Burawoy, The Functions and Reproduction of Migrant Labor' 1976

The Functions and Reproduction of Migrant Labor: Comparative Material from Southern
Africa and the United States

Author(s): Michael Burawoy
Source: American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 81, No. 5 (Mar., 1976), pp. 1050-1087
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
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The Functions and Reproduction of Migrant Labor:
Comparative Material from Southern Africa
and the United States1
Michael Burawoy
Universityof Chicago
For a capitalisteconomyto function, its labor forcemustbe main-

tained;thatis,workers mustreceivea historically determined minimal
day-to-daysubsistence.It mustalso be renewed;that is, vacancies
mustbe filled.A systemof migrantlabor is characterizedby the
institutional and physicalseparationof the processes
differentiation
of renewaland maintenance.Accordingly, migrantlabor entails a
dual dependenceupon employment in one place and an alternate
economyand/or state in another.In addition,the separationof
migrantworkersfromtheirfamiliesis implied.It is enforcedthrough
specificlegal and politicalmechanismswhichregulategeographical
mobilityand impose restrictions on the occupationalmobilityof
migrants. These mechanisms in turnare madepossibleby themigrant
workers'powerlessnessin the place of employment, in the labor
market,and underthe legal and politicalsystemswherethey are
employed.One consequenceof a systemof migrantlabor is the
externalization,to an alternateeconomyand/or state, of certain
costs of labor-forcerenewal-costsnormallyborneby the employer
and/orstate of employment. This framework is developedand ap-
plied to migrantfarmworkersin Californiaand migrantminework-
ers in South Africa.The differences betweenthe two systemsare
highlighted and analyzed in termsof the broaderfeaturesof the
Finally,the implications
respectivesocial structures. of the theoreti-
cal schemeare discussedand extendedto an interpretation of race
relations.
Traditionally,studiesof labor migrationhave adoptedthe perspectiveof

theindividualmigrant. This has involvedtheexamination of twoquestions:
thereasonsformigration and its consequencesat thelevelof theindividual
or group.In answerto thefirstquestion,it has generallybeen assumedthat
individualsrespondto the "push" and "pull" factorsassociatedwiththe
market.Withregardto the secondquestion,attentionis directedto prob-
1 This paper originatedwith the ideas and work of Jaap van Velsen and was later
stimulatedby Harold Wolpe. I owe the greatestdebt to Adam Przeworski,who read
and criticizedsuccessivedraftsand helped in placing the analysis in a broad theoretical
framework.I am also gratefulto a numberof personswho were kind enough to com-
ment on various versionsof the paper, forcingme to reformulatemany aspects of the
problem: Manuel Castells,William K. Cummings,Terence Halliday, Ida Susser,William
J. Wilson, and two anonymousreferees.
1050 AJS Volume 81 Number5

MigrantLabor: Functionsand Reproduction
lems of adaptation,assimilation,and acculturationof the newlyarrived

migrant.In each instance,individualsare conceptualizedas activelyre-
spondingto environmental forces,maximizingtheirindividualinterests,
and in thissenseexercising controlovertheirown destiny.Althoughthese
formulations are important,theyare too restricted
to clarifythe function-
ing of a systemof migrantlaboreitherin its broadersocial,political,and
economiccontextsor wherethe flowof labor is regulatedto a greateror
lesserextentto suit dominantpoliticaland economicinterests.
The shortcomings of conventionalanalysis are particularlyapparent
withregardto migrantlaborersin thefieldsof Californiaor thegold mines
of SouthAfrica,wherespecificpoliticalmechanismsregulatetheirmove-
mentbetweenindustryand "home."Accordingly, whatis of interestis not
how migrantsadapt to theirnewenvironment but howstructural, particu-
larlypoliticaland legal,constraintsmake permanent "integration" impos-
sible. The issues are not ones of assimilationand acculturationbut of
enforcedsegregationthroughsuch "total" institutions as the compound
and labor camp and the corresponding persistenceof race and ethnicdif-
ferentiation.The individualcannot be conceivedof as a rationalactor
maximizinginterestsunder marketforces.Instead, the flowof labor is
directedby supramarket institutions
beyondthe controlof an individual
or evena groupof migrants. For thesereasons,theanalysisof suchsystems
ofmigrant laborrequiresa different
perspective:one focusingon thenature
of externalcoerciveinstitutionsand theirmodeof organization.The devel-
opmentof suchan approachis thepurposeof thispaper.
THEORETICAL INTRODUCTION
For an economyto function,

a laborforcehas to be maintained
and renewed.
In otherwords,workershave to subsistfromday to day, and vacancies
createdby theirdeparturefromor by the expansionof the labor force
mustbe filledby new recruits.Undercapitalismthe distinctionbetween
these two elementsof the reproductionof labor poweris normallycon-
cealed.2The same institutionssimultaneously performboth renewaland
2 The concept of "reproduction"is central to this paper and will be used in two em-
pirical contexts,those of labor power and systemsof migrantlabor. In each context,
reproductionpresupposesthe existenceof what is being reproduced.It expressesa pre-
occupation with continuity,persistence,and above all repetition.The concept is
motivatedby the view "that nothingwhich exists is natural (in the nonhabitualsense
of the word), but ratherexists because of the existenceof certain conditions,whose
disappearance cannot remain without consequences" (Gramsci 1971, p. 158). Social
relations,labor power,systemsof migrantlabor, etc.,do not merelyexistbut have to be
produced again and again-that is, reproduced.Analysisof the conditionsof reproduc-
tion entailsexamininghow different levels or regionsof the social structureinterconnect
so as to ensure the repetitionof the particularprocess of "producing" labor power,
1051

AmericanJournalof Sociology
maintenancefunctions.For example,the distinctionbetweenthe rearing

of childrenand the day-to-daysustenanceof theproductiveworkeris not
normallyinscribedin the organizationof the family.On the contrary,
domesticworksimultaneously providesforboth maintenanceand renewal
requirements of the labor force.Equally,in theprovisionof welfare,hous-
ing,and urbanamenitiessuch as transportation, the state simultaneously
performs both maintenanceand renewal.Only in a fewinstitutions such
as the schoolare renewalprocessesclearlyseparatedfromthoseof main-
tenance.As indicatedin the distribution of familywelfarebenefits,even
the industrialenterprise tendsto treatthe day-to-daymaintenanceof the
labor forceand the creationof a futureone as thoughtheyconstituted a
singleprocess.
By contrast,the organization of migrantlabor not onlymakesthe dis-
tinctionapparentbut is evendefinedby the separationof theprocessesof
maintenancefromthose of renewal.How does this separationmanifest
itself?First,the twoprocessestake place in geographically separateloca-
tions.Second,at the level of the institutions of reproduction, the institu-
tionsof maintenancemay be verydifferent fromthoseof renewal,or a
singleinstitution may continueto engagein both processes.To take the
familyas an exampleof the latterpossibility, geographicalseparationof
thetwoprocessesis reflected in a correspondingdivisionof laborand inter-
nal differentiation
ofthefamilyunit.Thus,forMexicanmigrants, processes
of renewalare organizedunderthe Mexicanstatein the Mexicaneconomy
and thoseof maintenance in the UnitedStates.Yet the kinshipgroupre-
mains a singlecohesiveunit despiteits internaldifferentiation. What is
important forthispaper is thatthe activitiesof maintenanceand renewal
are separated.
They remain,however,indissolublyinterdependent, as reflectedin the
oscillatorymovement of migrants betweenworkand home.Undercapital-
ism the bindingof productionand reproduction is achievedthrougheco-
nomicnecessity:forthelaboringpopulation,workis necessaryforsurvival;
underfeudalismthe unification is achievedthroughcoerciveregulation.A
systemof migrantlabor containselementsof each. On the one hand,re-
newalprocessesare dependenton incomeleftoverfrommaintenance, which
is remitted homeby theproductiveworker.On theotherhand,productive
workersrequirecontinuedsupportfromtheirfamiliesengagedin renewal
systemsof migrantlabor, etc. While what is being reproducedhas invariantcharac-

teristics,the conditionsforits reproductionmay have to be modified.Thus, as we shall
see, while the definitionof a systemof migrantlabor entails the specificationof a set
of invariant features,the conditionsof reproductionwill vary between societies and
over time.In additionto Marx's treatmentin Capital, an importantdiscussionof repro-
ductionis to be foundin Balibar (1970, chap. 3).
1052

at home,because theyhave no permanentlegal or politicalstatusat the

place of work.In otherwords,the state3organizesthe dependenceof the
productiveworkeron thereproductive worker, whiletheeconomyorganizes
the dependenceof thereproductive workeron the productiveworker.The
interdependence establishesthe cohesionof the family.Similarties link
thestatesupplying laborand thestateemploying labor: theformer requires
revenueand employment foritspopulation,thelatterrequireslaborat low
wage rates.
In the following sections,I exploretwo implicationsof the separation
of themaintenance and renewalprocesses.The firstconcernsthe functions
of migrantlabor.Undersucha systemcostsof renewal,normallyborneby
the employing state and economy,are to a considerabledegreeborneby
anothereconomyor anotherstate or a combinationof the two. Further-
more,the employerof migrantlabor is neitherresponsiblepoliticallynor
accountablefinancially to the externalpoliticaland economicsystems.In
otherwords,a proportion of thecostsof renewalis externalizedto an alter-
nateeconomyand/orstate.The secondimplication concernstheconditions
forthe reproduction of a systemof migrantlabor namely,the reproduc-
tionof its definingcharacteristic, the separationof maintenanceand re-
newalprocesses.
The two systemsof migrantlabor werechosennot fortheirsimilarity
but fortheircontrast, witha viewto highlighting theinvariantcharacteris-
tics theyshare.Furthermore, I hope to showthatan analysisfoundedon
examination of theconditionsforthereproduction of theinvariantcharac-
teristics
leads to a betterunderstanding of thepeculiarities
of theindividual
system;thatis, differences arise out of the interplaybetweenthe under-
3 The notion of the capitalist state used here derives from Poulantzas (1973) and
Przeworski.For our purposes,the capitalist state is constitutedof formalinstitutions,
each with an internalcoherenceand relative autonomy,which in combinationpossess
the monopolyof universallybindingrules to which forcemay be applied. Throughout
the paper I associate the state with the organizationof the reproductionof systemsof
migrantlabor, thus unavoidably conferringupon it a monolithicquality it does not in
practice possess. Althoughthis is no place to elaborate on a theoryof the capitalist
state,two points are in order.First,I do not regardit as necessarythat the capitalist
statebe an "instrument"of the economicallydominantclass. Though thereare instances,
particularlyin the case of migrantlabor in California,in which the state does indeed
appear to be an instrumentof the economicallydominantclass, this is not implied by
our definitionof the capitaliststate. On the contrary,it is the relativeautonomyof the
capitaliststate whichis centralto its operation.Indeed, the discussionof migrantlabor
in South Africamentionssignificant occasionswhen the state clearlyacted in opposition
to the interestsof the mine owners.Therefore,I propose a tentativeformulationof the
functionof the capitaliststate: in normal times it preservesthe cohesion of a society
as a whole. Second, it is a state in which a societyis divided into classes; therefore,
it
reflectsto some extentthe interestsand strugglesof all classes, if only to preservethe
stabilityof the whole.
1053

lyingstructureand the particularpoliticaland economiccontext.More

I arguethatobservedpatternsof relationsamongraces,classes,
specifically,
and fractions of classesemergeout of an interaction
betweentheorganiza-
tionof the separationof maintenancefromrenewalprocessesand certain
featuresof theparticularindustry and theparticularstate.
MINE WORKERS IN SOUTH AFRICA
The South Africangold mines,firstcommercially exploitedin the last

decade of the 19th century,have reliedon two typesof migrantlabor.
On theone hand,unskilledtaskshave been and continueto be performed
by Africanlabor recruitedfromthe rural hinterlandand surrounding
territories(see Wilson 1972a, p. 70, forexact distributionby geographic
location). Once cajoled into sellingtheirlabor powerby expropriation of
land, imposition of taxation,and similarnonmarket inducements, African
workersbecameattractedto wage employment as a way of makingup or
supplementing theirmeans of subsistence(Horwitz 1967, chap. 2). On
theotherhand,whitelabor,initiallyrecruited fromBritain,was employed
in skilledand supervisory positions.Justas craftunionsat thattimehad
a powerfulmonopolyof a sectorof the Britishlabor market,so the white
workersof South Africa,in part influenced by theirexperienceat home,
formed a unionto protecttheirpositionsfromcompetition fromblacklabor
(Simons and Simons 1969, chap. 3). Althoughmine ownerswished to
advanceblacksintomoreskilledoccupations,theirefforts wereobstructed
as earlyas 1893 by thelegal enforcement of the colorbar whichreserved
a rangeof jobs forwhiteworkers.As the miningindustryexpanded,the
colorbar becamean entrenched featureof the occupationalstructure,bar-
ringblacks fromadvancementinto skilledand even semiskilledjobs and
stipulatingan upper limitto the employment ratio of blacks to whites
(Wilson 1972a, pp. 110-19). On a numberof occasions,most notably
duringthe Rand Revolt of 1922, managementattemptedto breach the
color bar, but the powerand determination of whiteworkersto protect
theirmonopolistic positionprovedinsurmountable.
Once the colorbar was acceptedas irrevocable, management soughtto
offsetthe costlyprotectionof whitelabor by externalizing the costs of
renewalof a black labor force.This processwas made possible by the
reproduction of the systemof migrantlabor. Initiallya responseto the
insecurityof employment in industryand the lack of provisionforper-
manentsettlementnear the place of workunder colonial rule, migrant
labor continuesto be an institutionalized featureof the miningindustry.
Justhow the systemhas been perpetuatedand how certainlabor costs
are reducedunderit will be examinedin subsequentsections.
1054

The EconomicFunctionsof MigrantLabor

EarlierI was carefulto definea systemof migrantlabor in institutional
terms.Othershave definedit in economicterms,and I now proposeto
considersome of the difficulties of these formulations. Wolpe (1972),
Castells (1975), and, withsomequalifications,Castles and Kosack (1973,
chap. 9) all assertthat a systemof migrantlabor lowersthe cost of the
reproduction of laborpower;Wolpe goes so faras to claim thatit consti-
tutesa systemof cheap laborpower.However,the assessmentof the costs
on the rate of profitis far
and benefitsof migrantlabor and of its effects
morecomplicatedthan even Castles and Kosack (pp. 374-75, 422) indi-
cate and requiresconsiderably moresubstantiationthanany of thewriters
provide.4First,theyfail to distinguishamongthe institutions whosecosts
are reduced,preeminently betweenthe state and the employer though,
of course,the twosets of costsare not unrelated.In otherwords,theydo
not addressthequestion,Cheap forwhom?(Castles and Kosack,however,
do discussthe implicationsfordomesticlabor.) Second,theydo not ade-
quately examinewhichaspectsof the costs of the reproduction of labor
power-maintenanceor renewal-are reduced.Third,whileit is truethat
migrantlabordoes lead to someeconomicsavingsforemployerand state,
the reproduction of a systemof migrantlabor in itselfrepresentsa cost
whichmayoutweighthe economicbenefitsbased on the externalization of
renewal.None of thesewritersconsidersthecosts (politicalas well as eco-
nomic) of thereproduction of a systemof migrantlabor.
What evidenceis thereto suggestthatblack mineworkersreceivelittle
morethanthecostsof maintaining themselvesfromday to day? Virtually
all black workersin the gold minesmigratebetweenthe reserves5 or sur-
roundingblack countriesand theirplaces of employment. In otherindus-
tries,migrantlabor is less prevalent,and Wilson writes,"The mining
industrywouldhave to double the wages if theyhoped to competewith
the manufacturing sector for labor" (1972a, p. 153). His calculations
appear to be based on theaverageearningsof Africansin different sectors,
and whiletheydo not take into consideration skill differential
and pay-
4 When migrantlabor is referred to as "cheap," the issue is not whethera singlemigrant

workercosts less to hire than a singledomesticworkerin any specificcontext,although
that meaningis frequentlyconferredupon the term.Like the other writerscited here,
I am consideringthe cost of the system of migrantlabor. I am concernedwith an
institutionalratherthan a marginaleconomicanalysis.
5 The reservesare those geographicalareas wherethe black three-quarters of the South
Africanpopulation are allowed to acquire permanentdomicile and landed property.
They representapproximatelyone-tenthof the area of South Africa.Bantustansare the
theoretically
self-governing reserves.In practice,however,the degreeof self-government
is so limited by their poverty that, except concerningsome internal matters,Ban-
tustansdepend upon the South Africangovernmentin Pretoria.
1055

mentsin kind,these factorsalone cannotaccountfor the observeddif-

ference.The miningindustrypays less by virtueof its access to isolated
laborsupplies,becausesomeproportion ofthecostsofrenewalis assumedto
be borneby a subsistenceeconomy.But it shouldbe noted that people
in thesesubsistenceeconomies(particularlythe reserves)may be so poor
that theyare largelydependenton incomeremittedby kinsmenworking
in urbanareas. Througha frugalexistencein town,savingsare made from
whatare essentiallymaintenance wages.
Whiletheextraction of producefroma precapitalist modeof production
redoundsto the benefitof the employerof migrantlabor,relianceon an
alternatestate or its functionalequivalentredoundsto the benefitof the
SouthAfricanstate. Functionsnormallyperformed by the state,such as
provisionof welfarefacilities,education,and social security,are trans-
ferredto the communalcontextof the precapitalisteconomy.The provi-
sionofurbanamenitiesis therefore limitedto thosenecessaryforthesingle
productive worker.
But pointingto the existenceof "excessiveexploitation"and the exter-
nalizationof costsof labor-force renewalis not thesame as demonstrating
theexistenceof cheap labor.In one senseall laboris cheapsimplybecause
it is exploited.6In anothersense,it is a moredifficultconceptto grapple
with.Cheap withrespectto what?It is conceivable,forexample,thatthe
reduction in thecostsof reproducing laborpowerthroughaccess to a sub-
sistenceeconomywould be outweighedby the latter'sreplacement by a
capital-intensive argiculturaleconomy.(In fact,given the state of soil
erosionin the reserves,thisis unlikely,but it is the sortof questionin-
volvedin examiningwhethera particularsystemof labor is cheap.) So
far,I have highlighted the economicbenefitsforstate and capital of a
systemof migrantlabor,but thereare also politicalbenefits.A seriesof
politicalcosts are externalizedto the reserves,costs associatedwiththe
residenceof a large,stable black populationundera whitesupremacist
state. Indeed, the systemof migrantlabor is oftenperceivedin political
terms.
We cannot,however, ignorethecostsassociatedwithmigrantlabor,such
as highratesof turnover, recruitment expenses,and the moregeneralset
of costsexperiencedby the state and arisingfromthe politicaland legal
conditionsforthe reproduction of a systemof migrantlabor. When all
theseare introduced, manyof themintangible, the balance sheetbecomes
so complexthat the notionof cheap labor,in practiceif not in principle,
may becomeimpossibleto handle.
6 "Exploitation" refersto the existenceof a "surplus value" remainingwhen the value
of a worker'swage and the value of the means of productionconsumedby a workerare
subtractedfromthe value of a worker'sproduce. The rate of exploitationis the ratio
of this surplusvalue to the value of the wage.
1056

One way of circumventing theproblemis to dispensewiththenotionof

cheaplaboraltogether. An alternativeapproachis to adopt thetautological
argumentthat migrantlabor exists because it is cheap and it is cheap
because it exists.This is not as unenlightening as it mightappear, for
tautologiesare usefulif theylead to the formulation of importantques-
tions.For example,we maybe led to ask whatis cheapaboutmigrant labor
and thusto generatenewinsights.
Finally,it maybe that"Cheap withrespectto what?"is less appropriate
than"Cheap forwhom?"Whilemigrantlabormaybe cheap forindustries
thatrelyextensively on unskilledlabor and have facilitiesforthe recruit-
mentof migrantlaborers,thesmallerindustry whichuses skilledlaborand
has littleaccess to isolatedlabor suppliesfindsa systemof migrantlabor
moreexpensive.If industrybears a small minority and the state the ma-
jorityof thecostsof organizing a systemof migrantlabor,theformer may
findit cheap comparedwithothersystemsof labor,whilethe lattermay
findit moreexpensivethan systemsrelyingmoreon marketinstitutions
forthe regulationof labor supplies.Yet at the same time,one mustnot
forgetthatthestatedoes notfinanceitselfbut relieson industry to support
its activities.Thus the questionof whethermigrantlabor is cheap fora
particularindustryinvolvesnot only an examinationof the directcosts
experiencedby that industrybut also secondarycosts,such as taxation
appropriated by thestate.While"Cheap forwhom?"may appear to sim-
plifytheproblem,it stillremainsinordinately complex,and theproblems
of comparison-thatis, Cheap forwhomwithrespectto whatand under
whatconditions?-arestillwithus.
I have arguedelsewhere(Burawoy1974) thattheappearanceofmigrant
laborin SouthAfricamustbe sought,not in its specificor generalcheap-
ness,but in the historically concretecircumstances of the articulationof
different modes of productionand the corresponding superstructures.At
thelevelof function, thereis nothingnecessaryaboutthesystemofmigrant
labor. It is not what Castells (1975) refersto as an "organic"part of
capitalismat a particularstage in its development. Instead,it is a con-
juncturalfeaturewhichacts as a functional substituteforothermodesof
organizinglabor undercapitalism.
Dependenceon a CapitalistEconomy
I turnnow to examinethe conditionsforthe reproduction of a systemof
migrantlabor.They naturallyrevolvearoundthe separationof themeans
of renewalfromthemeansof maintenance of a laborforce.Two aspectsof
thereproductionof thisseparationcan be delineated.First,thereis there-
productionof a twindependencyupon the capitalisteconomyon the one
hand,and upona subsistenceeconomyand/oralternatestateon theother.
1057

Second,thereis the (coercive) separationof the familyfromthe worker

(in such a manneras to preservetheirmutual dependence)througha
seriesof legal and politicalmeasuresand institutions.
What is the basis of a dependenceon the capitalisteconomy,and how
is it reproduced?Originally,the impositionof taxes upon the Africans
livingin the ruralareas dislocatedthemfromtheirsubsistencelivelihood
and requiredthemto seek employment in the emergingextractiveindus-
tries.This was so, forexample,forMalawians who trekkedto the South
Africangold minesand the Zambiancoppermines.In South Africa,the
movement of blacks to the townswas further compoundedby the state's
expropriation of land, makingsubsistenceexistenceincreasingly difficult
and relianceon an additionalsource of incomeincreasinglynecessary.
With regardto Mozambique,Harris (1959) showshow the colonialad-
ministration forcedablebodiedmales into the systemof migrantlabor by
conscription, where necessary.Even where subsistencelivelihoodcould
still be eked out, Africanshave supplemented it with incomefromem-
ploymentin the urban areas. Arrighi(1973) shows how Africanswho
began to respondto the demandforagricultural producewiththe devel-
opmentof SouthernRhodesiaat thebeginning of thiscenturywerepriced
out of themarketthroughdiscriminatory subsidiesfavoringthe European
farmer.Accordingly, the rewardsof remainingin the rural areas and
accumulating surplusproducewerearrangedto be less thanthoseof enter-
ing wage employment. In this way, the colonialadministration managed
to generatea commitment to and, to a certaindegree(taxes still had to
be paid in cash), a dependenceon the capitalisteconomy.In all these
cases, Africanswho engagedin productiveactivitiesin the townswere
able to send homea portionof theirincomeout of whichtaxes could be
paid and on occasion"luxury"itemsbought.The broadeningcommitment
to theSouthAfricanwage economyand in particularthegoldminesstems
largelyfromthe inabilityof the reservesin SouthAfricaand, to a lesser
extent,the ruralareas of Malawi and Mozambiqueto supportthe repro-
ductionof a labor force.
Dependenceon a SubsistenceEconomy
Wages earnedby Africanmineworkerson the Rand are calculatedon the

assumptionthat theysupplementthe produceof a subsistenceeconomy
(Bettison 1960; Harris 1959). To providesome materialbasis forsuch
an assumptionand to ensure continuingdependenceon a subsistence
economy,the economymust be capable of providingforsome needs. It
mustbe continuallyrecreatedin the face of the erodingtendencyof cap-
italism(Lenin 1960,pp. 40-41). It is necessaryin thisdiscussion,there-
1058

fore,to examinetheimpactof an industrialeconomyupon the subsistence

economyin the surrounding ruralareas.
The ruraleconomyin the South Africanreserveshas been undercon-
tinualdecay,as soil erosionand overpopulation make the extractionof a
viable existencethereincreasinglydifficult. The South Africangovern-
ment'srecognition of thisfactand its desireto preventthe further decline
of the ruralblack economylead Wolpe (1972) to interpret the policyof
"separatedevelopment"as an endeavorto re-createthe subsistencebase
of the migrantlabor force.So far,the actual resourcesinvestedin the
Bantustansare meagercomparedwithwhat will be necessaryto reverse
the trend.One factorin the slowingdownof the accumulationof land in
the hands of a fewAfricansin the reservesand the dispossessionof the
majorityhas been the government's activepolicyof reproducing a system
of communalland tenureand the corresponding precapitalistrelationsof
production.How much the reservesare able to produceis a matterfor
somedebate.In any event,thenumerousprosecutions underthepass laws
suggestthat the dependenceis morean artifactof the legal and political
institutionsforcingAfricansback into the reservesthan a resultof a
commitment to a viableeconomy.
The situationin surrounding black territorieslike Malawi is somewhat
different. Whiletheimpactof migrantlaborin someareas has contributed
to the erosionof the subsistenceeconomy,in othersit has reinforced that
economy.The crucialvariablewouldappear to be the relianceof the sub-
sistenceeconomyon ablebodiedmales. Wherethe economyis such that
the absenceof males does not preventthe cultivationof crops,the earn-
ings remitted by thoseabsentserveto bolsterthe ruralpoliticaleconomy
(van Velsen 1961; Harris 1959; Watson 1958). By contrast,thoseecon-
omiesrelyingon male labor forcultivation, as in "slash and burn" tech-
niques,have tended to be adverselyaffectedby the systemof migrant
labor (Richards 1939).
The Regulationof Circulation

The twin dependencyon two modes of productiondoes not reproduce
itselfwithoutrecourseto noneconomic institutions.
We have alreadynoted
how attachmentto the capitalisteconomywas generatedby the interven-
tionof colonialadministrationsin the subsistenceeconomiesand how de-
pendencyon the latteris perpetuatedby preventing theirerosionthrough
supramarket intervention.
The thesisI am aboutto outlineis thatthetwin
dependency can be betterseen as a reflection
of a set of politicaland legal
arrangements designedto separate the means of renewalfromthose of
maintenanceand at the same timeto ensurea continuedconnectionbe-
tweenthe two.
1059

The separationof familyfromworkeris organizedthrougha set of laws

restricting
urban residence,with few exceptions,to those who are gain-
fullyemployed.The enforcement of pass laws externalizesthe suppliesof
unemployed labor and the processesof labor-forcerenewalto areas where
thosenot gainfullyemployedare legallypermittedto reside-namely,the
reservesor Bantustansand the surrounding black territories.
Influxcon-
troland pass laws also ensurethat,on termination of a contractwithan
employer,a workerreturnsto the "home" area beforebeing allowed to
gain further employment in the urbanarea. Shoulda workerbecomeun-
employedowingto retirement, physicaldisability,or simplyscarcityof
opportunity, he can have no legalresidenceoutsidethereservesor wherever
his homemaybe. Such arrangements compelthe workerto maintainclose
ties withthe remainder of the familyin the reservesor surrounding terri-
tories.Equally, thesemeasureslead to the remittance of a proportion of
wagesearnedin townand therebysupplythedomesticunitwithnecessary
commoditiesfor the renewalof the labor force.In otherwords,influx
controland pass laws preservethe separationof renewaland maintenance
functions,preventthe stabilizationof familiesin the urbanareas and the
surrenderof subsistenceexistencein the reserves,uphold the continued
interdependence of workerand family,and, finally,regulatethe circula-
tionof laborbetweentheplace of workand "home."
Restrictions
on OccupationalMobility
Participationin a systemof migrantlabor has tendedto be incompatible
withemployment in skilledpositions(Arrighi1973, pp. 216-18) forat
least two reasons.First, forjobs requiringboth trainingand experience
fortheireffective performance, highratesof labor turnovercould be pro-
hibitivelycostly.7Second,entryinto the moreskilledoccupationsin any
considerablenumberscould resultin the development of powerbased on
the possessionof a relativelyscarce resource.We may conclude,there-
fore,thatthepreservation of thecolorbar is not merelya matterof safe-
guardingthe interests of whiteworkersbut also represents a major factor
in thereproduction of a systemof migrantlabor.
In thiscondition, we have the possibleseeds of the erosionof a system
of migrantlabor. With its superiorrecruitment facilitiesand extensive
use of unskilledlabor,the miningindustryhas successfully adapteditself
to theexigenciesof a systemof migrantlabor.However,as manufacturing
assumesan increasingly importantrolein the SouthAfricaneconomy,and
as the colorbar is removedfromincreasingly higherskilllevels,a greater
7 This need not be so when the turnoverarises fromfluctuations
in the level of employ-
ment,e.g., in the case of migrantcoke workersin England at the turn of the present
century(Hobsbawm 1964, chap. 9).
1060

numberof Africanswill be engagedin skilledand supervisorypositions.

This is perhapsthemajorcontradiction
betweenthereproduction of a sys-
temof migrantlaborand thedevelopment of the SouthAfricaneconomy.8
MigrantLabor Powerlessness
The reproduction of a systemof migrantlabor hingeson the inabilityof
themigrants, as individualsor as a group,to influencetheinstitutionsthat
subordinate themto theotherfractions of thelaborforceas well as to the
employer.Dominationof the migrantlabor forcetakes place in three
arenas: the labor market,the industrialorganization, and the state.
I shalldeal withthestatefirst.Underthecapitaliststate,themigrantis
treatedas an alien withoutrightsof citizenship.In the South African
colonialsuperstructure, the differentialincorporationof races leaves the
subordinate race withno formalpowerto modifyfundamental institutions.
The migranthas no significant politicalrightsand onlylimitedlegal rights
in the urbanareas. Only in the Bantustansor reservescan Africansexer-
cise rightsof citizenship,and because of theirverylimitedresourcessuch
participationis unable to affecttheirlives materially.Protestby blacks
directedat the SouthAfricanstate has been dealt withviolently, and the
rise of a police state makes combinationalmost impossible(see, e.g.,
Simonsand Simons1969; Roux 1964; Kuper 1957).
In cementingthe systemof migrantlabor,the role of ideologyis not
unimportant. The coincidenceof racialcharacteristics and participation in
a systemof migrantlabor has a numberof consequences.All dominant
ideologiesunder capitalismtend to conceal the underlyingclass struc-
ture; if an ideologyhas a strongcomponentof racial supremacy,class
differentiation is masked by the prevailingracial perspectives.This
remarkapplies equally to the consciousnessof the dominantand the
dominatedclasses.As a result,the dominantideologypays littleattention
to the economicroleof migrantlabor and the mannerin whichits exploi-
tationis organized.Behavioralcharacteristics due to participationin a
systemof migrantlabor are portrayedby the dominantideologyas racial
characteristics.Migrantlabor is seen as a voluntaristic formof partici-
pation in the South Africaneconomy,upholdingthe integrity and indig-
enous cultureof the Africanpeople. It is consideredthe natural and
8 In this connectionit is interestingto note the emergenceof the

border industry
program (Bell 1973). The South Africangovernmenthas tried to promote the move-
mentof capital to labor, ratherthan the reverse.Industriesestablishednear the borders
of the reservesenable black laborersto commuteto work. Mayer (1971, "Postscript")
describes the developmentof a township in the reserve near East London and the
government'sattemptto reunifyproductiveworkerand family.The Border Industry
Program promoted by the Mexican government(Baerresen 1971; Briggs 1973, pp.
44-47) representsa similarmovementof Americancapital to an externallabor reservoir.
1061

inevitableformof black labor. It purportedlyreflectsthe strengthof

traditionpullingthe Africanfromthe foreignand corrosiveurban area
to his natural environment and therebysolidifyinghis so-called tribal
allegiances.Instead of therebeingan inherentconflictbetweenthe dom-
inantideologyand the systemof migrantlabor,the formerreinforces and
legitimates thecoexistence of twostructurally differentmodesof organiza-
tionof labordistributed accordingto racialcharacteristics.
Dominationwithinindustryis enforcedwith the cooperationof the
state, as when strikeaction is suppressed.Though not actually illegal,
tradeunionorganization amongblackshas been thwartedthrough"racial
discrimination in the law and in labor practices;government obstruction
and intimidation;and colour prejudiceamong white workers"(Hepple
1971, p. 72). Only 2% of black workersin South Africaare organized
intotradeunions.The structural conflict
betweenmigrantlabor and orga-
nized nonmigrant whiteworkersredoundsto the advantageof the em-
ployer. The conflictis based on competitionover the distributionof
incomewithinthe workingclass. Concessionsextractedfromthe mine
ownersby one groupare granted,to a considerableextent,at the expense
of theothergroup.For example,the restrictive practicesand development
of a strongwhitetradeunionled to theinstitutionalization of a systemof
migrantlabor incorporating an ever-increasing earningsgap between
black and whiteworkers(Wilson 1972a, p. 46). Not surprisingly, white
workershave assistedmanagement in the subordinationof black workers
withinindustry,for example,throughthe breakingof strikes.Equally,
whiteworkersare ever consciousof management'sinterestin breaching
the color bar and advancingblack workersinto more skilledpositions.
This reinforces divisionswithinthe workingclass. In addition,the black
labor forcehas been the victimof collusionamong the different mining
companiesin wage fixing.Withthedevelopment of the Chamberof Mines
to coordinatepoliciesof the industryin areas of commoninterestto the
variouscompanies,therearose a commonwage policybased on the prin-
ciple of "maximumaverage" (Horwitz 1967, p. 27). Such industrywide
policiespreventedcompetition forlaborfromredounding to theadvantage
of the black migrantworkers.
Finally,I turnto the domination of black workersin the labormarket.
The superiorrecruitment organizationsof the miningindustrygive it
monopolistic access to such labor reservoirs as Malawi and Mozambique
and even more distantterritories. In 1973 foreignlabor accountedfor
80% of theblacksemployed.Sincepass laws precludethedevelopment of
a labor reservoir withinthe urbanareas, theyfavorindustrieswitheffec-
tive recruitment organizationswhich employ black labor in primarily
unskilledoccupations.Witha weakerrecruitment capacity,manufacturing
industry has to restrict
itselfto a laborsupplyfromthereserves, forwhich
1062

it competeswithall otheremployers of black labor.Overpopulation in the
reservesand diminishingsubsistencelevels have led to increasesin earn-
ings necessaryto supplementrural incomes.Being less dependenton
South Africanlabor and drawingextensivelyon foreignlabor reservoirs
wheresubsistencelevelshave not declined,the miningindustryhas man-
aged to maintainthe real earningsof its black workersat approximately
thesame leveloverthepast 60 years (Wilson 1972a, table 5).
A Systemof MigrantLabor WhichFailed to ReproduceItself

So farI have arguedthatthedistinguishing featureof a systemof migrant
laboris theseparationof processesof renewalfromthoseof maintenance.
Further,thisseparationis not a naturalor voluntaristic phenomenon but
mustbe enforcedthrougha set of politicaland legal mechanismswhich
presupposethat the migrantis withoutcitizenshiprightsand has only
limitedpower in the state of employment. Therefore,when the specific
mechanisms that enforcethe circulationof labor,restrictits upwardmo-
bility,and establishthe migrant'spowerlessness are relaxedor disappear,
if my thesisis correct,we shouldthenexpectthe systemto fail to repro-
duce itself.In this contextthe decline of migrantlabor in Zambia is
pertinent.9
Priorto theLabour Government's assumptionof powerin Britainafter
theSecondWorldWar,thepatternof migrantlaborbetweenthe Northern
Rhodesian(now Zambian) copperminesand the ruralhinterland followed
thatjust describedforSouthAfrica.Untilthepostwarperiod,thecolonial
administration activelyorganizedthe politicaland legal mechanismsthat
separatedthe workerfromhis family.Subsequently,the administration
retreatedfromthe performance of these functionsforreasonsrelatedto
Zambia's statusas a Britishprotectorate. First,Africanswerenot merely
allowed to organizetrade unions but in some instanceswere actively
encouragedto do so. Later in the 1950s,politicalpartiesrepresenting the
Africanpopulationbegan to appear. At the same time,the colonialgov-
ernment becameless resolutein defending the colorbar in industry(par-
ticularlythe copperindustry).Withoutsupportfromthe colonialadmin-
istration,whiteworkerswereunable to preventthe removalof the color
bar fromjobs whichtheyhad previouslymonopolized.As restrictions on
Africanadvancementwere beingrelaxed,regulationson the geographical
movementof black workersbegan to disappearalso. Significantly, in the
early 1950s theminingcompaniesbegan to dispensewiththeir"pole-and-
dagga" hutsand to buildfamilyaccommodations fortheirblackemployees.
9 Epstein (1958) and Burawoy (1972, chap. 2) describethese changesas they occurred
on the NorthernRhodesian copperbelt.
1063

Thus, the separationof renewaland maintenancefunctionswas being

slowlyand even deliberately undermined. Finally,shiftsin ideologyfrom
whitesupremacyto evolutionary movementto Africanself-determination
furtherweakenedthe legitimacyof migrantlabor and the regulatory
mechanisms necessaryforits reproduction. Therefore,we may tentatively
concludethat,unlessseparatedby a specificset of politicaland legal insti-
tutions,theprocessesof maintenance and renewaltendto coalesce.In other
words,economicfactorsby themselvescannot enforcethe separationof
workerfromfamilybut mustbe supplemented by structures of coercion.
Systemsof migrantlabor,as theyhave existedor continueto existin
southernAfrica,may be regardedas "pure" types.State organizationof
the separationof maintenancefromrenewalis transparent.Further,I
have shownhow a systemof migrantlabor dissolveswhenthe state no
longerperforms this function.But the framework developedis of limited
interestif it can be appliedonly to southernAfrica.The questionbefore
us now is: Can the framework be extendedto shed lighton the natureof
migrantlaborin other,radicallydifferent countries?
FARM LABOR IN CALIFORNIA
The discussionhere is complicatedby the more variegatedhistoryof

seasonal agricultural
labor in California.I will endeavorto highlightthe
aspectsmostrelevantto comparisonwithSouthAfricanmineworkersand
to the development of a moregeneralframework forthe analysisof sys-
temsof migrantlabor in capitalistsocieties.
Because Californiais the UnitedStates's largestagriculturalproducer,
farmlaborhas assumeda criticalrole in its development. The historyof
farmlabor is the historyof a successionof labor reservoirs. Each group
enteredas a domesticmigratory or alien migrantlabor force,but, before
stabilizing,voluntarilyleft agriculturefor employment in other sectors
of the economyor was removedforciblyand succeededby a new group
of migrants.
The Chinesewerethe firstimmigrant groupto respondto the seasonal
demands of Californiaagriculture.They were renderedoccupationally
immobileby discriminatory practices,and their stabilizationcoincided
withincreasing demandsforChineseexclusionby domesticlaborduringthe
last twodecadesof the 19thcentury(McWilliams1964,chap.2). Withthe
eclipseof Chineselabor,whitesaffectedby the depressionof the 1890s
were recruitedfor workin the fields; but with the returnof economic
prosperity,a new reservoirwas tapped-the Japanese (ibid., chap. 4).
By theend of thefirstdecadeof thiscentury, theJapanesehad superseded
everyothergroup,onlyto lose theirdominanceto Mexicansby 1915.After
the First WorldWar and increasingly until the Second,whitedomestic
1064

labor was again recruitedforfarmwork.Althoughattemptsto settlethe
dust bowl migratory workersof the 1930s into camps were made, they
wereneververysuccessful(McWilliams1971, chap. 16). Many laborers
wererecruitedfromthe skid rowsof Californiacitiesfortemporary jobs
in agriculture(Fisher 1953,pp. 51-57; Anderson1923; Parker 1920).
The wartimedemandforlabor outsideagriculturethreatenedthe sup-
ply of domesticlabor.The governments of Mexico and the UnitedStates
signedan agreementprovidingfor the use of Mexican labor undercon-
tractin farmemployment. Known as the braceroprogram,this was the
firstgovernmentally administered systemof migrantlabor in agriculture.
At the same timeas bracerosenteredlegallyundercontract,illegal mi-
grants,referredto as "wetbacks,"were also crossingthe borderfrom
Mexico in searchof employment. Their numbershave varied according
to such factorsas the stateof the Mexicaneconomy(Gamio 1930, chaps.
1, 12), the stringency of bordercontrols(Samora 1971), and the avail-
abilityof jobs in the United States (see Frisbie [1975] fora statistical
analysisof economicpush and pull factors).Althoughthe actual number
of illegal Mexican entrantsis not known,the numberapprehendedan-
nuallyrose steadilyfromthe early 1940s to a peak of over a millionin
1954 (Galarza 1964, chap. 8). Recent studies indicate that with the
termination of thebraceroprogramin 1965 the numberof illegalentrants
has again risen,while commuterswho live in Mexico and workin the
United States have assumed a new prominencein the border states
(North 1970,chaps. 1, 3). Meanwhile,domesticlabor has organizeditself
in an attemptto preventcompetitionfromlabor recruitedlegally or
illegallyfromforeignlaborpools.
The EconomicFunctionsof MigrantLabor

Castells (1975) indicatesthat,in additionto suffering excessiveexploita-
tion,migrantlabor functions as a regulatorof capitalistcrises,cushioning
the impactof the expansionand contractionof capital. When industry
faces a recession,for example,migrantworkersare particularlyeasy to
lay off.The natureof agricultural production,ratherthancapitalistcrises,
gives rise to fluctuations
in the demandforfarmlabor. Nonetheless,mi-
grantlabor performsthe same "regulatory"functionin Californiaagri-
business,providingforseasonal labor requirements.
The basic dilemmafaced by farmemployers, particularlythosewith
farmoperationsrequiring
seasonalhandsin largenumbers,is this:They
wanta laborsupplywhich,on theonehand,is readyand willingto meet
theshort-termworkrequirementsand which,on theotherhand,willnot
imposesocialandeconomicproblems on themor on thecommunity when
workis finished.
Thisis whatis expectedof migratoryworkers.The de-
1065

mandformigratory workers
is thustwofold:To be readyto go to work
whenneeded;to be gonewhennotneeded.[U.S. President's
Commission
on Migratory
Labor1951,p. 16]
The moregenericfunctionof a systemof migrantlabor-namely, the

externalizationof the costsof labor forcerenewaland low wage labor-is
complicatedby the coexistenceof threedifferent labor systemsin Cali-
fornia.First, there are migrantswho circulate between Mexico and
California.They constitutea systemof externalmigrantlabor. Second,
thereare alienswho residein Californiathroughout theyear.They consti-
tutea systemof internalmigrantlabor.Finally,thereis a domesticlabor
forcewhichmigratesfromplace to place in searchof employment. It does
not constitutea systemof migrantlabor as definedhere.I shall referto
thisfractionof the labor forceas migratory labor.At different periodsin
thehistoryof Californiaagriculture, differentsystemshave been dominant.
The migrants fromMexicobear theclosestresemblance to Africansfrom
Malawi or the reservesworkingin the SouthAfricanminingindustry.In
both cases the systemof migrantlabor facilitatesthe externalization of
thecostsof renewaland theprovisionof earningsat a levelcommensurable
withthe day-to-dayexistenceof the farmlaborer.10 A systemof internal
migration has no obviousparallelwiththe SouthAfricansituation.Japa-
nese,Chinese,and manyMexican aliens who workedin the fieldsduring
the harvestperioddid not return"home" in the off-season but eked out
an existencein Californiatowns.As a result,they became a potential
burdenupon the state wheretheywereemployed.At the same time,be-
cause they were mainlysingle,ablebodiedmen, the processesof main-
tenancewereseparatedfromthoseof renewal,whichtookplace in their
countryof origin(see, e.g., Fuller 1940,p. 19824).
Domesticmigratory labordistinguishesitselffrommigrantlaborby the
fusionof the functions of labor-forcerenewaland maintenance. The em-
ployerand/orstate mustbear all the costs of reproducing labor power.
Othertechniquesare adaptedto compensatefortheinabilityto externalize
costsin thecase of domesticmigratory workers.The prevailingadaptation
has been theexploitation of familylaborin pickingcrops,so thatearnings
of theindividualcan be maintainedat inordinately low levels.If we look
10Accordingto the 1960 census,over half the Chicano familieslivingin the ruralareas
had an income below $3,000 and 14% receivedless than $1,000 (Briggs 1973, p. 23).
Anothersurveyshowed that commutersfromMexico were being paid average hourly
ratesof $1.65 (if theywere Mexican nationals,i.e., "greencard" commuters[see n. 12])
and $1.45 (if they were U.S. citizens) (North 1970, p. 114). The correspondingannual
incomes were, respectively$3,910 and $2,984 (ibid., p. 117), both fallingbelow the
povertyline. Illegal migrantsfromMexico were paid at rates between those of green
card commutersand U.S. citizencommuters(ibid., p. 116). Accordingto Samora (1971,
pp. 98-102), in the El Paso regionin 1969 the going wage for wetbacks was between
$0.75 and $1.10 per hour-far below the national minimumwage of $1.60.
1066

upon wages as the costs of maintainingand renewingthe family,the

greaterthe numberemployedwithineach family,the less each individual
memberhas to be paid. In this way, the earningsof domesticlabor are
kept at the level paid to internaland externalmigrants.However,with
domesticlabor the state of employment has to bear a set of costs,such
as welfareforthe old and youngand education,even thoughthesemay
be small as comparedwithcosts forothersectorsof the nationallabor
force.
Althoughthereis evidenceto suggestthat growersprefera systemof
migrantlabor to a systemof migratory labor (U.S. President'sCommis-
sion on MigratoryLabor 1951, p. 16), therehave been periodsin Cali-
forniahistory,particularlyduringeconomicdepressions,when migrant
labor barelyexisted.More recently,the organizationof migratory labor
in theUnitedFarmWorkersUnionand theeclipseof thebraceroprogram
have led to an increasein the use of domesticlabor. Clearlythe interests
of the state,as definedby such factorsas the level of employment and
the politicalpowerof domesticgroups,interactwiththe interestsof the
growersto determinethe relativeimportance of each systemof labor.
The issue of cheap labor arisesin the Californiacontext,just as it did
forSouthAfrica.The immediateeconomicgains to growersfromthe use
of migrantlabor may be moreapparentin the case of farmlabor. First,
migrantlabor is a commonformof adaptationto seasonalfluctuations in
the demandforunskilledwork.For example,in the firsthalfof the 19th
century,Irish migrantstraveledto England to work as farmlaborers
duringharvestperiodsand returnedto Ireland duringthe slack seasons
(Redford 1926, pp. 122-29). They were also paid less than domestic
labor. Second,the systemof migrantlabor is not such a "total" institu-
tion in Californiaas it is in South Africa,and it may requirefewerre-
sourcesforits reproduction. It appearsto be less a responseto government
intervention than a direct reflectionof the economicinterestsof the
growers.It may be arguedthatin SouthAfricapoliticalcosts as well as
economiccostsare beingexternalized, whereasin Californiathe economic
costs are paramount.So long as migrantlabor was readilyavailable,the
need forcapital substitution was not urgently felt.But withmovesin the
directionof effective
unionorganization of domesticmigratory workersand
the dissolutionof the braceroprogram,growershave turnedincreasingly
to pickingby mechanization.
Twin Dependency
In discussingSouthAfrica,I notedthata systemof migrantlaborinvolved
a twindependencyon two separatedeconomies.This is also true,but in
a weakersense,in California.Externalmigrants-essentiallyMexicans-
1067

dependon theirown state and to a lesserextenton employment in the

United States. In the case of internalmigrants,thereis an overriding
dependencyon employment in the UnitedStates; and, like externalmi-
grants,theyhave tendedto be restricted to such marginaloccupationsas
farmlabor. In both instances,thereis a separationof the processesof
labor-forcemaintenancefromthose of renewal,but the connectionbe-
tweenthetwois stronger forexternalmigrants.
Withrespectto the migrant'sdependencyon employment in the South
Africaneconomy,I noted the deliberatepoliciesof the colonial admin-
istrationto forcethe Africanpopulationoffthe land and into the labor
marketto createan industrialworkforceand also removecompetition with
whitefarmersin the commodity marketforagriculturalproducts.These
goals wereachievedthroughthe expropriation of land and the levyingof
taxes.The dependency of Mexicanson the UnitedStates economycannot
be reducedto such terms.The availabilityof Mexican labor has been
contingent upon such factorsas the state of the Mexican economyand
politicalchange,as in the revolutionaryperiodbetween1910 and 1930
whichled to thereleaseof manyMexicansfrompeonagein the haciendas.
However,at a moregenerallevel theproximity of the UnitedStateshas
been a factorin the persistentunderdevelopment of Mexico, makingit
difficult
forthat nationto absorb the fullpotentialof its labor forceor
to competewithwages available in the United States. Furthermore, the
verysale of laborpowerby an underdeveloped country,such as Malawi
or Mexico,to an economically advancednationservesonlyto reinforce the
relationsof economicsubjugationand domination.This is so despitepro-
testationsby the South Africanand United States governments that in
employingnationalsof underdevelopedcountriesthey are doing these
countriesa service.In a narrowsense, theyare doing just that by ab-
sorbingsurpluslabor that could presenta politicalthreatto the under-
developednation and by providingrural workerswith "their only real
opportunity for economicself improvement" and the possibilityof re-
mittingincome home (Hancock 1959, p. 122). In a broader context,
however,migrantlabor existsonlybecause of the unevendevelopment of
capitalismand reflectsthe economicdependenceof Mexico on the United
Statesand Malawi on SouthAfrica.
It shouldbe notedthatsomeMexicanswhocrosstheborderto workdo
not in factreturnto Mexicoon the termination of theiremployment, just
as thereare many Malawians residingillegallyin South Africa.Many
Mexicansattemptto findjobs elsewherein theUnitedStates.Beingillegal
residentsin the UnitedStatesmakesthemmuchmorevulnerableto arbi-
traryexploitation by employers.In manyrespectstheirpositionis akin to
that of the internalmigrantwho faces limitedemployment opportunity
and discriminatory practices.The Chinese and Japanese duringthose
1068

periodswhentheydominatedfarmlabor weredependenton findingem-
ployment in marginaloccupations.UnlikeMexicans,theycouldnot easily
returnhome and become the responsibility of anotherstate. However,
because theyare single,internalmigrantscan subsiston relativelysmall
incomes.
Finally,briefmentionshouldbe made of attemptsto establisha system
of migrantlaboramongdomesticworkerswhentheydominatedthe farm-
labor forcein the interwarperiod. Apart fromincreasingexploitation
throughtheemployment of familylabor,thereweremovesamonggrowers
to createsubsistenceeconomiesso as to reducethe burdenof the work
forceon the stateand to stabilizeits movement. Such programsfor"land
colonization"stemmedfromthe potentialshortageof labor and the costs
of armiesof unemployed duringthe slack season,but theyachievedlittle
success beforegrowersdiscoveredalternativeexternallabor reservoirs
(McWilliams1971,pp. 92-96, 200-210; U.S. Congress1940,pp. 230-31,
240, 250). In effect,the programswere effortsto set up a systemof
"reserves')as in SouthAfricaor a systemof workhouses like thosewhich
provideda pool of laborforEnglishemployers in agricultureand industry
duringthe 18thcentury(Redford1926,pp. 21-23).
Morecommonhas beenthetechniqueof engendering dependencethrough
thedistribution of relief.Unemployed domesticlaboris maintainedduring
theslackseasonby thejudiciousprovisionof reliefimmediately suspended
whenopeningsappear in the fields.This ensuresthe availabilityof labor
in the busy season (McWilliams1971, pp. 285-96). Similarmechanisms
forthe distribution of reliefappearedin Englandat the end of the 18th
century:". . . the perpetuationof the Speenhamlandand 'roundsman'
systems,in all theirvariety,was ensuredby the demandof the larger
farmers-inan industrywhichhas exceptionalrequirements foroccasional
or casual labor-for a permanentcheap labor reserve"(Thompson1968,
p. 244). As thestudyof Piven and Cloward(1971, chaps. 1, 4) suggests,
the distribution of poor reliefis designedto meetthe conditionsfordual
dependency uponthestateon theone hand and theemployer on theother,
so thatlabormaybe mobilizedand distributed to accommodatethechang-
ing demandsof the economy.Poor relief,therefore, may be regardedas a
functionalequivalentof migrantlabor, in that both performthe same
regulatoryfunction,cushioningthe seasonal labor requirements of the
agriculturalindustry.
The Regulationof Circulation

Poor reliefand land colonizationare designedto controlthe movement
of domesticlabor,so thatit is available whereand whenit is neededand
does not constitutea liabilitywhereand when it is not needed. What
1069

mechanismsare available to controlthe movementof externalmigrants

such as thosefromMexico? The workcontract,definingthe relationship
betweenmigrantworkersand growersor intermediaries, is by its very
natureonlyfortemporary employment; afterit has expired,the workers
have no alternative but to leave theagricultural
areas. They mayleave for
theirhomesacrossthe border,moveinto a Californiatown,or migrateto
someotherpartof theUnitedStates.
Justas influxcontrolenforces theseparationofmaintenance and renewal
functions whileregulating the returnof labor to its home,similarmecha-
nismsoperateto regulatethemovement of Mexicanmigrants. Thus, border
patrol (Samora 1971,chaps. 1, 2) attemptsto restrictillegalimmigration
intothe UnitedStates.Immigration laws are designedto separateworkers
fromtheirfamilies,so that the costs of labor-force renewalare bornein
Mexico whilethe UnitedStates employerand government, eitherat the
federalor regionallevel, are responsibleonly for maintainingworkers
duringtheperiodof employment (North 1970,pp. 92-93).
Immigrationlaws and theirenforcement by borderpatrol and other
government agenciesaim to preventtheemergence ofpools of unemployed
Mexicansliable to becomepubliccharges.At the same time,theyprovide
growersand otheremployers withadequatesuppliesof labor.The consoli-
dation of the braceroprogramin the 1950s was accompaniedby more
stringent policiesof influxcontrol.Duringthisperiod,immigration author-
itiesattempted to restrict
migration acrosstheborderto workers contracted
for agriculturalemployment by agenciesestablishedin Mexico. At the
same time,legislativemeasuresin the United States were introducedto
preventbracerosfrom"escaping"fromfarmemployment and seekingjobs
elsewhere.Accordingly, each workerwas givena card bearinga contract
number,an employer'sname,and the namesof countiesin whichit was
valid (Galarza 1964,p. 83). In otherwords,it was a speciesof thenotori-
ous SouthAfricanpass. These typesof restriction on migrantemployment
in the UnitedStatesand the removalof migrantsfromthe countrywhen
the contractexpiredensuredtheircontinuingrelianceon Mexico and a
bindingconnectionto the processesof labor-force renewal.
on OccupationalMobility
Restrictions
The returnof migrants to theirhomesafterthetermination of theemploy-
mentcontractservesto restrict themto unskilledoccupationsin particular
sectorsof employment. Underthesystemof migrantlabor foundin South
Africa,thecolorbar broadlydefinestheboundariesbetweenjobs monopo-
lized by migrantsand thoseheld as thepreserveof domesticwhitelabor.
Structuralconflictwithinthe workingclass of the miningindustryoccurs
in a verticaldimension
betweena whitelaboraristocracyand blackmigrant
1070

labor. By contrast,withinCaliforniaagriculture thereis no need forthe

counterpart of a colorbar, because virtuallyall jobs are unskilled.At the
same time,the equivalentof a colorbar does operateto preventmobility
out of agriculturalemployment.
The resultis thatconspicuousconflicts have occurredin the horizontal
dimensionbetweenmigrantworkers(Chinese,Japanese,Mexicans,etc.)
and domesticworkers(whitedepressionvictims,Chicanos,etc.). Differing
relationsto the meansof productionhave not been the axis of manifest
conflict;on the contrary,theworkingclass has been internally dividedas
a resultof differingrelationsto superstructural elements-thatis, differ-
encesof legaland politicalstatusin theplace of employment. Thoughweak
in comparison withorganizedlabor,domesticfarmlaboris potentially more
powerfulthan are migrantworkers.Thus, duringthe last decade of the
19thcentury, domesticlaborsuccessfully resisteddisplacement by Chinese
labor. Growerscontinuedto employChineselabor afterlegislationhad
been passed to provideforthe exclusionfromemployment of Chinesenot
legallyresidentin the country.The refusalof growersto bow beforepres-
sure fromlabor organizationsled to riotsthroughout the state between
1893 and 1896, eventuallyforcingthe removalof Chinesefromthe fields
(McWilliams 1971, pp. 74-80; Fuller 1940, pp. 19814-15). Since then,
domesticlaborhas had onlylimitedsuccessin establishing itselfas a per-
manentfarm-labor force,reflectingits vulnerabilityto the politicalpower
of agribusiness.
The Vulnerability
of Farm Labor
In discussingthe reproduction of the systemof migrantlabor in South
Africa,I contrastedthe strengthof the domesticwhiteworkerswiththe
powerlessness of black migrantswho confront a state organizedfortheir
repression.The perpetuation of the systemturnson the abilityof white
workersto maintainthe colorbar at a skill level consistentwithmigrant
labor. In California,the situationis reversed.There the reproduction
of
thesystemof migrantlaborrests,noton thestrength, buton theweakness
of domesticlabor,its inabilityto preventgrowersfromdrawingupon for-
eignsuppliesof labor.We take it forgrantedthat the migrant-internal
or external-has littleor no power,few if any rights,and virtuallyno
meansof appealingagainstinfringements of his labor contract."There-
11 This is not entirelycorrect.Particularlyin the case of bracerosthereis a long history

of attemptsby the Mexican government, underpressurefromorganizedlabor in Mexico
and anti-Americaninterests,to protectthe rightsof Mexican nationalsemployedin the
U.S. Southwest. This has sometimes involved blacklistingemployerswho failed to
comply with the terms of the agreementsigned between the two governmentscon-
cerningthe workingconditionsand rightsof braceros.For a period duringthe Second
World War, the Mexican governmentrefusedto authorizebraceros for work in Texas
1071

fore,what is of interestis the mannerin whichdomesticlaborershave

been systematically preventedfromforcingthe growersto employthem
and themalone,underminimum wage conditions.
Farmlaborhas traditionally beenexcludedfromlaborlegislation(Briggs
1973, chap. 5; Myers 1959). For example,the NationalLabor Relations
Act of 1964 excludedfarmworkersfromunemployment compensation.
From 1910 to 1956,farmwagesrangedfrom40%oto 75%obelow factory
wages (Hancock 1959,p. 25). In 1966 farmwageswerehalf the average
of thosein industrialemployment as a whole.When domesticlabor has
threatenedto organize,it has been eitherdisplacedby migrantlabor-
externalor internal--orviolentlyrepressed.Thus, Galarza (1964, pt. 4)
describesin detail how the braceroprogramfosteredthe replacement of
domesticlabor with Mexican labor paid at prevailingrates,ones which
domesticworkersfoundunacceptablesincetheywerebased on labor-force
maintenance ratherthanmaintenance and renewal.In thisway thebraceros
came to dominatethepickingof a numberof crops.The segmentation of
the farm-labor forceinto migrants(legal or illegal) and domesticshas
obstructedthedevelopment of effectiveunionorganization.As recentlyas
1973, strikeactivityby the UnitedFarm WorkersUnion was unable to
preventthegathering of the harvestcrop by labor recruitedfromforeign
countries.
In otherwords,theabilityof domesticlaborto organizeitselfis severely
circumscribed by thepowerof the growers,whohave gainedmonopolistic
access to externallabor reservoirs.In achievingtheseends,therehas been
a longhistoryof collaboration betweenfarmers and immigration authorities
(Greene 1969) and of collusionbetweenfarmersand state police in sup-
pressinglabor organizations and labor protest.Wherepolice efforts have
been inadequateor ineffectual, growershave shownno hesitationin re-
cruiting"citizenarmies"and vigilantegroupsto combatresistancefrom
farmlabor (see, e.g., McWilliams 1971, chaps. 14, 15; U.S. Congress
1940, whichwas devotedto theseissues). While the federalgovernment
has been awareof thecollaboration of the richand powerfulin California
and of the use of the state as an instrument forprotectingthe economic
because of instancesof extremeracial discrimination.

In practice,growerseitherignored
manyconditionsof the bracerocontractor chose to use illegal migrantswhen theywere
available. A historicaltreatmentof attemptsby the Mexican governmentto secure
reasonableconditionsforcontractlabor workingin the United States underthe bracero
programsmay be foundin Scruggs (1960, 1963). The U.S. Labor Departmenthas also
tried to enforceconditionslaid down in the bracero program.However, in the early
1960s such attemptsin the Texas cotton harvest led to court cases in which growers
enteredsuits against the Department of Labor. Where the court's ruling upheld the
government,growersrapidly introducedcotton harvestingby mechanization,and the
plightof domesticlabor was exacerbated(Jones 1965,pp. 131-52). The severityof the
growers'reactionattests to the infrequencywith which conditionsof employmentof
Mexicans were actually regulated.
1072

interestsof large-scalefarmers,the strengthof the farmlobbyin Wash-

ingtonhas managedto preventany effective intervention (Galarza 1970).
As recentlyas 1974,despiteoppositionfromorganizedlabor,theSupreme
Courtsanctionedthe use of foreignmigrantson the basis of the adminis-
trativefictionthattheyare legal residentsof the UnitedStates.'2
The powerof thegrowersis reflected in theirabilityto establishcommon
wage rates,and evenin timesof laborscarcity,thesehave preventedcom-
petitionfromredounding to the advantageof farmlabor. Fisher (1953),
McWilliams(1971), Galarza (1964), and othershave documented thecol-
laborationof growersin employerassociationsto definewhat is in effect
a "maximumaverage,"thoughit is referred to as the "prevailingwage."
In theory, theprevailingratesare to be fixedby thefreeplayof themarket.
In fact,theyare establishedunilaterallyby the growersaccordingto the
same criteria followed by the South African Chamber of Mines: ". . . a
wage whichis fairto one's neighborin that it is no higher,and a wage
whichis fairto oneselfin thatit is no lower"(Fisher 1953,p. 110).
Unilateralwage fixing,
monopolistic recruitment,militantantiunionism,
and powerfullobbiesin centralgovernment implyan inordinate concentra-
tionofpower.Forsometimecommentators have viewedthelowwagelevels
and unhealthyworkingconditionsof farmlabor as a consequenceof the
concentrationoflandownership and theverticalintegrationwiththecannery
industry,whichhas engagedin pricefixing(McWilliams1971,pp. 279-80).
Withtheconcentration of ownership and theabsorptionof agriculture
into
a nationalfoodindustry,recentyears have witnessedthe entryof large
corporationsand industrialconglomerates into large-scalefarming.Thus,
one discoversthatthe fourleadingprivateownersof agricultural land are
SouthernPacificCompany,TennecoIncorporated(the largeoil and chemi-
cal conglomerate),
Tejon Ranch Company(halfownedby theLos Angeles
12 Farm workersbroughta suit for "declaratoryand
injunctive"reliefwith respectto
the practice of the Immigrationand Naturalization Service in permittingsome aliens
livingin Mexico and Canada to commuteto work in the United States on a daily and
seasonal basis (October 17, 1974). The Supreme Court ruled (November 25, 1974) by
a marginof fiveto four that "both the daily and seasonal commuterswere immigrants
who were lawfullyadmittedfor permanentresidenceand were returningfromtempo-
rary visit abroad when they enteredthe United States and were differentfromthose
groupsof aliens whichcould be admittedonly on certificate by the Secretaryof Labor"
(Supreme Court Reporter 1974, p. 272). The declarationsupportedthe long-standing
administrativepractice of allowing migrantsfromMexico to enter the United States
for temporarywork (42,000 daily commuters,of whom 25,000 are involved in agricul-
ture, and 8,300 seasonal commuters),on the grounds that such migrantswere per-
manentresidentsof the United States and thereforenot subject to eitherquota restric-
tions or certificationby the Secretaryof Labor (such immigrantsuse the greencard as
a reentrypermitin lieu of an immigrantvisa). Dissentingjudges felt the rulingwas
based on an "administrativeconstructionof a statute which conflictswith the express
meaning of the statutoryterms" (ibid., p. 283), but it has provided growers with
unrestricted access to an externallabor supply and as a resulthas constituteda major
obstacle to the effectiveunionizationof domesticworkers.
1073

TimesMirrorCorporation),and StandardOil of California(see Fellmeth
1971, vol. 1, chap. 1; vol. 2, appendix1B; Agribusiness Accountability
Project 1972). If this werenot enough,the problemsfacingthe United
Farm WorkersUnion have been compoundedby the intervention of the
InternationalBrotherhood of Teamsters,whichhas signed"sweetheart"
contractswithmanyof the growers.
Does thedominantideologyexercisea moderating influence on thearbi-
traryuse of thispowerand in particularon thereproduction of thesystem
of migrantlabor?WhereastheSouthAfricanideologyof whitesupremacy
legitimates the colonialsuperstructure (Burawoy1974) thatorganizesthe
conditionsof reproduction of the systemof migrantlabor and institution-
alizes migrantpowerlessness, the dominantideologyin the UnitedStates
is conditionedby notionsof "equality,""justice,"and "citizenship."Ac-
cordingly, the UnitedStatesgovernment has frequently appearedto resist
the use of migrantlabor in agriculture, particularlywhen subjectedto
pressuresfromorganizedlaborconcernedto protectdomesticfarmworkers
(Hawley 1966; Scruggs1960). The variousbraceroprogramssince 1942
have requiredgrowersto provideevidenceof a shortageof domesticlabor
and to makevisibleattemptsto recruitsuchlabor.The agreement between
the UnitedStatesand Mexicoalso stipulatedthatbraceroshad to be paid
at prevailingrates,and employers wererequiredto make contributions to
insuranceschemes,housing,and nonprofit canteenfacilitiesand to offer
each workera minimumnumberof hoursof workeveryweek (see, e.g.,
Galarza 1964,pts. 2, 3).
Whiletheseprovisions are to be foundin theagreements signedbetween
of
thegovernments theUnitedStatesand Mexico,theirexecutionhas been
quite a differentmatter.To supervisethe scheme,the UnitedStatesgov-
ernmentappointedbodies sympatheticto the interestsof the growers.
Togetherwith associationsof farmemployers,these bodies workedout
ways to circumventthe provisions(Fisher 1953, chaps. 4, 5; Galarza
1964, pts. 4, 5). It was in the administration of the programthat the
government was able to conciliatethepowerful growersopposedto restric-
tionsimposedon theiremployment practices.
If thedominant ideologydoesnotexercisemuchconstraint overtheprac-
ticesof growers, it does tend to concealthosepractices.First,it presents
United States agricultureas composedof a large numberof small-scale
independent farmerswho workon theirown land. This hides the decline
in the numbersof such independentfarmersand the fact,particularly
significantin California,thattheoverwhelming proportion of land is owned
by industrialconsortiums and workedby a migrantor migratory labor
force.Second,the dominantideologytendsto obscurethe typicalcondi-
tionsof migrant-labor exploitation. Justas in SouthAfricathe racial per-
spectivesof separatedevelopment have tendedto concealthe positionof
1074

particulargroupswithrespectto the meansof production, in the United

Statesthecombination of an ideologywhichstressesethnicpluralismwith
the coincidenceof ethnicityand occupationhas had a similar effect.
Whereasin South Africaconflictbetweenmigrantsand nonmigrants is
highlightedbut seenin racialterms,in Californiaconflict
betweenmigrant
and domesticlabor is maskedby theircommonMexicanheritage.
CONCLUSION
We have learnedthatone conditionfortheseparationof maintenance and

renewalprocesseslies in thepoliticalstatusof migrantlaborers.It is their
relationto the state-the denial of legal,political,and civil rights-that
distinguishes migrantworkersfromdomesticworkers. The distinctionholds
forbothmineworkerson theRand and farmlaborersin California.At the
sametime,we have observeda markedcontrastin relationsbetweendomes-
tic and migrantworkersin the two areas. In SouthAfricaa caste division
in theformof a colorbar separatesthetwosectorsof thelaborforce,while
in the UnitedStatescompetition betweendomesticand migrantlaborpre-
vails. In the former
country,domesticlaborhas access to considerablere-
sourcesof politicalpower,whilein the latterit appears relativelyweak.
Whatdoes thisdiscrepancy signify?
The State and Its Bearingon the Reproductionof MigrantLabor

The fact thatunbridledcompetition betweenmigrantand domesticlabor
is as ubiquitousin the UnitedStates as it is restricted and regulatedin
South Africa,irrespective of the particularindustry,indicatesthat the
skill differentialsfoundin the miningindustryand absentin agriculture
cannot explain the different patternsof relationsbetweenmigrantand
domesticworkersin our two case studies.13On the contrary,it suggests
thatwe mustturnto broadercharacteristics of the two societiesin order
to understandthe differences alluded to in the previousparagraph.
First,thereis thesimpledemographic factthatmigrantlabor,legal and
illegal,is relativelyinsignificant
in the UnitedStates (thoughnot as in-
significant as is commonly supposed) as comparedwithits centralrolein
the South Africanlabor system.Second,domesticlabor in South Africa
constitutesa minority segmentof the total labor forceand as a resultis
relativelyundifferentiated as comparedwith the domesticlabor forcein
the UnitedStates.The simpledichotomy betweendomesticworkerswith
rightsof citizenshipand migrantswithno rightsmay be a usefulsimplifi-
13 Outside the contextof gold mining,thereis the added complicationin

South Africa
that not all black labor is obviously migrantlabor (see, e.g., Wilson 1972b, chap. 4).
1075

cation in the South Africancontext,but it is too crude for the United

States,wheresuchmarginalfractions of thedomesticlaborforceas migra-
toryfarmworkersare incomparably weakerthanorganizedlabor in other
sectorsof the economy.
At the same time,the numericaland functionalsignificance of migrant
labor is contingentupon the state's capacity to reproducea systemof
migrantlabor.I have emphasizedrepeatedlythat the volumeof migrant
labor is not something to be takenas givenbut is createdand recreated
by the state. Withina single nation,the state determinesthe relative
importanceof migrantand domesticlabor. Accordingly, changesin the
organizationof the state,as in Zambia, can go so far as to transform a
numerically dominantsectorof the labor forcefrommigrantto domestic
status and at the same timedeny a minoritysectorits domesticstatus.
Similarly,in contrastto otherEuropeancountries,Britainhas until re-
centlyawardedfullcitizenshiprightsto immigrants fromotherparts of
the Commonwealth. Whereasimmigrants to France,Germany,and Swit-
zerlandhave tendedto assumethe statusof migrants, in Britaintheybe-
camepartof thedomesticlaborforce(Castlesand Kosack 1973,chap. 11).
To what extentthe politicalstatus of immigrants actually affectstheir
economicstatushas been an issue fordebate,withsomeplayingdownthe
importanceof differences (Castles and Kosack 1973) and othersgiving
themgreateremphasis(Rex 1974). The pointis, however,that the state
determines whetheran immigrant is to be a migrantor a domesticworker.
Therefore, thefirsttwofactorsconsideredabove-the demographic impor-
tanceof migrant laborand thedifferentiation of thedomesticlaborforce-
are contingentupona third:thenatureof thestate,itsorganization and in
particulartherelativeautonomyof theeconomywithrespectto thepoliti-
cal system.
In SouthAfricaa dual labormarketis organizedby a monolithic state,
so thatone sectoris largelycomposedof migrantworkersand theotherof
domesticworkers.In the UnitedStates,on the otherhand, withits less
centralizedstate apparatus,the dual labor marketis definedin termsof
relationto the economicstructure. Low-profit serviceand competitive in-
dustrieswith an unstablenonunionizedor weaklyunionizedlabor force
producethe lowerincomestrata of the workingclass, while high-profit
monopolyindustrywith stable unionizedlabor accountsfor the higher
incomestrata (O'Connor 1973, chap. 1; Harrison1972). The dominant
divisionin the South Africanlabor marketis based on relationto the
state,whereasthatin the UnitedStates is based on industryof employ-
ment,that is, relationto the economy.In one instance,migrantlabor
constitutes the basis of an entiresegmentof the labor force;in the other,
it formsbut a fractionof a segment.Yet in bothinstances,althoughfor
different reasons,the reproduction of migrantlabor deepensthe division
1076

betweenthe twosegments.We may conclude,therefore, thatthe relevant

differencesbetweenSouthAfricaand theUnitedStatesturnon therelative
autonomyof the economywithrespectto the state. In South Africaan
overarching state intervenesin the organization of productiveand market
relations,whereasin the United States productiveand marketrelations
are reproducedwithsignificantly less interventionfromthe state.
What,then,has thisanalysisofreproduction requirements accomplished?
I have assumedthat,althoughthe conditionsof reproduction may vary
over timeand betweensocieties,what is beingreproducedis definedby
certaininvariantstructures. In the case of migrantlabor, the invariant
structure was foundto be the separationof maintenance and renewalpro-
cesses. Furthermore, the unique characteristics and consequencesof a
givensystemof migrantlabor emergeout of the interplaybetweenthe
invariantstructure and a specificeconomicand politicalcontext.In other
wordsthe markeddissimilarity of the systemsof migrantlabor in South
Africaand the UnitedStates may be attributedto the differing political,
ideological,and economicsituationsin whichtheseparationofmaintenance
and renewalprocessesis organized.Thus, reproduction analysisis a power-
ful tool in comparativeanalysis,betweensocietiesand over time,because
it accounts simultaneouslyfor similarityand diversity.Yet the very
strength of such analysisis also its majorweakness,as is apparentin my
treatment of labor power.Throughout, I have assumedthat labor power
itselfis invariant.This is impliedby limitingthe reproduction of labor
powerto twoprocesses-maintenance and renewal.The treatment ignored
the possibilitythat labor power,like machinery, may be adapted to the
changingdemandsof capitaland technological innovation. In myexamples
of migrantlabor,adaptationis not a significant factor,because the jobs
performed remainthe same over time.But extendingthe analysisof re-
production of laborpowerto an entirelaborforceovera longperio(dshows
thatrequisiteskills,education,and socializationin thebroadestsense,that
is, the contentof labor power,undergoconsiderablechange (Braverman
1974). Changesin thestructure of capitalism,suchas the consolidation of
the dual economy,have repercussions forprocessesof labor forceadapta-
tion (Bowles 1972). In otherwords,a diachronicratherthan synchronic
analysisof thereproduction of laborpowercannot,in general,restrict itself
to the processesof maintenance and renewalbut mustbe extendedto in-
clude processesof adaptation.
The Rise and Fall of Systemsof MigrantLabor

So far,I have establishedthe conditionsforthe reproduction
of a system
of migrantlabor,but a completetheoryof reproduction shouldembracea
characteristic
dynamics(Cortes,Przeworski, and Sprague1974, pp. 279-
1077

80). The reproduction of any systemin and of itselfcreatestendencies

towardits changeand persistence.Moreover,thesetendenciescan be de-
duced fromthe "laws" or conditionsof reproduction. Are thereany rudi-
mentaryprocesseswhichmightconstitutea theoryof the dynamicsof a
systemof migrantlabor?Or are thechangesbroughtaboutby theinternal
structureof the system,that is, by its dynamics,swampedby external
exigencieswhichimpingein an unpredictable fashionupon the system?
I notedthatthesystemof migrantlaborin Zambia dissolvedprimarily
because the colonialstate disengageditselffromthe organizationof the
separationof the maintenanceand renewalprocesses.To whatextentwas
thistheproductof a dynamicsimmanent in thestructureof thesystemof
migrantlabor and its reproduction? To what extentwas it the resultof
externalforces?The expansionof the NorthernRhodesian (Zambian)
economyrequiredthe expansionof the systemof migrantlabor. The in-
creasedinvolvement of Africansin wageemployment led to theirorganiza-
tion initiallyinto tribalassociationsbut also into embryonicand, later,
strongtrade unions.Organizedeconomicclass strugglesinevitablyled to
increasedremuneration and consequentlyundermined the foundations of
the systemof migrantlabor and precipitatedits dissolution.Advancing
witheconomicstruggles, politicalstruggleserodedanothercentralrequire-
mentof the reproduction of a systemof migrantlabor-migrant-labor
powerlessness. In otherwords,the expansionof the systemof migrant
laborstimulatedand structured class struggleswhichultimately forcedthe
breakdownof the systemitself.At the same time,however,intertwined
withsuch a "bottomup" view of the dynamicsof the systemof migrant
laborare the"top down"concessionsby thecolonialgovernment prompted
by politicalchangesin Britainand by thegeneralclimatein thecolonized
world.To disentangle theintricateinteraction of concessionsand struggles
in thedeclineof thesystemof migrantlaborin Zambia wouldbe a worth-
whileand challengingtask. Sufficeit to say here that internaldynamics
are but a partialexplanationof thedissolutionof the systemin Zambia.14
14 The systemof migrantlabor has not completelydissolved. In a survey I conducted

among a carefullyselectedsample of 218 mine workersin 1969, I found that 39% had
returnedto their home villages within the precedingtwo years and 71% within the
precedingfive.Breakingthese figuresdown by age and lengthof time spent in urban
areas (urban experience), I found that the older a worker (controllingfor urban
experience),the more frequentlyhe returnedto his home village, and the greaterhis
urban experience(controllingfor age) the less frequentlyhe returnedto it. Zambian
workershave neverhad theirland expropriatedin the mannerof the enclosuremove-
ment in England. Thereforethey retain ties to the rural areas as a formof security,
This may involve remittinga part of theirincome home-
particularlyfor retirement.
though very few (7%o) claim to do so on a regular basis-or entertainingvisiting
kinsmenfromthe home area, as well as returningperiodicallyto the rural areas. As an
increasingproportionof the work forceis born in the urban areas, withno home village,
1078

Nonetheless,Zambia does illustratedynamicsarisingin the place of

employment-namely, theweakeningof thecolonialstateand theadvance
of the politicaland economicstatusof the migrantworker.By contrast,
forSouthAfricawe stressedthe dynamicsof the interaction of capitalist
and precapitalisteconomiesand the way in whichthe expansionof the
former tendedto erodethelatter.In its reproductiverole,theSouthAfrican
stateorganizescounteracting influencesdesignedto re-create
theprecapital-
ist modeof production.But it is becomingincreasingly apparentthat,al-
thoughthe systemof migrantlabor containsits own contradictions that
continuallythreatento underminethe system,the major threatto the
system,particularly as it affectsthegold mines,is fromrelativelyautono-
mousexternalsources.
Priorto 1950,southernAfricaconstituted a relativelycoherentpolitical
unitboundtogether by variousformsof colonialruleand organizedaround
certainfocalpointsof industrialdevelopment. The peripheralareas served
as laborreservoirs and weremade subservient to the economicinterests of
theextractive industries,
mostnotablythecopperminesof NorthernRho-
desia, the coal minesof SouthernRhodesia,and the gold minesof South
Africa,as well as agriculturein all theseterritories.
Strugglesforpolitical
independence in Malawi, Tanzania, and Zambia led to the "autonomiza-
tion"of the foreignreservoirs thatsuppliedlabor forthegold mines.The
ban on recruitment forSouth Africanindustryimposedby the Zambian
and Tanzanian governments meantthat South Africawouldhave to be-
come increasingly relianton its own internalsystemof migrantlabor.
Hence thereemergedrenewedinterestin thereserveareas and thecreation
of Bantustans.With no major industryof its own,Malawi continuedto
serveas a major foreignlabor reservoirforSouthAfricanindustry, par-
ticularlythe gold mines,reinforcing its own underdevelopment and its
dependencyon SouthAfrica.
The sporadicbut verydefinitesuccessof guerrillamovements in Portu-
guese Africaled to a coup d'etat in the metropolitan countryand to the
demise of Portuguesecolonialismin Africa,precipitatingdisturbances
throughout southernAfrica.The whiteminority regimeof SouthernRho-
desia is nowunderpressureto negotiatewithblack nationalistleaders,and
in 1974 Malawi declareda ban on the supplyof migrantlabor to South
and as pensionand welfareschemesimprovein the economyas a whole, the retention

of linkagesbetweenurban and ruralcommunitiesshould be expectedto decline further.
But the most tellingstatisticsconcerningthe dissolutionof the systemof migrantlabor
are to be foundin commitmentto employmentin industry:in 1969 the average length
of serviceof Zambian mineworkerswas 9.4 years (as comparedwith 4.3 years in 1955),
with a correspondingturnoverof 6.4% per annum-an extremelylow turnoverby any
standards.
1079

Africa.Withthe independence of Mozambique,thereis the possibilityof

anothermajorsourceof laborwithdrawingits supplyto SouthAfrica.The
reactionof the SouthAfricanChamberof Mines has been as follows:
Energeticstepshavebeentakento attractSouthAfricans and thepro-
portionhasincreasedfrom22 percentat 31stMarch,1974to 32 percent
at 30thApril,1975.It is hopedthatit willbe possibleto increasethis
proportioneven further,and it will therefore
be necessaryto compete
forlabourwithothersectorsof theeconomy and to providemorehousing
accommodations forSouthAfrican workers. Inevitablythebulkof mining
labourwillremainmigratory formanyyearsto comebutit is hopedthat
a coreof stableSouthAfricanemployees can be builtup on longer-life
mines.. . [SouthAfrican Chamber of Mines1975]
The SouthAfricanstateis now facedwiththe dilemmaof choosingeither
the expandedreproduction of the systemof migrantlabor withinits own
boundariesor thedissolutionof thesystem.(For further details,see South
AfricanInstituteof Race Relations1975,pp. 281-88; Leys 1975.)
The SouthAfricanexampledemonstrates thata systemof migrantlabor
is placed in jeopardyas soon as the externallaborreservoirgainspolitical
autonomy.The studyof Mexican migrantworkersin the UnitedStates
lendssomesupportto such a conclusion.The utilizationof Mexicanlabor
to bolsterthe UnitedStateseconomyhas been the subjectof considerable
politicaldebate withinMexico, fromtime to time leading the Mexican
government to imposecontrolsand conditionson the use of such labor.
The braceroprogram,withits elaboratealthoughrarelyentirelyenforced
systemof regulations, reflectedjust such a concernforthe treatment of
Mexicannationals.In practice,however,politicalcontrolover the supply
of laboris onlya minorfactorin thedetermination of theebb and flowof
migrantlabor across the border.Indeed, it may be arguedthat in this
instanceit is unrealisticto speak of a systemof migrantlabor at all, be-
cause any characteristic dynamicsof the systemare overwhelmed by a
widerangeof externalfactors,such as the stateof the economyon either
side of theborder.
Parallels withslaveryare intriguing and deservebriefmention.In its
purest form,slaveryis an extremeversionof migrantlabor in which
processesof renewaltake place in a distantcountry(insofaras male
workersonly are involved) and maintenancetakes place on the planta-
tion; the severancebetweenmaintenanceand renewalis total and final.
Indenturedlabor standssomewhere on the continuum betweensystemsof
slaveryand the systemsof migrantlabor examinedin thispaper. Under
a systemof worldwidecolonialism,such as existedin the 18th century,
slaves could be procuredreadily;but witheconomic,political,and ideo-
logicalchangesin the systemof worldcapitalism,the movement forabo-
litionestablisheditself.As a result,the survivalof the systembecame
1080

contingentupon the organizationof labor-forcerenewal alongside its

maintenance. Wallerstein(1976) arguesthat increased"costs" of slavery
in the decadesbeforetheAmericanCivil War notedby Fogel and Enger-
man (1974) and Genovese(1974) werea resultof Americanprohibition
of international slave trade in 1807. Further,he argues,slaverywas a
viablesystemof laboronlyso longas a substantialproportion of thecosts
of renewalwere borne in externallabor reservoirs, and thereforetheir
collapse spelled the downfallof slavery.15In otherwords,the specific
cheapnessof slaveryis to be found,neitherin the powerlessness of slaves
(thoughthis is an inevitableand necessarycondition)nor in theireffi-
ciency,but (if it is to be foundat all) in the characteristicmode of re-
productionof labor power. When monopolisticaccess to externallabor
reservoirs is lost,systemsof slaveryand migrantlabor have to be recon-
stitutedor transformed. It remainsto be seen whetherthe SouthAfrican
systemof migrantlabor is to be successfully resurrected
throughthe in-
tervention of thestate or whether it willfollowthehistoricroad of slavery
in the UnitedStates.
Beyond MigrantLabor
What light does our conceptualdistinctionbetweenmaintenanceand
renewalshed on systemsof labor that are not migrantand in whichin-
ternaldifferentiation
of the domesticlabor forceis prominent?One ap-
proach to thesebroaderissues is a reformulation of our analysisof the
costsof reproductionof labor power.Earlier,the savingsgeneratedby a
systemof migrantlabor wereexpressedin termsof the externalization of
certaincosts. That is, certainprocessesnormallyfinancedby the em-
ployerand thestateof employment are externalized
so that the employer
and the employing state assumeno responsibility.
However,such savings
could be viewedin termsof the reductionof certainrenewalcosts rather
15 Althoughthe heyday of Americanslavery appears to have come afterthe importa-

tion of slaves became illegal, with the slave population quadruplingin 50 years as a
resultof naturalincrease,the increasemust be regardedas a consequenceof the incor-
porationof renewalprocessesinto plantationsociety.The reproductionof a systemof
slaveryinvolves the reproductionnot merelyof slaves but also of slave owners.Thus,
to show that slaveryis a viable labor systemat any point in time,it is not enough to
show that the "break-evenage"-when "the accumulatedexpendituresby planterson
slaves were greaterthan the average accumulatedincome which they took fromthem"
(Fogel and Engerman1974,p. 153)-is less than lifeexpectancy.It must also be shown
that the differencereflectsearningsgreaterthan the costs of the life-styleof the slave-
holders.AlthoughFogel and Engerman (1974, p. 155) do note that the break-evenage
rose in the decades beforethe Civil War and imply that life expectancyalso increased,
theyneithertell us the trendof the difference between these two values nor relate the
differenceto the costs of the reproductionof the style of life of the slaveholders.In
otherwords, the data of Fogel and Engermando not speak directlyto the hypothesis
presentedhere.
1081

than theirexternalization.That is, it is cheaperto educateand bringup

a family,and so forth,in a Bantustanor a Mexicanshantytown than in
Johannesburg or California,where the reproduction of labor power is
organizedforhigher-income groupsand where,as a result,lower-income
groupsare penalized.Luxuriessuperfluous to the basic processesof re-
newal in the Bantustanor Mexican town or village become necessities
in Johannesburg or California.In other words,the requirements for a
minimalstandardof livingvaryfromplace to place, accordingto thelevel
of industrialdevelopment. Increasesin the level of consumption or, more
broadly,the rise of the cost of reproduction of labor power,is a conse-
quence of and a conditionforthe economicexpansionof capitalistsoci-
eties (Gorz 1967,chap. 4).
Againstthis background,the significance of migrantlabor lies in the
separationof the processesof maintenanceand renewal,so that renewal
takes place wherelivingstandardsare low and maintenancetakes place
withineasy accessof employment. Thus,wagesearnedby migrantworkers
are lower than those of domesticworkers,because the formerrequire
fewerresourcesto sustainthe renewalprocessthan the latter.Wherea
supplyof migrantlabor is not available,industryitselfmay migrateto
areas wherethecostsof thereproduction of laborpowerare lower.Indeed,
themigration of industry maybe a moreattractiveproposition forcapital-
ists,as it relievesthemof responsibility forthe social and politicalcosts
of the maintenanceof migrantlabor. On the otherhand, when a host
countryassumesresponsibility for the regulationand dominationof the
laborforce,thecapitalistenterprise is frequently subjectedto politicaland
economicuncertainties beyondits control.
Expressingeconomicbenefitsin termsof reductionratherthan exter-
nalizationof costsallowsus to go beyondmigrantlaborand examinevari-
ous ways of organizingthe reproduction of labor powerwithina single
economy.The questionbecomes:Are thereareas or institutions withina
given societywhichorganizethe process of labor-forcerenewalat re-
duced costs? If thereare, what specificmechanisms perpetuatethe coex-
istenceof differing modes of organizinglabor-force renewal?Thus, one
mightask whetherthe urbanghettoin the UnitedStates is a functional
equivalentof the Bantustanin SouthAfrica.Althoughan adequate treat-
ment would involvea carefulcomparisonof the politicaleconomiesof
Bantustanand ghetto,a fewremarksmay be made in passing.One strik-
ing resemblance betweenthe two places is the importanceof the female-
dominatedhousehold.Liebow (1967), forexample,showshowthe"matri-
focal" familyof the urban ghettois a productof "the inabilityof the
Negro man to earn a livingand supporthis family"(p. 224). Marriages
do not last long,and womenof the ghetto,like womenof the Bantustan
and of the villagesin BritishGuiana (Smith 1956), are forcedto extend
1082

theirsourcesof incomeby whatevermeans theycan musterand through
allianceswith a successionof mates.Liebow's observationssuggestthat
ghettolifeis characterizedby the separationof the processesof renewal,
engagingthe motherand her children,fromthoseof maintenance, which
concernthe "marginal"or temporarily employedlower-classmale.
My argumentwould be that the ghetto,like the Bantustanand the
Mexicantownor village,is a definitelylocatedinstitution whosefunction
for the capitalisteconomyis the allocationof the renewalprocessesto
areas whererenewalcosts are low. As one expositionof the dual labor
marketthesis for the United States points out, the reproduction of a
differentiatedlabor forcerestson the reductionof renewalcosts through
segregation in housing,education,and welfare(Baron and Hymer1968).
"Institutionalracism" (Wilson 1973, p. 34) or "internalcolonialism"
(Blauner 1972,pt. 1) may thenbe understoodas the apparatus,coercive
wherenecessary,for the regulationof renewalprocessesof a particular
segmentof the labor forceand theirallocationto specificinstitutions and
areas. In otherwords,I am suggestingthat racismbe interpreted as a
particularmode of reproduction of labor powerand that "powerlessness"
is not so muchthedefiningas a necessaryconditionforracism.Further-
more,distinctions betweendifferenttypesof race relations,suchas van den
Berghe's (1967) distinctionbetweencompetitiveand paternalisticones,
may be understoodin termsof particulararticulations of productiveand
reproductive processes.Thus, wherethe same elementsof the dominant
class organizebothproductionof commodities and reproduction of labor
power,a systemof paternalistic relationsemerges,whereaswhenthe two
processesare separated,withone organizedby theemployerand theother
by thestate,a different system competitive race relations-emerges.
One may ask one furtherquestion:What is the importance of thevari-
ationin thecostsof labor-force renewal?Low-profit industryis dependent
on the existenceand perpetuation of institutionswhichreducethe costs
of labor-force renewalforsegments of theworkingclass. At thesame time,
the economyas a whole,but particularly high-profit monopolyindustry,
is dependenton increasinglevels of demandand therefore on increasing
the costs of labor-forcereproduction.This oppositionof short-term need
forreducingthe cost of labor and long-term need forincreaseddemand
is partiallyresolvedthroughthebifurcation of the workingclass (both in
SouthAfricaand the UnitedStates). With the expansionof capital, the
oppositiondevelopsand theschismwithintheworking class widens(Fuchs
1968,pp. 53, 61; Bluestone1972). One segmentof thelaborforcedevotes
moretimeand moneyto renewalprocesses,whilethe otherstrugglesto
maintainitselffromday to day. The consequencesmay be observedin
the diverseformsof familyorganizationmeasuredin termsof the rela-
tionshipbetweenrenewaland maintenance activities.
1083

I introducedrace into the discussionand could equally well have ex-

tendedthe argumentto relationsbetweenthe sexes16to defendthe thesis
that it is not just the "powerlessness"which certainminoritygroups
sharebut also theirdifferent modesof insertioninto the reproduction of
labor power which determinestheirgroup characteristics. That blacks
have had less politicalpowerthan whitesmeans that theyare morevul-
nerableto excessiveexploitation, but thishas been realizedonly through
specificmodesof reproduction of laborpoweron theplantationand in the
ghetto.Whatdifferentiates womenfromblacksand bothfrommigrants can
ultimately be reducedto thedifferent modesof reproduction oflaborpower
in whichtheyare engagedor theirdifferent relationsto a singlemodeof
reproduction. Interpretingthe significanceof these various modes of
reproduction of laborpowerthruststhediscussionback to therelationship
betweenthe rate of exploitation and the rate of profit.I have repeatedly
pointedout that the relationship betweenexploitationand profitis medi-
ated by an ensembleof structures thatreproducenot merelylabor power
but also the social relationscharacterizing capitalistproduction.Intensi-
fyingexploitationdoes not appear spontaneously but has to be created
and re-created by modesof enforcement; it requiresa moreelaborateand
costlyapparatusof reproduction, or morespecifically the expansionof the
state,whichin turneats away at profits.Yet at the same time,a reduc-
tion in the rate of exploitationmay generategreaterconsent,thereby
allowinga relativecontraction of the state and conceivablyleadingto an
increasein the rate of profit.Here I can only raise what is a complex
empiricaland theoreticalproblem.
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The Functions and Reproduction of Migrant Labor: Comparative Material from Southern

Africa and the United States

This content downloaded from 128.228.173.41 on Tue, 16 Apr 2013 12:21:46 PM

For a capitalisteconomyto function, its labor forcemustbe main-

Traditionally,studiesof labor migrationhave adoptedthe perspectiveof

1050 AJS Volume 81 Number5

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lems of adaptation,assimilation,and acculturationof the newlyarrived

For an economyto function,

This content downloaded from 128.228.173.41 on Tue, 16 Apr 2013 12:21:46 PM

maintenancefunctions.For example,the distinctionbetweenthe rearing

systemsof migrantlabor, etc. While what is being reproducedhas invariantcharac-

This content downloaded from 128.228.173.41 on Tue, 16 Apr 2013 12:21:46 PM

at home,because theyhave no permanentlegal or politicalstatusat the

This content downloaded from 128.228.173.41 on Tue, 16 Apr 2013 12:21:46 PM

lyingstructureand the particularpoliticaland economiccontext.More

MINE WORKERS IN SOUTH AFRICA

The South Africangold mines,firstcommercially exploitedin the last

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The EconomicFunctionsof MigrantLabor

4 When migrantlabor is referred to as "cheap," the issue is not whethera singlemigrant

This content downloaded from 128.228.173.41 on Tue, 16 Apr 2013 12:21:46 PM

mentsin kind,these factorsalone cannotaccountfor the observeddif-

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One way of circumventing theproblemis to dispensewiththenotionof

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Second,thereis the (coercive) separationof the familyfromthe worker

Wages earnedby Africanmineworkerson the Rand are calculatedon the

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fore,to examinetheimpactof an industrialeconomyupon the subsistence

The Regulationof Circulation

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The separationof familyfromworkeris organizedthrougha set of laws

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numberof Africanswill be engagedin skilledand supervisorypositions.

8 In this connectionit is interestingto note the emergenceof the

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inevitableformof black labor. It purportedlyreflectsthe strengthof

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A Systemof MigrantLabor WhichFailed to ReproduceItself

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Thus, the separationof renewaland maintenancefunctionswas being

FARM LABOR IN CALIFORNIA

The discussionhere is complicatedby the more variegatedhistoryof

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The EconomicFunctionsof MigrantLabor

This content downloaded from 128.228.173.41 on Tue, 16 Apr 2013 12:21:46 PM

The moregenericfunctionof a systemof migrantlabor-namely, the

This content downloaded from 128.228.173.41 on Tue, 16 Apr 2013 12:21:46 PM

upon wages as the costs of maintainingand renewingthe family,the

This content downloaded from 128.228.173.41 on Tue, 16 Apr 2013 12:21:46 PM

dependon theirown state and to a lesserextenton employment in the

This content downloaded from 128.228.173.41 on Tue, 16 Apr 2013 12:21:46 PM

The Regulationof Circulation

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mechanismsare available to controlthe movementof externalmigrants

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labor. By contrast,withinCaliforniaagriculture thereis no need forthe

11 This is not entirelycorrect.Particularlyin the case of bracerosthereis a long history

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fore,what is of interestis the mannerin whichdomesticlaborershave

because of instancesof extremeracial discrimination.

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interestsof large-scalefarmers,the strengthof the farmlobbyin Wash-

Burawoy, The Functions and Reproduction of Migrant Labor' 1976

Burawoy, The Functions and Reproduction of Migrant Labor' 1976