This article was downloaded by: [Michael Grenfell]

On: 26 November 2013, At: 01:27

Publisher: Routledge
Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered
office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

Social Epistemology: A Journal of

Knowledge, Culture and Policy
Publication details, including instructions for authors and
subscription information:
http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/tsep20

“Shadow Boxing”: Reflections on

Bourdieu and Language
Michael Grenfell
Published online: 21 Nov 2013.

To cite this article: Michael Grenfell (2013) “Shadow Boxing”: Reflections on Bourdieu and
Language, Social Epistemology: A Journal of Knowledge, Culture and Policy, 27:3-4, 280-286, DOI:
10.1080/02691728.2013.818738

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2013.818738

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the
“Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis,
our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to
the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions
and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors,
and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content
should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources
of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims,
proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or
howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising
out of the use of the Content.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any
substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing,
systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms &
Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-
and-conditions
 Social Epistemology, 2013
Vol. 27, Nos. 3–4, 280–286, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2013.818738

“Shadow Boxing”: Reflections on

Bourdieu and Language
Michael Grenfell

The article begins in a reflexive mode, situating its author in relation to language and
Downloaded by [Michael Grenfell] at 01:27 26 November 2013

to the work of Pierre Bourdieu. This position is then used to raise pertinent issues con-
cerning the reception of Bourdieu’s writings in the field of Anglo-Saxon academia.
The author’s interpretation of the main precepts of Bourdieu’s approach to language
is set out, leading towards a critical consideration of Simon Susen’s “Bourdieusian
reflections on language: Unavoidable conditions of the real speech situation”. The
focus of coverage is on Susen’s language in examining philosophical issues underlying
Bourdieu’s own conception of language. Acknowledgement is made of the merits of
Susen’s theoretical framework, whilst insisting on “practical necessity” as an integral
part of any consideration of Bourdieu’s method. The term “shadow boxing” is used to
suggest that, whilst many scholars in the humanities and social sciences find it easy to
attack Bourdieu, few criticisms seem to stick. Finally, the paper argues that the fact
that Bourdieu remains elusive can be regarded as both a strength and a weakness of
his theory of practice, considered here with respect to language.

Keywords: Bourdieu; Epistemology; Language; Linguistic Market; Methodology;

Reflexivity; Susen

Introduction

“Shadow boxing”: to make the motions of defence and attack.

The image of “shadow boxing” came to mind when Simon Susen asked me to
offer a commentary on his article “Bourdieusian reflections on language: Unavoid-

Michael Grenfell is the 1905 Chair of Education at Trinity College, University of Dublin, Ireland. He is also
a former Professor of Education at the University of Southampton, UK. He is the author of 16 books and
numerous research articles on topics such as second language learning and teaching, teacher education, and
philosophy and research methodology, especially with respect to the applications of Pierre Bourdieu’s theory
of practice (notably in relation to areas of social-theoretical investigation such as language, aesthetics, educa-
tion, politics, culture and art). Correspondence to: Michael Grenfell, University of Dublin, Dublin, Ireland.
Email: grenfelm@tcd.ie

Ó 2013 Taylor & Francis

 Social Epistemology 281

able conditions of the real speech situation” for this Special Issue of Social Episte-
mology dedicated to “Bourdieu and Language”. Why this image?
To answer this question, I need to allow myself a certain personal
reflection——something which is hardly permitted in academic texts in general, not
even those presented within a Bourdieusian framework, and despite Bourdieu’s insis-
tence that his was a reflexive approach and despite his lengthy discussions of “partic-
ipant objectivation” (see, for instance, Bourdieu 2000). As one who first encountered
Bourdieu in the mid-1970s, whose work has dominated my academic career, I real-
ized early on that, although I could see the richness and potential in Bourdieu’s
work, this was not always appreciated by what Bourdieu called an “Anglo-Saxon”
audience. They did not quite “get it”. Sociologists and philosophers outside of conti-
nental Europe did not appreciate “la morale”, that is, that grounding in neo-Kantian
metaphysics that gave birth to phenomenology and existentialism, which are so
Downloaded by [Michael Grenfell] at 01:27 26 November 2013

central to an understanding of Bourdieu but which are badly understood outside

mainland Europe. Yes, they are dissected by scholars, and left in bits, but the main
point is missed. There is no empathy for it, that “feel for the game” about which
Bourdieu wrote in his works. There is a filmed interview between Bourdieu and
Passeron on YouTube from the 1960s, entitled “Epistemological vigilance”. One
wonders who, at the time, shared these concerns for epistemology and vigilance.
Indeed, who does so today? This is why this Special Issue is all the more welcome.
To conclude my personal reflection, I have felt my own position within Bour-
dieusian studies——after having published several books and articles on the
topic1——has moved from advocate to “party-pooper”. Having extolled the poten-
tial in Bourdieu’s theory of practice, I now find myself critical of most applications
of it. Again, there is a sense that they do not quite “get it”. I have referred to these
elsewhere as “misuses and abuses” (Grenfell 2010), as the range of academic strate-
gies used by various writers and researchers: for example, by showing what Bour-
dieu “fails” to do, or “avoids” doing, or “sidesteps” doing——or, indeed, setting
him up to be shot down by wilfully misinterpreting what he intends to do. They
make too much of Bourdieu and too little. They are often keen to appropriate
him to their own academic discourse and, in so doing, neutralize what he has to
offer. The recent work on Bourdieu and the literary field is a good example of the
way writers are intent on asserting their own dominant tradition, rather than mak-
ing use of what Bourdieu has to offer them (see, for instance, Ahearne and Speller
2012). It is like shadow boxing: there is a great deal of intense activity, blows are
directed at Bourdieu, but few are landed, since he is not quite standing where they
think he is. This is never truer than in the case of language.

What’s in a Word?
Bourdieu warns “to beware of words” (Wacquant 1989) in his methodological
advice to the would-be researcher. Issues of language are all-pervasive in his work,
and it is possible to discern at least four principal strands in it. Firstly, there is his
interest in language as an empirical social phenomenon; secondly, the way lan-
 282 M. Grenfell
guage mediates social processes, encapsulated in his own methodological
instruments; thirdly, his own specialist language——habitus, field, etc.; and,
fourthly, his critique of the academic study of language and linguistics——sociolin-
guistics (Labov), philosophy (Searle, Austin) and universal grammar (Chomsky).
Bourdieu argues very strongly that his own conceptual tools were logically necessi-
tated by the empirical data in which he immersed himself (Bourdieu [2000] 2005,
2). In other words, terms such as habitus and field are to be received not simply as
metaphorical descriptors, heuristic devices to elucidate social processes, but as sci-
entific instruments which are “realistically” present within the very phenomena
from which they are invoked.
This point is perfectly consistent with Bourdieu’s theoretical perspective on lan-
guage. He castigates writers such as Comte and Saussure, and after them Chomsky,
for seeing language as a “universal treasure”, as a set of neutral signifiers used to sig-
Downloaded by [Michael Grenfell] at 01:27 26 November 2013

nify. Words for Bourdieu always imply relationships. At base is the intensional [sic]
relation between a human being/social agent and their environment, in all its mani-
festations. The misspelling is intended to draw attention to the structural nature of
such a relation; and it is a structure that is both structured and structuring (see Bour-
dieu 1972 and Bourdieu [1972] 1977)——a two-way dialectic of subject and object
described methodologically by Bourdieu as “structural constructivism” or “con-
structive structuralism” (1989). Words express these structures and this structuring,
and indeed carry them. At base here is not (contra Hasan 1999) an “externalist”
reading of language but an externalist / internalist dynamic which amounts to a the-
ory of knowledge; except, of course, that that knowledge is always interest-laden.
Meaning is never once-and-for-all, neutral, singular, transmitted from one to
another in a Lockean sense of perfect communication, but always open to interpre-
tation, representation and misunderstanding; it is contested but gravitates towards
the dominant sense occurring in a social space in a centripetal way. What is signified
is carried in the signifier “transformed and transubstantiated” into a socially relative
meaning (see Bourdieu [1988] 1991) imbibed with the values of the social environ-
ment from which it emerges. In this sense, Husserlian “emergence” is just as danger-
ous as Heideggerian “transcendence”, since both reify sense and meaning, rather
than seeing them as a dynamic social process of (re)construction.

Reflections on Reflexions
I write all this by way of prelude to approaching Susen’s “Bourdieusian reflections
on language: Unavoidable conditions of the real speech situation”. Already in the
title I find much to question: Is it “reflections” or “reflexions”? What does he mean
by “conditions”? Why are they supposed to be “unavoidable”? What is “real”, or is
it “realist”? Is it “real speech situation” or “speech event”? These questions are not
simply those of a pedant, but raise the presuppositions, tropes, implications and
interests that resonate with my own academic signifiers, as I work to position this
article in the social space that is Bourdieusian scholarship. I smile at the way he
adopts (ironically perhaps, and without naming it) Bourdieu’s own favourite nar-
 Social Epistemology 283

rative devices when, for example, a single change carries with it a wealth of
words——“to identify the unavoidable conditions of the real speech situation rather
than the avoidable conditions of the ideal speech situation” (Susen 2013, 200)——,
or turns phrases back on themselves to make the point——“in order to understand
that the legitimacy of linguistic validity is always contingent upon the validity of
social legitimacy” (Susen 2013, 200; see ibid., 218).
He goes on to suggest that, because it is right to say there is a Bourdieusian
study of language, it would be a contradiction to affirm that there is such a thing
as a Bourdieusian theory of language. Well, that all depends…
Bourdieu, of course, always asserted that he never theorized as such and, indeed,
as above, I would side with him in arguing that much of his so-called theory was
derived from empirical engagement. Nevertheless, he does offer a theory of practice,
and that is the whole point. Ipso facto, as study is a practical activity, it is subject to
Downloaded by [Michael Grenfell] at 01:27 26 November 2013

the same theory of practice; surely, that is the essential base of what is required in
terms of participant objectivation. So, whilst there is no theory in a Popperian sense
of falsification and “knowledge without a knowing subject” (Popper [1972] 1979),
Bourdieu’s theory of practice must subsume both “study” and “language” and, thus,
implies at least a “theory of language (practice)”.
Susen then states that Bourdieu was a philosophe by training and a sociologue
by choice (see Susen 2013, 200), and then he says that, whilst there is a Bourdieu-
sian sociology of language, there is no such thing as Bourdieusian philosophy of lan-
guage (see Susen 2013, 200). Yes, but…
Bourdieu’s own academic career strategy involved him embracing sociology, a
subject which, at the time, was unpopular and not even taught that much at
French universities. Yet, his route to that was also by way of anthropology; and,
although he does generally refer to “sociology”, this is often in terms of “LA
sociologie” (the sociology), which seems to imply “his” (and only his!) sociology. In
many books, and even in translated titles of the same, sociology seems to have very
close affinities to ethnography, and anthropology for him. Given what I have writ-
ten above, it would seem impossible to dissociate his sociology from his philoso-
phy because of Bourdieu’s own epistemological foundations to what he means by
structure: phenomenology (Merleau-Ponty, Husserl), writers of the history of the
philosophy of science (Bachelard, Canguilhem), not to mention his inverted
appropriation of Sartre and, by way of implication, Heidegger. I have always
thought that Bourdieu is best described as a “social philosopher”. It follows from
all this that there is a philosophy of language in Bourdieu, although perhaps not
the one that Susen expects or, indeed, may even recognize.
Susen next draws attention to the way the “linguistic field” is only one of many
other social fields and concludes, therefore, drawing again on Bourdieu’s back flip
narrative device, that whilst there is a Bourdieusian “social-theoretic” approach
to language, it is unjustified to characterize Bourdieusian sociology as a “language-
theoretic” approach to the social.
This claim again raises the issue not only of the relationship between sociology
and philosophy, but also, more importantly, of the relationship between language
 284 M. Grenfell
and the social. For Bourdieu, language is social. Yet, the social cannot be regarded
characteristically as language, perhaps in the way that Foucault’s philosophy might.
There is no place in Bourdieu’s social-theoretic approach to refer to social agents
being “talked into being” or of fields of knowledge as essentially discursive. The lin-
guistic field——if it is a field——must be a very special field. Bourdieu often prefers
to use the term “linguistic market”, meaning that there are normative issues being
played out in all social spaces where language appears as the légitime (la norme)
and, hence, is juxtaposed to the local variant in a literal “play on words” and “play
with words” where the social and the symbolic are being implicitly negotiated in
terms of what is and is not acceptable, thus establishing structures of domination
and subjugation through what is and is not recognized. This is true of all fields
and social spaces. Consequently, we must take field generally in its narrower sense
and linguistic field in its broadest sense——the two are not really comparable.
Downloaded by [Michael Grenfell] at 01:27 26 November 2013

Methodological Concerns
The above points are made by Susen to explain the absence of what he calls
“ontological presuppositions” in the literature on Bourdieu and language. Is this
true of my own work on the same (see, for instance, Grenfell 2011)?
Susen’s is an interesting list of characteristics that might be used to describe
language from a Bourdieusian perspective: sociality, dialecticality, signifiability,
doxicality, discursivity, legitimacy, ideology, contestability, commodifiability,
symbolic power. I did ask myself whether he made some of these up——“commod-
ifiability”? Again, I am not trying to be pedantic; rather, I am simply attempting
to draw attention to the practice (a theoretical account of which we have from
Bourdieu) of working in a field of practice. Words do have epistemological status
in Bourdieu’s would-be theory. Indeed, I have always adopted the practice of writ-
ing his key concepts——field, habitus, capital, etc.——in italics in order to draw
attention to the fact that they need to be read as dynamic epistemological matrices
entering a narrative, not as mere metaphorical descriptors. In other words, when
any single concept is used, an entire theory of practice——structuring structures,
etc.——is invoked. It is difficult to work——to write and read——in this way, with
this dynamic constantly in mind. Yet, without it, one quickly descends to a weak
form of constructivism: habitus is agency, field is context, reflexivity is self-aware-
ness. No, that is not it at all!
For Bourdieu, what is epistemological is ontological——the two are co-terminus.
Susen’s presuppositions are certainly epistemological; hence, by my own argument,
they must also be ontological. Yet, I asked myself about their practical conse-
quence. Only a few feature to any large extent in Bourdieu’s own writings, and I
found myself wanting to substitute more conventional Bourdieusian terms for the
ones in his list: for example, “the constructive” for “the dialectic”, “field” for “the
discursive”, “the heterodoxic” for “the contestable”——to mention only a few.
Some of my own alternatives seem closer to the practical usefulness of Bourdieu’s
approach to language since they are one step closer to offering a methodology for
 Social Epistemology 285

the empirical study of language, from this perspective. In my own work (2011:
Chapter 9), I have set this out (a) in terms of a three-phase approach to linguistic
study——“construction of the research object”, “field study” and participant objecti-
vation——and (b) in terms of a three-level approach to field analysis——“field and
the field of power”, “field itself” and “habitus of those in the field”.
This approach seems consistent with Bourdieu’s own. Although it is not
systematized in this way by him, it is perhaps a necessary first step if we are going
to form some sort of consensus around what it is to study language in this way.
My point is that Susen’s list of presuppositions, so ably presented and discussed,
seems to imply a claim to ontological status which asserts (theoretical) significance,
whilst what we need is to think more in terms of their (practical) adaptability and
applicability. In what sense are they “unavoidable”? Are they logically necessitated
by empirical data? The terms on the list may represent a useful range of epistemo-
Downloaded by [Michael Grenfell] at 01:27 26 November 2013

logical dimensions to language but seem to lack practical (praxis/praxeological)

usefulness from a methodological——that is, empirical——point of view for the
study of language.
With the publication of Ce que parler veut dire in 1982 and, with it, its full
frontal attack on Chomskyan linguistics, Bourdieu seems to have offended an
academic field to such an extent that, for the most part, they deal with him by
ignoring him. This is a great pity as, even in terms of sociolinguistics and social
psycholinguistics, Bourdieu has much to offer, although we may be some way off
from a Bourdieusian version of transformational grammar! Still, I would argue
that the main challenge of a Bourdieusian approach to language is now methodo-
logical, rather than epistemological, even though I accept that this present Special
Issue goes some way to elucidating, if not finally nailing, Bourdieu and language
from a socio-philosophical point of view.

Conclusion
I began this article with a term that came to me in approaching it——that of
“shadow boxing”, an image itself which conjures up the picture of someone going
through the motions of (in this case scholastic) attack, whilst never actually landing
a punch. As I argued, critics of Bourdieu often seem to be engaged in just such an
activity, and one of the strengths (possible weaknesses) of Bourdieu’s theory and
method is that it almost demands to be critiqued in its own terms. Not to do so is
somehow to miss the point. To do so, however, risks becoming ensnared in
Bourdieusian language, of possibly reifying his concepts, or applying a broad meta-
phorical sweep to narratives. Both needed to be avoided. Bourdieu is probably at
his most slippery and convincing in the way he uses language and, indeed, the ana-
lytical terms themselves. No wonder he told us to beware of language. Thus, I have
argued the following: it is necessary to be terminologically ascetic; to not use more
terms than is necessary; it is necessary to use only those logically necessitated by the
data; it is necessary to avoid theory for theory’s sake; and, finally, it is necessary to
approach Bourdieusian language through a deep understanding of the epistemology
 286 M. Grenfell
that underlies it and the ontology it implies. In other words, it is necessary to pre-
serve the integrity of Bourdieu’s language about language. Such would form its own
orthodoxy and offer an associative language for those working from this perspec-
tive, which would surely begin to unlock some of the more evasive aspects of par-
ticipant objectivation as a necessary precursor to the kind of praxeological
knowledge that this approach provides. Basically, sometimes it is just necessary to
climb into the ring with Bourdieu and punch it out! Susen’s reflections are a wel-
come contribution in that endeavour.

Note
[1] See subsequent publications: Grenfell (2004, 2007, 2010, 2011, 2012); Grenfell and Hardy
(2007); Grenfell et al. (2012).
Downloaded by [Michael Grenfell] at 01:27 26 November 2013

References
Ahearne, J and J. Speller eds. 2012. Bourdieu and the literary field. Paragraph 35 (1): 1–388.
Bourdieu, P. [1972] 1977. Outline of a theory of practice. Translated by R. Nice. Cambridge:
CUP.
——————. 1972. Esquisse d’une théorie de la pratique. Précédé de trois études d’ethnologie kabyle.
[Outline of a theory of practice]. Translated by R. Nice. Cambridge: CUP.
——————. 1982. Ce que parler veut dire. L’économie des échanges linguistiques. Paris: Fayard.
——————. 1989. Social space and symbolic power. Sociological Theory 7 (1): 14–25.
——————. [1988] 1991. The political ontology of Martin Heidegger. Translated by P. Collier.
Oxford: Polity Press.
——————. 2000. “Participant objectivation”. Address given in receipt of the Aldous Huxley
Medal for Anthroplogy, University of London, 12th November, Mimeograph, 12pp.
——————. [2000] 2005. Les Structures sociales de l’economie [The social structures of the economy].
Translated by Chris Turner. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Grenfell, M. 2004. Pierre Bourdieu: Agent provocateur. London: Continuum.
——————. 2007. Pierre Bourdieu: Education and training. London: Continuum.
——————. 2010. Working with habitus and field: The logic of Bourdieu’s practice. In Cultural
analysis and Bourdieu’s legacy: Settling accounts and developing alternatives, edited by
E. Silva and A. Warde, pp. 14–27. London: Routledge.
——————. 2011. Bourdieu, language and linguistics. London: Continuum.
——————. ed. 2012. Pierre Bourdieu: Key concepts. Stocksfield: Acumen.
Grenfell, M., D. Bloome, C. Hardy, K. Pahl, J. Rowsell, and B. Street. 2011. Language, ethnography
and education: Bridging new literacy studies and Bourdieu. New York: Routledge.
Grenfell, M., and C. Hardy. 2007. Art rules. Pierre Bourdieu and the visual arts. Oxford: Berg.
Hasan, R. 1999. The disempowerment game: Bourdieu and language in literacy. Linguistics and
Education 10 (1): 25–87.
Popper, K. [1972] 1979. Objective knowledge. London: Routledge.
Susen, S. 2013. Bourdieusian reflections on language: Unavoidable conditions of the real speech
situation. Social Epistemology 27 (3–4): 199–246.
Wacquant, L. 1989. Towards a reflexive sociology: A workshop with Pierre Bourdieu. Sociological
Theory 7 (1): 26–63.