Bayan v Zamora October 10, 2000

BAYAN (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan), a Junk VFA Movement, Bishop Tomas Millamena (Iglesia Filipina
Independiente), Bishop Elmer Bolocan (United Church of Christ of the Phil.), Dr. Reynaldo Legasca, Md,
Kilusang Mambubukid Ng Pilipinas, Kilusang Mayo Uno, Gabriela, Prolabor, and The Public Interest Law
Center, petitioners, vs. Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, Foreign Affairs Secretary Domingo Siazon,
Defense Secretary Orlando Mercado, Brig. Gen. Alexander Aguirre, Senate President Marcelo Fernan,
Senator Franklin Drilon, Senator Blas Ople, Senator Rodolfo Biazon, And Senator Francisco Tatad,
respondents.

Facts: On March 14, 1947, the Philippines and the United States of America forged a Military Bases
Agreement which formalized, among others, the use of installations in the Philippine territory by United
States military personnel. In view of the impending expiration of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement in
1991, the Philippines and the United States negotiated for a possible extension of the military bases
agreement. On September 16, 1991, the Philippine Senate rejected the proposed RP-US Treaty of
Friendship, Cooperation and Security which, in effect, would have extended the presence of US military
bases in the Philippines. On July 18, 1997, the United States panel, headed by US Defense Deputy
Assistant Secretary for Asia Pacific Kurt Campbell, met with the Philippine panel, headed by Foreign
Affairs Undersecretary Rodolfo Severino Jr., to exchange notes on “the complementing strategic
interests of the United States and the Philippines in the Asia-Pacific region.” Both sides discussed,
among other things, the possible elements of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA for brevity).
Thereafter, then President Fidel V. Ramos approved the VFA, which was respectively signed by public
respondent Secretary Siazon and Unites States Ambassador Thomas Hubbard. On October 5, 1998,
President Joseph E. Estrada, through respondent Secretary of Foreign Affairs, ratified the VFA. On
October 6, 1998, the President, acting through respondent Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora,
officially transmitted to the Senate of the Philippines, the Instrument of Ratification, the letter of the
President and the VFA, for concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution

Issues (justiciable controversy): (1) Whether or not petitioners have legal standing as concerned citizens,
taxpayers, or legislators to question the constitutionality of the VFA; (2) whether the VFA is governed by
the provisions of Section 21, Article VII or of Section 25, Article XVIII of the Constitution; (3) and whether
or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction.

Ruling: (1) No. Petitioners failed to show that they have sustained, or are in danger of sustaining any
direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the VFA. As taxpayers, petitioners have not established
that the VFA involves the exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending powers. On this point, it bears
stressing that a taxpayer’s suit refers to a case where the act complained of directly involves the illegal
disbursement of public funds derived from taxation.

(2) Yes.The fact that the President referred the VFA to the Senate under Section 21, Article VII, and that
the Senate extended its concurrence under the same provision, is immaterial. For in either case,
whether under Section 21, Article VII or Section 25, Article XVIII, the fundamental law is crystalline that
the concurrence of the Senate is mandatory to comply with the strict constitutional requirements.
(3) No. In fine, absent any clear showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondents, the
Court as the final arbiter of legal controversies and staunch sentinel of the rights of the people is then
without power to conduct an incursion and meddle with such affairs purely executive and legislative in
character and nature. For the Constitution no less, maps out the distinct boundaries and limits the
metes and bounds within which each of the three political branches of government may exercise the
powers exclusively and essentially conferred to it by law.

Pimentel v House of Representatives G.R . 141489 nov. 22, 2009

11 concur, 2 took no part, 1 leave

Facts:

On 3 March 1995, the Party-List System Act took effect. On 11 May 1998, in accordance with the Party-
List System Act, national elections were held which included, for the first time, the election through
popular vote of party-list groups and organizations whose nominees would become members of the
House. Proclaimed winners were 14 party-list representatives from 13 organizations, including Melvyn
D. Eballe, Leonardo Q. Montemayor, Cresente C. Paez, Loretta Ann P. Rosales and Patricia M. Sarenas
from party-list groups Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives[5] (APEC), Alyansang Bayanihan ng
mga Magsasaka, Manggagawang Bukid at Mangingisda (ABA), NATCO Network Party (COOP-NATCCO),
Akbayan! Citizens Action Party (AKBAYAN), and Abanse! Pinay (ABANSE). Due to the votes it garnered,
APEC was able to send 2 representatives to the House, while the 12 other party-list groups had one
representative each. Also elected were district representatives belonging to various political parties.
Subsequently, the House constituted its HRET and CA contingent by electing its representatives to these
two constitutional bodies. In practice, the procedure involves the nomination by the political parties of
House members who are to occupy seats in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and
the Commission on Appointments (CA). From available records, it does not appear that after the 11 May
1998 elections the party-list groups in the House nominated any of their representatives to the HRET or
the CA. As of the date of filing of the present petitions for prohibition and mandamus with prayer for
writ of preliminary injunction, the House contingents to the HRET and the CA were composed solely of
district representatives belonging to the different political parties. On 18 January 2000, Senator Aquilino
Q. Pimentel, Jr. wrote two letters addressed to then Senate President Blas F. Ople, as Chairman of the
CA, and to Associate Justice of the Supreme Court Jose A. R. Melo (now retired), as Chairman of the
HRET. The letters requested Senate President Ople and Justice Melo to cause the restructuring of the CA
and the HRET, respectively, to include party-list representatives to conform to Sections 17 and 18,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. In its meeting of 20 January 2000, the HRET resolved to direct the
Secretary of the Tribunal to refer Senator Pimentel’s letter to the Secretary-General of the House of
Representatives. On the same day, HRET Secretary Daisy B. Panga-Vega, in an Indorsement of even date,
referred the letter to House of Representatives Secretary General Roberto P. Nazareno. On 2 February
2000, Eballe, et al. filed with this Court their Petitions for Prohibition, Mandamus and Preliminary
Injunction (with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order) against the HRET, its Chairman and Members,
and against the CA, its Chairman and Members. They contend that, under the Constitution and the
Party-List System Act, party-list representatives should have 1.2 or at least 1 seat in the HRET, and 2.4
seats in the CA. They charge that the HRET, CA, et al. committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to
act positively on the letter of Senator Pimentel. In its Resolution of 8 February 2000, the Court en banc
directed the consolidation of GR 141490 with GR 141489. On 11 February 2000, Eballe et al. filed in both
cases a motion to amend their petitions to implead then Speaker Manuel B. Villar, Jr. as an additional
respondent, in his capacity as Speaker of the House and as one of the members of the CA. The Court
granted both motions and admitted the amended petitions. Senator Pimentel filed the present petitions
on the strength of his oath to protect, defend and uphold the Constitution and in his capacity as
taxpayer ‘and as a member of the CA. He was joined by 5 party-list representatives from APEC, ABA,
ABANSE, AKBAYAN and COOP-NATCCO as co-petitioners.

Issue:

[1] Whether the present composition of the House Electoral Tribunal violates the constitutional
requirement of proportional representation because there are no party-list representatives in the hret.

[2]: Whether the refusal of the HRET and the CA to reconstitute themselves to include party-list
representatives constitutes grave abuse of discretion.

Held:

[1] NO. The Constitution expressly grants to the House of Representatives the prerogative, within
constitutionally defined limits, to choose from among its district and party-list representatives those
who may occupy the seats allotted to the House in the HRET and the CA. Section 18, Article VI of the
Constitution explicitly confers on the Senate and on the House the authority to elect among their
members those who would fill the 12 seats for Senators and 12 seats for House members in the
Commission on Appointments. Under Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution, each chamber of
Congress exercises the power to choose, within constitutionally defined limits, who among their
members would occupy the allotted 6 seats of each chamber’s respective electoral tribunal. These
constitutional provisions are reiterated in Rules 3 and 4 (a) of the 1998 Rules of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal. The discretion of the House to choose its members to the HRET and
the CA is not absolute, being subject to the mandatory constitutional rule on proportional
representation.[26] However, under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court may not interfere
with the exercise by the House of this constitutionally mandated duty, absent a clear violation of the
Constitution or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.[27] Otherwise, ‘the
doctrine of separation of powers calls for each branch of government to be left alone to discharge its
duties as it sees fit.[28] Neither can the Court speculate on what action the House may take if party-list
representatives are duly nominated for membership in the HRET and the CA. The petitions are bereft of
any allegation that respondents prevented the party-list groups in the House from participating in the
election of members of the HRET and the CA. Neither does it appear that after the 11 May 1998
elections, the House barred the party-list representatives from seeking membership in the HRET or the
CA. Rather, it appears from the available facts that the party-list groups in the House at that time simply
refrained from participating in the election process. The party-list representatives did not designate
their nominees even up to the time they filed the petitions, with the predictable result that the House
did not consider any party-list representative for election to the HRET or the CA. As the primary recourse
of the party-list representatives lies with the House of Representatives, ‘the Court cannot resolve the
issues presented by petitioners at this time.

[2]: There is no grave abuse in the action or lack of action by the HRET and the CA in response to the
letters of Senator Pimentel. Under Sections 17 and 18 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and their
internal rules, the HRET and the CA are bereft of any power to reconstitute themselves.

Endencia v. David aug. 31, 1953

Saturnino David, the then Collector of Internal Revenue, ordered the taxing of Justice Pastor Endencia’s
and Justice Fernando Jugo’s (and other judges’) salary pursuant to Sec. 13 of Republic Act No. 590 which
provides that

No salary wherever received by any public officer of the Republic of the Philippines shall be considered
as exempt from the income tax, payment of which is hereby declared not to be a diminution of his
compensation fixed by the Constitution or by law.

The judges however argued that under the case of Perfecto vs Meer, judges are exempt from taxation –
this is also in observance of the doctrine of separation of powers, i.e., the executive, to which the
Internal Revenue reports, is separate from the judiciary; that under the Constitution, the judiciary is
independent and the salaries of judges may not be diminished by the other branches of government;
that taxing their salaries is already a diminution of their benefits/salaries (see Section 9, Art. VIII,
Constitution).

The Solicitor General, arguing in behalf of the CIR, states that the decision in Perfecto vs Meer was
rendered ineffective when Congress enacted Republic Act No. 590.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 13 of RA 590 is constitutional.

HELD: No. The said provision is a violation of the separation of powers. Only courts have the power to
interpret laws. Congress makes laws but courts interpret them. In Sec. 13, R.A. 590, Congress is already
encroaching upon the functions of the courts when it inserted the phrase: “payment of which [tax] is
hereby declared not to be a diminution of his compensation fixed by the Constitution or by law.”

Here, Congress is already saying that imposing taxes upon judges is not a diminution of their salary. This
is a clear example of interpretation or ascertainment of the meaning of the phrase “which shall not be
diminished during their continuance in office,” found in Section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution,
referring to the salaries of judicial officers. This act of interpreting the Constitution or any part thereof
by the Legislature is an invasion of the well-defined and established province and jurisdiction of the
Judiciary.
“The rule is recognized elsewhere that the legislature cannot pass any declaratory act, or act declaratory
of what the law was before its passage, so as to give it any binding weight with the courts. A legislative
definition of a word as used in a statute is not conclusive of its meaning as used elsewhere; otherwise,
the legislature would be usurping a judicial function in defining a term.

The interpretation and application of the Constitution and of statutes is within the exclusive province
and jurisdiction of the judicial department, and that in enacting a law, the Legislature may not legally
provide therein that it be interpreted in such a way that it may not violate a Constitutional prohibition,
thereby tying the hands of the courts in their task of later interpreting said statute, especially when the
interpretation sought and provided in said statute runs counter to a previous interpretation already
given in a case by the highest court of the land.

FACTS:

Saturnino David was the Internal Revenue Collector who ordered Judges Endencio and Jugo’s salaries. A
case was filed. However, upon construing Article VIII Section 9 of the constitution, it shows that judicial
officers are exempt from paying tax from their salaries and thus considered that the deduction of
salaries from the said judges as a violation from the compensation received by judicial officers.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 13 of RA 590 is constitutional.

RULING:

No, the Section 13 of RA 590 is unconstitutional. The collection of income taxes in judicial officers is
considered as against the provisions given by the Article VIII Sec 9 of the Constitution. The compensation
shall not be diminished during their continuance of their service. Section 13 of RA 590 stated that no
salary received by any public officer of the republic shall be exempted from paying its taxes. This specific
part of RA 590 is in contrary with what is Article VIII Sec 9 has provided.

Bustillo v Real

KMU v Garcia

FACTS:

The Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) and the Land Transportation Franchising
and Regulatory Board (LTFRB) released memoranda allowing provincial bus operators to charge
passengers rates within 15% above and below the official LTFRB rate for a period of one year. Provincial
Bus Operators Association of the Philippines applied for fare rate increase. This was opposed by the
Philippine Consumer Foundation, Inc. and Perla Bautista as they were exorbitant and unreasonable.

ISSUE:Whether or not the provincial bus operators have authority to reduce and increase fare rates
based on the order of the LTFRB

HELD: The Legislature delegated to the defunct Public Service Commission the power of fixing rates of
public services and the LTFRB is likewise vested with the same. Such delegation is permitted in order to
adapt to the increasing complexity of modern life. The authority given by the LTFRB to the provincial bus
operators to set a fare range is illegal and invalid as it is tantamount to an undue delegation of
legislative authority. Potestas delegata non delegari protest. What has been delegated cannot be
delegated. A further delegation of power would constitute a negation of the duty in violation of the trust
reposed in the delegate mandated to discharge it directly. The policy of allowing the provincial bus
operators to change their fares would lead to a chaotic situation and would leave the riding public at the
mercy of transport operators.

KILUSANG MAYO UNO LABOR CENTER vs.HON. JESUS B. GARCIA, JR., the LAND TRANSPORTATION
FRANCHISING AND REGULATORY BOARD, and the PROVINCIAL BUS OPERATORS ASSOCIATION OF THE
PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 115381 December 23, 1994

FACTS :

Then Secretary of DOTC, Oscar M. Orbos, issued Memorandum Circular No. 90-395 to then LTFRB
Chairman, Remedios A.S. Fernando allowing provincial bus operators to charge passengers rates within
a range of 15% above and 15% below the LTFRB official rate for a period of one (1) year.

This range was later increased by LTFRB thru a Memorandum Circular No. 92-009 providing, among
others, that “The existing authorized fare range system of plus or minus 15 per cent for provincial buses
and jeepneys shall be widened to 20% and -25% limit in 1994 with the authorized fare to be replaced by
an indicative or reference rate as the basis for the expanded fare range.”

Sometime in March, 1994, private respondent PBOAP, availing itself of the deregulation policy of the
DOTC allowing provincial bus operators to collect plus 20% and minus 25% of the prescribed fare
without first having filed a petition for the purpose and without the benefit of a public hearing,
announced a fare increase of twenty (20%) percent of the existing fares.

On March 16, 1994, petitioner KMU filed a petition before the LTFRB opposing the upward adjustment
of bus fares, which the LTFRB dismissed for lack of merit.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the authority given by respondent LTFRB to provincial bus operators to set a fare range
of plus or minus fifteen (15%) percent, later increased to plus twenty (20%) and minus twenty-five (-
25%) percent, over and above the existing authorized fare without having to file a petition for the
purpose, is unconstitutional, invalid and illegal.

HELD:

Yes.

Under section 16(c) of the Public Service Act, the Legislature delegated to the defunct Public Service
Commission the power of fixing the rates of public services. Respondent LTFRB, the existing regulatory
body today, is likewise vested with the same under Executive Order No. 202 dated June 19, 1987. x x x
However, nowhere under the aforesaid provisions of law are the regulatory bodies, the PSC and LTFRB
alike, authorized to delegate that power to a common carrier, a transport operator, or other public
service.

Garcia v. Executive Secretary july 3, 1992

Facts: Executive Order no 475 imposed an additional duty of 9% on crude oil and oil products while
Executive Order 478 imposed a special duty on crude oil and oil products. Petitioners claimed that both
EOs are unconstitutional because all revenue measures must originate from the House of
Representatives and the Tariff and Customs Code authorized the president to increase the tariff duties
only to protect local industries but not to raise additional revenue for the government.

Issue: Whether or not the tariff rates imposed are valid?

Decision: Petition dismissed for lack of merit. The assailed Executive Orders are valid. Congress may by
law authorize the president to fit tariff rates and other duties within specified limits. The issuance of
these EOs authorized by Sections 104 and 401 of the Tariff and Customs Code. There is nothing in the
law that suggests that the authority may only be exercised to protect local industries. Custom duties
may be designated to achieve more than one policy objective the protection of local industries and to
raise revenue for the government.

In November 1990, President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 438 which imposed, in
addition to any other duties, taxes and charges imposed by law on all articles imported into the
Philippines, an additional duty of 5% ad valorem tax. This additional duty was imposed across the board
on all imported articles, including crude oil and other oil products imported into the Philippines. In 1991,
EO 443 increased the additional duty to 9%. In the same year, EO 475 was passed reinstating the
previous 5% duty except that crude oil and other oil products continued to be taxed at 9%. Enrique
Garcia, a representative from Bataan, avers that EO 475 and 478 are unconstitutional for they violate
Section 24 of Article VI of the Constitution which provides:

All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local
application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate
may propose or concur with amendments.

He contends that since the Constitution vests the authority to enact revenue bills in Congress, the
President may not assume such power by issuing Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 which are in the
nature of revenue-generating measures.

ISSUE: Whether or not EO 475 and 478 are constitutional.

HELD: Under Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution, the enactment of appropriation, revenue and
tariff bills, like all other bills is, of course, within the province of the Legislative rather than the Executive
Department. It does not follow, however, that therefore Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478, assuming
they may be characterized as revenue measures, are prohibited to be exercised by the President, that
they must be enacted instead by the Congress of the Philippines.
Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution provides as follows:

(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such
limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and
wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program
of the Government.

There is thus explicit constitutional permission to Congress to authorize the President “subject to such
limitations and restrictions as [Congress] may impose” to fix “within specific limits” “tariff rates . . . and
other duties or imposts . . . .” In this case, it is the Tariff and Customs Code which authorized the
President ot issue the said EOs.

Araneta v. Dinglasan Aug. 26, 1949

FACTS:

The five cases are consolidated for all of them present the same fundamental question. Antonio Araneta
is being charged for violating EO 62 which regulates rentals for houses and lots for residential buildings.
Another case is of Leon Ma. Guerrero seeking to have a permit issued for the exportation of his
manufactured shoes. Another is of Eulogio Rodriguez seeking to prohibit the treasury from disbursing
funds pursuant to EO 225, while another is of Antonio Barredo attacking EO 226 which appropriated
funds to hold the national elections. They all content that CA 671 or the emergency Powers Act is
already inoperative and that all EOs issued under said Act also ceased

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Emergency Powers Act has ceased to have any force and effect

HELD:

CA 671 does not fix the duration of its effectiveness. The intention of the act has to be sought for in its
nature, object to be accomplished, the purpose to be subserved and its relation to the Constitution.
Article VI of the Constitution provides that any law passed by virtue thereof should be “for a limited
period”. It is presumed that CA 671 was approved with this limitation in view. The opposite theory
would make the law repugnant to the Constitution, and is contrary to the principle that the legislature is
deemed to have full knowledge of the Constitutional scope of its power. CA 671 became inoperative
when Congress met in regular session of May 25, 1946, and that EO Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226 were
issued without authority of law. In a regular session, the power if Congress to legislate is not
circumscribed except by the limitations imposed by the organic law.

Antonio Araneta is being charged for allegedly violating of Executive Order 62 which regulates rentals
for houses and lots for residential buildings. Judge Rafael Dinglasan was the judge hearing the case.
Araneta appealed seeking to prohibit Dinglasan and the Fiscal from proceeding with the case. He
averred that EO 62 was issued by virtue of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 671 which he claimed ceased to
exist, hence, the EO has no legal basis.
Three other cases were consolidated with this one. L-3055 which is an appeal by Leon Ma. Guerrero, a
shoe exporter, against EO 192 which controls exports in the Philippines; he is seeking to have permit
issued to him.

L-3054 is filed by Eulogio Rodriguez to prohibit the treasury from disbursing funds [from ’49-‘50]
pursuant to EO 225.

L-3056 filed by Antonio Barredo is attacking EO 226 which was appropriating funds to hold the national
elections.

They all aver that CA 671, otherwise known as AN ACT DECLARING A STATE OF TOTAL EMERGENCY AS A
RESULT OF WAR INVOLVING THE PHILIPPINES AND AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT TO PROMULGATE
RULES AND REGULATIONS TO MEET SUCH EMERGENCY or simply the Emergency Powers Act, is already
inoperative and that all EOs issued pursuant to said CA had likewise ceased.

ISSUE: Whether or not CA 671 has ceased.

HELD: Yes. CA 671, which granted emergency powers to the president, became inoperative ex proprio
vigore when Congress met in regular session on May 25, 1946, and that Executive Orders Nos. 62, 192,
225 and 226 were issued without authority of law. In setting the first regular session of Congress instead
of the first special session which preceded it as the point of expiration of the Act, the SC is giving effect
to the purpose and intention of the National Assembly. In a special session, the Congress may “consider
general legislation or only such subjects as he (President) may designate.” Such acts were to be good
only up to the corresponding dates of adjournment of the following sessions of the Legislature, “unless
sooner amended or repealed by the National Assembly.” Even if war continues to rage on, new
legislation must be made and approved in order to continue the EPAs, otherwise it is lifted upon
reconvening or upon early repeal.

Rodriguez v. Gella Feb 2, 1953

Facts:

1. Petitioners sought to invalidate Executive Orders (EO) 545 and 546 issued on November 10, 1952. EO
545 appropriated the sum of P37,850,500 for urgent and essential public works, while EO 546 set aside
the sum of P11,367,600 for relief in the provinces and cities visited by typhoons, floods, droughts,
earthquakes, volcanic action and other calamities

2. Section 26 of Article VI of the Constitution provides that "in times of war or other national
emergency, the Congress may by law authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such
restrictions as it may prescribe, to promulgate rules and regulations to carry out a declared national
policy." Accordingly the National Assembly passed Commonwealth Act No. 671, declaring (in section 1)
the national policy that "the existence of war between the United States and other countries of Europe
and Asia, which involves the Philippines makes it necessary to invest the President with extraordinary
powers in order to meet the resulting emergency," and (in section 2) authorizing the President, "during
the existence of the emergency, to promulgate such rules and regulations as he may deem necessary to
carry out the national policy declared in section 1."

3. House Bill No. 727 sought to repeal all Emergency Powers Acts but was vetoed by the President. HB
727 may at least be considered as a concurrent resolution of the Congress to formally declare the
termination of the emergency powers.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Executive Orders are still operative

NO.

1. EOs 545 and 546 must be declared as having no legal anchorage. The Congress has since liberation
repeatedly been approving acts appropriating funds for the operation of the Government, public works,
and many others purposes, with the result that as to such legislative task the Congress must be deemed
to have long decided to assume the corresponding power itself and to withdraw the same from the
President.

2. CA 671 was in pursuance of the constitutional provision, it has to be assumed that the National
Assembly intended it to be only for a limited period. If it be contended that the Act has not yet been
duly repealed, and such step is necessary to a cessation of the emergency powers delegated to the
President, the result would be obvious unconstitutionality, since it may never be repealed by the
Congress, or if the latter ever attempts to do so, the President may wield his veto.

3. If the President had ceased to have powers with regards to general appropriations, none can remain
in respect of special appropriations; otherwise he may accomplish indirectly what he cannot do directly.
Besides, it is significant that Act No. 671 expressly limited the power of the President to that continuing
"in force" appropriations which would lapse or otherwise become inoperative, so that, even assuming
that the Act is still effective, it is doubtful whether the President can by executive orders make new
appropriations.

4. The specific power "to continue in force laws and appropriations which would lapse or otherwise
become inoperative" is a limitation on the general power "to exercise such other powers as he may
deem necessary to enable the Government to fulfil its responsibilities and to maintain and enforce its
authority." Indeed, to hold that although the Congress has, for about seven years since liberation, been
normally functioning and legislating on every conceivable field, the President still has any residuary
powers under the Act, would necessarily lead to confusion and overlapping, if not conflict.

5. The framers of the Constitution, however, had the vision of and were careful in allowing delegation
of legislative powers to the President for a limited period "in times of war or other national emergency."
They had thus entrusted to the good judgment of the Congress the duty of coping with any national
emergency by a more efficient procedure; but it alone must decide because emergency in itself cannot
and should not create power. In our democracy the hope and survival of the nation lie in the wisdom
and unselfish patriotism of all officials and in their faithful adherence to the Constitution.
Eulogio Rodriguez et al seek to invalidate Executive Orders 545 and 546 issued in 1952, the first
appropriating the sum of P37,850,500 for urgent and essential public works, and the second setting
aside the sum of P11,367,600 for relief in the provinces and cities visited by typhoons, floods, droughts,
earthquakes, volcanic action and other calamities. They sought to have Vicente Gella, then National
Treasurer, be enjoined from releasing funds pursuant to said EOs. These EO’s were pursuant to
Commonwealth Act 671. Note that prior to Araneta vs Dinglasan, Congress passed House Bill 727
intending to revoke CA 671 but the same was vetoed by the President due to the Korean War and his
perception that war is still subsisting as a fact. Note also that CA 671 was already declared inoperative
by the Supreme Court in the same case of Araneta vs Dinglasan.

ISSUE: Whether or not the EO’s are valid.

HELD: No. As similarly decided in the Araneta case, the EO’s issued in pursuant to CA 671 shall be
rendered ineffective. The president did not invoke any actual emergencies or calamities emanating from
the last world war for which CA 671 has been intended. Without such invocation, the veto of the
president cannot be of merit for the emergency he feared cannot be attributed to the war contemplated
in CA 671. Even if the president vetoed the repealing bill the intent of Congress must be given due
weight. For it would be absurd to contend otherwise. For “while Congress might delegate its power by a
simple majority, it might not be able to recall them except by two-third vote. In other words, it would be
easier for Congress to delegate its powers than to take them back. This is not right and is not, and ought
not to be the law.” Act No. 671 may be likened to an ordinary contract of agency, whereby the consent
of the agent is necessary only in the sense that he cannot be compelled to accept the trust, in the same
way that the principal cannot be forced to keep the relation in eternity or at the will of the agent.
Neither can it be suggested that the agency created under the Act is coupled with interest.

Magtajas v. Pryce properties corproration, inc and Philippine amusement and gaming corporation
July 20, 1994

FACTS: There was instant opposition when PAGCOR announced the opening of a casino in Cagayan de
Oro City. Civic organizations angrily denounced the project.The trouble arose when in 1992, flush with
its tremendous success in several cities, PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro
City.he reaction of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City was swift and hostile. On
December 7, 1992, it enacted Ordinance No. 3353.Nor was this all. On January 4, 1993, it adopted a
sterner Ordinance No. 3375-93Pryce assailed the ordinances before the Court of Appeals, where it was
joined by PAGCOR as intervenor and supplemental petitioner. Their challenge succeeded. On March 31,
1993, the Court of Appeals declared the ordinances invalid and issued the writ prayed for to prohibit
their enforcement

ISSUE: WON Ordinance 3353 and 3375-93 valid

HELD: No

Local Government Code, local government units are authorized to prevent or suppress, among others,
"gambling and other prohibited games of chance." Obviously, this provision excludes games of chance
which are not prohibited but are in fact permitted by law.The rationale of the requirement that the
ordinances should not contravene a statute is obvious.Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This
decree has the status of a statute that cannot be amended or nullified by a mere ordinance. Hence, it
was not competent for the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City to enact Ordinance No.
3353 prohibiting the use of buildings for the operation of a casino and Ordinance No. 3375-93
prohibiting the operation of casinos. For all their praiseworthy motives, these ordinances are contrary to
P.D. 1869 and the public policy announced therein and are therefore ultra vires and void.

Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc v. Jac Liner, Inc.

Two ordinances were enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Lucena with the objective of alleviating
the traffic congestion said to have been caused by the existence of various bus and jeepney terminals
within the city. City Ordinance 1631 grants franchise to the Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc. to
construct, finance, establish, operate and maintain common bus- jeepney terminal facility in the City of
Lucena. City Ordinance 1778, on the other hand, strips out all the temporary terminals in the City of
Lucena the right to operate which as a result favors only the Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc. The
Regional Trial Court of Lucena declared City Ordinance 1631 as a valid excercise of police power while
declaring City Ordinance 1778 as null and void for being invalid. Petitioner Lucena Grand Central
Terminal, Inc. filed its Motion for Reconsideration which was denied. Lucena then elevated it via petition
for review under Rule 45 before the Court. The Court referred the petition to the Court of Appeals (CA)
with which it has concurrent jurisdiction. The CA dismissed the petition and affirmed the challenged
orders of the trial court. Its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the CA, Lucena now
comes to the Court via petition for review to assail the Decision and Resolution of the CA.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the means employed by the Lucena Sannguniang Panlungsod to attain its professed
objective were reasonably necessary and not duly oppressive upon individuals.

HELD:

With the aim of localizing the source of traffic congestion in the city to a single location, the subject
ordinances prohibit the operation of all bus and jeepney terminals within Lucena, including those
already existing, and allow the operation of only one common terminal located outside the city proper,
the franchise for which was granted to Lucena. The common carriers plying routes to and from Lucena
City are thus compelled to close down their existing terminals and use the facilities of Lucena. The true
role of Constitutional Law is to effect an equilibrium between authority and liberty so that rights are
exercised within the framework of the law and the laws are enacted with due deference to rights. A due
deference to the rights of the individual thus requires a more careful formulation of solutions to societal
problems. From the memorandum filed before the Court by Lucena, it is gathered that the Sangguniang
Panlungsod had identified the cause of traffic congestion to be the indiscriminate loading and unloading
of passengers by buses on the streets of the city proper, hence, the conclusion that the terminals
contributed to the proliferation of buses obstructing traffic on the city streets. Bus terminals per se do
not, however, impede or help impede the flow of traffic. How the outright proscription against the
existence of all terminals, apart from that franchised to Lucena, can be considered as reasonably
necessary to solve the traffic problem, the Court has not been enlightened. If terminals lack adequate
space such that bus drivers are compelled to load and unload passengers on the streets instead of inside
the terminals, then reasonable specifications for the size of terminals could be instituted, with permits
to operate the same denied those which are unable to meet the specifications. In the subject
ordinances, however, the scope of the proscription against the maintenance of terminals is so broad
that even entities which might be able to provide facilities better than the franchised terminal are
barred from operating at all. The Court is not unaware of the resolutions of various barangays in Lucena
City supporting the establishment of a common terminal, and similar expressions of support from the
private sector, copies of which were submitted to this Court by Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc. The
weight of popular opinion, however, must be balanced with that of an individual‘s rights.