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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND
COMMUNICATIONS (DOTC) vs. SPOUSES
VICENTE ABECINA and MARIA CLEOFE
ABECINA
G.R. No. 206484 June 29, 2016
BRION, J.:
FACTS:
Respondent spouses Vicente and Maria Cleofe
Abecina are the registered owners of five parcels of
land in Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte. The
DOTC awarded Digitel Telecommunications
Philippines, Inc. (Digitel) a contract for the
management, operation, maintenance, and
development of a Regional Telecommunications
Development Project (RTDP) under the National
Telephone Program.
The DOTC and Digitel subsequently entered into
several Facilities Management Agreements (FMA)
for Digitel to manage, operate, maintain, and
develop facilities comprising local telephone
exchange lines in various municipalities in Luzon.
The FMAs were later converted into Financial Lease
Agreements (FLA).
The municipality of Jose Panganiban, Camarines
Norte, donated 1200sq.m. parcel of land to the
DOTC for the implementation of the RDTP in the
municipality. However, the municipality
erroneously included portions of the respondents’
property in the donation. Pursuant to the lease
agreements, Digitel constructed a telephone
exchange on the property which encroached on the
properties of the respondent spouses.
Respondent spouses Abecina discovered Digitel’s
occupation over portions of their properties. They
required Digitel to vacate their properties and pay
damages, but the latter refused, insisting that it
was occupying the property of the DOTC pursuant
to their FLA. They sent a final demand letter to both
the DOTC and Digitel to vacate the premises and
to pay unpaid rent/damages in the amount of 1.2M.
Neither the DOTC nor Digitel complied with the
demand. Respondent spouses filed an accion
publiciana complaint against the DOTC and Digitel
for recovery of possession and damages.
DOTC claimed immunity from suit and ownership
over the subject properties but it admitted during
the pre-trial conference that the Abecinas were the
rightful owners of the properties.
Sps Abecina and Digitel executed a Compromise
Agreement and entered into a Contract of Lease
which was approved by the RTC.
RTC decision
It brushed aside the defense of state immunity.
Government immunity from suit could not be used
as an instrument to perpetuate an injustice on a
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citizen. It held that as the lawful owners of the
properties, the respondent spouses enjoyed the right
to use and to possess them. RTC ordered the DOTC
(as a builder in bad faith) to forfeit the improvements
and vacate the properties and to pay actual, moral,
and exemplary damages.
CA decision
CA upheld RTC decision but deleted the award of
exemplary damages. It denied the DOTC’s claim of
state immunity from suit, reasoning that the DOTC
removed its cloak of immunity after entering into a
proprietary contract – the Financial Lease Agreement
with Digitel. It adopted the RTC’s position that state
immunity cannot be used to defeat a valid claim for
compensation arising from an unlawful taking without
the proper expropriation proceedings.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
DOTC’s contention
Its Financial Lease Agreement with Digitel was
entered into in pursuit of its governmental functions
to promote and develop networks of communication
systems. Therefore, it cannot be interpreted as a
waiver of state immunity. It argues that while the
DOTC, in good faith and in the performance of its
mandate, took private property without formal
expropriation proceedings, the taking was
nevertheless an exercise of eminent domain. Instead
of allowing recovery of the property, the case should
be remanded to the RTC for determination of just
compensation.
Respondent Spouses’ contention
State immunity cannot be invoked to perpetrate an
injustice against its citizens. They also maintain that
because the subject properties are titled, the DOTC is
a builder in bad faith who is deemed to have lost the
improvements it introduced.
ISSUE: Whether or not DOTC may properly invoke
state immunity
HELD: NO
The fundamental doctrine that “the State may not be
sued without its consent” stems from the principle
that there can be no legal right against the authority
which makes the law on which the right depends. But
as the principle itself implies, the doctrine of state
immunity is not absolute. The State may waive its
cloak of immunity and the waiver may be made
expressly or by implication.
It is necessary to distinguish between the State’s
sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and
its private, commercial, and proprietary acts (jure
gestionis). Presently, state immunity restrictively
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extends only to acts jure imperii while acts jure for the DOTC to actually take the property at this
gestionis are considered as a waiver of immunity. point.

In the case at bar, there is no doubt that when the DOTC as a builder in bad faith
DOTC constructed the encroaching structures and
DOTC was not a builder in bad faith when the
subsequently entered into the FLA with Digitel for
improvements were constructed. The encroachment
their maintenance, it was carrying out a sovereign
over the properties was a result of a mistaken
function. Therefore, we agree with the DOTC’s
implementation of the donation from the municipality.
contention that these are acts jure imperii that fall
Good faith consists in the belief of the builder that the
within the cloak of state immunity. However, the
land he is building on is his and [of] his ignorance of
doctrine of state immunity cannot serve as an
any defect or flaw in his title. While the DOTC later
instrument for perpetrating an injustice to a citizen.
realized its error and admitted its encroachment over
Our laws require that the State’s power of eminent the respondents' property, there is no evidence that
domain shall be exercised through expropriation it acted maliciously or in bad faith when the
proceedings in court. Whenever private property is construction was done.
taken for public use, it becomes the ministerial
Article 527 of the Civil Code presumes good faith.
duty of the concerned office or agency to initiate
Without proof that DOTC’s mistake was made in bad
expropriation proceedings. By necessary
faith, its construction is presumed to have been made
implication, the filing of a complaint for
in good faith. Therefore, the forfeiture of the
expropriation is a waiver of State immunity.
improvements in favor of the respondent spouses is
If the DOTC had correctly followed the regular unwarranted.
procedure upon discovering that it had encroached
on the respondents’ property, it would have
initiated expropriation proceedings instead of
insisting on its immunity from suit. The petitioners
would not have had to resort to filing its complaint
for reconveyance. When the government takes any
property for public use, which is conditioned upon
the payment of just compensation, to be judicially
ascertained, it makes manifest that it submits to
the jurisdiction of a court. There is no thought then
that the doctrine of immunity from suit could still
be appropriately invoked.

Therefore, DOTC’s entry into and taking of

possession of the respondents’ property amounted
to an implied waiver of its governmental immunity
from suit.

Other issues:

Propriety of reconveyance (Sabi ni DOTC

expropriation proceedings na daw kasi dapat kasi
ginagamit na yung property for governmental
functions)

The exercise of eminent domain requires a genuine

necessity to take the property for public use and
the consequent payment of just compensation. The
property is evidently being used for a public
purpose. However, we also note that the
respondent spouses willingly entered into a lease
agreement with Digitel for the use of the subject
properties.

If in the future the factual circumstances should

change and the respondents refuse to continue the
lease, then the DOTC may initiate expropriation
proceedings. But as matters now stand, the
respondents are clearly willing to lease the
property. Therefore, we find no genuine necessity

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Republic of the Philippines v Gonzalo Roque
G. R. No. 203610 October 10, 2016
Brion, J.:
FACTS:
Respondents owned several parcels of land with a
total area of about 9,811 square meters,4 located
in Constitution Hills, Quezon City.5 Gonzalo
represented the respondents in the court
proceedings.
In 1978, the Republic, through the Department of
Public Works and Highways (DPWH), approached
the respondents and asked them to sell a portion
of the land at government-dictated prices lower
than the market value.6 The Republic was
supposed to use the land for President Marcos'
National Government Center (NGC) Project — his
plan to bring together the various national
government offices in one venue for greater
efficiency and to create additional areas for the
expanding needs of the central government and
the people.
The respondents allege that several public hearings
regarding the sale took place between the Republic
and the respondents;8 and that during these
meetings, the Republic made the following
representations.
First, the Republic guaranteed that although the
respondents would get paid a price much lower
than the market value of the land, the construction
of the NGC Project would eventually enhance the
value of the surrounding portions of the land that
they still own.
Vicente R. Jayme (Jayme) offering to buy back the
properties.17 Gonzalo received no response.
The respondents' suspicion was confirmed in
December 2003. Armando A. De Castro (De Castro),
then undersecretary of the Housing and Urban
Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC), wrote a
letter to the respondents, requesting them to vacate
all portions of the sold land that they were still
occupying, because the government would use the
properties for socialized housing pursuant to Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 9207.1
Realizing that the Republic had completely
abandoned its initial plan to use the land for the NGC
Project, in 2005, the respondents filed a complaint for
the annulment of the sale of the properties on the
grounds of fraud, force, intimidation, or undue
influence.24 They also asserted their right to buy
back the properties at the same price at which they
sold them since the Republic failed to develop the land
according to the original purpose for which it was
"expropriated."25cralawred Alternatively, they asked
for the payment of additional compensation in the
amount of not less than Five Million Pesos.
n their answer,27 the Republic and the HUDCC
(defendants) argue that: (1) they are immune from
suit as government instrumentalities; (2) they agreed
to neither the respondents' right to repurchase the
properties in case the government abandons the NGC
Project nor a right to additional compensation in case
the respondents' remaining properties suffer a
decrease in market value; (3) the respondents were
not forced, intimidated, or unduly influenced to sell
their properties to the government; and (4) even
assuming that any vice of consent attended the sale,
the respondents' action for the annulment of sale is
barred by prescription28 and laches.

Second, the Republic assured the respondents

that, in the remote possibility that it abandons the
ISSUES:
project, they will have the right to buy back the
land. (a) Whether the Republic is immune from suit;
The respondents further allege that they were (b) Whether the action is barred by prescription or
reluctant to sell the land, but felt compelled to do laches; and
so because martial law was in force, and they dared
not resist a project of President Marcos.11 Thus, (c) Whether an exception to the parol evidence rule
relying on the Republic's representations, the applies.
respondents signed the deeds of absolute sale.

The Republic did not immediately take possession

of all of the land it had bought from the
respondents;14 thus, the respondents continued to
occupy portions of the sold properties.
After several years, informal settlers began to
occupy parts of the land, and the respondents felt
that the Republic was reneging on its undertaking
to develop the land into the NGC Project.16 Hence,
Gonzalo sent letters dated March 25, 1987, and
September 23, 1988, to then DPWH Secretary
HELD:
a. NO The Constitution provides that "the State
may not be sued without its consent."49 One
instance when a suit is against the State is
when the Republic is sued by name,50 as in
this case.
A suit against the State is allowed when the State
gives its consent, either expressly or impliedly.
Express consent is given through a statute51 while
implied consent is given when the State enters into a

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contract or commences litigation.52 Although not
all contracts entered into by the government
operates as a waiver of its non-suability, the Court
held in the two cases below that the State
effectively gave its consent when it entered into
contracts and committed breach.
In Santiago v. The Government of the Republic of
the Philippines,53 Ildefonso Santiago and his wife
donated a parcel of land to the Republic on the
alleged condition that the latter would install
lighting facilities and a water system and would
build an office building and parking lot on the
property on or before December 7, 1974. Santiago
filed a complaint for the revocation of the donation
due to the government's breach of the condition.
The trial court dismissed the case based on the
State's non-suability. The Court set aside the
dismissal on certiorari, reasoning that the State's
consent to be sued is presumed when the State
fails to comply with the alleged terms of a deed of
donation. It essentially held that the Republic
impliedly waived its immunity.
In Republic v. Sandiganbayan,54 the Court ruled
that when the Republic entered into a compromise
agreement with a private person, it stripped itself
of its immunity from suit and placed itself on the
same level as its adversary. When the State enters
into a contract which creates mutual or reciprocal
rights and obligations, the State may be sued even
without express consent.55 Its consent to be sued
is implied from its entry into the contract and the
Republic's breach grants the other party the right
to enforce or repudiate the contract.
In the present case, the Republic entered into
deeds of sale with the respondents to construct the
NGC Project on the lots sold. To facilitate the sale,
the Republic created a negotiating team to discuss
the terms of the sale with the respondents. The
latter agreed to the negotiated sale on these
alleged conditions: (a) that they will have the right
to repurchase the properties if the NGC Project
does not push through; and (b) that the NGC
Project will increase the market value of their
remaining properties.
Following Santiago and Republic, the State's failure
to abide by these conditions constitutes the State's
implied waiver of its immunity. We reiterate that
the doctrine of state immunity from suit cannot
serve to perpetrate an injustice on a citizen.56 If
we rule otherwise, we will be tolerating unfair
dealing in contract negotiation.
b. NO. Resolving the issues of prescription
and laches in the present case requires a
factual review, specifically whether the
presidential proclamations that reduced the
land allotted for the NGC Project covered
the subject properties and when the
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prescription period should start to run under
the circumstances. These are questions of fact
that this Court need not delve into.
Nevertheless, the RTC found and concluded, with the
CA affirming, that the respondents' action to annul
the sale is not barred either by prescription or laches.
Both court ruled that the enactment of RA 9207 was
the earliest time that the respondents could have
known about the government's plans to officially use
the land for socialized housing. Thus, the respondents
were not barred by prescription when they filed their
complaint in 2005, within four (4) years from the
enactment of RA 9207.
As to laches, both the RTC and the CA found that the
respondents' letters to the DPWH showed that they
were vigilant in asserting their alleged right to
repurchase the properties from the Republic. This
vigilance negates the Republic's claim of laches.
We are bound and accordingly adopt these findings
and conclusions by the lower courts.
c. NO. Section 9, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
provides that a written contract is deemed to
contain all the terms agreed upon by the
parties and no evidence of these terms is
admissible other than the contents of the
contract.
The parol evidence rule forbids any addition to the
terms of a written agreement by testimony showing
that the parties orally agreed on other terms before
the signing of the document.61 However, a party may
present evidence to modify, explain, or add to the
terms of a written agreement if he puts in issue in his
pleadings either: (a) an intrinsic ambiguity, mistake,
or imperfection in the written agreement; (b) the
failure of the written agreement to express the
parties' true intent and agreement; (c) the validity of
the written agreement; or (d) the existence of other
terms agreed to by the parties or their successors in
interest after the execution of the written agreement.
The issue must be squarely presented.
We note the basic rule that he who alleges must prove
his case. In this case, the respondents have the
burden to prove that the sale was subject to two
conditions: (a) their remaining properties will benefit
from the increase in land value after the construction
of the NGC Project and (b) the government will return
the sold properties to them should the NGC Project
not materialize. However, they failed to discharge this
burden.
Notably, they failed to present copies of the deeds of
sale to show that the sale was attended by the alleged
conditions. Pursuant to the parol evidence rule, no
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evidence of contractual terms is admissible other

than the contract itself. On this level alone, the
respondents failed to discharge their burden.

Furthermore, the respondents failed to put in issue

in their pleadings the sale contract's failure to
express the parties' agreement.

On a final note, we point out that the parties

entered into a negotiated sale transaction; thus,
the Republic did not acquire the property through
expropriation.

In expropriation, the Republic's acquisition of the

expropriated property is subject to the condition
that the Republic will return the property should
the public purpose for which the expropriation was
done did not materialize.68 On the other hand, a
sale contract between the Republic and private
persons is not subject to this same condition unless
the parties stipulate it.

The respondents in this case failed to prove that

the sale was attended by a similar condition.
Hence, the parties are bound by their sale contract
transferring the property without the condition
applicable in expropriation cases.

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Republic of the Philippines v. Davonn Harp
G.R. No. 188829; June 13, 2016
Sereno, C.J.
FACTS:
Respondent Harp was born and raised in the
USA, and while on a visit to the Philippines, he was
discovered by basketball talent scouts. He was
invited to play in the PBL and was drafted to the
PBA. Respondent was invited to participate in a
Senate investigation jointly conducted by the
Committee on Games, Amusement, and Sports;
and the Committee on Constitutional Amendments,
Revision of Codes and Laws. The Senate inquiry
sought to review the processes and requirements
involved in the acquisition and determination of
Philippine citizenship in connection with the “influx
of bogus Fil-Am or Fil-foreign basketball players
into the PBA and other basketball associations in
the Philippines.”
In the course of the inquiry, it was
established that respondent had previously
obtained recognition as a citizen of the Philippines
from the BI and the DOJ upon submission of
several documents. The Senate committees,
however, found reason to doubt the Philippine
citizenship of respondent. After a scrutiny of the
documents he had submitted, they concluded that
he had used spurious documents in support of his
Petition for Recognition (such as a simulated or
highly suspicious birth certificate with several
erasure marks and discrepancies as to its entries).
In the report, the Senate committees also
directed the BI and the DOJ to examine thoroughly
the authenticity of the documents submitted by
certain PBA players, including respondent, and to
determine if they were indeed citizens of the
Philippines.
The DOJ issued a department order creating
a special committee to investigate the citizenship
of the PBA players identified in the report. As part
of the investigation, the players were required to
submit position papers. The DOJ special committee
concluded that there was substantial evidence to
conduct summary deportation proceedings against
respondent for misrepresentation as a Filipino
citizen in applying for recognition before the
Bureau of Immigration and DOJ, relying on the
findings of the Senate committees and NBI on the
apparent alterations made in the Certificate of Live
Birth of respondent’s father.
Acting on the special committee’s findings,
the DOJ secretary issued a resolution revoking the
recognition accorded to respondent and 5 other
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PBA players, and also directed the BI to undertake
summary deportation proceedings against them.
Upon receipt of the Summary Deportation
Order, respondent filed a Petition for Review with an
application for injunction before the CA to seek the
reversal of the DOJ Resolution and the BI Summary
Deportation Order.
This was granted by the CA, holding that respondent,
who was a recognized citizen of the Philippines, could
not be summarily deported and that his citizenship
may only be attacked through a direct action in a
proceeding that would respect his rights as a citizen.
The CA however refused to settle the issue of
citizenship, by reason of his incorrect resort to Rule
43.
ISSUES/HELD:
Whether or not respondent’s appeal was rendered
moot and academic by his voluntary departure from
the Philippines.
No, respondent’s appeal was not rendered
moot and academic by his voluntary departure from
the Philippines. Petitioners’ allegation that appeal is
no longer necessary to resolve the appeal of
respondent because he has voluntarily departed from
the Philippines and is now beyond the legal processes
of the country is not proper based on the case of
Lewin v. Deportation Board, involving an alien who
entered the Philippines as a temporary visitor and
eventually left without any assurance that he would
be allowed to return to the country. However, the SC
ruled that it does not apply to the present case since
it involves those whose Philippine citizenship has
been previously recognized and whose intention to
return to the country has likewise been manifested.
In the case of Gonzalez v. Pennisi , wherein the
respondent prior to his deportation, was recognized
as a Filipino citizen, it was stated that :“he manifested
his intent to return to the country because his Filipino
wife and children are residing in the Philippines. The
filing of the petitions before the CA and before this
court showed his intention to prove his Filipino lineage
and citizenship, as well as the error committed by
petitioners in causing his deportation from the
country. He was precisely questioning the DOJ's
revocation of his certificate of recognition and his
summary deportation by the BI.”
Like the respondent in Gonzalez, respondent
herein is also a recognized citizen of the Philippines.
He has fought for his citizenship and clearly
demonstrated his intent to return to the country.
Consequently, the SC holds that his departure has not
rendered this case moot and academic.
Whether or not the DOJ erroneously revoked the
recognition accorded to the respondent.
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Yes, DOJ erroneously revoked the
recognition accorded to the respondent. The SC
decided to resolve the following issues brought by
the DOJ Resolution and Summary Deportation
Order:
a) Finality of the Recognition Accorded to
Respondent
The recognition granted to respondent has
not attained finality. The SC has consistently ruled
that the issue of citizenship may be threshed out
as the occasion demands. Res Judicata only applies
once a finding of citizenship is affirmed by the
Court in a proceeding which: (a) the person whose
citizenship is questioned is a party; (b) the person's
citizenship is raised as a material issue; and (c) the
Solicitor General or an authorized representative is
able to take an active part. Since respondent's
citizenship has not been the subject of such a
proceeding, there is no obstacle to revisiting the
matter in this case.
the Philippines on the strength of the documentary
evidence he presented, such as his birth certificate,
certificate of live birth, naturalization certificate, and
certification issued by the Consulate General of the
Philippines in San Francisco. In its Resolution,
however, the DOJ decided to attach more importance
to the "clear and convincing" rebuttal evidence from
the Senate committees and the NBI, which
supposedly outweighed the probative value of these
authenticated documents.
It must be emphasized, however, that
Manuel's birth certificate, a public document and an
official record in the custody of the Civil Registrar,
enjoys the presumption of regularity and authenticity.
To defeat these presumptions, the party making the
allegation must present clear, positive and convincing
evidence of alteration. For obvious reasons, this
burden cannot be discharged by the mere submission
of an inconclusive report from the Senate Committee
and the presentation of an excerpt of an NBI report
on the purported alterations.

b) Validity of the DOJ Resolution

The DOJ Resolution was invalid. The
evidence relied upon by the DOJ and the BI is not
enough to negate the probative value of the
documentary evidence submitted by respondent to
prove his Philippine citizenship. The SC finds no
reason to set aside the rule that public documents,
particularly those related to the Civil Register, are
“prima facie evidence of the facts therein
contained.”
As in any administrative proceeding, the
exercise of the power to revoke a certificate of
recognition already issued requires the observance
of the basic tenets of due process. At the very
least, it is imperative that the ruling be supported
by substantial evidence in view of the gravity of the
consequences that would arise from a revocation.
In this case, the DOJ relied on certain pieces
of documentary and testimonial evidence to
support its conclusion that respondent is not a true
citizen of the Philippines: (a) the findings of the
Senate committees and the NBI that alterations
were made in the Certificate of Live Birth of
Manuel; (b) the discrepancy between the middle
initial found in Manuel's birth certificate and that
which appears in respondent's affidavit of
citizenship; (c) the results of the Senate's field
investigations of respondent's relatives; and (d) a
Certification from the Secretary of Barangay
stating that "Manuel Arce Gonzalez" was not
included in the 2002 list of voters in that barangay.
c) Validity of the Summary Deportation Order
The Summary Deportation Order was invalid. It is
settled that summary deportation proceedings cannot
be instituted by the BI against citizens of the
Philippines. In Board of Commissioners v. Dela Rosa,
the Court reiterated the doctrine that citizens may
resort to courts for protection if their right to live in
peace, without molestation from any official or
authority, is disturbed in a deportation proceeding. In
that case, the SC stated: “When the evidence
submitted by a respondent is conclusive of his
citizenship, the right to immediate review should also
be recognized and the courts should promptly enjoin
the deportation proceedings. A citizen is entitled to
live in peace, without molestation from any official or
authority, and if he is disturbed by a deportation
proceeding, he has the unquestionable right to resort
to the courts for his protection, either by a writ of
habeas corpus or of prohibition, on the legal ground
that the Board lacks jurisdiction. If he is a citizen and
evidence thereof is satisfactory, there is no sense nor
justice in allowing the deportation proceedings to
continue, granting him the remedy only after the
Board has finished its investigation of his
undesirability.”
Since respondent has already been declared
and recognized as a Philippine citizen by the BI and
the DOJ, he must be protected from summary
deportation proceedings.

The Court finds these pieces of evidence

inadequate to warrant a revocation of the
recognition accorded to respondent. Respondent
was earlier recognized as a natural-born citizen of

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REPRESENTATIVES EDCEL C. LAGMAN, et al. declared that it found no compelling reason to revoke
v. HON. SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, the same. The House of Representatives likewise
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, et al. issued a resolution expressing its full support to the
G.R. No. 231658, 04 July 2017 President, as it finds no reason to revoke
Proclamation No. 216.
EN BANC (Del Castillo, J.)
Invoking the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII
DOCTRINE OF THE CASE
of the Constitution, various citizens filed several
It is difficult, if not impossible, to fix the territorial petitions, essentially invoking the Court’s specific and
scope of martial law in direct proportion to the special jurisdiction to review the sufficiency of the
"range" of actual rebellion and public safety simply factual basis of Proclamation No. 216; and seeking to
because rebellion and public safety have no fixed nullify Proclamation No. 216 for being
physical dimensions. Their transitory and abstract unconstitutional because it lacks sufficient factual
nature defies precise measurements; hence, the basis.
determination of the territorial scope of martial law ISSUES:
could only be drawn from arbitrary, not fixed,
variables. The Constitution must have considered 1. Are the instant petitions the
these limitations when it granted the President "appropriate proceeding" covered by Paragraph 3,
wide leeway and flexibility in determining the Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution?
territorial scope of martial law. Moreover, the
President's duty to maintain peace and public
2. Is the President, in declaring martial
safety is not limited only to the place where there
law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas
is actual rebellion; it extends to other areas where
corpus,:
the present hostilities are in danger of spilling over.
a. required to be factually correct or only not arbitrary
It is not intended merely to prevent the escape of
in his appreciation of facts;
lawless elements from Marawi City, but also to
b. required to obtain the favorable recommendation
avoid enemy reinforcements and to cut their supply
thereon of the Secretary of National
lines coming from different parts of Mindanao.
Defense; or
Thus, limiting the proclamation and/or suspension
to the place where there is actual rebellion would
not only defeat the purpose of declaring martial
law, it will make the exercise thereof ineffective
and useless. c. required to take into account only the situation at
the time of the proclamation, even if subsequent
FACTS: events prove the situation to have not been
accurately reported?
Effective May 23, 2017, and for a period not
exceeding 60 days, President Rodrigo Roa Duterte 3.
issued Proclamation No. 216 declaring a state of IsthepoweroftheCourttoreviewthesufficiencyof
martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ thefactualbasisoftheproclamationofmartial law or the
of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao. suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus independent of the actual actions that have
Within the timeline set by Section 18, Article VII of
been taken by Congress jointly or separately?
the Constitution, the President submitted to
Congress on May 25, 2017, a written Report on the
factual basis of Proclamation No. 216. The Report 4.
pointed out that for decades, Mindanao has been Weretheresufficientfactualbasisfortheproclam
plagued with rebellion and lawless violence which ationofmartiallaworthesuspensionofthe privilege of
only escalated and worsened with the passing of the writ of habeas corpus?
time. The Report also highlighted the strategic a. What are the parameters for review?
location of Marawi City and the crucial and b. Who has the burden of proof?
significant role it plays in Mindanao, and the c. What is the threshold of evidence?
Philippines as a whole. In addition, the Report
pointed out the possible tragic repercussions once
Marawi City falls under the control of the lawless 5.
groups. Istheexerciseofthepowerofjudicialreviewbythe
Courtinvolvesthecalibrationofgraduated powers
After the submission of the Report and the granted the President as Commander-in-Chief?
briefings, the Senate issued a resolution
expressing full support to the martial law
proclamation and finding Proclamation No. 216 to 6. May Proclamation No. 216 be
be satisfactory, constitutional and in accordance considered, vague, and thus null and void:
with the law. In the same Resolution, the Senate

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a. with its inclusion of “other rebel
groups”; or
b. since it has no guidelines
specifying its actual operational parameters within
the entire Mindanao region?
7.
ArethearmedhostilitiesmentionedinProclamationNo
.216andintheReportofthePresidentto Congress
sufficient bases;
a. for the existence of actual
rebellion; or
b. for a declaration of martial law or
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus in the entire Mindanao
region?
8. Are terrorism or acts attributable to
terrorism equivalent to actual rebellion and the
requirements of public safety sufficient to declare
martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus?
9. Will nullifying Proclamation No. 216:
a. have the effect of recalling Proclamation No. 55
s. 2016; or
b.
alsonullifytheactsofthePresidentincallingoutthearm
edforcestoquelllawlessviolencein
Marawi and other parts of the Mindanao region?
RULING:
1.
YES.TheuniquefeaturesofthethirdparagraphofSecti
on18,ArticleVIIclearlyindicatethatitshould be
treated as sui generis separate and different from
those enumerated in Article VIII.
Under the third paragraph of Section 18, Article
VII, a petition filed pursuant therewith will follow a
different rule on standing as any citizen may file it.
Said provision of the Constitution also limits the
issue to the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
exercise by the Chief Executive of his emergency
powers. The usual period for filing pleadings in
Petition for Certiorari pursuant to Section 1 or
Section 5 of Article VIII is likewise not applicable
under the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII
considering the limited period within which the
Court has to promulgate its decision.
In fine, the phrase “in an appropriate proceeding:
appearing on the third paragraph of Section 18,
Article VII refers to any action initiated by a citizen
for the purpose of questioning the sufficiency of the
factual basis of the exercise of the Chief Executive's
emergency powers, as in these cases. It could be
denominated as a complaint, a petition, or a matter
to be resolved by the Court.
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2.
a. NO. In determining the sufficiency of
the factual basis of the declaration and/or the
suspension,
the Court should look into the full complement or
totality of the factual basis, and not piecemeal or
individually. Neither should the Court expect absolute
correctness of the facts stated in the proclamation
and in the written Report as the President could not
be expected to verify the accuracy and veracity of all
facts reported to him due to the urgency of the
situation.
To require precision in the President's appreciation of
facts would unduly burden him and therefore impede
the process of his decision-making. Such a
requirement will practically necessitate the President
to be on the ground to confirm the correctness of the
reports submitted to him within a period that only the
circumstances obtaining would be able to dictate.
b.
NO.Eventherecommendationof,orconsultation
with,theSecretaryofNationalDefense,or other high-
ranking military officials, is not a condition for the
President to declare martial law.
A plain reading of Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution shows that the President's power to
declare martial law is not subject to any condition
except for the requirements of actual invasion or
rebellion and that public safety requires it. Besides, it
would be contrary to common sense if the decision of
the President is made dependent on the
recommendation of his mere alter ego. Rightly so, it
is only on the President and no other that the exercise
of the powers of the Commander-in-Chief under
Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution is bestowed.
c. YES. Since the exercise of these
powers is a judgment call of the President, the
determination of the Court as to whether there is
sufficient factual basis for the exercise of the power
to declare martial law and/or suspend the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus, must be based only on
facts or information known by or available to the
President at the time he made the declaration or
suspension which facts or information are found in the
proclamation as well as the written Report submitted
by him to Congress. These may be based on the
situation existing at the time the declaration was
made or past events. As to how far the past events
should be from the present depends on the President.
Similarly, events that happened after the issuance of
the proclamation, which are included in the written
report, cannot be considered in determining the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration of
martial law and/or the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus since these happened after
the President had already issued the proclamation. If
at all, they may be used only as tools, guides or
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reference in the Court's determination of the
sufficiency of factual basis, but not as part or
component of the portfolio of the factual basis
itself.
3.
YES.TheCourtmaystrikedownthepresidentialprocla
mationinanappropriateproceedingfiledby any
citizen on the ground of lack sufficient factual basis.
On the other hand, Congress may revoke the
proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall
not be set aside by the President.
In reviewing the sufficiency of the factual basis of
the proclamation or suspension, the Court
considers only the information and data available
to the President prior to, or at the time of the
declaration; it is not allowed to “undertake an
independent investigation beyond the pleadings.”
On the other hand, Congress may take into
consideration not only data available prior to, but
likewise events supervening the declaration. Unlike
the Court which does not look into the absolute
correctness of the factual basis as will be discussed
below, Congress could probe deeper and further; it
can delve into the accuracy of the facts presented
before it.
In addition, the Court's review power is passive; it
is only initiated by the filing of a petition "in an
appropriate proceeding" by a citizen. On the other
hand, Congress' review mechanism is automatic in
the sense that it may be activated by Congress
itself at any time after the proclamation or
suspension was made.
Thus, the power to review by the Court and the
power to revoke by Congress are not only totally
different but likewise independent from each other
although concededly, they have the same
trajectory, which is, the nullification of the
presidential proclamation. Needless to say, the
power of the Court to review can be exercised
independently from the power of revocation of
Congress.
4.
YES.ThePresidentdeducedfromthefactsavail
abletohimthattherewasanarmedpublicuprising, the
culpable purpose of which was to remove from the
allegiance to the Philippine Government a portion
of its territory and to deprive the Chief Executive of
any of his powers and prerogative, leading the
President to believe that there was probable cause
that the crime of rebellion was and is being
committed and that public safety requires the
imposition of martial law and suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
a. Section 18, Article VII itself sets the
parameters for determining the sufficiency of the
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factual basis for the declaration of martial law and/or
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, "namely (1) actual invasion or rebellion, and
(2) public safety requires the exercise of such
power."170 Without the concurrence of the two
conditions, the President's declaration of martial law
and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus must be struck down.
A review of the aforesaid facts similarly leads the
Court to conclude that the President, in issuing
Proclamation No. 216, had sufficient factual ' bases
tending to show that actual rebellion exists. The
President's conclusion, that there was an armed
public uprising, the culpable purpose of which was the
removal from the allegiance of the Philippine
Government a portion of its territory and the
deprivation of the President from performing his
powers and prerogatives, was reached after a tactical
consideration of the facts. In fine, the President
satisfactorily discharged his burden of proof.
b.
Afterall,whatthePresidentneedstosatisfyisonly
thestandardofprobablecauseforavalid declaration of
martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus.
c. What the President needs to satisfy is
only the standard of probable cause for a valid
declaration of martial law and suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
5.
NO.Thepowerofjudicialreviewdoesnotextendto
calibratingthePresident'sdecisionpertaining to which
extraordinary power to avail given a set of facts or
conditions. To do so would be tantamount to an
incursion into the exclusive domain of the Executive
and an infringement on the prerogative that solely, at
least initially, lies with the President.
6.
a. NO. The term "other rebel groups" in
Proclamation No. 216 is not at all vague when viewed
in the context of the words that accompany it. Verily,
the text of Proclamation No. 216 refers to "other rebel
groups" found in Proclamation No. 55, which it cited
by way of reference in its Whereas clauses.
b. NO. There is no need for the Court to
determine the constitutionality of the implementing
and/or operational guidelines, general orders, arrest
orders and other orders issued after the proclamation
for being irrelevant to its review. Thus, any act
committed under the said orders in violation of the
Constitution and the laws, such as criminal acts or
human rights violations, should be resolved in a
separate proceeding. Finally, there is a risk that if the
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Court wades into these areas, it would be deemed
a trespassing into the sphere that is reserved
exclusively for Congress in the exercise of its power
to revoke.
7.
YES.AreviewofthefactsavailabletothePresid
entthattherewasanarmedpublicuprising,the
culpable purpose of which was to remove from the
allegiance to the Philippine Government a portion
of its territory and to deprive the Chief Executive of
any of his power and prerogatives leading to
President to believe that there was probable cause
that the crime of rebellion was and is being
committed and that public safety requires the
imposition of martial law and suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The
President, in issuing Proclamation No. 216, had
sufficient factual bases tending to show that actual
rebellion exists. The President’s conclusion was
reached after a tactical consideration of the facts.
In fine, the President satisfactorily discharged his
burden of proof. After all, what the President needs
to satisfy is only the standard of probable cause for
a valid declaration of martial law and suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
8.
YES.Foradeclarationofmartiallaworsuspensi
onoftheprivilegeofthewritofhabeascorpusto be
valid, there must be concurrence of actual rebellion
or invasion and the public safety requirement. In
his report, the President noted that the acts of
violence perpetrated by the ASG and the Maute
Group were directed not only against government
forces or establishment but likewise against
civilians and their properties. In addition and in
relation to the armed hostilities, bomb threats were
issued, road blockades and checkpoints were set
up, schools and churches were burned, civilian
hostages were taken and killed, non-Muslim or
Christians were targeted, young male Muslims
were forced to join their group, medical services
and delivery of basic services were hampered,
reinforcement of government troops and civilian
movement were hindered, and the security of the
entire Mindanao Islands was compromised. Based
on the foregoing, Proclamation No. 216 has
sufficient factual basis there being probable cause
to believe that rebellion exists and that public
safety requires the martial law declaration and the
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.
9.
a. NO. The calling out power is in a
different category from the power to declare
martial law and the power to suspend the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus. The Court’s
declaration of a state of national emergency on
account of lawless violence in Mindanao through
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Proclamation No. 55 dated September 4, 2016 where
he called upon the Armed Forces and the Philippine
National Police (PNP) to undertake such measures to
suppress any and all forms of lawless violence from
spreading and escalating elsewhere in the Philippines.
The President’s calling out power is in a different
category from the power to suspend the writ of
habeas corpus and the power to declare martial law.
In other words, the President may exercise the power
to call out the Armed Forces independently of the
power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus and to declare martial law, although, of
course, it may also be precluded to a possible future
exercise of the latter powers, as in this case.
b. NO. Under the “operative fact
doctrine”, the unconstitutional statute is recognized
as an “operative fact” before it is declared
unconstitutional. The actual existence of a statute
prior to such a determination of constitutionality is an
operative fact that may have consequence which
cannot always be erased by a new judicial
declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to
the invalidy may have to be considered in various
aspects- with respect to particular regulations,
individual and corporate and particular conduct,
private and official.
Court Ruling on Martial law on Whole of
Mindanao
We revert back to the premise that the discretion to
determine the territorial scope of martial law lies with
the President. The Constitution grants him the
prerogative whether to put the entire Philippines or
any part thereof under martial law. There is no
constitutional edict that martial law should be
confined only in the particular place where the armed
public uprising actually transpired. This is not only
practical but also logical. Martial law is an urgent
measure since at stake is the nation's territorial
sovereignty and survival. As such, the President has
to respond quickly. After the rebellion in the Court's
compound, he need not wait for another rebellion to
be mounted in Quezon City before he could impose
martial law thereat. If that is the case, then the
President would have to wait until every remote
corner in the country is infested with rebels before he
could declare martial law in the entire Philippines. For
sure, this is not the scenario envisioned by the
Constitution.
Going back to the illustration above, although the
President is not required to impose martial law only
within the Court's compound because it is where the
armed public uprising actually transpired, he may do
so if he sees fit. At the same time, however, he is not
precluded from expanding the coverage of martial law
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beyond the Court's compound. After all, rebellion is

not confined within predetermined bounds.

It is difficult, if not impossible, to fix the territorial

scope of martial law in direct proportion to the
"range" of actual rebellion and public safety simply
because rebellion and public safety have no fixed
physical dimensions. Their transitory and abstract
nature defies precise measurements; hence, the
determination of the territorial scope of martial law
could only be drawn from arbitrary, not fixed,
variables. The Constitution must have considered
these limitations when it granted the President
wide leeway and flexibility in determining the
territorial scope of martial law. Moreover, the
President's duty to maintain peace and public
safety is not limited only to the place where there
is actual rebellion; it extends to other areas where
the present hostilities are in danger of spilling over.
It is not intended merely to prevent the escape of
lawless elements from Marawi City, but also to
avoid enemy reinforcements and to cut their supply
lines coming from different parts of Mindanao.
Thus, limiting the proclamation and/or suspension
to the place where there is actual rebellion would
not only defeat the purpose of declaring martial
law, it will make the exercise thereof ineffective
and useless.

x x x Marawi lies in the heart of Mindanao. In fact,

the Kilometer Zero marker in Mindanao is found in
Marawi City thereby making Marawi City the point
of reference of all roads in Mindanao.
Thus, there is reasonable basis to believe that
Marawi is only the staging point of the rebellion,
both for symbolic and strategic reasons. Marawi
may not be the target but the whole of Mindanao.
As mentioned in the Report, "[l]awless armed
groups have historically used provinces adjoining
Marawi City as escape routes, supply lines, and
backdoor passages;" there is also the plan to
establish a wilayat in Mindanao by staging the
siege of Marawi. The report that prior to May 23,
2017, Abdullah Maute had already dispatched
some of his men to various places in Mindanao,
such as Marawi, Iligan, and Cagayan de Oro for
bombing operations, carnapping, and the murder
of military and police personnel, must also be
considered. Indeed, there is some semblance of
truth to the contention that Marawi is only the
start, and Mindanao the end.

x x x Verily, the Court upholds the validity of the

declaration of martial law and suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire
Mindanao region.

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ALBERT WILSON v. THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
EDUARDO ERMITA
G.R. No. 189220 December 07, 2016
PROCEEDINGS in GR NO. 135915
On September 16, 1996, Wilson, a British national, was accused
and charged with the crime of consummated rape by a 12-year-
old girl, the daughter of his Filipina live-in partner. The girl was
assisted by her biological father in filing the criminal complaint.
Immediately thereafter, Wilson was taken into custody.
RTC: Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape and
was imposed death penalty.
Indemnify the victim an amount of P50, 000.00.
*Pending appeal, Wilson filed with the committee, pursuant to
the Optional Protocol, a case against the RP for violations of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
CA: the Court reversed the ruling of the RTC. It found that there
were serious discrepancies and inconsistent statements
particularly in the testimony given by the victim. It concluded
that there was not enough evidence to support the finding of
guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of rape by Wilson.
THE PRESENT CASE
FACTS:
Wilson was released from detention the day after the acquittal.
He immediately left the Philippines for the United Kingdom
(UK). Upon his return in the UK, Wilson sought compensation
from the Board of Claims (BOC) of the Department of Justice
(DOJ) pursuant to R.A. No. 730916 through counsel as one who
was unjustly accused, convicted and imprisoned but released
by virtue of an acquittal.The BoC-DOJ awarded to Wilson
P14,000.00 as compensation. Wilson was informed of the BoC-
DOJ award and that he had to claim the compensation in person
in the Philippines. Wilson moved for reconsideration arguing
that under R.A. No. 7309, he was entitled to P40,000.00 and
that a memorandum was issued directing the BOC to raise the
award to the maximum amount that may be paid to those
unjustly imprisoned or detained subject to the availability of
funds.
Wilson applied for and was denied a tourist visa to travel to the
Philippines due to his presence in the Bureau of Immigration
(BI) watch list. According to the BI, Wilson's presence in the
watch list could be attributed to his overstaying and his
previous conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude.
The BoC-DOJ, thereafter, issued Resolution No. 2001-25 dated
August 24, 2001 granting Wilson an additional award of
P26,000.00 in addition to the initial amount of P14,000.00
bringing the total award to P40,000.00. The DOJ issued a check
amounting to P26,000.00 representing the additional award.
The check was made out to Wilson, care of the Ambassador of
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UK at the request of the former.
On November 11, 2003, the Committee issued the View. It found
that the allegations falling under Article 14, paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and
6 of the ICCPR were inadmissible. The Committee stated:
9. In accordance with article 2, paragraph 3 (a), of the [ICCPR], the
State party is under an obligation to provide the author with an
effective remedy. In respect of the violations of article 9 the State
party should compensate the author. As to the violations of
articles 7 and 10 suffered while in detention, including subsequent
to sentence of death, the Committee observes that
the compensation provided by the State party under its domestic
law was not directed at these violations, and that compensation
due to the author should take due account both of the seriousness
of the violations and the damage to the author caused. In this
context, the Committee recalls the duty upon the State party to
undertake a comprehensive and impartial investigation of the
issues raised in the course of the author's detention, and to draw
the appropriate penal and disciplinary consequences for the
individuals found responsible. As to the imposition of immigration
fees and visa exclusion, the Committee takes the view that in order
to remedy the violations of the Covenant the State party should
refund to the author the moneys claimed from him. All monetary
compensation thus due to the author by the State party should be
made available for payment to the author at the venue of his
choice, be it within the State party's territory or abroad. The State
party is also under an obligation to avoid similar violations in the
future.
In his letter dated October 20, 2008, Wilson reiterated his June 19,
2008 letter and asked that the payment of compensation be
effected, a comprehensive and impartial investigation be
conducted, and the monies paid by Wilson with respect to
immigration fees and visa exclusion be refunded.
On September 9, 2009, Wilson filed the present petition
for mandamus. He insists his entitlement to the writ
of mandamus owing to the ICCPR and the Optional Protocol. He
argues that by virtue of the doctrine of transformation, the RP is in
breach of an international obligation since any View issued by the
Committee constitutes part of international law and that the RP is
obligated to enforce the same. He prays that:
1. Respondents take steps to ensure that Albert Wilson is
paid and given reparation in the amount sufficient to
compensate him for the torture and abuse he suffered
under the penal system of the Philippines, in compliance
with Philippine treaty obligations in the ICCPR as
embodied in the Communication of the Human Rights
Committee in Case no. 868/1999 in keeping with
international law on reparations.
2. Respondents undertake continual efforts and steps to
ensure that no torture and inhuman and degrading
treatment are suffered by prisoners in the National
Penitentiary and other places of detention and
imprisonment in the Philippines, in the manner laid down
in the Manila Bay case.
3.
ISSUE: Whether Mandamus lie to compel the view?
HELD: NO. The petition is without merit.
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Under Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, mandamus is a
writ issued to compel a tribunal to perform an act which the law
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station, to
wit:
Section 3. Petition for mandamus. - When any tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a
duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully
excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or
office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in
the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying
that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent,
immediately or at some other time to be specified by the court,
to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of the
petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner
by reason of the wrongful acts of the respondent.
The petition shall also contain a sworn certification of non-
forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of Section 3,
Rule 46.
persons who were: (1) unjustly accused, convicted and imprisoned
but released by virtue of an acquittal; (2) unjustly detained and
released without being charged; (3) a victim of arbitrary or illegal
detention and released without being charged; and (4) victim of a
violent crime.42 Under R.A. No. 7309, compensation for victims of
unjust imprisonment or detention will be based on the number of
months of imprisonment. Compensation for each month of
imprisonment shall not exceed P1,000.00.43
It is clear, however, that Wilson has been granted compensation
under R.A. No. 7309. In fact, the BoC-DOJ granted to Wilson the
maximum allowed compensation under that law. It was Wilson's
decision not to collect the money granted to him.
Other than the R.A. No. 7309, under which Wilson had already
been granted compensation, there is no other law or regulation
that forms the basis of such ministerial right that the government
is impelled to grant. Wilson does not present any law by which his
ministerial right arises from with respect to additional
compensation. It is not within this Court's discretion to adjust any
monetary grant arbitrarily.

In Yuvienco v. Hon. Canonoy, etc., et al.,37 and several times

reiterated thereafter, the Court held that a purely ministerial
duty must exist and a clear legal right must be established by
the petitioner for mandamus to lie, to wit:

Two pertinent principles arc well settled in this jurisdiction: (a)

one is that mandamus would lie only to compel a tribunal,
board or officer to comply with a purely ministerial duty, or to
allow a party to exercise a right or to occupy and enjoy the
privileges of an office to which he is lawfully entitled; (b) the
others is that for the writ of mandamus to issue, petitioner
must establish a clear legal right to the relief sought, and a
mandatory duty on the part of the respondent in relation
thereto.

It behooves the Court to examine whether the View dated

November 11, 2003 relied upon by Wilson confers upon him
any legal right which the respondents are ministerially required
to perform but have unlawfully neglected.

No Ministerial Duty

It is well-settled that a ministerial duty must be clear and

specific as to leave no room for the exercise of discretion in its
performance.39 As stated in Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco v. Hon.
Speaker Feliciano R. Belmonte, Jr., Secretary General Marilyn B.
Barua-Yap and Regina Ongsiako Reyes:40

A purely ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or

tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed
manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority,
without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the
propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a
duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how
or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary
and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the
discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official
discretion or judgment.

R.A. No. 7309 was passed on March 30, 1992 creating a BoC-
DOJ to evaluate and investigate claims for compensation for

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RIZALITO Y. DAVID v. SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
AND MARY GRACE POE-LLAMANZARES
G.R. No. 221538, September 20, 2016
Leonen, J.:
FACTS:
Senator Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares is a foundling
whose biological parents are unknown. As an
infant, she was abandoned at the Parish Church of
Jaro, Iloilo. She was later adopted and raised by
spouses FPJ and Susan Roces. She took her college
degree in the USA. She returns to the Philippines
frequently.
On July 29, 1991, Senator Poe decided to settle in
the US with her husband and children and lived
there for some time. She was naturalized and
granted American citizenship on October 18, 2001.
She was subsequently given a United States
passport.
When FPJ ran for President in 2004, she returned
to support her father's candidacy. After the
Elections, she returned to the United States on July
8, 2004.
On December 14, 2004, FPJ died. She stayed in the
country until February 3, 2005 to attend her
father's funeral and to attend to the settling of his
estate.
In 2004, Senator Poe resigned from work in the
United States and decided to return home in 2005.
She came back on May 24, 2005. On July 7, 2006,
she took the Oath of Allegiance to Republic of the
Philippines
In July 2006, her Petition for Retention and or Re-
acquisition of Philippine Citizenship and derivative
citizenship on behalf of her three children were
granted. Senator Poe became a registered voter of
Barangay Santa Lucia, San Juan City on August 31,
2006.
Senator Poe made several trips to the United
States of America between 2006 and 2009 using
her United States Passport. She used her passport
"after having taken her Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic on 07 July 2006, but not after she has
formally renounced her American citizenship on 20
October 2010.
On October 6, 2010, President Aquino appointed
Senator Poe as Chairperson of the Movie and
Television Review and Classification Board
(MTRCB). On October 20, 2010, Senator Poe
executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance
to the United States of America and Renunciation
of American Citizenship.
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Senator Poe executed an Oath/Affirmation of
Renunciation of Nationality of the United States on
July 12, 2011.
Senator Poe decided to run as Senator in the 2013
Elections and eventually won.
David, a losing candidate in the 2013 Senatorial
Elections, filed before the Senate Electoral Tribunal a
Petition for Quo Warranto on August 6, 2015. He
contested the election of Senator Poe for failing to
"comply with the citizenship and residency
requirements mandated by the Constitution.
On November 17, 2015, the Senate Electoral Tribunal
promulgated its assailed Decision finding Senator Poe
to be a natural-born citizen and, therefore, qualified
to hold office as Senator.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether Grace Poe is eligible to sit as a
Senator
HELD: Voting 9-3, the high court ruled in favor of
Poe.
From the deliberations of the 1934 Constitutional
Convention on citizenship, it was never the intention
of the framers to exclude foundlings from natural-
born citizenship status.
“Children or people born in a country of unknown
parents are citizens of this nation” and the only
reason that there was no specific reference to
foundlings in the 1935 provision was that these cases
“are few and far in between.” Evident intent was to
adopt the concept found in the Spanish Code “wherein
all children of unknown parentage born in Spanish
territory are considered Spaniards, because the
presumption is that a child of unknown parentage is
the son of a Spaniard.”
Under Art. 14 of the Hague Convention of 1930 (on
Conflict of Nationality Laws), a foundling is presumed
to have been born on the territory of the State in
which it was found until the contrary is proved.
Although the Philippines is not a signatory to said
convention, its provisions are binding as they form
part of the law of the land pursuant to the
incorporation clause. Senator Roxas in the 1934
Constitutional Convention remarked “By international
law the principle that children or people born in a
country of unknown parents are citizens in this nation
is recognized…” By referring to this rule in
international law (which was no other than Art. 14 of
the Hague Convention of 1930), what was effectively
created in the Constitution itself, was an exception to
the general rule of natural-born citizenship based on
blood descent.

Hence, foundlings (children born in the Philippines
with unknown parentage) were, by birth, accorded
natural-born citizenship by the Constitution.
“natural-born citizens by legal fiction”The framers
of the Constitution were sufficiently empowered to
create a class of natural-born citizens by legal
fiction, as an exception to the jus sanguinis rule.
This is evident from Art. 1 (State to determine who
are its nationals) and Art. 2 (questions on
nationality to be determined by the law of that
State) of the 1930 Hague Convention.
Poe validly reacquired her natural-born Filipino
citizenship upon taking her Oath of Allegiance to
the Republic, as required under Section 3, R.A. No.
9225. Before assuming her position as MTRCB
Chairman, Poe executed an affidavit
renunciation of foreign citizenship. This was
sufficient to qualify her for her appointive position,
and later, her elective office as R.A. No. 9225 did
not require that her Certificate of Loss of
Nationality filed before the U.S. Embassy be first
approved in order that she may qualify for office.
Records of the Bureau of Immigration show that
Poe still used her U.S. passport after having taken
her Oath of Allegiance but not after she has
renounced her U.S. Citizenship.
Yung SC may jurisdiction sya na ireview yung
decisions ng SET – JUDICIAL REVIEW
Exclusive, original jurisdiction over contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications
of the elective officials falling within the scope of
their powers is, thus, vested in these electoral
tribunals. It is only before them that post-election
challenges against the election, returns, and
qualifications of Senators and Representatives (as
well as of the President and the Vice-President, in
the case of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal) may
be initiated.
The judgments of these tribunals are not beyond
the scope of any review. Article VI, Section 17's
stipulation of electoral tribunals' being the "sole"
judge must be read in harmony with Article VIII,
Section 1's express statement that "[j]udicial
power includes the duty of the courts of justice . .
. to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government." Judicial review
is, therefore, still possible.
Ang paulit ulit sinasabi ni Dean Albano about sa
case na ito ay yung circumstantial evidence lang
daw yung ginamit para ma prove yung citizenship
ni Grace Poe.
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V. F
Private respondent has done this. The evidence she
adduced in these proceedings attests to how at least
one—if not both—of her biological parents were
Filipino citizens.
Proving private respondent's biological parentage is
now practically impossible. To begin with, she was
abandoned as a newborn infant. She was abandoned
almost half a century ago. By now, there are only a
handful of those who, in 1968, were able-minded
adults who can still lucidly render testimonies on the
of circumstances of her birth and finding. Even the
identification of individuals against whom DNA
evidence may be tested is improbable, and by sheer
economic cost, prohibitive.
However, our evidentiary rules admit of alternative
means for private respondent to establish her
parentage.
In lieu of direct evidence, facts may be proven
through circumstantial evidence. In Suerte-Felipe v.
People:185
Direct evidence is that which proves the fact in
dispute without the aid of any inference or
presumption; while circumstantial evidence is the
proof of fact or facts from which, taken either singly
or collectively, the existence of a particular fact in
dispute may be inferred as a necessary or probable
consequence.186chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
People v. Raganas187 further defines circumstantial
evidence:
Circumstantial evidence is that which relates to a
series of facts other than the fact in issue, which by
experience have been found so associated with such
fact that in a relation of cause and effect, they lead
us to a satisfactory conclusion.188
Rule 133, Section 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence,
for instance, stipulates when circumstantial evidence
is sufficient to justify a conviction in criminal
proceedings:
Section 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient.
— Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction
if:
(a) There is more than one circumstances;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived
are proven; and
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(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such
as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt.
Although the Revised Rules on Evidence's sole
mention of circumstantial evidence is in reference
to criminal proceedings, this Court has
nevertheless sustained the use of circumstantial
evidence in other proceedings.189 There is no
rational basis for making the use of circumstantial
evidence exclusive to criminal proceedings and for
not considering circumstantial facts as valid means
for proof in civil and/or administrative proceedings.
In criminal proceedings, circumstantial evidence
suffices to sustain a conviction (which may result
in deprivation of life, liberty, and property)
anchored on the highest standard or proof that our
legal system would require, i.e., proof beyond
reasonable doubt. If circumstantial evidence
suffices for such a high standard, so too may it
suffice to satisfy the less stringent standard of
proof in administrative and quasi-judicial
proceedings such as those before the Senate
Electoral Tribunal, i.e., substantial
evidence.190chanrobleslaw
following table is support of his statistical
inference:196
NUMBER OF FOREIGN AND FILIPINO CHILDREN
BORN IN THE PHILIPPINES: 1965-1975 and 2010-
2014
Thus, out of the 900,165 recorded births in the
Philippines in 1968, only 1,595 or 0.18% newborns
were foreigners. This translates to roughly 99.8%
probability that private respondent was born a Filipino
citizen.
Given the sheer difficulty, if not outright impossibility,
of identifying her parents after half a century, a range
of substantive proof is available to sustain a
reasonable conclusion as to private respondent's
parentage.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is
DISMISSED. Public respondent Senate Electoral
Tribunal did not act without or in excess of its
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
rendering its assailed November 17, 2015 Decision
and December 3, 2015 Resolution.
Private respondent Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares is a
natural-born Filipino citizen qualified to hold office as
Senator of the Republic.
SO ORDERED.

Private respondent was found as a newborn infant

outside the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo on
September 3, 1968.191 In 1968, Iloilo, as did
most—if not all—Philippine provinces, had a
predominantly Filipino population.192 Private
respondent is described as having "brown almond-
shaped eyes, a low nasal bridge, straight black hair
and an oval-shaped face."193 She stands at 5 feet
and 2 inches tall.194 Further, in 1968, there was
no international airport in Jaro, Iloilo.

These circumstances are substantial evidence

justifying an inference that her biological parents
were Filipino. Her abandonment at a Catholic
Church is more or less consistent with how a
Filipino who, in 1968, lived in a predominantly
religious and Catholic environment, would have
behaved. The absence of an international airport in
Jaro, Iloilo precludes the possibility of a foreigner
mother, along with a foreigner father, swiftly and
surreptitiously coming in and out of Jaro, Iloilo just
to give birth and leave her offspring there. Though
proof of ethnicity is unnecessary, her physical
features nonetheless attest to it.

In the other related case of Poe-Llamanzares v.

Commission on Elections,195 the Solicitor General
underscored how it is statistically more probable
that private respondent was born a Filipino citizen
rather than as a foreigner. He submitted the

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Rep. Baguilat vs Speaker Alvarez
GR. No. 227757 July 25, 2017
Perlas-Bernabe, J.:
FACTS:
1. Prior to the opening of the 17th Congress on July
2017, news surfaced that Rep. Suarez sought
endorsement from President Duterte for his
appointment as Minority Leader in the House. That
to this effect, some members of the House Majority
coalition feigned membership in the Minority to
ensure appointment of Rep. Suarez.
2. Prior to the election of the House Speaker, then-
acting floor Leader Rep. Fariñas and Rep. Atienza
agreed that all who voted for the winning speaker
shall be members of Majority and all who will
abstain or vote in favor of other candidates will be
members of the minority, no one objected.
3. Rep. Alvarez won the election of House Speaker
with 252 votes. Rep. Baguilat got eight votes, Rep.
Suarez got 7 and 21 abstained.
4. Herein petitioners hoped that the long-standing
tradition where the second candidate who garnered
the second highest vote automatically becomes
Minority Leader, in this case, Rep. Baguilat. Despite
numerous follow-ups from House Speaker Alvarez,
Baguilat was never recognized as such.
5. One of the abstentionists, Rep. Abayon,
manifested that all those who did not vote for
Alvarez have voted for Suarez as minority leader.
Fariñas moved for the recognition of Suarez but
Rep. Lagman opposed on the ground that Suarez
is a majority member, hence cannot be voted in
the minority and that those who voted for him are
independent members.
6. Petitioners filed herein Petition for Mandamus to
the Supreme Court for the recognition of Baguilat
as minority leader on the ground of the
aforementioned long-standing tradition and
irregularities in the election of Suarez.
7. Suarez maintains that the court has no
jurisdiction as the election of Minority is an internal
matter to the HoR. The OSG, in behalf of the
respondents insisted that the principle of
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separation of powers and political question applies to
the instant question.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondents may be
compelled via mandamus to recognize Rep. Baguilat
as the Minority leader.
HELD:
No, Mandamus is an extraordinary relief to one who
has a CLEAR legal right to the performance of the act
to be compelled which is not attendant in this case.
The election proceeded without anyone objecting to
the agreement between Fariñas and Atienza stating
that all who voted for the winning speaker shall be
members of Majority and all who will abstain or vote
in favor of other candidates will be members of the
minority. This unobjected procession was reflected in
the Journal of the house, which according to
jurisprudence is conclusive.
Moreover, Section 16, (1), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution provides that: 1. The Senate shall elect
its President and the House of Representatives, its
Speaker, by a majority vote of all its respective
Members. Each House shall choose such other officers
as it may deem necessary.
Under this provision, the house may decide to have
officers other than the Speaker and that the method
and manner as to how these officers are chosen is
something within its sole control. In the case of
Defensor-Santiago vs Guingona, the court observed
that the Constitution is dead silent on how the
election of all leaders except the House Speaker must
be done.
Corollary, paragraph 3 of the same section in Article
16 vests in the HoR the sole Authority to determine
the rules of proceedings, as they are subject to
revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of
the House. As a general rule, the court has no
authority to interfere and unilaterally intrude into that
exclusive realm. As an exception, it may strike down
such determination in case of grave abuse of
discretion, which is not present herein. As may be
gleaned from the circumstances of the case as to how
the house conducted the questioned proceedings,
such grave abuse of discretion is absent. To rule
otherwise will not only embroil this court to the real
of Politics but will will breach the separation of powers
doctrine.
Wherefore, the petition is DISMISSED.
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Alexander Padilla vs. Congress
G.R. No. 231671 25 July 2017
Leonardo-De Castro, J.:
FACTS:
On May 23, 2017, President Duterte issued
Proclamation No. 216, declaring a state of martial
law and suspending the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus in the Mindanao group of islands on
the grounds of rebellion and necessity of public
safety pursuant to Article VII, Section 18 of the
1987 Constitution.
Within forty-eight ( 48) hours after the
proclamation, or on May 25, 2017, and while the
Congress was in session, President Duterte
transmitted his "Report relative to Proclamation
No. 216 dated 23 May 2017" (Report) to the
Senate, through Senate President Pimentel, and
the House of Representatives, through House
Speaker Pantaleon D. Alvarez (House Speaker
Alvarez).
On May 30, 2017, the Senate deliberated on these
proposed resolutions: (a) Proposed Senate (P.S.)
Resolution No. 388, which expressed support for
President Duterte’s Proclamation No. 216; and (b)
P.S. Resolution No. 390, which called for the
convening in joint session of the Senate and the
House of Representatives to deliberate on
President Duterte's Proclamation No. 216.
P.S. Resolution No. 388 was approved, after
receiving seventeen (17) affirmative votes as
against five (5) negative votes, and was adopted
as Senate Resolution No. 49 entitled "Resolution
Expressing the Sense of the Senate Not to Revoke,
at this Time, Proclamation No. 216, Series of 2017,
Entitled 'Declaring a State of Martial Law and
Suspending the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus in the Whole of Mindanao. " P.S. Resolution
No. 390, on the other hand, garnered only nine (9)
votes from the senators who were in favor of it as
opposed to twelve (12) votes from the senators
who were against its approval and adoption.
After the closed-door briefing, the House of
Representatives resumed its regular meeting and
deliberated on House Resolution No. 1050 entitled
"Resolution Expressing the Full Support of the
House of Representatives to President Rodrigo
Duterte as it Finds No Reason to Revoke
Proclamation No. 216, Entitled 'Declaring a State of
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Martial Law and Suspending the Privilege of the Writ
of Habeas Corpus in the Whole of Mindanao. '" The
House of Representatives proceeded to divide its
members on the matter of approving said resolution
through viva voce voting. The result shows that the
members who were in favor of passing the subject
resolution secured the majority vote. The House of
Representatives also purportedly discussed the
proposal calling for a joint session of the Congress to
deliberate and vote on President Duterte's
Proclamation No. 216. After the debates, however,
the proposal was rejected.
These series of events led to the filing of the present
consolidated petitions.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the
subject matter of these consolidated petitions;
YES
2. Whether or not the petitions satisfy the requisites
for the Court’s exercise of its power of judicial
review; YES
3. Whether or not the Congress has the mandatory
duty to convene jointly upon the President’s
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of Habeas Corpus under
Art. 7, Sec. 18 of the 1987 Constitution(MAIN
ISSUE); NO and
4. Whether or not a writ of mandamus or certiorari
may be issued in the present cases. NO
HELD:
1. YES. Contrary to respondents' protestations, the
Court's exercise of jurisdiction over these petitions
cannot be deemed as an unwarranted intrusion into
the exclusive domain of the Legislature. Bearing in
mind that the principal substantive issue presented in
the cases at bar is the proper interpretation of Article
VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution, particularly
regarding the duty of the Congress to vote jointly
when the President declares martial law and/or
suspends the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,
there can be no doubt that the Court may take
jurisdiction over the petitions. It is the prerogative of
the Judiciary to declare "what the law is.
2. YES.
3. NO. The Congress is not constitutionally mandated
to convene in joint session except to vote to revoke
the President’s Declaration or suspension.
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martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the

writ of habeas corpus and grants the Congress the
Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution fully
power to revoke, as well as extend, the proclamation
reads:
and/or; and vests upon the Judiciary the power to
review the sufficiency of the factual basis for such
proclamation and/or suspension.
Sec. 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-
Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and
whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out
There are four provisions in Article VII, Section 18 of
such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
the 1987 Constitution specifically pertaining to the
violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion
role of the Congress when the President proclaims
or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he
martial law and/or suspends the privilege of the writ
may, for a period not exceeding sixty days,
of habeas corpus, viz. :
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
or place the Philippines or any part thereof under a. Within forty-eight ( 48) hours from the
martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in
President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress;
writing to the Congress.
b. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least
a majority of all its Members in regular or special
session, may revoke such proclamation or
The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least
suspension, which revocation shall not be set
a majority of all its Members in regular or special
aside by the President;
session, may revoke such proclamation or
suspension which revocation shall not be set aside c. Upon the initiative of the_ President, the
by the President. Upon the initiative of the Congress may, in the same manner. extend such
President, the Congress may, in the same manner, proclamation or suspension for a period to be
extend such proclamation or suspension for a determined by the Congress, if the invasion or
period to be determined by the Congress, if the rebellion shall persist; and
invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety
d. The Congress, if not in session, shall within
requires it.
twenty four hours (24) following such
proclamation or suspension, convene in
accordance with its rules without need of call.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within
twenty-four hours following such proclamation or
suspension, convene in accordance with its rules
without need of a call. There is no question herein that the first provision
was complied with, as within forty-eight (48) hours
from the issuance on May 23, 2017 by President
Duterte of Proclamation No. 216, declaring a state of
Outside explicit constitutional limitations, the
martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ
Commander-in-Chief clause in Article VII, Section
of habeas corpus in Mindanao, copies of President
18 of the 1987 Constitution vests on the President,
Duterte's Report relative to Proclamation No. 216 was
as Commander-in Chief, absolute authority over
transmitted to and received by the Senate and the
the persons and actions of the members of the
House of Representatives on May 25, 2017. The Court
armed forces, in recognition that the President, as
will not touch upon the third and fourth provisions as
Chief Executive, has the general responsibility to
these concern factual circumstances which arc not
promote public peace, and as Commander-in-
availing in the instant petitions. The petitions at bar
Chief, the more specific duty to prevent and
involve the initial proclamation of martial law and
suppress rebellion and lawless violence. However,
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
to safeguard against possible abuse by the
corpus, and not their extension; and the Congress
President of the exercise of his power to proclaim
was still in session 68 when President Duterte issued
martial law and/or suspend the privilege of the writ
Proclamation No .. 216 on May 23, 2017.
of habeas corpus, the 1987 Constitution, through
the same provision, institutionalized checks and
balances on the President's power through the two
It is the second provision that is under judicial
other co-equal and independent branches of
scrutiny herein: “The Congress, voting jointly, by a
government, i.e., the Congress and the Judiciary.
vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular
In particular, Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987
or special session, may revoke such proclamation or
Constitution requires the President to submit a
report to the Congress after his proclamation of

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suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside
by the President.”
A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that
when the law is clear and free from any doubt or
ambiguity, there is no room for construction or
interpretation. There is only room for application.
According to the plain meaning rule or verba legis,
when the statute is clear, plain, and free from
ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and
applied without attempted interpretation. It is
expressed in the maxims index animi sermo or
"speech is the index of intention[,]" and verba legis
non est recedendum or "from the words of a
statute there should be no departure.”
The provision in question is clear, plain, and
unambiguous. In its literal and ordinary meaning,
the provision grants the Congress the power to
revoke the President's proclamation of martial law
or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus and prescribes how the Congress
may exercise such power, i.e., by a vote of at least
a majority of all its Members, voting jointly, in a
regular or special session. The use of the word
"may" in the provision - such that "[t]he Congress
x x x may revoke such proclamation or suspension
x x x" - is to be construed as permissive and
operating to confer discretion on the Congress on
whether or not to revoke, but in order to revoke,
the same provision sets the requirement that at
least a majority of the Members of the Congress,
voting jointly, favor revocation.
It is worthy to stress that the provision does not
actually refer to a "joint session.” While it may be
conceded, subject to the discussions below, that
the phrase “voting jointly" shall already be
understood to mean that the joint voting will be
done "in joint session," notwithstanding the
absence of clear language in the Constitution, still,
the requirement that “[t]he Congress, voting
jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its
Members in regular or special session, x x x"
explicitly applies only to the situation when the
Congress revokes the President's proclamation of
martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus. Simply put, the provision
only requires Congress to vote jointly on the
revocation of the President's proclamation and/or
suspension.
Hence, the plain language of the subject
constitutional provision does not support the
petitioners' argument that it is obligatory for the
Congress to convene in joint session following the
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President's proclamation of martial law and/or
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, under all circumstances.
4. NO. It is essential to the issuance of a writ of
mandamus that petitioner should have a clear legal
right to the thing demanded and it must be the
imperative duty of the respondent to perform the act
required. Mandamus never issues in doubtful cases.
While it may not be necessary that the ministerial
duty be absolutely expressed, it must however, be
clear. The writ neither confers powers nor imposes
duties. It is simply a command to exercise a power
already possessed and to perform a duty already
imposed.
Although there are jurisprudential examples of the
Court issuing a writ of mandamus to compel the
fulfillment of legislative duty, we must distinguish the
present controversy with those previous cases. In this
particular instance, the Court has no authority to
compel the Senate and the House of Representatives
to convene in joint session absent a clear ministerial
duty on its part to do so under the Constitution and
in complete disregard of the separate actions already
undertaken by both Houses on Proclamation No. 216,
including their respective decisions to no longer hold
a joint session, considering their respective
resolutions not to revoke said Proclamation.
In the same vein, there is no cause for the Court to
grant a writ of certiorari.
As earlier discussed, under the Court's expanded
jurisdiction, a petition for certiorari is a proper
remedy to question the act of any branch or
instrumentality of the government on the ground of
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the
government, even if the latter does not exercise
judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions.95
Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment as to be equivalent to
lack or excess of jurisdiction; in other words, power
is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by
reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility;
and such exercise is so patent or so gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual
refusal either to perform the duty enjoined or to act
at all in contemplation of law. It bears to mention that
to pray in one petition for the issuance of both a writ
of mandamus and a writ of certiorari for the very
same act - which, in the Tafiada Petition, the non-
convening by the two Houses of the Congress in joint
session - is contradictory, as the former involves a
mandatory duty which the government branch or
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instrumentality must perform without discretion,

while the latter recognizes discretion on the part of
the government branch or instrumentality but
which was exercised arbitrarily or despotically.
Nevertheless, if the Court is to adjudge the petition
for certiorari alone, it still finds the same to be
without merit. To reiterate, the two Houses of the
Congress decided to no longer hold a joint session
only after deliberations among their Members and
putting the same to vote, in accordance with their
respective rules of procedure. Premises
considered, the Congress did not gravely abuse its
discretion when it did not jointly convene upon the
President's issuance of Proclamation No. 216 prior
to expressing its concurrence thereto.

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