78 A MIND WAR

This should not be discussed and decided only by the Supreme

Council for National Defense, but it should be taken into account
in the everyday activity of state institutions that_ sh?uld serve the
citizen as the aforementioned document clearly md1cates.

Cognitive War, Security Culture and Risk

Perception. Romania and the Others
V.I\SILE SEBASTIAN DANCU

Communication is the most important element of competition

and influence in society, and in international relations. Max
vVebber was the first theoretician who observed that the existence
of the 'state is based on force. The rational - legal legitimacy
implies that social order is regulated by abstract rules, which are
accepted by responsible citizens as a consequence of persuasive,
therefore non-violent methods. Rational legitimacy is founded on
the acceptance of the lawful nature of the legal norms in force.
Elections, for example, are symbolic rituals of instituting political
power and escape valves for domestic social violence which could
be channeled against political power in times of crisis. The
authority of administrative institutions of power, manifested in
the election ritual, symbolizes a harmonization of the m.Yor inte-
rests of the community and represents the non violent result of
legal institutional proceedings.
For Geoff Mulgan (2007) the ability of the state to take respon-
sibili ty for the exercise of power is the harmonization of three
sources of power: violence (lawful), money and truth. Violence
can only be used in a negative way, money in two ways - you can
give and take money from people, but knowledge and thought can
change things, they can move mountains and make transient
power seem eternal.
We are living in the age of the informational society as men-
tioned by Alvin Toffier, whose mechanisms are described by what
 80 A Mil'D WAR The Cognitive War, Security Culture and Risk Perception 81

~anuel Castells calls the network sociery. 1 At the center of society Whaley5 tries to build a typology of cogmtlve manipulation
ltes the economy qf knowledge where welfare is created through the methods that we present in the following table; we would like to
point out that there are other forms of cognitive manipulation
economic exploitation of knowledge. However, one of the most
that we will discuss later in this paper.
important processes of the network sociery is the one that creates
value, because, as Manuel Castells2 claims, the value is an expres- Figure I. Cognitive manipulation methods (Whaley, 1982)
DISSIMULATION SIMULATION
sion of power, whoever has power decides what value is. (showing the false)
(hiding the real)
Masking To eliminate an old Mimicking To recreate an old
1. In search of cognitive dominance pattem or blend it with a pattern, imitating it
background pattern
John Arquilla3 believes that a dominant state manages to per- Repackaging To modify an old pat- Inventing To create a new
tern by matching pattern
suade, to force other states to divide their system of values or to
another
doubt their own knowledge criteria, norms or values. Cognitive Decoying To give an additional,
Dazzling To blur an old pattern
arenas are social spaces where perceptions of the world, social .. reducing its certainty alternative pattern
increasing its certainty
purposes, causalities and reasoning are formed, spaces where indi-
viduals are under strong pressure from those who tend to impose The notion of war qf meaninf has been frequently used of late.
their own cognitive system. After the fall of the Berlin wall, the strategies of the Cold War
In practice, only few intelligence services that are part of the became obsolete, the common enemy disappeared and the eco-
s~ate system display a behavior that prepares them for the cogni-
nomic competition became visible, yet competition and conflict
got diversified. Disinformation actions were carried out against
tive war. The old ideology of most of the services determines
the public opinion undermining the meaning of collective actions,
them to focus on the search of an objective, positive truth while
at the same time the neo-liberals questioned the role of the weak-
the intelligence collection is distinct from the analysis compart- ening state control to the benefit of private economic or strategic
~ent: the officers gather intelligence, while the analysts interpret interests, especially to the benefit of multinational companies.
It or reconstruct the whole picture. 4 It a working method adequate
for traditional conflicts; nowadays, however, it is necessary to inte- 2. The competition to influence the public opinion is
grate the collection and analysis of social signals.
truly a cognitive war
1
~anuel Castells, The Rise if the Network Society. The lr!formation Age: Economy, Parties and other political organizations, economic organiza-
focte~ and Culture, vol. I , Mal~e1~ Blackwell, second edition, 2000.
tions and brands, NGOs and the civil society, interest groups
Manuel Castells, Commumcatlon Power, Oxford University Press Inc. New
York. 2009. '
3
J. _Arquilla, ''The Strategic implications of strategic dominance", in Strategic .i Barton Whaley, 'Towards a General Theory of Deception', injohn Gooch &
Remew, 1994, vol.22, no.3, pp. 24-30. Amos Perm utter (com·d.), Military deception and strategic surprise, Totowa, NJ, Frank
4
Christian Harbulot and Didier Lucas coo rd., Laguerre cognitive, Editions Charles Cass&Co, 1982.
Lavauzelle, Paris 2002. fi Loup Fran cart, Laguerre du sens, Oeconomica, Paris, 2000.
 82 AMI:XD WAR
(legitimate or illegitimate), the national state versus other states
take part in the total war, through processes called today public
diplomacy, through education and social marketing campaigns.
Moreover, local structures compete in creating identities (local,
regional, national and even transnational). We can speak of a
boom of wars of meaning, fuelled by the fact that after the fall of
the Berlin wall, the strategies of the Cold War became obsolete,
the common enemy disappeared and economic competition
developed. Nowadays, the economic competition does not take
place merely on the economic market:
• disinformation actions are carried out against the public
opinion undermining the meaning of collective actions;
• the neo-liberals question the role of the state;
• political elites fight over short term strategies while intellec-
tual elites fight over resources.
An important phenomenon has appeared and it could create
havoc or lead to stagnation: claiming the meaning or the mono-
poly of meaning after the elections or to put it differently, "who
wins the elections is right". Thus, every four years the electoral
windmill determines a change of strategies, policies, development
plans making it impossible for us to move forward.
A cognitive war would thus mean the use of know-
ledge and intelligence analysis abilities to serve such bel-
ligerent purposes. It becomes apparent in the transference of
myths and models between cultures. This is carried out by using
cultural bombs based on storytelling and other opportunities
revealed by the application of the results obtained in social sci-
ences to areas of influence.
Influence is a concept that is harder to visualize. It is neither
a relation of coercion, nor of causality. It is an asymmetric relation,
a result of an indirect strategy in many cases. Defining influence,
American sociologists represented it as a relation of transmitting
dominance or power; influence is what is transmitted (Katz,
Lazarsfeld, Hovland). Other theories refer to the idea of prestige.
It is certain that influence cannot be reduced to a single model, it
The Cognitive War, Security Culture and Risk Perception 83
can take many forms: individual and colle~tive, visible or invisible,
negative or positive, conscious or unconscious. . . .
Influence is an indirect act carried out through Signs; It Is not
an immediate cause-effect relation. We do not have to see it as a
content transfer relation; it depends on the unpredictability of the
receiver. In the cognitive war influence may mean propagation but
it is not a unique model because we only have effect analysis
models. Empirical studies show the failure of manipulation and
political marketing actions. Influence is also. persuas.ion, even
though we do not have universal models for this case .eith~r. The
mark of persuasion is the change of opinion, but even m th~s case,
influence is a more subtle case and cannot be reduced to this. The
term of ideological contamination could be closer to the meaning of
the' term influence used in the cognitive war. Ideologies help us
make representations of the world, make projections in the future
and distinguish right from wrong. .
In the case of strategic influence operations we speak of mflu-
ence as a strat~gy that is coordinated and planned actions with a
particular purpose and a specific target.
Wars of meaning and wars of image.
After the end of the Cold War the strategic certainties disap-
peared and military interventions required public justifi.cation.
The purpose of military interventions has became very different
from traditional ones, even though their official motivation has
been related to peace keeping or the restoration of public order:
economic competition, regional stability, humanitarian operations (or under
humanitarian cover), commercial supremacy, opening ~ the local markets.
One of the most important operations is that of getting con-
sensus and obtaining the adequate motivation for common action.
Claiming the meaning becomes, in many cases, more important
than claiming the interest. Nowadays, information is a more
important target than oil in wars of meaning, as some~ody point-
ed out. All our actions carry meaning, but take place m contexts
of interpretation that assign them meaning and are interpreted by
84 AMI:\'D WAR
social classes and social agents according or not to their conflicting
interests. The meaning structure revolves around three important
concepts: signifying meaning, significant meaning, and
signified meaning7 .
Signifying meaning can be analyzed objectively, being the
reference meaning; it represents the motivation of actions and can
be regarded as intentional meaning deriving from the assumed pur-
poses, but also as normative meaning deriving from the specific
rules that govern the respective action.
The motivation behind actions is relative, because it influences
interest in interstate relations; conflicting interests have led to the
setting up of the international legislation on sovereignty and the
legitimacy of defending one's interests. Thus, a French author8 set
up the following interest scale that is definitely not exhaustive:
• world interests: nuclear nonproliferation, environment;
• western interests: European stability, fight against the Mafia;
• regional interests: regional stability, prosperity;
• vital national interests: sovereignty, territorial integrity,
citizen protection
• national strategic interests: energy and food supply, alli-
ances and agreements;
• national capability interests: commercial, agricultural,
industrial, cultural.
Not only interests, but also values determine the main meaning
of an action. The values include ethical elements and beliefs, aspi-
rations and reference points, common representations. They have
a dual nature, both objective and subjective, as different commu-
nities may fill similar axiological categories with various contents.
A non-hierarchical9 classification could be the following:
• ethical: good, truth, beauty;
7
Loup Francart, Laguerre du sens, Oeconomica, Paris, 2000, pp. 39 - 69.
8
Ibidem, p.44.
9 initial intention or in the teleological fundamentals.
Ibidem, p.46
The Cognitive War, Security Culture and Risk Perception 85
• humanitarian: human rights, justice, solidarity, tolerance,
respect, health;
• community-related: common history, common territory,
identity;
• international: sovereignty, peoples' right to self-determi-
nation;
• social and political: law, order, justice, progress, demo-
cracy, pluralism;
• economic: ownership, work.
The meaning is also intentional; it is not only determined by
interests or values, but also defined by the purpose of the action.
If we take the example of a political project, we notice that it is a
structured and coherent set of general objectives, which are theo-
retically defined following an analysis of the existing order. It
defines the formula of the common good of a group, over a cer-
tain time span and in accordance with benchmark models and
values. But the political project also includes strategies, i.e. ways of
implementing a project and solving conflicts.
Finally, the normative dimension of the meaning derives from
rules and raises the issue of legitimacy. It makes reference to natu-
ral law, but also to the rights of the state, of the people, of indi-
viduals or even to humanitarian law, which is more and more
frequently invoked in modern conflagrations.
The significant meaning is related to reality, to praxis, and
has the effectiveness of actions as a criterion. In this respect, .the
wars of meaning acquire the most dynamic dimension, as they are
focused on the following aspects: mastering and protecting systems and
iTf:formation; neutralizing enemy information systems; psychological actions, etc.
We can also refer here to a practical sense, i.e. effectiveness
me<;tSured by an actual sense which derives from the general
effect, as the final effect may exceed the sum of measurable effects,
but also to an induced sense, i.e. effects generated by retroactions,
interactions and feedback, which were not taken into account in the
86 AMI!"DWAR
The signified meaning is the meaning perceived in the
social context in which the belligerent action occurs. This includes
the actions belonging to the so-called psychological war, those
meant to offer a coherent explanatory meaning that matches
intentions. The manner of communicating political, economic or
military actions is the most important stake of certain present-day
conflicts. One of the best known public relations consultants in
the US,John W Rendon, who led many of the CIA and Pentagon
operations in Iraq, said at a conference held at the US Air Force
Academy in 1996: "I am not a national security strategist or a
military tactician. I am a politician and a person who uses com-
munication to meet public-policy or corporate-policy objectives.
I am an information warrior and a perception manager". 10
One of the most important objectives of the wars of meaning is
to control social information with a view to protecting national
security. The global media boom diminishes a nation's resistance,
and it can affect its willingness to preserve its culture, values or cer-
tain identity elements. Given its frequency and magnitude, the
social information introduced in the media with aggressive inten-
tions, if it is strictly organized and managed according to certain
strategic objectives, can take the form of media operations. It is
already commonplace for media structures directed by the power
centers that manage them to limit the freedom of action of political
and military decision makers, to make difficult the achievement of
surprise, to compromise state security, to be used as information
gathering, manipulation, disinformation and propaganda means.
3. Information warfare. Case studies and security
practices
There is a competition for acquiring knowledge in the world
nowadays, and the one who knows more and learns faster than his
IU Sheldon Rampton and john Stauber, vVeapoTIS of Mass Deceptio7l- The Uses of
Propaganda in Bush's War on Iraq, Penguin Group Inc, NY, 2003, p.l3
The Cognitive War, Security Culture and R isk Perception 87
competitors gains a strategic advantage. The disturbance of the
information systems used in economic or other type of activities
destabilizes the whole collectivity. Thus, a new battle field appears -
the informational lands.
Information warfare is still seen as a new concept, which indi-
cates that warfare and its metamorphoses are no longer under-
stood. We could discern the following reasons which explain our
incapacity to understand the shifts in the balance of power tri-
ggered by geopolitical changes, globalization, information and
communication technologies, the "over-financing" within capital-
ism and its growing media impact 11 :
• the general European reticence about seemg the world
through the lens of conflict;
• the inability of governments to reform themselves in order to
build innovative reading grids, which should take into account the
major shifts that took place in the world in the last two decades;
• the difliculties encountered by the present-day culture in
building a substantial government project, which should lay down
priorities and durable strategic axes.
Therefore, a new strategic thinking, able to fulfill certain key
imperatives, is more necessary than ever. The present global con-
frontations (military, economic, cultural, information-related)
which will shape the future, and the unique nature that most of
them have, should be analyzed. At the same time, the reasons
behind our incapacity to envisage new forms of conflicts and to
act accordingly, in order to find innovative solutions, should
be explored.
In a recently published work 12, George Cristian Maior demon-
strates that in today's world the strategy is not only of a military
nature, but it is necessary to create an alliance between theoreticians
II Eric Delbecque, in N.Arpagian, Cyberguerre, Vuibert, Paris, 2009, pp. 17-18
1
~ Georae Cristian Maior, Incerti!Jtdine. Ga11dire strategica si relatii intematiouale in seco-
lul XXI (Uncertain !)I. Strategic Thiukiug and l11tema/.ional Relations iu the 2 P' Century),
RAO, Bucuresti, 2008
88 A MIND WAR
and practitiOners, and this situation entails that theoreticians
sometimes have to do practical things. The author shows that, in
order to face the new threats, strategic workshops are needed, as
a place where knowledge is an increasingly important tool and
where academics and practitioners meet. The national defense
academics are in fact the new soldiers. We must admit
that this is a new approach, and I think that it is not rea-
dily acceptable to the generals of traditional battles and
the military who consider national defense as an attri-
bute of uniformed men. What is the origin of this need to
change the logic of the national defense strategy preparation?
George Cristian Maior builds his theory on two new key concepts
resulting from the most recent analyses of social sciences: the net-
work state and the non-state. Faced with the changes and develop-
ments of the 21st century, every state finds it increasingly difficult
to resist the pressure to keep its borders closed and well-defined.
"It is increasingly difficult for every state to oppose physical barri-
ers against the conveyance of ideas, goods, capital or persons
across national borders." 13 By quoting Ulrich Beck, who suggests
that the concepts on which the modern society is based (home,
family, class, state, economy, politics) should be rethought, recon-
ceptualized from a methodological cosmopolitanism perspective, Maior
shows that a way must be found to explain the link between tradi-
tional international relations (state and territory based) and the
new forms of these relations, developed as a result of globaliza-
tion. Manuel Castells's network-state is advanced as an explanatory
concept. Castells considers that this is the final form reached by
the states which undergo changes in terms of their structure and
role. Thus he defines the network as a se t of nodes (centers,
according to others) which generates a complex communication
structure, built around a set of objectives that ensure at the same
time unity of purpose and adaptability to the environment in
which it operates.
13
Ibidem, p.81
The Cognitive War, Security Culture and Risk Perception 89
According to George Cristian Maior, networks play nowadays
an extremely important role in the development of international
relations. There are networks specific to the new era, which deter-
mine negative developments in the financial or security field (the
onset of the global economic crisis; the terrorist attacks that are
based on a network with nodes in more than 60 states), and "the
distinction [ ... ] between the domestic and foreign domains
becomes less visible and discernible due to the transnational,
international and subnational effects of the networks" 14• At the end
of the chapter, the author warns, with reference maybe also to the
realities in Romania and the obtuseness of politicians, that the
phenomenon will become increasingly widespread, with both
positive and negative consequences on foreign policy and interna-
tional telations, and the states' negative reactions towards net-
works and lack of openness thereto could entail negative effects
such as marginalization and exclusion from the system.
In January 2009 a new threat occurred in the US, after weap-
ons of mass destruction and nuclear attacks: "the cyber apoca-
lypse" - Cybergeddon. According to Americans, this phenomenon
can be described as follows: a massive qffinsive meant to cause the same
damages for the country and its networks as the 9/11 attacks did. It is not
surprising that cyber lands become a new battlefield if we take
into account the increasingly important role played by informa-
tion technologies in our daily life. The knowledge economy and
the progressive generalization of information societies have gener-
ated not only extraordinary cultural and commercial benefits, but
also certain vulnerabilities, some of those yet to be discovered.
As far back as 1993, Rand Corporation experts John Arquilla
and David Ronfeldt said: "Cyberwar is coming" 15 • Talking about
the significance of this phenomenon, the two experts state that, in
14
Ibidem, p.87
"'.J.Arquilla, D.Ronfeldt, Cybmvar is coming!, Comparative Strategy, vol.l2, no.2,
1993, pp. 141-165.
90 A MI!'DWAR
terms of fight innovation, "cyberwar will be for the 21st century
what blietzkrieg was for the 20 111 century".
· According to Fran<;ois-Bernard Huyghe, a French expert in
information sciences, one must take into account a very important
distinction 16:
Cyberwar (or Information Warfore; Fr.: Cyberguerre) is a strictly
military term which designates the performance of military ope-
rations based on principles related to information channels.
Consequently, the issue here is the destruction or destabilization
of enemy communication systems.
Netwar (Fr: Netguerre) corresponds to large scale conflicts
ben-veen nations or companies. In this case the aggressor will try
to alter what a target population (consumers, public opinion,
voters, etc) thinks about itself or about the world.
The Internet does nothing but provide a new way of using
already existing tactics. For instance, actor Robert Sherwood con-
vinced President Roosevelt to establish an international informa-
tion service to support the Americans' war efforts. In his opinion,
the best propaganda is to tell the truth to the world. Therefore the
radio Voice of America began its broadcast in February 1942, in
almost every European language, such as Albanian , Czech,
Slovak, Polish or Serbian-Croatian. In July 1994 the daily pro-
gram includes 119 hours of broadcast in 50 languages. This is an
efficient political weapon, which deals with the enemy in the bat-
tlefield of ideas.
An example of an information assault is the Russian- Georgian
conflict in the summer of 2008: as the situation was growing more
problematic, the web page of the Georgian president began to be
assaulted by a remotely controlled "zombie" computer network
and was overloaded to such an extent that it was no longer acces-
sible to users. Next month the websites of the main media chan-
nels, institutions or ministries in Georgia were targeted by the
attacks. The pictures on these websites were replaced with others
1
fi F.~B. Huyghe, L'ennemi al'ere rmmtrique, Presses Universitairesde France, 200 I
The Cognitive War, Security Culture and Risk Perception 91
showing Georgian officials in Nazi uniforms, and the president's
portrait was replaced with that of Adolph Hitler. Following these
events and the IT attacks undergone by Estonia in 2007, NATO
member states wondered whether this type of attack should
be treated as a traditional military attack and fall under article 5
of NATO's founding treaty signed on April 4, 1949. According to
Article 5 , "The Parties agree that an armed attack against one
or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered
an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if
such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the
right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article
51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or
Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert
with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including
the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the
North Atlantic area". No concrete decision to this end has been
made so far.
The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly debated this issue during
the 17th annual session held in Astana onjuly 3, 2008. In a docu-
ment drawn up on that occasion this type of aggression is paral-
leled to slavery. However, no concrete positions as to this issue
were formulated at that time either.
In recent years we have witnessed the development of warblogs
or milblogs. These blogs enable soldiers, mainly retired ones, to
comment on military operations or decisions made by their supe-
riors. For example, in the summer of 2008, a deadly ambush in
Afghanistan during which 10 American soldiers were killed gave
rise to an extensive debate regarding the circumstances of the
attack, which determined the Secretary of Defense to develop his
account on the events in the Uzbin Valley. The honesty of the
leaders is questioned, and discussions around the young age of
the recruits and the quality of the equipment begin in the cyber-
space, hundreds of warblogs on this subject emerging in the US.
Not only do they offer an opportunity to voice an opinion, but also
92 A MIND WAR
have an influence on how the discussions on a certain subject
develop or on the decisions that are made.
In France, the Research Center in the Social Sciences of
Defense published a study on military blogs in the summer of
2007 .The author, Marine Chartrener, finds that these blogs pro-
vide information on manoeuvres and operations involving active
players, a liberty that is possible due to anonymity, as pseudonyms
are usually used.
In the same way, the US Secretary of Defense announced in
2007 that American soldiers were denied access to YouTube,
MySpace and other similar websites, under the pretext of over-
loading the Internet bandwidth. However, his concern was most
probably related to the information that the soldiers might dis-
close regarding the operations in which they were involved.
Another concern is related to cell phones and the data they con-
tain regarding the user. One approach was to prohibit the dispatch
of SMS or to delete all the information on the SIM card upon
leaving the theater of war.
In Iran, a special unit of the morality police is in charge with
checking the mobile phones of passers-by. Citizens whose mobile
phones contain SMS, pictures or films that go against Islamic
moral norms are brought to justice.
In 1994, the French White Paper on Difense stipulated that "Media
management becomes a component of the military strategy. From
now on the information stands at the core of all defense policies.
[ ... ] The opportunities for manipulation and disinformation are
the reverse of generalized information and great vigilance is
required in this field".
On June I 7, 2008, when Nicolas Sarkozy brought the White
Paper on Difense and Securi!J to the attention of the representatives
of the armed and security forces, he emphasized 17: "For 15 years,
France has not been threatened by invasion [. .. ] The risk of cyber
attacks which could paralyze the nation is no longer only a mere
17 In N.Arpagian, Cyberspace, Vuibert, Paris, 2009, p.44
The Cognitive War, Security Culture and Risk Perception 93
possibility: France and several European countries have recently
fallen victim to them."
Unlike traditional armed conflicts, the Internet is not con-
trolled only by the state, which would decide upon certain military
actions. There are also private players, especially companies. In
response to IT threats, Cisco Systems, IBM, Intel, Juniper
Networks and Microsoft established the Industry Consortium for
Advancement of Security on the Internet (ICASI). This is a non-
profit entity designed to manage IT security threats.
The myth of absolute media control
"In the past no government had the power to keep its citizens
under constant surveillance. [ .. .] With the development of televi-
sion, ~nd the technical advance which made it possible to receive
and transmit simultaneously on the same instrument, private life
came to an end." (George Orwell, 1984)
For more than half a century, the United States of America
has introduced the surveillance of the enemy's means of commu-
nication , and not only of those. In 1943 the U.S. collaborated with
the United Kingdom in this respect, with a view to penetrating the
German cryptographic system with the help of Enigma.
In 1947 the two countries signed a pact linking their )fames:
UKUSA. Later on they were joined by Canada, Australia and
New Zealand. Other countries, such as Germany or Turkey;
became associated members, but were not granted full access to
the tools used by this global network called Echelon. This network
monitors telephone, fax or e-mail communications. The intelli-
gence thus collected is not limited to the military field, but covers
every strategic domain.
T he United States of America and the founding members are
entitled to make a selection of the intelligence they provide to
other nations and therefore learn what they are interested in while
controlling the intelligence they have access to. Echelon's main
advantage lies in the fact that it has global coverage and combines
94 AMI!'\DWAR
technologies such as voice recogmtJon systems, optical reading,
data extraction and content analysis programs.
At the same time, unlike traditional telephone monitoring
tactics, Echelon does not require that the target be known in
advance, as it can be identified later on, if during the monitoring
process a certain element draws the attention of those perform-
ing the surveillance.
Certainly, the collection of huge amounts of intelligence raises
the problem of processing and making use of it. For example, as
university professor Eric Heilmann 18 specifies: ''A surveillance
camera captures everything in its field of view, without distinc-
tions, and what it collects is prolific: one camera records 25
images per second, i.e. more than 2 million images in 24 hours; in
a 20-room location, a system may capture tens of millions of
images in a single day! [...] The experience of the British police
in the inquiry related to several bombings in London, in 1999:
about 1,100 recordings containing more than 25,000 hours had
been watched by 50 agents, mobilized for 10 days, before identify-
ing the perpetrator of the criminal acts".
The establishment of IT ''Armadas" is not at all costly, as it
takes only several hundreds of euros for IT sabotage - by blocking
the services - or several thousands for the dispatch of an effective
virus. An OECD report issued injune 2008 estimates that the use
of an infected computer may cost 33 cents, so that there is no
need to compete with a country's defense budget. Therefore,
states, groups of military activists or even private individuals can
be IT aggressors.
Secrecy is also prevailing in this activity considering that while
one can assess an enemy nation's armed forces, the number of
soldiers, airplanes or tanks, it is impossible to evaluate the IT
attack or defense capacity. Therefore, the potential of an enemy
Ill Eric Heilmann, "La videosurveillance, un mirage technologique et politique",
in Lauren Mucchielli, coord., LA Frenesie securitaire, la Decouverte, 2008.
The Cognitive War, Security Culture and Risk Perception 95
att_ack is ?nly k~own once it has occurred, strategic anticipation
bemg an Impossible task. ·
Information technology is omnipresent in the modern society;
from the dematerialization of financial flows to the operation of
traffic lights in big cities, everything is controlled through informa-
tion and communication technologies. Thus, in the case of an
aggression the list of priority domains should be reevaluated, with
a focus on the systems which, if affected, would determine a wor-
sening of the social climate and an increased risk of mass move-
ments or social tensions.
. The co~~anies which manage vital equipment (transporta-
tion, electnc1ty or water networks) have constantly resorted to
c_ommercial IT ~elutions in order to coordinate the smooth opera-
tiOn o~. the eqmpment. This makes them vulnerable, as they can
be easily affected by malicious individuals, and such actions have
cascad_e e~ects and serious consequences. All the operators of
extensive mfrastructures use automated supervision and control
systems (SCADA: Supervisory, Control and Data Acquisition).
They allow remote supervision with a view to reducing the num-
ber of personnel that would have been necessary to perform this
task. These communication channels can be hacked or spied on.
Forbes magazine featured the account of a hacker who attacked a
SCADA system and gained control over a nuclear power plant in
the United States.
There are five potential directions in which IT attacks can have
an impact19:
• physical consequences for the population: unavailabi-
lity of ~edical services, transportation stoppage, higher risks of
car_ acCidents due to the lack of traffic signals, potential psycho-
logical trauma for the citizens faced with a crisis situation·
.
. • potential consequences on the environment: disrup-
'
tiOn of water and electricity supply, improper functioning of the
l~l N.Arpagian, Cyberguerre, Vuibert, Paris, 2009, pp.71-72
96 A MIND WAR
sewage system, consequences on the maintenance of nuclear or
chemical sites;
• economic consequences: industrial, financial and social
losses due to the improper functioning of IT systems;
• political consequences that may cause tensions, public
disorder, uprisings;
• consequences related to the accumulation and com-
bination of the above mentioned circumstances.
A traditional military attack leaves little scope for doubt, while
IT attacks are more ambiguous. If a website receives too many
requests, is it successful or is it targeted by an IT attack meant to
overload the server? It is difficult to distinguish betwwn genuine
and malicious users, as some of them may have a computer
infected with a virus without knowing it.
The fight for intelligence
The following example serves to illustrate the importance of
strategic intelligence: Nathan Rotschild, having been the first one
informed about the defeat of Napoleon at Waterloo in 1815, sold
the 20 shares he held on the London Stock Exchange, determining
a fall in price. He bought again these shares before the news about
Wellington's victory broke, thus realizing a substantial profit.
Given the dematerialization characteristic of today's economy
and society, the value of intelligence can only be on the increase.
Intelligence has become a new weapon in conflicts which involve
various players: companies, states, non-governmental organiza-
tions, private individuals, associations. This tool facilitates dissi-
mulation and, in these theaters of operations, the ones who are
exerting an influence are never in the first line. Alliances
are ephemeral, and the losses are difficult to evaluate.
Disinformation
The golden rule related to disinformation is a simple one:
"Calumniate, calumniate, something will always remain after
it". In this respect, technology is an important tool. The term
The Cognitive War, Security Culture and Risk Perception 9.7
"disinformation" appeared in the jargon of intelligence services
during the First World War. The German Staff used it to desig-
nate certain forged radio communications intended to deceive.
In the digital era, there are numerous opportunities for the
"modulation" of information, and not only with the purpose of
falsification. For example, during the U.S. presidential election
campaign in 2008, Barack Obama's teams were worried about
the votes their candidate would get in some historically pro-De-
mocratic states but which had given a majority _vote to the
Republicans at the previous elections. In order to convince young-
er voters in these areas, Obama's staff purchased advertising
space in video games popular with young people under 30. The
picture of the senator from Illinois was featured in 28 games dis-
tributed through XBoxLive for the Xbox 360 console; in October
and November his picture appeared on billboards erected in bas-
ketball courts, American football fields or on posters for virtual
concerts. These advertising messages were only visible to the
inhabitants of Ohio, Iowa, Montana, Indiana, Wisconsin, North
Carolina, Nevada, New Mexico, Florida and Colorado. This was
possible due to the digital mapping and personalization capacity
of the digital tool, which ensured such precision in promotional
targeting.
The "editorial" control on search engines is an important
advantage in the logic of cyberwar. Yandex, the equivalent of
Coogle in Russia, which has 6 million visitors per day, was bought
by oligarch Alicher Ousmanov in September 2008. This increased
his scope of influence, as he owns Kommersant, an important busi-
ness daily, and a US blogs service, www.live-journal.com.
Daniel Kimmahe, senior analyst at Radio Free Europe, published
in March 2008 the document The Al-Qgeda Media Nexus: The Virtual
Network behind the Global Message20, making a survey on the use of
Web 2.0 technologies by the supporters of Al-Qaeda. This new
generation technology is based on interactivity. We no longer talk
~ 0 Downloadable: http:/ I docs.rferl.org/ en-US/ AQ_media_Nexus.pdf
98 AMI:-!DWAR
about a single transmitter and a passive receiver of the message.
With Web 2.0 every Internet user can generate content. Wikipedia,
the collaborative encyclopedia, is the best example.
Another feature of Web 2.0 systems is the growing popularity
of online sc;>cial networks (Facebook, Likedin, Viadeo, etc). These
websites allow everybody to introduce themselves to other users as
far as their personal and professional lives are concerned. The
process is uncomplicated, the subscription is in most cases free of
charge, and then the access to personalized services is paid for.
Some users detail their academic path, family status, career stages,
interests and hobbies. All this information help create a detailed
individual portrait, a personal file that intelligence services would
compile after a long period of time and with great risks of errors
or omissions. This information is completed and updated by the
users themselves. At the same time, reviewing a user's contacts
creates a clear image of the social networks he/she is a part o(
In France, the Mediametrie Institute estimated that in the
second quarter of 2008 these websites had 5.2 million subscribers.
Thus, at least 16% of the French Internet users were members of
at least one online social network, having as motivation the exten-
sion of their professional network.
Manipulation risks are therefore extremely high; in February
2008 a Morrocan engineer pretended to be prince Moulay
Rachid, the brother of the Morrocan king, on Facebook. He was
prosecuted for "usurping the identity of the prince" and "the forg-
ing of IT documents", as he set up a false profile of the prince on
this website. Identity theft is facilitated by these socializing tools.
Blogs
At the end of 2008, the Information Service of the French
Government (responsible for the government's communication)
launched an inquiry for offers for a survey meant to provide a
quantitative and qualitative review of the manner in which the
media - such as news websites and the blogs of some journalists -
handles governmental news, using a list of 15 items and including
The Cognitive War, Security Culture and Risk Perception 99
approximately 50 websites. The estimated budget is between
20,000 and 130,000 euros.
At the same time, the French Ministry of National Education
launched a project for the analysis of the Internet opinion climate
in 2008.The objectives of the Ministry are the following21 :
• to identity strategic issues (permanent, predictable or emerging);
• to identify and analyze strategic or opinion-shaping sources;
• to pinpoint opinion leaders, alert initiators, and to analyze
their potential influence and capacity to associate in a network;
• to decrypt debate sources and their manner of propagation;
• to pinpoint significant information;
• to monitor significant information over time;
• to reveal quantitative measures (volume of contributions,
number of comments, number of viewers);
• to understand and interpret this information;
• to anticipate and evaluate contagion and crisis risks;
• to alert and take measures accordingly.
According to Eric Alata, the author of a doctoral thesis on
electronic piracy22 , there is a 3 minute interval between the
moment a computer is connected to the Internet for the first time
and until it is subject to the first attempted connection by another
person or another computer.
Futurologist Alvin Toffier referred to the impact of informa-
tion on our civilization as "the third wave", the first one being the
agricultural revolution, and the second one the technological revo-
lution. The idea of information warfare was expressed by Thomas
Rona 23 as far back as 1976. Although this issue is extensively
approached in the American literature, there is no consensus on
'21 Callier de clauses particulieres (no.2008/ 57)
The thesis for obtaining the doctoral degree in information systems at the Uni-
'l'l.
versity of Toulouse (The National Institute for Applied Sciences in Toulouse),
Eric Alata, December 7, 2007: Obsematinn, caractbisation et modelisation de processus
d'attaques sur lntemeL
'23 T.Rona, Weapons Systems and Iriformation Wa!fore, Boeing Aerospace Co., Se-
attle, 1976.
100 A MIND WAR
the definition of this term. One of them, formulated by the
Defense Department and the US Joint Staff is the following: "an
action taken in order to interfere with enemy information, treat-
ment of information, IT systems and computer networks so as to
ensure our superiority in terms of information, at the same time
protecting our information, treatment of information, IT systems
and computer networks."
The Military Science Publishing House offers a more concise
definition: "in a larger sense, information warfare includes actions
which use information in order to meet national objectives."
The centralization of information is indispensable, but not suf-
ficient to make good use of them. The unproductive accumula-
tion of data is not enough; we should know at all times what type
of information we possess. The French intelligence services, espe-
cially the Directorate of Territorial Surveillance (DST), integrated
in the Central Directorate of Internal Intelligence (DCRI), duly
took into account this requirement. Thus, in 1946, DST acquired
a specialized documentation and processing system, designed to
receive open or confidential documents from allied intelligence or
security services, as well as intelligence obtained from technical
or human sources. At the same time, it verified information, leading
to additional investigations. 24
In 2005, a note from the General Secretariat for National
Defense, a service subordinated to the Prime Minister which
includes the Central Directorate for Information System Security,
advised the members of ministerial cabinets and the representa-
tives of important French industrial groups against using the
Blackberry instant messaging marketed by the Canadian company
RIM (Research in Motion), arguing that the data flow passing
through the servers could be monitored by the United States.
After several years and a media scandal, the use of Blackberries
~ 4 Michel Auboin, Arnaud and Jean Tulard, Hist,oire et dictiormaire de fa police,
Robert Laffont, 2005.
The Cognitive War, Security Culture and Risk Perception 101
by the collaborators of the French president was prohibited in
December 2008.
In 2005, the research and development expenditure for defense
amounted to approximately 35 billion euros: 19 billion euros from
private companies, 14 billion from civil administrations and 2.5
billion from the Defense administration. Given the need for stra-
tegic choices, the French Defense Ministry has selected several
research domains which have received a priority status since 2007:
supervising the soil and gathering information in a strategic and
non-intrusive manner (e.g. using acoustic sensors), networking
various weapon systems, devising air fight systems, improving
nuclear attack protection systems, as well as preparing airspace
programs for a potential European airspace defense policy.
It is important to be technologically more advanced than your
opponent, but it is not recommended to communicate too much
on this issue, and this dilemma is of concern to those responsible
for a country's security. A balance must exist between informing
the public about the risks it is exposed to and justifying the public
funds allocated in this domain.
In 2002, the U.S. Congress established a committee responsible
for monitoring the efforts devoted to cyberspace security by the
National Research Council. Five years later this endeavor materi-
alized in a vast report, titled Toward a Safer and More Secure Cyberspace.
In this document, the risks are classified as follows 25 :
• a potential large scale disaster caused by an IT aggression;
• a lack of productive investments, a company's resources
being devoted primarily to ensuring the security of IT and com-
munications systems;
• the development of cybercrime which, in case it becomes
significant and determines excessive damage, could raise doubts
about the benefits of the information society.
The White Paper on Defense and National Security drawn up
in France in 2008 aims at defining the policies which could ensure
~~> In N.Arpagian, Cyberspace, Vuibert, Paris, 2009, p.l3 7
 102 A MIND WAR
the country's security and the protection of its interests over the
next 15 years26• The authors of the report identified several tech-
nological breakthroughs foreseen for 2020-2030 (although the
predictions are ambitious and artificial), such as: robotics and the
development of cognitive systems, the development of new func-
tional materials, new active detection technologies, guided energy
transmitters, cellular therapy through nanotechnology, quantum
IT, new information processing techniques, etc.
Who has control over the Internet?
The Internet has its origin in the American soldiers' need for a
less vulnerable way of communication in the case of a nuclear
attack. In 1989, the researchers from The European Center for
Nuclear Research (CERN) created the World Wide Web, which
would then be used by millions of Internauts. In 1998, ICANN
(the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers), a
non-profit making organization functioning under the aegis of the
U.S. Trade Department, located in Los Angeles, became respon-
sible for managing this network.
ICANN manages domain names (DNS) and ensures the users'
connection to the websites whose coordinates they have accessed .
ICANN manages thirteen root-servers that form the technological
architecture of the Internet: ten are located in California and
Washington, two in Europe (Sweden and UK) and one in japan.
It is thus obvious that the manager of Internet addresses has
access to any information and can restrict the users' access.
Allegations about ICANN being controlled by the American
government are rejected by its representatives, and the president
of the organization, D. Twomey, states that "The Department of
Commerce wants ICANN to be fully independent of any
governmen t"27 •
n~~· Downloadable on www.hvreblancdefenseetsecurite.gouv.fr.
. d'apres les domteesfoumies par le Droit Constitutiomteljrauf ais, Librairie de Ia Societe
ApudN.Arpagian, Cyberspace, Vuibert, Paris, 2009, p.152.
The Cognitive War, Security Culture and Risk Perception 103
In his novel 1984, George Orwell summarizes the importance
of memory as follows: "He who controls the past controls the
future, and he who controls the present controls the past". In a
society with high population densities, producing huge quantities
of information every day, the question arises as to what will hap-
pen with such information in the future. Archiving is probably one
answer, but it is more about building what will become the mate-
rial trace of a country's collective memory and will contribute to
its future cohesion.
In his paper A contribution to the general theory qf the state, published
in 1920, constitutional theorist Raymont Carre de Malberg
defines the state as a community of individuals established on a
territory of its own and having a certain organization, wherefrom
results a superior action, command and coercion power of the
group in relation to its members28 . In international law, the
Montevideo declaration made on December 26, 1933 established
the definition of the state as a system made up of three elements:
a power of coercion exerted on a population living on a certain ter-
ritory. What is left of this definition when this territory extends glob-
ally, and the population is potentially the entire world population?
Although the Internet has a global nature, the legislation that
has been applied so far is national or even regional-specific in a
structure like the European Union.
IT security policies
In 1986, a commission and an interministerial delegation for
the security of the intelligence services were simultaneously set up
in France. In addition, there is a central service of information
system security. This administrative proliferation was criticized
twenty years later by Deputy Pierre Lasbordes in a report submit-
ted to Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin in 2006: "The
~u Raymont Carre de Mal berg, Contribution aIa theorie ghterale de l'Eta~ specialement
du Recueil Sirey, Paris, 1920. Available on www.openlibrary.org.
104 A Ml:-\D Wt.R
multiplication of public actors (Ministry of Interior, Ministry of
Economy, General Secretariat for National Defense - SGDN,
Central Directorate for Information System Security - DCSSI)
with overlapping roles and less precise founding documents cre-
ates a general impression of confusion and dispersion of human
and material resources. In this chaos, the main public actor,
SGDN, and more precisely DCSSI, is affected by a lack of autho-
rity and sometimes credibility in front of the targeted public.
These two factors [ ...] have a negative impact on the effective-
ness of the state in defining and implementing the information
system security".
In France there are numerous organizations responsible for the
security of information systems, and this surely does not add to
their effectiveness.
In the United States it appears that the same volume of
resources is used for creating new control bodies as it is for carry-
ing out actual cybersecurity operations. Every year we witness the
establishment of a new entity of this type.
A few months after the completion of his second term, on
January 8, 2008, George W Bush signed the Presidential National
Securiry Directive no.54. The detailed document has not been made
public, but former minister Roger Romani obtained some infor-
mation regarding its contents29 :
• increasing the power of the Government Surveillance and
Alarm Center, whose responsibility is to protect American infra-
structures on the Internet;
• extending the Einstein program to the entire administration
and the federal agencies; managed by NSA, it is designed "to per-
form surveillance so as to detect any suspicious network activity";
• reducing the number of Internet access points in administra-
tion networks from two thousand to fifty, so as to facilitate security
and surveillance activities;
~!l N.Arpagian, Cyberspace, Vuibert, Paris, 2009, pp. 204-205.
The Cognitive War, Security Culture and Risk Perception 105
• establishing the National Cyber Security Center, by grouping
the different IT security services under the aegis of the Homeland
Security Department;
• extending the National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force
within the FBI; increasing the number of personnel by approxi-
mately 200;
• strengthening the devices that allow the control and purchase
of IT and electronic communication equipment imported in the
United States.
In February 2006, the Homeland Security Department
launched the Cyberstorm operation, a simulation exercise involving
a hundred public and private institutions, as well as tens of com-
panies, in order to observe how they react and cooperate in the
case of massive IT attacks designed to disrupt critical infrastruc-
tures: power supply and distribution, transportation, telecommu-
nications, etc. In 2006, a summary of the findings of this exercise
was published, the main conclusions being the following3°:
• the need for a better coordination between federal agencies,
especially in terms of procedures; the manner of decision making
in companies and within the government should be clearer, so that
their stakes be more precisely identified;
• every time intervention rules have been clearly defined in
advance, public and private actors could cooperate in a prompt
and efficient manner; this does not refer only to cyber-crises, but
it is more necessary in their case given the instantaneous circula-
tion of information over the Internet;
• the number of incidents between the IT structures of the
public and private sectors has increased, and this complicates a
harmonized response in the event of an IT attack;
• training sessions for participants should be organized in the
future;
30 N.Arpagian Cyberspace, Vuibert, Paris, 2009, pp. 209-210.
 106 AMii\'DWAR
• the more numerous the attacks, the more difficult it was to
have a coordinated and uniform response; this situation requires
more intense information exchanges between participants;
• it became obvious that it would be necessary to establish a
common pool for the exchange of information between various
entities, so that each of them has the same data, at the same time;
it is a prerequisite for the effectiveness of a tool grouping different
players, spread over large areas;
• communication with the public should not be underestimated
in the event of such a crisis; the message should be clear, coherent
and constructive;
• it is imperative that the available procedures, instruments and
technologies are improved, following an analysis of the manner in
which they have been used during the crisis.
This exercise was repeated in March 2008, five countries
taking part in Cyberstorm II: Australia, Canada, the United
States, New Zealand and the United Kingdom. The purpose was
to enact the findings of the previous exercise. The attacks were
carried out through multiple channels: websites, e-mail, telepho~e,
etc. This exercise may seem pointless to security experts, who
could argue that each crisis is unique and it is impossible to pre-
pare yourself and plan your actions for a crisis which is by defini-
tion unpredictable. Nevertheless, one cannot deny that these
exercises may reveal certain flaws or communication problems.
In December 1997, the G8 Interior and Justice ministers issued
a list of ten principles and an action plan in response to cyber-
netic threats. The principles are the following3':
• there will be no clemency for those who commit IT frauds;
• the inquiries conducted in respect of international high tech
crimes should be coordinated between all the countries concerned
irrespective of location and the damage caused by them; ' • to make sure that the legislation in each country effectively
• police officers should be trained and equipped to confront
high tech crimes;
:ll N.Arpagian Cyberspace, Vuibert, Paris, 2009, pp. 221-222.
The Cognitive War, Security Culture and Risk Perception 107
• the legislation should protect the confidentiality, integrity and
availability of data and systems against any unauthorized altera-
tion and guarantee that any serious abuse shall be punished;
• the legislation should authorize safeguarding and rapid access
to electronic data, which are often essential for the success of
an mqwry;
• mutual assistance regulations should guarantee the duly col-
lection and exchange of evidence for inquiries related to interna-
tional high tech crimes;
• the access of police forces to public electronic data should not
require an authorization from the state possessing such data;
• thorough computer analysis norms meant to ensure the
retrieval and authentication of electronic data during inquiries
should be improved;
• to the extent possible, IT and telecommunication systems
should be designed so as to facilitate the prevention and detection
of Internet frauds; at the same time, they should facilitate the trac-
ing of criminals and the collection of evidence;
• activities in this field should be coordinated with those of
other relevant international bodies in order to prevent useless dis-
persion and double efforts.
The action plan developed on this occasion includes the fol-
lowing items 32 :
• to use different national specialized services for ensuring a
quick and effective intervention in response to transnational high
tech attacks and establish a 24/7 contact point;
• to take the necessary steps to make sure that every country
has sufficient qualified personnel and IT equipment to success-
fully achieve the mission of fighting cyber crime and to improve
the cooperation with security services of other countries;
sanctions cyber crimes and facilitates the inquiries related to
IT&C systems;
:~'.! N.Arpagian Cyberspace, Vuibert, Paris, 2009, pp. 222-223.
108 AMI~D WAR
• to ensure that cyber crimes are systematically taken into con-
sideration in drawing up interstate conventions and agreements;
• to set the legal terms applicable to the preservation of digital
evidence prior to the initiation of interstate cooperation proce-
dures, the manner of carrying out cross-border inquiries and data
tracking investigations;
• to multiply and facilitate accelerated procedures for the
collection of data regarding communication exchanges from
telecom operators or Internet providers, especially from those
located abroad;
• to strengthen the cooperation with the IT industry in order
to facilitate the efforts of state services in fighting cyber crime, for
example in respect of gathering evidence;
• to commit to respond in every possible manner to requests
received from foreign intelligence services in case of an emergency;
• to encourage the formulation of an international set of com-
mon technical norms which should ensure the provision of feasi-
ble and secure IT systems to citizens and to the private sector;
• to make sure that security services use standardized techno-
logical solutions for the research and retrieval of data within their
inquiries, and subsequently in the judicial stage; the same is valid
for the authentication of elements thus collected.
4. The culture of security against a background of new
threats and risks. The case of Romania
The need for a reform of the secret services is a subject of
debate especially on the political scene, and I do not think this
is a new topic either in our country or in the contemporary world
in general. The reform of the Romanian Intelligence Service is
already an accomplished fact, an evident achievement already
perceived by the public and having clear consequences on the
public image of this institution and on the trust people place in it.
Only the reason behind this debate may be new in our case: the
The Cognitive War, Security Culture and Risk Perception 109
actors on the political scene want to become exclusive supervisors and benificiaries
rif the results rif the intelligence activiry. Politicians aim at politically or
at least institutionally subordinating them, but a relationship
of subordination that they could exploit as a competitive advan-
tage. This may be also the explanation for the multiplication of
this type of institutions in our society to a number of five or even
six secret services, according to the speculations in the Romanian
press. The National Intelligence Community strives to get truly
established, but it is hindered by the fight over the external or civil
control of the intelligence services. The establishment of the
National Intelligence Community as an entity designed to unita-
rily coordinate the activities carried out by intelligence-operation-
al structures and to assess in an integrated manner the intelligence
they collect in relation to the national security of Romania caused
quite a big political scandal. Although meant to increase the effi-
ciency of the intelligence services, to rule out parallelisms and
overlaps, CNI has been criticized from the very beginning for
having no legal grounds, for representing a "CSAT in miniature"
or an instrum~nt of political control which obstructs the parlia-
mentary or civic oversight of the secret services.
A national security strategy adapted to the 21st century and its
specific threats is still imperceptible. Beyond the political fights
and the motivations of certain legitimate or illegitimate interest
groups, the reform of the secret services involves many areas and
is not limited to mere organizational changes. In recent years, the
Romanian Intelligence Service has initiated this fundamental
change, including open debates with civil society experts, which is
a proof of the fact that we are witnessing an intelligent change of the
way things function in intelligence.
But the internal efforts of the intelligence agencies are not suf-
ficient; in order to work out a coherent national security strategy
and complete the reform of the Romanian intelligence services, it
is necessary to hold public debates, rational political debates, and
to have the support of the civil society.
110 A MIND WAR
4. The culture of secrecy and the rational definition of
the concealed side
First of all, I think that a coherent strategy should necessarily
include considerations on the definition of secrecy in our society.
This is an important issue for us, as the Romanian society
wavers between a culture of excessive secrecy and a rush
to rob the state of any secret, induced especially by some
players within the civil society. When we initiated the Law
regarding the.free access to iriformation we took into account the need to
make it a liberal, but not excessive law, in line with the necessity
of having a rational classification of certain types of information.
There are no societies without secrets, because, at least in princi-
ple, there are no suicidal societies.
But the definition of secrecy in a society is a mamffacturing issue,
as the Americans use to say; it should be the result of a social
consensus, of a negotiation. We talk about transparency and, of
course, the secret services are taking now such steps: they try to
open up, but on a closer look at the administrative documents we
notice that transparency is accompanied by an increased number
'
of classified documents across Europe. In contemporary societies
there are millions of classified documents and this means that in
' have a security culture, it is a society where rumors as a substitute
our society too, the form and not the content is starting to prevail
as far as the policy of actual transparency is concerned. We read
documents written in formal terms, where the form is prevailing.
When the head of a secret service is on TV, he is congratulated at
the end if he succeeded in saying nothing, but gave an elegant
performance. It is a sort of competition of simulated openness
and encryption. On the other hand, journalists are not wise
enough to understand that some things are classified by law and
any insistence on them can only obstruct the communication with
somebody who works in this field.
It is important to hold a serious public debate on the need to
classify certain information, as a substantial part of the culture of
transparency. People can understand the need for a system of
The Cognitive War, Security Culture and Risk Perception 111
classified information if the intelligence services provide them
with examples, with a persuasion program customized to various
groups of the population, depending on their culture, experience,
values.
The public will be in a position to understand quite easily that,
beyond the need for transparency, there is no society without
secrets. However, the difference between them is generated by the
complexity reached by developed societies and the refinement of
their intelligence services: some ensure the secrecy l!J def!Jing access, while
the powerfUl ones ensure the secrecy in.front of the public eye, l!J wqy of trans-
parency and iriformation bombardment.
The secrecy arises from the political or strategic power that it
offers to a state, the scarcity of (mainly economic or technical)
intelligence and the protection it ensures to its owner. It does not
concern only the past, as it is frequently considered (someboqy did
something); it usually concerns the future (projects, treaties, con-
spiracies) or even a developing present (inventions, patents, techni-
cal or economic solutions).
An incoherent and ambiguous security culture
A country which has recently escaped communism does not
for information flourish, and the perception of risks is accompa-
nied by extreme emotional responses, which create collective
panic or, on the contrary, apathy.
The culture of security does not come into existence by
itself, but it is the result of a monitored and guided process.
What is the culture of security? How is it developed? These
questions should be answered, and the answer should be turned
into action plans and strategies. All intelligence services offer
various forms of training. Romania has made a good start in
this respect, by way of the new status received by the National
Intelligence College and the education reform within the
National Intelligence Academy.
 112 A MIND WAR The Cognitive War, Security Culture and Risk Perception 113

In Romania, national risk barometers are quasi-non-existent, In Romania, which of the following issues are the first
opinion polls are not conducted and the public is not informed three that concern you the most?33
in this respect. If we analyzed the risks perceived by the public
according to specialized barometers as against those assessed in First mention Second mention Third mention
regular opinion polls, we would understand how far we are from Unemployment 33% 8% 4%
a culture of risk perception management. Our opinion polls use
Financial hards)1ip 8%
some rather formal grids - the fear of war, of illness and of a region- and social exclusion
21% 13%
al coriflict- which are frequently irrelevant in terms of individual Insecurity 18% 20% 9%
activity. There is also an important aspect regarding the inter- 5% 8% 4%
Terrorism
pretation of the public agenda. The skillfulness of those who ll%
Environmental damage 6% 14%
conduct analyses is to search for and identify tendencies that are
AIDS 1% 3% 4%
small, but with an important development potential. It is well known that
Climate change 4% 9% 8%
a 30%, 20% or l 0% tendency, which has reached the top, is
already a dead tendency, as the decline will be the next stage of Effects of globalization 1% 6% 7%
its cycle. The great skill is to detect tendencies of 2%, l %, 3%, Toxicomania (alcohol, 1% 5% 14%
drugs, etc)
and to understand which of these small waves will become the
big wave. Nuclear risks 1% 4%
Car accidents 7% 6% 13%
We have recently conducted several risk perception barome-
ters, and their results represent a good diagnostic for certain com- Food risks 1% 3% 9%
ponents of our security culture. Our security is affected by Chemical risks 2%
certain adverse effects of the lack of information and of I do not know 1% 1% 1%
a chaotic transition. The risks perceived by the society are I do not respond 1% 2%
influenced by several elements of social insecurity which blur the
m<Uor risks system, like a hyper-personalized definition of This perception affects confidence in the main bodies of the
the situation. For example, unemployment, financial hardship, Romanian state. Setting aside the political institutions, the general
poverty and insecurity, due to their personal relevance, conceal confidence in the Romanian state and in its capacity to act for the
the potential risks of terrorism, toxicomania, different epidemics insurance of individual and collective security is strongly ques-
or chemical risks. tioned. Almost 60% of Romanian citizens do not trust the main
public policies that are implemented by the public authorities,
although recently, in some fields, the Romanian state has a
remarkable activity compared to European practices.

:rl International Brand Consultants (IBC) survey, November 2008, national sample
114 AMtl"DWAR The Cognitive War, Security Culture and Risk Perception 115

Do you trust Romanian authorities with respect to their Do you trust Romanian authorities with respect to their
actions meant to protect citizens in the following fields?34 actions meant to protect citizens in the following fields? 35

NO YES NO YES
Teenage smoking 55% 36% Chemical installations 53% 31%
Drugs 55% 35% Floods 60% 29%
Air pollution 57% 31% Professional diseases 55% 30%
Alcoholism 59% 30% Nuclear plants 50% 33%
AIDS 48% 41% Shipping dangerous material 52% 33%
Teenage obesity 53% 35% Domestic accidents 54% 31%
Lake, river and sea pollution 58% 31% Genetically modified organisms 57% 27%
Traffic accidents 52% 38% Domestic waste incinerators 57% 28%
Pesticides 57% 31% Mobile phone network antennas 52% 33%
Chemical waste 58% 27% Food products 55% 34%
Radioactive waste 56% 29% Avian flue 53% 33%
Terrorism 49% 38% Plane accidents 53% 33%
Forrest fires 55% 33% Medical X-rays 49% 36%

No wonder then, that in the case of certain topics of discussion
that turn into media frays, there is always the inertia of a negative
perception. If we take a look at the uniform perception, at the fact
that citizens have a similar approach to topics that differ in sub-
stance or proximity to them, we realize that in fact risk perception
is strongly influenced by a generally negative perception within
the security culture and by the inconsistencies of the social repre-
sentation by public institutions.
Starting from the negative evaluation that is not influenced by
a so-called statistics incidence of risks, people estimate that the
truth regarding the management of major risks is being hidden
from them. Here, however, the perception seems to bear a more
realistic impact from the danger perceived. Nonetheless, fields
such as pollution, industrial accidents, nuclear waste are perceived
strongly enough as fields where the authorities do not tell the truth
to their citizens.

:H International Brand Consultants (IBC) Opinion Poll, November 2008, on a :n International Brand Consultants (IBC) Opinion Poll, November 2008, on a
segment of national population. segment of national population.
 116 AMI:-:DWAR The Cognitive War, Security Culture and Risk Perception 117

For each of the following fields, do you estimate that For each of the following fields, do you estimate
the truth is being told regarding the risks posed to the that the truth is being told regarding risks posed to the
population? 36 population?37

NO YES NO YES
Teenage smoking 30% 60% Chemical installations 45% 40%
Drugs 34% 57% Floods 42% 46%
Air pollution 37% 52% Professional diseases 50% 34%
Alcoholism 31% 57% Nuclear plants 47% 37%
AIDS 34% 56% Shipping dangerous material 46% 37%
Teenage obesity 35% 52% Domestic accidents 44% 41%
Lake, river and sea pollution 45% 44% Genetically modified organisms 50% 34%
Traffic accidents 35% 54% Domestic waste incinerators 49% 34%
Pesticides 47% 38% Mobile phone network antennas 43% 43%
Chemical waste 51% 34%
Food products 41% 46%
Radioactive waste 50% 34%
Avian flue 43% 45%
Plane accidents 39% 45%

Public suspicion as to the hiding of truth also covers social fields Medical X-rays 42% 43%
such as professional diseases, genetically modified organisms, incin-
eration of domestic waste or the shipping of dangerous material. However, the strong perception of some major risks induces to
the population a series of unjustified fears regarding location
options. The unanimous rejection of neighboring potential risk
areas correctly describes the real paranoia that people go through.
On the one hand, people live in the area of certain antennas for
mobile networks in towns, in seismic risk areas (Vrancea, for
instance), in the area of nuclear plants (Cernavoda), airports or
domestic waste incine~ators. But on the other hand, if they are
asked as to the acceptance of this situation, they strongly reject it.
It is clear that sometimes, due to lack of information concerning
the real risk potential, people are unsatisfied and their dissatisfac-

International Brand Consultants (IBC) Opinion Poll, November 2008, on a 7

:lli :l International Brand Consultants (IBC) Opinion Poll, November 2008, on a
segment of national population. segment of national population.
118 A MIND WAR The Cognitive War, Security Culture and Risk Perception 119

tion translates also into a loss of trust in the state authorities or From the different industrial or technological activi-
even in the Romanian state in general. ties listed below which are those that in your opinion
pose the risk of triggering a serious accident or a disaster
in Romania?39
Would you accept living near:3 8
CANNOT I CAN
trigger a serious accident
NO YES
Nuclear plant 50% 50%
A mobile communication 65% 25%
Nuclear waste storage areas 52% 48%
network antenna
Chemical installations 70% 30%
High voltage lines 74% 18%
Shipping of dangerous material 66% 34%
A nuclear research center 82% 8%
Oil refineries 70% 30%
A nuclear plant 81% 8%
Natural gas distribution 75% 25%
A seismic area 86% 4%
A domestic waste incinerator 86% 3% Biology research laboratories 75% 25%
An airport 73°/o 17% Fireworks factories and warehouses 80% 20%
An area vulnerable to floods 86% 3% Dams 82% 18%
An important chemical installation 83% 6% Road transport 90% 10%
An area where domestic waste 87% 3% Air transport 91% 9%
is disposed of Military installations 93% 7%
An area where radioactive waste 87% 2% Railway transport 97% 3%
is being stored
An area where chemical waste 87% 2%
is being stored A society without enemies?
After 1990, the Romanian society became a naive society, a
We currently have in Romania an uncertain and ambiguous sort of society without enemies, a nation that has only friends
security culture, marked by information gaps, unjustified fears everywhere, in all public discourse. Following the dissolution of
or apathy. the Cold War polarity, a society without any enemies is in itself a
vulnerable society. It has a vulnerable structure, as well as a vul-
nerable culture.

:111 International Brand Consultants (IBC) Opinion Poll, November 2008, on a :{!I International Brand Consultants (IBC) Opinion Poll, November 2008, on a
segment of national population. segment of national population.
120 AMINDW,\R
Formerly, one used to say that the enemy was the capitalism or
NATO. However, we knew the Russians were the enemy, others
knew about the Hungarians and their millenary dream. Students
from the National Defense College ask me: Who is our enemy? Who
poses the main threat? It is very difficult to answer because within the
public discourse, we do not have an official definition. The enemy
has to be defined from the social and cultural perspectives. The
definition should not necessarily refer to an absolute polarity - the
axis of evil - but we should give a definition. Or else, are we a
paradise-like society that evolves towards the best of possible
worlds? We could say that, but we shall see it doesn't work.
It is difficult to set up a strategy for promoting a public con-
science of risk perception .a nd collective mobilization, without first
defining the enemy.
New threats: the cognitive war
A security strategy and the reform of the intelligence system
cannot ignore the peculiarities of the new threats.
The cognitive war means the use of knowledge and informa-
tion processing capacities for conflictual purposes. The transfer of
myths and models among cultures can trouble the public opinion
and can lead to a change in values. Using the ideology of the
state that is a poor manager was a leading idea of the neo-liber-
al discourse during the transition period in Central and Eastern
Europe. What should the average Romanian citizen - who
believed what the transition professors told him - think now when
he sees that the state is the solution to save the world from
crisis? Romanian banks are privatized, but state owned banks from abroad
interflre, Romtelecom is no longer a Romanian state owned company, but it is
bought by OTE, a Greek state owned compa'!Y.
With respect to threats, the cognitive war, the use of knowledge
capacities and information processing capacities for conflictual
purposes, such as the transfer of myths and models among
cultures, this is something more complex than it may seem at first
sight. The way in which different cultures view poverty and
The Cognitive War, Security Culture and Risk Perception 121
wealth: the wealthy shall never reach the Kingdom of Heaven,
perhaps only then when pigs might fly, as the Christian belief says.
The Eastern region also has this definition of wealth. On the
other hand, the Protestant logic is different: it encourages you to
accumulate, because you can be the chosen one; you do not know
who is the chosen one, but your duty is to multiply that which has
been given to you by God. And what does this give in our case?
Take a look at our opinion polls, 80% of the population state that
those who accumulate wealth in one way or another have done it
illicitly, due to luck or through corruption.
The disappearance of the common sense of the war
In our societies, which are more and more frequently defined
as pluralist, we notice the disappearance of the common sense of
the war. During the Cold War, we had the war of all for the
defense of the cvuntry, but now there is a public debate, which
often includes contradictory arguments, with respect to the par-
ticipation of the Romanian military in Iraq and Afghanistan. Is it
our war? citizens ask. Those who die there are they not just mer-
cenaries? Why do we burry them with military honors? The
public opinion still cannot understand that under the new
geo-strategic conditions, security is a collective affair, and that
the country is not to be defended only at its physical, geographi-
cal borders.
The political legitimacy of certain military actions is not yet
unanimously acknowledged, as long as the Gulf War and the
aerial operations against Yugoslavia had no UN mandate. And I
do not think we are yet ready for a public debate on the role of
the army as to the ever widening range of major risks. The parade
is just military, but the risks are new: terrorism, environment risks,
health risks, poverty. And to all these, we add today the organiza-
tion crisis of classical armies: the end of the classical contact war
and the rise of the remote war.
Thus there are several conflicts regarding the direction among
participants to the conflict, among the western nations who inter-
122 AMI~DWAR
fered in different countries and the latter, among international
organizations in order to justify their role. Opinion leaders and
public factions fight within groups and communities.
Open source attack
The perception of social reality is a construct of the media
pressure. Our image of many institutions, processes, social phe-
nomena is mediated, is indirectly formed, it is not the result of
direct contact. Let us take the example of the corruption percep-
tion index, which is the combined result of the media bombard-
ment and of direct perception. The corruption perception index
is generally used as an aggression instrument against societies. I,
for one, as a member of the government, I had the opportunity to
propose that the government grant money for a thorough research
led by international organizations on the National lntegriry System.
No one was interested by the fact that the government could give
money because more objective figures had come up. The corrup-
tion perception index would not have worked. The corruption
perception index is amplified through open sources. And the open
source attack is currently the most important threat.
Within the reform process of the secret services, there
is an important dilemma for modern states: either we
invest in intellectual capitalization, within the diversity
of mobilizable cognitive systems (difficult to justify these
budgetary orientations), or we invest in interception and
control capacities of infrastructures, taking the risk of
major operational failures.
If we choose the first option, then we, as a nation, we shall be
able to manage diverse cognitive systems, and in the case of such
a conflict to manage decentralized and diverse patterns. I mean to
say that we do not think as during the Cold War, along a pattern
according to which the behavior and reactions are predictable, i.e.
along a well known cultural pattern. Nowadays, individuals use
several interpretation systems depending in interaction situations.
The Cognitive War, Security Culture and Risk Perception 123
The individual is no longer the slave of an ideological corpus. He
can make up his own strange, ever meant to be studied, puzzle.
This is why, maybe, the form of the conflict in this cognitive
war is important, and it has largely been debated in recent years.
Now, the most important shall be the following: we have an indi-
vidual who reacts depending on the situation: a sort of chamele-
onic identity with values specific to certain contexts. People are no
longer that homogeneous as the marketing or opinion polls studies
define them, they can no longer be reduced to a simple cultural
model. Those who study life styles realize that there are no longer
three or five cultural categories. Instead we have very many types
of personality, multi-shaped personalities, just as the virus that
changes its shape very often.
Furthermore, we do not have a European security doctrine in
this society without enemies. Thus it is difficult for us to integrate
economic competition, the economic war within the contempo-
rary thinking system. We know that we have allies in NATO, we
have partners within the European Union, but economic competi-
tion is the same.
The lack of expert institutions and think-tanks
I think that our society is seriously underdeveloped from this
perspective because it does not have too many mechanisms that
can offer external expertise. I studied public knowledge for the
Uninominal vote Law- among members of the Parliament who
voted it- and I was amazed to find out that just one or two people
who worked on the law know all the consequences: the way a
deputy is elected, through all filters. This is what happens with
most of the documents: the most visible and the most important
for society are those that no one knows.
We need groups of reflection and influence. These cannot be
developed unless there are budgets and unless they are encour-
aged by the state institutions. A think-tank network cannot be
developed without media visibility, without logistics, without
publishing powers, and especially without orders from the
124 A MIND Wi\R
administration, from the industry, and even from the government.
A revealing example that no longer needs additional analysis:
Alvin Toffier, we all know, has written interesting things. But few
of us know that he has been an employee of Rand Corporation.
The economic vulnerability of Romania is generated
by the lack of economic intelligence
Along the years I worked as a communication consultant for
larger or smaller enterprises. At this moment, if we take a look at
our banks, we see that although the financial crisis started in
February 2007, banks in Romania have no war room, they are not
prepared to face a crisis situation, a crisis communication. There
is no organization deficiency, in my opinion; it is all due to a lack
of economic security culture. The economic security culture sup-
poses the existence of a national strategy for the protection of
information or of the intellectual and technical heritage, but also
the capacity to influence certain components depending on the
desired ethos, whether we refer to the way in which a state orga-
nizes the circulation of Hollywood films or to the way in which a
state places its representatives within international organizations.
We generally ignore the need for influence in the field of eco-
nomic relations; we do little to engender the political and diplo-
matic state action for the prosperity of the nation, by helping
enterprises conquer a market or by discouraging competitors.
Within an economic intelligence strategy, we are interested in
changing the nature of perception of the economic activity and
of Romania's potential, because the international competition is
decided not only on economic evaluation criteria.
The lack of strategies for increasing the social capa-
city to apply complex influence technologies that have
recently been developed by social sciences
Social sciences are ever more frequently applied in the field of
persuasion and influence by powerful states. Influence as a
concept is more difficult to grasp, it is a relation, without being a
The Cognitive War, Security Culture and Risk Perception 125
constraint or a contract, it is an asymmetric relation, the result of
an indirect strategy, when intentional. Influence cannot be reduced
to a unique model, and it can take several shapes: individual and
collective, visible and invisible, negative and positive, conscious or
unconscious. It is an indirect act exercised by the means of signs.
It does not create an immediate cause- effect type of relationship.
It does not suppose a content transfer; it pertains to the unpredict-
ability of reception. During the Clinton Administration, the sift
power concept was developed Qoseph S. Nye). This concept
described the capacity to persuade others to do what we want, without
sticks and carrots, the capacity to seduce: to make friends and legitimacy .for
American actions.
New risks generated by the meaning and image wars
The information societies are irifluenced and liable to irifluence. The glo-
balization of markets impacts upon the globalization of opinions
and there are new major risks. We speak about three new types of
risks generated by new realities:
Risks to the security of information systems. Paradoxically, within the
information society, the more extensive and the more powerful
networks are, the more vulnerable they are.
Image related risks: the more political or economic organizations
rely on seduction, and the more they become powerful influence
agents, proselytize and induce emotion, the more vulnerable they
are to be "damned" and to have their image tarnished.
Cognitive risk: the more means of gaining knowledge we have,
the less we know. The more open sources we have and the more
scientific data we have, the more difficult it is for us to counter
disinformation.
General strategic intelligence of our society
Finally, I think that the general strategic intelligence of a society
is measured also according to its possibility to manage and elimi-
nate major political management errors. These mistakes pertain
not only to decision, they are not only decisions generated by the
126 A MIND WAR

lack of quality information, and they pertain to the competition

among influence factors within a society. For instance: prejudicing
the fundamentals of social cohesion within a socie!J. In recent years, the
fight among trade unions or the political and electoral fight
opposed social categories against each others, affecting the social
tissue of cohesion and solidarity. This kind of political misman-
agement must be eliminated by generalizing a new strategic think- The Transformation of y.......,..n: ___ -- co -
ing applied to our capacity to administer society, an intelligence Management and
capacity that is indispensable to social management. a Revolution of

"It was the best of times, it ·

It was the age of wisdom, it
It was the epoch of belief, it
It was the,.season of Light, it
It was the spring op hope, it
We had everything before us
c~

I. Transformation versus F
Change within the Contempora
In her study "Towards a Revolution in Intelligence Affairs" 1,
Deborah Barger, emphasized that reform in the field of intelli-
gence was facing systemic failures, b~cause in most cases, it was
directed towards fixing only the past mistakes or errors. This
helped the intelligence agencies to better prepare for well-known
circumstances and issues, but didn't ensure a new approach to the
challenges raised by an ever-changing security environment. To
counterbalance the essentially restrictive character of such reforms,
the transformation of an organization has to look towards future
opportunities in order to analyze what is going to happen, not
1 Deborah Barger, Towards a RetJo/ution in lntelligmce Affairs, Technical Report, RAND
Corporation, 2005, p. 7, www.rand.org.