Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA – WESTERN DIVISION
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1 basis alleges, that each of the defendants sued under fictitious names is in some
2 manner responsible for the wrongs and damages alleged below, in so acting was
3 functioning as the agent, servant, partner, or employee of the Defendant, and in
4 taking the actions mentioned below was acting within the course and scope of his
5 or her authority as such agent, servant, partner, or employee, with the permission
6 and consent of the Defendant. The named Defendant and Doe defendants are
7 sometimes hereafter referred to, collectively and/or individually, as “Defendants.”
8 IV.
9 FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
10 10. Defendant hired Plaintiff to work as a set decorator for Defendant’s
11 Shangahi Disney Resort theme park project on or about May 20, 2014. Plaintiff
12 was employed at Defendant’s Glendale, California location.
13 11. On or about November 2015, Plaintiff informed several managers for
14 Defendant—including Bethann Brody, Catherine Ritenour, and Lori Ceballos—as
15 well as the Defendant’s “WDP&R Leave Administration Team,” that she would
16 need to take a leave of absence to care for her father with a serious health condition
17 in February 2016.
18 12. On or about November 3, 2015, a Set Decoration Staff Meeting was
19 held by the Defendant and employees on working on the Shanghai Disney Resort
20 project were told that everyone would be traveling to Shanghai, China via a one-
21 way ticket in January 2016. This would require Plaintiff to initially fly to
22 Shanghai, China for her employment, return to the United States in February 2016
23 for a period to care for her father, and then return to Shanghai. Defendant’s Set
24 Decoration Manager for the Shanghai Disney Resort project, Bethann Brody
25 (“Defendant Brody”)—who was the manager of the department where the Plaintiff
26 was employed—after learning of Plaintiff’s request for leave of absence, shook her
27 finger at Plaintiff and advised Plaintiff that she should make her “decision
28 carefully.”
1 weeks or not at all. Plaintiff offered to purchase her own fight back to the United
2 States so she could care for her father but Ritenour stated there would not be any
3 breaks allowed while in the field. Due to this decision, Plaintiff contacted
4 Defendant’s Family Leave Team and requested to begin processing the necessary
5 paperwork to allow Plaintiff to take a leave of absence under the FMLA.
6 18. On or about December 17, 2015, Defendant Ritenour emailed Plaintiff
7 asking for Plaintiff’s decision as to whether Plaintiff would travel to Shanghai.
8 Plaintiff responded that she did not see how she would be able to travel Shanghai if
9 she would not be allowed to return to care for her seriously ill father even when
10 Plaintiff had offered to pay for the trip back. Ritenour responded “but there’s
11 internet in China, you can manage things that way.” Plaintiff then stated she had
12 the FMLA paperwork ready to submit after obtaining the signature from her
13 father’s medical doctor. Upon learning that Plaintiff was submitting the FMLA
14 paperwork, Defendant Ritenour threatened Plaintiff stating that if Plaintiff cannot
15 travel to Shanghai on Defendant’s terms and instead choose to take a leave of
16 absence to care for her father, Plaintiff’s last day of employment would be
17 December 31, 2015. Plaintiff submitted her FMLA paperwork on or about the
18 evening of December 17, 2015 after working late in the warehouse.
19 19. On or about December 24, 2015, Plaintiff contacted Defendant’s
20 Family Leave Team who verified that her FMLA was approved. Plaintiff emailed
21 Defendant Ritenour to inform her that her FMLA was approved. Ritenour
22 responded via email that Defendant Brody had received confirmation of the FMLA
23 approval and further emailed that Plaintiff “can come in and do any transition on
24 Monday, January 4th and start your leave on the 5th. Or you can start your leave
25 on the 4th and not return until after your leave.”
26 20. On January 4, 2016, Plaintiff sent an email to Defendant Ritenour
27 advising her of Plaintiff’s work plans for the day, discussing the dates to begin her
28 FMLA leave of absence, and that she had a meeting with Defendant Brody that
1 afternoon to “discuss any loose ends.” Plaintiff worked the entire day until 4:00
2 p.m. and then sought out Defendant Ritenour to obtain signatures on her FMLA
3 paperwork. When Plaintiff arrived at Ritenour’s office, she was met by Defendants
4 Catherine Ritenour, Bethann Brody and Lori Ceballos. Defendant Ritenour
5 refused to sign the Plaintiff’s FMLA paperwork. Instead, Plaintiff was informed
6 that she was being terminated from the Defendant company since Plaintiff needed
7 time off to care for her ailing father.
8 V.
9 FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
10 Interference in violation of the Family Medical Leave Act
11 [29 U.S.C. § 2615(A)(1)]
12 21. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference the foregoing paragraphs 1
13 through 20, as though fully set forth herein.
14 22. At all times mentioned in this complaint, the Family and Medical
15 Leave Act (the “FMLA”) was in full force and effect and was binding on
16 Defendant.
17 23. Plaintiff was employed by Defendants for a period of in excess of 12
18 months immediately prior to January 4, 2016.
19 24. During the 12 months immediately prior to January 4, 2016, Plaintiff
20 worked at least 1,250 hours for Defendants.
21 25. The FMLA provides eligible employees the right to take up to 12
22 weeks of family care and medical leave in any 12-month period with the provision
23 of health benefits while on such leave and a guarantee of employment to the same
24 or a comparable position upon the expiration of the leave. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2612(a),
25 2615(a).
26 26. Family care and medical leave includes leave to care for a parent with
27 a serious health condition. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a).
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1 27. Plaintiff’s father suffered from dementia and heart failure, both of
2 which required continuing treatment and constituted serious health conditions
3 within the meaning of the FMLA. 29 U.S.C.§ 2611(11); 29 C.F.R. § 825.113(a).
4 28. At all relevant times, the Department of Labor (DOL) regulations, 29
5 C.F.R. § 825.100, et seq., were in full force and effect and were binding on
6 Defendant. The DOL regulations provide, “Any violations of the [FMLA] or of
7 these [Department of Labor] regulations constitute interfering with, restraining, or
8 denying the exercise of rights provided by the Act.” 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(b).
9 29. At all relevant times, Section 2615 of Title 29 of the United States
10 Code was in full force and effect and binding upon the Defendant. Section
11 2615(a)(1) prohibits employers from interfering with, restraining, or otherwise
12 denying the exercise of or the attempt to exercise any right provided under the
13 FMLA. Unlawfully interfering with the exercise of an employee’s rights includes
14 discouraging an employee from using such leave. 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(b); see Xin
15 Liu v. Amway Corp., 347 F.3d 1125, 1134-35 (9th Cir. 2003).
16 30. Plaintiff provided timely and reasonable notice to Defendants of her
17 need to take leave to care for her father who had a serious health condition. See 29
18 C.F.R. §§ 825.302-825.303.
19 31. Defendants interfered with Plaintiff exercising her FMLA rights by
20 discouraging Plaintiff from using her FMLA leave.
21 32. Defendants termination of Plaintiff’s employment constitutes an
22 interference with Plaintiff’s attempt to exercise her rights under the FMLA.
23 33. Defendants violations of the FMLA were willful in that Defendants
24 knew or showed reckless disregard for the matter and whether such conduct was
25 prohibited.
26 34. As a direct and proximate result of the Defendants’ termination of
27 Plaintiff and conduct of the Company, Plaintiff has suffered and will continue to
28 suffer damages in terms of lost wages, lost bonuses, lost benefits, and other
1 pecuniary loss according to proof, and interest thereon, and emotional distress and
2 mental suffering according to proof at trial.
3 35. Plaintiff seeks twice the value of her damages for losses of wages and
4 benefits, plus interest, as liquidated damages pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §
5 2617(a)(1)(iii) and 29 C.F.R. § 825.400(c), for the reason that Defendants have
6 failed to act in good faith and did not have reasonable grounds for believing they
7 were not violating the FMLA and cannot establish a defense based thereon.
8 36. FMLA provides for an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs
9 incurred by a prevailing plaintiff in an action brought under its provisions. Plaintiff
10 has employed and will continue to employ attorneys for the initiation and
11 prosecution of this action. Plaintiff has incurred and will continue to incur
12 attorneys’ fees and costs herein. Plaintiff is entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees
13 and costs.
14 VI.
15 SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
16 Discrimination in violation of the Family Medical Leave Act
17 [29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2)]
18 37. Plaintiff realleges and hereby incorporates by reference the foregoing
19 paragraphs 1 through 36, as though fully set forth herein.
20 38. The FMLA provides that “[i]t shall be unlawful for any employer to
21 discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any individual for opposing
22 any practice made unlawful by this title [of the FMLA].” 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2).
23 The FMLA further provides that an employer is prohibited from discriminating
24 against employees or prospective employees who have used or tried to use FMLA
25 leave. 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(c). “[E]mployers cannot use the taking of FMLA leave
26 as a negative factor in employment actions. . . .” Id.
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1 VII.
2 THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
3 Wrongful Termination In Violation Of Public Policy
4 [Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 335.1]
5 46. Plaintiff realleges and hereby incorporates by reference the foregoing
6 paragraphs 1 through 45, as though fully set forth herein.
7 47. It is, and at all times herein mentioned has been, the law and public
8 policy of the state of California that employers may not terminate an employee for
9 exercising her leave rights. By interfering, discriminating against and terminating
10 plaintiff because she exercised or attempted to her exercise her rights to FMLA
11 leave, Defendants violated California’s public policy. See Xin Liu, 347 F.3d at
12 1137-38.
13 48. Defendants’ unlawful actions were intentional, willful, malicious
14 and/or done with reckless disregard of Plaintiff’s rights.
15 49. As a proximate result of Defendants’ action of wrongfully terminating
16 Plaintiff in violation of fundamental public policy, Plaintiff has suffered the loss of
17 wages, salary, benefits, and additional damages in an amount to be proven at trial.
18 50. As a further proximate result of Defendants’ unlawful actions,
19 Plaintiff has suffered mental anguish, and emotional distress, in an amount to be
20 proven at trial.
21 51. In committing the foregoing acts, Defendants are guilty of oppression,
22 fraud, and/or malice under California Civil Code section 3294, thereby entitling
23 Plaintiff to punitive damages in a sum appropriate to punish and make an example
24 of Defendants.
25 52. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory and punitive damages, any lost
26 wages and benefits, injunctive and declaratory relief and attorneys’ fees and costs.
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1 VIII.
2 FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
3 Unlawful And Unfair Business Practices
4 [Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, et seq.]
5 53. Plaintiff realleges and hereby incorporates by reference the foregoing
6 paragraphs 1 through 52, as though fully set forth herein.
7 54. California Business and Professions Code § 17200, et seq., prohibits
8 unlawful, unfair and fraudulent business practices.
9 55. Defendants have committed unlawful and unfair business practices
10 including, but not limited to, interfering with Plaintiff’s rights under state and
11 federal leave laws and regulations, including, but not limited to, 29 U.S.C. §
12 2615(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2), 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(b), 29 C.F.R. §
13 825.220(c), and violating California’s public policy.
14 56. As a result of the Defendants’ unfair and unlawful business practices,
15 Defendants have reaped unfair and illegal profits at the expense of Plaintiff and
16 members of the public. Accordingly, Defendants should be made to disgorge their
17 ill-gotten gains and to restore them to Plaintiff.
18 57. As a result of the aforementioned acts, Plaintiff has lost and continues
19 to lose money or property and suffered and continues to suffer injury in fact in the
20 form of wages, salary, employment benefits, and other compensation, and other
21 funds and benefits legally belonging to Plaintiff.
22 58. Plaintiff is entitled to restitution and to an award of attorneys’ fees and
23 costs.
24 IX.
25 PRAYER FOR RELIEF
26 WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands judgment against Defendants, jointly and
27 severally, as follows:
28 1. For economic damages according to proof;
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