by Anthony Weston which does not appearuntil late 1989. 39
That the philosophical literature has not been avoiding issues Illich
seeks to address in Tools for Conviviality can be shown by noting that
from 1985 to 1989 The Philosopher'sIndex cites more than fifty articles
per year on technology. In 1989, for instance, there are references to
eighty-four articles on technology. The dearthof philosophical literature
on Illich also cannot be explained as a function of his failure to publish in
42 CARL MITCHAM

philosophicaljournalsor to teach in a university philosophy department.

NeitherJacquesEllul nor HerbertMarcusefulfilled such criteria,yet their
work is widely criticized and considered philosophical. It is simply the
case that in the English-speakingphilosophical literatureon technology
Illich's work is singularlyoverlooked and ignored.
The Repertoirebibliographiquede la philosophie is the major interna-
tional index to philosophical literature in European languages. Again,
through 1975 there are no articles about or by Illich. In 1976 the first
articles appear: one on, another by lllich.4o The 1977 edition cites one
article41 and three books.42 The 1977 Repertoire bibliographique also
cites the Spanish and Italian translationsof Tools of Convivialityand the
Spanishedition of Energy and Equity.
This indicates a recognition of philosophical importancethat Illich has
not been accordedby The Philosopher'sIndex. Indeed, from 1977 Illich's
books and the translationsof his books, articles by and about, and reviews
appear regularly in the Repertoire bibliographique. In the European
philosophical community, once Illich is recognized as a philosophical
author,this recognition is sustainedfrom the late 1970s onward. It is also
the case, however, that Tools for Conviviality fails to occupy a place of
prominence in this recognition, which focuses much more attention on
Medical Nemesis.43
Despite these oversights it is perhaps appropriateto note that bibliog-
raphy in the special field of philosophy and technology studies has, from
an early period, recognized the relevance of Illich's wor04 - although
this has done nothing to promoteits philosophicalconsideration.
As already suggested, the only body of literature that has accorded
Tools for Convivialityany substantialattentionis that associated with the
alternativetechnology movement. The widely used collection of readings,
Stepping Stones: AppropriateTechnology and Beyond (1978),45 includes
a selection from Tools for Conviviality. In the late 1970s Valentina
Borremans,an associate of Illich at CIDOC, edited a I 12-page Guide to
Convivial Tools.46 Interestinglyenough, Borremans includes as relevant
references to all of Illich's books to that point. In 1982 Malcom Hollick's
"TheAppropriateTechnology Movement and Its Literature:A Retrospec-
tive" also gives Tools for Convivialityprominentconsideration.47
The real influence of this text has been not in the philosophical
literature,but - appropriatelyenough - among a small circle of friends,
con-vivo. The disappointing paradox of this influence is that it has not
promoted a continuation and deepening of the analysis of the inner
 ARGUMENT,INSIGHT,INFLUENCE
TOOLSFOR CONVNIALITY: 43

structureof tools, either in later work by Illich or in that of his colleagues.

Indeed, Shadow Work, a collection of five essays, carries on a running
critiqueof certainaspects of the alternativetechnology movement without
ever advancingthe critique of tools.48 Gender has a section, "Genderand
Tools," which provides historical data on the breakbetween artifacts and
gender that is part of the modern way with tools, but it gives no
phenomenological description of this break or grounding for its occur-
rence.49 ABCdoes an analysis of the culturalimpact of that tool known as
writing, but not in such a way as to deepen principles developed in Tools
for Conviviality. Indeed, the trajectory of Illich's thought moves away
from concern for the inner characterof tools and toward an emphasis on
their external relations - specifically their impact, not on social institu-
tions and relationships, so much as on self-understandings and self-
images.
There exists, however, a traditionof artifactistthought after Tools for
Conviviality(1973), which includes at least the following:
Langdon Winner, AutonomousTechnology: Technics-Out-of-Controlas a Theme in
Political Thought (1977) and The Whale and the Reactor: A Search for Limits in an
Age ofHigh Technology(1986).50

Don Ihde, Technics and Praxis (1979) and ExistentialTechnics (1983)Y

Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi and Eugene Rochberg-Halton, The Meaning of Things:

Domestic Symbolsand the Self(1981).52

Albert Borgmann,Technologyand the CharacterofContemporaryLife: A Philosophi-

cal Inquiry(1984).53

What is disappointingis that in none of these books has any serious use
been made of the work of Illich.
Consider Langdon Winner. His initial book, AutonomousTechnology,
published in 1977, four years after Tools for Conviviality, accords Illich
only the most casual mention.54 AutonomousTechnology: Technics-out-
of-Control as a Theme in Political Thought is an extended defense and
elaborationof a thesis found most fully articulatedin Ellul's The Tech-
nological Society - the idea that the rise of modern technology is
coordinatewith the creation of a new form of political life, which Winner
calls "technologicalpolitics." Although his overlooking of Illich might be
explained as a result of Winner's focus on analyzing the technological
politics characteristicof what Ellul terms the technical milieu, Illich's
44 CARL MITCHAM

description of politics after the second watershed in technical develop-

ment correspondsprecisely to these two other descriptors.Illich's further
analysis of the specific autonomies of certain kinds of tools and the
concrete implicationsthat flow from their inner structures,not to mention
his conception of justice and the politics of inversion, open further
complementary avenues for analysis. Moreover, the same year that
Winner's work appeared also witnessed the publication of Ellul's The
Technological System, an extended revision and commentaryon the first
two chapters of The Technological Society. Unlike Winner, Ellul does
give Illich considerableattention,quoting him at length on four different
occasions.55
The common ground between Winner and Illich is noted by Anthony
Weston in the sole philosophical analysis of Tools for Convivialityyet to
appear in English, already mentioned. Weston identifies three ways that
Illich's fundamentalcriteria of conviviality apply to tools. For Illich, a
tool is convivial if it
(I) can be freely chosen,
(2) is an active expression of personallife, and
(3) is not monopolizedby some professionalelite.
Winner, in the last chapter of his book, introduces without much argu-
ment three guidelines that might be incorporatedinto an "epistemological
Luddism" for questioning and reintroducinginto technological politics
some of the characterof traditionalpolitical life. These would examine
technologies in terms of their
(a) intelligibility to non-experts,
(b) degrees of flexibility, and
(c) tendency to foster dependency.56
As Weston observes, Winner's (a) correspondsto Illich's (3), Winner's
(b) to Illich's (1), and Winner's(c) to Illich's (2).57
The difference between Winner and Illich is that Winner is primarily
analyzing that literature which focuses the problem of autonomous
technology for political reflection and only secondarily the problem of
technology itself; on the otherhand, Illich, like Ellul, is dealing in the first
place with the problemof technology.
Winner'ssecond book, The Whale and the Reactor, is not significantly
different in this regard. It mentions Illich, but only twice and in pass-
ing.58 "Do Artifacts Have Politics?," the central chapter of the first and
controlling section of the book, could have been deepened and
strengthenedby an engagement with the central argument of Tools for
 TOOLS FOR CONVIVIAUTY:ARGUMENT, INSIGHT,INFLUENCE 45

Conviviality. Originally published in 1980, "Do Artifacts Have Politics?"

considers two ways in which artifactscan embody political implications.
In the first, human beings specifically make technologies solve political
problems. He cites the examples of Robert Moses's Long Island parkway
overpasses, which were designed to restrictuse by buses and thus access
by the poorerclasses of the city; Cyrus McCormick'smolding machines,
utilized to breakshop floor labor organization;and the mechanicaltomato
harvester,which turnedtruckfarming into agribusiness.
The things we call "technologies" are ways of building order in our world....
Consciously or unconsciously, deliberately or inadvertently, societies choose
structuresfor technologies that influence how people are going to work, communi-
cate, travel, consume, and so forth over a very long time. In the processes by which
structuringdecisions are made, different people are situated differently and possess
unequal degrees of power as well as unequal levels of awareness.... For that reason
the same careful attention one would give to the rules, roles, and relationships of
politics must also be given to such things as the building of highways, the creationof
television networks, and the tailoring of seemingly insignificant features of new
machines.59

In comparisonwith Illich's argumentand its urgency, this simple call for

more carfulnessin tool making and using sounds like a weak platitude.
In the second case, there are technologies which, independentof any
human intention, embody certain inherent political implications. Here
Winnercites the argumentsof Engels, Plato, and Marx (in that order) and
then distinguishes strong and weak versions of this thesis. In the strong
version, a certain technology is said to require or necessitate some
specific social relations. In the weak version, a technology is argued not
to require but to be strongly compatible with specific social relations.
"My belief that we ought to attend more closely to technical objects
themselves is not to say that we can ignore the contexts in which those
objects are situated."6oBut in neither version does Winner analyze the
inner structureof modem tools. In comparison with Illich, his analysis
remainsorientedtowardtheoreticaldiscussion and externalrelations.
Consider also Don Ihde. Neither Technics and Praxis nor Existential
Technics makes any reference to Illich. On the one hand, this is more
understandablethan with Winner; Ihde analyzes not so much discussions
about the politics of tools as tools in scientific research and, to some
moderate extent, leisure. On the other hand, Illich himself also provides
insights into the phenomenology of human-technologyinteractions that
complement Ibde's work. Ihde's work, like Illich's, is focused more on
46 CARL MITCHAM

the using of tools than on their making; but unlike Illich, Ihde is con-
cerned primarily with scientific instrumentationor the cognitive use of
tools to the exclusion of more quotidianengagements such as education,
transportation,and medicine.
Technics and Praxis, for instance, considers in detail the ways in which
tools or instruments can extend human capability (compare Tools for
Conviviality, pp. 84-85) and, in the process, also restrict access to the
world (a point Illich does not develop) through a simultaneous
amplification-reductionstructure. Ihde uses the example of a dentist's
probe which, as a small metal rod with a pointed tip, is able to detect
irregularitiesin a tooth that a finger would not be able to sens':!.
But at the same time that the probe extends and amplifies, it reduces another
dimension of the tooth experience. With my finger I sensed the warmthof the tooth,
its wetness, etc., aspects which I did not get through the probe at all. The probe,
precisely in giving me a finer discriminationrelatedto the micro-features,"forgot"or
reducedthe full range of otherfeatures sensed with my finger's touCh.61
The probe embodies or extends finger or hand. But instrumentsnot only
enter into what Ihde thereby terms embodimentrelations; they also take
on hermeneuticrelations.In the relation

Human~ Instrument~ World

the instrumentcan be assimilated to a human-instrumentcombinationso

that the user and instrumenttogetherconfrontor interpretthe world thus:

[Human-Instrument]~ World.

But human users can also place themselves over against the instrument,
now viewed as part of the world, and thus enter into an hermeneuticor
interpretativerelationshipdirectly with the instrument-world:

Human~ [Instrument-World].

Eyeglasses are engaged in embodimentrelations, electron microscopes in

hermeneuticrelations.
Ihde's consideration of how concrete things such as dental probes,
telephones, magnifying glasses, microscopes, electron microscopes,
telescopes, electronic music instruments, or computers exhibit such
 ARGUMENT,INSIGHT,INFLUENCE
TOOLSFOR CONVIVIALITY: 47

relationshipscan be correlatedwith Illich's concerns for the ways power

amplificationentails freedom reduction.The move in ExistentialTechnics
toward consideration of how technical engagements influence human
self-understandings can be correlated as well with emphases more
prominentin Illich's later work.
Ihde, however, simply analyzes the differences between these two
human experiences of instruments without explaining their ground in
differentkinds of tools. But clearly what Illich identifies as the difference
between hand tools and power tools begins to provide this explanation.
Hand tools are more amenable to embodimentrelations, whereas power
tools tend to requirehenneneuticrelations.
Like the later Illich and the Ihde of Existential Technics, Mihaly
Csikszentmihalyi ana Eugene Rochberg-Haltonare concerned with the
relationbetween things and self-understandings.In theirwords,
Men and women make order in their selves ... by first creating and then interacting
with the material world. The nature of that transaction will determine. to a great
extent, the kind of person that emerges. Thus the things that surround us are in-
separablefrom who we are. The materialobjects we use are not just tools we can pick
up and discard at our convenience; they constitute the frameworkof experience that
gives orderto our otherwise shapeless selves. 62

Theirfocus, however, is on household things and their symbolic import. It

is nevertheless remarkablethat in a comprehensive survey of previous
approaches to an understandingof things that considers psychological,
anthropological, and sociological studies there is no mention of the
approachrepresentedby Illich (or Ihde, for that matter).
At the same time, by raising the question of the symbolic import of
things, Csikszentmihalyiand Rochberg-Haltonre-presentthe challenge of
immaterialism associated perhaps most often with Baudrillard. This
challenge concerns the relation between the inner structure, the func-
tional, and the symbolic charactersof artifacts, and is crucial to Illich's
argument for self-learned self-limitation in the making and using of
technology. Any attempt to focus ethical-political reflection on material
artifacts - especially one arguing for the experiential learning of self-
limitations - must address the counterthesis of Baudrillardand others
regarding the immaterial, sign character of contemporary objects. For
Baudrillard,for instance, "Thereare no limits to consumption"63because
modem things are more like words than physical objects. Just as conversa-
tion is inherentlylimitless, so is modem consumption.
48 CARL MITCHAM

[W]e want to consume more and more. [Read: "We want to talk more and more."]
This compulsion to consume [to talk] is not the consequence of some psychological
determinant... nor is it simply the power of emulation. It is a total idealist practice
which has no longer anything to do (beyond a certain point) with the satisfaction of
needs, nor with the reality principle; it becomes energized in the ... object-signs of
consumption. ... Hence, the desire to "moderate"consu~tion or to establish a
normalizingnetworkof needs is naive and absurdmoralism.
Albert Borgmann'sexplication of contemporaryartifactsin terms of what
he calls the device paradigm perhaps provides the beginning of an
analytic response. Borgmann also, alone among serious philosophers of
artifice writingin the wake of Tools for Conviviality,grants it a measure
of recognition- even while he takes issue with at least one thesis of the
text.65
Borgmanncontraststraditionalthings with modem devices.
A thing ... is inseparablefrom its context, namely, its world, and from our commerce
with the thing and its world, namely. engagement.The experience of a thing is always
and also a bodily and social engagementwith the thing'sworld.66

A device, by contrast,seeks to realize the promise of technology "to bring

the forces of natureand culture under control, to liberate us from misery
and toil, and to enrich our lives"67 in a materialobject cut loose from all
bodily and social engagement. In contrast with a fireplace, for example,
"a central heating plant procures mere warmth and disburdens us of all
other elements."68 In its very disburdenment, the device takes on a
disembodiedor immaterializedcharacter,like a word or a sign.
But human beings are not just the users of words and signs; they are
embodied beings whose lives are realized through what Borgmann calls
focal things and practices. While recognizing, with Baudrillard, the
presence and influence of devices, Borgmann nevertheless, like Illich,
calls for
the recognition and restraint of the [device] paradigm.To restrainthe paradigmis to
restrictit to its propersphere. Its propersphere is the backgroundor peripheryof focal
things and practices. Technology so reformed is no longer the characteristic and
dominant way in which we take up with reality; ratherit is a way of proceeding that
we follow at certaintimes and up to a point, one that is left behind when we reach the
thresholdof our focal and final concerns.69

According to Borgmann,such a reform will take place not out of crisis so

much as out of focal concern. It is not the stick of necessity so much as
the carrotof "the significance of things and the dignity of humans"70that
can lead from a nonconvivial to a convivial world. Whetherthis is as true
 TOOLSFOR CONVIVIAliTY:
ARGUMENT, INSIGHT,INFLUENCE 49

in the world dominatedby power tools as it is in a world of hand tools is

perhapsanotherissue to be addressedby artifactistthought.
Although the direct influence of Tools for Conviviality has been
limited, still a diversity of collateral thinkers testify to the need for and
vitality of its artifactistprogram,and to the need for common cause across
more than one philosophicalperspective. Illich's insight may not yet have
been accorded explicit acknowledgment as a contribution to the
phenomenology of artifacts, but then the common pursuit of this reflec-
tion has taken on none of the features of an old or established discourse.
As the phenomenology of artifacts emerges into shared conversation, it
may well be that Tools for Conviviality will be able to playa role. As
argument,it remainsyoung.

The PennsylvaniaState University

NOTES

I Ivan Illich, Tools for Conviviality (New York: Harper & Row, 1973). All page
references in the text are to this volume.
A full analysis of this book would have to incorporatecomparisons with at least
three basic translations,which have benefittedfrom Illich's revisions. With commen-
taries quoted from hand written notes by the author (dated April 1987) on the title
pages in a special collection of the Rare Books Room at the Pattee Libraryof the
PennsylvaniaState University, these are:
La convivencialidad(Barcelona: Barral, 1973). pp. 148. Translatedfrom English
by MateraPadillade Gossmann, but "totallyreviewed by the authorif not dictated
to Dona Matera."Numerous additionsand subtractions.For example, the first two
paragraphsof the English introductionare enlargedto three paragraphsin Spanish,
while the section on tools and libertarianjustice (adaptingJohn StuartMill) at the
end of chaptertwo is simply deleted.

La convivialite (Paris: Seuil, 1973).pp. 160. From the title page of the English
edition of Tools for Conviviality: "N.B. A posterior, French book, based on this
has been totally re-writtenby me, and has often served as the basis for translations
into otherlanguages."

Selbstbegrenzung:Eine politische Kritik der Technik. "Tools for Conviviality."

Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1975. pp. 190. German by Thomas Lindquist.
Copyright references to both English and French versions. ''This is the final
version of my essay, which goes beyond the French. I wrote it with the assistance
of Dr. Gustav Kiinstler, my teacher, mentor and paternal friend, while he was
immobilizeddying ... in a Vienna hospital."
2 According to Illich's commentary(see note 1), Energy and Equity was "writtenat
50 CARL MITCHAM

the requestof MarionBoyars by expandingan articlepublishedin Le Monde.

3 Examples:
From Medical Nemesis (New York: Pantheon,1976), p. 5: This book "uses a model
of social assessment of technological progress that I have spelled out elsewhere
[footnote references Tools for Conviviality] and applied previously to education
[footnote references Deschooling Society] and transportation[footnote references
Energy and Equity], and that I now apply to the criticism of the professional
monopoly and of the scientism in health care."
From Toward a History of Needs (New York: Pantheon, 1978), p. ix: "The ftrst
essay ["Energyand Equity"] is a postscriptto my book Tools for Conviviality (New
York, 1973)."
From Shadow Work (Boston: Marion Boyars, 1981), p. 4: "In Tools for Con-
viviality, I called attention to how the environment is ruined for use-value oriented
action by economic growth."
Tools for Convivialityis also the only book that has been the basis for the publica-
tion of another book by a student of IIlich's work. See Valentina Borremans'
Reference Guide to Convivial Tools, Special Report no. 13 (Library Journal, 1980),
with a preface by Illich. The Guide itself is referenced in Gender (New York:
Pantheon,1982), p. 18.
4 Energy and Equity (New York: Harper& Row, 1974) will also be published in this
series. This will not be the case for any subsequentIIlich book.
5 See, e.g., Valerie Mike, "Towardan Ethics of Evidence - and Beyond: Observa-
tions on Technology and Illness," Research in Philosophy and Technology 9 (1989):
101-113.
6 See John StuartMill, On Liberty(1859), chapter1, paragraph9: "The object of this
essay is to assert one very simple principle ... that the sole end for which mankindis
warranted,individually or collectively, in interferingwith the liberty of action of any
of theirnumber,is self-protection."
7 Wolfgang Sachs, "The Gospel of Global Efficiency: On Worldwatch and other
Reportson the State of the World,"privatelycirculatedarticle, a highly edited version
of which appearedas "A Critiqueof Ecology," New Perspectives Quarterly 6, no. 1
(Spring 1989): 16-19.
8 Ivan IIlich and Barry Sanders,ABC: The Alphabetizationof the Popular Mind (San
Francisco:North Point Press, 1988).
9 Ernst Kapp, in Grundlinieneiner Philosophie der Technik(1877), the ftrst book to
develop an explicit philosophyof technology, stressed the formerview.
10 Ivan IIlich, Celebration of Awareness:A Call for InstitutionalRevolution(Garden
City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1970).
11 JacquesLafttte,Reflexionssur la science des machines (Paris: Bloud et Gay, 1932;
reprintedParis: J. Vrin, 1972); English translation byJohn Hart and Jean LeMoyne,
Reflections on the Science of Machines ([London, Ontario, Canada] Mechanology
Press, n.d.). Gilbert Simondon, Du mode d' existence des objets techniques (paris:
Aubier, 1958; reprinted 1969, 1989). For commentary see Carl Mitcham,
"Documentation:Analysis of Machines in the French IntellectualTradition(Espinas,
Lafttte,Weil)," Research in Philosophyand Technology 2 (1979): 189-234.
12 Jacques Ellul, La Technique ou l'enjeu du siecie (paris: Colin, 1954), chapter2,
section 2. English translationby John Wilkinson: The Technological Society (New
 TOOLSFOR CONVIVIALITY:
ARGUMENT,INSIGHT,INFLUENCE 51

York: Knopf, 1964). See also the two-part update of this seminal text: Le systeme
tecnicien (Paris: Calmann-Levy, 1977), English translationby Joachim Neugroschel,
The Technological System (New York: Continuum,1980); and Le blufftechnologique
(paris:Hachette, 1988); English translationby Geoffrey W. Bromiley, The Technologi-
cal Bluff(GrandRapids, Mich.: Eerdmans,1990).
13 Gunther Anders, "Commandmentsin the Atomic Age," in Burning Conscience
(London:Weidenfeldand Nicolson, 1961), p. 18. Italics added.
14 Lewis Mumford, "Authoritarianand Democratic Technics," Technology and
Culture5, no. 1 (Winter1964): 1-8.
IS Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man (New York:
McGraw-Hill,1964), especially chapterI, "MediumIs the Message."
16 Jean Baudrillard,Le systeme des objets (Paris: Gallimard,1968).
17 HerbertA. Simon, The Sciences of the Artificial (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press,
1969; second, expandededition, 1981).
18 Richard Weaver, "Humanism in an Age of Science," ed. Robert Hamlin,
Intercollegiate Review 7, nos. 1-2 (Fall 1970): 15. (Both Anders and Weaver are
reprinted in C. Mitcham and R. Mackey, eds., Philosophy and Technology, New
York: Free Press, 1972,1983, pp. 130-135 and 136-142, respectively.)
19 For an appraisal of the necessity and benefit of artifice, see Jacques Ellul,
"Techniqueand the Opening Chaptersof Genesis," in Carl Mitcham and Jim Grote,
eds., Theology and Technology (Lanham, Md: University Press of America, 1984),
pp. 123-138.
20 See, e.g., MarshallMcLuhanand QuentinFiore. with JeromeAgel, The MediumIs
the Massage (New York: Bantam, 1967).
21 See Mario Bunge's Scientific Research (New York: Springer, 1967), vol. 2: The
Search for Truth, Part 3, chapter 11, "Action,"for a distinction between substantive
and operative applicationsof science, with the latterconstitutingscientific studies of
machines and human-machine interactions which is another way of describing
Simon's interest.
22 Lewis Mumford,Technics and Civilization (New York: Harcourt,Brace & World,
1963; first published1934), p. 11.
23 Extending this analysis, which obviously adapts terms from Aristotelian
metaphysics, one could describe the tool as signate matter. Then one could also say
that the more technologically advanced the tool, the more signate its matter;and thus
the more determinedits motion.
24 See, e.g., the discussion in LarryA. Hickman'sJohn Dewey's Pragmatic Technol-
ogy (Bloomington: IndianaUniversity Press, 1990).
2S See especially Hans Jonas, The Imperativeof Responsibility:In Search of an Ethics
for the Technological Age, trans. Hans Jonas and David Herr(Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1984).
26 See RobertPaul Wolff, BarringtonMoore, Jr., and HerbertMarcuse,A Critique of
Pure Tolerance (Boston: Beacon, 1965; 2d edition, 1969), for a critical response to
Mill's principle.
27 The dissertationsin question:
(1) BarbaraWelch, "Being-in-the-Body: A Reflection upon American Self-
Medication Drug Advertising,"Ph.D. dissertation, Mass Communications,
Universityof Iowa, 1984. pp. 412.
52 CARL MITCHAM

(2) Michael O'Neill, "InnovativePractices in State FundedCommunityHealth

Agencies: The Case of Quebec's Community Health Departments,"Ph.D.
dissertation,Sociology, Boston University, 1986. pp. 514.
(3) WouterTurpijn,"In de Schaduw van de Volkshuisvesting: Een Studie over
de Zelfwerkzaamheidvan Bewoners" [Shadow-housing: A study of self-
help among residents], Ph.D. dissertation, Urban and Regional Planning,
Rijksuniversiteitte Utrecht(The Netherlands),1987. pp. 225.
(4) David Nicholas James, "WhatIs Professional Ethics?,"Ph.D. dissertation,
Philosophy, VanderbiltUniversity, 1981. pp. 183.
(5) Robert Blythe Bowden, "The Development and Utilization of a School
OperationInstrument,"Ed.D. dissertation, Education, Catholic University
of America, 1981. pp. 157.
(6) Burt David Braunius, "ParticipatoryResearch for Curriculum Building:
Establishing Intentions in Adult Religious Education,"Ph.D. dissertation,
Education,Michigan State University, 1983. pp. 253.
(7) EdwardCosmo Matranga,"RadicalEducationalReform and Alternativesto
Schooling in Revolutionary Mexico," Ph.D. dissertation, Education,
Universityof Connecticut,1981. pp. 279.
(8) Charles Jeffrey Mitchiner, "From FrustratedBureaucratto Radical Critic:
Everett Reimer's Case Against Public Schooling," Ph.D. dissertation,
Education,Georgia State University, 1981. pp. 383.
(9) Kenneth Henry Luebbering,"Learningfor Nowhere: EducationalThought
in Anarchist Tradition," Ph.D. dissertation, Education, University of
Missouri, 1980. pp. 224.
(10) Michele Geslin Small, "Educationfor a Systems Age," Ph.D. dissertation,
Education,University of Minnesota, 1983. pp. 189.
(11) James Hardy Barr, Jr., "Educationfor the Handicapped in the Arabian
Peninsula: Issues and Trends," Ed.D. dissertation, Education, Columbia
UniversityTeachersCollege, 1983. pp. 170.
(12) George Harrison Wood, II, "Schools, Social Change, and the Politics of
Paralysis,"Ph.D. dissertation,Education, University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign,1981. pp. 125.
(13) Terry Price Harter,"A Critique of North American ProtestantTheological
Education from the Perspectives of Ivan Illich and Paulo Freire," Ph.D.
dissertation, Theology,Boston University GraduateSchool, 1980. pp. 338.
(14) John Nelson Fritz, "A ComparativeStudy of Health and Medical Practices
in Two Rural IntermountainCommunities,"Ph.D. dissertation,Anthropol-
ogy, University of Utah, 1984. pp. 314.
(15) Marc Lewis Berk, "The Limits of Medicine: The Distributionof Medical
Resources and its Effect on Health Outcomes," Ph.D. dissertation,
Sociology, New York University, 1981. pp. 165.
(16) JuanneElizabethNancarrowClarke,"Medicalizationin the Past Centuryin
the Province of Ontario: The Physician as Moral Entrepreneur,"Ph.D.
dissertation,Sociology, University of Waterloo, 1980.
(17) Colette Frances Kung, "Illich's LearningWeb Theory and its implications
for Development for the Rural Regions of Malaysia," Ph.D. dissertation,
Education,Loyola University of Chicago, 1979. pp. 159.
 ARGUMENT.INSIGHT.INFLUENCE
TOOLSFOR CONVWIALlTY: 53
(18) Charles Raymond Schindler. "A Philosophical Analysis of Ivan Illich's
Construct. 'Deschooling Society' and Related Terms." Ph.D. dissertation.
Education.Michigan State University. 1972. pp. 96.
(19) John RichardMinnis. "A Study of the Concept Lifelong LearningBased on
a Comparative Analysis of the Philosophy and Educational Thought of
Edward C. Lindeman. Malcom S. Knowles. and Ivan D. Illich." Ph.D.
dissertation,Education,FloridaState University. 1975. pp. 222.
(20) William Iderson Johnson. "HermeticAlchemy as the Patternfor Schooling
Seen by Ivan Illich in the Works of John Amos Comenius."Ph.D. disserta-
tion, Education.Ohio State University, 1973. pp. 168.
(21) Kurt William Holderied. "Ivan Illich and Contemporaries: Comparing
Views of School Reform." Ed.D. dissertation, Education, Marquette
University. 1975. pp. 383.
(22) Robert William McGurrin,"The Sociological, Philosophical. and Educa-
tional Thought of Ivan Illich and Adam Curle," Ed.D. dissertation.
Education.University of SouthernCalifornia.1978.
(23) Lucille C. Bruch. "Deschooling and Retooling: An Examination of the
Philosophy of Ivan IlIich with ParticularEmphasis on his Analysis of the
Structures of Society." Ph.D. dissertation. Education. Michigan State
University. 1974. pp' 1I2.
(24) John Lawrence Elias. "A Comparisonand Critical Evaluationof the Social
and EducationalThought of Paulo Freire and Ivan Illich. with a Particular
Emphasis upon the Religious Inspirationof their Thought,"Ph.D. disserta-
tion. Education.Temple University. 1974. pp. 215.
(25) Salim AkhtarSharif, "The Problem of Poverty in Rural India: A Proposed
Model in the Community Development Program of India. Using the
Pedagogy of the Consciousness Raising (Paulo Freire's and Ivan Illich's
Educational Methods) and Growth Group Models." D.Min. dissertation.
Social Work. ClaremontSchool of Theology. 1976. pp. 103.
28 Ignacio L. Goetz. "On Man and His Schooling." Educational Theory 24 (Winter
1974): 85-98. Aims to clarify. interpret.and defend IlIich'sargumentsin Deschooling
Society.
29 William F. Hare. "Opennessin Education,"Philosophy of Education: Proceedings
30 (1974): 218-226; Brian Birchall. "Some Misconceptions in Ivan Illich."
Educational Theory 24 (Fall 1974): 414-425; and William E. Brownson, "The
Structure of Competition in the School and Its Consequences." Philosophy of
Education: Proceedings 30 (1974): 227-240. Hare and Brownson are sympathetic.
Birchall is not. (Here, and in the relevant notes that follow. the order of citations is
determinedby theiroccurrencein The Philosopher'sIndex.)
30 Michael Micklin. "ThoseMisconceptionsAre Not Illich's,"EducationalTheory25
(Summer1975): 323-329.
31 Ivan Illich. "The Political Uses of Natural Death," Hastings Center Studies 2
(January1974): 18-20.
32 Lee Nisbet. Humanist36 (September-October1976): 49.
33 G. Horobin, "Commentaryon Ivan IlIich's 'The Medicalization of Life' and
Edmund Leach's 'Society's Expectations of Health· ... Journal of Medical Ethics 1
(July 1975): 90-91. Illich's "The Medicalizationof Life" appears in the same issue.
54 CARL MITCHAM

pp. 73-77, along with another relatedpiece.

34 Bruce F. Baker, "lIIich and KierkegaardRecombined,"Philosophy 0/ Education:
Proceedings 34 (1978): 410-416. Leroy F. Troutner, "IIlich and Kierkegaard
Combined," Philosophy 0/ Education: Proceedings 34 (1978): 397-409; Carl G.
Hedman, "The 'Deschooling' Controversy Revisited: A Defense of IIlich's
'ParticipatorySocialism'," EducationalTheory 29 (Spring 1979): 109-116.
35 Carl Hedman, "IlIich, Kozol, and Rousseau on Public Education,"Social Theory
and Practice 6 (Fall 1980): 339-362.
36 A. J. Watt, "IIIich and Anarchism," Educational Philosophy and Theory 13
(October 1981): 1-16; and Timothy Reagan, "The Foundations of IIIich's Social
Thought,"Educational Theory 30 (Fall 1980): 293-306. Watt sees IIIich as a social
theoristin the traditionof anarchistsand syndicalists such as Bakunin and Kropotkin;
Reagan says the theoretical basis of his criticism of social institutions"is essentially
medieval in nature."
37 Ivan Illich, "Shadow-Work" and "VernacularValues," Philosophica (Belgium) 26
(1980): 7-46 and 47-102, respectively.
38 Ivan IIlich "Subsistence,"in Kenneth Vaux, ed., Powers That Make Us Human
(Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1985), pp. 45-53.
39 Anthony Weston, "Ivan lIIich and the Radical Critique of Tools," Research in
Philosophy and Technology9 (1989): 171-182.
40 On IIIich: Brian Birchall, "Some Misconceptions in Ivan IIlich,"cited above from
The Philosopher'sIndex. By IIlich: "The Dawn of EpimetheanMan,"a version of the
conclusion of Deschooling Society, published by CIDOC as part of a colloquium on
the work of Erich Frommin 1972.
41 Alessandro Dall'Olio, SJ., "La critica sociale di Ivan lIIich,"Civiltii Cattolica 127
(1976): 48-53.
42 Hans Achterhuis, Filoso/en van de derde wereld. Frantz Fanon, Che Guevara,
Paulo Freire, Ivan //lich, Mao Tse-Toeng (Bilthoven: Ambo, 1975); HerbertGintis et
at., Critica de Ivan //lich (Barcelona: Anagrama, 1975); dlld Hubert Hannoun, Ivan
Illich 0 la escuela sin sociedad (Barcelona:Edicions 62, 1976).
43 The French and German editions of Medical Nemesis are, incidentally, virtually
new books: Nemesis medicale: ['expropriationde la sante (paris: Seuil, 1975); Die
Nemesis der Medizin, trans. Thomas Lindquist (Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt,
1981). Each, for instance, contains its own distinctive set of copious references to
Frenchand Germanliterature.
44 In the bibliography appended to Carl Mitcham and Robert Mackey, eds.,
Philosophy and Technology: Readings in the Philosophical Problems o/Technology
(New York: Free Press, 1973) there are no books by IIlich, since his work had not yet
explicitly addressedthe question of technology. His only publishedbooks at that time
are two theology collections from 1970 and Deschooling Society (1971). But the
revised bibliography in the paperbackreprint (1983) does include Tools for Con-
viviality, annotating it as "alternative technology" literature. However, the
Bibliography0/ the Philosophy o/Technology(Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1973) which grew out of work on Philosophy and Technology, does annotate The
Church, Change and Development(1970), a volume which was more or less privately
published, in the section on "Religious Critiques: Secondary Sources." The fIrst
update to the general bibliography covering the years 1973-1974 includes lIIich's
 TOOLSFOR CONVlVIAllTY:ARGUMENT, INSIGHT,INFLUENCE 55

Tools for Convivialitywith a substantialannotation;see Carl Mitchamand Jim Grote,

"CurrentBibliography in the Philosophy of Technology: 1973-1974," Research in
Philosophy and Technology, 1 (1978): 313-390. A second bibliographic update for
1975-1976 includes an entry on Medical Nemesis; see Carl Mitcham and Jim Grote,
"CurrentBibliography in the Philosophy of Technology: 1975-1976"; the bibliog-
raphyconstitutesan entire issue of Research in Philosophy and Technology, 4 (1981):
1-241. A thirdbibliographicupdate for 1977-1978 has an entry on Toward aHistory
of Needs (1978); see Carl Mitcham and Jim Grote, "CurrentBibliography in the
Philosophy of Technology: 1977-1978," Research in Philosophy and Technology, 6
(1983): 231-289.
The bibliographyon theology and technology repeats the entry on Church, Change
and Developmentfrom 1973; see Carl Mitcham and Jim Grote, eds., Theology and
Technology: Essays in Christian Analysis and Exegesis (Lanham, Md.: University
Press of America, 1984), pp. 323-516.
45 Lane DeMoll and Gigi Coe, eds., Stepping Stones: AppropriateTechnology and
Beyond(New York: Schocken, 1978).
46 See note 3.
47 Malcom Hollick, "The Appropriate TechnologyMovement and Its Liberation:A
Retrospective,"Technologyin Society 4, no. 3 (1982): 213-229.
48 See especially ''The Three Dimensions of Public Choice" and "Research by
People"in ShadowWork(Boston: MarionBoyars, 1981), pp. 7-26 and 75-95.
49 Ivan Illich, Gender (New York: Pantheon,1982), pp. 91-93.
so LangdonWinner,AutonomousTechnology: Technics-out-of-Controlas a Theme in
Political Thought (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1977); and The Whale and the
Reactor: A Search for Limits in an Age of High Technology (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1986).
51 Don Ihde, Technics and Praxis (Boston: Reidel, 1979); and Existential Technics
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1983).
S2 Mihaly Csikszentrnihalyiand Eugene Rochberg-Halton,The Meaning of Things:
Domestic Symbolsand the Self (New York: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1981).
S3 Albert Borgmann, Technology and the Character of Contemporary Life: A
Philosophical Inquiry(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984).
54 Winner, Autonomous Technology, p. 240, mentions Illich along with Ellul,
Mumford,Marcuse,and Goodman. But each of the otherfour, with one or more of his
works cited, is discussed at some length. The only place to find Illich's full name is in
the index; and no works are cited.
ss Ellul, TechnologicalSystem,pp. 335, n. 22; 339, n. 4; 348, n. 7; and 355, n. 13. All
references are to Tools for Conviviality. See also Ellul, Technological Bluff, p. 108:
"IvanIllich was the best if not the first of those to emphasize thresholds."
S6 Winner, AutonomousTechnology, pp. 326-327. There are some minor citation
mistakes in Weston.
57 Weston, "IvanIllich and the Radical Critiqueof Tools," p. 182, note 6.
58 Winner, The Whale and the Reactor, pp. 72 and 141. The first reference is to no
particularwork; the second, to Medical Nemesis.
S9 Ibid., pp. 28-29.
60 Ibid., p. 39.
61 Ihde, Technics and Praxis, p. 21.
56 CARL MITCHAM

62 Csikszentmihalyiand Rochberg-Halton,The Meaning of Things, p. 16.

63 Baudrillard,Le systeme des objets, from the translationin Mark Poster, ed., Jean
Baudrillard:Selected Writings (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1988), p.
24. Italics in the original.
64 Poster, Baudrillard:Selected Writings,p. 25.
65 Borgmann, Technology and the Character of ContemporaryLife, pp. 167-168.
Illich is also mentioned in passing and/orfootnoted on pp. 125,145, and 278.
66 Ibid., p. 4l.
67 Ibid.
68 Ibid., p. 42.
69 Ibid., p. 220.
70 Ibid.
 LEONARD J. WAKS

IVAN ILLICHAND DESCHOOLINGSOCIETY:

A REAPPRAISAL

I. DESCHOOUNGSOCIETY:THE SETIING

It is difficult for readersnew to Ivan Illich's Deschooling Society to grasp

its message unless they place it in the ideological context of the late
1960s. Paintingwith a broadbrush,we may say that focal concerns of this
time included inequality, psychological impotence, and environmental
crisis:
Social Inequality:The decade which began with Michael Harrington's
The OtherAmericamoved throughthe civil rights movement and Lyndon
Johnson'sWar on Poverty to the Black Muslims and Black Panthers.It
startedwith a rush of liberal idealism and ended with new frustrationsand
new polarizingrhetoricsof race conflict.
Psychological Impotence: Popular psychological and sociological
books of the 1950s, such as Paul Goodman'sGrowing Up Absurd,David
Reisman'sThe Lonely Crowd, and William F. Whyte'S The Organization
Man focused on conformity and alienation. New studies in the 1960s
included Kenneth Keniston's The Uncommitted,and at decade's end, a
flood of books on alienation.
The Crisis of Technology and Environment: The decade began as
Rachel Carson's Silent Spring raised environmental awareness, which
then focused on exponential population growth (Paul Ehrlich's The
Population Bomb), environmentalpollution, and resource depletion. The
Vietnam body counts and defoliation underscoredthe "anti-life"natureof
technology.
The nation's youth responded with campus anti-warprotests and off-
campus experiments in living. Stewart Brand's Whole Earth Catalog
became the key publicationevent at decade's end, and the first EarthDay
was celebrated in 1970. The Whole Earth Catalog'S innocent sounding
subtitle "access to tools" was in fact subversive; while focused on do-it-
yourself information,the word "tools" implied things held in the hand,
brought under personal control to endow utilitarianactivities with self-

57
Paul T. Durbin (ed.), Europe, America,and Technology:Philosophical Perspectives, 57-73.
© 1991 KluwerAcademicPublishers.
58 LEONARDJ. WAKS

expressive purpose. A lifestyle grounded in "tools" was thus contrasted

with the "anti-life" technology of the "mega-machine"and "military-
industrialcomplex."

The Ideology ofSchooling and School Ideologies

Thatthe educationalsystem would be called upon to melioratethese three
social problems should come as no surprise;since the system of schools
and colleges was set in place, Americans have regardedit as a panacea.
Because social ills grow from the awareness, attitudes, imaginations,and
skills of the people, it is plausible to think that educationcan cure them.
This kind of thinking is also convenient, for the putative problem-
resolutions are expected in the indeterminatefuture, without causing any
immediate social disruptions. Economic disparities can be addressed by
expanding higher education to improve access to professional roles.
Racist attitudes can be ameliorated through multicultural, alienation
throughaffective, and ecocide by environmentaleducation.
This "panacea-thinking" re-framescurrentsocial problems in terms of
educationalprograms,and the late 1960s saw a flowering of educational
ideologies, including those of at least nine groups:
(1) Liberal establishmentarians:These were primarily Washington-
based educational opinion leaders closely linked to the national
Democratic party, who advocated greater educational equity and child-
centeredness,both of which implied increased educationspending.
(2) Back to basics conservatives: Examples included Max Rafferty and
S. I. Hayakawa in California, who supported entrenched practices and
opposed the liberal agenda and its increased educationalexpendituresas
miseducative"frills."
(3) Technologicalprogressives: Here the leading figures, B. F. Skinner,
Benjamin Bloom, and James Popham, sought to raise standardsthrough
the measurementof minimumcompetencies of teachers and learners.This
group redefined education in terms of scientifically based behavioral-
managementinterventionsto produce"specific learningobjectives."
(4) Free-schoolers: Led by A. S. Neill and Peter Marin, this group
wanted schools to be places where kids could be left free to "do their own
thing"and whose curriculum,in the American version at least, was often
a mixtureof radical slogans, psychedelic drugs, and sexual intercourse.
(5) Community controllers: This group argued that educational
 IVAN ILLICHAND DESCHOOLINGSOCIETY:A REAPPRAISAL 59

inequalities were the result of white educators'malevolence towards and

ignorance of minority kids. They thought that minorities would have
better opportunities if minority leaders could gain control of school
administrationsand curricula.
(6) White radical school reformers: Books such as HerbertKohl's 36
Children and Jonathan Kozol's Death at an Early Age argued that
through stupidity and design large city schools worked against minority
students. Putting it crudely, they proved that top Harvard liberal arts
graduatescould be more effective in conveying basic verbal and quantita-
tive skills to minority youth than ordinaryteachers (white or minority)
lacking theirelevated IQs and culturaland educationalopportunities.
(7) Communitarian anarchists:This view, best exemplified in the work
of Paul Goodman, argued that school was largely irrelevant in the
socialization process, that the real "curriculum"was simply the larger
society, and that educational reform simply meant making a better
society.
(8) Dialogicalliberationists: Paulo Freire and his followers developed
strategies tying acquisition of basic cognitive skills to awareness of
conflicts shaping the life contours of their mostly oppressed adult
students.
(9) Hidden curricularists: Philip Jackson's Life in Classrooms and
Robert Dreeben's On What is Learned in School argued, on the basis of
classroom observationsand social theory, that the function of school was
not to convey cognitive skills, but rather to convey norms and values
which required toleration of passive roles, authority, crowding and
external evaluation, in order to "prepare"young people for life in
industrialsociety.
We may divide these into those offering prescriptions for school
improvement (1-6), and those making critiques of the institution of
schooling (7-9). The improvers, despite their differences, shared the
assumption that major social problems could be resolved by
improvements in education. The "deschooling" slogan corralled the
improvers and made them a visible target by challenging explicitly their
sharedcore assumption.The critics stepped beyond school improvement,
and it was Illich who integratedtheir insights. In the early 1970s it was
frequently said that while there were no new elements in Illich's critique,
he had re-configuredelements of existing critiquesinto a new whole.
60 LEONARD 1. WAKS

II. DESCHOOLINGSOCIETY:THE TEXT

Illich organizedan alternativeeducationparadigmaroundthe deschooling

concept. He had read, admiredand quoted Kuhn's Structureof Scientific
Revolutions,and saw himself as offering a new template for educational
and social studies which resolved anomalies in the competing ideologies
of late industrial society while suggesting new lines of inquiry and
practice.
The most daring and paradoxicalaspect of the new paradigmwas that
it took the system of schools and colleges to be the prime cause of the
social dilemmas of late industrialsociety, ratherthan as the means to their
resolution.
Illich's tone was confrontational; he shocked his concerned and
thoughtful readers with a new vision just beyond their bandwidth of
thinkable options. He did not start where they were and take them one
step at a time from shared definitions and premises to new conclusions.
Instead his new vision filled every sentence, every word, with new
meaning. The paradigmshift was like a religious conversion. Initially one
did not quite understand;every idea seemed just out of reach. Then there
was an intuition, and finally a clear vision of a new world both obvious
and necessary. In retrospect,the opening ideas seemed not so much like
first steps of an argument,but dazzling insights which already embodied
the new conclusions.
Many students, especially those who are poor, intuitively know what the schools do
for them. They school them to confuse process and substance. Once these become
blurred,a new logic is assumed: the more treatmentthere is, the betterare the results
... imagination is "schooled" to accept service in place of value (p. I; all page
references in the text are to Illich's Deschooling Society, 1970).1

Here in the first three sentences we have the core of Deschooling Society,
and if well-schooled readers do not quite get it, those uneducable little
minoritykids understandit intuitively.
SumnerRosen put this point well:
The brilliance of his writing, its epigrammatic and paradoxical weight, poses an
obstacle for some. The sparks seem to take on a life of their own.... He often maps
different but converging approaches to his target rather than building a reasoned
argumentthat enables the readerto isolate and deal with the stages of analysis. Illich
prefers to state and then restate and elaboratehis central insights; he prefers to begin
with them ratherthan move towards them. Thus everything depends on the correct-
ness of his position, the accuracy with which his first shot hits the target.2
 IVAN ILLICHAND DESCHOOUNGSOCIETY:A REAPPRAISAL 61

Though Deschooling Society presents in this way a multifaceted jewel,

each chapterbears its own specific weight. Illich asserts in chapter 1 that
schooling is the prime cause of our social problems rather than the
solution to them. Therefore we must disestablish schools, not try to
improve them. He explains in chapter 2 the essential terms "schooling"
and "deschooling,"while arguing (in chapter3) that schooling leads to an
"institutionalizationof values" which lies at the root of our primarysocial
ills.
Chapter4 established a broadersocial-philosophicalcontext for these
claims. "Left-convivial"institutions are contrastedwith "right-manipula-
tive" opposites on the socio-political spectrum.Learninginstitutionsplay
a key role at both poles. The key philosophicaldichotomies of the book -
process vs. value, constraintvs. freedom, passivity vs. activity, expecta-
tion vs. hope, addictionvs. self-reliance- are associated with left vs. right
social alternatives.Our social problems are rooted in right-manipulative
institutions.Schooling is the keystone which holds all other manipulative
institutionsin place.
The various school reform proposals, despite their differences, all take
compulsory schooling for granted (chapter 5) while learning webs
illustrate (chapter 6) that viable alternative learning institutions are
possible. Finally, in chapter7, Illich makes the ethical principle guiding
his analysis - the primacy of self-defining persons living within es-
tablished limits - explicit. We can now re-read Deschooling Society in
greaterdetail.

1. WhyWe MustDisestablish Schools

Schooling is a paradigm of an industrial-age institution, so that the
analysis of schooling becomes a paradigmfor the analysis of others, such
as the family, state, and medicine. But there is something special and
central in schooling - in some fashion schooling sets and holds in place
the patterns of norms and behaviors which protect and sustain other
institutions.
The analysis of schooling is thus both a template for analyses of other
institutions which together will demonstrate "the mutual definition of
man's nature and the nature of modern institutions which characterizes
world view and language" (p. 2), and a special case as the keystone
institution.
There are two aspects to deschooling: deschooling education and
62 LEONARDI. WAKS

deschooling society. It is not just education but social reality which has
been schooled and not just education but society which needs to be
deschooled.

2. PhenomenologyofSchools
Because our worldview and language are shaped by our industrial-age
assumptions, we seek a language which breaks free from these assump-
tions, a stripping away of these to gain a more natural,assumption-free
standpoint; hence the need for a phenomenology of schooling. Illich
attemptsto go "backto the things themselves"to see them with renewed
clarity.
In this spirit, schooling is re-described as an age-specific, teacher-
related process requiring full-time attendance and an obligatory cur-
riculum (p. 25). It is critical to rememberthat when schooling is critiqued
in Deschooling Society, it is defined by these four criteria, which also
permit the definition of "deschooling"as the deconstructionof the age-
specific, teacher-related,compulsory curriculum.This process has three
dimensions:
de-financingschooling, by reducingpublic expenditureson education;
dis-establishing schooling, by eliminating regulations mandating
cumpulsory attendance, and rendering illegal all barriers to learning
opportunitiesor employment based on prior treatmentsundergone; and
opening the marketfor educational services, by eliminating barriersto
their provision outside the mainstreamsystem.

3. RitualizationofProgress
There are four links between schooling and the social pathologies of
industrialsociety. Schooling is a model, a paradigm,of passive consump-
tion. It creates technical professionals in the production and service
sectors to fulfill expectations and sustain new demand. It creates radical
monopolies by promotingthe belief that one needs the special skills of all
these professionals, and so confines thinking within the web of industrial
skill and activity categories. By so doing, it constrains active doing for
oneself and active self-definition, driving out naturalcompetence in all
dimensions of life including learning itself. Finally, schooling is the
driving force of industrial pollution, by creating a growing addiction to
industriallyproducedgoods and the industriallife-style.
 IVAN ILLICHAND DESCHOOLINGSOCIETY:A REAPPRAISAL 63

These links in turn depend upon four myths: (a) the myth of the
institutionalizationof values, (b) the myth of the measurementof values,
(c) the myth of the packagingof values, and (d) the myth of self-perpetuat-
ing progress.
(a) The mytho/the institutionalizingo/values: School teaches that any
social process must have a correspondingvalue, based on the paradigm
that the process of instruction (however meaningless and deadly)
produceslearningand knowledge. Once this idea sinks in:
All our activities tend to take the shape of client relationships to other specialized
institutions. Once the self-taught man or woman has been discredited, all non-
professional activity is rendered suspect... [and the learner becomes] easy prey to
otherinsitutions(p. 39).
(b) The mytho/the measuremento/values: Institutionalizedvalues are
quantitativeand measurable, whereas growth as a person is growth in
"disciplineddissidence," which cannot be comparedwith any curriculum
evaluationrod or anotherperson'sachievement.
(c) The mytho/the packaging o/values: The reductionof knowledge to
a commodity conditions the learnerto expect it to come from a learning
package:
The result of the curriculumproductionprocess looks like any other modem staple. It
is a bundle of plannedmeanings, a package of values, a commodity whose "balanced
appeal" makes it marketable ... consumer-pupils are taught to make their desires
conform to marketablevalues (p. 41).
(d) The myth 0/ self-perpetuating progress: School programs are
designed to addict the learnerto even more school programs;but even if
such learning becomes an addiction, it can never yield "the joy of
knowing something to one's own satisfaction." Each subject comes
packaged with the instructionto go on consuming the next. But "growth
conceived as open ended consumption- eternalprogress- can never lead
to maturity"(p. 43).
Each of these myths obscures the difference between a life of realizing
one's personal meanings throughself-defmed action and a life of passive
expectation and joyless consumption. In the passive life, the personal
good becomes redefmed as possession of unequally distributed
commodities and services. Power over living is transferredfrom personal
hands to manipulativeinstitutionscontrolledby elites, and life is reduced
to endless consumption of industrially produced products and services,
leading to irreversibleenvironmentaldegradation.
64 LEONARD1. WAKS

4. Institutional Spectrum
Institutionsfor learning thus undergirdall other institutions, and school-
ing - so defined - is the foundation of contemporary technological
society. As Illich put it:
I believe that a desirable future depends on our deliberatelychoosing a life of action
over a life of consumption,on our engenderinga lifestyle which will enable us to be
spontaneous,independent,yet relatedto each other, ratherthan maintaininga lifestyle
which only allows us to make and unmake, produce and consume -a style of life
which is merely a way station to the depletion and pollution of the environment(p.
52).

We thus need criteria for distinguishing left-convivial institutions, those

which support personal growth and the appropriate technological
developments which conduce to it, from right-manipulativeones where
technocratsforce us to live out and even redefine our lives within their
straitjacket.It is worth quoting Illich at length on this distinction:
At stake in the choice between the institutional right and left is the very nature of
human life; man must choose whether to be rich in things or in the freedom to use
them (p. 62) ....
At both extremes of the spectrum we find service institutions,but on the right the
service is imposed manipulation,and the client is made the victim of advertising,
aggression, indoctrination,imprisonmentand electroshock. On the left the service is
amplified opportunitywithin formally defined limits, while the client remains a free
agent.
Right wing institutionstend to be highly complex and costly productionprocesses
in which much of the elaboration and expense is concerned with convincing con-
sumers that they cannot live without the productor the treatmentbeing offered by the
institution. Left wing institutions tend to be networks which facilitate client initiated
communicationor cooperation(p. 55).

The postal or telephone service is a left-convivial institution, because

access is easy and the message is not controlled, so individualscan freely
use the service to further their own ends. Highways look like left-
convivial institutionsbut are not, because access demands possession of a
car, and the highways provide only "privilegedaccess to restricted areas"
(p. 58). The productionof cars creates the demand for multilane super-
highways, bridges, and oilfields; this "hooks society on the entire
package."
But schooling is the "most insidious" of non-convivial institutions,
because while highway systems only produce a demand for cars,
schooling all at once creates and sustains the demandfor the "entireset of
 IVAN ILLICHAND DESCHOOLINGSOCIETY:A REAPPRAISAL 65

modem institutions at the right end of the spectrum"(p. 60). Highways

result from the perversionof the naturaldesire for mobility, while schools
"pervertthe natural inclination to grow and learn" into the demand for
instruction,leading to the "abnegationof self-initiated activity." Unsafe
cars may kill and maim on the highways, but, by making people abdicate
responsibilityfor their own growth, schooling leads to "spiritualsuicide"
(p.60).

5. IrrationalConsistencies
The liberals, conservatives, free-schoolers, behavioral managers,
community-controllers,and radical reformers all accept as givens the
need for more schooling and wider distributionof the commodities and
services of consumer society. Instead of trying to settle the debates
between them, we must view them as so many sides of the same worth-
less coin, as sharing the assumptions which confine young people to the
"irrationalconsistencies" of fitting their activities and life-plans into the
procrusteanbeds of technocratic,manipulativealternatives.

6. LearningWebs
To show that there is nothing inevitable about the rightwarddirection of
contemporary society, Illich seeks to demonstrate by the example of
"learningwebs" that left-convivial alternativesare at least possible - that
there can be effective educational institutions which do not depend on
manipulationor marketing,and do not determineaccess to other forms of
activity - hence, which can avoid creating those addictions which
generate pathological inequalities, impotence, and environmental
degradation.
Learningrequirementsin society can be met by four webs, or "reticular
structures"providing access to (a) things, (b) models, (c) peers, and (d)
masterteachers and life guides:
(a) Things: Schooling cuts the learneroff from the world, and removes
things from everyday use by labeling them educational tools. Thus even
the textbook, library book, cassette, or map can be used only when a
curriculumprescribes.Deschooling requires making the general environ-
ment more accessible (for example, by eliminating inscrutable modem
high-tech junk) and making "educationaltools" widely available for self-
directedlearning.
66 LEONARD J. WAKS

(b) Models for the acquisition of skills: Here Illich argues that school-
ing, through the certification process, makes skills scarce by eliminating
skilled but uncertifiedmodels from the educationalmarket.
(c) Peer-matching: Communications devices, similar to computer
dating services, can permitpeople to find partnersfor activities involving
the explorationand use of skills acquired.Peer-matchingis impossible in
schools, where no chess players can find a close match, or where common
interestsare at best accidentaland haphazard.
(d) Elders to be primuminter pares in difficult exploratoryintellectual
journeys. Here Illich's model is the self-chosen "masterteacher."While
this is "somewhatelusive,"

In practice, an individual is a leader if people follow his initiative and become

apprentices in his progressive discoveries. Frequently this involves a progressive
vision of entirely new standards- quite understandabletoday - in which present
"wrong"will tum out "right"(pp. 99-1(0).

7. RebirthofEpimetheanMan
In the final chapter,llIich makes his guiding ethical principleexplicit: the
primacy of lives of self-determinedfree activity, within social limits, in
pursuit of self-defined goals and meanings. Because he calls such self-
defining individuals "Epimethean,"reviewing the Epimetheus myth may
help us grasp his meaning.
Epimetheus (hindsight) was the brother of the Titan Prometheus
(foresight, planning). Zeus gave the two brothersjoint responsibility for
creating man. Epimetheus made the first try, but unthinkinglygave away
all the powers to naturalcreatures- courage to lions, speed to leopards-
thus leaving nothing for man. Prometheusthen went to the sun and lit a
torch for man who, otherwise weak and pitiful, could gain control over
naturewhen armedwith fire.
The gods, seeking to restrict fire-empoweredman, created woman, in
the form of the alluring Pandora(gift for all). They filled her box with
miseries and misfortunes, and warned her never to open it. Prometheus
resisted her charms, but Epimetheus could not. He married her and
broughther down to earth,and when curiosity led her to open the box, the
miseries and misfortunesflew out, leaving only hope behind.
For Illich, our Promethean legacy of fire (technology) has for the
moment eclipsed our Epimethean legacy of hope. Our penchant for
 IVAN ILLICHAND DESCHOOUNGSOCIETY:A REAPPRAISAL 67

planning has gotten ahead of our historical understanding;our lust for

power and control has overcome our love of one anotherand our planet
home. We must now back off from the Prometheanventure and foster the
Epimetheans among us - those who will "love the earth more than
products,"who can "meeteach other,"yet who can also collaboratewith
their Prometheanbrothersin the lighting of fire and the bending of iron
(pp. 115-116).

III. DESCHOOLINGAND THE EPILOGTO THE INDUSTRIALAGE

From Deschooling Society (1970) through Tools for Conviviality (1973)

and Medical Nemesis (1976), Illich developed a critique of industrial
institutions, which he called an "epilog"to the industrialage. The "two
watersheds"of Tools for Conviviality, which divided industrialdevelop-
ment into three stages, providedthe framework.The first stage culminates
at an initial watershedwhen productionand service professionalsare able
to maximize the marginal value of innovations, measured against
conventional yardsticks. Between the two watersheds additional innova-
tions provide additional value, but the marginal value (the amount of
value addedby each) diminishes.
Past the second watershed, each additional innovation is of negative
value - that is, the total situation is made worse by each "improvement"
in treatmentor process. In orderto maintainthe appearanceof improve-
ment, innovators are compelled past that point to "invent their own
yardsticks."That is, value criteriaare subtly shifted to yield positive (but
invalid) assessments of further(negative) developments. Past the second
watershedthe technical professionals continue to make "breakthroughs,"
but only on objectives they have themselves established. Their own
processes and outcomes replace the results valued on the initial criteria;
hospitalized health in an iron lung or artificial heart, or the nuclear
security of star wars, or certificationfor additionalunits of mind-numbing
programmed instruction, replace health, security, and competence.
Because of this shift in value criteria(which the "have nots" understand
intuitively), those who have bought into the game confuse process with
substance, and service with value. This lies behind their sense of im-
potence and theirtreadmillof joyless consumption.
For Illich, the first watershed in medicine and other industrialized
professions took place around 1913, the second during the mid-1950s.
Interestingly,John Dewey's educationalproject was formulatedbetween
68 LEONARD J. WAKS

1900 (School and Society) and 1916 (Democracy and Education). So

Illich implicitly scripts himself in the Deschooling Society narrativeas the
Dewey counterpartin the after-the-second-watershedperiod, the age of
decline.
At the ftrst watershed, more educationat the margin meant the greatest
additional gain in intelligence per until of treatment- hence Dewey's
optimistic tone. Past the second watershed, however, each additional
treatment yields less cumulative intelligence and adaptiveness; at that
point the system of schools and colleges starts to make people stupider,
and each "improvement"in the system makes them even stupiderthan the
one before.
It is crucial to grasp that this decrease in collective competence is not a
direct result of poor teaching-learningpractices. It grows, instead, from
the radical monopoly of educators, and their promotion of radical
monopoly in other spheres of activity. People learn in school that action
outside of certifted areas of expertise is not legitimate; thus they lose the
ability to give personal direction to their lives, to learn and to act as they
will.
This two-watersheds framework helps explain the connection Illich
wants to draw between schooling and the problems of inequality,
impotence, commodity-addiction, and industrial pollution. Past the
second watershed, new value-yardsticksare invented by technocrats,and
poverty is redeftnedas failing to meet them. Once basic needs have been
translatedby society into demands for industriallyproducedcommodities
and services, poverty can be deftned by standardswhich technocratscan
change at will; being poor means falling behind any currentlyadvertised
ideal of consumption.
The growing dependence on technocratic institutions for basic needs
leads to psychological impotence,the inabilityto fend for oneself. Thus im-
potence is simply one aspect of modem poverty; it is the poverty of self-
possession, the school-induced lack of alive awareness of one's natural
capacities, which even the "haves"suffer along with the "have-nots."
Medical Nemesis reinforces this reading. The worst medical problem
Illich diagnoses in that work is not clinical iatrogenesis - people getting
sick from harmful medical treatments.Clinical iatrogenesis only calls for
betterclinical medicine. Social and cultural iatrogenesis- doctor-induced
addiction to health care, dependence on the doctor and submission to
medical authorityand ritualsfor action in ever-expandingspheres of life -
are by far more serious problems.
 IVAN ILLICHAND DESCHOOUNGSOC/EIY:A REAPPRAISAL 69

In Medical Nemesis Illich does not urge a bettersort of clinical practice

- "preventive,""client-aligned"and "natural"- in place of high-tech
developments. In "A Plea for Body History: Twelve Years After Medical
Nemesis,"3 he suggests that the more holistic and people-based clinical
practices have actually had even more detrimental consequences, by
making us all willing handmaidens of the medical culture, unpaid
physician'sassistants, increasing our addictions to "health"as the doctor
would define it, bringing "our bodies and our selves" under medical
concepts and care.4
This should make us cautious about reading Illich as an educational
innovator advocating learning webs as educational alternatives - even
though many influentialreadersinterpretedIllich in this way. The clinical
consequence of schooling is that people are made stupid by compulsory
lessons. But this is not as serious as the social and cultural consequence
of schooling - that people become (falsely) convinced that they cannot do
for themselves - that they cannot define their lives, learn what they need
to know, and act effectively to achieve theirends.
To put this another way, Illich's basic concern was not deschooling
education,but deschooling society - hence the jarringtitle of his book. He
did not direct his critique against conventional pedagogy, but rather
against radical monopoly and its cultural side effects; his goal in
Deschooling Society was no more to advance educational alternatives
than it was in Medical Nemesis to push for alternativemedicine.

IV. DESCHOOLINGSOCIETY:CRITIQUE

We can evaluate Deschooling Society with respect to both the social end
it advances and the means it puts forward for attaining thatend. I start
with problemsof means.
Several early critics complained that Illich offered no map, no transi-
tion strategy, to achieve a convivial society. They noted that Illich called
deschooling a "political objective" but then failed to indicate any
plausible political action steps.
We could ask whetherthe "learningwebs" themselves could become a
part of a strategy for deschooling society, a tool for ushering in a left-
convivial alternative,or whetherthe webs must be seen solely as elements
of the convivial end?
Because so many influential authors were prescribing educational
70 LEONARDJ. WAKS

innovations at the time, it was all too easy to read the learning webs as
prescribed innovations, and Illich's detailed descriptions made this
especially tempting. Ronald Gross, JohnHolt and other out-of-the-system
educators immediately set up such webs in the hope of transforming
education.
Illich himself had arguedthat the value to be derived from at least some
of the webs dependedupon the prior transitionto a deschooled society (p.
101). And the webs developed by Gross and Holt, whatevertheir virtues,
have hardly shaken society. At most, they have provided one kink in the
educational system - while in the process co-opting Illich as an educa-
tional innovator. We must conclude that Deschooling Society fails when
considered as a heuristic for generatingimmediate tactics for transform-
ing society.
What standardsmight Illich himself have set? He says:
As Thomas Kuhnpoints out, in a periodof constantlychangingparadigmsmost of the
very distinguished leaders are bound to be proven wrong by the test of hindsight.
Intellectualleadershipdoes depend on superiorintellectualdiscipline and imagination
and the willingness to associate with others in theirexercise (p. 1(0).

Herbert Gintis5 criticized Illich for working outside of particularlocal

action groups such as feminist collectives or labor unions. The criticism
was precisely that Illich did not associate with others, or at least enough
of the right ones. For Gintis, this failure reflected "dialectical"shortcom-
ings in Illich's critical method; he offered a negation, an antithesis, but
failed to go beyond it to a new synthesis grounded in real people with
action opportunitiesand achievable goals in real life situations.
We can generalize this kind of audience-relatedcriticism for judging
Deschooling Society as a paradigm.For Kuhn, a new paradigmsucceeds
not merely because of its cognitive power in resolving anomalies, but
because of the values of scientists. Ideas become paradigmatic when
following them takes the followers where they want and need to go - to
new lines of inquiry, new links to resources for experiments, new
attention from the importantcenters of scientific power and authority.
This leads us to consider whether deschooling appealed in a comparable
mannerto the values of any groups influencing educationaldecisions and
directionsin society, left, right, or center.
Illich's ideas did suggest directions for some out-of-the-system
educators. And for a short time Illich was also "news" in the education
colleges; many professors of educational theory and policy used
 IVAN ILLICHAND DESCHOOLlNGSOCIETY:A REAPPRAISAL 71

Deschooling Society and Everett Reimer's companion volume, School Is

Dead, in requiredcourses for educationalprofessionals. Peter Goldstone,
a philosopherin the Temple University College of Education,frequently
referred with irony to the 3-credit "school is dead" requirement for
teacher certification in Pennsylvania, suggesting that the deschooling
concept offered all educatorsis not a productivenew direction but a dead
end.
Like Gintis and Illich's Marxistcritics, we can also assess Illich's left-
convivial vision of humanity in society as an ideal end. I have some
doubts (they are no more than this) about the very possibility of convivial
society as Illich depicts it. He provides only hints about left-convivial
institutions. While we have both right-manipulative society and a
sociology to explain it, we possess no concrete examples of left society.
Illich frequently emphasized the universal reach of schooling and right-
manipUlative institutions in the contemporary world. This fact, plus
Kenneth Boulding's fIrst law (anything which exists is possible),
currentlywarrantsus in assertingonly that right-manipulativetechnologi-
cal societies are possible. The Illich corpus consists of brilliantcritiques
and imaginativethought-experiments,but it does not depict a functioning
world of real people in a real convivial society.
I worry that Illich may be inferring the possibility of left-convivial
society from the existence of marginal left-convivial sub-groups within
manipulativesociety. He may see his own band of roving scholars as a
microcosm of convivial society, thinking, "We exist - why can't
everyone be just like us?" But this would be an unacceptableinference. It
is one thing for some individuals in society to break away from conven-
tion and shape their own lives - here our understandingthe phraseand the
situation is at least partially dependent upon the given backgroundof
stable social conventions and economic processes. It is quite anotherfor
there to be a society composed exclusively of "disciplineddissidents."
This may enjoy something of the logical status of a handfulof thumbs, a
week full of weekends, or a lifetime of retirement.

V. CONCLUDINGREMARKS

Even if we were to conclude that Deschooling Society has failed to map

out either a convincing social ideal or a transitionalstrategy (I do not
imagine that anything I have said forces this conclusion), it still must be
said that Illich refocused the discussion of education in society, showing
72 LEONARD J. WAKS

with great clarity what was at stake in the question of education policy.
He created an intellectual system-perturbation,and liberated a lot of
energy that was bound up in taken-for-grantedassumptions. The dust is
still settling.
Can we use Deschooling Society as a source of insight for the 1990s?
The social, psychological, and environmentalconcerns of 1970 have all
evolved in unanticipatedways, and new problems (e.g., the decline of the
U.S. in the global economy) compete for public attention. We have new
ideological needs. The contemporaryrelevance of the Illich corpus cannot
be taken for granted if the Sunday New YorkTimes Book Review is any
indicator.In a "Springcleaning"article in Spring 1990, some wit advised
us to throw out "all books by Ivan Illich."
Personally I think this would be hasty and foolish. These books still
provide a trenchant analysis of our educational institutions and their
social and culturaleffects. Illich may yet prove to be our Moses, pointing
us to the promisedland he never entered. If we toss him aside, where will
a new synthesis, or even the materials for one, come from? Few of the
educational ideas of the late 1960s came out of research universities.
Outside-the-systemintellectuals - from A. S. Neill and Peter Marin to
Paul Goodman,JonathanKozol, and even Ivan Illich himself - made their
statements and received a hearing. But if we take Russell Jacoby's
warning in The Last Intellectuals seriously, and I think we must, there are
now fewer vantage points in society for a fresh vision as the universities
absorb all intellectual energies. In 1990 we do not have nine robust
educational ideologies, or even one which generates real sparks. (Allan
Bloom is hardly more than a disgruntledprofessor; the anti-canonistsand
deconstructivists are mostly young turks fighting for academic turf.)
Twenty years after Deschooling Society, we are more mired than ever in
schooling, comfortedonly by a mountingtolerancefor its anomalies.6

The PennsylvaniaState University

NOTES

I Ivan Illich" Deschooling Society (New York: Harper& Row, 1970). See also his
Tools/or Conviviality(New York: Harper& Row, 1973) and Medical Nemesis (New
York: Pantheon,1976).
2 SumnerRosen, "TakingIllich Seriously,"in A. Gartner,C. Greer, and F. Riessman,
eds., AfterDeschooling What? (New York: Harper& Row, 1973), pp. 85-103.
3 Ivan Illich, "A Plea for Body History: Twelve Years after Medical Nemesis,"
 IVAN ILLICHAND DESCHOOLINGSOCIETY:A REAPPRAISAL 73

Bulletin o/Science, Technology, and Society 6, no. 6 (1986): 19-22.

4 Ibid., p. 20.
5 HerbertGintis, "Towarda Political Economy of Education:A Radical Critique of
Ivan Illich's Deschooling Society," in Gartner,Greer, and Riessman, AfterDeschool-
ing What?, pp. 29-76.
6 I wish to thank Carl Mitcham for suggesting many useful stylistic and substantive
improvements.
 ROBERTN. PROCI'OR

IVAN ILLICH'SMEDICALNEMESIS:
FIFIEENYEARS LATER

INTRODUCTION

Ivan Illich is dying - the result of a prominenttumorthat has spreadfrom

his jaw to other parts of his body. As those close to him know, he will
refuse most medical treatment.He has tried acupunctureand massage,
and is not completely averse to an occasional pain reliever. He wants to
"die his own death,"not a hospital death while attachedto monitors and
tubes. He does not want to prolong death; nor does he want to find
himself swallowed up in the medical bureaucracythat was the target of
his artful ire in Medical Nemesis, his most systematic and notorious
publication.1
I first read Medical Nemesis when I assigned it as a text for "Biology
and Social Issues," a course I taught with Ruth Hubbardand Richard
Lewontin at HarvardUniversity from 1978 to 1984. In the several years
we used the text, students were rarely lukewarmin their reactions. Some
ridiculed the work; others were visibly and favorably impressed. The
same was true of the professionalresponse. The New England Journal of
Medicine called it "an imaginative and provocative critique." Lancet
labelled it "an important book" - prompting Illich's publisher to
announce on the first page of the text: "LeadingDoctors and Scientists
urge you to read"this book! Most reviews were more ambivalent. Time
magazine called his prescription "both polemical and disappointing,"
though not without merit in many of its individual points. Saturday
Review'sreviewer dismissed the book as "unrealistic,if not nonsensical,"
though even this reviewer admired the passion and the courage of the
author.Lewis Thomas in the New YorkReview ofBooks likewise worried
that Illich had overestimated the pernicious power of medicine; still,
Thomas did concede that Illich was right to have pointed out that modern
medicine is impotentin the face of many modernillnesses. The New York
Times, while deploring Illich's "sterile individualism,"declared that "no
polemicist writing today has his passion, his range, his glittering and

75
Paul T. Durbin (ed.), Europe, America,and Technology:Philosophical Perspectives, 75-94.
© 1991 KluwerAcademicPublishers.
76 ROBERT N. PROCroR

pyrotechnicarsenal."2Medical Nemesis may well be the most controver-

sial critiqueof medicine of this century.
I myself was preparedfor a sympathetic reading, having been early
enthralledby, but later dissatisfied with, the Texan pragmatist-Veblenian
philosophy of C. E. Ayres, one of the great technological optimists of our
century. My father, a disciple of Ayres at the University of Texas, had
raised me from an early age to marvel at technology. I recall his forecast
that one day we might no longer need to brush our teeth: early in life we
would simply dissolve them away to the root and apply in their place a
tough, zinc-tungstenceramic - indestructible,highly desirable. My father
really did believe that technology was the key to progress. I recall his
cursing the snail darter- the tiny fish that held up the great dam. (A
special law of Congress eventually allowed it to be built.) I also recall his
stating once that he really could not understandall the fuss about the
impending extinction of certain creatures, like gorillas. What good are
they, anyway? He was confident that for every human problem there was
a technical solution, that even if, say, pollution becomes really bad there
are always gas masks. Sure they might seem strange at first, but then,
there must also have been a time when people were repulsed by
eyeglasses! Humans, he would remind me, are adaptableorganisms- we
can learn to wear and enjoy the mask. In hushed, almost religious, tones
he would speculate about the golden age to come. Race problems could
be cured by pills that would change one's color (in which direction?).My
generation might even be the first to live forever, given the progress of
medical technology.
Illich, the Austrianemigre and former parish priest of New York City,
alreadyfamous for his Deschooling Society and celebratedas presidentof
the University of Puerto Rico, gave quite a different account. Medicine
was not enriching human life, but robbing it. Medicine had become an
insult to human decency, transformingbirth and death - and much in
between - into a narrowly technical set of problems, problems for
specialists to manage with expensive and ultimately ineffective devices.
Medicine was eroding human freedom and autonomy; medicine had
become both a servantto and master of the industrialoverproductionthat
was making society morbid. Even worse, medicine had become an opiate
for the masses, providing a flight from the arts of self and community
healing that have flourished throughthe centuries. Few had ever put the
argumentso forcefully.
 IVAN ILLICH'SMEDICALNEMESIS:FIFTEENYEARS LATER 77

THE ARGUMENT

Illich was not the first to criticize medical technology. Government

bureaucratsand citizens' action groups had long lamented the exorbitant
costs of medicine - soaring since World War II well above the inflation
rate. Critics had already pointed to the fact that Americans spend twice
what Canadians spend on health care, for little or no difference in the
product. Critics had warned of the unfettered growth of "medical
empires"in the late 1960s, when academic medical centers swallowed up
smaller public and private hospitals in robber baron style.3 Many more
had advertisedthe dangers of fraud and malpractice.But these were not
what the Illich book was primarilyconcernedabout.
There was also the long-standingsocialist critique, according to which
the pursuitof profit or the privateownershipof capital is the bogeyman to
which we may attributeour ill-health. Concerns had long been voiced
about the unequal distributionof medical service,4 but this again was not
the primary thrust of Illich's critique. Illich argues instead that state
ownership of medical facilities is not necessarily any better than private
ownership,that the supposed benefits of Soviet or Scandinavianor British
health care are not genuine. This was confirmed shortly after Illich's
book, when many were shocked to learn that, despite having the largest
numberof physicians in the world, the Soviet life-span actually began to
decline in the late 1960s and early 1970s.5 (Soviet vital statistics were not
publishedagain until Gorbachevtook office.)
There were also the many and diverse alternative, homeopathic, and
naturopathichealing traditions- each of which advised its own distinctive
regimen of exercise, massage, water or herbal therapies, sometimes with
pedigrees reaching back into the centuries. Illich also says little about
these, though he does point out that many of the so-called alternatives
(encountergroups or chiropractic,for example) simply contributeto the
overall medicalizationof society, substitutingone kind of pill for another,
further expanding the dependence on professional therapies. (Barbara
Ehrenreichand Deirdre English note that homeopaths in the nineteenth
century discovered something very valuable, at least from a pecuniary
point of view: "a way to make a commodity out of doing nothing at
all.")6
Illich's argumentis different. His thesis is that doctors are dangerous,
that medical treatment is at least as harmful as traffic or industrial
accidents or even war. Doctors in his view have at best little to do with
78 ROBERTN. PROCTOR

health, though they have managedto twist us into thinkingthey do, to the
point where many parts of life once considered healthy will now be
viewed as diseased (and vice versa), and treatment of nondiseases
occupies a substantialportionof the physician'stime.
Centralto his argumentis that much of human illness is doctor-madeor
iatrogenic (from iatro, Greek for physician; and gennan, Greek to
produce).7 Illich distinguishes three types of iatrogenesis: clinical, social,
and cultural.
Clinical iatrogenesis is the most familiar and, according to Illich, the
most benign. Medical quackeryand malpracticehave long been a concern
of physicians. However, incompetence in the traditionalsense, botched
surgery, for example, is not the major focus of Illich's critique. The
problem occurs, rather,when medicine is working properly. Illich points
out that most adults in the U.S. and Britain ingest a medically prescribed
substanceevery 24-36 hours, that Americans consume some 225 aspirins
per person per annum (p. 63). Unnecessary surgery has become "a
standard procedure" (p. 20). Clinical iatrogenesis includes not only
damage inflicted by the physician by accident or for profit, but also
damages resulting from efforts to protect themselves from lawsuits for
failing to provide a medical service.
Illich reports that the U.S. Department of Health, Education and
Welfare once calculated that seven percent of all patients suffer some
form of compensableinjury while hospitalized, and that "thefrequency of
reportedaccidents in hospitals is higher than in all industries but mines
and high-rise construction"(p. 23). In this, university hospitals are more
pathogenic than others: "One out of every five patients admitted to a
typical research hospital acquires an iatrogenic disease." One case in
thirtyleads to death. Many of these accidents come from complicationsof
drug therapy, but a substantialportion come from diagnostic procedures.
Cardiac catheterization -a diagnostic procedure used to determine
whether one suffers from cardiomyopathy- kills one in fifty patients,
though there is no evidence that the diagnosis one obtains can be used to
improve the health of the sufferer.
Illich argues that, historically, medical care has very little to do with
health. Illich draws from Thomas McKeown and others to show that the
decline in mortalityover the last two centuries (at least among the peoples
of the richer nations) is largely due to the decline in infant mortality,and
this in tum is largely due to changes in public health (especially the
separation of drinking water and sewage, but also improvements in
 IVAN ILLICH'SMEDICALNEMESIS:FIFfEENYEARS LATER 79

childhood nutrition), not to advances in medicine. Tuberculosis, one of

the major killers in the nineteenthcentury, was all but eliminated by the
time an effective therapy was introducedin the mid-1940s. Death rates
from pneumoniawere already in rapid decline when sulphonamidesand
antibiotics were introduced. Whooping cough and measles, two of the
leading nineteenth-centurykillers, had all but disappearedby the time
immunizationwas generally available. Smallpox vaccines did eventually
eradicatethe scourge from England (and later the entire world); but in the
first five years after vaccination laws were enforced in the 1860s, the
English deathrate from the disease rose from 100 per million to 400 per
million. The story for many other therapies is similar. Most of the
diseases from which people suffered in the nineteenth century were
already in decline by the time therapies were available. Public health and
nutrition were by and large the most importantcauses of remediation;
medical therapiesin some cases speeded improvement,but in other cases
may well have retardedit. Illich generalizes his argumentto point out that
many of the diseases from which modern civilized peoples suffer are
equally unresponsive to scientific medicine. Survival rates for the most
common types of cancer have remained virtually unchanged for the last
three or four decades despite the war launched by Nixon on the disease;
the same is true for many of the other "diseases of civilization" (heart
disease and stroke, for example) from which modern humans suffer.
Medicine may ritualize, commodify, or monopolize these ailments, but it
has had little success in conqueringthem.
More subtle is social iatrogenesis, the process by which medical
practice"encouragespeople to become consumers of curative,preventive,
industrial, and environmental medicine." Just as people have become
dependentupon medicine when they are sick, they rely on physicians to
be declaredhealthy. Social iatrogenesisis the name Illich gives to what he
calls the medicalization of life. Symptoms include the medical
bureaucracy'sfostering of new forms of stress, dependence, and painful
needs, lowered levels of tolerance for discomfort or pain, and diminished
rights to self-care. Ill-health not certified by a physician is branded
malingering or delusion. Even the language by which people know and
name their suffering has become medicalized. Medical bureaucrats
determine who may drive a car and who can stay home from work; who
must be locked up and who may become a soldier, a prostitute,or a cook;
who may cross bordersand who may run for the vice-presidency; who is
dead and who is competentto commit a crime (p. 71). Life is turnedinto a
80 ROBERTN. PROCTOR

pilgrimage through "check-ups"and "clinics" (English words that have

entered dozens of other languages). Life begins and ends in the hospital.
Doctors overprescribeand jump to the knife. It is forgotten that Hip-
pocrates said, "Forthe sick, the least is the best."
It is here that Illich introducesthe idea of a radical medical monopoly,
that medicine exerts a monopoly over health comparableto the academic
monopoly over education, morticians over burial, motorized traffic over
transportation,TV and radio over informationflows, scientific sex guides
over erotic technique, and so forth and so on.8 (Anyone who doubts this
should see how hard it is to buy a set of dental tools to clean your own
teeth.) Illich's formulationis as follows:
When cities are built around vehicles, they devalue human feet; when schools pre-
empt learning, they devalue the autodidact;when hospitals draft all those who are in
critical condition, they impose on society a new form of dying. Ordinarymonopolies
comer the market;radical monopolies disable people from doing or making things on
their own (p. 34).

Radical monopolies transmogrify all aspects of life. Formal education

renders autodidacts unemployable, just as intensive agriculturedestroys
the subsistence farmer, or the deployment of professional police under-
mines control by the local populace. In the field of medicine, the radical
monopoly is expressed when mutual care and self-medication are turned
into misdemeanorsor even felonies, when people sickened by their work
or their leisure find alibi or escape only in a life of medical supervision.
The monopoly allows medicine to label as healthy people who feel sick,
and as sick people who feel healthy. Deviance in general acquires a
medical label. Much of human suffering, as of conception, birth, and
death, has been moved from the home to the hospital. Disease carries new
and twisted stigmas, as when people come to know themselves (and are
known to others) as ex-alcoholics, former mental patients, carriersof this
or that genetic trait, disabled to this or that degree measureddown to the
percent.
One measure of the extent to which life has been medicalized can be
seen in economic terms. Prior to 1950, Americans spent on average less
than one month's wages for health care. By the time of Illich's writing
this had grown to five to seven weeks. Today it is seven to nine weeks per
year. Medical constructioncosts rose enormouslyin the 1960s and 1970s,
to the point where hospital construction costs reached $85,000 per
hospital bed. Cost overruns at the U.S. government's Department of
 IVAN ILLICH'SMEDICALNEMESIS:AFTEEN YEARS LATER 81

Health and Human Services meanwhile grew to exceed those of the

Pentagon. And physicians, once classed with artisans, rose to the top of
the financial scale for professionals in the capitalist world. In 1900, only
about one percent of the U.S. labor force was involved in the various
health occupations;by the 1970s this had risen to more than five percent,
and today the figure is closer to ten.9
Illich also points out that rich and poor nations benefit in differentways
from the medicalization of the national budget. Pharmaceuticalsbanned
in the U.S. are often exported to third world nations, where they are sold
with few or no controls. Salvador Allende, for a time presidentof Chile
and a physician, sought to ban imports of drugs that had not been
approved in the U.S. or Europe. After the CIA-financed coup against
Allende in September 1973, many of those who supported the
restructuringof Chilean medicine were murdered.Physicians trained in
the third world migrate in droves to the first world; the medical "brain
drain"from Latin America to the U.S. alone in 1973 has been estimatedat
$200 million, a figure equal to the total medical aid provided to Latin
America during the first decade of the "Alliance for Progress."Socialized
medicine moves, but does not eliminate, the problem: the decisions
concerning who will receive what kind of medicine (and when) are
simply shifted to administrativepanels of physicians.
The key to social iatrogenesis is that people are being robbed of their
confidence in their ability to judge and control their health. Physicians,
we are told, are the only ones able to heal. "The warning to consult a
doctor makes the buyer believe he is incompetent to beware" (p. 58).
Social iatrogenesis means a loss of the sense that the body heals itself.
Even whether one is sick cannot be decided outside medical circles. Nor
is social iatrogenesis something that the profession has foisted upon
people: "More health damage is caused by people's belief that they
cannot cope with their illness unless they call on their doctor than doctors
could ever cause by foisting theirministrationson people" (p. 51).
Finally, cultural iatrogenesis is the process by which humans are
robbed even of the capacity to suffer and die with dignity. Cultural
iatrogenesis, Illich says, is the "ultimateevil" of medical progress. Where
people once learned to heal by cultivating the arts of eating, breathing,
loving, and singing, modem medicine has become organized around the
suppression of pain. The idea that skill in the arts of suffering might be
the most effective way of dealing with pain has been renderedobsolete
and absurd. The human response to suffering has been blunted, leaving
82 ROBERTN. PROcrOR

compassion obsolete as a social virtue. Patientsrun to their physicians for

release from suffering, as patients are turned into timorous pets, and
eventually into "unfeeling spectators of their own decaying selves" (p.
50). The world is no longer dreary or sinful or corrupt,or threatenedby
barbarians;the new function of the medical/political order is less to
maximize happinessthan to minimize pain.
Cultural iatrogenesis brings with it a new notion of death and the
obligation of physicians to "manage"death. FrancisBacon was one of the
first to make the prolongationof life one of the primaryduties of doctors.
With this came a strong distinction between death by accident and death
by "naturalcauses" - people come to believe that the only noble death is
death at one's desk at the greatest possible age. Physicians have come to
devote increasing attention to the final days of life; now, one's final
moments are surroundedby a medical spectacle that rivals the most
elaborate rituals of premodernsocieties. Medicine becomes a matter of
law, to the point that fatalities not under supervised medical care become
a matterof police suspicion.
Medicine, in short, has little to do with health. Capitalizing on the
increasing statistical health, doctors have managed to take the credit for
this transformation. Health has improved, science takes the credit.
Impairment and suffering, along with birth and death, are rendered
medical conditions, managed and commodified on an engineering or
business model. Death has changed from something one confronts to
something into which one is ushered -a high cost spectatorsport, where
men in masks with dazzling devices monitor and manipulatethe organs
and fluids of their dying patients, delaying or hastening, but ultimately
only uglifying, the inevitable.

THE SIGNIFICANCEAND THE SOLUTIONS

Illich's was one of several 1970s landmarkcritiques of medicine.IO Our

Bodies Our Selves, the feminist treatise of the Boston Women's Health
Collective, pioneered self-help as an alternative to professional - and
male-dominated- misreadingor misshaping of the female body. Barbara
Ehrenreichand Deirdre English's For Her Own Good: 150 Years of the
Experts'Advice to Womenpushed this critiquefurther,demonstratingthat
the powers of healing had been wrested from women with the profes-
sionalizationof medicine. Male, and often misogynist, physicians came to
dominate medicine for more than two centuries, bringing along not just
 IVAN ILLICH'SMEDICALNEMESIS:FIFfEENYEARS LATER 83

the suppressionof female healers (midwives and herbalists,for example),

but also a host of new and creative "maladies"from which females were
supposed to have suffered (hysteria, supposedly caused by a "wandering"
womb, for example). Other authors emphasized the importanceof food,
exercise, or vitamins for health. Burkitt and Trowell's Refined Car-
bohydrateFoods and Disease showed that propernutritionwas far more
importantfor preventingcolon cancer than whatevermedical prophylaxis
one might receive. Frances Moore Lappe's Diet for a Small Planet
provided recipes for foods that would be both healthy and politically
responsible.II
Thomas McKeown challenged medicine's claim to be the producerand
savior of health, and his The Role of Medicine and The Modern Rise of
Population (both published in 1976) argued that progress in medical
science has contributed little to the cure or prevention of the major
diseases. Most of the growth in first-world life expectancy over the last
century and a half has been due to the elimination of childhood diseases,
primarily through improved nutrition and sanitation. Medical
intervention, through vaccines, for example, has contributed compara-
tively little to overall health and well being.12
Samuel Epstein made a similar argumentin his path-breakingPolitics
of Cancer, one of the most widely read critiques of the decade. Epstein
argued that cancer is a productof industrialcivilization, and rates can be
expected to rise, given increasing exposures to carcinogens in the
workplace (asbestos, benzene, chromium, nickel oxides, and petroleum
fractions, for example). Epstein showed that mortality rates for many
cancers are on the increase, and that the much-touted "medical triad"
developed to combat cancer (surgery, radiation,and chemotherapy)is at
best ineffective, at worst life-threatening, costly,and degrading.13
lllich incorporates many of these themes into his own, more radical
attack. He acknowledges the value of popularself-help manuals such as
that produced by the Boston Women's Health Collective, but he also
worries that the authors of such works "remaindeeply committed to a
basically medicalized society" (p. 223, note 26). He is at times aware of
the feminist critique, but he is not particularlyinterested in the fact that
men and women suffer the medicalization of their lives and bodies in
profoundlydifferent ways, that for most of its history the overwhelmingly
male medical profession has been deeply misogynist in its assumptions
and practices.14 He is aware that prevention is more cost-effective than
curative medicine, but he is also wary of efforts to manage public health
84 ROBERTN. PROCTOR

on a large scale. He is bothered by the fact that unregulated industrial

effluents foul the workplace, but he is also worried that we have become
obsessed with a myriad of real and imaginarythreatsto our health, to the
point that life itself has come to be lived as a series of encounters with
disease. The malaise of modem medicine, in other words, lies not in
specific policies or forms of organization, but in its very power and
existence. "Beyond a critical level of intensity, institutionalhealth care -
no matter if it takes the form of cure, prevention, or environmental
engineering - is equivalent to systematic health denial" (p. xv). The
medicalization of life has eroded personal stamina by transferring
responsibilityfor health from oneself or one's community toprofessional
experts whose very trainingoften makes them incompetent.
His solution is what he calls a "laicizationof the Aesculapian temple,"
stopping the epidemic of iatrogenesis. Recovery must be a political not a
professional task. Illich asks for powers to limit the professional manage-
ment of health. Social iatrogenesis can be reversed only by political
action that rolls back professional dominance;culturaliatrogenesis can be
diminished only by recognizing the value of suffering and eliminating the
obligation people feel to rush to a physician whenever they feel ill. Pain,
impairment,and suffering must be made again a personal challenge rather
than a technical problem. He is doubtful, though, whether mainstream
"alternative"medical movements will ever manage to solve the problem.
Many alternative therapies exploit the dissatisfaction people feel with
orthodox medicine, but end up trying to remedy the situation by erecting
yet anotherprofessionalelite.
Illich's political ontology is somewhat obscure,15 but he does make
clear that he sees little hope in the most commonly circulatedcriticisms of
medical practice, including (1) consumer protection; (2) efforts to
equalize access to medical services; (3) alternativeforms of professional
practice; (4) increased supportfor more rigorous and scientific medicine;
and (5) environmentalengineering and preventivemedicine.
Consumer protection according to Illich, merely guarantees an
adequatesupply of the opiate to the addict; such movements in his view,
do little to curtail the demand people have for professional medicine.
Quality and cost control are therefore not the key issues - far more
importantis whetherpeople have the right and strengthto accept or refuse
treatment. Medical technique needs not to be improved but reduced;
anything less will simply extend the medicalization of life. Equal access
is another red herring, insofar as redressing the privileged access of the
 IVAN ILLICH'SMEDICALNEMESIS:FIFTEENYEARS LATER 85

rich will only guarantee"equalaccess to torts."National health care does

little to solve the basic problem: the socialist state simply assumes the
costs, leaving basic questions of what kind of care to provide to whom,
when, and how, up to the professionalmedical elite.
Health for Illich designates "the range of autonomy within which a
person exercises control over his own biological states and over the
conditions of his immediate environment"(p. 238). Health is equivalent
to "the degree of lived freedom." Illich does believe that laws ought to
guarantee equal access to health as freedom, but he also believes that
achieving that freedom requires that the total volume of health care be
limited. Illich therefore rejects the third, widely discussed remedy:
alternative forms of professional practice. Decentralizationof delivery,
national health insurance, group practice by specialists, and health
maintenanceorganizationsall suffer, in his view, from the problem that,
while increasing efficiency, they strengthen the medical industry. They
may appearto make care less self-serving and more health-serving,but
they actually augment the size and stability of the medical bureaucracy.
The same is true of efforts to increase the scientific standardsof medical
practice. In its reliance on modem science, medicine has lost its artisanal
roots. Scientific jargonmystifies the public unnecessarily.
Finally, Illich rejects environmental engineering and preventive
medicine under the rubric of what he calls "engineering for a plastic
womb." Illich draws from Rene Dubos a warning that humans may be
able to adapt to the stresses of the second industrialrevolution; this is to
be feared, Illich says, because adaptationto stress is one of the primary
causes of disease. The new type of medicine involved in the shift from
patient-orientedmedicine to milieu-orientedmedicine is also to be feared
since it introduces a new legitimacy for "total treatment."Industrial
safety, health education,and psychic reconditioningare partof the human
engineeringIllich fears as populationsare fit into engineering systems. In
the "monster"of environmental engineering, the boundaries between
therapies administered under medical, educational, or ideological
rationalesare blurred.
One common criticism raised against Illich's book is that it focuses
purely on the negative. McKeown, in his Role of Medicine, ridicules
Illich's generalization that a professional, physician-based health care
system "must produce clinical damages which outweigh its practical
benefits"- comparingthis to the assessment that there is more evil than
good in the world. There might well be, but how would one ever go about
86 ROBERTN. PROCTOR

testing such a claim?16 Medicine no doubt creates its own demand and
deprives individuals of responsibility for their own health; but surely
there is a need for balance in the assessment. Antibiotics can be effective
when they are needed, and there are certainly cases where specia.lized
equipment and professional skill are valuable. McKeown points to
dentistry, and the treatment of emergency injuries, including obstetric
emergencies, as examples. Drug laws were introducedto combat abuses
that are now largely forgotten; the unrestrictedsale of such items without
medical supervision would probably reintroduce the quackeries that
plagued most of the richernations of the world until early in the twentieth
century - and that plague much of the rest of the world still today.
McKeown also challenges Illich's idea that pain relief is a bad thing.
There are no doubt abuses, but surely there are also cases where
prolongedpain and suffering is the worst form of misery.
Vicente Navarro raises a different set of concerns. Navarro criticizes
Illich for confusing the problems of capitalist industry with supposed
problems of industry in general. Illich is a theoreticianof industrialism,
the view that technology shapes society. Industrialgrowth, in this view,
has shifted power from owners to managers and bureaucrats.
Gemeinschaftis replaced by Gesellschaft, and technocraticexperts - like
physician engineers- rule. Class conflict is replacedby generally fruitless
struggles between the alienated masses and the omnipotent technocrats.
The only way to reverse the resultantalienation- iatrogenesis - is to rein
in the bureaucracy: to deindustrialize, deprofessionalize, and slow or
reverse industrialgrowth. Navarro points out that Illich's prescriptionin
certainrespects is similar to that of Milton Friedman,anotheradvocate of
removing the licensing and regulationof healers. Individualsare to be the
ultimate arbiters of what kind of care they will receive. In another
perspective,Illich is a medical trust-buster.17
Navarroargues, by contrast,that iatrogenesis is a consequence and not
a cause of larger social forces. Consumer needs are produced not by
manipulativeprofessionals but by an economic system that commodifies
all spheres of life and then fetishizes those commodities - health in-
cluded. Illich, according to Navarro, underestimates the needs of the
economic system (capitalism), and overestimates the power and
autonomy of bureaucracies. Illich fails to realize that social relations
shape technologies more often than the reverse. Misconceiving technical
bureaucraciesas autonomous entities, he fails to address why technical
knowledge is distributedthe way it is and, more importantly, why it is
 IVAN ILLICH'SMEDICALNEMESIS:FIFTEENYEARS LATER 87

used in particularinstances to oppress rather than to liberate (or vice

versa).
Illich pays little attention either to the class character of medical
productionor to the nature and consequences of the unequal distribution
of medical services. He does point out that third world countries, by
virtue of their poverty, suffer different diseases from those of first world
peoples. He also notes that the majorityof drugs are ingested by women.
But the unequal distributionof medical resources is not his focus. He is
aware that American blacks, for example, suffer many more health
problemsthan whites - that for most of this century,black life expectancy
has been nearly ten years less than white. But increased access to
medicine, in Illich's view, is not the solution. Indeed, the fact that the
poor suffer less medical treatmentthan the rich is to their benefit; more
medicine for the poor would only add to the "totalnegative impact which
a poor environment has on the health of the poor"; less access to the
present health care system "would, contraryto popular rhetoric, benefit
the poor."18
Illich's critique, in this sense, is abstract; he refuses to distinguish
between good and bad medicine, or to note how medicine as it is might be
transformedinto medicine as it should be. His emphasis is always on the
need for less medicine, not different medicine. How medicine might
affect differentgroups in differentways is of little concern to him, though
many of the signal questions of medical ethics requirethat this be a focus.
Community control of medicine sounds like a noble ideal, but what if a
community wants to forcibly deny services to certain individuals? Two
hundred thousand women die every year from botched (that is,
nonmedical) abortions; most of these deaths could have been prevented
by propermedical management.Religious activists, not medical person-
nel, have been the primaryopponents of freedom of choice in this sphere.
Illich does not even mention abortion in his book. Labor activists have
sought to improve the health and safety of the workplace, but there is no
mention of such struggles in his book. Presumablysuch efforts would fall
under the rubric of what he calls "environmentalengineering" - yet
anothercoopted cog in the great medicalizationmachine.

THE FIFTEENYEARS SINCE

Medical Nemesis has aged fairly well in the fifteen years since its
publication. The occasional hopeful passages about Chinese "barefoot
88 ROBERTN. PROCTOR

doctors"inspiredby culturalrevolutionaryideals do yellow certainpages,

but even here Illich was more cautious than others in his hopes for science
that would walk on two legs ("redand expert").With respect to his shock
statistics, many have only grown worse. Illich had noted that, at the time
of his writing, over eight percent of U.S. GNP was spent on health care.
Today's figure is closer to thirteenpercent.The cost of care between 1950
and 1975 rose over three hundredpercent; since that time, the rate has
continuedto rise still further.Americans now spend $700 billion annually
on medical care - and even C. Everett Koop, Ronald Reagan's surgeon
general, estimates that a quarterof this is unnecessary. Physicians have
come to rival Wall Street brokers with salaries in the hundreds of
thousands of dollars. And pharmaceuticalcompanies still spend three or
four times more on marketingthan they do on research.19
New medical heroics have taken the medicalizationof life much further
than in the days of Medical Nemesis. The artificial heart (the "draculaof
technology," according to an editorial in the New YorkTimes) has come
and gone (after absorbinghundredsof millions of taxpayers'dollars), and
we have enteredthe age of multiple organ transplants.Death with dignity
has become a concern of many states, where patientsarm themselves with
living wills to prevent overeagerphysicians from trying to stretch their
patients'last hours into miserabledays or weeks. Nancy Cruzanwas alive
and well when Illich wrote his book. In 1983, when she slipped into a
vegetative coma after an automobile accident, her parents were barred
from "pulling the plug" for more than seven years, despite undisputed
evidence that her brain had decayed to a point where recovery was
impossible. (It is interestingto note, however, that it was Missouri courts,
and not the family's physicians, who forced Ms. Cruzanto remain tied to
her feeding tubes.Yo
New genetic and medical-heroic techniques promise to introduce new
and previously unimaginable stigmas. Severe and debilitating ailments
such as Huntington'sdisease and cystic fibrosis have now been traced to
specific genes. What will be the occupational or insuranceprospects for
carriers of these untreatablemaladies - especially given that tests are
already available to identify these carriersat an early age, even in utero?
The commercializationof medicine has extended to the commercializa-
tion of body tissues, and the U.S. PatentOffice has begun quietly granting
patentrights for several sections of the humangenome.21
The effectiveness of medicine has also remainedcontroversial.Debates
still rage over whether overall cancer rates have declined, but several of
 IVAN ILLICH'SMEDICALNEMESIS:
FIFfEEN YEARS LATER 89

the worst killers - notably breast and lung cancer - steadily increase.22
Every year a million Americans are diagnosed as having cancer, and
statistical studies show that medical treatmentin most cases does little to
increase one's chances of recovery. Stanford University's president,
Donald Kennedy, once called America's cancer program "a medical
Vietnam." James Watson was blunter when he labelled it "a bunch of
shit." Recent years have also seen entirely new epidemics stymie the
medical profession. Some of these, such as AIDS, are cases where the
pathogen is simply too protean to succumb to medical therapy. In other
cases, such as "PMS,"the very existence of the malady has been called
into question.
Criticism of medical institutions and of medical practice has also
grown substantially since the appearanceof Illich's book. Home births
have multiplied, as have movements to allow for a "deathwith dignity."
Dissatisfaction with medicalization is an importantroot of both of these
movements. Ralph Nader recently published a list of the thousands of
physicians censuredby the AMA. (You can look it up and find out if your
doctor is on the list.) Bioethicists have drawn attention to gender bias in
the right to die: men's expressed wishes to withhold heroic treatmentare
taken more seriously than are women's.23 Others have pointed out the
racial bias in access to medical care. The National Institutesof Health has
been sharply criticized for excluding women from its studies of the health
effects of pharmaceuticals;and in July of 1990 the CongressionalCaucus
for Women's Issues proposed a $237 million legislative package to
redress the bias.24 Alternative medical institutions continue to spring up,
and "self-help" has become a popular fashion.25 Patients' rights has
become a pillar of medical ethics. The entire field of medical ethics
promises to become a specialty - no doubt to Illich's horror.Many third
world nations have rejected fIrst-world-imposedhealth care ideals, as
when the Sandinista government launched its campaign to abandon
bottle-feeding and returnto breastfeeding. Even William L. Roper, head
of the Centers for Disease Control in Atlanta, has recognized the need for
a revolution in medical education, given that "99 percent"of the U.S.
medical curriculumteaches curativemedicine, not prevention.26
Illich himself remains disdainful, though, of all solutions that stop short
of abandoning the medical bureaucracy itself. He worries about the
proliferation of new armies of professional "wellness" managers
corneringever-expandingmarketsin human life and death, suffering and
contentment. The former parish priest is wary of a thousand linguistic,27
90 ROBERT N. PROCTOR

economic, and conceptual pitfalls into which industriallife has fallen, but
he provides very few ladders to help us find a way out. This is what has
left so many of his readers disappointed. One is often left with the
impression that the only way forward is backwards- back past the ways
of all of industrial life and into some older, imaginary order where the
plain virtues of abstinencewill once again be honored.

CONCLUSION

In all of his work, Illich is concerned to expose how technologies and

technical bureaucracies structure the way we think, work, love, play,
sense, or learn. How does the habit of watching television make us look at
the world around us? How does photographychange the way we see?
How does mechanized or automotive transportationlimit where we can
walk? How do monopolies over educationmake it difficult to learn?How
does literacy make it different to speak or remember?The argument is
that techniques - in a very broad sense of that term, including technical
bureaucracies, habits, and assumptions - structure life in curious and
often subtle ways. Consumption, as well as production, produces a
scarcity of time, space, and choice. Consumptionbeyond a certain point
of intensity can produce a scarcity of time. Rapid transitor automobility
can produce a scarcity of space. Planning can destroy the possibilities for
choice. Photographycan transformhow one sees.
One of Illich's overarchinggoals is to renderdoubtful the certainties
that surroundus - that schooling fosters intelligence, that medicine fosters
health, that reading fosters awareness, and so forth. It is difficult to argue
with such a critique, given its abstractand sweeping character.For Illich,
it is not this or that medicine that is faulty, but medicine itself. The
profession (all professions, since the problem is professionalization)
needs not new priorities but diminished power. Iatrogenesis is not an
isolated phenomenon;rather,it must be understood"as but one aspect of
the destructivedominance of industryover society." "Like time-consum-
ing acceleration, stupefying education, self-destructive military defense,
disorienting information, or unsettling housing projects, pathogenic
medicine is the result of industrial overproduction that paralyzes
autonomousaction"(p. 207).
It is really medical bureaucracythatIllich objects to ratherthan specific
medical techniques- though certain techniques will be typical of certain
types of bureaucracies.Medical bureaucracymay strangle social as well
 IVAN ILLICH'SMEDICALNEMESIS:
FIFTEENYEARS LATER 91

as capitalistmedicine, homeopathyas well as allopathy. Once it reaches a

certain size, medical bureaucracyunleashes a "nightmareforged from
good intentions,"where the personal caring part of medicine is dwarfed
by papertraces to insuranceagents, brief and frustratingencounters with
hospital administrators,and a host of other middle managers of the
medical collectivity. Hopes are dim, in his view, for an easy way out,
given that it is the industrialway of life and not, say, capitalismor sexism
or moral or educational failings that are to blame for iatrogenesis in its
various forms.
There is a certainromance in this view, in the contrastwith the whole
and purer past, the "vernacular"as Illich put it in his much maligned
book, Gender.28 Illich clearly yearns for the days when people cared for
one another, enduring pain instead of fighting it with drugs, dying with
dignity and not amidst a tangle of tubes. Illich is a self-avowed ascetic;
much of his life has been an elaboratenay-saying to the modernindustrial
world. He deplores television, photography, schools, and roads, along
with alphabetization, industrialization, monopolization, specialization,
and the denudedrhetoricsof systems theory,cybernetics,and environmen-
tal management.29 What he will affirm is often less clear.30 Certainly
liberties and rights, but which ones and how far? Rights to purchase or
produce any type of pharmacopeia?To smoke in public buildings? To
die, or to allow one's incompetent relatives to die? To refuse medical
treatmentfor oneself or one's children? What about the rights of com-
panies to export drugs to third world nations? Or the rights of producers
to foul the workplacewith toxics?
Abstract calls for freedom or autonomy can be frail in the face of
unequaldistributionsof power. Illich's call for a returnto "joyfulsobriety
and liberating austerity" may ring true for many overconsumers of
materia medica and medical doctrine, but it may sound hollow to people
for whom scarcity is more threateningthan abundance.It may even sound
errant to those working to establish health and safety standards in the
workplace, or legal sanctions to protectthe quality of the air we breathe
or the food we eat. Industrial-strengthhazards may require industrial-
strengthregulations.Ifprofessions expand to solve the problem, where is
the harmreally done?
Nemesis, Illich reminds us, was the Greek divinity who punished men
for their hubris, their attempt to become heroes rather than humans.
Prometheus,in stealing fire from the heavens, brings down Nemesis on
himself for his trespass; he is put in irons and chained to a Caucasian
92 ROBERT N. PROCTOR

rock. An eagle preyed on his liver, which heartless healing gods then
cured overnight, forcing him to submit to the tortureagain the next day.
This is painful punishmentfor the hubris of stealing knowledge from the
gods.
But is it really so wrong for us to look to medicine - or any other
technology - in search of comfort, beauty, or power? The reversal of
medical nemesis is supposed to come from "withinman"and not from yet
another managed form of expertise, health maintenance scheme, or
wellness program.What it is that is within us to counteractthese institu-
tions, Illich does not say. His abstract, ascetic cynicism leaves us with
little in the way of constructive alternatives - though that is not his
purpose. His interest is more corrosive than constructive. He leaves it up
to us to find new paths, once invention is unmasked as the mother of
necessity.
Illich no doubt exaggerates the ills of modem medicine. But this in
itself is not necessarily a bad thing. Paul Sweezy once noted that the
function of both science and art is to exaggerate, provided that what is
exaggeratedis truthand not falsehood.31 In this sense, we do owe a debt
to this work of science and art that struggles with the Aesculapian
nemesis.

The PennsylvaniaState University

NOTES

I Medical Nemesis was first published in 1975 with the subtitle The Expropriationof
Health (London: Calder & Boyars, 1975). Citations here will be to the revised,
Americanedition (New York: Bantam, 1976).
2 For reviews, see The New York Review of Books, September 16, 1976, pp. 3-4
(Lewis Thomas);SaturdayReview, March 1, 1976, p. 28 (J. E. Bishop); The New York
Times Book Review, May 2, 1976, p. 1. Lewis Thomas, strangely, tries to explain the
shortcomings of modem medicine (and Illich's critique thereof) by claiming that,
unlike the physical or life sciences, medicine is still a "pre-Darwin,pre-Newton
enterprise"(p. 3).
3 See The AmericanHealth Empire (New York: Random House, 1970), publishedby
the Health Policy Advisory Center; also David Kote1chuck, ed., Prognosis Negative:
Crisis in the Health Care System (New York: Vintage, 1976).
4 See, for example, Vicente Navarro,Medicine under Capita/ism (New York: Prodist,
1976); and Lesley Doyal, The Political Economy of Health (London: Pluto Press,
1979).
 IVAN ILLICH'SMEDICALNEMESIS:FIFfEENYEARS LATER 93
5 RichardCooper, "RisingDeath Rates in the Soviet Union,"New EnglandJournal of
Medicine 304 (1981): 1259-1265.
6 BarbaraEhrenreichand Deirdre English, For Her Own Good: 150 Years of the
Experts'Advice to Women(GardenCity, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1979), p. 59.
7 Illich was not the first to use this term. Medical dictionaries define it as "any
adverse condition in a patient occurring as the result of treatmentby a physician or
surgeon." See Dorland's illustrated Medical Dictionary, 25th ed. (Philadelphia,
1974).
8 For the idea of "radical monopoly" developed in a general manner, see Illich's
Toolsfor Conviviality(Berkeley, Calif.: Heyday Books, 1973), pp. 51-57.
9 For background,see BarbaraCaress, "The Health Workforce: Bigger Pie, Smaller
Pieces," in Kotelchuk,Prognosis Negative, pp. 164-170.
10 Critique of medicine is hardly a product of the 1960s. Early critics include
Montesquieu,Tolstoy, and BernardShaw. IlIich expresses a debt also to Rene Dubos,
whose Mirage of Health (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1959) had argued that
medicine has contributedlittle to health.
11 D. P. Burkitt and H. C. Trowell, eds., Refined CarbohydrateFoods and Disease:
Some Implicationsof Dietary Fibre (London: Academic Press, 1975); Frances Moore
Lappe, Diet for a Small Planet (rev. ed.; New York: Ballantine Books, 1975).
Compare also G. Edward Griffin's curious World Without Cancer: The Story of
VitaminB\7 (Westlake Village, Calif.: AmericanMedia, 1974); the book, publishedin
association with the John Birch Society, warns of a "Rockefeller conspiracy" to
withhold alternativecancertreatmentssuch as Laetrilefrom the Americanpublic.
12 Thomas McKeown, The Role of Medicine: Dream, Mirage, or Nemesis?
(princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979; original, 1976); and The Modern
Rise ofPopulation (New York: Arnold, 1976).
13 Samuel Epstein, The Politics of Cancer (GardenCity, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1978).
14 See Ehrenreich and English, For Her Own Good. Compare also Anne Fausto-
Sterling, Myths of Gender: Biological Theories About Women and Men (New York:
Basic Books, 1985); also Ruth Hubbard, The Politics of Women's Biology (New
Brunswick,N.J.: RutgersUniversity Press, 1990).
15 In Tools for Conviviality, IIlich states that "the retooling of society will remain a
pious dream unless the ideals of socialist justice prevail. I believe that the present
crisis of our major institutions ought to be welcomed as a crisis of revolutionary
liberationbecause our present institutions abridge basic human freedom for the sake
of providing people with more institutionaloutputs. This world-wide crisis of world-
wide institutions can lead to a new consciousness about the nature of tools and to
majority action for their control. If tools are not controlled politically, they will be
managed in a belated technocratic response to disaster. Freedom and dignity will
continue to dissolve into an unprecedentedenslavementof man to his tools" (p. 12).
16 McKeown, Role of Medicine, p. 185
\7 Vicente Navarro,"The Industrializationof Fetishism: A Critiqueof Ivan Illich," in
his Medicine under Capitalism, pp. 103-131. Navarro also criticizes Illich for
equatingcare with cure. The distinctionis important,for in cases where medicine may
not provide a cure, it may still provide valuable care.
18 Illich develops this point in a more general fashion in Tools for Conviviality,where
94 ROBERTN. PROCTOR

he suggests that a just distributionof industrialoutputs is necessary but not sufficient

to promote convivial production:"People can be equally enslaved by their tools" (p.
13).
19 In 1973, I1Iich points out, the U.S. drug industry spent an average of $4,500 on
each practicingphysician for advertisingand promotion.Average salary for a clinical
departmenthead at a U.S . medical SChOOl in 1989 was $193,000 (reportedin the New
YorkTimes, June 20, 1989).
20 "Sad Farewells for Young Woman Startingon Road to Death," New York Times,
December 16, 1990.
21 See Rebecca Eisenberg, "Patentingthe Human Genome," Emory Law Journal 39
(1990): 721-745.
22 In 1987, the Federal Centers for Disease Control reported that cancer was the
leading cause of prematureloss of life among American women, and that breast
cancer was the primarycause of that loss ("AlarmingRise in Breast CancerIndicated
by Data," New York Times, November 15, 1987). Lung cancer rates for men have
risen from 5/100,000 in 1930 to 75/100,000 in 1985. On the continuingcancerdebate,
see Eliot Marshall,"ExpertsClash Over CancerData,"Science 250 (1990): 900-902.
23 Steven Miles, "GenderBias in the Right to Die," AmericanJournal of Law and
Medicine, June, 1990.
24 Andrew Purvis, "A Perilous Gap,"Time, special issue, "Women:The Road Ahead"
(Fall, 1990), pp. 66-67.
25 On the German self-help movement see Stefan Lundt, ed., Rebellion gegen das
Valium Zeitalter: Uberlegungen zur Gesundheitsbewegung(Berlin: Gesundheitsver-
lag, 1981).
26 Lawrence K. Altman, "A Profession Divided Is Finding It Hard to Teach Preven-
tion," New York Times, August 14, 1990. Cancer prevention and control constitutes
only about five percentof the total budgetof the National CancerInstitute.
27 For a German-languagecontinuationof the IlIich-style linguistic critique, see Uwe
Porksen, Plastikworter:Die Sprac/ze einer internationalenDiktatur (Stuttgart:Ernst
Klett Verlag, 1988).
28 Ivan IlIich, Gender (New York: Pantheon,1982).
29 Ivan Illich and Barry Sanders, ABC: The Alphabetizationof the Popular Mind
(New York: Vintage, 1989).
30 In his most hopeful book, Tools for Conviviality, IIIich contrasts convivial and
industrial tools - tools leading to "individualfreedom realized in personal indepen-
dence" and tools that stand as obstacles to that freedom (pp. 11-13). As examples of
convivial tools, IIIich cites the telephone, most hand tools, the mails and the small
town market;he also readily admits, however, that each of these can be coopted and
abused. Illich calls for a new politics that would limit the production of tools that
violate values of survival, justice, and self-defined work. See also Carl Mitcham's
essay in this volume.
31 See preface to Paul A. Baran and Paul M. Sweezy, Monopoly Capital (New York:
Monthly Review Press, 1966), p. viii.
 LARRY D. SPENCE

IVAN ILLICH'SH20 AND THE

WATERSOF FORGETFULNESS

We managed to rearrangethe city down to the last

grain of sand. Upheavals of imagination erupted
under our fingers. Then we came down and saw
under our giant dragonfly mountains of smoke,
whirling dust. (George Konrad,The City Builder)

His eyes darted around the room, in a startling reminder of the mis-
chievous gaze of HarpoMarx. His acute face was an etching of discipline
and stamina. Here was the universal iconoclast creating en "epilogue to
the industrialage." Ivan Illich began to speak: to the history seminar.Did I
hear correctly? Yes, he was discussing the water closets of Victorian
London. That was my introduction,in 1986, to the authorand the themes
of H20 and the Waterso/Forgetfulness.1
Social scientists have overlooked this "inquiry into our changing
perceptionsof urbanspace and the waters that cleanse it." Otherworks by
Illich have been widely noticed. References to Deschooling Society and
Medical Nemesis fill columns of the Social Science Citation Index. Social
scientists are fascinated and put off by Illich. Some characterizehim as an
ideologue or a screamerof moral outrage. Others see him as a dangerous
revolutionary,an alarming reactionary,a futile romantic, or a puzzling
radical conservative. Illich's criticisms of modem society have been
frequently praised for their insight into our epidemic of crises and their
debunking of the myths of objective progress. Defenders of modernity
indict him as the smart, silly writer of fallacious, inconsistent, and
swindling arguments.While many praise Illich's erudition,sundry others
charge that he writes in reckless disregard of evidence, logic, and
common sense. No one believes he is boring.
The Citation Index lists only one brief review of H20 in the last five
years. The review, by Colin Ward in the British magazine, New Society,
was negative.2 Ward found the work obscure, tedious, elliptical, and
incomprehensible - though in the 1970s, Ward had written that he

95
Paul T. Durbin (ed.), Europe,America,and Technology:Philosophical Perspectives, 95-105.
© 1991 KluwerAcademicPublishers. J
96 LARRY D. SPENCE

esteemed Illich "for all sorts of insights, for his dethronementof the
pretensions of the education industry and for his deadly pricking of the
monopolistic claims of professionalismin many fields."
H 20 is hardgoing for social scientists. Let us try to discover why.
I was startledby the book's themes. Within two hours of listening and
arguing, Illich disabused me of two errors. First, I misunderstood the
ancient Roman system of water supply. Relying on Lewis Mumford,I had
thought of it as a kind of prototype of a modem urban sewage system.
Second, I believed that modem indoor plumbing was one sure example of
progress. I questioned the automobile and derided the space station, but
using an outdoor privy on cold mornings had taught me what
technological progress meant. Both mistakes were typical of me and my
social science colleagues. I had read present day assumptions into past
experience. I had equated what is new and comfort-making with an
improvementin life. The first kind of mistake results in a distortionof the
past. The second kind results in a falsification of the present.
Social scientists make such mistakes with regUlarity. They plunder
history to try to make the world better. This promptsthem to debase the
past and to believe that any and all conditions of life can be improved.
Theirfaith is an expectationthat humanplanningand control can produce
results of stupendous goodness. Perhaps this is inescapable. Social
scientists work this way. They see social life as a boat load of humanity,
all facing backward, drifting down a sometimes peaceful but often
dangerous river. All social knowledge is of the past. That is why the
people are seated facing backwards. They can see the river of time, its
rapids, currents,and pools, after they have lived through the passage. To
survive and thrive, people need to know what to do in the presentto shape
the future. The job of the social scientists is to help. In their investiga-
tions, they try to find out what is going to happen; how to make or stop
things from happening;and what to choose to happen.
Eugene Meehan (from whom I borrowed this image? points out that
we cannot do this by logically deducing the future from the past. The past
is but a sample of events, not a universe. In orderto projectthe future, we
must generalize. But we cannot know if any generalizationis correctuntil
the end of time. If I assert that "roaringindicates white water" on the
basis of the past, I do not and cannot know that it will always hold in the
future. Because I have only a few and not all observationsof the river of
history, my generalization is not logically valid. That is the infamous
problemof induction.
 IVAN ILLICH'SH20 AND THE WATERSOF FORGETFULNESS 97

What we must do, writes Meehan, is to find - more accurately,create-

generalized patterns, based on history, that we can use to anticipate,
control, and choose the future. We call those patternsconcepts, classifica-
tions, descriptions, forecasts, theories, priorities, and policies. Such
patternsare basic to humansurvival.They are simple, powerful,anddange-
ous tools. Each generalizationis strippedof the details of time and place.
We notice the association of events. When the leaves begin to fall, the
daily temperature falls. Or we create collections of characteristics.
Serpents with triangularheads, a deep pit between the eye and the nostril
and elliptical eyes that are native to North America are poisonous. We
then use those patternsto predict the future. I see that leaves are falling
and I know that cooler days and nights are coming. I see a memberof the
pit viper family on a log and I can anticipate that its bite will be
poisonous. No matterthat the leaves that fall each year are wonderfully
different. Even the beauty of a single snake and the unanswerablegrief of
an individualdeath play no partin the enterprise.
We also take sequences of events, assume causality and use that pattern
to produce, maintain, or stop some events. I notice that high rates of
inflation precede riots, and sometimes the fall of governments. I find,
reading history, various interpretationsof this connection. It fits what we
know about the past. I look at the cases I can find to see if the sequence
always occurs or only in some situations. Do other conditions destroy the
effect? IfI do my work well I have devised one way to maintainpolitical
stability - limit the rate of inflation. Now, I have to find out how to do
that.
Once I have createdand tested, to the satisfaction of informed users, a
theory to limit inflation, I face an even more complex task. As Meehan
points out, capacity forces choice. If we can lower the rate of inflation,
should we? To make that choice we must project what will happen if we
act and what will happen if we do not. Then we decide which set of
consequences is better. Again this decision must be based on past
experience. Specifically, what relevant past cases have been desirable or
not? At this point details and emotions must be added to an ongoing
debate that never results in a perfect decision. Despite the common
bromide, ends do justify the means. Justification involves not just the
ends which we wanted but all of the ends, especially the distateful ones.
All of the consequences of anothercourse. Suppose we lower inflation by
raising interestrates. Will that not increase unemploymentfor some while
enrichingothers?
98 LARRY D. SPENCE

Social scientists do not always do these things well. But roughly that is
what we try to do. We plunderhistory in search of patterns.We general-
ize those patternsinto intellectual instrumentsto be used to make the best
human future. Some scoff and say this cannot be done. They point out
that the concepts of social science are so poor or contested, the instru-
ments are so weak and poorly justifiedand the normativestructuresare so
underdeveloped,that they are of little help in directing public actions.
Those charges are true. What we do not know is whether the tools of
social science could be made more useful. But even that point is moot.
Despite humanist critics, including philosophers of science, social
scientists keep trying to produceknowledge. Humanbeings, throughtheir
governments, try to anticipate, control, and choose the future. Through
their businesses, their schools, their farms, and their families, human
beings keep trying. Indeed they must. Social scientists only search for
ways to do it better.Given humanefforts and theirhigh rate of failure, we
can only hope that social scientists will succeed.
In advance we know that our attempts to improve will fail. They will
not always fail absolutely. But they will fail in some degree. Again,
history is our textbook. Therefore,social scientists should be humble and
cunning. The question of what can and cannot be improved is open.
Humility requires that we approach conditions to learn if they can be
helped. Cunning requires a restricted scope in our projects. As Karl
Popper has proposed, if we seek real improvementswe must do so in a
piecemeal fashion. That does not condemn us to some kind of passive
incrementalism.Doing nothing, underwhateverbanner,requiresthe same
quality of investigationas a novel reform. Ourprojectscan be radical. But
they must be correctable.If we are cunning we try to construct social
knowledge in such a way that we can learn from our mistakes. This
requiresthat we express the assumptionsof our patternsclearly. We must
state the purposes of our efforts with exactness. We can compare the
consequences of applying our tools with our intentions only if they are
explicit. The comparison requires attention to relevant details. If we do
that then when we fail we know that some of our assumptions are false,
our patternsare faulty, or our intended purposes are mistaken. The better
constructedour patternsand the more detailed our descriptions the more
likely we are to learn something when we are wrong.
My mistakes - which Illich pointed out - were part of a social scien-
tist's learned incapacities. I saw the past as a series of efforts to become
the present. This sentimentalDarwinismassumes that our social practices
 IVAN ILLICH'SH 20 AND THE WATERS OF FORGEfFULNESS 99

have passed the tests of time and are superior. It may be a fatal view.
When we adopt it we are like the cheerful man who jumped from a
skyscraper.He thought he was doing well until the last inches above the
pavement. If not fatal, it is confounding. When we see the past this way
we misunderstandit. When we see the present this way we misjudge it.
All of Illich's books, and this one in particular,are useful for disabusing
social scientists of this approach.
People in the past had their own purposes.They tried, like us, to create
instrumentsof knowledge to influence or make the future. Always, they
failed or succeeded in different degrees. They sometimes got what they
wanted, but with some unintendedsurprises.If our present is a result of
theirintentionsit is also much more - and much less. We are arrogantand
mistakenif we think we are a solution to their problems.Each civilization
producesits own problems.
Illich's book, H20, is full of such lessons. It makes any social scientist
feel like a mere pupil. Illich says the purposeof the book is to explore the
historicity of stuff. He demonstrates that water is an ineffable and
changing stuff throughouthumanhistory. It is not an ahistoricalsubstance
that was, and can be, used in different ways. Water, the stuff, varies with
culture and epoch. Water, Illich shows us, has been the stuff of dreams,
purification,and cleansing. It has been a well of remembrance,connect-
ing the living with the dead, and it has been a triumphantcivic display. It
became a circulatingliquid essential to health. The water of the modern
world - the recycled cleaning fluid and toilet flush we call H20 - is not
the water of dreams,purification,memory, or civic pride. It cannotbe.
But here we see that Illich's approach to history is hard for a social
scientist to take seriously. We like to think that stuff is what we care to
make it. The occasion of this book was the desire to build a lake in mid-
city Dallas. Social scientists were asked to assess the feasibility and
desirabilityof turninga dozen downtown blocks into an extravaganceof
water. They were asked: will this help business, raise new taxes, attract
tourists, and promote the moral uplift of civic life? Illich's answer was
that however commercially successful such a lake might be it would
never be a reservoirof naturalbeauty. For it would be a body of H20 -a
stuff created by industrial society. No matter what we might wish and
want, a liquid poisoned by waste and chemically treated to become
drinkablewill not foster our dreamsor lift our spirits.
Such an answer, stating that people cannot do something they desire,
seems an insult to the very enterprise of social science. The social
100 LARRY D. SPENCE

investigator'sjob is to find ways to achieve what men and women desire.

To criticize or deny the desire is a usurpationor an admission of weak-
ness. Illich's works of social criticism take exactly that approach.He is
always telling us that despite our wishes we cannot make everyone smart,
healthy, and rich.
Illich's approachto history, his perspective, is tragic. By an author's
perspective or framework we mean, after Kenneth Burke, "the more or
less organized system of meanings by which a thinking man gauges the
historical situation and adopts a role with relation to it."4 We must grasp
an author'sframe to understand,even to read, his works. Ifwe do not we
must smash his ideas to fit our own framework. When we smash we
introduce chaos. We also create a cheap critique. For example, Colin
Ward refers to Illich's book as a patchworkquilt full of odd historical
references that have been previously compiled in the book, Cleanliness
and Godliness, publishedages ago.5
Burke characterizesa tragic frame this way. It involves a resignation
based on a sense of personal limits, a treatmentof sin, especially the sin
of aggressive pride (hubris), held together by a forensic structurewhich
deduces events one after another with logical and magical inevitability.
The tragic view of life is both passionate and rational. It assumes a
tension between the stunning joys of living and their sobering repercus-
sions. Life is euphoric in its beauty and implacable in its rules. Men and
women must act in hope and then endure the consequences. Burke notes
that today we consider such assumptionsabout life and history sick.
Politically, we do not like to talk about limits. In the U.S. our political
institutions are designed to promote and exploit growth. Limits and an
allegiance to the U.S. Constitutionare not compatible. Without growth,
American politics becomes a zero-sum game. The hallowed institutions
that promotedcompromisesand log-rolling do not function well when the
pie of public largess stops growing. So one way out of our present
difficulty is to find the means to new growth. We see science, technology,
space, EasternEurope, the Soviet Union all as new means to growth. Talk
of limits to growth, as one value-free economist has stated, is immoral.
Social scientists read history as cheerfully as they can. Most use irony
to account for failures. Their irony is dramatic.Social investigators find
out what people think they are doing and then point out that what is
actually going on is something else entirely. Of course, irony is not
foreign to Illich. But there is a difference. The irony of the social scientist
works like this. People think prostitutionis a vice. They make a hue and
 IVAN ILLICH'SH20 AND THE WATERSOF FORGETFULNESS 101

cry to outlaw it and refonn its practitioners.Over time their efforts meet
with little success. Observing this, social scientists make the happy
discovery that prostitutionis a bulwarkof the monogamous family. All
that is wrong is the attempt to refonn it. Or people lament that their
governments do not work. Political scientists discover that it does not
matter. Governments that do not work encourage local initiatives and
volunteerism.
Social science irony can be quite conservative. A gaggle of recent
authors I will not name have become famous by arguing as follows. All
public attempts to improve human life not only fail, they end up doing
just the opposite. Attempts to reduce poverty increase poverty. Attempts
to forge treatiesbetween nations to preventwars create the conditions that
make wars likely. And so on. The beauty of this is that any refonn is
known to be pernicious at birth. We do not need to assess, discuss, or test
them. Like astrology, this irony produces knowledge impervious to
experience or observation. When social scientists employ it, they always
know the answerto any proposalfor improvement- just say no.
Illich's irony is different becauseit is tragic. We transfonnwater into a
means for deodorizingurbanspace and it becomes poisonous sewage. But
this results not from a mistaken impulse to do good in a world that is the
best it can be; it results from a human weakness to be arrogant. A
deodorizedcity is a high-mindedgoal. The efforts to achieve it therefore
are necessary. The secondary effects of those efforts are trivial and best
ignored. The high-mindedarroganceof social engineering encourages us
to ignore reality and to lie to ourselves. And all of this we do in the name
of progress.
Illich's irony is set off by the sin of pride. The hubris of the social
scientist is aggressive and utopian. According to Illich, the sin is the
constructing of whole worlds on drawing boards and then bulldozing
them into human life. That capacity - to make utopiandreams come true
- was absent in the ancient world. When Socrates was asked if his utopia
could come into existence, he said perhapsif we could scrape the canvas
clean. What was a metaphor to Plato's ancient readers has become a
chilling threattoday.
In the case of the tragedy of water (as Illich's book might have been
called), we find deodorant ideologues convincing people that they and
their cities stink. Such odors are dangerousto life. Thus cities and human
beings must be sanitized. Those ideologues - and I am willing to concede
they were social scientists in spirit if not fact - conceived of an odorless
102 LARRY D. SPENCE

city space. Their model for constructingsuch a city was borrowed from
medicine. They employed Harvey's description of the circulation of
blood. (That points up anotherproblemof social scientists. They look for
short-cutsto knowledge. Seeking usable patternsthey are quick to borrow
from other disciplines with sometimes hilarious and sometimes awful
results.) As a result, water was transmogrified into a transport for
excrement.Waterbecame, in Illich's words, the cleaning fluid, H2 0.
We have the sin of pride coupled with the capacity to change the world.
The resulting crime is the reduction of the water of ritual, purification,
and memory to the H2 0 of washing, cleaning, and flushing. What we
miss is the recognition of gUilt and its expiation. Here is anotherimpor-
tant insight that Illich offers the social scientist. We live, he says, in a
world with the evidence of crimes all about ut. We learn to ignore these
clues and not to recognize the crimes. All this we do in the name of
industrialprogress.
Another way of saying this is to note that Illich writes about sin. He
writes about social sin - excuses committedout of pride by collectivities.
His book could also be called "sins of sewage," and other Illich books
could be renamed "sins of schooling," "sins of medicine," or "sins of
professional care." Once you get into Illich's tragic frame, ideas like the
sins of the internal combustion engine, the sins of flush toilets, even the
sins of computers make sense. For each of these devices is driven by a
demonic disregardfor limits. Each is rotten with perfection. To see these
sins, as Illich asks us to, is to force our moral development.
Capacity forces choice. If we can transport water into closets to
defecate into it, and if we can wash the excrement into the general water
supply, we are faced with a choice. Should we? The answer to that
depends on considerationof the consequences. How will that toilet and
the social discipline it requiresaffect specific qualities of human life now
and in the future? It will not do to recall the Winter discomfort of the
outhouse. To manufactureand use flush toilets has the consequence of
degradingwater- degradingits quality and degradingits meaning. When
water becomes a cleaning fluid, it "sings reality"in a new and disturbing
way.
Within limits we can think and live water in many forms. But the
crucial notion is limits. Each form of water has its rules. Each way of
living has its costs. The rules and the costs have to be recognized,
investigated, discussed. The value of Illich for the social scientist is this.
He opens the dialogue concerning technology and policy to moral
 IVAN ILLICH'SHp AND THE WATERSOF FORGETFULNESS 103

concerns. He reminds us: technology cannot supplant politics. Politics

cannot be sublimatedinto technical decisions. Each "progressive"device,
product,or system becomes a life form in the future. Each device, product
or system we now employ determines how we live now. Thus we are
condemned to choose. To construct the language and the rules of such
social choosing is the great task of contemporarypolitics. To provide
concepts, frameworks, and models for that task is the job of the social
scientist.
This brings us to my differences with Illich. We differ in emphasis. I
will exaggerateto make the difference clear. Illich's work focuses on the
impact of machines, productionsystems, and productson human senses,
habits, and imagination. To oversimplify, he asks: How do tools shape
our dreams?I focus on the impact of traditionalvalues, political systems,
and policies on the design of machines. I ask: How do our dreams shape
our tools? Those perspectives are complementary. Historically,each is a
moment in a cycle of dreams becoming machines and machines giving
rise to different dreams. In tum, new dreams promote new machines.
Notice that I do not call this cycle progress;just history in the form of one
thing afteranother.I have learnedthat from Illich. When men and women
make dreams come true throughtechnology they create nightmaresalso.
Every realized dream, particularlya dream bulldozed into reality, has
costs. The greater, the more fantastic, the more ideal, and the more
liberating the dream, the greater the destruction its realization entails.
"Withdreamscome responsibilities,"wrote the poet, Delmore Schwartz.
I think the cycle, dream-tool-dream,is destructive.I assume that reality
is more complex than the human brain. Thus we can know or imagine
only parts. Even when we think wholes we can only abstract from
complex entities certain features such as shape or structure.Thus our
knowledge and our dreams are partial. We always leave out some and
sometimes many of the details. When we try to realize our utopian
dreams, we try to bulldoze great plans of simplicity and implicit ig-
noranceonto the complex, but fragile, relationshipsof life. We realize not
our dreams but tyranny. Certainly that is the sobering lesson of the
twentiethcentury.
My dream, as dream, may be a great delight to me and to you. As a
realized plan it will become our prison. When I think I know the proper
shape or form for other human lives and beings - be that form ever so
hopeful and benign -I will constrict and poison human potentials. The
result will not be new men and women of some ideological type. It will be
104 LARRY D. SPENCE

sullen men and women stuntedby their obsession with the only thing that
can matterto them, their freedom.
Realizing dreams is a vicious business. Utopian dreams do not stink
and do not sweat. H. G. Wells begins his autobiographywith the modem
cry, "I need freedom of mind. I want peace for work. I am distressed by
immediate circumstances."Wells wanted individuallife to be cleansed of
what he called "irrelevantnecessities" and subordinatedto "beauty and
truth, to universal interests and mightier aims." Some pages later he is
talking with Lenin "on the 'liquidation'of the peasantand the urbantoiler
- by large scale agricultureand power machinery." Suchideals of life do
not reek or fail but neitherdo they encompass what is unique, surprising,
and satisfying in humannecessities.
Should we not submit our dreams to the criticism of experience? Look
where this leads. If we temper or limit our dreams, we lose this wild,
unnerving part of human experience. That is the horrorsuggested by the
book, H 20, - we have lost or are losing our capacity to dream. To try to
create a lake of recycled toilet water in the midst of Dallas is not a wonder
of imaginationbut a symptomof its failure. Tools, products,and organiza-
tions based on ignoring, suppressing, perfuming,and escaping the details
of life promotetruncated,mean, and silly dreams.
For the past two years I have been reading the written account of such
dreams concerning men and women in space colonies. Space offers an
environmentwithout gravity. But it is also without air or water. Absent
the efforts required to overcome gravity, men and women can become
kinder,gentlercreatures.The man-madecapsule requiredby hostile space
makes possible, through engineering trial and error, an ideal human
environment.This combinationpromises perfect human beings in perfect
orbiting worlds. But the realization of this perfection requires incarcera-
tion. NASA is now spending money to learn: How little space, air, water,
and light can humanstolerateand for how long?
Such dreams do not have anything helpful to do with social science.
They are temptations. They encourage our pride. They urge us to sin.
They lead us to misuse our resources and ingenuity. As we use these
dreamsto guide our policies they become but wishful thinking. Betterthat
we reach for our bootstrapsthan for the stars.
Many social scientists do not like or understandIllich. They categorize
him as radical, reactionary,arrogant,authoritarian,utopian, unmindful of
the weak and poor. Unfortunately,they miss the point. Or perhaps they
feel the point and react accordingly. For Illich's works, such as this one,
 IVAN ILLICH'SHp AND THE WATERSOF FORGETFULNESS 105

are indictments of the arrogantand sloppy way they do their work. H 2 0

reveals a history embarrassingin its motley details and plans gone awry.
It shows a history enchanting in its myths, dreams, and surprises. The
book demonstratesthe power of an historicaland tragic frame to diagnose
the problems of our times. I take its lessons to be time-worn principles:
Love details. Despise shoddiness. Respect limits. Preserveyour dreams.

The PennsylvaniaState University

NOTES

I Ivan Illich, Hp and the Watersof Forgetfulness (Berkeley, Calif.: Heyday, 1987).
2 Colin Ward, "SanitaryMan, review of Hp and the Waters of Forgetfulness,"New
Society (25 July 1986).
3 Eugene J. Meehan, The ThinkingGame (Chatham,N.J.: ChathamHouse, 1988), and
Ethics for Policymaking: A Methodological Analysis (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood
Press, 1990).
4 See Kenneth Burke, Attitudestoward History (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1959), as well as Burke'snumerousother writings.
5 See Reginald Reynolds, Cleanliness and Godliness (London: Allen & Unwin,
1943).
 PARTll

MISCELLANY
 THOMAS ALEXANDER

THE TECHNOLOGYOF DESIRE:

JOHN DEWEY, SOCIAL CRITICISM,
AND THE AESTHETICSOF HUMAN EXISTENCE

In an importantessay, "Science and Society," Dewey makes this observa-

tion: "The significant outward forms of the civilization of the western
world are the productof the machine and technology."Later on he adds,
"We are forced to consider the relation of human ideas and ideals to the
social consequences which are producedby science as an instrument.The
problem involved is the greatest civilization has had to face."1 In many
ways this stands as a statement of the central theme of Dewey's own
work, which takes a very complex attitudetoward the problemstated and
weaves an equally complex answer. Indeed, of the major twentieth-
centurythinkers,Dewey is the only one to take the question of technology
as central-unless one includes MartinHeidegger's work, which stands,
whatever qualificationsare made, as a negative reaction to technological
civilization.2 One of the advantages of Dewey's work, in fact, is the
complex way Dewey approaches "the greatest problem civilization has
had to face," and offers what may be the only possible response other
than fatalism or blind faith in the consequences of industrialcivilization.
It will be the primarypurposeof this essay to indicate how deep Dewey's
vision was of technology's relation to the end of producinga context in
which human life can be lived fully and intelligently. For Dewey, only
when the final aesthetic ends of human existence are acknowledged can
technology itself become "responsible."3In addition to clearing up some
misconceptions about Dewey's instrumentalism,I wish to stress the
importanceof the ideas of art and social intelligence in Dewey's under-
standingof technology.

Karl Marx delivered one of the most profound characterizationsof

bourgeois-industrialcivilization in The CommunistManifesto:
Constant revolutionizing of production, uninterrupteddisturbance of all social

109
Paul T. Durbin (ed.), Europe,America,and Technology: Philosophical Perspectives. 109-126.
© 1991 KluwerAcademicPublishers.
110 THOMAS ALEXANDER

conditions. everlastinguncertaintyand agitationdistinguish the bourgeois epoch from

all earlier ones. All fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of ancient and
venerable prejudices and opinions are swept away, all new-formed ones become
antiquatedbefore they can ossify. All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is
profaned,and man at last is compelled to face with sober senses his real conditions of
life and his relations with his kind.4
Marx of course expresses the view that this is a portentouscrisis in human
history. It will eventuate in man's truly coming to know himself and his
world. He would no longer exist as the extension of the machine but
would make the means of productionserve absolutely the ends of human
living alone. Human existence is thoroughlydeterminedand transformed
by the technological world it creates. However, Marx still has the
Promethean faith that, though history moves forward by a series of
catastrophes,it ends up with human nature in the driver's seat. The idea
of "directedchange" is a bourgeois illusion; history moves according to
iron laws. But if there is no judgmentday of history, and if technology
remains simply an alien power removing all that is solid and sacred about
human existence, a deterministic pessimism like that of Jacques Ellul
replaces the deterministicoptimism of Marx.
An interesting comparison comes from that other great demystifier of
civilization, Sigmund Freud. In that brooding work, Civilization and Its
Discontents, Freudraises the following question:
These things that, by his science and technology, man has broughtabout on this earth,
on which he first appearedas a feeble animal organism ... do not only sound like a
fairy tale, they are an actual fulfillment of every - of almost every - fairy-tale wish.
All these assets he may lay claim to as his culturalacquisition. Long ago he formed an
ideal conception of omnipotence and omniscience which he embodied in his gods. To
these gods he attributedeverythingthat seemed unattainableto his wishes, or that was
forbiddento him. One may say, therefore, that these gods were culturalideals. Today
he has come very close to the attainmentof this ideal, he has almost become a god
himself. Only, it is true, in the fashion in which ideals are usually attainedaccording
to the general judgmentof humanity. Not completely; in some respects not at all, in
others only half way. Man has, as it were, become a kind of prostheticGod. When he
puts on all his auxiliary organs he is truly magnificent; but those organs have not
grown onto him and they still give him much trouble at times. ... Future ages will
bring with them new and probably unimaginably great advances in the field of
civilization and will increase man's likeness to God still more. But in the interestsof
our investigations, we will not forget that present-dayman does not feel happy in his
Godlike character.5
Freud, of course goes on to reflect that the "prostheticGod" will not and
cannot ever be truly happy, for civilization - which Freud here equates
 THE TECHNOLOGYOF DESIRE 111

with man's technological capacity to fulfill his fairy-tale wishes to

become divine, that is, to satisfy the demands of all desire - has exacted a
price of eternal denial of satisfaction of prehistoric desires. This turns
man into the creaturecapable of self-tormentand self-destruction- "the
interesting animal,"as FriedrichNietzsche called us. The true question,
for Freud, was whether man's creative, that is, erotic project of civiliza-
tion would falter before the destructive urge to annihilate that project
entirely. Eros faces Thanatos, chained together at the feet by Ananke,
Necessity.
It is importantto note several tacit assumptionsin Freud'sunderstand-
ing of desire and technology here. First, he tends to view human desire,
especially the deepest erotic drives, as preformulatedand teleologically
predetermined.These desires are shaped, he thinks, by early evolutionary
history in which humans were asocial, aggressive creatures. Second,
Freud views technology simply as an appendage to these predetermined
desires, detachable prosthetic means which have not deeply changed the
creatures that we are but only enhanced our pursuit of the pleasure
principle. Insofaras man succeeds in gratifyingthese desires, civilization
is a history of progress.
I do not intend to dwell upon either Marx'sor Freud'sanalyses. Marx
has made human nature a function of technological production, while
Freud sees underneath all our sublimated civilized consciousness an
unreconstructedprehistoricanimal. In their own ways these views reflect
dominatingprejudicesof the nineteenthcentury- though, oddly enough,
they derive from Thomas Hobbes. It was Hobbes who first propounded
that man is a maker ratherthan a spectator-knower,that in the state of
nature we existed as isolated individuals, driven by the most primitive
needs and fears left unchanged by the calculated benefit of the social
contract.Withoutdismissing the importanceof these claims or the degree
of truth each possesses, we must question the fundamentalmodels upon
which they are made.
Here I think the significance of Dewey's work becomes quite central.
Dewey challenges both theses: first, that the world within which human
beings experience themselves and understand their world consciously
(what Marx would call the "superstructure"of ideology) is merely a
function of our pre-establishedtechnological practices (though to be sure
these play a very great part in shaping self-awareness and rational
understanding);and, second, that there is a primitive subconscious nature
which constitutesthe ends of humandesire. InsteadDewey will argue (a)
112 THOMAS ALEXANDER

that, under certain conditions, human intelligence can be genuinely self-

directive and certain aspects of technology have made this possible; (b)
that once certain basic organic needs are met, the ends of human desire
have the capacity to change; and (c) that, with the applicationof method,
desire itself can become educatedand intelligent.
In other words, Dewey sees that one possibility of technology is the
education of desire which results in an art of human existence. With
Marx, Dewey sees that liberationmust be construedin terms of a political
transformationin which human life is the end, not the means, of tech-
nological production. With Freud, Dewey points to an underlying drive
motivating the project of civilization. But this drive is neitheraggressive
nor sexual. It is the drive to experience oneself and one's world with a
pervasive sense of meaning and fulfillment, a drive which I call the
human Eros. The result is that the question of technology for Dewey
ineluctably forces us to consider questions of politics, questions of
education, and questions above all of aesthetics. For it is in the aesthetic
mode of experience, Dewey asserts, that this integralfulfillment of human
existence is achieved.

II

Before undertaking this explication, an obstacle must be surmounted.

Dewey is perhapsthe most pervasively misunderstoodand systematically
misread thinker of the century. In his case we are not simply presented
with accomplished philosophers getting the minute arabesques of his
thought tangled up. We encounter,rather,an almost ubiquitous inversion
of his ideas - though this usually occurs in his less able advocates, like
RichardRorty or ErnestNagel, and in his critics. The rebirthof interestin
Dewey in the last decade is finally producing fresh, challenging rein-
terpretationsof him.
One of the most dangerousmisinterpretationsof Dewey is to tag him as
an "instrumentalist."This, I realize, must seem shocking, since Dewey
coined the term at one point to distinguish a part of his philosophy from
the many "pragmatisms"flourishing in the early part of the century. This
is still the "ism" most widely used to characterizeDewey in freshman
courses. Dewey himself, however, eventually opted for "cultural
naturalism"as the phraseto describe his philosophy as a whole.6
Among the many meanings Dewey attached to instrumentalism,none
was more importantthan the claim that ends and means could not be
 THETECHNOLOGYOF DESIRE 113

divorced, or even distinguished, except for practical reasons; that is, for
purposes of control. Dewey was misunderstood as saying that desire
selects certain ends beforehand and then intelligence sets about finding
out the means to satisfy them. "Means"were "meremeans,"handmaidsto
the demands of the blind imperativesof desire. Thus one comes to find
such characterizationsas the following by NormanVig: "Instrumentalism
holds that technology is simply a means to an end."7 This is the view
which we found in Freud:the primitive, irrationalnatureof desire forever
severs it from transformationby intelligence; it simply dictates and reason
follows as "slave of the passions."
This was a view which Dewey not only rejectedbut saw as the primary
opponent of the one which he held. Instead, Dewey argues that in the
course of reflective inquiryboth ends and means are worked out together.
Previous values become re-evaluatedas their meaning for human action
becomes clearer. Ends initially desired may turn out not to be desirable.s
We cannot avoid the undergone quality of primaryexperience. We may
actually desire some things at some time, but as these "had"qualities
become linked to unfolding histories, their qualities and meanings
undergo change and the capacity for criticism emerges. Inquiry thus
becomes the "educationof desire."Conversely, intelligence for Dewey is
not utilitarianpracticaldeliberation,a calculation of means in light of a
pre-establishedend of desire; it is a shared quest for experience, deeply
fulfilling in meaning and value, and it is realized by methodically
undertakingto see experience as a developing process in which the actual
is permeatedby the possible. It thus becomes primarilyan explorationof
the question of ends.
The misunderstandingof Dewey also touches on his numerousappeals
to science and the experimental method as liberating factors of human
civilization. Again, we find not only miscontrual but inversion in
interpretation.By those who see science as dogmatically committed to a
programof materialisticreductionismin its use of the modern concept of
causal explanation, Dewey would be read as advocating that all human
phenomena should be explained ultimately by finding physicalistic laws
governing behavior. The "manifest image" of man should disappear,
leaving us with "man the machine." And all the features of civilization
should be translatedinto reinforced behavior or neural synapses, as one
school of thoughtwould still have it today.
Dewey repudiates such notions and sees his philosophy as deeply
antagonistic to them. Science, he believes, is misunderstoodas a synop-
114 THOMAS ALEXANDER

ticon of truth claims that correspond with reality and are governed by
laws of conversion. It is the idea of science as a developing process of
cooperative inquiry which is important for Dewey. Science explores
natural events in connection with human operations; science is shared
social habits of self-critical, imaginative, experimentalinquiry ultimately
directedtowardthe fulfillment of humanexistence.
This points to a pluralistic view of experimental methodology. If
human beings behave in ways that atomic physics cannot explain, then
atomic physics is not the appropriate methodology for inquiry into
humans or human affairs (except insofar as they exhibit physical
properties).It is a primaryfeature of inquiry for Dewey as much as for
Aristotle that methodology should fit the subject matter. "The assimila-
tion of human science to physical science," Dewey wrote, "represents...
only anotherform of absolutistic logic."9 Fitting the method to the subject
is by no means easy to determine - all the more reason for choosing a
flexible, experimental,and pluralisticapproachto methodology.
It must be acknowledged that Dewey's constant appeals to science and
the experimentalmethod often sound as if a narrowerpositivist program
were in his mind. Yet it was Dewey's aim (perhaps mistaken) that "the
experimentalmethod"be construed as a plurality of methodologies - as
many as the subjects embraced. The experimentalmethod is nothing less
than the total capacity of sharedhumanexperience to question, to explore,
to modify itself on the basis of continuousexperiences.
I am almost done with my warnings- and I would point out that these
misinterpretations have tremendous consequences for our topic:
technology and the educationof desire throughsocial criticism.
Pragmatistsin general and Dewey in particularhave been targeted by
critics like BertrandRussell for being optimistic advocates of unrestricted
commercial technology. Such criticisms are ignorant. Only if one
understandspragmatismas holding that technology is a mere means to a
pre-given end, and that the satisfactionof our most elemental desires ipso
facto counts as good, can one hold the incredibly naive, harmfuldoctrine
that unregulatedtechnology constitutes progress, that the ultimate aim of
science is to produce commodities to maximize the program of the
Pleasure Principle. Technology understood that way would be mere
applied science aimed at serving the ends of unreflective desire. The
erotic task of civlization would be to gratify the human wish to become
God, to allow us to live in the fairy-tale world of science fiction writers,
where everything about the human condition has changed except man
 THE TECHNOLOGYOF DESIRE 115

himself. The fairy-tale world for Freud is the world in which desire
achieves its end without effort or obstacle. Like Aristotle's god, desire
converges with its end instantaneously and without deliberation or
thought for anything else. Consciousness disappearshere, giving way to
pure thoughtlessreflex or instinct.
I have already noted Dewey's primarycriticism of this - namely, that
desire alone does not determineends and then assign the task of obtaining
them to intelligence. But Dewey has anothercriticism: action unimpeded
by any need for adjustmentand reflection becomes unconscious habit.
Were the fairy-tale view of technology as a complete, instantaneous
gratification of given desires achieved, humans would cease to be
conscious and self-conscious animals. We only dream up technological
utopias or tales of Aladdin's lamp because of life's frustrations.Without
the awareness of inhibitions to action, gratificationbecomes mechanical,
unimbuedwith mind or meaning. This leads to one of the basic questions
of technology for Dewey: how it is to be understoodin relation to desire
and intelligence. This is a relationwhich cannot be innocently assumed to
be established. Neither is the relationshipautomaticallyor optimistically
beneficial.

III

We have already begun to misconceive technology, Dewey says, if we

appropriatethe problematic definition of it as applied science. This
assumes the theory-practicedichotomy, and Dewey says this is the major
practicaland theoreticalproblemof our culture. Farbetter,Dewey says, if
we understandscience as technology theoreticized. At least this captures
the importanthistorical movement from solving practical problems, like
measuring farmland, to more abstract sciences like geometry. It is no
fallacy, from this point of view, to understandthings in their genetic,
developmental, functional contexts. For Dewey, we must be careful to
begin by acknowledging as fully as possible the situational,the transac-
tional way that humans are in the worW together. This means we should
not begin with dualistic dichotomies between mind and body, self and
society, desire and intelligence, ends and means. Humans, as situational
beings, inhabit the world through interacting with those features which
constitute our environment. Insofar as we are biological creatures, this
environmentis biological.
I would note here that Dewey was among the first philosophers to
116 THOMAS ALEXANDER

describe his philosophy explicitly as "ecological."l0 This involves the

further claim that, as animals, we are involved in a temporal mode of
existence in which there are goods and the chances of losing them. This
situation requiresthat we act in an artful way, and our existence dynami-
cally reflects the order of our interactionwith the world. By nature we
must develop skills, arts, crafts, technai, in order to survive. It is only in
this way that the shape, connection, and meaning of the world opens to
us.
But transactions extend beyond the biological to the cultural. We
appropriatethe world and the art of the world through each other, as
social beings who communicate by symbols, who participatein shared
activities. We inhabit a temporality which transcends the immediate
moment of neural synapses and extends from our dimly recollected early
childhood to our anticipateddeath. The present moment marks a moment
in a developing life history which is temporally encountered or ex-
periencedas temporal.We encounterourselves in the human situation as
biosocial beings who need others in order to survive at all. We labor for
what seems unending years of childhood tutelage to assimilate our culture
so that we may emerge as fully participatingmembers. For Dewey, it is
significant that we are primarily learners rather than knowers, and he
thinks this is the first lesson any epistemology should learn. Human
beings develop and grow, and they do this by means of a shared social
existence in which we care for each other. Without that basic fact, quite
simply, we die. This makes our social reality as fully biological as any
neuralsynapse.
Human activity, then, is extremely complex. Activity as such is
anything which immediately serves to continue the integratedfunctioning
of an organism over time. For human beings, this must be understoodto
extend into the sphere of culture, of the world appropriatedsymbolically,
so that it becomes expressive of embodied meaning and value. Our
activity serves to maintainand develop our existence as creatures whoare
inherently cultural. Those actions which manage to overcome obstacles
tending to frustrateour existence become dyed with a sense of importance
and significance - so much so that they consciously embody our sense of
meaning and value.
This is what Dewey calls aesthetic or consummatoryexperience. Our
experience ceases to be the mere promise of intrinsicfulfillment; instead,
it consciously realizes possibilities through actions guided by definite
anticipations.Such experience, eminently meaningful,extends beyond the
 THE TECHNOLOGYOF DESIRE 117

merely practicaland the cognitive. Meaning and value here are undergone
or lived, not as initial primitive desires which have now been gratified,
but as the maturefruits of intelligent, critical experience. In other words,
meaning and value are understoodas the pervasive aesthetic qualities of
an experience which directly embodies an intrinsic sense of self-fulfill-
ment.
A qualification. Though most experience has the capacity to be
developed in such a way that these qualities are realized, these pos-
sibilities very often remain ignored and undeveloped. This, for Dewey, is
the tragedy of most of our lives - and this tragedy is reflected in those
philosophies which relegate the aesthetic to the domain of secondary,
subjective fantasy.
It is my thesis that we cannot hope to understandDewey the instrumen-
talist until we have graspedDewey the aesthetician.Aesthetic experience,
for Dewey, is the cardinal indicator of what experience itself is. It has
been developed so as to incarnatethe human need for meaning and value.
The term "art"signifies precisely those means which bring this sort of
experience about. The epitome of Dewey's instrumentalismis to be found
in Dewey's understandingof art. In fact, Dewey gives perhaps his most
lucid definition of instrumentalismin Artas Experience:
In both the production and enjoyed perception of works of art, knowledge is
transfonned;it becomes something more than knowledge because it is merged with
non-intellectualelements to fonn an experience worth while as an experience. I have
from time to time set forth a conception of knowledge as being "instrumental."
Strangemeanings have been imputedby critics to this conception. Its actual contentis
simple: Knowledge is instrumental to the enrichment of immediate experience
throughthe control over action that it exercises.11

In artistic-aestheticexperience - for Dewey, to behold is to participate

artistically,and to create is also to behold aesthetically-a developmental
process so thoroughly integratesends and means that we have a model for
any and every kind of human activity. The aesthetic experience grows
from the fundamentalhuman need to organize experience into a world
that sustains meaning and value. Dewey describes experience so
transformedin the singular,as "anexperience":
We have an experience when the material experienced runs its course to fulfillment.
Then and only then is it integratedwithin and demarcatedin the general stream of
experience from other experiences. ... In such experiences, every successive part
flows freely, without seam and without unfilled blanks, into what ensues. At the same
time there is no sacrifice of the self-identity of the parts.... Because of continuous
118 THOMAS ALEXANDER

merging, there are no holes, mechanicaljunctions, and dead centres when we have an
experience. There are pauses, places of rest, but they punctuateand define the quality
of movement. They sum up what has been undergoneand prevent its dissipation and
idle evaporation.... An experience has a unity that gives it its name: that meal, that
storm, that ruptureof friendship. The existence of this unity is constitutedby a single
quality that pervades the entire experience in spite of its variation of constituent
parts.12

It is a pity, says Dewey, that we isolate the aesthetic in a separaterealm of

the fine arts. We thereby lose what is the most importantavailable tool of
social criticism. So much of our world is so deeply unfulfilling that fine
art often becomes the highbrow's religion, an escape valve which he or
she needs to keep going. By contrast, the genuine implication of the
aesthetic is to liberate all practical activity. The aesthetic marks the
general end of human experience, the possibility of experiencing in a
direct and significant way those meanings and values which give human
life its sense of meaning and fulfillment. When action is not directed
towardthis end, it either subvertsthat end or realizes it by chance.
Technology, therefore, as the power of human experience to realize
ends through the control of means, only becomes intelligible if it is
consciously understood as the art of imbuing human existence with
meaning and value.
Art implies a sensitivity to concrete, individual context ratherthan an
ability to produce in general without any considerationof particularends
or contexts. As such, it should be contrasted with merely mechanical
production.Art is what produces the direct, contextualizedfulfillment of
experience. Art is not opposed to mechanical productionbecause it does
not use tools (obviously it does) but because of its ability to generate
concrete fulfillment. It is a refinementof mechanical production.In this
sense, for Dewey, the question of technology becomes the question of art.

IV

To restate what I considerto be Dewey's most fundamentalclaim: human

beings need to embody in their activities a sense of meaning and value.
This fulfills them and guides them so that their lives exhibit as much
coherency, creativity, vitality, affection, and significance as possible.
Human Eros is thus urged to embody the possibility of meaningful
existence. Civilization, from this standpoint,is an erotic project. To deny
a humanthis possibility is, in effect, to destroy that person.
It is a remarkablefeature of so much of human civilization that the
 THE TECHNOLOGYOF DESIRE 119

lives of vast multitudeshave been spent to secure the erotic projects of a

few. An example: One of the primary human technologies of early
civilizations was slavery. There, essential needs remain unfulfilled and
unrecognized.They may not be missed, or at best they may be felt only in
a dumb, pervasive, nameless agony. Or they may have been ac-
knowledged but surrenderedas a way of respondingto the situation."Arts
of acceptance,"Dewey says, had to prevail. Anotherexample: In cultures
where infant mortality is extremely high, parents cannot afford the
emotional luxury of becoming too attached to children. (At least this is
what some anthropologicalresearcherssay.) But when the human desire
for meaning is consciously frustrated,the destructive forces of Thanatos
are loosed. When humanbeings who have lived in an organized,fulfilling
world lose that sustaining order, destructive, nihilistic action is a likely
response.13
Cultures not only seek to secure the necessities of biological survival,
such as food, shelter, and protection from attack; they seek to establish
conditions in which human beings can meaningfully participate in
activities which carry a sense of funded or embodied aesthetic value.
Among these we find the capacity to participateas a full member of a
social group, winning respect and acknowledgment from fellows; the
capacity to live a stable, productive life, to care for others and raise a
family, to experience both the beauty and the terrorof existence not alone
but with others; and of course the capacity to experience the intellectual
excitementof learningthe ways of the world and ourselves.
To be sure, most cultures have not consciously understoodthemselves
as projects of this sort. For millennia, the ancient Egyptians simply saw
their culture as perpetuatingthe just orderof the gods, rna'at. It has been
the fate of the West since the Renaissance to have to come to grips with
an understandingof culture itself as technological project. Unfortunately,
this has often been confused with the notion that technological production
itself is the end of civilization - an idea reflected in Marx'sdescriptionof
bourgeois culture (see above), as well as in Marx's utopian view of the
technological future.
This change in Western culture resulted from a number of dramatic
changes. Together they succeeded in shatteringwhat had been a highly
integrated, highly rationalized civilization (though probably less in-
tegratedthan nostalgic historians are inclined to believe). The expansion
of technology and the new science largely contributedto that change -
though they were born of efforts to secure and extend the late medieval
120 rnOMAS ALEXANDER

world. It is a fact of technology that it establishes the basis for further

technology, so that was anotheragent of change. A tool designed to meet
a pre-existentneed suddenly is seen to have uses undreamtof, and it may
lead to the invention of entirely new technologies (and thus further
change) or create new problems which in turnmust be met with still more
new technologies.
There is anotheraspect to consider as well. The rate of change not only
increases but the direction of change becomes, in the end, unpredictable
and unmanageable. Where the Renaissance expressed the high
hopefulness of a Baconian New Atlantis, where science creates a paradise
on earth, by the nineteenth century there was a widespread feeling that
things are out of control. Hegel's and Marx'sstrangeefforts to discern the
teleology of history, or John StuartMill's optimism about how a society
dedicated to individualism will inevitably result in progress, express in
their own ways a greatersense of providencethan of human control. The
counterfoil to this optimism is Nietzsche's descriptionof our situation as
that of "rollingtoward an x"; and his various postmodernistfollowers see
us caught in an absurd,collectivizing technological/culturaldrift.
I would note in passing thatNietzsche's own solution to this crisis was
quite nostalgic and optimistic. The Ubermensch must be able to look into
this absurdmess and stare it down, even rejoice in it - and to do this over
and over again. Nietzsche, with Epictetus or the Buddhalong ago, tried to
teach an "artof acceptance,"not Dewey's "artof control."14
We are thus presented with a culture which is born in the whirlwind
and where "all that is solid melts into air." The rise of Western technol-
ogy has made culturalchange an inescapable fact of the meaning of our
existence.
Three responses are possible here: (1) We may opt for the modem
version of the Stoics' belief in cosmic providence, for the optimistic
notion that technology and economics are guided by a benevolent unseen
hand which needs no conscious human intervention. (2) We may accept
the fatalistic view popular with French theorists that technology is an
undirected, impersonal, totalizing movement. Or (3) we can defend the
view that technology requires the development of a critical, imaginative,
informed social intelligence which can contextualize the technological
projectwithin the largeraim of realizing the erotic task of civilization.
The fundamentalquestion of technology in light of this third option -
which is, obviously, the Deweyan option - requires an emphasis upon
training both human intelligence and imagination - our capacity to
 THE TECHNOLOGYOF DESIRE 121

generate and retain the aesthetic end of our social experience. The human
projectas a whole must be understoodin terms of an "aestheticsof human
existence." In other words, we must inquireinto the ways in which human
beings can develop cooperative, experimentalinsight into the projects of
their shared lives so that their actions, as far as possible, can bring forth
conditions under which life is expressive of meaning and value. Our
technological understanding needs to be informed by aesthetic and
political imagination.
Dewey was right in taking aesthetic experience as primary, and I am
suggesting that one of the most important facets of a philosophical
exploration of the question of technology is that the aesthetic require-
ments of human existence are intrinsic to the enterprise. This approach
provides above all a way of integratingthree crucial topics: the natureof
those productive practices which produce valued ends, or the praxis of
techne; the question of social communication, or the embodiment of
praxis within culture; and the need for aesthetically apprehendedguiding
ideals which enhance our capacity for intelligent social action and
criticism.
In looking at art Dewey thinks we have a model of ideal productive
practice. For Dewey, art is any action in which means are so organized
that a fulfilling, consummatory experience develops. This allows us
consciously to experience meaning and value as directly embodied in our
lives through activity, in a medium which has an expressive character,
which means it is also a social and cultural event. Although means and
ends are thoroughly integrated,the experience unfolds out of the need for
active intelligence to organize the material. This is what keeps the
experience from becoming a mindless reflex activity. It is only through
the use of means, tools, media, that the meaning of the expereince can
become present. The rationalityand order of the world is a reflection of
the technai or arts by which we renderit rational-or, better,by which we
make its aesthetic humanrationalityactual.
For Dewey, tools are extensions of the primary human technology,
acting toward an end; that is, of behaviorconsciously directed. Tools thus
exhibit a technical-aesthetictemporality.Our bodies are our first technol-
ogy and our bodily coordinationis our first work of art. From the arts of
the organic body itself, the human body grows into its habits, its "artof
the world"(by no means a mere "prosthetic"device). Originally, we may
simply seek to recapturea previous object of desire, as a baby reaches for
a toy that he or she wishes to hold again; but in the process of directed
122 THOMAS ALEXANDER

experience, we encounter new meanings, new values, and the range of

experience grows.
In short, desire becomes educated and funded with intelligence: we
learn, we become experienced or artful in our transactions.In trying to
organize our activities in light of desired ends, we discover that through
activity we reveal further possibilities of existence. Experience is
disclosed to be not only orderablebut open to meaningfuldevelopment.
From the Deweyan perspective, a tool synthesizes experience existen-
tially. A hammer, when grasped as a hammer, exposes a number of
possible projects. It is only through mediating activities that we ap-
propriatethe future into the present, allowing it to become a guiding end
for present behavior. Human beings are capable of realizing the pos-
sibilities of the future only throughthe mediation of tools. 15 In doing so
we can act intelligently and evaluate our actions by understandingthem as
attempts to embody a project. The tool is only as intelligent as the hand
using it, but it actively shapes the habits and range of actions of the
critical intelligence behind the hand. The path of freedom lies in the
interactivepossibilities in the hand-tool relationship,which is constantly
explored and re-evaluated. If our world of technological change has
disrupted us, it has also created the possibility for human beings to
recognize that we are active, creative participants in the project of
securing meaning and value in our lives.
Thus, instead of Freud'snotion of primitive desires simply appropriat-
ing technology prosthetically, in an external manner, to fill out the
programof the Pleasure Principle, Dewey sees human beings as capable
of developing new and more intelligent desires as intelligence is applied
to organizing experience. Not only are human beings learnersfor Dewey,
but we become civilized through the pervasive structuringhabits of our
subconscious. The subconscious as it operates in artisticexperience is the
first place to look for clarification. Far from being a primitive drive
deflected or sublimated into a substituteproject, the subconscious grows
and becomes transformedinto an expressive object.16
Similarly,Dewey's view is opposed to Marx'snightmarishcharacteriza-
tion of our civilization as one in which human life has been consumed by
technological production for its own sake, as a civilization in which
humanrationalityis incapableof directedchange.
Artistic experience for Dewey is both social and political. It is in-
herentlyexpressive. It epitomizes our effort toward communication- and
that at a level deeper than the exchange of information.Dewey repeatedly
 THE TECHNOLOGYOF DESIRE 123

extols art as a more effective and profoundmeans of humancommunica-

tion than any other mode we possess. Attempting to embody consum-
matory experience in a medium, we create the possibility that others can
appropriatethe meaningful possibilities of the art work produced}? For
example, though Emily Dickinson did not write her poems to be read by
others, in organizing the medium of the English language and leaving
behind a record of that action on paper, she created the possibility for
shared appreciation and understanding. When we participate in her
poetry, Dewey would say, there is a social and cultural transaction
between us and the long-dead poet. The humanbonds which sustain us in
our quest for meaning and value, and which civilization seeks to secure
and upon which it depends, are of this sort. They are not simply ex-
changes of information.
Ultimately we must be able together to create social ideals of human
existence, and this too is an aesthetic issue. Dewey would regret that
some theories of meaning tend to ignore the communicationprocess, the
social developmental transactionthat determines the nature of meaning.
Too often people look to minimalist models, for example, ideals of
cognitive equivalency. The experience of art, for Dewey, allows us access
to a way of understandingthose most fulfilling human relationships in
which significant values are embodied.
I want to stress once again here that the art of humancommunicationis
the art of building a genuine community in which human life is pursued
with intelligence and creativity. In the process, as in the fine arts, human
actions seek, discover, and embody expressive values and meanings. This
requires that human beings be able to grasp each other, that they act
mutually to realize a common project or to secure a common value. Not
only do we understandeach other in terms of the role each of us plays in
attaining a desired end, but we can modify our activities in a responsive
manner.However, without an immanentlyguiding ideal which allows us
to regulate our activities so that the most meaningful possibilities are
realized, our activity would become mechanical, disjoined from any
fulfilling end.
In the end, the problemof humanaction, which includes the problemof
technology, is the discovery of sustaining ideals by means of which
human beings can realize as many fulfilling values as possible. I would
emphasize that this is not the classical liberal ideal of the state as neutral
with respect to the satisfaction of subjective desires. That is closer to
Freud's view. For Dewey, the state must seek to establish a democratic
124 THOMAS ALEXANDER

culture in which people can pursue the good life mutually, actively, and
intelligently. Democratic culture can pursue this ideal only as an ongoing
experiment. We must strive to grasp the possibilities of our culture and
the means whereby they can be realized or avoided. This implies a
widespread, informed, critical intelligence. For Dewey, a "public" is
created whenever a group of people are affected by unforeseen but
important long-term consequences. A public becomes intelligent,
however, only when it can organize itself politically and attempt to
regulate and anticipatethese consequences. This is the properfunction of
government.I 8
Democracy also requires taking education seriously. In a democratic
culture, the education of desire through intelligence takes on special
meaning.l9 If this objective is attained, the chances are improved of
evaluating and controlling the effects of technology upon our shared
project of building fulfilling lives. Dewey sees the need above all for
developing our moral imagination as the task of education. We must
become disciplinedcritics in the aesthetics of humanexistence.
Instead of celebrating our culture as an embodiment of the one true
way (as the ancient Egyptians did), we must see our culture as an
experiment in the art or techne of human living. Our culture could, of
course, be an experiment out of control - at best a moral for later
civilizations to heed as they dig up and muse upon our bones and ruins.
But there is also the possibility that we can grasp ourselves intelligently
enough to try to direct our culturalactivities in light of a sustaining ideal
of humanexistence. For this ideal to be realized, it needs to be connected
to means for its realization- that is, to technology. Ifwe take technology
in this broad sense to be the art of human existence - the activity by
which humans produce meaning and value for their lives - then we can
take a critical standpoint that avoids either blind endorsement or
wholesale rejectionof technology as such.
Dewey believed that this would lead to the humanizationof technol-
ogy; and he further believed that this is the primary issue for contem-
porary philosophy. Near the end of Dewey's life, well after we had
enteredthe age of atomic weapons, he expressed this hope:
In sober fact, we are living at a stage in history which relatively speaking is so
immaturethat ... our science is technical ratherthan widely and deeply human....
The philosophers of the 17th, 18th, and 19th century did an important work in
promoting conditions which removed obstacles to the progress of physical and
physiological science. There is now a supreme challenge, a supreme opportunity.If
 THE TECHNOLOGYOF DESIRE 125

Galileo and his successors could look upon this gatheringhere today he would say, "It
is for you to do for the very life of man what we did for the physical and physiological
conditions of that life. Discovery of these conditions was for us the immediate task
that determinedthe end of our search. You possess the results of that search. It is for
you to use them as means to carryforwardthe establishingof a more humaneorderof
freedom, equity, and nobility. We accomplished the simpler and more technical part
of the work. It is for you, possessors of a torch lit by our toil and sacrifice to
undertake, with patient and courageous intelligence, a work which will hand on to
your successors a torch that will illuminatea truly humanworld."20

If this sounds too optimistic for our postmodem ears, we must ask what
other options remain for critical reflection. The alternative seems to be
that of the mere spectatorwatching the onslaughtof undirectedhistory-a
retrospectiveratherthan a predictive intelligence. If we cannot attain a
transformationof our condition leading to the realization of a humane
world, philosophy will deserve to be characterizedas it has been by
WalterBenjamin:
A Klee painting named "Angelus Novus" shows an angel looking as though he is
about to move away from something he is fixedly contemplating.His eyes are staring,
his mouth is open, his wings are spread. This is how one pictures the angel of history.
His face is turnedtoward the past. Where we perceive a chain of events, he sees one
single catastrophewhich keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage and hurls it in front of
his feet. The angel would like to stay, awaken the dead andmake whole what has been
smashed. But a storm is blowing from Paradise; it has got caught in his wings with
such violence that the angel can no longer close them. This storm irresistibly propels
him into the future to which his back is turned, while the pile of debris before him
grows skyward.This storm is what we call progress.21

SouthernIllinois University

NOTES

1 John Dewey, The Later Works (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press,
1981) volume 5, pp. 53 and 55. The essay in question can be found in Dewey's
Philosophy and Civilization (1931).
2 I realize that Heidegger can be read as simply wanting to allow the essence of
technology to become manifest; and that, in Being and Time (New York: Harper&
Row, 1962; Germanoriginal, 1927), he offers a sophisticatedaccount of the way that
tools and equipment imply an interconnected world. Nevertheless, I think it is
indisputable that the underlying temper of Heidegger's thought involves a reaction
against technological civilization, whether capitalist or socialist. I think his
Introduction to Metaphysics (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1959;
Germanoriginal, 1953) makes this clear.
3 The term is taken from Larry Hickman's fine discussion at the end of his John
126 THOMAS ALEXANDER

Dewey's Pragmatic Technology (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990). See

also Robert J. Roth, "Personand Technology: A Deweyan Perspective,"in R. Roth,
ed., Person and Community(New York: FordhamUniversity Press, 1975).
4 Karl Marx and FriedrichEngels, The CommunistManifesto. This is included in D.
Struik, ed., Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844 (Buffalo, N.Y.:
Prometheus,1988; fITst English translatio'.l, 1964).
5 Sigmund Freud,Civilizationand Its Discontents (New York: Norton, 1961; German
original, 1913), pp. 38-39.
6 Dewey does this in his most instrumentalistwork, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry
(1938). See LaterWorks,vol. 12, p. 28.
7 Norman Vig, "Technology, Philosophy, and the State: An Overview," in M. Kraft
and N. Vig, Technologyand Politics (Durham,N.C.: Duke University Press, 1988), p.
12.
8 This is a major point Dewey makes in his Theory of Valuation (1939). See Later
Works, vol. 13. It is also made in his Human Nature and Conduct (1922); see Middle
Works,vol. 14
9 Dewey, The Public and Its Problems (1927); see LaterWorks,vol. 2, pp. 359-360.
10 Dewey and ArthurBentley, Knowing and the Known (1949); see Later Works,vol.
17, pp. 117-120. Dewey's term, "transaction"(earlier he had used "interaction"),
expresses essentially the same idea. It is that the organism should be seen in terms of
its relationships, general and specific, with the complex system within which it
develops over time.
11 Dewey, Artas Experience (1934); see LaterWorks,vol. 10, p. 294.
12 Ibid., pp. 42-44.
13 See Colin Turnbull'spowerful descriptionof the fragmentationof the meaningful
civilized life of a tribe in the extremities of starvation,in The MountainPeople (New
York: Simon and Schuster, 1972). This should be contrastedwith his description, in
The Forest People (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1961) of a central-African
pygmy civilization in which the sense of meaning and value is still strong.
14 In The Quest for Certainty (1929; Later Works, vol. 4), Dewey distinguishes
between arts of acceptance - in which one adjusts to circumstance- and arts of
control, in which one seeks to modify the environmentto achieve more fulfilling ends.
15 The idea is discussed most fully in chapter4 of Experienceand Nature (1925); see
LaterWorks,vol. 1.
16 Ibid., p. 228.
17 See chapters4 and 5 of Artas Experience (1934); see LaterWorks,vol. 10.
18 This is a major point in The Public and Its Problems (1927; Later Works, vol. 2);
see especially chapters1 and 2.
19 This is the primary theme of Dewey's Democracy and Education (1916; see
Middle Works,vol. 8), but it reappearsin a multitudeof his other writings.
20 Dewey, "Has Philosophy a Future?"in LaterWorks,vol. 16, p. 368.
21 WalterBenjamin,Illuminations(New York: Schocken, 1968), pp. 257-258.
 HANSLENK

IDEOLOGY,TECHNOCRACY,AND
KNOWLEDGEUTILIZATION

I. IDEOLOGY

Some years ago in Europethere was widespreaddiscussion of "theend of

ideology."1 The point seemed to be that at least those of us who live in
industrializedcountries live in a post-ideological era. Has a postmodern
pluralism in postindustrial societies eliminated ideology? Has a tech-
nocratic trend, manifest especially in the efficiency-oriented administra-
tive procedures of large organizations, gained such a foothold that
ideological factors are no longer important?I believe that such diagnoses
of the Zeitgeist are too vague and general. "Anyone who generalizes
generally lies," goes the cliche. To make the same point in anotherway:
claims about the end of ideology may display an ideological bias.
I want here to deal with some intriguing questions about ideologies
linked to science and technology - or, more generally, to any knowledge
utilization. But before getting to those questions we need to clarify the
concept of "ideology."Such concepts, after all, have been used in many
ways, often ambiguously, in the history of social philosophy.
Probablythe first systematic critiqueof ideology, of ideological biasing
of knowledge, was Francis Bacon's critique of the supposedly authorita-
tive knowledge of his day in terms of idols of the tribe, of the cave, of the
marketplace, and of the theater.
Bacon, however, did not use the word ideology. That was first used by
A. L. C. Destutt de Tracy in 1796, leading to a "school of ideologues" in
the Napoleonic era. According to Destutt de Tracy and the ideologues, the
analysis of ideas and perceptions,including the faculties involved in their
production,can be turned into a science based on the analysis of sensa-
tions. Ideology, for Destutt de Tracy and the ideologues, should be partof
a unique new fundamental science of zoology. Napoleon originally
favored the ideologues but later turnedagainst them when they criticized
him. He then denounced the ideologues as fanatical metaphysicians, as
devotees of abstractconcepts with no practicalsignificance. Though there

127
Paul T. Durbin (ed.), Europe, America,and Technology:Philosophical Perspectives, 127-140.
© 1991 KluwerAcademicPublishers.
128 HANSLENK

were later uses of "ideology"in a positive sense, the tenn generally took
on the connotation of abstract theory unconnected with social reality
propoundedby intellectuals-often in orderto gain political power.
A more influential use of the concept of ideology was that of Karl
Marx and Friedrich Engels. They returned to Bacon's conception of
biased ideas but linked it to the usage among post-Napoleonic political
writers, emphasizing the use of ideas for political purposes - though
without any pejorative overtones. Other aspects of the Marx-Engels
conception include "false consciousness" and a substruc-
ture/superstructuredialectic: ideologies fall among the superstructure
phenomena dialectically related to the substructureof the forces and
relations of productionin the historical class struggle. Ideas appearto be
autonomous by concealing the underlying economic and technological
forces that detenninetheir meaning. Ideologies in this sense playa special
role in political legitimation. (A full account of Marxist, neo-Marxist,and
post-Marxistconceptions of ideology cannot be providedhere.)
The next importantstage in this brief history is the rise of the sociology
of knowledge, under the influence of Alfred Seidel, in the 1920s.2 The
outstandingfigure in this movement is Karl Mannheim,especially in his
book, Ideology and Utopia (1929).3 In contradistinction to Marx's
negative usage, the sociologists of knowledge claimed that ideology
pervades all knowledge - theories, perceptions, sensations, all the
phenomena of consciousness. Mannheim speaks of "total ideology," of
the "connection of all knowledge with material, social, and existential
reality."All thinking is socially grounded,not just that of the ruling class.
(Again, these fonnulations were widely discussed and debated, but a full
account cannot be given here.)
A critique of ideology that combines something of Marx and Mann-
heim can be found in the works of the neo-Marxists, Max Horkheimer4
and TheodorAdorno, in the 1930s. Horkheimerand Adorno claim to have
discovered the hidden bourgeois foundations of Mannheim's fonnulation,
but they adopt his conception of a historical detennination of all of
knowledge. Horkheimer, for instance, speaks of "the most advanced
knowledge" of a particularage as in fact "a mish-mash of outdated
opinions contrary to the truth." Horkheimer and Adorno, nonetheless,
believed that a "critical"approach,a critique of ideology, could lift the
veil of false consciousness and arriveat a true consciousness.
Herbert Marcuse's critique of our technological society as one-
dimensional5 falls within this tradition, as does the work of Jiirgen
 IDEOLOGY,TECHNOCRACY,AND KNOWLEDGEUTILIZATION 129

Habennas. What Habennas adds - for instance, in "Technik" und

"Wissenschaft"als "Ideologie" (1968)6 - is thatthe ideological character
of public opinion or social consciousness pervadeseven the institutionsof
science and technology.
These Marxist and neo-Marxist approaches, along with Mannheim's
sociology-of-knowledge conception of ideology, are all very general. A
narrower, methodological conception of ideology can be found in the
positivist approach of Theodor Geiger in Ideologie und Wahrheit
(1953).7 Geiger focuses on the ideological character of particular
statements rather than general theories. A statement is ideological, he
says, if the person making it intends it to be purely theoretical- whereas,
in fact, it is value-laden, detenninedby a hidden nonnative commitment.
The function of ideological statements, according to Geiger, is pseudo-
neutrality:they mask political and nonnativepresuppositionsin the guise
of theoretical neutrality. They are pseudo-scientific statements masking
disguised nonnativevalue judgments.
This methodological conception of ideology seems very useful -
especially in contrast to the sweeping usages of the Marxists and
sociologists of knowledge. However, this fruitful conception of theoreti-
cal disguise also has limitations. It seems to me too narrowto restrictit to
just statements or propositions; theories and attitudes and conceptual
systems can also wear the mask of value-neutrality.So I would propose a
combined approach: keep the methodological account, but apply it
broadly. Such a combined approach can avoid the pitfall of over-
generalization, of identifying any system of ideas with ideology in
general. The advantage of combining a methodologically restricted
concept of ideology with its use for social-critical purposes is that it can
show how ideologies have the social function of legitimating power and
privilege, of justifying particularsocial, political, and moral values as if
they were universal - without at the same time committing the over-
generalizationfallacy of the Marxists and the sociologists of knowledge.
A side note: Talcott Parsons's conception of ideologies as belief
systems that offer cognitive legitimation for value orientations with
respect to empirical matters is close to this combined approach. (See
Parsons, The Social System, 1951.)8 Furthennore, Parsons clearly
differentiates between this narrow conception of ideology and the old,
vague conception. In one respect, moreover, Parsons'sneutralconception
of ideology is preferableto Geiger's somewhat negative approach.On the
other hand, Parsons's explication lacks the methodological refinement
130 HANSLENK

and philosophical depth of Geiger's approach - not to mention the

critical-social-philosophythrustthatI have added.
In conclusion and as a general statement, we may, then, conceive of
ideologies as theoretical formulations of cognitive systems (including
individual statements, hypotheses, concepts, and arguments)that are put
forward to rationalize, justify, or legitimate attitudes, orientations, and
opinions commonly held in a society (including small subgroups of a
society). Despite their theoreticalformulation,they are impregnatedwith
values, norms, hidden (sometimes even subconscious) preferences,and so
on.
Sociopolitical ideologies, in particular,are ideologies which initiate,
rationalize, or justify attitudes, opinions, or strategies with respect to
social goods. They involve equality and inequality, priorityand privilege,
and the distributionof scarce resources- including changes of status with
respect to all of these. Social ideologies thus facilitate planning,decisions,
and actions that affect all these value-related issues. They also serve the
function of simplifying orientations in a complex world, reducing
complexities and making them more manageable.They help people cope
with social problems and social conflict. They even help individuals deal
with intrapersonal conflict or tension, helping to create a sense of
personal identity by clarifying role expectations as well as goals and
values. In making value judgments seem objective, they hide the very
deep-rootedcommitmentsthatgive them their force.
Ideologies in this sense can be either comprehensivevalue systems for
whole societies or particularideologies for particulargroups - including
scientific communities. An example of ideology in the broad sense is the
Marxist view of ideas as belonging to a superstructuredialectically
related to the material substructureof economics and technology. What I
want to turn to instead is particularideologies related to knowledge
utilization in advanced industrial societies. Two particularideologies I
concentrateon are scientism and technocracy, including features the two
have in common and interactions between them. I will end, finally, by
proposing some steps that would be required to formulate a social
philosophy of technology that does not involve the shortcomingsof these
ideologies.
 IDEOLOGY,TECHNOCRACY,AND KNOWLEDGEUTILIZATION 131

II. SCIENTISM

"Scientism"is a term coined by philosophers who oppose it, so it must

have polemical connotations. Its origins, building on the earlier "two-
cultures"controversyassociated with the name of C. P. Snow,9 began as a
continuation of the critique of neo-positivism in social science. Two
leading German philosopher-opponents of scientism have provided
definitions. Karl-Otto Apel says scientism means turning the human
subject of science into an object of science. 1O Paul Lorenzen, in his turn,
emphasizes two characteristics:naturalscience as the ideal for all other
sciences, and value-neutrality.(On the latter score, Lorenzen admits that
adherentsof scientism must thereforegive up the idea of providingvalues
for society and for the state.)}}
I suspect that there are in fact few adherentsof scientism in this strict
sense, though the old positivistic programof providing a strict demarca-
tion between metaphysics and science may come close. But, since Paul
Feyerabend,I2 Imre Lakatos,13 Yehuda Elkana,14 and John Watkinsl5
have demonstratedthe intimate link between science and metaphysical
ideas, the quarrel over demarcationcriteria seems a matter for purists.
Furthermore,since few alleged adherentsof pure scientism actually go so
far as to deny the usefulness of philosophy (including its normativeparts)
altogether, the whole debate seems a grotesque comedy, a useless
continuationof the anti-positivismdebates thatraged in West Germanyin
the 1960s and 1970s. (One sign of the uselessness of both sets of debates
is that early adherents of the positivists' reductionistic "physicalism"
program such as Rudolf Carnap had abandoned it long before these
debates started.)
A defense of absolute scientism, then, seems impossible - if not for
pure science, then certainly for applied science, which is where a
physicalist programwould have to be implemented. However, there are
variantsof scientism that are worth attacking,and I turnto these now.
A methodological scientism would hold up the model of the exact
sciences as the ideal for all sciences - indeed, for any rational method
whatsoever. Behaviorism in psychology is an obvious example, but
people have also proposed scientistic models for all the social sciences
and even for the humanities.
Scientism in the ethical realm - which presupposesthe methodological
model (as, for instance, in the grand physicalist scheme of Otto Neu-
rathl6 ) - would subject humanbeings to the same kinds of experimentsas
132 HANSLENK

those used in the naturalsciences. (I will not go into it here, but there is a
similar approach in the so-called "technological imperative": "Can
implies ought."More on this later.)
A third version of scientism may be given the apt but ugly title,
"scientocracy."Like the first, above, it would treat all human relation-
ships, including large-scale societies, as analyzableusing the methods, the
criteria, and the results of science. One extreme version takes the norms
and values of science as described by sociologists such as Robert
Merton17 - values such as honesty, openness, tolerance, critical
rationality, disinterestedness, objectivity, emotional neutrality, even
universalizability- to be the ideal norms for organizing human groups
and societies.
Paul Feyerabend is the most vocal opponent of all these variants of
scientism, which he attacks as a "chauvinismof science" and "the unholy
alliance of science and rationalism."18In Feyerabend'sview:
A stranglinggrasp of an ideologically petrified science would express itself in almost
any societal realm: Human relationshipswould be treatedand judged "scientifically"
- which means that the capacity for intuitive, non-objectifiable understandingof
fellow human beings would be lost. The fellow human ceases to be a friend or a
fellow-sufferer whom one owes devotion or understanding.No one would really
understandlanguage. One would see humans as an objective system, as something to
generalize about and to observe in orderto test those generalizations.19

If this devastatingcritiqueseems to focus on scientocracyor methodologi-

cal scientism, it can be extended to scientism in the ethical realm as well.
For example, debates about experimenting with human subjects have
addressed the question whether human subjects can or cannot be sub-
jected to the methods of natural science (see Hans Jonas20 and Hans
Lenk21). The basic critiqueof scientism in the moral realm is that treating
humans as guinea pigs violates ethical norms - even when human
experimentation is carried out in accord with the highest norms of
science. And this applies to social science field experimentsjust as much
as to any otherhumanexperimentation.
There is a direct connection between methodological scientism,
scientism in the moral realm, and certain technocratictendencies already
pointed out by Aldous Huxley decades ago.22 What I have in mind is a
kind of social engineering used to manipulateboth consciousness and the
unconscious. This would involve not only external manipulationbut self-
manipulationthrough drugs (a kind of Valium mania or other sorts of
widespreaddrug addiction). It would also involve advertisingtechniques.
 IDEOLOGY,TECHNOCRACY,AND KNOWLEDGEUTILIZATION 133

And it would involve direct experiments, both behavioral and social-

scientific. But its most sinister manifestation would come with genetic
engineering. Already we have the capacity to modify genetic inheritance,
even to produce new living species. This might be extended to human
genetics, for example, in order to eliminate genetically-transmitted
diseases. (In passing, I would note that this raises grave moral questions,
for researchersas well as the public at large. Does humankindhave the
right to alter life forms, and if so how far does this right extend? Would it
be ethical to try to "improve"human nature - whatever that might
mean?23) This brings me to my next topic.

III. SYSTEMS TECHNOCRACY

There is another escalating trend that bears watching. Associated with

microelectronics and information systems, others have called it the
"technetronicrevolution,"but I preferto think of it as a form of systems
technocracy. What I have in mind is the growing power of computer-
based methods of control as applied especially in the administrationof
organizations- that is, systems engineering as applied, for instance, in
bureaucracies (with their history of red tape!). The development of
computer and electronic technologies, of information systems, and
especially of so-called "expert"systems - all of these seem to include a
capacity for the technocraticcontrol of people's private lives throughthe
manipulationof data banks and other means. Furthermore,legal protec-
tions against commercial or governmentalmisuse of such data are poorly
developed. Moreover, there are serious moral questions involved where
individuals are no longer capable of dealing with the consequences of the
stored information,either because there is too much of it or because (as
with certain satellite warning systems in military applications) humans
cannot react quickly enough. In short, there are serious problems -
privacy being just one - with the rapid development of computer and
informationsystems.
Does this involve a new kind of technocracy?Already two decades ago
I was warning people of the possibility of a systems technocracy.24
Already then I could see trends in that directionfostered by developments
in computerand informationnetworks. Now the question is worth asking
again: Will the computer and microelectronic revolution - by which I
mean not only developments in informationscience but also in systems
engineering - inevitably lead to a systems technocracy with ever more
134 HANSLENK

serious consequences? I believe that debates about trends toward a

systems technocracy (which is, after all, scarcely distinguishable from
technocracy in general) should become more and more prominent as
information and systems science develops - and especially as it gets
applied in ever largercomputerizedinformationsystems with the capacity
to be used for centralizedauthoritarianpurposes. Burnham'sThe Rise of
the ComputerState (1983)25 has already spelled out some of the trends
and dangers - especially dangers for democracy in the tendency of
administrativeinformationsystems to have a momentumof their own that
can override political controls (especially if there is no effective legal
protectionin place).
Is a systems technocracy our fate in the future? To answer this
important question, we need first to look at some disturbing trends -
trends unfortunatelyignored hitherto by social philosophers. The first
example is what might be called the "telecratic"trends apparentin the
electronic media. And here I have in mind not only television but
information processing. People refer to media-ocracy as leading to
mediocrity, and there is just as great a tendency to get hooked on video
games and other things of that sort as there is to get hooked on television.
Even hackers seem to be hooked on what they do. And, aside from
individual addiction, there seems to be a societal immersion, even
submersion, in the consumerism associated with television and related
electronic entertainment.
We know, however, that paradise is no passive state. At least in the
Western tradition, we understand ourselves as basically active, as
independentand capable of acting for ourselves. Humans are achieving or
performingbeings; we develop - indeed we win - our personalityonly by
achievement, by self-development, by self-improvement.I have written a
book on this subject, Eigenleistung (1983),26 in which I develop a
comprehensive anthropology of the acting/achieving individual. I think
this is clearly relevantto the problem of coping with the seductive power
of the telecommunications media - especially their inducements to
passivity. The passive way in which young people get immersed in
looking at movies or images on television or video screens; the vicarious
experiences created by these media, as well as video games; the pseudo-
excitement, with no personal, active, authentic engagement- all of these
threatenthe educationby way of self-improvementand self-interpretation
that young people ought to experience. The distractivepower of the new
electronic media should never be underestimated.
 IDEOLOGY,TECHNOCRACY,AND KNOWLEDGEUTILIZATION 135

Is there any way we can counterbalancethese trends (which, to repeat,

seem to me to have technocratic implications)? Can we encourage
authentic and engaged activities in the arts, in sports, in nature ex-
periences - even in science if pursued properly? Is autonomy and
authenticity even possible in interacting with the telecommunications
media? with computer programming? with expert-systems problem
solving?
In my opinion, such questions need to be addressedby interdisciplinary
task forces, by groups including psychologists, sociologists, computer
scientists, legal scholars, philosophers, educators, planners, ad-
ministrators,and politicians- not to mention that new breed of specialists
(such as ergonomists, etc.) who have taken this sort of thing to be their
special focus. Coping with the threat of systems technocracy is a truly
interdisciplinarychallenge. We need to develop new approaches for
handling masses of data; new approachesto structuringknowledge (going
beyond engineering approachesusing expert systems); and new models
for assigning responsibility (including ethical responsibility) in cases of
malfunctioning computers (or, sometimes, computers that function too
well!); and so on. In short, we need new ways of handling scientific and
technological advances and new social and moral philosophies to guide
us.
This leads to my final topic.

IV. SIMILARITIESAND INTERACTIONSBETWEENSCIENTISMAND TECHNOCRACY

The oldest forms of technocracy- associated with the names of Claude

Saint-Simon and Thorstein Veblen - now seem very much out of date.
Similarly, the antitechnocraticfears of Helmut Schelsky27 and Jacques
Ellul28 about an "administrativestate" seem equally outdated. Likewise,
the predictionsof Adorno, Horkheimer,and (to a degree) Habermas- that
political debate would disappearin the face of the legitimizing force of
the feasible and the functional - neither do these, today, seem very
realistic.
Nevertheless, there are some ominous trends suggested by these earlier
opponents of technocracy. There may be no conscious conspiracy to
establish an expertocracy, but the privileged positions accorded to
informationand systems experts today suggest to me the possibility of a
systems technocracy - at least in some administrativerealms in some
institutions. Moreover, there is a certain momentum that develops as a
136 HANSLENK

result of infrastructuresand established procedures. These are hard to

change quickly and economically. Once large-scale institutions are in
place, there are serious constraintson future courses of action. And all of
this can take on the characterof an ideology, pre-emptingthe need for
political justificationor legitimation.
There is at least the possibility that such an ideology could develop -
something I warned of two decades ago in terms of the danger of "the
normativeforce of feasibility."Similarly, Marcuse, StanislausLem,29 and
H. Ozbekhan30 have warned us of the dangers of "the technological
imperative." On the other side of the picture, there is Edward Teller
saying explicitly that, "Whatevercan be known should be applied."31 Or
one of my colleagues, a computerscientist, saying that if largercomputer
networks can be built, they should be. Or again there is the example of
governmentpressurein Germanyto institutecable television just because
it can be done.
These trends and tendencies associated with the expansion of systems
integration and large-scale networks - especially in the administrative
arena - seem to me to link scientism and technocracy in troublesome
ways. The sciences I worry about most in this respect are all applied
sciences: systems science and the policy and planningsciences.
Habermas has identified the core of technocratic tendencies in ad-
vanced industrialsocieties as the fact that they tend to close off, displace,
or even precludethe criticial discussion of political and moral problemsin
the name of a technological rationalityof means. As he says, this leads to
the unquestionedacceptance of ends or goals, to the "depoliticization"of
public opinion among the masses. Andre Gorz has succinctly charac-
terized this as today's peculiar ideology of technocracy.32 To do away
with the rational discussion of norms and values, especially in the
establishment of goals for the technological exploitation of science,
would clearly return us to the absolute scientism discussed above. To
apply science alone in the solution of social and political problems,
attempting to solve them in a maximally efficient way, would be to
implementHabermas'sfeared technocracyexactly as predicted.
Such possibilities, closely linking technocracy and scientism, are of
course no more than models of an ideal type sort; they do not describe
actual behavior- for the most part, not even approximately.In that sense,
there are very few pure technocratsin Habermas's sense.
On the other hand, Habermas's predictions do seem to apply to some
planners and organizers, to some decision makers in the technological
 IDEOLOGY,TECHNOCRACY,AND KNOWLEDGEUTILIZATION 137

realm who go about their business - it sometimes seems in every case -

without any considerationof values or any reflection on goals. Moralists
cannot take the place of technological decision makers,but neithershould
the reverse be true. (By itself, this is no argumentagainst the traditional
practicalorientationof technical decision makers- only against excesses
or onesidedness.)
In calling these trends technocratic,I do not focus on individual actors
in any special way; I am worried about the applicationof scientific and
technical methods, without reflection, within large-scale social systems.
Furthermore,whenever there is philosophical or moral debate in public
about such issues - and especially in those cases in which it has an
influence on technical decisions - this feared link between technocracy
and scientism is weakened. Sometimes, in these cases, individualdecision
makers continue to act in a scientistic or technocraticway. But that only
reinforces a distinction between an individualistic and a collective
meaning of "scientism" and "technocracy."(I would suggest, in this
respect, that Adorno and Habermasand other "critical"thinkers had the
collective meaning of the terms in mind when they criticized the ideology
of technocracy.)
To me, all of this suggests that philosophers, journalists, and even
critics from within the scientific community have a grave social respon-
sibility to criticize technocratic tendencies. They can exercise this
responsibilityas members of advisory boards or commissions, as well as
in the formationof public opinion. As affects the public, this could mean
writing articles for journals of public opinion, appearing on panels on
television, speaking out publicly, and so forth (as has happened, for
instance, on environmentalissues).
There is one final link between scientism and technocracy that I want
to discuss. It has to do with claims about the extension of scientific values
to the general public - as also discussed above. But the version I am
concerned with refers especially to the United States, and more par-
ticularly to the so-called "science lobby" there. One of the scientific
values identified by Merton and other sociologists of science is the
autonomy of science, the freedom of scientists to make their own
decisions, including policy decisions, without interference from the
public. In the interest of guaranteeingthe purity of research as well as
establishing or maintaining the ideal of pure science as an important
cultural value, scientists sometimes cultivate another ideology - that of
"purescience."
138 HANSLENK

Peter Weingarthas done careful research on American science policy

and shown how, under the mask of this pure science ideology, a large
degree of self interest has been introduced into science policy in the
U.S.33 Oligarchical scientists have turned into politicians, planners for
science in official committees and agencies. Weingart talks about an
institutionalized"science lobby" whose members are not out for personal
gain but who work to insulate scientific goal-setting from public scrutiny.
(Weingart even notes how the term "lobby" had been used for the
activities of certain physicists as early as 1945, though the term disap-
peared in the final draft of the critical scientists' manifesto when it
appeared.)
This institution within science, this policy of setting goals exclusively
in the interestof science, can be seen as a form of scientism. Furthermore,
the chief scientific decision makers in such a system may properly be
called expertocratsif not technocrats.The worst examples are the defense
and health establishments in collusion with the military/industrial
complex and the medical/industrialcomplex.
There are, however, countertrendsin force that may have a chance of
repoliticizing science policy, of countering scientistic and technocratic
trends - though going to an opposite extreme, endangering the limited
autonomy that science should have, would be equally dangerous.
According to Weingart, this is the dilemma of contemporary science
policy - especially in the U.S., but increasinglyalso in Europeand Japan.
The ideology of pure science may, moreover, run into obstacles other
than a repoliticising counterforce.Limitations on resources may require
democratic priority-setting,especially when projects lumped under the
heading, "big science," are in question. And this is not just an issue of
being unable to predict social benefits as an outcome of these big
ventures. Compromises between the general interests of society and the
special interests of science would be required in any case. In such a
situation, argumentsfor scientific autonomy are seen to be clearly what
they are: political grabs for money and power. As the public becomes
more critical of big science, it may also become critical of claims of
scientific autonomy.
I would not want, in the end, to be misunderstood.Problems of the
future will require the application of scientific knowledge for their
solution. But they will also require contributionsby social critics, and
philosophers among them. In a word, solving the problems of the future
will require comprehensive, interdisciplinary,and systematic planning;
 IDEOLOGY,TECHNOCRACY,AND KNOWLEDGEUTILIZATION 139

but in the end only democratic decisions will solve the problems in an
optimumway.

UniversityofKarlsruhe

NOTES

I See Hans Lenk, ed., Technokratieals Ideologie (Stuttgart:Kohlhammer,1973).

2 Alfred Seidel, Bewusstseinals Verhlingnis(Bonn: Cohen, 1927).
3 Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1936;
Germanoriginal, 1929).
4 Max Horkheimer,"Ideologie,"FrankfurterBeitriige zur Sozialjorschung4 (1956):
162-181; and "Ideologie und Handeln,"FrankfurterBeitriige zur Sozialjorschung 10
(1962): 38-47.
5 HerbertMarcuse,One-DimensionalMan (Boston: Beacon, 1964).
6 Jtirgen Habermas, "Technik" und "Wissenschaft" als "Ideologie" (Frankfurt:
Suhrkamp,1968).
7 TheodorGeiger, Ideologie und Wahrheit(Stuttgart:Humboldt-Verlag,1953).
8 Talcott Parsons,The Social System (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1951).
9 C. P. Snow, The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1959); also, The Two Cultures and a Second Look
(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press, 1969).
10 Karl-Otto Apel, "Szientismus oder transzendentaleHermeneutik?,"Hermeneutik
und Dialektik1 (1970).
II Paul Lorenzen, "Szientismus versus Dialektik," Hermeneutik und Dialektik 1
(1970).
12 Paul Feyerabend,Against Method: Outline of an AnarchisticTheory of Knowledge
(Atlantic Highlands,N.J.: HumanitiesPress, 1975).
13 Imre Lakatos, "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research
Programmes,"in I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave, eds., Criticism and the Growth of
Knowledge (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press, 1970), pp. 91-195.
14 Yehuda Elkana, "The Problem of Knowledge," Studium Generale 24 (1971):
1426-1439.
15 John W. M. Watkins,"Influentialand ConfirmableMetaphysics,"Mind 67 (1958):
344-365.
16 Otto Neurath, Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung, Sozialismus und Logischer
Empirismus(Frankfurt,1979).
17 Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press,
1957). See also N. W. Storer,The Social System of Science (New York: Holt, Rinehart
and Winston, 1966).
18 Feyerabend,AgainstMethod(see note 12, above), passim.
19 Paul K. Feyerabend,Erkenntnisfiir freie Menschen (Frankfurt:Suhrkamp, 1979),
p.100.
20 Hans Jonas, The Imperative of Responsibility: In Search of an Ethics for the
140 HANSLENK

Technological Age (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984; Gennan original,

1979).
21 Hans Lenk, Pragmatische Vernunft (Stuttgart: RecIam, 1979), and Lenk, ed.,
HumaneExperimente?Genbiologie und Psychologie (Munich, 1985).
22 Aldous Huxley, Brave New World(GardenCity, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1932).
23 Lenk, Humane Experimente?,passim.
24 See Hans Lenk, "Technokratie-Ideologie-Philosophie,"in H. Lenk, ed.,
Philosophie im technologischen Zeitalter (2d ed.: Stuttgart:Kohlhammer,1971), pp.
108-132; and "Technocracy and Scientism? Remarks Concerning an Ideological
Discussion,"Man and World5 (1972): 253-272.
25 David Burnham, The Rise of the Computer State (New York: Random House,
1983).
26 Hans Lenk, Eigenleistung: Pliidoyer fur eine positive Leistungskultur(Zurich:
Edition Interfrom,1983).
27 Helmut Schelsky, Der Mensch in der wissenschaftlichenZivilisation (Cologne and
Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1961), and Auf der Suche nach Wirklichkeit
(DUsseldorf: Diederichs, 1965).
28 Jacques Ellul, The Technological Society (New York: Knopf, 1964; French
original,1954).
29 StanislausLem, Summatechnologiae (Frankfurt:Insel, 1976).
30 H. Ozbekhan, "The Triumph of Technology: 'Can Implies Ought,'" xerox
manuscript,Systems Development Corporation,Santa Monica, California.
31 EdwardTeller, interview in Bild der Wissenschaft12 (1975): 94-116.
32 Andre Gorz, "Technokratieund Arbeitsbewegung,"in C. Koch and D. Senghaas,
eds., Texte zur Technokratiediskussion(Frankfurt:Suhrkamp,1970), pp. 13lff.
33 Peter Weingart,Die amerikanischeWissenschaftslobby(DUsseldorf: Bertelsmann-
Universitats-Verlag, 1970).
 MANUEL MEDINA

TECHNOLOGYAND SCIENTIFICCONCEPTS:
MECHANICSAND THE CONCEPTOF MASS IN ARCHIMEDES

In the fIrst scholium of his Principia, Newton says that the concepts of
time, space, location, and motion are too well known to need defIning.
The concept of mass (or quantitas materiae), on the other hand, is
included as the fIrst of the eight definitions that precede the laws of
motion. Here is the defInition:
The quantityof matteris the measure of the same, arising from its density and bulk
conjointly.1

Newton then says that in his treatise "body" and "mass" refer to this
measurablequantity.
From the beginning, modem physics has encounteredserious theoreti-
cal diffIculties with the concept of mass. Newton's definition has often
been criticized by physicists; Ernst Mach was one, and he charged that
Newton's defInitionis both unfortunateand circularin defining density as
mass per unit volume.2
Newton's phrase to characterize the quantity of matter, quantitas
materiae, is medieval. Kepler had already proposed a more modem
conception, defIning mass (meaning the resistance a body exhibits with
respect to continuing in motion) as directly proportionalto its quantityof
matter. Newton's conception systematizes Kepler's. However, it was left
to Euler to complete the defInition of inertialmass; he said the mass of a
body is measuredby the force needed to set it in motion with a fIxed rate
of acceleration.
According to Newton, quantitas materiae is manifested in the resis-
tance of a body to changes in the dynamics of motion; furthermore,"the
same [quantitas materiae] is known by the weight of each body."3 In
contrastto Newton, ancientnaturalphilosophersdid not consider weight a
measure of matter- though long before the rise of that philosophy there
had been procedures and instruments for measuring the quantity of
matter.WhatI have in mind is often called "hylometrics."

141
Paul T. Durbin (ed.), Europe, America,and Technology:Philosophical Perspectives, 141-156.
© 1991 KluwerAcademicPublishers.
142 MANUEL MEDINA

1. ANCIENTHYLOMETRICS

In commercial transactions,agreement must be reached on the value of

the merchandise;among other things, this depends on measurementsof
quantity. Procedures designed to determine quantity - prior to the
development of techniques of weighing - included simple counting and
volume determinations. However, in commerce involving precious
metals, the use of scales goes back at least to 2,000 B.C.
Egyptian paintings of the twentieth and twenty-first dynasties
(1,200-950 B.c.) already show scales being used in public marketplaces.
Similarly, in classical Greece, the same kinds of scales were in common
use.
The earliest instrumentfor weighing - typically two arms balanced at
the center with trays hanging at each end - the Romans called a bi/anx.
These scales were most commonly made of wood, but they were
nonetheless extremely accurate. For example, pre-ColumbianIncas used
scales whose arm lengths differed less than a tenth of a millimeter and
which could detect a difference of 0.05 gram in weight. And small scales
with metal arms, which could differentiate down to a centigram, are
known to have existed in Mesopotamia.
In this same period, there are many examples of scales found in the
"books of the dead" in Egyptian sarcophagi. These include fairly large
scales involving equal arm lengths, some with pointers and others with a
system of wires undertension from lead weights. Scales of these types are
clearly depicted on Greek vases.4
More or less plausible conjectures are all we have to tell us about the
origins of instrumentsas old as the scale. However, we can be fairly sure
that the kinds of instrumentsmentioned are derivative from still earlier
instruments. The fact that scales appear in the myths of very diverse
cultures can be taken as an indicationthey had their origin in ritual. In the
Egyptianbooks of the dead, scales are depicted as being used in deciding
the fate of the deceased; for instance, in weighing a dead person's heart
against a feather of Maat. The destiny of the dead person in the "other
world" hung in the balance. Scales as instruments of judgment also
appear in the Bible and the Koran and in Zoroastrian, Vedic, and
Buddhist texts. In the books of the dead, the scale already appears as the
symbol of justice.
In Greek and Roman myths, scales were used in kerostasis, in which
models of the two antagonists were placed in the trays to determine the
 TECHNOLOGYAND SCIENTIFICCONCEPTS 143

outcome of a dispute. For instance, in the Iliad, this is the way Zeus
decided Hector's fate in his battle with Achilles. This usage in myths
seems to be directly linked to an ancient ritualused to decide between two
antagonists. An iron bar was placed over a fulcrum at equal distances
from the two, and each had to try to tilt it; if neither could do so, it was
determined that they had equal strength - that they were "equivalent."
This ritual, as it appears in myths, has been repeatedly pointed to as the
ancestorof scales in the technical sense. And it is obvious that this could
also explain the notion of scales as determiningequivalence of weight.5
Similarly, ritual offerings also display the scale as representing
equivalence. What I am referringto is rituals weighing a person against a
quantity of gold or some other precious metal; the amount equivalent to
the weight of the person was then offered to the gods or disbursed to
appropriateparties. The essential meaning here is that of equal value or
identity between the person making the sacrifice and what is symbolically
sacrificed in his or her place. And here again the equivalence is es-
tablishedby a sort of scale.
The use of scales for secular purposes began with commerce in
precious metals, and - it should be noted - originally determined the
qualityratherthan the quantityof the meta1.6
Within the class of basic measurement techniques - counting,
geometric measurements, measurements of length, area, and volume,
measurementsof mass, and measurementsof time - ancient hylometrics
is based on the first two, which are, methodologically speaking, the oldest
and most fundamenta1.7
The most primitive technique of hylometrics is based on simple
geometry, establishing the density of bodies in relation to their volume.
The weighing of gold was originally done by volume, and in ancient
cultures where scales were as yet unknown - for instance, among the
Aztecs - it was the only technique used. This procedure,employing only
the measurementof volume, was widely used for liquids, grains, and
flour, and it continuedlong after precise scales became available.
Geometric measuringplayed a fundamentalrole in the development of
scale measurement- among other reasons, because there was a close
connection between the systems of weights used in scales and in volume
measurements.For example, uniform vegetable seeds were used as a unit
of weight - with the carob bean giving rise to the carat. Nonetheless, a
measurementthat originated in Babylonia, the mass of an inch of pure
gold (equivalent to about 315 grams), came to be one of the most
144 MANUEL MEDINA

importantunits; it appearswith slight modification in Egypt, Greece, and

Rome (where it was known as the libra - pound-a term still used today).

2. HYLOMETRICSWITH SCALES AND THEORETICALMECHANICS

Using scales for measuringmatterhad great significance in the history of

commercialtransactions,but it was essential for the developmentof early
theoretical mechanics. Theorizing about scales is present in the earliest
known works on the theory of mechanics. In the pseudo-Aristotelian
treatise, Mechanics (although it remains controversial who wrote this
treatise, it clearly originated in the Peripateticschool), the discussion of
scales is based on Aristotelian theories of dynamics. On the other hand,
the Book on the Balance, attributedto Euclid, is purely axiomatic in style
and deals strictly with statics. The works of Archimedes follow the latter
course - although it is fair to say that the pseudo-Aristoteliantreatise had
just as great an influence on laterdevelopments.
Among medieval works on scales, outstanding are Elementa super
demonstrationem ponderum[elements on the demonstrationof weights],
and De ratione ponderis [the meaning of weight], both by Jordan
Nemorarius.
Toward the end of the sixteenth century, Simon Stevin wrote a famous
book on statics, De Beghinselen der Weegconst [elements of the art of
weighing]. A short time later Galileo discussed scales in two papers, Le
mecaniche [mechanics] and La bilancetta [the small scale]. And Christian
Huygens wrote a Demonstratio de equilibrio bilancis [demonstrationof
the equilibriumof scales].
The reason why the theory of scales is so important in theoretical
mechanics is that, though it is involved in providing instruments of
measurement,it falls properlyunder the heading of theoretical measure-
ments of matter. In this context, the theories of Archimedes are the most
basic with respect to the concept of mass.
Before writing his better-known On the Equilibrium of Planes,
Archimedes had written a treatise with the title, Elements of Mechanics,
which includes a book entitled On Balances. Though the book is lost, its
contents can be inferred from references in the Mechanics of Hero of
Alexandria.
Returning to On the Equilibriumof Planes (the title of which bears
little resemblanceto the contents), it contains theories about scales using
ideal weights with geometric figures in order to determine the surface,
 TECHNOLOGYAND SCIENTIFICCONCEPTS 145

volume, and center of gravity of those figures. Using scales in this way is
clearly evident (among other places) in propositionsix in On the Quadra-
ture of the Parabola, where Archimedes explains to Dositeus (to whom
the work is dedicated): "I first discovered the theorem by way of
mechanics, then demonstratedit geometrically."g
As we see in the preface to Archimedes' importantwork rediscovered
at the beginning of this century by the Danish historian, J. L. Heiberg -
now known as On the Method of Mechanical Theorems - axiomatic
formalization is the theoretical way in which the results of the
"mechanicalmethod"are presented.9 This consists in balancinggeometri-
cal figures whose surface and volume are unknown against others whose
magnitudes are known in order thereby to determine the values of the
unknown figures. Although this does not involve real scales but
represents instead a primitive sort of "thought experiment," the
mechanical-geometricalmethod of investigation was based - and this is
absolutely certain - on the application of technical procedures of
measuringmatterthat were simultaneouslymechanicaland geometrical.
It was in this fashion - so Archimedes claims in On the Method of
Mechanical Theorems - that Democritus arrived, without proof of any
kind, at a ratio of one thirdbetween the volumes of a cone and a pyramid
with respect to a cylinder and prism with equal bases and equal heights.
To do this, he must have used a real scale, weighing the respective figures
made of some homogenous materialsuch as wood or clay.
It is possible that Archimedes, imitating the methods of Democritus,
used similar procedures,involving pieces of thin metal cut in appropriate
shapes, to determinethe area of parabolicsegments.to However, it is clear
that the authorof On the Methodof Mechanical Theoremsformalizedthis
method of mechanical trials, thus converting it into a method of mathe-
matical construction.And with the new system he was able, for the first
time, to determine the volume of a sphere, its surface, and the size of
segments of a sphere- laterextending this to othergeometricalfigures.
In On the Equilibrium of Planes, the fundamental features of the
Archimedian method are presented; there, mechanical scale
measurementsare convertedinto a theory for the measurementof matter.
The treatisebegins with seven postulatesand includes two books in which
a total of twenty-five propositionsare demonstrated.These are the seven
postulates:
1. Equal weights at equal distance [from a fulcrum] are in equilibrium,
and equal weights at unequal distances are not in eqUilibrium but
146 MANUEL MEDINA

incline towardthe weight which is at the greaterdistance.

2. If, when weights at certaindistances are in equilibrium,something be
added to one of the weights, they are not in equilibriumbut incline
towards that weight to which the addition was made.
3. Similarly, if anything be taken away from one of the weights, they
are not in equilibrium but incline towards the weight from which
nothing was taken.
4. When equal and similar plane figures coincide if applied to one
another,theircenters of gravity similarly coincide.
5. In figures which are unequal but similarthe centers of gravity will be
similarly situated. By points similarly situated in relation to similar
figures I mean points such that, if straightlines be drawn from them
to the equal angles, they make equal angles with the corresponding
sides.
6. If magnitudes at certain distances be in equilibrium, (other) mag-
nitudes equal to them will also be in equilibrium at the same
distances.
7. In any figure whose perimeter is concave in (one and) the same
directionthe centerof gravity must be within the figure.I I
In the matter-measuringpostulates (1, 2, 3, and 6), several new
principles not found in Euclidean geometry are introduced;these include
equilibriumand equal weight and the operationsused to combine weights
- all clearly theoreticalin nature.
In these formulations it is clear that Archimedes is thinking of bodies
hanging from the arms of a scale. In the first three postulates the term
used is /3a.nea. or weights; in postulate six the term lle)'Egea. or magnitude
appears and signifies both plane and solid figures. In either case, it is
assumed that bodies of equal magnitudehave equal weight.
Among the propositionsdemonstratedon the basis of these postulates,
the following belong to a mechanics based on scales:
1. Weights which balance at equal distances are equal.
2. Unequal weights at equal distances will not balance but will incline
towardsthe greaterweight.
3. Unequal weights will balance at unequaldistances, the greaterweight
being at the lesser distance.
4. Two magnitudes, whether commensurable (proposition 6) or
incommensurable(proposition 7), balance at distances reciprocally
proportionalto the magnitudes.I2
In demonstratingthese propositions, Archimedes often uses proofs of
 TECHNOLOGYAND SCIENTIFICCONCEPTS 147

the reductio ad absurdumtype. For example, in proving propositionone,

he says:
For, if they are unequal, take away from the greaterthe difference between the two.
The remainderswill then not balance (by postulate3) - which is absurd.

The second propositionis proved this way:

For take away from the greaterthe difference between the two. The equal remainders
will therefore balance (by postulate 1). Hence, if we add the difference again, the
weights will not balance but incline towards the greater(by postulate2).13

Archimedes'treatise is concerned with an ancient form of the mechanics

of measuring matter;that is, with determiningmass by means of scales.
The technique, however, involves mathematicalconstructionin addition
to the use of actual scales. The rules for carrying out a construction
establish technical prerequisites or conditions that an instrumentmust
satisfy. In a scale with two arms, there are three basic conditions:
1. a state of equilibriumconditionfor equivalentmasses;
2. a sensitivity condition: with any increase or decrease in mass, the
scale must both depart from a state of equilibriumand indicate the
directionin which the change has taken place; and
3. a stability condition: balance is unaffected by the substitution of
equivalentmasses - for example, exchanging the masses in the trays
at eitherend.
In Archimedes'formulationin On the EquilibriumofPlanes, the norms
that correspondto the technical prerequisitesfor anyone constructinga set
of scales are conceptualized as idealized forms. Thus proposition one
fulfills the state of eqUilibrium condition; propositions two and three
together fulfill the sensitivity condition; and proposition six fulfills the
stabilitycondition.
These formulations represent theoretical conceptualizations or
presuppositionsboth for the constructingof (accurate) scales and for the
use of scales. In propositionsone and two, the conditions of a mechanics
of matter-measurementare summarized- in propositionone, the equality
that obtains in a state of equilibrium; in proposition two, the state of
imbalance that occurs with unequal masses. In a theoretical formulation
of the mechanics of measuring matter, specifications for manufacturers
and instructionsfor users of scales are converted into propertiesof ideal
instrumentsthat can never actually be made. Furthermore,proving the
theoremsrequiresadditionalconditions that are unattainablein real life.
148 MANUEL MEDINA

These conditions are partlyformal: perfectly straight arms, a fulcrum

precisely at the center, etc. But they are also material - materials of
homogeneous density or absolute rigidity - andfunctional: a stability that
is absolute, an unlimited capacity, a sensitivity capable of measuring
infinitesimal changes in geometric shapes. That is, we are here dealing
with a mechanical artifact but one which exists only in a fictional
formulation where instruments behave in an ideal, absolute, perfect
fashion, strictly obeying the technical rules requiredfor theirconstruction.
In this theoretical formulation, optimum functioning derives from, is
logically related to, ideal instantiationof the technical requirementsfor
both constructionand use.

3. THE CONCEPTOF MASS IN STATICS

In the theoretical mechanics of scales a metric concept of massI4 is

defined which is fundamental in applying Archimedes' methods. This
concept of mass refers to geometric figures whose masses are assumed to
be proportionalto surface or volume - are assumed, that is, to have
homogeneous density. Once a ratio is established between two geometric
figures, the same ratio therefore applies to corresponding areas or
volumes. In this Archimedianfashion, once the surface or volume of one
figure is known, that of anothercan be computed.I5 Archimedes'method
thus requiresneitheran absolute value for mass nor the establishmentof a
basic unit measure of mass to produce a scale with a fixed value. His is a
relativistic concept of mass requiring no more than that certain values
correspondproportionallyto certainmasses. To measure matterusing the
concept of mass implicit in Archimedes' method, a scale must be used;
the ratio between two masses is inversely proportionalto the lengths of
the arms of a balancedscale.
This theoretical metricizationof a scale using the concept of mass is
not, therefore, completely independentof geometric magnitudes; indeed,
it presupposes a prior determination of proportional values in linear
measurements. The correspondence between value for masses and
geometrical magnitudes is essential for integratingArchimedes' concept
of mass into the theory of ratios and proportions.And this in tum can be
considered to be the essential core of the ancient general theory of
measurement.16
This geometrical treatmentof magnitudesin the measurementof mass
allows Archimedes to produce a theory of relations between incommen-
 TECHNOLOGYAND SCIENTIFICCONCEPTS 149

surable magnitudes in spite of the fact that the ratios among the masses
are all commensurable.So, for example, in propositionseven of On the
Equilibriumof Planes, a "law of the lever" for scales is demonstrated
using incommensurablemagnitudes. The Archimedian proof for ratios
involving non-unitarymasses is based on propositions six and seven and
amounts to a general pronouncement of the inverse proportionality
between masses and the lengths of the arms of scales.
The proof of these propositions which Archimedes puts forward has
been an object of contention ever since Ernst Mach criticized it, saying
that Archimedes is assuming what he is trying to prove.17 Mach's
criticism gave rise to a number of publications defending the honor of
Archimedes. However, the clear result has been a recognition that several
additionalassumptionsare needed - some purely geometric, for instance,
suppositions about the centers of gravity of plane figures - in order to
prove the propositionsin question.IS
On the other hand, as I will show in what follows, an equivalent
metricization of the concept of mass can be carried out without using
Archimedes'sixth and seventh propositions.Furthermore,this new metric
of mass would be free from the limitations of Archimedes' concept -
limiting it to one class of objects, those with homogeneous density where
mass is proportionalto volume in the same way as with geometrical
figures. The new metric could be extended to objects of different
densities, non-homogeneousas well as homogeneous.
Assuming a two-arm scale, we can first accuratelydefine the notion of
homogeneous density:
A body is homogeneously dense when any two partsof it that have equal volume also
have equal mass - and this, in tum, can be demonstratedby a state of balance when
the two are weighed against one anotheron a two-armscale.

This implies that, if the two partsof a homogeneous body add up to unity
in fixed proportions,then the masses of those two parts are also propor-
tional - by definition.I9 And in general the ratios of the masses of any
two parts of a homogeneously dense body - whether or not the parts are
equal-are equal to the ratios of theirvolumes.
These definitions correspond exactly to the traditional technique of
measuring quantities of matter in terms of volume as in the example
(mentioned earlier) of devising scales for weighing precious metals. In
fact, using a two-armed scale and volume-measuringprocedures,we can
establish with precision the prerequisitesof homogeneity that are needed
150 MANUEL MEDINA

to reproduce homogeneously dense bodies of specified masses. Then

using these as elements for comparison we can define the mass propor-
tions of any body whatsoever, of no matterwhat materialit is comprised.
Specifically, we can determinethe ratio of the masses of any two bodies
whatsoever as the ratio of the volumes of two parts of a homogeneously
dense body equal in mass, respectively, to the two bodies in question.
Such a procedurecan establish mass ratios solely on the basis of equal-
arm scales without any need for a basic unit of mass.

4. TECHNIQUEAND SCIENTIFICCONCEPTS

The concept of mass introduced in the previous section - based on

Archimedes' concept - is purely a concept belonging to statics. Its
metricizationpresupposesno procedureor metric involving time or force;
it requiresonly the measurementof lengths and volumes. Determiningthe
values that correspond to mass ratios is independent of theoretical
physics; it requires no previous physical theory. Neither does it require
the ability to determine - theoretically or practically - gravitationalor
other types of forces that might intervene. Historically, mechanical
procedures for precisely measuring masses were in place long before
anyone developed the theories of dynamics of modem physics.20
As noted, the static concept of mass, implicit in Archimedes'mechani-
cal method and in formulations of a mechanical theory of scales, con-
stitutes a statics theory of traditionaltechniques for measuringmasses. In
Archimedes'treatise, On the Equilibriumof Planes, rules that correspond
to technical requirementsfor manufacturingaccurate scales are formal-
ized as postulates reflecting the states and propertiesof scales that would
meet the requirementsin an ideal fashion. Then from these postulates,
taken as describing an ideal scale, corresponding propositions are
deduced which describe the use of scales. And this system of postulates
and theorems constitutesthe basis of the theory for measuringmasses that
Archimedesrefers to as his "mechanicalmethod."
It can be demonstrated(though the proof will not be displayed here)
that Archimedes' postulates and theorems define a structurefor measur-
ing masses which satisfies the formal conditions of a proportionalscale -
and therebyof a metric for the concept of mass.
Nonetheless, such a formalized reconstructionmust be clearly distin-
guished from structuralistinterpretationsof the same phenomenon;in the
formalized version, the technical features of the scientific concepts would
 TECHNOLOGYAND SCIENTIFICCONCEPTS 151

be hidden by the fact that most of the formal conditions would be

interpretedas laws of nature. An example can be found in Wolfgang
Stegmtiller's well known structuralisttextbook on the philosophy of
science, where the concept of mass is introducedwith the help of scales.
With respect to the concept of symmetry involved,21 Stegmtiller says it
represents a general empirical condition valid for our world, though
"anotherworld could possibly exist in which it would not be valid."22
To validate this contrast, he makes the furtherpresuppositionthat the
scales "workproperly";and what he has in mind is the possibility that the
balance arms might be "rusty or twisted"23 - to avoid which he puts
himself at the mercy of the person manufacturingthe scale 24 whose job it
would be to "guaranteeproperfunctioning."25 This typical combination
of theoretical bias and ingenuity is further complicated by a profound
ignoranceof history.
Stegmtiller assures us that we would have to "give up the notion of
introducingthe comparativeconcept of mass by means of scales"26 if it
could be proved that the proper-functioningpresuppositionwas invalid -
something that WOUld, of course, requireproperlyfunctioning scales!
In replying to this nonsense, we can ignore the fact that scales that were
very accuratehad been in use for thousandsof years before it occurredto
philosophersto talk about concepts, hypotheses, and theories. More to the
point: if we interpret symmetry, in the relationship of "having equal
weight," as a "peculiarityof our world"27 that constitutes a property of
bodies in every case establishedby means of a properlyfunctioning scale,
then we must immediatelyrecognize that Stegmtiller'scondition is unver-
ifiable. The symmetry condition is, in the most precise sense, a precon-
dition, the criterionby which we verify thatthe scale is operating correctly.
What we are dealing with is the ancient rule for determining the
accuracy of a scale. This process consists of switching the bodies in the
trays of a scale that is in equilibriumto see if the exchange affects the
balance. This practicethen serves as a rule that serves as a norm which a
properly functioning scale must satisfy. The goal the manufacturerof a
scale aims at is that his instrumentsatisfy this condition. Contraryto the
opinion of some philosophersof science, Archimedes- who was familiar
with the use of scales - was not unawareof this rule. Indeed, proposition
six in On the Equilibriumof Planes is a theoretical formulation of this
rule. If, in practice, we discovered an asymmetry, we would not think
something had violated a naturallaw; we would assume that the scale we
were using was not working correctly.
152 MANUEL MEDINA

The structuresby means of which we formalize the characteristicsof

metric concepts do not representan empirically given naturaldomain -
one that satisfies determinateconditions in a formal fashion. Rather,they
representa practical domain generated by technical means using instru-
ments and measurement processes. In general, just as with measuring
masses in theoretical mechanics, techniques of measurement are,
fundamentally,establishedon the basis of two kinds of norms:
(1) norms or requirementsfor working appropriatelythat measuring
instruments must satisfy - which represent goals to be realized by
technical means in conformity with well defined rules of construction;
and
(2) norms or instructionsfor using the instrumentsto determinemetric
values.
Within a theoretical framework and, in derivative fashion, in a
structural reconstruction of metric concepts, technical norms and
requirements are formalized as affirmative propositions or formal
conditions - referring,respectively, to propertiesor relationshipsamong
objects. However, such a theoretical formulationtacitly presupposes the
fictitious existence of ideal measuring instruments- instruments,that is,
which satisfy practicalrequirementsin an unsurpassed,absolute fashion.
The formal conditions of metric structures,then, correspondto rules for
correctfunctioning and use of measuringinstruments- that is, in the end,
they correspondto requirementsthat must be met technically in making
instruments of measurement and in actually measuring things. Putting
these techniques into practice can be more or less approximate,thereby
limiting the relative perfection of concrete measuring processes. On the
other hand, in the theoretical realm, an ideal realization of the require-
ments for constructionand use is given by supposition.
Metric concepts, therefore, have a theoretical characterinsofar as they
are the result of the conceptualization,the theoretical systematizationof
instrumentsand proceduresfor measuring,that is, of metric techniques. In
tum, metric concepts give way to scientific techniques or technologies
(for example, the mathematicalproceduresof the method of Archimedes);
or, in general, to fruitful mathematical treatments of the results of
measurement.
Scientific concepts and theories constitute one of the objects of
investigation in philosophy of science. But, in order to comprehendthe
process that leads from measurementtechniques to scientific concepts to
technological results, in addition to providing a theoreticalreconstruction
 TECHNOLOGYAND SCIENTIFICCONCEPTS 153

of the concepts, we must very carefully reconstruct and explain the

underlying technical framework.And in carryingout this difficult task -
which requires us to look at the real genesis of these concepts and
scientific theories - philosophy of science is inseparablefrom the history
and philosophy of technology.

UniversityofBarcelona

NOTES

1 See the Motte-Cajori edition of Newton's Principia (Berkeley: University of

CaliforniaPress, 1934).
2 Ernst Mach, The Science of Mechanics (LaSalle, Ill.: Open Court, 1960; Gennan
original, 1883), chapter2. It is not clear, however, that what Mach is talking about is
precisely the notion of density to which Newton refers. With respect to the defmition
of mass, it appears that for Newton the concept of density was a primitive,
methodologically presupposed by mass; this seems so because nowhere in the
Principia is there a referenceto a metric procedurefor detenniningdensity.
3 Newton, Principia, loco cit. In contrast with Aristotle and medieval scholasticism,
Newton does not conceive of weight in tenns of something within bodies but in tenns
of external influences due to gravitationalforces. Given that bodies fall, as a result of
gravity, at a speed proportional to the quantity of matter they contain, weight is
proportionalto mass in a particularlocation. Nonetheless, weight and mass are not
identical, as shown by the fact that weight varies at different places on the earth,
whereas mass remainsconstant.
4 See Bruno Kisch, Scales and Weights (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press,
1965) I, 4; also, A. Seidenberg and A. Casey, "The Ritual Origin of the Balance,"
Archivefor History of the Exact Sciences 23 (1980): 179-225. Although in modem
times people have introduced other types of instruments for weighing things, the
classic balance scale is still used. And, with the introductionof numerous improve-
ments, the newest sorts of analyticalbalances can attainvery greatprecision. Even so,
there are two types of systematicerrorthat occur using a balance. The first is linked to
the fact that it is impossible, in practice, to manufacturebalance arms of exactly the
same length. The second is relatedto lack of sensitivity because two differentbalance
scales will react differently to an identical weight placed in each depending on the
load the pans carry in each case. These deficiencies can be eliminated in modem
balance scales by counterweighting the arms to accommodate infinitesimal dif-
ferences in the arms, as well as by techniques of adding and taking away weights to
counteractthe effects of particularloads.
5 See Seidenbergand Casey, "RitualOrigin of the Balance."
6 The alloy of gold and silver called electrumhas been recognized since very ancient
times, giving rise to the problemof detenniningthe purityof gold. Proof of purityfor
precious metals was realized by a process of counterweighingthe sample in question
154 MANUEL MEDINA

against an equal amount of gold (or other precious metal) known to be pure. If the
scale balanced,the sample was taken to be authentic.
7 Counting objects has been around for more than thirty thousand years. That is the
date of the first depiction of numbers as marks on wolf bones signifying the number
capturedin hunting. And the number couldbe quite high, with a specially heavy mark
at twenty-five.
Geometric measurementarose from techniques priests used to construct altars or
layout grounds for rituals with exactly reproducibleshapes (circles, squares, etc.).
They used stakes and ropes in these designs. Later, techniques for determining
geometric shapes were secularized for purposes of measuring fields for agriculture.
This was very importantin ancient Egypt, where government functionaries had to
reconstructthe boundariesof fields every time the Nile River flooded. Such measure-
ments were carried out using a stretched rope held by two assistants, with three
scribes writingdown the results in a book.
In Mesopotamia, these procedures for measuring agriculturalfields, using a rope
and stakes, were utilized to parcel out royal lands to be rentedout.
A similar sort of practical geometry was also used in ancient times for the
measurementsand calculationsneeded to build buildings andconstructotherobjects -
e.g., pyramids, columns, brick walls - that require regular shapes. Linear measure-
ment was the foundationfor calculatingsurfaces and volumes using rules, procedures,
and systems devised for solving concrete problems.
8 See T. L. Heath, ed., The Worksof Archimedes(New York: Dover, 1953; combines
1897 edition of Works with 1912 edition of The Methods), p. 233. A diligent student
can check my discussion of Archimedes against that of Marshall Clagett, s.v.
"Archimedes,"in the Dictionary of Scientific Biography (New York: Scribner's,
1970), vol. 1, pp. 213-231.
9 Heath, Works,p. 233.
10 See Ivo Schneider, Archimedes: Ingenieur, Naturwissenschaftler und Mathe-
matiker(Darmstadt:WissenschaftlicheBuchgesellschaft, 1979), chapter2.
11 Heath, Works,p. 189.
12 Ibid., p. 190.
13 Ibid.
14 I have worked out a complete deductive formalizationof Archimedes' treatmentof
mass, but it is not reproducedhere. See Manuel Medina, "La tecnica de los conceptos
cientificos: Mecanica y concepto de masa,"Arbor509 (May 1988): 31-57.
15 Archimedes, in his method, combines geometric and mechanical measurementsof
mass in a form very similar to the procedure,mentioned earlier, for determiningthe
purity of a metal sample by counterweighing it against an equal volume of known
purity.See note 6, above.
16 We owe the earliest formulationof a theory of measurementto the Pythagoreans.
In their teachings, non-numerical relations can be representedby way of relations
between whole or rational numbers. For example, in Pythagorean musical theory,
harmonicrelations are representedby relations between lengths and tones or intervals
are represented as rational numbers. But the discovery, later on, of incommen-
surability made it clear that, although relations between whole numbers can be
representedas relations between segments of a straight line, the inverse cannot be
shown to be true in general. So, given a unit of measurementno matter how small,
 TECHNOLOGYAND SCIENTIFICCONCEPTS 155

there will always be incommensurablemagnitudes related to it. Incommensurables

threw Pythagoreanteachings into a state of crisis, but this led to new foundations that
do not requireabsolute measurements.Theaetetus and Eudoxus of Cnidus elaborated
a purely geometric theory, the theory of ratios and proportions,which led to a theory
of measurementbased on relative values that does not requirefixed units. In this new
theory, systematized by Euclid in his Elements, relations between non-numerical
magnitudes- whether commensurableor incommensurable- can be representedas
proportionalgeometric relations that can be reduced, ultimately, to linear measure-
ments. The primacy of a geometry founded on the theory of proportions,in tenns of
the theory of measurement,parallels exactly the methodologicalpriorityof geometric
procedures with respect to measurement techniques. Geometry, then, is not only
historicallypriorto the theory of mass-measurement,but the primitivefonns of mass-
detennination were volumetric; and the procedures for mechanical measurement
presupposegeometrical measurement,both in the constructionof balance scales and
in the establishmentof systems of weights.
17 Mach, Science of Mechanics, pp. 14, 15, 19, 20, and 30. [Editor's note: page
referencesare to the ninth Gennanedition, 1933.]
18 The purpose of the proof laid out by Archimedes was to reduce the so-called
Roman balance to the simpler fonn involving equal anns. This would provide a
theoretical legitimation for its use in detenniningmass-ratios, which the mechanical
method requires.Even so, the proof has faults, and a purely mechanical measurement
of mass is theoretically incoherent. Archimedes in fact presupposes the very
instrumentsof measurementthat are needed to provide a foundation for his theory.
The postulates as fonnulated in On the Equilibrium of Planes do not include a
theoreticalconceptualizationof the Roman balance comparableto that for the equal-
ann balance.
19 Such concepts are implicit in the procedure by which Archimedes (according to
Vitruvius) discovered the fraud of Hiero's crown. Archimedes supposes that, given
two partsof a body of homogeneous density (in the particularcase, gold), if the ratio
of the masses, establishedusing a scale, is equal to one, then the ratio of the volumes
is also equal to unity and the two fill the same volume. Archimedes takes a piece of
gold, weighted in a balance, that has the same mass as the crown. When there turns
out to be a disequilibriumbetween the two objects of equal volume, he can conclude
that they are not both made of the same material - they are not both gold. This
discovery on Archimedes'partis no more than a variantof the ancient procedurefor
proving the authenticityof precious metals by establishing that equality of volumes
equals equality of masses of the materials. (See note 6, above.) Archimedes es-
tablishes equality of mass, then tests whetherequal volumes are really equal.
20 Contraryto what structuralistphilosophersof science seek, the theoreticalconcepts
presuppose, not the vaidity of the theories, but the properfunctioning of measuring
techniques.
21 For any x and y, if x weighs the same as y, then y weighs the same as x.
22 Wolfgang Stegmiiller, Probleme und Resultate der Wissenschaftstheorie und
analytischenPhilosophie (Berlin: Springer-Verlag,1970), p. 34.
23 Ibid., p. 35.
24 Ibid., p. 61.
25 Ibid.
156 MANUEL MEDINA

26 Ibid., p. 35.
27 Ibid., p. 34.
 FRIEDRICHRAPP

THE LIMITEDPROMISEOF TECHNOLOGYASSESSMENT

TECHNOLOGYAND HISTORY

At a first glance, technology and history appear to be fundamentally

different, if not opposed to each other. In the engineering sciences and
within the conceptual and organizationalframeworkof decision making
the artifactsbroughtabout by technology are regardedas definite, isolated
systems. These technological artifacts can in principle be controlled and
their "behavior"predicted with precision. In a broaderperspective, one
could even claim that everything that can be predicted, controlled, and
effectively managedbelongs to the field of technics.
Not so with history. It is a commonplace that the course of history
cannot be predicted,controlled, or effectively managed. Of course, there
are short-term trend extrapolations, and both management and politics
aim to control and manage, within a certain range, the furthercourse of
the economy or public affairs. But in contrastto engineering, the success
of the historicalsciences in determiningthe futureis ratherlimited.
The disproportionbetween the definite and fixed characterof technol-
ogy and the indefinite, unconfinedcharacterof history is due to the basic
principles that govern the two realms. Technological systems are distinct
from theirenvironmentin a clear-cutmannerand their working principles
depend on the timeless, fixed laws of nature.Technology is characterized
by isolation and lawfulness. Nothing similar exists in history. Here, the
dominant features are holism and spontaneity of human behavior or
totality and free will. The various historical events of an epoch are so
tightly interwoven that it is virtually impossible to isolate individual
elements. They form, as it were, a multidimensionalclosely-knit web.
Only if we attemptto answer certain questions or to investigate specific
chains of causal connections can we conceptually dissect this web,
separating out certain strands of events. Pushing the metaphor a little
further, it is the task of historical research to identify or to reveal such
strands.

157
Paul T. Durbin (ed.), Europe,America,and Technology:Philosophical Perspectives, 157-173.
© 1991 KluwerAcademicPublishers.
158 FRIEDRICHRAPP

It is an inherentfeature of historical writing that it can never come to

an end, for two reasons. Objectively, there is an abundance of factors
involved in any event in history; and subjectively, the investigator can
and must choose among different concepts and categories, among
questions to be asked and hypothes.;s to be applied in orderto reconstruct
the past. The analogous questions for the natural and the engineering
sciences have been settled once and for all in well-defined technical
concepts, paradigms,models, and theories. These are designed in orderto
channel the way of asking questions and giving answers to them so that a
maximum of explanatory and predictive power, along with technical
control and efficiency, is obtained.
At this juncture,it may be worth mentioning that anotherexample of
the atomistic vs. the holistic approach is the ecology problem. From a
formal point of view, the environment takes up the same position as
history. Recent discussion of this problem has shown that as a matterof
fact technological systems are not isolated from their environmentto the
degree that has hitherto been presupposed.Today their usually noxious
influence upon the larger system of the biosphere can no longer be
neglected. In a rathersimplified mannerone could say that history refers
to the broadercontext in time, whereas the ecology problemrefers to the
broadercontext in space.
Clearly, the disproportion and contrariety between technology and
history (as well as between technological systems and their ecological
environment)has always existed. After all, the origin and application of
any type of technology always involves an interferencewith nature.What
is new about our present situation and what creates the ecological
predicamentis the problem of scale. 1 In former times, the effects of a
certain type of technology on the biological environmentas well as the
far-reaching social and cultural consequences of technological innova-
tions were not given special attention, since they were introduced at a
slow pace and they had a ratherrestrictedsphere of influence. Nowadays,
the situation has changed; we realize that the direct and indirect conse-
quences of technology constitute a basic factor, if not the basic factor of
change in our world.

THE BASIC NOTION OF TECHNOLOGYASSESSMENT

In orderto deal with the undesiredand/or unintendedside effects of ever

 THE LIMITEDPROMISEOF TECHNOLOGYASSESSMENT 159

accelerating and ever increasing technological change, the procedure

called technology assessment (TA) has been put forward as an "early
warning system" that would point out far-reachingecological, political,
and social consequences, which are usually not taken into consideration
within the ratherlimited range of economic decision making in terms of
cost-benefit analysis. Since the foundation of the Office of Technology
Assessment (OTA) in the U.S. in 1972, this newly emerging field has
been the object of many publications.These mainly cover the technique,
its theoreticalstructure,and the proceduresto be applied in a process of
technology assessment.2
In what follows, T Ais not discussed in terms of highly technical rules
of procedureor methodologicaldetails. Rather,emphasis is on its general
or basic traits, on the metatheoreticalfeatures of TA. By its very nature
such an analysis has a double function. It demarcatesa sort of safe ground
-a sphere within which theoretically justified conditional assessments
can be expected - while at the same time it avoids problematic and
unjustifieddogmatic prescriptions.
Surely things happen, people act, technological innovations are put
forward, and historical changes take place irrespective of whether these
features are being consideredin theoreticalterms or not. This applies also
to TA. The assessment of technological innovations is by no means a
completely new phenomenon.In the past, technological innovations were
not put to use at randombut ratherafter examining their expected effects.
Within the limitations imposed by the circumstances and by culturally
defined criteria, humankindhas always aimed at what we regard as the
highest possible efficiency in our actions. Only in this way are we able to
use our potential economically and to reconcile, at least partly, the
constant disparity between always limited resources and the potentially
unlimitedneeds in all spheres of humanactivity.
In any situation of choice, i.e., when at least two different courses of
action are possible, a decision must be made. Ifthis decision is not to be
the result of mere intuition but of a rational decision resulting from
deliberateselection and theoreticalconsideration,then, at least in partand
implicitly, some sort of assessment of the relative values of the given
alternativesmust take place. This is to say that a priority-orderingof the
desired effects and of the means available for attaining them must be
taken into account. Hence, in a broad sense, T A can not be really new;
historically, it is related to cost-benefit analysis and utilitarianethics. In
160 FRIEDRICHRAPP

all of these cases, the ultimateaim is to find an optimal allocation in terms

of given priorities or scales of values; in short, in terms of some norma-
tive order.
However, hitherto TA was mostly performed implicitly and on an
intuitive basis ratherthan explicitly and by means of scientific methodol-
ogy. In every situation where a technological innovation was proposed
and one had to choose whether to introduce it or not, some sort of
technology assessment must have been performed in the very act of
considering the relative benefits to be expected from introducing the
innovations or not. Using only an intuitive procedurewas only naturalas
long as the effects of technological innovation stayed within a compara-
tively limited scale and did not too far exceed the immediately desired
results - which were usually considered only in terms of engineering
efficiency and economic profit. In contrastto this, nowadays many people
feel that the far-reachingimpacts on the social and physical environment
of large-scale technological innovations are reaching a critical threshold.
Deliberate assessment has become imperative.

NO SUPERTHEORY

The intuitive characterof traditionaltechnology assessments underscores

a problem:that the appropriateplace of TA within the process of decision
making is far from clear. Since technological innovations do not come
about by themselves but are brought about intentionally, their genesis
must in principle be open to a decision-theoreticalanalysis. However, the
complex process of social choice which results in concrete decisions
about technological innovations involves various stages (research and
development, construction of the first prototype, broad diffusion),
different levels (managerial and/or planning decisions, marketing,
advertising, consumer behavior), and diverse institutional frameworks
(economics, government, public opinion). Within scientific disciplines
such as decision theory, the theory of innovations, economics, sociology,
and political science, only limited aspects of this process are investigated.
It is no coincidence that in all of these disciplines only a conceptually
isolated segment of the whole process of technological innovation is
taken into account. There is no straightforwardand complete approachto
the complexity of the real world. Convenient models can only be
achieved at the price of simplification. In reducingcomplexity to the level
of well-defined and surveyable conceptual and theoretical schemes, the
 THE LIMITEDPROMISEOF TECHNOLOGYASSESSMENT 161

best we can hope is to grasp certain aspects of the real phenomena.This

applies to scientific research as well as to the development and applica-
tion of technological systems. In doing so we must always keep in mind
that other, complementaryapproachesand ways of action could also be
chosen. There is no supermodel that could reasonablyclaim to cover all
relevant aspects with the same degree of accuracy. Only a variety of
models, each complementing the other, can yield an understandingthat
escapes the narrow-mindednessof a single approach.
On the metatheoretical level, there is another problem. No overall
scheme could assign to the disciplines involved a systematic place for
each in all types of TA studies. Since it is in the nature of discursive
knowledge that there can be no clearly defined supertheory, it is not
surprising that in TA programs proposed to date, the collaboration of
scholars from different disciplines has not resulted in the coherent
synthesis hoped for. Since no single holistic approachis in sight, one is
limited to ad hoc proceduresand piecemeal solutions.
Systems theory, sometimes offered as a solution, is too abstractand
general. After all, the subsystems and their relations to one anothermust
be specified in detail. In doing this, one is again forced to make choices,
thus eliminatingothercategoricalschemes that could have been selected.
It would be unfair to demand, among the specific proceduresof TA,
that a degree of synthesis be attainedwhich has no parallel in the whole
range of scholarship. As a consequence of the manifold and mutually
interferingintentions and decisions of the actors involved, and due to the
complex network of the institutionalframeworks concerned in bringing
about technological innovations,it is inevitable that differentexplanations
will appear. The idea that an ideal model of T A might be developed,
which would hold an unambiguous and unchallenged place, must be
abandoned.
This vague scientific and methodological status of TA extends further
to the concrete political role that T A can play within the process of
technological innovation. Clearly, the efficiency of a particularT A is
confined within the limits imposed by the institutional framework in
which it takes place. Moreover, it is an open question whether a TA
should take place before, during, or after the earliest stage of an innova-
tion (researchand development),in the period of a pilot project,or only in
the final stage of implementation.Furthermore,similar doubts arise when
a completed assessment is put into practice.The problemshere are related
to the need for broad education of the public, to legal restraintsor fiscal
162 FRIEDRICHRAPP

restrictions (or incentives), and, occasionally, to outright state inter-

ference.
On a more abstractlevel the difficulty arising here can be described as
the disproportion and contrariety between technology and history, as
mentioned above. In the complex process of decision making as set forth
here, time is the decisive variable; hence bringing about technological
innovations is nothing but an element of the broaderhistorical process.
This is to say that in the final analysis, TA is an attempt to deal with
history in terms of technics. We know that, due to the spontaneity of
human behavior, this attempt will never succeed completely. One may
even doubt whetherone should really want it to succeed, since that would
amount to a reduction of individual choice, political freedom, and
pluralisticcultureto a streamlinedsystem of enforcementand control.
On the other hand, it is equally true that we must adhere to the notion
and aim of T A if we are not to act in a blind manner. (1 am here
employing Kant'snotion of a regulative idea.) We must act as if we were
able to performperfect TA studies, to arrive at well-founded assessments,
and to put them into practice. Modern technological systems are so
complex, and their social, cultural, and ecological consequences are so
far-reaching, that we cannot just deal with them in an intuitive way,
handlingthem as if they were only of minor importance.There is no other
way; we must face the complexity, put forward appropriatemodels,
forecast the results to be expected from certain types of technology, and
deliberately assess their desirability. In short, TA is not a panacea, but
neither is it a futile mind game. Taken in a broad sense, TA is the only
appropriatemethod we have for dealing with modern technology in a
responsibleway.

DIFFERENTTYPES OF T A

For the purposesof analysis, one can distinguishthree types of TA:

(1) TA can be exploited to justify political aims. Since allegedly
scientific argumentstend to increase public support,politicians and other
decision makers may be interested in gaining support for their claims
through appropriateTA reports. Needless to say, this type of TA is not
scientifically or theoretically significant, though it may have practical
importance.
(2) One may also use TA as a means of political decision making in
pointing out alternative ways of attainingpre-set goals, in predictingthe
 THE LIMITEDPROMISEOF TECHNOLOGYASSESSMENT 163

consequences to be expected from certain modes of action, and in

assessing the relative values of foreseeable consequences. In this case, TA
statements have a descriptive and hypothetical nature;no single solution
is put forward. In this way, a decision maker can gain the knowledge
needed in order to arrive at a well-considered choice of his or her own;
the maximum factual informationcan be gained so that normativechoice
can be made in a well-founded manner.
(3) In a more far-reachingversion, TA can be regarded as having a
prescriptive and categorical character; it can be treated as authoritative
ratherthan merely instrumental.It can prescribegoals to be attained as
well as specify desirable states of affairs, treatedas the only appropriate
and "true"way. From a philosophical point of view, such a prescriptive
TA amounts to a disguised revival of the traditionalidea of philosopher
kings of Plato's Republic - against which Karl Popper argued so force-
fully.3 In this modem version, knowledge about the "true"needs of
people, about the ideal good life, about the best state of affairs to be
attained for the commonwealth, would no longer be provided by the
philosopherbut by the person or the group doing a TA.
Clearly, when it comes to an evaluation point in TA study, some
ultimate reference point will necessarily be involved, some normative
ideal. And ideals of this type can and must be discussed in a rationalway,
puttingforwardargumentsfor and againstthem. But problemsarise if any
individual or social group claims to be in possession of the ultimate
normative truth.
Although all three types of T A tend to merge in practical use, each
raises specific philosophicalproblems.
In case (1) of pretext TA, it is a methodological problem of deciding
which scientific criteria make it possible to distinguish would-be TA
from genuine TA. Generally speaking, though not in every case,
established standardsof scholarship should be enough to rule out make-
believe. These standardsdemand that premises be laid open, that explicit
and consistent models of the area investigated be formulated,and that a
high degree of corroborationbe attained.
In addition, a clear distinction should be made between prescriptive
and descriptive statements in a TA.4 There is no way of avoiding value
statements when performing T A studies, and the value judgments of
people who deal with technology can be studied in the same way as other
empirical matters. Furthermore,on the metatheoreticallevel, the ques-
tions asked by a researcher,the selection of problems to be investigated,
164 FRIEDRICHRAPP

the criteriafor assessing the relevance of evidence - all these are clearly
value-laden. It is of the utmost importance that the value-Iadenness of
normative judgments be made explicit and distinguished from factual
statements.
The distinction can help, at least formally, to settle the much disputed
conflict over the information appropriatelyprovided by scientific and
technological experts as opposed to the choices appropriatelymade by
citizens and consumers. Put in a nutshell, experts are competent to judge
mattersof fact,which includes describing the best possible way to achieve
a preset goal under well defined conditions. Based on this information,
the public should then arrive at a decision in terms of normative criteria.
Here neither side takes over the function of the other; they depend on
each other. The expert is not competentto make choices that belong to the
public, nor can the public, without sufficient information, and without
knowing which options are at hand, make judgmentsabout factual matters.
A clarificationof epistemological issues of this sort is one benefit that can
be achieved by clarifying the structureeven of a pretextTA. Even though
it is often a complicated matter to draw a clear-cut borderline between
value statements and matters of fact, it is still of great help to know
whethera certainclaim can in principlebe sustainedby investigatingfactual
matters,or only by reference to value judgmentsor normativearguments.
Type (2) concerns conditional TA as an effective supportfor decision
making. This is the most important case and therefore deserves more
detailed discussion. Many questions arise in this context. First of all, the
idea of assessing the effects of technological innovations implies that
these effects are known. The basic notion is that, due to the laws of the
physical world and to the regularitiesof the social realm, certain effects
will (objectively) obtain; furthermore, we are (subjectively) able to
predictthese effects with a sufficient degree of certainty.
As is well known, however, our capacity for prediction is in fact
severely restricted. Even in the physical world only the results of well-
defined and/orcontrolledvariables allow reliable predictions.
About earthquakes,hurricanes,and even the weather next week, only
rough forecasts are possible. Concerning the impact of complex tech-
nological systems on the environemnt,and its capacity for self-regenera-
tion, similar uncertaintiesobtain. Concerningthe culturalconsequences of
possible future scientific and technological innovations, even less can be
predicted. In brief, short-termpredictions about technical consequences
tend to be safe, but those far-reaching forecasts of social, cultural, and
 THE LIMITEDPROMISEOF TECHNOLOGYASSESSMENT 165

economic matters that are implied in assessing technological innovations

cannot achieve more than a degree of probability. As one example,
retrospectivetechnology assessments - contrastingforecasts made at the
time with the state of affairs that actually occurred - demonstratethis
uncertainty. For instance, when people started building automobiles or
airplaines,nobody predictedthe diverse and ramified, direct and indirect,
social and culturalresults that actually followed from these innovations.5
And no one today can predict with certainty what the concrete results of
microelectronicsand genetic engineeringwill be.
When it comes to making predictionsabout scientific and technological
matters that refer to the most advanced research, even experts arrive at
different forecasts. This is because newly emerging knowledge is, by
definition, not yet firmly established. As a result, within this grey zone,
the usually hard predictions of science and technology tum out to be
rathersoft. This is highly relevantif one wants to startwith TA at an early
stage of the innovationprocess.
It may also be worth mentioning at this point that at least implicitly the
notorious problem of induction comes into play: any forecast is an
attempt to predict a future state of affairs on the basis of empirical
evidence from the past.
Even in such limited fields as economics, or the even more limited field
or econometrics, only conditional and unreliablepredictionsare possible.
The only safe procedureis to limit predictionsby choosing an appropriate
theoretical mode, which is based on well-defined ceteris paribus (other
things being equal) clauses. It is only by reducing the complexity of the
real world, by conceptual isolation, by defining a certain area to make it
exhibit a specific theoretical structure,that one can achieve even fairly
definite results.
Since such expected results do not exist in isolation - they are elements
of a larger system - one should, ultimately, consider the whole globe.
This is evident in problems of the ecology, resources, and energy.
Because of complex interrelationshipsamong technology, economics,
politics, social structure,and culture, one must always make predictions
in terms of the broadest possible context. In view of world-wide scien-
tific, technological, and economic competition - as well as the global
characterof the problems of ecology, energy, and resources- any attempt
to assess and control technology on a national level defeats its own
purpose. An allegedly complete T A that offers anything less than global
solutions is a farce.
166 FRIEDRICHRAPP

Similar considerations apply to particulartechnological items. In our

day, technological systems and procedures are based on complex and
interdependentsubsystems at different levels. Even a minor and unimpor-
tant innovation in electronics or synthetics will usually penetrate into
other fields. There it may give rise or at least contributeto further, far-
reaching technological changes. For this reason, complete control of
technology would imply that, along with assessing and controlling large-
scale innovations, one would need to assess all of the possibly far-
reaching small innovations involved. It is obvious that this would be
infeasible except in a planned economy that is strictly monitored by the
state, and considering the low efficiency of such a system it is not to be
expected that proposalsof this type will meet with unanimousapproval.
The situation is aggravatedby the fact that all predictionsare based on
past trends; they exclude unexpected occurrences such as economic
swings or shifts in consumer behavior. It is a paradox of technology
assessment that, where we ought to consider the entire range of tech-
nological, economic, social, cultural, and ecological consequences of
technological innovations, everything that we can achieve is limited and
imperfect. What makes things even more complicated is the fact that
nobody can be sure to what degree future scientific discoveries and
technological innovations will alter trends that have prevailed up to now.
Completely new situationsmight arise.
The same argument applies to the preferences we ascribe to future
generations. Nobody can be sure that our successors will adhere to the
same hierarchyof values that we do.

NORMATIVEISSUES

Let us suppose, for the sake of argument,that all the methodological and
epistemological problems involved in predicting future states of affairs
have been settled in a satisfactory way. Even then we would not have
reached the core problem involved in assessing such states of affairs.
Predictingis in principle descriptive. From an epistemological viewpoint,
predictinga lunareclipse, or the consumerbehaviorof future generations,
or the social and cultural effects of a technological innovation - all of
these are forecasts based on extrapolationfrom past experiences. Not so
with the assessment problem. There we enter the realm of normative
questions. This is the arena in which values and ideals govern our
behavior.
 THE LIMITEDPROMISEOF TECHNOLOGYASSESSMENT 167

Here, criteria need to be established that allow desirable states to be

distinguishedfrom undesirableones. Problems of this type, by their very
nature, can not be solved by factual considerations. Since the issues at
stake are ideals, problems can be dealt with only in the realm of thought.
Furthermore,such questions arise inevitably, whether we address them
explicitly or only implicitly, in intuitivejudgments.Neither does it matter
how normativeissues are formulated.One may speak of interests. needs,
values. ideals, moral feelings. aims. or goals. In any of these formulations,
the ultimatequestion is what should be done. what we ought to do.
In assessment. one may rely on a vague, intuitive notion of preference
which correspondsto an alleged average opinion. But TA is supposed to
be designed to go beyond such intuitive and general notions. to give
explicit and detailed assessments. These detailed assessments require
consideration of the diverging preferences of different individuals and
groups. This is perfectly natural.since different individuals have different
characters and particular biographical experiences. They belong to
particular social groups, are shaped by professional or occupational
commitments,have different political opinions, and so on. In all cases in
which people are free to express their opinion, such divergences are
clearly observable. They existed in the past; they exist in the present;and
we must assume that they will continue to exist in the future. So even if
we had perfect knowledge of the preferences of the members of coming
generations,this would not solve our problem.
In a TA, a hypotheticalresolution of normative differences is presup-
posed. Every TA, by definition, results in some particularevaluation of
the available alternativesin terms of a clearly specified value pattern.At
this point, the disjunction between T A and ordinary political and
economic decision making becomes all too clear. TA cannot contributeto
the sort of decision making that goes on in real-life economics or politics.
It is the pluralism of value systems that must lead us to reject categori-
cal TA, type (3) above. From a logical point of view, a single recommen-
dation out of a list of alternativesuggestions is possible only if disagree-
ments over preferences have been settled in one way or another. If
different preferencesare taken into consideration,one can never arrive at
a single solution. Alternatives remain, and choices must be left to the
individual or collective decision makers. This may seem a neat logical
trick, but it amounts to giving up the categorical type (3) of TA in favor
of the hypotheticaltype (2).
The argumentpresentedhere is purely formal. It depends neitheron the
168 FRIEDRICHRAPP

content of the preferencesconsidered nor on the nature of the normative

categories taken into account. It holds good for any ultimate prescriptive
elements, for any of the diverging values treatedin moral philosophy, any
of the diverging needs dealt with in social anthropology, any of the
diverging interestsdiscussed in political theory.
At first sight, my conclusion here may appear to be merely
methodological. On closer inspection, however, my conclusion reveals
the philosophical position I have tacitly presupposed.I prefer pluralistic
decision processes as opposed to monolithic, single, uniform solutions. In
the conditional, hypotheticaltype (2) of TA, where different alternatives
are put forward and the choice is left open, the purpose of T A is to make
possible informed consent. By contrast, type (3) makes TA experts the
only competentdecision makers.

NO COMPLETECONTROL

What arises under this heading is a crucial problem, that of aggregate

social and political decision making at the national level (and ultimately
also at the global level). Although this problem can be solved, by
distributing the decision process among various interconnected and
interacting subsystems - management, the market, politics, etc. - it
becomes necessary to create effective institutions for doing so. Such
institutions would allow us practically to shape the divergent and even
conflicting aims of the members of society. There would be well-defined
economic, political, social, and culturalaims.
On a philosophical level, a further task arises - to ascertain the true
needs of the commonwealthas a whole. And here one must consider the
possibility that a majorityvote may be different from what is really good
or desirable. This philosophical conundrumhas been aroundat least since
Rousseau's concept of the volonte gemffrale. (Rousseau actually intended
to cover both aspects.) Free enterpriseand a marketeconomy, liberalism
and the institutions of a democratic, open society are based on the
presuppositionthat the majority will by definition make the right choice;
what the majoritydecides is right.
Applying this to technological change, an ex-post-facto reconstruction
considers what happens to be the outcome of a decision involving the
complex mutually interacting and interfering intentions, decisions, and
actions of the individuals within a given economic and political set of
institutions. History, including technological change as an element in it,
 THE LIMITEDPROMISEOF TECHNOLOGYASSESSMENT 169

goes its way, as it were, without theoretical justification. What has

happened, what is being decided at every moment, can be interpretedas
resulting from a highly complex, intricate, aggregative, collective
decision process.
In this interpretation,neither pragmatics nor abstract theory alone
yields a satisfying solution. What is needed is a mixtureof pragmatism
and rationalism. After all, even the most subtle philosophicalinquiry into
ultimate goals must finally come to an end, whether all the theoretical
issues have been settled or not. For practicalreasons, intuitive or ad hoc
solutions must always be admitted. On the other hand, all ad hoc
solutions involve rational deliberation about the pros and cons of the
different options. So any decision process that goes beyond intuitive
assessment contains at least some elements of rationalchoice.
The very aim of TA is to extend the realm of deliberateassessment, to
reduce the sphere of merely intuitive decision making. Two speculative
points, in particular, are involved here: first, the contrast between
manipulated or alienated and true or non-alienated needs - which,
ultimately, includes the ideal of the good life or of the summumbonum;
second, a similar contrastbetween the free, spontaneousdecision making
of the individualin liberalismas opposed to universal,rationalobligations
common to all men, as emphasized by Platonists of all sorts. T A cannot
solve these problems; one must refer to the relevant philosophical
literature.
However, with respect to these controversies, two arguments can be
adduced in favor of the pluralistic approach and against the unitary
solutions of the Platonists. The first is a theoreticalargument.Up to now
it has not been possible, in philosophicalinquiry,to establish an authorita-
tive and undisputed theoretical understandingof true needs or of the
ultimate aims of human conduct. In view of the contingent,culturallyand
historically changing conditions of individual and social life, one may
even doubt whether it is reasonable to expect undisputed, strictly
universal ideas in this area. As a result, nobody can claim to be in
possession of a safe, definite, and indubitable point of reference with
respect to the content of ethical norms. This, of course, cannot keep
philosophers from searching for the ideal of a conclusive truth. Indeed,
this ideal is often a tacit presuppositionof philosophical discussions. The
search for truth constitutes an ever new task, an ideal to be striven for,
even though we know from the outset that we may never achieve it. The
fact that there is no conclusive way of replacing a plurality of value
170 FRIEDRICHRAPP

systems with a uniform pattern provides a strong argument in favor of

economic and political pluralism.
The second argumentis based on practical consequences. Since value
pluralism exists, one could only make a single ideal of the good
obligatory for everybody by imposing it on the relevant social groups or
on the nation as a whole. But this would deprive people of their freedom;
it would also seem to invalidate the basic aim of TA, to secure the good
life for all members of society. The idea of achieving control of technol-
ogy at the cost of imposing complete control on society, thus depriving
individuals of what they take the good life to be, would be self-defeating.
Someone might object that the responsibility we have toward future
generationsdemands universal solutions - even at a high price. But how
high can this price reasonably be? Can it really demand the giving up of
democraticproceduresand humanrights?
My analysis here has been based on highly simplified models, but I
think it reveals something. In reality, fortunately, there are ways of
finding solutions somewhere between the extremes of pure laissez faire
and complete control. Examples would include reports of commissions,
science and technology courts, the democratic system of checks and
balances. All of these are designed to merge divergent values to pursue a
single course of action. And it is, paradoxically,within this context that
TA has a legitimate, indeed a methodologically indispensable, function,
to bring aboutenlightenedand informedconsent.

INTRODUCINGMORETECHNIQUE?

At this juncture,an inevitable, inherenttension within the concept of TA

becomes evident. TA is designed to moderate or, if possible, eliminate
precisely those negative effects of modern technology that constrain the
autonomy, self-determination,and spontaneityof individuals.The goal of
TA is to insure an authentic,fulfilled, and humane way of life. In orderto
achieve this goal, TA necessarily involves technocratic and utopian
elements. The technocraticelement is the notion of scientifically-based,
rationally justified, and efficiently implemented solutions. The utopian
vision of a perfect state of human affairs is supposed to free us from
uncertainties,evils, and defects. The concept of a categoricaltype (3) T A
is intendedto combine the ideal of rationalcontrol with that of an earthly
paradise, yielding a technological utopia. Clearly, arguments in favor of
 THE LIMITEDPROMISEOF TECHNOLOGYASSESSMENT 171

this conception are as philosophically respectable and legitimate as

argumentsagainst it.
Now, since the physical and social environmentof modem industrial
societies are shapedthroughoutby technology and scientific methods, any
measure aimed at controlling technology will necessarily fit within the
given framework. It will itself be technical. This is most evident in the
idea of control, which is the key concept of technological thinking. From
this perspective, only a general rejection of modem technology (as in
certain versions of AlternativeTechnology), seems viable as a counter-
approach. And here one comes to the final paradox: one simply cannot
escape from the given technology-shapedsituation. One cannot renounce
carefully considered (hence scientific) or effective (hence technological)
means and hope to achieve humanitarianends.
This does not imply that we cannot act against an allegedly almighty
and ever-present"technologicalprogress"which follows its own internal
logic without human interference,as Jacques Ellul maintains.6 After all,
technology does not exist by itself; it is produced by humans - and
deliberately so. Therefore, in principle, humans are free to change the
future course of technological development. This holds good despite the
fact that technological change, like everything else that happens in
history, typically differs from what the actors intended to bring about.
Here we face the ever precarioushuman condition. We have no choice
otherthan to act as if we are in control of what we are doing, yet we know
that this is the case only to a very limited degree. In TA, we are limited to
technological systems that are easy to survey, and to the very short term.7
Still it would clearly be a mistake to conclude that we should, as it
were, renounce the ground on which we are standing. Technology,
because it is an inherentpart of our material culture, is also part of our
social and individual culture. A complete renunciation of technology
would amount to renouncing the whole way of life that has emerged in
the course of history, and that is part of our heritage.8 In fact, the human
condition has always been far from perfect. It is not by chance that
Thomas More named his fictitious island, where ideal conditions of life
exist, Utopia - that is, nowhere.
Despite the critical objections that can be raised, one should keep in
mind that modern technological innovations were introduced because
they were regardedas more efficient or more useful than the technology
that existed before. It would be hard to find today, in the industrialized
nations, a single person willing to live at the level of poverty and
172 FRIEDRICHRAPP

discomfort offered by the technology of a hundredyears ago. In assesing

the technological changes of the past, one should keep in mind a bit of
worldly wisdom: a fulfilled need is no longer considered worth
mentioning;highest attentionis usually paid to problemsjust arising.

A REASONABLECONCLUSION

To sum up, three points have been made against an allegedly complete
and omnipotent TA: that decision processes are complex and many-
faceted; that predictions are unreliable; and that all we can expect is a
pluralityof value systems. Since TA is confrontedwith these problems, it
cannot serve as a universal remedy for all the actual or possible ills of
modem technology. Since technological change is part of the larger
process of historical change, there is no way of avoiding the uncertainties
and risks inherentin the process of creative change. After all, any creation
of something new implies the destruction of the old. A chance with no
risk would be no chance at all. But chance is all we have in the ever-
varying, irreversiblehistoricalprocess of technological change.
TA may not be perfect, but it should not be abandoned.It is indispens-
able. The reason it cannot entirely be dismissed is that it is, in the
broadest sense, nothing but the method of rational choice applied
consistently. And it can lead to informed consent. The fundamentalmerit
of T A consists in making explicit - and thus available for public discus-
sion at the political level and rationaldiscourse at the philosophical level
- presuppositions and implications of factual matters and normative
issues that would otherwise be consideredonly in an intuitive way.
Furthermore,TA is essential in order to arrive at informed consent.
Granting the limitations indicated, TA is the only means we have of
making technological problems explicit, of opening them up to rational
interdisciplinarydiscussion. T A can do this if it includes all the relevant
considerations,scientific and philosophical.
A final note: the interdisciplinarycollaboration needed for achieving
this poses problems of its own. Nonetheless, the interdisciplinary
approachis the only way to arrive at a synthesis, at an understandingthat
transcends the borderlines of individual disciplines. The broad, well-
informed discussion that this leads to is urgently needed in arriving at
well-founded judgments about the factual and moral problems of our
increasingly technological age. To the extent that the risks of the future
are foreseeable, we should face them with eyes open and, if possible, with
 THE LIMITEDPROMISEOF TECHNOLOGYASSESSMENT 173

a broad consensus of opinion. The limited sort of TA espoused here can

help to achieve this noble goal.

University ofDortmund

NOTES

I See Robert McGinn, "The Problem of Scale in Human Life," in P. Durbin, ed.,
Research in Philosophy and Technology, vol. 1 (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1978),
pp.39-52.
2 See Alan L. Porter et al., A Guidebookfor Technology Assessment and Impact
Analysis (New York: North Holland, 1980).
3 Karl R. Popper, The Poverty of Historicism (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul,
1957).
4 See H. Albert and E. Topitsch, eds., Werturteilsstreit(Darmstadt:Wissenschaftliche
Buchgesellschaft, 1979).
5 See Joel A. Tarr, ed., Retrospective Technology Assessment (San Francisco: San
FranciscoPress, 1977).
6 JacquesEllul, The Technological Society (New York: Knopf, 1964; Frenchoriginal,
1954).
7 Friedrich Rapp, Analytical Philosophy of Technology (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1981);
also, Rapp, "ResponsibilityAllocation in Modem Technology," in J. Rasmussen, B.
Brehmer,and J. Leplat, eds., DistributedDecision Making (Chichester:Wiley, 1991),
pp. 223-246.
8 See Samuel C. FIorman,The Existential Pleasures of Engineering (New York: St.
Martin's,1976).
 KRISTINSHRADER-FRECHETfE

ADAM SMITH AND ALMA MATER:

TECHNOLOGYAND THE THREATTO ACADEMICFREEDOM

1. INTRODUCTION

In 1981, the West Germanpharmaceuticalcompany, Hoechst, gave $70

million to Harvard'sDepartmentof Molecular Biology in exchange for
rights to marketall discoveries made in the departmentand to exclude all
funding and researchthat interferedwith Hoechst's proprietaryposition.
As one observer put it: "Hoechst . . . purchased. . . control of an entire
universitydepartment.... Everyone in that lab is an indenturedservantto
Hoechst."1
In the past, Harvard'spatent policy required that all health-related
discoveries made in its labs be dedicatedto the public. In the last decade,
because of deals with companies like Hoechst and Monsanto,Harvardhas
assigned patentrights in exchange for financial support.2
In the same year as the Harvarddeal with Hoechst, the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology signed a contract with entrepreneur Jack
Whiteheadto establish a biotechnology researchcenter. Whiteheadgave
MIT $125 million in exchange for MIT's relinquishingpatentrights and
control over finances, hiring, and choice of research.The agreementgave
Whitehead'schildrenthe majorityof positions on the financial committee
of the institute'sboard.3
Such problemsare not just occurringin the West.4 Several corporations
and countries, interested in African mineral resources, have literally
bought entire universities in Nigeria, Zaire, and Ethiopia. At some
African institutions, up to eighty percent of the professors have been
supported by a single corporation.5 Industrialinfluence over university
affairs also continues to be very great in Japan, where the government
recently awarded more than $100 million in taxpayer monies to fund
university-industrycooperation so as to insure that Japanese companies
dominatethe internationalbiotechnology market.6
At the three major universities with which I have been associated,
commerce and technology have also eroded traditionalacademic values.

175
Paul T. Durbin (ed.), Europe, America,and Technology:Philosophical Perspectives, 175-189.
© 1991 KluwerAcademicPublishers.
176 KRISTINSHRADER-FRECHETTE

For example, simply because a physicist had a million dollars in Depart-

ment of Defense contracts, one university tried to give him a distin-
guished researchprofessorship,even though most of his publicationsand
contracts were not refereed. Afraid that the professor's work would not
survive blind refereeing by peers, the university tried to use U.S. Air
Force generals, in charge of weapons development, as scholarly reviewers
for his promotion.
Another professor was named to an endowed chair only because the
corporationwhich gave the funds for the chair specified that the money
was contingent on the company's being able to name the professor. At
anotherof the three universities, two nuclearengineers have received full
summer salaries, for fifteen years, at taxpayer expense, from the U.S.
Atomic Energy Commission and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission for doing nothing. They have no publications to speak of,
but can be relied upon, regardless of the circumstances, to make pro-
nuclear statements to the local press. It is common knowledge that their
summersalaries are little more than bribes.

2. CONSEQUENCESOF SELLINGSCIENCEAND TECHNOLOGY

If the preceding examples are typical, and they appear to be, then
universities may be selling their integrity in much the same way as the
medieval church sold pardons and indulgences.? In moving from public
servants to entrepreneurs,suniversities have lost much of their accoun-
tability to the public and blurredthe lines between disinterestedresearch
and profit.9 Nobel Laureate and former MIT faculty member David
Baltimore, for example, owns more than a million dollars in shares in a
biotechnology company designed to commercialize his inventions. Other
university scientists have similar conflicts of interest and own more than
$10 million each, in shares in business supported by their technical
research.10
Such commercial ventures mean that professors may be more loyal to
their businesses than to their universities, more loyal to Adam Smith, and
to those who fund their research,than to Alma Mater. They may be more
interested in technology-related profits than in pure research, both of
which suggest a third problem, secrecy. Because of funders' proprietary
privileges, colleagues no longer swap information, for fear that a rival
commercial interest might obtain it. Also, all Department of Defense
contracts,at least in the U.S., include prepublicationreview, or license to
 ADAM SMITH AND ALMA MATER 177

censor.11 This secrecy is an enonnous problem since more than fifty

percent of all American scientists and engineers are working on defense
contracts;and more than two-thirdsof all U.S. federal researchmoney is
poured into defense-related projects. Higher education, in several
countries,is runningthe risk of becoming a mere conduit for the military-
industrialcomplex.I2 Because of the fact that there is an inverse relation-
ship between military spending and economic growth,13 and because
secrecy and censorship stifle scientific progress, military spending at
universitiesleads to massive culturaland intellectualdistortions.I4
If professors know that they are dependent upon industry or military
monies to supply their labs or to pay their graduate students, then they
will be less likely to bite the hand that feeds them. They will be more
likely to perfonntheir researchand interprettheir results in a way that is
acceptable to their funders. Moreover, because industry and the military
control so much universityresearchfunding, they have already succeeded
in curbing basic, long-tenn research, in favor of short-tenntasks.IS In so
doing, they have restricted academic freedom,I6 and redefined science
and technology. Science and technology have become whatever project
can get funding and make money for the universitythroughindirectcosts,
ratherthan what is judgedimportantby one's peers.17
Graduatestudents, eager for financial support, are channeled, not into
basic research,and not into areas of greatestacademic merit. Insteadthey
are pushed into technological projects having limited intellectual
importance but great economic potential for commercial enterprises.IS
"What would have happened to Einstein and the general theory of
relativity if a businessmanhad come up to him when he was 20 and said,
'Don't bother with relativity - it'll never make any money. Why don't
you work with my company on something profitableinstead?'"19
With business and technology ratherthan academic peers defining what
is quality research, scholars who have not been bought by industry are
placed at a disadvantage. There is already abundant evidence that
professors have been discriminatedagainst because of lack of favor by
corporate sponsors.20 At many major universities, the departmentsthat
are expanding are those with corporatefunding. Those that are being cut
back are those "unprofitable"departmentsin which the technological and
business world is not interested.21 As the noted biologist Richard
Lewontin put it, when he heard about the Harvarddeal with Hoechst:
"Whatabout the rest of us who are so foolish as to study unprofitable
things like poetry, Sanskrit philology, evolutionary biology, and the
178 KRISTINSHRADER-FRECHETTE

history of the chansons? Will ... [the dean] have time to hear our pleas
for space, colleagues, funds, and students between meetings with the
University'sbusiness partners?"22
In universities dominated by industrialand technological support, the
curriculumis more narrowly focused, more devoted to applied research,
and less supportive of "unproductive"scholarly activities. As Nobelist
Isidore Rabi warned, this narrowness paves the way for a repetition of
what happened in Germany during the 1930s. The rise of militaristic
nationalism, fueled by the dominance of narrow technical and
professional training, eroded ethical values and liberal university
education, thus laying the foundation for Hitler. Given such a restrictive
conception of the university and of scholarship,it was no accident that in
1937 the PrussianAcademy of Sciences condemned Einstein because he
criticized the violations of civil liberties in the Nazi regime.23
Once an Einstein, or any other disinterestedacademic, is condemned
for speaking out in the public interest, then the narrowing of the ivory
tower begins to strangle democracy as well. No country can survive the
theft of its universities' capacity to criticize. Democratic institutions are
fed by the free flow of informationand criticism, and both government
and the public require the universities to provide this independent
perspective. Otherwise government must blindly choose the answers
offered by corporationswho are by nature self-interested. Because they
are self-interested,they cannot be trustedto judge what is in the common
interest. Democracy needs the Socratic gadfly, the detachedobserver, and
the social critic. Neither society nor the university can afford for it to
become the whore for special interestgroups.24
For a university to allow industryto reap what the taxpayerhas sown,
especially in a situation involving secrecy, is to allow taxation (on behalf
of technology) without representation of the people. It is to allow
universities to sell the public birthright. Moreover, at some point, a
university (e.g., Carnegie Mellon, with sixty percentof its reserachfunds
from the Departmentof Defense) is no longer an academic institution,but
a branch of the Air Force, or a branch of Monsanto, or a branch of
Hoechst.25 In such a situation,academic freedom is nothing more than the
right to be bought by the highest bidder. It is naive to believe that such
funding patternsdo not decrease both university autonomy and the free,
informed consent of the public. As Lewontin retorted:"The prospect of
the university [in its personnel and promotion actions] treating with an
even hand and without the slightest prejudicea professorin whom it has
 ADAM SMITH AND ALMA MATER 179

already invested $200,000 in a joint financial venture [with industry] is

ludicrous."26
Profit-makingventures in the university, especially with large corpora-
tions, are also questionable because they tend to violate justice and
ordinary prohibitions against monopolies. In the U.S., of all corporate
monies given to universities, one third was providedby only ten corpora-
tions, and one fifth of all industry funds - millions of dollars - was
providedby only two corporationsP
Many private research laboratorieshave complained that universities
have unfair advantages in competing with them.28 Antitrustlegislation
prevents collaboration among corporations desiring to apply new
technological discoveries, yet university-industrycollaboration is still
permitted.Moreover,since universityresearchdollars, at least in the U.S.,
result in two to four times as many patent applications as do research
dollars from all other sources, including businesses' own corporate
laboratories,29any company working alone will be disadvantaged.This
disadvantageis likely to propel an even greaterpush for corporationsto
buy particulardepartments,to try to monopolize certain technological
knowledge, knowing that it is the intellectualcapital of the future.30

3. THE CASE FOR UNIVERSITIES'ACCEPTINGCORPORATEFUNDS

One alleged justificationfor universities'accepting corporatefunds is that

professors ought to have academic freedom to pursueresearchfunded by
vested interests. University scholars, however, even at privateinstitutions,
directly and indirectly receive much of their support from the public.
They are funded in partby taxpayers,by virtue of their being tax-exempt
and accepting governmentgrants. Hence, if citizens have to pay, in part,
for university research,then they ought to have a say in what researchis
done. Ifthe public is not completely free to withdraw its tax supportfor
scientists' work, then scientists ought not be completely free to do
whatever work they choose. Only wholly self-supporting scholarsought
to be completely free in negotiating contracts for research. Moreover,
selling oneself to the highest industrialor technological bidder is hardly
an argumentfor the freedom of the person beingsold.
Another argument for large-scale industry-universitycollaboration is
that serving corporate interests amounts to serving the public interest.
This too is false, since industry is typically interested in short-term,
applied research for profit maximization, whereas academia is typically
180 KRISTINSHRADER-FRECHETTE

interestedin long-term, basic researchfor the sake of knowledge. History

also suggests that it is naive to assume the automatic beneficence of
technology or industry. Many industries campaigned against child labor
laws. Many industries continue to campaign against increased environ-
mental, safety, and health regulations, and many technologies threaten
health and safety.
The nuclear industry in the U.S., for example, has successfully
campaigned for protection against ninety-nine percent of liability
damages, in the event of a catastrophicnuclear accident.31 The chemical
industry, at least in the U.S., successfully lobbied, both to protect itself
against the liability provisions of the toxic waste superfund legislation
and to cut industrycleanup funds by two thirds. Likewise, Johns Manville
knowingly exposed four million U.S. workers to asbestos, even after they
knew the health effects, and the company fought to prevent disclosure of
the danger. MetropolitanEdison Company falsified the cooling system
tests at Three Mile Island prior to the nuclear acci-
dent.32 Such examples are widespread,and this is part of the reason why,
in the U.S., there are nearly a quarterof a million occupationallyinduced
fatalities or permanentdisabilities every year. Most of these industrial
accidents are preventable.33
Such examples are not meant to suggest, of course, that all industries
and technologies cause grave harm. Obviously they do not. The point is
that it is naive to believe that any special interest group automatically
behaves in the public interest. And if so, then industry control of
academiais not necessarily benevolent.
But does the public not benefit when a new medical technology like
interferon (a cancer drug), for example, is developed and marketed
through industry-universitycooperation?The problem with this response
is that the public benefit is disproportionalto the public investment.
Interferon was discovered as a result of research sponsored by the
National Institutes of Health, that is, taxpayers. The financial rewardsfor
developing and marketingthe drug will go to Hoffman-LaRocheand to
the University of California. This means that the public will have paid
three times for interferon:first for the researchto make it; second for the
tax credits for laboratories, wages, and equipment; and third for the
commercially produced product. Yet the public benefits only once, by
having the product. The drug company and the university, however,
benefit twice: they have the product and they have the profit made by
commercializing the product. To the degree that technological benefits
 ADAM SMITH AND ALMA MATER 181

and costs are inequitablydistributed,34to that extent industryshould pay

a higher price for the intellectual capital it extracts from universities.35
Industry ought not be able to transforma public-sector social resource,
technological knowledge, into a private-sectorpreserve with little public
accountability)6 Otherwise the public would be subsidizing private
interests,often without consent.
Arguments in favor of laissez-faire industry control over segments of
academiaare fraughtwith feigned naivete. University administratorswant
the industry dollars, but they somehow believe that the funds do not
compromisetheir autonomy. As one universityadministratorquipped:we
want "to get pregnantwithout really losing our virginity."37Universities
have allowed selective enslavement of their faculties, and then called it
productivity. The situation is reminiscent of what Tacitus said of the
Romans: "Theymade a desert and called it peace."38

4. USING THE TRADITIONALDISCIPLINESTO REFORMTHE UNIVERSITY

How do we find our way out of the academic desert? How do we tum
from an overemphasis on profit, back to creating what Jefferson called
"anaristocracyof talent and virtue"?39What can we do to help renew the
university, to help restore its traditionalvalues, and to help it serve as a
societal critic? How can we help the university speak for public, rather
than merely private, interests? Let me give one example as a partial
answerto all these questions.
Roger Cooke, a philosopherat the Delft University of Technology in
the Netherlands,has done a remarkablejob of speaking for public values
and serving as a societal critic of industrial prejudicesthat have invaded
academia. Working in a departmentwith an annual turnoverof about $8
million and a hundred projects, Cooke's goal has been to quantify
technical uncertaintyas subjective probability,and thereforeto assess the
quality of technology assessments and rational decisionmaking.40 Under
grants from the Dutch Ministry of Housing, Physical Planning, and
Environment,Cooke and his co-workers have applied their models at the
European Space Research and Technology Centre, in large Dutch
chemical process plants,and in the nuclearindustry.41
Studying expert probability estimates of various subsystem failures
associated with nuclear fission, for example, Cooke revealed the flawed
analyses of universityresearcherswho were paid by the nuclearindustry.
He discovered that the famous WASH-1400, allegedly the best and most
182 KRISTIN SHRADER-FRECHETIE

extensive risk assessment ever performed, is riddled with errors and

therefore underestimates nuclear hazards. Cooke also showed that the
failure probabilitiesallegedly calculated by private nuclear interests were
wildly divergent among themselves and hence unreliable. For example,
the average spread(or ratio of the largest to the smallest estimates) of the
thirty expert probabilityestimates, over the sixty components studied in
WASH-1400, was 167,820.42
Cooke and his co-workers at Delft used actual empirical failure
frequencies (obtained as part of an evaluation of operatingexperience at
nuclear installations) from a study done by Oak Ridge National
Laboratories to calibrate some of the more testable subjective
probabilities used in the famous WASH-1400 risk assessment.43 The
Dutch researcherscompared actual failure frequencies for seven reactor
subsystems with the ninety percent confidence bounds for the same
probabilities calculated in the WASH-1400 study. Amazingly, all the
observed failure values from operatingexperience fell outside the ninety
percent confidence bands in the WASH-1400 study. The fact that all the
quantities fall outside them means that WASH-1400, allegedly the best
risk assessment, is very poorly calibrated, that the nuclear failure
probabilities are too low, and that the experts exhibited a number of
probabilisticserrors,including an overconfidencebias.44
Cooke's work has not been merely epistemological, focusing only on
the logical and methodological problems with industrial and university
assessments of the probabilistic risk of technologies like nuclear fis-
sion.45 He has also exposed the high degree to which allegedly objective
scientific studies, done by vested interests, are extremely sensitive to
experts' value judgments that, in many cases, the public is just as
qualified to make. Cooke has shown that assessors' highly questionable
value judgmentsabout risk methodology have literally determinedpolicy
recommendations. For example, nuclear studies done by the Ford
Foundation/MitreCorporationand by the Union of ConcernedScientists
(UCS) agree on the facts, on the probabilityand consequence estimates
associated with the risk from commercial fission,46 although they
disagree in their recommendations regarding using atomic energy to
generate electricity. The DCS risk analysis decided against use of the
technology; the Ford/Mitrestudy advised in favor of it.47 Cooke showed
that the two studies disagreed in their policy recommendationsbecause
they used different value judgments regarding rational risk behavior.48
The disturbingthing about these contradictorydecisions and their hidden,
 ADAM SMITH AND ALMA MATER 183

but determining,value judgmentsis that risk assessors generally pass off

their recommendations as objective and scientific, even though most
assessments are funded by the industry being assessed. In reality, the
assessments are highly subjective because they are dependent upon
problematiccognitive or epistemic value judgments.49
In uncovering the cognitive or epistemic value judgments on which
nuclear risk assessments are based, Cooke has showed that typical
problems of technology policy are fundamentally philosophical and
ethical problems - and therefore problems to be solved by democratic
procedure, ratherthan merely expert decision or technocraticmandate.5o
He has unmasked ideology, vested interest, and metaphysics posing as
value-free science and technology. He has also unmasked the alleged
objectivityof universityresearchthat is funded by special interests.
Moreover,as a universityphilosopher,Cooke has become a spokesper-
son for the public interest, for the ordinary citizen who has been dis-
enfranchised by a complex of university and industrial decisionmakers
who erroneouslyallege that laypersons do not have the expertise neces-
sary to make decisions about commercial nuclearfission. Cooke and his
university coworkers have enfranchised the public through education
about the value judgments imbedded in industrial risk assessments.51
They have illustratedthe dictum of Thomas Jefferson:"I know of no safe
depository of the ultimate powers of the society but the people them-
selves; and if we think them not enlightened enough to exercise their
control with a wholesome discretion, the remedy is not to take it from
them, but to inform their discretion."52 Cooke, the philosopher, has
informedthe discretionof the people.
In uncovering the values problems associated with issues like biotech-
nology, military research, and nuclear power, philosophers can strike
against the skewed tradition of value-free inquiry, a tradition that
encourages students to think that values are private and determined
wholly subjectively. Philosophical reasoningcan show that not all views
deserve equal respect,53 and therefore that not all values are wholly
sUbjective.
Cooke's work, and that of professors like him, suggests that traditional
disciplines can answer the question of Juvenal: "Quis custodiet ipsos
custodes?"54Who shall guard the guardiansthemselves? The answer is
the university,philosophers,and disinterestedintellectuals.
184 KRISTIN SHRADER-FRECHETIE

5. RESTRUCTURINGTHE UNIVERSITYTO ACHIEVEREFORM

It is obvious, however, that philosophical analysis of technology assess-

ments, scientific methods, and ethical values is not alone enough to
guaranteeeither sound public policy or universities that act in the public
interest.This is because not all educationis intellectual. Knowledge alone
is not sufficient to insure right action regardingtechnology. We need as
well, as Aristotle understood and Socrates did not, to recognize the
importanceof early habituation,positive example, and self discipline. We
need to know how to help create thoughtful and compassionatecitizens.
As Montaigne put it: "To compose our characteris our duty, not to
compose books; to win, not battles and provinces, but order and tran-
qUility in our own conduct. Our great and glorious masterpiece is to live
appropriately."55
But how, in addition to traditionaleducation, can the university teach
concern for the public interest?How can it teach technology assessment-
by habit, example, and exhortation - without resorting to forms of
indoctrinationand propagandathat are "inimicalto the academy"?56
A first step might be by encouraging students and faculty to serve the
community,57 Right now, roughly sixty percent of Harvard under-
graduates- and seventy percent at my own alma mater - now engage at
some point during college in tutoring underprivilegedchildren, staffing
shelters for the homeless, working with prison inmates, teaching illiterate
adults to read, or trying to assist the community outside the university.58
Communityservice seems to be one way to try to extend our sensitivity,
beyond our private interest, to the public need. Without this extension of
our sensitivity, I am not sure that philosophical analysis, alone, will
enable us to develop the habits necessary for recognizing andmeeting our
obligations to serve the public interestand to assess technology.
Universities can also teach by example in refusing to preside over the
demise of the altruistic professor. They can provide a structure that
encourages researchersto follow the example of Cesar Milstein. Milstein
is the co-inventor of monoclonal antibodies. He shared his cells with
otherresearchers,and he asked that they not seek patents.59
More generally, universities should provide guidelines to insure that
outside funding and control neither exceed a certain financial level nor
threaten departmental autonomy, pure research, and the interests of
students and the public. Committees composed of both faculty and
representativesof the public should also scrutinize industry and military
 ADAM SMITH AND ALMA MATER 185

contracts with universities. At lease part of this scrutiny should address

whether the proposed contracts are in accord with something like the
American Civil Liberties Union Guidelines on University and Contract
Research.6O
Of course, it is neitherdesirable nor workable to prohibitall university
cooperation with industry and technology. Nevertheless, university
committees ought to have guidelines requiringlarge funders to perform
compensatoryactions or to pay for programsthat present"the other side"
- that discuss the social and ethical dangers associated with the research
being done. In other words, the university ought to attempt to prevent a
monopoly in the marketplace of ideas.
For example, when laboratoriesat the University of California began
developing ninety percent of the nuclear warheads in the U.S. arsenal,
Californiaprofessorsdemandedthat the taxpayersand the universityfund
a massive research and teaching Center for Global Peace and Disarma-
ment.61 At the national or governmental level, insuring that there are
articulatespokespersonsfor the other side might mean creatinga funding
agency for interdisciplinaryuniversity projects that deal with ethical and
values issues in science and technology. In the U.S. we are fortunateto
have the Ethics and Values Studies (EVS) program of the National
Science Foundation.62

6. CONCLUSION

All these suggestions mean that, if industry seeks to buy technological

knowledge, the intellectual capital of the university, then it will have to
do so underpublic scrutiny. And it will have to pay prices that reflect the
prior taxpayer investment in the research.63 Otherwise we are being
forced to preside over the sale of our intellectualbirthright.

UniversityofSouth Florida

NOTES

1 M. Kenney, "The Ethical Dilemmas of University-Industry Collaborations,"

Journal of Business Ethics 6 (1987): 132-133; and I. Stark, "The University Goes to
Market,"Thoughtand Action: NEA Higher EducationJournal 1 ,no. 1 (Fall 1984): 9,
17.
2 Stark, ibid., pp. 15-16. See also T. Tolbert, "The Monsanto Experience,"Thought
and Action:NEA Higher EducationJournal 1, no. 1 (Fall 1984): 72-73.
186 KRISTIN SHRADER-FRECHETfE

3 W. Lepkowski, "Academic Values Tested by MIT's New Center,"Chemical and

Engineering, March 15, 1982, pp. 7-12.
4 See T. Zazloff, "The University, by Definition, May Be the Wrong Place for
Military Research," The Chronicle of Higher Education, April 20, 1988, p. A52.
Although they do not always involve as much money, similar deals are occurring
elsewhere. University of California researchers, at the behest of the agribusiness
industry, are using public funds to conduct research on mechanized harvesting that
will benefit industry but will cause thousands of farmworkers to lose their jobs. The
farmworkers are suing the University of California on the grounds that it is using
public funds for private gain. See also D. Noble, "Science for Sale," Thought and
Action:NEA Higher EducationJournal 1, no. 1 (Fall 1984): 39.
5 See E. H. Berman, "Foundations, United States Foreign Policy, and African
Education, 1945-1975," Harvard Educational Review 49, no. 2 (May 1979):
145-179,esp.p.175.
6 Tolbert,"MonsantoExperience,"p. 70.
7 See L. Minsky, "Greedin the Groves: PartTwo," Thoughtand Action: NEA Higher
EducationJournal 1, no. 1 (Fall 1984): 46.
8 Ibid.
9 See R. Nader, "Greedin the Groves: Part One," Thoughtand Action: NEA Higher
EducationJournal 1, no. 1 (Fall 1984): 41.
10 Kenney, "Ethical Dilemmas," pp. 129-131; Lepkowski, "Academic Values
Tested,"pp. 7 and 10.
II Kenney, "Ethical Dilemmas," p. 131; H. Ehrlich, "The Univesity-Military
Research Connection,"Thoughtand Action: NEA Higher Education Journal 1, no. I
(Fall 1984): 123.
12 See I. Winn, "The University and the Strategic Defense Initiative,"Thought and
Action:NEA Higher EducationJournal 1 ,no. 1 (Fall 1984): 20-23.
13 Ibid., p. 23.
14 J. T. Edsall and the American Association for the Advancement of Science
(AAAS) Committee on Scientific Freedom and Responsibility, Scientific Freedom
and Responsibility (Washington, D.C.: AAAS, 1975), pp. 20-21; R. Merton, The
Sociology of Science (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973), pp. 9, 318,456;
M. Bayles, Professional Ethics (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 1981), p. 68; A.
Coumand and H. Zuckerman,The Code of Science: Analysis and Reflections on Its
Future (New York: Columbia University Institutefor the Study of Science in Human
Affairs, 1970), p. 14.
IS See Stark,"UniversityGoes to Market,"p. 16.
16 Ibid.
17 D. E. Blevins and S. R. Ewer, "UniversityResearch and Development Activities,"
Journal ofBusiness Ethics 7 (1988): 652.
18 Stark,"UniversityGoes to Market,"p. 18.
19 Leonard Minsky, quoted in K. Mangan, "Institutionsand Scholars Face Ethical
Dilemmas over Pursuit of Research with Commercial Value," The Chronicle of
Higher Education, July 29, 1987, p. 12.
20 See Zasloff, "UniversityMay Be Wrong Place,"p. A52.
21 Stark,"UniversityGoes to Market,"p. 17; Winn, "Universityand SOl," p. 28; and
Blevins and Ewer, "UniversityResearch,"p. 651.
 ADAM SMITH AND ALMA MATER 187

22 Quoted in Stark,"UniversityGoes to Market,"p. 18.

23 Winn, "University and SDI," pp. 27-29, and A. Einstein, Ideas and Opinions,
trans. by S. Bergman(New York: Crown, 1954), pp. 205-210.
24 Minsky, "Greed in the Groves," pp. 48 and 16. Blevins and Ewer, "University
Research,"p. 655.
25 Zasloff, "UniversityMay Be Wrong Place,"p. A52.
26 Quoted in Stark, "UniversityGoes to Market,"p. 17. See Lepkowski, "Academic
Values Tested,"p. 7; Minsky, "Greedin the Groves,"pp. 44-45.
27 Noble, "Science for Sale," p. 31
28 Blevins and Ewer, "UniversityResearch,"p. 648.
29 Ibid., p. 650.
30 Tolbert,"MonsantoExperience,"p. 71.
31 See K. Shrader-Frechette,Nuclear Power and Public Policy (Dordrecht:Reidel,
1983), pp. 74ff.
32 Stark,"UniversityGoes to Market,"p. 14.
33 K. Shrader-Frechette,Risk Analysis and Scientific Method (Dordrecht: Reidel,
1985), p. 4.
34 See Noble, "Science for Sale," p. 39, and Minsky, "Greedin the Groves,"p. 47.
35 See Lepkowski, "AcademicValues Tested,"p. 12.
36 See Stark,"UniversityGoes to Market,"p. 19.
37 Ibid, p. 20.
38 Quoted by Minsky, see "Greedin the Groves,"p. 49.
39 Quoted by D. Bok, "Ethics, the University, and Society," Harvard Magazine,
May/June1988, p. 40.
40 R. Cooke, "Expertsin Uncertainty"(Delft: Delft University of Technology, 1988),
unpublishedmanuscript,chapter10.
41 Ibid., chapter15.
42 Ibid., chapter2.
43 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Reactor Safety Study-An Aassessmentof
Accident Risks in U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Plants, Report No. (NUREG-
75/014) WASH-1400 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GovernmentPrinting Office, 1975),
pp. 157ff.
44 Cooke, "Expertsin Uncertainty,"chapter9.
45 Ibid.
46 Union of ConcernedScientists and Nuclear Energy Policy Study Group, The Risks
of Nuclear Power Reactors, a Review of the NRC Reactor Safety Study WASH1400
(Cambridge,Mass.: Union of ConcernedScientists, 1977).
47 Ibid.
48 R. Cooke, "Risk Assessment and Rational Decision," Dialectica 36, no. 4 (1982):
334ff.
49 The Bayesian rule used by a majority of experts embodies an ethically liberal or
utilitarianvalue judgmentthat allows one to violate potential minorityrights (to insure
protectionagainst catastrophicnuclearrisk) for the sake of the majority.The maximin
rule, used by very few experts, embodies an ethically conservative or deontological
value judgmentthat does not allow policymakers to violate minority rights to bodily
security and protectionfrom technological catastrophe.Although experts might have
the right to determinerisk probabilities,it is obvious that they do not have the right to
188 KRISTIN SHRADER-FRECHETIE

decide whether those probabilitiesshould be evaluated in terms of a deontological or

utilitarianethical scheme. They are not experts on the value systems of the public, but
only on technical matters.
50 See K. Shrader-Frechette,Science Policy, Ethics, and Economic Methodology
(Dordrecht:Reidel, 1984), chapter9, and Shrader-Frechette,RiskAnalysis, chapter2.
51 See Shrader-Frechette,Science Policy, chapter 3, and Shrader-Frechette,Risk
Analysis, chapter2.
52 Cited in D. Bazelon, "Risk and Responsibility,"Science 205, no. 4403 (1979):
277-280.
53 In my own work on probabilistic risk assessment and on the ethical judgments
often hidden in science policy, I have tried to do many of the same things that Cooke
has accomplished. It can be shown, for example, that virtually all nuclear risk
assessment falls victim to the ethical error that G. E. Moore called the "naturalistic
fallacy." This error is manifested in the nuclear debate by policymakers who define
the ethical problems of free, informedconsent, accident compensation, and equity of
risk distribution as purely technical or naturalistic problems of the magnitude of
accident probability. Risk assessments therefore erroneously assume that there is a
probabilisticquantityto be discovered by scientists ratherthan also an ethical policy
to be decided by the people. (See Shrader-Frechette,Nuclear Power, chapter6.) It is
also easy to show that nuclearpolicy, at least in the U.S., is fundamentallyinconsis-
tent and unjust, in part because the government limits the liability of the nuclear
industry to less than one percent of total possible damages caused by a catastrophic
nuclear accident. The government imposed the liability limit at the insistence of
nuclear lobbyists who said that industrywould go bankruptin the event of a serious
accident. (See Shrader-Frechette,Nuclear Power, chapter 4.) The government
rationale for the liability limit is that nuclear power is safe, and therefore that the
public does not need liability protection. But tracing the logical consequences of this
argument,just as Plato did when he employed the technique known as reductio ad
absurdum,shows that such an argumentis false. If nuclearpower is safe, then no one
needs liability protection,contraryto what industrymaintains. It is neither consistent
nor just for industry to claim that it needs protection from bankruptcycaused by a
serious accident, and yet to claim that the public does not need the same protection.
(See Shrader-Frechette, Nuclear Power, chapter4.)
54 D. J. Juvenal,Satires VI, no. I, 292.
55 Quoted in Bok, "Ethics,the University, and Society," p. 50.
56 Ibid., p. 44.
57 Ibid., p. 46.
58 Ibid., p. 47; see also M. Barron, "Who's Elite?" Notre Dame Magazine, Spring
1989, p. 2.
59 Stark,"UniversityGoes to Market,"pp. 12-13.
60 American Civil Liberties Union, "Guidelines on University and Contract
Research,"Thoughtand Action: NEA Higher EducationJournal 1, no. 1 (Fall 1984):
22-23. These guidelines prohibit universities from accepting grants or contracts that
confer upon an external party the power to censor or delay research contents or
dissemination. They also prohibitresearch that requires a security clearance and any
research that interferes with professors' primary teaching, research, and service
missions. The guidelines require that faculty evaluation be the exclusive province of
 ADAM SMITH AND ALMA MATER 189

the university, that the evaluation be accomplished primarily in terms of criteria of

academic merit, and that all researchbe open to public and professional judgmentas
to its merit. Finally, the guidelines require that universities disclose all funding
agreementsinto which they have entered.
61 Ehrlich,"University-Military," p. 119.
62 Anotherway to promote university autonomy and objectivity is to found a chapter
of the Coalition for Universities in the Public Interest.(ContactNational Coalition for
Universities in the Public Interest, Box 19367, Washington, D.C. 20036.) This is a
new organizationunderthe ladershipof LeonardMinsky and underthe sponsorshipof
Ralph Nader. Its goal is to preventindustrydominationof academia.
63 See Winn, "Universityand SOl," pp. 29-30.
 PART III

SYMPOSIUMON EDUCATIONIN
SCIENCE,TECHNOLOGY,AND VALUES
 LEONARD J. WAKS

SYMPOSIUMON EDUCATIONIN SCIENCE,

TECHNOLOGY,AND VALUES:
INTRODUCTION

Citizens in our technological society are increasinglyconfrontedwith life-

style choices and public policy issues which are beyond the scope of
widely distributedanalytical, interpretive,and practical skills. Examples
of these issues include life-extension, genetic screening, solid waste
disposal, strategic defense in space, release of genetically engineered
organisms into the environment, and funding the super-collider and
human genome projects. Because an intelligence sufficient to confront
such mattersis not possessed by masses of people from all social groups,
the quality of our lives, our democratic institutions, our naturalenviron-
ment, and the very existence of future generationsare all threatened.
What can we as a society do to raise the level of technological intel-
ligence, in this sense, among masses of citizens? Secondaryand collegiate
education, once largely in private hands, have in the last century become
supported primarily by taxation and controlled by government. At first
glance this appears to make formal education society's most promising
instrumentfor raising this kind of intelligence.
But our liberal democratic heritage should make us stop and reflect
before rushing into educationalprogramsdesigned to affect the life-style
choices and value judgments of the people in any direct manner. Our
values and plans of living are privatematters.In liberal democratictheory
these are priorto the state, which exists primarilyto secure for individuals
the space to live as they choose, informed by a plurality of ethical
traditionswhich the liberal state may neitherestablish nor constrain.
Over the last twenty years there have been many intellectual and
educational efforts to address such problems of technology and values.
At a meeting in 1988 to review and focus the agenda of the National
Science Foundationin this area, a working group on educationconcluded
in part:
- More systematic attention needs to be given to the purposes and

193
Paul T. Durbin (ed.), Europe, America, and Technology: Philosophical Perspectives, 193-195.
© 1991 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
194 LEONARD J. WAKS

objectives of ethics and values studies (EVS) education in science and

technology. In exposing studentsto various issues and concerns relatedto
the social contexts of science, are we seeking to change the way people
behave or the types of decisions they make?
- EVS cannot be considered only on the basis of theory and content.
Exposure to these studies is often premised on the belief that informed
discussion of ethical principles will lead to changes of behavior and the
types of decisions made by both individuals and groups. But the
connection between reflections upon ethics and values and the conscious
expression of selected values needs to be reinforcedin the classroom.
- In examining these issues, we need to keep in mind the institutional
contexts that shape science and engineeringcourses at all levels.
This backgroundof social challenges, liberal democratic constraints,
and policy directives sets the stage for the three papers which follow.
Each examines distinct yet relatedquestions: (1) what are the appropriate
roles and limits of public education in shaping values for technological
society; (2) what contributions to this task might be made by the
philosophical dimensions of public education; and (3) what impact on
values may be expected from any new curriculumdelivered within the
standardinstructionalformats of the educational institutions of industrial
society?
In the first paper, Robert Fullinwider explores the "civic education"
argument, to the effect that state-supportededucational interventions in
value formation are justified, but only to the extent that they secure the
necessary means for maintaining liberal democratic institutions. Fullin-
wider presses some of the key distinctions presupposedin this argument,
and then presents his own novel view of ethical traditionsas "languages"
which make value discourses possible but rarely generate determinate
judgments.In this way, Fullinwidershows that publicly-supportedvalues
education may be grounded in ethical traditions without inappropriately
shaping value choices or establishing an official doctrine of rights and
wrongs.
Michael Pritchard considers the role of philosophy in science-
technology-society educational efforts. He considers two species of
philosophical instruction,the critical thinking approachesbased primarily
on the work of Robert Ennis, and the philosophy for children approach
generatedby Matthew Lipman. Pritchard'smain conclusions are (1) that
critical thinking methods may usefully be taught both in separatecourses
and as components of courses in standardschool and college disciplines
 INTRODUCTION 195

such as history, science, and literature; and (2) an even richer, more
speculative philosophical fare may be digested with gusto and great
benefit even by very young learners.
In the last paper in the set, I explore the significance of standard
formats of instruction on value formation. Building on the model of
television viewing, I argue that there is a need to distinguish form and
content in institutionalizedcommunications,and that form has an impact
on values which is pervasive, relatively unperceived, and independentof
the communication content. Drawing on this "hidden curriculum"
argument,I conclude that educationalefforts to raise the capacity of the
masses of people to confront rationally the challenges of technological
society will requiresignificant changes not merely in curriculumcontent,
but also in the educationalformats characteristicof industrialsociety.
These papers were preparedfor the project, "Basic Researchon Ethics
and Values Education in Science and Technology," supported by the
National Science Foundationin GrantNo. DIR-8911488. Any opinions,
findings, conclusions or recommendations expressed are those of the
authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science
Foundation.

The PennsylvaniaState University

 ROBERTK. FULLINWIDER

SCIENCEAND TECHNOLOGYEDUCATION
AS CIVIC EDUCATION

In 1987 Congressman Tony Hall (D., Ohio) introduced legislation to

create a Commission on Values Education,chargedto "identifycommon
values which should be promotedin United States schools." Promptedto
act by his sense of a "nationalmoral recession,"Hall offered his own list
of "commonvalues," including "honesty, integrity, tolerance, the rule of
law, love of knowledge, and respect for the common goOd:'1 The idea
that a national commission should make a list of values to be "endorsed
by the federal government"and taught in the schools reflects a public
climate of concern about misconduct in public office, fraud and pecula-
tion in private business, and indiscipline and slackness in youth. What
remains contentious is how this concern should be translatedinto action.
A national values commission no doubt will strike some as a step toward
restoring the nation's moral health and impress others as a step toward
moral tyranny.
There does seem a substantialfeeling among citizens that the schools
must address the nation's "moral decline." According to polls reported
recently by The Wall Street Journal, eighty-four percent of the public
wants moral values taught in the schools. Yet, as the newspaper also
reported,"most teachers object to the concept of morality education on
philosophical or practicalgrounds."Moral education in schools, said one
educator,"wipes out diversity and separationof church and state,"while,
accordingto another,it would be "dangerous,sad, and boring to have one
view of moralityimposed on our people."2
Nor is public sentiment as uniform as the poll figures suggest. At the
same time that there is much ferment to reform and improve public
education, there is growing hostility to public schools and government
control of education. The numberof private schools has grown markedly
in the past two decades and so has litigation to vindicate home schooling,
secure exemption from mandated curricula, and gain relief from
governmentstandards.Likewise, the idea of "disestablishingschooling"-
getting governmentout of the business of operating schools - has more

197
Paul T. Durbin (ed.), Europe, America,and Technology:Philosophical Perspectives, 197-215.
© 1991 KluwerAcademicPublishers. Printedin the Netherlands.
198 ROBERTK. FULLINWIDER

than a few credible spokesmen.3 Indeed, framed in a certain way, the

rationalefor public schools in a liberal democratic state seems eminently
problematic.As one of the most thoughtful writers on education has put
the problem, "Any system of schools intended for all the members of the
society would have to be neutralin relation to the diverse ways of life in
the society," yet "[i]f the public school does not reflect any ideal of
human life, how can it effectively educate?"4 If public schooling in
generalraises questions, moral educationin the public schools raises them
even more sharply.
One strategy for confronting the problem of moral education is that
incorporatedin Tony Hall's plan for a commission on values: find a list of
values endorsed by everyone. At one level, this seems a rathermindless
strategy. What recommendsthe teaching of particularvalues just because
they appearon a list a commission of citizens could agree to? As with any
outcome of negotiation and compromise, the resulting list might contain
entries that no one favors as a first choice. A list of everybody's second
choices does not seem the stuff around which good curriculumis built.
Moreover,taken out of theircontexts in overall ways of life, the particular
values on the list may add up to nothing coherentor sensible as a whole.
At another level, however, something like the consensus approach is
more plausible, and is the standardjustification both for having public
schools and for teaching values in them. The argument, made most
eloquently and richly in Amy Gutmann'sDemocratic Education (1987),
aims to identify those values presupposedby our political commitments.5
These "consensus" values are not derived by vote but by a
"transcendentaldeduction," so to speak. They are the "fundamental
values necessary to the maintenanceof a democraticpolitical system"that
protects the pluralismand diversity of lives in society.6 These values the
state properlymay take responsibility to inculcate in students. I call this
argumentthe "civic educationargument."
Can this strategy for resolving the problem of values in public educa-
tion answer the critics and dissenters?To see whether it can, we need to
flesh out the civic education argument and see what it implies. What
conception of values education is needed to serve both pluralism and
democracy?Does that conception commit schools to "imposingone view
of morality"on their students?
I answer these questions in the following way. First, I develop the civic
education argument in more detail and describe the values education it
underwrites (Part I). The civic education argument supports inducting
 SCIENCEAND TECHNOLOGYEDUCATIONAS CIVIC EDUCATION 199

students into what I will call the "practiceof public reason."I go on (in
Part II) to argue that an education in public reason involves a substantial
moral education, but it does not permit a sharp and clear separationof
civic and moral education. Because this conclusion seems to some
educators, such as the ones quoted in The Wall Street Journal, to permit
or requirea dangerous"imposing"on students, I try to allay some of the
fears in this regard by describing what a moral education is (Part ill).
Finally, I discuss science education as a form of civic and moral educa-
tion (Part IV). I show several ways in which the study of science con-
tributes to students' acquiring an understanding of, and literacy in,
"publicreason."

The civic education argument goes like this. To the extent that we all
share a commitment to a political system of protected liberties and
democraticdecision making-a system that secures the space for different
groups to live out different ways of life - we are committedto recreating
the conditions for the continued flourishing of that system.7 Part of
recreating those conditions means educating each generation in certain
civic virtues. These include the "capacity for independent rational
judgment,"8 the "disposition to respect the rights of others,"9 "the
capacity to discuss and defend [one's] political commitmentswith people
who do not share them,"10 and the ability "to evaluate the talents,
character,and performanceof public officials."ll Now these capacities,
dispositions, and abilities are clearly values themselves or presuppose
certain values. Proper civic education cannot be neutral about them;
rather,its job is to instill them. However, these common values may be
thought teachable without prejudicing wider moral options about the
meaning of life and the worth of the goals to which we variously commit
ourselves. Civic education cannot be values-neutralbut its non-neutrality
can be contained to what is shared. The state "must not venture beyond
this point. It must not throw its weight behind ideals of personal excel-
lence outside the sharedunderstandingof civic excellence."12 So goes the
argument.
The central idea of the civic education argument is a powerful one.
Dissenting groups in society cannot demand exemption from the very
laws and rules that allow and protect their dissent without arrogatingto
themselves the status of free riders. In a pluraliststate, groups want to be
200 ROBERT K. FULLINWIDER

free to define and live out their own conception of the good life. They
want to be free not only of state interferencebut of privateinterferenceas
well. Accommodating this desire may be no small task in a state where
the differentgroups dislike each other or take an interestin changing each
other's way of life. The conditions for successful pluralismare two: (i) a
rule of law that limits coercive interference by either public or private
agents in the personallives of individuals;and (ii) a social environmentof
tolerance and respect that moderates the inclinations of groups toward
non-coercive interferencein each other'sway of life.
A group that wants to be protectedfrom coercive interferencebut that
also wants to be exempt from the rules and conditions which make that
protection possible wants to have its cake and eat it too. Some of the
fundamentalistreligious sects that StephenArons writes about sympatheti-
cally in his brief against public schooling, Compelling Belief (1986),
explicitly aim at "[separating]the faithful from society."13 As long as
such sects are small and marginal,they can be exempted by the state from
certain requirements.This is possible because the rest of society still
conforms to the conditions that prevent or dampen centrifugaltendencies
toward separatismby all groups. The dissenting, separatistsect relies on
the general observance of rules it wants to be exempt from. It enjoys the
protectionsthat allow it to practice its faith, and does not ask to be free of
those; but their existence, of course, presupposes that the state has not
fragmented. Should society revert to the state of nature, there would be
nothing protectingthe dissenting sect from the aggression and predation
of othergroups and sects.
To the extent, then, that there are rules and conditions whose general
observance is necessary for sustaining the liberal, pluraliststate, they are
properlyimposed upon everybody. Dissenting groups may by right claim
relief only from those rules and conditions that go beyond what is
necessary for sustaining the state. They may not claim relief from
educational standards or requirements necessary to create political
competence and inculcate social attitudes of mutual forebearance and
tolerance.

II

The civic education argumentis not only powerful but attractiveas well.
It seems to grant a scope for necessary values education while pre-
serving a wide neutrality that respects cultural and moral pluralism.
 SCIENCEAND TECHNOLOGYEDUCATIONAS CIVIC EDUCATION 201

It draws a line beyond which state non-neutrality cannot go.

However, it would be a mistake to think that the civic education
argument can resolve all the disagreements and disputes about values
educationin the schools. There are at least two reasons why it leaves open
large areas of unresolved questions. The first reason is that the civic
educationargumentitself can be interpretedin weaker and strongerways,
and different interpretationswill authorize more or less values education
as within its scope. The second reason is that on any interpretationof the
civic argument, schools will find it impossible to divorce civic from
moral values; that is, they will not be able to teach civic lessons without
teaching moral lessons as well. Consequently, the civic education
argumentpermits a good deal of moral education in the schools and thus
must trigger the alarms of those who feel that moral education in the
schools means a dangerous "imposing," or who fear that wrong or
mistakenmoral lessons will be taught.

A. Interpretingthe Civic EducationArgument

The civic educationargumentlooks attractivebecause it promises to draw
a line between civic values, which ought to be taught in school, and moral
values, which ought not. It draws a line between civic excellence and
personal excellence, so that the schools can take a stand on the former
without taking a stand on the latter. However, the line will be drawn at
different places by different interpretations of the civic education
argument.
The civic education argument gets purchase in our purportedly
"shared"political commitments. But what, precisely, is the content of the
postulated shared commitmentto recreate the conditions for sustaining a
system of protected liberties and democratic decision making? How,
precisely, are we to define the shared goal? Is it to teach those virtues
minimally necessary for the political system to persist without dangerous
decline into incivility, impotence, and even violence? Or is it to teach
those virtues productive of social improvementand progress? Arguably,
the "common view of the world" that allows citizens to "interacthar-
moniously and communicateintelligibly" will be morally richer than the
common view requiredto sustain a simple modus vivendi constrainingthe
means of adversarialpower struggles.14 Harmony is a more demanding
goal than live-and-Iet-live. Thus, we are likely to arrive at very different
locations of the point beyond which the state may not throw its weight in
202 ROBERTK. FULLINWIDER

educating our children depending on whether we start with a minimal or

maximal understandingof what is necessary to maintain the political
system.
On the strong version of the civic education argumentdeveloped by
Amy Gutmannand Dennis Thompson, the crucial civic virtue is "mutual
respect," which "requiresa favorable attitude toward, and constructive
interaction with, the persons with whom one disagrees."15 Ideally, the
democratic citizen will offer sincere and genuine arguments to her
opponents and will take their arguments at face value as sincere and
genuine as well. She will make the best case she can, open to the
possibility that she will change her mind after all is said and done, while
looking for the narrowestconstructionof the differences that separateher
view from opposing views. 16
Mutual respect makes possible effective and fruitful political discus-
sion about issues deeply dividing the citizenry of a democracy. It is an
aspect of an effective "practice of public reason." I mean by "public
reason" common ways of weighing evidence, assessing arguments, and
drawing inferences, as well as a common stock of information and
cultural models to which appeal can be made in argumentas grounds of
comparison or contrast. Mutual respect specifies some of the intellectual
virtues that an effective practice of public reason can support. The
centrality of these virtues derives from a particular conception of
democracy. On conceptions that greatly limit the issues that could be put
up for collective debate and choice, and that suppose decisions to be
outcomes of controlled power struggles ratherthan good-faith delibera-
tions, the virtues of "mutualrespect"would not be central to democratic
decision making. Consequently,where we draw the line between the civic
and the moral will differ accordingto our conception of democracy.

B. Separating the Civic and Moral

This last observation leads to the second point about civic and moral
values. Whereverwe draw the line, can we keep each kind of value on its
own side? Whatever civic capabilities we set out to teach, can we keep
larger moral virtues and conceptions from bleeding into them? Consider,
again, the capacities associated with any strong or weak conception of
democratic"publicreason."Among them is the ability to "engage in civic
discourse,"17 and a principal task of civic education must be to teach
students how "to argue about the values on which they differ,"18 how "to
 SCIENCEAND TECHNOLOGYEDUCATIONAS CIVIC EDUCATION 203

reason out loud about disagreements that arise in politics."19 It is not

possible, however, to flesh out these ideas of argument,discussion, and
reasoning without use of standardsthat go beyond the largely mechanical
criteria of logical fluency and factual accuracy. What counts as good
reasoningand arguing will reflect the ends they are thoughtto serve.
If, for example, success in electoral competition is the regulative end,
then the standardby which to measure political argumentis effectiveness
in persuadingvoters and supportersto your side. From this point of view,
argumentsare viewed strategically, and valued in light of their effective-
ness, not their truth. To put truth first is to value good-faith arguments,
argumentsthat aim to persuade only by representingreality as faithfully
as possible. Such representationsare likely to be complex, subtle, and
partial,and not easily amenable to the simple sloganeeringmost effective
in electoral campaigns.
So there is a way of understandingand deploying arguments that
sacrifices truth for persuasion, and there is a way that sacrifices persua-
sion for truth.If students, in debating political issues in school, mimic the
larger public debates, they will tend to treat argumentsstrategically- or
fail even to note that there is a difference between good-faith arguments
and strategic arguments. Is it importantthat they learn the difference or
learn to rankone over the other?
Socrates, in Plato's Gorgias, picturedrhetoric that is designed merely
to persuadeas a form of pandering,and judged it bad because it makes us
worse off, in contrastto philosophical argument, which makes us better
off. But in making this distinction and defending philosophical argument
against rhetoric,Socrates invokes a non-politicalconception of the health
of the soul and the goodness of a person.20 Ifthey are to acquire the habit
of good-faith arguing or to develop a lively appreciationof the difference
between strategic and good-faith arguing, can students be trainedonly in
a core civic conception of argument? Or, to put the question more
pointedly: can there be any civic conception of argument that does not
alreadypresupposesome idea of the health of the soul?
Relatedly, consider the ability to understandthose we disagree with, an
ability that should be a component of the developed capacity to argue
about public affairs and one that is a condition of the virtue of "mutual
respect" described earlier. Again, need this ability consist in more than
being adept at identifying the rhetorical and strategic weaknesses of an
opponent'sposition? A conception of the ability to understandas strategic
adeptness flows readily from a focus on competitive political success. A
204 ROBERT K. FULLINWIDER

quite distinct and different conception of understandingaccompanies a

principle of charity, which instructs us always to imagine others as
seeking the truth and to choose, of the many possible ways to construe
their words, the interpretationthat makes their view have the best chance
of being true. It is, perhaps,possible to promote this principle of charity,
as it may also be possible to promote some version of good faith in
debate, by appeal to a political conception of argumentlike the Gutmann-
Thompson view. Even so, how can students appreciatethe political worth
of charitable interpretationwithout appreciating its intrinsic, not just
instrumental,goodness? How can they not appreciatethe intrinsic moral
evil in unjustlyjudging another?
The same impossibility of keeping political values walled off from
moral spillover shows up when we tum to other values that are con-
stituents of civic virtue. How can a student learn to identify and condemn
abuse of authority by officeholders and public officials without this
affecting her reaction to abuse of authorityat home and in other personal
contexts? How can the student see the worth of due process and
proceduralfairness in the law without seeing their similar worth in non-
legal and non-political contexts? How can a student learn to assess the
characterof candidates for office without relying on antecedent moral
standardsfor her political standards,and without her political standards
shaping and coloring her moral standards?Moreover, how in each of
these cases can the student separateher conclusions about the instrumen-
tal undesirability of abuse of power, procedural arbitrariness, and
arrogancein office from her perceptionsof their intrinsic ugliness?
Because political values are not really separate from moral values,
political ideals from moral ideals, and political virtues from moral virtues,
it is impossible successfully to do political education without also doing
moral education. Thus, the line that the civic education argumentdraws
between civic excellences (about which schools must take a stand) and
personal ideals (about which schools should be neutral)- the line which
"the liberal state must not venture beyond"- cannot be understoodas one
that cleanly separates the civic and the moral but ratheras one that puts
the civic-plus-the-moral-content-implicated-in-the-civic on the one side
and the moral-content-not-directly-implicated-in-the-civic on the other.
The civic educationargumentdraws a line, but one that lets in more of the
contentiousmoral domainthan might initially be supposed.
The aspiration of the civic education argument- to have the school
remain more or less neutralon value issues that transcendthe civic - is a
 SCIENCEAND TECHNOLOGYEDUCATION AS CIVIC EDUCATION 205

desirable one in a culturallyand religiously diverse society. Though it is

more elusive than might have been supposed, neutrality still provides a
guidepost for criticizing or revising the moral content of public school
curricula.However, to see how, and what kind of, neutralityis possible,
we need to turnto an examinationof moral educationitself.

III

Many cntIcs oppose moral education in the schools because they

conceive of it as teachers "prescribingaccepted truths to passive and
absorbent students" (indoctrination) or as students talking about their
subjective feelings without guidance or direction (values clarification),to
use a simplemindedbut common way of dividing the possibilities.21 Both
dissenting parents and critical educators might be less wary of moral
education in the schools if they understood it as neither of these two
things. With a richer (or, at least, different) conception of morality at
hand, they might see how extensive moral education is possible while still
honoringa certainkind of neutrality.
People typically think of morality as dogma rather than as a
vocabulary; and they think of explicit moral education as imposing
doctrinaluniformityratherthan supplying conceptualaccuity.
Let us take seriously the idea of morality-as-vocabularyand press the
analogy between morality and language. On this analogy, learning
morality is like learning a language (in fact, morality is to a large extent
learned in learning a natural language): it is the acquisition of moral
concepts and the practice of applying them. The larger our descriptive
vocabulary,the richerare our powers of description;the largerour moral
vocabulary,the more refined are our powers of judgmentand evaluation.
A vocabulary supplies us with words; it does not tell us what to say
with them. In contrast, a dogma does tell us what to say; it supplies the
correct beliefs. So, which way we analogize morality will make a big
difference in our responses to moral education. Our seeing moral
educationas imposing dogma is bound to make us uneasy. "Who is to say
what is correct?"is our response. Because the correctness of so many
moral views is contested and disputed in our society, we do not want to
let school teachers be the arbiters of truth. We do not want the schools
taking stands; we want them to remain neutral.However, if, in contrastto
this picture of dogmatizing, we fix on the image of moral-education-as-
learning-a-vocabulary,we might be less likely to see it as a straitjacket
206 ROBERT K. FULLINWIDER

than as a tool, less likely to see it as imposing contested and unwanted

beliefs on childrenthan as equippingthem to judge for themselves.
My pressing the analogy between morality and language is aimed at
undermining the common habit of thinking of moral education as a
straitjacket.It is also aimed at reminding us that moral education - and
often wholly adequate and sufficient moral education - is going on in
places we are not even paying attentionto when we carry on our quarrels
about directive moral education or the desirability of values clarification
courses or ethics discussions in the curriculum. Once we conceive of
learning morality as acquiringa vocabularyof criticism and appreciation,
we begin to see that learning morality is, in fact, incidental to learning
about almost anything. Any school curriculumrich in literature,the arts,
history, and the sciences teaches standards, norms, ideals, and virtues
every day - standards, norms, ideals, and virtues that pertain to the
excellent performance of specific inquiries (accuracy in scientific
measurement, honesty in reporting of experimental results, fidelity to
historical records), that underlie prudence (self-control for long term
gains, moderation in consumption, reflectiveness about career choice),
that infuse appreciation of craft, beauty, and nature (the economy of
means, the order of parts, the consummationof effort), and that measure
the moral life (the honor in a cheerful, generous response to cir-
cumstances, the worth of truthfulness, the dignity of fortitude, and the
serenity that comes in facing death without regretor bitterness).A superb
moral education can be given students through solid instruction in the
principal arts and sciences of their culture without resort to moral
didacticism,directive teaching, or values clarification.In fact, specifically
designed ethics courses, whether conducted "directively" or
"discursively"according to the crude contrastdrawn at the beginning of
this section, may add nothing at all to moral education. Such courses
frequently offer a bland and flaccid generic terminology in place of the
richer vocabulary of the rest of the curriculum, and suspend students
between glib solutions and persistentirresolution.
Thus, a school that set out deliberately not to morally educate its
students would simply have to close down altogether. It could not teach
children their native language since so much of any natural language is
about how to be and not to be. It would have to deprive its students of all
stories of human affairs, since those stories are structuredby evaluative
concepts - by ideas of success and failure, foresight and blindness,
heedfulness and heedlessness, care and negligence, duty and dereliction,
 SCIENCEAND TECHNOLOGYEDUCATIONAS CIVIC EDUCATION 207

pride and shame, hope and despair, wonder and dullness, competitionand
cooperation,beginning and ending. But without stories of human affairs,
a school could not effectively teach non-morallessons either. It could not
teach about inflation, log-rolling, scientific discovery, coalition-building,
paranoia, ecological niches, deterrence of crime, price controls, or
infectious diseases.
I have used the analogy between morality and language to suggest that
moral education need not have the dogmatizing cast feared by many
parents and critics. A moral education supplies tools of evaluation (a
vocabulary) ratherthan doctrines for adhesion (dogma). Now, the sharp
division between word and belief suggested by the dichotomy, dogma
versus vocabulary, is not going to hold when pressed hard. Even in
teaching our native language we are teaching things, not just words. It is
unavoidable.The way, for example, a child picks up terms like "nurse"or
"housewife"from spoken contexts, written stories, or school readers will
carry with it a substantial baggage of social norms about gender. The
same is true in teaching a moral and political vocabulary. Concepts must
be taught by reference to concrete instantiations, and the standard
examples taught will carry along a backgroundof social belief. This is
especially true of the civic virtues, since they will be taught through the
medium ofthe nation'spolitical history.
Thus, it will not quite do to say that in learning a vocabulary, we just
learn words and not what to say with those words. The way the
vocabularyis taught will presdispose us to saying certainthings. Even so,
the predispositions need not be firm and may easily be overridden by
other elements of the vocabulary.The richer one's vocabulary,the richer
are one's arsenal of concrete examples and surroundingbeliefs; and the
more likely the arsenal embraces elements that clash with, subvert, or
undermine other elements, thus allowing imagination and judgment
greater, more critical play than in the properly dogmatized person. The
dogmatic or doctrinaireperson believes one thing or a few. The well-
educated person believes many things, consequently has to sort them out
and arrangethem in patternsand make them consistent. Thus, although it
is an exaggeration to claim that learning a vocabulary does not tell us
what to say, the crude contrastbetween learning a dogma and learning a
vocabularystill points to an importantcontrast.It shifts our orientationso
that we can bettersee the possibility of neutralityof a sort even in a moral
education.
Recall the dilemma for a liberal theory of public schooling posed
208 ROBERTK. FULLINWIDER

earlier: "Any system of schools intended for all the members of the
society would have to be neutralin relation to the diverse ways of life in
the society," yet "[i]f the public school does not reflect any ideal of
human life, how can it effectively educate?"22The answer to the dilemma
is this: it is true that schools could not effectively educate if they reflected
no ideal of human life, but in effectively educating childrenthey need not
offer only one ideal of human life. A good school offers not an ideal but
many ideals.
There are two ways a school can be neutral. It can exclude from its
curriculumanything that divides the largercommunity (and this seems to
be the idea of neutralitymotivatingthose critics who want moral teaching
out of the public schools), or it can include the divisive matters while
faithfully and sympathetically representing the different ways the
community looks at them. Teachers and texts can explore with students
the variety of visions, ideals, aspirations, and ways of life available in
their community and in the larger culture. School can acquaint students
with multiple vocabularies of value, and the hopes, ambitions, dreams,
and duties that give them life and make them attractive to different
segments of the community. It can let different ways of life speak for
themselves in theirbest voices and most complete manifestations.
There is a way, then, the liberal conception of schooling can avoid the
dilemma posedfor it two paragraphsago. The school can be both neutral
and effective. It can educate students into the moral vocabularies of the
community without prejudicingor privileging anyone of them. This last
claim, however, has to be qualified in a significant way. The civic
educationargumentrequiresschools to take a stand on some civic virtues,
and the privileging of the civic vocabulary will, as a by-product, favor
certain non-civic virtues, ideals, and ways of life as well. For reasons
suggested above when I described the difference between the dogmatic
and well-educated person, the elements of favoritism can be counter-
balancedby the influence of parents,church, and other parts of the school
experience itself. Still, the idea of a well-educated person underlyingthe
kind of moral educationI have been describingmay itself conflict sharply
with what some parents want for their children. They, themselves, hope
successfully to dogmatize their children, and an education that makes
students open-minded, objective, intellectually curious, and generous
toward the views of others threatens the success of those hopes. Here
there is inevitable conflict between parents and school, but if the civic
education argument is sound, the state is fully justified in offering an
 SCIENCEAND TECHNOLOGYEDUCATIONAS CIVIC EDUCATION 209

education that develops in students the intellectual virtues that support

mutualrespect or the ability to participatein the practiceof public reason.

IV

I turn at last to the place of science and technology instructionin values

education. From what has already been said about civic and moral
education, it should not be difficult to see how science educationcan be a
part of civic and moral learning. I will discuss science education under
three headings: science and public reason, science and controversy, and
the STS agenda.

A. Science and Public Reason

A central aim of civic education is to develop in students a capacity for
fruitful public discussion of issues. Genuine public deliberation is not
possible in the absence of common forms of reasoning and arguing. To
deliberate together and justify themselves to one another, citizens must
have similar ideas about what validates an inference and what counts as
evidence, and they must share some range of substantivebeliefs enabling
them to agree upon basic characterizationsof issues and alternatives.
Moreover, deliberation is more effective when the deliberatorspossess
the intellectual virtues inhering in mutual respect. These virtues and
common understandingsI have called "publicreason."Now, science and
scientific method, broadly understood and in their best manifestations,
representa valuable social ideal, as well as achievement,in public reason.
Science's ethos of publicity (a scientist's tests and findings must be able
to be checked, authenticated, or duplicated by other scientists), its
techniques of investigation (scientists seek precision through measure-
ment, experimentation,and mathematicalanalysis), and its successes at
discovery and explanation(central scientific doctrines remain stable over
a long period and supportpowerful technologies and social organizations)
offer a model of public reason in two ways: as a method of inquiryand as
a supplierof reliable information.
Consider, first, scientific methods. Students who pursue well-taught
courses of study in the physical and life sciences learn a lot about inquiry
in general. They learn the importanceof patient and careful observation,
exactitude and precision in measurement,honest and complete reporting
of evidence, experimental validation of conjectures, and caution in
210 ROBERT K. FULLINWIDER

drawingconclusions. They learn how to work towardnarrowingdisagree-

ment and devising mutually acceptable tests for deciding the differences
that remain. They learn to encounter other inquirersas equals, similarly
searchingfor answers accordingto common methods.
The methods of science are in good part a reflection of its ethos of
pUblicity. Scientific work is intended for assessment, testing, improve-
ment, or rejectionby the collective effort of the communityof scientists, a
community open to all who submit themselves to the common and open
methods of scientific inquiry. Science historically has had greatersuccess
than either religion or politics in transcendingthe ideological, cultural,
linguistic, and geographical differences that divide and separate people.
The physics done in China, Sierra Leone, Uruguay, and Indonesia is the
same as that done in Syria, Canada, Malaysia, and Tanzania. Scientific
ideas circulate freely within an internationalcommunity and scientists
visit beyond their home institutesand laboratorieswith regularity.
Science provides not only an instructive model of inquiry but a model
of the authority of reason itself. Science does not call upon external
authority- political, ecclesiastical, or otherwise - to ground its findings
or conclusions. The results of scientific work stand or fall by collective
judgmentaccording to shared standardsof reasoning which serve as the
final source of appeal in scientific questions. The nature of the authority
of scientific reason is quite distinctive. First, nothing in science, including
its own methods and claims of authority,is immune to criticism from the
scientific point of view itself. Scientific reason is a form of self-correcting
reason. This means that in principle no scientific belief, no matter how
deep and basic, is privileged against rejection. Thus, though science, like
any form of understanding,rests on "faith"and "commitments"- deep
assumptions that guide judgment and inquiry - the faith of science is
quite different from religious faith. "Fallibilism"in science - the attitude
that lets us go on with our knowledge practices in science while not ruling
out that our seemingly most reliable beliefs may eventually be overturned
- bespeaks a kind of faith very different from that which animates the
religious believer, whose faith is not hedged and qualified by being
conditionalon the outcome of future free inquiry.
Now, quite obviously, science instruction in the schools need not
model a form of public reason to students at all. For the study of science
to impart the civic lessons sketched here, the science taught must be
science with a human face. If students are simply set to memorizing the
structureof molecules or calculating the specific gravity of substances,
 SCIENCEAND TECHNOLOGYEDUCATIONAS CIVIC EDUCATION 211

they will take away from their studies a sense of science as static and
fixed. They will take away a sense of the authorityof science textbooks
rather than the authority of scientific reason. They will only dimly
understandthe efficacy of the intellectual virtues embedded in the ethos
of public, collective inquiry since they will not see scientists working out
their disagreements, overcoming their uncertainties, assessing their
findings, making discoveries, runninginto dead ends - in short, they will
not see scientists thinking. A science education in the primary and
secondary schools, if it is to serve civic and moral aims, must be many
more things than formulas to learn and equations to master; it must also
be exploration and discovery really experienced, and great exploration
and discovery relived (throughhistory and biography).It must, as well, be
the story of science's failure to live up to its own ideals, and of the
constriction,ratherthan enlargement,of vision that comes from assuming
that what can not be capturedby the currentinstrumentsof measurement
and quantificationcan not be intelligently thought about (or is not worth
thinking about). It must be the story of science's conflicts with religion
and philosophy.

B. Science and Controversy

Although a good scientific education must give a student a sense of how
scientists controvertissues and debate their differences, it need not do so
through the use of contemporary political debates about issues with
scientific or technological dimensions, such as nuclear power,
atmospheric pollution, destruction of plant and animal species, space-
based weaponry, energy conservation, genetic screening, and so on.
(There are reasons discussed below to include such debates in a civic
education.) In fact, such debates often obscure one of the lessons science
can model about public reason, namely the operation of good-faith
argumentand debate. Studentsneed to understandwhat it means - what it
really looks like - to actually practice the mutual respect Gutmann and
Thompson describe - to accept an opponent's arguments at face value,
construingthem as generously and charitablyas one can, and responding
with counterargumentsgenuinely responsive and relevant to the initial
arguments.Students need to see what it looks like to modify a position in
the light of criticism, to cooperate in looking for common ground, and to
point out the strengths in an opponent's position and disclose the
weaknesses in one's own. There should be ample sources in the history
212 ROBERTK. FULLINWIDER

and literatureof science both to show good-faith argumentin its best light
and show failures and divergences from that ideal.
The drawback with contemporary political controversies involving
scientific or technological dimensions is that - as in all live and strongly
contested political controversies-a lot of the public arguing is strategic
ratherthan in good faith. It is meant to score political points, to make an
opponent look bad, to rally supporters, to incense, pacify, or scare a
particularconstituency, and to mobilize voters. Thus such controversies
are often bad models of the intellectual virtues in deliberationand debate.
On the other hand, students must learn, as preparationfor civic life, how
to attempt to discern good-faith arguments in the midst of unpromising
and politically "noisy" circumstances. Contemporary political con-
troversies involving scientific and technological dimensions can be
constructivein that regard.

C. AboutScience: The STSAgenda

The Science, Technology, and Society (STS) movement has among its
aims more and better science teaching in schools, with the hope that
students will be betterable to understandmany of the political issues that
confront the country. National debates about workplace safety, environ-
mental protection, regulation of food and drugs, energy policy, and
disposal of nuclear wastes, to name a few, involve substantialtechnical
and scientific informationand findings. Citizens need some rudimentary
understandingof science and technology to make even modest sense of
expert testimony and controversy. A wide diffusion of general science
understandingpermitsthe organs of democraticdecision making to reflect
genuine citizen opinion.
But STS equally wants the curriculumto make students more savvy
about science as a social institution and practice. It wants students to
understandphysicists, not just physics. That is, it wants students to
understandthat the people who do physics are largely men who inhabit
research universities and work on projects that require substantial
governmentspending, often from the Defense Department;and that these
facts about the contemporarysocial organizationof physics shape the way
researchtopics are chosen, influence the kinds of hypotheses and theories
that are given credibility, limit access to data and testing equipment, and
affect the translation of research into socially useful or harmful tech-
nologies. The facts about how science is actually done show how the
 SCIENCEAND TECHNOLOGYEDUCATIONAS CIVIC EDUCATION 213

ideals of science (as ethos, method, and reliable body of knowledge) are
compromisedin various ways. For example, because scientists frequently
work on sensitive military research, or for institutions that want to patent
new techniques or technologies developed in their laboratories, science
informationis often kept secret, ratherthan circulating freely within the
scientific community.
Similarly, controversies within science sometimes are, and must be,
resolved on non-scientific grounds. Debates among scientists about the
efficacy of a drug in treating cancer or AIDS, for example, if they were
merely academic debates, could be left unresolved and open. But they are
not merely academic exercises, since decisions about government
regulation, use by physicians and hospitals, and investment and develop-
ment by pharmaceuticalcompanies tum on the outcome of the debates.
Since these decisions about regulation, availability, and investment are
decisions that cannot, or sometimes ought not, be postponed, closure of
the scientific controversy must import economic, political, and moral as
well as use scientific considerations.23
STS urges "demystification"of science not for its own sake but for its
putative liberating effects on civic action. Students and citizens who
understandsomething about as well as of science will be less susceptible
to the cult of expertise and less willing to abdicate active involvement in
social issues that tum on scientific or technical matters.They will be more
inclined to trust their own judgments, and more inclined to get politically
involved.24
Because of the far-reachingeffects of science and technology on the
lives and well-being of all citizens, and because of the way science and
technology affect social institutions and political decisions, the general
imperativesof STS educationfall squarely within a long traditionof civic
education. Of course, the general imperatives might be carried out in
ways thatjustifiably offend parentsand community leaders. The issues of
most interest to STS - energy policy, nuclear power, environmental
degradation, global warming - are controversial politically and shot
through with scientific disagreement. Moreover, people differ on these
issues because of their broaderreligious and philosophical attitudesabout
the world and the place of humans within it. Consequently, there some-
times will be a fine line in STS education between "educatingto civic
responsibility"and "recruitingto a cause," between using the classroom
to expand students' vocabularies of value and using it to attractstudents
to a world-view.
214 ROBERTK. FULLINWIDER

Whetherthroughthe particularaims of STS, or througha more general

conception of science education in the schools, the study of science can
be a principalpartof the civic and moral education of youth. Science and
technology not only model certain ideals of public reason, and not only
inform democratic choice, they also reflect deep human characteristics.
An abiding curiosity about the workings of nature, an unsuppressible
impulse to search out the unknown, a fascination with puzzles, a
proclivity to tinker and invent, a constant quest for new venues upon
which to give imaginationfull play - these are traits that virtually define
what it is to be human, and science and technology are preeminentarenas
for giving them expression. Although much about the contemporary
institutional and social embodiments of science and technology needs
reform, the histories of science and technology are histories of the human
spirit at work.

University ofMaryland

NOTES

1 H. R. 2667; Congressional Record, vol. 133 (June 16, 1987).

2 April 6, 1990, page B 1.
3 See, e.g., Richard Baer, "American Public Education and the Myth of Value
Neutrality,"in Richard John Neuhaus, ed., Democracy and the Renewal of Public
Education (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1987), pp. 1-24; Stephen Arons,
Compelling Belief: The Culture of American Schooling (Amherst: University of
MassachusettsPress, 1986).
4 Brian S. Crittenden, Parents, the State and the Right to Educate (Melbourne:
University of MelbournePress, 1988), pp. 122 and 13.
5 Amy Gutmann,Democratic Education (Princeton, N.J.: PrincetonUniversity Press,
1987), pp. 38-39, and throughout.For other recent examples, see RosemaryChamber-
lin, Free Children and Democratic Schools: A Philosophical Study of Liberty and
Education (New York: Falmer Press, 1989), p. 86; Derek L. Phillips, Toward a Just
Social Order (Princeton,N.J.: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1986), p. 181-186; Kenneth
A. Strike, Liberty and Learning (New York: St. Martin'sPress, 1982), p. 159; and
William Galston, "Civic Educationin the Liberal State,"in Nancy L. Rosenblum, ed.,
Liberalismand the Moral Life (Cambridge, Mass.: HarvardUniversity Press, 1989),
p.97.
6 Bethel School District v. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. 3159, 3164 (1986).
7 Gutmann,Democratic Education, pp. 41-52.
8 Crittenden,Parents, p. 116.
9 Galston, "Civic Education,"p. 93.
10 Gutmann,Democratic Education,p. 107.
11 Galston, "Civic Education,"p. 93.
 SCIENCEAND TECHNOLOGYEDUCATIONAS CIVIC EDUCATION 215

12 Ibid., p. 101.
13 "Separationof the faithful from society is the goal," Arons writes about the
fundamentalists.See Arons, CompellingBelief, p. 151.
14 Quoting Strike,Libertyand Learning,p. 159.
15 Amy Gutmannand Dennis Thompson, "MoralConflict and Political Consensus,"
Ethics 101 (October 1990): 76.
16 Ibid., pp. 80-82.
17 Galston, "Civic Education,"p. 93.
18 Crittenden,Parents, p. 137.
19 Gutmann,Democratic Education,p. 58.
20 Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns, eds., Plato: The Collected Dialogues
(princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press), pp. 283-285. Socrates' own life
provides a picture of how good-faith arguments are ill-suited as political tools.
Callicles, in Gorgias, reflects the common experience of Socrates' respondentswhen
he says: "Itseems to me, I know not how, that you are right, Socrates, but I feel as the
many do. I am not quite convinced by you." Socrates replies: "That is because the
love of demos dwells in your soul, Callicles, and resists me, but if perchance we
investigate these same problems better, you will be persuaded"(p. 295; emphases
added). Arguments toward the truth are hard, and often go against the popular
prejudicesand beliefs.
21 I paraphrase here Robert M. Gordon, "Freedom of Expression and Values
Inculcation in the Public School Curriculum,"Journal of Law and Education, 13
(October 1984): 531. Gordon himself (p. 557) offers a version of the "civic education
argument":values explicitly or implicitly expressed in the Constitutionmay be taught
in school. Gordon realizes that it may be hard to keep the teaching of other, general
values like "honesty, truthfulness,and respect for others"out of the classroom, and
concedes they need not be kept out "as long as they can be taught without coercing
studentsinto actually believing them"!
22 See note 4 above.
23 See, e.g., H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr., and Arthur L. Caplan, eds., Scientific
Controversies:Case Studies in the Resolutionand Closure of Disputes in Science and
Technology (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press, 1987).
24 "STS educators make two related value commitments: to promoting an ethic of
responsibility,and to encouragingbroad participationin the resolution of technologi-
cally charged issues through democratic processes." Leonard Waks, "School-
Community Relations for Ethics and Values in STS Education,"Working Paper #3,
National STS Network, Penn State University, 1988, p. 2.
 MICHAELS. PRITCHARD

STS, CRITICALTHINKING,AND PHILOSOPHYFOR CHILDREN

INTRODUCTION

There is widespreadagreementthat our schools need to improve science

education.There is also widespreadagreementthat the schools need to do
much betterat helping students develop critical thinking skills. These two
needs seem clearly connected. Neither can be adequately met indepen-
dently of the other. Precisely how science education and critical thinking
should be joined is less clear. Everything depends on how each is to be
understood;and here there is anythingbut widespreadagreement.
This paper will suggest an unexpected avenue for joining science
education and critical thinking in the service of our children. Philosophy,
I will try to show, can contributeimportantlyto science education- not
just in high school (a startling enough idea), but as early as science
education itself begins. Philosophy has always been closely allied with
critical thinking. But philosophical thinking is not just critical thinking in
a narrow"problem-solving"sense. Critical thinking in philosophy cannot
be clearly separatedfrom imaginative and creative thinking that often is
noted as much for generatingas for solving problems.This is as centralto
good science education as more narrowly conceived problem-solving
techniques are.
AN EDUCATIONALCHALLENGE

As we become more and more dependenton high technology, there is a

growing problemof scientific and technological literacy. Quite apartfrom
concern about whether we are turning out enough scientifically and
technologically trained students to keep up competitively at the interna-
tional level, there are fundamental value questions that need to be
addressed. These questions are of two sorts. First, there are questions
about the appropriatedevelopmentand use of technology. For example, is
genetic engineering desirableand, if so, in what areas and to what extent?
Is the development of technology for the use of nuclear energy desirable

217
Paul T. Durbin(ed.), Europe,America,and Technology:Philosophical Perspectives, 217-246.
© 1991 KluwerAcademicPublishers.
218 MICHAELS. PRITCHARD

and, if so, in what areas and to what extent? Science and technology can
move in many differentdirections. Which are the most desirable- and for
whose (and what) benefit, and at whose (and what) risk of harm?Second,
there are questions about the role of citizens in a democratic society who
must wrestle with questions of the first sort. How well are we doing at
fostering an informed, thoughtful citizenry that can participatemeaning-
fully in addressing issues about the appropriatedevelopment and use of
technology? Not very well- either in very general terms or in regard to
more specific areas of concern such as medical technology or the
generationand disposal of waste.
These are not new problems. A quarterof a century ago the National
EducationAssociation's EducationalPolicy Commission urged: "Whatis
being advocated here is not the productionof more physicists, biologists,
or mathematicians, but rather the development of a person whose
approach to life as a whole is that of a person who thinks -a rational
person."! Thus conceived, a rational person could be anyone, not just
someone with special expertise. Still, such a person, whether scientist or
not, needs to know something about science - more than most of our
studentsdo today.2 Equally important,however, science education should
include more than what is standardlythought of as science per se. What
can this mean?
Michael Martinargues that science education should aim at helping us
apply the scientific spirit to all relevant contexts - scientific, practical,
moral, and even religious:
An excellent physicist who is mindless and uncritical in buying his son a bike or
himself a new car is deficient not just in his consumereducation. There is something
profoundlylacking in his science education. He would not dream of accepting a new
physicial theory without careful evaluationof the evidence. Yet he accepts the claims
of the manufacturerwithout a qualm.... Similarly, a good chemist who is uncritical
of some simple-mindedanswer to a certaincomplex moral problem is not just lacking
in his moral education, but is also deficient in his scientific education. The well-
trained scientific mind would consider the alternatives and the relevant evidence in
consideringan answer to a problemin chemistryor morality.3
Martin suggests that consumer education and some aspects of moral
educationshould be consideredpartsof science education.He emphasizes
the contributionsthat scientific thinking can make to resolving consumer
and moral problems. This is a reasonable suggestion, but only if it is not
taken to imply that science always has the last word. Many consumerand
moral problems are best viewed as framing a value context within which
 STS, CRITICALTHINKING,AND PHILOSOPHYFOR CHILDREN 219

scientific issues themselves acquire their significance and urgency. For

example, it is because we value health that the scientific quest for causes
and cures of certain diseases is so highly valued. (Even the words
"health"and "disease"have connotations that go beyond a value-neutral
scientific characterization.)
In any case, if education should aim at helping students become
rational persons, it seems clear enough that the whole person - as
scientific-minded, practical, moral, and religious - must be taken into
account. Ifwe think of this in the context of ethics education, this means
that, as Leonard Waks suggests, we must focus on the personal, moral,
and civic aspects of persons' lives. In this context, the role of science in
educationtakes on a very differentcast than studentsthemselves typically
see. For example, considerthis contrastingview:
In high school there is a common system of "learning"that goes something like this:
listen, take notes, memorize, and regurgitatefacts. Each high school subject seems to
show the world through a distinct window unconnectedto the window presentedby
otherc1asses.4
These are the words of two thoughtfultenth-graderswho have taken time
to reflect on their education and have found it wanting. What they
describe, even if not uniformly true of the schools, is widespreadenough
to give us cause for concern. The fact that these are the reflections of
tenth-graders,not their teachers or other adults, strengthensratherthan
weakens the case. After all, it is the students themselves who are sup-
posed to find theireducationalexperiences meaningful,connected, and so
on. If even the very best students find what these students, David
Benjaminand JeremyScott do, the problemseems real enough.
Assuming there is a genuine problemhere, how might it be resolved, or
at least ameliorated?David Benjamin and Jeremy Scott found an ally in
philosophy, especially in Thomas Nagel's What Does It All Mean? In
contrastto what they found in their high school, they say of Nagel's little
book:
Philosophy, on the other hand, attempts to look through all windows at once. The
methodof reasoningwe acquiredthroughWhatDoes It All Mean? is not introducedin
high school. We feel that a high school philosophy course would benefit interested
students. Not only does philosophy deal with abstract concepts, but it is also
concerned with everyday decisions. As we reached high school age, we realized that
we were facing some difficult problems involving ethics and justice. Philosophy
encouraged us to gain a better understandingof these questions and to reach an
objective position, on which we might base our actions.5
220 MICHAELS. PRITCHARD

Philosophy usually enters the curriculumonly at the college level. David

Benjaminand JeremyScott talk about the value of philosophy at the high
school level. However, for them, this was actually a return to philosophy.
They were first introduced to philosophy in the fifth grade by Martin
Benjamin, David's father. As tenth-graders they sought out Martin
Benjamin for more philosophy - something they had enjoyed immensely
as fifth-gradersbut which was apparentlyabsent from their schooling in
the subsequentfive years.
In this paperI will be exploring the more radical thesis that philosophy
should have a place even in the elementary schools - and that it can
enrich science education. While not a substitute for science education,
philosophy can make a significant contributionto the kind of science
education envisaged by the Educational Policies Commission. In the
twenty-five years since the Commission issued its recommendations,a
seemingly endless list of educational reforms has been proposed. Most
recently we are witnessing a call for teaching critical thinking. Like most
educationalbuzzwords, its common use often masks ratherthan clarifies
what those in apparentagreementreally have in mind. So the first task at
hand is to provide a reasonable account of what critical thinking is, and
why it should be prized. The next task will be to show how philosophy at
the elementary-schoollevel can encouragecritical thinkingin ways that at
the same time enhance science education. Here I will rely on the impres-
sive work already well underway in Matthew Lipman'sInstitute for the
Advancementof Philosophy for Children(IAPC).6

WHAT IS CRITICALTHINKING?

There is widespread agreement among educators that we need to do a

much betterjob helping students develop their critical thinking abilities.
Many cite lowered scores on standardizedreading and math tests as
evidence of this need. Others simply note their students' difficulties in
engaging in thoughtful, reflective discussion and in writing organized,
well arguedessays.
It might be thought that these two kinds of supportingevidence should
point educators in the same direction. Perhaps they should, but, in fact,
they do not. Beneath the surface of agreementabout the need for critical
thinking are striking differences about just what critical thinking is. This
is acknowledged by leading advocates of critical thinking. Without at
least a rough consensus on what critical thinking is, they urge, confusion
 STS, CRITICALTHINKING,AND PHILOSOPHYFOR CHILDREN 221

about what is needed and what might count as educational success or

failure in this regardis inevitable.
So, what is critical thinking?RobertEnnis offers the following succinct
definition:
"Criticalthinking,"as I think the term is generally used, means reasonable reflective
thinkingthat is focused on deciding what to believe or do?
This definition has several virtues. First, it is concise. Second, it identifies
reflection as a key ingredient. Third, by emphasizing reasonableness, it
suggests that critical thinking is not a solitary activity. To say that
someone is reasonableis to say that she or he can be reasoned with. One
must be open-minded. This does not exclude having settled beliefs and
commitments, but it does imply an openness to new perspectives and a
willingness to listen to, and possibly learn from, others. Fourth, the
definition does not exclude creative thinking: "Formulatinghypotheses,
alternativeways of viewing a problem, questions, possible solutions, and
plans for investigating something, for example, are all creative acts that
come underthis definition.',g
Nevertheless, Ennis's definition may focus too narrowly on deciding
what to believe and do. Critical thinking also can be used to make sense
of what we read, see, or hear and to make inferences from premises with
which we may disagree or about which we have no particularview. Of
course, such critical thinking might eventually lead to deciding what to
believe or do, but it need not.
Ennis's taxonomy of critical thinking skills is actually broaderthan his
definition of critical thinking suggests. For example, it includes disposi-
tions to seek clear statementsof questions, to be open-minded,to seek as
much precision as the subject permits, to think in an orderlymanner,and
to be sensitive to the feelings and level of understandingof others. It also
includes abilities such as focusing on the context of an argument,
detecting unstated assumptions, clarifying arguments,making inferences
from premises, and interactingwith others in a reasonablemanner.
The contrastbetween Ennis'sconcise definition of critical thinkingand
his more comprehensive taxonomy of skills, abilities, and dispositions
illustrates a danger. As Ennis observes, critical thinking is commonly
associated with problem solving. But exclusive focus on his concise
definition may encourage some to construethis association too narrowly.
As I will argue later, highly developed critical thinking frequently poses
more questions than answers. It opens up new avenues for inquiryand, in
222 MICHAELS. PRITCHARD

this sense, is as creative as it is critical. This is not to deny the value of

critical thinking in problem solving. However, problem solving does not
always involve critical thinking; and the exercise of critical imagination
sometimes creates more problemsthan it solves.
To minimize misunderstanding,it is perhapsbest not to rely heavily on
a concise definition of critical thinking. Recently, the American
Philosophical Association's Committee on Pre-College Philosophy
sponsored a project to determine if expert consensus could be reached on
what critical thinking is, how it might be assessed, and what forms of
instructionshould be used. A core group of forty-six panelists used the
Delphi Method of striving for consensus.9 After several rounds of
reviewing one another'sreflections, the panelists arrived at a consensus
statementabout critical thinking and the ideal criticalthinker:
We understandcritical thinking to be purposeful, self-regulatory judgment which
results in interpretation,analysis, evaluation, and inference, as well as explanationof
the evidential, conceptual, methodological, criteriological, or contextual considera-
tions upon which thatjudgmentis based. CT is essential as a tool of inquiry. As such,
CT is a liberating force in education and a powerful resource in one's personal and
civic life. While not synonymous with good thinking, CT is a pervasive and self-
rectifying human phenomenon. The ideal critical thinker is habitually inquisitive,
well-informed, trustful of reason, open-minded, flexible, fair-minded in evaluation,
honest in facing personal biases, prudentin making judgments,willing to reconsider,
clear about issues, orderly in complex matters, diligent in seeking relevant informa-
tion, reasonable in the selection of criteria, focused in inquiry, and persistent in
seeking results which are as precise as the subject and the circumstancesof inquiry
permit. Thus, educating good critical thinkers means working toward this ideal. It
combines developing CT skills with nurturingthose dispositions which consistently
yield useful insights and which are the basis of a rationaland democraticsociety. 10

We might wish for a more concise statement, but it is unlikely that

anything less complex than this can guard against serious misunderstand-
ing. Even this statement requires several pages of interpretationin the
report. Without repeating those details, I will simply assume that the
reportprovides a reasonablygood approximationof what critical thinking
is. I now turn to the more controversial area of implementationin the
schools.
If we agree that something needs to be done to improve the critical
thinking of children, how is this to be accomplished?On the one hand, a
standardview of many who advocate improving critical thinking is to
introducespecial courses on critical thinking. On the other hand, there are
those, like John McPeck, who believe that such courses are seriously
 STS, CRITICALTHINKING,AND PHILOSOPHYFOR CHILDREN 223

misguided; critical thinking instead should be infused in specific dis-

ciplines alreadyin place.
Anyone who supports, as I do, the view that philosophy can make an
importantcontributionto the critical thinking of children has reason to
respond to McPeck's challenge. Although philosophy includes much
more than critical thinking within its purview, critical thinking of just the
sort attacked by McPeck has a fundamental place in philosophy.
McPeck's attack on separate critical thinking courses is not framed
specifically as an attack on philosophy as a subject in its own right, but
this would seem to be a naturalextension of its general thrust.
McPeck's argumentstartsfrom the premise that all thinking, critical or
otherwise, "is always about some particularthing or subject (let us call
this thing X), and that it thereforemakes little or no sense to say 'I teach
thinking simpliciter,' or I teach thinking in general but not about anything
in particular.'"IIHe concludes:
Those committedto the standardapproachpurportto teach courses in critical thinking
simpliciter, and it doesn't matter what the subject may be about. In my view, this
borderson being an absurdity,because there are almost as many ways of thinking as
there are things to think about. To claim to teach critical thinking in general, even
about mundane"everydayproblems,"is to make promises which cannot be kept.12

McPeck's view has two parts, only one of which need be challenged by
those favoring separatecritical thinkingcourses. One partis the claim that
it is essential that critical thinkingbe presentedwithin the alreadyexisting
disciplines in the schools. McPeck's opponentsneed not challenge this. In
fact, they should not. There is a need for critical thinking in history
classes, in literatureclasses, in science classes, and so on. Advocates of
separatecritical thinking courses cannot sensibly claim that these courses
in and of themselves take care of the critical thinkingneeds in the various
disciplines. But McPeck's argumenthas a second part- viz., that critical
thinking courses, as such, do not significantly contributeto developing
critical thinkers.
McPeck does not deny that critical thinking in one area may carry over
to another:
It is possible that there may be some common elements in the various tasks requiring
reasoning, but a little reflection suggests that the differences among the kinds of
reasoningare far greater,and more obvious, than whateverthey may have in common.
After the fact, a logician might want to describe some inference by an historian as
"inductive," as he might also describe some mathematician's or astronomer's
224 MICHAELS. PRITCHARD

inference as "inductive,"but this logical nomenclatureis merely a handy theoretical

(or formal) description of the two inferences.13

McPeck contends that empirical studies that have tried to discover

whether or not there are "transfer-of-training"effects have come up
virtually empty. This, he says, is what common sense would predict, and
this fits nicely within his own conception of critical thinking. He adds,
"Butthe InformalLogic Movement, by contrast,continues to press for its
small bag of tricks (e.g., the fallacies, etc.) to make one a critical thinker
in any area no matterwhat the subject matter."14
This second part of McPeck's argumentcalls for several comments. It
might be noted first that his broadside against the Informal Logic
Movement commits two fallacies in the logician's small bag of tricks.
One is the fallacy of "poisoning the well," substituting pejorative
language ("small bag of tricks") for argument. A more serious fallacy
here is the "strawman"fallacy of ignoring an opponent'sactual position
and replacing it with an easily criticizable misrepresentationof the
position. As already noted, those who support critical thinking courses
cannot sensibly deny the need for critical thinking in already established
courses. There is also no reason for them to suppose that critical thinking
in those courses is simply a reiterationof what students learn in a critical
thinking course.No one can be a critical thinkerin an area about which he
or she knows little. However, this does not mean that the critical thinking
dispositions and skills that are refined in a critical thinking course cannot
assist one's critical thinkingin othercourses.
McPeck seems to believe that there is only a loose relationshipbetween
induction in history and induction in science. At certain levels this is no
doubt true. However, hasty generalization,ignoring unfavorableevidence,
and trying to construct a coherent explanation from bits and pieces of
evidence seem to have a great deal in common across disciplines.
Methods of verification, falsification, and hypothesis construction may
have much in common as well. Ironically,the more McPeck stresses how
little differentsubject areas have in common in regardto critical thinking,
the less critical thinking is likely to be encouraged about relationships
among these areas. This can only exacerbate the problem of an already
fragmentedcurriculumthat makes it difficult for students to make sense
of theireducationalexperiences as a whole. I5
It will hardly do for McPeck to cite the lack of empirical evidence of
transfer-of-trainingeffects from one discipline to another. Both McPeck
and his opponents decry the lack of critical thinking in the schools.
 STS. CRITICALTHINKING.AND PHILOSOPHYFOR CHILDREN 225

Common sense would predict a strong correlation between low-level

critical thinking and low-level transfer-of-training.This is the expected
consequence of rote learning in particular disciplines that lack
mechanisms for critical self-appraisal. Given the low-level critical
thinkingthat McPeck and his opponents claim is prevalentin the schools,
it is no wonder that there is little evidence of transfer-of-training.His
hypothesis cannot be tested until the level of critical thinking is sig-
nificantly raised. Pointing this out is yet anotherexercise in the kind of
critical thinking that McPeck apparentlyconfines to the logician's little
bag of tricks.
At this point, perhapsthe best evidence available is only anecdotal. In
that vein, I offer the following. A few years ago I visited more than
twenty elementary schools in southwesternMichigan. One of the topics
for discussion was assumptions- unstatedthings that we take for granted.
Although sometimes we do need to take things for granted,there are other
times when critically examining our assumptionsis necessary if we are to
handle problemsadequately.Here are some examples:
Problem 1. A crime has been committed. There are three, and only
three, legitimate suspects: Adams, Baker, andCarr.You know that either
Adams or Baker is guilty, but not both. You know that either Baker or
Carris guilty, but not both. Who is guilty?
Problem 2. One of four girls has emptied the cookie jar. Each makes a
statement, but one and only one of their statements is true. Here is what
they said:

Alice: Betsy did it.

Betsy: Marthadid it.
Barb: I didn'tdo it.
Martha: Betsy lied when she said I did it.
Who emptiedthe cookie jar?
Problem 1 seems easy enough at first glance. Nearly everyone (adult or
child) thinks that it must have been Baker. But, as some students point
out, this assumes that the crime was committedby only one person. Ifwe
cannot make this assumption, we cannot conclude anything more than:
EitherBakerdid it alone, or Adams and Carrdid it together. Problem2 is
more complex, but many quickly conclude that Barb must have done it.
But can we assume that Betsy was lying when she said that Marthadid it?
What if Betsy mistakenlybelieved that Marthadid it? Then she would not
226 MICHAELS. PRITCHARD

be lying, and Martha'sstatement would be false; so Alice would have

emptied the cookie jar. Although this example has the same frustrating
indetenninacyas the first one, it provides an occasion for discussing the
concept of lying (a sometimes tricky concept itself).
It might be thought that such examples do more harm than good -
suggesting to childrenthat some problemscannot be solved without more
infonnation (like good science problems?). But notice that it is good,
solid logic that reveals in both cases that we are stuck with two pos-
sibilities instead of one definite answer. It is deductive logic combined
with a critical examination of assumptions. So, some things are quite
definite, even though the final answer is not. Only uncritical thinking
pennits a final resolution.
A steady diet of such irresolutionmight encouragecynicism, but a few
examples should encourage just the sort of "trouble-making"we should
expect from critical thinkers. From the indetenninacyof these examples,
students might then be encouraged to go on to discuss what further
infonnation might help resolve these cases, thus opening the logician's
small bag of tricks for guidance in inductivereasoning.
Many teachers apparently enjoy sharing brain-teasers with their
students. This is fine, but they should be viewed with some caution. For
some teachers brain-teasersare viewed simply as challenging but self-
contained exercises in thinking, a source of amusement but little else.
However, when presented in the context of discussing the importanceof
critically examining our assumptions, they can take on broader sig-
nificance. In such a context, not only are students trying to solve a brain-
teaser, they are also reflecting on how they ought to think about problems.
That is, they are thinking about their own thinking processes, an impor-
tant partof critical thinking.
Actually, it is only a short step from seemingly self-contained brain-
teasers to puzzles about assumptions that clearly have broader implica-
tions. A studentpresentedme with just such an example during one of the
first sessions I had with a fifth-gradeclass. This example is familiarto old
Archie Bunker fans: A father and a son are involved in a car accident.
Both are seriously injuredand requiresurgery.The doctorenters the room
where the boy is and says: "I cannot operateon this child. He is my son."
How is this possible? Students not familiar with the story frequentlycome
up with ingenious answers. Perhapsthe doctor is the boy's stepfather,or
perhaps the injured father is the boy's stepfather. Or perhaps one of the
fathers is a godfather. Or perhapsthe injuredfather is a priest. When this
 STS. CRITICALTHINKING.AND PHILOSOPHYFOR CHILDREN 227

puzzle was first popularizedmany years ago on the TV program"All in

the Family," the intended solution occurred to relatively few people -
males or females, adults or children.A sign of some social progressis that
today's elementary school children are much more likely to suggest that
the doctoris the boy's mother.
What does this last example illustrate? The session focused on the
importance of critically examining assumptions when trying to solve
puzzles. The puzzles I offered rangedfrom innocuous detective stories to
geometric puzzles. The student offered an example that addresses a
serious social problem - stereotyping. It is also another illustration of
hasty generalization. So, by moving us to the social arena, the student
opened up the possibility of exploring another area in serious need of
critical reflection. Since the assumptions we make about social and
professionalroles take form ratherearly in life, exposing them to critical
examinationshould not wait until adulthood. It should be added that it is
not clear to what established pre-college discipline this kind of problem
belongs.
Returning now to McPeck's attack on separate critical thinking
courses, what is the subject under considerationin these examples? It is
the importance of critically examining assumptions. Examples could
come from stories, geometry, history, everyday life, or whatever.
Observations made about critical thinking (e.g., hasty generalization,
stereotyping)are generalizableto a variety of disciplines - even though a
rich arrayof examples from anyone discipline requiresknowledge in that
discipline. However, the employment of concepts and principles of
critical thinking that cut across the disciplines can aid students, not only
in thinking critically in particulardisciplines, but also between them.
Many problems that call for critical thinking lie between disciplines, at
least as they are traditionallyconceived. For example, at the adult level,
within what discipline(s) do questions concerning the appropriateuse of
high technology lie? Physics? Chemistry? Engineering? Biology?
Medicine? Economics? Political Science? Anthropology? Religion?
Philosophy? And which discipline(s) at the pre-college level are helping
to prepare our children to address these questions as they move from
childhoodto adulthood?
What I have been arguingis that we need not frame the question about
the place of critical thinking in either/orterms. Critical thinking courses
can be valuable in their own right. But they will mean little unless critical
thinking is encouraged in the already established disciplines as well. It
228 MICHAELS. PRITCHARD

might be argued that everything that can be accomplished in a critical

thinking course can be incorporatedwithin particulardisciplines. As a
practical proposal, this is an unlikely prospect. There is little reason to
think that sufficient time will be taken in particulardisciplines to attend
to, not only the critical thinking needs peculiarto a given discipline, but
also to relationshipsamong the disciplines and to everyday life as well. A
course in critical thinking cannot do all of this either. However, contrary
to McPeck's worries, advocates of critical thinking agree. A furtherpoint,
one to be explored in the next section, is that there is anotherdiscipline,
or subject area, that can make a substantial contribution to critical
thinking. This is philosophy, a subject standardly ignored in the pre-
college curriculum.

PHILOSOPHYFOR CHILDREN

When I took my first course in philosophy as a college sophomore, I was

warned by a friend that philosophy is a very difficult subject. Freshmen
were advised to wait until at least their sophomoreyear. The vast majority
of students simply avoided the subject entirely. Some fifteen years later
another friend asked me if I thought that elementary school children
might benefit from studying philosophy. I was somewhat embarrassedto
confess that I had never seriously entertainedthis question. Like nearly
everyone else, I simply assumed that the study of philosophy is basically
for adults - and a rather select group of adults at that. Then I was
introducedto HarryStottlemeier.
Harry Stottlemeier is the fictional creation of philosopher Matthew
Lipman, directorof the Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for
Children (JAPC). Since the mid 1970s, Harry and his fifth-grade friends
have introduced thousands of actual elementary and middle school
children to the study of philosophy. In fact, Harry is celebrated world-
wide; Lipman's ninety-six page novel, Harry Stottlemeier'sDiscovery
has been translatedinto fifteen languages. Since the publicationof Harry,
JAPC has publishednovels and accompanyingclassroom materialsfor the
entire K-12 curriculum.
Initially skeptical, I have been persuaded that young children are,
indeed, capable of significant philosophical thinking - and that the
schools should do much more than they presently do to foster such
thinking. Gareth Matthews has amply illustrated the natural place
philosophical thinking occupies in early childhood.16 He indicates that he
 STS, CRITICALTHINKING,AND PHILOSOPHYFOR CHILDREN 229

fIrst became interestedin exploring the philosophicalthinkingof children

as a means of persuadinghis college students that philosophy is not such
a strange, alien subject as they suppose - by showing them that, although
philosophy might now seem strange to them, it is likely that there was a
time in their lives when philosophicalcuriosity was as naturalas anything
else. What accounts for its virtualdisappearanceduringschool years is no
doubt a complicatedstory.
Although doubters remain, there has been ample documentationover
the last fifteen years that school children are quite capable of engaging in
serious and sophisticated philosophical inquiry.l7 However, even if this
capability is acknowledged, we can still ask why the schools should pay
any particularattentionto this. The curriculum,educatorsmight object, is
already over-crowded. How can room be found for yet another subject?
Besides, philosophy is a trouble-maker.After all, wasn'tSocrates triedfor
believing in false gods and corruptingthe youth?
The fIrst objection is practical, and it should not be underestimated.
However, there is no point in addressingit if objections of the second sort
carrythe day. Is philosophy basically just a trouble-maker,or does it have
an essential contribution to make to the education of our children?
Lipman and others contend that it does. Their answer goes well beyond
the contributionphilosophy can make to fostering critical thinking, but
here I will focus only on this aspect of their answer. To anticipatea bit,
part of the answer to the question of whether philosophy is a trouble-
makeris that, yes, it is - but this is an inherentrisk of any programthat is
serious about promotingcritical thinking. So the real issue is whetherthe
schools should encourage critical thinking. Ifthe answer is yes, then the
only remainingquestion is how this is best accomplished. Lipman argues
thathere philosophy shines - and that, therefore,the schools should fInd a
place for philosophy even if it puts a squeeze on some other parts of the
curriculum.
At the outset, it is importantto realize that, for Lipman,Philosophy for
Children is not what McPeck refers to as a course in critical thinking
simpliciter. Critical thinking is incorporatedwithin a broaderprogramin
philosophy. Thus, critical thinking is employed both in the explorationof
philosophical issues (appearance/reality;knowledge/belief; mind/brain;
etc.) and as a subjectof philosophic study itself (logic).
Lipman contends that, not only do elementary school students fInd
philosophicalissues intensely interesting,they can begin to make sense of
their educational experiences as a whole once they are encouraged to
230 MICHAELS. PRITCHARD

inquireabout the kinds of thinkingprocesses they actually employ both in

and out of school. They wonder, guess, speculate, hypothesize, doubt,
puzzle, infer, question, and form beliefs. In Philosophy for Children
programsthey wonder about what wondering is, how doubting is related
to believing, and so on. In short, they think (reflectively) about thinking.
The novelty of this is aptly capturedby Harry Stottlemeierin one of his
school essays:
THINKING

To me the most interesting thing in the whole world is thinking. I know that lots of
other things are also very importantand wonderful, like electricity, and magnetism
and gravitation. But although we understand them, they can't understand us. So
thinking must be something very special. ... In school, we think about math, and we
think about spelling, and we think about grammar.But who ever heard of thinking
about thinking?If we think about electricity, we can understandit better, but when we
think about thinking, we seem to understandourselves better.18

In the space of ninety-six pages, Harry and his friends discover on their
own, and in their own terms, many of the basic concepts and rules of
Aristotle'ssyllogistic logic. At times they boldly pronouncethe discovery
of apparently exceptionless rules. At other times they find coun-
terexamples that caution them to proceed in a more careful, inductive
manner. Applications are made in the classroom, on the playground,and
within their family life. They also discuss such heady philosophical
questions as whether thoughts are real, what the mind is, whether
everything has to have a cause, and what fairness is. Throughoutthe story
the children develop a concern to think impartially (look at all sides of
issues and not jump to conclusions), to think consistently (avoid self-
contradiction), to work out the implications of statements, to consider
alternativepossibilities, to distinguish wholes from parts, to give reasons
for what they think ratherthan simply assert opinions, and to examine
assumptions.
A crucial feature of the novel is that the children themselves initiate
inquiry ratherthan depend on adults always setting the agenda. They do
not see themselves as empty vessels into which information is to be
poured. Neither do their teachers see them this way. Slowly the reader
sees the classroom converted into what IAPC programscall a community
of inquiry.19 In such a learning environmenteach student is regardedas
having the potential to make an importantcontributionto the discussion.
Studentsare pressedto give reasons in supportof whateverthey say.
 STS, CRITICALTHINKING,AND PHILOSOPHYFOR CHILDREN 231

Critical thinking, Matthew Lipman insists, strives for criteria-based

judgments - judgments supportedby standardsor reasons. The impor-
tance of criteria-basedjudgments, he notes, is evident in the sciences as
well as in philosophy:
When we consider people who are engaged in the sciences or professions, we note
that they are generally able to cite the criteria they employ when they make judg-
ments. Teachers cite the criteria they use in arriving at the grades they assign their
students; doctors cite the criteriathey use in diagnosing and prescribingfor a patient;
and book reviewers are able to indicate the criteriathey appeal to in evaluatingbooks.
Likewise, when scientists classify plants or animals or solar phenomena or micro-
scopic objects, they can readily cite the classificatory criteriathat assist them in the
making of such judgments.2o
What philosophy adds to the mix is self-conscious discussion and
evaluation of criteria themselves. This encourages thinking that is self-
correcting, a fundamentalfeatureof critical thinking.
So, unlike "values clarification" programs, students are invited to
evaluate one another'sreasoning. However, mere put-downs, insults, and
disrespectful behavior in general are discouraged. The critical thinking
exemplified by the students is not simply clever argumentation.As they
discuss issues together (both in and out of the classroom), the students
develop a growing respect and concern for one another despite their
frequent differences. Thus, the students' capacity for empathy is both
engaged and reinforced.
Obviously for this to work well the students must become better
listeners in order to become betterthinkers. This, in tum, helps students
overcome the egocentric tendency to see things only from one's own
point of view. One thing that becomes evident to the children in Harry-
and to readersof the story - is that even those whose thinkingis logically
flawed may have something importantto contribute.When we ask how
someone arrives at even an obviously incorrectanswer, we see that he or
she is not simply mistaken - and "mistaken"does not equal "stupid."
Near the end of Harry, as the children are reflecting on the kind of
thinking they have been doing in their rather unusual classroom, Lisa
recalls a poem her fatherreadto her:
It said the thoughts in our minds are like bats in a cave, and these ideas go flying
about blindly, keeping within the walls. But then, in the last line, the poem says that
every once in a while, "agraceful errorcorrectsthe cave."21
Just such an erroris illustratedat the very outset of the novel when Harry
232 MICHAELS. PRITCHARD

is asked by his teacher, "Whatis it that has a long tail, and revolves about
the sun once every 77 years?" Harry could not remember that it is
Halley's comet, but knew that his teacher had just said that all planets
revolve aroundthe sun. So he guessed, "A planet?"Harrydid not let his
embarrassment at giving the wrong answer to (in the eyes of his
classmates) an easy question discourage him from trying to figure out
how he had gone wrong. He discovered that he had converted"All planets
revolve about the sun" to "All things that revolve about the sun are
planets."He convertedseveral more sentences, each time discovering that
what began as true became false. He then formed a hypothesis: When you
tum sentences around,they are no longer true. Excited at this discovery,
he shared it with his friend Lisa, offering to demonstrate it with any
example she might presentto him.
Lisa's very first example put a dent in Harry'shypothesis. She offered
a counterexample:"No eagles are lions." However, by the end of chapter
one Harry and Lisa formulated a more complex hypothesis: When a
sentence beginning with "all"is reversed, it is no longer true; but when a
sentence beginning with "no"is reversed, it stays true. Laterthe children
in the novel try to figure out why "all"and "no"sentences behave in this
way - and why anyone should care about such things.
Harry has some very special features that may take the unsuspecting
adult readerby surprise.First, althoughHarry is intendedto help students
develop and refine their logical thinking, the logic is not presented
didactically. Instead, the children are permittedto discover rules of logic
much as a scientist might go about testing an hypothesis, including
making false starts and confronting initial disappointments. Second,
Harry deliberately has its charactersmake logical mistakes that are not
correctedanywhere in the story. Thus, readersare invited to join the quest
with Harryand his friends, ratherthan have everything worked out neatly
for them. Third,and as a consequence of both of these points, the children
in Harry and in the classroom are credited with having logical abilities.
Their abilities are challenged and stretched rather than "implanted"
through didactic instruction. This kind of respect for children as com-
petent inquirers also characterizesthe extensive workbooks that accom-
pany each of the novels in the IAPe programs.
Allowing children to discover things on their own can reap rewarding
dividends. For example, fourth-gradershave no difficulty at all in finding
exceptions to Harry'shypothesis that sentences beginning with "all"are
no longer true when reversed. Something like "All tigers are tigers" is a
 STS, CRITICALTHINKING,AND PHILOSOPHYFOR CHILDREN 233

favorite. So is "All rabbits are hares."A fourth-graderonce offered his

classmates the following: "All answers have questions" and "All ques-
tions have answers."22It might be tempting for a teacher to object that
these sentences are not of the right sort. Harry'ssentences are all of the
variety "All ... are ... ," whereas these sentences have the form "All ...
have ...." But the students can rightly reply that Harrynever qualifies
his statement in this way. His statement is a very general one about
sentences beginning with "all."
Another temptationmight be to stick to the task, thankingthe student
for an interestingexample and asking if anyone else has an example. But
in a philosophy class such an example can provide an occasion for an
exciting digression. Fortunately,I had the presence of mind to encourage
this group of fourth-gradersto talk a bit about whetherthey thought both
sentences are true. They insisted that "All answers have questions"must
be true- we would not call something an answerunless it were an answer
to a question. But "All questions have answers" provoked a barrageof
challenges:
How many grains of sand are there on earth? [Answer: Just count them. Reply: The
wind will blow them aroundand we'll count some more than once.]
How many grains of sand are thereon all the planets?[Answer: Maybe we can'tcount
them, but there is an answer anyway.]
How many trees are there on earth?[Answer: It might take a long time to count them,
but there'san answer. Reply: By the time we finish counting them, some trees would
have died and others would have startedto grow.]
Did God make time begin? [Correction:If there is a God, did He make time begin? (A
potentialtrouble-maker.)]
Does space have limits? [A stopper.]
Will time end? [Offered with an impish grin, betraying the student's sense that this
was the stopper. He noted that if time does end some day, no one will be able later to
confirm this. But he may also have been puzzling about the meaningfulness of the
question- what could it mean to say that time will end?]

Thus, in the space of just a few minutes this group of fourth-graders

moved from logic to metaphysics- on this, my fIrst visit to theirclass.
It is remarkablehow quickly young children can convert seemingly
innocuous questions into issues of philosophical importance. Several
years ago I met with a group of fifth-gradersonce a week after school for
the entire school year.23 Typically I read a paragraphor two from Harry
or another children's story (such as Frank Baum's Ozma of Oz). For
example, in one brief passage in Harry Lisa agrees with Harrythat, while
all cats are animals, not all animals are cats. Still, she says, "In make
234 MICHAELS. PRITCHARD

believe they can be. I can imagine what I please, and when I do, Harry's
rules won't apply."
I asked the group to imagine a world in which all animals are cats.
Then, to have us test Lisa's claim about the logic of make believe, I asked
Jeff, "Ina world in which all animals are cats, would you be a cat?"Jeff
grinned and replied, "In my case, no, because I'm not an animal. But in
Mike's case, yes, because he is an animal!" After their laughter died
down, the group launched a forty-five minute discussion that not only
questioned Lisa's claim that Harry'srules do not apply in make believe,
but also explored questions about the logic of classificatory schemes,
concluding with a serious discussion of what it is to be a person. Near the
end of this highly animated session Larry said, "I want to know why
everyone's getting so huffy about a little subject."Rick replied, "We're
thinking!That'swhat we're here for."
As the students were leaving I heard one of them comment, "Ifwe
want to, we could argue for hours!"Anotherreplied, "Fordays!" When I
entered the room the next week, the students were already engaged in an
intense discussion about what an encyclopedia said about whether
humans are animals. What followed was another animated session -
which this time included a discussion of whether everything in the
encyclopedia is known to be true. Emily commented:
Some things we're not sure of; and the encyclopedia could put down every word
about how the solar system was formed, and it would probablysay there was big dust
that spun around like a top. But we're not sure about that. And, so, that could be
wrong.

I asked whether, in that case, the encyclopedia will say, "We'renot sure."
Mike replied, "It'llsay 'hypothesis'- which is a guess." Kurtadded, "It'll
say we're not sure yet."
Most of these students seemed quite content to pursue questions
vigorously and thoughtfully without feeling the need to bring everything
to closure. However, Jeff found it difficult to accept non-closure. After
two lively sessions about the relationshipbetween the mind and the brain,
he pounded on the table and demanded, "What's the answer, Mr.
Pritchard?Tell us what the answer is!" We had a reunion three years
later, and again when they were nearing the end of high school. Both
times they recalled the mind/braindiscussions. And on both occasions
Jeff indicatedthat he wantedto be told what the answeris.
Unfortunately,Jeff's desire for final, definitive answers seems to be
 STS, CRITICALTHINKING,AND PHILOSOPHYFOR CHILDREN 235

shared by all too many teachers - at least in the classroom. At our final
reunion I asked the group if they had been able to pursue in their regular
classes some of the kinds of questions we had discussed some years
before. Their responses closely matched David Benjamin and Jeremy
Scott's characterizationof high school learning: "Listen, take notes,
memorize, and regurgitatefacts." However, in contrast to Jeff, David
Benjamin and Jeremy Scott welcome the absence of final, conclusive
answers. They begin their review of Nagel's book with a celebration of
the lack of such answers:
The wise guru, who has obtained all knowledge and a complete understandingof the
world, sits atop a misconception. People have long believed thatthe final ending point
of knowledge is the guru'speak. They think that from the guru'smountain-top,with
complete knowledge, the world can be simplified and viewed clearly and accurately.
We have found that high school reinforces this fantasy. Thomas Nagel's short
introductionto philosophy, What Does It All Mean?, made us see that as you obtain
more knowledge, you find that there is more knowledge to be obtained. Answering
questions brings about more unansweredquestions, and thus a point of complete and
final knowledge cannotbe reached.24

This endless quest for knowledge is not a cause of despairfor these two
young philosophers. They found reading Nagel's little book thoroughly
enjoyable. They close their review with an enthusiastic endorsementof
theirmost recent philosophicalexcursion:
Philosophy would help high school students to link and understandtheir knowledge.
The guru may understandhis knowledge, and he may in fact be a wise man, but in
believing that he knows all, he lacks the open-mindednessand critical questioning we
discovered throughphilosophy.25

PHILOSOPYAND SCIENCE,TECHNOLOGY,AND SOCIETYEDUCATION

David Benjamin and Jeremy Scott indicate that, as high school students,
they turned to philosophy because they realized that they "were facing
some difficult problems involving ethics and justice," but their formal
education was not preparing them to address these questions. They
comment:
We had long been led to believe that science could explain all aspects of the natural
world. But having read [Nagel's book], we found that science is not able to answer all
of our questions about the world. While looking for viable solutions, we were forced
to use careful reasoning and to arrive at conclusions which were consistent with our
lives. This type of reasoningcarriedover into aspects other than philosophy, where it
236 MICHAELS. PRITCHARD

proved to be just as effective. Thus, our introduction to philosophy raised our

awareness of the world around us and helped us attain a more thorough method of
reasoning.26

Although Harry had given them a start several years before, the lack of
follow-up in their schools resulted in their perception of an unmet
educational need in high school.27 Those whose regular classrooms are
never interruptedby inquiringHarryStottlemeiersare less likely to share
this perception. These are the students Gareth Matthews is talking about
when he says he turnedto the philosophicalthinking of childrento figure
out ways of persuadinghis college students that philosophy is not such a
strange,alien subject afterall.
Harry Stottlemeier'sDiscovery is aimed primarily at fifth and sixth-
graders.Its main focus in on philosophical inquiry in general and logic in
particular.Lisa, a sequel to Harry, concentrateson ethical inquiry (e.g.,
Lisa worries about whethershe is consistent in loving her pet gerbil while
at the same time loving to eat chicken).28 However, ethical questions are
systematically pursued in Harry as well, and philosophical inquiry does
not begin with Harry. Pixie, written for third and fourth-graders,focuses
on the search for meaning throughlanguage - concentratingon the logic
of relationships,analogical reasoning, ambiguity and vagueness. But it is
Kio and Gus, also written for third and fourth-graders,that may be most
relevantto STS aims at the elementaryschool level. 29
Kio and Gus is the novel for the IAPC program called "Reasoning
about Nature."The accompanying workbook is called Wonderingat the
World. Gus is blind. She and Kio, along with older siblings and Kio's
grandparentsshare experiences that focus largely on our relationship to
the naturalenvironment, with a special emphasis on our relationship to
animals. IAPC characterizes its workbook as "helping children think
about the world by encouraging them to acquire reasoning and inquiry
skills. Through hundredsof exercises and discussion plans, children are
shown how these cognitive skills can be applied to the concepts by means
of which we understandthe world of nature."(See 1989-1990 Philosophy
for Childrencatalogue.)
Some examples from the workbooknicely illustratehow Wonderingat
the Worldcan departsignificantly from the kind of science educationthat
David Benjamin and Jeremy Scott complain about. Each of these
examples begins with a leading idea that is triggeredby a specific passage
in the novel, Kio and Gus. The leading idea is then followed by a series of
 STS, CRITICALTHINKING,AND PHILOSOPHYFOR CHILDREN 237

questions or exercises designed to stimulate class discussion. Here is one

from the workbook(p. 353) about beavers:
The beaver is a rodent found in Europe and North America. Beavers have thick fur,
round heads, small ears, and a scaly, flattened tail. (Their tails are generally about 6
inches wide and 10 inches long. Beavers use their tails as rudderswhile swimming, as
support while gnawing trees, or to slap water in order to warn other beavers of
danger.) Beavers weigh from 40 to 50 pounds apiece. American beavers build twig
and mud "lodges"with underwaterentrances. If the water is too shallow, the beavers
constructdams made of tree trunksor mud.
This description of beavers is well suited for the common system of
learning David Benjamin and Jeremy Scott identify - take some notes,
memorize key facts, and regurgitatethem at appropriatetimes. With the
aid of pictures of beavers at work, students might have their curiosity
aroused to the point of making the entire exercise painless, if not rather
pleasant.
What else, one might ask, could one do with such a passage? The
workbooksuggests several possibilities. Some thoughtexperimentscould
be performed:"If you were a beaver, would you gnaw trees?";"Ifyou
were a beaver, would you build dams?";"Ifyou were a beaver would you
have a flat tail?"; "If beavers could fly, would that make them birds?"
What can be gained from such thoughtexperiment?Among other things,
students are invited to undertakesome conceptual analysis (Are all flying
animals birds?); they are encouraged to reflect about what is possible
(Could there be a flying beaver?); and they are prodded to engage in
imaginativethinking(Imagine you are now a beaver).
Encouragingimaginative thinking can have exciting results. Trying to
imagine what it would be like to be a beaver might promote empathic
understandingof other species. But it might also help students recognize
serious limitations in this regard.I once asked a group of fifth-gradersto
imagine what it might be like to be a cat.30 After several students offered
standardresponses, Carlen pondered, "I've always wondered, if I were
ever a cat, if other cats speak. When we hear them say 'meow, meow,'
they say 'meow, meow' to us. But when they hear us say something, they
may say, 'Whatis that?'"Rickpicked up on this:
It's hard to think if a cat would say, "I wonder what those people sound like." They
may not even know what people are. They may just go huhlalalala inside their minds.
We don'tknow it. Like, if you had a wish and you wished you were an animal, you'd
probably think like yourself and say, "Oh, this is what a cat feels like." But, then if
you do that, you don't know what it feels like because you're still feeling part of a
human. So you would wish you were just like a cat for one whole day with the natural
238 MICHAELS. PRITCHARD

instincts of a cat and you don'tknow anythingabout humans. You'd act like a cat, and
you wouldn'treally know any humanwords or anything,unless cats do.
What Carlen and Rick are doing is questioning what the other students
seem to take for granted- viz., that we can understandwhat it is like to be
a cat. In the process of articulatingtheir worries, they are not only on the
edge of the classic philosophical problem of other minds, they are also
attempting to work their way out of the egocentric thinking that Jean
Piaget claims dominates the thinking of young children and infects our
thinking throughout our lives. Resisting egocentric tendencies is, of
course, important for successful social relationships and for social
understandinggenerally; but it is also importantfor understandingand
evaluatingscientific claims to objectivity.31
As Carlen'sand Rick's comments about what it might be like to be a
cat illustrate, even striaghtforwardlydescriptive statements, like the
passage about beavers, can be used to stimulate serious philosophical
discussion. But Wondering at the World sometimes directly raises
controversialissues. Consider the leading idea in the workbook (p. 227)
entitled, "ChickenFarming":
Chickens are raised for both meat and eggs. In modem poultry farms, chickens spend
their entire lives in tiny pens. They lay their eggs, then they are slaughteredfor their
meat. Opponents of this practice call it "factory fanning" and object to it on the
groundthat it is cruel to these birds to treatthem in this fashion.

This passage is followed by a series of factual statementsthat students are

invited to assess in regardto their relevance in sorting out the pro's and
con's of factory farming. For example:
Chickens do not seem to be very intelligent.
Most people like to eat chickens.
Vegetariansdon'teat meat, and that includes chickens.
Chickens evidently can feel pain.
Some people say that animals have rights.
Some people say that animals don'thave any rights.
Iffarmers couldn'traise chickens, they'dlose money.
Some people say that chickens don'tcomplain.
Some people say chickens are fed hannful chemicals, so when you eat a chicken, you
eat those chemicals.

There is an expectation that students will agree on the relevance or

irrelevance of these (or other) factual claims with respect to the issue at
hand. What is expected is that they will attemptto give reasoned support
for their views, thus developing and exercising critical judgment.
 STS, CRITICALTHINKING,AND PHILOSOPHYFOR CHILDREN 239

It might be objected that such discussions can cause trouble on the

home front. What if Amy comes home and declares she will no longer eat
meat? One reply is that some children do this without the benefit of such
discussions anyway, and it is unlikely that many children will have no
acquaintancewith the idea of not eating meat. But, the objector might
continue, why encourage this behavior? This question deserves several
responses. First, it is not obvious that refusal to eat meat will be prompted
by such discussions. But let us suppose it will in some cases. If this
resulted from an adult discussion of the same issue, would we say that
such discussions should not take place? How is it differentwith children?
To say that children are too young to understandand appreciate the
nuances of the issue is to adopt a condescending attitude toward their
critical thinkingabilities. While there are some sensitive and controversial
areas that children may not be ready to discuss, it is not clear why this is
one of them. Furthermore,not permitting such a discussion in effect
stacks the deck against vegetarianismas children move into adulthood,
since by then most will have been spared the need to question how the
basic foods for which they now have a long standingappetiteare made so
readily available. If, as adults, we acknowledge that factory farmingposes
ethical problems, we might well ask whether we have the right to deny
children opportunitiesto discuss these problems, while at the same time
permitting a vested interest in the form of eating habits to settle in
uncritically.
The chicken farming example illustrates that encouraging critical
thinking does risk rocking the boat somewhat. This may be why en-
thusiasm for critical thinking in the schools is not universally shared. I
will returnto this topic later. For now I simply ask how else we might
preparechildren for responsibly coping with a complex, problem-filled
world. Voting begins at age eighteen. Attempting to postpone the
development of critical thinking until then is not a promising idea for a
democraticsociety.
Anotherexample from Wonderingat the World is a leading idea with
the heading, "Garbageand Sewage." All children know about garbage.
Most know something about sewers. But it is unlikely many (children or
adults) know as much about either as they should. Here is an informa-
tional passage from the workbook(p. 391):
Every communityhas its "sanitationdepartment,"which is responsible for collecting
the garbage left for collection by householders. (Sanitation workers distinguish
between "trash," which is broken or junked materials, paper goods, etc., and
240 MICHAELS. PRITCHARD

"garbage,"which contains the remnantsof foodstuffs.} The sewage disposal problem

is dealt with differently: each community has sewers which collect the sewage from
each household and bring it to a central point for treatment.After treatment,it may be
disposed of in rivers or streams. But many communities still dump raw, untreated
sewage into rivers and oceans, and often the treatmentprovidedis inadequate.
Cities are responsible for about 20 percent of the water pollution problem. The
pollution they dump in the water sources reduces the oxygen that is dissolved in the
water, and this in turnmakes it impossible for fish to live in such water.
The discussion questions accompanying this passage deal primarilywith
considering alternatives- including what individuals might do if garbage
collection ceased or sewers were closed. It is but a short step from these
questions to value questions about environmentalconcerns.
Although a science class can confine itself primarilyto descriptionsof
scientific and technological matters, such descriptions in environmental
areas are well suited for value inquiryas well. The Michigan Environmen-
tal Education Association, with the support of Western Michigan
University's Science for Citizens Center, has recently made an effort to
integratethe study of chemistry with concern for values. One educational
productfor high school chemistry classes is entitled, "HazardousWastes
and the ConsumerConnection."32 This publicationbegins with something
familiar to all consumers: the use of paperand plastic bags. Is the use of
one preferableto the other?
As long as we raise no questions about how bags are produced or
disposed of, it is unlikely that many will have strong preferencesfor one
kind of bag over the other. "Hazardous Wastes and the Consumer
Connection"describes the science and technology involved, connecting
paperbags with the wood pulp processing industry and plastic bags with
the petroleum industry. It also discusses pollution problems associated
with the disposal of each kind of bag. Next the publication raises
questions about responsible consumer choice and alternatives for
minimizing adverse impact on the environment.
Publications like "HazardousWastes and the Consumer Connection"
illustratehow the study of science and technology can be naturallylinked
with value inquiry. They also show the importanceof making such links.
Although Philosophy for Childrenobviously is no substitutefor scientific
and technological education of this kind, it can help set the stage. Like
ecology, philosophy seeks to understand connections and to develop
comprehensive perspectives. Philosophy also raises fundamental
questions about how we should live our lives, and it attempts to answer
these questions in a reflective manner. Philosophical reflection about
 STS, CRITICALTHINKING,AND PHILOSOPHYFOR CHILDREN 241

relationshipsamong science, technology, and values cannot operate in a

factual vacuum. But this is made evident by philosophical reflection
itself. At the same time this reflection makes clear what is at stake in
developing scientific and technological literacy- therebyhelping students
understandboth why they need science educationand why that education
should not be divorcedfrom value inquiry.

EVALUATINGPHILOSOPHYFOR CHILDREN

!APC's Philosophy for Children programs have made their way into
thousandsof classrooms aroundthe world, particularlyat the elementary
and middle school levels. It is obvious that these programs reject the
"quick fix" approach to education. Teachers using the programs are
expected to go through a rigorous training workshop. !APC discourages
piecemeal use of the programs(e.g., simply trying out a few exercises that
seem interestingor fun). It recommendsthe introductionof philosophy as
a regular part of the curriculum (two and a half hours per week is
recommended).Thus, an !APC programis no light investmentin time and
energy.
At this level of concentration,!APC is basically the only show in town,
at least prior to high school. 33 However, there is no reason why other
programscannot be developed. There is much children'sliteraturefrom
which to choose that might serve to stimulatephilosophical discussion.34
Also, given the practical realities in trying to bring about curriculum
change, it is desirable that other ways of packaging philosophy for
childrenbe developed as well.
Aside from the considerable merits of the programs themselves, an
argumentfor promoting IAPC programs in particularis that they have
already been successful in winning adherentsto the idea that philosophy
belongs in the classroom. IAPC programsare recognized as meritorious
by the National Diffusion Network, thus making state funds available to
help train teachers to use the programs. Instrumentalin gaining this
recognition has been student performanceon the New Jersey Reasoning
Skills Test, a test preparedby the EducationalTesting Services (ETS)
with!APC programsin mind.
There is evidence that studentswho have spent a year working with the
Harry programdo significantly betteron the New Jersey Reasoning Skills
test than comparablegroups who have no experience with the program.35
A rather high percentage of the test items are related to deductive
242 MICHAELS. PRITCHARD

reasoning, and so for the most part are quite straightforward.But, for
precisely this reason, the test seems to leave unassessed a great deal of the
critical thinking fostered by the program. Here teacher observation of
classroom discussion and written assignments seems to provide the best
evidence of studentdevelopmentin critical thinking. Of course, for this to
work well, teachers must be well preparedboth to conduct philosophy
classes and to make reliable assessments of how their students are doing.
Since both are unfamiliar activities for most teachers, it is perhaps
premature to speak with much confidence or precision about how
philosophy is actually faring in the classroom. In a sense, the experiment
has just begun.
Even if teachers and their parents become convinved that children are
capable of significant philosophical thinking, they may not want it. The
open-endednessof philosophicalthinking is bound to hit sensitive nerves
from time to time. Religious groups may confuse philosophy with
"secularhumanism"and protest what they fear is the underminingof the
religious faith they wish theirchildrento have.
They may also be distrustfulof philosophical approachesto ethics. For
years, nearly eighty percentof surveyed adults have said they favor moral
education in the schools. But this does not mean that the majority of
adults have the same kind of thing in mind. How many, for example,
would agree with this letterto the editorof a majornewspaper?
Ideally, moral training should be given to children in the home by precept and by
example. But at this point we have to face the fact that in too many cases this is not
happening. Millions of children are not being sent to Sunday School. The only hope
for developing a morally responsiblesociety is to have "moralbehavior"taughtin the
school. Whose morals should be taught? What's wrong with the Commandmentsof
God for openers?

So much for the separation of church and state! We might also ask
whetherthis is a call for philosophicaldiscussion of moral concerns or for
moral indoctrination.
There is no denying that the introduction of philosophy invites
problems such as these; in no way do I wish to minimize the difficulty of
resolving them in a satisfactory way. Here I only wish to point out that
these problems are not the special province of philosophy. Critical
thinking itself invites such problems - as the creationismcontroversy in
biology so amply illustrates. Those who advocate the strengtheningof
critical thinking skills need to be fully aware of what this entails.
Although McPeck may have a point in saying that critical thinking to
 STS, CRITICALTHINKING,AND PHILOSOPHYFOR CHILDREN 243

some extent takes on special forms in particulardisciplines, there are no

disciplines within which critical thinking cannot raise people's hackles.
Furthermore,the critical spirit is unlikely to be confined to only one
discipline, and only to safe topics.
No doubt there are some who quite candidly assert that they do not
want children to become critical thinkers. At some point, however, we
must ask, not what some fearful adults want for children, but what kind of
education is needed for children to become thoughtful, responsible
citizens in a democratic society. This is to ask both what kinds of
educational institutions our society needs and what educational rights
childrenthemselves have.
The real fear, however, is that too many may take Samuel Butler's
satiricalwords as serious advice:
To parents who wish to lead a quiet life I would say: Tell your children that they are
very naughty- much naughtierthan most children;point to the young people of some
acquaintanceas models of perfection, and impress your own children with a deep
sense of their own inferiority. You carry so many more guns than they do that they
cannot fight you. This is called moral influence and it will enable you to bounce them
as much as you please; they think you know, and they will not have yet caught you
lying often enough to suspect that you are not the unworldlyand scrupulouslytruthful
person which you representyourself to be; nor yet will they know how great a coward
you are, nor how soon you will run away, if they fight you with persistency and
judgment.You keep the dice, and throw them, then, for you can easily manage to stop
your children from examining them .... True, your children will probablyfind out all
about it some day, but not until too late to be of much service to them or incon-
venience to yourself.36

WesternMichigan University

NOTES

1 EducationalPolicies Commission, Educationand the Spirit of Science (y.Iashington,

D.C.: National Education Association, 1964), p. 16. Cited in Michael Martin, "The
Goals of Science Education,"Thinking,4, no. 2 (1985): 20.
2 For economy of expression I will often use the words "science" or "scientists"
rather than "science and technology" or "scientists and technologists." I mean to
include both at once, but without having to use longer expressions. Thus, "science
education"is meant to refer to education in technology as well. Although for some
purposes it may be importantto distinguish science from technology, that is not the
case in this paper.
3 Martin,"Goals,"p. 20.
4 David Benjamin and Jeremy Scott, "Review of What Does It All Mean?," in
244 MICHAELS. PRITCHARD

Thinking,7, no. 4 (1988): 29.

5 Ibid.
6 IAPC is located at Montclair State University in Upper Montclair, New Jersey.
Lipman and his associates have published a variety of children'snovels and accom-
panying teachers' workbooks that will be discussed below. These materials are
available directly from IAPC.
7 Robert Ennis, "A Conception of Critical Thinking - With Some Curriculum
Suggestions," in Newsletter on Teaching Philosophy, American Philosophical
Association, Summer 1987, p. I. Ennis and Stephen P. Norris offer the same
definition in their Evaluating Critical Thinking (Pacific Grove, Calif.: Midwest
Publications, 1989), p. 3. There they claim that their definition is a close approxima-
tion of what educatorsgenerally mean by critical thinking.
8 Ibid. I discuss relationships between critical and creative thinking more fully in
"Critical Thinking: Problem-Solving or Problem-Creating?"Analytic Teaching, 8
(1987): 25-29.
9 Roughly half of the panelists were from philosophy; twenty percentfrom education;
and twenty percent from the social sciences. The remainderwere from the physical
sciences. Peter Facione describes the Delphi Method in the following way. "In Delphi
research experts participatein several rounds of questions which call for thoughtful
and detailed responses. Achieving a consensus of expert opinion using the Delphi
Method is not a matter of voting or tabulatingquantitativedata. Rather the expert
panelists work towardconsensus by sharingtheir reasonedopinions and being willing
to reconsider them in light of the comments, objections and arguments offered by
other experts"(1989 Report, pp. 4-5). Thus, critical thinking is built into the method
used to arriveat a consensus about critical thinking.
10 Facione, 1989 Report, p. 3. It is interestingto note that both Ennis and Norris were
panelists, as was Matthew Lipman, whose work in Philosophy for Children will be
discussed below. Notably absent from the list, however, is John McPeck, who will be
discussed in the next section.
11 John McPeck, "Criticalthinking and the 'Trivial Pursuit'Theory of Knowledge,"
Teaching Philosophy, October 1985, p. 295.
12 Ibid., p. 296.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
15 Students' difficulty in making sense of their educational experience as a whole is
discussed at length in Matthew Lipman'sPhilosophy in the Classroom (philadelphia:
Temple University Press, 1980).
16 See Gareth Matthews, Philosophy and the Young Child (Cambridge, Mass.:
HarvardUniversity Press, 1980); and Dialogues with Children (Cambridge, Mass.:
HarvardUniversity Press, 1984).
17 See, for example, any issues of Thinking and Analytic Teaching, two periodicals
devoted to the philosophical thinking of children. See also my Philosophical
Adventureswith Children (Lanham,Md.: University Press of America, 1985).
18 Matthew Lipman, Harry Stottlemeier'sDiscovery (Montclair, N.J.: First Mountain
Foundation,1974),pp. 16-17.
19 For an extended discussion of the idea of a community of inquiry in the context of
Philosophy for Children, see Ann Margaret Sharp, "What is a Community of
 STS, CRITICALTHINKING,AND PHILOSOPHYFOR CHILDREN 245

Inquiry?"Journal of Moral Education, 16, no. 1 (January1987).

20 Matthew Lipman, "Philosophy for Children and Critical Thinking,"Thinking, 7,
no. 4 (1988): S12.
21 Lipman,Harry Stottlemeier'sDiscovery, p. 95.
22 This example is discussed furtherin chapter 10, "FromLogic to Metaphysics,"in
my PhilosophicalAdventureswith Children.
23 For the full transcriptof the session I am about to discuss, see chapter4, "If All
Animals Were Cats,"in my Philosophical Adventureswith Children.
24 Benjaminand Scott, "Review,"p. 28.
25 Ibid., p. 29.
26 Ibid.
27 It is noteworthy that their reading and discussion of Nagel's book took place
outside the regularclassroom. They then formed a high school philosophy club that
meets in the high school after regular school hours. This group of about twenty
studentschose BertrandRussell's Problems of Philosophy as its next challenge.
28 Suki and Mark are written for junior and senior high school students. They
concentrate,respectively, on reasoningin the language arts and reasoningin the social
sciences. Harry Prime, closely related to the original Harry, is written for adults who
are returning to complete their high school work. Elfie, the most recent IAPe
program,aims at the K-2 grade range.
29 CatherineYoung Silva, directorof the BrazilianCenterof Philosophy for Children,
is working on a promising project on environmentalethics at the elementary school
level. With Kio and Gus as a startingpoint, the intent is to construct an extensive,
intentionally focused curriculum. It will emphasize reasoning skills, inquiry skills,
concept formation skills, and translationskills that are necessary for developing good
judgmentaboutenvironmentalconcerns. See InternationalCurriculumin Environmen-
tal Ethics: Proposal to UNESCO, November 10,1989.
30 These examples, and many others, are discussed in my Philosophical Adventures
with Children. See especially chapter 4, "If All Animals Were Cats." This chapter
highlights two forty-five minute discussions I had with Carlen, Rick, and the other
fifth-graders.The first session was initiatedby my question, "In a world in which all
animals are cats, would you be a cat?" Jeff immediately replied, "In my case, no,
because I'm not an animal. But in Mike's case, yes, because he is an animaL"After
the laughtersubsided, the studentsproceededwith minimal participationon my partto
discuss an impressive numberof things: differences and similarities between humans
and non-humans; the nature of classificatory schemes; differences in kind and
differences of degree; the difference between somebody and something; what a person
is; prejudice;analogical reasoning;appeals to authority;evidence and proof; and what
hypotheses are.
31 Ironically, when I showed a videotape of the discussion within which Carlen'sand
Rick's comments occurred, the first question from the audience was, "Do you often
permit digressions like this?" The next comment, followed by many nods of
agreement, was that there seldom would be time for such digressions in the already
crowded school day. The audience consisted of fifty teachers in a gifted and talented
program!
32 Edith Assaff, David W. Chapman, and Augusto Q. Medina, "HazardousWastes
and the Consumer Connection," Hazardous Chemicals Education Project of the
246 MICHAELS. PRITCHARD

Michigan Environmental Education Association, published by Western Michigan

University'sScience for Citizens Center,Kalamazoo,Michigan, 1984.
33 There have been high school philosophy courses for quite some time. However,
they still are not widespread. Typically they are offered as senior level courses as a
special elective within a school's literatureprogram. Mark Weinstein has recently
edited a high school level readerthat combines philosophical literaturewith standard
philosophical writings. Portions of many high school literaturetexts include some
philosophicalwritings.
34 GarethMatthews discusses some of this literaturein each issue of Thinking. Also,
it should not be overlooked that, once they are familiar enough with philosophy,
teachersshould be able to develop resources themselves.
35 Several articles in Thinking provide evidence of the positive impact of JAPC
programs, including an extensive analysis by Virginia Shipman of the Educational
Testing Services.
36 From Samuel Butler's The Way of All Flesh, cited by R. M. Hare in his "Value
Education in a Pluralist Society," in Matthew Lipman, Ann Sharp, and Fred Os-
canyan, eds., Growing Up with Philosophy (Philadelphia:Temple University Press,
1978), pp. 274-275.
 LEONARD J. WAKS

STS EDUCATIONAND THE PARADOX

OF GREEN STUDIES

Since the dawn of the industrial era, social cntlcs have identified
problems unique to industrialsociety. Carlyle, Thoreau,and Dostoyevski
worried about the erosion of human values, while Marx. and Engels
emphasized the dehumanizationof the masses of industrialworkers and
the degradationof theirurbanenvironments.
The early-twentieth-centurysociologist Max Weber broke decisively
with Enlightenment optimism about science and technology. In the
domain of ideas, he asserted, the scientific spirit leads to a
"disenchantmentof the world," creating a gulf between our longing for
overall meaning in life and the meaningless world of causal processes and
chance events which science substitutes for earlier mythic worlds. In
productive life, industrialtechnology has replaced the rhythms of nature
and the excellences of craft with the "iron cage" of the industrial
workplace.
In our high technology era, such problems of meaning and value have
been intensified. New weapons and recombinantDNA cheapen life. The
very ideas of artificial intelligence, expert systems, and knowledge
engineering constitute a "disenchantmentof the person."New telecom-
municationssystems permitthe spreadof new "silicon cages" throughout
the world.
But our times have witnessed a more profoundchallenge - the threatto
life itself, stemming from the environmental effects of the global
industrialenterprise.The terms "ozone layer" and "climatechange" and
"Brazilianrain forest" have entered everyone's nightmare scenarios of
doom.
These problems are by now familiar; the relation of science and
technology to society has become problematic. Susan Cozzens has
recently stated:

247
Paul T. Durbin (ed.), Europe, America,and Technology:Philosophical Perspectives, 247-257.
© 1991 KluwerAcademicPublishers.
248 LEONARD J. WAKS

Science and technology have become elements in most of the critical issues facing
humanity: issues of war and peace, the environment, world health, universal
subsistence. The map of STS the Problem must thus be very inclusive. It stretches
aroundthe world, from developed to developing countries ... from office and board
room to factory and family room.1
In the last twenty years many people - educators, social activists,
politicians, and media people - have started to respond to this problem
situation. Because STS the Problem is an integral part of our entire way
of life, it draws forth STS the Response. This cannot be a mere "techno-
fix," but requires a vision of a new way of living - new values and new
action patterns- and also visions of steps that will lead us from here to
there.
No one knows what a new, "sustainable"or "post-industrial"society
will be like in detail. No one knows which features of industrialsociety it
must preserve and which it must abandon. But there is broad agreement
about at least some of the values likely to promote and preserve this new
way of living; these include a rejection of materialism, consumerism,
individualism, the domination of nature, mass ignorance, and political
passivity - and the prizing of self-development and natural well-being
sustained by a healthy, active life-style, respect for and cooperationwith
nature and one another, and informed citizen participationin community
affairs.
STS the Response involves, of necessity, changes in awareness and
values and patterns of living. It is natural to think that it will have an
importanteducation component. Thus has been born STS Education, a
grassroots curriculum innovation which developed spontaneously in
schools and colleges in Western Europe, the United States, and Canada,
and has in the last decade spread throughoutthe world. This innovation
has emphasizedthe raising of awareness of the challenges of science and
technology in society, leading to inquiry, value judgment,and responsible
action (e.g., in environmentalcampaigns).

II

Our project in values education in science and technology, coinciding

with the twentieth anniversaryof EarthDay, provides a good opportunity
to stand back from STS Educationand attemptto put it in context - in the
context of both STS the Problemand also STS the Response. My guiding
questions are these two:
 STS EDUCATIONAND THE PARADOX OF GREEN STUDIES 249

What is the optimal role of STS Educationin schools and colleges as a

partof the total response patternavailable to democraticsocieties to STS
the Problem?
What is the optimal/ormfor STS Educationin this response?
To ask such questions is to conceive of STS Education as one com-
ponent within the educational system, which is in tum an integral
component of the larger social system. But this way of thinking should
alert us immediately to a potential tension. For that larger system is the
very industrial system which generates STS the Problem. So we must
from the startbe aware that as an integratedcomponent of the system of
schools and colleges, STS Education may itself be in some way part of
the problem.

III

With this advance warning, let us think in very general terms about the
socializationof values in contemporaryindustrialsociety. When we speak:
of "values," we are speaking about people's beliefs about what con-
tributesto realizing their good. In orderto have such beliefs, people must
have an emotionally charged image or vision - which may be just an
inarticulateintuition- of their good. To speak: of values is to speak: of the
things which people believe will advance their lives, fulfill their aspira-
tions, contributeto theirgood.
Where do these images and visions of the good come from? The
primaryagencies of socialization of values of the young are families, the
mass media, peer culture (especially for adolescents), as well as schools.
Other institutions have an important but indirect impact: economic
institutions, through their pervasive influence upon all of the primary
agencies, and also political, religious, and culturalinstitutions.
The school experience is the bridge between the world of childhood in
the family and the world of adulthood with its economic and citizen
responsibilities.Understandingthe school experience is an importantpart
of understandingthe process of preparationfor adult roles in industrial
society.
We should hardlybe surprisedto discover that the various components
of this socialization system work together to promote the value structure
of industrial society: the consumerism, materialism, and individualism
which contributeto STS the Problem. But it may be useful to consider
just how these components contributeto the formationof these values. It
250 LEONARDJ. WAKS

will be sufficient for the purpose at hand to limit my consideration to

television and schools, using the analysis of the former as a template for
understandingthe latter.

IV

Social critics have provided elements for a comprehensive critique of

television. Jean Raffa notes that for children, television viewing has pre-
empted active daily play, placed a premium on passive spectatorship,
created a fantasy world of problems with speedy resolutions within
predictabletime frames, and established a moral context which tolerates
and even glorifies violence. According to ChristopherJohnson, TV has
generated a popular culture in which children are taught that group
membershipdepends upon fitting a pre-conceived, commercially shaped
mold. Those who cannot fit become isolated, prisonersof envy with deep
resentmentsand feelings of inferiority.
In all of the criticisms two major themes bear emphasis: (1) the
viewing experience has a form or structure as well as programming
content; and (2) both the form and content are linked to contemporary
forms of industrialproductionand consumption, and thus to the various
social problemsassociated with them.

The Structureof the Viewing Experience

The broadcasttelevision experience may be analyzed into its form and its
content. The programcontent is variable, but it is fit into a more or less
fixed structure.Because this form does not vary, it is more or less hidden;
it is the stable ground against which the changing program content is
perceived.
Experience provided in this form is pervasive throughoutmuch of the
world. In the average Americanhousehold, the television is on fifty hours
a week. By the time young Americans become teenagers, they have
actually watched roughly twenty thousand hours of television, and five
hundred thousand TV commercials. The viewing experience is charac-
terized by these features:
The quality of attentionin broadcasttelevision is passive - the image is
captivatingand must be, because even a momentaryloss of interest can
lead to a scanning of alternatives.
The selection process is also passive; the content is shaped and selected
 STS EDUCATIONAND THE PARADOX OF GREEN STUDIES 251

for broadcast,and the viewer takes what is available at a given time from
alternativesselected upon similarcriteria.
The time flow of experience is continuous and not underthe viewer's
control. Unlike a book, a television program can not be set down for
moment-to-momentreflection, nor maya segment be repeatedto verify or
augment an earlier viewing. (Of course, this is possible with videocas-
settes, a fact which merely brings the specific form of broadcasttelevision
into sharpfocus.)
Episodes are neatly packagednarrativeswithin predictabletime frames.
Each episode is self-contained;there are no prerequisites.The viewer can
enter at any point in a sequence of programs;and so there is no possibility
of building a hierarchyof concepts upon a foundationof priorlearning.
Perplexities,complexities, shades of grey must be avoided, as they lead
to reflection and hence withdrawalof interestfrom the immediate image.
The traditional instruments of reasoned discourse - arguments,
hypotheses, discussions, refutations- for this reason must be set aside in
favor of a compelling storylineconveyed by strong images.2
The overall preferencethe viewer forms throughhabitualviewing is for
experience which is passive, solitary, amusing, over-simplified, and
cognitively undemanding.Such expectations are not likely to provide the
best preparationfor a life presenting intellectual and ethical challenges
and demanding active participation, cooperation, responsibility, and
persistence in the face of setbacks and frustrations - characteristics
identified with a sustainablesociety.

Linkages
However, these preferences are linked to the larger world of industrial
production and consumption. Nicholas Johnson, former U.S. Federal
CommunicationsCommissioner,has argued that life in industrialsociety
- job, family goals, products, life-styles - constitutes a comprehensive
pattern.To enter it anywhere is to be surroundedby it everywhere, living
out a plan of life and seeking a good which is not one's own.
Television has a pervasive influence on this pattern.All the commer-
cials and all the programmingare orchestratedby the large commercial
enterpriseswhich control virtually all of the available air time to sell the
wares of industrialsociety. But:
Television not only distributesprogramsand sells products,it also preaches a general
252 LEONARDI. WAKS

philosophy of life ... [the philosophy] that the primary measure of an individual's
worth is his consumptionof products.3

This philosophy also asserts that these products can provide "instant
solutions to life's most pressing problems,"so there is no need to devote
our energies to self-development, discipline, training, cooperation or
compromise with other people. Insteadof taking charge of our own lives
by forming such values, we permit our lives to be structuredby require-
ments of our jobs in industrialworkplaces so that we may maintainour
buying power - the power to acquire industrially produced goods and
services and thus advance our good as this philosophy conceives it.
In short, Johnson goes on, television is a false philosophy which
"educatesus away from life." But accepting it does not merely harm its
adherents.By sustainingthe consumeridea of the good, and obscuringall
alternatives, this philosophy also fuels the global expansion of the
industrialenterpriseand hence the continuing destructionof the natural
environment.
When we grasp the implications of the structure and linkages of
broadcasttelevision, we are likely to be less inclined to try to fix televi-
sion by pushing for changes in programcontent. A few more programs
about whales and a few less about war toys will not make much of a
difference - especially when the programsabout whales will have to be
very similar in overall structureto those about war toys to gain and hold
viewer attention. But a more comprehensive re-orientationof program
content does not even appear possible when the purpose of those who
control the enterpriseis to sell war toys and other consumerproducts,not
to save the whales or otherwise preservethe environment.

v
While most TV critics have focused on the content of programming(e.g.,
triviality and violence), some have identified stable factors in the
structure of television which contribute to our social ills. Some radical
television critics4 have urged that we abandon attempts to alter program
content, and simply eliminateTV from our lives. Postmanhas replied that
this is impossible. In a society of freely choosing individuals,television is
here to stay, and we have to learn how to take control of it. He proposes
mandatory school programs in television literacy, training viewers to
grasp the structureof the experience and the underlying motivations of
the programmers,and thus breakits hold.
 STS EDUCATIONAND THE PARADOX OF GREENSTUDIES 253

This may simply be pushing the problem back a step, attempting to

alter the content of schooling, while ignoring that the structure of the
school experience and the institutional linkages there are no less
problematicthan those of broadcasttelevision.
Like television, schools play a pervasive role in the life of young
people. The suiface of schooling is the symbolic contentembodied in and
conveyed throughthe curriculum.This content is variable; it is subject to
value judgment,political influence, and change. Thus it is highly visible.
But there are deep structuralregularities of the school experience which
are more stable and hence less readily perceived. These regularities
nonetheless have effects. They compose what has been called the "hidden
curriculum"of the school. Studentsmust masterthis hidden curriculumto
make their way through school and lay claim to the privileges of adult
life. Classical accounts of this process were provided almost a quarter
centuryago by RobertDreeben5 and Philip Jackson.6
Dreeben notes that extensive schooling for the masses is unique to
industrialsocieties, and asks: what is the function of schooling in such
societies? The school's primary function, he answers, is to promote
developmentalchanges which enable young people to make the transition
from the family to the requirementsof adult economicand civic life. The
school provides a structure of experience conducive to learning the
principles of conduct appropriateto adult roles in out-of-family settings
such as the workplace.
This learning occurs through coping with typical school situations;
repeated performances on typical academic assignments promote the
beliefs, values, and preferences most conducive to succeeding on these
particular tasks. But, over time, the value orientations developed in
response to these tasks are generalized to other task situations, and are
raised to a level of general cultural values. It is in this way, ratherthan by
direct value training or didactic instruction, that value socialization is
accomplished. The "experiences schools afford pupils, the tasks, struc-
tural arrangements, constraints, sanctions, and opportunities for the
generalization of ideas and investment of emotions produce normative
changes."7
The values learned through school routines, according to Dreeben,
include independence, achievement, and universalism. Independence
refers to the acknowledgment that there are tasks which must be done
alone, and that others have a right to demand such independentbehavior.
Achievement refers to the value of performing assigned tasks to an
254 LEONARDJ. WAKS

external standard, which is promoted by the assignment-performance-

evaluation sequence of school work. It involves the willingness to judge
one's own worth in abstraction from the performance of classmates.
Universalism is the value inherentin treating members of like categories
alike, rather than as special cases. In the family, each child can be
considered as an individual; in school, children are categorized in a
variety of ways such as age level and academic track. To learn the value
of universalismis to accept being treatedas a memberof such categories
and to learnto categorize and treatothers in the same way.
The values of isolated performance,evaluation on externally set tasks,
and treatmentaccorded by category are, argues Dreeben, central to the
expectations for workers and citizens in industrial societies. It is by
promotingsuch values, ratherthan by conveying symbolic knowledge or
productiveskills, that the school preparesthe young for adult life. 8
Jackson's analysis is similar. For him, the dominant aspects of the
school experience are summed up in the terms crowds, praise, and power.
The crowding of the classroom implies that the young person must learn
to tolerate delay, interruption,and distraction. Students are constantly
praised- evaluated- for performanceson tasks set and controlledby the
teacher and undertaken without inner motivation or conviction. The
learneris also subject to vastly unequal power in relations with teachers
and school authorities.He learns to be
passive and to acquiesce in the networkof rules, regulations,and routinesin which he
is embedded... to accept the plans and policies of higher authoritieseven when their
rationaleis unexplainedand theirmeaning unclear.9

All aspects of the hidden curriculum demand docility. This conflicts

directly with intellectual and ethical requirementsto challenge authority
and question the values and assumptions embedded in traditions. But
where it conflicts with the official or symbolic curriculum,the "hidden
curriculum"has priority.While many talentedand spirited studentscome
into conflict with school routines and are failed, few teachers ever fail a
student who "tries," that is, who cooperates with school routines,
regardlessof symbolic learningtasks.
Jackson concurs with Dreeben that the values and habits learned in
schools "have a high payoff value" in other settings in industrial
societies, and that in this sense "schools might really be called preparation
for life."
But only for life in industrialsociety! This is what connects institution-
 STS EDUCATIONAND THE PARADOX OF GREEN STUDIES 255

alized educationwith STS the Problem.Recall the consensus aboutvalues

promoting a sustainable post-industrial society: self-development,
cooperationand mutual responsibility, active participationin community
affairs. These conflict sharply with the values learned in school: accep-
tance of work in isolation on tasks which would benefit from the coopera-
tion of peers, concentrationof effort and acceptance of evaluation by
reference to an external performancestandard,achievements considered
apartfrom the group, docile acceptanceof power and authority.

VI

How might the school experience, and STS education in particular,

promotethe learningof alternativevalues deemed centralto a sustainable
society? We can consider both the formal or official curriculum of
symbolic content and the informal or hidden curriculum of structural
regularities.
The official curriculumis the most visible and the most changeable
element of the school experience. Changes in curriculum content are
minimally disruptive;they consist merely in inserting different symbolic
content into the stable processes of educational institutions. Teachers
have some discretionin content selection and sequencing, but little in the
structure of school experience. For these reasons, the education com-
ponent of responses to STS the Problem has tended to take the form of
STS Education,understoodas a curriculumcontentinnovation.
It must immediately be added that authoritativeconceptual models of
STS education(e.g., those ofthe Science throughSTS Project,BSCS, and
Peter Rubba) go beyond content change, and also posit goals of behavior
change stemming from new awareness. But research demonstratesthat
most attempts to implement STS have involved little more than a
substitutionof symbolic content elements within an unchanged instruc-
tional structure.There may be topic substitutionof "life in acid lakes"for
"partsof a frog," but the lesson still consists of teachertalk and assigned
seat work. Where changes in instructionalprocess are proposed,they tend
to be rathereclectic, withouteithercoherence or theoreticalrationale.
I do not want to be taken as devaluing proposed STS innovations in
curriculumcontent. On the contrary,I think new content emphases in the
curriculum are absolutely necessary. New emotion-backed visions for
living will requirenew levels of awareness and new symbolic knowledge,
not merely new habits. What is especially needed is symbolic content -
256 LEONARD J. WAKS

especially in science and technology education- which demonstratesthat

the high energy consumption, high pollution lifestyle of advanced
industrial societies is not the only possibility - that humanly satisfying
alternativeswithin a sustainablesociety are at least conceivable. Students
should also become aware of the consequences of materialist and
consumeristvalue systems, of how these values are maintainedand how
they may be changed.
However, the argumentI am developing points to the informal hidden
curriculumas a more basic targetfor reform. A new structureof tasks and
a new culture of classroom experience is needed. Coping with learning
activities within the new structuremust promotevalues deemed consistent
with the demands of a sustainable society. I have no detailed picture of
this new structureand new culture, but I put some very general ideas
forwardto stimulatefurtherdiscussion.
1. Because we want to promote emotional investment in tasks shaped
by intrinsic motivations, we must shift some control of the content and
process of learningfrom teacherto learner.
2. Because we want to promotesome degree of cooperationand mutual
responsibility, we must place greateremphasis on group projects, with a
focus of evaluation on the social competence of the group, including
leadership, mutual support, and respect for members as persons. Many
activities conductedunderindividualcontrol and pacing can be contextual-
ized as componentparts of group projects.
3. Because we want to promote active participationin group delibera-
tion and decision making, we must shift some authority in the teacher-
learner situation to the learners. This may have at least two dimensions
beyond the content of learning. First, learners as group members may be
encouragedto share greaterauthoritywith respect to the maintenanceof
order. Kohlberg's "just community" program provides a useful model.
Second, the positional (as opposed to expert) authorityof the teachermay
be reduced in the context of evaluation. Teachers can remain guides,
mentors and advocates for projects under the direction of their students,
individuallyor in groups. But by establishinga non-judgmental(although
corrective) climate, they can reduce the threatsassociated with evaluation
and the high psychological costs of failure.
I have distinguished the form from the symbolic content of the
curriculum,and have arguedthat the formal regularitiesand their linkages
with the broaderinstitutional structureplay the more importantrole in
values socialization. If this is correct, then those wishing to form educa-
 STS EDUCAnON AND THE PARADOX OF GREEN STUDIES 257

tional responses to STS the Problemmust pay especially close attentionto

the underlyingstructureof the learningexperiences they prescribe,and to
that structure's relation to the problematic aspects of contemporary
technological society, as well as to future, more sustainable,social orders.

The PennsylvaniaState University

NOTES

1 Susan Cozzens, "The Disappearing Disciplines of STS," Bulletin of Science,

Technology, and Society 10, no. 1 (1990): 1-5; reference is to p. 1.
2 For a discussion of these features, see Neil Postman, AmusingOurselves to Death
(New York: Viking, 1985).
3 Nicholas Johnson,Test PatternforLiving (New York: Bantam, 1974), p. 35.
4 Most notably Jerry Mander, Four Arguments against Television (New York:
Morrow, 1979).
5 Robert Dreeben, On What Is Learnedin School (Reading, Mass.: Addison Wesley,
1968).
6 Philip Jackson,Life in Classrooms (New York: Holt, Rinehartand Winston, 1968).
7 Dreeben, WhatIs Learnedin School, p. 55.
g Ibid., p. 129.
9 Jackson,Life in Classrooms, p. 33.
 INDEX

academic freedom 177-179 Boulding, Kenneth71

Adorno,Theodor 128, 135, 137 Brand,Stewart57
aesthetic 109, 112, 116-119, 121, 123 Burke, Kenneth 100
Allende, Salvador81 Burkitt,D. P. 83
alienation57 Burnham,David 134
alternativemedicine 77, 84, 85 Butler, Samuel 243
alternativetechnology 40, 42, 171
Anders, Gunther34, 35, 39 capitalism2, 86,91
Anshen, Ruth Nanda 18 Carlyle, Thomas 247
Apel, Karl-Otto131 Carnap,Rudolf 131
Aquinas, Thomas 19 Carson,Rachel 57
Archimedes 144-147, 149-152 China 3
Aristotle 19, 184 civic education 194, 197-214
Arons, Stephen 200 Commoner,Barry27
art 117,118,121-123 Communism1,3-5,7,9
artifactism34, 43, 49 conservatives 1,9,58,65
artifactology33, 34 consumption3, 4, 8, 47, 48, 63, 65, 90,
assumptions225-227 248,251,256
autonomoustechnology 43, 44 convivial institutions 18,25,61,64,65,
Ayers, C. E. 76 71
conviviality 19, 22-24, 28-31, 38, 39,
Bach, JohannSebastian9 44,69,71
Bacon, Francis82, 127, 128 Cooke, Roger 181-183
Baltimore,David 176 Cozzens, Susan 247
Baudrillard,Jean 34, 35,47,48 critical thinking 194, 217-243
Baum, Frank233 critical thinking as troublemaking226,
Benjamin,David 219, 220, 235-237 229
Benjamin,Martin220 critical thinking, separate courses
BenjaminWalter 125 222-225,227,228
Bloom, Allan 72 Cruzan,Nancy 88
Bloom, Benjamin58 Csikszentmihalyi,Mihaly 43, 47
Bonaparte,Napoleon 127
Borgmann,Albert43, 48 Destutt de Tracy, A. L. C. 127
Borremans,Valentina42 democracy, 3-5, 7, 9, 124, 134, 168,

259
260 INDEX

178,198,199,201,202,218 geometry 144-146, 148, 149

democratictechnics 34 Gintis, Herbert70, 71
Democritus 145 Goethe, Johann9
deschooling 59-62, 65, 69-71 Goldstone, Peter 71
descriptive statements163 good-faith arguments203
Dewey, John 38, 67, 68, 109, 111-124 Goodman,Paul 57,59, 72
Dickinson, Emily 123 Gorbachev,Mikhail 77
Dietrich, Richard15 Gorz, Andre 136
Dositeus 145 Gross, Ronald 70
Dostoyevski, Fyodor247 Gutmann,Amy 198,202,204,211
Dreeben, Robert59, 253, 254
Dubos, Rene 85 Habermas,Jiirgen 128, 129, 135-137
Duden, Barbara15 Hall, Tony 197, 198
Harrington,Michael 57
East Germany2, 8, 9 Harvey, William 102
EasternEurope 1,3,6-8, 10, 100 Hayakawa,S. I. 58
ecology 27, 57,116, 158, 165 Hegel, G. W. F. 120
educationalreform58-61, 69, 70 Heiberg, J. L. 145
educationalsystem 58, 68, 70, 72, 249 Heidegger, Martin 109
efficiency 37 Heilbroner,R. L. 2
Egyptianbooks of the dead 142 hidden curriculum195, 253-256
Ehrenreich,Barbara77, 82 Hippocrates80
Ehrlich, Paul 27, 57 history 96-100, 103, 105, 157, 158,
Einstein, Albert 177, 178 162
Elkana,Yehuda 131 Hitler, Adolf 178
Ellul, Jacques34, 42-44,110,135,171 Hobbes, Thomas 111
Engels, Friedrich,45, 128,247 Hoinacki, Lee 15
English, Deirdre77, 82 Hollick, Malcolm 42
Ennis, Michael 194 Holt, John 70
Ennis, Robert221 Horkheimer,Max 128, 135
Epictetus 120 Hubbard,Ruth, 75
Epimetheusmyth 66 hubris 100, 101
Epstein, Samuel 83 Huxley, Aldous 132
Euclid 144 Huygens, Christian144
Euler, Leonhard141 hylometrics 141, 143
EuropeanEconomic Community6, 7
iatrogenic illness 20, 68, 78, 79, 81, 82,
Feyerabend,Paull3l, 131 84-86,90
Freire,Paulo 59 ideology 127-130, 136-138
Freud, Sigmund 110, 112, 113, 115, Ihde, Don 43, 45, 46
122, 123 Illich, Ivan 15-23, 25-31, 33, 35-49,
Friedman,Milton 86 57, 59-62, 64-72, 75-87, 89-92,
Fullinwider,Robert 194 95,96,98-100,102,103-105
instrumentalism109, 112, 113, 117
Galbraith,J. K. 2
Galileo 125, 144 Jackson, Philip 59,253,254
Geiger, Theodor 129, 130 Jacoby, Russell 72
 INDEX 261

Japan9,10 McLuhan,Marshall34, 35
Jefferson,Thomas 181, 183 McPeck, John 222-225, 227-229, 242
Johnson,Christopher250 measurementtechniques 143, 149, 150,
Johnson, Lyndon 57 152
Johnson,Nicholas 251, 252 mechanics, theoretical 144-147, 152
Jonas, Hans 39, 132 Meehan, Eugene96, 97
JordanNemorarius144 Merton, Robert 132, 137
Juvenal 183 Michnik, Adam 1
Mill, John Stuart26, 39, 120
Kant, Immanuel162 Milstein, Cesar 184
Keniston, Kenneth 57 Mitcham, Carl 15
Kennedy, Donald 89 modernity 1
Kepler, Johann 141 Montaigne, Michel 184
Klee, Paul 125 More, Thomas 171
Kohl, Herbert59 mortalitydecline 78, 83
Kohlberg,Lawrence256 Moses 72
Koop, C. Everett88 Moses, Robert45
Kozol, Jonathan59, 72 Mumford,Lewis 34-36, 96
Kuhn, Thomas 60, 70 myths 105

Lafitte, Jacques 33, 34, 37 Nader, Ralph 89

Lakatos, Imre 131 Nagel, Ernest 112
Lappe, FrancesMoore 83 Nagel, Thomas 219, 235
Lem, Stanislaus 136 Navarro,Vicente 86
Lenin, V. I. 104 Neill, A. S. 58, 72
Lenk, Hans 132 Neurath,Otto 131
Lewontin, Richard75, 177, 178 Newton, Isaac 141
liberals 1,9,58,65 Nietzsche, FriedrichIll, 120
Lipman,Matthew 194, 220, 228-230 Nixon, RichardM. 79
Lorenzen, Paul 131 normativeissues 166, 167
Luther,Martin9 nutrition79, 83

Mach, Ernst 141, 149 optimism 110, 120, 125,247

manipulativeinstitutions18, 61, 63-65, Ozbekhan,H. 136
71
Mannheim,Karl 128, 129 Pandora'sbox 66
Marcuse,Herbert27, 42, 128, 136 Parsons,Talcott 129
Marin,Peter58, 72 patentrights 175
Martin,Michael 218 pessimism 110
Marx, Harpo 95 philosophy for children 194, 220,
Marx, Karl 45, 109-112, 119, 120, 122, 228-243
128,247 Piaget, Jean 238
Marxism9, 25, 27,33, 128-130 Plato 33, 45,101,163,203
mass, concept of 141,144,148-151 pluralism 167, 168, 199,200
Matthews,Gareth228, 236 Poland 2
McCormick,Cyrus 45 Popham,James 58
McKeown, Thomas 78, 83, 85, 86 Popper, Karl 98, 163
262 INDEX

positivism 131 Simondon, Gilbert33, 34, 37

postindustrialsociety 127 sin 102, 104
Postman,Neil 252 Skinner,B. F. 58
postmodemtechnology 5-8, 10 Smith, Adam 175, 176
prescriptivestatements 163 Snow, C. P. 131
pride 100-102, 104 social inequality57
Pritchard,Michael 194, 234 social scientists 95-104
Proctor,Robert 16 socialism 2
professional control 62, 67--69, 77, 79, socialization of values 249, 256
80-82,84,86,89,90 sociology of knowledge 128, 129
progress62, 63, 76, 96, 102, 171 Socrates 101, 184,203,229
progressives58 Soviet Union 1-4, 77, 100
Prometheusmyth 66, 92 space colonies 104
public health 79 Spence, Larry16
public interest 180, 183, 184 Stalin, Joseph 4, 7
Stegmilller, Wolfgang 151
Rabi, Isidore 178 Stevin, Simon 144
radicalmonopolies 27, 62, 68, 69, 80 strategicarguments203
Raffa, Jean 250 structureof TV viewing 250-252
Rafferty, Max 58 structureof school experience 253-257
Rahner,Hugo 19 suffering 81, 82
Rahner,Karl 19 sustainablesociety 248, 255-257
Reagan, Ronald 88 Sweezy, Paul 92
Reimer, Everett71 systems technocracy133-135
Reisman, David 57 systems theory 161
risk assessments 182, 183
Rochberg-Halton,Eugene 43,47 teaching science 209-212, 217, 218,
Roper, William L. 89 220
Rorty, Richard112 technocracy 4-9, 29, 65, 68, 86, 130,
Rosen, Sumner60 133, 135-138
Rousseau, J.-J. 168 technological convergence 2
Roy, Rustum 15, 16 technology 1,3,4,7,8, 10,36,39,40,
Rubba, Peter 255 47, 57, 58, 76, 86, 103, 109, 111,
Russell, Bertrand114 112,115,118,120,121,157,158,
162, 171
Saint-Simon,Claude 135 technology and values education 193,
Sanders,Barry 15 209
scales 142-151 technology assessment 158-172, 181,
Schelsky, Helmut 135 182, 184
Schwartz,Delmore 103 television 250-253
science lobby 137, 138 Teller, Edward136
science, technology, and society 212, Thomas, Lewis 75
235,236,247-257 Thompson, Dennis 202, 204, 211
scientism 130-132, 135-138 Thoreau,Henry David 247
Scott, Jeremy 219, 220, 235-237 tools 19,21-33,35-40,43,45-47,49,
Seidel, Alfred 128 57,58,103,121-124
Simon, Herbert34 tragic approach100-102, 105
 INDEX 263

Trowell, H. C. 83 Ward, Colin 95,100

Watkins,John 131
United States 9 Watson, James 89
university-industrycontracts 175-181, Weaver, Richard34,35
183-185 Weber, Max 247
utopias 103, 104, 171 Weingart,Peter 138
Wells, H. G. 104
value neutrality129, 131 West Germany2, 9
values education 197-209 Weston, Anthony41
Veblen, Thorstein135 Whitehead,Jack 175
Vig, Norman 113 Whyte, William F. 57
Winner,Langdon43-45
Waks, Leonard219 Winston, Brian 15
 PHILOSOPHYAND TECHNOLOGY
Series Editor:Paul T. Durbin

OFFICIALPUBLICATIONSOF
THE SOCIETYFOR PHILOSOPHYAND TECHNOLOGY

1. Philosophyand Technology
Edited by Paul T. Durbinand FriedrichRapp. 1983 ISBN 90-277-1576-9
(Publishedas Volume 80 in 'Boston Studies in the Philosophyof Science')
2. Philosophy and Technology,II. InformationTechnology and Computorsin
Theory and Practice.
Edited by Carl Mitchamand Alois Huning. 1986 ISBN 90-277-1975-6
(publishedas Volume 90 in 'Boston Studies in the Philosophyof Science')
3. Technologyand Responsibility
Edited by Paul T. Durbin. 1987 ISBN 90-277-2415-6; Pb 90-277-2416-4
4. Technologyand ContemporaryLife
Edited by Paul T. Durbin. 1988 ISBN 90-277-2570-5; Pb 90-277-2571-3
5. TechnologicalTransformation.Contextualand ConceptualImplications
Edited by EdmundF. Byrne and Joseph C. Pitt. 1989 ISBN 90-277-2826-7
6. Philosophy ofTechnology. Practical,Historical and OtherDimensions
Editedby Paul T. Durbin. 1989 ISBN 0-7923-0139-0
7. Broad and Narrow InterpretationsofPhilosophy ofTechnology
Edited by Paul T. Durbin. 1990 ISBN 0-7923-0684-8
8. Europe, America,and Technology: Philosophical Perspectives
Edited by Paul T. Durbin. 1991 ISBN 0-7923-1254-6

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