Cravajal, Keir Joey T.

LE 107
Problem Areas in Legal Ethics December 15, 2017

The Lawyer and the Society

(1) Corazon T. Nevada v. Atty. Rodolfo D. Casuga
A.C. No. 7591, March 20, 2012
Facts:
Atty. Rodolfo D. Casuga (Atty. Rodolfo for brevity) represented himself as an
administrator of Mt. Crest Hotel before a certain Jung Jong Chul, for purposes of leasing
an office space at the hotel. A lease contract was entered between Atty. Rodolfo and
Jung without the knowledge of Corazon T. Nevada (Corazon for brevity), the principal
stockholder of the family corporation which owns Mt. Crest Hotel. Notably, Atty. Rodolfo
signed over the printed name of one of the principal stockholders and even notarized the
document himself. Atty. Rodolfo also received the sum of P90,000.00 as rental deposit.
In the course of their dealings, Corazon also delivered jewelries worth P300,000.00
and a Rolex watch worth P120,000.00 to Atty. Rodolfo for purposes of selling them.
Despite repeated demands, Atty. Rodolfo failed to deliver either the proceeds of the sale
or the items themselves.
The IBP-CBD and the IBP Board of Governors found Atty. Rodolfo guilty of
misconduct, violation of the notarial law, and misappropriation of funds and property of
the client.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Rodolfo is guilty of (1) gross misconduct, (2) violation of the
notarial law, and (3) misappropriation.
Ruling:
(1) Yes. There is gross misconduct when there is a transgression of some
established or definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross
negligence, or the corrupt or persistent violation of the law or disregard of well-known
legal rules. Here, Atty. Rodolfo took advantage of his apparent close relationship with
Corazon by misrepresenting himself to be authorized to enter into contract of lease, and
even receiving the benefits of the said contract. Atty. Rodolfo’s acts therefore constitute
gross misconduct.
(2) Yes. The notarial law disqualifies a notary public from performing a notarial act
if he or she is a party to the instrument or document that is to be notarized. In this case,
Atty. Rodolfo became a party to the contract of lease when he affixed his signature above
the printed name of one of the principal stockholders without any qualification. When he
notarized the same contract, he went against the function of a Notary Public to guard
against any illegal or immoral arrangement.
(3) Yes. Rule 16.03 of the CPR demands that a lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys
and properties of his clients that may come into his possession. Having been tasked to
sell such valuables, Atty. Rodolfo was duty-bound to return them upon demand. Sure
enough, the absence of a lawyer-client relationship between Atty. Rodolfo and Corazon
does not exonerate the former. Both the CPR and case law penalize not only malpractice
and dishonesty in the profession, but also gross misconduct not connected with the
professional duties of a lawyer.
Cravajal, Keir Joey T. LE 107
Problem Areas in Legal Ethics December 15, 2017

(2) Vitoria C. Heenan v. Atty. Erlinda Espejo

A.C. No. 10050, December 3, 2013
Facts:
Respondent borrowed from petitioner two hundred fifty thousand pesos (Php
250,000.00) to secure the payment of the loan. Atty. Espejo (respondent) simultaneously
issued and turned over to Victoria a check dated February 2, 2009 for two hundred
seventy-five thousand pesos (Php 275,000.00) covering the loan amount and agree
interest. On due date, the check was dishonored. When respondent still refused to pay,
petitioner filed a criminal complaint against her for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22
and Estafa. However, respondent disregarded the notices and subpoenas issued by the
Quezon City Prosecutor’s Office which she personally received and continued to ignore
petitioner’s demands. Petitioner thereafter file the instant administrative case against
respondent before the CBD.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable.
Ruling:
Yes. Verily, lawyers must at all times faithfully perform their duties to society, to
the bar, to the courts and to their clients. The fact that Atty. Espejo obtained the loan
and issued the worthless checks in her private capacity and not as attorney of Victoria is
of no moment. As the Court has held in several cases, a lawyer may be disciplined not
only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession but also for gross misconduct outside
of his professional capacity. While the Court may not ordinarily discipline a lawyer for
misconduct committed in his non-professional or private capacity, the Court may be
justified in suspending or removing him as an attorney where his misconduct outside of
the lawyer’s professional dealings is so gross in character as to show him morally unfit
and unworthy of the privilege which his licenses and the law confer.
Further, the misconduct of Atty. Espejo is aggravated by her unjustified refusal to
obey the orders of the IBP directing her to file an answer to the complaint of Victoria and
to appear at the scheduled mandatory conference. This constitutes blatant disrespect for
the IBP which amounts to conduct unbecoming a lawyer.
Undoubtedly, Atty. Espejo’s issuance of worthless checks and her blatant refusal
to heed the directives of the Quezon City Prosecutor’s Office and the IBP contravene
Canon 1, Rule 1.01; Canon 7, Rule 7.03; and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Cravajal, Keir Joey T. LE 107
Problem Areas in Legal Ethics December 15, 2017

(3) Sps. Amador and Rosita Tejada v. Atty. Antoniutti K. Palaa

A.C. No. 7434, August 23, 2007
Facts:
A disbarment case was initiated by petitioners-spouses Tejada before the IBP
against Atty. Antoniutti K. Palaa for his continue refusal to settle his long overdue loan
obligation. It was alleged that Atty. Palaa borrowed money from the petitioners in the
amount of P100,000.00 so that he may have the Torrens title of a parcel of land owned
by him reconstituted. The parties executed a written agreement stipulating that after
Atty. Palaa has already reconstituted such Torrens title, he will deliver the same to the
petitioners as security for the amount financed and that he will pay P70,000.00 by way
of interest on top of the P100,000.00 borrowed by him. Atty. Palaa assured the petitioners
that he will comply with his obligations within 3 months from the execution of said written
agreement. However, he failed to participate in the proceedings before the Commission
on Bar Discipline of the IBP despite notice. Hence, the IBP Board of Governors
recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for 3 months.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Palaa is guilty of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Ruling:
Yes. The Court found that the complainants could not have been defrauded
without the representation of respondent. He knew that his representations were false
since the filling fee for a petition for reconstitution in 2001 was only P3,145.00 and other
expenses including the publication of the filling of the petition could not have cost more
than P20,000.00. It is clear that he employed deceit in convincing complainants to part
with their hard earned money and the latter could not have been easily swayed to lend
the money were it not for his misrepresentations and failed promises as a member of the
bar. He also failed to pay his just and legal obligation.
His disobedience to the directives of the IBP in falling to participate in the
proceedings before it is in reality a gross and blatant disrespect to the Court. Failing in
this duty as a member of the bar which is being supervised by the Court under the
Constitution, the SC found heavier sanction fall on respondent. Thus, penalty is increased
to 6 months suspension from the practice of law.
Cravajal, Keir Joey T. LE 107
Problem Areas in Legal Ethics December 15, 2017

(4) In Re: Tagorda

53 Phil. 37 (1929)
Facts:
Luis B. Tagorda, a practicing attorney and a member of the provincial board of
Isabela, admits that previous to the last general elections he made use of a card written
in Spanish and Ilocano, offering his services as attorney and notary public, with
description of what he can do. Also, he admits writing to a lieutenant of barrio in his
home municipality written in Ilocano, saying that “despite my membership in the Board I
will have my residence here in Echague. I will attend the session of the Board of Ilagan,
but will come back home on the following day here in Echague to live and serve with you
as a lawyer and notary public” asking that this information be transmitted to the public.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Luis B. Tagorda has committed prohibited advertising.
Ruling:
Yes. The most worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for a young
lawyer, and especially with his brother lawyers, is the establishment of a well-merited
reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. The publication or circulation of
ordinary simple business cards, being a matter of personal taste or local custom, and
sometimes of convenience, is not per se improper. But Solicitation of business by circulars
or advertisements, or by personal communications or interview not warranted by personal
relations, is unprofessional. Tagorda was suspended for one month.
Cravajal, Keir Joey T. LE 107
Problem Areas in Legal Ethics December 15, 2017

(5) Adriano E. Dacanay v. Baker & Mckenzie and Juan G. Collas Jr., Luis Ma. Guerrero,
Vicente A. Torres, Rafael E. Evangelista, Jr., Romeo L. Salonga, Jose R. Sandejas, Lucas
M. Nunag, J. Claro Tesoro, Natividad B. Kwan and Jose A. Curammeng, Jr.
Adm. Case No. 2131, May 10, 1985
Facts:
Lawyer Adriano E. Dacanay, admitted to the bar in 1954, in his 1980 verified
complaint, sought to enjoin Juan G. Collas, Jr. and nine other lawyers from practising law
under the name of Baker & McKenzie, a law firm organized in Illinois.
In a letter dated November 16, 1979 respondent Vicente A. Torres, using the
letterhead of Baker & McKenzie, which contains the names of the ten lawyers, asked
Rosie Clurman for the release of 87 shares of Cathay Products International, Inc. to H.E.
Gabriel, a client.
Attorney Dacanay, in his reply dated December 7, 1979, denied any liability of
Clurman to Gabriel. He requested that he be informed whether the lawyer of Gabriel is
Baker & McKenzie" and if not, what is your purpose in using the letterhead of another
law office." Not having received any reply, he filed the instant complaint.
Issue:
Whether or not the use of foreign law firm constitutes misrepresentation.
Ruling:
Yes. The use of foreign law firm as their firm name is a misrepresentation because
as a foreign law firm, Baker & McKenzie is not authorized to practice law in the Philippines.
Cravajal, Keir Joey T. LE 107
Problem Areas in Legal Ethics December 15, 2017

The Lawyer and the Legal Profession

(1) Antero J. Pobre v. Sen. Miriam Defensor-Santiago
A.C. No. 7399, August 25, 2009
Facts:
In a complaint filed by Antero J. Pobre, he alleged that the speech delivered by
Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago on the Senate floor reflected total disrespect towards
the Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and the other members of the Court and constituted
direct contempt of the court. As such, Pobre asks that disbarment proceedings or other
disciplinary actions be taken against the lady senator. For her part, Senator Santiago
averred that those statements were covered by the constitutional provision on
parliamentary immunity as the statement is aimed to expose an unjust act of the JBC
which calls for future remedial legislation.
Issue:
(1) Whether or not the privilege speech delivered by Senator Miriam Defensor-
Santiago is actionable.
(2) Whether or not Senator Santiago violated the provision of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
Ruling:
(1) No. Senator Santiago’s privilege speech is not actionable criminally or in a
disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of Court.
(2) Yes. The lady senator clearly violated Canon 8, Rule 8.01 and Canon 11 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Needless to stress, Senator Santiago, as a member
of the Bar and officer of the court, like any other, is duty-bound to uphold the dignity and
authority of this Court and to maintain the respect due its members. Lawyers in public
service are keepers of public faith and are burdened with the higher degree of social
responsibility, perhaps higher that their brethren in private practice. Senator Santiago
should have known, as nay perceptive individual, the impact her statements would make
on the people’s faith in the integrity of the courts.
Cravajal, Keir Joey T. LE 107
Problem Areas in Legal Ethics December 15, 2017

(2) EVANGELINE LEDA v. ATTY. TREBONIAN TABANG

A.C. No. 2505, February 21, 1992
Facts:
Complainant, Evangeline Leda, squarely puts in issue respondent Atty. Trebonian
Tabang's good moral character, in two Complaints she had filed against him, one
docketed as Bar Matter No. 78 instituted on 6 January 1982, and the present
Administrative Case No. 2505, which is a Petition for Disbarment, filed on 14 February
1983.
It appears that on 3 October 1976, Respondent and Complainant contracted
marriage at Tigbauan, Iloilo. The marriage, solemnized by Judge Jose T. Tavarro of
Tigbauan, was performed under Article 76 of the Civil Code1 as one of exceptional
character.
The parties agreed to keep the fact of marriage a secret until after Respondent
had finished his law studies (began in l977), and had taken the Bar examinations (in
1981), allegedly to ensure a stable future for them. Complainant admits, though, that
they had not lived together as husband and wife.
Respondent finished his law studies in 1981 and thereafter applied to take the Bar.
In his application, he declared that he was "single." He then passed the examinations but
Complainant blocked him from taking his Oath by instituting Bar Matter No. 78, claiming
that Respondent had acted fraudulently in filling out his application and, thus, was
unworthy to take the lawyer's Oath for lack of good moral character. Complainant also
alleged that after Respondent's law studies, he became aloof and "abandoned" her.
The Court deferred Respondent's Oath-taking and required him to answer the Complaint.
Issue:
Whether or not the declaration in the application to take the bar that one is
“single”, when in fact he is not violates the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Ruling:
Yes. One who had subsisting marriage is in violation of Rule 7.01, even if the
applicant believed that his marriage was void ab initio. A person cannot presume invalidity
of marriage without a judicial declaration of nullity.
Cravajal, Keir Joey T. LE 107
Problem Areas in Legal Ethics December 15, 2017

(3) SOPHIA ALAWI v. ASHARY M. ALAUYA, Clerk of Court VI, Shari'a District Court,
Marawi City
A.M. SDC-97-2-P. February 24, 1997
Facts:
Sophia Alawi was a sales representative of E.B. Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd. of
Davao City, a real estate and housing company. Ashari M. Alauya is the incumbent
executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari’a District in Marawi City, They were
classmates, and used to be friends.
Through Alawi’s agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on installments
by Alauya of one of the housing units of Villarosa. In connection, a housing loan was also
granted to Alauya by the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC).
Not long afterwards, Alauya addressed a letter to the President of Villarosa & Co.
advising of the termination of his contract with the company. He claimed that his consent
was vitiated because Alawi had resorted to gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud,
dishonesty and abuse of confidence. He also wrote similar letters to the Vice President of
Villarosa and the Vice President of NHMFC.
On learning of Alauya’s letters, Alawi filed an administrative complaint against him.
One of her grounds was Alauya’s usurpation of the title of “attorney,” which only regular
members of the Philippine Bar may properly use.
Alauya justified his use of the title, “attorney,” by the assertion that it is “lexically
synonymous” with “Counsellors-at-law.” a title to which Shari’a lawyers have a rightful
claim, adding that he prefers the title of “attorney” because “counsellor” is often mistaken
for “councilor,” “konsehal” or the Maranao term “consial,” connoting a local legislator
beholden to the mayor. Withal, he does not consider himself a lawyer.
Issue:
Whether or not Alauya, a member of Shari’a Bar can use the title attorney.
Ruling:
No. Persons who passed the Shari’a Bar may only practice before Shari’a courts.
Their use of the title “attorney” is not allowed because they are not members of the
Philippine Bar. The title of “attorney” is reserved to those who have successfully passed
the Bar Examinations and have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and remain members thereof in good standing.
Cravajal, Keir Joey T. LE 107
Problem Areas in Legal Ethics December 15, 2017

(4) REMEDIOS RAMIREZ TAPUCAR v. ATTY. LAURO L. TAPUCAR

A.C. No. 4148. July 30, 1998
Facts:
From the Report and Recommendation of the Commission on Bar Discipline, it
appears that complainant and respondent were married on October 29, 1953 at the
Sacred Heart Roman Catholic Church in Quezon City. They established their residence in
Antipolo, Rizal, were eight of their eleven children were born. In 1962 respondent
relocated his family to Dadiangas, Cotabato (Now General Santos City), where his last
three children were born and where he practiced his profession until his appointment as
a CFI Judge in Butuan City on January 30, 1976. In August, 1976, shortly after being
appointed as CFI Judge, respondent began cohabiting with a certain Elena (Helen) Pea,
in Nasipit, Agusan Del Norte. On December 28, 1977 Elena gave birth to their first child,
named Ofelia Sembrano Pea. In view of this cohabitation, a certain Atty. Tranquilino Calo
filed an administrative complaint against respondent for immorality.
Despite this penalty, respondent still continued to cohabit with Elena, giving rise
to another charge of immorality and other administrative cases, such as conduct
unbecoming an officer of the court, and grossly immoral conduct. These cases were
consolidated and after investigation, this Court ordered his dismissal and separation from
the service. But his dismissal as a judge did not impel respondent to mend his ways. He
continued living with Elena, which resulted in the birth on September 20, 1989, of their
second child named Laella Pea Tapucar. Moreover, he completely abandoned complainant
and his children by her. Respondent later moved from Nasipit, Agusan del Norte back to
Antipolo, Rizal, bringing along Elena and their two children. And on March 5, 1992,
respondent contracted marriage with Elena in a ceremony solemnized by Metropolitan
Trial Court Judge Isagani A. Geronimo of Antipolo, Rizal. This was done while the
respondent’s marriage to complainant subsists, as nothing on record shows the
dissolution thereof.
Notwithstanding sanctions previously imposed upon him by the Honorable
Supreme Court, respondent continued the illicit liaison with Elena. In his report
Commissioner Fernandez noted that, instead of contradicting the charges against him,
respondent displayed arrogance, and even made a mockery of the law and the Court, as
when he said: I have been ordered suspended by Supreme Court for two months without
pay in 1980 for having a mistress, the same girl Ms. Elena (Helen) Pea, now my wife.
Being ordered separated in later administrative case constitute double jeopardy. If now
disbarred for marrying Ms. Elena Pea will constitute triple jeopardy. If that’s the law so
be it.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent should be disbarred.
Ruling:
Yes. The Respondent is disbarred on the ground of gross immoral behavior over a
long period of time and a cavalier attitude and moral indifference to scandal. According
to Supreme Court, this shows a serious flaw in his character. A lawyer is expected at all
times to uphold the integrity of and the dignity of the legal profession by faithfully
performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients.
Cravajal, Keir Joey T. LE 107
Problem Areas in Legal Ethics December 15, 2017

(5) REXIE EFREN A. BUGARING AND ROYAL BECHTEL BUILDERS, INC., v. HON.
DOLORES S. ESPAOL, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court
Branch 90, Imus, Cavite
G.R. No. 133090. January 19, 2001
Facts:
During the hearing of this case, plaintiffs and counsel were present together with
one (1) operating a video camera who was taking pictures of the proceedings of the case
while counsel, Atty. Rexie Efren Bugaring was making manifestation to the effect that he
was ready to mark his documentary evidence pursuant to his Motion to cite (in contempt
of court) the Deputy Register of Deeds of Cavite, Diosdado Concepcion.
The Court called the attention of said counsel who explained that he did not cause
the appearance of the cameraman to take pictures, however, he admitted that they came
from a function, and that was the reason why the said cameraman was in tow with him
and the plaintiffs. Notwithstanding the flimsy explanation given, the counsel sent out the
cameraman after the Court took exception to the fact that although the proceedings are
open to the public and that it being a court of record, and since its permission was not
sought, such situation was an abuse of discretion of the Court. When the respondent,
Deputy Register of Deeds Concepcion manifested that he needed the services of counsel
and right then and there appointed Atty. Elpidio Barzaga to represent him, the case was
allowed to be called again. On the second call, Atty. Bugaring started to insist that he be
allowed to mark and present his documentary evidence in spite of the fact that Atty.
Barzaga was still manifesting that he be allowed to submit a written pleading for his client,
considering that the Motion has so many ramifications and the issues are complicated.
At this point, Atty. Bugaring was insisting that he be allowed to mark his
documentary evidence and was raring to argue as in fact he was already perorating
despite the fact that Atty. Barzaga has not yet finished with his manifestation. As Atty.
Bugaring appears to disregard orderly procedure, the Court directed him to listen and
wait for the ruling of the Court for an orderly proceeding.
While claiming that he was listening, he would speak up anytime he felt like doing
so. Thus, the Court declared him out of order, at which point, Atty. Bugaring flared up
and uttered words insulting the Court; such as: that he knows better than the latter as
he has won all his cases of certiorari in the appellate Courts, that he knows better the
Rules of Court; that he was going to move for the inhibition of the Presiding Judge for
allegedly being antagonistic to his client, and other invectives were hurled to the discredit
of the Court. Thus, in open court, Atty. Bugaring was declared in direct contempt and
order the Courts sheriff to arrest and place him under detention.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Bugaring violated Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Ruling:
Yes. Rudely interrupting opposing counsel while the latter is presenting evidence
is a violation of Canon 8 of the Code. Rule 8.01 of the latter provides that “a lawyer shall
not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise
improper. Therefore, Atty. Bugaring was cited for contempt of court and incarcerated for
three days and ordered to pay a fine.
Cravajal, Keir Joey T. LE 107
Problem Areas in Legal Ethics December 15, 2017

The Lawyer and the Courts

(1) Antonio Conlu v. Atty. Ireneo Aredonia, Jr.
A.C. No. 4955, September 12, 2011
Facts:
Conlu was the defendant in a civil case for quieting of title and recovery of a parcel
of land before the RTC of Silay, Negros Occidental. He hired Atty. Aredonia, Jr. to
represent him in the case. The RTC rendered judgment adverse to Conlu. Therefrom,
Atty. Aredonia, Jr. appealed to the CA, the recourse being docketed as CA-G.R. CV No.
5007. The CA, per its resolution, eventually dismissed the appeal for non-filling of the
appellant’s brief within the reglementary period. Antonio only got the dismissal from his
wife who verified the status of the case when she happened to be in Manila.
When confronted about the dismissal, Atty. Aredonia, Jr. promise to seek
reconsideration which he did, but which the CA later denied for belated filling of the
motion. In that motion, Atty. Aredonia, Jr. averred that he only received the disputed
February 10, 1997 CA resolution on April 25, 1997, adding in this regard that the person
in the law office who initially received the copy of the resolution was not authorized.
Conlu got the records of the case back and personally filed another motion for
reconsideration on October 13, 1997, which the CA again denied. Conlu’s petition for
certiorari before the SC was also dismissed.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Aredonia, Jr. should be held administratively liable.
Ruling:
Yes. His lack of candor in his professional relationship with Conlu was not
abhorrent enough, Atty. Aredonia, Jr. tried to mislead the appellate court about the
receipt of a copy of its February 10, 1997 Resolution dismissing the appeal in CA-G.R. CV
No. 50075. He denied personally receiving such copy, but the CA found and declared that
he himself received said copy. The CA arrived at this conclusion thru the process of
comparing Atty. Aredonia, Jr.’s signature appearing in the pleadings with that in the
registry return card. Both signatures belong to one and the same person. Needless to
stress, Atty. Aredonia, Jr. had under the premises indulged in deliberate falsehood,
contrary to the self-explanatory prescriptions of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 10, Rule
10.01.
The Court cannot write finis to this case without delving into and addressing Atty.
Aredonia, Jr.’s defiant stance against the Court as demonstrated by his repetitive
disregard of its resolution to file his comment on the basic complaint. After requesting
and securing no less than three (3) extensions of time to file his comment, he simply
closed, so to speak, communication lines. And when ordered to give an explanation
through a show-cause directive for not complying, he asked for and was granted a 30-
day extension but the required comment never came. When the Court eventually directed
the NBI to arrest him, he just left his last known address and could not be locate.
Manifestly, he has fallen short of the diligence required of every member of the Bar. The
pertinent Canon of the Code of Professional Responsibility which he also violate is Canon
12.
Cravajal, Keir Joey T. LE 107
Problem Areas in Legal Ethics December 15, 2017

(2) Erlinda I. Bildner and Maximo K. Ilusorio v. Erlinda K. Ilusorio, Ramon K. Ilusorio,
Marietta K. Ilusorio, Shereen K. Ilusorio, Cecilia A. Bisua, and Atty. Manuel R. Singson
G.R. No. 157384, June 5, 2009
Facts:
Petitioners filed a disbarment charge against Atty. Manuel Singson on the grounds
of attempted bribery and serious misconduct. The documentary evidence submitted
provide (1) the transcript of the stenographic notes of the May 31, 2000 hearing in the
sala of Judge Reyes in Civil Case 4537-R when the judge made it of record about the
attempt to bribe; (2) the affidavit of Judge Reyes dated December 23, 2004 narrating in
some detail how and thru whom the attempt to bribe adverted to was made; and (3) the
affidavit of Atty. Sevilla who admitted having been approached by Atty. Singson to
intercede for his case pending with Judge Reyes. Significantly, Atty. Singson admitted
having made phone calls to Judge Reyes, either in his residence or office in Baguio City
during the period material. However, he said that he was merely following up the status
of a temporary restraining order applied for and sometimes asking for the resetting of
hearings.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Singson should be disbarred.
Ruling:
No. Matters touching on case status could and should be done through the court
staff, and resetting is usually accomplished thru proper written motion or in open court.
The highly immoral implication of a lawyer approaching a judge evincing a willingness to
discuss, in private, a matter related to a case pending in that judge’s sala cannot be over-
emphasized. The fact that Atty. Singson did talk on different occasions to Judge Reyes,
initially through a mutual friend, Atty. Sevilla, is determinative that Atty. Singson was
indeed trying to influence the judge to rule in his clients favor. Canon 13 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility enjoins a lawyer to refrain from any impropriety which tends
to influence or gives the appearance of influencing the court. The possibility of an
attempted bribery is not far from reality considering Atty. Singson’s persistent phone calls.
However, heeding the injunction against decreeing disbarment where a lesser sanction
would suffice to accomplish the desired end, a suspension for one year from the practice
of law was found to be appropriate.
Cravajal, Keir Joey T. LE 107
Problem Areas in Legal Ethics December 15, 2017

(3) Edison G. Cheng v. Atty. Alexander M. Agravante

A.C. No. 6183, March 23, 2004
Facts:
Respondent Atty. Alexander M. Agravante served as counsel for the Rogemson
Co., Inc. in a case filed against it before the NLRC in Davao City by its former employee,
a certain Beaver Martin B. Barril. Labor Artbiter Newton R. Sancho rendered a decision in
favor of the complainant, and ordered Rogemson to pay Barril separation pay and
backwages. A copy of said decision was received by respondent’s law office. However,
respondent filed a Memorandum of Appeal with the NLRC. Consequently, the NLRC
dismissed Rogemson’s appeal, respondents had ten calendar days to perfect their appeal
therefrom. However, the records similarly bear that this present appeal was filed belatedly
by way of mail. The complainants terminated the services of Atty. Agravante. Through
their new lawyers, complainants wrote Atty. Agravante, demanding that they be
compensated for the pecuniary damages they had suffered as a result of his negligence.
When it appeared that Atty. Agravante had no intention of responding to their letter,
Edison G. Cheng, General Manager of Rogemson, filed an affidavit-complaint with the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline. The case was then assigned to Commissioner Caesar R.
Dulay for investigation.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Agravante violated the Canon for being negligent.
Ruling:
Yes. The investigating commissioner found that Agravante was guilty of
negligence. With regard to the date of receipt of the Labor Arbiter’s decision. Thus,
Commissioner Dulay concluded that Agravante misled the NLRC when he certified in his
Memorandum of Appeal that he received the adverse decision of the Labor Arbiter on
September 10, 1998. Before lawyers are admitted to the bar, they must first solemnly
swear to do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court. This oath, to which all
lawyers subscribe in solemn agreement to dedicate themselves to the pursuit of justice,
is not a mare ceremony or formality for practicing law to be forgotten afterwards, nor is
it mere words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that every lawyer must uphold and
keep inviolable at all times. This duty is expressed in general terms in the Code of
Professional Responsibility. In the case at bar, Agravante lied when he said he received
the Labor Arbiter’s decision on September 10, 1998 in order to make it appear that his
Memorandum of Appeal was filed on time. It cannot be stressed enough how important
it is for a lawyer as an officer of the court to observe honesty at all times, especially
before the courts. A lawyer must be a disciple of truth, and Agravante has clearly failed
to live up to this duty.
Cravajal, Keir Joey T. LE 107
Problem Areas in Legal Ethics December 15, 2017

(4) ESTEBAN M. LIBIT v. ATTYS. EDELSON G. OLIVA and FLORANDO A. UMALI

A.C. No. 2837, October 7, 1994
Facts:
In civil Case No. 84-24144 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, entitled "Pedro
Cutingting, plaintiff versus Alfredo Tan, defendant", the Honorable Presiding Judge
Domingo Panis issued an order wherein the NBI is hereby ordered to conduct an
investigation with the end in view of determining the author of the Sheriff's Return which
appears to have been falsified and to institute such criminal action as the evidence will
warrant.
After conducting the necessary investigation, the NBI, through herein complainant
charged the above-mentioned respondents of falsification of Sheriff’s Return of Summons
during the aforesaid civil case thereby impending and/or obstructing the speedy
administration and/or dispensation of Justice. Respondents in their respective answers
denied having any hand in the falsification of the said sheriff's return.
The case was reffered to Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Atty. Edelson G. Oliva violated the code of ethics.
Ruling:
Yes. Respondent Atty. Edelson G. Oliva as counsel for plaintiff in a civil case
presented a falsified sheriff’s return of summon. The Court held, a lawyer’s responsibility
to protect and advance the interests of his client does not warrant a course of action
propelled by ill motives and malicious intentions against the other party. It is essential
that lawyers bear in mind at all times that their first duty is not to their clients but rather
to the courts, that they are above all court officers sworn to assist the courts in rendering
justice to all and sundry, and only secondarily are they advocates of the exclusive
interests of their clients.
Cravajal, Keir Joey T. LE 107
Problem Areas in Legal Ethics December 15, 2017

(5) ARSENIA T. BERGONIA v. Atty. ARSENIO A. MERRERA

A.C. No. 5024. February 20, 2003
Facts:
Complainant, together with her relatives, filed a case for the quieting of title
(docketed as Civil Case No. U-4601) against her niece Josephine Bergonia, as well as
Spouses Rodolfo and Remedios Parayno and their minor daughter Gretchen. After due
trial, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, Branch 49, promulgated its
Decision in favor of the Parayno spouses and their daughter. On appeal, the CA affirmed
the ruling of the trial court and the Decision became final and executory.
Since the disputed land was still in the possession of complainant, the Paraynos
instituted Civil Case No. U-6061 to recover possession. After the Answer was filed,
respondent became her counsel of record. After due trial, Branch 48 of the same RTC
rendered its Decision ordering her to vacate the premises and to surrender possession
thereof to the Parayno spouses.
Thereafter, complainant appealed the RTC judgment to the CA. Respondent, as
counsel, received a Notice to File Brief on December 17, 1997. Acting on his Motion for
extension to file the appellants brief, the CA in its February 18, 1998 minute Resolution
granted him until March 17, 1998 to do so. Even before the first extension had lapsed,
however, he again filed an Urgent Second Motion for extension to file brief, praying that
he be given until April 16, 1998 to submit the required pleading. The CA again granted
his Second Motion. Eventually, the deadline, which had already been extended twice,
lapsed without his filing the appellants brief. Hence, the CA, upon motion of the appellees,
dismissed the appeal in its June 25, 1998 Resolution.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Arsenio A. Merrera violated Rule 12.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
Ruling:
Yes. The Court held that if respondent thought it was best to dispense with the
appellant’s brief, a lawyer who requests an extension to file a pleading must do so in
good faith and with a genuine intent to file the required pleading within the extended
period. In granting the request, the court acts on the presumption that the applicant has
a justifiable reason for failing to comply with the period allowed. Without this implied
trust, the motion for extension will be deemed to be a mere ruse to delay or thwart the
appealed decision. Respondent was suspended from the practice of law for six months.
Cravajal, Keir Joey T. LE 107
Problem Areas in Legal Ethics December 15, 2017

The Lawyer and the Clients

(1) Atty. Ricardo M. Salomon, Jr. v. Atty. Joselito Frial
A.C. No. 7820, September 12, 2008
Facts:
Atty. Frial was the counsel of Lucy Lo in case against Atty. Salomon. A writ of
attachment was issued in favor of Lo for Salomon’s Volvo and Nissan Sentra. In a
complaint for disbarment, Atty. Salomon alleged that instead of depositing the attached
cars in the court premises, the attaching sheriff of Manila turned them over to Atty. Frial.
On several occasions, the Nissan Sentra was spotted being used by unauthorized
individuals. It was seen in front of a battery shop in Quezon City, in a Shell station in
Manresa, and another Shell station near Kamias St., Quezon City. It was also spotted
being driven by bondsman Liquigan with Atty. Frial’s consent. Atty. Frial also allegedly
withheld information as to the whereabouts of the Volvo. It turned out that the car was
totally destroyed by fire in front of Atty. Frial’s house and the latter failed to inform the
court about such. The IBP Commission concluded that Atty. Frial failed to observe the
diligence required of him as custodian of the cars and recommended his suspension from
the practice of law for one year.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Frial failed to observe the diligence required as custodian.
Ruling:
Yes. He is guilty of grave misconduct arising from his violation of Canon 16 of the
CPR which provides that “money of the client or collected for the client or other trust
property coming into the profession of the lawyer should be reported and accounted for
promptly and should not under any circumstances be commingled with his own or be
used by him.”
A lawyer is first and foremost an officer of the court. As such, he is expected to
respect the courts order and processes. Atty. Frial miserably fell short of his duties as
such officer. He trifled with the writ of attachment the court issued. Atty. Frial was remiss
in his obligation of taking good care of the attached cars. He also allowed the use of the
Nissan Sentra car by persons who had no business using it. He did not inform the court
or at least the sheriff of the destruction of the Volvo car. What is worse is that he took
custody of them without so much as informing the court, let alone securing, its authority.
For his negligence and unauthorized possession of the cars, the Court found Atty.
Frial guilty of infidelity in the custody of the attached cars and grave misconduct. We
must mention, at this juncture, that the victorious parties in the case are not without
legal recourse in recovering the Volvo’s value from Atty. Frial should they desire to do so.
Cravajal, Keir Joey T. LE 107
Problem Areas in Legal Ethics December 15, 2017

(2) Violeta R. Tahaw v. Atty. Jeremias P. Vitan

A.C. No. 6441, October 21, 2004
Facts:
Violeta R. Tahaw (Tahaw for brevity), the complainant, secured the services of
respondent Atty. Jeremias Vitan (Vitan for brevity) for filling appropriate action for a
partition of a real property located in Makati City delivering to respondent four (4) checks
amounting to P30,000.00. Upon verification to check if a case has been filed for and in
her behalf, she was issued a certification by the Clerk of Court in Makati that no such
case was filed prompting Tahaw to write respondent informing him that she was
terminating his services as counsel and demanded the refund of the P30,000.00 to which
Vitan failed to return prompting to file a complaint of disbarment or suspension with IBP.
Issue:
Whether or not the non-filing of a case constitute a remiss in the lawyer’s
responsibilities which can be penalized by disbarment or suspension with the IBP.
Ruling:
The Court agreed with the recommendation of the IBP that respondent has been
remiss in his responsibilities. He is found guilty of violation of Canons 7 and 17 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility for his failure to file the necessary pleading for his
client’s case and for the failure to return and immediately deliver the funds of his client
advanced for the purpose of filing the said case, upon demand, and even after his
commitment with the IBP to do so.
Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides, “a lawyer owes
fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed in him. The trust and confidence of clients require in lawyer a high standard and
appreciation of his duty to them. Nothing should be done by any member of the legal
fidelity which might tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of the public in the
fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the legal profession.
The respondent was suspended for six (6) months with a stern warning that a
repetition of the same and similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
Cravajal, Keir Joey T. LE 107
Problem Areas in Legal Ethics December 15, 2017

(3) Donald Dee v. Court of Appeals and Atty. Amelito Mutuc

176 SCRA 651 (1989)
Facts:
Dee and his father went to the residence of Atty. Mutuc to seek his advice
regarding the problem of the alleged indebtedness of petitioner’s brother Dewey Dee, to
Caesar’s Palace. Petitioner’s father was apprehensive over the safety of his son, Dewey
having heard of a link between the mafia and Caesaer’s Palace and his possibility that his
son may be harmed at the instance of the latter. Atty. Mutuc assured petitioner and his
father that he would inquire into the matter, after which his services were reportedly
contracted for Php 100,000.00. Further investigation revealed that the alleged debt of
Dewey had actually been incurred by Ramon Sy, with Dewey merely signing for the chits.
Atty. Mutuc talked with the president of Caesar’s Palace and advised the president for the
sake and in the interest of the casino it would be better to make Ramon Sy answer for
the indebtedness. The president told him that if he could convince Ramon Sy to
acknowledge the obligation, Dewey would be exculpated from liability. Ramon Sy
acknowledged the oblgation, thereafter, the account of Dewey was cleared. Atty. Mutuc
sent demand letters to petitioner demanding the balance of P50,000.00 as attorney’s
fees.
Petitioner Dee ignored said letters. Atty. Mutuc filed a complaint against petitioner
Dee for the collection of attorney’s fees. Petitioner denied the existence of any
professional relationship of attorney and client between him and Atty. Mutuc. Dee insists
that the visit made to Atty. Mutuc was merely informal and that Atty. Mutuc had not been
specifically contacted to handle the problem. The Php 50,000.00 given to Atty. Mutuc was
alleged to be given not in the nature of attorney’s fees but merely pocket money.
Issue:
Whether or not there was a lawyer-client relationship.
Ruling:
Yes. The absence of a written contract will not preclude the finding that there was
a professional relationship which merits attorney’s fees for professional services rendered.
To establish the relationship, it is sufficient that the advice and assistance of an attorney
is sought and received in any matter petinent to his profession. An acceptance of the
relation is implied on the part of the attorney from his acting on behalf of his client in
pursuance of a request form the latter. Therefore, Mutuc is entitled to receive a
reasonable compensation. Atty. Mutuc did not represent conflicting interests as claimed
by Dee when the latter alleged that Atty. Mutuc was acting as agent of Caesar’s Palace.
Mutuc’s representations in behalf of petitioner Dee were resistance to the casino’s claim
but were actually geared toward proving the liability of true debtor, Ramon Sy.
Cravajal, Keir Joey T. LE 107
Problem Areas in Legal Ethics December 15, 2017

(4) Imelda A. Nakpil v. Atty. Carlos J. Valdes

A.C. No. 2040, March 4, 1998 266 SCRA 758
Facts:
Jose Nakpil was interested in a piece of property situated in Moran, Baguio. He
went into an agreement with Atty. Carlos J. Valdes for the latter to buying the property
in trust for Nakpil. Valdes did buy the property by contracting 2 loans. The lands’ titles
were transferred to his name. When Jose Nakpil died, Imelda Nakpil his wife acquired the
services of Valdes and his accounting and law firms for the settlement of the estate of
Jose Nakpil. What Valdes did was to exclude the property in Baguio from the list of assets
of Jose Nakpil he actually transferred the property to his company, the Caval Realty
Corporation while including the loans he contracted. What Imelda did was to file a suit
for reconveyance in the CFI. While the case was pending, Imelda also filed an
administrative complaint for disbarment against Valdes. The CFI dismissed the action for
reconveyance. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of CFI. The complaint for
reconveyance went up to the SC and was decided in favor of Nakpil. The SC held that
Valdes only held the lots in trust for Nakpil.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Valdes should be administratively sanctioned for his acts,
namely: (1) excluding the property in Baguio form the estate of Jose Nakpil; (2) including
his loans as claims on the estate; (3) apparently, representing conflicting interests when
his accounting firm prepared the list of claims of creditors Angel Nakpil and ENORN
against the estate of Jose Nakpil, which was represented by his law firm.
Ruling:
The SC found Valdes guilty of misconduct and suspends him for 1 year. The Court
held that the first two acts clearly show that Valdes broke the trust reposed on him by
Imelda Nakpil when the latter agreed to use his professional services as a lawyer and an
accountant. It was clear that Jose Nakpil and Atty. Valdes came to an agreement that the
latter would be buying the property in trust for Jose. By his act of excluding the property
form the estate and including the loans he contracted and used for his own benefit as
claims, Valdes took for granted the trust formed between Jose and him for they had a
close relationship since the 50’s, which was the basis for Imelda’s decision to use his
services. As to the third charge, we hold respondent guilty of representing conflicting
interests which is proscribed by Canon 15, Rule 15.03. In the case at bar, there is no
question that the interests of the estate and that of its creditors are adverse to each
other. Respondent’s accounting firm prepared the list of assets and liabilities of the estate
and, at the same time, computed the claims of two creditors of the estate. There is clearly
a conflict between the interest of the estate which stands as the debtor, and that of the
two claimants who are creditors of the estate.
Cravajal, Keir Joey T. LE 107
Problem Areas in Legal Ethics December 15, 2017

(5) SANTOS VENTURA HOCORMA FOUNDATION, INC., represented by GABRIEL H.

ABAD v. ATTY. RICHARD V. FUNK
A.C. No. 9094, 15 August 2012
Facts:
Complainant Santos Ventura Hocorma Foundation, Inc. (Hocorma Foundation)
filed a complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Richard Funk. It alleged that
Atty. Funk used to work as corporate secretary, counsel, chief executive officer, and
trustee of the foundation from 1983 to 1985. He also served as its counsel in several
criminal and civil cases.
Hocorma Foundation further alleged that on November 25, 2006 Atty. Funk filed
an action for quieting of title and damages against Hocorma Foundation on behalf of
Mabalacat Institute, Inc. (Mabalacat Institute). Atty. Funk did so, according to the
foundation, using information that he acquired while serving as its counsel in violation of
the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) and in breach of attorney-client relationship.
In his answer, Atty. Funk averred that Don Teodoro V. Santos (Santos) organized
Mabalacat Institute in 1950 and Hocorma Foundation in 1979. Santos hired him in January
1982 to assist Santos and the organizations he established, including the Mabalacat
Institute, in its legal problems. In 1983 the Mabalacat Institute made Atty. Funk serve as
a director and legal counsel.
Subsequently, according to Atty. Funk, when Santos got involved in various
litigations, he sold or donated substantial portions of his real and personal properties to
the Hocorma Foundation. Santos hired Atty. Funk for this purpose. The latter emphasized
that, in all these, the attorney-client relationship was always between Santos and him.
He was more of Santos' personal lawyer than the lawyer of Hocorma Foundation.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Funk committed conflict of interest as enshrined in the Code
of Professional Responsibility.
Ruling:
Yes. Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the CPR provides that a lawyer cannot represent
conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure
of the facts. Here, it is undeniable that Atty. Funk was formerly the legal counsel of
Hocorma Foundation. Years after terminating his relationship with the foundation, he filed
a complaint against it on behalf of another client, the Mabalacat Institute, without the
foundation's written consent.
An attorney owes his client undivided allegiance. Because of the highly fiduciary
nature of their relationship, sound public policy dictates that he be prohibited from
representing conflicting interests or discharging inconsistent duties. An attorney may not,
without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel for a person whose
interest conflicts with that of his present or former client. This rule is so absolute that
good faith and honest intention on the erring lawyer's part does not make it inoperative.
Atty. Richard Funk is suspended from the practice of law for one year effective
immediately.